Daoism and Wittgenstein Daoism, a philosophy movement that consists of many terms, notions and propositions cryptic and

mysterious to the western readers particularly in its metaphysical and epistemological claims, might often be dismissed merely as an obsolete and self-contradictory set of beliefs due to the mystical nature of certain statements in it. However, setting aside the truths of the metaphysical and mystical revelations about the ultimate reality, its claims on the language and epistemology are intriguingly indicative of the perceived bias and error associated with the language we are utilizing and consequently, our beliefs followed from the use of our language. In the early wentieth !entury, one of the greatest western philosophers of all time, "udwig Wittgenstein, also made a series of profound claims related to the nature of our linguistics and epistemological issues. It is the focus of my paper to compare and contrast those two belief systems from different eras, locations and most significantly, from different languages, which probably produced different conceptual schemes, values and methodologies so that such a comparison could be challenging to say the least, if not impossible or misleading. However, one of the questions that will be as#ed within the paper itself is if such a comparison between two $language games% could be made and therefore, my conclusion could potentially be, in Wittgenstein&s words, $throwing away the ladder after climbing it%. 'irst of all, Daoism, li#e any philosophical or intellectual movement in the West such as (omanticism or )*istentialism, consists of a variety of writers and philosophers focusing on similar themes and paradigms. +mong those, however, the most important wor#s should be attributed to "ao zu and !huang zu. +lthough I believe that !huang zu&s writings can be more closely ,u*taposed and relatable to Wittgensteinian conceptions on language, "ao significant precursor to !huang language. +ccording to "ao zu, $ he Dao that can be named is not the eternal and unchanging Dao.% Dao, directly translated as the Way, could be easier to understand as the way ultimate nature-reality is zu&s ao e !hing which is the

zu&s wor#s already consists of similar themes on the usage of

or wor#s. It should be obvious that the insufficiency of language to describe something that we, e*cept from those sages who understand the Dao, are not immediately aware of or are not used to describing. It is similar to e*plaining what the colors are to a person who has been blind since birth, and the blind person will hardly understand what it means to see a color or have a color li#e normal people do. 'urthermore, the Dao is $described% as $the 'orm of the 'ormless%, $ he +ppearance of the Invisible% in such parado*ical terms since all we can say is that the Dao has only unspea#able qualities . .o matter how hard we try using our language, we will end up with empty descriptions such as formless, invisible, intangible, clueless, unspea#able, nameless. herefore, for one who understands the Dao, the best course of action is not to describe it at all as one understands it beyond the conventions and the names used in language. Wittgenstein, in his earlier wor#, ratatus "ogico /hilosophicus 0 "/1, also warned us to stay silent about things that we cannot or we should not describe using our language and logic. He claimed that propositions of logic, tautologies and contradictions can neither be true or false as we have no other rules to determine their truth-values, and therefore, $senseless%, which means they do not describe anything or have any truth-value that we can assess using the e*isting rules. He also distinguished propositions that are devoid of meanings or true descriptions. )*amples include metaphysical, religious, ethical and aesthetic claims which asserts beyond the propositions of logic and what is in the world and accordingly, these are $nonsensical% as they fail to convey any truth-value about the world. herefore, Wittgenstein claimed that $What we cannot spea# about, we must pass over in silence.% )arlier Wittgenstein in "/ admits that even though those metaphysical, religious, ethical and aesthetic claims cannot be described using correct rules of language and propositions of logic, they could however be shown in a different non-cognitive system. herefore, Wittgensteinian $sense% does not necessarily translate to having meaning or being meaningful, and therefore, something without sense could still have meaning. he problem is rather pointed to the universal insufficiency of language

to accommodate those non-factual propositions. When we attempt to ma#e sense of those non-factual propositions and assess their truth-value, we fail because they have none. 2taying silent, for Wittgenstein, therefore should be the goal of philosophy and he recommended that future philosophers should abstain from going beyond this boundary between spea#able and unspea#able and such #nowledge should be the goal of philosophy. 3oth Wittgenstein and "ao zu suggested if one wants to understand something beyond

language, one must discard the language itself in the process of realizing it rather than trying to invent new terms and concepts which further complicates the sub,ect and creating more $nonsensical% in our language. "ao zu claimed that $those who are s#illed in the Dao do not dispute about it, and those who dispute are not s#illed in it. hose who #now the Dao are not e*tensively learned, and the

e*tensively learned do not #now it.% "earning, presumably, communicating through the use of language cannot promote the understanding of the Dao. 4n the other hand, Wittgenstein asserted that the goal of philosophy should be #nowing this boundary, and we should avoid overe*tending beyond it, but still realize that there are things ine*pressible beyond this boundary. "ao zu claimed, $ He who devotes
himself to learning see#s from day to day to increase his #nowledge. He who devotes himself to the ao see#s from day to day to diminish his doing. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, until he arrives at doing nothing on purpose.% 5nsurprisingly, ,ust as much as Wittgensteinian conception is regarded as

anti-philosophical by many philosophers of his day, aoist approach features as a non-intellectual or even as an anti-intellectual movement to the rival schools during the respective era. Despite the significant difference in one stopping at the boundary0as he cannot conceive an alternative given his bac#ground in the western traditions and therefore claimed that $the limits of my language mean the limits of my world1 and the other marching beyond it with a different approach other than ordinary language, we have two very similar systems of thin#ing concerning the verbally ine*pressible Dao and non-logical $nonsensical%. 3oth aoist and Wittgensteinian thoughts did not conclude at the inadequacy of language and

recommending silence but further developed as in the former by !huang zu0! 1, and in the latter, by Wittgenstein himself, in /hilosophical Investigations0/I1 three decades after "/. 3efore we e*plored the issues of language and #nowledge in ! and /I, it should be noted that these boo#s were written in very similar styles which include lots of parables, anecdotes, rhetorical questions, short passages, and short sentences, which will become apparent as I e*plain some of their important concepts. 'irst, ! has an interesting passage related to the words and their meanings. ! said, $ he fish trap e*ists because of the fish6 once you7ve gotten the fish, you can forget the trap. he rabbit snare e*ists because of the rabbit6 once you7ve gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once youve gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him8% his strongly conveys the message that words are only for their use in reaching the meaning. 'or e*ample, the word $coin% encompasses a combination of certain shapes, materials, te*tures, its uses in our society etc. 4nce we coin the term as we give it some meaning, all we have is this combination of qualities represented by certain alphabets and certain sounds. ! seemed to have a negative view toward the use of words in language as he is suggesting to get rid or to overcome them. ! continues to maintain the concept of the ine*pressible Dao as "ao zu has previously

asserted, but additionally, attempts to play around with words, logic and language in conveying the message of the Dao rather than merely being silent or discarding language and communicating or philosophizing in a non-verbal way. It is not a coincidence that one of the core principles of ! is the e*position that opposites are identical, an evident violation of fundamental logical principles. 3ut of course, as we shall see, ! is not claiming within the boundary of our usual language, but rather

delving into the area of $nonsensical% as Wittgenstein would put it. he following passage in ! would reveal how we can recognize the ine*pressible Dao. $.othing in the world is bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and 9ount &ai is small6 no one lives longer than a doomed child, and /&engtsu died

young6 heaven and earth are born together with me, and the myriad things and I are one.% +pparently,

none of which is a true description of the state of affairs in the world, and ! does not mean these to be true literally. hen the question is what these sentences actually mean, and some people would answer in many different ways. 2ome would relate to metaphysical assertions in other systems, and many would say these are all various representations of the claim that opposites are identical. 5ltimately, whenever ! tried to convey something about the ine*pressible Dao, it turns out that we can barely and vaguely understand it e*cept that it cannot be ta#en literally, and so are most religious and metaphysical assertions. We have to distort the language and possibly logic first to describe something indescribable and even then, I do not thin# that we understand what these lines really mean as much as we understand $it is raining% or $:im is si* feet tall% since such an understanding relies on the language we use. o further clarify the idea that opposites are identical, ! claims that the reality could be

interpreted from different perspectives using the /arable of the 9on#eys. + mon#ey #eeper said to the mon#ey to give them three in the morning and four in the evening, which angered the mon#eys. 2o, the #eeper $changed% the proposal and said that he would give four in the morning and three in the evening, but this time, the mon#eys were pleased. 0possibly because that was what they had in mind in the first place1. herefore, according to ! , the moral of the story is that we often fail to recognize that states of affairs what we thin# are or what our language suggests different are actually not so different at all. +lso, more importantly, conflicting claims are often meaning the same thing, and thus, a wise person would never be worried about reconciling or reaching to an agreement of those claims because he understands that these are all relative interpretations of the same thing. "ater Wittgenstein in /I has many similar claims to those in ! in addition to the similar

writing style. 'irst of all, for the later Wittgenstein, the question $what is a word really8 is analogous to $What is a piece in chess8% ;ery similar to ! , he believes that words are only for their uses in practice. Words have 0or should have1 their correspondents, either action or states or ob,ects in the real world which we can point to. 9ost famously, he compared language to games and hence, he comes up

with the term $language-games% 0which include reporting an event, acting, ,o#ing, than#ing, as#ing and so on1. In essence, learning language is analogous to learning a game. In learning chess, all we learn is how to use pieces with different names in different ways according to the rules. When we say something that does not fit into the laws of language and therefore, have no use, we fail to understand each other. 'urthermore, Wittgenstein claimed that we cannot give a definite and complete definition of words, for e*ample, the word $game% and therefore, it is impossible to say what what the meanings of words in words even though we seem to understand them through the ways they are used. However, Wittgenstein warned us that $philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.% What he means by that is that we face unanswerable or confusing problems and parado*es, specifically in philosophy, when we tend to twist the respective rules of language already in place as agreed by the group of people practicing the language. herefore, Wittgenstein claimed that

$/hilosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.% We again see the similarity of re,ecting the use of verbal words to identify things outside of our language. :st as ! recommended not to complicate the e*isting language to describe the Dao, Wittgenstein in /I

claimed that $It is not our I am to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. 'or the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. 3ut this imply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.% /I, among other things, tries to tell us that we often use words in ways that easily manipulate us to get lost in our contemplation. We still use those words even though we do not really understand those words and many of the philosophical problems are based on those words. Wittgenstein said,$In our failure to understand the use of a word we ta#e it as the e*pression of a queer process. 0+s we thin# of time as a queer medium, of the mind as a queer #ind of being.1% ime, in the sense of $indefinite% duration, , or the mind, in the sense of $non-physical% form, escapes from our immediate e*periences and we fail to understand them. If what we mean by mind is the collection of my individual sensations, individuals thoughts, and individual desires, then, we should not have a problem using the term. 3ut,

what we li#e to call the mind is something more than a bundle, and a thing which we cannot describe in any verbal and simple way, we either invent new words which does not fit in our language properly or we misuse the e*isting words in improper ways according to the language, and we have the problem of dualism or monism or other metaphysical theories. his is e*actly what ! was also warning against. We should not distort the language to understand something beyond the scope of language, which will only result in further confusions. We could also see another similarity between ! and /I in that even though both try to claim not to ma#e confusions in the language, both somehow still play with the words in the way which in my opinion, seems to be against that very doctrine of their own. In ! , we saw claims involving contradictory elements according to the e*isting language. In /I, some of the e*amples are a little better understandable. 'or e*ample, Wittgenstein said, % here is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long, nor that it is not one meter long, and that is the standard meter in /aris.% 4ne might be inclined to say that the standard meter is actually one meter long, but our very definition of one meter is comparing with the standard meter. herefore, it does not fit with our definition to say that the standard meter is one meter, but on the other hand as well, we cannot say the standard meter is not one meter. )ssentially, it stands at the boundary of the definition of one meter and thus, we fail to assess whether it is one meter or not, and possibly, violating the law of e*cluded-middle. his e*ample

signifies why Wittgenstein&s writings are more sophisticated and valuable than those of Daoist sages. +ll Daoist sages could say are contradictory sentences which a non-Daoist would fail to understand no matter how hard he tries in a strictly scholastic way. In contrast, /I is filled with e*amples which, on the border of logic and language, could help us who are $trapped% inside the language barrier, to understand a little better within the framewor# of language. 3ut from another point of view, Daoists are far bolder at ma#ing $deeper% claims that Wittgenstein would want to say but cannot bring himself to say them as he was being meticulous about this language barrier. +nother interesting line of thought involving the comparison between languages and

games Wittgenstein&s /I which can be related to the Daoist doctrine $4pposites are equal% is his question of as#ing what it means to follow the rule. He gives the description of two people $playing chess% by yelling or stamping of feet, which are $translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess.% 2o the question he as#s is , $2hould we still be inclined to say they were playing a game8 What right would one have to say so8 his was our parado*< no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. he answer was< if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. +nd so there would be neither accord nor conflict there.% 'or me, this view that there is no ob,ective way of following the rules of language seems to agree with Daoist statements of opposites are equal and it is only our conventions in language that deters us from seeing that there is indeed no universal, ob,ective method of interpreting things outside the framewor# of our language. Wittgenstein again tries to tell us that $language is a labyrinth of paths. =ou approach from one side and #now your way about6 you approach the same place from another side and no longer #now your way about.% his reminds us of the different and contradictory ways of tal#ing about reality in many eastern mystic systems of thoughts including Hinduism, 3uddhism and Daoism. + Daoist would not argue against other ways of tal#ing about reality because they are, in fact, leading to the same destination. Daoists brought up the limits of language and verbal #nowledge, and asserted non-verbal way0s1 of realizing thing-in-itself, or the nonsensical, or, they would prefer to call, the ine*pressible Dao. hese words are neither referring to the same thing nor different things as ordinary meanings of $sameness% and $differentness%> does not apply out there. herefore, the Daoist principle that $opposite things are identical% is rather a misuse of terms and should be get rid of as non-sense from the verbal language once we realize what the idea behind those words are. Wittgenstein was more diligent in phrasing his words, but his doctrine of silence is only the first step. .ow is the time to as# the question that I raised in the introduction. !an we really compare >.Why is this not a proper word while its meaning as I use it seems to different from $difference%81

those two systems of thoughts from different languages8 he answer is neither yes nor no. 4nly within the framewor# of a particular language 0such as the )nglish language that I am using1, a comparison can be possible. I tried to e*plain what it is meant by the Dao based on the translations available, but how can we say that a Daoist would agree with a particular translation of Daoism8 2urely, for a nonDaoist, the word Dao means something different from what the real Daoists have in mind or even those real Daoists might have different meanings for each of them since verbal communication is infeasible. 4r, what about Wittgenstein concerning translating his ?erman writings into )nglish or other languages8 he word $incommensurable% is applicable here because such a comparison li#e my very comparison between Daoism and Wittgenstein is erroneous but not purposeless. I thin# my interpretations of the two systems of thoughts would be helpful to the readers to formulate their own interpretations on the issue of language and logic. However, I hereby warn the readers to be very cautious in the process, and to recognize that this comparison is inherently flawed.

3ibliography

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heories of Hinduism,