WASHINGTON DC, Feb 25, 2005 | ISSN: 1684-2057 | www.sa !"b#$e.

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The Six Steps to Get Out of the Balochistan Quicksand

() A H A'"$ IS*A+A(AD, Feb!#a!) 25: W,a "s ,a--e$"$. "$ (a/&%,"s a$ &$%e a.a"$ 'e!e/) -!&0es ,e -!&1&#$2 !# , "$ ,e a2a.e 3T,&se w,& 2& $& /ea!$ 1!&' ,"s &!) a!e %&$2e'$e2 & !e-ea " 3. O$%e a.a"$ 4a5"s a$6s '"/" a!) 7#$ a "s a5"$. 4a5"s a$ &wa!2s -&ss"b/e %"0"/ wa! a$2 se%ess"&$. T,e w!" "$. "s %/ea! &$ ,e wa//. This is a brief strategic analysis of the Balochistan situation. Wars since 1945 are fought by proxy. Without

formal declaration and in the shadows. Balochistan is simply another such war. The essence of the whole affair is a combination of two factors. One being real or percei ed in!ustices meted out to the Baloch race by the "a#istani federal establishment or mafia. $econd being the complex geopolitical game being played since 19%9& the high point of which was 9'11. Balochistan has been the (ra idian or aboriginal pro ince of "a#istan. )a ing been educated in *uetta the intense albeit secret manner in which federal go ernment personnel& both ci il and military& despised the Baloch was a crystal clear fact for anyone with lin#s to the abo e mentioned select mafia. +as was disco ered in early 195,s but Balochistan denied it till 19-. when the first significant /"+ gas pro!ect was completed in *uetta. /ater a gas pipeline was also laid till *uetta& with much show off by the military !unta of the usurper 0ia when Balochistan was headed by a corps commander and father in law of 0ia1s son who had absented himself from 19-1 war and who late +eneral 2fti#har $haheed had owed to ha e shot after the war for cowardice. +wadar another contro ersial pro!ect was started 3, years too late by the present military !unta. +wadar far from being iewed as a positi e pro!ect is perhaps rightly iewed by the Baloch as another 4ho#rapar railway conspiracy to turn the Baloch into a minority.The matter is simple. 2n 19.9 once the 5ahya 6artial /aw was imposed a leading Baloch leader explained to the +eneral Officer 7ommanding& 1. (i ision in *uetta& that de elopment in Balochistan would mean turning the Baloch indigenous population into a minority and this would not be acceptable to any Baloch whether a common man or a $ardar. This faux pas was committed by 6usharraf once he started +wadar. 2nterestingly +wadar& a future 7hinese na al base and a city that would turn the Baloch into a minority in their own pro ince& is a thorn both for the Baloch and the 8$. 9 deadly possible con ergence of interest in a delicate geopolitical era once 8$ is the only :oman ;mpire fighting the Barbarians. The brilliant "a#istani military !unta led by arm chair strategists thin# that they defeated the Baloch in 194%&195% & 19.4&19.% and 19-. and would do it again.This is a gra e error. 9n imperial strategic blunder. Today with 8$ in 9fghanistan& 9fghanistan being the new 8$ "hilippines& Balochistan is a different ball game. The new 8$ strategic agenda is possibly the creation of a 4urd $tate. 2f it is extended to creation of a new Baloch state& it should not be a surprise. 9n independent Baloch state would gi e the 8$ an excellent base which could possibly replace'supplement both 9fghanistan and "a#istan to stri#e at future strategic targets in 7entral 9sia& 6iddle ;ast and ;astern 7hina. 9 clean corridor from the 2ndian Ocean till 7entral 9sia for pipelines etc with no problem clients li#e the "ashtun Taliban or the "a#istani military !unta with its ery own personal power problems. 6ilitarily "a#istan 9rmy if committed in Balochistan is certainly bound to come to greater grief than it did in any of its internal wars. The Baloch guerrillas with a paltry <3 6illion per month can commit some = to 5 "a#istani di isions doing exactly what the 2ndians were doing in 4ashmir. 9n independent Balochistan would be a strategic opportunity for 8$. /in#ing 8$ occupied 9fghanistan directly with the 2ndian Ocean. 9 few billion 8$ dollars pumped in the possibly independent state& with an ambassador li#e 0almay 4halil>ad super ising distribution of funds can ma#e Balochistan more prosperous than (ubai. 9 ery nai e statement was made by the +o ernor of Balochistan blaming the entire situation to the influx of external support from Balochistan1s ?orth and ?orthwestern border. There is no doubt that the present war in Balochistan is indigenous. ;xternal support succeeds once a guerrilla war has internal roots. Today the war in Balochistan has the combined support of the Baloch masses and the $ardar. The last attempt to sa e Balochistan from becoming another $indh dominated by ethnic mafias from outside the pro ince or more closely an 9ustralia populated by whites. What should be the response. @irst the "a#istani military !unta needs to stop the construction of new cantonments. $econd should be careful control on population of +wadar. 9ll non Baloch doing business in +wadar must not be allowed the right to ote in any elections

held in +wadar. Third control of +wadar being gi en to the Balochistan "ro incial +o ernment. @ourth Balochistan "ro incial +o ernment allowed to ma#e direct economic entures with foreign in estors so that the 2slamabad non Baloch @ederal mafia is sidelined. @ifth cancellation of all land deals in +wadar. The @ederal +o ernment may compensate the losers. 2t would be less costly than fighting another 19-1 li#e war in which the "a#istan 9rmed @orces were humiliated and se erely damaged both materially and psychologically. $ixth transfer of control of all mineral and gas installations to the Balochistan "ro incial +o ernment. The @ederal +o ernment may monitor the facilities. The "a#istan military !unta needs to understand that the best way to protect the Baloch oil and gas resources are the proud chests of the Baloch race and not the paid soldiers of an army with a strong preA194- mercenary tradition& ha ing fired at its own people in 1%5-& in 1919 and at the )oly 4a1aba B)ouse of +odC in $audi 9rabia. The Balochistan war may be fatal for "a#istan. 2f 8$$: was disintegrated what is "a#istan. 9 small fly. 9 microscopic one. /astly the "a#istani military !unta needs to remember 4issinger1s famous DuoteE FTo be an enemy of 8$ is O4& but to be its friend is deadly.F 6ay 9llah instill some sanity in the macho men leading "a#istan wearing camouflaged commando !ac#ets in sheer iolation of the F(ress :egulationsF of "a#istan 9rmy. The military leaders must read a little $ha#espeareE FThe fault dear Brutus is not in our stars & but oursel es.F @or +ods sa#e stop blaming the 2ndians& Gews or 9mericans. Gustice begins at home and "a#istan1s ci il and military rulers ha e exploited Balochistan since 194-. Once they admit this fact e erything will start to fall in line and be O4. The writer is former Assistant Editor of Defence Journal, Tank Corps retired Major of Pakistan Army and author of the Pakistan Army till 1 !" used as a reference material at #arious military academies and institutions in the world includin$ %& Army 'ar Colle$e Carlisle and %& Army Command and (eneral &taff Colle$e )ort *ea#enworth+ Email, pa#oca#alry-kurdland+com ;mail $tory H
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