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PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DEL ROSARIO vs. HON. DAMIAN L.

JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch III, SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963 FACTS: Jacinto et. al. commenced an action for forcible entry against del Rosario, et al. at the municipal court of Quezon City. The forcible entry case involve a two parcel of land claimed to be owned by Jacinto et. al. through purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. Del Rosario, et al, on their answer, claim prior possession before the purchase of the plaintiff and alleged that owned the land through purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier. While the action is still pending, del Rosario, et al commenced an action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance. In November 6 it denied the motion to suspend proceedings. Appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down on November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and now on appeal before us. ISSUE: Whether or not the pending action for forcible entry should be dismissed. RULING: With respect to the other order - that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings - it is enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them when the forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay the proceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The very petition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actions previously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them. There was special civil action No. 5318, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, dismissed by Judge Andres Reyes for lack of jurisdiction and then refiled in Branch V (Quezon City), but again dismissed by Judge Nicasio Yatco on July 2, 1959; and subsequently, there was special civil action No. 5500, Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissed by Judge Felix R. Domingo on July 8, 1959. Both of these actions were instituted after the ejectment case was filed by herein appellees and sought to suspend the trial thereof. There must be an end to the litigious rigmarole pursued by appellants. ANASTACIO T. TEODORO, JR. vs. ARMANDO MIRASOL G.R. No. L-8934. May 18, 1956 FACTS: Teodoro and Mirasol entered into a two-year lease contract, which would expire on October 1, 1952 and could be renewed for another two years upon written consent of both parties. On October 15, 1952, Mirasol wrote to Teadoro that the lease already expired. He gave Teodoro notice of termination since Teodoro lost interest in renewing the lease. Teodoro filed an action for specific performance and/or declaratory relief in CFI alleging that it is not true that he lost interest since Mirasol allowed him to renew the lease; that Mirasol is barred from

denying it; and that he has already paid. Teodoro prayed that the court fix the extended period of lease to 2 years and that Mirasol be required to pay P10,000 moral damage. Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court has no jurisdiction; that there is a pending unlawful detainer case in MTC between the parties; and that Teadoro's claim is barred by Statute of Frauds. Teadoro replied that the unlawful detainer suit in MTC was filed after plaintiff's action in CFI and that the former must be dismissed. Besides, Teodoro is claiming for moral damages, which the CFI must determine. CFI dismissed the case and denied Teodoro's motion for reconsideration since the issue on extension of lease can be resolved in the ejectment case even if it was filed later, as ruled in Lim v Lim. Teodoro argues before SC that there is no identity between unlawful detainer case and his case since this one is for specific performance or for declaratory relief and that this suit includes a claim for moral damages, both of which the CFI can only decide, not the MTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is proper. RULING: It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action. We find, therefore, no error in the ruling of the court a quo that Plaintiffs action should be dismissed on the ground of the pendency of another more appropriate action between the same parties and for the same cause. Action for declaratory relief is meant only for those cases where a contract is desired to be construed prior to its breach because of an impending controversy and that the parties may be informed of their rights. Here, the lease contract had already expired and there has already been a breach; hence, the action for declaratory relief is no longer proper. Even if proper, there is no longer any need for the action since the matter could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. The claim for damages is merely an incident of the main question of whether or not plaintiff should be allowed to continue the lease for two years more. He may not assert it in the action for declaratory relief, as an excuse or reason for continuing his suit. DOTMATRIX TRADING as represented by its proprietors, namely ROMY YAP CHUA, RENATO ROLLAN and ROLANDO D. CADIZ vs. ROMMEL B. LEGASPI under the name and style of BIG J FARMS and RBL FARM G.R. No. 155622 October 26, 2009 FACTS: Dotmatrix Trading are engaged in the business of buying and selling of commodities, including day-old chicks. Rommel B. Legaspi was the Dotmatrixs supplier of day-old chicks from September to December 2001. Sometime in 2002, Legaspi sent a demand letter to the petitioners for the payment of delivered day-old chicks. Dotmatrix replied with a demand for delivery of an alleged deficiency or return of the over-payment made. Failing to satisfy each other's demands, both parties went to court. On June 11, 2002, Dotmatrix Trading filed a complaint against the Legaspi before RTC-Tarlac for the return of the over-payment made, plus damages. On June 19, 2002, Legaspi filed before RTC-Malolos a complaint for the collection of balance and damages against theDotmatrix. Upon receipt of the summons and complaint, the Legaspi filed a motion to dismiss the case before RTC-Tarlac on the ground of litis pendentia. RTC-Tarlac granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners elevated the case to the SC on a pure question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case before RTC-Tarlac - filed ahead of the case before RTC-Malolos - should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. RULING: SC dismissed the petition. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the case later in time should yield to the earlier case; what is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens can apply; it is the filing of the action, not the receipt of summons, which determines priority in date. SC held further that the case before RTC-Malolos is the appropriate case to determine the rights of the parties. The case in Tarlac is purely preemptive. Another compelling reason is the stage of the case. Trial on the merits has already been conducted in the case before RTC-Malolos, with the petitioners given the full opportunity to present evidence on their defense. To dismiss it at this point would result in needless delay in the resolution of the parties dispute and bring them back to square one. The elements of litis pendentia (pending suit) are: 1. The parties in the two actions are the same. 2. There is a substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought. 3. Any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Under this established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GATEWAY PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC (GPHI). G.R. No. 181485 February 15, 2012 FACTS: This case involves two civil cases, Civil Case No. TM-1022 (Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and Civil Case No. TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale). GPHI was a subsidiary company of Gateway Electronics Company (GEC). In 1995 and 1996, GEC obtained long term loans from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in the amount ofP600,000,000.00. The loans were secured by mortgages executed by GEC over its various properties. Subsequently, LBP offered to provide additional funds to GEC by inviting other banking institutions to lend money therefor. LBP allegedly agreed to submit the properties mortgaged to it by GEC as part of the latters assets that will be covered by a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI), ensuring that "all participating banks in the loan syndicate will have equal security position." Due to difficulties in paying its obligations, GEC then requested PNB to convert its long-term loans into a Convertible Omnibus Credit Line. In a letter dated August 13, 1997 addressed to Israel F. Maducdoc, the Senior Vice President of GEC, PNB approved such a conversion subject to certain conditions. As part of the requirements of PNB, GPHI was made a co-borrower in the agreement and was obligated to execute in favor of PNB a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land. In March 1998, LBP allegedly refused to abide by its undertaking to share the mortgaged properties of GEC with the consortium of creditor banks. GPHI learned of PNBs supposedly underhanded registration of the real estate mortgage with intent to foreclose the same. GPHI filed a complaint and prayed that upon receipt of the complaint by the trial court, a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the properties of GPHI.

It appears that the RTC did not issue a TRO in favor of GPHI, which lead to the foreclosure of the property. GPHI filed a Petition for Annulment of Foreclosure of Mortgage with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On September 11, 2001, PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss the above petition, and contended that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. Essentially, PNB argued that GPHI resorted to a splitting of a cause of action by first filing a complaint for the annulment of the contract of real estate mortgage and then filing a petition for the annulment of the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage. PNB further alleged that the subsequent petition of GPHI failed to state a cause of action. On December 20, 2001, the RTC ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. TM1108. ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites of litis pendentia exist to warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-1108. RULING: There is litis pendentia or another action pendente lite if the following requisites are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The crux of the controversy in the instant case is whether there is an identity of causes of action in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 and TM-1108. As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not In the case at bar, a perusal of the allegations in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) reveal that the said cases invoke the same fundamental issue, i.e., the temporary nature of the security that was to be provided by the mortgaged properties of GPHI. In essence, the cause of action of GPHI in both cases is the alleged act of PNB of reneging on a prior agreement or understanding with GEC and GPHI vis--vis the constitution, purpose and consequences of the real estate mortgage over the properties of GPHI. While the reliefs sought in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) are seemingly different, the ultimate question that the trial court would have to resolve in both cases is whether the real estate mortgage over the properties of GPHI was actually intended to secure the loan obligations of GEC to PNB so much so that PNB can legally foreclose on the mortgaged properties should GEC fail to settle its loan obligations. In this regard, GPHI made reference to the letter of PNB dated August 13, 1997 and the Amendment to the Credit Agreement between GEC, GPHI and PNB as the primary documents upon which GPHI based its arguments regarding the supposed intention of the parties in both Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 (Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage) and TM-1108 (Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale) Thus, the same documentary evidence would necessarily sustain both cases.

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