HERE UNLAWFUL DETAINER FORCIBLE ENTRY 2013 jurisprudence Pls digest 2-4 Marcuss Ferrel Micabalo Pls digest

5-8 Jesse Joe Lagon Please submit unya September 22, 2013 PS: pls ayaw dugay2 kai mag himo pa powerpoint c Guil Vil ani and kelangan later by 4PM ang written report kai ipa hardbound pa. thankyou! 1. Jan Nenita Quality Foods vs Galabo- doney na ni micabalo GR NO. 174191 2. Feb Casilang vs casilang-dizon GR 180269 3. Mar PABALAN, ET AL., G.R. No. 174844 4. April HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G. R. No. 183858 5. April CASTIGADOR G.R. No. 179011 CATEDRILLA, Petitioner 6. April EVANGELINE RIVERACALINGASAN aud E. RICAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No.171555 7. April IMPT: SPS. ARMANDO SILVERIO, SR. AND REMEDIOS SILVERIO, G.R. No. 184079 8. Jul PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY G.R. No. 196741

Casilang vs casilang-dizon GR 180269 February 20, 2013

On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1994 under her fathers name. On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo renounced their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario. In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same "through intestate succession from his late father."4 For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, who was from the Public Attorneys Office, failed to appear at the scheduled pre -trial conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against him rendered by the MTC ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618. On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and Francisca ( The respondents aunts and uncle),7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint,8 docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages" against the respondents, the RTC of Dagupan rendered a decision in petioners favor. Hence this case:

ISSUE: Whether or not Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant
in an ejectment suit. HELD: YES, Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in an ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of possession; its determination is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment,accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the

action to recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.32 Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership issue is not conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70: Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense of owners hip in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership, which necessarily includes recovery of possession 34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs, and seeks to invalidate Ireneos "claim" over Lot N o. 4618 and to declare TD No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim executed by Ireneos heirs.

G.R. No. 174844

March 20, 2013

VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN, ET AL., Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO, SR., Respondents. Facts: On 31 December 1910, Onofre Palapo sold in favor of Placido Sy-Cansoy a parcel of land situated in the then Barrio Calapian (now Barangay Estela), Liloan, Leyte (now Southern), for the stated consideration of P86.00. On 29 October 1934, Placido, in turn, executed a notarized deed in Spanish, affirming a 12 October 1912 sale of the same parcel for the sum of P100.00 in favor of Miguels wife, Antonia Bayon. Faulting Simplecio Palapo with forcible entry into the property on 17 October 1934, Antonia, represented by Simeon Maamo, later filed the 4 December 1934 ejectment complaint in the court of justice of peae in Liloan leyte. Simplecio filed an answer, asserting that, as one of the heirs of Concepcion Palapo, he had been in legal possession of the property for many years without once being disturbed by anyone. 7 On the strength of the aforesaid documents of transfer as well as the evidence of prior possession adduced by Antonia, however, the Court of the Justice of the Peace of Liloan, Leyte went on to render a Decision dated 17 December 1934, brushing aside Simplecios defense for lack of evidentiary basis and ordering h im to vacate the parcel in litigation. On 9 December 1981, Simeon Sr., Fabian Sr., Juliana, Olivo, Silvestre Sr., Angela, Bonifacia and Estelita, all surnamed Maamo (plaintiffs Maamo), commenced the instant suit with the filing of their complaint for recovery of real property and damages against Simplecios children, Crispiniano, Juanito Sr., Arsenia and Roberto, all surnamed Palapo (defendants Palapo).10 In their amended complaint, plaintiffs Maamo alleged that, as children and heirs of the Spouses Miguel and Antonia, they were the co-owners of the parcel of land sold by Placido which, while reported in tax declarations to contain an area of 1,612 square meters, actually measured 13,813 square meters. Invoking the decision redeemed in favor of Antonia in Civil Case No. 298, plaintiffs Maamo maintained that their parents later relented to Simplecios entreaty to be allowed to stay on the property as administrator. Plaintiffs Maamo further averred that, having illegally claimed ownership over the western portion of the property after Simplecios death in 1971, defendants Palapo unjustifiably refused to heed their demands for the return of the litigated section measuring 7,055 square meters. Hence this case, Issue: whether or not a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case is conclusive with respect to the issue of material possession. Held: Yes, While it is true that a judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership,49 the rule is settled that such a judgment is conclusive with respect to the issue of material possession.50Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on

conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties and their privies on a different claim or cause of action. In the present case, Petitioners fault the CA for supposedly disregarding their evidence to the effect that Simplecio had been in possession of the property since 1912 as well as Simeon Sr.s admission that respondents have not been in possession thereof since 1935. Aside from the fact that the TDs they presented pertain to a different property, however, petitioners conveniently overlook Antonias filing of an ejectment complaint against Simplecio in 1934 with respect to the property herein litigated. In the 17 December 1934 Decision rendered in the case, the Court of the Justice of the Peace of Liloan Leyte significantly determined Antonias prior possession of the property and upheld her right to take possession thereof. To Our mind, the fact that the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 298 was returned duly served 52 also lends credence to respondents claim that Simplecios possession of the property was upon Miguels tolerance.53 Since acts of a possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription,54 petitioners cannot claim to have acquired ownership of the property by virtue of their possession thereof since 1935. Under Articles 44455 and 194256 of the old Civil Code, possession of real property is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are merely tolerated by the possessor, or which are due to his license. 57 Granted that long, continued occupation, accompanied by acts of a possessory character, affords some evidence that possession has been exerted in the character of owner and under claim of right, 58 this inference is unavailing to petitioners since Simplecios continued possession of the property after his defeat in the ejectment suit was clearly upon the tolerance of respondents predecessors-in-interest.

G.R. No. 183858

April 17, 2013

HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, represented by JENNIFER R. MARQUEZ, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CARLOS AND ELIZABETH ABACAN, Respondents

he Facts of the case are as follows: A parcel of land located in Sumapang, Malolos City is registered in the name of Freddie Santiago (Santiago) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 103697.5 On 23 August 1999, petitioner Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC) acquired the property from Santiago, but later found that the lot was already occupied by some individuals, among them respondent-spouses Carlos and Elizabeth Abacan.6 HTRDC then filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent-spouses and the other occupants. It withdrew the complaint, however, because it needed to verify the exact location of the property, which the occupants claimed was covered by emancipation patents issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). HTRDC commenced a complaint with the DARAB for cancellation of emancipation patents against some of the occupants of the land. During the pendency of the DARAB case, the occupants possession was tolerated. 7 On 30 April 2002, the provincial adjudicator ordered the cancellation of the emancipation patents of the occupants of the land.8 The DARAB later affirmed the decision of the provincial adjudicator.9 On 4 November 2003, HTRDC filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTCC of Malolos against the occupants of the subject land, again including respondent spouses. 10 Petitioner alleged that from the time it purchased the property in 1999 until the pendency of the DARAB case, it had no immediate need for the subject parcel of land. When the need arose, it made both verbal and written demands on the occupants to vacate the property. Despite its final demand on 17 June 2003, the occupants failed to vacate the property. Thus, HTRDC had to resort to the filing of an ejectment case against them.

Meanwhile, the provincial agrarian reform officer (PARO) filed an action for annulment of sale against HTRDC.14Respondents thereafter moved to stay execution on the ground that a supervening event had transpired. 15 The MTCC denied the motion, ruling that the mere filing of an action by the PARO did not materially change the situation of the parties, and hence, may not be considered as a supervening event. Issue: 1) Whether or not the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. 2) Whether or not HTRDC has a de facto possession of the subject property. HELD: 1.) The CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. 2.) As the case now stands, both parties are claiming ownership of the subject property: petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in its favor by the registered land owner; and respondents, by subsequently issued emancipation patents in their names. This issue would more appropriately be ventilated in a full-blown proceeding, rather than in a motion to stay the execution of the judgment rendered in the instant summary ejectment proceeding. To reiterate, the sole issue in the present case is de facto possession of the subject property, and this was conclusively settled by the MTCC in HTRDC's favor in its final and executory Consolidated Decision of 25 May 2005. We therefore rule that the CA committed reversible error in ruling that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents' motion to quash the alias writs of execution and demolition.