SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ. SATURNINA M. VDA. DE LOPEZ, administratrix-appellee, vs. DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ, minors, represented by their mother and natural guardian LOLITA B. BACHAR, movants-appellants. Facts: On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased (Sp. Proc No. 3740), filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar. On October 6, 1964 the trial court on the grounds that proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributes. Issue: (1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late; and (2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy Held: 1. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time. 2. In our opinion the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that the probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this case within a reasonable time thereafter. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not impotable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.

G.R. No. L-42615

August 10, 1976

SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA, DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA, ROSARIO DIVINAGRACIA and JUANITA DIVINAGRACIA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE VALERIO V. ROVIRA in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Iloilo City, and CAMILO DIVINAGRACIA, respondents. AQUINO, J.: The question in this case is whether an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's estate. The facts are as follows; Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1, 1964. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their four daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. The notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and in the Manila times. Two days after his death, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate (Spec. Proc. No. 1752). The order setting the petition for hearing was published on April 22 and 29 and May 6, 1964 in the Yuhum, an English and Ilongo weekly circulating in Iloilo City and Western Visayas. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22, 1964. She administered the estate for seven years. She paid the estate and inheritance taxes. In April, 1971 she submitted to the court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. That pleading, which was signed by the widow and her four daughters, contains, aside from the accounting, (1) an inventory of the assets of the decedent's estate as of December 31, 1970 (par. 3); (2) a declaration as to who were the heirs of the decedent and their respective shares in the estate (par. 4); (3) a statement that the five heirs (the widow and four daughters) had received their respective shares, each consisting of a one-fifth proindiviso participation in the decedent's estate (pars. 5 and 6), and (4) an assumption by the heirs of the obligations of the estate (par. 8). Judge Castrense C. Veloso in his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and project of partition and declared the proceeding "closed and terminated, subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the outstanding obligations of the estate". The partition was duly registered. On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had become final, Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent; that he was born on November 9, 1930, and that he came to know of the intestate proceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. He prayed for the determination of his share in the decedent's estate. The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the proceeding could no longer be reopened; that its expediente had already been archived; that there is no allegation in the motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by the decedent, and that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain Camilo's action for acknowledgment, as held in Paterno vs. Paterno, L-23060, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 585. The motion remained unresolved for more than four years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired in the early part of 1975. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned order dated October 18, 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and Salud Bretaa that there was no declaration of heirs, and that an interested party, who was left out in the partition, should be allowed to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the proper motion within the reglementary period. The probate court in its questioned order directed the administratrix to submit a complete liquidation of the conjugal partnership and an inventory of the decedent's estate after the payment of its debts. It further directed that the liquidation and the inventory should be set for hearing with notice to movant Camilo Divinagracia. Thereafter, another hearing should be held to determine the decedent's heirs. At the hearing, Camilo could present evidence to prove his claim that he was an Id acknowledged spurious child of the deceased. The lower court denied the administratrix's motion for reconsideration of its order reopening the intestate proceeding. A copy of the order of denial was received by the administratrix on January 7, 1976. She filed on January 31, 1976 the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. It is really an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440.

We hold that the probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice (Varela vs. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248). The order closing it was already final and executory. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore (Imperial vs. Muoz, L-30787, August 29, 1974, 58 SCRA 678. Compare with Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741; Jerez vs. Nietes, L-26876, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 904, 909; Vda. de Lopez vs. Lopez, L-23195, September 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 80, 83, where the motion to reopen the intestate proceeding was filed within the reglementary period). Moreover, the order for the reopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there had been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by the administratrix and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a statement as to who were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary shares. That project of partition was a substantial compliance with articles 179 et sequentia of the Civil Code. The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as the decedent's spurious child. That question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. Republic Act No. 4834, which took effect on June 18, 1966, provides: SECTION 1. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations court. There shall be a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in the Province of Iloilo, for which a judge who shall possess the same qualifications, enjoy the same privileges and receive the same salary as judges of courts of first instance, shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment; xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters (seven classes of cases) should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary courts, said incident shall be determined in the main case. The instant case is similar to the Paterno case, supra, and Bartolome vs. Bartolome, L-23661, December 20, 1967, 21 SCRA 1324, where it was held that cases involving paternity and acknowledgment fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The Paterno and Bartolome cases involve provisions of the Charter of Manila inserted by Republic Act No. 1401 in Republic Act No. 409), which created its Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Those provisions are similar to the provisions of Republic Act No. 4834 which created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. It was clarified in the Paterno case that the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the action of the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary share in his putative father's estate, which is cognizable by the Court of First Instance: It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. There is a rule that the remedy of a natural child, who has not been voluntarily acknowledged (Art. 278, Civil Code) but who can justifiably compel recognition. is either (a) a separate action against his parent to compel recognition, or, if the parent is dead, against all the potential heirs who would be prejudiced by his recognition together with an action for the enforcement of his rights against his parent or the latter's heirs; or (b) he may intervene in the administration proceeding for the settlement of his deceased parent's estate and there ask for recognition and at the same time enforce his hereditary rights (Briz vs. Briz and Remigio, 43 Phil. 763; Suarez vs. Suarez, 43 Phil. 903; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227; Zaldarriaga

vs. Mario, L-19566, May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 48; Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-21938, 33 SCRA 252). This rule, which may be applied to the spurious child's action to establish his filiation and assert his hereditary rights, is good in provinces where there are no Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and where the administration proceeding has not been instituted or is already closed. In this connection, a review of the rules governing the filiation of a spurious child may be useful in ascertaining the remedy open to Camilo Divinagracia. The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married woman cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287, Civil Code). But their filiation must be duly proven (Ibid, Art. 887). How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children (Pactor vs. Pestao, 107 Phil. 685; Edades vs. Edades, infra; Reyes vs. Zuzuarregui 102 Phil. 346, 354). Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children (Paulino and Nieto vs. Pauline, 113 Phil. 697, 700). That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children (Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522). A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children (Art. 278, Civil Code). In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284 Noble vs. Noble, 64 O.G. 1753; Edades vs. Edades, 99 Phil. 675; Sotto vs. Sotto, L-20921, May 24, 1966, 17 SCRA 243; Republic vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-19946, February 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 272; Galeon vs. Galeon, L30380, February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 516; Paterno vs. Paterno, supra). The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children (Vda. de Clemea vs. Clemea, L-24845, August 22, 1968, 24 SCRA 720; Velez vs. Velez, L-28873, July 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 190; Barles vs. Ponce Enrile, supra). In the instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose whether he has any evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in his motion that would sustain his claim for compulsory acknowledgment of his filiation. (Cf. Pactor vs. Pestao, 107 Phil. 685). In view of the foregoing considerations, the probate court's order of October 18, 1975, reopening the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Feliciano Divinagracia, is set aside. Costs against private respondent. Separate Opinions BARREDO, J., concurring: I concur in the scholarly and comprehensive opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino resolving the issues of jurisdiction and procedure raised in the petition and in the resulting judgment rendered by him. However, I do not feel prepared at this time to share his views as to the modes open to spurious children to establish their illegitimate paternity as basis for entitling them to the successional and other rights granted to them by the Civil Code. I have yet to be convinced that allowing spurious children to prove such paternity by means other than those indispensably prescribed for natural children places the former "in a better position" than the latter. Presently, I feel that spurious children who are certainly without fault, as also are natural children, in their being born as such are more unfortunate than the latter, if only because there is bound to be more antagonism against them from the legitimates and naturals and it is an unusual philanderer who openly and formally acknowledges spurious children. And if without such direct acknowledgment, a spurious child can no longer prove his paternity otherwise, no matter how convincing his evidence may be, would that not amount to practically diluting, if not nullifying indirectly, the commendable objective of the Civil

Code of giving to all innocent children more in law than what their indiscreet and perhaps inconsiderate parents care to bestow on them, for obvious reasons of convenience?

Partition of Estate- Effects of Partition JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA ANDALEJANDRO LOPEZ Facts : Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.llOn April 28,1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor. On October 26, 1953,herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopteddaughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez,the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the will was admitted to probate and thesurviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the Court of First Instanceof Pampanga. Neverthless, both Alejandro and Juanita executed a project partition, approved by the lower court onApril 23, 1960 and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate andinheritance taxesOn April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez beordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita the lots allocated toher. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying that AlejandroLopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed theseparate petition alleging the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that he ceasedas a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches andnegligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. The parties haveagreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil actionaforementioned has been finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the ground that the partiesthemselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari andmandamus. Issue : WON the project partition approved by the TC ordering it closed and terminated terminated the Probate proceeding. Ruling : No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distributionof the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiongvs. Tecson, ); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing anaction to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period has not elapsed. The better practice, for the heir who hasnot received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and notthrough an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decisionor order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributedand disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as, which secures for the heirs or legateesthe right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other personhaving the same in his possession", re-states the doctrines. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for thedelivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when theamended project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had notyet expired. The position of Juanita should be sustained and the writs prayed for granted

Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. SalasG.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992 Facts:

Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died in Cebu City with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real and personal properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and PuertoBello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, she executed a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed toher collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties. She designatedRosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond.Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo Miro.Jesus Fran filed a petition with the CFI of Cebu for the probate of Remedios' last will andtestament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not beassuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on the thirdpage of the said petition. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing andappointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.The private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed a manifestation alleging that theyneeded time to study the petition because some heirs who are entitled to receive their respectiveshares have been intentionally omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample time to filetheir opposition, after which the hearing be reset to another date. Private respondents did not fileany opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of theWill. No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix, RemediosMejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as executor thereof. Petitioners filed anInventory of the Estate and copies thereof were furnished to the petitioners. Subsequently, aProject of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees andlegatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M.Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court's approval. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of approving the partition, declaring the parties therein as theonly heirs entitled to the estate and directing the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed. Thereafter, the aforesaid branch(which issued the order) was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.Petitioners filed with the new branch a motion for reconsideration of the probate judgment andthe order of partition. Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the court. Respondent Judgeissued an order declaring the testamentary disposition as void. Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge Salas committed grave abuse of jurisdiction. Ruling: Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackof jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set asidethe probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversionof the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally statethat they have no objection to the allowance of the will. For all legal intents and purposes, theybecame proponents of the same. After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been noclaim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to whichprivate respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probatecourt. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal noticeof the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these actsnevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formalnotice would have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedesthe project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the lastoperative acts to terminate the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledgeof the decision, they should have desisted from performing the above acts and insteaddemanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. Thesame conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizingthe Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of thedate of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private respondents werepresent when the court dictated the said order. **Where part of estate is not distributed yet, recourse is not to reopen probate proceedings, but amotion for execution or an action for reconveyance. A probate judgment long closed cannot beattacked by a mere motion for reconsideration.Failure to attack the original of the will to the petition is not critical where the will itself wasadduced in evidence. Otherwise stated, it is not necessary to attack the original will to the petitionfor probate

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES

G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,res pondents. G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999 MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents. KAPUNAN. FACTS: G.R. Nos. 120681-83 The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Bina y, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue favor to private parties). The informations alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, the n a municipality of Metro Manila. Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against him. G.R. No. 128136 Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, a ll of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. Two complaints were raised against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School which informations were filed before the RTC of Batangas City. While another complaint on the same matter was eventually filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that the same complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The proceedings of both cases were suspended by the Sandiganbayan and the RTC pending resolution of the Binay case as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE/S: I. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject cases.

II. In GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC effectively ousted the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case and estopped the respondents from filing an information before the latter; and whether the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy. RULING: I. The court ruled that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. R.A. No. 7975 (took effect on May 16, 1995) as amended by RA. 8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997) specified that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code when t he principal accused includes officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regio nal director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) with enumeration as to officials specificall y included. Even if the municipal mayor is not specifically included in the list and despite the fact that the actual salary received is not equivalent to grade 27, the court ruled that the classification of salary grades should not be based on the actual amount of salary received but on the nature of the funct ions performed by the official concerned - the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around. In the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the DBM lists the municipal Mayor under S alary Grade 27. Petitioners, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code also settles the matter as it provides that municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758. II. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction even if the information was first filed in the RTC since the latter did not have jurisdiction in the first place as provided in R.A. 7975. Estoppel could not also be invoked because jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the consent or agreement of the parties. The court has previously ruled that a filing of a complaint with one court does not prevent the plaintiff from filin g the same with the competent court. This does not amount to forum shopping since the only authority of the first court was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse

decision. Also, the filing of another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does not also amount to double jeopardy because there can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy should have been for the petitioner to move the quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction. The consolidated petitions were DISMISSED .

CASE DIGEST ALTERNATE Jejomar C. Binay vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan

Facts: Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) againstMayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds(RPC A220) andViolation of Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filedconstituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 yearsconstituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore washeld in abeyance pending the resol ution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolutiondenying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for reconsideration. In themeantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspen d the accused pendente lite (benefits) whichwas later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolutiondenying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rightswhen the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the petitionersopposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonethelessreiterated its pr evious resolutions and order after the submission of the reply.Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so muchso that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati allegingthat the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion.Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdicti on of SBover the criminal cases. Issue: WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975. Held: YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction in all cas es involvingviolations of Republic Act No. 3019otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, andChapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,where one or more of theaccused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense:1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classifiedas grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "localofficials classified as Grade 27 and higher.

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel AlfonsoCortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21. The petition at bench arose from the following milieu: The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Phil ippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On

February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90 -3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads: That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by vir tue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.[1] On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, p reventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.[2] The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitione r posted bail and was granted temporary liberty. When arraigned on April 9, 1991,[3] the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash[4] the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,[5] in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and o fficers. Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,[6] the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. T hus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.[7] Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,[9] he arg ued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a prelim inary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP. In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the p etitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the p etitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; ( d) the petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant.[11] For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.[12] On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the perfo rmance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,[13] the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of 27 as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion[14] and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office. The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration[15] of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and thos e of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.[16] The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and unequivoc ably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the cr ime was committed. On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when th e shooting happened.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after prelimina ry hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accused in his relation to his function and duty as m ember of the then Philippine Constabulary. Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asunc ion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994: (1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof; (2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.[17] On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,[ 18] the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial. Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC. The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC. The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with homicide with the impos able penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below 27 committed in relation t o office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court. The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be gi ven retroactive effect. The Ruling of the Court The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin. The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information.[19] Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.[20] Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases in volving the following: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .[21]

10

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to t heir office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.[22] The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevat ion of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law: In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescri bed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the pr oper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position correspondi ng to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion tempor al. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.[23] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

159 People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003] Second Division, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto aske d him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the 11

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver. Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.

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SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO QUESTION LEGALITY OF SEARCH; EVIDENCE IN ILLEGAL SEARCH PEOPLE VS. BENHUR MAMARIL G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004 Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the PNP station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the person who conducted the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same. Appellant denied that he was residing at his parents house since he has been residing at a rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother, but on said search o peration, his brother and family were out. He testified that he was at his parents house because he visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time during the trial and admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly search was his. Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant. 2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of the search. 3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence against the accused. Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. 2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not determine if the search warrant 13

was issued in accordance with law. It was only during the trial that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. 3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article III of the Constitution.

178 People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result ofan ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied bySPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed. Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable search and seizure. 14

Held: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs SUSAN CANTON, appellant Facts: Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught in possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) without prescription or license. Susan was bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal detector and beeped. A civilian inspector of the airport searched her and upon frisking, she felt something that is bulging in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover packets that were wrapped with packing tape. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights Ruling: No, warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not violative of her constitutional rights. What was done to Susan was a stop and frisk search. stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly 15

criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. The search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 which states that Holder hereof and his handcarried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances xxx. This is another exemption in warrantless arrest and seizure. After the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Malacat v CA 283 SCRA 159 (December 12, 1997) Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his companions Positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentati on grenade tucked insi de the latters front waist line. Yus com pani on, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Stati on 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and ther eafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizur e can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose ob ject is either tomaintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of ex plosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk. Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and sei zures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 16

5(a) has been denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b)has been described as a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) c ustoms searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and frisk. The concepts of a stop -and-frisk and of a search i ncidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. Thes e two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other ha nd, while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is notarmed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least t hree (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, ther e was nothing in Malacats behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Mal acat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discover ed inside the front wais tline of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant vi olations of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Warrantless arrests / Searches and Seizures People v. Pasudag G. R. No. 128822. (May 4, 2001) FACTS: SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Pasudag owned it. A team was dispatched and the team arrived and went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. The police looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasudag signed. 17

ISSUE: Arrest and seizure valid? HELD: As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The testimony of SPO3 Jovencio Fajarito reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his constitutional rights. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused- appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

168 People vs. Estrella [GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: Prior to 20 November 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of Antonio C. Estella at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales. In the morning of 20 November 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied the police officers to Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the search warrant. On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella sitting on a rocking chair located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, the latter's brother, and being rented by Estrella's live-in partner, named Eva. They approached Estrella and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed Estrella the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked Estrella if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. While inside the hut, Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained 4 big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea and SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested Estrella and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales. The defense, however, alleged otherwise and claimed that on 20 November 1996 between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m., while Estrella was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about 70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued against him. Estrella identified himself to them. The policemen inquired from Estrella as to where his house is 18

located and Estrella told them that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him and insisted that Estrella's house is that house located about 5 8 meters away from them. Estrella told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to Estrella. They photographed Estrella and brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Estella was investigated at San Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan. Still, Estrella was charged for possession of prohibited drugs and unlicensed firearms. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69), in Criminal Case RTC 2143-I and on 25 August 1998, found Estrella guilty of violating Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The 8.320 kilograms of dried marijuana was ordered confiscated in favor of the government, and the Sheriff was directed to deliver the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition. On the other hand, Estrella was acquitted from the charge of violation of PD 1866 The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and 4 live ammunitions, subject of the offense, were however ordered delivered to any authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Estrella appealed said decision. Issue: Whether the search undertaken inside the hut during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered was legal. Held: There is no convincing proof that Estrella indeed surrendered the prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution's story. Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5 (Arrest without warrant; when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112." Never was it proven that Estrella, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no search incident to a lawful arrest. Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 12 (Search incident to lawful arrest), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter's person that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case. The purpose of the exception in Chimel v. California is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person being arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Herein, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within Estrela's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may 19

be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY TING UY FACTS: Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags of shabu were confiscated found underneath the drivers seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he contended that he was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible. ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible. HELD: No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of a buybust operation conducted by police officers. The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures ( People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]). A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping ( People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.

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