HRA CONSULTATION NO.

26-MF-7555-00D 2000

September

APPENDIX C

Depleted Uranium Exposures to Personnel Following the Camp Doha Fire, Kuwait, July 1991
R. I. Scherpelz R. J. Traub J. G. Droppo M. A. Parkhurst

June 2000

Prepared for and edited by the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830

C-1

Depleted Uranium Exposures to Personnel Following the Camp Doha Fire, Kuwait, July 1991

R. I. Scherpelz R. J. Traub J. G. Droppo M. A. Parkhurst

June 2000

Prepared for and edited by the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, Washington 99352

i

Summary
On July 11 and 12, 1991, a fire engulfed a motor pool at the U.S. Army s Camp Doha, in Kuwait. This fire engulfed combat-ready military vehicles, including M1A1 tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and ammunition carriers, as well as stacks of stored ammunition. After the fire was out, this area remained extremely hazardous because some of the ammunition had caught fire or exploded from the heat and distributed unexploded ordnance (UXO) over a wide area. Although this UXO was far more hazardous and seriously life threatening, another type of potentially hazardous material was also left behind: the partially oxidized remains of DU penetrators from 120-mm series anti-armor rounds and the DU oxide dust generated by the heat of the fire. Depleted uranium is a mildly radioactive material and a heavy metal. This analysis of the Camp Doha fire focuses on the levels of DU to which workers may have been exposed and the resulting radiological and chemical toxicological risks to personnel from this exposure. This report describes scenarios of how Army and contractor personnel may have been exposed to DU during and after the fire. The scenarios are based primarily on reports that described the conditions and activities that occurred during and after the fire. The assumptions and uncertainties used in constructing the scenarios are documented. The scenarios attempt to describe conservative but reasonable exposure conditions that may have existed at Camp Doha. During the fire, personnel may have inhaled DU that was entrained in the smoke plume from the fire. After the fire, personnel may have handled DU penetrators and ingested or inhaled DU-containing dust during the decontamination and cleanup activities that occurred in the months following the fire. The exposure scenario for the decontamination and cleanup activities consists of four major activities. The first activity involved the recovery work that preceded decontamination and cleanup. During this activity, DU was suspended in the air by wind erosion. The second activity involved the removal of DU oxide piles formed from burned DU penetrators. The third activity involved sweeping of the contaminated area, an action that would have caused DU dusts to be suspended in air. The fourth activity involved sweeping of the contaminated area a second time, during which, remaining DU would again have been suspended in the air by the sweeping action. After the second sweeping, essentially all DU was removed from the area. This report also contains the results of dose calculations, both chemical and radiation doses, that may have been received by personnel who were downwind of the fire, and by personnel who participated in the decontamination and cleanup activities. Two types of calculation were performed for this study: exposure calculations and dosimetry calculations. The exposure calculations estimate the air concentrations of DU to which the personnel may have been exposed. The chemical dosimetry calculations estimate the maximum concentration of uranium in the target organ due to the exposure scenario activities. For uranium, the target organ is usually identified as the kidney. The radiation dosimetry calculations estimate the CEDE that would have been received from activities described by the exposure scenario. The results of the calculations of concentrations and doses from the scenarios during the fire and from post-fire activities, uncertainties encountered, and estimated doses are described below.

ii

Exposure from DU Oxides in the FirePlume During the phase of the fire that produced the highest uranium air concentrations, the estimated average air concentration was 3.5 10-7 g-U/m3 at the location of highest concentration. This concentration is well below the ACGIH limit of 2 10-4 g-U/m3 for workers exposed daily to uranium in air and represents a low concentration. This air concentration is also below the NRC limit for exposures of the general public to insoluble uranium. No workers were reported to have been present (or remained) in or near this area during the fire. The maximum radiological dose to a worker located in the position of highest air concentration for the full duration of the fire was calculated to be 0.000003 rem (CEDE), well below the annual limit of 0.10 rem for exposure by a member of the public. The chemical dose assessment estimated the maximum concentration to the kidney of a person located at the position of highest air concentration for the duration of the fire would have been approximately 2.8 10-7 g-U/g of kidney. This concentration is well below 3 g-U/g of kidney, which is the concentration of uranium in the kidney thought to cause kidney damage in humans. Exposures and Doses from Recovery and Cleanup Activities During the recovery and cleanup activities, the estimated air concentrations ranged from 3.8 10-5 g/m3 to 4.2 10-4 g/m3. These air concentrations, when averaged over the course of a year, are below the NRC limit when adjusted for particle size distribution for occupational exposure to airborne uranium, but they are greater than the NRC limits for exposure of the general public to uranium. These estimated air concentrations are greater than 2 10-4 g/m3, which is the ACGIH limit for continuous exposure to uranium (the TWA), but are lower than 6 10-4 g/m3, the ACGIH limit for short-term exposures (TLV-STEL). The ACGIH air concentration limit was exceeded for only three weeks. The chemical assessment estimated that the maximum concentration of uranium in the kidney of the most highly exposed workers was 9.5 10-2 g-U/g of kidney. This concentration is below 3 g-U/g of kidney, which is the concentration of uranium in the kidney that is thought to cause kidney damage in humans. The estimated chemical dose is low even though the air concentrations were high because only small amounts of the uranium would be deposited in the lung; most of the dust particles were too large to be inhaled. The estimated radiological dose received by the most highly exposed workers was 0.065 rem. This dose is less than 0.1 rem, which is the NRC annual dose limit for individual members of the public. Uncertainties Encountered This study relied primarily on eyewitness accounts, some of which were conflicting. Also, because there was no air monitoring performed during these activities, it was necessary to estimate many quantities that were used to calculate the doses received. iii

Although the total inventory of DU munitions was known, the quantity of DU oxide formed during the fire was not known. There were no measurement data to assist in this determination. The day-by-day location of each recovery worker was also not known. Only general descriptions of job categories and type of work performed were available. No resuspension factors have been measured specifically for DU. It was necessary to use resuspension factors from studies done with different materials. Particle size distribution greatly influences the chemical and radiological doses received by workers. The particle size distribution of the DU oxides that remained close to a burned penetrator was based on dust samples from two penetrators that were burned in a wood and diesel fuel fire. It is assumed, but not certain, that the particle size distribution of DU oxides from the test burn is similar to that of the Camp Doha fire oxides. Estimated Doses The estimated chemical and radiation doses to personnel who were at Camp Doha during the fire and who participated in the decontamination and cleanup activities following the fire are low. The estimated doses are all below the limits set by U.S. regulatory agencies. The estimated air concentrations of DU oxide to which the workers may have been exposed were high, but only for a few weeks rather than for a full year. The estimated chemical exposures that occurred during decontamination of the area and the first sweeping exceeded the ACGIH limits, but for only 2 weeks. The estimated chemical dose, represented by the concentration of uranium in the kidney, did not exceed the recommended limits. The radiological exposures did not exceed the limits for occupational exposure to airborne uranium. The radiological exposure limits for exposure of members of the general public were exceeded but only for approximately 3 weeks. The radiological dose received by the most highly exposed group of individuals did not exceed the dose limit for members of the general public.

iv

Acronyms
ACGIH ALI AMAD AMCCOM ARF BDAT CEC CECOM CEDE CHPPM DAC DIL DU ECC EOD gsd GI ICRP MEPAS NBC NCRP OSAGWI OSHA PEL PPE RADCON TLV TLV-STEL TLV-TWA American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists annual limit on intake activity median aerodynamic diameter Armament Munitions and Chemical Command airborne release fraction Battle Damage Assessments Team Combat Engineer Company Communications-Electronics Command committed effective dose equivalent Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine derived air concentration derived investigation level depleted uranium Environmental Chemical Corporation Explosive Ordnance Disposal geometric standard deviation gastrointestinal International Commission on Radiological Protection Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System Nuclear-Biological-Chemical National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Occupational Safety and Health Administration permissible exposure limit personnel protective equipment radiological control threshold limit value threshold limit value short-term exposure limit threshold limit value - time-weighted average

UN UXO

United Nations unexploded ordnance

vi

Contents
Summary ...................................................................................................................................... Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... 1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2.0 General Approach to Dose Assessment .................................................................................. 3.0 Estimate of the Quantity and Distribution of DU Oxides ........................................................ 3.1 Mass of DU Involved in the Fire ..................................................................................... 3.2 Mass of DU Oxides Created by the Fire........................................................................... 3.2.1 DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Tanks .......................................................... 3.2.2 DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Conexes ...................................................... 3.3 Distribution of DU Oxide in the Doha North Compound ................................................. 4.0 Estimate of DU-In-Air Concentrations and Transport............................................................. 4.1 DU-In-Air Concentrations Accompanying the Fire .......................................................... 4.1.1 Mass of DU Released During the Fire .................................................................... 4.1.2 Relative Air Concentrations ................................................................................... 4.1.3 Time-Integrated DU-in-Air Concentrations at Exposure Locations......................... 4.2 DU-In-Air Concentrations Resulting from Resuspension ................................................. 5.0 Recovery Worker Activities and DU Exposure....................................................................... 5.1 Methodology................................................................................................................... 5.2 Worker Activity .............................................................................................................. 5.2.1 Explosive Ordnance Demolition Personnel (146th Ordnance Detachment) .............. 5.2.2 Engineers [58th Combat Engineering Company (CEC)] .......................................... vii iii vii 1.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3

5.2.3 54th Chemical Troop .............................................................................................. 5.2.4 Regimental NBC Officers ...................................................................................... 5.2.5 Armament Munitions and Chemical Command ...................................................... 5.2.6 U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command............................................... 5.2.7 2nd Squadron Soldiers ............................................................................................ 5.2.8 ECC Contractors.................................................................................................... 6.0 Dose Assessment ................................................................................................................... 6.1 Physical Properties of DU Oxides.................................................................................... 6.1.1 Density of Uranium Oxides ................................................................................... 6.1.2 Particle Size Distribution of Uranium Oxides......................................................... 6.2 Biokinetic Properties of Uranium Oxides......................................................................... 6.3 Personnel Characteristics................................................................................................. 6.3.1 Inhalation .............................................................................................................. 6.3.2 Ingestion Characteristics ........................................................................................ 6.4 Biokinetic Models ........................................................................................................... 6.4.1 Respiratory Tract Model ........................................................................................ 6.4.2 GI Tract Model...................................................................................................... 6.4.3 Systemic Models ................................................................................................... 6.4.4 Computer Implementations of the Biokinetic Models ............................................. 6.5 Internal Dose Factors ...................................................................................................... 6.5.1 Tissue-Weighting Factors ...................................................................................... 6.5.2 Inhalation Dose Factors ......................................................................................... 6.5.3 Ingestion Dose Factor ............................................................................................ viii

5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7

6.6 Doses Received by Personnel Exposed to DU During the Fire ......................................... 6.6.1 Chemical Doses ..................................................................................................... 6.6.2 Radiation Doses..................................................................................................... 6.7 Doses Received by Personnel Exposed to DU During Recovery Work ............................ 6.7.1 Chemical Doses ..................................................................................................... 6.7.2 Radiation Doses to Recovery Workers ................................................................... 7.0 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 7.1 Significance of DU Exposures......................................................................................... 7.1.1 Chemical Doses ..................................................................................................... 7.1.2 Radiation Doses..................................................................................................... 7.2 Modeling Uncertainty ..................................................................................................... 7.2.1 Sensitivity of Results to Assumptions .................................................................... 7.2.2 Data Limitations .................................................................................................... 8.0 References .............................................................................................................................

6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.10 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.4 8.1

Figures
1.1 Camp Doha Map.................................................................................................................... 3.1 Conceptual Model of the Distribution of DU Oxides in the Camp Doha North Compound, July 12, 1991............................................................................................. 3.2 Modeling Assumptions for the Mass of DU Oxides Present in the Camp Doha North Compound from July 11, 1991 through November 15, 1991......................................... 4.1 Calculated Relative Air Concentrations for the Elevated Release............................................ 4.2 Calculated Relative Air Concentrations for the Ground-Level Release ................................... 4.3 Air Concentrations of DU Over the Doha North Compound Following the July 11-12, 1991 Fire ............................................................................................................. ix 1.2

3.8

3.11 4.4 4.5

4.10

Tables
3.1 DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Burned M1A1 Tanks ................................................... 3.2 Scenario for Fate of DU Rounds in Conexes .......................................................................... 3.3 Summary of DU Oxide Produced in the Doha Fire ................................................................. 3.4 Deposits of DU Oxides in the North Compound Following the July 11-12 Fire ...................... 4.1 Meteorological Data for Time of Emissions ........................................................................... 4.2 Time-Integrated Relative Concentrations (Chi/Q) as a Function of Distance from the Origin, Based on Elevated- and Ground-Level Release Heights.......................................................... 4.3 Average DU Surface Concentrations for DU Oxide Piles in the North Compound Following the July 11-12 Fire ................................................................................................ 4.4 Parameters Used for Resuspension ......................................................................................... 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.2

4.3

4.8 4.9

5.1 Exposed Troops During July 1991 Doha Accident (recovery workers only not counting troops downwind of the fire)............................................................................................................. 5.2 6.1. Summary of Assumptions Employed in the Calculation of Inhalation and Ingestion Dose Factors........................................................................................................... 6.2 Inhalation Doses Received by People Downwind of the Doha Fire ......................................... 6.3 Chemical Doses Received by Personnel During Recovery Work Activities at Camp Doha ..... 6.4 Internal Doses Received by Personnel During Recovery Work Activities at Camp Doha ........

6.2 6.8 6.10 6.12

1.0 Introduction
This report was prepared for the U.S. Army by PNNL to document a study of exposures of personnel to DU during and after the fire that occurred at Camp Doha, Kuwait on July 11 and 12, 1991.(a) The fire engulfed the 2nd Squadron motor pool at Camp Doha. Although fighting in the Gulf War had ceased several months before the accident, sudden aggression by the Iraqi military was considered a serious possibility, and the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Camp Doha was poised to serve as a deterrent or rapid response force if needed. Thus military vehicles, including M1A1 tanks, BFV, and ammunition carriers, were combat-ready in the motor pool, uploaded with a full complement of ammunition. After the fire started in an ammunition carrier, it quickly became an extremely hazardous event with exploding ammunition. These explosions distributed ordnance over a wide area, leaving an extremely dangerous debris field containing a high concentration of UXO. The recovery and cleanup work after the fire was performed with a sense of urgency due to the threat of an enemy nearby. The immense area to be recovered was scattered with UXOs, which were often concealed by other debris. In fact, unintentional UXO explosions caused serious injury and three deaths among recovery workers. In addition to the military threat and life-threatening danger of UXOs, environmental conditions made recovery work very difficult. Desert temperatures were typically above 100F, a constant wind blew, smoke from burning oil wells was always present, and biting sand flies and other insects were a constant annoyance. Approximately 660 120-mm series rounds, containing DU penetrators, were involved in the fire. The hazards of DU are of two types: chemical and radiological. The chemical toxicity of DU is similar to other heavy metals with storage in the skeleton and excretion via the urine accompanied by renal toxicity. The radiological toxicity of DU is derived from U-238, the major constituent of DU, which is radioactive, albeit with a low SpA (0.336 Ci/g). Consequently, DU presents potential chemical and radiological risks from repeatedly handling of the penetrators or from inhaling or ingesting DU oxides formed in the fire. At the time of the recovery work, the chemical and radiological risks were acknowledged, but generally considered insignificant in relation to other safety hazards, and for many recovery workers it was unknown. Thus, protective actions that are considered standard practice for routine industrial chemical and radiological work in more comfortable settings were not typically employed. This report documents the assessment of chemical and radiation exposures received by personnel who may have been exposed to airborne releases and debris from the Camp Doha fire and to recovery personnel who worked in and near the contaminated areas in the months after the fire (see camp map in Figure 1.1). The data needed for the dose assessments were gathered by studying accounts of the accident and recovery work including the Environmental Exposure Report released by the OSAGWI, OSAGWI (1998).

(a) PNNL is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830. 1.1

Fire started here

Figure 1.1. Camp Doha Map Additionally, results of tests that have been performed to understand the physical behavior of DU during fires and airborne transport were reviewed for pertinent properties. Some of these were reviewed and summarized by Parkhurst et al. (1995).

1.2

These dose assessments are based on our best current understanding of post-fire conditions and personnel recovery activities. Limited quantitative information about DU oxides actually present means that large uncertainties exist in input parameters used in the analysis. In lieu of actual information, numerous assumptions were made concerning the existing conditions and personnel activities. These assumptions were always chosen to be as reasonable as possible but still conservative to avoid underestimating a dose. The bases for these assumptions are documented in this report. The ensuing chapters describe the dose assessment approach, how the quantity and distribution of DU oxides were estimated, how the concentrations and transportation of DU in air were estimated, the activities of the recovery workers and their related chemical and radiological exposure to DU, the assessment of dose to recovery workers, and finally conclusions about the significance of DU exposures and modeling uncertainties.

1.3

2.0 General Approach to Dose Assessment

This chapter describes the approach taken to assess doses to recovery workers after the Camp Doha fire. In considering possible dose pathways, it was determined that recovery workers could have been exposed to the hazards of DU via the following dose pathways: external doses to the hands and whole body from handling DU penetrators inhalation of DU oxides entrained in smoke generated by the fire inhalation of DU oxides resuspended from surface contamination ingestion of DU oxides from contaminated surfaces. Of these possible pathways, the most significant sources of exposure are the two inhalation and the incidental ingestion pathways. The external radiation dose rate from DU, including DU penetrators, is low and requires long exposure times to approach significant levels. The inhalation pathway is significant only when the DU is in the form of fine particles, which can happen only after the DU oxidizes. In military scenarios, DU can oxidize when a penetrator strikes an obstacle such as armor or becomes engulfed in a fire. Because there were no oxides caused by impact of armor, fire-generated oxides represent the primary chemical and radiological risk factors in the Doha event. To assess the intake of DU oxides entrained in smoke, the following steps were taken: 1. The mass of DU oxides generated in the fire was estimated. 2. The fraction of the DU oxides entrained by the fire effluents was estimated. 3. The transport of airborne DU oxides to personnel downwind was calculated. 4. The amount of DU oxides inhaled by a person downwind was calculated. 5. The intake of DU oxides was converted to dose. To assess the inhalation of DU oxides by recovery workers in contaminated areas and downwind of contaminated areas, the following steps were taken to estimate the source term: 1. The mass of DU oxides generated in the fire was estimated. 2. The distribution of DU oxides as surface contamination in Camp Doha was estimated. 3. The resuspension of DU oxides from contaminated surfaces was estimated.

2.1

4. The air concentrations from resuspended DU oxides were estimated. Activities of recovery workers were reconstructed, including the following: the dates of activities during which exposure might have occurred the total number of hours spent in the recovery areas the types of recovery activities causing DU oxide resuspension. Finally, the amount of DU oxides inhaled by a representative person in each worker category was calculated, and the DU oxide intake was converted to dose.

2.2

3.0 Estimate of the Quantity and Distribution of DU Oxides

This chapter discusses the source term used to assess potential personnel exposures and describes the steps involved to estimate 1) the mass of DU involved in the fire, 2) the amount of DU that was converted to DU oxides, and 3) the distribution of these DU oxides over the Camp Doha site. The source term is the quantity of the material in question that is available for personnel exposures. For this study, the source term is the mass of DU, in an oxide form, that could present chemical and radiological exposures.

3.1

Mass of DU Involved in the Fire

There were 660 120mm DU rounds reportedly involved in the Doha fire. This figure was derived from an accident report (U.S. Army Safety Center 1991) containing a list of ammunition destroyed in the fire. The 120mm DU round is an antitank round deployed by the M1A1 main battle tank during the Gulf War. The round includes a DU penetrator, which is a rod of DU metal that weighs approximately 4 to 5 kg. Two variations of the 120mm round were used in the Gulf War: one with an approximate mass of 4 kg and one with an approximate mass of 4.68 kg. No report exists that states how many of the two variations were involved in the Doha fire, but this study conservatively assumes that all rounds were of the 4.68 kg variation. Thus, the total mass of DU metal from the 660 rounds would be approximately 660 x 4.68 or 3,090 kg DU. The 120mm DU rounds represent the only source of DU that could produce personnel exposure in the Doha incident. During the Gulf War, the military also employed two other types of munitions containing DU, the 105mm antitank round and 30mm rounds in the GAU-8 Gatling gun mounted on A-10 aircraft; neither of these rounds were present in Doha. Bradley Fighting Vehicles currently employ 25mm rounds, and some witnesses mistakenly recollect the presence of these rounds in Doha, but the military did not field this type of round until well after 1991. There was also concern about the DU that was part of the heavy armor of the M1A1. However, the BDAT that inspected the burned M1A1 tanks at Doha reported that the armor packages were undamaged, and there was no possibility that DU from the tank armor was available to add to the DU source term, OSAGWI (1998). Thus, the source term for this study assumes an approximate 3,090-kg mass of DU, in the form of metal, available for oxidation and dispersion.

3.2

Mass of DU Oxides Created by the Fire

The only DU available for personnel exposure by the inhalation and ingestion pathways was DU oxides. The oxides of DU, in the form of UO2 and U3O8, are formed when DU penetrators are subjected to high temperatures (above several hundred degrees Celsius) for several hours. Generally, when a round is exposed to high heat sufficient to ignite the propellant in the cartridge case, the resulting pressure ejects the projectile containing the penetrator some distance away. If there were no obstacles in the way, the penetrator could travel 20 ft or more before coming to rest (based on the results of tests performed using the 12mm DU round, Haggard et al., (1986). On the other hand, nearby obstacles could stop a penetrator 3.1

near its original position. In the Doha event, the resting location of the penetrator determined the degree of oxidation: if the penetrator landed in a portion of the fire where it would be exposed to high temperatures for a number of hours, the oxidation could be extensive, approaching 90 to 100 percent of the metal. If the penetrator landed in a location sheltered from high temperatures, no oxidation would occur (there may have been minute quantities of DU oxides clinging to the penetrator from previous corrosion, but these oxides would be insignificant contributors to the source term). Observers found examples of both extremes in the debris of the Doha North Compound, OSAGWI (1998). Burn tests were performed on 120mm DU ammunition in 1982, 1983, and 1985 and provide insights into probable oxidation behavior. The results from these tests can give some information on the possible creation of DU oxides in the Doha fire, but care must be taken in applying the results of the burn tests because they did not simulate the conditions at Camp Doha. The first and second burn tests were conducted with 12 120mm DU rounds in wooden shipping containers using wood and diesel oil to fuel the fire, Hooker et al., (1983). In this test, as each round s propellant burned off, there was no pressurization in either the cartridge case (which is combustible) or the shipping container, so the penetrators dropped into the fire, and the fire burned for approximately 2 days. Thus, the penetrators remained at high temperature for a long period of time, and oxidation was extensive. Many of the rounds oxidized completely, and a total of 84 percent of the DU metal was oxidized. The 1985 test (Haggard et al. 1986) was conducted similarly with 12 120mm DU rounds except that the cartridges were packaged in metal shipping containers. The metal container provided pressurization when the propellant ignited for each round, and the penetrators were ejected to some degree. Eight of the rounds were ejected out of the fire area and experienced no oxidation. Three more landed 5 ft from the test stand, where they oxidized slightly (2, 10, and 12 percent of the metal was oxidized for these rounds). One round landed at the base of the stand and experienced 90 percent oxidation. The 1983 test was performed with rounds in wooden shipping containers, which was unlike the configuration used in Doha. Thus, it did not include the effect of pressurization and subsequent ejection of a penetrator as occurred in Doha. However, it indicated that penetrators remaining in the fire for many hours would completely oxidize. This may have some applicability to cartridges loaded and trapped in the M1A1 tanks that caught fire. The 1985 test used penetrators in metal containers, so the pressurization and ejection mechanisms were the same for this test and for the rounds stored in conexes that were involved in the Doha fire. However, the analogy is limited, because in the burn test an ejected penetrator was likely to land outside the fire, where no oxidation would occur. In the Doha fire, a round may have been ejected 20 ft or more from its original position but may still have been within the fire and subjected to temperatures that produce oxidation. In addition to the intentional burn tests, rounds stowed in an Abrams tank were involved in a vehicle fire at the conclusion of a series of impact tests, Fliszar, Wilsey, and Bloore (1989). This vehicle had several holes from impact providing channels for the fire to vent. Seventeen penetrators were expelled 3.2

during the fire. One was caught on a tow hook and remained in the fire where it oxidized about 70 percent of the penetrator. Of those expelled, about 4.4 percent of their DU oxidized. Of those retained in the tank, about 15.5 percent of their DU oxidized. Immediately before the Camp Doha fire started, there were two general locations for 120mm DU rounds: uploaded in M1A1 tanks and stored in conexes on the motor pool pad. Three M1A1 tanks burned; each held a full load of 37 120mm DU rounds, accounting for 111 of the 660 damaged rounds. The other 549 damaged rounds were stored in conexes in the motor pool area. The fate of rounds originating in the conexes is different than the fate of the rounds in the tank because of the differing fire conditions and, consequently, different oxidation conditions in the two locations.

3.2.1

DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Tanks

Each of the three burned tanks had 37 120mm DU rounds that were damaged by the fire. It is possible that some of these rounds were ejected from their storage locations or from the tank itself by ignition of the propellant, but BDAT and other observers stated that the blast control panels were extremely effective at confining the penetrators. These eyewitness accounts are believed to mean that the penetrators/projectiles remained within their storage racks. However, to be conservative, this study assumes that for each tank, no more than one penetrator was ejected and 36 penetrators, whether oxidized or not, remained inside the tank, OSAGWI (1998). The degree of oxidation can be estimated based on several observations by eyewitnesses: Most of the penetrators found in the tanks were scorched but intact. Others had melted, fragmented, or oxidized to some degree in the intense heat. The heaviest concentration of DU contamination was found in the interiors of the burned tanks. A possible scenario that would match these observations would have 26 rounds experiencing less than 10 percent oxidation (5 percent assumed) (most scorched but intact); the others remaining in the tank would experience more. Nine rounds would experience 20 percent oxidation, and one round would experience 50 percent oxidation. This degree of oxidation could be experienced in an extended hot fire. This scenario produces an average oxidation of 10 percent; when applied to the 36 rounds remaining in each tank during the fire; it would produce 16.9 kg of DU in the form of oxide (roughly 40 lb of charcoalcolored powder). If the degree of oxidation had been substantially more than 10 percent, the quantity of DU oxide inside a tank should have drawn astonished remarks from observers, who would have found large piles of charcoal dust in the bustle or hull racks or found themselves ankle-deep in charcoal dust when they entered a burned tank. No such comments were mentioned so 10 percent oxidation inside the tanks seems reasonable. For the estimated (hypothetical) three rounds (one from each burned tank) that might have landed outside the tanks, it is difficult to reconstruct the oxidation conditions they may have landed in cool spots or hot spots. Observers mentioned that substantial DU oxides were found in the vicinity of the 3.3

burned tanks, so an estimate of 50 percent oxidation for these penetrators would be reasonable, leading to an estimate that about 7 kg of DU as oxides could be found on the surface near the tanks. A summary of the DU oxides produced from rounds in the three burned tanks is presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.1. DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Burned M1A1 Tanks Rounds in each M1A1 tank Number of penetrators remaining in each tank % Oxidation of DU remaining in tanks Mass of DU oxides inside each tank at end of fire Mass of DU oxides inside three tanks at end of fire Number of penetrators ejected from three tanks % Oxidation of DU, ejected penetrators Mass of DU oxide outside tanks 37 36 10% 16.9 kg 50.5 kg 3 50% 7.0 kg

In the event that the eyewitness accounts or the interpretation of them underestimate the number of ejected penetrators, an alternative estimate for the number of rounds remaining inside the tank could be derived by analogy with the results of a test with an Abrams tank, Fliszar, Wilsey, and Bloore (1989). During this test, after a number of rounds had been fired at an uploaded tank, the tank caught fire, and 17 DU rounds out of 27 uploaded DU rounds were expelled. However, the assumption used in this assessment considers 37 uploaded DU rounds. If this observation were used as a basis for estimation, the values in Table 3.1 would be modified so that 19.7 kg (14 penetrators/tank x 4.68 kg/penetrator x 10% oxidation x 3 tanks) of DU oxides remained in the tank at the end of the fire and 161.5 kg (23 penetrators/tank x 4.68 kg/penetrator x 50% oxidation x 3 tanks) of DU oxides would have formed outside the tanks as a result of penetrator ejection. The values in Table 3.1 are used as this study s basis for dose assessment, because they are based on eyewitness expert observation, but the alternative values should be recognized as alternate upper-bound values.

3.2.2

DU Oxides Produced from Rounds in Conexes

For the 549 rounds that were stored in conexes, an estimate of the DU oxide produced can begin with some quotes from eyewitnesses and excerpts from Tab I of the OSAGWI (1998) report: In addition to the estimated 111 sabot rounds uploaded on the burned tanks, several hundred other sabot rounds were stored in MILVANS trailers or conexes in the 2nd Squadron motor pool. Some of these had exploded in fires that were of such sustained intensity that steel howitzers and other equipment had melted, making it likely that many DU rounds had been damaged by oxidation in the fires. Localized contamination was also found around three of the tanks and several of the burned conexes, however, reports and accounts by RADCON personnel indicated that the

3.4

levels of radiation here were below even the regulatory guidelines for donning respiratory protection. In addition, several hundred spent DU penetrators had been scattered and in some cases partially burned and oxidized in and around the MILVANS containers holding each platoon s ammunition resupply load. Upon entering the 2nd Squadron motor pool, the ECC team found large quantities of DU scattered around the vicinity of the MILVAN containers (used for ammo storage) that had detonated in the fire. Many of these DU penetrators were intact, but others had fragmented or burned down to varying degrees, with some almost completely reduced. In addition to these reports, Tab I of the OSAGWI (1998) report contains a photograph of a collection of more than 40 penetrators that were gathered from the North Compound (see Figure 1.1). Inspection of this photo shows that 11 of the penetrators still had their nose cones and tail fins intact, which meant that the temperatures to which they were exposed were probably not high enough to produce oxidation. Another 14 had either tail fins or nose cones still intact, so if any oxidation occurred it was trivial: probably less than 5 percent of the metal oxidized. Another 14 exhibited some degree of oxidation, but not substantial: probably less than 10 percent of the metal oxidized. The three penetrators that showed the worst degree of oxidation probably did not suffer more than 20 percent oxidation. This collection was not a representative sampling of the 549 rounds from conexes (it did not include any that were almost completely reduced to powder, nor did it include any where the propellant failed to ignite), but it does give a general indication of the range of penetrator conditions that could be found after the fire. Another photograph shows a conex containing DU rounds in essentially undamaged shipping packages. These rounds would have been designated as damaged, because they were in the fire area and their serviceability would be suspect for future use. Yet no oxidation of these penetrators should have occurred. With these observations as a guide, a scenario for the fate of the 549-conex penetrators was developed is summarized in Table 3.2. A summary of the estimate of the quantity of DU oxide generated in the Doha fire is presented in Table 3.3. As shown in Table 3.3, this study assumes that the total amount of DU in the oxides produced by the Doha fire was 465 kg, which is 15 percent of the DU metal present in the 660 penetrators. The uncertainties involved in this estimation are large, because there were no careful measurements made at Doha that could guide the estimating process. However, it is extremely unlikely that the total oxidation was less than 5 percent or more than 20 percent, and in the judgment of the study authors, 15 percent is probably a conservative overestimation.

3.5

Table 3.2. Scenario for Fate of DU Rounds in Conexes Estimate Total number of rounds 549 Rounds with 0% oxidation 300 0 10% oxidation (assume 5%) 100 10 25% oxidation (assume 17.5%) 50 25 50% oxidation (assume 37.5%) 25 50 90% oxidation (assume 70%) 25 > 90% oxidation (assume 95%) 49 Overall oxidation 16% Mass of DU oxide produced 408 kg Note: The assumed % is used in calculating the overall oxidation percentage. Table 3.3. Summary of DU Oxide Produced in the Doha Fire DU oxide produced in burned M1A1 tanks DU oxide produced by rounds ejected from tanks DU oxide produced from rounds stored in conexes Estimated Total 50.5 kg 7.0 kg 408.0 kg 465.0 kg

If the number of ejected penetrators were assumed to be 17 per burned tank rather than 3, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, the value in Table 3.3 for DU oxide produced by rounds ejected from tanks would be 119.3 kg instead of 7.0. (The oxides produced inside the tanks would be 28.1 kg instead of 50.5 kg.) The estimated total would be 555 instead of 465 kg. The oxides produced from DU penetrators in fires exist in a wide range of particle sizes. The results of the 1983 and 1985 burn tests with 120mm DU rounds indicated that only a small fraction, ranging from 0.08 to 0.6 percent (Mishima et al. 1985; Haggard et al. 1986), of the DU oxide formed in a fire was in the form of particles with an AED smaller than 10 m, which is the generally accepted upper limit of particles that are respirable and may pose an inhalation risk. In Section 3.3, the total mass of DU oxides that were produced, including the complete array of particle sizes, is discussed. The impact of particle size on resuspension is discussed in Section 4.2, and its impact on dose assessment is discussed in Chapter 6.0.

3.3

Distribution of DU Oxide in the Doha North Compound

The recovery workers reported that no DU was found outside the North Compound, and the DU oxides were restricted to the concrete pad that served as the motor pool for the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons. This observation is consistent with data from the 1985 burn test, which showed that 120mm DU rounds were ejected no more than 24 ft from the fire. DU deposits found in the North Compound consisted of

3.6

intact penetrators, solid remnants of penetrators (those portions that did not oxidize), and piles of DU oxides. After the fire, significant amounts of DU were found in two general locations: near the conexes in the general vicinity of the 2nd Squadron motor pool and near the burned tanks in the washrack area at the southern end of the North Compound. Because the distribution of DU oxides in the North Compound determined the exposures received by recovery workers, a conceptual model was developed to describe the location and quantity of DU oxide deposits. This model was developed based on eyewitness accounts, assumptions about the formation of DU oxides as described in the previous section, and knowledge of the behavior of DU oxides. The model illustrates the assumed DU oxide distribution and was used as a basis for estimating personnel exposures during the recovery effort (Figure 3.1). The map shows roughly the southern two-thirds of the North Compound. Dimensions on the map are approximate. The northern area of contamination, in the central part of the motor pool pad, is the region where fire engulfed conexes containing stored ammunition. Here penetrators were ejected from conexes and oxidized in the intense part of the fire. The intense fire area is assumed to cover a 70-meter-by-30-meter area (based on photographs and the observation of videos); any oxidation of penetrators would be expected to occur in this area. The model assumes that there were 249 discrete deposits of DU oxides randomly distributed in this area, one for each penetrator that experienced some degree of oxidization. Each penetrator was assumed to produce a small pile of DU oxide that would have collected on the ground underneath it. The data from Table 3.2 were used to determine the makeup of the individual DU oxide deposits distributed in the intense fire area in the 2nd Squadron motor pool area. The 249 penetrators with oxidation are assumed to be randomly distributed in the intense fire area. The model assumes that the DU oxides in the three highest oxidation categories fell off the penetrator and formed a pile of dust on the ground, where it could be exposed to resuspension effects. For the 17.5 percent oxidation category, some of the DU oxides fell to the ground to form a deposit, but some clung to the penetrator where it could not be resuspended. For the 5 percent deposits, it was assumed that the DU oxides clung tenaciously to the penetrator (matching the experience with oxidized penetrators in the laboratory, as reported in Haggard et al., 1986) and did not form loose powder deposits that could be resuspended. Table 3.4 gives a summary of the mass of DU oxides in each of the deposits. These deposits of DU oxides represent the source terms for exposure of recovery workers by resuspension. In the southern contamination area, near the washrack, three penetrators are assumed to have been ejected from the three burned tanks; the other rounds uploaded in the tanks were assumed to stay inside the tank. This gives two sources of contamination in the southern contamination area: 17 kg of DU oxide inside each of the three tanks and 7.0 kg in three discrete piles (with 2.3 kg DU each) where the penetrators were oxidized.

3.7

2nd
70 m x 30 m Intense fire area

Squadron Motor Pool

Oxidized Penetrator: total #: 249 DU oxide: 0-4.6 kg each Total DU oxide under penetrators: 408 kg

Note: This diagram does not show every oxidized penetrator (artistic license employed here).

Washrack Area
Burned M1A1 17 kg DU oxide each

Oxidized penetrator DU oxide mass: 2.3 kg each

DU oxide total for washrack area: 7.0 kg in piles under penetrators, 50.5 kg inside tanks

Figure 3.1. Conceptual Model of the Distribution of DU Oxides in the Camp Doha North Compound, July 12, 1991

3.8

North

Wind Direction: 302 - 326 deg Speed: 6-8 m/s

Table 3.4. Deposits of DU Oxides in the North Compound Following the July 11-12 Fire Mass of DU per Average Number deposit Amount of of (kg) Oxidation Deposits 49 95% 4.446 25 70% 3.276 25 37% 1.732 50 17.5% 0.819(a) 100 5% 0.234(b) (a) Some of DU oxides cling to penetrator. (b) All of DU oxides cling to penetrator. The DU oxide piles created under the oxidized penetrators were disturbed by the following activities: wind erosion the steady wind would resuspend some of the DU oxide particles and transport some particles downwind human and mechanical activity recovery workers walking in the area or vehicles moving through the area would stir up the DU oxide particles decontamination work recovery workers would clean up the DU oxide piles, removing the DU from the site and preventing it from causing personnel exposure sweeping after the penetrators and piles of DU oxides were removed by recovery workers, the pavement was swept. Residual DU oxides remaining on the pavement would have become airborne. The calculations performed in this study assumed that over time, the decontamination work decreased the quantity of DU oxides available for resuspension, and thus there was an air concentration that varied with time affecting the recovery workers. Figure 3.2 presents the assumed mass of DU in the form of oxides present in the 2nd Squadron motor pool area of the North Compound as a function of time following the fire. This graph is based on a set of simplified but conservative assumptions about the activities in the area that affected the DU: From July 11 until September 15, wind resuspension and light activity were the only major activities affecting the DU oxide mass. Following this time period, there was a 1-week decontamination effort where the bulk of the DU oxide piles were carefully removed. Following the decontamination effort, there was a 2-week period of sweeping the North Compound. This period was assumed to consist of a first sweeping, cleaning the entire intense fire area in 7 days. Then there was a second sweeping, again cleaning the same area in 7 days.

3.9

At the conclusion of the cleanup effort, the North Compound was clean, with no DU oxides remaining on the surface. The assumptions listed above differed in minor aspects from the reports of the activities, but the simplifications were made to allow for a reasonable modeling effort. As an example, some of the DU oxide was probably removed by EOD personnel in mid-July and by AMCOM and U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) personnel in later July, whereas the model assumes that all oxide removal occurred in September. The simplified model, however, used conservative assumptions, and if the assumptions had been more realistic, it would have produced lower exposure estimates to the recovery workers. The mass assumptions illustrated in Figure 3.2 are used in Section 4.2 of this study for the calculation of DU air concentrations. One effect is intentionally ignored in this conceptual model: the quantity of DU oxide that was made airborne during the fire and transported offsite. An estimate of this quantity is used in Chapter 4.0, where doses are calculated for people situated downwind of the fire. However, this quantity is small in relation to the total mass of DU oxide generated, and uncertainties in the estimation of oxide generated are large enough that ignoring the quantity removed during the fire does not affect the analysis appreciably.

3.10

4.0 Estimate of DU-In-Air Concentrations and Transport

This chapter discusses the estimations of air concentrations that were used to calculate exposure to the Camp Doha residents and recovery workers. Airborne exposure of DU occurred by transport of DU generated in the fire and entrained in the fire effluents and by resuspension of DU oxides loosely deposited on the ground.

4.1

DU-In-Air Concentrations Accompanying the Fire

During the fire, which began on July 11 and continued through July 12, DU oxides that were formed in the fire and were not contained by structures or debris could have become airborne and been transported downwind, exposing soldiers or other people in the area. This section describes how the study evaluated the degree of exposure that could have occurred from this source.

4.1.1

Mass of DU Released During the Fire

Analogies from previous burn tests provide a useful resource for determining the amount of DU that could have become airborne during the Doha fire. As part of the hazard classification test, in which 12 120mm DU rounds in metal shipping containers were burned (Haggard et al., 1986), a mass balance study was conducted of all DU involved in the fire. After the penetrators were burned, the researchers collected intact penetrators, partially oxidized penetrators, a large DU oxide pile that surrounded one penetrator, and DU-contaminated soil and ash debris. The mass of this metal and oxide was weighed or calculated from activity readings and compared with the pre-test DU inventory. The difference between the original and the post-test mass corresponded to the quantity of DU oxides that were unrecovered and represented the maximum amount of the DU oxides that could have become airborne during the fire. This unrecovered mass was found to be 0.1 percent of the total DU oxides formed. The 0.1 percent value is used by the current study to estimate the ARF for the fires at Doha. This ARF is believed to be conservative, because the burn test was performed under ideal conditions, with no surfaces above the fire to prevent the DU oxides from being transported into the air. In the Doha fire, the internal structures of the tank would have inhibited, to some degree, DU oxides that were created in the tanks from becoming airborne where they could be transported downwind. Using the ARF of 0.1 percent, the total calculated mass of DU oxides that became airborne during the fire would be 0.408 kg DU from the conexes (0.001 x 408 kg), and 0.0575 kg DU from the tanks (0.001 x 57.5 kg).

4.1.2

Relative Air Concentrations

The effect of the downwind transport of the airborne DU can be evaluated by atmospheric dispersion modeling. The computer code RATCHET-PC, a simplified version of the RATCHET software package (Ramsdell, Simonen, and Burk 1994) was used to perform the simulations. The transport calculations 4.1

were performed for a 24-hour time period to cover the duration of the fire. Actual Camp Doha meteorological data for July 11 and 12, 1991 were used in the model for the transport calculations. Atmospheric stability classes were chosen to match the existing conditions considering the time of day, temperature, and wind speed. The atmospheric mixing layer was chosen to be a constant 1500 meters. These conditions are summarized in Table 4.1. Table 4.1. Meteorological Data for Time of Emissions Wind Direction (Degrees) 310 310 310 320 330 320

Time (hours elapsed) 0-2 2-8 8 - 12 12 - 14 14 - 20 20 - 24

Windspeed (m/sec) 7 7 7 6 6 7

Temperature, C 43 44 41 38 36 39

Stability Class 2 2 2 4 5 4

The fire started at about 10:20 am, but no oxides were formed for several hours. Thus, the model assumed that airborne emissions began at 1:00 pm. The delay was to allow the fire to elevate the penetrators to their ignition temperatures. Most of the DU oxide emission was assumed to occur in the 12 hours following 1:00 pm; during this time period a release rate of 8 percent of the material per hour was used, for a total of 96 percent of the material emitted from the fire during the first 12 hours. The remaining 4 percent was assumed to have been made airborne during the remaining hours of the scenario. Many atmospheric dispersion models use a uniform set of meteorological conditions for the duration of plume passage, but RATCHET-PC models the plume movement using meteorological conditions that vary with time. Thus, the output of the model shows a two-dimensional pattern of downwind air concentrations that would result from the changing wind conditions and stability classes as they actually occurred. Two different scenarios were used for the release of the material: one with plume rise and one without. The heat generated by the fire causes the plume rise, giving the fire effluents buoyancy and driving the effluents high above the ground before transporting them downwind. Plume rise typically has the effect of making air concentrations lower within the first kilometer or so downwind. Ignoring plume rise, or modeling it as a ground-level release, would be conservative, so the ground-level release scenario was also modeled as an upper bound. The plume rise calculation was performed by assuming that releases occurred from four elevations: 10, 25, 50, and 100 meters above the ground. One-fourth of the material was released from each height. The ground-level release assumed that all material was released from only one elevation: 10 meters. RATCHET-PC was used to calculate relative time-integrated air concentrations, in units of sec/m3, for a grid of locations downwind of the release point (Table 4.2). These values represent time-integrated air concentrations for a hypothetical person located in the receptor position for the duration of plume 4.2

Table 4.2. Time-Integrated Relative Concentrations (Chi/Q) as a Function of Distance from the Origin, Based on Elevated- and Ground-Level Release Heights Time-Integrated Concentration Time-Integrated Concentration Based on Unit Release Based on Unit Release Ground-Level Release Elevated Release Distance Plume Plume from Origin Coordinates Max Chi/Q Coordinates Max Chi/Q km km East km South (sec/m3) km East km South (sec/m3) 2.7 10-9 9.7 10-9 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 7.8 10-7(a) 2.0 10-7 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.0 2.1 10-7 3.2 10-7 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.2 -7 3.0 10 5.5 10-7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 4.0 10-7 6.0 10-7(b) 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.7 3.9 10-7 4.4 10-7 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 2.0 3.3 10-7 2.6 10-7 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.4 2.2 2.0 10-7 1.2 10-7 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.5 9.2 10-8 7.6 10-8 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.7 -7 (a) Maxima in bold type; overall maximum for elevated release, 7.8 x 10 , is at 1.0 km. (b) Maximum for ground-level release is 6.0 x 10-7 at 1.70 km. passage. The values were calculated for nodal points of a grid that had 41 nodes in the East-West direction and 51 nodes in the North-South direction, with the nodes spaced 100 meters apart. The calculated relative air concentrations for the grid locations, assuming the elevated release, are presented diagrammatically as Figure 4.1, and the calculated air concentrations for the ground-level release are shown in Figure 4.2. Table 4.2 presents the maximum air concentrations for selected distances for both types of release.

4.1.3

Time-Integrated DU-in-Air Concentrations at Exposure Locations

The most significant location for troops who may have been exposed to airborne DU during the fire would be the United Nations (UN) Compound at the southern end of Camp Doha. Many soldiers assembled there during the fire and reported seeing smoke from the fire pass over them. This study calculated air concentration to soldiers located in the UN Compound by assuming that there were two sources of DU emitted by the fire, one in the region of the conexes and one in the area of the washrack, where the burning tanks were located. A point located on the Eastern edge of the UN Compound (which would get the highest exposure from the plume) is located about 980 meters South and 150 meters East of the part of the North Compound where the conexes were located. For the elevated release, RATCHETPC calculated an integrated relative air concentration of 5.36 x 10-9 sec/m3 for this location. Because the

4.3

0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0 0 0 0

0
0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.E-11 2.E-11

2.E-10

2.E-10

2.E-10

2.E-10

2.E-10

2.E-10

3.E-10

4.E-10

5.E-10

5.E-10

5.E-10

2.E-10

3.E-10

4.E-10

6.E-10

7.E-10

9.E-10

1.E-09

1.E-09

1.E-09

2.E-10

4.E-10

6.E-10

9.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

2.E-09

2.E-09

3.E-09

3.E-09

2nd Squadron Motor 0 Origin Pool

2.E-10

4.E-10

7.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

3.E-09

4.E-09

4.E-09

5.E-09

6.E-09

6.E-09

0 Wash 2.E-10
rack

5.E-10

8.E-10

2.E-09

2.E-09

4.E-09

5.E-09

7.E-09

9.E-09

1.E-08

1.E-08

1.E-08

2.E-10

4.E-10

8.E-10

2.E-09

3.E-09

4.E-09

7.E-09

9.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-10

4.E-10

7.E-10

2.E-09

3.E-09

5.E-09

7.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-08

3.E-08

3.E-08

3.E-08

4.E-08

3.E-10

6.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

4.E-09

7.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

2.E-08

3.E-08

4.E-08

5.E-08

6.E-08

6.E-08

2.E-10

4.E-10

8.E-10

2.E-09

3.E-09

6.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

3.E-08

4.E-08

5.E-08

6.E-08

8.E-08

9.E-08

9.E-08

2.E-10

5.E-10

1.E-09

3.E-09

5.E-09

9.E-09

2.E-08

2.E-08

4.E-08

5.E-08

7.E-08

9.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-07

1.E-07

3.E-10

7.E-10

2.E-09

3.E-09

7.E-09

2.E-08

5.E-08

5.E-08

5.E-08

7.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-07

1.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

UN Compound
0 0 2.E-10 4.E-10 9.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 1.E-08 1.E-07 4.E-07 2.E-07 8.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07

N o r t h S o u t

0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

2.E-10

4.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

5.E-09

2.E-08

3.E-07

8.E-07

4.E-07

1.E-07

1.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

2.E-10

5.E-10

1.E-09

3.E-09

5.E-09

1.E-08

9.E-08

3.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

2.E-10

5.E-10

1.E-09

3.E-09

6.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

7.E-08

3.E-07

5.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

4.E-07

2.E-10

5.E-10

1.E-09

3.E-09

5.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

7.E-08

4.E-07

7.E-07

3.E-07

2.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

2.E-11

2.E-10

4.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

5.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

4.E-08

1.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

2.E-07

3.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

2.E-11

4.E-11

4.E-10

1.E-09

2.E-09

4.E-09

9.E-09

2.E-08

3.E-08

5.E-08

1.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

3.E-07

3.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

2.E-11

4.E-11

3.E-10

8.E-10

2.E-09

4.E-09

7.E-09

1.E-08

2.E-08

4.E-08

1.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

2.E-07

3.E-07

4.E-07

4.E-07

Figure 4.1. Calculated Relative Air Concentrations for the Elevated Release 4.4

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.E-11 1.E-10 1.E-10 2.E-10 2.E-10 2.E-10 3.E-10 3.E-10

6.E-10 8.E-10 9.E-10 9.E-10 9.E-10 9.E-10 3.E-10 3.E-10 4.E-10 4.E-10

7.E-10 1.E-09 1.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 1.E-09 6.E-10

7.E-10 1.E-09 2.E-09 2.E-09 3.E-09 4.E-09 4.E-09 4.E-09 5.E-09 4.E-09 4.E-09 4.E-09 3.E-09 3.E-09 2.E-09

2nd 0 0 Squadron Motor Pool

9.E-10 1.E-09 2.E-09 3.E-09 5.E-09 6.E-09 7.E-09 9.E-09 9.E-09 9.E-09 9.E-09 8.E-09 7.E-09 6.E-09 5.E-09 4.E-09

Origin 0 0

0 0

1.E-09 2.E-09 3.E-09 5.E-09 7.E-09 9.E-09 1.E-08 1.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 1.E-08 1.E-08 9.E-09 7.E-09

1.E-09 2.E-09 3.E-09 6.E-09 9.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 3.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 1.E-08

9.E-10 2.E-09 3.E-09 6.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 2.E-08 3.E-08 4.E-08 5.E-08 6.E-08 6.E-08 6.E-08 6.E-08 5.E-08 4.E-08 4.E-08 3.E-08 2.E-08

7.E-10 1.E-09 3.E-09 6.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 3.E-08 4.E-08 5.E-08 7.E-08 8.E-08 9.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-07 9.E-08 8.E-08 7.E-08 6.E-08 4.E-08 3.E-08 1.E-09 2.E-09 5.E-09 9.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 4.E-08 6.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-07 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07 1.E-07 1.E-07 9.E-08 7.E-08 5.E-08

7.E-10 2.E-09 3.E-09 7.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 4.E-08 6.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07 1.E-07 7.E-08 9.E-10 2.E-09 5.E-09 9.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 5.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07 1.E-07

UN Compound 0 0 1.E-09 3.E-09 6.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 4.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 1.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07
0 0 0 0 0 6.E-10 2.E-09 3.E-09 7.E-09 1.E-08 3.E-08 9.E-08 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 7.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 8.E-09 2.E-08 4.E-08 1.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 6.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 7.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 9.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 9.E-08 2.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 8.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 9.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 6.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 8.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 9.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 6.E-08 9.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 6.E-07 6.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07

1.0 N o r t h S o u t h D i 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

8.E-11 7.E-10 2.E-09 4.E-09 8.E-09 2.E-08 3.E-08 5.E-08 8.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 5.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 9.E-11 2.E-10 2.E-09 3.E-09 7.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 4.E-08 7.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 4.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-10 2.E-10 1.E-09 3.E-09 5.E-09 1.E-08 2.E-08 3.E-08 6.E-08 9.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 3.E-07 2.E-07 2.E-07 1.E-07

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9

Figure 4.2. Calculated Relative Air Concentrations for the Ground-Level Release

4.5

quantity of DU released near the conexes was estimated to be 0.408 kg (as discussed in Section 4.1.1); the time-integrated air concentration from this source would be (0.408 kg) x (106 mg/kg) x (5.36 x 10-9 sec/m3) = 0.0022 mgsec/m3 For the source of DU in the burning tanks, the receptor point in the UN Compound is 750 meters South and 75 meters East, which would have a relative air concentration for the elevated release of 2.04 x 10-9 sec/m3. Because the DU released from this point would be 0.0575 kg, the time-integrated air concentration would be (0.0575 kg) x (106 mg/kg) x (2.04 x 10-9 sec/m3) = 0.00012 mgsec/m3 The total time-integrated air concentration for this point, assuming an elevated plume, would be the sum of these two values, or 0.0022 + 0.0001 = 0.0023 mgsec/m3 This value represents the total airborne quantity of DU that a person would have been exposed to if he/she resided in the UN Compound for the entire duration of the fire. In Chapter 6.0, this value is converted to a dose by applying the correct BR and dose factor. The time-integrated air concentration for this location would be different if a ground-level release were assumed. The RATCHET-PC calculations gave relative air concentrations of 1.77 x 10-8 sec/m3 for the DU source near the conexes, and 7.25 x 10-9 sec/m3 for the DU source in the burning tanks. When these values are used in place of the elevated concentrations, the total exposure is 0.0076 mgsec/m3. The maximum value that a person could have been exposed to can be calculated using the maximum air concentration supplied by RATCHET-PC (7.80 x 10-7 sec/m3) along with an elevated plume at a location 1 km directly downwind from the release point. To be conservative, this relative air concentration could be used with both DU sources to give a time-integrated air concentration of (0.408 + 0.0575) kg x (106 mg/kg) x (7.80 x 10-7 sec/m3) = 0.363 mgsec/m3

4.2

DU-In-Air Concentrations Resulting from Resuspension

Recovery workers in the contaminated area of the North Compound and those working downwind of the contaminated area may have been exposed to DU aerosols suspended in the air. This airborne DU would have been resuspended from deposits on the concrete surface by mechanisms such as wind, human activities, or the movement of vehicles. This section describes the calculation of the air concentrations from resuspended DU. The resuspension analysis was conducted using the following sequence of events:

4.6

From the time of the fire, July 11, until the start of final cleanup, September 15, it was assumed that only wind and light activity would have produced any DU resuspension or removal of DU oxides from the contaminated area. This conservative modeling simplification ignores DU removal that probably occurred during this time period, and results in a uniform DU-in-air concentration for this time period. For the 7 days following September 15, cleanup and decontamination of the piles is assumed to occur. We assumed that 90 percent of each pile of DU oxides was removed, leaving only a thin (possibly invisible) layer on the pavement. This action removed most of the mass of DU oxides from the contaminated area. For the 7-day period between September 22 and 28, it is assumed that the contaminated area was swept. Resuspension of DU oxides would have been high during this period because of the sweeping action, but a large amount of DU oxides would have been removed. For the 7-day period between September 29 and October 5, the contaminated area was swept for a second time. This produced a high airborne concentration as the residual DU oxides remaining after the first sweeping were resuspended. It also resulted in removing the remaining DU oxides from the contaminated area. Air concentrations were estimated for each of the time periods of the recovery effort described above. Based on the observations that the winds were relatively steady in the time period following the fire, the winds are modeled as always being in one direction at a speed of 7 meter/sec. This assumption is good for short-term exposures. For periods of a day or longer, the actual concentration at a point will be lower because of the area s natural variability of wind direction. Onsite air concentrations were computed using literature values of resuspension factors, Sehmel (1980). An upper limit resuspension factor for wind erosion/light activity of 1 x 10-4 m-1 was used to compute concentrations under pre-cleanup conditions. A resuspension factor typical of active onsite activities of 1 x 10-3 m-1 was used for the decontamination and sweeping activities. Assuming that the cleanup had helped stabilize the surfaces, a resuspension factor of 1 x 10-5 m-1 was used for the time period after the cleanup activity. The emission rates for activities and wind erosion were based on estimates of the potential for suspension of DU oxide material. A bulk density of 4.5 g/cm3 was assumed for the mixture of oxides. That material was assumed to be in individual piles distributed within the rectangular area where the penetrators oxidized (30 meters by 70 meters). Before the first sweeping, the DU oxide particles that were susceptible to resuspension by wind or other activity were in a thin layer on the surface of a DU oxide pile. A 20-m thickness was assumed for this surface layer. The average surface area for a pile was assumed to be 600 cm2, based on photographs of DU oxide piles that formed under penetrators. This surface area was independent of the degree of oxidation of the penetrator, because it was assumed that oxides falling from a penetrator would land in roughly the same footprint; different degrees of oxidation would result in a difference in the thickness 4.7

of the piles, but not the exposed surface area. The average exposed DU surface concentration was found by summing the amounts of DU in this surface layer on each of the 149 piles of DU oxides, then dividing by the total area in which the piles resided. The average surface concentration was found to be 0.3831 g/m2 over the 2100 m2 area of intense burning, as shown in Table 4.3. Table 4.3. Average DU Surface Concentrations for DU Oxide Piles in the North Compound Following the July 11-12 Fire Average DU Surface Concentration (g/m2) 0.1260 0.0643 0.0643 0.1286 0.3831

Average Amount of Oxidation 95% 70% 37% 17.5% Total

Number of Oxide Piles 49 25 25 50

Mass of DU per Oxide Pile (kg) 4.446 3.276 1.732 0.819

This average surface concentration was assumed to stay constant during the initial period of wind and light-activity resuspension, because the wind gradually decreased the thickness of a pile but left the footprint of the pile undisturbed. It was assumed that the decontamination effort removed the bulk powder of a pile, thus dramatically decreasing the amount of DU oxides in the area, but left a faint footprint of the pile, which still left the same average surface contamination. When sweeping started, the discrete piles were smeared into a uniform distribution over the large area, and the two sweepings effectively removed the DU from the surface. Air concentrations for areas downwind of the contaminated area were estimated using a standard Gaussian dispersion model. An emission rate equivalent to the assumed resuspension rates was estimated using the following process: first the dispersion model was run for a unit release rate of 1 g/sec from a 2100 m2 area, then the emission rate required to simulate the onsite air concentrations (computed using resuspension factors) was back calculated. This emission rate could then be used to simulate downwind DU air concentrations that were consistent with the values for the contaminated areas. The estimates of DU air concentrations and equivalent emission rates for the contaminated area are given in Table 4.4. Lacking specific details, arbitrary assumptions were made to allow for emulation of a time series of DU-in-air concentrations during the cleanup activities. The decontamination activity was assumed to occur over a 7-day period, so the surface DU was removed with 90 percent efficiency from 1/7 of the total area each day. The initial sweeping activity was assumed to occur over the 7 days following decontamination, and then a second complete sweeping was performed over the next 7 days. For each sweeping period, it was assumed that 90 percent of contaminated material was removed and that 1/7 of the area was swept each day. With the resuspension-factor-based approach, assuming shorter or longer

4.8

Table 4.4. Parameters Used for Resuspension Resuspension Factor (1/meter) Before Cleanup Wind Erosion During Decon Activities During First Sweeping During Second Sweeping After Cleanup Wind Erosion 1 10-4 1 10-3 1 10-3 1 10-3 1 10-5 Onsite Air Concentration (g/m3) 3.83 10-5 4.21 10-4 3.85 10-4 1.96 10-4 1.94 10-7 Equivalent Emission Rate (g/sec) 1.41 10-6 1.41 10-5 1.41 10-5 1.41 10-5 1.41 10-6

time periods for these activities would correspondingly reduce or extend the exposure times but would not change the estimated concentrations. The assumptions of efficiency and number of sweeps directly impact the estimation of the effectiveness of the cleanup but do not impact the estimated concentration values. The air modeling was performed using a standard sector-average Gaussian formulation and rural atmospheric dispersion values recommended by Briggs, Gifford (1976). The implementation of this atmospheric model in the Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS; Whelan et al., 1989; Droppo and Buck 1996) includes an algorithm to account for the spread of the release over the area. Deposition computations were based on a combination of atmospheric boundary layer similarity theory and empirical deposition rate curves, Sehmel and Hodgson (1978). These computations were made for 10 particulate size groups to estimate the shift of particle size distribution that occurs as a function of travel distance. Reported size fractions were used to characterize the initial size distribution of airborne material. Concentrations as a function of particle size were computed for several locations in the area and downwind of the area. The maximum computed air concentrations occurred at the downwind edge of the area containing the piles of DU. Figure 4.3 shows the air concentration as a function of time after the fire. The air concentration values in this graph were used to calculate worker exposures. The calculations of air concentrations described in this section were performed for assumed conditions in the 2nd Squadron Motor Pool area, but the general analysis can be extended to the washrack area. The DU concentrations in air were based upon the distribution of DU oxide piles in an area: for the 2100 m2 area, there were 149 piles, or one for every 14.1 m2. The sources of DU contamination on the surface of the washrack area were the three penetrators ejected from a tank. If they had been distributed in an area of 42 m2, which is a realistic possibility, the airborne concentrations would have been the same as shown in Figure 4.3. If they had been spread out over a larger area, the concentrations would have 4.9

5.0 Recovery Worker Activities and DU Exposure

Approximately 600 personnel were potentially exposed to DU during the Doha fire and during the 4-month recovery and cleanup period that followed. An estimate of the severity of their exposures must consider the following: their location in relation to source material the time period of their exposure the duration of their exposure the quantity of source material available for exposure. For the reconstruction of the exposures received by Doha personnel, very few of these factors are known with much certainty. The necessary modeling input information was determined by studying the narratives in the OSAGWI (1998) report and the interviews conducted with workers. This section presents the methodology for categorizing recovery workers, discusses the activities of recovery workers in the North Compound of Camp Doha, and describes the factors listed above that could affect the severity of worker exposure to DU.

5.1

Methodology

Eight job categories were chosen to represent the types of workers who were exposed to DU during the recovery work. For each job category, the approximate number of people in that category was estimated, and the approximate dates for their exposures were determined. The total number of hours of recovery work in the North Compound was estimated for a typical person in each job category, based on the OSAGWI (1998) report and worker interviews. The total number of hours of recovery work was broken down into two categories: hours spent upwind of the DU contamination, where there would be no inhalation of airborne DU, and hours spent either in the area of DU contamination or downwind of it, where inhalation of DU would occur. Several general assumptions were made about work habits that affect the estimated exposures: Several reports indicate that workers spent long hours at their tasks, due to the urgency of cleaning up the base under the threat of a possible hostile enemy. This study assumes that a typical recovery worker worked 12 hours per day, 6 days per week. Of the 12 hours worked each day, 10 hours were assumed to be in the North Compound (the other 2 hours would cover mealtimes, errand running, administrative work, etc.).

5.1

A simplifying assumption was used for this model that time spent in the North Compound was either upwind of the contamination or in an airborne contamination area (corresponding to the surface contamination area and the areas downwind from it). A uniform air concentration was used for the airborne contamination area, corresponding to the maximum concentration that would be expected. The air concentration was assumed to vary day-by-day, according to the type of resuspension activity occurring (as described in Section 4.2), but no attempt at calculating a variation by position was attempted. This uniform concentration assumption was necessary, because there are no data available to support a location-specific calculation, and the assumption is conservative. Work in the North Compound was assumed vigorous, given the hot temperatures and the difficult tasks performed. Thus BRs for inhalation would correspond to heavy work for estimating inhalation. It was assumed that recovery workers did not use PPE, so the usual effectiveness of PPE at reducing inhalation exposures was not accounted for in this study. In reality, a few of the workers wore protective masks, but most did not, so assuming no credit for PPE is a reasonable and conservative assumption.

5.2

Worker Activity

Table 5.1 summarizes the breakdown of hours in exposure conditions for the job categories. The following sections describe each job category, relating what is known from the OSAGWI (1998) report and eyewitness accounts of probable exposure conditions. Table 5.1. Exposed Troops During July 1991 Doha Accident (recovery workers only not counting troops downwind of the fire) Number of Total Hours Per-Day Number Approximate Number of Hours of Upwind Exposure of Days Dates of Recovery (no Time Job Category Personnel Exposed Exposure Work exposure) (hours) EOD Personnel 146th Ord. Det. 10 7/14 to 7/23 10 100 25 7.5 th Engineers - 58 58 15 0.6 7/14 to 7/23, Combat Engr Co. 200 - 300 9/15 to 11/15 72 (CEC) 116 29 1.2 54th Chemical Troop 6 7/12 and 7/18 2 20 5 7.5 Regimental NBC staff 6 7/12 to 7/23 12 50 12 3.2 7/14 to 7/23, 2nd Squadron Troops 100 - 200 9/15 to 11/15 72 20 5 0.2 AMCCOM 3 7/19 to 8/2 15 120 40 5.3 CECOM 4 7/24 to 8/2 10 90 23 6.7 Env. Chem. Corp. (ECC) Contractors 15 9/15 to 11/15 62 480 120 5.8 5.2

5.2.1

EOD Personnel (146th Ordnance Detachment)

The 146th EOD Detachment had 10 to 12 personnel working in the North Compound from about July 14 to July 23. These troops were primarily occupied with remediating the hazard of UXO in the North Compound, but they also helped with identifying DU penetrators found in the rubble. Their activities primarily included disarming and removing UXOs. Because UXO removal had to be complete before heavy cleanup work commenced, there was very little sweeping or operation of heavy equipment while the EOD troops were in the North Compound. Number of EOD Personnel: 10 to 12 (two died in a UXO accident on July 23). Total Hours of Recovery Work: The typical EOD worker spent 100 hours in the North Compound (10 working days from July 14 to July 23; 10 hours per day). Distribution of Recovery Hours: This study assumes that 25 percent of EOD personnel time (25 hours) in the North Compound was spent upwind of the DU contamination. Thus, each person would have spent 75 hours in an airborne contamination area (either in the area with burned penetrators or downwind of it).

5.2.2

Engineers 58th CEC

The combat engineers in the 58th CEC performed a variety of activities during the Doha recovery and cleanup. Engineers assisted the EOD troops during the first 2 weeks after the fire, picking up small pieces of debris including DU penetrators. They also worked to clear large debris and burned vehicles, and they operated heavy equipment such as scrapers and bulldozers. The 58th CEC troops worked during nearly all phases of the recovery work, including the final cleanup during the September to November time frame. Number of 58th CEC Personnel: The OSAGWI (1998) report states that this unit represented the largest contingent of personnel working in the North Compound cleanup and recovery. While the number was not explicitly stated, it is estimated to be in the range of 200 to 300 personnel. Total Hours of Recovery Work: Because engineers worked with EOD troops in the first weeks after the fire, an average engineer working in the compound would have worked 100 hours in July, similar to the EOD troops. In the September to November time frame, engineers would have worked for 8 weeks, so an average worker would spend 480 hours (8 weeks x 6 days/week x 10 hours/day) in this time frame. However, not all members of the Company were in the North Compound at any one time. If we assume that, on average, 20 workers were in the compound at any one time, then a total of 11,600 person-hours (20 workers x [100 hours + 480 hours]) were spent by engineers in the North Compound. If this time were spread over 200 people, an average of 58 hours per person would be spent in the North Compound. However, it is possible that a few engineers with special skills (for example, bulldozer drivers) may have spent twice as much time in the recovery work. Thus, Table 5.1 includes two entries for engineers: 58 hours for an average worker and 116 hours for a maximally exposed worker.

5.3

Distribution of Recovery Hours: This study assumes that 25 percent of personnel time (15 hours for the average worker, 29 for the maximum) in the North Compound was spent upwind of the DU contamination.

5.2.3

54th Chemical Troop

Soldiers from the 54th Chemical Troop operated the M-93 Fox NBC vehicle to monitor for radiation after the fire. This work, however, would not have resulted in measurable exposure to DU, because they operated on the periphery of the compound and the air inside the vehicle was well filtered. A few troops from this unit also did some radiation monitoring with hand-held instruments, but the OSAGWI (1998) report says that these troops spent very little time inside the North Compound. Number of 54th Chemical Troop Personnel: There may have been several dozen soldiers in the unit, but only a few were in the North Compound and exposed to DU. This study assumes that 6 soldiers were possibly exposed. Total Hours of Recovery Work: For the 6 exposed personnel, an average of 20 hours (2 days) may have been spent in the North Compound. Distribution of Recovery Hours: About 25 percent of their time was spent upwind; the rest of their time in the North Compound occurred very soon after the fire, before any substantial cleanup activity occurred, so there would have been no sweeping or heavy equipment operation during this time.

5.2.4

Regimental NBC Officers

Several NBC staff worked in mid-July, monitoring for radiation and picking up a few DU penetrators. Number of Regimental NBC Officers: 6 Total Hours of Recovery Work: Because they sometimes worked with the 146th EOD soldiers, this study assumes that they worked half of the number of hours of the EOD personnel that is, 50 hours. Distribution of Recovery Hours: NBC staff work was similar to the EOD staff work, so the same proportional distribution for hours in the North Compound is used.

5.2.5

Armament Munitions and Chemical Command

Three radiological control staff members of AMCCOM worked at Doha from about July 19 until August 2. Their primary mission was to assess the levels of radioactive contamination of the burned tanks and sufficiently decontaminate them to allow them to be shipped back to the U.S. They also did limited radiation monitoring of contaminated areas.

5.4

Number of AMCCOM staff: 3 Total Hours of Recovery Work: The study assumed 12 working days, 10 hours per day in the North Compound, which totals 120 hours per person. Distribution of Recovery Hours: The AMCCOM staff worked in the North Compound during a time when general cleanup was at a lull. Except for dragging incapacitated M1A1 tanks to a clean area, no sweeping or heavy equipment operation occurred to cause DU oxide resuspension to add to their exposures.

5.2.6

U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command

Four RADCON staff members from CECOM were at Doha from about July 24 until August 2. Their primary mission was site characterization, including monitoring of general area surfaces for DU contamination. Number of CECOM staff: 4 Total Hours of Recovery Work: The study assumed 9 working days, 10 hours per day in the North Compound, which totals 90 hours per person. Distribution of Recovery Hours: The CECOM staff worked in the North Compound during a time when general cleanup was at a lull. Thus, no sweeping or heavy equipment operation was occurring to cause DU oxide resuspension to add to their exposures.

5.2.7

2nd Squadron Soldiers

Soldiers from the 2nd Squadron did much of the routine cleanup work in the area where their vehicles were parked in the North Compound. Troops from this unit picked up small debris and did most of the sweeping after UXOs and heavy debris had been cleared, which would have been a prime pathway for exposure to DU oxides in the air. Number of 2nd Squadron Troops: 100 to 200. Total Recovery Hours: The typical soldier from this unit spent 1 or 2 days in the North Compound, so 20 hours is assumed for the average time per person. Distribution of Recovery Hours: This study assumes that 25 percent of 2nd Squadron personnel time was spent upwind of the contamination in the North Compound, and the rest of their time was assumed to have been spent sweeping contaminated areas. This assumption is conservative, because these troops performed activities other than sweeping, which would have resulted in lower air concentrations of resuspended uranium.

5.5

5.2.8

ECC Contractors

The EOD technicians from ECC worked in the North Compound from mid-September until midNovember. Their primary responsibility was clearing UXOs, but they also recovered half of the DU penetrators found at Doha and they cleaned up some of the DU oxide powder. Upon completion of their work in mid-November, the compound was completely cleared of UXOs and the DU contamination was cleaned up. Number of ECC Contractors: 15, including 14 civilian contractors and an Army Sergeant First Class who provided onsite oversight and support. Total Recovery Hours: Assuming 8 weeks of work at 60 hours per week, 480 hours would have been spent in the North Compound. Distribution of Recovery Hours: This study assumes that 25 percent of ECC personnel time was spent upwind of contamination.

5.6

6.0 Dose Assessment

During and following the fire at Camp Doha, DU oxides could have been taken into the body by two routes: inhalation and ingestion. Inhalation exposure could have occurred as a result of personnel breathing powdered DU oxides that were entrained in air. Ingestion could have occurred as a result of touching contaminated objects such as machinery and soil that could contaminate an individual s hands. Following contact there may have been incidental hand-to-mouth transfer of the DU. It is also possible that DU oxides could have entered through open cuts on ungloved hands. However, this occurrence was not described in the reports reviewed and could not be modeled without additional information. Chemical and radiation doses to workers from ingestion and inhalation intakes of uranium oxides were calculated in this study. Chemical doses calculated for this study were intended to be the maximum concentration of uranium in kidney tissues. Because the maximum concentration of uranium in the kidney might have occurred after the exposure ended, the calculations tracked the concentration of uranium in the kidney for a full year following the intake. Radiation doses were calculated as the cumulative doses that the individual would receive in the 50 years following the intakes. The radiation doses calculated for this report are formally called the CEDEs. A CEDE is the sum of the products of the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the CDE to these organs or tissues. Tissue-weighting factors are the proportion of the risk of stochastic effects resulting from irradiation of individual organs or tissues to the total risk of stochastic effects when the whole body is irradiated uniformly. The tissue-weighting factors used in the calculations are described in Section 6.4.1. The calculation of chemical and radiation doses received by personnel following the Camp Doha fire depended on the chemical and physical properties of the DU oxides, the site-specific conditions, and the characteristics of the personnel. This chapter describes the assumptions that were made to compute the doses. These assumptions are summarized in Table 6.1. In the final sections of this chapter, radiation dose factors are used to calculate the internal doses that may have been received by personnel during the fire at Camp Doha and during recovery work after the fire.

6.1

Physical Properties of DU Oxides

Two oxides of uranium, UO2 and U3O8, are typically formed during fires and were presumed to have been formed during the fire at Camp Doha. These compounds are quite insoluble, but characterization of burn test oxides have shown that there is often a small percentage of the total mass that is considerably more soluble. A third oxide, UO3, was included in the calculations as a surrogate to account for the possibility that a more soluble uranium oxide fraction was also present. Two physical properties of DU oxide the density of the material and the particle size distribution particularly influence the calculation of radiation dose received by personnel following exposures to airborne dusts.

6.1

6.1.1

Density of Uranium Oxides

The density of the uranium oxides influences the deposition pattern of the oxide in the lung. This occurs because the AED varies with density, relative to the physical size of the particle, and deposition of particles in the lung will generally increase as the AEDs decrease. The densities of the uranium oxides are shown in Table 6.1. Table 6.1. Summary of Assumptions Employed in the Calculation of Inhalation and Ingestion Dose Factors Personnel Information BR(a) 1.688 m3/hr (Heavy Work) Breathing Habit(a) Mouth Breather Soil Ingestion Rate(b) 100 mg/d Isotopic Composition of DU Isotope Weight Fraction(c) 6.00 10-06 U-234 2.00 10-03 U-235 3.00 10-06 U-236 9.98 10-01 U-238 Characteristics of Uranium Oxides Weight Lung Solubility Oxide Fraction(c) Density(d) Class/Type(e) GI Tract f1 Value(e) 2 10-3 UO2 0.465 10.96 Y/S 2 10-2(f) UO3 0.07 7.29 W/M 2 10-3 U3O8 0.465 8.3 Y/S Aerosol Size Distribution Exposure Condition Size Distribution 5 m AMAD, gsd = 2.5 Fire 60 m AMAD, gsd = 2.8(g) Recovery Work Data from ICRP (1994) Data from NCRP (1999) Data from OSAGWI (1998) Data from Lide (1994) Data from ICRP (1979) Data from ICRP (1995) Based on data from Haggard et al. (1986) and Resuspension Calculations

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

6.2

6.1.2

Particle Size Distribution of Uranium Oxides

The fraction of an intake that is deposited in the respiratory tract is greatly influenced by the particle size distribution of the inhaled material. Large particles might not be inhaled or will be preferentially deposited in the anterior nasal or naso-oropharynx/larynx regions and, consequently, never reach the lung during inspiration of air. Extremely fine powders, on the other hand, may remain entrained in the expired air and may not be deposited in the lung. For other sizes, the fraction deposited in the lung and the fraction deposited in the various regions of the lung depends on the particle size and density in a complicated manner that was described by the ICRP in their Publication 66 (1994). Two particle size distributions were used to provide dose factors for this study. The first size distribution corresponds to the aerosols generated during the fire, and the second distribution corresponds to the aerosols generated by resuspension of DU oxide during recovery work. Burn tests conducted with 120mm DU rounds did not produce sufficient airborne DU aerosols to be collected and analyzed for particle size distribution. Therefore, following the ICRP (1994) recommendations when no other information is available, DU aerosols in a plume emitted from a fire are assumed to have a particle size distribution of 5-m AMAD and a g of 2.5. The DU aerosols resuspended by recovery work were assumed to have a particle size distribution similar to those described by Haggard et al., (1986). They described the particle size distribution of uranium oxides that remained at the site of three burn tests. Their analyses showed that, of the samples that were analyzed, the minimum AMAD was about 550 m; the g was not stated. The particle size distribution given by Haggard et al., (1986) was used as input to the MEPAS code, as described in Section 4.2. The particle size distribution of the DU oxide suspended by the recovery work activities was determined to be 60-m AMAD with a g of 2.8. This g is larger than the default g of 2.5 recommended by the ICRP (1994). It was necessary, however, to increase the g to account for the fraction of the particles having AEDs less than 3 m. The DU oxide powders analyzed by Haggard et al., (1986) apparently did not contain particles smaller than about 0.5 m; therefore, the particle size distribution chosen for this analysis will tend to overemphasize the small diameter particles. The effect of overemphasizing small particles is to overestimate the deposition of DU particles in the lung and the consequent dose.

6.2

Biokinetic Properties of Uranium Oxides

The solubility of uranium oxides varies according to the specific oxide. The ICRP lists UO3 as exhibiting Class W (Type M) solubility and the solubility of UO2 and U3O8 as Class Y (Type S) (ICRP 1979; 1995). Note that UO3 was included in this study solely because of its solubility characteristics. The relative amount of Classes W- or Y-soluble oxides depends on the manner in which the oxide was formed. Following burn tests of the 120mm DU rounds in metal shipping containers, Haggard et al., (1986) found that 4 percent of the total DU oxide was fairly soluble and was classified as Class D

6.3

(Type F) material, while the remaining 96 percent was highly insoluble and classified as Class Y (Type S) material. Other field measurements indicate that, following a fire, 0 to 8 percent of the oxides are determined to be Class W and 92 to 100 percent are determined to be Class Y, OSWAGI (1998). For purposes of these calculations, the total uranium oxide was assumed to be 7 percent soluble and 93 percent insoluble. The soluble oxide was assumed to be UO3, and, following the ICRP recommendations, was modeled as Class W (Type M) material. The insoluble oxide was assumed to be 46.5 percent by weight UO2 and 46.5 percent U3O8, based on the metal content, and, following the ICRP recommendations, was modeled as Class Y (Type S) material. Although the kinetics of UO3 was modeled for this study, it should be noted that UO3 has not been observed following any test burn of penetrators. The modeling included UO3 only to account for the solubility characteristics that have been observed.

6.3

Personnel Characteristics

The personal characteristics of the exposed individuals influence the magnitude of the internal dose factors. For inhalation, the pertinent characteristics include the breathing habit and rate of the individuals. For ingestion, the quantity of soil and dust consumed by personnel influences the dose factors.

6.3.1

Inhalation

The personal characteristics that most greatly influence the quantity of DU oxide inhaled are the BR and the breathing habits of the individual. The BR, along with the air concentration of the DU oxide, determines the magnitude of the intake. The BR also influences the distribution of the aerosol within the lung. The breathing habit of the individual indicates the extent to which he/she breathes through his/her mouth. The BR assumed for this dose assessment was 1.688 m3/hr. This BR has been associated with heavy work by the ICRP (1994). This level of activity presumes that the individuals spend 12.5 percent of their workday at about two-thirds of their maximal workload and the remaining 87.5 percent, at one-third of their maximal workload, ICRP (1994). This level of work corresponds to heavy construction type work and is appropriate for the activities performed during the fire and recovery work. For this dose assessment, it was assumed that the personnel were mouth breathers, which means that they breathed through the mouth more than do individuals who are normal nasal augmentors. The impact of this assumption is to maximize the deposition of the DU oxide into the deep lung where it is available for absorption into the blood.

6.3.2

Ingestion Characteristics

Ingestion of uranium oxides was assumed to be due to incidental hand-to-mouth transfers of the uranium oxides after contact with contaminated soil or equipment. The total soil ingestion rate was assumed to be equal to that which would occur in a construction site, recommended by the NCRP as 100 mg/d, NCRP (1999). This study is based on the assumption that all soil ingested while working in the general area of DU contamination was uranium-contaminated soil, that the DU concentration in the 6.4

soil was 10 percent by weight, and that the entire ingestion occurred during the workday. The working day for the recovery work activities was assumed to average 10 hr/d. The resultant ingestion rate was 1 mg DU (normalized as the metal) per hour of recovery work.

6.4

Biokinetic Models

Biokinetic models are mathematical descriptions of the absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion processes within the body. In the case of uranium, the metabolism is limited to the transfer of uranium between the organs and tissues of the body. The biokinetic model employed for these calculations consisted of three submodels: respiratory tract, GI tract, and the systemic or other organs. The respiratory tract and GI tract models simulate the processes by which DU is absorbed into the body. The systemic model simulates the distribution of uranium within, and excretion from, the body. All biokinetic models used for this study are current or past recommendations of the ICRP.

6.4.1

Respiratory Tract Model

The ICRP 66 (1994) respiratory tract model was used. This model was chosen, because it provides a mechanism to compute the deposition in the lung of aerosols that have arbitrary particle size distributions. This model also accounts for the influence of the density and shape factors of the aerosol particles on the distribution of material in the lung. Earlier ICRP respiratory tract models could be used for only a limited range of aerosol size distributions. Also, with this respiratory tract model, it is possible to account for an individual s characteristics such as size, BR, and extent of breathing through the mouth.

6.4.2

GI Tract Model

The biokinetic model for the GI tract is described in ICRP 30 (1979). This model consists of four compartments that represent the stomach, the small intestine, the upper large intestine, and the lower large intestine. The fraction of the material entering the GI tract that is absorbed into the body is defined by the f1 value, the larger the f1 value the greater the absorption into the body. The f1 values used in this study are shown in Table 6.1.

6.4.3

Systemic Models

Two different systemic models were used for this study. The systemic model used to compute the radiation dose factors is described in ICRP 30 (1979). This model assumes that the uranium entering the transfer compartment (that is, blood) is distributed to the mineral bone, kidney, and other, unspecified tissues. The biokinetic model also assumes that the uranium deposited in the mineral bone is uniformly distributed throughout the volume of the mineral bone. The systemic model used to compute the concentration of uranium in the kidney was described in ICRP 69 (1995). This model explicitly models the blood and provides for cycling among the compartments of the body. In this model, the kidney is divided into two compartments, one that loses uranium to the urine and another that returns uranium to blood. The compartment that loses uranium to the urine is roughly equivalent to the renal tubules, ICRP (1995). In the model, uranium is removed from 6.5

the renal tubules to the urinary bladder with a half time of 7 days, ICRP (1995). The second kidney compartment represents the remaining tissues of the kidney and retains uranium with a half time of 5 years. For this report, the quantity of uranium in the kidney is the sum of both kidney compartments. To compute the concentration of uranium in the kidney, a kidney mass of 310 grams (ICRP 1975) was used.

6.4.4

Computer Implementations of the Biokinetic Models

The radiological dose calculations were performed using the LUDEP Version 2.06 computer code, Jarvis et al., (1996). This computer code has implemented the ICRP 66 respiratory tract model, the ICRP 30 systemic model, and the ICRP 30 GI tract model. The ICRP 69 systemic model was not implemented in the LUDEP code when these calculations were performed. The concentrations of uranium in the kidney during and following exposures were calculated using the ICRP 66 respiratory tract model, the ICRP 69 systemic model for uranium, and the ICRP 30 GI tract models. The models were implemented in the Matlab /Simulink programming environment. This implementation was used, because the computer code used for radiation dosimetry (LUDEP) does not report instantaneous quantities of material in the model compartments that were necessary to determine the maximal concentration of uranium in the kidney. The ICRP 69 systemic model for uranium was used for these calculations to reflect the current recommendations of the ICRP.

6.5

Internal Dose Factors

Internal dose factors provide a simple means to convert exposure conditions to radiation dose. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the radiation dose factors provide for calculation of the CEDE. The dose factors were normalized to intakes of DU metal rather than uranium oxides. This normalization was chosen to be consistent with the calculations of previous chapters.

6.5.1

Tissue-Weighting Factors

Tissue-weighting factors are employed during the calculation of the CEDE to account for the varying sensitivities of tissues to the stochastic effects of radiation. The tissue weighting factors used for dose factors described in this chapter were published in ICRP 26 (1977). These tissue-weighting factors were also published in the Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies (54 FR 2822) and form the basis for regulations in the U.S. (for example, see 10 CFR 20.1003).

6.5.2

Inhalation Dose Factors

Inhalation dose factors were calculated using the LUDEP Version 2.06 computer code, Jarvis et al., (1996). This computer code has implemented the biokinetic models described in the preceding section. The dose factor for inhalation of the 5-m AMAD aerosol was 1.74 x 10-4 Seivert (Sv)/mg (0.0174 rem/mg) of DU metal in the oxides. The dose factor for inhalation of the 60-m-AMAD aerosol was estimated to be 8.43 x 10-6 Sv/mg (0.000843 rem/mg) of DU metal in the oxides.

6.6

6.5.3

Ingestion Dose Factor

A dose factor for incidental ingestion of DU oxide was calculated using data published by Eckerman, Wolbarst, and Richardson (1988). The GI tract and systemic biokinetic models used for this data tabulation are those described above. The dose factor for ingestion was estimated to be 1.52 x 10-7 Sv/mg (0.0000152 rem/mg) of DU metal in the oxides.

6.6

Doses Received by Personnel Exposed to DU During the Fire

The DU oxide particles that become airborne from fire were assumed to have a particle size distribution of 5 m AMAD, based on ICRP recommendations for use when the exact particle size distribution is unknown. As described in Section 6.3.1, it is assumed that persons exposed during the fire had a BR of 1.688 m3/hr, the same rate assumed for recovery workers. The doses described in this section are based on the estimated quantity of oxides formed, based on the ejection of one penetrator from each tank, as described in Chapter 3.0. The alternate estimate of oxides formed, based on the ejection of 17 penetrators from each tank, also described in Chapter 3.0, would increase the estimated doses by 27 percent.

6.6.1

Chemical Doses

Because uranium is a nephrotoxin, it was necessary to compute the concentration of uranium in the kidney following exposure to uranium. For this study, the calculated kidney dose was the maximum concentration of uranium in the kidney that would occur over a 1-year period following the start of the exposure to uranium. The concentration of uranium in the kidney is dependent on the concentration of uranium in the air but the plume calculations given in Section 4.1.2 give a time-integrated air concentration, not a time-dependent air concentration. To calculate an average air concentration from the Chi/Q, it was first necessary to estimate for how long the uranium was actually suspended in the air. Consistent with Section 4.1.2, the chemical dose calculations were based on the assumption that 96 percent of the integral air concentration occurred in the first 12 hours (after oxidation was initiated) and the remaining 4 percent occurred in the final 12 hours. Using these assumptions, average air concentration during the first 12 hours was 5.1 x 10-8, 1.7 x 10-7, and 8.1 x10-6 mg/m3 at the UN Compound for an elevated release, at the UN Compound for a ground-level release, and at the maximum exposure location, respectively. The maximum concentrations of uranium in the kidney following these exposures are shown in Table 6.2.

6.7

Table 6.2. Inhalation Doses Received by People Downwind of the Doha Fire Chemical Dose (g-uranium per gram of kidney) 1.8 10-9 5.9 10-9 2.8 10-7

Exposure Condition Elevated release, UN Compound Ground-level release, UN Compound Maximum exposure: 1 km downwind of elevated release

Time-Integrated Air Concentration 0.0023 mgsec/m3 0.0076 mgsec/m3 0.363 mgsec/m3

Radiation Dose Sv (rem), CEDE 1.9 10-10 Sv (0.000000019 rem) 6.2 10-10 Sv (0.000000062 rem) 3.0 10-8 Sv (0.0000030 rem)

6.6.2

Radiation Doses

Persons exposed to airborne DU would have received an inhalation dose that can be calculated using the following formula: D = DF x BR x C / 3600 where D DF BR C 3600 = inhalation dose (Sv) = dose factor (Sv/mg) = breathing rate (m3/hr) = time-integrated air concentration (mgsec/m3) = conversion factor (sec/hr) (6.1)

Thus a sample calculation of an inhalation dose to a person in the UN Compound during an elevated release would be as follows: D = (1.74 x 10-4 Sv/mg) (1.688 m3/hr) (0.0023 mgsec/m3) / (3600 sec/hr) = 1.9 10-10 Sv (0.000000019 rem) Table 6.2 presents the calculated inhalation doses for three types of exposures. The results of the downwind transport analysis (Table 6.2) show that the maximum chemical dose that may have been received by a person downwind of the fire would have been about 2.8 x 10-7 g of uranium per gram of kidney tissue. For this dose to be received, the person would have had to remain in the location of the highest air concentration for the entire duration of the fire. For a person who was located in the UN Compound, the inhalation chemical dose was estimated to range from 1.8 x 10-9 to 5.9 x 10-9 g of uranium per gram of kidney tissue, depending upon whether the plume was best described as an elevated release or a ground-level release.

6.8

The results of the downwind transport analysis (Table 6.2) show that the maximum radiation dose that may have been received by a person downwind of the fire would have been about 0.0000030 rem. This radiation dose would have been received by a person located in the area of highest concentration, and in order to receive this radiation dose, the person would have needed to be located in that position for the entire 24-hour period of the fire. For a person located in the UN Compound, the inhalation radiation dose would have been about 0.000000019 rem; with even more conservative assumptions, this estimate could be as high as 0.000000062 rem.

6.7

Doses Received by Personnel Exposed to DU During Recovery Work

Personnel who participated in recovery work at Camp Doha could have received doses from two pathways: inhaled DU that had been suspended in air during the various recovery work activities ingested DU from contamination on their hands that was incidentally transferred to their mouths Workers in the North Compound could have received DU exposure in the form of DU oxide particles inhaled while working in areas of contamination or downwind of those areas. As described in Chapter 5.0, individual workers performed a variety of activities in the contaminated area or at some distance downwind from the actual contaminated area. Because the resuspension factors for the different work locations are similar, the maximum resuspension factor (as a function of distance) for each type of recovery work was used for the dose calculations. The individuals who performed the Camp Doha recovery work activities were likely to have ingested incidental quantities of contaminated soil and ash while carrying out their activities. The concentration of DU in soils and ash on the motor pool pavement surface was not known. It was assumed that 10 percent of the ingested soil was DU in the form of oxides. A further assumption was made that all the soil ingested was ingested during a 10-hour working day. The DU ingestion rate was therefore estimated to be 1 mg DU per hour at work. The doses described in this section are based on the estimated quantity of oxides formed, based on the ejection of one penetrator from each tank, as described in Chapter 3.0. The alternate estimate of oxides formed, based on the ejection of 17 penetrators from each tank, also described in Chapter 3.0, would increase the estimated doses by 27 percent.

6.7.1

Chemical Doses

To assess the concentration of uranium in the kidney for each job category described in Section 5.2 it was necessary to simulate the exposure and working conditions of the persons who were involved in the recovery work. The workers were assumed to work 6 days per week during their presence at Camp Doha. The daily exposure durations of the workers were obtained from Table 5.1, and the air concentrations in

6.9

the work area were obtained from Table 4.4. The calculations accounted for the intermittent nature of the exposures and the changes in the air concentrations to which the workers were exposed. The workers were assumed to ingest uranium-contaminated soil at the rate of 1 mg uranium per hour of exposure time. The results of the calculations listed in Table 6.3 show the maximal concentration of uranium in the kidney due to inhalation and ingestion. The data in the columns labeled Inhalation and Ingestion show the maximal kidney concentrations when each intake route is considered separately. The data in the column labeled Total show the maximal kidney concentrations for the combined inhalation and ingestion routes of intake. Table 6.3. Chemical Doses Received by Personnel During Recovery Work Activities at Camp Doha Maximum Concentration of Uranium in the Kidney g-uranium per gram of Kidney Inhalation Ingestion Total(a) EOD Personnel 3.8 10-03 5.9 10-02 6.3 10-02 146th Ord. Det. 3.1 10-04 4.7 10-03 5.0 10-03 Average Engineers 58th CEC 7.3 10-03 1.3 10-02 2.0 10-02 High 9.3 10-04 1.4 10-02 1.5 10-02 54th Chemical Troop -03 -02 1.9 10 2.9 10 3.0 10-02 Regimental NBC staff 1.2 10-03 2.2 10-03 3.3 10-03 2nd Squadron Troops 3.2 10-03 4.9 10-02 5.2 10-02 AMCCOM 3.0 10-03 4.7 10-02 5.0 10-02 CECOM 3.5 10-02 6.3 10-02 9.5 10-02 ECC Contractors (a) Totals may not sum because of rounding and because the time of maximal kidney concentration due to inhalation and ingestion may not coincide. The inhaled fraction calculated from the data presented in Table 6.3 ( 36 percent) to the total concentration of DU in the kidneys will be greater for the 58th Combat Engineers (High), the 2nd Squadron Troops, and the ECC Contractors because of their exposure to higher airborne concentration of DU due to resuspension of DU from their decontamination activities and exposure durations during the Camp Doha cleanup.

6.7.2

Radiation Doses to Recovery Workers

The inhalation doses to persons exposed to airborne DU during recovery work are calculated using the following formula: D = DF x BR x C x ET (6.2)

6.10

where D = DF = BR = C = ET =

inhalation dose (Sv) dose factor (Sv/mg) breathing rate (m3/hr) air concentration of DU (mg/m3) total exposure time (hr)

A sample calculation for a person who was performing decontamination work for 15 hours would be as follows: D = (8.43 x 10-6 Sv/mg)(1.688 m3/hr)(3.83 x 10-2 mg/m3)(15 hr) = 8.2 10-6 Sv (0.00082 rem) The air concentration recovery workers were exposed to varied day-by-day, depending on the quantity of DU oxides present in the North Compound and the types of activities occurring that created DU resuspension, as discussed in Section 4.2. To assess the inhalation dose for each worker category, an incremental dose for each day worked in the recovery area was calculated, and the daily incremental doses were summed. The day-by-day air concentration values are presented in Figure 4.4, and the dates of activity and number of hours worked per day in the contamination area, or downwind of it, are presented in Table 5.1 for each job category. Inhalation doses for all activities are shown in Table 6.4. The radiation dose due to ingestion of contaminated soil can be computed from the following equation: D = DF x SC x SIR x ET where D DF SC SIR ET = ingestion dose (Sv) = ingestion dose factor (Sv/mg DU) = soil concentration of DU (mg DU/mg soil) = soil ingestion rate (mg soil/hr) =exposure time (hr) (6.3)

The exposure time for each job category was taken from Table 5.1 and includes the total hours in recovery work minus the total hours upwind from the contaminated area. As discussed in Chapter 5.0, the exposure time is the sum of the time that the workers were estimated to spend in the contamination area, plus the time that the workers were estimated to spend downwind from the contamination area. A sample calculation for a person who worked in a contaminated area for 360 hours would be as follows:

6.11

D = (1.52 x 10-7 Sv/mg DU)(0.1 mg DU/ mg soil)(10 mg/hr)(360 hr) = 5.5 x 10-5 Sv (0.0055 rem). Ingestion doses for persons who performed recovery work are shown in Table 6.4. Table 6.4. Internal Doses Received by Personnel During Recovery Work Activities at Camp Doha Internal Doses Received, Sv (rem), CEDE Inhalation Ingestion Total(a) 4.1 10-5 Sv 1.1 10-5 Sv 5.2 10-5 Sv EOD Personnel th 146 Ord. Det. (0.0041 rem) (0.0011 rem) (0.0052 rem) 6.5 10-5 Sv 6.6 10-6 Sv 7.2 10-5 Sv Average (0.0065 rem) (0.00066 rem) (0.0072 rem) -4 -5 Engineers 1.3 10 Sv 1.3 10 Sv 1.4 10-4 Sv 58th CEC (0.013 rem) (0.0013 rem) (0.014 rem) High -6 -6 8.2 10 Sv 2.3 10 Sv 1.0 10-5 Sv th (0.00082 rem) (0.00023 rem) (0.0010 rem) 54 Chemical Troop 2.1 10-5 Sv 5.8 10-6 Sv 2.7 10-5 Sv Regimental NBC staff (0.0021 rem) (0.00058 rem) (0.0027 rem) -5 -6 2.2 10 Sv 2.2 10 Sv 2.4 10-5 Sv 2nd Squadron Troops (0.0022 rem) (0.00022 rem) (0.0024 rem) -5 -5 4.3 10 Sv 1.2 10 Sv 5.5 10-5 Sv AMCCOM (0.0043 rem) (0.0012 rem) (0.0055 rem) -5 -5 3.7 10 Sv 1.0 10 Sv 4.7 10-5 Sv CECOM (0.0037 rem) (0.0010 rem) (0.0047 rem) -4 -5 6.0 10 Sv 5.5 10 Sv 6.5 10-4 Sv (0.060 rem) (0.0055 rem) (0.065 rem) ECC Contractors (a) Totals may not sum because of rounding.

6.12

7.0 Conclusions
This study estimated the exposures and intakes of DU for residents and recovery workers at Camp Doha, Kuwait, following the July 1991 fire. People who were exposed to airborne effluents from the fire were estimated to have received very small chemical doses: the maximum concentration in the kidney was estimated to be about 1.8 x 10-8 g-U/g of kidney for people assembled in the UN Compound at the base and about 2.8 x 10-7 g-U/g of kidney for a person who was located in the area of highest air concentration. Estimated chemical doses for recovery workers who spent extensive time in the contaminated areas of the North Compound after the fire range from 3.3 x 10-3 g-U/g of kidney to 9.5 x 10-2 g-U/g of kidney, depending on which type of activity they were involved in. People exposed to airborne effluents from the fire were estimated to have received very small radiation doses: about 0.000000062 rem for people assembled in the UN Compound at the base and about 0.000003 rem for a person who may have been located in the area of highest air concentration. Estimated doses for recovery workers who spent time in the contaminated areas of the North Compound after the fire, range from 0.001 rem to 0.065 rem depending on the recovery worker s type of activity.

7.1
7.1.1

Significance of DU Exposures
Chemical Doses

The OSHA PELs and ACGIH TLVs are standards that limit the exposure of workers to hazardous chemicals. For uranium, a major difference between the two standards is that the ACGIH TLVs are the same for soluble and insoluble compounds whereas the OSHA standard distinguishes between soluble and insoluble compounds. The ACGIH TLV-TWA is 0.2 mg/m3 and the TLV-STEL is 0.6 mg/m3, ACGIH (1999). The OSHA PEL is 0.05 mg/m3 for soluble forms of uranium and 0.25 mg/m3 for insoluble forms of uranium, 29 CFR 1910.1000 Table Z-1. These values may be compared with the air concentrations calculated for this study which were 0.038 mg/m3, 0.42 mg/m3, 0.385 mg/m3, 0.196 mg/m3, and 0.000194 mg/m3 total uranium for initial wind erosion, decontamination, the first sweeping, the second sweeping, and final wind erosion, respectively. Based on these data, the TLV-TWA and PEL values may have been exceeded during the decontamination and sweeping activities. The air concentrations of this study were calculated, not measured, however, and both the TLVs and PELs are intended to be compared with measurements made in the workplace. In particular, the ACGIH (1999) states that the term total particulate refers to airborne material sampled with a 37-mm closed-face cassette. No guidance is given concerning how to compare calculated air concentrations of aerosols that have arbitrary particle size distributions, such as those presented in this study, to either the TLVs or PELs, which are intended to be compared with measured air concentrations. For this study, the collection efficiency of the sampling cassette was assumed to be unity for all particle sizes. If the collection efficiency of an actual sampler is less than unity, then the calculated air concentrations might not have exceeded the air concentrations that would be measured by a sampler.

7.1

Because uranium is a renal toxin, studies have been conducted to determine a maximum permissible concentration of uranium in the kidney. A frequently quoted value is 3 g-U/g of kidney a value that was determined in 1949 to cause kidney damage, Spoor and Hursch (1973). There have been suggestions to lower this value to 0.6 (Kathren and Weber 1988) or 0.3 g-U/g of kidney (Leggett 1989) based on the results of animal studies. The calculations of this study indicate that the kidney concentrations of workers did not exceed the historic value of 3 g-U/g of kidney nor did they meet or exceed either of the proposed lower levels. The reason that the kidney concentrations do not exceed even the lowest of the proposed maximum permissible concentrations of uranium in the kidney while at the same time the calculated air concentrations apparently do exceed published limits on air concentration is due to the short exposure durations and the particle size distribution of the uranium dust. The uranium dust generated during the decontamination activities was estimated to be 60-m AMAD with a g of 2.8. Calculations using the ICRP 66 (1994) respiratory tract model show that for this aerosol only about 1.9 percent of an intake is actually deposited in the thoracic regions of the lung. Thus very little of the uranium in the air actually enters the body.

7.1.2

Radiation Doses

To prevent radiation-induced injury to workers, ALIs and derived air concentrations (DACs) are used. An ALI is that annual intake of a radionuclide that would result in a radiation dose to Reference Man (ICRP 1975) equal to the relevant primary guide (that is, to the limiting value of committed dose, which is 5 rem). A DAC is that concentration of a radionuclide in air, which if breathed for a work-year, would result in an intake corresponding to its ALI. The EPA has prepared tables of ALIs and DACs (Eckerman, Wolbarst, and Richarson 1988) for use by U.S. regulatory agencies such as the NRC (for example, 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Annual Limits on Intake (ALIs) and Derived Air Concentrations (DACs) of Radionuclides for Occupational Exposure; Effluent Concentrations; Concentrations for Release to Sewerage). The published occupational DACs, based on U-238, are 0.9 mg/m3 and 0.06 mg/m3, for Class W and Class Y uranium, respectively. Because the ALIs and DACs are based on a particle size distribution of 1 m AMAD, it is necessary to adjust the DACs for the actual particle size distribution, which was 60 m AMAD. The adjustment for particle size distribution was based on the ratio of inhalation dose factors. The adjusted DACs are, for occupational exposures, 20 mg/m3 and 1 mg/m3, for Class W and Y uranium, respectively. For exposures of the general public, the adjusted DACs are 8 x 10-2 mg/m3 and 6 x 10-2 mg/m3 for Class W and Y uranium, respectively. The calculations of this report indicate that the adjusted occupational DACs were not exceeded during the decontamination and recovery activities. All of the radiation doses reported in this study are lower than the annual radiation exposure that every person can expect to receive from natural background. The estimated radiation doses are 3 or more orders of magnitude lower than the thresholds for immediately observable physical effects in the body, so there is no possibility of acute health effects (that is, health effects observable soon after exposure) resulting from this exposure. Long-term health effects, such as cancer that may be caused by radiation exposure are theoretically possible with any non-zero exposure, but the probability of cancer resulting 7.2

from a 0.065 rem exposure is trivial compared to the naturally occurring cancer incidence in the general population. The increased probability of fatal cancer induction can be estimated by using the risk factors published in ICRP 60 (1991). The risk of fatal cancer induction from uniform whole body irradiation has been estimated to be 4 x 10-4 rem-1, ICRP (1991). The risk of fatal cancer induction from the 0.065 rem dose is then (4 x 10-4 rem-1)(0.065 rem) = 3 x 10-5. This risk of fatal cancer can be compared to the natural incidence of cancer. Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the U.S., exceeded only by heart disease. In the U.S., one of every four deaths is from cancer, for a natural risk of 0.25, American Cancer Society (2000).

7.2

Modeling Uncertainty

The analyses in this study depended heavily on the interpretation of comments and reports to arrive at quantitative values that were used in the dose assessments. This type of dose assessment typically depends upon careful measurements and scientific observations to have a high degree of confidence in the analysis, but no such data were available for this study. Thus, there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with the results of this analysis. The study authors tried to ensure that the assumptions would be conservative, resulting in a dose assessment that probably overestimated the actual exposures rather than possibly underestimating them.

7.2.1

Sensitivity of Results to Assumptions

The North Compound surface contamination estimate depended heavily on the study s assumptions about the number, distribution, and characteristics of piles of DU oxides. Actual observations gave minimal guidance in making these assumptions. A conservative assumption concerns the changes in contamination level with time: this analysis assumed that the contamination levels remained uniform over the first 2 months after the fire, ignoring the action of wind and cleanup personnel in removing the contamination from the surface of the motor pool during this time period. The study then assumed nearly complete removal of the DU oxides over a period of 3 weeks starting in mid-September. This assumption was made because there were no reliable data upon which to base a more realistic schedule for the removal of DU oxides. The highest dose estimates calculated in this study were for the ECC contractors, who spent the most time in the North Compound. However, they did not start their work until 2 months after the fire, and 2 months of a steady wind plus the action of recovery crews before them would have removed a substantial amount of contamination. Thus, the dose estimate for these workers is believed to be very conservative. One assumption used in this study that was not the most conservative assumption possible was the fraction of DU in soil used for the ingestion dose calculation. Available data indicated the amount of soil that could be incidentally ingested by a worker, but the study had to make an assumption about how much of that soil would have consisted of DU. Possible choices ranged from 0 to 100 percent, and a value less than 100 percent was chosen because it seemed reasonable that a limitless supply of sand would have been blowing across the motor pool with some settling onto the surface and mixing with the DU. A value of 10 percent seemed reasonable to the authors, so it was used in the ingestion calculation. If this assumption was a significant underestimation, however, the highest possible ingestion dose, 7.3

corresponding to a soil composition, that is 100 percent DU, would be 0.055 rem (rather than 0.0055 rem) to an ECC contractor, for a total dose of 0.120 rem (rather than 0.065 rem presented in Table 6.3). This higher dose estimate, while much less realistic in the judgment of the study authors, would still be low enough to ensure that health effects from the radiation dose would be very unlikely. Resuspension is a very difficult effect to model precisely, even when based on carefully measured input values. Resuspension factors from the literature can easily vary by a factor of 10 with only slightly varying assumptions. As an example, a value of 0.01 can be used for sweeping indoors, compared to the value of 0.001 used for sweeping in this study. The values chosen for this study were judged by the authors to be the most appropriate for the conditions, but the resuspension calculation should be thought of as an order-of-magnitude estimate.

7.2.2

Data Limitations

This study s modeling effort was limited by the quality of the data available. Most of these shortcomings included details of the conditions during the accident. Some of the more important data limitations include: DU oxides available for exposure
The quantity of DU oxides produced by the fire: there were no measurement data that could

provide accurate input to this fundamental piece of data, so the study had to base the estimate on assumptions about the fire conditions.
Detailed fire conditions: little is known about the fire temperatures and duration of fire

temperatures for various regions of the fire, at which DU rounds were stored, which would determine the degree of oxidation for the penetrators.
The distribution of penetrators in the fire: the distribution of penetrators in the North Compound

was not documented, so the study relied on conservative but reasonable assumptions about where penetrators might have landed and how many could have been oxidized by fire.
The initial distribution of DU oxides in the North Compound (number and sizes of oxide piles,

smeared-out surface contamination): the distribution and behavior of DU oxides that fell from burning penetrators in the North Compound was not observed and documented, so the study s analysis was based on conservative but reasonable assumptions rather than actual data.
The day-by-day change in distribution of DU oxides as recovery progressed: this was not

systematically measured, and the monitoring that did occur was not documented in a way that could help this study, so assumptions were made about this behavior.

7.4

Recovery worker activities

The day-by-day location of each recovery worker: the hours each recovery worker spent in

contamination areas on each day of the recovery effort would have allowed for a more accurate dose assessment for the workers. The reports provide general descriptions of job categories, but it is impossible to reconstruct the location of each worker as a function of time, so the study made a number of assumptions based on these narratives in order to estimate exposures.
The day-by-day activities occurring in contamination areas: these activities caused resuspension

and consequent changes in air concentrations. These activities were only generally outlined in the reports; a more detailed description of the activities would have provided a more detailed basis for the modeling. Physical behavior of DU oxides (a detailed discussion of this data limitation is discussed by Parkhurst et al., [1999])
Resuspension factors for DU: no resuspension factors have been measured specifically for DU,

so the values used were derived from data for other material. These factors are not derived as a function of particle size. Confidence in the model would be vastly improved if more appropriate resuspension factors could be identified and applied.
Particle size distribution of DU oxides that remain close to a burned penetrator: this distribution

was used for the estimation of resuspension and for the conversion of DU intake to dose. The distribution used by the study was based on limited data from burn tests; there were only two data sets from which to choose.
The ARF for 120mm DU rounds in fire: the ARF used in this study was derived from 120mm

DU round burn tests, but no airborne DU has been directly detected in a 120mm DU round burn test, and the quantity released during the 1987 accidental Abrams fire was inconsequential. The ARF was assumed to be equal to the unrecovered fraction of a mass-balance study, an assumption that is definitely conservative.
Particle size distribution of DU oxide in a fire plume: this study used a value of 5 m AMAD,

based on an ICRP default recommendation, not based on an analysis of an actual airborne sample.
A mechanism to relate calculated air concentrations to the air concentrations that would be

measured by a sampler: regulations for worker exposure are written in terms of what is collected by a particular type and size of air sampler but not necessarily in terms of a calculated air concentration. This study based the comparison to regulatory values solely on calculated air concentrations.

7.5

8.0 References
10 CFR Part 20. 2000. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standards for Protection Against Radiation. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 29 CFR Part 1910.1000. 2000. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, Air Contaminants. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. 52 FR 2822-2834. January 27, 1987. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for Occupational Exposure: Recommendations Approved by the President. Federal Register. American Cancer Society (ACS). April 9, 2000. Available to downloaded from the World Wide Web: http://www.cancer.org/statistics/cff2000/basicfacts.html#expecteddie American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). 1999. TLV and BEIs: Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents. Cincinnati, Ohio. Clayton, G. D. and F. E. Clayton, eds. 1994. Patty s Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology: Fourth Edition, Volume II, Part C Toxicology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York. Droppo, J. G. and J. W. Buck. 1996. The Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS): Atmospheric Pathway Formulation. PNNL-11080, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Eckerman, K. F., A. B. Wolbarst, and A. C. B. Richardson. 1988. Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion. (Federal Guidance Report No. 11). EPA-520/1-88-020. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. Fliszar, R. W., E. W. Wilsey, and E. W. Bloore. 1989. Radiological Contamination from Impacted Abrams Heavy Armor. BRL-TR-3068, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Gifford, F. A. 1976. Turbulent Diffusion Typing Schemes: A Review, Nucl. Saf. 17(1):74. Haggard, D. L., W. M. Herrington, C. D. Hooker, J. Mishima, M. A. Parkhurst, R. I. Scherpelz, L. A. Sigalla, and D. E. Hadlock. 1986. Hazard Classification Test of the 120-mm, APFSDS-T, M829 Cartridge: Metal Shipping Container. PNL-5928, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Harley, N. H., E. C. Foulkes, L. H. Hilborne, A. Hudson, and C. R. Anthony. 1999. A Review of the Scientific Literature As It Pertains to Golf War Illnesses: Volume 7 Depleted Uranium. Rand, Santa Monica, California. 8.1

Hooker, C. D., D. E. Hadlock, J. Mishima, and R. L. Gilchrist. 1983. Hazard Classification Test of the Cartridge, 120 mm, APFSDS-T, XM829. PNL-4459, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1975. Report on the Task Group on Reference Manual. ICRP publication 23, Pergamon Press, New York. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1977. Recommendations of the ICRP. ICRP publication 26, Pergamon Press, New York. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1979. Limits for intakes of radionuclides by workers. (ICRP publication 30, part 1). Annals of the ICRP Vol. 2, No. 3-4, Pergamon Press, New York. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1991. 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. (ICRP publication 60). Annals of the ICRP Vol. 21, No. 1-3, Pergamon Press, New York. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1994. Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection. (ICRP publication 66). Annals of the ICRP Vol. 24, No. 1-3, Pergamon Press, New York. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1995. Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 4, Inhalation Dose Coefficients. (ICRP publication 71). Annals of the ICRP Vol. 25 No. 3-4, Pergamon Press, New York. Jarvis, N. S., A. Birchall, A. C. James, M. R. Baily, and M. -D. Dorrian. 1996. Ludep 2.0: Personal Computer Program for Calculating Internal Doses Using the ICRP Publication 66 Respiratory Tract Model. NRBP-SR287, National Radiological Protection Board, Chilton, Didcot, Oxon OX11 0RQ. Kathren R. L. and J. R. Weber. 1988. Ultrasensitive Techniques for Measurement of Uranium in Biological Samples and The Nephrotoxicity of Uranium. NUREG/CR-5125, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Leggett, R. W. 1989. The Behavior and Chemical Toxicity of U in the Kidney: A Reassessment. Health Phys. 57(3):365-383. Lide, David R., Ed. 1994. CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 75th Edition. CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida. Mishima, J., M. A. Parkhurst, R. I. Scherpelz, and D. E. Hadlock. 1985. Potential Behavior of Depleted Uranium Penetrators under Shipping and Bulk Storage Accident Conditions. PNL-5415, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

8.2

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). 1989. Comparative Carcinogenicity of Ionizing Radiation and Chemicals. NCRP Report 96, National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Bethesda, Maryland. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). 1999. Recommended Screening Limits for Contaminated Surface Soil and Review of Factors Relevant to Site-Specific Studies. NCRP Report No. 129, Bethesda, Maryland. Office of the Special Assistant on Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI). 1998. Environmental Exposures Report: Depleted Uranium in the Gulf. Parkhurst, M. A., J. R. Johnson, J. Mishima, and J. L. Pierce. 1995. Evaluation of DU Aerosol Data: Its Adequacy for Inhalation Modeling. PNL-10903, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Parkhurst, M. A., K. M. Krupka, A. D. Maughan, J. A. Glissmeyer, S. P. Shelton and J. G. Droppo. 1999. Evaluation of DU Soil Contamination and Resuspension Data: Its Adequacy for Dose Modeling of Inhalation and Ingestion. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington, in press. Ramsdell, J. V. Jr., C. A. Simonen, and K. W. Burk. 1994. Regional Atmospheric Transport Code for Hanford Emission Tracking. PNWD-2224 HEDR. Prepared for the Technical Steering Panel and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention by Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington. Russell, J. J., R. L. Kathren and S. E. Dietert. 1996. A Histological Kidney Study of Uranium and NonUranium Workers. Health Phys. 70(4):466-472. Sehmel, G. A. and F. D. Hodgson. 1978. A Model for Predicting Dry Deposition of Particles and Gases to Environmental Surfaces. PNL-SA-6721, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Sehmel, G. A. 1980. Particle Resuspension: A Review. Environment International, 4:107-127. Spoor, N. L. and J. B. Hursch. Protection Criteria pp 241-270, in Hodge, H. C., J. N. Stannard and J. B. Hursh. 1973. Uranium, Plutonium, Transplutonic Elements. Handbook of Experimental Pharmacology, XXXVI. Springer-Verlag, New York. U.S. Army Safety Center. 1991. Estimated Cost of Destroyed Ammunition, Army Accident Report 910711001, Fort Rucker, Alabama. Whelan G., J. Buck, D. Strenge, et al. 1989. Overview of the multimedia environmental pollutant assessment system (MEPAS). Hazardous Waste & Hazardous Materials (9):191-207.

8.3

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION AND READINESS

Probabilistic Estimates of Dose from Depleted Uranium during DeploymentsRoutine Duty Scenarios
Final Report
January 15, 2009

Prepared For: Prepared By:

Force Health Protection and Readiness Directorate Science Applications International Corporation 8301 Greensboro Drive, Suite 500, M/S E-5-5 McLean, VA 22102 GS-23F-8079 W81XWH-05F-0664,Northrop-Grumman Mission Systems

Subcontract No: Prime Contract:

Table of Contents

Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ 1 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 2 List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. 3 1 2 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 4 Background ......................................................................................................................... 4 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 3.1 Depleted Uranium Employment ............................................................................. 4 Contamination studies............................................................................................. 5 Exposure scenarios.................................................................................................. 5 Input Parameters ..................................................................................................... 6 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.2 4 5 6 Soil Contamination ..................................................................................... 6 Uranium Soil Resuspension and Air Concentrations.................................. 9 Breathing Rate .......................................................................................... 11 Duration of DU Exposure ......................................................................... 12 Dose Factors.............................................................................................. 12

Methods............................................................................................................................... 6

Calculations........................................................................................................... 13

Results............................................................................................................................... 15 Implications of Estimated Doses ...................................................................................... 18 References......................................................................................................................... 20 Uranium in Soil Samples from Studies at DU Employment Sites ............... 21 Soil Result Tables ................................................................................................. 21 Dose Factor Values........................................................................................ 25 Dose Factor Values ............................................................................................... 25 Mathcad Calculation Worksheet.................................................................... 28 Mathcad Worksheet for Dose Calculation............................................................ 28 I-1

Attachment I Attachment II II-1 Attachment III III-1

List of Figures

Figure 1. Uranium Surface Contamination for 5,000 Trials.......................................................... 9 Figure 2. Resuspension factor distribution for 5,000 trials.......................................................... 10 Figure 3. Distribution of air concentrations for 5,000 trials ........................................................ 11 Figure 4. Breathing Rate distribution for 5,000 trials.................................................................. 12 Figure 5. Uranium Dose Factor Distribution for Lung from P-CI Data for 5,000 trials ............. 14 Figure 6. Distribution of Doses (rem CED) to the Lung Using P-CI Dose Factors ................... 15

List of Tables

Table 1. Depleted Uranium Usage in Past Conflicts ..................................................................... 4 Table 2. Exposure Levels and Related Activities .......................................................................... 5 Table 3. Organ Dose (rem CED) using P-CI Dose Factors ......................................................... 16 Table 4. Organ Dose (rem CED) using CI-Array Dose Factors .................................................. 17 Table 5. Probability of Causation for Named Cancers ................................................................ 18 Table I-1. Tables of Soil Results................................................................................................... 21 Table I-2. Selected Soil Results from Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNEP, 2003).......................... 22 Table I-3. Selected Soil Results from Kosovo (Danesi, 2003) .................................................... 23 Table I-4. Selected Soil Results from Kuwait (IAEA 2003) ....................................................... 24 Table II-1. Capstone P-CI (BZM) Organ Dose (HT(50)) Factors ............................................... 26 Table II-2. Capstone CI-Array (Area Monitors) Organ Dose (HT(50)) Factors ......................... 27

Introduction

The Department of Veterans Affairs requested assistance from the Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), Force Health Protection and Readiness Directorate (FHP&R) for determining radiation doses potentially received by service members exposed to depleted uranium (DU) during deployments. FHP&R convened a meeting of military service representatives and other interested parties to explore the requirements, possible technical approaches, and anticipated problems for developing a response to the request. One outcome of the meeting was the suggestion to explore prototypes methodologies for estimating the radiation doses for certain cohorts of personnel exposed to DU, when other sources of dose information such as the results of urine bioassay or other independent dose assessments are unavailable. This document describes an approach for determining radiation doses for DoD personnel who performed routine duties in areas contaminated with residual amounts of depleted uranium during extended deployments. The approach uses dose factors for DU developed during DoDs DU Capstone Study that may tend to overestimate dose for the scenarios examined herein.

Background
An understanding of how and where depleted uranium munitions were used, Knowledge of the ways that service members could have been exposed, Knowledge about the amounts and locations of depleted uranium contamination in affected areas, and A knowledge of dose assessment principles, the properties of DU, and the biokinetics of internally deposited DU. Depleted Uranium Employment

Developing estimates of radiation doses from exposure to depleted uranium requires:

2.1

United States and coalition forces used DU muntions during the conflicts listed in Table 1. Types of DU munitions included large caliber (105 mm and 120 mm) rounds fired by Abrams and other tanks, and smaller caliber (25 mm and 30 mm) fired by Harriers and A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Table 1. Depleted Uranium Usage in Past Conflicts Conflict 1991 Gulf War Operation Joint Endeavor (1995) Operation Joint Guardian (1999) Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) Location Kuwait, Iraq Bosnia-Herzegovina Kosovo Iraq DU Munitions 25 mm, 30 mm, 105 mm, 120 mm 30 mm 30 mm 25 mm, 30 mm, 120 mm

2.2

Contamination studies

Some studies of environmental contamination with DU have been completed in areas of weapons use. However, these are quite limited for the areas of greatest employment1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) completed several studies of DU contamination in the Balkans at locations affected by Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guardian. Other studies include one performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Kuwait, limited assessments in areas of destroyed equipment during OP TELIC-the UK equivalent of OIF, and limited studies conducted by various agencies within Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. Details of those studies that are relevant to developing the methods for the exposure scenarios under study herein are discussed in section 3. 2.3 Exposure scenarios

Service members could have been exposed to situations resulting in internalized DU from inhalation, ingestion, contamination of wounds, or wounding by DU munitions. Investigations following the 1991 Gulf War developed three levels of potential exposure to DU for use in initial characterizations (triage) of potential severity. Table 2 defines the three levels as updated in DoD guidance for OIF, and provides examples of the types of duties and activities that could have contributed to exposures within each of the levels. Table 2. Exposure Levels and Related Activities Level
Level IPersonnel Struck by a DU Munition or DU fragment or Who Were In, On, or Near (less than 50 Meters) an Armored Vehicle at the Time (or Shortly After) it was struck. Level IIPersonnel Who Routinely Enter DU Damaged Vehicles as a Part of their Military Occupational Specialty or Who Fight Fires Involving DU munitions. Level IIIPersonnel with Incidental Exposure to DU.

Activities
Soldiers in or on a US vehicle when a DU munition penetrated it. Soldiers who entered US vehicles to rescue occupants immediately after fire DU impacts. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and unit personnel Unit personnel who performed maintenance on or recovered items from damaged vehicles. Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs) Battle Damage Assessment Team (BDAT) members 144th Service and Supply Co. personnel and others who processed damaged equipment Radiation Control (RADCON) team members Personnel exposed to DU during cleanup operations Personnel exposed to smoke from burning DU rounds Personnel exposed to smoke from burning vehicles Personnel who entered DU-contaminated equipment Personnel exposed to smoke from Iraq's DU-struck equipment.

Methods

Dose to internal organs from inhaled radioactivity can be estimated using knowledge of the concentration of airborne radioactive material and its particle size distribution, the breathing rate of the exposed individual, and the duration of exposure, which determines the total intake of material. The intake of material is combined with dose factors to convert the intake of material to a Committed Equivalent Dose (CED) to various organs and tissues. Equation 1 describes that calculation.

D = S R BR T DF
where D= S= R= BR = T= DF = CED to specific organs and tissues (rem) Soil contamination (mg Um2) Resuspension factor (m1) Breathing rate (m3hr1) Exposure duration (hours, hr) Dose factor for specified organ(s) (remmg1 intake)

(1)

In addition to calculating a best estimate of the dose and deriving the uncertainty associated with that value, it is desired to apply a probabilistic approach to assessing the dose and uncertainties to better understand the likelihood of encountering the range of radiation dose from DU exposures. To accomplish this objective, distributions are developed for each of the contributing parameters required by Equation 1, except the exposure duration (T) in this current approach. The following sections address the development of distributions for each of the parameters. 3.1 3.1.1 Input Parameters Soil Contamination

Although DU munitions have been used in a number of military operations since 1991, reliable information on the concentration of DU residues in soils is quite limited, especially in Iraq and neighboring countries. UNEP studied DU in soils near areas of DU usage during the 1995 and 1999 conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. The IAEA conducted studies in the soils of Kuwait that were considered to have been areas where DU munitions were used or where damaged military and civilian vehicles were stored / remained following possible damage from DU munitions. Finally, some studies in Kuwait and Iraq have been conducted by government and academic scientists within those or neighboring countries (Iraq). Most of these studies relate to DU residues from the 1991 Gulf War, with little or no information about DU residues generated during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-present). Additional details and assessment of the utility of the soil results for use as the basis for the source term to be used in this effort are discussed in the following sections. Attachment I provides tables of the soil monitoring results discussed in the following sections.

3.1.1.1 Balkans DU Studies The UNEP conducted post-conflict environmental assessments in Kosovo (UNEP, 2001), Serbia and Montenegro (UNEP, 2002), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNEP, 2003) to assess the overall impact of DU used in the conflicts that occurred there in 1995 and 1999. In both conflicts, 30mm DU munitions fired by the A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft comprised the primary source of DU contamination (UNEP, 2003). Each of the studies contains extensive details about the results of ambient radiation dose rate surveys and the results of DU soil concentrations determined from soil samples. Most of those results focused on the assessment of DU contamination in areas of DU employment, especially in the close vicinity of intact or remnants of DU munitions penetratorsused in some anti-armor weapons. The soil concentrations measured within 10-20 meters of and below (0-5 cm) penetrators were typically quite highthousands of milligrams of uranium-238 per kilogram of soil and with high percentages of DU. UNEP scientists concluded that localized DU contamination could be found at distances of less than 20 meters of residual penetrators in soil and within 50 to 100 meters on hard ground (UNEP, 2001; UNEP, 2003). Although these results can be useful in assessing doses for individuals, such as study scientists, or local citizens who may have inadvertently entered the area, they are not useful for populationbased exposures in a region (Danesi, 2003). In addition to the soil samples collected within identified employment areas, UNEP collected soil samples at distances much farther (100 meters or more) from the impact locations to assess the more general contamination situation. Examination of the results of samples collected in the top 5 cm of soil in Kosovo indicated that uranium-238 concentrations ranged from less than 1 mgkg1 to no more than 20 mgkg1 (Danesi, 2003; UNEP, 2003). DU comprised from zero to more than 90 percent of the total uranium in those samples. Interestingly, the DU content in the low to middle ranges did not seem to be correlated strongly with total uranium. For those samples, field blanks had uranium-238 concentrations of about 1 to 4.6 mgkg1 and were entirely natural uranium. In general, UNEP (2003) found normal levels of uranium of 1 to 9.5 mg Ukg1 in Kosovo. Table I-2 and Table I-3 of Attachment I contain the selected soil results from these studies. 3.1.1.2 DU Studies in Kuwait and Iraq (1991 Gulf War) A few studies have been conducted in Kuwait and Iraq to assess the extent of DU contamination from use in the 1991 Iraq War. Published reports of studies conducted by Iraqi scientists concentrated on areas that could be identified using external radiation dose rates. Reported results determined using gamma-ray spectrometry pertain mainly to areas of significant uranium residues and reported uranium-238 concentrations of several thousand to tens of thousands of milligrams per kilogram (Al-Kigani et al., 2005). The IAEA studied residual DU in areas of Kuwait that may have been contaminated during the 1991 Gulf War or were of concern to the local populace (IAEA, 2003). Sites of potential interest for developing source terms consisted of: Al Dohathe site of a military storage area that experienced a major fire and explosions involving DU and other equipment, which has been decontaminated. Al Jahraa sizeable urban area subject to desert winds that bring in fine sand and an area near sites where military actions occurred in the past.

Al Mutlaaincludes the main road to Iraq and the scene of a retreating Iraqi convoy during the 1991 Gulf War; destroyed vehicles have been removed and the road resurfaced. Military Hospital outside Kuwait Citystorage location for several thousand damaged and destroyed Iraqi vehicles starting about 18 months after combat activities ceased.

Results for soil analyses showed essentially no elevated uranium (or DU content) for locations at Al Jahra or Al Mutlaa. At Al Doha, uranium-238 radioactivity ranged from 14.4 to 87.13 Bqkg1equivalent to uranium-238 concentrations of 1.16 to 7.03 mgkg1with DU contents ranging from 1 to about 70 percent that were roughly correlated to the total uranium-238 concentration. This suggests the uranium concentrations above about 1.1 mgkg1 were attributed to DU contamination. At the Military Hospital location, uranium radioactivity ranged from 12.0 to 41 Bqkg1 or 0.87 to 3.31 mgkg1, and with DU contents of about 5 to 66 percent. Table I-4 of Attachment 1 provides the detailed results discussed in this section. 3.1.1.3 Iraqi DU Soil Studies (Operation Iraqi Freedom) Detailed studies on the extent of DU contamination in Iraq as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom have not been located. However, assessments of DU contamination on and around two locations containing equipment damaged by DU munitions were conducted by United Kingdom scientists as part of its Operation TELICthe UKs complement to OIF. One location involved a damaged artillery piece and the other a damaged Iraqi T-55 tank. The results for both locations demonstrated high concentrations of uranium close to the equipment that ranged from tens to thousands of mg Ukg1, and decreased rapidly with distance returning to close background levels at 20 meters. 3.1.1.4 Uranium Soil Concentration Distribution The soil results from studies in Kuwait (IAEA, 2003) were compared with results from the Balkans for samples taken at large distances (several hundred meters) from penetrator impact areas. These results should represent total uranium and DU content characteristics of general locations that may have had some migration of DU from the more highly contaminated impact points. The IAEA (2003) results for Al Doha provided a reasonable collection of results to serve as the basis for a distribution of uranium soil concentrations. That distribution was determined to be represented by a 90 percent credibility interval of 0.6 to 8.1 mgkg1 of uranium-238 and a median of 2.2 mgkg1. The uranium concentrations in mg kg1 were converted to surface contamination levels (mg Um2), using the assumption that soil has a density of 1.5 gcm3 and that the uranium available for resuspension resides in the top 5 cm of the ground. Although some results for soils in Iraq and Kuwait reported the percentage of DU, those results did not correlate well with total uranium content, which would have been the case if the uranium concentration above background levels could be attributed to DU. Therefore, it was assumed that the total uranium concentration consisted of DUan assumption that would tend to overestimate the dose. It is recognized that the results from Al Doha represent only 10 samples with elevated uranium contents. However, these were chosen as reasonably representative because they were more 8

consistentat the lower content levelswith the results of samples collected in other areas in Kuwait, and had lower background levels than samples obtained in the Balkans. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of soil concentrations generated for 5,000 trials, and displays the cumulative probability function (PDF), which is used for statistical purposes. 3.1.2 Uranium Soil Resuspension and Air Concentrations

3.1.2.1 Resuspension DU contamination in soil can be resuspended into the air by various actions including ambient winds of various velocities, or through the disturbance by various activities such as movement of vehicles, personnel movements, or the movements of aircraft-particularly hovering helicopters. The relationship between contamination on and in the ground and the concentration in the air above the ground has been described through the use of a resuspension factor R, expressed in units of reciprocal meters, which relates the contamination on the ground (mgm2) and the concentration in the air (mgm3) according to Equation 2
R= A S

(2)

where:

R is the resuspension factor (m1) S is the surface contamination (mgm2) A is the air concentration (mgm3) above the contaminated surface.

Soil Surface Contamination Distribution 5,000 Cases 700 600 Frequency 500 400 60% 300 200 100 0 0 500 1000
-2

120% 100% 80%

Cum. Percent (PDF)

Frequency Cum. Percent (PDF)

40% 20% 0% 1500

Surface Contamintion (mg U m )

Figure 1. Uranium Surface Contamination for 5,000 Trials 9

Resuspension factors can vary over a many orders of magnitude from 103 m1 under conditions of heavy vehicular or helicopter activity, to 104 to 106 m1 under various conditions of personnel and ambient wind driven activity for fresh contamination, and down to 107 to 109 m1 or lower for ambient winds and aged contamination. The scenario under consideration in this case deals with Service members who may have been exposed under the following conditions. Ambient wind-driven resuspended uranium (including DU) in or near contaminated areas. Light to moderate ground or vehicular movement for limited times. No extended activities in heavily contaminated areas.

Under these conditions, resuspension factors ranging from 106 to 104 m1 provide a credible range for dose estimates to be used in compensation programs, and may produce dose estimates that are higher than expected for aged residual DU. Thus, the resuspension factors used in these calculations are represented by a log-normal distribution with a 90 percent credibility interval of 106 m1 (5 percent) to 104 m1 (95 percent) and a median value of 105 m1 (50 percent). Figure 2 displays the results of the distribution of resuspension factors produced for 5,000 random trials.

Resuspension Factor Distribution 5,000 trials 250 200 Frequency 150 100 50 0 1.0E-07 1.0E-06 1.0E-05 1.0E-04 -1 Resuspension (m )
Frequency Cum Percent (PDF)

120%
Cum. Percent (PDF)

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1.0E-03

Figure 2. Resuspension factor distribution for 5,000 trials

10

3.1.2.2 Air Concentration Calculation of the dose from inhaled materials requires an estimate of the amount of material taken into the body, which is based on the air concentration of the contaminant of concern in the air breathed by the exposed person. The air concentration is determined by combining the soil contamination from 3.1.1 and the resuspension factor from the 3.1.2.1 above. The air concentration distribution for 5,000 random trials is shown in Error! Reference source not found..

Air Concentration Distribution 5,000 Trials

300
Frequency

120%
Cum. Percent (PDF)

250
Frequency

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%

200 150 100 50 0

1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01
-3

1.E+00

Air Concentration (mg m )

Figure 3. Distribution of air concentrations for 5,000 trials 3.1.3 Breathing Rate

The rate that an individual breathes in air varies with several factors such as physical condition, level of activity, and certain physiological factors, such as size. For service members, it is assumed that all are in excellent physical condition and that the breathing rate depends mostly on the amount of physical activity. Various studies of physical activity show that the breathing rates vary with activity. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has developed a series of activity levels and associated breathing rates. Those activity levels can be combined, weighted by the fraction of a day spent performing at various activity levels to produce an overall average daily breathing rate. For this scenario, those factors have been reviewed and a distribution of breathing rates developed such that the breathing rates are represented by a log-normal distribution with 90 11

Cum. Percent (PDF)

percent credibility limits of 0.7 m3hr1 to 3 m3hr1 and a median value of 1.2 m3hr1. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of breathing rates for 5,000 random trials. 3.1.4 Duration of DU Exposure

The scenario being considered herein represents a routine deployment involving a variety of duties that support the overall mission assigned to a particular unit. The missions assigned do not consist of primary involvement with handling or treatment of contaminated equipment or operation primarily in areas contaminated above those levels encountered outside a few hundred meters from the point where DU munitions may have been used. Therefore, the potential exposure can be viewed as an expected occurrence during some part of a duty day. For example, one possible allocation of time during a duty day would consist of 12 to 14 hours outside a garrison area; and the remainder of time10 to 12 hours in garrison. During the time in garrison, exposure to DU would not be likely, and exposure while outside the garrison in transit to and at duty locations exposure to DU would be possible up to 25 percent of the time. Therefore, the total time exposed to airborne DU could be about 1,000 hours during a one-year deployment to areas that could involve duties that might encounter DU. That number could be adjusted for other duty conditions; however, substantial differences would be needed to impact overall dose and a compensation decision in a significant way.

Breathing Rate Distribution 5,000 Trials

350 300 250 Frequency 200 60% 150 100 50 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Breathing Rate (m 3 hr-1) Frequency Cum. Percent (PDF) 40% 20% 0% 120% 100% 80%

Figure 4. Breathing Rate distribution for 5,000 trials 3.1.5 Dose Factors

The total intake of material inhaled is converted to radiation doses from DU to internal organs using established dose factors. Recommended factors for many environmental and occupational 12

Cum. Percnet (PDF)

exposure situations are available for adults (ICRP, 1994). In addition to those, dose factors developed during the Department of Defense DU CAPSTONE project, overseen by the USACHPPM are specific to the types of depleted uranium materials and exposure conditions that are representative of the exposure situations under study in this. Dose factors available in (Szrom F. et al., 2004) provide doses per hour of exposure during scenarios that are relevant for deployed personnel. Dose factors for inhalation are derived from two data sets from studies described in Szrom F. et al. (2004). The first data set was derived from personnel cascade impactors (P-CI) worn by recovery personnel inside contaminated vehicles. The second data set was derived from cascade impactors (CIs) from sampling arrays at fixed locations inside a contaminated vehicle (Parkhurst et al., 2004). Both sets of data were examined for this study to select the most useful parameters that could be used. Results for each set of data included minimum and maximum values, mean values, standard deviations, and tenth percentile, median and ninetieth percentile values. After review, it was concluded that the mean and standard deviation values and a normal distribution were most appropriate for this study. Although these types of exposure situations often can be represented by log-normal distributions, the CAPSTONE results did not appear to be characteristic of lognormal distributions. The tabulated CAPSTONE dose results expressed in rem per hour of exposure were adjusted by the intakes (mg DU per hour) to produce factors (rem per mg DU) for these calculations. Attachment II contains tables with the modified CAPSTONE dose factor values used as the basis for preparing dose factor distributions for this study. Figure 5 provides an example dose factor distribution expressed as rem committed equivalent dose (CED) for the lungs using the P-CI data. Cautions apply to the use of the DU CAPSTONE dose factors for evaluating doses to individuals exposed to residual DU deposited on the ground when exposures occur long after the contaminating event. The dose factors derived in CAPSTONE used DU air concentrations attributed to fresh DU aerosols for exposures that might occur within a few hours after the contaminating event. In most cases, the types of exposure considered in this report would be more likely to occur weeks, months or years after the event. Under those circumstances, the DU contaminant would be subject to effects of weathering, which could change the particle sizes, cause the DU to migrate below the surface of the soil and reduce resuspension among other effectsactions expected to lower the intake and dose under most circumstance. 3.2 Calculations

The next step in accomplishing the dose estimates involves the use of modeling techniques to use the parameter distributions described above to generate random values of each parameter to calculate individual values of dose using Equation 1 for a selected number of calcuations. In this effort, 5,000 calculations were performed. The dose calculations have been implemented in a Mathcad Version 12 worksheet (Attachment III) that performs the calculations, and reports the dose results along with other statistical parameters.

13

Dose Factor Distribution PCI Data - Lung 350

Frequency

120%
Cum. Percent (PDF)

300 250 Frequency 200

100% 80% 60%

Cum. Percent (PDF)

150 100 50 0 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019 rem per mg U intake 40% 20% 0% 0.020

Figure 5. Uranium Dose Factor Distribution for Lung from P-CI Data for 5,000 trials

14

Results

Table 3 and Table 4 provide the results (rem CED) to 37 organs and tissues calculated using the P-CI and CI-Array dose factors, respectively as well as the distributions values of other parameters discussed in the previous sections. In addition, Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of the 5,000 individual dose calculations (points) and the PDF.

Dose Distribution PCI Data - Lung 300 250 Frequency 200 150 100 50 0 1.E-04
Frequency Cum. Percent

120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1.E+01 Cum. Percent (PDF)

1.E-03

1.E-02 1.E-01 rem CED

1.E+00

Figure 6. Distribution of Doses (rem CED) to the Lung Using P-CI Dose Factors

15

Table 3. Organ Dose (rem CED) using P-CI Dose Factors

Organ Adrenals Urinary Bladder Brain Breast Gall Bladder Heart Kidney Liver Muscle Ovaries Pancreas Testes Thyroid Red Bone Marrow Bone Surface Skin Spleen Thymus Uterus Extra Thoracic Lung Colon Esophagus Remainder Stomach Small Intestine Upper Large Intestine Lower Large Intestine Extra Thoracic-1 Extra Thoracic-2 Extra Thoracic Lymph Nodes BB (sec cells) BB (bas cells) bb Alveolar Interstitial Thoracic Lymph Nodes Gonads 5th Percentile 3.87E-06 4.10E-06 3.97E-06 4.14E-06 1.75E-05 3.86E-06 4.15E-05 1.54E-05 4.11E-06 3.93E-06 4.17E-06 4.24E-06 4.16E-06 1.29E-05 1.14E-04 4.16E-06 3.93E-06 3.97E-06 4.03E-06 -2.74E-02 3.57E-03 -5.82E-05 4.22E-06 6.23E+02 3.67E-06 3.10E-06 -1.19E-05 -1.30E-04 -1.06E-02 -2.76E-02 1.92E-02 2.20E-03 9.57E-05 3.33E-03 6.46E-03 5.24E-02 3.85E-06 Median 4.86E-05 4.99E-05 5.03E-05 4.79E-05 1.76E-04 5.06E-05 5.22E-04 1.95E-04 4.86E-05 5.03E-05 4.95E-05 4.91E-05 4.90E-05 1.48E-04 1.38E-03 4.90E-05 4.93E-05 4.84E-05 4.98E-05 2.12E-02 3.49E-02 3.71E-05 4.86E-05 6.14E+03 4.90E-05 4.86E-05 4.14E-05 3.78E-05 3.11E-04 2.09E-02 1.90E-01 2.18E-02 1.42E-03 3.29E-02 6.35E-02 5.15E-01 4.92E-05 Geometric mean 4.88E-05 4.90E-05 4.87E-05 4.88E-05 1.76E-04 4.91E-05 5.16E-04 1.90E-04 4.90E-05 4.90E-05 4.89E-05 4.84E-05 4.87E-05 1.48E-04 1.38E-03 4.78E-05 4.87E-05 4.86E-05 4.85E-05 2.11E-02 3.52E-02 3.83E-05 4.88E-05 6.17E+03 4.77E-05 4.62E-05 4.19E-05 4.20E-05 4.62E-04 2.13E-02 1.91E-01 2.18E-02 1.41E-03 3.31E-02 6.37E-02 5.17E-01 4.81E-05 Geometric Standard Deviation 4.50E+00 4.48E+00 4.49E+00 4.42E+00 4.06E+00 4.46E+00 4.51E+00 4.62E+00 4.47E+00 4.44E+00 4.45E+00 4.47E+00 4.52E+00 4.48E+00 4.52E+00 4.53E+00 4.50E+00 4.49E+00 4.52E+00 8.25E+00 4.03E+00 8.46E+00 4.45E+00 4.03E+00 4.63E+00 4.85E+00 6.82E+00 9.36E+00 1.05E+01 8.21E+00 4.03E+00 4.04E+00 4.76E+00 4.03E+00 4.03E+00 4.03E+00 4.51E+00 95th Percentile 5.83E-04 5.67E-04 5.35E-04 5.65E-04 1.81E-03 5.51E-04 5.90E-03 2.26E-03 5.70E-04 5.29E-04 5.54E-04 5.36E-04 5.74E-04 1.66E-03 1.61E-02 5.33E-04 5.50E-04 5.47E-04 5.37E-04 3.43E-01 3.68E-01 6.23E-04 5.32E-04 6.39E+04 5.67E-04 5.39E-04 6.19E-04 8.85E-04 1.93E-02 3.51E-01 1.96E+00 2.25E-01 1.68E-02 3.41E-01 6.60E-01 5.35E+00 5.61E-04

16

Table 4. Organ Dose (rem CED) using CI-Array Dose Factors

Organ Adrenals Urinary Bladder Brain Breast Gall Bladd Heart Kidney Liver Muscle Ovaries Pancreas Testes Thyroid Red Bone Marrow Bone Surface Skin Spleen Thymus Uterus Extra Thoracic Lung Colon Esophagus Remainder Stomach Small Intestine Upper Large Intestine Lower Large Intestine Extra Thoracic-1 Extra Thoracic-2 Extra Thoracic Lymph Nodes BB (sec cells) BB (bas cells) Bb Alveolar Interstitial Thoracic Lymph Nodes Gonads 5th Percentile -1.34E-04 -1.27E-04 -1.34E-04 -1.44E-04 -1.27E-04 -1.42E-04 -1.51E-03 -4.83E-04 -1.25E-04 -1.39E-04 -1.44E-04 -1.45E-04 -1.29E-04 -3.96E-04 -3.57E-03 -1.30E-04 -1.38E-04 -1.22E-04 -1.35E-04 -1.23E-01 1.91E-03 -3.17E-04 -1.25E-04 -1.13E-02 -1.41E-04 -1.61E-04 -2.50E-04 -4.62E-04 -1.36E-02 -1.32E-01 -3.60E-02 -8.27E-03 -1.53E-03 3.18E-03 3.21E-03 2.14E-03 -1.38E-04 Median 3.33E-05 3.20E-05 3.27E-05 3.40E-05 3.42E-05 3.50E-05 3.22E-04 1.36E-04 3.38E-05 3.18E-05 3.33E-05 3.34E-05 3.28E-05 9.53E-05 8.98E-04 3.45E-05 3.32E-05 3.38E-05 3.27E-05 3.72E-03 2.48E-02 2.89E-05 3.45E-05 3.48E-03 3.34E-05 3.40E-05 2.84E-05 2.74E-05 2.15E-04 3.89E-03 1.45E-03 9.77E-03 6.54E-04 3.80E-02 3.32E-02 2.35E-02 3.51E-05 Geometric mean 3.60E-05 3.61E-05 3.73E-05 3.77E-05 3.69E-05 3.88E-05 3.67E-04 1.49E-04 3.72E-05 3.70E-05 3.66E-05 3.74E-05 3.70E-05 1.10E-04 1.03E-03 3.82E-05 3.62E-05 3.86E-05 3.68E-05 5.44E-03 2.46E-02 3.65E-05 3.86E-05 3.85E-03 3.76E-05 3.91E-05 3.43E-05 3.55E-05 3.27E-04 5.49E-03 1.92E-03 9.88E-03 7.05E-04 3.70E-02 3.36E-02 2.29E-02 3.80E-05 Geometric Standard Deviation 9.38E+00 9.45E+00 9.26E+00 9.16E+00 9.38E+00 9.11E+00 9.35E+00 9.18E+00 9.43E+00 9.32E+00 9.47E+00 9.47E+00 9.31E+00 9.32E+00 9.42E+00 9.29E+00 9.34E+00 9.31E+00 9.32E+00 1.05E+01 4.53E+00 9.92E+00 9.04E+00 9.07E+00 9.42E+00 9.35E+00 1.01E+01 1.04E+01 1.06E+01 1.06E+01 1.06E+01 7.81E+00 8.72E+00 4.44E+00 4.20E+00 4.30E+00 9.31E+00 95th Percentile 6.96E-04 7.31E-04 7.28E-04 6.75E-04 6.96E-04 7.15E-04 7.15E-03 2.65E-03 7.13E-04 7.02E-04 7.39E-04 7.12E-04 6.97E-04 2.07E-03 2.05E-02 7.06E-04 7.12E-04 7.49E-04 7.33E-04 2.19E-01 2.65E-01 8.08E-04 6.98E-04 7.00E-02 7.15E-04 7.49E-04 8.07E-04 1.02E-03 1.89E-02 2.22E-01 6.10E-02 1.57E-01 1.22E-02 3.90E-01 3.30E-01 2.36E-01 7.18E-04

17

Implications of Estimated Doses

VA uses radiation doses to veterans as one element in determining the eligibility for disability benefits for conditions that may be associated with military service. For cancer, VA commonly uses current scientific information about the association of radiation dose and cancer as described in the latest version of the radioepidemiological tables developed by the National Cancer Institute (NCI). It uses one or both versions of software implementations of these tables, known as the Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program (IREP) (Otchin, 2007). A version developed for the NCI, known as NCI-IREP and a version developed for the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), known as NIOSH-IREP (NIOSH, 2002) are available and used. These programs use the radiation dose and other information about the veteran, such as age at exposure, and at a diagnosis of the disease to calculate a probability of causation (PC) or assigned share. This value represents the contribution of the radiation dose to the overall likelihood for developing cancer. The radiation doses from DU reported in Section 4 were used with NIOSH-IREP to calculate the PC for cancers of several representative organs; namely lung cancer, bone cancer, and prostate cancer. The PCs were evaluated with the following assumptions: Age 21 at exposure. Age 40 and age 60 at diagnosis of the cancer. The total dose calculated over 50 years was received in the year of exposure. The upper bound dose (95th percentile) was used as a constant value, and the dose distributions (log-normal) were used in separate PC calculations.

Lung and bone cancer were selected because the lungs and bone surfaces tend to receive substantially higher doses from internal uranium than most other organs. Prostate cancer was selected because it represents an expected condition as men age. Table 5 summarizes the results for those calculations, and demonstrates that the contributions of the radiation doses to the likelihood of cancer as PCs are all less than 1 per cent. Table 5. Probability of Causation for Named Cancers
PC (Constant Dose UB) Cancer and organ Bone Surface Lung Geometric Mean Dose 1.38E-03 3.49E-02 Upper bound (95%tile) 1.61E-02 3.68E-01 Age (years) Expose/ Diagnose 21/40 0.11% 1.96% 0.00% Age (years) Expose/ Diagnose 21/60 0.07% 1.86% 0.00% PC (Lognormal Dose) Age (years) Expose/ Diagnose 21/40 0.05% 0.98% 0.00% Age (years) Expose/ Diagnose 21/60 0.03% 0.76% 0.00%

gsd 4.52 4.03

Prostate 4.91E-05 4.47 5.36E-04 (Testes) Note: gsd means geometric standard deviation

18

These examples are intended as illustrations for the doses calculated in this project. Doses and the resulting PC would be expected to change if exposure times were increased, soil concentrations changed, and so on.

19

References

Al-Kinani AT, AS Al-Saidi, S Al-Anni. 2005. Investigation of depleted uranium contamination in south west of Iraq. Iran. J. Radiat. Res., 3 (3):109-115. Danesi PR, A Bleise, W Burkart, T Cabianca, MJ Campbell, M Makarewicz, J Moreno, C Tuniz, M Hotchkis. 2003. Isotopic composition and origin of uranium and plutonium in selected soil samples collected in Kosovo. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, Volume 64: 121131. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 2003. Radiological Conditions in Areas of Kuwait with Residues of Depleted Uranium. International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1994. Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers. Replacement for ICRP Publication 61. ICRP Publication 68. Pergamon Press: Oxford, United Kingdom. 1994. National Cancer Institute (NCI). 2008. Interactive RadioEpidemiological Program (IREP), V 5.4. http://www.irep.nci.nih.gov/ December 4, 2008. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 2002. NIOSH-Interactive RadioEpidemiological Progam (NIOSH-IREP), Technical Documentation, Final Report. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/pdfs/irep/irepfnl.pdf Cincinnati, Ohio, June 18, 2002. Otchin, NS. 2007. The Use of the Interactive Radioepidemiological Program (IREP) by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Briefing to Meeting of the Veterans Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction (VBDR). March 7, 2007. Parkhurst MA, Szrom F, Guilmette RA, Holmes TD, Cheng YS, Kenoyer JL, J Collins W, Sanderson TE, Fliszar RW, Gold K, Beckman JC, Long JA. Capstone depleted uranium aerosols: generation and characterization, Volumes 1 and 2. PNNL-14168, prepared for he US Army by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington; 2004. Szrom F, EG Daxon, MA Parkhurst, GA Falo, and JW Collins. Level II and level III inhalation and ingestion dose calculations. PNWD 3480, Prepared for the US Army by Battelle under the Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center Task 241, DO 0189, Aberdeen, Maryland; 2004. UNEP. 2001. Depleted Uranium in Kosovo Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment. United Nations Environmental Program. Vienna. UNEP. 2002. Depleted Uranium in Serbia and Montenegro Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. United Nations Environmental Program. Geneva. UNEP. 2003. Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment. United Nations Environmental Program. Vienna.

20

Attachment I
I-1 Soil Result Tables

Uranium in Soil Samples from Studies at DU Employment Sites

This attachment contains the results of soil analyses for uranium conducted by the agencies at locations described in tab , which also identifies the table in this section with the results. Table I-1. Tables of Soil Results Agency Conducting Study UNEP IAEA, ANSTO1 IAEA Location Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Kuwait Reference (UNEP, 2003) (Danesi, 2003) (IAEA, 2003) Table of Results Table I-2 Table I-3 Table I-4

Notes: 1. Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization

21

Table I-2. Selected Soil Results from Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNEP, 2003)
Sample Ident. NUC-2001-101-01 NUC-2001-101-02 NUC-2001-101-03 NUC-2001-101-04 NUC-2001-101-05 NUC-2001-101-06 NUC-2001-101-07 NUC-2001-101-08 NUC-2001-101-10 NUC-2001-101-11 NUC-2001-101-12 NUC-2001-103-01 NUC-2001-103-02 NUC-2001-103-03 NUC-2001-103-04 NUC-2001-103-05 NUC-2001-103-06 NUC-2001-103-07 NUC-2001-103-08 NUC-2001-103-09 NUC-2001-104-01 NUC-2001-104-02 NUC-2001-104-03 NUC-2001-104-04 NUC-2001-104-05 NUC-2001-104-06 NUC-2001-104-07 NUC-2001-104-08 NUC-2001-105-01 NUC-2001-105-02 NUC-2001-105-03 NUC-2001-105-04 NUC-2001-106-01 NUC-2001-106-02 NUC-2001-106-03 NUC-2001-106-04 NUC-2001-106-05 NUC-2001-106-06 NUC-2001-106-07 NUC-2001-106-08 NUC-2001-106-09 NUC-2001-107-01 NUC-2001-107-02 NUC-2001-107-03 NUC-2001-107-04 NUC-2001-107-05 NUC-2001-107-06 NUC-2001-107-07 Sample Info Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil over penetrator 0 - 5 cm Soil around penetrator 5 - 15 cm Soil, 8 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil / Field blank 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil / Field blank 0 - 5 cm Soil, point of higher radioactivity, 10 sticks, 2 sqm, 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil / Field blank 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 12 sticks 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m 0 - 5 cm Soil, Field Blank 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm Soil, 10 sticks, 5x5 m area 0 - 5 cm U238 (mg/kg) 6.0 5.3 12.2 3.0 3.7 3.5 1161 24758 6.5 17.6 4.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.0 3.3 12.9 11.1 12.6 7.9 6.0 3.7 5.8 2.6 5.2 5.0 4.7 3.7 3.0 13.1 3.5 6.1 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.1 4.0 3.9 9.0 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.2 3.4 U235/U238 (mg/mg) 0.004147 0.004505 0.003211 0.006946 0.005855 0.007255 0.00203 0.00202 0.004781 0.003017 0.007252 0.006991 0.006584 0.006569 0.00695 0.006634 0.007057 0.007188 0.007201 0.006479 0.005849 0.005815 0.005761 0.007068 0.007239 0.00727 0.007261 0.00726 0.007261 0.007272 0.007276 0.007278 0.007053 0.003214 0.007276 0.004804 0.007261 0.007276 0.00728 0.007237 0.007273 0.004863 0.003696 0.00695 0.007206 0.007163 0.007217 0.007223 U238 (Bq/kg) 7.50E+01 6.61E+01 1.51E+02 3.69E+01 4.59E+01 4.40E+01 1.44E+04 3.07E+05 8.12E+01 2.18E+02 5.69E+01 2.31E+01 2.08E+01 1.95E+01 1.89E+01 2.16E+01 1.95E+01 1.73E+01 1.26E+01 4.03E+01 1.60E+02 1.38E+02 1.56E+02 9.74E+01 7.39E+01 4.60E+01 7.22E+01 3.26E+01 6.43E+01 6.26E+01 5.86E+01 4.62E+01 3.68E+01 1.63E+02 4.37E+01 7.59E+01 4.50E+01 3.99E+01 3.40E+01 3.89E+01 4.93E+01 4.86E+01 1.11E+02 4.27E+01 3.56E+01 3.36E+01 2.76E+01 4.24E+01 %DU 59.04 52.22 76.91 5.81 26.53 -0.05 99.50 99.69 46.96 80.62 0.01 4.96 12.68 12.97 5.74 11.73 3.71 1.22 0.98 14.67 26.64 27.29 28.31 3.50 0.26 -0.33 -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.37 -0.44 -0.48 3.78 76.85 -0.44 46.52 -0.16 -0.44 -0.52 0.30 -0.39 45.40 67.65 5.74 0.88 1.70 0.68 0.56 mg/m2 453.6 399.8 913.3 223.2 277.6 266.1 87096.8 1856854. 8 491.1 1318.5 344.2 139.7 125.8 117.9 114.3 130.6 117.9 104.6 76.2 243.8 967.7 834.7 943.5 589.1 447.0 278.2 436.7 197.2 388.9 378.6 354.4 279.4 222.6 985.9 264.3 459.1 272.2 241.3 205.6 235.3 298.2 294.0 671.4 258.3 215.3 203.2 166.9 256.5

22

Table I-3. Selected Soil Results from Kosovo (Danesi, 2003)

Location Vranovac Hill Radonjicko Jezero Dam Rznic Barracks, close to"hot spots in streets Rznic Barracks, close to"hot spots in streets Ceja Mountain underneath a jacket 05cm Sample Info Soil Core 0-5cm Surface sample close to penetrator hole in bunker Soil Core 0-5cm Soil Core 0-5cm U238 (mg/kg) 1.91 7.9 U235/U238 (mg/mg) 0.00726 0.00291 U238 (Bq/kg) 23.7 98.0 %DU -0.14 82.66

3.14 11.9

0.00688 0.00325

38.9 148

7.06 76.16

Soil Core 0-5cm

4040

0.0017

50096

105.82

23

Table I-4. Selected Soil Results from Kuwait (IAEA 2003)

Location Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil core Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil core Al Doha soil after remediation Al Doha soil after remediation AL Jahra surface soil AL Jahra surface soil AL Jahra surface soil AL Jahra surface soil AL Jahra surface soil AL Jahra surface soil Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Al Mutlaa surface soil along side road Military Hospital Vehicle Storage Military Hospital Vehicle Storage Military Hospital Vehicle Storage Military Hospital Vehicle Storage Military Hospital Vehicle Storage Sample Info 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm 0-5 cm soil core 0-5cm surface 0-5 cm surface 0-5 cm surface 0-5 cm surface 0-5 cm U238 (mg/kg) 1.16 1.18 1.20 1.42 1.77 1.79 2.46 2.49 6.45 7.03 0.78 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.95 0.64 0.69 0.71 0.84 0.91 0.97 1.02 1.18 0.87 0.97 1.33 1.36 3.31 U235/U238 (mg/mg) 0.0071 0.0072 0.0072 0.0064 0.0063 0.0058 0.0066 0.0066 0.0035 0.0036 0.0073 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072 0.0073 0.0072 0.0073 0.0072 0.0073 0.0071 0.0072 0.0073 0.0071 0.007 0.0072 0.0072 0.0066 0.0038 U238 (Bq/kg) 14.4 14.6 14.9 17.6 21.9 22.2 30.5 30.9 80 87.13 9.7 10.8 10.9 11 11.2 11.8 7.9 8.6 8.8 10.4 11.3 12 12.6 14.6 10.8 12 16.5 16.9 41 %DU 2.89 1.00 1.00 16.17 18.07 27.57 12.38 12.38 71.39 69.48 -0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.90 1.00 -0.90 1.00 -0.90 2.89 1.00 -0.90 2.89 4.79 1.00 1.00 12.38 65.66

24

Attachment II
II-1 Dose Factor Values

Dose Factor Values

The dose factor values derived from the CAPSTONE study are shown in the tables of this attachment. Table II-1 shows the values used derived from the PCI results and Table II-2 shows the values derived from the Array results.

25

Table II-1. Capstone P-CI (BZM) Organ Dose (HT(50)) Factors

Equivalent Dose Rates in rem mg-1 Organ Adrenals Urinary Bladder Brain Breast Gall Bladd Heart Kidney Liver Muscle Ovaries Pancreas Testes Thyroid Red Bone Marrow Bone Surface Skin Spleen Thymus Uterus Extra Thoracic Lung Colon Esophagus Remainder Stomach Small Intestine Upper Large Intestine Lower Large Intestine ExtraThoracic-1 ExtraThoracic-2 ExtraThoracic Lymph Nodes BB (sec cells) BB (bas cells) Bb Alveolar Interstitial Thoracic Lymph Nodes Gonads Average 5.91E-05 5.93E-05 5.90E-05 5.91E-05 8.94E-05 5.93E-05 6.05E-04 2.33E-04 5.90E-05 5.90E-05 5.91E-05 5.89E-05 5.90E-05 1.80E-04 1.69E-03 5.90E-05 5.91E-05 5.92E-05 5.90E-05 4.03E-02 2.56E-02 8.27E-05 5.92E-05 7.80E+02 5.99E-05 6.11E-05 7.18E-05 9.69E-05 2.45E-03 4.03E-02 8.11E-02 2.04E-02 1.80E-03 2.96E-02 3.58E-02 1.83E-01 5.89E-05 Standard Deviation 2.76E-05 2.78E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 9.08E-05 2.76E-05 2.90E-04 1.08E-04 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 8.39E-05 7.90E-04 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 2.76E-05 1.53E-02 1.81E-02 2.90E-05 2.76E-05 3.17E+03 2.76E-05 2.77E-05 2.83E-05 2.99E-05 3.83E-04 1.52E-02 9.80E-02 1.13E-02 8.35E-04 1.70E-02 3.27E-02 2.66E-01 2.76E-05 Minimum 1.04E-05 1.05E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.09E-04 4.07E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 3.15E-05 2.96E-04 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05 1.57E-02 3.69E-04 3.09E-05 1.04E-05 3.40E-03 1.12E-05 1.23E-05 2.16E-05 4.32E-05 1.60E-03 1.57E-02 1.69E-03 8.89E-04 3.58E-04 1.87E-04 2.28E-04 1.75E-03 1.04E-05 10th Percentile 3.78E-05 3.80E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 4.08E-05 3.78E-05 3.32E-04 1.48E-04 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 1.14E-04 1.08E-03 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 3.77E-05 1.95E-02 6.48E-03 6.22E-05 3.77E-05 6.51E-03 3.86E-05 3.99E-05 5.08E-05 7.66E-05 1.87E-03 1.95E-02 2.12E-03 9.95E-03 9.35E-04 7.18E-03 4.71E-03 9.01E-03 3.77E-05 Median 5.53E-05 5.56E-05 5.53E-05 5.55E-05 5.75E-05 5.58E-05 5.81E-04 2.19E-04 5.53E-05 5.53E-05 5.54E-05 5.52E-05 5.53E-05 1.69E-04 1.59E-03 5.53E-05 5.55E-05 5.56E-05 5.52E-05 3.69E-02 1.96E-02 7.94E-05 5.56E-05 1.43E-02 5.63E-05 5.76E-05 6.94E-05 9.27E-05 2.52E-03 3.70E-02 1.18E-02 1.81E-02 1.74E-03 2.73E-02 2.04E-02 1.79E-02 5.52E-05 90th Percentile 7.68E-05 7.72E-05 7.68E-05 7.68E-05 1.83E-04 7.69E-05 8.07E-04 3.02E-04 7.68E-05 7.68E-05 7.68E-05 7.67E-05 7.68E-05 2.34E-04 2.20E-03 7.68E-05 7.68E-05 7.68E-05 7.70E-05 6.25E-02 5.45E-02 9.97E-05 7.68E-05 2.90E-02 7.76E-05 7.89E-05 8.93E-05 1.13E-04 2.77E-03 6.24E-02 2.31E-01 3.35E-02 2.96E-03 5.50E-02 8.76E-02 5.61E-01 7.67E-05 Maximum 1.72E-04 1.73E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 3.78E-04 1.72E-04 1.77E-03 6.74E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 5.22E-04 4.92E-03 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 1.72E-04 7.06E-02 6.79E-02 2.05E-04 1.72E-04 1.60E+04 1.73E-04 1.75E-04 1.90E-04 2.25E-04 3.25E-03 7.05E-02 2.59E-01 5.52E-02 3.73E-03 6.21E-02 1.20E-01 9.24E-01 1.72E-04

26

Table II-2. Capstone CI-Array (Area Monitors) Organ Dose (HT(50)) Factors
Equivalent Dose Rates in rem mg-1 Organ Adrenals Urinary Bladder Brain Breast Gall Bladd Heart Kidney Liver Muscle Ovaries Pancreas Testes Thyroid Red Bone Marrow Bone Surface Skin Spleen Thymus Uterus Extra Thoracic Lung Colon Esophagus Remainder Stomach Small Intestine Upper Large Intestine Lower Large Intestine ExtraThoracic-1 ExtraThoracic-2 ExtraThoracic Lymph Nodes BB (sec cells) BB (bas cells) Bb Alveolar Interstitial Thoracic Lymph Nodes Gonads Average 1.05E-04 1.05E-04 1.04E-04 1.05E-04 1.04E-04 1.05E-04 1.05E-03 4.12E-04 1.04E-04 1.04E-04 1.04E-04 1.04E-04 1.04E-04 3.15E-04 3.00E-03 1.04E-04 1.04E-04 1.05E-04 1.04E-04 2.40E-02 3.34E-02 1.27E-04 1.05E-04 7.83E-03 1.05E-04 1.06E-04 1.17E-04 1.41E-04 2.16E-03 2.40E-02 7.02E-03 2.52E-02 1.91E-03 4.80E-02 3.87E-02 2.73E-02 1.04E-04 Standard Deviation 2.81E-05 2.81E-05 2.80E-05 2.81E-05 2.80E-05 2.81E-05 2.80E-04 1.11E-04 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 8.56E-05 8.06E-04 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.81E-05 2.80E-05 4.33E-03 1.41E-02 2.80E-05 2.81E-05 2.84E-03 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.80E-05 2.90E-04 4.34E-03 1.59E-03 7.20E-03 5.18E-04 2.10E-02 1.82E-02 1.26E-02 2.80E-05 Minimum 4.06E-05 4.09E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.25E-04 1.59E-04 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 1.22E-04 1.16E-03 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 4.06E-05 1.90E-02 5.39E-03 6.16E-05 4.06E-05 3.88E-03 4.14E-05 4.25E-05 5.21E-05 7.43E-05 1.80E-03 1.91E-02 5.31E-03 6.58E-03 6.13E-04 7.55E-03 5.02E-03 3.96E-03 4.06E-05 10th Percentile 7.78E-05 7.81E-05 7.77E-05 7.78E-05 7.77E-05 7.79E-05 7.65E-04 3.06E-04 7.77E-05 7.77E-05 7.77E-05 7.77E-05 7.77E-05 2.37E-04 2.23E-03 7.77E-05 7.77E-05 7.78E-05 7.77E-05 2.06E-02 2.31E-02 1.01E-04 7.78E-05 4.85E-03 7.85E-05 7.98E-05 9.02E-05 1.14E-04 1.82E-03 2.07E-02 5.64E-03 1.93E-02 1.52E-03 3.13E-02 2.36E-02 1.36E-02 7.77E-05 Median 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.16E-03 4.36E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 3.23E-04 3.18E-03 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 1.11E-04 2.26E-02 3.10E-02 1.35E-04 1.11E-04 7.45E-03 1.12E-04 1.13E-04 1.24E-04 1.49E-04 2.29E-03 2.27E-02 6.50E-03 2.71E-02 2.03E-03 4.57E-02 3.18E-02 2.30E-02 1.11E-04 90th Percentile 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.33E-03 5.28E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 4.08E-04 3.84E-03 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 1.34E-04 3.02E-02 5.12E-02 1.56E-04 1.34E-04 1.18E-02 1.34E-04 1.36E-04 1.46E-04 1.69E-04 2.50E-03 3.02E-02 9.23E-03 3.16E-02 2.42E-03 7.52E-02 6.17E-02 4.30E-02 1.34E-04 Maximum 1.40E-04 1.41E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.38E-03 5.52E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 4.27E-04 4.02E-03 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 1.40E-04 3.28E-02 5.57E-02 1.62E-04 1.40E-04 1.25E-02 1.41E-04 1.42E-04 1.52E-04 1.75E-04 2.55E-03 3.29E-02 9.95E-03 3.38E-02 2.55E-03 8.39E-02 6.69E-02 4.57E-02 1.40E-04

27

Attachment III Mathcad Calculation Worksheet

III-1 Mathcad Worksheet for Dose Calculation A non-working version (Adobe Acrobat) of the Mathcad calculation worksheet developed for this effort and used in the calculation of results is provided in Attachment III and the working version is provided as a separate file with the Microsoft Word version of this document.

28

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Attachment III Mathcad Worksheet for DU Dose Calculations

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 1 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Calculate Organ Dose from Depleted Uranium Exposure to Contaminated Soil.

1.0 General Comments Estimate dose from inhalation of resuspended soil using CAPSTONE dose factors. Allows selection of Array or PCI dose factors, which are read in from an Excel data file. Performs Monte Carlo type calculations using distributions of breathing rate, soil concentration, resuspension factor, and dose factors. Distributions generated from pre-established distributions of each parameter. Allows display of dose distribution for a selected organ. Selection of the organ is made in Section 2.0 Provides for selection of exposure time in hours. Reports Committed Equivalent Doses (rem) to organs. Provides illustrative dose distribution plots for one, selected organ. Can be modified to generate more. Reports CEDs in a summary table; full results can be printed or output to an Excel data file.

2.0 Input Parameters Number of interations, n n := 5000 i := 1 .. n SoilDep := 5 cm DFI := 1

SoilDen := 1.5 grams per cubic meter

Select dose factor input contol DFI; choose 1 for PCI or -1 for Array

To reduce the space required to display the dose distributions for all organs; this worksheet allows the selection of a specific organ to display. The sheet displays the Dose Factor distribution, the resulting distribution of doses to the selected organ, correlations of the dose distribution with the four parameters used in the calculation, and scatters plots of the distributions of the four paramenters against the dose distribution. These are provided for illustration prupostes. Read in both dose factor data tables. PCI Data DoseFactorsPCI := Array Data

nh_pci_df2_rev.xls

DoseFactorsArray :=

nh_arr_df2_rev.xl

Select organ for dose distribution display. DoseFactors := DoseFactorsPCI if DFI > 0 DoseFactorsArray if DFI < 0 o := 1 .. 37 dc := 1 .. 7 oj := 1 .. 12 1 Orgnam := DoseFactors Label
1 , dc

oi := 1 .. 37 DoseF
oi , dc

Organ := Orgnam
oi

oi+ 1

:= DoseFactors

1 , dc

:= DoseFactors

oi+ 1 , dc+ 1

ok := 25 .. 37

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 2 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

oj =
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

submatrix( Organ , 1 , 12 , 1 , 1 )oj = + 12 = submatrix( Organ , 13 , 24 , 1 , 1 ) ok = =

"Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

submatrix( Organ , 25 , 37 , 1 , 1 ) =
"Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads"

Three sets of column pairs are listed above. Set ii to the number in the left column that corresponds to the organ listed in the right column; e.g. ii = 21 selects "lung". ii := 21 Organ = "Lung"
ii

2.1 Exposure Duration . Exposure is set in the variable Etime with units of hours. Explain the rationale for the exposure time. Etime := 1000 Etime = 1 10
3

hours

For this case, the exposure time is set to 1,000 hours, which represents an individual spending one-half work day in contaminated areas on average over a year. 2.2 Breathing Rate The breathing rate distribution, brknow is a matrix with percentile in column 1 and breathing rates (m3 hr-1) in column 2.

.05 0.7 2 brknow := .5 1.2 br := brknow .95 3

Generate Data set of "n" randon points for calculation Define a log normal distribution with geometric standard deviation (GSD) derive from the median (50%tile) value and the 5 and 95 %tile values using the relationship that the 95%tile value is the median multiplied by the standard deviation squared and the 5%tile value is the median divided by the standard deviation squared. The distribution is characterized when 90% of the distribution occurs between 5 and 95 percentile. First some initial setup to define the lognormal paramenters. llb is the lower bound, med is the median, and ub is the upper bound llb := br med := br ub := br
1 2 3

med = 1.2 uppersd := uppersd :=

ub = 3 ub med uppersd

llb = 0.7 uppersd = 2.5

Displayed values.

uppersd = 1.581

med uppersd = 3

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 3 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

lowersd := llb med lowersd := lowersd

lowersd = 0.84 lowersd = 0.917 sd = 1.581 lnmed := ln( med) lnsd := ln( sd ) med uppersd
2

= 0.48

sd := uppersd med = 1.2

lnsd = 0.458

ln( med) = 0.182

Generate the set of random breathing rate values and set to brdist, which will be used in calculations. x := rlnorm( n , lnmed , lnsd) Set up plot of breathing rate values with histogram xhis. xhis := histogram( 20 , x ) brdist := x 2 yval := xhis 1 xval := xhis min( x ) = 0.25 mean( x ) = 1.333 max( x ) = 5.823 Stdev( x ) = 0.63 median( x ) = 1.206

this sets the final breathing rate distribution.

Breathing Rate
1500

Frequency

1000

500

Breathing rate (m3/hr)

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 4 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

2.3 Soil Concentration The distribution of soil concentrations (mg uranium per kg soil) is shown below in matrix soilconinit. Column 1 contains the percentile and column 2 contains the lower limit of credibility (5%tile) of soil concentration, the median (50%tile), and the upper limit (95%tile) of credibility for the soil concentration.

.05 0.6 soilconinit := .5 2.2 .95 8.1

2 scon := soilconinit

SoilDen = 1.5

Convert soil in mg U per kg soil to mg U per square meter. Assume soil density is SoilDen g/cm3 . Calculate the area for 1 kilogram of soil for a depth of SoilDep cm. vol2surf := scon := 1000 SoilDen SoilDep 10
4

vol2surf = 1.33 10

m2 in 1 kilogram

scon vol2surf
2

soilmed := scon

soilmed = 165

scon = 607.5
3

Some Setup calculations med := soilmed uppersd := uppersd := ub med uppersd ub := scon
3

llb := scon

ub = 607.5

llb = 45

uppersd = 3.682 uppersd = 1.919 lowersd = 7.425 10 lowersd = 86.168 sd = 1.919 lnmed := ln( med) lnsd := ln( sd )
3

med uppersd = 607.5

lowersd := llb med lowersd := lowersd

med uppersd
2

= 44.815

sd := uppersd med = 165

lnsd = 0.652

ln( med) = 5.106

Generate the set of soil concentrations x := rlnorm( n , lnmed , lnsd) lx := ln( x ) lx := sort ( lx) soildist := x Set up plot xhis := histogram( 100 , lx) xmed := median( x ) Sets soildist to the soil concentration values. 2 yval := xhis
1 xhis

xval := e

median( x ) = 165.037 Ptile05 = 56.739 Ptile95 = 490.78 xmed = 165.037

xs := sort ( x )

Ptile05 := xs

z := 0 .. 1.25 max( yval)

n 20

Ptile95 := xs
19

n 20

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 5 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Soil Concentration
200

Frequency

Dose 5 %tile Median 95 %tile

100

0 10

100

1 .10

1 .10

U mg per square meter

xy xx := i
i

xy := x

xy :=
i

xmed

xy2 := 1
i

x05 :=

Ptile05 xmed

x05 = 0.344 xy05 := x05

i

x95 :=

Ptile95 xmed

x95 = 2.974

xy95 := x95
i

Scatter Plot of Soil Concentrations

100

Data Reference 95 %tile 5 %tile

10

DU mg per square meter

0.1

0.01

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Trial Number
Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd Page 6 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

2.4 Resuspension.

.05 10 6 resusp := .5 10 5 1 4 percent := resusp .95 10

2 resp := resusp

Estimate the geometric standard deviation from the median (50%tile) value and the 5%tile and 95%tile values using the relationship that the 95%tile value is the median multiplied by the standard deviation squared and the 5%tile value is the median divided by the standard deviation squared. The distribution is characterized when 90% of the distribution occurs between 5 and 95 %. The trial distribution has values of 10 -6, 10-5, and 10-4 m-1 for 5, 50, and 95%tiles. med := resp uppersd := uppersd := lowersd := lowersd :=
2

ub := resp

llb := resp

llb = 1 10

med = 1 10

ub = 1 10

ub med uppersd med llb lowersd

uppersd = 10 uppersd = 3.162 lowersd = 10 lowersd = 3.162 sd = 3.162 lnsd := ln( sd ) med uppersd
2

med uppersd = 1 10

= 1 10

sd := uppersd med = 1 10
5

lnsd = 1.151

lnmed := ln( med)

ln( med) = 11.513

Generate the distribution of resuspension factor s . x := rlnorm( n , lnmed , lnsd) lx := ln( x ) lx := sort ( lx) 2 yval := xhis xval := e
1 xhis

min( x ) = 1.777 10

max( x ) = 4.279 10

xhis := histogram( 100 , lx) rf := x

mean( x ) = 1.873 10

Stdev( x ) = 2.795 10

Set rf to the generated distribution.

Set up some plotting information. rs := sort ( x ) Ptile05 := rs Ptile95 := rs

19 n 20 n 20

z := 0 .. 1.25 max( yval) Ptile05 = 1.383 median 10 ( x ) = 9.794 10 Ptile95 = 6.577 10

5 6 6

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 7 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Resuspension Factor
150

Frequency

100

Normal Dist 5%tile Median 95%tile

50

0 7 1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

Resuspension factor
Calcuate Air Concentration ACl := ln soildist rf
i i

)
i

AChis := histogram( 100 , ACl) ACx := e

1 AChis

2 ACy := AChis
i i

acon := soildist rf
i i

AC := soildist rf

AC := sort ( AC) ACy n

k := 1 .. 100 CumACy :=
k

l= 1

U Air Concentrations
200 1

150

100

0.5

50

0 5 1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

0.01

0.1

0 1

U Air Concentration (mg per m3) Air Concentration Cum. Prob.

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Cumulative Probability

Frequency

Page 8 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

2. 5 Dose Factor Distributions Set up normal distribution for the Dose Factors from modified Capstone data. The mean for each organ is the DoseF with column (dc=2); and standard deviation is DoseF with the column (dc = 3). For display purposes, the results for one organ with ii selected in the setup section plotted. Oi := oi
oi

dcmn := 2 dcstd := 3
oi , dcmn oi

mn := DoseF

stdv := DoseF
oi

oi , dcstd

oi x := rnorm n , mn , stdv

oi

)
and Organ = "Lung"
ii

min( x ) = 0.046

max( x ) = 3.17 10

From initial setup, ii = 21

ii xhis := histogram 25 , x DCF := x

2 yval := xhis

1 ii xval := xhis mean x = 0.018 minx := min( xval) maxx := max( xval) miny := min( yval) maxy := max( yval)

( )

ii 4 Stdev x = 3.674 10

( )

( ) ii min( x ) = 0.017
maxx = 0.02 maxy = 609

ii median x = 0.018

Plot of Dose Factors for Organ ii = "Lung"

Dose Factors
600

Frequency

400

200

0.017

0.018

0.019

rem per mg U intake

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 9 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

3.0 Dose Calculation. Dose is the result of the following calculation. The soil concentration is multiplied by the resuspension factor to produce an air concentration. The air concentration is multiplied by the breathing rate (Br) and the exposure duration (Etime) to produce a total intake. The total intake is multiplied by the dose factor to produce the dose to the organ. j := oi dose
i, j j

:= Etime brdist soildist rf DCF

i i i

i, j

Calculate Geometric Mean

j medi := median dose j j doses := sort dose dosest := doses v := 19 v := n 20 n 20

T

j stddev := stdev dose

j

ldose

i, j

:= ln dose

i, j

) )
j lgsd := stdev ldose
j

j lmean := mean ldose

j

v ptile95 := dosest v ptile05 := dosest

gmdose := e
j j

lmean j

lgsd := e
j j

lgsd j

gmdose := Re gmdose

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 10 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

3.1 Dose Results Case Parameters Exposure time is Etime = 1 10 hour(s) 95%tile soil is scon = 607.5 3 Other parameters (breathing rate, soil concentration, resuspension factor, and dose factors are distributions as discussed above. H1 := augment( "Organ" , "5%tile" , "Median Dose" , "geo mean" , "gsd" , "95%tile" ) xx := stack( H1 , augment( Organ , ptile05 , medi , gmdose , lgsd , ptile95) ) xx =
"Organ" "Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" "Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads" "5%tile" 3.87210-6 4.09710-6 3.96610-6 4.14110-6 1.75210-5 3.86210-6 4.15210-5 1.54510-5 4.10510-6 3.92810-6 4.17110-6 4.24310-6 4.15910-6 1.2910-5 1.14310-4 4.15910-6 3.93110-6 3.97210-6 4.03310-6 -0.027 3.5710-3 -5.81910-5 4.21810-6 623.013 3.66610-6 3.10210-6 -1.18610-5 -1.29610-4 -0.011 -0.028 0.019 2.20510-3 9.56710-5 3.32810-3 6.46210-3 0.052 3.84810-6 "Median Dose" 4.85610-5 4.99210-5 5.02510-5 4.78710-5 1.76210-4 5.05910-5 5.2210-4 1.94710-4 4.85710-5 5.02610-5 4.94610-5 4.91510-5 4.89510-5 1.48210-4 1.38210-3 4.90310-5 4.93110-5 4.83710-5 4.97910-5 0.021 0.035 3.71410-5 4.85510-5 6.14103 4.89710-5 4.85910-5 4.14110-5 3.78310-5 3.10610-4 0.021 0.19 0.022 1.41610-3 0.033 0.063 0.515 4.92410-5 "geo mean" 4.87910-5 4.90510-5 4.86810-5 4.88210-5 1.75710-4 4.90710-5 5.1610-4 1.90410-4 4.90110-5 4.90410-5 4.89410-5 4.84210-5 4.86810-5 1.48210-4 1.37510-3 4.78310-5 4.87110-5 4.86510-5 4.8510-5 0.021 0.035 3.83410-5 4.8810-5 6.168103 4.76710-5 4.61610-5 4.18510-5 4.20310-5 4.6210-4 0.021 0.191 0.022 1.40610-3 0.033 0.064 0.517 4.81110-5 "gsd" 4.498 4.478 4.492 4.416 4.056 4.464 4.508 4.622 4.475 4.442 4.449 4.468 4.52 4.483 4.522 4.534 4.5 4.485 4.52 8.246 4.033 8.457 4.454 4.031 4.633 4.845 6.82 9.356 10.528 8.208 4.031 4.036 4.763 4.032 4.031 4.031 4.505 "95%tile" 5.83210-4 5.67510-4 5.3510-4 5.65210-4 1.8110-3 5.51410-4 5.89510-3 2.26410-3 5.70410-4 5.29410-4 5.53510-4 5.36410-4 5.74210-4 1.66210-3 0.016 5.33210-4 5.49810-4 5.46910-4 5.37210-4 0.343 0.368 6.22710-4 5.32410-4 6.386104 5.67410-4 5.39210-4 6.19510-4 8.85210-4 0.019 0.351 1.958 0.225 0.017 0.341 0.66 5.348 5.61410-4 3

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 11 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

3.2 Correlations and Scatter Plots for selected organ designated by ii. ii pdos := dose ldos := ln( pdos ) ldos := sort ( ldos) lrdos := Re ldos lhis := histogram( 50 , lrdos) lxval := e ii ii T T pt05 := ptile05 pmed := medi
1 lhis

Organ = "Lung"
ii i

2 lyval := lhis pt95 := ptile95

ii

lymax := 1.25 max( lyval)

yp := 0 .. lymax

lxmin := min( lxval)lxmax := max( lxval)

lxmin

lxmin := log( lxmin) lxmin := floor( lxmin) + 1 lxmin := 10 pt05 = 3.57 10

1 3

pmed = 0.035
1

pt95 = 0.368
1

Dose Distribution for Selected Organ

Dose 5 %tile Median 95 %tile

300

Frequency

200

100

0 3 1 .10

0.01

0.1

10

Dose (rem)

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 12 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Plot correlations among results and parameters for the selected organ ( Organ = "Lung" )
ii

corr( brdist , pdos ) = 0.235

corr( soildist , pdos ) = 0.325

Breathing Rate
10 10

Soil Concentration
Dose (rem CED)
1 0.1 0.01 1 .10 1 .10
3 4

Dose (rem CED)

1 0.1 0.01 1 .10 1 .10

3 4

0.1

10

10

100

1 .10

1 .10

Breathing Rate (m3/hr)

Soil Concentration (mg U / sq m)

corr( rf , pdos ) = 0.667

ii corr DCF , pdos = 0.023

Resuspension Factor Correlation

10 10

Dose Factor Correlation

Dose (rem CED)
1 0.1 0.01 1 .10 1 .10
3 4

Dose (rem CED)

1 0.1 0.01 1 .10 1 .10

3

0.016

0.017

0.018

0.019

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

1 .10

Dose Factor (rem per mg)

Resuspension factor (m-1)

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 13 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. orgn := Organ
T

H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 1 , 7 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 stack H2 , augment doses , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses

"Adrenals" -5.92710-5 -5.40710-5 -5.39410-5 -3.47210-5 -2.99210-5 -2.40610-5 -2.21210-5 -1.40410-5 -1.14410-5 -9.7410-6 -9.46110-6 -9.12710-6 -7.74110-6 -7.31110-6 -7.00810-6 -5.29410-6 -4.8810-6 -3.83610-6 -2.81910-6 -2.72610-6 -2.69210-6 -1.77110-6 -7.74410-7 -5.96710-7 -2.82810-7 -1.01210-7 -7.78110-8 -6.89310-8 2.67910-7 2.75810-7 2.98110-7 3.5510-7 3.710-7 4.49610-7 4.92210-7 5.01810-7 5.09910-7 5.80610-7 5.95210-7 "U.Bladd" -2.63510-4 -6.50410-5 -5.69810-5 -4.82810-5 -1.88310-5 -1.21510-5 -1.14710-5 -7.68610-6 -7.20410-6 -6.49610-6 -6.21410-6 -4.5210-6 -4.13810-6 -3.65210-6 -3.55210-6 -2.75410-6 -1.70210-6 -9.50610-7 -2.79110-7 -1.74210-7 -1.67410-7 -1.58610-7 -9.53510-8 -6.05210-8 2.67810-8 1.44510-7 1.51610-7 1.6610-7 1.96410-7 2.13510-7 2.43510-7 2.61810-7 3.12510-7 3.43610-7 4.22610-7 4.53110-7 5.26810-7 5.48810-7 5.49510-7 "Brain" -1.77910-5 -1.73210-5 -1.32110-5 -1.19510-5 -9.66610-6 -7.97310-6 -7.43310-6 -5.79510-6 -5.66210-6 -3.5910-6 -1.95410-6 -1.94810-6 -1.40410-6 -1.37610-6 -1.08110-6 -1.06210-6 -7.810-7 -1.91410-7 4.48910-8 6.23810-8 6.6410-8 2.09510-7 2.94210-7 2.96110-7 3.04310-7 3.32510-7 3.91510-7 4.25910-7 5.33210-7 5.75410-7 6.06710-7 6.210-7 6.28310-7 7.01210-7 7.37710-7 7.46410-7 7.6510-7 7.74210-7 7.88310-7 "Breast" -1.39110-4 -5.22710-5 -3.9610-5 -2.7310-5 -2.48510-5 -2.3710-5 -1.32110-5 -1.12110-5 -1.02610-5 -1.01710-5 -8.79810-6 -7.51310-6 -6.73910-6 -6.710-6 -6.50910-6 -5.61210-6 -4.69310-6 -3.42710-6 -2.64110-6 -1.52610-6 -1.51610-6 -1.1310-6 -1.0210-6 -5.00110-7 1.61310-7 2.03810-7 2.52110-7 3.42810-7 3.78110-7 4.06110-7 4.32110-7 4.51410-7 4.8910-7 5.21110-7 5.37310-7 6.20510-7 6.25710-7 6.54110-7 6.7110-7

)) =
"Heart" -3.08510-5 -3.00210-5 -1.11510-5 -7.2110-6 -6.88810-6 -3.75110-6 -3.18610-6 -3.10410-6 -2.73710-6 -2.48110-6 -2.20510-6 -2.1510-6 -1.67810-6 -4.57310-7 -3.12210-7 -2.04110-7 1.09110-7 3.03710-7 3.24710-7 3.85910-7 4.24910-7 4.45210-7 4.50810-7 4.72510-7 4.8210-7 5.02110-7 5.47510-7 5.74510-7 6.32910-7 6.59910-7 6.74910-7 6.80110-7 6.85510-7 6.88510-7 7.02510-7 7.32410-7 7.52810-7 8.29210-7 8.34210-7 "Kidney" -1.74310-3 -8.78210-4 -6.37210-4 -2.89210-4 -2.33410-4 -2.16210-4 -1.49310-4 -1.39610-4 -9.85910-5 -8.51110-5 -7.510-5 -6.17310-5 -5.65310-5 -4.47110-5 -3.54710-5 -2.41710-5 -1.90710-5 -5.87510-6 -1.1510-6 -1.91810-7 1.53710-7 5.18910-7 1.24710-6 1.5710-6 2.18410-6 3.02310-6 3.08510-6 3.20310-6 3.2910-6 4.22910-6 4.30610-6 4.91410-6 5.1610-6 5.31110-6 6.10510-6 6.52210-6 6.71310-6 7.99610-6 8.11210-6

"G.Bladd" 9.98610-7 1.25210-6 1.65910-6 2.0710-6 2.12410-6 2.13410-6 2.27610-6 2.76510-6 2.76610-6 2.93310-6 2.93910-6 3.29510-6 3.56210-6 3.57910-6 3.74710-6 3.96510-6 3.96910-6 4.06710-6 4.09510-6 4.40910-6 4.5710-6 4.80810-6 5.04310-6 5.16610-6 5.22510-6 5.28910-6 5.30210-6 5.59610-6 5.82710-6 5.86510-6 5.94110-6 5.94810-6 5.95410-6 6.0510-6 6.05310-6 6.12510-6 6.13410-6 6.16910-6 6.17410-6

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 14 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 8 , 14) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 , doses , doses , doses , doses stack H2 , augment doses , doses , doses
"Liver" -5.86410-4 -3.37110-4 -1.5510-4 -1.07210-4 -7.86810-5 -4.41910-5 -3.84510-5 -2.11810-5 -1.87110-5 -1.77810-5 -1.50710-5 -1.41110-5 -5.39310-6 -4.36210-6 -2.20610-6 -1.29510-6 -1.16410-6 -1.09510-6 -1.01510-6 -7.4210-7 -2.81510-7 -4.6210-8 8.3810-8 1.35710-7 1.43510-7 1.47510-7 5.05210-7 6.73110-7 1.01910-6 1.19210-6 1.43710-6 1.49910-6 1.59610-6 1.68510-6 1.68510-6 1.75410-6 1.87110-6 2.01110-6 2.36710-6 "Muscle" -2.37410-4 -1.41110-4 -6.66910-5 -5.67910-5 -4.19210-5 -2.8910-5 -2.80110-5 -2.62210-5 -2.09210-5 -1.60610-5 -1.29210-5 -1.2810-5 -1.24110-5 -1.08710-5 -1.0410-5 -8.57410-6 -6.86910-6 -2.91310-6 -2.6710-6 -2.54410-6 -2.38810-6 -1.96610-6 -8.38310-7 -6.90810-7 -4.21510-7 -1.72210-7 1.54410-7 2.19710-7 2.35610-7 2.90510-7 2.91710-7 3.74910-7 4.32710-7 5.20810-7 5.39710-7 5.8210-7 6.28310-7 6.48510-7 6.58410-7 "Ovaries" -4.97510-5 -3.02910-5 -2.75710-5 -2.62610-5 -1.91810-5 -1.43610-5 -8.49310-6 -5.36810-6 -4.15410-6 -3.94810-6 -2.97610-6 -2.70910-6 -2.35610-6 -1.65810-6 -1.2210-6 -1.06710-6 -9.3510-7 -7.2210-7 -6.22710-7 -1.74610-7 2.9110-7 3.25210-7 3.30110-7 3.44110-7 3.64810-7 4.01310-7 4.79910-7 5.16510-7 5.35310-7 5.44110-7 5.85610-7 5.86710-7 5.95210-7 6.00310-7 6.23110-7 6.33910-7 6.49310-7 7.06610-7 7.16310-7 "Pancreas" -1.88310-4 -1.13110-4 -3.56310-5 -8.19910-6 -5.08610-6 -4.94610-6 -2.77210-6 -2.02810-6 -1.76310-6 -1.54410-6 -1.45110-6 -1.2210-6 -1.13410-6 -6.80110-7 -2.85510-7 4.23410-8 6.68310-8 1.36110-7 2.22410-7 3.07410-7 4.14410-7 4.38310-7 4.44210-7 5.6110-7 5.71310-7 6.18610-7 6.37710-7 6.62110-7 6.6610-7 6.8710-7 6.94410-7 710-7 7.5410-7 7.78910-7 8.41410-7 8.93710-7 8.94710-7 9.41310-7 9.55210-7 "Testes" -4.56110-5 -3.54110-5 -2.03510-5 -1.59610-5 -1.0110-5 -9.43310-6 -7.18510-6 -9.61810-7 -9.28410-7 -7.66410-7 -5.75510-7 -4.85810-7 -6.22410-8 3.41210-9 3.53610-9 1.2110-7 1.42810-7 2.35510-7 2.89110-7 2.89810-7 3.03610-7 3.24610-7 3.43110-7 3.77710-7 4.32610-7 4.4510-7 4.63310-7 5.59110-7 6.09610-7 6.5310-7 7.07710-7 7.14210-7 7.96110-7 7.96710-7 8.08810-7 8.36310-7 8.38610-7 8.72110-7 9.21110-7

)) =
"R.B.M." -2.2110-4 -7.24710-5 -6.29210-5 -5.9510-5 -5.72510-5 -5.58910-5 -3.93710-5 -3.56910-5 -3.41710-5 -1.89410-5 -1.7610-5 -1.46110-5 -1.3910-5 -1.17110-5 -9.90510-6 -9.25410-6 -5.43710-6 -4.07710-6 -3.21110-6 -2.50810-6 -2.29110-6 -1.87410-6 -1.34610-6 -1.32910-7 -9.05810-8 7.30610-7 8.27810-7 8.53110-7 8.72510-7 1.03210-6 1.05210-6 1.27510-6 1.3510-6 1.45810-6 1.58310-6 1.68210-6 1.71510-6 1.89910-6 1.90810-6

"Thyroid" -6.19510-4 -9.510-5 -1.12510-5 -8.4410-6 -7.64510-6 -5.89510-6 -4.30410-6 -3.96810-6 -3.81810-6 -2.5410-6 -2.38310-6 -8.86510-7 -7.77910-7 -7.28210-7 -6.26710-7 -5.53210-7 -4.31210-7 -3.84310-7 -8.11210-8 7.84210-8 7.9910-8 9.67810-8 1.36710-7 1.89510-7 2.32710-7 2.66410-7 2.76610-7 3.27810-7 3.48410-7 5.50310-7 5.81610-7 5.99810-7 6.70210-7 6.7910-7 7.09610-7 7.52310-7 7.77210-7 7.81110-7 8.19610-7

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 15 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 15 , 21) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses stack H2 , augment doses
"Bone Sur" -0.011 -9.07710-3 -4.79210-3 -2.82910-3 -1.20710-3 -6.210-4 -3.68910-4 -3.47710-4 -2.03810-4 -2.00910-4 -1.75510-4 -1.39610-4 -1.32710-4 -9.12710-5 -7.16610-5 -6.57710-5 -6.54110-5 -5.10310-5 -4.55810-5 -4.54310-5 -3.93210-5 -2.95810-5 -2.37310-5 -2.08510-5 -8.26110-6 -5.35810-6 -4.66610-6 3.55810-7 2.40510-6 5.08310-6 5.76910-6 7.2710-6 8.00410-6 9.66910-6 1.17210-5 1.22910-5 1.24910-5 1.2810-5 1.44910-5 "Skin" -3.01910-5 -1.79710-5 -1.47810-5 -1.19810-5 -8.02710-6 -7.41810-6 -6.89510-6 -6.79910-6 -6.54810-6 -6.42210-6 -6.21710-6 -4.04310-6 -2.83410-6 -2.83210-6 -2.31710-6 -2.09410-6 -1.6710-6 -1.6410-6 -1.38710-6 -8.71110-7 -8.51710-7 -7.68210-7 -6.8410-7 -5.49410-7 -4.28210-7 -1.70110-7 -1.04910-7 6.22810-8 2.39210-7 2.61310-7 2.96210-7 3.27610-7 3.83110-7 3.95310-7 4.05110-7 4.96710-7 4.96810-7 5.42510-7 5.44510-7 "Spleen" -3.33310-4 -1.01610-4 -4.66410-5 -3.73610-5 -3.60610-5 -3.37710-5 -3.08110-5 -9.58310-6 -6.54710-6 -5.59510-6 -3.11610-6 -2.96510-6 -2.58210-6 -1.83910-6 -9.29310-7 -7.17310-7 -7.12410-7 -1.94410-7 -4.31310-8 1.47510-7 2.33910-7 2.43610-7 2.81710-7 3.09710-7 3.19710-7 3.33510-7 3.38810-7 4.30110-7 5.70710-7 5.76610-7 5.78510-7 6.02910-7 7.19710-7 7.21610-7 7.2610-7 7.50810-7 7.57510-7 7.81110-7 7.85710-7 "Thymus" -1.93710-5 -1.36310-5 -1.25410-5 -7.21710-6 -5.84910-6 -3.27910-6 -2.19810-6 -2.08910-6 -1.47810-6 -1.22610-6 -1.14410-6 -9.39810-7 -7.25910-7 -6.17110-8 1.8810-7 1.93510-7 2.26610-7 2.36410-7 2.42710-7 2.60910-7 2.73310-7 2.7810-7 2.88410-7 4.76410-7 4.94910-7 5.56910-7 5.86510-7 6.11310-7 6.93110-7 7.41110-7 7.96110-7 8.12210-7 8.13710-7 8.18710-7 8.59510-7 9.10610-7 9.12310-7 9.37310-7 9.48410-7 "Uterus" -2.72410-4 -7.90710-5 -4.5110-5 -2.71510-5 -2.32710-5 -1.56410-5 -1.04410-5 -9.57910-6 -9.08810-6 -6.47610-6 -4.46310-6 -3.08610-6 -2.3410-6 -2.33910-6 -2.17410-6 -2.14410-6 -2.09610-6 -1.90910-6 -1.77110-6 -4.28610-7 -4.19410-7 -4.16710-7 -3.87410-7 -2.3910-7 -1.39910-7 -3.5910-9 7.06410-8 2.40810-7 3.37610-7 4.1410-7 4.19310-7 5.7810-7 5.89810-7 6.08610-7 6.25710-7 6.49310-7 6.87810-7 7.91310-7 8.31710-7

)) =
"ET" -3.498 -2.786 -2.07 -1.994 -1.957 -1.441 -1.101 -1.039 -0.99 -0.963 -0.858 -0.686 -0.524 -0.52 -0.459 -0.455 -0.438 -0.424 -0.401 -0.392 -0.312 -0.3 -0.285 -0.265 -0.257 -0.253 -0.239 -0.235 -0.225 -0.223 -0.221 -0.207 -0.206 -0.205 -0.205 -0.201 -0.198 -0.196 -0.196 "Lung" 1.81510-4 2.36910-4 3.26510-4 3.57910-4 4.0710-4 4.5110-4 5.89610-4 6.19310-4 6.54710-4 6.58710-4 6.64810-4 6.71110-4 6.88510-4 6.910-4 7.13810-4 7.19610-4 8.02110-4 8.08110-4 8.40710-4 8.94610-4 9.15610-4 9.2410-4 9.80610-4 9.89110-4 1.00710-3 1.03910-3 1.0410-3 1.07610-3 1.08310-3 1.09810-3 1.110-3 1.11210-3 1.12210-3 1.13410-3 1.15410-3 1.1610-3 1.17110-3 1.18910-3 1.18910-3

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 16 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 22 , 28) 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses stack H2 , augment doses
"Colon" -2.0710-3 -1.7810-3 -1.40910-3 -1.31910-3 -1.29410-3 -1.20510-3 -1.11410-3 -1.06210-3 -9.31310-4 -9.19910-4 -8.06110-4 -7.62810-4 -7.54410-4 -7.43910-4 -6.94510-4 -6.69210-4 -6.63410-4 -6.48210-4 -6.31810-4 -6.23110-4 -6.09610-4 -6.05310-4 -5.99710-4 -5.8910-4 -5.53910-4 -5.4910-4 -5.39810-4 -5.19210-4 -5.15210-4 -5.05110-4 -4.95810-4 -4.91410-4 -4.88110-4 -4.83210-4 -4.79110-4 -4.69310-4 -4.60510-4 -4.56210-4 -4.55510-4 "Esophagus" -2.05810-4 -4.8210-5 -3.62810-5 -2.2210-5 -1.65610-5 -1.12110-5 -5.99710-6 -5.52610-6 -5.39410-6 -3.11710-6 -2.33610-6 -2.21810-6 -2.15310-6 -1.27610-6 -1.21110-6 -1.17610-6 -1.00410-6 -8.29610-7 -7.93110-7 -6.92610-7 -5.61410-7 -4.71710-7 1.10510-7 1.15110-7 2.44110-7 3.00210-7 3.10510-7 3.72610-7 3.78410-7 3.90310-7 4.05310-7 4.24610-7 4.3910-7 4.73910-7 5.01310-7 5.38810-7 5.5110-7 5.99910-7 6.26910-7 "Remainder" 31.725 41.538 55.852 65.026 69.12 78.315 108.843 108.856 115.521 116.126 117.826 119.147 120.661 121.94 123.778 124.501 135.769 142.947 143.476 159.546 160.501 160.576 168.807 173.507 176.822 180.983 186.547 188.658 189.485 192.427 192.658 198.53 198.537 201.766 203.294 204.043 206.632 208.198 208.752 "Stomach" -2.08710-4 -1.56810-4 -1.37410-4 -1.15110-4 -8.22310-5 -7.7510-5 -7.45810-5 -5.28310-5 -5.08810-5 -3.8710-5 -2.95110-5 -2.39810-5 -2.10510-5 -1.86310-5 -1.48310-5 -1.46510-5 -1.22710-5 -7.79610-6 -7.77210-6 -7.43610-6 -7.4310-6 -7.40110-6 -6.910-6 -6.72110-6 -6.45610-6 -5.89110-6 -5.41410-6 -4.80910-6 -3.69110-6 -3.55410-6 -3.53610-6 -3.12210-6 -3.00410-6 -1.87810-6 -1.85310-6 -1.6210-6 -1.54410-6 -1.43310-6 -1.06610-6 "SI" -1.39410-3 -4.6210-4 -1.39310-4 -1.30510-4 -1.1510-4 -6.59110-5 -6.20610-5 -5.65510-5 -3.04710-5 -2.78910-5 -2.76510-5 -2.75610-5 -2.75610-5 -2.3210-5 -2.1910-5 -1.86810-5 -1.82410-5 -1.79610-5 -1.78710-5 -1.59310-5 -1.52310-5 -1.38910-5 -1.29410-5 -1.22610-5 -1.18910-5 -1.08710-5 -8.37910-6 -7.47110-6 -6.42210-6 -5.91110-6 -5.29610-6 -5.19110-6 -5.06110-6 -4.9910-6 -4.94210-6 -4.9410-6 -4.79910-6 -4.21310-6 -3.68410-6

)) =
"LLI" -6.16210-3 -6.00310-3 -4.52410-3 -4.46910-3 -2.47910-3 -1.71810-3 -1.68810-3 -1.68510-3 -1.60510-3 -1.59710-3 -1.3410-3 -1.2210-3 -1.14210-3 -1.05510-3 -1.0410-3 -1.02410-3 -1.00910-3 -9.63610-4 -8.40410-4 -8.17610-4 -7.50810-4 -6.8910-4 -6.86310-4 -6.64510-4 -6.61410-4 -6.55910-4 -6.55110-4 -6.48810-4 -6.40210-4 -6.36710-4 -6.06810-4 -6.04710-4 -6.03610-4 -5.9410-4 -5.78210-4 -5.74810-4 -5.71710-4 -5.68310-4 -5.4610-4

"ULI" -2.34110-3 -1.15710-3 -1.1110-3 -7.7710-4 -6.97410-4 -6.80310-4 -6.46910-4 -6.41710-4 -6.02610-4 -5.1810-4 -5.13110-4 -4.5410-4 -3.96110-4 -3.8510-4 -3.71710-4 -3.71310-4 -3.55610-4 -3.4710-4 -3.34210-4 -3.25410-4 -3.25310-4 -2.7610-4 -2.72810-4 -2.69910-4 -2.68210-4 -2.6310-4 -2.17210-4 -2.15310-4 -2.02910-4 -2.02110-4 -1.96410-4 -1.9410-4 -1.87710-4 -1.83510-4 -1.82110-4 -1.74110-4 -1.73610-4 -1.66510-4 -1.63610-4

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 17 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 29 , 34) 29 30 31 32 33 34 , doses , doses , doses , doses , doses stack H2 , augment doses
"ET1" -0.315 -0.198 -0.18 -0.174 -0.17 -0.145 -0.124 -0.12 -0.114 -0.112 -0.11 -0.109 -0.107 -0.106 -0.106 -0.105 -0.104 -0.096 -0.086 -0.083 -0.083 -0.076 -0.075 -0.071 -0.06 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.049 -0.047 -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.042 -0.042 "ET2" -1.246 -0.839 -0.69 -0.661 -0.651 -0.579 -0.482 -0.451 -0.446 -0.427 -0.425 -0.422 -0.398 -0.371 -0.361 -0.319 -0.315 -0.307 -0.284 -0.284 -0.278 -0.277 -0.273 -0.257 -0.253 -0.252 -0.246 -0.245 -0.236 -0.227 -0.225 -0.218 -0.214 -0.214 -0.213 -0.209 -0.202 -0.197 -0.193 -0.182 "LNET" 1.01610-3 1.29910-3 1.73310-3 2.06610-3 2.06810-3 2.45410-3 3.2410-3 3.27910-3 3.51110-3 3.60310-3 3.62310-3 3.63710-3 3.68710-3 3.73810-3 3.83710-3 3.89110-3 4.21310-3 4.44610-3 4.47110-3 4.82410-3 4.96810-3 4.97610-3 5.22210-3 5.39910-3 5.52210-3 5.56410-3 5.7210-3 5.74210-3 5.76810-3 5.90710-3 6.00210-3 6.09710-3 6.1310-3 6.20210-3 6.27410-3 6.3110-3 6.37410-3 6.40510-3 6.45610-3 6.51410-3 "BB (sec cells)" 1.20910-4 1.4910-4 1.92310-4 2.25510-4 2.32910-4 2.62210-4 3.66710-4 3.83110-4 3.99110-4 4.08910-4 4.110-4 4.21710-4 4.39710-4 4.48910-4 4.59610-4 4.63210-4 4.77110-4 5.4210-4 5.49910-4 5.92410-4 5.97110-4 6.01110-4 6.04810-4 6.16710-4 6.37910-4 6.43610-4 6.63210-4 6.69310-4 6.77910-4 6.87910-4 6.90710-4 7.01710-4 7.04110-4 7.05810-4 7.11710-4 7.16610-4 7.19110-4 7.32610-4 7.37710-4 7.55810-4

)) =
"BB (bas cells)" -4.65910-3 -2.6110-3 -2.55810-3 -1.9110-3 -1.36210-3 -1.03610-3 -9.55210-4 -9.12710-4 -8.8510-4 -8.83110-4 -8.74910-4 -8.1910-4 -7.57810-4 -7.51310-4 -6.34510-4 -5.84610-4 -5.5510-4 -5.34310-4 -5.05910-4 -4.64310-4 -3.78410-4 -3.50410-4 -2.80710-4 -2.74410-4 -2.71310-4 -2.63210-4 -2.56510-4 -2.32410-4 -2.06610-4 -1.87610-4 -1.67810-4 -1.46810-4 -1.45410-4 -1.35310-4 -1.3510-4 -1.16910-4 -1.14510-4 -1.12310-4 -1.09610-4 -1.03710-4 "bb" 1.70810-4 2.22910-4 3.00610-4 3.48310-4 3.67210-4 4.23410-4 5.81510-4 5.82710-4 6.18110-4 6.20710-4 6.35810-4 6.38810-4 6.41710-4 6.42110-4 6.65510-4 6.65810-4 7.40710-4 7.61210-4 7.69910-4 8.43910-4 8.54110-4 8.72210-4 8.9610-4 9.18110-4 9.39410-4 9.82410-4 1.00210-3 1.01210-3 1.01410-3 1.02210-3 1.04410-3 1.04710-3 1.06210-3 1.06810-3 1.09410-3 1.09510-3 1.10410-3 1.1110-3 1.11510-3 1.12410-3

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 18 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of first 40 dose results for the listed organs. H2 := submatrix( orgn , 1 , 1 , 35 , 37) 35 36 37 , doses , doses stack H2 , augment doses
"AI" 3.29210-4 4.24510-4 5.76110-4 6.80110-4 7.05610-4 8.10110-4 1.12310-3 1.13410-3 1.18910-3 1.19910-3 1.23210-3 1.23410-3 1.25510-3 1.26510-3 1.2810-3 1.28410-3 1.39910-3 1.46510-3 1.47910-3 1.62810-3 1.64810-3 1.67110-3 1.74310-3 1.79310-3 1.83210-3 1.8810-3 1.91710-3 1.94910-3 1.95810-3 1.95910-3 1.98110-3 2.03610-3 2.06210-3 2.08110-3 2.09310-3 2.09810-3 2.12210-3 2.14210-3 2.1710-3 2.17710-3 "LNTH" 2.65410-3 3.50410-3 4.69210-3 5.4310-3 5.72910-3 6.50610-3 9.20210-3 9.21210-3 9.64610-3 9.79810-3 9.84410-3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 "Gonads" -2.25310-4 -7.22310-5 -4.85110-5 -3.30810-5 -1.99110-5 -1.70810-5 -1.47810-5 -1.16810-5 -1.09310-5 -7.92310-6 -7.30410-6 -5.22510-6 -4.84110-6 -4.45110-6 -4.40810-6 -2.93710-6 -1.22110-6 -1.09110-6 -8.68710-7 -6.43510-7 -2.46310-7 -1.34510-7 -1.77710-8 6.60910-8 1.28510-7 2.34610-7 3.20210-7 3.79310-7 3.87710-7 3.95810-7 4.0310-7 4.56910-7 5.29210-7 5.59710-7 5.91110-7 5.91710-7 6.15310-7 6.23710-7 6.46110-7 6.66510-7

)) =

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 19 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of PCI Dose Factors (Part 1) 1 2 3 4 augment DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI =
"organ" "Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" "Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads" "average" 5.90810-5 5.93310-5 5.89910-5 5.91310-5 8.94310-5 5.92610-5 6.05110-4 2.32610-4 5.90510-5 5.910-5 5.90810-5 5.89510-5 5.90410-5 1.79710-4 1.69310-3 5.90110-5 5.90910-5 5.91710-5 5.90110-5 0.04 0.026 8.27110-5 5.91710-5 779.729 5.98810-5 6.11310-5 7.18410-5 9.68910-5 2.44810-3 0.04 0.081 0.02 1.80410-3 0.03 0.036 0.183 5.89510-5 "stdev" 2.76210-5 2.77710-5 2.75710-5 2.75810-5 9.08110-5 2.76110-5 2.89710-4 1.08410-4 2.75710-5 2.75710-5 2.75910-5 2.75510-5 2.75710-5 8.39210-5 7.89710-4 2.75710-5 2.75810-5 2.7610-5 2.75910-5 0.015 0.018 2.89610-5 2.7610-5 3.17103 2.75810-5 2.76910-5 2.83210-5 2.99210-5 3.8310-4 0.015 0.098 0.011 8.34810-4 0.017 0.033 0.266 2.75510-5 "min" 1.04110-5 1.04810-5 1.04210-5 1.04110-5 1.04110-5 1.04210-5 1.08510-4 4.06810-5 1.04210-5 1.04310-5 1.04110-5 1.04110-5 1.04210-5 3.1510-5 2.96210-4 1.04110-5 1.04110-5 1.04310-5 1.04110-5 0.016 3.68710-4 3.08910-5 1.04310-5 3.40110-3 1.11710-5 1.22710-5 2.1610-5 4.31810-5 1.60410-3 0.016 1.69410-3 8.88810-4 3.58110-4 1.87310-4 2.28210-4 1.75110-3 1.04110-5

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 20 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of PCI Dose Factors (Part 2) 1 5 6 7 8 augment DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI , DoseFactorsPCI =
"organ" "Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" "Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads" "10%-tile" 3.77610-5 3.79810-5 3.77310-5 3.77410-5 4.08110-5 3.77610-5 3.31910-4 1.47910-4 3.77410-5 3.77410-5 3.77410-5 3.77310-5 3.77410-5 1.14510-4 1.07710-3 3.77310-5 3.77510-5 3.77510-5 3.77310-5 0.02 6.47810-3 6.21810-5 3.77510-5 6.50710-3 3.86110-5 3.98810-5 5.07610-5 7.65810-5 1.8710-3 0.02 2.12210-3 9.95310-3 9.34610-4 7.17710-3 4.70510-3 9.00510-3 3.77310-5 "median" 5.53110-5 5.55610-5 5.52610-5 5.55510-5 5.75310-5 5.58210-5 5.80810-4 2.18910-4 5.53310-5 5.52610-5 5.53610-5 5.52410-5 5.5310-5 1.69210-4 1.59210-3 5.52710-5 5.54910-5 5.55810-5 5.52510-5 0.037 0.02 7.94410-5 5.55810-5 0.014 5.62610-5 5.7610-5 6.94310-5 9.27210-5 2.51610-3 0.037 0.012 0.018 1.74310-3 0.027 0.02 0.018 5.52410-5 "90%-tile" 7.68410-5 7.72410-5 7.67810-5 7.68310-5 1.83110-4 7.69110-5 8.06610-4 3.0210-4 7.6810-5 7.67810-5 7.68310-5 7.67310-5 7.67910-5 2.33810-4 2.19910-3 7.67610-5 7.68110-5 7.68510-5 7.69510-5 0.062 0.054 9.97310-5 7.68510-5 0.029 7.76510-5 7.88910-5 8.92610-5 1.13510-4 2.77510-3 0.062 0.231 0.033 2.95810-3 0.055 0.088 0.561 7.67310-5 "max" 1.7210-4 1.7310-4 1.71810-4 1.71910-4 3.78110-4 1.7210-4 1.76610-3 6.74410-4 1.71810-4 1.71810-4 1.71910-4 1.71710-4 1.71810-4 5.22110-4 4.91610-3 1.71810-4 1.71910-4 1.7210-4 1.71810-4 0.071 0.068 2.05210-4 1.7210-4 1.596104 1.72710-4 1.74810-4 1.910-4 2.25310-4 3.25310-3 0.071 0.259 0.055 3.72910-3 0.062 0.12 0.924 1.71710-4

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 21 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of Array Dose Factors (Part 1) 1 2 3 4 augment DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray =

"organ" "Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" "Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads"

"average" 1.04610-4 1.0510-4 1.04410-4 1.04610-4 1.04410-4 1.04610-4 1.05410-3 4.11710-4 1.04410-4 1.04410-4 1.04510-4 1.04410-4 1.04410-4 3.15110-4 2.99710-3 1.04410-4 1.04510-4 1.04610-4 1.04410-4 0.024 0.033 1.2710-4 1.04610-4 7.83310-3 1.05310-4 1.06510-4 1.16710-4 1.40610-4 2.16410-3 0.024 7.02410-3 0.025 1.91210-3 0.048 0.039 0.027 1.04410-4

"stdev" 2.80710-5 2.81510-5 2.79910-5 2.80610-5 2.79910-5 2.80910-5 2.80210-4 1.10910-4 2.810-5 2.79810-5 2.810-5 2.79810-5 2.79910-5 8.56210-5 8.06410-4 2.79910-5 2.810-5 2.80710-5 2.79910-5 4.32910-3 0.014 2.80110-5 2.80710-5 2.83610-3 2.79910-5 2.810-5 2.79710-5 2.80310-5 2.90110-4 4.34110-3 1.5910-3 7.19610-3 5.18410-4 0.021 0.018 0.013 2.79810-5

"min" 4.06210-5 4.08510-5 4.0610-5 4.06210-5 4.0610-5 4.06310-5 4.2510-4 1.59310-4 4.06110-5 4.06210-5 4.06210-5 4.0610-5 4.0610-5 1.21810-4 1.16110-3 4.0610-5 4.06210-5 4.06210-5 4.0610-5 0.019 5.38510-3 6.16410-5 4.06210-5 3.87810-3 4.13910-5 4.25110-5 5.21210-5 7.43110-5 1.80510-3 0.019 5.31310-3 6.57910-3 6.13210-4 7.54810-3 5.01910-3 3.95610-3 4.0610-5

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 22 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Table of Array Dose Factors (Part 2) 1 5 6 7 8 augment DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray , DoseFactorsArray =
"organ" "Adrenals" "U.Bladd" "Brain" "Breast" "G.Bladd" "Heart" "Kidney" "Liver" "Muscle" "Ovaries" "Pancreas" "Testes" "Thyroid" "R.B.M." "Bone Sur" "Skin" "Spleen" "Thymus" "Uterus" "ET" "Lung" "Colon" "Esophagus" "Remainder" "Stomach" "SI" "ULI" "LLI" "ET1" "ET2" "LNET" "BB (sec cells)" "BB (bas cells)" "bb" "AI" "LNTH" "Gonads" "10%-tile" 7.78110-5 7.81310-5 7.76810-5 7.77910-5 7.76910-5 7.78510-5 7.65210-4 3.0610-4 7.7710-5 7.76910-5 7.77110-5 7.76610-5 7.76910-5 2.36710-4 2.22810-3 7.76810-5 7.77210-5 7.78110-5 7.76910-5 0.021 0.023 1.00710-4 7.78110-5 4.84710-3 7.85110-5 7.97610-5 9.0210-5 1.14210-4 1.82310-3 0.021 5.6410-3 0.019 1.5210-3 0.031 0.024 0.014 7.76610-5 "median" 1.1110-4 1.11510-4 1.10810-4 1.10910-4 1.10810-4 1.1110-4 1.16410-3 4.36410-4 1.10810-4 1.10810-4 1.10910-4 1.10810-4 1.10810-4 3.22710-4 3.17710-3 1.10810-4 1.10910-4 1.10910-4 1.10810-4 0.023 0.031 1.34710-4 1.10910-4 7.44610-3 1.11810-4 1.1310-4 1.23910-4 1.4910-4 2.2910-3 0.023 6.50510-3 0.027 2.03510-3 0.046 0.032 0.023 1.10810-4 "90%-tile" 1.33910-4 1.34410-4 1.33610-4 1.33910-4 1.33610-4 1.3410-4 1.33510-3 5.27810-4 1.33610-4 1.33610-4 1.33710-4 1.33610-4 1.33610-4 4.08210-4 3.84110-3 1.33610-4 1.33710-4 1.33910-4 1.33610-4 0.03 0.051 1.55810-4 1.33910-4 0.012 1.34410-4 1.35610-4 1.45610-4 1.6910-4 2.49610-3 0.03 9.22910-3 0.032 2.42410-3 0.075 0.062 0.043 1.33610-4 "max" 1.40110-4 1.40510-4 1.39710-4 1.40110-4 1.39710-4 1.40110-4 1.38110-3 5.52410-4 1.39810-4 1.39710-4 1.39810-4 1.39710-4 1.39710-4 4.2710-4 4.01910-3 1.39710-4 1.39810-4 1.40110-4 1.39710-4 0.033 0.056 1.61710-4 1.40110-4 0.013 1.40610-4 1.41810-4 1.51610-4 1.74710-4 2.55410-3 0.033 9.95310-3 0.034 2.5510-3 0.084 0.067 0.046 1.39710-4

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 23 of 24

DU Organ Dose Calculator

1/15/2009 3:28 PM

Du_DoseCalc_Soil_PCI.xmcd

Page 24 of 24

(b)(6)

8.0 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Depleted uranium (DU) aerosols formed when Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (referred to here as Bradley vehicles) were perforated with large-caliber (LC)-DU munitions were characterized in the Capstone DU Aerosol Study (Parkhurst et al. 2004). The measured quantities of DU aerosol and some of the aerosol characteristics were used to model the DU concentrations, intakes, and associated organ and tissue doses to crewmembers who were in one of these vehicles at the time the crew compartments (the turrets in Abrams tanks or Bradley vehicles or the passenger compartment in Bradley vehicles) were perforated by LC-DU rounds. Additionally, the DU concentrations and doses were modeled for first responders who entered either type of vehicle shortly after perforation. The overall intent of this risk assessment was to estimate the risks to human health from exposure to these DU aerosols. Knowledge of these risks will improve the evaluation of past exposures, decisions on future policy on medical management and post-conflict follow up, and tactical and operational combat decisions by commanders. Four vehicle configurations were tested in the Capstone study, and a total of 13 LC-DU shots were fired into and perforated the test vehicles. The shot lines were selected to 1) simulate shot lines experienced in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and 2) maximize the amount of penetrator erosion. With the exception of the Phase-IV shot (discussed below), the target vehicles were ballistic turrets and hulls (BHTs) of Abrams tanks and Bradley vehicles. These BHTs were actual vehicle structures in which the instrumentation, unnecessary structures (e.g., seats), and flammable materials were removed or had not been installed. Unlike operational vehicles, there were no ventilation systems of any kind in these BHTs. In the four test phases, the vehicle configurations included: Phase IAbrams tank BHT (seven shots were fired through non-DU armor) Phase IIBradley vehicle BHT (three shots were fired) Phase IIIAbrams tank BHT (two shots were fired through DU armor) Phase IVA fully functional Abrams tank equipped with an operating ventilation system (one DU shot was fired into the DU armor).

Based on the DU concentrations collected in the aerosols, it is estimated that a maximum of 7% of the penetrator was aerosolized inside the heavily armored Abrams tank and a maximum of 1% in the less heavily armored Bradley vehicle. Scenarios were developed for Level I inhalation exposures. A Level I exposure refers to 1) those crewmembers inside an Abrams tank or a Bradley vehicle at the time a crew compartment is perforated and 2) those personnel entering immediately afterward. The scenario elements for those in the vehicle at the time of perforation included 1) the time that elapsed (duration) between the time of perforation and the time crewmembers exited the vehicle and 2) the degree of exertion (light or heavy) in terms of breathing rate for the duration of the exposure. Four scenarios were developed for those inside the vehicle at the time of the incident and who remained inside for up to 1 min (Scenario A), up to 5 min (Scenario B), up to 1 h (Scenario C), and up to 2 h (Scenario D) (Table 8.1). A fifth scenario (Scenario E) was developed for first responders. In this scenario, the first responders entered the vehicle 5 min after perforation, exited 10 min later, and heavily exerted themselves the entire time they were in the vehicle.

8.1

Table 8.1. Summary of Exposure Scenario Parameters

Level I Scenario Crewmembers Inside Vehicle Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D First Responder Scenario E Entry 5 min post shot, exit 10 min later 10 min 3 m3/h From impact to exit 1 min post shot From impact to exit 5 min post shot From impact to exit 1 h post shot From impact to exit 2 h post shot 1 min 5 min 1h 2h 3 m3/h 3 m3/h 3 m3/h for first 15 min, 1.5 m3/h thereafter 3 m3/h for first 15 min, 1.5 m3/h thereafter Time of Exposure Exposure Duration Breathing Rate

8.1

Adequacy of Mathematical Modeling

Mathematical models developed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) were used to model the organ doses and concentration. These models included the Human Respiratory Tract Model (ICRP [66] 1994a, [68] 1994b, [71] 1995b, [78] 1997), the Gastrointestinal Tract Model (ICRP [30] 1979), and the Uranium Systemic Biokinetic Model (ICRP [69] 1995a, [78] 1997). The respiratory tract model implemented for the dosimetric analysis of the Capstone data is that described in ICRP 66 (1994a) with three important distinctions. The deposition model is identical to the ICRP 66 model, but the clearance model has been modified to better describe the experimental data. The bound subcompartment of the ICRP 66 model has been renamed the very slowly dissolving or vsd compartment. In the standard ICRP 66 respiratory tract model, the activity in the bound subcompartment does not transfer between compartments. In the modified model, the activity in the vsd subcompartment does transfer between compartments with the same rate constants as for the initial and transformed subcompartments. Also, for purposes of dose calculations, the vsd compartment is the same source tissue as the initial and transformed subcompartments. The transfer coefficients between subcompartments have been renamed and are numerically different than the transfer coefficients between the subcompartments of the ICRP 66 respiratory tract model. The transfer coefficients used to calculate the doses in Table A.2 are shown in Table 4.9. Measured aerosol parameters used from the Capstone study included the time-dependent DU aerosol concentration, DU particle size, and in vitro solubility. DU aerosol concentrations were taken from Marple eight-stage cascade impactor (CIs) with data obtained at eight separate time intervals. The CIs also provided the particle size distributions as a function of time. To improve accuracy and reduce uncertainty in the dose calculations, stage-specific concentration data were used directly in the analyses rather than using the fitted unimodal and bimodal lognormal distributions, which for many samples were poorly fit. In vitro solubility characteristics were determined from the powder samples collected in a fivestage cyclone that collected aerosols during the first 2 h after the vehicle was perforated. The residues were relatively insoluble; however, most had a small soluble component, and their dissolution rates were classified as moderate, slow, or very slow.

8.2

The following conclusions were reached regarding the adequacy of modeling. The data from the Capstone study provided a sound basis for dose and risk assessment and reduced many of the uncertainties in estimating DU exposures that existed prior to that study. The development of exposure-dose models that use the size-specific stage data from CIs was an important improvement in dose assessment, allowing the quality and variability of the original measurement data to be maintained in the calculations. Although this technique was driven by the high degree of heterogeneity of the DU aerosols, making lognormal fitting unreliable, the technique should be useful for any dose assessment in which size-selective aerosol data are available. The transformation of multi-component exponential functions obtained from in vitro dissolution study into the ICRP 66 solubility model structure enabled direct application of the in vitro results. Although the mechanisms likely responsible for DU dissolution are not compatible with the description of the compartments in the ICRP 66 model, the transformation is mathematically correct and makes the best use of the data. Implementation of the Markov chain Monte Carlo method for uncertainty estimation made good use of the extensive aerosol measurement data and allowed propagation of uncertainties in a robust manner. As further analysis of uncertainties in model structures and parameter values become available, they can be incorporated into more extensive uncertainty analysis approaches that will be able to take advantage of the Bayesian statistical approaches. Although the uncertainty in the data underlying the uncertainty analysis was about 40%, the uncertainty on E(50) was about 10 to 20%. This is due to the relatively large number of measurements (30 to 40) on which the E(50) was calculated.

8.2

Predicted Human Health Effects

The Capstone field test results and the exposure scenarios evaluated were selected to support estimates of radiological and chemical exposures for Level I crewmembers and passengers in, on, or near either an Abrams tank or a Bradley vehicle at the time the vehicle was perforated. Biokinetic models were used to calculate relevant chemical and radiological doses; these doses were converted into chemical and radiological risks using available human data to assess the chemical risks of uranium exposure and the radiological risks of internally deposited alpha-emitting radioactive materials. Modeling intakes, uranium concentrations, and the associated doses to the organs of personnel that meet the Level I exposure criterion led to predictions about health effects from chemical effects and radiological doses for these personnel. These predictions assume one LC-DU round perforates the crew compartment and that no ventilation systems are operating during or after perforation, except where indicated.

8.3

8.2.1

DU Mass Intakes

The predicted median intakes of DU mass (0.381 nCi/mg) from the aerosols for the five scenarios are listed for each vehicle configuration in Table 8.2. The intakes range from a low of 10 mg for a 1-min exposure in the ventilated Abrams tank with DU armor to a high of 1000 mg for a 2-h exposure in an unventilated Abrams tank with DU armor. These data were used as input to the models for calculations of DU concentrations to tissues and organs and radiological doses. Table 8.2. Summary of Median DU Intakes by Scenario
DU Intake (mg) Abrams Tank Through Through Conventional Armor, DU Armor, No Ventilation No Ventilation 280 250 590 710 760 970 780 1000 160 200 Through DU Armor, EC/NBC Ventilation 10 43 91 110 27 Bradley Vehicle, Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 83 220 330 380 99

Scenario A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min

8.2.2

Chemical Toxicity Effects

The chemical toxicity of uranium has been evaluated in numerous animal studies and through human studies of workers in the uranium processing field over many years. These studies have identified the kidney as the target organ for uranium toxicity. For this reason, occupational safety levels are based on the kidney as the target organ. A review of renal effects in humans occurring after acute exposures to uranium was used to develop a set of effects groups correlating uranium (U) concentrations in the kidneys with renal effects. These Renal Effects Groups (REGs) were used to predict the potential effects of the current exposure concentrations. Table 8.3 summarizes the predicted median peak kidney uranium concentrations for exposure Scenarios A through E to two significant figures. For comparison, the de facto occupational guideline is 3 g U/g kidney (ICRP [2] 1959). The concentrations predicted for exposures in an Abrams tank with an operating ventilation system are about an order of magnitude below the ICRP occupational guideline and are well below levels at which adverse health effects might be expected. The concentrations predicted for exposures in unventilated vehicles range from those that are not predicted to cause kidney dysfunction to concentrations where there may be transient or protracted indicators of kidney dysfunction. For Scenarios A and B, the predicted kidney uranium concentrations were either within REG 0 (2.2 g U/g kidney; no kidney dysfunction) or REG 1 (>2.2 to 6.4 g U/g kidney; transient renal dysfunction) with the exception of Scenario B for the Abrams tank through conventional armor, which is at the interface between REG 1 and REG 2 (>6.4 to 18 g U/g kidney; protracted kidney dysfunction). In Scenarios C and D, the predicted kidney uranium concentrations were in REG 1 for the Bradley vehicle and the Abrams tank through DU armor and in REG 2 for the Abrams tank through conventional armor. Based on the modeling results, the highest peak concentrations of DU in the kidney would be reduced to 3 g U/g 8.4

kidney or less within a month. Even at the 90th percentile level, no scenarios reached REG 3 levels (>18 g U/g kidney), for which more severe symptoms are predicted. Table 8.3. Summary of Median Peak Kidney Uranium Concentrations by Scenario
Peak Kidney Uranium Concentrations (g U/g Kidney) Abrams Tank Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 3.0 6.4 8.2 8.0 1.5 Through DU Armor, No Ventilation 1.1 2.6 3.5 3.7 0.67 Through DU Armor, EC/NBC Ventilation 0.05 0.23 0.46 0.56 0.14 Bradley Vehicle, Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 1.0 2.9 3.5 4.0 1.4

Scenario A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min

8.2.3

Radiological Effects

The radiation doses from internally deposited uranium and other alpha-emitting radionuclides have been studied in both humans and animals. These studies provide robust biokinetic models for estimating the distribution of uranium in the body and associated radiation doses to various organs of the body. The human data are robust enough to allow the use of risk factors derived from internal alpha emitters and organ-specific factors rather than using the E(50) and the cancer risk factors used to convert E(50) to risk. The results of this study indicated that the risk from using organ-specific risks was greater than the risk obtained using the E(50) methodology by about 35%. The potential for this was discussed by the ICRP in Publication 66 (1994a). Consequently, this assessment was based on organ-specific risks, which are driven primarily by the dose to the lung. The median committed effective doses, E(50)s, are presented in Table 8.4 by scenario. Doses for all scenarios in the Abrams/conventional armor tank, the ventilated Abrams/DU armor tank, and the Bradley vehicle were within U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) annual dose limit of 5 rem/yr for occupational workers. The E(50) for Scenario B in the unventilated Abrams tank perforated through DU armor was predicted to be 6 rem with a 5 min exposure, increased to nearly 9 rem for a 2-h exposure. These doses are within NRCs annual dose limit of 10 rem/yr for occupational workers with a planned, special exposure (e.g., protecting valuable property during an emergency). Radiation doses at the levels predicted are not expected to cause adverse health effects.

8.5

Table 8.4. Summary of the Median Committed Effective Doses for Most Likely Scenarios
E(50), rem Abrams Tank Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 2.0 3.7 4.8 5.0 0.92 Through DU Armor, No Ventilation 2.2 6.0 8.3 8.7 1.9 Through DU Armor, EC/NBC On 0.090 0.44 1.02 1.20 0.41

Scenario A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min

Bradley Vehicle, Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 0.59 1.7 2.1 2.4 0.89

Committed equivalent doses, HT(50), to organs were also calculated for the lung, bone surface, kidney, red marrow, and liver. The doses to the lung were higher by at least a factor of 10 than the doses to these tissues/organs. The predicted median HLung(50)s calculated for the lung are summarized in Table 8.5 by scenario. For reference, the U.S. annual occupational limit to any individual organ or tissue other than the lens of the eye is 50 rem (10 CFR 20). Except for the case in which an Abrams tank was perforated through DU armor and the stay-time was 1 to 2 h, the predicted doses to the organs were within this annual occupational limit, although the first-year doses, which relate better to immediate health effects, were less than the 50 rem organ dose limit, even for the unventilated Abrams tank. The HLung(50)s at the levels predicted are not expected to cause adverse health effects. Table 8.5. Summary of the Median Committed Equivalent Lung Doses for Most Likely Scenarios
HLung(50), rem Abrams Tank Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 14 32 38 39 8.8 Through DU Armor, No Ventilation 18 44 60 61 14 Through DU Armor, EC/NBC On 0.66 3.3 7.6 8.7 3.1

Most Likely Scenarios A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min

Bradley Vehicle, Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 5.2 14 20 22 6.7

The long-term radiation health effects of inhaled uranium compounds have been difficult to identify with any certainty in human populations. Epidemiologic studies of workers in the uranium processing industry suggest that there may be a very weak association between exposure to inhaled uranium and cancer. Because of the relative absence of data on increased cancer incidence in exposed populations, no risk coefficients for uranium-induced cancer are available from these populations. The increase in lifetime cancer mortality risk was calculated using generic ICRP risk coefficients and the conservative linear, nothreshold theory of effect thought to be protective of health. The risks for total cancer mortality are based on the sum of the individual organs risks.

8.6

Table 8.6 summarizes the estimated median lifetime cancer mortality from inhaled, deposited DU for the five exposure scenarios evaluated. Using conservative factors that may overestimate risks, the highest median probability of lifetime cancer mortality calculated in any of the scenarios was 0.0045 for a crewmember staying for 2 h (Scenario D) in an unventilated Abrams tank BHT that had been perforated through DU armor. A risk of 0.0045 implies that, on average, the chance over an individuals lifetime of dying of cancer from this exposure is 0.45% greater than the chance of that same individual dying from the natural or background rate, which is 23.6% for males and 20.0% for females (Ries et al. 2003). If a crewmember exited this same tank within 1 min after perforation, the lifetime risk of cancer mortality is predicted to be 0.0012 or 0.12%. The risks were slightly lower for crewmembers exposed to DU aerosols in an unventilated Abrams BHT penetrated through non-DU armor, and less still for crewmembers exposed in an unventilated Bradley vehicle, and least to a crewmember in a ventilated Abrams tank penetrated through DU armor. Table 8.6. Summary by Scenario of Median Lifetime Risk of Fatal Cancer from DU Aerosol Inhalation
Lifetime Risk of Fatal Cancer (%) Abrams Tank Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.050 Through DU Armor, No Ventilation 0.12 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.10 Through DU Armor with EC/NBC On 0.0049 0.025 0.057 0.065 0.0023 Bradley Vehicle, Through Conventional Armor, No Ventilation 0.034 0.099 0.12 0.14 0.052

Scenario A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min

8.3

Effect of Ventilation and NBC Overpressure Systems

The Capstone data were robust enough to provide upper bound estimates of Level I exposures for vehicles in which ventilation systems and, for the Abrams BHT, the EC/NBC system were off and hatches were closed at the time of perforation. The redundancies in the experiment were sufficient to ensure reasonable certainties in the data and confidence in the conclusions drawn from the data. Operation of the EC/NBC system in the Abrams tank or the ventilation systems in the Bradley vehicle can significantly reduce the DU aerosol concentrations and its associated radiological and toxicological risks. The intake of DU and the doses can be significantly reduced without increasing the operational risks to the crew if: these ventilation systems are operating at the time of perforation and remain operating after perforation, or these ventilation systems are activated shortly after impact (within the first couple of minutes postperforation). The effect of a functional EC/NBC overpressure system on DU aerosols and dose reduction in an Abrams tank was significant as demonstrated in the Phase-IV test in which the EC/NBC system in the Abrams tank was on and in the modeled results with the Abrams BHT using differences in air exchange rates.

8.7

The chemical and radiological risks were reduced by more than an order of magnitude for a stay-time of 5 min (Scenario B). The impact of the ventilation systems on dose reduction to a Bradley vehicle crew was not experimentally measured. Modeling suggests that ventilation will significantly reduce the toxicological risks to the Bradley crew and passengers, but by a factor less than for the Abrams tank. Activating ventilation systems would also reduce the risks to first responders and to other personnel subsequently entering the vehicle. The opening of hatches would be expected to add to the rate of aerosol dispersion for either vehicle.

8.4

Applying the Risk Assessment Results

The ultimate application of the risk assessment to prospective situations is to assess the risk of Level I personnel and provide a best estimate of risk that could be used by operational commanders and medical personnel before, during, and after the conflict for risk assessment, risk management, treatment, and training. The use of the best estimate risks provide data that are robust enough for use in the commanders risk assessment during combat and can provide initial estimates of individual risks in terms of Radiation Exposure Status (RES) categories and initial estimates of the toxicological effects. The estimated variability in dose and in individual characteristics and actions is large enough that biomonitoring would be required to determine individual doses. Translating the estimated risks into operationally relevant terms for the military was accomplished using NATO and DoD doctrine for radiological risks and developing an REG system for the chemical risks. The NATO/DoD/Army RES categories can be used to categorize DU exposures in a manner that is useful to field commanders and medical personnel. The RES system provides a means for placing the potential risk of increased incidence of fatal cancer into operational perspective. It was developed specifically for use in those military environments where the operational risks exceed those in the peacetime environments, for which the peacetime safety system was designed and is applicable to Level I exposures because by definition, Level I exposures can only occur during combat operations.

8.4.1

Categories of Human Health Effects

Radiological risks were compared with NATO (NATO STANAG-2083 [1996]) and DoD (JP 3-11 [2000]) RES levels to establish levels of risk of increased fatal cancer for use in all military operations including combat. The fatal cancer risks calculated for the DU exposures were used to place the exposures into one of the RES categories. Because a comparable chemical effects system was not already in place, the chemical REG strategy was employed based upon clinically relevant endpoints from human uranium toxicology data. Table 8.4 summarizes the best estimate radiological and chemical risks for perforations of these vehicles based on median values to reflect the most probable risks for each of the vehicles and each of the configurations. The following health effects conclusions can be drawn from this table: Crewmembers exiting an unventilated Abrams tank perforated through DU armor or a perforated Bradley vehicle within 1 min are unlikely to exhibit observable chemical or radiological effects from inhaling DU aerosols. For crewmembers in an unventilated Abrams tank in which the perforation is through non-DU armor, a 1-min exposure may cause transient renal effects.

8.8

 Crewmembers remaining in an unventilated vehicle through DU or non-DU armor for longer periods of time (greater than 1 min and up to 2 h) may experience transient or protracted but reversible renal dysfunction. For all scenarios, even with the ventilation systems off or inoperative, the radiological risks do not exceed those risks that are allowed for occupational limits for planned special exposures10 rem or RES 1C. In all vehicles, exposures to first responders are not projected to exceed RES 1B (the risk equivalent to NRCs occupational dose limit of 5 rem). The radiation doses and dose rates from any of the five scenarios and in either vehicle are too low for deterministic effects to occur, including damage to the immune system. Table 8.7. Median Radiological and Chemical Risk Groups by Vehicle and Scenario
Abrams Tank (Through Non-DU Armor, No Ventilation) RES REG Abrams Tank (Through DU Armor, No Ventilation) RES REG Abrams Tank (Through DU Armor, with EC/NBC Ventilation) RES REG Bradley Fighting Vehicle (No Ventilation) RES REG

Scenario

A - Crew, exit in 1 min B - Crew, exit in 5 min C - Crew, exit in 1 h D - Crew, exit in 2 h E - First responders, entry at 5 min, exit in 10 min
*

1B** 1B** 1C 1C 1B

1 1/2 2 2 0

1B** 1C 1C/1D 1C/1D 1B**

0 1 1* 1* 0

1A* 1B 1B 1B 1B

0 0 0 0 0

1B 1B** 1B** 1B** 1B

0 1 1* 1* 0

For RES, this indicates that the dose exceeded the U.S. average annual limit for the general public (0.1 rem) but did not exceed the risk associated with RES 1Aequivalent to 0.5 rem. * For REG, this indicates that the kidney concentration within REG 1 exceeded the ICRP occupational guideline of 3 g U/g kidney. ** For RES, this indicates the risk exceeded the risk associated with the ICRP occupational limit (5-yr average) of 2 rem.

All of the risks were sufficiently high that post-exposure biomonitoring is recommended to determine the actual exposure and the associated radiation dose and toxicological impact. The radiological requirement for individual dose assessment is a part of the RES doctrine. The need for kidney-effects monitoring should be considered a part of post-deployment occupational health screening based on the results of the biomonitoring.

8.4.2

Multiple Perforations

The Capstone data provided DU aerosol concentrations as a function of time for two perforations where the second perforation occurred 13 to 14 min after the first perforation. These data showed that the events were essentially independent of one another, and both the peak kidney uranium concentrations and radiation doses from the second shot were approximately the same as from the first shot. Although the data are limited, it appears that the radiation doses and kidney uranium concentrations for two shots can be roughly approximated by doubling the doses and kidney concentrations. The DU aerosol

8.9

concentration from three or more perforations has not been evaluated. As the time delay between perforations is reduced, more residual aerosol from the first shot would be mixed in with aerosols produced in the subsequent shot. In this circumstance and with multiple perforations, the doses from higher concentrations may be offset if particle agglomeration increases in proportion to the amount of aerosol created. Increased particle agglomeration would increase deposition amounts and decrease the doses associated with aerosol inhalation.

8.4.3

Relationship of Risk Assessment Results to DoD/Army Doctrine and Policy

Based on this analysis using Capstone data, current DoD and U.S. Army doctrine and policies appear to be appropriate for the risks incurred by perforation of armored vehicles with DU munitions. The following comments and conclusions are provided: The DoD/Army RES system provides a means for placing the potential risk of increased incidence of fatal cancer into operational perspective. The system is derived from peacetime occupational and contingency doses that were adapted to the military operational environments including combat. The system is applicable to Level I exposures because, by definition, Level I exposures can only occur during combat operations. Activation of available ventilation or EC/NBC systems is a quick, effective method for removing DU aerosols from the interior of armored vehicles, thereby reducing health risks to crewmembers. The doctrine may need to be evaluated to determine if temporary illness and diminished performance may occur for personnel whose intake of uranium aerosol concentrations is consistent with REG 2. The medical and operational recommendations in U.S. Army (FM 4.02-7 2002) and DoD (AFRRI 2003; JP 3-11 2000) doctrine for actions recommended for each of the RES levels need to be reviewed and modified for DU exposure. Consideration should be given to reviewing and modifying the RES doctrine in the following areas: Using risk levels rather than radiation dose as the standard for each category. Translating the RES to risk levels allows the use of this table for all carcinogens, both radiological and chemical. This will provide more consistent risk assessments by using a well-established, peer-reviewed framework for determining risk. Modifying the medical outcomes and recommended medical actions in current DoD policies for each RES level to take into account the differences between whole-body, low-LET radiation and the internal exposures from DU. The primary difference to consider is the difference in injury to the immune system. Injury to the immune system from DU exposure is negligible when compared to exposure to whole-body, low-LET radiation. Adopting a REG-type toxicological framework for deterministic effects from radiation or chemical exposure and using the RES structure for stochastic chemical effects.

8.10

8.5

Human Health Risk Conclusions

The Capstone data were robust enough to provide upper estimates of Level I exposures within vehicles with non-operating or inoperative ventilation systems (including the EC/NBC ventilation system in the Abrams tank). Although variations would be expected from shot to shot, the redundancies in the experiment were sufficient to ensure reasonable certainties in the data and in the conclusions drawn from the data. The activation of ventilation systems in either vehicle or the EC/NBC ventilation system in the Abrams tank can significantly reduce the DU aerosol concentration and associated health risks without affecting the operational status of the crew or increasing operational risk. The Capstone data from a single-shot perforation of an Abrams tank through DU armor and with an operating EC/NBC ventilation system showed that the risks were reduced to below the risk limits for peacetime occupational exposures. The same is likely to also be true for two perforations through DU armor of a tank with an operating EC/NBC system. Theoretical calculations indicate that activation of the Bradley vehicle ventilation system will also rapidly reduce the aerosol concentrations and associated risks when compared with an unventilated Bradley vehicle. General results of the Level I risk assessment include the following: The level of chemical and radiological risks to crewmembers from DU intake following perforation of an Abrams tank or a Bradley vehicle will depend on whether or not one or more vehicle ventilation systems were operating at the time of and after armor perforation. For exposure in an unventilated vehicle, the most probable health effects predicted from analyses of the highest doses are for acute transient kidney injury and an increase in the long-term risk of lung cancer. The kidney is the organ that has the highest chemical risk from uranium. None of the chemical risks exceeded REG 2. The Bradley vehicle and Abrams tank with DU armor (with or without ventilation) were within REG 1. The lung is the organ of consequence predicted to receive the highest radiation dose (extrathoracic airways and lymph nodes receive more in some cases but are not particularly sensitive to chemical effects nor are they targets for radiation). The highest median lifetime risk of cancer mortality from any single-perforation scenario and shot was 0.45%, which should be compared to the current 23.6% risk of cancer mortality in U.S. males. For the Abrams tank with no operating ventilation system, the majority of the aerosol intake occurs in the first 5 to 10 min after perforation. This finding reinforces the importance of early activation of ventilation systems. In all vehicles, exposures to first responders are not projected to exceed REG 0 (which is below the de facto occupational guideline of 3 g U/g kidney).

8.11

 Although the chemical and radiation risks are estimated to be low, counseling of exposed personnel and their family members is very important because of the perceived risks associated with DU exposure. Although the radiation risks are estimated to be low, all of the radiation risks exceeded the risks for which individual dose assessments are required. Because of differences in individual exposure for a given crewmember in a perforated vehicle, a DU bioassay is essential for estimating individual doses. Activation of the Abrams tank EC/NBC System will reduce the estimated intake of DU and the chemical dose significantly if it is activated shortly (i.e., 2 to 3 min) after perforation. Likewise, operating the Bradley vehicle ventilation system during and after perforation by a DU munition will result in lower chemical doses.

8.6

Recommendations for Follow-On Actions

The results of this work highlighted several areas that may require follow-on work. The following recommendations are provided for consideration: Review and revise, as necessary, DU bioassay procedures. The need for and the mechanisms for conducting and timing DU bioassays should be reviewed to ensure that the data needed to determine individual doses are obtained and archived appropriately. Conduct epidemiology studies on crewmembers with positive DU bioassay results. The primary data gap is the human health effects from acute exposures to DU aerosols. The recently implemented DU bioassay program (U.S. Army Medical Command 2004) could provide the exposure measurement data lacking in previous studies. Conduct experimental studies in laboratory animals to clarify the relationship of kidney toxicity to the dose of uranium following acute inhalation of DU. Because acute kidney toxicity is the predominant predicted risk for staying 1 to 2 h in an unventilated vehicle immediately after it is perforated by DU munitions, a better understanding of the clinical course of the effects from inhaled uranium is needed to assist management of combat situations. The studies should correlate kidney uranium burden over time with biochemical and pathological changes to the kidney. Uranium oxides aerosols with solubility characteristics similar to those observed in the Capstone study are recommended. It is unlikely that Soldiers will be exposed to DU alone. Therefore, there should be an evaluation of other metals and chemicals likely to be present in conjunction with DU when a combat vehicle is perforated, and the potential effects of DU in combination with these compounds. (An analysis of other metals in the Capstone DU aerosols is discussed in Parkhurst et al. 2004.) Re-examine crew immediate-action drills to ensure that appropriate actions are included. Immediate activation of the Abrams tank EC/NBC ventilation system or the Bradley vehicle ventilation systems should be considered for all perforations of armored vehicles in which these systems remain operational. These systems are effective at removing dust and particulates from the crew compartment and significantly reducing DU aerosol intake. 8.12

 Review and modify, as appropriate, the DU awareness training using the results of this work as the bases for the modifications.

8.7

References

Armed Forces Radiation Research Institute (AFRRI). 2003. Medical Management of Radiological Casualties, Second Edition. Bethesda, Maryland. FM 4-02.7. 2002. Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, October 2002. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1959. Report on the Committee II on Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation. ICRP Publication 2, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1979. Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers. ICRP Publication 30, Part 1, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1994a. Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 66, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1994b. Dose Coefficients for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers. ICRP Publication 68, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1995a. Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 3 Ingestion Dose Coefficients. ICRP Publication 69, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1995b. Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides: Part 4 Inhalation Dose Coefficients. ICRP Publication 71, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 1997. Individual Monitoring for Internal Exposure of Workers. ICRP Publication 78, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. Joint Publication 3-11. 2000. Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, JP 3-11, 11 July 2000. NATO STANAG-2083. 1986. Commanders Guide on Nuclear Radiation Exposure of Groups. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAG)-2083, Edition 5. 19 September 1986. (Latest Amendment, 26 June 1994.) Parkhurst MA, F Szrom, RA Guilmette, TD Holmes, YS Cheng, JL Kenoyer, JW Collins, TE Sanderson, RW Fliszar, K Gold, JC Beckman, and JA Long. 2004. Capstone Depleted Uranium Aerosols: Generation and Characterization, Volumes 1 and 2. PNNL-14168, Prepared for the US Army by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

8.13

Ries LAG, MP Eisner, CL Kosary, BF Hankey, BA Miller, L Clegg, A Mariotto, MP Fay, EJ Feuer, and BK Edwards (eds). 2003. SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1975-2000, National Cancer Institute. Bethesda, Maryland. Accessed online in January 2004 at http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2000,2003. US Army Medical Command. 2004. OTSG/MEDCOM Policy Memo 03-007, 13 January 2004, Medical Management of Army Personnel Exposed to Depleted Uranium (DU), Office of the US Army Surgeon General, US Army Medical Command Policy Memorandum, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas.

8.14

Documents to be Produced Briefings

Update on Depleted Uranium (DU)

R. Craig Postlewaite, DVM, MPH Director, Force Readiness and Health Assurance Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Health Protection & Readiness)

June 28, 2012

Overview of DU Update

Precautions to Prevent Exposures Identification of DU Exposures: 1991 Gulf War Conclusions after 18 Years of Medical Surveillance Toxicological Research Current DU Urine Biomonitoring Program Current Status of DU as a Battlefield Hazard

Precautions to Prevent Exposures of Service Members to Depleted Uranium

Key message: Depleted uranium, though 40% less radioactive than natural uranium, merits respect and, when possible, exposure avoidance due to its toxicological and radiological properties, and their potential to cause harm
3

Precautions to Prevent Exposures of Service Members to Depleted Uranium

Services responsible for providing training to prevent exposure of personnel to DU:
Operational training targeted to specific military occupations (e.g., incorporated into specialty training for radiation safety officers and chemical corps at Armys Chemical School) DU general awareness training in basic and advanced enlisted and officer courses Pre-deployment just-in-time training (USCENTCOM requires Pre-Deployment Training encompassing health risks such as occupational and environmental hazards in theater)
4

Identification of DU Exposures: 1991 Gulf War

exposed to DU began during 1991 Gulf War Exposed through inhalation of DU particles, contamination of wounds with DU dust, and/or wounding with DU fragments
Identification and follow-up of Service members

Survivors of armor-piercing munitions had greatest potential for health effects In 1993-94, slightly more than 100 veterans with possible high-level DU exposures identified through urine testing Invited to participate in a long-term medical surveillance program at the Baltimore Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center 74 of invited veterans have been evaluated to date, many 3 or more times; eligible for comprehensive multi-system exams 5 every two years

Conclusions after 18 Years of Medical Surveillance

Persistent DU in urine is associated with retention of DU fragments in the body
Fragments serve as an ongoing source of DU exposure

No clinically significant long-term health effects detected in these highly exposed veterans
Because absorbed uranium is filtered through the kidneys, chemical toxicity to kidneys represents a greater health risk than radiotoxicity, including cancer No evidence of clinically significant changes in the kidney or bone, the two principal target organs of uranium No clinical or epidemiologic evidence that uranium causes 6 cancer in humans

DU Toxicological Research
The kidney is the most sensitive target organ for uranium toxicity, and human exposure to large amounts of uranium has sometimes been associated with kidney damage Other possible human health risks related to chemical or radiological effects remain theoretical at this time, but merit continuing close scrutiny of results of laboratory research and human exposures Cell culture and laboratory animal research suggest that chronic exposure to DU may result in genetic changes, and possibly cancer, reproductive, or neurological effects
7

DoD DU Urine Biomonitoring Program

Began in 2003 Identifies Service members possibly exposed:
Referral by commanders, health care providers, or self-referral Post-Deployment Health Assessment

Requires testing for:

Individuals in, on, or near tanks/vehicles struck by armor-piercing munitions Rescue personnel routinely entering destroyed tanks/vehicles Optional for others:

Confirms exposures by presence of DU in urine collection Refers exposed individuals to Baltimore VA Medical Center for medical follow-up
8

DoD DU Urine Biomonitoring Program

Since 2003, a total of 2,701 U.S. Service members have undergone DU urine bioassays through late 2011 10 Service members have had DU identified in their urine; those confirmed on repeat testing were referred to the VAs long-term DU Follow-up Program
Most DU particles that are inhaled are rapidly cleared from the body In all six of those participating in the VA program, including two who initially submitted fragments to DoDs embedded metal fragments program, DU fragments have been the source of DU in the urine

None have had total uranium (depleted plus natural) levels high enough to cause, or be expected to cause, adverse health effects

Current Status of DU as a Battlefield Hazard

No clinically significant health effects in veterans heavily exposed to DU from 1991 Gulf War No documented DU exposures since 2007:
No DoD personnel have tested positive for DU in past 5 years No active combat using DU munitions

Since 2010, only 63 DoD personnel have submitted urine specimens for DU testing U.S. forces have not used DU munitions in Afghanistan DU exposure is not a major battlefield hazard
10

Remaining Depleted Uranium Concerns

Depleted uranium, though 40% less radioactive than natural uranium, merits respect and, when possible, exposure avoidance due to its chemical and radiological properties, and their potential to cause harm The DoD remains open to the possibility that DU may pose a long-term health risk to those exposed to high levels, and continues to closely monitor the results of the VA DU Follow-up Program
11

Questions

12

Potential Exposures to Depleted Uranium During the 1991 Gulf War

Michael E. Kilpatrick, M.D. Deputy Director Force Health Protection and Readiness Department of Defense
PP0014

Section of IOM Statement of Work Related to Public Law 109-364, Section 716: Study of Health Effects of Exposure to Depleted Uranium

The study committee will examine the feasibility of conducting an epidemiologic study of veterans who were exposed to depleted uranium while on active duty including veterans who:

If the committee determines an epidemiologic study is feasible, it will provide guidance on the design of the study. The study design would include assessment of health effects in children of depleted uraniumexposed veterans.

(1) were exposed to smoke from fires resulting from the burning of vehicles containing depleted uranium munitions or fires at depots at which depleted uranium munitions were stored; (2) worked within environments containing depleted uranium dust or residues from depleted uranium munitions; (3) were within a structure or vehicle while it was struck by a depleted uranium munition; (4) climbed on or entered equipment or structures struck by a depleted uranium munition; or (5) were medical personnel who provided initial treatment to members of the Armed Forces described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4).

2
Force Health Protection & Readiness

Exposure Assessment for Depleted Uranium (DU)

A valid exposure assessment for DU would be necessary to conduct an epidemiological study of its health effects. Health effects of chemicals in humans are a function of dosage (intensity of exposure) and duration of exposure. No exposure measurements for DU were taken at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, such as air samples. This means that estimates of exposure, as mandated in Section 716, would rely entirely on self-report (for example, exposed to smoke from fires resulting from the burning of vehicles containing depleted uranium munitions. ) Since 1998, veterans could volunteer to participate in urinary bioassays for uranium concentrations to determine their current body burdens.
Veterans who have embedded metal fragments continue to excrete detectable concentrations of DU. All other veterans had brief, transient inhalation exposures. None of them have had positive bioassays.

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Levels of Potential DU Exposure During the 1991 Gulf War (OSAGWI, 2000)

DoD investigated potential DU exposures among 1991 Gulf War veterans. Depleted Uranium in the Gulf (2nd ed., 2000); DoD Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI). Three levels of potential exposure. (See page 7.) Level I exposure Soldiers in or on a US vehicle when a DU munition penetrated it (N=104). OSAGWI interviewed nearly all 104 survivors of these friendly fire incidents. These individuals have been invited to participate in the Baltimore follow-up study. Soldiers who entered US vehicles to rescue occupants immediately after friendly-fire DU impacts (N=30-60). Level II exposure Soldiers who routinely entered vehicles possibly contaminated with DU dust, after combat (N=150-200). For example, personnel who performed maintenance on or recovered items from US vehicles struck by DU munitions. OSAGWI interviewed most of these individuals (those who could be identified and located). Personnel exposed to DU during cleanup operations after fire at Camp Doha (N=about 600). Level III exposure Short-term exposures, generally at very low levels, such as briefly entering or climbing on vehicles disabled by DU munitions. (N=unknown, probably thousands). 4

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Levels of Exposures for the Groups Listed in Section 716

Level I

Level II

were within a structure or vehicle while it was struck by a depleted uranium munition worked within environments containing depleted uranium dust or residues from depleted uranium munitions were exposed to smoke from fires resulting from the burning of vehicles containing depleted uranium munitions or fires at depots at which depleted uranium munitions were stored climbed on or entered equipment or structures struck by a depleted uranium munition medical personnel who provided initial treatment to members of the Armed Forces described in the previous groups children of DU-exposed veterans
5

Level III

Other groups

Force Health Protection & Readiness

DU Medical Surveillance Program

Medical surveillance of survivors of friendly fire incidents (Level I exposures); veterans are invited to participate every two years. Started in 1993-94 at the Baltimore VA Medical Center. Program Director is Dr. Melissa McDiarmid. 74 of 104 Level I veterans have been evaluated at least once; several have been evaluated three or more times. All veterans had inhalation exposures; a minority have embedded metal fragments, which could not be removed. Worst case scenarios for the potential inhalation exposures in Level I were modeled in the DoD Capstone Study (summarized below). Several veterans have persistent disability directly related to their wounds, including severe burns, amputations, fractures, and concussions.
6
Force Health Protection & Readiness

DU Medical Surveillance Program of Veterans with Level I Exposures

1993-94 evaluation of 33 Level I veterans

1997 evaluation of 29 Level I veterans (4 did not return) 1999 evaluation of 50 Level I veterans
McDiarmid, Environmental Research, 2000 McDiarmid, J. Occupational & Environmental Medicine, 2001 21 veterans had been evaluated before; 29 veterans were new. 13 of 50 veterans had retained metal fragments.

Hooper, Health Physics, 1999 15 of 33 veterans had retained metal fragments.

2001 evaluation of 39 Level I veterans

2003 evaluation of 32 Level I veterans

McDiarmid, J. Toxicology & Environmental Health, 2004 31 veterans had been evaluated before; 8 veterans were new. 13 of 39 veterans had retained metal fragments. McDiarmid, International Archives of Occup. & Env. Health, 2006 All 32 veterans had been evaluated before. 13 of 32 veterans had retained metal fragments.

McDiarmid, Health Physics, 2007 30 veterans had been evaluated before; 4 veterans were new. 10 of 34 veterans had retained metal fragments. Force Health Protection & Readiness

2005 evaluation of 34 Level I veterans

DU Medical Surveillance Program (cont.)

Detailed exposure and medical history; physical exams Urine tests

Hematology: routine blood tests Neuropsychological testing (memory, attention span, etc.) Thyroid function tests Reproductive function
Semen analysis Levels of four reproductive hormones

24-hour urine collection to measure concentration of total uranium and isotopic analysis for DU concentration Routine kidney function tests; specialized tests of early kidney damage (kidney is target organ in high-dose animal studies)

Genetic tests

Frequency of chromosomal aberrations Assay of single mutation (HPRT: hypoxanthine-guanine phosphoribosyl 8 transferase)

Force Health Protection & Readiness

DU Medical Surveillance Program (cont.)

Veterans with retained DU fragments continue to excrete very high concentrations of uranium in the urine (as much as one thousand times higher than the general US population). (McDiarmid, Health Physics, 2007) Conclusions about health effects (year of exam): 1993-94: No evidence of adverse clinical outcomes associated with uranium exposure at this time in these individuals. 1997: Relatively few uranium-related clinical outcomes documented in this group. 1999: Relatively few abnormal clinical findings in this group. 2001: Clinical outcomes related to urine uranium measures have revealed few abnormalities. 2003: Persistent urine uranium elevations continue to be observed more than 12 years since first exposure. Despite this, renal or other clinical abnormalities were not observed. 2005: Results continued to show no evidence of clinically-significant DU-related health effects. The 74 veterans in this cohort reported that they have fathered 70 children since the 1991 Gulf War. All of these children were born healthy, without major birth defects. (McDiarmid, personal communication, Jan. 2008) 9 This cohort will be evaluated every 2 years, indefinitely.

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Results of Program for Veterans Who Requested Uranium Bioassays (Volunteers)

In August 1998, DoD and VA started a national initiative to offer a DU medical evaluation to any concerned veteran of the 1991 Gulf War. Questionnaire that included 30 exposure questions (for example, in a vehicle hit by friendly fire, or inspected vehicles that had been damaged by DU munitions) 24-hour urine collection for uranium concentration First 169 veterans who volunteered (tested in Aug. 1998 to Dec. 1999) McDiarmid, Health Physics, 2001 The cut point for normal was chosen as 0.050 micrograms uranium per gram creatinine, based on the upper limit of normal in the general population. The median level for the 169 veterans was 0.010. One veteran had an elevated uranium level that was confirmed. He had retained metal fragments from a friendly fire incident. Only one of the 30 exposure questions predicted elevated uranium levels, that is, the presence of retained metal fragments.
10

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Results of Program for Veterans Who Requested Uranium Bioassays (Volunteers) (cont.)

First 446 veterans who volunteered (includes the first group of 169 veterans plus 227 veterans tested in Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2002) The cut point for normal was chosen as 0.050 micrograms uranium per gram creatinine. The median level (50th percentile) for the 446 veterans was 0.010. The 95th percentile for the 446 veterans was 0.049. Three veterans had elevated uranium levels that were confirmed to be DU. The presence of retained metal fragments had the highest predictive value for elevated uranium levels, out of the 30 exposure questions. Conclusion: For soldiers whose uranium levels are now normal, organ toxicity in the future from a uranium exposure in the distant past is unlikely.
11

McDiarmid, Health Physics, 2004 About 25% were still on active-duty, and 75% were veterans.

Each had retained metal fragments from a friendly fire incident.

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Comparison of Veteran Data with NHANES Data on Uranium Levels in the General US Population

National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), conducted by CDC

Second National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals, 2003. Included 1,405 adults, aged 20 years or older, randomly selected from the general US population. 50th percentile concentration of urinary uranium: 0.006 95th percentile concentration of urinary uranium: 0.034

Conclusions in McDiarmid, Health Physics, 2004:

No clinically significant difference in 50th percentile levels between 446 Gulf War veterans and 2003 NHANES data. No clinically significant difference in 95th percentile levels between 446 Gulf War veterans and 2003 NHANES data.
Force Health Protection & Readiness

12

Uranium Bioassays for Service Members Returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Since 2003, more than 2,200 Service members who have returned from OIF have requested uranium bioassays.
In general, these tests were performed within days to a few months after their return home. 10 individuals had elevated uranium levels that were confirmed to be DU. All 10 currently had retained metal fragments or recently had fragments removed. 3 have already been evaluated in the Baltimore follow-up program.

Post-Deployment Health Assessments

Mandatory questionnaire performed by all Service members returning from OIF. 21 questions on specific environmental exposures during deployment. Only 3% of more than 900,000 Service members returning from OIF reported potential DU exposures (sometimes or often).

13
Force Health Protection & Readiness

DoD Capstone Aerosols Study

DoD performed a health risk assessment of estimated DU exposures of personnel in, on, or near armored vehicles:
Armored vehicles that were perforated by large caliber DU munitions, or Vehicles with DU armor that were perforated by any type of munition

The concentration of DU aerosols inside vehicles perforated by DU munitions had not been adequately studied to predict the possible health effects from this type of exposure. Full title: Depleted Uranium Aerosol Doses and Risks: Summary of

US Assessments

Short title: Capstone Aerosols Study Sponsored by the US Army and DoD Health Affairs 1,100 page report based on 5-year study at cost of $6 million Two-part study: collection of aerosols, and health risk assessment Published in October 2004
14

Force Health Protection & Readiness

DoD Capstone Aerosols Study (cont.)

Characterization of DU aerosols

Human Health Risk Assessment

Controlled experiments to collect DU aerosols (test fires), under conditions designed to simulate realistic wartime conditions. During 1991 Gulf War, 3 Abrams tanks and several Bradley Fighting Vehicles had DU perforations of the crew compartments. Two types of vehicles were experimentally perforated with a large caliber DU penetrator: an Abrams tank and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Simultaneous collection of air samples within the vehicles; required air sampling systems that were rugged enough to withstand explosions within the crew compartment. Goal was to provide a peer-reviewed, rigorous estimate of health risks to personnel exposed to DU, at the air concentrations measured during the test fires. Used internationally recognized models to estimate the radiological dose and chemical concentrations that could be internalized into the body. Detailed literature review on human health effects of uranium was used to determine the relationship of estimated concentration of DU in the body, and the resulting chemical and radiological health risks.
15

Force Health Protection & Readiness

DoD Capstone Aerosols Study (cont.)

Overall conclusion:

Abrams tanks

Chemical and radiological risks of DU exposure in or near impacted vehicles would be low. In nearly all exposure scenarios, crew members would not be likely to experience any adverse health effects. The most important factor for reducing exposure after DU perforation would be the use of onboard vehicle ventilation, during and soon after perforation. DU exposure levels for most scenarios in Abrams tanks would be below routine occupational health limits, and would not cause health effects. In one scenario, DU exposures, which might cause temporary kidney effects, could occur in an unventilated Abrams tank with conventional (non-DU) armor, if exposures were more than 5 minutes. No health effects would be expected in Bradleys, even if unventilated.
16

Bradley Fighting Vehicle

Force Health Protection & Readiness

NAS Review of DoD Capstone Aerosols Study (January 2008)

At request of the US Army, the National Academy of Sciences performed a scientific review of the DoD Capstones Aerosol Study. Title: Review of Toxicologic and Radiologic Risks to Military Personnel from Exposure to Depleted Uranium During and After Combat.
Published on January 30, 2008.

Statement of Task:
Review the toxicologic, radiologic, epidemiologic, and toxicokinetic data on DU and to assess the Capstone Report on toxicologic and radiologic risks to soldiers exposed to DU. Consider health hazard and environmental reports prepared by such organizations as WHO, UN Environment Programme (for the postconflict Balkans), International Atomic Energy Agency, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and UK Royal Society. Identify relevant data deficiencies and offer recommendations for future research.
17
Force Health Protection & Readiness

Overall Findings of the NAS Review of DoD Capstone Aerosols Study (January 2008)

Overall, NAS found the methods and results of the Capstone exposure assessment to be appropriate and well-done. For Level I exposures, the NAS estimated intakes were within a factor of 2 of the Capstone estimated intakes. For Level II and Level III exposures, there was agreement between the NAS and Capstone estimated intakes. The Capstone Report developed a categorization scheme, the Renal Effects Group, that correlated modeled renal concentrations of DU with possible renal effects and likely health outcomes. The NAS raised some questions about the Capstone reports use of Renal Effects Group. It recommended re-evaluation of the relationship between renal concentrations and renal effects, at low doses of DU. NAS stated that the approach that the Capstone report used to estimate cancer risks was appropriate, based on the radiological properties of DU.
Force Health Protection & Readiness

18

Major Recommendations of the NAS Review of DoD Capstone Aerosols Study (January 2008)

The Army should review the accuracy of the acute exposure data presented in the Capstone Report that the Army used to support the relationship between modeled renal concentrations of uranium and renal effects. Cancer risk estimates should be calculated for Levels II and III exposure to determine whether decontamination of vehicles perforated by DU munitions should be conducted to reduce the risk of fatal cancer from unprotected people. For Level II personnel working in vehicles perforated by DU munitions, the number of hours should be limited, and protective equipment, particularly respirators, should be used to reduce potentially important cumulative DU exposure. If Gulf War Level II personnel who had several hours of unprotected exposure to DU in perforated vehicles can be identified, they should receive health monitoring.
19

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Summary

DoD performed a comprehensive investigation of various occupational scenarios that could lead to DU exposure during the 1991 Gulf War. DU Medical Surveillance Program-results from 1993 to 2005:

Volunteer program since 1998, for 1991 Gulf War veterans with concerns about possible DU exposure

Level I, embedded metal fragments: Some individuals continue to excrete very high concentrations of uranium. Level I, inhalation exposure only: Uranium concentrations have always been within normal limits. Only 3 veterans had retained fragments, and had elevated uranium levels. Nearly all exposures were in Level II and III, and uranium levels were normal. Only 10 veterans with retained fragments had positive bioassays.

More than 2,200 OIF veterans have been tested within days to months of their return home. Uranium levels in 1991 Gulf War veterans and OIF veterans, who do not have retained metal fragments, are indistinguishable from uranium levels in the general population.
20

Force Health Protection & Readiness

Summary (cont.)

VA and DoD are committed to continuing the DU Medical Surveillance Program indefinitely, for veterans with Level I exposures. Volunteer program will continue indefinitely for veterans of the 1991 Gulf War and OIF who have concerns about potential DU exposure. No DU-related health effects have been identified in veterans with Level I exposures.

21
Force Health Protection & Readiness

Overview of Laboratory Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Ten toxicology projects in the DoD research portfolio related to illnesses in Gulf War veterans.
Total funding of $7.15 million. All projects are complete. Five have published results.

Overall results of five projects:

Rats implanted with DU pellets in thigh muscles did not develop cancer (3 studies) Rats implanted with foil squares of DU developed sarcomas (one study); follow-up research is continuing High concentration of DU in kidneys over lifetime did not cause kidney toxicity in rats

Results of additional DoD-funded project on health effects of DU:

No adverse effects on reproductive success in male or female rats implanted with DU pellets; no adverse effects on offspring, to date

Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Ten toxicology projects in the DoD research portfolio related to illnesses in Gulf War veterans.
Total funding of $7.15 million. Two projects also included toxicology of tungsten alloys (DoD-122, DoD130). All projects are complete. Five have published results, as summarized below.

DoD-7A Health risk assessment of embedded depleted uranium (DU): behavior, physiology, histology, and biokinetic modeling
TC Pellmar, et al., 1999, Toxicological Sciences TC Pellmar, et al., 1999, Neurotoxicology RW Leggett & TC Pellmar, 2003, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity Sprague-Dawley rats were implanted with DU pellets in thigh muscles Highest concentrations of DU were in kidneys and bone; despite significant levels in kidneys, no detectable kidney toxicity DU reached detectable concentrations in brain; however, no adverse effects on behavioral test battery Biokinetics of embedded DU is similar to more common forms of soluble uranium (i.e., intravenous uranyl nitrate), regarding long-term accumulation in kidneys, bone, and liver Some rats were followed for full 2-year lifespan; no cancers developed

Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

DoD-7B Carcinogenicity of DU fragments
FF Hahn, et al., 2002, Environmental Health Perspectives Wistar rats were implanted with foil squares of DU or DU pellets in thigh muscles Rats implanted with foil squares of DU developed soft tissue sarcomas Rats implanted with DU pellets did not develop cancer Authors stated that the cancers associated with foil squares could be related to foreign body reactions. This project received funding for follow-up research (DoD-127).

DoD-130 Carcinogenicity and immunotoxicity of embedded DU and heavy-metal tungsten alloys in rodents
JF Kalinich, et al., 2005, Environmental Health Perspectives F344 rats implanted with DU pellets or tungsten alloy pellets in thigh muscles Rats implanted with tungsten/nickel/cobalt alloys developed sarcomas Rats implanted with DU pellets did not develop cancer

Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

DoD-122 Carcinogenic potential of DU and tungsten alloys
AC Miller, et al.: Several publications on effects of DU on mutagenicity and genotoxicity assays in cell cultures Unclear relevance of these studies, in relation to experiments in whole animals

DoD-123 Immunotoxicity of DU and heavy metal tungsten alloys

JF Kalinich, et al., 2002, Toxicology Effects of DU on white blood cells in cell culture Unclear relevance of these studies, in relation to experiments in whole animals

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

Deployment Health Support Directorate

Surgeon Captain Richard Johnston
Gulf and Deployment Health Liaison to the US/DOD

US Department of Defense Depleted Uranium Research Update

Outline
Background Research Update Policies Operation Iraqi Freedom Depleted Uranium Urine Bioassay Results Current Concerns with Tungsten Alloy Questions

Background
The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) was established in 1996 to investigate possible causes of medically unexplained symptoms in some Gulf War veterans
A key focus area was on the potential health effects of exposure to depleted uranium

The OSAGWI evolved into a new organization called the Deployment Health Support Directorate in 2002
The DHSD now focuses on protection of personnel in current and future deployments and is less involved in 1991 Gulf War issues

Background
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Under Secretary of Defense Personnel & Readiness Dr. David Chu Assist Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Dr. William Winkenwerder
DASD Health Budgets & Financial Policy DASD Health Policy Administrati on

DoD Health Affairs

DASD Clinical & Program Policy

DASD Force Health Protection & Readiness

Ms. Embrey

Strategic Communicat ions Coordinator

Chief Information Officer

Deployment Health Support Directorate Deputy Dir,

Communication s & Media Relations

Dir. Med, Chem, Bio, Radiological & Nuclear Programs

Dr. Kilpatrick

Background
DoD Health Affairs
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Under Secretary of Defense Personnel & Readiness Dr. David Chu Assist Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Dr. William Winkenwerder

DoD Health Affairs

DASD Clinical & Program Policy

DASD Force Health Protection & Readiness

Ms. Embrey

DASD Health Budgets & Financial Policy

DASD Health Policy Administration

Strategic Communications Coordinator

Chief Information Officer

Deployment Health Support Directorate Deputy Dir,

Communications & Media Relations

Dir. Med, Chem, Bio, Radiological & Nuclear Programs

Dr. Kilpatrick

DU Research Update
DoD Funded DU-related Research Veterans Affairs DU Medical Follow-up Program DU CAPSTONE Program

Overview of DoD Laboratory Research on Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Ten completed DU toxicology projects in the DoD Gulf War Illness research portfolio
Total funding of $7.15 million Five projects have published results

Overall results of five projects:

Rats implanted with DU pellets in thigh muscles did not develop cancer (3 studies) Rats implanted with foil squares of DU developed sarcomas (1 study); follow-up research is continuing High concentration of DU in kidneys over lifetime did not cause kidney toxicity in rats

Overview of DoD Laboratory Research on Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Results of one additional DoD-funded project on health effects of DU:
No adverse effects on reproductive success in male or female rats implanted with DU pellets; no adverse effects on offspring, to date

DoD Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Health risk assessment of embedded depleted uranium (DU): behavior, physiology, histology, and biokinetic modeling; TC Pellmar, et al., 1999,
Toxicological Sciences; TC Pellmar, et al., 1999, Neurotoxicology; RW Leggett & TC Pellmar, 2003, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity

Sprague-Dawley rats thigh muscles implanted with DU pellets; no cancers developed over 2 year period Highest concentrations of DU in kidneys and bone with no detectable kidney toxicity DU concentrations detectable in brain; no adverse effects on behavioral test battery Biokinetics of embedded DU is similar to soluble uranium (i.e., uranyl nitrate) for long-term accumulation in kidneys, bone, and liver

DoD Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Carcinogenicity of DU fragments
FF Hahn, et al., 2002, Environmental Health Perspectives

Wistar rats thigh muscles implanted with DU foil squares or DU pellets This variety of rat has a propensity for developing tumors Those rats implanted with DU foil squares developed soft tissue sarcomas Those rats implanted with DU pellets did not develop cancer Authors stated that the cancers associated with DU foil squares could be related to foreign body reactions

DoD Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Carcinogenicity and immunotoxicity of embedded DU and heavy-metal tungsten alloys in rodents; JF Kalinich, et al., 2005, Environmental Health
Perspectives

F344 rats thigh muscles implanted with DU pellets or tungsten alloy pellets Those rats implanted with DU pellets did not develop cancer Those rats implanted with tungsten/nickel/cobalt alloys developed rhabdomyosarcomas which rapidly metastasized

Additional DoD Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Arfsten, et al 2005, Study of the reproductive effects in rats surgically implanted with depleted uranium for up to 90 days, Journal of
Toxicology & Environmental Health

Male & female Sprague-Dawley rats implanted with DU pellets Rats mated 30 days after implantation DU did not cause adverse effects on the male or female rats, including reproductive success, survival, or body weight gain DU did not cause adverse effects on their offspring, including birth weight, survival, litter size, birth defects, neurodevelopment or immune function Research on the offspring is continuing, including their reproductive success

Additional DoD Research on the Health Effects of Depleted Uranium

Arfsten, et al 2006, Evaluation of the effect of implanted depleted uranium on male reproductive success, sperm concentration, and sperm velocity, Environmental Research
Male Sprague-Dawley rats implanted with DU pellets At 150 days after implantation, no evidence of systemic toxicity At 150 days after implantation, no evidence of changes in sperm concentration or velocity At 30 days and 120 days after implantation, no evidence of adverse effects on mating success

Veterans Affairs (VA)-DU Medical Follow-up Program Results

Program Established at Baltimore VA Medical Center (1993), with clinical evaluations Objectives gain information on combat DU exposure medical effects and develop sound basis for surgical removal of fragments
To date, 74 of about 100 1991 Gulf War survivors evaluated at least once; about 1/3 with retained fragments Veterans with shrapnel participated in most of the 6 evaluations ( every two years) Four Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans have also been added to the original group

VA - DU Medical Surveillance Protocol

Detailed exposure and medical history; physical exams Urine tests
24-hour urine collection to measure concentration of total uranium Routine kidney function tests; specialized tests of early kidney damage (kidney is target organ in highdose animal studies)

Hematology: routine blood tests Neuropsychological testing (memory, attention span, etc.) Thyroid function tests

VA- DU Medical Surveillance Protocol (Cont) Reproductive function

Semen analysis Levels of four reproductive hormones

Genetic tests
Frequency of chromosomal aberrations and sister chromatid exchanges (SCEs) Assay of single X chromosome mutation (HPRT)

Immunological tests
Routine immune tests (rheumatoid factor, ANA, etc.) 14 phenotypic markers (CD4 cells, CD8 cells, etc.)

Whole Body Radiation Counting

VA-DU Follow-up Program Results

Clinical Findings
Some veterans with DU shrapnel continue to excrete very high levels of DU Kidney function: essentially no statistical differences in high (>100 ng/g creatinine) vs low urine uranium groups Reproductive function: 11 of 33 veterans with retained shrapnel have had 68 children; all without birth defects Reproductive hormones: no differences in levels in high vs low groups; consistently higher sperm concentrations found in those with high levels of uranium excretion

VA-DU Follow-up Program Results (Cont) Clinical Findings (Cont.)

Genotoxicity: No consistent differences in rates of chromosomal aberrations or SCEs; HPRT mutations suggestion of higher rate; further work planned

DU CAPSTONE Test Project Background DU exposures resulting from use in 1991 Gulf War Limited data for some inhalation exposure scenarios OSD/Army co-sponsored, $6M, 4-year, 2 phases
DU CAPSTONE Aerosol Study DU CAPSTONE Human Health Risk Assessment

DU CAPSTONE Aerosol Study

Simulate Gulf War/future combat exposure scenarios 13 DU shots at Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles 8,000 samples, four labs for complete characterization of aerosols conc., particle size, chemical and physical form, lung solubility Results
Concentrations inside vehicles fall within minutes Large particles settle more quickly Less aerosol generated in Abrams Tanks than Bradley Fighting Vehicles Absorption class - ICRP Moderate for most

DU CAPSTONE Conclusions
Predicted radiation doses are below U.S. peacetime safety standards and not likely to cause adverse health effects for all scenarios modeled Predicted uranium concentrations in the kidneys are not likely to cause adverse chemicallyinduced health effects for most scenarios There may be short-term heavy metal effects on the kidneys for exposures exceeding five minutes in unventilated Abrams tanks perforated through armor

Policies
Policy for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) DU Medical Management, Health Affairs Policy 03-012, May 30, 2003 Policy for Deployment Biomonitoring and Approved Bioassays for Depleted Uranium and Lead, Health Affairs Policy 04-004, Feb 6, 2004 Policies Available at: http://www.ha.osd.mil/

HA Policy 03-012, May 30, 2003, OIF DU Medical Management

Identification of personnel exposed/potentially exposed to DU Qualitative exposure assessment Bioassay required for all:
Level I exposures: Personnel struck by DU munitions/fragments, or who were in, on, or near (less < 50M) an armored vehicle at time it was struck Level II exposures: Personnel who routinely enter DU damaged vehicles as part of their military occupational specialty

Bioassay optional, based on medical indications and/or concerns expressed by the individual, for all Level III, incidental exposures

HA Policy 03-012, May 30, 2003, OIF DU Medical Management

24-hour urine specimens collected, ideally within 180 days of exposure and sent to Service-approved labs Bioassays consist of testing of urine, normalized for urine creatinine excretion levels, for total uranium and the presence of DU (isotopic analysis) Personnel notified of results with appropriate risk communication messages Quality assurance includes internal laboratory and external cross checks

HA Policy 04-004, Feb 6, 2004 Deploy. Biomonitoring and Approved Bioassays for DU and Lead

Provided selection and approval criteria for biomarkers to be used in deployed settings Provided guidelines for lead exposure biomarkers and updated guidance for DU

OIF Depleted Uranium (DU) Bioassay Results

Referral to the Baltimore VA DU Medical Follow-up program offered to all with confirmed DU exposure DoD Deployment Health Clinical Center (Walter Reed Medical Center) archival center and responsible for referrals and any long-term case management

OIF Depleted Uranium (DU) Bioassay Results (1 Apr 2003- Sept 30, 2005)
Army Navy/ Marines Air Force T O T A L 238 496 249 Elevated Detect- Retained able FragTotal ments DU Uraniumb 8 13 2 113 186 7 0 0 1 8 16 1 6 29 52

Level I Level II Level III a Uncatc Total

189 269 199 1128 1785

47 220 43 11 227

2 7 7

0 1139 16 2122

More Information
DHSD Depleted Uranium Library
http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/du_library/

DoD Deployment Health Clinical Center

http://www.pdhealth.mil

DoD Deployment Health and Family Readiness Library

http://deploymenthealthlibrary.fhp.osd.mil/home.jsp

USA Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM)

http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

http://www.va.gov/

(b)(6)

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

(b)(6)

Lancet article about Iraqi study of rates of birth defects October 5 2013

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(13)618127/fulltext outlinegoeshere TheLancet,Volume382,Issue9899<http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/issue/vol382no9899/PIIS0140 6736(13)X60465>,Pages11651166,5October2013 <PreviousArticle<http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(13)620243/fulltext>|NextArticle <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(13)620589/fulltext>> doi:10.1016/S01406736(13)618127http://www.thelancet.com/images/clear.gif <http://www.thelancet.com/popup?fileName=citeusingdoi>CiteorLinkUsingDOI <http://www.thelancet.com/popup?fileName=citeusingdoi> PublishedOnline:01October2013 QuestionsraisedoverIraqcongenitalbirthdefectsstudy OriginalText PaulCWebster<http://www.thelancet.com/search/results?fieldName=Authors&searchTerm=Paul%20C+Webster> ThereleaseofastudyoncongenitalbirthdefectsinIraqhasbeenmetwithcontroversy,withsomeexpertsquestioning itsmethodologyandpeerreview.PaulCWebsterreports. WHOofficialshavesteppedintodefendanunsignedandsharplycriticisedreport <http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/iraq/documents/Congenital_birth_defects_report.pdf>releasedbytheIraqi MinistryofHealth(MOH)oncongenitalbirthdefectsinareaswhereUSledcoalitionforcesusedtoxinlacedmunitions. AlthoughseveralrecentstudiesfromIraqreportedworryingratesofcongenitalbirthdefectsinareaswherehighlytoxic munitionssuchasdepleteduraniumshellswereusedbyBritish,US,andothercoalitionforces,thenewstudy,which wascofundedbytheIraqiGovernmentandWHO,foundnoclearevidencetosuggestanunusuallyhighrateof congenitalbirthdefectsinIraq.AfterinitiallyreferringquestionsaboutthestudytoIraqiofficials,JaffarHussain,WHO's
1

HeadofMissioninIraq,toldtheTheLancetlastweekthatthereportisbasedonsurveytechniquesthatarerenowned worldwideandontheworkofinternationalexpertswhopeerreviewedthedataextensively. Thestudy,whichisbasedona2012surveyofmothersin10800householdsfrom18Iraqidistricts,relieslargelyon mothers'memoriesofthedetailsofspontaneousabortions,stillbirths,andbirthswithcongenitaldefectssincethe 1980s(43387pregnancies).Citingalackofmedicalrecordsforolderevents,theIraqiGovernmentinterviewerswere abletoviewmedicalfilesforonly32%ofthetotalreportedcases. Althoughwarningthatthesurveyedmothers'recollectionsmightnotbeaccurate,thereportdoesnoteathreefold increaseinreportedbirthdefectsbetween198892(76per1000births)and200307(262per1000births). Nonetheless,itassertstheratesforspontaneousabortion,stillbirthsandcongenitalbirthdefectsfoundinthestudy areconsistentwithorevenlowerthaninternationalestimates.Thereportedstillbirthratefor200812isconsiderably lowerthanWHOestablishednorms,thestudyindicates,leadingittosuggestpossibleunderreportingofstillbirths,or thatstillbirthratesinIraqarelowerthanestimatedelsewhere. WHOsaysthatsincetheissueofassociatingbirthdefectswithexposuretodepleteduraniumhasnotbeenincludedin thescopeofthisparticularstudy,establishingalinkbetweenthe[congenitalbirthdefects]prevalenceandexposureto depleteduraniumwouldrequirefurtherresearch.AccordingtoJaffar,thereisstillfurtherroomformoredetailed analysisandWHOisdiscussingproducingamoredetailedreportwiththeIraqiMOH. ThestudynotesthatWHOofferedtechnicalservicestotheMinistry,andthatWHOconvenedanexpertpeerreview meetingonthestudyinlateJulywithsixexpertsfromtheLondonSchoolofHygieneandTropicalMedicine(LSHTM), UniversityCollegeLondon(UCL),theUSCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention(CDC),andtheNorwaybasedFafo ResearchFoundation.WHOsaysthismeetingwasorganisedafteritwasdeterminedtheworkshouldalsoundergothe scientificstandardofpeerreview. Thatmaynothavebeenfullyachieved,however.SimonCousens,professorofepidemiologyandstatisticsatLSHTM, whowasamongthoseinvitedbyWHOtoreviewthestudy,saysheattendedarelativelybriefmeetingofaroundone andahalfhours,sojustgavesomecommentsonanearlypresentationoftheresults.Iwouldn'tclassifythatas thoroughpeerreview. AttheCDCinAtlanta,Georgia,spokeswomanBelsieGonzalezconfirmedthatCDCofficialsdidparticipateinthepeer reviewmeetingattheinvitationoftheWHORegionalOfficefortheEasternMediterranean.CDCdidnotparticipatein anyaspectsofthestudy.Weprovideddatainterpretationadviceonthereport. SeveralofWHO'sexpertreviewersraisemethodologicalconcernsaboutthestudy.Itsmainlimitationisthatitislargely basedonwhatpeoplereported,withoutanymedicalexamination,saysCousens.AttheFafoFoundationinOslo,social anthropologistJohnPedersenaddsthatthestudy'slimitedgeographicalscope(Iraqhasmorethan100districts)sharply reducesitsrelevanceinunderstandingthenationalpatternandprevalenceofbirthdefectsinIraq.Iwouldn't necessarilyhavedesignedthestudyinthesamewayasitwasdesigned,explainsPedersen,whonotesthatlowerrates ofbirthdefectscouldbeexpectedfrommothers'recollectionsthanifdoctorshadbeenaskedtoreportthem. Clicktotoggleimagesize<http://download.thelancet.com/images/journalimages/0140 6736/PIIS0140673613618127.fx1.lrg.jpg> Clicktotoggleimagesize Fullsizeimage <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673613618127/images?imageId=fx1&sectionType=lightBlu e&hasDownloadImagesLink=false>(77K)GettyImages ChildrenwhowerebornwithbirthdefectsinFallujah(picturedNovember,2009)
2

 IagreewithJonPedersenthattherearelimitationsinthestudydesign,saysBernadetteModell,emeritusprofessorof communitygeneticsatUCL.However,itisreallydifficulttoconductepidemiologicalstudiesofcongenitaldisorders outsideahighincomesetting,becausemanycongenitaldisordersaredifficulttodiagnosewithoutsophisticatedclinical andlaboratoryfacilitiesandarelativelyhighproportionofthosethatoccurinlowerincomesettingsmaybedueto environmentalcauses. Takingtheselimitationsintoaccount,Modelladds,IthinktheIraqstudywasprettygood,andasobjectiveaswas feasible.Iwasparticularlyimpressedwiththeefficientorganisationofdatacollectionwhenthestudywasunderway. Thereviewersallagreedthatthedataprovidenoevidencetosupportclaimsofanepidemicofcongenitalanomalies eithernationally,orinanyparticulararea.However,thestudyamassedaverylargeamountofdata,whichneeds furtheranalysis,ideallywithexpertassistance. KeithBaverstock,authorofa2004UNreportthathighlightedthepotentialseriousnessofIraq'slegacyofintensive exposuretodepleteduraniumordinanceemployedbyBritishandAmericantroopsbothduringtheFirstGulfWarof 1991,andaftertheUSledoccupationin2003,saysthereport'srelianceonthetermpeerreviewdoesnotconform withconventionalusage.It'sreallymisleading,hecharges.IhavetoquestionwhattheroleofWHOisinthisstudyas awhole,BaverstockaddsafternotingthatthestudynamesnoauthorsfromWHOortheIraqiMOHalthoughaWHO websitedoesexplainitdidprovidetechnicalassistanceonstudydesign,methodology,datacollection,dataanalysis andreportwriting.Forhispart,WHO'sJaffarconfirmsthattheownershipofstudyandtheauthorshipofthereportis withtheMOHfromtheoutset. ResearchersinIraq,theUK,andtheUSAwhohaveprobedcongenitalbirthdefectsandhavepublishedrecentpeer reviewedstudiesalsoexpressconcernsaboutthemethodologyemployedbytheIraqiMOHandWHO. AlthoughWHOsaysthatatthispointnoefforttoneithersubstantiatenornegatethefindingsofotherstudiescanbe employedbecausethestudyisnotaimingtoestablishcauseeffectassociationsbetween[congenitalbirthdefects] prevalenceandenvironmentalriskfactors,thestudyissuedbytheIraqiGovernmentstatesthatinrecentyearsthere havebeenseveralanecdotalreportsofgeographicalregionswithanunusuallyhighprevalenceofcongenitalbirth defectsinIraq.Mostofthereportsdidnotmeetthenormsforanobjectivestudyofbirthdefects,andareviewofthe publishedliteraturecouldfindnoclearevidencetosupporttheirfindings. SamiraAlaani,apaediatricianinFallujah,Iraq,whocopublisheda2011study <http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph8010089>utilisinghospitalrecordstoconcludethatcongenitalmalformations accountedfor15%ofallbirthsinFallujahsince2003,saysthenewstudycofundedbyWHOandtheIraqiGovernment shouldhaveemployedhospitalrecordsmorecomprehensively. MuhsinAlSabbakoftheBasrahMedicalSchoolinBasrah,Iraq,whocopublisheda2012study <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s0012801208172>reportinga17foldincreaseinbirthdefectsintheAlBasrahMaternity Hospitalsince1994,warnsthatthedatafromBasrahinthenewstudydoesnotmatchlocalhospitalrecords. AlisonAlborzisaspecialistonlearningdisabilitiesinchildrenattheUniversityofManchester,UK,whopublisheda2013 study<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23729096>presentingdatafroma2010surveyof6032householdsin fourIraqigovernatesincludingdataformorethan10000childrenandyoungpeopleshowingaprevalenceofcongenital birthdefectsmorethan25timeshigherthanreportedintheIraqiGovernmentstudy.Shesaysthenewreportgives littleinformationaboutsamplinganddoesnotofferanydiscussionofwhetherthedistrictschosenforanalysisreflect thecharacteristicsofthegovernorateasawhole. MozhganSavabieasfahani,atoxicologistbasedinMichigan,USA,whocoauthoredtheAlaaniandAlSabbakstudies, agreeswithAlborzthattheselectioncriteriadeterminedbytheMOHarenotsufficientlyexplained.Basedon informationavailableinthisreport,wecannotruleoutselectionbiasissues,shewarns.Shealsoquestionsthedecision nottoemployhospitalrecordsmorecomprehensively,andnotesthatthereportsuffersfromalackofdetailregarding
3

whichareaswereexposedtobombardmentorheavyfightingandwhichareaswerenot.Theexposedandunexposed populationsremainunidentifiedthroughout. TariqAlHadithioftheHawlerMedicalUniversityinErbil,Iraq,whoundertooktheliteraturereviewcitedbytheIraqi GovernmentindescribingtheworkofAlaani,AlSabbak,Alborz,andSavabieasfahaniasnotmeetingobjectivenorms, reachedaconclusionthatwasfarmoretentativethantheIraqiGovernmentsuggests.Asnotenoughdataonpre1991 GulfWarprevalenceofbirthdefectsareavailable,AlHadithistresses,therangesofbirthdefectsreportedinthe reviewedstudiesfromIraqmostprobablydonotprovideaclearindicationofapossibleenvironmentalexposure including[depleteduranium]orotherteratogenicagents. KelleyAnnBrix,M.D.,M.P.H. DeputyDirectorforDefenseMedicalResearchandDevelopmentProgram OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforHealthAffairs ForceHealthProtectionandReadiness DefenseHealthHeadquarters 7700ArlingtonBoulevard,Suite5101(Code:FHP&R) FallsChurch,VA220425101
(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

03 August 2011

(b)(6) (b)(6)

23 Jan 12

(b)(6) (b)(6)

OIF Depleted Uranium (DU) Bioassay Results (thru March 31 2004)

Army Navy/ Marines Air Force
T O T A L

Elevated Total Uranium >50 ng/g cre

Detectable Levels of DU

Removed Fragments

Level I Level II Level III* Uncat Total

107 107 52 267 533

32 195 0 0 227

1 140 3 305 2 54

4 8 0 2 14

5 5 (DU) 0 0 0 5 0 5 (non DU) 0 5/5

0 267 6 766

* For Level III only, this is just the number tested, not the total of Level IIIs identified

(b)(6)