G.R. No.

183063

February 24, 2010

As Cayetanos sole witness Leonardo was already physically infirm (hard of hearing and due to old age) at the time trial commenced, his testimony was taken by deposition on written interrogatories.15 In answer to the interrogatories,16 Leonardo declared that his family had lived on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it following his acquisition from Julian Ydulzura in 192317 who had purchased it from Lazaro Raada in 1917;18 that the construction of a family home in 1923 was reflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 192419; that after his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built his own house and a bodega thereon; that Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997;20 that the lot was assigned to him and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance by virtue of a private document, "Kaligonan," dated June 16, 1951,21 which was executed by all of the heirs, the contents of which document were subsequently confirmed in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated August 24, 1988;22 and that on February 10, 1961, Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardos) halfshare in the lot, thereby making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof.23 On the other hand, Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter lot subject of the present case as embodied in a deed of absolute sale;24 and that Catalino religiously paid real estate taxes therefor. And she presented an approved Subdivision Plan of Lot 249,25 Cad-866 indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a survey undertaken by Geodetic Engineer Armando Diola on May 9, 1997.26 The above-said Subdivision Plan of the lot, duly approved by Celso V. Loriega, Jr., Regional Technical Director of the DENR, Lands Management Services, Region Office XIII for Butuan City, carries the following annotation: Surveyed in accordance with survey authority no. (X-2A) 77 issued by CENRO.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CAYETANO L. SERRANO,1 and HEIRS OF CATALINO M. ALAAN, represented by PAULITA P. ALAAN,Respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Respondent Cayetano L. Serrano (Cayetano) filed on September 21, 1988 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City an application for registration,2 docketed as LRC Case No. 270, over a 533-square meter parcel of commercial land known as Lot 249 ([on Plan Psu-157485] the lot), located in Poblacion Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. Cayetano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz; by virtue of a Deed of Exchange3 dated February 10, 1961; and by a private deed of partition and extrajudicial settlement forged by him and his co-heirs. Invoking the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree or, in the alternative, the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,4 Cayetano also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917 by himself and through his deceased parentspredecessors-in-interest or for more than 70 years. The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita),5 intervened and filed an application for registration,6 their predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased7 a 217.45-square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano on February 27, 1989 during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration. The intervenor-heirs of Catalino, also invoking the provisions of the Property Registration Decree or, alternatively, of Chapter VIII, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, prayed that their application for confirmation of title be considered jointly with that of Cayetanos, and that, thereafter, original certificates of title be issued in both their names. Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenor-Heirs of Catalinos application for registration.8 Cayetanos brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him at the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away9 and was substituted by his heirs. At the trial, the following pieces of documentary evidence, inter alia, were presented to support Cayetanos claim of ownership over the lot: original survey plan dated January 3, 1957 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Bureau of Lands Director Zoilo Castrillo,10 technical description of the lot (Psu-157485),11 Tax Declarations for the years 1924 (in the name of Simeon) and 1948-1997 (in the name of either Simeon [deceased] or Cayetano),12 official receipts showing real estate tax payments (from 19481997),13 and Surveyors Certificate No. 157485 dated January 1957.14

This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per project no. 5 L.C Map No. 550 certified on July 18, 1925. Lot 249-A, Lot 9090, Lot 249-B, Lot 9091, CAD 866 Cabadbaran Cadastre. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by Butuan provincial prosecutor Ambrosio Gallarde, did not present any evidence to oppose the applications. By Decision of November 3, 2003,27 the RTC granted respondents applications, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, conformably with existing laws and jurisprudence, DECISION is hereby rendered: 1. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-15(5)7485 (now known as Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D) containing an area of 316 sq. meters to applicant Cayetano L. Serrano, Sr., represented by his heirs; 2. Awarding a portion of Lot 249, Psu-157485 (now known as Lot 249-A, Csd-1-000443-D) containing an area of 217 sq. meters to applicant Catalina M. Alaan, represented by Paulita P. Alaan; IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of herein petitioner, appealed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals on the grounds that respondents failed to present evidence that the property was alienable or that they possessed the same in the manner and duration required by the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.28 By Decision of May 13, 2008,29 the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in this wise: xxxx . . . [F]rom the aforequoted annotation, the OSGs assertion that there was no competent evidence that would clearly show the subject land was released as alienable and disposable land is unavailing. On the contrary, We HOLD that the said annotation would suffice to comply with the requirement of certification as the same is competent enough to show that the disputed land or the parcels of land (now Lot Nos. 249-A, Cad-866 and 249-B Cad-866, respectively) applied for by the applicants (Cayetano and Alaan) were already reclassified as alienable and disposable as early as 18 July 1925, under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 550. xxxx Records show that the subject land was first owned and possessed by Lazaro Raada and the same was sold to Julian Ydulzura per untitled document executed on 15 May 1917. On 3 September 1923, Ydulzura sold the subject land for one hundred fifty pesos (Php150.00) to Simeon M. Serrano per untitled document, father of Cayetano. Simeon M. Serrano then had the subject land tax declared in his name in 1924 per Declaration of Real Property (Urban) No. 18,587. Upon the demise of Simeon Serrano on 9 January 1931, his heirs, including herein applicant Cayetano, partitioned by way of an Agreement on 16 June 1951 the properties of their deceased father. On 24 August 1988, the heirs of Simeon M. Serrano executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement confirming further the Agreement executed on 16 June 1954 (sic). It is worth noting that from 1955 up to the filing of the Application for Registration in 21 June 1988 and until 1997, Cayetano religiously paid the real estate taxes of the said subject property. As held in a long line of cases, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. Undoubtedly, applicant Cayetano, through his predecessors-in-interest, having been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation over the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier had met the requirements set forth in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. In fine, We FIND and so HOLD that applicant Cayetano L. Serrano and intervenor-appellee heirs of Catalino M. Alaan, have registrable title to the aforesaid subject lands, Lot 249-B, Csd-13-000443-D and Lot 249-A, Csd-1000443-D, respectively, as they were able to prove that they are qualified and had complied with the requirementsset forth by the provisions of P.D. No. 1529 which amended Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and Presidential Decree No. 1073, which to Our mind merited the allowance of the application for registration of the said property by the trial court.30 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition which raises the same grounds as those raised by petitioner before the appellate court. The petition fails. The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.31 The Court reiterates the doctrine which more accurately construes Section 14(1) in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit,32 viz: . . . the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.33 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied) While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents.1avvphi1 Petitioners contention that respondents failed to adduce sufficient proof of possession and occupation as required under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree does not lie. Undeniably, respondents and/or their predecessors-in-interest must be shown to have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. On what constitutes open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation as required by statute, Republic v. Alconaba34teaches: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his

possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessors-in-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was first owned by Lazaro Raada who sold the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn sold it to his and Cayetanos father Simeon in 1923; that Simeon built a house thereon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed materials, and of coconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeons demise in 1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations made in 1948-1958.35 When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo had any other pre-war tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explained that all available records may have been destroyed or lost during the last war but that after the war, the lot was reassessed in his fathers name.36 The Court finds Leonardos explanation plausible and there is nothing in the records that detracts from its probative value. Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments37 religiously made by Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after his fathers death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot. The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land. On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President. It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano. On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors: I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public domain. II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the necessary for any public use or purpose and in not ordering in the present registration proceedings. III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the applicantappellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property of the State. IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public domain. Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees. Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee Director of Lands. Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano. MONTEMAYOR, J.:

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay. Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same: Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6) Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay). Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus: ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505 this Court said: The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal. In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 155080 February 5, 2004

SOLEDAD CALICDAN, represented by her guardian GUADALUPE CASTILLO, petitioner vs. SILVERiO CENDAA, substituted by his legal heir CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.) The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52). . . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the April 4, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266,1 which set aside the November 12, 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. D-10270.2 The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan.3 On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaa,4 who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.5 On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that

respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondents possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.6 In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss", respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of properties of the petitioner.7 On November 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as follows: 1. Ordering defendant Silverio Cendaa to vacate the land in question and surrender ownership and possession of the same to plaintiff; and 2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses, plus cost of suit. SO ORDERED.8 On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and declared that the donation was valid. Furthermore, it held that petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues: (1) whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid; and (2) whether or not petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription. As a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. This is because its findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.9 The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

(5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken into account, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon which they are based; and (8) when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.10 In the case at bar, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting; thus, we are constrained to review the findings of facts. The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey. After a review of the evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted during the cross examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista. Pertinent portions of his testimony read: Q. And Sixto Calicdan inherited this property from his parents? A. No, sir. Q. What do you mean by no? A. To my knowledge and information, Sixto Calicdan bought the property from his cousin, I think Flaviano or Felomino Bautista. Q. So, in other words, you have no personal knowledge about how Sixto Calicdan acquired this property? A. I think it was by purchase.

(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting; Q. According to information, so you have no actual personal knowledge how Sixto Calicadan acquired this property? A. Yes, because when the property was bought by my uncle, I was not yet born, so information only.

Q. So when you were born, you came to know already that Sixto Calicdan is the owner of this property? A. Yes, thru the son of Felomino Bautista who is now, I think, in Baguio. Q. You have not seen any document to show that Sixto Calicdan purchased the property from one Felomino Bautista? A. None, sir.11 In People v. Guittap,12 we held that: Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence. The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based on respondents bare hearsay testimony as evidence of the donation made by Fermina. Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.13 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.14 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.15 Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the case at bar as it demands that the possession be "in good faith and with just title,"16 and there is no evidence on record to prove respondents "good faith", nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than 45 years aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent was in possession of the land for 45 years counted from the time of the donation in 1947.

This is more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public, adverse and in the concept of an owner. Respondent fenced the land and built his house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupes father as his contractor. His act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon.17 Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him. As we said in the case of Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano Santiago:18 Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondents possession. Thus, in Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals,19 we held: Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession. (Underscoring ours) In sum, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, and declared respondent the rightful owner of the subject property, not on the basis of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, which is hereby declared void, but on extraordinary acquisitive prescription. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 4, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67266, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. D-10270 before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on official leave. [G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000] JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ULANDU DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M77,[1] which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.[2] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 30, 1992.[3] The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles. On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[4] The case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No.4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.[5] The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 5263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.[6] On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court[7] where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985,[8] this time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for. Manikx On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner.[9] The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower courts Order.[10] It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.[11] Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds "I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of thirty 30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b ) shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986. II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908."[12] The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is the respondents position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972,[13] petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met. We agree with respondents. In Republic vs. Doldol,[14] the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as follows -"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: Maniks (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the original) Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.[15]

A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[16] where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground t at at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows -"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340). Manikan Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do. We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead parent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bur au of Lands is void ab initio." Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.[17] In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.[18] Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[19] Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development[20] from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned. Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/17/00 9:46 AM [G.R. No. 171726, February 23, 2011] VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

RESPONDENT. DECISION

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assails the Decision[1] dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the April 28, 2000 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in LRC No. P-115, LRA Rec. No. N-68012, which granted petitioners' application for registration of title over two parcels of land, denominated as Lots 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre. The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: On March 22, 1949, petitioners' father, L. Yu Chang[4] and the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, through its then Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property[5] wherein the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece of land located in San Juan, Pili. Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the property thus obtained and erected a residential house and a gasoline station thereon. He also declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 01794[6] and 01795[7]and paid the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight (28) official receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10, 1976. When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the property and succeeded in the possession of the property. On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation[8] of their rights over the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's five children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in favor of herein petitioners. After the transfer, petitioners had the subject property surveyed and subdivided into two lots, Lot 2199[9] and Lot 2200[10] of Plan SWO-05-000888, Pili Cadastre. Petitioners also declared the lots in their names for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 02633[11] and paid the real property taxes thereon. On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself and in representation of her brother and copetitioner, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition[12] for registration of title over the aforementioned lots under the Property Registration Decree. In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest "have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100 years"[13]; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the property in the concept of owners. Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance and registration of title in their names. In support of their application, petitioners submitted the following documents, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Agreement to Exchange Real Property; Deed of Transfer and Renunciation; Approved Plan of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; Approved Technical Description of Lot 2199; Approved Technical Description of Lot 2200; Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-044 for Lot 2199 Cad. 291; and Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet (FAAS) A.R.P. No. 026-043 for Lot 2200 Cad. 291 Pili Cadastre.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition[14]to the application, alleging, inter alia, that: (1) neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation. No other parties filed their opposition. Thus, on December 14, 1998, an Order of General Default[15] was issued by the trial court. After hearing, the trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application. Thefallo of the trial court's decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Confirming the imperfect title of the herein applicants Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang over the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph two (2) page 2 of the Petition, particularly Lot 2199, Plans S"0-05000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre and Lot 2200, Plan SWO-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre; both Filipino citizens, residents of #14 Joaquin St., Corinthian Garden, Quezon City and San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur respectively; 2. Ordering the dismissal of the application in the Cadastral proceeding with respect to Lots 2199 and 2200, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre under CAD Case No. N-9; 3. After finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the Administrator, Land Registration Authority to the herein applicants above-mentioned. SO ORDERED.[16] The Republic appealed the decision to the CA on the ground that the court a quo erred in granting petitioners' application for registration of Lots 2199 and 2200 despite their failure to show compliance with the requirements of the law. In addition, the Republic asserted that the land was classified as public forest land; hence, it could not be subject to appropriation and alienation. As aforesaid, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on August 26, 2005, and dismissed petitioners' application for land registration. The CA considered the petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not able to present incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are alienable and disposable.[17] The CA relied on the testimony of Lamberto Orcena, Land Management Officer III of CENRO, Iriga City, who testified that prior to October 30, 1986, the entire area encompassing the right side of the Naga-Legaspi Highway, including the subject properties, was classified as forest land. According to the CA, even if the area within which the subject properties are located is now being used for residential and commercial purposes, such fact will not convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land.[18] The CA stressed that there must be a positive act from the government declassifying the land as forest land before it could be deemed alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[19] Additionally, the CA noted that the lands sought to be registered were declared disposable public land only on

October 30, 1986. Thus, it was only from that time that the period of open, continuous and notorious possession commenced to toll against the State. Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court via the present appeal, raising the sole issue of whether the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for registration of title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even government structures existing and standing on the land.[20] In their Memorandum,[21] petitioners point out that the original owner and possessor of the subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was established in 1930. The land was originally part of the municipal ground adjacent to the Municipal Building located at the right side of the Naga-Legaspi National Highway.[22] From 1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the property through barter and up to the filing of petitioners' application in 1997, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual physical and material possession of the land in the concept of an owner, notorious and known to the public and adverse to the whole world. The Republic, through the OSG, for its part, maintains that petitioners failed to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots for the period of time required by law. The OSG also submits that the subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. We deny the petition for lack of merit. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, under which petitioners' application was filed, provides: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Property Registration Decree, to wit: xxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors[-]in[-]interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. x x x x[23] Under this provision, in order that petitioners' application for registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[24] Applicants must overcome the presumption that the land they are applying for is part of the public domain and that they have an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in their names arising from an imperfect title.[25]

In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their application are alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is hardly the proof required under the law. As clarified by this Court in Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,[26] a forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.[27] Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[28] As aptly held by the appellate court: [T]he fact that the area within which the subject parcels of land are located is being used for residential and commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject parcels of land into agricultural land. It is fundamental that before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.[29] Moreover, during the hearing of petitioners' application, the Republic presented a Report[30] of Rene Gomez, Land Investigator/Inspector, CENRO No. V-2-3, which disclosed that the lots applied for by the petitioners were classified as alienable and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393 and released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A Compliance[31] dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OIC-CENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court also stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291 were "verified to be within Alienable and Disposable area under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the then Bureau of Forestry". Evidently, therefore, the subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners' possession of the subject forest land prior to the date when it was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession.[32] To reiterate, it is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not be considered as possession in the concept of owner.[33] The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared and alienable.[34] Much as this Court wants to conform to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law's stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles.[35] Here, petitioners failed to present "wellnigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to prove their compliance of the requirements under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing their application for confirmation and registration of title. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67430 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Brion,* J., see: separate opinion. Bersamin, Abad,** and Sereno, JJ., concur.