Michelle D.

Weitzel GOV E-1061: Take Home Exam, Essay 4 February 23, 2014

Religion in Machiavelli and Hobbes: Pre-modern Relic, Political Device, or Normative Foundation
Niccol Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes both propose powerfully secular theories of governance that, at first blush, appear to have little in the way of religious grounding or content. Both authors, writing approximately 140 years apart, drew heavily upon their personal experiences in the tumultuous political arenas of their respective eras and composed trenchant accounts of human nature that would seem untinted by theological idealism. Machiavelli and Hobbes, in different ways, are both realists and secularists to the degree that discussions of religion in their texts centers overwhelmingly on how religion can be made useful for politics. The exploitation of religious beliefs for political ends is an abiding theme for both Machiavelli and Hobbes in the context of their discussions of power, preservation and self-interest. But do Machiavelli and Hobbes relegate religion to a purely instrumental role in The Prince, Discourses on Livy, and Leviathan? Is a discussion of religion in these texts solely limited to its relation to political utility? This paper looks at accounts of politics put forward by Machiavelli and Hobbes to examine their individual, and divergent, treatments of religion, and posits that the undergirding bases of Christian behavioral norms played an important supplementary role, beyond simple political utility, in their respective theories of governance. In particular, it argues that while Machiavelli advocates the use of religion for political ends, he implicitly relies on fundamental Christian norms in the formulation of his conception of a good or moral life. Hobbes too grasps the political utility of ideology, and similarly advocates its exploitation, but he relies comparatively less on religion as a normative base. Instead, Hobbes employs religious narratives as a blueprint, or model, for the formation of his ordered commonwealth under an absolute sovereign.

Machiavelli, writing during a period of intense infighting among the warring city-states and the papacy in Renaissance Italy, encouraged his princes to use whatever tools they could muster to their political advantage, regardless of any moral tension associated with the use of deceit, cruelty, cunning and fear. This apparently amoral stance included the exploitation of religion for political purposes, and Machiavelli is explicit in giving this advice: this has to be understood: that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are held good, since he is often under a necessity, to maintain his state, of acting against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion.1 It was perhaps through observation of the temporal power of the Church (which Machiavelli railed against as too weak to unify Italy by itself, but too strong to allow any other power to do so), that Machiavelli became attuned to the formidable political applications of religion. He wrote that ecclesiastical principalities could be maintained without virtue or fortune because they were sustained by orders that have grown old with religion, which have been so powerful and of such a kind that they keep their princes in state however [the princes] proceed and live.2 Machiavelli elaborates that ecclesiastical principalities are secure and prosperous because they subsist by superior causes and are exalted and maintained by God. He suggests that princes should tap into these superior causes that offer such a secure grip on power, not necessarily because he believes in the normative value of religion, but primarily because he believes in its value as a mechanism by which to instill obedience and respect in a polity. This link between religion and obedience is exemplified in an anecdote in Discourses in Livy pertaining to the Roman consul Papirius actions in preparation for an important clash with the Samnites. Machiavelli tells the reader that it was the practice of Roman generals never to go into battle until they had persuaded their soldiers that the gods promised them victory:
1

Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, Ed. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pg.70. 2 Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, Ed. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pg. 45.

Among other auspices, they had in their armies certain orders of augers whom they called chicken-men; and whenever they were ordered to do battle with the enemy, they wished the chicken-men to take their auspices. If the chickens ate, they engaged in combat with good augury; if they did not eat, they abstained from the fight. Nonetheless, when reason showed them a thing they ought to donotwithstanding that the auspices had been adverse-- they did it in any mode. But they turned it around with means and modes so aptly that it did not appear they had done it with disdain for religion.3 As indicated in the story of the chicken-men, Machiavelli advocated that all things that arise in favor of that religion [princes] should favor and magnify, even though they judge them false.4 Here, he seems to suggest that true faith in God is irrelevant to the employment of religion for political ends, and religions role in politics is predominantly limited to the manner in which it can be made instrumental. But religion played a supplementary role in Machiavellis politics, in that it provided the cognitive bases for his political thought by framing conceptions of a good and moral life. Machiavelli argues that the ignominies suffered by the Italian city states arise from the hands of the Roman church in part because of the wicked examples of that court, having lost all devotion and religion: for where there is religion one presupposes every good, so where it is missing one presupposes to the contrary.5 This reliance on a cognitive sub-stratum of Christian norms is illuminated further in chapter fifteen of The Prince when Machiavelli submits a long list of possible human qualities: someone cruel, someone merciful, the one a breaker of faith, the other faithful; the one humane, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one honest, the other clever; the one hard the other agreeable; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other unbelieving, and the like.6 He indicates his

Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. 41. 4 Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. 39. 5 Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. 38. 6 Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, Ed. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pgs. 61-62.

understanding of the commonly shared value judgments that are embodied in these descriptive qualities: I know that everyone will confess that it would be a very laudable thing to find in a prince all of the above-mentioned qualities that are held good,7 before concluding with the advice that a prudent prince cannot wholly observe the good qualities, since human conditions do not permit it. Machiavellis first cognitive move of recognizing and listing various adjectives that describe general human conditions can be understood as a straightforward presentation of the facts at hand as he perceives them. Machiavelli takes a second step, in formulating a prescriptive response that is in keeping with his realistic vision of human motives, saying that the Prince should not care about incurring the reputation of those vices without which it is difficult to save ones state. But Machiavelli does not, at any point in this discussion, enter into a debate about what it means to be good or how it comes about that these various human qualities are imbued with normative value. The notion of good behavior, and what is virtuous, does not appear to be up for debate. While Machiavelli (and presumably his readership) clearly understands a distinction between good and bad, and while Machiavelli advises a path that prioritizes power retention and political gain over good behavior, he takes for granted the fundamental morality embedded in adjectival pairs such as cruel/merciful, lascivious/chaste, and honest/clever. In this manner, Machiavelli relies heavily on commonly held Christian conceptions of moral behavior to undergird his discussion of politics and governance. A third way in which religion plays a role in Machiavellis thinking about politics involves the authors reliance on Christian narrative forms. It is possible that these deep-rooted religious conventions and accounts of a cultural understory, or set of cognitive axioms, appear to be so fundamental to 16th-century thought that they were inextricable from Machiavellis own modern, secular conceptions; alternatively, Machiavelli consciously co-opted religious forms for his own purposes, much as he advised his princes to do. In either case, two of Machiavellis prescriptions for a
7

Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, Ed. Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Pg. 62.

successful republic, upon examination, bear great resemblance to notions of redemption and the afterlife that are prevalent in Christian thought. Consider, for example, the way that Machiavelli frames his account of the need for succession in a republic: because princes are short of life, it must be that the kingdom will fail soon, as his virtue fails. Hence it arises that kingdoms that depend solely on the virtue of one man are hardly durable. thus it is the safety of a republic or a kingdom to have not one prince who governs prudently while he lives, but one individual who orders it so that it is also maintained when he dies.8 Machiavellis aspiration for a strong republic that persists after the death of the founding prince can be viewed as a secular version of the Christian belief in the continuance of life after death. This foregrounding of the continuance of societal and governmental forms beyond the tenure of any single guardian or interpreter can be understood as emerging from Christian narratives. A second example involves Machiavellis discussion of the requisite return to first principles, in which he details the violent executions of the sons of Brutus, Maelius the grain dealer, and several others. Machiavelli writes that one should not wish ten years at most to pass from one to another of such executions, for when this time is past, men begin to vary in their customs and transgress the laws. Unless something arises by which punishment is brought back to their memory and fear is renewed in their spirits, soon so may delinquents join together that they can no longer be punished without danger.9 In the introduction to Discourses, Harvey Mansfield points out that it is no accident that Machiavellis call for the renewal of the republic through violence and the purging of dissenters bears a close resemblance to Christ dying for our sins, a central mystery of the Christian tradition.10 A final example in this vein draws attention to Machiavellis selection of genre. The Mirrors for Princes genre comprised a time-honored form of work steeped in modes of religious counsel; these advice books
8

Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. 36. 9 Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. 211. 10 Machiavelli, Niccol. Discourses on Livy. Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pg. xxxv.

traditionally upheld godly morals and taught princes the virtues they should seek to acquire, often highlighting the four cardinal virtues. Machiavelli rejects the content of the genre but retains the form, itself a curious example of the way in which religious tradition undergirded Machiavellis political thought. Much like his Italian predecessor, Hobbes was not opposed to a political strategy that exploited religious ideology, but it is less clear that religious tenets played the same undergirding, normative role for Hobbes as it did for Machiavelli. In his 1651 book, Leviathan, Hobbes appears comfortable leaving questions about higher human purposes unanswered. Hobbes does rely on religion, however, as a blueprint for creation; a form that can be copied and reproduced in the secular world, in Hobbes case, for the purpose of creating a single sovereign to preside over a commonwealth. Hobbes staked his claims in Leviathan on his understanding of an essential and undifferentiated human nature. Machiavelli also formulated an account of human nature, but it diverges from Hobbes in that it divides men into aggressive, princely types characterized by their desire to oppress, and commoners, whose overriding motivation was the desired not to be oppressed. In addition to this fundamental disparity between the two theorists conceptions of human nature, there were marked differences in their theories that evolved from basic variances in their attitudes toward the role of religion in politics. Whereas the crux of Machiavellis advice centered on the utility of religion in power acquisition strategies for new princes, Hobbes placed a greater emphasis on religion as a means by which to secure civil obedience and frame a sustainable political order. Hobbes capitalized on the regulatory and juridical aspects of religion as a means by which to buttress his argument for the necessity of an absolute sovereign who would effectively keep peace in the temporal realm. Hobbes was influenced by the English Civil War between royalists and parliamentarians that engulfed England in 1642, as well as by the execution of King Charles I, and the replacement of the monarchy with a protectorate under Oliver Cromwells rule in 1653. Cromwells revolt, in particular,

revealed the power of ideology to captivate peoples minds and drive them to rebellious action. Hobbes was disposed to draw lessons from observation and history rather than from abstract first principles,11 and he observed that those individuals in control of religious doctrine wielded a great influence in the establishment and enforcement of law and order. He wrote some of those that have observed [this seed of Religion], have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.12 Still focused on civic obedience, Hobbes remarked on a further function of religion as a release valve for social pressures, arguing that people would be entertained with the pomp and pastime of religious festivals and would need nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state.13 It is not surprising, given the weight that Hobbes assigns to the influence of religion and the correspondent power positioned in the hands of the clergy, that he warns against the dangers of association by those animated by False Doctrines, perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, and compared such people to wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.14 Hobbes indicated that a prudent sovereign would restrain association, since all association produces opinions and has the potential to conceive of doctrine that could undermine the commonwealth. But for Hobbes, the role of religion extends beyond a merely persuasive and powerful ideology to be co-opted for secular purposes, and he wrote Leviathan in part to extirpate ideology from politics and the public sphere, replacing any motivation stemming from comparatively uncontrollable spiritual ideologies with the methodologically manageable motivation of fear. By arguing that fear was the only motivator that should be reckoned with, Hobbes was able to eliminate religion as a possible source of
11 12

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 16. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg 168. 13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 178. 14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 375.

competition for his sovereign. In making the human quality of fear the foremost motive for political action, and in establishing human capacity to reason as the predominant driver of human agency, Hobbes effectively displaced religion from a position of supremacy, allowing him to subsume religion and the ecclesiastical power of the Church of England under the aegis of the sovereign, which marked one step in his ultimate cognitive goal of amassing absolute power under a single entity. This move is represented viscerally in the illustrated frontispiece15 which displays Leviathan reigning above a well-ordered land, holding a civic sword of justice in his right hand and a religious scepter in his left. Hobbes sovereign rules over both state and church, and Hobbes seems to suggest that the sovereign may dictate religious norms if it is in the interest of peace. He elucidates this point in his discussion of the institutional rights of the sovereign in chapter eighteen, claiming that it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all books before they were published.16 Beneath Leviathan in the illustration stand two pillars, the left one constructed of building blocks representing elements in the civic realm to include a fortress, a crown, armaments, and a warring military. The second pillar, on the right, portrays a church, a papal coronet, the three-pronged staphs carried by clergy, and a scene of religious debate. Regarded in its entirety, the drawing can be read in two ways: from bottom to top, it tells a story of the peace and power of the township resting ultimately on civil and religious foundations; from top to bottom, the image appears to indicate that the sovereign must suppress both secular and religious sources of power and unrest in order to achieve peace. Either way, the sovereignty of Leviathan is unequivocal; church and state fall equally within the compass of his rule.

15 16

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 71 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 233.

The integration of religion and the church into a realm that exists hierarchically underneath Hobbes sovereign raises questions about the normative origins of Hobbes conceptions of the good and moral life. Unlike Machiavelli, who elides these questions by implicitly referencing a commonly shared Christian understanding of morality, Hobbes adopts a straightforward approach and makes a decidedly unreligious claim that conceptions of the good devolve into nothing more than personal opinions: Whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill. For these words of Good, and Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so.17 This thoroughly utilitarian conception of good and evil serves Hobbes purposes well in that it lays the foundation for a conception of incontrovertible justice once humans have laid down their natural rights and joined in a political society under a single sovereign. As the sole individual chosen to retain natural appetites, the sovereign becomes the ultimate arbiter of the good life for her polity. Hobbes conception of the good requires two additional cognitive steps before it can methodically lead to the type of political order Hobbes envisions. First, a polity must agree on one convergent version of the good (life itself); second, they must agree on the worst bad thing (an untimely death). Hobbes claims that humans will ultimately arrive at this consensus through their experiences in the state of nature. Yet, this conception, while consistent with Hobbes line of reasoning and supportive of his greater purpose of promoting a monarchical sovereign, nevertheless leaves significant moral quandaries unaddressed. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes, whether through omission or through express purpose, offer political theories that are not subservient to a normative religious morality. At the same time, neither author provides a positive philosophical account of the good lifethey have deconstructed the normative values that religion instills without replacing them with comparable moral alternatives.

17

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 120.

Machiavelli demonstrates how to gain and retain temporal power, and encourages the formation of a free republicbut to what end? Hobbes creates an ordered and secure commonwealth in which subjects need no longer fear an untimely death at the hands of their neighbors, but it is unclear what satisfaction or what purpose they are meant to attain in this staid environment. Hobbes concludes that there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers.18 It appears from this claim that there is no role for religion in Hobbes account. Nonetheless, Hobbes, like Machiavelli, falls back on a religiously substantiated conception of nature and of creation as a sort of blueprint for his theory of governance. Hobbes encourages humans to imitate Gods creativity and to replicate the creation myth by urging a one-time, God-like act of political creation: the birth of the social contract and the concomitant establishment of sovereignty and a polity embodied in the Leviathan. This secular act is steeped in religious references and is interwoven with the narrative of the well-known Christian myth of creation. It is not coincidental that Hobbes chose to name his sovereign after Gods enormously scaled creation in the Christian Old Testament. Hobbes is suggesting that a polity imitate Gods act of creation by choosing of a political sovereign whose presence will lift humans out of a (godless) state of nature into a commonwealth, thus inexorably conferring religious origins on his modern secular state.

18

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. C.B. MacPherson. Penguin Books, 1985. Pg. 160.