FAQ ABOUT ADMINISTRATION OF THE BEADS TASK

1. What is the beads task?

The beads task (Phillips and Edwards, 1966) is an experimental task designed
to examine individuals reasoning style under conditions of uncertainty. It is
based on a Bayesian model of probabilistic reasoning. It was first used in
psychosis research by Garety and colleagues (Huq et al., 1988; Garety et al.,
1991). It has since been widely used in studies of people with psychosis and
delusions and has been shown to demonstrate a jumping to conclusions (JTC)
reasoning style, i.e. a tendency to make decisions hastily based on insufficient
information (see Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et al., 2007; Freeman 2007 for
reviews). Using the beads task (or variants of the task), a robust JTC bias has
been shown in individuals with active delusions (e.g Garety et al., 1991; Menon et
al., 2006; Peters & Garety, 2006; Garety et al., 2005), in people at risk for
psychosis (Broome et al., 2007), in people scoring highly on delusional ideation
scales (Colbert & Peters, 2002; Linney et al., 1998; Moritz & Woodward, 2005;
Van Dael et al., 2006; Warman & Martin, 2006) and in people who have remitted
from delusions (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Peters & Garety, 2006).
2. Is there a standard procedure of the beads task?
In the original version of the beads task as used in psychosis research (Garety
et al., 1991, 2005; Huq et al., 1988), individuals are presented with two jars each
containing 100 coloured beads. There are 85 beads of one colour (e.g. black) and
15 beads of another (e.g. yellow) in one jar, while the other jar contains beads in
opposite proportions (i.e. 15 black and 85 yellow). The jars will then be removed
from view. Upon request from the participant, beads will be presented, one at a
time, from just one of the jars in a predetermined order. Participants can view as
many beads as they want until they are certain from which jar the beads are
drawn. In a harder version of the task, a colour ratio of 60:40 instead of 85:15
may be used (Dudley et al., 1997a). While the 85:15 version is simple and maybe
more suitable for assessing patients with poor concentration, there may be little
variation across well functioning groups in performance. On the other hand, more
difficult versions of the task may be more effective in discriminating differences
between groups with attenuated biases, such as at risk groups. The task can be
presented using real beads in a jar or administered on a computer. However,
showing the actual jars will facilitate task comprehension when computerised
administration is used.
Instead of coloured beads in the jars, considered to be abstract and neutral
materials, variants of the beads task have been developed using more ecological
materials, such as fish in 2 lakes (Woodward et al., 2008) or children from 2
schools (Dudley et al., 1997b), and self-referent or emotionally salient materials,
such as words from 2 surveys about a person (Dudley et al., 1997b) or about the
participant him/herself (Warman et al., 2007). There is evidence that performance
differs when proportions (e.g. 85:15 vs. 60:40) vary (i.e. groups take account of
the changed task demands), but performance on different variants of the task is
highly correlated.

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3. How to score the beads task performance?

Two experimental conditions have been commonly used in the beads task. In
the draws to decision (DTD) condition, participants request as many beads as
they deem necessary to decide from which jar the beads are being drawn. The
task is terminated once a decision has been made. The number of beads requested
before making a decision is recorded. This can be scored as mean number of
beads or dichotomised into JTC/ not JTC with two beads or fewer classified as a
JTC response (Garety et al., 2005). The DTD condition which measures data
gathering has yielded most consistent results in showing differences between
people with delusions or delusional ideation and other groups (Fine et al., 2007).
In the probabilistic estimation condition, the number of beads presented is
predetermined by the experimenter. In this case, participants are asked, after each
bead draw, how certain they are that the beads are being drawn from a particular
jar. The variables of interest are the number of draws required to reach a high
level of certainty, and/or the mean level of certainty on the early trials of the task.
4. Is it helpful to include a memory aid in beads task?
In the computerised version of the beads task used by Dudley et al (1997a),
the beads that were drawn were left visible to the participant during some trials,
but this memory aid was found to have no impact on test performance.
Nevertheless, since there is some evidence that JTC is related to memory and task
demands (Menon et al., 2006; Garety et al., 2009; Broome et al., 2007), using a
memory-aided condition may reduce effects of memory deficits, though this has
not been formally demonstrated.
5. Is there a practice effect for repeated testing using the beads task?
Some studies have found that participants draw fewer beads in repeated
testing, which has been attributed to a practice effect of the task (Peters & Garety,
2006; Woodward et al., 2008; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). However, in one
study, with a group recovering from acute psychosis, the opposite has also been
shown and beads performance improved with recovery (Menon et al., 2008).

Computerised versions of the task have been developed by Robert Dudley and
amended by Philippa Garety and Daniel Freeman, and are available for use with
permission and free of charge. Please cite the following reference if these
computerised versions are used:
Garety, P. A., Freeman, D., Jolley, S., Dunn, G., Bebbington, P. E., Fowler, D. G.
et al. (2005). Reasoning, Emotions, and Delusional Conviction in Psychosis.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114, 373-384.

[Fact sheet prepared by Suzanne So and Philippa Garety Sept 2009]

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Reference List
Broome, M. R., Johns, L. C., Valli, I., Woolley, J. B., Tabraham, P., Brett, C. et al. (2007).
People with an At Risk Mental State jump to conclusions. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 191, s38-s42.
Colbert, S. M. & Peters, E. R. (2002). Need for closure and jumping-to-conclusions in
delusion-prone individuals. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 190, 27-31.
Dudley, R. E., John, C. H., Young, A. W., & Over, D. E. (1997a). Normal and abnormal
reasoning in people with delusions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36, 243258.
Dudley, R. E. J., John, C. H., Young, A. W., & Over, D. E. (1997b). The effect of selfreferent material on the reasoning of people with delusions. British Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 36, 575-584.
Fine, C., Gardner, M., Craigie, J., & Gold, I. (2007). Hopping, skipping or jumping to
conclusions? Clarifying the role of the JTC bias in delusions. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 12, 46-77.
Freeman, D. (2007). Suspicious minds: The psychology of persecutory delusions. Clinical
Psychology Review, 27(4), 425-457.
Garety, P. A., Hemsley, D. R., & Wessely, S. (1991). Reasoning in deluded schizophrenic and
paranoid patients: Biases in performance on a probabilistic inference task. Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease, 179, 194-201.
Garety, P. A. & Freeman, D. (1999). Cognitive approaches to delusions: A critical review of
theories and evidence. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 113-154.
Garety, P. A., Freeman, D., Jolley, S., Dunn, G., Bebbington, P. E., Fowler, D. G. et al.
(2005). Reasoning, Emotions, and Delusional Conviction in Psychosis. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 114, 373-384.
Garety, P. A., Ross, K., Greenwood, K., & Freeman, D. (2009). Neuropsychological
functioning and jumping to conclusions in delusions. Ref Type: Unpublished Work
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988). Probabilistic judgements in deluded and
non-deluded subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A, 40, 801-812.
Linney, Y. M., Peters, E. R., & Ayton, P. (1998). Reasoning biases in delusion-prone
individuals. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 37, 285-302.
Menon, M., Pomarol-Clotet, E., McKenna, P. J., & McCarthy, R. A. (2006). Probabilistic
reasoning in schizophrenia: a comparison of the performance of deluded and
nondeluded schizophrenic patients and exploration of possible cognitive
underpinnings. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 11, 521-536.
Menon, M., Mizrahi, R., & Kapur, S. (2008). 'Jumping to conclusions' and delusions in
psychosis: Relationship and response to treatment. Schizophrenia Research, 98, 225231.

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Moritz, S. & Woodward, T. S. (2005). Jumping to conclusions in delusional and nondelusional schizophrenic patients. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 193207.
Peters, E. & Garety, P. (2006). Cognitive functioning in delusions: A longitudinal analysis.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, 481-514.
Phillips, L. D. & Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in a simple probability inference task.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72(3), 346-354.
Van Dael, F., Versmissen, D., Janssen, I., Myin-Germeys, I., van Os, J., & Krabbendam, L.
(2006). Data gathering: Biased in psychosis? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, 341-351.
Warman, D. M., Lysaker, P. H., Martin, J. M., Davis, L., & Haudenschield, S. L. (2007).
Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of delusional beliefs. Behaviour Research
& Therapy, 45, 1255-1269.
Warman, D. M. & Martin, J. M. (2006). Jumping to conclusions and delusion proneness: the
impact of emotionally salient stimuli. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 194,
760-765.
Woodward, T. S., Munz, M., LeClerc, C., & Lecomte, T. Change in delusions is associated
with change in "jumping to conclusions". Psychiatry Research, (in press).

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