No. the statement to be given by the witness will not be admissible in court.

In the given case at bar, the testimony to be given by the witness summoned by the prosecution comes from a third party. It is stated in the case that the witness called by the prosecution will testify that the victim, wife of the accused, had said to a nurse My husband (the accused) has poisoned me. The nature of the statement that is to be given by the witness comes from a third person a knowledge not being from her own and not derived from her own perception and as such it is embraced within the definition of hearsay. aa 1. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. --- People v. Mongaya, 17139-R, April 29, 1959. What is and what is not hearsay is not as simple a matter to determine. Hearsay surely cannot be defined as what another person said. If x and y enter into an oral contract in the presence and hearing of W, his testimony as to what X and Y said to cannot be excluded as hearsay. These statement means constitute the contract and when W testifies to them he is giving direct evidence upon the subject of inquiry. If w told another person what he had heard X and Y say to each other, that persons statement of what W said would be hearsay if offered to prove the contract. --- Tong v. Cadilo, 35288-R, May 23, 1973. Section 36 Rule 130 Rules of Court: Testimonial Knowledge Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded -- A witness can only testify only to those facts that are of his personal knowledge, meaning, those that were derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30a) The rule, however, admits of exceptions, viz: 1. Dying declaration - made by one under the consciousness of an impending death. 2. Declaration against interest 3. Declaration about pedigree 4. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree 5. Common reputation 6. Res gestae - statements made while startling occurence is taking place. 7. Entries made in the course of business. 8. Entries in Official Records 9. Commercial lists 10. Learned treatises 11. Depositions made in earlier proceedings Source(s): Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.[24] Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. [25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. [26]It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
[22] [23] [24] [25] [26]

Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracys Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220 -221. Id. 20 Am Jur 404. People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946). Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243.

Clearly, the information given by either Lumboy or Palos to PO3 Birung as to the identity of appellant is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. 21 Section 36 of Rule 130 22 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, PO3 Birung's testimony is even double or multiple hearsay, since it is based upon "third-hand" information related to the witness by someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single hearsay. Source: People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 124514 July 6, 2000) 21. Francisco, R., Basic Evidence, p. 212
22. Sec. 36 or Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

It is important to note the exact scope of the Rule. In Cullen v. Clarke [1963] I.R. 368, 378, the leading recent Irish case on the subject, Kingsmill Moore J. gave a full statement of its limitations: In view of some of the arguments addressed to the Court, it is necessary to emphasise that there is no general rule of evidence to the effect that a witness may not testify as to the words spoken by a person who is not produced as a witness. There is a general rule subject to many exceptions that evidence of the speaking of such words is inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts which they assert; .... This is the rule known as the rule against hearsay. If the fact that the words were spoken rather than their truth is what it is sought to prove, a statement is admissible.

On the other hand, there are certain exceptions on the rule with regards to the inadmissibility of a hearsay statement. Such exceptions are reflected in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court specifically in Sections 37 through 47. Despite of this, the statement that will be testified by the witness will still remain inadmissible because of the fact that the witness did not retrieve it directly from the person making such declaration but rather from the person whom the victim delivered her declaration to.
According to Rule 803 of Federal Rules of Evidence supra, is based upon the assumption
that a hearsay statement falling within one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that whether the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining admissibility. The instant rule proceeds upon a different theory:

hearsay which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a specified standard. The rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant. The exceptions evolved at common law with respect to declarations of unavailable declarants furnish the basis for the exceptions enumerated in the proposal.

In United States vs. Castellon et al. (12 Phil. Rep., 160), the following principle was laid down:
"1.Evidence; hearsay; dying declarations. Notwithstanding the fact that hearsay evidence is not admissible at a trial, the statements made by an individual who is seriously wounded, at a moment when he was dying, being convinced that there was no hope of recovery, constitute per se at least a grave, conclusive and decisive indication of the culpability of the persons designated by the dying man, inasmuch as it must be assumed that he, being in so precarious a condition, spoke truthfully, and that he was not induced by a desire to tell a lie and to injure an innocent person."

The testimony of a witness who swears he has heard the dying statements of a personseriously wounded, made while the latter was in real danger of death and without hope of recovery, even though hearsay evidence, is nevertheless admissible when such declaration refers to the immediate cause of his death or to any circumstance connected therewith.
Source: US v. Angel Montes (G.R. No. 3000 September 11, 1906)

The admission of the ante mortem statement of the deceased in a prosecution for homicide, relative to the circumstances attending the crime is based upon the necessity and is allowed in order to prevent a failure of justice. The rule admitting these statements constitutes an exception to two more general rules; namely, that which rejects hearsay evidence and that which secures to the accused person the right to meet the witness face to face. Being in derogation of these rules, the exception is not to be arbitrarily extended beyond the welldefined limits set by reason and authority. Source: US vs. Lucas Virrey G.R. No. L-12901. February 12, 1918

In conclusion, the basis of the inadmissibility of the witness testimony reflects from the provision provided in Section 36 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court which clearly states that a witness can only testify only to those facts that are of his personal
knowledge, meaning, those that were derived from his own perception. The courts have also made it clear that in certain special cases only are these inadmissibility granted exceptions. Although it is clear in the case given that the victim made such declaration/statement where her death was certain, the witness knowledge on the matter could not be admitted. Because such information was taken from the person who the victim made the declaration directly to making the testifying witness a third party.