MSc in Pipelines Engineering Pipelines Safety - Risk Quantification This lecture will cover the following aspects: How

are pipeline failure risks quantified? What pipeline databases exist for failure rates?
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What are typical failure rates for pipelines How is Consequence Analysis carried out? Which Risk Criteria are applied for pipelines?

How are pipeline failure risks quantified? Risk Assessment Studies

Hazard Identification - what can happen? External Impact, Corrosion Mechanical defect, Natural Other, Rupture, Puncture, Pinhole Incident Data - Historical Fault data - extrapolation Predictive Modelling, Fracture Mechanics Release - leak rate, rain out Gas jet / plume Pool Evaporation Dispersion Wind/ Weather Fire Radiation Explosion Overpressure Toxic Effects Individual Risk / Transects / Societal Risk Criteria / Land Use Planning Zones Effects

Frequency Analysis - how often?

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Consequence Analysis - how bad?

Risk Tolerability - is it OK?

 How are pipeline failure risks quantified? Usual measure is frequency of specific incident such as pinhole or puncture or rupture Per 1000 kilometres per year ( per km.yrs)
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which is equivalent to Per metre per million years ( x 10-6 per year) or Per kilometre per thousand years ( x 10-3 per year)

s What pipeline databases exist for failure rates? 1 European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG)

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Objectives To demonstrate the high safety level of European gas transmission pipelines To provide non-EGIG members with the best available failure data on gas pipeline incidents

European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

Objectives To demonstrate the high safety level of Europe an gas transmission pipelines To provide non-EGIG members with the best available failure data on gas pipeline incidents Scope Only pipeline incidents with an unintentional gas release Only onshore gas transmission pipelines steel pipelines design pressure > 15 bar outside fences of installations excluding associated equipment (e.g. valves, compressors) or parts other than the pipeline itself

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European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

Participants Dansk Gasteknisk Center a/s represented by DONG (Denmark) ENAGAS, S.A. (Spain) Gaz de France (France) N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (The Netherlands)
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Ruhrgas AG (Germany) Distrigas n.v. (Belgium) SNAM S.p.A. (Italy) SWISSGAS (Switzerland) Transco (part of BG), represented by BG Technology (England)

Summary 4th EGIG report 1999

An extensive analysis on collected information has lead to the following results: Over the period 1970 - 1998 there has been no fatal accident involving inhabitants. The overall incident frequency with an unintentional gas release over the period 1970 to 1998 is 0,480 incidents per year per 1000 km pipeline. However, the figure over the past 5 years is significantly lower: 0,211 incidents per year per 1000 km pipeline. External interference remains the main cause of gas pipeline incidents involving gas leakage; an average of 0,239 incidents per year per 1000 km pipeline for the period 1970 to 1998. An improvement in the incident frequency has been observed in recent years; over the past 5 years the figure is 0,087 incidents per year per 1000 km pipeline. For the incident causes 'corrosion' and 'construction defects/ material failures no ageing could be demonstrated.

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EGIG - Failure frequency trend 1970-98

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2 CONCAWE - the oil companies study group

for Conservation of Clean Air and Water - Europe

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CONCAWE Database
Performance of cross-country oil pipelines in Western Europe Statistical summary of reported spillages 2000

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The latest in a series of annual issues, this report reviews the performance in 2000 of 30,870 km of on-shore oil pipelines in Western Europe with regards to hydrocarbon spillage. Incidents are analysed by cause and the effectiveness of the clean-up is recorded. Direct repair and clean-up costs are reported. Performance in 2000 was markedly better than the long-term average, third party activities remaining the main cause of spillage incidents. The report also gives the annual pigging inspection statistics. Some 3000 km of pipeline were internally inspected in 2000. 75% of the pipeline inventory has now been inspected with such tools.

CONCAWE Database
Sixty-six companies and other bodies operating oil pipelines in Western Europe currently provide statistics for the CONCAWE annual report on the performance of cross-country oil pipelines. These organisations operate some 250 different service pipelines which at the end of 2000 had a combined length of 30,780 km, an increase of 860 km since 1999. Volume transported in 2000 was 672 Mm3 of crude oil and refined products, which is 1.5 Mm3 less than in 1999. Total traffic volume in 2000 amounted to 126 x 109 m3 x km, 1% higher than in 1999. There were 6 reported oil spillages from pipelines during 2000 (12.6 per year on average since 1971). There were no associated fires or injuries. The net oil loss into the environment amounted to 84 m3, equivalent to 0.1 parts per million (ppm) of the total volume transported. The gross spillage was 360 m3, which is 0.5 ppm. A total of 276 m3, i.e., 77% of the spillage was recovered.

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CONCAWE Database
The causes of the oil ? Mechanical failure ? Operational ? Corrosion ? Natural hazard ? Third party activity spillages are attributed to: 1 incident 0 incidents 1 incident 0 incidents 4 incidents

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CONCAWE Database

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CONCAWE Database
Typical failure rate data for Crude Oil pipelines < 202 mm diameter:Pinhole Puncture Rupture Total

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Third party

0.313

0.537

0.359

1.209

Mechanical Natural Total

0.106 0.003 0.412

0.091 0.073 0.701

0.106 0.227 0.692

0.303 0.303 1.815

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

United Kingdom Onshore Pipelines Operators Association 14 major UK pipeline operators includes gas and oil pipelines operators covered by Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 5 Companies have pooled Fault and Leak Data covering 96% of Major Accident Hazard Gas and Liquid Pipelines in the UK

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Pipeline and product loss incident data from onshore Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHPs) operated by Transco, Shell UK, BP, Huntsman and Powergen UK, covering operating experience up to the end of 2000.

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

The overall failure frequency over the period 1961 to 2000 is 0.289 incidents per 1000 km.year.
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The failure frequency over the last 5 years is 0.093 incidents per 1000 km.year. A further report will cover predicted failure frequencies based on models of the growth of part-wall defects where no product loss has occurred, in order to provide failure frequencies for pipeline groups where historical failure data are sparse.

Butane CO Condensate Crude Oil (Spiked) Ethane Ethylene

Period Number of Incidents 6 21 25 27 40 33 9 10

19.5 36.3 24.0 212.6 38.1 1,198.5

Propylene LPG Natural Gas (Dry) Other Propane TOTAL

36.3 9.6 19,947.7 318.3 19.5 21,860

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1961 - 1965 1966 - 1970 1971 - 1975 1976 - 1980 1981 - 1985 1986 - 1990 1991 - 1995 1996 - 2000

Total Exposure [km.yr] 10,261 35,115 65,411 80,322 90,497 96,728 103,672 107,508

Frequency [Incidents per 1000 km.yr] 0.585 0.598 0.382 0.336 0.442 0.341 0.087 0.093

Hole Size Class Full Bore* 50mm 20mm 6mm 0 Full Bore

Number of Incidents 7 16 36 63 171

Frequency [Incidents per 1000 km.yr] 0.012 0.027 0.061 0.106 0.289

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

Development of Overall Incident Frequency 1.4 Frequency per 1000 km.yr Overall Average up to Year 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0
1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Moving 5-year Average

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Year

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

Development of Incident Frequency by Cause 0.45 0.4 Frequency per 1000 km.yr 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 External Corrosion Ground Movement Girth Weld Defect Pipe Defect Unknown External Interference Internal Corrosion Other Seam Weld Defect

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Year

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

Historical and Recent Failure Frequencies 0.07 1960-2000 0.06 Frequency per 1000 km.yr 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0
Ot he r Ex ter na lC or Ex ro sio ter n na l In ter fer en Gr ce ou nd Mo ve m Int en er t na lC or ro sio Gi n rth W eld De fec t Un kn ow n De fec t Se am De fec t

1996-2000

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Pi pe

Cause

W eld

UKOPA Database for UK Gas Pipeline Data

Product Loss Incidents Caused by External Interference Frequency by Wall Thickness and Hole Equiv. Diameter 0.3 0-6 0.25
Frequency per 1000 km.yr

6 - 20 20 - 50 50+ Full Bore

0.2

0.15

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0.1

0.05

0 <5 5 - 10 10 15 >15 Wall Thickness Class (mm)

s What are typical failure rates for pipelines Assimilate failure rate data into diameter ranges:Diameter range mm 0-100 125-250 300-400 450-550 600-700 750-850 900-1000 1000+ EGIG 1000-kmyear 0.719 0.429 0.163 0.067 0.027 0.011 0.005 0.002 BG 1000-km-year 0.239 0.168 0.086 0.046 0.025 0.014 0.007 0.005

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Adjust failure rate for mitigation factors:Depth of cover Normalised Failure Reduction (Inflation) factor <0.91 m 3.3 0.91-1.22 m 1.0 >1.22 m 0.7

Pipeline Location Rural Suburban Town

Diameter Min wall thickness

Normalised Failure Reduction (Inflation) factor 1.0 3.9 23.1

Normalised wall thickness failure frequency factor

<=4.8 <=150 >150<=450 >450<=600 >900<=1050 >1050 4.8 6.4 7.9 11.9 12.7 1 XXX XXX XXX XXX

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>4.8, <=6.4 0.2 1.0 XXX XXX XXX

>6.4,<=7.9 0.2 0.4 1.0 XXX XXX

>7.9<=9.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 XXX XXX

>9.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 XXX

Mitigation measure

Marker posts All other measures Slabbing, concrete etc (under review)

Normalised Failure Reduction (Inflation) factor 1.0 0.9

What do you do if no failures have occurred for a pipeline diameter range? - use Predictive Models 1 Linear regression Analysis - EGIG Data

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Linear Regression Analysis

Log to base 10 of failure frequency Diameter midpoints as X- values Parameters calculated for known datasets giving Y = MX + C equation = -0.00258X + 0.11456

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Linear Regression Analysis

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Alternatively, Use Fault Data to predict Failure Rate

UKOPA Fault Database Structural Reliability Analysis combines theoretical and empirical structural mechanics with uncertainty analysis of structural parameters in order to determine failure probabilities
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Uses parameters for which statistically significant numbers of measured values are often available (e.g. wall thickness and yield strength) in predictive models (limit state functions) in order to predict the uncertainty in parameters for which statistically significant databases are unavailable (e.g. leak & rupture incidents).

How is Consequence Analysis carried out? Assess Zones affected by each failure: - pinhole - small area - ignored - puncture - rupture - most significant affect Consequence Analysis carried out for
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- flammable fluid - ignition / no ignition probability - fireball - circular area affected by thermal radiation from fireball formed by up to 30 seconds release from the ruptured pipeline

- flash fire - directional ellipse area affected Complex geometric calculation to assess probability of being affected at a specific distance from the pipeline - jet fire - directional dependent of whether jet is free and unobstructed or there is interference with crater - often modelled as worst-case circular effect - explosion - directional dependent on source of overpressure and location of source of ignition - not usually modelled for Natural gas Probabilities of each OUTCOME calculated from an EVENT TREE:-

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MISHAP Event Tree for Gas Release

Immediate Ignition Release Obstructed Delayed Local Ignition Delayed Remote Ignition Fireball+jetfire 0.2 0.5 Yes 0.3 0.25 Yes 0.075 No 0.225 Yes 0.075 No 0.225 0.1 Jetfire 0.075 No ignition 0.225 Jetfire 0.075 Yes Flahfire+jetfire 0.0225 0.0225 No 0.2025 No ignition 0.2025 Fireball+jetfire 0.05 0.5 Yes 0.075 0.25 Yes 0.01875 Jetfire 0.01875

0.25 0.8 Gas Release Daytime 0.75

Yes 0.2 No 0.6

0.75

0.5

No 0.3

0.25

0.75

0.9

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0.25 0.2 Nightime 0.75

Yes 0.05 No 0.15

TOTALS
0.75 No 0.05625 No ignition 0.05625

Fireball + jetfire 0.25 Jetfire 0.1875 Flashfire + jetfire0.0281 No Ignition 0.5344 total 1

0.5

No 0.075

0.25

Yes 0.01875

Jetfire 0.01875

0.75

No 0.05625

0.1

Yes Flahfire+jetfire 0.0056 0.005625 No 0.0506 No ignition 0.050625

0.9

Important to calculate the length of pipeline which can affect someone at various distances from a pipeline:If you are standing here Fireball

Pipeline Interaction distance University of Newcastle upon Tyne

Interaction distance = 2 x radius of circle = length of pipeline which could affect you
If you are standing here Fireball

R D

R Int Dist

Interaction distance

Interaction distance = 2 x (R2-D2)

Risk = frequency of rupture incidents / metre per 10-6 years x number of metres of pipeline which can affect individual (interaction distance) = effect per 10-6 years

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Frequency and Consequences of each event are assessed to give the RISK TRANSECT:Risk Total Risk

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Flashfire Fireball Jetfire 200 150 100 50 Pipeline 50 100 150 200

Typical Risk Transect from IG/TD/1

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Risk Criteria - Land Use Planning

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inner zone - no housing at all allowed - calculated from fireball radius full bore rupture (NOT risk based) - typically 85 metres for 10.75 " (270mm) 100 bar ethylene pipeline pipeline e n zo inner

Risk Criteria - Land Use Planning

middle zone - only a small increase in population allowed - calculated from risk to 1 in a million (10-6 per year) - typically 240 metres for 10.75 " (270mm) 100 bar ethylene pipeline
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e le zon midd

pipeline

outer zone Risk Criteria - Land Use Planning - no vulnerable population allowed - calculated from risk to 0.3 in a million (3 X 10-7 per year) - typically 320 metres for 10.75 " (270mm) 100 bar
e r zon e t u o
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pipeline

Typical Societal Risk Curve from IG/TD/1

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