EVOLUTION OF WAR: THE FOURTH GENERATION BY: T. X.

HAMMES CATEGORY: WAR & TERRORISM SMALL WARS & STRATEGIC THINKING

The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation

LtCol Thomas X. Hammes Marine Corps Gazette September 1994 The move toward fourth generation warfare is occurring in parallel with the move into the information agei.e., with the political, economic, and social changes affecting society as a wholeand the essential characteristics of this new form of warfare have been clearly illustrated in recent conflicts. If we loo at the development of warfare in the modern era! we see three distinct generations " Third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 " s it not about time for the fourth generation to appear! #Marine Corps Gazette! "ctober 1989 In 19$9! the authors of this article challenged their readers to consider whether the passage of %& 'ears meant it was time for a generational shift in war( )uring the * 'ears since the article was published! the world has undergone incredible changes in its political! economic! and social structure( There is a growing consensus that the world is on the cusp of a fundamental shift from an industrial societ' to an information#based societ'( +istor' shows that societal shifts of this magnitude cannot occur without a fundamental change in the wa' we conduct war( It is clearl' time for a fourth generation of modern war( In this article! I intend to show that the fourth generation of war has! in fact! evolved in con,unction with the political! economic! and societal changes that are modif'ing our world( -urther! li e its predecessors! the fourth generation of war did not arrive on the scene as a full' developed instrument but evolved .and is continuing to evolve/ at widel' scattered locations( -inall'! li e its predecessors! fourth generation tactics will not be used in isolation but mi0ed with those of earlier generations( The First Three Generations of War 1rior to challenging us to consider the implications of the fourth generation of modern war! Mr( 2ind and his co#authors presented a brief s etch of the three previous generations of war( The' theorized that the first three generations of modern war focused! in turn! on massed manpower! then massed firepower! and finall' on maneuver( 3hat these generations had in common is the fact each sought to defeat the enem' militaril'( Why Generational Change?

3hile 2ind and his fellow authors outlined the tactical changes between the generations of modern war! it is essential we understand what actuall' caused these generational shifts in warfare( The most commonl' cited reason is the evolution of technolog'( 3hile technological changes clearl' have a ma,or impact! attributing the generational changes in warfare primaril' to technolog' oversimplifies the problem( The true drivers of generational change are political! social! and economic factors( 4ach of these factors was pivotal in the evolution of the first three generations of war( 3hile brevit' prevents a detailed discussion! the single e0ample of 3orld 3ar I will illustrate the point( 3hile the evolution of rifled artiller'! machineguns! and barbed wire brought about trench warfare on the 3estern -ront! these technological developments alone were not sufficient to bring about the firepower#intensive second generational war that evolved from 1914#191%( The second generation re5uired not ,ust improved weaponr'! but the evolution of an entire political! economic! and social structure to support it( Second generation war grew from the societ' of the times( It re5uired the international political structure that focused on the balance of power! formed the alliances! and stuc to them through four incredibl' e0pensive! e0hausting 'ears of war( -urther! it re5uired the output of an industrial societ' to design! produce! and transport the e5uipment and huge 5uantities of ammunition it consumed( -inall'! it re5uired the development of a social s'stem that brought catastrophic losses( Technolog'! while important! was clearl' subordinate to political! economic! and social structures in setting the conditions for 3orld 3ar I( +aving completed this ver' brief introduction of the previous generations of modern war and wh' the' evolved! it is time to ta e up the challenge of the authors 5uoted at the beginning of the article( 3e must tr' to determine the form and impact of the fourth generation of war( 6ased on the observed correlation between each generation of war and the societ' it grew from! it is logical to assume the fourth generation of war will also ta e its shape from societ'( High Tech War as The Fourth Generation? In eeping with this observation! man' authors writing on the future of war have predicted it will be based on the impact of the information revolution on tactics and weapons( 7umerous articles have traced the development of information#based warfare from the incredible success of the Israeli 8ir -orce in the 6e a 9alle' in 19$: to the culmination of information war;<peration )4S4=T ST<=M(

4ach of these articles focuses on the e0ceptional lethalit' gained b' lin ing real#time information to precision guided weapons and controlling them with digital command and control( In fact! some authors have speculated that societies capable of producing such weapons will dominate warfare to a degree not seen since 3estern 4uropeans con5uered and colonized most of the nown world( 3hile it is clear that the information revolution will affect the future of war! the focus on the weapons and tactical aspects of the information revolution is as erroneous for the fourth generation as it was for its predecessors( Factors Sha ing the Future of War

To understand the potential shape of the fourth generation of war! we must loo at the political! economic! and social changes in societ' as well as the changes in technolog' since the advent of the third generation of war( 1oliticall' the world has undergone vast changes( The third generation of war developed when international relations were defined in terms of the 4uropean nation states that dominated them( In contrast! the fourth generation of war is coming of age during a period of e0ponential increase in the number and t'pe of pla'ers on the international scene( 3hile the outward trappings of the international s'stem are still in place! there have been massive changes in how it reall' operates( 6esides the huge increase in the number of nation states! there has been a fundamental change in the t'pe of pla'er involved in international affairs( 7ation states still remain the primar' actors! but increasingl' international actors in the form of the >nited 7ations! 7orth 8tlantic Treat' <rganization! the 4uropean Communit'! <rganization of 8frican >nit'! and a wide variet' of nongovernmental organizations are ma ing themselves felt in the international arena( In addition! transnational actors in the form of the media! religious movements! terrorist groups! drug cartels! and others influence international relations( -inall'! subnational groups .e(g(! the ?ulus! the Serbs! the @urds! and the 1alestinians/ are attempting to elevate their issues from matters of internal politics to a level of international concern( 4conomicall'! the world is becoming both much more heavil' intertwined and simultaneousl' more divided;intertwined in terms of trade! divided in terms of wealth distribution( -or both rich and poor countries! this economic integration has resulted in a stead' and significant reduction in their sovereignt'( In 191$ states e0ercised virtuall' absolute control over what nations the' traded with! the interest rates within their own nations! the tariffs the' charged! and the information the' released( The rapid integration of world economies has resulted in ma,or restrictions on in the abilit' of nation states to e0ercise these and other traditional instruments of nation sovereignt';to include the unilateral use of militar' power( Sociall'! we are developing international networ s in virtuall' ever' field of endeavor( There has been an e0ponential increase in the number of transnational business associations! research groups! academic societies! and even hobb'ists who maintain contact through a wide variet' of media( These networ s tie people together in distinctl' nontraditional wa's( 8s a result! we no longer conduct international affairs primaril' through official diplomatic and militar' channels( -urther! these associations provide a rapidl' increasing flow of nonofficial information between societies and a wea ening of the lin s t'ing the citizen to his nation state( Simultaneousl'! as national bonds become less important! allegiance to subnational groups based on ethnic! religious! or cultural ties are increasing( -inall'! we are raising a generation completel' at ease with the tools of the evolving information age( 4ducation combined with the relativel' low cost technolog'A has led to its rapid dissemination to all corners of the globe( In essence! the world is organizing itself in a series of interconnected networ s that while in contact with other networ s are not controlled b' them( Simultaneousl'! nation states find themselves torn in two directions#upward toward the international securit'! trade! and social organizations and downward b' subnational movements that want to splinter the state(

The e0ceptionall' broad changes across the spectrum of human activit' will clearl' shape the fourth generation of war( Bet! the 5uestion remains C3hat form will this generation ta eDC !et"ar as a #o$el for the Fourth Generation 8 number of authors have addressed e0actl' that 5uestion( The boldest! Eohn 8r5uilla and )avid 1onfeldt! provide a thesis for the future of war and then go on to provide a model for both mid#to high#intensit' war and one for low#intensit' conflict in their article CC'berwar is Coming!C which appeared in #omparative $trategy, 9ol( 1:! pp( 141#1F*! 7ov 9G( The' theorize thatH the information revolution will cause shifts! both in how societies ma' come into conflict and how their armed forces ma' wage war( 3e offer a distinction between what we call netwarsocietal# level ideational conflicts waged in part through internetted modes of communicationand c'berwar at the militar' level( 3hile the thesis is clearl' futuristic! their concept of c'berwar is essentiall' third generation warfare made vastl' more lethal through the use of information technolog'( In contrast! their vision of low#intensit' conflict as CnetwarC ma' be a highl' accurate model for the ne0t generation of war( 7etwar refers to information#related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies( It means tr'ing to disrupt! damage! or modif' what a target population nows or thin s it nows about itself and the world around it( 8 netwar ma' focus on public or elite opinion! or both( It ma' involve public diplomac' measures! propaganda and ps'chological campaigns! political and cultural subversion! deception or interference with local media! infiltration of computer networ s and databases! and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networ s( Thus designing a strateg' for netwar ma' mean grouping together from a new perspective a number of measures that have been used before but weIre viewed separatel' " In other words! netwar represents a new entr' on the spectrum of conflict that spans economic! political and social! as well as militar' forms of Cwar(C In summar'! the' see netwar as information#based conflict thatH

)isrupts! damages! or changes what a societ' thin s about itself and the world( Targets elite or public opinion based on the political structure of the enem' State( >ses all available networ s to carr' its message to the target audience(

Martin van Creveld! in The Transformation of %ar, agrees with this netwar vision of future war( +e contends future war will not be relativel' simple! high#tech conventional war! but rather e0tremel' comple0 low#intensit' conflict( 9an Creveld states that war will turn to the comple0 environment of low#intensit' conflict simpl' because computers have come to dominate the relativel' simpler environments of mid#to high# intensit' conflict(

Thus both the article and the boo see fourth generation war as comple0 engagements fought across the spectrum of human activit'( 8ntagonists will fight in the political! economic! social! and militar' arenas and communicate their messages through a combination of networ s and mass media( 3hile these authors agree on a coherent theor' for the fourth generation! theories! even b' highl' respected authors such as van Creveld! are insufficient ,ustification for polic' changes( 7ational securit' decision ma ers must demand a higher standard of proof before committing a nationIs resources to face a threat that ma' or ma' not be valid( Therefore! the e' 5uestion is whether we can validate these theories through observation of past and current conflicts( I contend we can( Evolution of the Fourth Generation of War 4ach element of fourth generation war proposed b' van Creveld and 8t5uilla and 1onfeldt can be seen in the evolution of insurgenc'( 3hile a wide#ranging stud' of insurgenc' will provide numerous e0amples of this new t'pe of war emerging! the length of this article re5uires that I focus m' stud' on the e0periences of 9ietnam! China! 7icaragua! and the 1alestinians( China 8s the first practitioner to write e0tensivel' about insurgenc'! Mao! li e Clausewitz! understood war is fundamentall' a CpoliticalC underta ing( +owever! he went much further than Clausewitz in his definition statingH <ur ,ob is not merel' to recite our political program to the people " .we must/ transform the political mobilization for the war into a regular movement( This is a matter of the first magnitude on which the victor' primaril' depends( Mao further e0horted thatH " political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for winning the war( Mao believed that political strength is the primar' re5uirement in war and is decidedl' more important than militar' prowess( This is a fundamental shift from the third generation concept that victor' is won primaril' through militar' superiorit' to the fourth generation concept of defeating the enem' primaril' through political action( <nl' after establishing the overriding political nature of insurgenc' did he outline his famous three phases for the successful conduct of insurgenc'H %hase &' The Strategic (efensive: The insurgents will concentrate primaril' on building political strength! Militar' action will be limited to harassment attac s and selected! politicall' motivated assassinations( %hase &&' The Strategic Stalemate: The insurgents gain strength and consolidate control of base areas( The' begin to activel' administer some portions of the contested area( Militar' activit' increases as dictated b' political re5uirements(

%hase &&&' The Strategic )ffensive: <nl' after the correlation of forces has shifted decisivel' in their favor do the insurgents commit their regular forces in the final offensive against the government( Though apparentl' ver' simple! these three phases show a sophisticated understanding of the powerful political! social! and economic elements that constitute the base of militar' power( Mao new insurgents could not match the governmentJs conventional militar' forces initiall'( Therefore! he conceived the careful buildup of political! social! and economic organizations during 1hase I and II( +is goal was nothing less than to change the Ccorrelation of forcesC between the government and the insurgent( <nl' after that shift would the insurgent be read' to move to 1hase III! the final destruction of the government b' conventional communist forces( Mao insisted on a united font of all parties and groups! people in all wal s of life! and all armed forces! a united front of all patriots the wor ers! peasants! soldiers! intellectuals and businessmen( +e used 1hase I and II to carefull' build that united front of Cmass organizations(C +e planned to involve ever' member of the communit' in one or more organizations#'oung communists! agricultural wor ers! womenIs groups! studentsI groups! etc( In effect! he built a broad base of interconnected networ s that made ever' member of societ' part of his war effort( Mao further foreshadowed the future when he wrote that in order to ma0imize their political power! insurgents must pro,ect it be'ond their borders( It is not enough for China to rel' on her strength alone! and she cannot win without utilizing the aid of international forces and the change within the enem' countr'! her international propaganda and diplomac' will become more important " Mao wrote that through propaganda! insurgents must attac their enem' b' undermining the political will of that enem'Is allies and sponsors( -urther! the' must mobilize neutral political opinion to pressure the enem'Is ma,or allies into withdrawing support for the war( The final tas of the insurgent propagandist was to generate material and economic support for the movement from friendl' and neutral countries( 4ssentiall'! Mao sought to Cdamage! disrupt! or changeC how Chinese societ' saw itself and how other societies saw China(I 8lthough firml' convinced of the primac' of the political aspects of the struggle! Mao also conceived a militar' strateg' that reinforced his political efforts( Mao wrote that while the final campaign would be a conventional attac ! earlier phases must include a mi0 of guerrilla and conventional militar' operations( The dual nature of insurgenc' would place the enem' on the horns of a dilemma( If the counterinsurgent concentrated his forces to deal with the conventional threat! the guerrillas would thrive( If he dispersed to deal with the guerrillas! his outposts were vulnerable to the insurgentIs conventional operations and guerrilla operations in the same area( The ob,ective of these 1hase I and II militar' actions was s much to ma e the government appear ineffective in the e'es of the people as to destro' the governmentIs forces( The increased comple0it' of the fourth generation of war is definitel' present in this strategic approach(

In summar'! Mao envisioned man' of the elements 8r5uilla and 1onfeldt identif' as fourth generation( +e built networ s! shaped opinions in target groups! and conducted intense propaganda and ps'chological operations campaigns( +e used those networ s to ma0imize his political! economic! and social power while minimizing the militar' aspects until the final offensive( MaoIs ideas obviousl' belong more to the fourth than the third generation of war( Mao still believed final victor' could onl' be won b' a third generation militar' campaign( It was to +o Chi Minh! MaoJs principal successful imitator! to ta e the evolution of war a step further( *iet !am <n the verge of winning the Second Indochina 3ar in 19F*! +o suffered a ma,or setbac when >(S( ground forces were introduced into the conflict( 3ith the entrance of these units! the communists were forced bac to 1hase II operations until such time as the correlation of forces once again changed in their favor( 8ware of his militar' and economic inferiorit'! +o sought to use international political maneuvering in con,unction with guerrilla war to bring about this change( +e new a e' factor in the outcome of the war was the international political situation( The length of each stage depends on " the changes between the enem' forces and ours! and also on the changes in the international situation whether the general offensive will come earl' or late( To accomplish those changes in the international situation! +o went be'ond MaoIs concept of national networ s and introduced 'et another aspect of fourth generation war( +e built or tapped into a variet' of international networ s( +o activel' encouraged and supported international peace movements .9ietnam 9eterans 8gainst the 3ar/! international charities .Kua ers/! and even individuals Eane -onda and +arrison Salisbur'/( 3hile he could not control these networ s! he could influence them and use their assistance in getting 8merican societ' to change its view of the war( In 19F$! +o and his principal strategist! Giap! provided another ma,or step forward in the evolution of war( The' used the media and international networ s to turn the tactical disaster of the 19F$ Tet <ffensive into a ma,or strategic success that eventuall' led to the withdrawal of >(S( forces from 9ietnam( 3hile the communists apparentl' did not anticipate the tremendous casualties and tactical failure of Tet! the' did carefull' select targets for ma0imum political impact( The' were certainl' aware of the fact it was an election 'ear in the >nited States( The' were aware the first significant crac s in >(S( support for the war were showing( Their massive commitment of irreplaceable resources to the Tet offensive shows the' hoped for a ma,or impact on the outcome of the war( 6ut despite all their planning! the' could not foresee the e0tent of the political impact in the >nited States( Bet unli e the >(S( leadership! the communists were 5uic to recognize the impact Tet had on >(S( public opinion and to capitalize on it( 3orldwide the' hammered at +oIs themeH The truth is that 1resident Eohnson wants neither peace nor peace negotiations( 8s a matter of fact! at the ver' moment when he tal s a lot about peace discussion! the >(S( imperialists are further e0panding the war of aggression in South 9ietnam! massivel' sending there tens of thousands of >(S( troops and e0tending CescalationC in 7orth 9ietnam(!I The peoples of the world have clearl'

seen this( That is precisel' the reason wh' the progressive 8merican people are activel' opposing( the >(S( war of aggression in 9ietnam( Given insurgenc'Is political nature! +o understood the >(S( center of gravit' was our political will( +e used both the mass media and his carefull' cultivated international networ s to magnif' the impact of Tet( 6ased on the media coverage of Tet and his own information campaign! he portra'ed the 9iet Cong as a militaril' insoluble problem for the >nited States( +e set out to directl' attac the >(S( center of gravit' and succeeded( 3ithin months of Tet! 1resident Eohnson had withdrawn from the 19F$ presidential race and >(S( public opinion turned against the war( This is +oIs uni5ue contribution to the evolution of war( +e shifted the emphasis from the defeat of the enem'Is militar' forces to the defeat of his political will( -urther! the enem'Is will was not to be bro en through direct attac s on the battlefield but rather through indirect attac s on his will to continue( +o! using the tools of fourth generation tactics! had defeated the much more powerful >nited States because the >nited States never understood the ind of war it was fighting( 8fter the withdrawal of >(S( support! it was onl' a matter of time before the communists! using basic third generation tactics! con5uered the south( !icaragua 8nother step toward the fourth generation of war was ta en b' the Sandinista 7ational 2iberation -ront .-S27/( The -S27 went a step be'ond +o b' developing a strateg' based on the assumption that they could not win a military victory. 8ccording to 8lfonso =obelo! one of the earl' opponents of the Somoza =egime! the -S27 Cnever e0pected a total victor'( This was something that the' made clear( The' never e0pected it "C Instead of militar' victor' against Somoza! the -S27 planned to win the war through internal and e0ternal political pressure against the Somoza regime( It wor ed( 8ccording to Col Eohn 3aghelstein! an insurgenc' anal'st with the Strategic Studies Institute! the -S27 achieved their victor' b' emplo'ing the following strategic approachH

6ringing the mass appeal of broad front political organizations into the movement to ensure not onl' better and wider internal support but outside support that did not have Cuban! 4astern 6loc! or Soviet taint(

>sing the Church! through 2iberation Theolog'! to give the guerrillas the moral high ground( 7ot losing sight of >(S( attention level( Controlling or influencing >(S( and world opinion through the media( Guerrilla chiefs actuall' wrote editorials for The &ew 'or( Times. Targeting the >(S( Congress through public opinion and orchestrating the propaganda campaign to minimize the >(S( response( 4stablishing front groups outside the countr' to function as public affairsLinformation offices to generate support for the movement and to pressure the >nited States into a less responsive mode(

<rchestrating and financing guest spea ers to >(S( academic! civic and church groups( These groups! in turn! will write letters to >(S( congressmen who hold e' committee positions overseeing securit' assistance operations(

6ased on this foundation! the Sandinistas established a two#tiered approach that attac ed the Somoza government across the spectrum of political! economic! and social issues while maintaining a low#level guerrilla campaign( <n the first tier! the international political front! the Sandinistas carefull' cultivated contacts with mainline >(S( churches! academics! and peace groups( 6' sponsoring visits to 7icaragua and sending spea ers to the >nited States! the Sandinistas were able to portra' themselves as a democratic movement in sharp contrast to the despotic and oppressive Somoza regime( These networ s in turn made sure that message was passed clearl' to the >(S( Congress( <n the second tier! the internal political scene! the Sandinistas supported and! to a degree! covertl' controlled a coalition of groups that touched the life of almost ever' 7icaraguan( -or instance! Moises +assan! one of the founders and e' leaders of the >nited 1eopleIs Movement .an organization of residents of poor neighborhoods/! did not reveal the fact that he was a member of the -S27 until after the government was overthrown( The -S27 understood the internal and international political value inherent in the support of an apparentl' untainted member of this e' movement( The -S27 applied this lesson to all sectors of 7icaraguan life( The' made great efforts to align the Chamorro famil' .the ownersLpublishers of )a *rensa, the e' newspaper in 7icaragua/ with their movement( This not onl' gave them a powerful and untainted voice but also one that the government could not suppress e0cept at great political cost( 8n' effort b' Somoza to suppress )a *rensa brought strong protests from the >(S( press and thus further legitimized the anti#Somoza coalition( The -S27 rounded out its political effort b' associating itself with and attempting to control a wide variet' of other organizations such as the 1atriotic -ront .an umbrella group for leftist political and labor movements/( In the social field! the Sandinista leadership recognized the Catholic ChurchIs e0ceptional influence in the lives of 7icaraguans( 6' attaching themselves to the philosoph' of 2iberation Theolog';the idea that the Catholic Church should assist the poor in overthrowing repressive regimes;the Sandinistas gained the respect and support of man' of the ,unior members of the Catholic Church( 3hile 2iberation Theolog' never gained the approval of the ChurchIs hierarch'! it served the purpose of aligning man' parish priests with the -S27! a communist movement( This was of particular importance because the clerg' attracted to 2iberation Theolog' were the same ones genuinel' dedicated to improving the lives of the poor of 7icaragua( Thus the Sandinistas were able to e0ploit 2iberation Theolog' b' associating their movement with the local priests and sisters most respected b' the people( The net effect of all these internal and international networ s was to build a coalition that isolated Somoza( This isolation so paral'zed Somoza that although he still had the capabilit' to win on the battlefield! he fled the countr'( The Sandinistas had achieved a genuine fourth generation victor'( Subse5uent to their victor'! the Sandinistas surprised and angered man' of their supporters when the' e0cluded all other members of the coalition from positions of real power( Bet despite this open shift from a coalition to a Cdictatorship of the parr'!C the -S27 was still able to mobilize its international networ s to defeat the =eagan 8dministrationIs efforts to fund the Contras(

)espite some glaring mista es in dealing with the >(S( Congress! the Sandinistas definitel' advanced the art of war( The' twice won a victor' using a fourth generation information approach of focusing on political and social activit' rather than militar' action( The Sandinistas proved fourth generation war focused on the political level could defeat a wea ! inefficient! and unpopular government( The 5uestion remainedH Can it do the same to a strong! efficient! popularl' elected! highl' legitimate governmentD The %alestinians The answer is C'es!C as proven b' the intifada uprising in the <ccupied Territories( This step in the evolution of war e0ploded onto the television screens of the world when the 1alestinians of the Gaza Strip too to the streets against the Israeli securit' forces( Initiall'! the incident loo ed li e another spasm of spontaneous anger on the part of the 1alestinians in the camps( 3hat made it different was the fact that it grew! spread! and sustained itself( There is still a good deal of debate about e0actl' how the uprising ignited! but for the purposes of this paper! wh' the intifada came into being is not as important as what happened;and how it illustrates the fourth generation of war( Most writers on this sub,ect agree on the following se5uence of events(

The intifada started on 9 )ecember 19$% when 1alestinian 'ouths too to the streets in riots against Israel occupation forces( 3ithin da's of its ignition! the uprising had spread throughout the occupied territories( 3ithin a month! three levels of leadership emerged on the 1alestinian sideH neighborhood leaders of Cpopular committees!C the >nified 7ational Command of the >prising .>7C>/! and finall' e' 1alestinian academics! ,ournalists! and political representatives(

8ll three leadership groups e0isted before the intifada bro e out( Bet! b' bringing together the street protesters and the three leadership groups! the intifada created a uni5ue organization ideall' suited to e0ploit the advantages of fourth generation war( The local neighborhood networ s dealt with grassroots issues;food! water! and medical care( The' maintained the morale and effectiveness of the uprising during various attempts b' Israeli forces to stamp it out( The >7C>! consisting of representatives of the four main 1alestinian nationalist factions! but e0cluding the fundamentalists! provided overall direction and coordination to the neighborhood committees( The academics! ,ournalists! and political leaders used their ties to >(S( and Israeli political and media leaders to e0plain the 1alestinian side of the issue( 6' appearing reasonable! educated! and concerned about peace and ,ustice in the Middle 4ast! the' drasticall' increased the impact of the action the local committees were orchestrating in the streets( Their ver' status as media stars neutralized attempts b' Israeli securit' forces to detain and silence them( 3or ing together! the three levels of leadership developed a well thought out strategic approach to the struggle using all the tools of fourth generation warH political! economic! social! and mass media( .-igure F(/ The' opted for a strateg' of limited violence .no use of firearms or e0plosives/! ma0imum media e0posure for their side of the issue! division of the CbattlefieldC into a contested zone .the occupied territories/ and! a safe zone .Israel proper/( In short! the' sought political victor' rather than a militar' one(

Internationall'! the 1alestinians sought to portra' themselves as the underdogs( 6' re,ecting the use of firearms and e0plosives .even though it was not alwa's honored b' the local elements/! the' pro,ected the intifada as a struggle of teenagers armed with roc s and stic against the best armed! best e5uipped! and best trained militar' force in the Middle 4ast( Internall'! the 1alestinians wanted to develop the image of an insoluble problem( 6' creating a contested zone and a safe zone! the' wanted to show the Israelis that while Israelis would never be safe in the <ccupied Territories! there was no threat to Israelis inside Israel( It was a conscious information campaign designed to push the Israeli electorate toward the desired political solution( This new message was not eas' to transmit( It had to overcome 'ears of terrorist attac s inside Israel( The intifada leadership understood that these attac s had strengthened the Israeli hard#line 2i ud 1art' b' ma ing the <ccupied Territories seem li e a buffer zone against terrorist attac s( 6' limiting the attac s to the <ccupied Territories! the 1alestinians showed that the Territories were not a securit' buffer but the source of trouble( 8lthough the intifada leadership could not control all attac s inside Israel! the message did get through( <n a local level! the 1alestinians built on a broad networ of pre#e0isting local organizations to solve practical problems of governing and to bind their people together in a concerted political effort( 8s Ian S( 2ipstic has notedH Studies of volunteer wor cooperatives! student associations! 'outh groups in refugee camps! and other grass#roots organizations repeatedl' show that these mobilizing framewor s for collective action evolved graduall'! from discrete! small#scale cooperatives responsive to the practical needs of 1alestinians " into networ s lin ed through representative of the various 12< factions to the overall nationalist movement( These practical! humanitarian networ s provided a significant tactical advantage( Given the international and domestic media coverage of these organizations! it was simpl' unacceptable for Israeli securit' forces to ta e action against them( Israel could not move against groups dedicated to improving the health care of the local population( This remained true no matter how much evidence the securit' forces could produce that proved the health#care providers were lin ed to the 12<( Several observers have noted that the intifada could have been crushed 5uic l' if Israeli securit' forces had used the same brutalit' S'ria used in +ama( These same observers noted that the Israeli people simpl' would not allow it( 4conomicall'! the intifada leadership turned the Israeli#ordered loc out of 3est 6an labor to 1alestinian advantage( The' stressed three results of the loc out( -irst! Israeli businesses suffered heav' losses due to lac of labor( Second! Israeli e0ports fell over MF*& million;much of the loss coming from the closing of mar ets inside the <ccupied Territories( -inall'! due to the *&#percent reduction in 1alestinian income! ta0 revenues from the Territories fell sharpl' at the same time Israeli e0penditures on policing the Territories shot up in response to the unrest( Sociall'! the local 1alestinian leaders used the labor loc out as a reason to emphasize self#reliance( The adversit' brought 1alestinian communities together against a common threat( 8s the intifada continued! it became apparent the Israelis were on the defensive across the spectrum( The intifada leaders stressed that the' were succeeding where the combined armies of all 8rab states had been

defeated repeatedl' for 4& 'ears( The intifada became a matter of pride not ,ust for 1alestinians but for all 8rabs( The 1alestinians used the international! Israeli! and 8rabic media as a specific tool( The international media! b' repeatedl' broadcasting scenes of the Israeli 8rm' firing on roc #throwing 1alestinian teenagers! changed the image of Israel from a besieged nation in the midst of power enemies to that of oppressive occupier( The constant repetition of this image even neutralized the powerful Eewish lobb' in the >nited States( The 1alestinians used the 8rabic media to show their own people and their 8rab brothers how the' were challenging Israel on a dail' basis( These broadcasts built the pride and solidarit' of the movement( Most important! the 1alestinians used the Israeli media to hammer home to Israelis the idea that the cost of maintaining Israeli presence in the occupied territories far e0ceeded its dubious securit' benefits( 8ccording to former 1rime Minister Shamir Cthe most important 5uestion of the .199:/ election was retention of Greater Israel(C 1alestinian action in the <ccupied Territories and restraint in Israel proper shattered the 2i ud coalition and allowed the 2abor 1art' to build a solid coalition for the first time since 19%%( <nce in power! the 2abor government was willing to conduct the serious negotiations that led to the 199G agreement on 1alestinian autonom'( 3hile the final 1alestinian goal of an independent state is still to be achieved! their use of fourth generation broad#spectrum tactics against what was essentiall' a third generation Israeli response has achieved more than an'one dared predict as recentl' as last 'ear( Generational Conflicts These four case studies;China! 9ietnam! 7icaragua! and the 3est 6an ;each confirm the characteristics of the fourth generation of war as described b' van Creveld and 8r5uilla and =onfeldt( 8ll four e0amples were fought across the political! economic! social! and militar' spectrums( Eust as important! these studies show that fourth generation tactics are rarel' emplo'ed e0clusivel'( =ather the' e0ist side b' side with the tactics of earlier generations( The conflicts in 2ebanon .19%F#$4/! Somalia! and 6osnia provide contemporar' reinforcement of this fact( Ta en as a group! these events illustrate that insurgent leaders understand and appl' the techni5ues of fourth generation war to manipulate 3estern democracies( 3hen dealing with 3estern democracies! these insurgent leaders focused on winning a political victor' b' changing the minds of the enem'Is polic'ma ers( The' found that when national interests are not at sta e! a direct message delivered via international media is an e0ceptionall' effective strategic approach( 6' using fourth generation techni5ues! local antagonists can change the national polic' of 3estern democracies( Then once the 3estern forces have gone! the' can continue to pursue their local ob,ectives using earlier generation techni5ues( Conclusions =ecent conflicts confirm that war is in fact evolving in con,unction with the political! economic! and social changes affecting societ' as a whole(

6eginning with MaoIs initial concept that political power was more decisive than militar' power and progressing to the intifada+s total reliance on the mass media and international networ s to neutralize Israeli militar' power! warfare has undergone a fundamental change( The fourth generation has arrived( Strategicall'! it attempts to directl' change the minds of enem' polic'ma ers( This change is not to be achieved through the traditional method of superiorit' on the battlefield( =ather it is to be accomplished through the superior use of all the networ s available in the information age( These networ s are emplo'ed to carr' specific messages to enem' polic'ma ers( 8 sophisticated opponent can even tailor the message to a specific audience and a specific strategic situation( Tacticall'! fourth generation war willH

6e fought in a comple0 arena of low#intensit' conflict( Include tacticsLtechni5ues from earlier generations( 6e fought across the spectrum of political! social! economic! and militar' networ s( 6e fought worldwide through these networ s( Involve a mi0 of national! international! transnational! and subnational actors(

The strategic approach and tactical techni5ues of fourth generation warfare will re5uire ma,or changes in the wa' we educate! emplo'! structure! and train forces( 1rofessional education! from initial#entr' training to war#college level! will have to be broadened to deal with the wide spectrum of issues commanders will confront in a fourth generation conflict( 8s 8r5uilla and 1onfeldt stated! leaders must be prepared to Cgroup together from a new perspective a number of measures that have been used before but were viewed separatel'(C Training .as distinct from education/ must e0pand to deal with tactical situations uni5ue to fourth generation warfare! such as staged confrontations between securit' forces and unarmed women and children( -urther! this broadened education must not be limited to militar' officers but must include decision ma ers from all agencies of the government involved with international securit' issues( 3e must go be'ond ,oint operations to interagenc' operations( If the enem' is going to stri e across the spectrum of human activit'! our national response must be coordinated across the multiple national agencies that deal with international issues( Eust as ,oint underta ing had to evolve graduall' into full#fledged ,oint operations! so will interagenc' operations have to mature from simple meetings to discuss cooperation into full' integrated national operations( -orce structure must be reconsidered in light of fourth generation issues( -ourth generation war will re5uire much more intelligence gathering and anal'tical and dissemination capabilit' to serve a highl' fle0ible! interagenc' command s'stem( 8t the same time! the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means our forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects too( -inall'! ,ust as man' current conflicts do not emplo' third generation tactics! not all future conflicts will be fought primaril' using fourth generation tactics( Therefore! it will be essential for national leaders to ma e an accurate anal'sis of the war the' are about to enter( The comple0 mi0 of generations of war with their overlapping political! economic! social! militar'! and mass media arenas ma es determining the t'pe of war we are entering more critical than ever( 3hile much of

ClausewitzI "n %ar has been rendered obsolete b' the enormous changes in the world! his admonition to national leaders remains more important than ever( Clausewitz wroteH The first! the supreme! the most far reaching act of ,udgment that the statesman and commander have to ma e is to establish b' that test the ind of war on which the' are embar ingA neither mista ing it for! nor tr'ing to turn it into! something that is alien to its nature(

Colonel T( N( +ammes is now .:&&4/ a senior militar' fellow at the 7ational )efense >niversit' in 3ashington! )C(