G.R. No.

L-19100

December 27, 1963

FELICIANO Z. TIMBANCAYA, petitioner-appellee, vs. SEVERINO E. VICENTE, ET AL.,respondentsappellants. Provincial Fiscal of Palawan I. R. Pea and Teodoro Q. Pea for respondents-appellants. E. Z. Gacott, J.P. de los Reyes and R.R. Valencia for petitioner-appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, in its Civil Case No. 381 for mandamus, declaring the decision of the Municipal Council of Puerto Princesa to oust the Chief of Police, as affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service, to be unjustified and ordering said municipal officers to reinstate the police chief, and pay him with back salary during his ouster.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The Municipal Mayor of Puerto Princesa had filed administrative charges against the Chief of Police, Feliciano Z. Timbancaya, on April 11, 1960. Purusant to Republic Act No. 557, the charges were investigated and tried by the Municipal Council; that body, on June 6, 1960, found the respondent guilty on two counts, to wit: (a) failure to arrest two persons who boxed the Municipal Attorney in front of the municipal building in the presence of the respondent Chief of Police, and (b) delaying the filing of a homicide case against the person responsible for the killing. The Council decided that the Chief of Police be required to resign his position. Upon appeal by the respondent, the case was reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service, who affirmed the ouster decision. An attempt to have the case elevated to the Civil Service Board of Appeals failed, because the Board declined to take cognizance of the case on the ground that the Commissioner's decision was final under section 2 of Republic Act No. 557.cThe Chief of Police then instituted mandamus proceedings to compel his reinstatement in the Court of First Instance of Palawan, alleging -9. That the decision of the Municipal Council was contrary to (the) law and evidence presented, and there is a manifest misapplication of a clear and legal provision that there was no impartial, free, full and fair hearing in view of the fact that evidence is (was) weighed in the spirit of hostility and partisanship. The Provincial Fiscal, representing the respondents, asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of action, but the court refused to dismiss. The Fiscal then filed his answer denying the charge made by the petitioning Chief of Police, and interposed the defense that petitioner had voluntarily submitted to investigation by the Municipal Council; that the trial was fair, free, and adequate; that the decision, affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service, barred the remedy of mandamus, and was not reviewable by the court in the absence of any allegation of "abuse of confidence, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority". At the trial, the court, over the Fiscal's objection, received the testimony of the Chief of Police and his witnesses, to the effect that he was not guilty of the administrative charges made against him. The fiscal refused to cross-examine. On July 17, 1961, the court rendered its decision, finding that there was no sufficient evidence to support the charges that the Council and the Civil Service Commissioner had found to have been proven, and said court held that the Chief of Police was not present when the Municipal Attorney was boxed, and that he did not delay the prosecution of the homicide case. Thereafter, the Fiscal appealed to this Court, insisting that the Court of First Instance had no power to review the merits of the administrative case and erred in retrying the case de novo. We find the appeal meritorious. Instead of inquiring into the charge of partiality by the Commissioner of Civil Service, the decision appealed from proceeded to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence against the chief of Police, on the basis of his testimony and that of the witnesses presented in court. This method was clearly erroneous. The invariable rule set by this Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive branch of the Government is that the findings of fact made therein must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. C.I.R., 69 Phil. 635); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682); that the administrative decision in

matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs. Moreno, L-17821, November 29, 1963)l law library These principles negate the power of a reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. Commonsense dictates that the question whether the administrative agency abused its discretion in weighing the evidence should be resolved solely on the basis of the proof that the administrative authorities had before them and no other. To assume, as the lower court has done, that after the administrative decision has been rendered the courts are then free to retry the case de novo is to misconceive the fundamental mission of judicial review. What was open to inquiry by the court are the charges of error of law, partiality, and denial of the due process against the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service, since that is the operative decision against the petitioner Timbancaya.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside; and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion. Costs against appellee, Feliciano Z. Timbancaya.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law lib

LUNA v. RODRIGUEZ www.chanrobles.com JOSE LINO LUNA, Petitioner, vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. This is an action based upon the alleged usurpation of a public office, that of governor of the Province of Rizal, in which a demurrer was filed to the complaint. The question before us arises on the issues framed by the demurrer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After setting out the election of the defendant, the complaint alleges that: "The plaintiff duly began a contest in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the said election, and, while the said contest was pending decision, the defendant took possession of the office to which he was elected on the 16th of October, 1916, by virtud of a certificate of election issued to him by the board of provincial canvassers, which certificate of election was the subject of controversy in the election contest."chanrobles virtual law library The complaint further alleges that: "The protest was decided by the Court of First Instance on the 14th day of January, 1917, and the plaintiff was declared to have received 4018 votes while the defendant was found to have received only 3,317 votes, that is to say, that the plaintiff was the one who received a plurality of the legal votes cast at the said election; and the court ordered, in consequence, that the provincial board, as the provincial board of canvassers, correct its canvass in accordance with the decision of the court."chanrobles virtual law library The complaint avers that: "In view of the decision referred to, the plaintiff notified the defendant that he was ready to qualify and to assume possession of the office and demanded that he quit the office and deliver it to the plaintiff; but that the defendant refused to do so." Upon these facts plaintiff asserts in his complaint that: "The defendant is retaining and usurping the office in question to the great injury of the plaintiff and to the detriment of the public interest;" and maintains that: "the plaintiff has the right, by virtue of the decision of the Court of First Instance above mentioned, to take possession of and exercise the duties of the office, and the defendant, by virtue of said decisions, has lost his right to occupy it, and is at the present time in possession thereof without right."A demurrer was filed to the complaint on the ground that: "The allegations of the complaint fail to show that the plaintiff is entitled to occupy the office and discharge the duties of the office now held by the defendant;" and that: "The facts set out in the complaint are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action as they do not show that the defendant is usurping or illegally retaining possession of the office in question We are of the opinion that the demurrer must be sustained. The complaint does not show that the plaintiff was entitled to the office or that the defendant is illegally in possession thereof. Section 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "A civil action may be brought in the

name of the Government of the Philippine Islands: (1) Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office;" and that such action may be commenced by any "person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another." Section 202 declared that: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the person so averred to be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires." Section 207 determines the form and nature of the judgment to be rendered in this class of action. It provides that: "When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, . . . judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the relator or plaintiff, as the case may be, recover his costs." This court has held on several occasions, in applying that portion of the Election Law referring to the election of provincial governors, that a person is not entitled to occupy the office of provincial governor until his election has been duly proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers and a certificate of election has been issued to him in pursuance of that proclamation (Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. Rep., 609). The certificate of election is the credential which proves his right to exercise the functions of the office and admits him into possession thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 1999 of the Administrative Code provides in effect that a person holding a public office shall continue to possess and exercise the functions of the same until his successor is elected and qualifies. By virtue of this statute on who occupies a public office is required to maintain possession thereof until his successor is elected and qualifies. If he turns the office over to a person who was not duly elected and who has not qualified he is acting in violation of law and will be responsible for the loss of money or property occasioned by such transfer. While section 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff in an action of quo warranto may be declared entitled to the office in question before he has taken the oath of office or executed the official bond required by law, that fact is not in conflict with our opinion that the plaintiff in the present action must go so far as to allege in his complaint and prove on the trial that he was duly elected to the office in dispute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The complaint rests the plaintiff's right to the office exclusively upon the decision of the Court of First Instance in the election contest. That right is not based on a proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers or on a certificate of election issued in pursuance thereof. There is no allegation in the complaint that the provincial board of canvassers corrected its canvass in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance, or that, after such correction, that body duly proclaimed the plaintiff elected to the office in question. Neither is there an allegation that a certificate of election was duly issued to the plaintiff in pursuance of such proclamation. Plaintiff's right to the office, according to his own allegations, rests exclusively on the judgment of the Court of First Instance referred to.This court has held on several occasions (Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238; Hontiveros vs. Altavas, 24 Phil. Rep., 632) that a Court of First Instance in an election contest has no authority to declare any one elected to the office to which the contest relates. Its sole duty is to order the provincial board of canvassers to correct its return. Its judgment, therefore, is not proof of plaintiff's election. Moreover, it is subject to appeal. In fact, the judgment of the court in this case was appealed and that appeal is now pending in this court. It is our opinion, therefore, that the complaint does not show either that the plaintiff is entitled to the office or that the defendant is usurping the same. Although it is not mentioned as ground of demurrer and has not been presented or discussed, it is a grave question, even conceding that this action is maintainable under any theory, whether the complaint is not demurrable on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. An election contest determines finally the right of the contestant as well as of each of the respondents to the office contested. While the contest does not determine the eligibility of the candidate for office, it determines who was elected to the office contested. It will be observed that the complaint in this action is not based on the

ineligibility of the defendant but seeks to determine who was elected to the office of provincial governor of the Province of Rizal in the last election. That question will be finally and conclusively determined in the election contest; and an action of quo warranto to determine the same question would seem to be unnecessary and burdensome. It is clear to us that, although the question has not been raised or discussed, this action is not maintainable under any theory. Section 27 of Act 1582 provides a method for the determination of election contests which is exclusive of every other remedy; and to the extent that it is applicable has modified the Code of Civil procedure dealing with actions founded upon the usurpation of public office. The case of Navarro vs. Gimenez (10 Phil. Rep., 226) is similar to the case before us. There the election was contested under section 27 of Act No. 1582. Immediately after the decision of the court had been rendered in that contest an action of usurpation was begun under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to which we have referred. The Supreme Court in that case decided the very question to which we have adverted. It said: It is very evident that the Legislature intended to provide a summary and exclusive way for determining the facts in relation to certain elections held under the law. It is expressly provided by section 27 that the decision of the Court of First Instance shall be final and conclusive. No appeal is allowed from that decision. In the present case there was such a proceeding. The present plaintiff was a party thereto. He had an opportunity to try and have decided the very questions which he now asks to have decided by this court in this proceeding. Those questions were, in fact, tried and decided in the court below and if this action can be maintained it would amount to an allowance of an appeal from the judgment of the court below in the election proceeding, the very thing which section 27 prohibits. It cannot be believed that the Legislature, after providing a special and exclusive manner for determining the facts in an election case, and after declaring that determination should be final, intended that the defeated party should have a right to try the same questions over again by virtue of the provisions of section 201, above quoted. That the provisions of section 201 have been modified to some extent by the Election Law is very clear. Whether or not it still remains in force and may be availed of by a defeated candidate, who claims that the possessor of an office is not entitled thereto for some reason not connected with the method of casting and counting the votes, we do not decide. We do decide, however, that it has been so far modified that no person claiming a right to a public office can now maintain an action by virtue of this section when the grounds alleged by him in his complaint relate to the facts which the Court of First Instance in proceedings under said section 27 had acquired a right to and did determine. This decision would seem to be conclusive of right to maintain the present action.In closing we call attention to the fact that unless the special remedies mentioned in Chapter IX of the Code of Civil Procedure are directed against the court of First Instance itself, the Supreme Court will usually require the proceeding to be brought in the Court of First Instance instead of the Supreme Court. The Court of First Instance is better adapted to the trial of these special remedies than is the Supreme Court; and we regard it as the better practice to begin the proceedings to obtain such remedies in the trial court in the first instance. This is especially true where the determination of the questions presented would require the taking of evidence. The demurrer is sustained and unless the complaint is amended within five days the action will be finally dismissed with costs. So ordered.

CANTILLO v. ARRIETA Effects of Acts of De Facto Officer Facts Petitioner herein was originally appointed as Temporary Municipal Policeman of the municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon which was attested by the Provl Treasurer and the SCS. Pursuant thereto, he took an oath of office and proceeded to serve in said municipality. Subsequently, petitioner was given another provisional appointment as Municipal Policeman in the same municipality and took his oath of office by virtue of said appointment. Said appointment was attested by the Provl Treasurer and the CSC. On his original appointment, Cantillo was 41 years old and was a second year high school student. He was later suspended from service as a result of a criminal case filed against him for Infidelity in the Custody of the prisoner and that he was not arraigned in said case. The then Asst. Provl Fiscal Fabria moved for the provisional dismissal of the case against petitioner for the insufficient evidence produced by the prosecution to establish petitioners guilt. After the dismissal of said case, petitioner presented oral and written requests for his reinstatement to the service and likewise prayed for the payment of his back salary. Petitioner commenced a mandamus case demanding that respondent municipality be compelled to pay his back salaries during his period of suspension basing his claim on sec. 4 of RA 557 which provides: SEC. 4. When a member of the provincial guards, city police or municipal police is accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal or city fiscal, as the case may be, the provincial governor, the city mayor or the municipal mayor shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final decision of the case by the court and, in case of acquittal the accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension Issue/s Whether or not Petitioner was entitled to be paid of the back salary from the time of his suspension to hispossible reinstatement Held/Ruling NO. The law in force at the time of petitioners provisional appointment as mun icipal policeman was RA 486, or the Police Act of 1966. Sec. 9 thereof enumerates the general qualifications for appointment to a local police agency require inter alia that the appointee in the case of an appointment in a municipal police force must have at least completed highschool. Effects of Acts of De Facto Officer Considering that at the time of petitioners primary appointment, he was short of the minimum educational requirement for position to which he had been appointed merely emphasizes his lack of qualifications required by law. This obviously affected the very validity of his appointment and barred the reinstatement he claimed after his suspension. During his tenure, he was only a de facto officer entitled to emolument for actual services rendered. The mistake of the proper officials resulting to the non-observance of the rules on the matter, does not render the legal requirement ineffective and unenforceable. In herein, what was not observed was the possession of the general qualifications for the appointment to the local police agency. V. Dispositive In view of what has been stated above, We deem it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case filed against petitioner amounted to acquittal within the meaning of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 557, as reenacted in Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 4864, concerning the payment of the salary during the period of suspension. The decision appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. This is a petition for certiorari 1 seeking to set aside the Resolution 2 of respondent Civil Service Commission which directed petitioner Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) to reappoint private respondent Daniel R. Cruz albeit to a position next lower in rank to VicePresident in petitioner corporation, and to pay him backwages from the date of his dismissal making as basis his old salary rate as Vice-President.

HIGC vs. CSC Private respondent was the Vice President, Finance and Administrative Group of the Home Financing Corporation, now known as the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), from 1 June 1986 to 8 July 1988, when he was not reappointed as a result of the reorganization of petitioner firm. Initially, the appointment of private respondent Cruz was approved as temporary by the Civil Service Commission (COMMISSION for brevity) subject to his completion of the Executive Leadership and Management Program. On a reconsideration, the COMMISSION changed the appointment from temporary to permanent but still subject to his completion of the leadership program within three (3) years from the effectivity date of his date of his appointment, otherwise he would be reverted to temporary status. Sometime in 1987, Cruz was found responsible by an investigating committee for simple neglect of duty arising from his inefficient supervision over his subordinates arising from the loss of six (6) Land Bank checks. In July 1988, HIGC underwent a reorganization which resulted among others in the reduction of the number of Vice-President positions from (6) to three (3). Respondent Cruz was one of those not reappointed as he was found to have no civil service eligibility. On appeal to the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board, Cruz invoked his permanent appointment and insisted that the question of his eligibility should be left for determination by the COMMISSION. In the meantime, Cruz sought to avail of the Early Separation Incentive Package (ESIP) granted by HIGC to those who were not reappointed and then withdrew his appeal. On 7 December 1988, Cruz refiled his appeal after he was not granted ESIP benefits by HIGC. On 8 December 1988, Cruz elevated his appeal for reinstatement with the COMMISSION. On 20 February 1989, the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board dismissed Cruz' appeal. On 2 August 1989, however, the COMMISSION issued Resolution No. 89-543 finding Cruz to be a holder of a permanent career position at HIGC, hence, may be reappointed to a position next lower in rank to Vice President under the Finance Group without reduction in salary, pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 1986, and that in case Cruz could not be reappointed then his application to avail of the Early Separation Incentive Package (ESIP) should be approved. It further ruled that Cruz should be paid all the benefits and privileges due him as Vice President of HIGC in connection with his reassignment to the Office of the President and Bliss Development Corporation. Resolving petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution, the COMMISSION issued on 18 December 1989 Resolution No. 89-973 holding that since Cruz had not received the early retirement benefits he applied for, he should reappointed to the position next lower to the Vice President of the Finance Group, such as Manager of the Comptrollership Department, Treasury or other Department, and that he should be paid his back salaries from the time of his termination on the basis of modified Resolution No. 89-973. Hence, this petition for certiorari. On 6 November 1990, We issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and to continue until further orders from the Court, enjoining respondent COMMISSION to cease and desist from enforcing its Order of 10 October 1990, 3 as well as the resolutions in question. Petitioner now contends that respondent COMMISSION committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned Resolutions for being contrary to established principles governing the civil service career system and of the basic constitutional mandate that appointments to the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; and, that the non-reappointment of Cruz was the result of a valid reorganization. We grant the petition. Issue to be resolved is whether the COMMISSION committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that respondent Cruz was a permanent employee enjoying security of tenure and thus may be removed from office only for cause.Respondent Cruz contends that he was extended a permanent appointment as indicated in his appointment papers. He asserts that it is not necessary for him to pass any competitive civil service examination to become eligible for he belongs to the third level in the career service, which covers positions in the Career Executive Service, and which does not require passing a competitive civil service examination. But law jurisprudence do not support the contention of private respondent. Presidential Decree

No. 807, otherwise known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," provides the following levels of positions in the career service: (a) the first level which includes clerical, trades, crafts and custodial service positions involving non-professional or sub-professional work in a non-supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and, (c) the third level; which includes positions in the Career Executive Service. Positions in the Career Executive Service consist of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent ranks as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. RULING: We find that respondent COMMISSION committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it insisted in holding respondent Cruz eligible for reappointment to a permanent position in a government owned and controlled corporation in derogation of the provision of law categorically proscribing such as conclusion. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned CSC Resolutions Nos. 89-543, 89-973 and 90-823 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent Daniel R. Cruz is declared ineligible for reappointment in petitioner Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation for lack of civil service eligibility as required by law. SO ORDERED. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727 FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid. HELD: The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Caasi vs. Court of Appeals Facts: This case refers to the two consolidated petitions both seeking the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of Merito Miguel, for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18,1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America and not of Bolinao. Miguel admits that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there and that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987. After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC dismissed the petitions. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

However, in his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that a green card holder being a permanent resident of oran immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green cardholder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to provethat he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to runfor elected office. This respondent has not done Issues: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa Issue: Whether Merito Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States Held:No. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office. Hence, his election was null and void. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. BORROMEO V. MARIANO Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, secs. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the night. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records." (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office.

(Sec. 173.) The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally wellestablished, that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provision of the statute. Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippines Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of udges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices. The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. A proviso which is directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is inoperative and void. To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, "no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned." The keyword to the proviso which follows is "appointed." This word should here be given its usual signification. Many of the decisions follow the definition of "appoint" found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. "Appoint" is there defined as "to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or authoritatively assign, as far a use, or to a position or office." All the authorities united in saying that the term "appoint" is well-known in law and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.) The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L. 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc., 1373.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the udge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district. Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction, conferred upon the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States, which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. (We make no ruling on this point because unnecessary for the resolution of the case.) But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this power could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one district, demoted, and transferred to another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of the judicial officer. The only recourse of the judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code

taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave from for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his consent. RULING: It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered LACSON v. ROMERO FACTS: On 1946, Antonio Lacson was appointed provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental by the President (Manuel Roxas). But on 1949, President (Elpidio Quirino) nominated Honorio Romero in Lacsons stead, nominating the latter as provincial fiscal of Tarlac. The nominations of both Lacson and Romero were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (COA).While Romero assumed office, Lacson refused to accept his new appointment and opposed the two court appearances of Romero as the new prosecutor of Tarlac. He asked the judges (Narvasa and Ocampo) to strike from the records Romeros appearances in their courts. But the two judges overruled Lacsons objection, making them fellow respondents in this quo warranto proceeding. MAIN ISSUE: Whether Lacson has the right to the post of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and to oust Romero therefrom? YES. The Court upheld Lacsons right to the office by answering sub-issues (as provided below). RATIO: 1.Did the COAs confirmation, without Lacsons acceptance of his nomination, create a vacancy in the post where Romero could be lawfully appointed? NO. There are three steps to appointment: Nomination by the President, confimation by the COA, and acceptance of the nominee. The first two steps constitute a mere offer for the post and are respectively, the acts of the Executive and Legislative department. But the last is necessary to make the appointment complete and effective. Since Lacson declined to accept the new appointment, he continues as fiscal in his old post. No vacancy created. 2.Does the nomination of Lacson to Tarlac and its confirmation by the COA equivalent to a removal from office? YES. To appoint and transfer from one province to another would mean removal and separation from office. The nature of the office of the provincial fiscal falls under civil service laws to be appointed by the President with the consent of COA. 3. Whether the President can, even with the confirmation of COA, remove a provincial fiscal without cause? NO. The (1935) Constitution denies such right, as it provides that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The prohibition against removal except for cause in our Constitution has no counterpart in the Federal Constitution of the United States, thus, the American cases cited by respondent are inapplicable. Further, the Administrative Code provides that a provincial fiscal over 65 shall vacate his office, the logical inference is that until he reaches 65 he has the right to continue in office. Furthermore, the Revised Administrative Code provides that before a civil servant is removed, there must first be an investigation where he will be given a fair hearing and opportunity to defend himself. In the case of petitioner Lacson, the record fails to show that he has been charged with any violation of law or regulation or found guilty thereto as to warrant his removal from office. Inasmuch as Lacson neither left, abandoned, nor resigned from his post,

there has no vacancy, and consequently, the appointment of respondent is invalid. TRIVIA, in case asked: The SC says: But in justice to the President and the Commission on Appointments, let it be stated once again that it would seem that the transfer of the petitioner to Tarlac was not meant and intended as a punishment, a disciplinary measure or demotion. It was really a promotion, at least at the time the appointment was made, when the salary grade of a provincial fiscal in Tarlac (first class province) is higher than that of Negros Oriental (second class province). Only, that later, due to a change in the category of Oriental Negros as a first class province too, the transfer was no longer a promotion in salary. Bautista vs Salonga FACTS: On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court. While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the President's appointment is considered constitutional. 2) Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation. 3) Whether or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989. HELD: The Court held that the it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath. Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office. In view of the foregoing, the petition is thus GRANTED and the restraining order for Mallillin was made permanent. Calderon vs Carale, GR No. 91636, FACTS:RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved in March 1989. Itprovides in Section 13 that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. President Aquino then appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.

The petitioner John Calderon filed a petition for prohibition questioning the validity of the appointments, insisting on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715. Petitioner claims that the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation despite passage of a law which requires the said confirmation. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VIIby expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. Previous cases on similar controversies follow the following doctrines:1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law ISSUE: Whether or not the necessity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines, as in this case, to the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), being pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715, constitutional and legal? HELD: The Court ruled that Article 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is declared unconstitutional. The appointed positions fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Also, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The necessity of the confirmation as outlined by RA 6715 is unconstitutional because: (1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Petition was denied.

DR. ELEANOR A. OSEA, vs.DR. CORAZON E. MALAYA, 188 scra 154 This is a petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 6, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49204.1 On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed Protest Case No. 91120-004 with the Civil Service Commission.2 She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the recommendation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that respondent's appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void.

The pertinent portion of Section 99 of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states:

Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or municipal school board shall: The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and other school officials. On March 31, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 980699, dismissing petitioner's protest-complaint.3 The Civil Service Commission found that on September 13, 1996, President Ramos appointed respondent, who was then Officer-in-Charge Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City, as Schools Division Superintendent without any specific division. Thus, respondent performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent in Iriga City. Subsequently, on November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service Commission held that Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent's appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission.5 On August 3, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 982058, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review of both Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 980699 and 982958 dated August 3, 1998, respectively, before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49204.7 On August 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari of the August 6, 1999 Decision on the following errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS MERELY RE-ASSIGNED TO CAMARINES SUR AND DID NOT REQUIRE THE MANDATORY PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD UNDER SECTION 99 OF RA 7160. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION MADE WHEN THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED RESPONDENT MALAYA AS DIVISION SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT BACK IN 1996 AND AS STATED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION THE LAW DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD FIRST CONSULT THE LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD BEFORE HE MAKES ANY APPOINTMENT AND THAT SECTION 99 OF THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE APPLIES ONLY TO THE Department of Education, Culture and Sports SECRETARY, WHO, HOWEVER, CAN ONLY MAKE RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT.8 The petition lacks merit. Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was transferred from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the President. The appointment may not be specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their particular stations was vested in the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Secretary, pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in Department of Education, Culture and Sports Order No. 75, Series of

1996. In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September 3, 1996 did not specify her station.10 It was Secretary Gloria who, in a Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner to the Division of Iriga City. We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that, under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.14 In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official. Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to further advice from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49204, as well as Resolutions 980699 and 982058 of the Civil Service Commission, are AFFIRMED.

Tejada v. DomingoFacts: Roseo U. Tejada and Radito C. Ching are senior clerks of the COA assigned to the auditingunits of the Philippine National Bank and the Central Bank respectively. Before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758, Tejada's gross monthly compensation was P3,673.20 while that of Ching amountsto only P3,134.00. Only the basic salary and the cost of living allowance, in the total sum of P2,323.00, were due each of them as senior clerks in the COA. The other benefits werevoluntarily given to them by the PNB and the CB, respectively. Prior to the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of thePhilippines, all officials and employees of the COA, assigned to, among others, governmentowned or controlled corporations, received their salaries, allowances, additional compensation,emoluments and other fringe benefits directly from such GOCCs. This practice was not deemedeffective enough to enhance the independence and protect the integrity of the COA. Thus, withthe end in view of insulating these COA officials and employees, particularly the auditors, fromunwarranted influence, thereby preserving the independence and integrity of the COA,Presidential Decree No. 1445 expressly mandates that the salaries and other forms of compensation of the personnel of the COA shall follow a common position classification

andcompensation plan regardless of agency assignment and shall be subject to P.D. No. 985; andthat all officials and employees thereof, including its representatives and support personnel, shallbe paid their salaries, emoluments and allowances directly by the COA out of the latter'sappropriations and contributions, which shall be considered as part of its operating expenses tobe included in the annual appropriations law, but funded from the assessments made upon, orfrom contributions of the GOCCs. It directs GOCCs to appropriate in their respective budgets andremit to the National Treasury an amount at least equivalent to the appropriation for the salariesand allowances of the representatives and staff of the Commission during the preceding fiscalyear. The requirement of a common position and compensation plan did away with the oldpractice of agencies concerned determining the number, compensation and assignment of COArepresentatives, which was both chaotic and unjust. The provision on direct payment by COA of the salaries and other benefits was designed to instill institution loyalty. This policy was furtherstrengthened by Executive Order No. 19 issued by Pres. Aquino. The law is clear that thecontributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit services which are based on theactual cost of the audit function in the corporation concerned plus a reasonable rate to coveroverhead expenses. The actual audit cost shall include personnel services, maintenance andother operating expenses, depreciation on capital and equipment and out-of-pocket expenses. Inrespect to the allowances and fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA personnelassigned to the former's auditing units, the same shall be directly defrayed by COA from its ownappropriations pursuant to Section 31 of the General Provisions of the General AppropriationsAct, otherwise known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 879. The provision was re-stated in the GeneralAppropriations Acts (GAA) of the succeeding calendar years. Then Section 18 of R.A. No. 6758was enacted. Pursuant to this law, COA issued an order deleting from the COA Centralized orSpecial Payroll of their allowances, fringe benefits and other emoluments of COA employeesincluding Tejada and Ching. Tejada et. al. sought reconsideration of said order. MR denied.Hence, they filed this petition. Issue: Whether or not under R.A. No. 6758, COA personnel may still be allowed to receive fromany government agency, local or national, including government-owned or controlledcorporations and government financing institutions, other allowances, emoluments and fringebenefits over and above their legally set salaries and allowances as COA employees Held: No. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 is designed to strengthen further the policy,earlier mandated by the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and then by ExecutiveOrder No. 19 (as amended by Executive Order No. 271), to preserve the independence andintegrity of the COA, by explicitly PROHIBITING: (1) COA officials and employees from receiving

salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, localgovernment unit, GOCCs and government financial institutions, except such compensation paiddirectly by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions, and (2) government entities,including GOCCs, government financial institutions and local government units from assessing orbilling other government entities, GOCCs, government financial institutions or local governmentunits for services rendered by the latter's officials and employees as part of their regularfunctions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said officials and employees. Whilethe cited section uses the word "prohibited," Section 22 of P.D. No. 1445 does not. No one maysuccessfully argue against the proposition that a total removal of the temptation and enticementthe extra emoluments provide would be one effective way to vigorously and aggressively enforcethe Constitutional provision mandating the COA to prevent or disallow irregular, unnecessary,excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds andproperties. The COA personnel assigned to the GOCCs who have absolutely nothing to lookforward to or expect from the latter in terms of extra benefits would have no reason to accordspecial treatment to the GOCCs by closing their eyes to irregular or unlawful expenditures or useof funds or property, or conducting perfunctory audit. The law realizes that such extra benefitscould diminish the personnel's seriousness and dedication in

the pursuit of their assigned tasks,affect their impartiality and provide a continuing temptation to ingratiate themselves to theGOCCs or government financial institutions concerned. In the end then, they would becomeineffective auditors.Upon the other hand, Memorandum Order No. 177 rationalizing the compensationstructure in GOCCs and government financial institutions, issued by the President on 31 May1988, limits the grant of extra allowances and fringe benefits to their officials and employees. There is actually a two-pronged strategy to preserve and enhance the independence andintegrity of the COA and make its personnel loyal to none other except that institution andbeholden to nobody but the people whose coffers they must guard with dedication andresponsibility. The first aspect of the strategy is directed to the COA itself, while the second aspect isaddressed directly against the GOCCs and government financial institutions. Under the first, COApersonnel assigned to auditing units of GOCCs or government financial institutions can receiveonly such salaries, allowances or fringe benefits paid directly by the COA out of its appropriationsand contributions. The contributions referred to are the cost of audit services earlier mentionedwhich cannot include the extra emoluments or benefits now claimed by petitioners. The COA isfurther barred from assessing or billing GOCCs and government financial institutions for servicesrendered by its personnel as part of their regular audit functions for purposes of payingadditional compensation to such personnel. Under the second, GOCCs and government financialinstitutions can no longer rely on Section 2 of P.D. No. 985; moreover, fringe benefits and otheremoluments in excess of the standardized rates, which may be continued to be received in theconcept of "transition allowance" under Memorandum Order No. 177, in relation to CorporateBudget Circular No. 15 (15 July 1988), apply only to the officials and employees of profit-makingand financially viable GOCCs and government financial institutions. The strategy also promotes and is consistent with the policy behind R.A. No. 6758, whichis to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay uponsubstantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of thepositions.It goes without saying then that the PNB and the CB cannot legally and validly continue togrant Tejada and Chung, respectively, the extra emoluments in question because these couldonly be given to its officials, employees or organic personnel, subject to Memorandum Order No.177 and Corporate Budget Circular No. 15. Otherwise stated, Tejada and Ching cannot legallyand validly receive such extra benefits from the PNB and the CB, respectively, because not onlyare they not organic personnel thereof, but also because of the express prohibition of Section 18of R.A. No. 6758. Tejada's contentions that Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 authorize their continuedreceipt of the extra allowances from the GOCCs to which they are assigned are patentlyuntenable. Section 12 refers to the regular allowances and compensation which an

instrumentality, entity or agency of the government grants to its organic personnel. In the caseof COA personnel, such allowances and compensation cannot include allowances, fringe benefitsor extra emoluments, such as those claimed by petitioners, which are granted by GOCCs orgovernment financial institutions because Section 18 of the Act itself bans the COA personnelfrom receiving them even as it also prohibits GOCCs and government financial institutions fromgranting such benefits to personnel of other government instrumentalities, entities or agenciesassigned to them to perform the regular functions of their mother units. There is no indication atall that R.A. No. 6758 has jettisoned the first aspect of the policy. On the contrary, it hasstrengthened it. It would have been absurd and illogical for the law to impose the prohibition andat the same time mandate its integration in the standardized salary rates of the personnel of theCOA. In the second place, the Secretary of the DBM, Guillermo Carague, has certified that "otherthan those authorized/mandated by law, the allowances, fringe benefits and other emolumentsthat were directly received by COA personnel from the various government owned and controlledcorporations, including government financial institutions, to which they are assigned, were notprovided under the regular appropriations of the Commission in the General Appropriations Actof 1989 and 1990." 21 They were not so provided because, as discussed above, there was nolegal basis therefor. To accept Tejadas theory would engraft into the law that which the Legislature neverintended and interpret the law in a manner that defeats or negates its purpose. Worse, it wouldcompel the PNB and the CB to continue granting petitioners Tejada and Ching, respectively, thesubject extra emoluments thus writing into the law an exception for the benefit of COApersonnel. This would

be judicial legislation. The questioned law is clear enough. Frankly, itsinterpretation is not even called for. Neither may Tejada seek refuge or consolidation underSection 17. Again, the additional compensation or fringe benefits and other emoluments referredto therein are those granted by the mother or parent unit to the incumbents thereof, i.e., theorganic personnel, which include benefits absorbed from local government units. The law doesnot mention benefits absorbed from GOCCs or government financial institutions. This is sobecause no such benefit was intended to be absorbed. On the contrary, GOCCs and governmentfinancial institutions were prohibited from granting them to non-organic personnel. Tejada and Ching also posit the view that since, in respect to GOCCs and governmentfinancial institutions, the law does not seem to make a distinction between an incumbent thereinwho is an organic personnel thereof and an incumbent who is a COA personnel assigned to theirauditing units, petitioners must, for purposes of Section 17, be considered "incumbents" of thePNB and the CB. They appeal to the rule on statutory construction that where the law does notmake any distinction, no distinction should be made. A distinction is not in order for the meaningof incumbent is neither doubtful nor susceptible of more than one interpretation. An incumbent isa person, who is in present possession of an office; one who is legally authorized to discharge theduties of an office. An office is a public charge or employment, an employment on behalf of thegovernment in any station or public trust, not merely transient, occasional or incidental. Anincumbent then can only refer to the holder of an office either by appointment or by election.Insofar as petitioners are concerned, they are incumbents of the position to which they havebeen appointed senior clerks of the COA and not of the PNB or the CB to which they are merelytemporarily assigned. ORBOS V. CA G.R. No. 92561 September 12, 1990

SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and NERIO MADARANG, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners. Jose C. Cimano for private respondent. Once again the extent of the authority of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to pass upon contested appointments is brought into focus in this petition. The appearance of the Solicitor General on behalf of the petitioner is also questioned.

In the course of the reorganization of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Guido C. Agon and Alfonso Magnayon were appointed to the positions of Head Telecommunications Engineer, range 74.

Nerio Madarang who was also appointed to the position of Supervising Telecommunications Engineer, range 12, questioned the appointments of Agon and Magnayon by filing an appeal with the Reorganization Appeals Board of the DOTC composed of Moises S. Tolentino, Jr. of the Office of the Secretary, as Chairman and Assistant Secretary Rosauro V. Sibal and Graciano L. Sitchon of the Office of the Secretary, as members. In a resolution dated January 9, 1989 the said Reorganization Appeals Board dismissed Madarang's appeal for lack of merit. Hence, he appealed to the public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC)

In its resolution dated August 29, 1989, respondent CSC revoked the appointments of Agon and Magnayon for the contested positions and directed the appointment of Madarang to the said position of Heads Telecommunications Engineer. 1 DOTC Assistant Secretary Sibal sought a reconsideration of the said resolution of the CSC but this was denied in a resolution dated November 2, 1989. 2

On November 21, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal filed a manifestation with the CSC stating:

The Telecommunications Office through the undersigned, hereby manifests that we received the CSC resolution in CSC Case No. 393 on November 12, 1989 and in compliance thereto, we will convene our Selection and Promotion Board to deliberate on the position of Head Telecommunications Engineer (reclassified to Engineer IV pursuant to National Compensation Circular No. 58 effective July 1, 1989) with qualified candidates including appellant Nerio Madarang. 3

In a letter dated November 27, 1989, respondent Madarang requested the CSC to take appropriate action by implementing its resolutions dated August 29, 1989 and November 2, 1989.

In an order dated December 19, 1989, the CSC directed the immediate implementation of its aforementioned resolution insofar as it concerned the appointment of Madarang. 4

Agon and Magnayon filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the aforestated resolutions of the CSC but these were denied by the said commission in a resolution dated January 19, 1990.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order which was filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of petitioner. On March 29, 1990, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice and issued a restraining order enjoining the CSC from enforcing its questioned resolutions until further orders.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CSC acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position.

While petitioner does not question the aforestated resolutions of the CSC insofar as it disapproved the appointments of Agon and Magnayon to the positions of Head Telecommunications Engineer, petitioner maintains that as the appointing authority, he has the right of choice and discretion to appoint the persons whom he deems fit to the position to be filled. 5 Petitioner emphasizes that when the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated November 2, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal informed the CSC through a manifestation that the DOTC Selection and Promotions Board will be convened to deliberate on the position of Head Telecommunications Engineer, taking into consideration qualified candidates including Nerio Madarang. Nevertheless, the CSC stood pat on its resolution directing the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position.

On the other hand, the CSC contends that it was properly exercising a constitutional and legal duty to enforce the merit and fitness principle in the appointment of civil servants and to uphold their equally guaranteed right to be appointed to similar or comparable positions in the reorganized agency consistent with applicable law and issuances of competent authorities. 6

Invoking the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 3 (Article IX [B]). The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the writ and reward system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.' (Emphasis supplied.);

Section 19, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:

Section 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees (l) Opportunity for government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens, and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. Employees shall be selected on the basis of the fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position.;

and Section 12 of the same Executive Order:

Sec. 12. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: (a) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provision of the said merit systems... (Emphasis supplied.)

respondent CSC argues that the primary objective of the CSC system is to promote and establish professionalism by ensuring a high level of morale among the employees and officers in the career civil service. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the CSC contends it should see to it that the merit system is applied, enforced and implemented in personnel actions involving appointments affecting all levels and ranks in the civil service at all times. 7

The Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit.

Paragraph H, Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the 'Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," provides:

Section 9. Powers and Function of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

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xxx

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(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing provision it is clear that the CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment and not the power to make the appointment itself or to direct that such appointment be made by the appointing authority. The CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a vacant position and it finds the person qualified it must so attest. The duty of the CSC is to attest appointments. 8 That function being discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. 9

By the same token, should the CSC find that the appointee is not qualified for the position, it has the duty to disapprove the appointment. Thereafter, the responsibility of appointing the qualified person in lieu of the disqualified appointee rests upon the discretion of the appointing authority. The CSC cannot encroach upon such discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.

This Court has pronounced in no uncertain terms that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. The Court likewise held that the CSC does not have the authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. 10

Petitioner demonstrated his deference to the resolutions of the CSC disapproving the appointments of Agon and Magnayon. However, in the implementation of said resolutions he decided to convene the DOTC Selection and Promotions Board to deliberate on the person who should be appointed as Head Telecommunications Engineer among qualified candidates including respondent Nerio Madarang. Instead of acknowledging the authority of petitioner to exercise its discretion in the appointment of a replacement, the CSC, in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, directed the appointment of Madarang as the substitute of its choice. This act of the CSC must be struck down.

Private respondent Madarang, besides his comment, filed a motion to disqualify the Office of the Solicitor General from appearing for petitioner and to cite petitioner in contempt of court for the filing of the petition.

The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents including petitioner and public respondent. This is so provided under Presidential Decree No. 478:

SECTION 1. Functions and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. .... (Emphasis supplied.) 10-A

In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position. 11 In such an instance the government office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.

In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit in the cause of the petitioner based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent the petitioner as he did by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the petitioner even if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of the CSC.

This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a position adverse to his clients like the CSC, the National Labor Relations Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines. In such instances, the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and recommendation to the Court which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to be excused from intervening in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own comment different from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the contention of a private party tenable as against that of the government or any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal cases.

There are cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action. The Court finds and so holds that this practice should be stopped. To repeat, the Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agents and officials in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. The exception is when such officials or agents are being charged criminally or are being civilly sued for damages arising from a felony. 12 His services cannot be lightly rejected, much less ignored by the office or officials concerned.

Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the parties. He should be given full support and cooperation by any agency or official involved in litigation. He should be enabled to faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities as the government advocate. And he should do no less for his clients. His burden of assisting in the fair and just administration of justice is clear.

This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist from

appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be advised of his position just as well.

Private respondent Madarang also seeks to hold petitioner in contempt of court on the ground that the petition was filed in order to circumvent or obviate the dismissal of a similar petition in this Court filed by Guido Agon and Alfonso Magnayon. The legal personality of the petitioner to file the petition is also questioned on the ground it was Assistant Secretary Sibal and not the petitioner who issued the contested appointments.

The petitioner denies this contention. He asserts that the petition was properly brought in his name as head of the DOTC as what is in issue is the reorganization of the said department. The petitioner does not dispute the disapproval of the appointments of Agon and Magnayon; he only disagrees with the order of the CSC directing the appointment of Madarang to the contested position. The petitioner also alleges that he was not aware of the existence of a separate petition filed in this Court by Agon and Magnayon.

The Court finds the arguments and assertions of petitioner to be well taken.

It is true that the records of this Court show that there is such a case docketed as G.R. No. 92064 entitled "Guido Agon, et al., vs. CSC et al." which is a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The petition was dismissed for late filing in a resolution dated February 27, 1990.

On March 29, 1990 this Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by the said petitioners there being no compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution.

Apparently, the disapproval of the appointments of Agon and Magnayon was the issue in said petition. In the present petition as aforestated, petitioner yields to the disapproval of the appointment of the two, but questions the authority of the CSC to direct the appointment of Madarang to the contested position.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the respondent CSC dated August 29, 1989, November 2, 1989 and January 19, 1990 are hereby annulled insofar as they direct the appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position. The petitioner is hereby authorized to convene the DOTC Selection and Promotion Board to determine who shall replace Guido Agon and Alfonso Magnayon to the contested position by considering all qualified candidates including Nerio Madarang. The restraining order dated March 29, 1990 is hereby made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No.114795 July 17, 1996Garcesvs CA 188 SCRA 154 FACTS: On July 27, 1986, petitioner Lucita Q. Garces was appointed ElectionRegistrar for Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte,replacing respondent ClaudioConcepcion from the said position. The respondent was, in turn, to betransferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. The Civil Service Commission(CSC) approved the appointments which was supposed to take effectupon assumption of office. Concepcion refused the transfer which madeGarces unable to resume her post in Gutalac. Also, the Provincial ElectionSupervisor Salvador Empeynado, also a respondent in this case, issued amemorandum prohibiting her from assuming office in Gutalac as the sameis not vacant.On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the Office of the AssistantDirector to defer her Gutalac post. However, on April 15, 1987, thepetitioner received a letter from Acting Manager of Finance ServiceDepartment with enclosed check to cover expenses on construction of polling booth s, addressed Mrs. LucitaGarces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboangadel Norte which was interpreted by the petitioner to mean as overridi ngthe previous deferment order while COMELEC en banc cancelled Concepcions appointment to Liloy since he is still occupying the post inGutalac.On February 26, 1988, Garces filed a petition for mandamus withpreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injuction and damages againstEmpeynado and Concepcion which was later dismissed by the court a quoon two grounds: (1) that the proper remedy is quo warranto and (2) thatthe matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involvingthe conduct of elections. COMELEC cancelled the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and Concepcion to Liloy through a resolution passeden banc. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the caseby the RTC, hence, the petition to this Court.Respondent Empeynado challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC contending that this matter is cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. He argues that this case should bereviewed only by the Supreme Court and that if RTC has jurisdiction over COMELEC Resolutions cancelation the appointments, then RTC becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to theaforementioned provision of the Constitution.ISSUE: Whether this case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court or by theSupreme Court.

LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292 Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibilityto protect the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from thedeleterious effect of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding area. It has the power and authorityto issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850 and itsamendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modifyorders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedlybestowed upon LLDA by EO 927. Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency hasonly such power as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise anadministrative agency has also such power as are necessarilyimplied in the exercise of its express powers.

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483 Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) andalliance of concerned teachers (ACT) undertook what theydescribed as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlighttheir plight resulting from the alleged failure of the publicauthorities to act upon grievances that had time and again beenbought to the latters attention. As a result of the said action, theDECS secretary dismissed from the service one of the privaterespondents and the other nine were suspended. Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won the CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies do? Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions. Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights. The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as regard claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely ,subject to such appeals or modes or review as may be provided bylaw. The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate. Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate? Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate depending on the law granting such power. Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or withoutquasi-legislative or quasijudicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies are formed for the sole purpose of investigation only (fact finding, etc.)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9891 AN ACT SEPARATING THE MACO NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL - NEW LEYTE ANNEX IN BARANGAY NEW LEYTE, MUNICIPALITY OF MACO, PROVINCE OF COMPOSTELA VALLEY FROM THE MAIN MACO NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, CONVERTING IT INTO AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL TO BE KNOWN AS NEW LEYTE NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR Section 1. Separation and Conversion into a National High School.- The Maco National High School- New Leyte Annex in Barangay New Leyte, Municipality of Maco, Province of Compostela Valley is hereby separated from the Main Maco National High School and converted into an independent national high school to be known as New Leyte National High School. Section 2. Transfer of Assets and Liabilities.- All personnel assets, liabilities and records of the Maco National High School- New Leyte Annex are hereby transferred to and absorbed by the New Leyte National High School. Section 3. Appropriations- The Secretary of Education shall immediately include in the Department's program the operationalization of the New Leyte National High School, the initial funding of which shall be charged against the current year's appropriations of the Maco National High School- New Leyte Annex. Thereafter, the amount necessary for the continued operation of the school shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 4. Implementation- The Secretary of Education shall issue rules and regulations that may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act. Section 5. Effectivity- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette. Approved, December 31, 2009.
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights. Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. (a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. (b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
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(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward. As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes. The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees; (a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
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(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies; (c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense. The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense. The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
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The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Approved: April 27, 1992.
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Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Ninth Congress

Republic Act No. 7610

June 17, 1992

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: ARTICLE I Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
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It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no control. The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life. Section 3. Definition of Terms.

(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition; (b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death. (c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children" include, but are not limited to, the following; (1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-related activities; (2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with their normal development; (3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas without the care of parents or a guardian or basic services needed for a good quality of life; (4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of extreme poverty or in an area which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic services needed for a good quality of life; (5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or (6) Circumstances analogous to those abovestated which endanger the life, safety or normal development of children. (d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers to the coordinated program of services and facilities to protected children against: (1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse; (2) Child trafficking; (3) Obscene publications and indecent shows; (4) Other acts of abuses; and (5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.
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ARTICLE II Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Section 4. Formulation of the Program. There shall be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by the Department of Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development in coordination with other government agencies and private sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances which endanger child survival and normal development. ARTICLE III Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; (2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; (3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute; (4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution. (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and (c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code. ARTICLE IV Child Trafficking Section 7. Child Trafficking. Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this Act:
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(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian; (c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or

(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or (e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking. A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act. ARTICLE V Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period. If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period. ARTICLE VI Other Acts of Abuse Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty. (c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the minor. (d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him to such place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or establishment. (e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to; (1) Beg or use begging as a means of living; (2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or

(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age. The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. ARTICLE VII Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse. All establishments and enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their authority or license to operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted under this Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of such sign shall be punishable by prision correccional. An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises of said establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna, travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists; exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and said services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or activities constituting the aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the acts penalized herein. ARTICLE VIII Working Children Section 12. Employment of Children. Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except: (1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and where only members of the employer's family are employed: Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life, safety and health and morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or (2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or information through cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with: (a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the child; (b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and; (c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skill acquisition of the child. In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirement.

The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of this Section. Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances. Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. No person shall employ child models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and violence. Section 15. Duty of Employer. Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of Presidential Decree No. 603. Section 16. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to operate shall be revoked. ARTICLE IX Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. In addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act and other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and development consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective communities. Section 18. System of and Access to Education. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific and relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall also accredit and support non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government organizations in said communities. Section 19. Health and Nutrition. The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition to children of indigenous cultural communities shall be given priority by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention. In the provision of health and nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and recognized. Section 20. Discrimination. Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and all forms of discrimination. Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000). Section 21. Participation. Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or appointed representatives shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and evaluation of all government programs affecting children of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and respected. ARTICLE X Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to promote the goal of children as zones of peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be observed. (a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected from any form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;

(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of its civilian units or other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies; (c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency relief services shall be kept unhampered; (d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in factfinding missions from both government and non-government institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be subjected to undue harassment in the performance of their work; (e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be utilized for military purposes such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and (f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated due to armed conflict. Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a result of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped to look after the safety and well-being of children during evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being. Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. Whenever possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the same premises and given separate accommodation from other evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal family life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in proportion to their physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor games. Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. Any child who has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights; (a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units; (b) Immediate free legal assistance; (c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and (d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court. If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such child to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had reached eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases. Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. The chairman of the barangay affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare and development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict. ARTICLE XI Remedial Procedures

Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following: (a) Offended party; (b) Parents or guardians; (c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;
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(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution; (e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development; (f) Barangay chairman; or (g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred. Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. The offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603. Section 29. Confidentiality. At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case. It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.
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Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court. Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act. ARTICLE XII Common Penal Provisions Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. (a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender has been previously convicted under this Act; (b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or employee thereof who is responsible for the violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its maximum period; (c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked; (d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and forever barred from entry to the country; (e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is prision correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense. ARTICLE XIII Final Provisions Section 32. Rules and Regulations. Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the effective implementation of this Act. Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Section 33. Appropriations. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter. Section 34. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect. Section 35. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 36. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. Approved: June 17, 1992.
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