Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism

Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism Author(s): Joshua Foa Dienstag Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review
Vol. 95, No. 4 December2001
Pessimism Nietzsche's Dionysian JOSHUA FOA DIENSTAG Universityof Virginia
As
to be too deterministic is oftenassumed or self-contradictory to a system of thought, pessimism use of the term"Dionysian I examine Nietzsche's withstand to describe pessimism" seriousscrutiny. Nietzschewas quite criticalof the his own philosophyin orderto challengethesepresumptions. his but he in nonetheless considered his own workto be a kind of popular day, pessimistic philosophers butas a philosophical one. Nietzsche's characterization pessimism,whichhe meantnot as a psychological on life that can draw sustenance,ratherthan recoil,from the Dionysianpessimismis a perspective disenchanted world advocated Whereas disordered, leftto us afterthedemiseof metaphysics. Schopenhauer Nietzsche that a maintained new could be the resignation, ground for activity found apart from narratives is an answer to thosewhocharacterize Nietzsche's Dionysian of reasonandprogress. pessimism philosophy, andpessimismmoregenerally, as passiveor suicidalmodesof thought.
ical thought possible (Koselleck 1985; Pocock 1975). Although this new sense of time did not, of course, produce a philosophy by itself, it did provide an intellectual structure that allowednew ideas underlying to be built atop it, and it made those ideas feel more plausiblewhen once proposed.It has been said many s it possibleto drawa positiveconclusion from times that the idea of progressis somethingmodem. to this platitude,2 pessimism,or is suchan attitudesimplya confusion One could offer manyqualifications but I will its in terms?It is often maintained or a contradiction accept generalvalidityand simplypoint out that the change in European time-consciousness that pessimismcannotbe taken seriouslyas a philosodid not authorize because it leads that it leads to only the idea of progress.Pessimism, is, nowhere, phy of is one its the hidden twin of progress too, or One could that the progeny, hopelessness resignation.1 reply consequencesof a philosophycannotaffectits truthor in modem politicalthought. Whatis surprising in standard intellectual historiesis falsehood.We cannotrejectpessimismbecausewe do not like where it takes us. On the contrary, we should how rapidlythe idea of linearityis assimilatedto the idea of progress,as if progressand stasis are the only be on guardagainstany tendencyto suppressa line of two choicesavailableto politicalphilosophy. The word its because conclusion us. the Yet, thought repels eminentlylogical qualityof this reply may deflect our pessimismcame into widespreaduse only in the nineteenth century, but it clearly names a persistent attention from another and more satisfyingsort of that in one defends as thought or set of thoughtsthat has recurredoften in response, pessimism particular social and politicaltheory since the Enlightenment in to We must opposed disagreeablethoughtsgenerally. tandem with its opposite.Both termsappearonly after not simplygrantthat pessimismleads to a posture of The epigraphfromNietzschesuggeststhat the thoughtsthey reflect are alreadyin play. Leibniz resignation. as a correlateto "maximum" and another result from pessimismis possible or, indeed, firstused "optimum" in his Theodiceeof 1710 (1985). French "minimum" that there is anothersort of pessimismaltogether,the conclusionsof whichdo not lead inevitably to despair. writers then began to refer to his doctrine as one of Like the idea of progressand the various philoso- optimisme.The term apparentlycrosses into English of Voltaire's ou l'Optimisme Candide phies to which it gave rise, pessimism is a modern with the popularity of 1759 As historians have the (1992). noted, phenomenon. many The firstknownprintedappearance of "pessimism" linear sense of historical time that emerged in the in Englishfollowed a few decades later, althoughthe early-modern period made entirelynew sorts of politcontext seems to indicatethat the termwas alreadyin use.3Philosophically, however,the emergenceof pesJoshua Foa Dienstag is Associate Professorand Associate Chair, simism be dated to 1750 (1964) and the appearmay and ForeignAffairs,P.O. Box 400787, Departmentof Government Discourse on theArtsand Sciences, VA, 22904-4787(jfdienstag ance of Rousseau's Universityof Virginia,Charlottesville, with its characterization of modem man as a moral @virginia.edu). Earlier versions were presented at the annual meeting of the degenerate. Rousseau's ideas were seconded, in the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationand the PrincetonPolitical nineteenthcentury,in such works as Leopardi's early I thankall the respondents andparticipants Philosophy Colloquium.
at those occasions for theirhelpfulcomments. Thanks are also due to Matthew Goldfeder, Amy Gutmann, George Kateb, Jennifer Alexander Mnookin, Nehamas,Bernard Reginster,and the referees and editorof thisjournalfor theirresponsesto variousdrafts.I also thank the Universityof Virginiaand Northwestern Universityfor researchsupportthat made the writingpossible. I See, for example,Bertrand Russell's(1945, 753-9) brief dismissal of Schopenhauer. The most commonqualification is the claimthat moderntheories of progressare merely a secularizedversion of earlier Christian theologiesof hope. The classictext is L6with1949. This argument has met with strong criticismsfrom, among others, Blumenberg (1983) and Pocock(1975).AlthoughI cannotaddressthis debatein detail, I shouldnote that I find these criticisms largelypersuasive.
2
kindof Thattherestill couldbe an altogether different andvisionbelongs to me pessimism,...thispremonition from me, as my proprium and ipsissias inseparable of thefuture-forit comes! mum.... I callthispessimism I see it coming!-Dionysian pessimism. -The GayScience
See pessimism in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary.
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Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism
December2001
MoralEssays([1827] 1983),but pessimismachievedits pessimismof both Hartmannand Schopenhauerled of this briefperiodof genuinepopularity throughthe workof directlyto nihilism.Indeed,the very popularity went form of pessimismin the late nineteenthcenturywas whose Parerga and Paralipomena Schopenhauer, one reason Nietzsche believed nihilism would soon through many editions after its initial publicationin dominanceof Europeansociety. 1851 (1942). Thereafter,although never a dominant enjoy a temporary Intermixed with his critique,however,is an account school in politicaltheory,pessimismwas a well-recognized positionfor at least severalgenerations.4 of anotherkind of pessimism.Nietzscheviewed it as distinct from the popular one and called it "that Whatshouldbe clear,even fromthis briefhistory,is viewedas a theoryrather courageouspessimismthat is ... the wayto 'myself,'to was originally that pessimism than (as we often think of it today) a psychological my task"(AOM,Preface,4). Thisalternative grewboth of the pre-Socratic Greeks(as he disposition.Rousseau'scomplicatedstory of material fromthe "pessimism" and from Schopendevelopment coincidingwith ethical devolution, for called it in The Birthof Tragedy) human but a deal of hauer's Nietzsche contained sharply psychology philosophy, great distinguished example, and betweenwhathe frequently called"mypessimism" but neither implied nor was meant to engender a those that precededit. Ultimately,he gave his alternadepressiveoutlook. With Schopenhauer,the story is more complicated.As the author of such lines as "If tive the name "Dionysian pessimism" (GS 370).7What the immediate and direct purpose of our life is not exactlyNietzschemeant by this term and what appeal it may still have is the aim of this essay to discover.In sufferingthen our existenceis the most ill-adaptedto since Nietzits purposein the world"(Schopenhauer 1970,41), he part, this is a projectof disentanglement, without from materialpur- sche made many references to "pessimism" indeed recommendedwithdrawal suits. But his reasonsfor doing so were largelymeta- alwaysindicatingwhich varietyhe was talkingabout. would Whenthese referencesareviewedas a whole,however, and he expectedthat sucha withdrawal physical, In any case, it is our clear patterns begin to emerge. Indeed, Nietzsche sharplylimit humanunhappiness. "theunclearword," posi- speaksof manytypesof pessimism, very moderntendencyto projecta philosophical tion onto people who are simplydepressedthat leads only one of which he can embrace(KGW8.1.129;see us to confuse philosophicalwith psychologicalpessi- WP 38). mism. The question of the implicationsof pessimism "Pessimism," by itself, is not a very specificterm to cannot be settled by studyingthe effects of unhappi- Nietzsche, and this is not surprising.The late nineness;they need to be addressedat the theoreticallevel teenth centurywas the one period in whichpessimism if not allegiance,in popuat which they arose.5Happinessand unhappinessare enjoyedwide respectability, The termwas used by universal phenomena, whereas pessimism, like the lar and intellectualdiscussions.8 theoriesof progressto whichit is opposed,is a modern and applied to a wide spectrum of authors in an indiscriminateway. Nietzsche's notes in the 1880s idea. Nietzsche'srelationshipto the pessimistswho pre- contain severallists of the varioustypes of pessimism. Whetherhe composedthese lists simplyto distinguish ceded him was hardlyone of uniformcelebration.He called Rousseau a "moral tarantula,"and although amongthe possiblevarietiesor becausehe plannedto writeaboutthemin sequenceis unclear.One list reads, initially inspired by Schopenhauer'sphilosophy, he eventuallydissociatedhimselffrom its systematiccon- in part: "Russian pessimism. Tolstoi, Dostoevsky / / roclusions (but retaineda respect for its criticalspirit). aesthetic pessimisml'art pour l'art 'description' Nietzschewas also unkindtowardthe pessimistspop- mantic and antiromantic pessimism/ epistemological "Phenomenalism." / anarular in the Germanyof his day, especiallyEduardvon pessimism./ Schopenhauer. who held the chairof philosophyin Berlin; chistic pessimism,"and so on, down to an entry for Hartmann, whichNietzscheidentifieswith Nietzsche called him "completely abysmal" (BGE "moralistic pessimism," himself that the believed As Nietzsche discussed below, (KGW8.2.73-4).9 204).6 Nietzsche did not address all these varieties of
von Hartmann and are Eduard In the nineteenth examples century, then HyppoliteTaine; in the twentieth,Weber, Adorno, Camus, a bit permitsa much Cioran,and so on. Relaxingone's definitions such figuresas Freud,Heidegger,Unamuno, longer list (including I cannottakeup herethe questionof the to be generated. andSartre) of pessimistic A simpledefinition might thinking. properboundaries but who reject be: those who acceptmodem notionsof temporality sectionbelow. the idea of progress.See the "GreekPessimism" fromattributing 5 Thishas not stoppedinterpreters Schopenhauer's childhood. See the introducfor example,to an unhappy pessimism, to Schopenhauer 1970. tion by Hollingdale 6 Nietzsche referenceswill use the followingsystem:AC = The and Maxims(1986); Anti-Christ (1968);AOM = AssortedOpinions BGE = BeyondGoodand Evil (1966a);BT = TheBirthof Tragedy
4
Human, All-too-Human(1986); GS = The Gay Science (1974); in the GM = On theGenealogy of Morals (1967a);PTG = Philosophy (1966b); Age of Greeks(1962);Z = ThusSpokeZarathustra Tragic Meditations TI = Twilight of the Idols (1967a); UM = Untimely (1984); and WP = The Willto Power (1967c). Numbersrefer to
(1967b); D = Daybreak (1982); EH = Ecce Homo (1967a); HH =
sectionsor, if therearenone,to pagenumbers Nietzsche's numbered For KGW= Werke: Kritische in the editionslistedin the references. Gesamtausgabe (1967d),numbersrefer to volume,book, and page. All translations fromthis last are my own responsibility, althoughI whenthese versions often drawon those in WP and otherpublished exist.All emphasesare originalunlessotherwisenoted. 7 Nietzschealso occasionally spoke of "the pessimismof strength" (KGW8.2.133),which,as we shall see, has a parallelbut not quite identicalmeaning. 8 One interesting accountof this, with manyuseful citationsto the literature, appearsin Dale 1989,chaps.9-10. contemporary to Power as "aphorism" 9 A versionof thisjottingappearsin TheWill marksin orderto 82. The editorsinserteda varietyof punctuation clarifyand associatevariouslines with one another;all this punctuand some of it appearsmistaken(apartfrom ation is suppositional, involvedin pretendingthat a list is an the obvious awkwardness In Nietzsche's notebook,but not in WP,the note goes on aphorism). are to be considered to list othertopicsthatapparently related,such To the best of my as "nationalism / science." / industrial competition
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review pessimismin depth,butwhen he did considerthem, he was usually careful to distinguish them from their what they had in comrelatives.From his perspective, mon was theirpracticeof rejectionand denigration or, in his vocabulary,"no-saying."But the object and to Nietzmeans of no-sayingwere far more important itself.After anothersuchlist of sche thanthe negativity pessimisms ("of sensibility,..,.of 'unfree will',.., .of "Whatmustnot be doubt"),he sets out a clarification: confusedwith all this:pleasurein sayingNo and doing No out of a tremendousstrengthand tension derived from sayingYes... the Dionysianin will, spirit,taste" (WP 1020).Dionysianpessimism,then, althoughit too is a no-sayingand relatedto the others,is explicitly set off from them. For Nietzsche it is a philosophyof personal conduct,a suggestionof how to managethe humanconditionand cope with the basic problemsof existence.Farfrombeinga psychological it disposition, is a set of practices intended to guide an individual world in which throughthe chaotic and disenchanted we find ourselves. A great deal has been writtenon the "artof living" that Nietzsche prescribesas a kind of substitutefor ethics.10 This literaturepoints us in the rightdirection but misses somethingcrucialby ignoringNietzsche's self-characterization as a kind of pessimist.The implications of that label will be exploredbelow, but they can be prefacedas follows:Pessimismhas a particular of the burdensof the humancondition understanding that these interpretershave not fully acknowledged. For Nietzsche, the time-boundcharacterof our existence forms the basic problematic(and sets limits to the possibilities)of anylife-practice that he can recommend. Nietzsche'sDionysianpessimismis a crystallization of ideasthat takesplace relatively late in his philosophical growth,but the term had many precursorsin his earlier periods. It is best understoodby tracing the development of Nietzsche's thoughts on pessimism the processbywhichhe disentangled his and,relatedly, own thinkingfrom that of Schopenhauer.11 Nietzsche began by quoting Schopenhaueruncritically,but he ended by proclaiminghis views to be the opposite of
knowledge, Nietzsche does not refer to his own pessimism as "moralistic" elsewhere. 10 The phrase "art of living" is from Hadot (1995, 272), who used it as a description of the intended goal of ancient philosophy, "an exercise practiced at each instant." See also Nehamas (1985, 1998), who applies the phrase to Nietzsche, as well as Thiele 1992, Strong 1988, Rorty 1989, Orlie 1997, and Connolly 1991. Foucault (1986) credits Hadot for inspiring his Nietzschean search for "techniques of the self' in ancient texts, but Hadot (1995, 206-13) politely declines to equate his interpretation with that of Foucault. This whole strand of interpretation is strongly criticized by those who believe Nietzsche meant to offer philosophical truths (although very novel ones) in the traditional meaning of that term. See, e.g., Appel 1999, Berkowitz, Clark 1990, and Leiter 1994. I cannot address this controversy in any detail, but my interpretation demonstrates an affinity with (and perhaps presents further evidence for) the view of the first group. 11I cannot accept the view that Nietzsche's writings, from first to last, are all of a piece. In exploring the early writings, I attempt to identify themes that, although they have rivals at the time, later become dominant. I accept, in broad outline at least, the division of Nietzsche's work into an early, middle, and late period as proposed by Warren 1988.
Vol. 95, No. 4 Schopenhauer's,although he still called Dionysian WhileNietzscheis more pessimismhis "quintessence." often labeled a nihilist than a pessimist,the crime of or apathyis one he is often charged incitingresignation with along with such acknowledged pessimists as If this chargeturnsout to be false, then Schopenhauer. it mustchangeour opinionof both Nietzsche'spolitical theory and pessimismmore generally. Properly understood, pessimism is not simply an important element of Nietzsche's philosophy but a traditionwhose strengthand relevancehas been overlooked. In the righthands,pessimismcan be-and has been-an energizingand even a liberatingphilosophy. It does indeedaskus to limitandeliminatesome of our hopes and expectations,but it can also provide the means to navigatethe bounded universeit describes. An entire literature,both scholarly and popular, is devoted to blamingpessimismfor whateverspiritual crisisis thoughtto occupyus at the moment.12 Indeed, it is such a flexible term of abuse that it has readily been applied to almost every criticalsocial theory of the twentieth century.Existentialism,critical theory, and postmodernism are regularlylabeled pessimistic, as if doingso were enoughto discreditthem.The term is more appropriate in some of these cases thanothers, but some thought should be given to why the label functionsso well as a gesture of dismissal. Criticsoften mistakea depictionof the world for a choice about our future, as if philosophersrejoice at the decline or decay they describe. This is akin to who warnof globalwarming because deridingscientists their models give apocalyptic predictions.Is it sensible to assumethat the scientistswant their predictionsto come true? If the pessimistsare right, it is the world that threatensus, not the writerswho describeit. Yet, ratherthan addressthe threatsto happinessthat the worlddailyprovides,criticsof pessimismfocus instead on the bearersof ill tidingsand hope that,in dismissing them, they will eliminate the message as well. Yet, despitethe instantunpopularity they accrue,pessimists keep appearing-I suspect because the world keeps the bad news.Ratherthanblamepessimism, delivering perhapswe shouldstudyit. Ratherthan hide from the ugliness of the world, perhaps we should learn to withstandit. Nietzschetook it as his task to find a way to live with the conclusionsat which he had arrived, and to live well, sometimes even joyfully. One can debate the degree to which he succeeded,but understandinghis pessimismmust reorientour approachto all those pessimismsthat followed in his wake. GREEK PESSIMISM Nietzschefirstwroteof pessimismandits connectionto
the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy.Although it was
to applythe termto the ancient certainlyanachronistic Greeks (the word did not exist before the early nineteenth century),his use of it here explainsa great deal
12 Some recent representative titles are Enemies of Hope: A Critique of ContemporaryPessimism (Tallis 1999) and The Future and Its Enemies (Postrel 1998).
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Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism about its meaningin his later work.Its appearancein this earlyworkmaybe thoughtto be due principally to the influenceof Schopenhauer, but the Greekversion Nietzsche claims to identify is in many ways distinct fromSchopenhauer's.13 In retrospect, Nietzscherecognized this. In the "Attemptat a Self-Criticism," which he added to the book upon its republication,he lamentedthat he had "obscured and spoiledDionysian with premonitions Schopenhauerian formulations" (BT, "ASC,"6).14 But this retrospective judgmentdid not, as might be expected, lead him to alter the characterization of the pre-SocraticGreeks as pessimists. That was not the "Schopenhauerian formulation" he had in mind. Indeed, in the 1886 edition he added the subtitle "Hellenismand Pessimism"to the in his new introduction workandemphasized thatwhat he still approvedof in the book was its examination of "the good, severe will of the older Greeks to pessimism" and its contrastwith the "optimism" initiated aroundthe time of Socrates(BT, "ASC,"4). The mistakethat the new introductionidentifiesis the confusionof Greek pessimismwith the Schopenhauerianvariety.The Dionysianpessimismof which Nietzsche had a premonitionthroughhis exploration of the Greekswas obscuredat firstby his equationof it with Schopenhauer'sphilosophy. Later, the ancient Greekswere still viewed as pessimistsbut were simply anotherkind,as was Nietzschehimself.In TheBirthof in fact,we havean earlyversionof Nietzsche's Tragedy, own pessimism.Greek pessimismis not the same as or Nietzsche,but it is an instructhat of Schopenhauer tive model, both to Nietzsche,who called it "the only parableand parallelin historyfor my own innermost experience" 2), andto us in our attemptto (EH, "BT," to this term. understandhis later attachment explainnot only the appearanceof Greek tragedybut at least in its traditional also its disappearance, form, after Euripides.As is well known,Nietzsche hypothesizes that Socrates'introduction(and Plato's furtherance) of a rationalistic philosophydestroyedthe preexistingculturalgroundsfor Greektragedy(BT 12-5). Whatdid Socratesdestroy,and how was this possible? havethe power Why,in anycase, shoulda philosopher to affectthe theater?The answerlies in the pessimism that Nietzsche associateswith the pre-Socratic philosophers and his belief that their ideas reflected the is originalcharacterof early Greek culture."Tragedy
the outlet of mystic-pessimistic knowledge" (KGW 3.3.73). Pessimism was the philosophical basis for the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. This was the wisdom
13 That Schopenhauer strongly influenced Nietzsche is generally uncontested by scholars, but the degree and timing of that influence are matters of considerable debate. For example, Kaufmann (in Nietzsche 1967b, 60n.) believes Nietzsche had already "broken loose from Schopenhauer" in The Birth of Tragedy, whereas Nehamas (1985, 42) believes it is precisely on the issue of tragedy that "the influence of Schopenhauer became dominant." Janaway (1998, 22), in a judicious formulation, maintains that "the Schopenhauerian system hovers eerily in the background, unasserted but indispensable." My article cannot settle this debate but may make a useful contribution to it. 14 The Birth of Tragedywas published in 1872 and reissued in 1886.
December2001 that the pre-Socratics possessedand that later generations firstdenied, then forgot. Socratesis the agent of this change because his philosophyis essentiallyopti-
The task that The Birth of Tragedyset itself was to
mouslypublishedessaywrittenat aboutthe same time as TheBirth,he likens Anaximander to Schopenhauer and calls him "the first philosophicalauthor of the ancients."He goes on to describeAnaximander as a "truepessimist" andquoteshis onlyextantfragment to justifythe label:"Wherethe sourceof thingsis, to that to necessity, place they must also pass away,according for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices,in accordancewith the ordinanceof Time" The comparisonwith (PTG 4; see KGW 3.2.312).16 follows directlyin Nietzsche'stext and Schopenhauer emphasizesthe moralqualityin both of their philosoas thoughit were an phies;bothview "allcoming-to-be from eternalbeing, a wrong illegitimateemancipation for whichdestruction is the only penance"(PTG 4; see 1998, 122). As discussedbelow, Nietzsche Cartwright laterdistinguished betweenSchopenhauer's moralizing pessimismand that of the Greeks. In otherwords,the pre-Socratics, as Nietzscheinterpreted them, graspedthe animating principleof pessimism as I have describedit elsewhere(Dienstag1999, burdenfor humanbeings 85-6): Time is an unshakable because it leads to the ultimate destruction of all things-and this fate belies anyprincipleof orderthat may, on the surface, appear to guide the course of
events.'" Of course, whether any of the pre-Socratics would have put things this way is debatable (although Heraclitus, in particular, is certainly often understood
15 A parallel analysis, but without the emphasis on pessimism, is offered in Strong 1988, 152ff. 16 This is a translation of Nietzsche's German translation of the Greek original, which he slightly adapted to suit his own understanding. A standard English translation of the pre-Socratics renders Anaximander's fragment thus: "And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens 'according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time"' (Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 118). 17For an alternate account of pessimism see Pauen 1997. For some conceptual analysis, see Bailey 1988.
Philosophy in the TragicAge of the Greeks, a posthu-
In the periodin whichhe wrote TheBirth,Nietzsche did not thinkof optimismand pessimismas two equal, if opposite,ways of looking at the world, as we might ... is older and more original today;rather"pessimism than optimism"(KGW 4.1.208). Pessimismis the domain of the Ionian philosophers who preceded Socratesand whose teachingswe possess only in fragments. Instead of trying to construct a systematic, as Socratesand Platowere to do, orderingphilosophy, the pre-Socratics graspedthe chaotic and disordered natureof the worldand only attemptedto cope with it insofar as that was possible:"Pessimism is the consequence of knowledge of the absolute illogic of the world-order" (KGW 3.3.74). In some notes from this period, Nietzsche first attributesto Democritusthe doctrinethat "the world andcallsthis [is]withoutmoraland aestheticmeaning" idea "the pessimismof accidents"(KGW 3.4.151). In
mistic (BT 14).15
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review in this fashion). What is importantis that Nietzsche understoodthem to be doing so, that he understood the root of pessimismto be, as he later wrote, "timesickness[Zeit-Krankheit]" (KGW7.2.51). of Nietzscheconsideredtragedyto be the outgrowth this view of the world as somethingconstantlyin flux, constantlyin the process of becoming and, thus, conThe ravagesof time stantlyin the processof destroying. could not be cured or compensatedthroughtragedy, only understood:"Tragedy... is in its essence pessimistic. Existence is in itself somethingvery terrible, man somethingvery foolish"(KGW3.2.38).Nietzsche resists the conclusion, popular since Aristotle, that tragedyoffers some kind of purificationof the emotions generated by the terrible truths of the human condition (TI, "What I Owe," 5; WP 851). He also rejects the idea that tragedies contain some sort of moral lesson meant to instructus in ethical behavior. Instead,he argues,tragedysimplyservesto laybarefor us the horriblesituationof human existence that the pre-Socraticphilosophersdescribe, a situation from which our mindswould otherwiseflee: The hero of tragedydoes not prove himself.., .in a whathe fate,justas littledoeshe suffer struggle against deserves. blindandwithcovered Rather, head,he fallsto his ruin: andhis desolate butnobleburden withwhich he remains in thepresence of thiswell-known world standing of terrors pressesitselflike a thornin our soul (KGW 3.2.38). The tragic outlook is thus generated from a base of pessimisticknowledge.It recommendsno cure for the pains of existence, only a public recognitionof their depth and power. Fromthe beginning,too, this view is associatedwith the Dionysian,"the mother of the mysteries,tragedy, pessimism"(KGW 3.3.309).The Athenianpublictheatrical festivals were known as the Dionysia, and Nietzsche goes so far as to claim the existence of a tradition"that Greek tragedyin its earliest form had for its sole theme the sufferings of Dionysus" (BT 10).18 Dionysus,in Nietzsche'saccount(whichhere certainly accountof the humancondiparallelsSchopenhauer's suffers the prototypical agonies of existence tion), inflictedby time. He is severed from the eternal flux and individuated, then tornto pieces and reunitedwith the whole: This view of thingsalreadyprovidesus with all the elements of a profound andpessimistic viewof theworld, mental of the onenessof everything existent, knowledge theconception astheprimal of individuation cause of evil, andof artasthejoyous hopethatthespellof individuation
doctrineof tragedy: the fundatogether with the mystery
Vol. 95, No. 4 "Dionysianstate" of the chorus as a whole (BT 10). The chorus is "the mirror-image in which the Dionysian man contemplateshimself' and also "a vision of the Dionysian mass of spectators" (BT 8). Actor, chorus,andpublicare all connectedin tragedythrough their Dionysiancharacter (see Strong1988,165). Each is a fragmenttorn from the whole. Nietzsche is here but also reconstituting the traditional critiquing philological stance that the chorus represents the Greek attacksthe originalpropopublic.Althoughhe sharply nents of this view, he in fact proposes not to reject it but to modify it. What he truly dislikes about the associationin its originalform is the implicationthat the connection between Athenian performers and spectatorsis somehowreflectedin contemporary (i.e., nineteenth-century) relationshipsbetween artists and their public. He will only accept the connection of citizens and chorus on the condition that the Greek public is understood as a unique phenomenon, a thatis, as a publicalreadyinfected "Dionysian throng," with the pessimistic wisdom of the pre-Socratics.19 Because modern audiencesno longer share this outof the modernsto the Greeksare,to look, comparisons Nietzsche,specious. Against this accountof pessimismand tragedyas a kind of Dionysian wisdom, Nietzsche counterposes Socraticphilosophy,whose characteristic feature now appearsto be its optimism.20 Even while proclaiming its ignorance,Socratic inquiryrejects the pessimistic idea that inquiry, like every human activity,is ultimatelydoomed:"Forwho could mistakethe optimistic element in the nature of dialectic,which celebratesa triumphwith every conclusion..,.the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overgrowits Dionysianregionsand impel it necessarilyto self-destruction" (BT 14). Socratesdoes not promiseeternalhappiness,but he does affirm both that virtue resultsin happinessand that virtue can be withinthe graspof all taught;happinessis theoretically He is anythingultimately denies that there (BT 15).21 aboutlife or inevitableaboutsuffering: mysterious "By contrastwith this practicalpessimism,Socratesis the prototypeof the theoreticaloptimistwho, withhis faith that the natureof things can be fathomed,ascribesto
19 Nietzsche identifies A.W. Schlegel as the originator of the other view; although he proclaims that he gives Schlegel's formulation "a deeper sense," he certainly also exaggerates his own distance from contemporary German thought about the Greeks. 20 My brief account of tragedy obviously underplays the role of the Apollonian as a contrast to the Dionysian. I do not suggest that the Apollonian is unimportant in The Birth. In the context of this discussion, however, it is less salient, since it is the Dionysian element of tragedy that is particularly linked to pessimism, and that is the element to which Socrates is particularlysupposed to object: "This is the new opposition: the Dionysian and the Socratic" (BT 12). 21 Throughout The Birth of Tragedy,Nietzsche's characterizations of Socrates are given without reference to their source; here it seems clear that he has in mind the conclusions of Socrates in Plato's Gorgias, Protagoras, and Republic that true happiness can only come from virtue and that virtue is equivalent to knowledge. This picture is common enough, but it is far from the only one possible; an opposite view could perhaps be constructed from the Socrates of the Meno, who concludes that virtue cannot be taught.
may be brokenin auguryof a restoredoneness (BT 10).
is essentiallyhumansuffering. In Dionysiansuffering tragedy,this is indicatedby a connectionbetween the variouselementsinvolvedin the publicperformance of the drama. The tragic hero simply personifies the
18Nietzsche calls this tradition "undisputed," which seems doubtful. Again, however, the accuracy of his construal of the philological literature and traditions is less important than how these were related to his own views.
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Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism knowledgeand insight the power of a panacea"(BT Socrates'fate at the hands of his Notwithstanding fellow citizens, Nietzsche has no doubt that this approach,developed by Plato, was ultimatelyvictorious in its strugglewith tragedy: dialecticdrives "Optimistic musicout of tragedy with the scourgeof its syllogisms" (BT 14). Just as the pessimismof an older generation of Greeksexplainsthe originof tragedy, so the Socratic turnin Greekphilosophy explainsits demise.Whenthe population adopted the optimistic perspective, the cultural context for tragedy evaporated (see Strong 1988, 161). From Nietzsche's perspective, this was anythingbut a theoreticaladvance.Greek pessimism may havebeen somewhatsoporificin its consequences (see below), but it had a fundamentalhonesty that Socratic-Platonic philosophylacks. This point, in parto The in the laterintroduction ticular,is reemphasized Birth.Pessimismis today,as in Nietzsche'stime, commonly associatedwith ideas of culturaldecay, but he takes the Greek experienceto indicate preciselythe opposite: in Indiaandnowis, to all appearances, us, "modamong Isthere a pessimism menandEuropeans? ofstrength? ern" the dialectics, andcheerfulness of the morality, frugality, theoretical now? notthisverySocratism might man--how to be so scientific be a signof decline.... Is the resolve about a kind of fearof, anescape from, everything perhaps A subtle lastresort pessimism? against-truth (BT,"ASC," 1)? The Greeksof Socrates'generationcould no longer bear to live with the brutal truths of the human conditionand sought refuge in an optimisticphilosophy.To Nietzschethiswas "morally speaking,a sort of cowardice... amorallyspeaking,a ruse"(BT, "ASC," 1). Either way, it was an active self-deception that made life more tolerable but less genuine. It was a retreat from a real look at the abyss to a pleasing fantasy of progress and happiness. Thus, Nietzsche concludes, the optimists are the true harbingersof culturaldecline.Whatelse can we call theirweakening with the stanceof the earlier of resolvein comparison Greeks? Nietzsche's attack on Socrates and Plato is often taken to be a defense of irrationalism, but from his perspectiveit is they who retreat from an honest
assessment of the world. The pessimistic vision of the world as fundamentally disordered, untamable, unfair, and destructive is the "truth" against which they close their eyes and retreat to a cave. If this was Greek pessimism, and if it was in some sense Dionysian, then what separates it from Nietzsche's own later pessimism? We are dealing here only with matters of degree, but the differences are real enough (a fuller answer will be given below). Ultimately, the "Dionysian man" of The Birth is likened by Nietzsche to Hamlet-both are paralyzed by the knowledge of "the eternal nature of things." Both, that is, have gained an understanding of the primordial chaos of the world, next to which their own efforts will of ... And again:thatof whichtragedy died,the Socratism Is pessimism a sign of decline... as it once was necessarily 15).
December2001 alwaysamountto nothing.Both, therefore,draw the conclusionthat actingis pointless: TheDionysian Hamlet: manresembles bothoncelooked knowtrulyinto the essenceof things, theyhavegained andnausea inhibits fortheiraction could not action; ledge, intheeternal nature of things; anything change theyfeelit to beridiculous orhumiliating thattheyshould be asked to set righta worldthat is out of joint. Knowledge kills bothinHamlet foraction, and truth, outweighs anymotive in the Dionysian man(BT7). The pessimismof the Greeks resulted in a quiescence that tragedy,rather than purging,encouraged and strengthened.22 This Schopenhauerian conclusion that pessimismmust issue in resignation is reversedin Nietzsche's later thought. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, the combinationof the Dionysianand the pessimistic served to stimulate activityrather than passivity.In it contained, in embryonicform, "the conception of pessimism,a pessimismof strength,a classicalpessimism ...The antithesis of classical pessimismis romantic pessimism... e.g., the pessimismof Schopenhauer"(KGW8.3.21).Althoughit is truethatTheBirth held manyof the elementsof Nietzsche'slateraccount of pessimism,this statementprobablyexaggeratesits distance from Schopenhauer(see Janaway1998, 24). After all, in the first edition Nietzschemaintainsthat the Greeks derivedsome sort of "metaphysical comfort" from tragedy;later, in rejectingthat conclusion, he suggests"youought to learn the art of this-worldly comfort first;you ought to learn to laugh, my young friends,if you are hell-benton remainingpessimists" sian pessimism stimulates action. But how can the elements of Greek pessimismbe recombinedto draw the conclusiondirectlyopposite that of TheBirth?
(BT, "ASC," 7).23Ultimately, then, Nietzsche's Dionysome notes for Ecce Homo, he wrote of The Birth that action;... true knowledge,an insight into the horrible
PESSIMISMAND NIHILISM
It will be helpful at this point to locate Nietzsche's objectionsto the pessimismof his day, especiallythat of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.AlthoughNietzsche consideredthe latter to be a comicallysimplisticversion of the former,his mockeryof it is instructive, for it reveals a great deal about what he takes popular Germanpessimismto be. to be a kind NietzschejudgedHartmann's pessimism
of reverse utilitarianism. That is, Hartmann posed the question of life as if it were a simple cost-benefit analysis: "Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudaemonism: all these modes of
Again it can be objected that this account ignores the Apollonian element of tragedy, which allowed the Greeks to put a mask of "cheerfulness" over these conclusions (BT 8). But this point should not be overstated. The Apollonian elements do not, in Nietzsche's account, cause the Greeks to forget Dionysian insights; they are simply a means for avoiding suicide. They do not fundamentally alter the posture of resignation but, rather, redirect its effects. 23 Maudemarie Clark (1998, 45) characterizes The Birth as "an attempt to save Schopenhauer's metaphysics by showing how to avoid Schopenhauer's own inconsistency."
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review thoughtwhich assess the value of things accordingto pleasureandpain ... [are]naiveties"(BGE 225). They are naive because they take reports of pleasure and pain at face value and becausethey neverimaginethat something other than simple pleasures could be a of life. Findingthe painsof life to outweigh justification the pleasures,Hartmanndraws the "logical"conclusion that life itself is best rejected.To Nietzsche, this entire way of thinkingis absurdand hardlymeritsthe Hartmann'spessimismis really title of "philosophy"; summationof peoples' no more than a mathematical feelings. the sumof pleasure; "Thesumof displeasure outweighs it wouldbe better if the worlddid not consequently is something thatrationally exist"-"The world should not exist because it causes thefeeling moredispleasure subject thanpleasure"-chatter of thissortcallsitselfpessimism
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expenses, this was only one element of his argument and, to Nietzsche,a minorone, even if it was emphasized by successorssuch as Hartmann.24 Schopenhauerhad, in Nietzsche's view, made a moral judgment against life and not merely an economiccalculationin its disfavor.Schopenhauer, unlike disorderof the Hartmann, recognizedthe fundamental worldfirstidentified,in a different way,by the Greeks. This, to Nietzsche,was Schopenhauer's great advance on all philosophysince Plato. It should have led him back to something like the tragic view of the prebut insteadhe drewa judgmentagainstsuch Socratics, a world, based on a moral standard.25 That is, he attemptedto accountsuch a chaos generically"evil," but could only do so based on an imagined "good" stability,a timelessworld of Being, againstwhich our world could be measured. transient,everyday it is itself a of sensibility: today!... I despisethispessimism Giventhesetwoinsights, thatbecoming hasno goaland life.I shallnever such signof deeply impoverished permit that underneath all is there no becoming grand unityin of his a meager as Hartmann to speak [one] "philosophical which the individual couldimmerse himself as completely pessimism" (WP701;see WP789). inanelement of supreme anescape remains: to pass value, Nietzsche's objection was not that Hartmannperon thiswholeworld sentence of becoming as a deception formed his calculationincorrectly. Nietzsche certainly andto invent a world world(WP12;see it, a true beyond WP6, 9, 11). did not maintain that life was or would be justified when pleasuresoutweighedpains (see KGW 4.2.414). This is the pessimismthat leads to nihilism. It is Aside from its sheer simplemindedness,what conin the sense that it rejects the optimism of makingsuch pessimistic demnsthis approach is the impossibility inherent in the idea of an ordered universe.On this a calculation.We lack the necessarymeasuring-stick. Schopenhauerremains, to Nietzsche, a great Hartmannassumesthat it is possible to stand outside point, critic of the nineteenth-century social philosophiesof life as a whole and, as it were, tote up its pluses and whether of the or Hegelianliberal-English minuses. This is inconceivable,in Nietzsche's view: progress, German varieties-and certainly is a stimulant to There is no perspectivesub specie aetemitatisfrom Nietzsche'sown to the pre-Socratics. rapproachement andthe worlditself, But ratherthan embrace whichto makesuchan assessment, the naturalchaos, as Greek as the pre-Socratics recognized,is in a constantstate of devisedone finalstrategy to did, Schopenhauer or becoming,which rendersany such tragedy transformation, it at to sit in and deem it bay, namely, keep judgment calculationstransientand useless. bad. This, to Nietzsche, is somethingworthyof being is of equivalent thesumof valueevery moment; Becoming called nihilism, and it is much more serious than in otherwords, its valuesalways remains the same; it has Hartmann's calculationthat for most individuals their no valueat all,for anything whichto measure it, quantaof pain exceeds their quantaof pleasure.It is against wouldhave insteada and in relation to whichthe word"value" judgmentagainstthe worldas a whole,a wish meaning,is lacking.Thetotalvalueof the worldcannotbe that not exist. Schopenhauer's it would pessimismis evaluated; consequently pessimism philosophical belongs moreseverebecauseit cannot be even in theory, cured, comical among things (WP708). the amount of in the world. pleasure The world as a whole cannot be said to have any by increasing life in its very nature is somethingworthyof Instead, value, and it cannotbe said to have a higher rejection.Schopenhauer's particular pessimismendorsesthe wis(or lower)value at one time ratherthanat another.We dom of Silenus:"Not to be born is best,"and for man can never say that things are getting better or worse "thenextbest thingby far is to go back/ backwherehe overall,or that the world as a whole is of high or low came from, quicklyas he can."26 value. At best, we might say that, taken as a whole, Ultimately,this strategycan be met with the objecthings get neither better nor worse, since whatever tion Nietzsche raises to Hartmann:No observation exists is alwaysin a processof transformation. 24 This Nietzsche found Hartmann'spessimism comicalon the point has been overlookedby severalcommentators betweenSchopenhauer and Nietzsche.Soll (1988, 113; ratherlike an infantwho rejectsthe worldthe moment relationship its milk goes missing-and did not worry that many 1998, 83ff.),for instance,seems to assumethat it is the surplus-ofargumentthat defines Schopenhauerand links him to Niwould be convincedby it. Or, if they came to espouse pain etzsche. Cartwright a "quasi-hedo(1998, 136) calls Schopenhauer such a view, it would not be because the arguments nist"but admitsthat Nietzscheis not. were persuasivebut because, as decadents,they were 25 There is strong evidence for this interpretation. For example, (1970,49) wrote:"Nothingis morecertainthanthat, alreadyinclinedto this position-like the later Greeks Schopenhauer it is the grievous sin of the world whichgivesrise speaking, of Socrates," (see TI, "Problem 2). Nietzsche'sreaction generally to the manifold andgreatsufering of theworld; wherebyis meantnot to Schopenhauer was quite different. Although any physical-empirical connexionbut a metaphysical one." had made the famous analogybetween 26 Sophocles,Oedipusat Colonus,lines 1388-91 (1982, 358). NiSchopenhauer etzschediscusses"the terriblewisdomof Silenus"in BT 3 and 4. life and a business whose receipts did not match its 929
Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism point exists from which to make such a judgment. there is no evidence for such a "true" Furthermore, need" for it to exist. world, only our "psychological Nietzsche makes these objectionsbut then goes farther: Schopenhauerdid not, in the end, have the "a pessimist,a worldcourageof his own convictions: denier and God-denier,who comes to a halt before morality-who affirmsmoralityand plays the flute [a pastime of Schopenhauer's],affirmslaede neminem [harm no one] morality:what? is that actually-a pessimist"(BGE 186)? In other words,Schopenhauer betrayedthe logical outcome of his own pessimismat the last possiblemomentby rejectingthe implications of his ontologysolely on a moralbasis, and an unverifiablemoralbasis at that (see Higgins 1998, 167ff.). At least for Socrates, optimismwas based on the idea that the world had an order;when this idea was abandoned,the Socraticmoralityshould have disapdeniedthe resultsof pearedas well. But Schopenhauer his own ontology.That he soughtto preservemorality a with a transcendental projectionwas transparently failure of nerve-and one with severe consequences. When moralityno longerclaimsto have a basis of any kind in the real world of events, it is free to condemn that worldin toto, to develop into genuine philosophical suicidalism. Although Nietzsche saw the roots of this sort of thinkingstretchingback to Socrates'final request that his debt to Asclepiusbe paid, it was not until Schopenhauercompletely uncoupled morality from ontology that this tendencycould fully develop (TI, "The Problemof Socrates").Nihilism,at least of this variety,is pessimismmixedwith moralityin a kind of devil'scocktail.27 This is the basis for Nietzsche'srepeatedclaimthat, rather than rejecting Schopenhauer's pessimism, he "deepened"it and "firstreally experiencedit" (WP 463). Whereas Schopenhauermixed up and adulterated his pessimism with morality, Nietzsche takes himselfto be purifying pessimismof the imperfections to its moderninventor,introduced that Schopenhauer, it (see BGE 56). In the introductionto the second volume of Human, All-too-Human,written in 1886, as Educator Nietzschelooks backon his Schopenhauer "I then went on tracesthis development: and explicitly to my reverencefor my firstand only to give expression educator, the great Arthur Schopenhauer... I was.., .already deep in the midst of moral skepticism and thatis to sayin thecritique and destructive analysis,
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The attackon ralitywithinwhichit has been encased.28 is thus,in spirit,an act of loyalty.And it Schopenhauer leaves Nietzsche free to "experience" pessimismin a unavailable to way Schopenhauer-unavailablein fact to any philosopherin the West ever since Socrates of optipoisoned Greekpessimismby his introduction mistic morality. If this means confrontingthe terrorthat Schopenhauer, and the pre-Socratic Greeks, found in the prospectof a world of flux and becoming,Nietzsche's perspectiveat least offers the advantageof not succumbingto a nihilismthat rejectslife as a whole (see Soll 1998,101ff.).Pessimism recognizesthat"becoming aims at nothingand achievesnothing," and pessimism does not sit injudgment of thiscondition(WP 12). What is the result? "The innocenceof becomingrestored" (TI, "Four Great Errors,"8).29 This idea Nietzsche considers "a tremendousrestorative"(WP 765) just becausewe are releasedfromthe burdenthat morality causesus to judge the worldas imposeson us. Morality a whole (an impossibility) and to judge it negatively(a mistakepredicatedon an impossibility): "Insofar as we believein morality we passsentenceon existence" (WP 6), we "findexistence a misfortune"(KGW 7.1.192). Along withthe terror,there is also "a greatliberation" involvedin pessimism(TI, "FGE,"8). We no longer give credence to the world-hatredand self-hatred boundup with morality. The burdenof its judgmentis removed. But are we not then returned to the Hamlet-like impotence of the pre-Socratics? Perhapsnot. To the innocence of becoming,Nietzsche now believes there will be two broad categories of response, which he and "weakcharacterizesas arisingout of "strength" ness";these indicatea capacity(or lack of capacity)to of life. Thosewho cannotbear toleratethe meaningless this sort of existence,who requirean ultimatemeaning to life, end up once again as nihilists,althoughin a psychologicalrather than a moralistic sense: "One grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to this afterworlds andfalse divinities-but cannotendure worldalthough one does not wantto denyit" (WP 12). This sort of pessimism does result in despair and and "theweak perishof it" (WP 37). This resignation, is what Schopenhauer's position, strippedof its illuwould amountto. sions of a thing-in-itself, Yet, it is a mistake to believe that human beings need such premanufactured likewise the intensifying of pessimism as understood meanings,for there is a hitherto" (AOM, Preface, 1; see also WP 463). That pessimismof strengthas well. "It is a measureof the Schopenhauer degree of strengthof will to what extent one can do critiqueis rooted in a moralskepticism: relies on moral categoriesin passinga finaljudgment on the world, and Nietzsche rejects these categories. 28 On Schopenhauer's self-consciously unoriginal morality, see BGE 186. becauseit 29 But the critiqueis likewisean intensification This translation makes it appear as if Nietzsche is replacing one liberatesSchopenhauer's pessimism(whichis, afterall, moral judgment about the world (i.e., that it is "guilty")with another from the commonplacemo- (that it is "innocent"). But the word Nietzsche uses is "unschuld,"the his originalcontribution)
Perhaps this is one example Nietzsche had in mind when he wrote of "the hidden history of philosophy, the psychology of its great names," that "Error is cowardice-every achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself' (WP 1041). See also WP 382.
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opposite in everyday speech of "schuld"or "guilty."Unschuld can be felicitously translated as "innocent," but the more literal translation is "not guilty" or "lacking guilt." Nietzsche's use of it here does not reverse the moral judgment but, insofar as possible, removes it entirely. To say that Becoming is unschuld is to adopt an agnostic position as to its moral worth and, moreover, to suggest that such a valuation is, in itself, inappropriate.
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AmericanPoliticalScience Review without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaninglessworld because one a smallportionof it oneself' (WP 585). It is organizes one thingto knowthatthereis no naturalor God-given meaningto the world as a whole or to life as a whole. But, from that point, to make "theinferencethat there is no meaningat all"is a "tremendous generalization," one that Nietzsche considers"pathological" (WP 13). Sucha generalization representsan absolutedisfaithin humanity,a presumptionthat humanscan create no meaningother thanthatwhichthey are given,whichin itself is as withoutfoundationas the earlierbelief in a naturalmoral order to the world.30 The alternativeto this is based on the humancapacityto createmeanings of a temporary naturein our own cornerof the cosmos. The lack of an overallnaturalmeaningin the universe is no argument that adequate meaning cannot be generated by individuals.Nietzsche may have made this faultygeneralization at the time he wrote TheBirth but he abandonsit in his later work. of Tragedy, Aphorism370 of The Gay Scienceencapsulatesthis transformation. Nietzsche describeshis initial attraction to "philosophical and pessimism" (Schopenhauer) "Germanmusic" (Wagner) as based on a misunderstanding.What appearedto him at first as a cultural "earthquake" emerging from a Dionysian "over-fullness of life" was in fact the productof "the impoverishment of life," which Nietzsche now labels "romanticism." Romanticism only simulates something is feigned.It seeks "above its radicalism revolutionary; all mildness, peacefulness, and goodness in thought and deed ... also logic, the conceptualunderstandability of existence... in short,a certainwarmnarrowness that keeps away fear and encloses one in optimistic horizons." Just as Wagner began his career as a but ended as a unctupartisanof the 1848 revolutions ous courtier to German princes, so Schopenhauer began with a seeming rejection of Socraticoptimism retreatedto it. This "romantic but, in the finalanalysis, is thus "an altogetherdifferentkind"from pessimism" Nietzsche'sown,whichhe nameshere for the firsttime as "Dionysian pessimism." Thattherestillcouldbe an altogether different kindof andvisionbelongs to me pessimism,...thispremonition
Vol. 95, No. 4 because the latter is too pessimistic,but because he is not pessimisticenough.
THE PESSIMISMOF STRENGTH
By a process of elimination, we have come some distance closer to understandingthe pessimism of whichNietzschecould approve,but it remainsto give a more detailedaccountof it. Certainly, his pessimismis a kind of no-saying,a rejectionof traditional morality. But he emphasizes the activity involved in such a no-sayingand considersit, by itself, to be something valuable.The alternative title Nietzschegaveone of his final books is perhaps a good startingpoint. How to witha Hammeris the second name given Philosophize to Twilight the book, however, of theIdols.Throughout there is little referenceto this "hammer," and readers are often left wonderingjust what it is.31In his notes Nietzsche repeatedlyrefers to pessimismas a kind of one used to break down and break apart "hammer," traditional ways of thinking(e.g., WP 132, 1055).This is healthyandrecuperative destruction on its own,even from some that apart rebuilding may come: "The hammer:a teachingwhich through setting loose the death-seeking pessimismbringsabout an extractionof the most vital"(KGW 8.1.108). What does it mean to wield the pessimism of strengthas a tool? In the firstplace,of course,it means to attackexistingmoralities,"to teach destructive ways of thinking" (KGW 7.3.210).In this task,pessimismis an all-purposeinstrumentbecause it attacksthe basis of all moralities, not just some of them. By denyingthe existence of any natural order to the universe and emphasizing the continuous flow of becoming and time, pessimismis as criticalof utilitarian moralityas it is of the Christianor Kantianvariety.But its effect is not simply a critical one. Even if destruction is a necessary prelude, that is not the end in itself. A hammeralso can be used to put somethingtogetherindeed, it is one of the few tools to possess this dual property. Likewise, pessimism "in the hand of the strongestbecomes simply a hammer and instrument with whichone can make oneself a new pair of wings" (KGW 8.1.109). as inseparablefrom me, as my propriumand ipsissibetween Wingsof whatsort?Here lies the difference mum... I callthispessimism of the future-forit comes! Nietzsche's and ones. Even the pessimism previous I see it coming!-Dionysian pessimism. Nietzscheadmired,such as that of the past pessimisms Romanticism, althoughit was Nietzsche'sown starting Greeks, came to an end with the destructionof illuout to be a kind of sham pessimism,and sions. In his account,the pre-Socratics turns evokedan ethos point, Nietzsche here declares his independence from it. of virtualparalysis. As does Buddhism, they taughtone Unadulterated pessimism is only now coming into to be at peace with the world'schaosbut not to seek to alter it. In a long note entitled "Critiqueof previous existence; only when it does can we fullyappreciateits Nietzscheoutlines his alternative: promise and dangers.Nietzsche rejectsSchopenhauer pessimism," (althoughgratefulfor the educationhe provided),not
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Soil (1988,116)andHiggins(1998,174),amongmanyothers,tend to view the differencebetween the two alternatives as a matterof so that the choice for strengthor weaknessis either temperament, something inborn and unalterableor a radical choice with no basis. I think the passagesquoted above make clear philosophical thatthis is not the case. Everyphilosophical choice,for Nietzsche,is in some respecta matterof character, but it is clear that these two positionsare separatedby ideas, not just moods.
Nietzschelikensthe hammerto "a tuning-fork" 31 In the foreword, withwhichhe soundsout the hollownessof idols. But this does not of the workas "adeclaration of squarewell withhis characterization war"and does not, in anycase, help us understand the natureof the hammer.The finalsection is entitled"TheHammerSpeaks" but is simplya shortquotationfrom ThusSpokeZarathustra. Perhapsthe hammer is Zarathustrahimself? But this only further begs the question.
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Our pessimism:the world does not have the value we thoughtit had .... Initialresult:it seems worthless [sic]; withthe namely, ... simplyin thissense arewe pessimists; and to ourselvesunreservedly will to admitthisrevaluation not to tell ourselves the same old story, not to lie to ourselves. That is preciselyhow we find the pathosthat impelsus to seek new values.In sum:the world mightbe far more valuablethanwe used to believe;.. . whilewe thoughtwe we may not even accordedit the highest interpretation, have given our humanexistence a moderatelyfair value (KGW8.1.248). Nietzsche is treading a delicate line, since, as we have seen, he also says it is a mistake to impute to the world any overarching value. But this does not mean we should cease to value anything at all. Schopenhauer's philosophy tends toward that nihilistic conclusion, which Nietzsche wants to resist. Pessimism as such need not lead there. Rather, the withdrawal of an overarching account of the world's value impels one to seek "new values" (note the plural). No single one of these can replace the old value system, but separately they may give us more reasons to continue living than can any overarching Meaning of Life. Christian morality and its offshoots seek to overcome thoughts of suicide with one ultimate duty, or ultimate happiness. Nietzsche's pessimism advises each of us individually to cobble together a meaning for life out of lesser goals with the ultimate result that, when these are gathered together, "the world might be far more valuable than we used to believe." Nietzsche's inspiration here, as in so many other matters, is the example of a certain kind of art. His praise of art is not the romantic idea that it puts us in touch with great truths.32 Rather, art represents the organization of a small portion of an otherwise meaningless world that gives purpose to an individual existence (WP 585). It is the attempt to impose a temporary form on the inevitable transformation of the world; since the world must acquire some sort of particular form in its metamorphoses, art is "repeating in miniature, as it were, the tendency of the whole" (WP 617)-but by an effort of will. Art is not an attempt to fight the pattern of existence but an effort to shape that pattern into something recognizable, "to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming-that joy which also encompasses joy in destruction"(TI, "What I Owe," 5). The creativity of artists is, in essence, "gratitude for their existence" (WP 852). When art assumes this shape, it becomes "the great seduction to life, the great stimulant to life" (WP 853). This is not to say, however, that such art must be "uplifting" in the conventional sense. Since joy in destruction may be a stimulant to life, even depictions of the most miserable things may be included: "The
His praise of art is not indiscriminate. He goes to great lengths to distinguish the sort of art he has in mind from that produced by the "artists of decadence" and "romanticism in art" (Wagner is always his chief example), which proceeds from "an impoverishment of life" and ends in "hatred of the ill-constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged... one who, as it were, revenges himself on all things by forcing his own image, the image of his torture, on them, branding them with it" (WP 852, GS 370).
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things they display are ugly: but that they display them comes from their pleasure in the ugly .... How liberating is Dostoevsky" (WP 821)! Nietzsche does not mean, of course, that we should all be artists, but we should approach our lives as artists do their work. If we can understand why an artist who knows that art is devoid of metaphysical value still wants to paint pictures, then we can understand why Nietzsche thinks pessimism can result in a creative pathos. A better example might be the situation of an architect: Any sane architect must know that no building lasts forever. Built in opposition to nature (as to some extent every human structure must be), it will be attacked by nature (by wind, water, and so on) the moment it is completed. Whatever the purpose for which the structure is designed, that purpose will someday be superceded. However beautiful it may seem when erected, it will someday, to another set of eyes, appear ugly. Yet, knowing all this, architects pursue their craft. Knowing that the universe will ultimately not tolerate their work, they continue to organize a small portion of that same universe for local purposes. The lack of order in the universe can also fuel nihilism, as Nietzsche is well aware. Unlike the nihilist, the pessimist does not just reveal the tragic character of existence but achieves a degree of equanimity about it. This aspect of pessimism often comes across as indifference to the suffering of others. Indeed, at times Nietzsche verges on expressing such indifference, but in the end he does something rather different. He advises, instead, that we not look to nature or God to express a horror of suffering on our behalf and that we not imagine that such suffering is any less "natural" than happiness: The benefit consists in the contemplationof nature's to good and evil. No justice in magnificentindifference history,no goodnessin nature:that is whythe pessimist,if to those placeswhere the he is an artist,goes in historicis absenceof justiceis revealedwithsplendidnaivete... and also in nature,to those placeswhereher evil and indifferis not disguised(WP 850). ent character The view that pessimism leads to resignation usually includes the notion that it promotes a disinterest in the workings of the world. Nietzsche suggests just the opposite. Pessimism is an invitation to a new critical investigation of nature and history, even those elements of life that we consider ugly and evil. One effect of this situation is that when we look at the world once again-without the grey-colored glasses of morality-we may see things differently. We may now find ourselves curious about that which, for millennia, we were taught to shun. Indeed, Nietzsche sees curiosity about what has been considered evil to be one of pessimism's greatest benefits. This does not mean we will simply celebrate what we once abhorred. Rather, we will seek it out on its own terms and come to our own fresh evaluation of it, and this goes for what was once called "good" as well: Let us dwell a moment on this symptom of highest Manno longer of strength. culture-I call it the pessimism is precisely of ills"; "justification" needs a "justification
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what he abhors:he enjoysillspur, cru;he finds senseless
Vol. 95, No. 4 fromwhichto viewlife as a whole reallyno perspective (whetherto deny or affirmit), so such an assent can only be a kind of gamble or risk-taking.It is an affirmation in the dark,an approval givenin ignorance. Above all, it is a decision to welcome the unknown future and accept the unseen past ratherthan cling to a familiarpresent (Z 2:20). All pessimismsconclude that the universehas no order and human historyno the Dionysianvarietyis the only one that can progress; find somethingto like about this situation: of pessimism as a Mynewwayto "yes." Mynewversion voluntary questfor fearfuland questionable aspectsof suchas thatcouldin thatwaylead beings... A pessimist to a Dionysian to theworld asit is:as a wishfor yes-saying its absolute return andeternity: withwhich a newidealof andsensibility be given(KGW would philosophy 8.2.121). The phrase"fearful and questionable," whichrecurs frequentlyin Nietzsche'stexts, is carefullychosen to The aspectsof existencethat indicatewhatis at issue.33 we have the greatest difficulty graspingand affirming are not the cruel and disgusting; they are those whose existenceis so threatening to oursense of orderthatwe haveheretoforedeniedtheirverybeing,so thatinitially we find them "questionable" or "dubious." Which are these? In Twilight the Nietzsche ridicules "the Idols, of almost laughablepovertyof instinctdisplayedby German philologistswheneverthey approachthe Dionysian."Why laughable?Because these philologistscannot recognizewhat is, so to speak, right under their noses. The "Dionysian mysteries" are simply "the mysteriesof sexuality... the sexualsymbolwas to the Greeks the symbol venerable as such, the intrinsic profoundmeaning of all antiquepiety" (TI, "WhatI Owe," 4; see Higgins 1998, 170ff.).The absurdityof in post-Socratic philosophyis ultimatelydemonstrated its attitudestowardsex andthe body.Whatoughtto be the most obviousand immediatesource of knowledge and pleasureis not merelyobscured but almostentirely obliterated.Crueltymay be condemned by morality, but at least it is acknowledged; sexualityis eliminated from view througha process of "moralcastrationism" (WP 204, 383). not cruelty,represents thatpartof life with Sexuality, whichit is most difficult to come to terms.It is the most difficultnot because it is inherentlyshameful("It was only Christianity... which made of sexuality somelies TI, "WhatI Owe,"4). The difficulty thingimpure": in affirming the necessity for pain and sufferingthat accompaniesany growth.That is, it involvesadmitting that we ourselves(and not just the world) are essentially flux and change.With its constantdissolutionof boundaries,sexualityis more threateningto the optimist than is the human tendency to cruelty. This violation of self-simultaneously painful and pleasurable-is the simplestand best evidence that our own natureis as unstableand tumultuous as that of the rest of the universeand, therefore,that no calculationof
and doubtful." For otheruses of thisterm,see, for example, WP852, GS 370. The phrasealways refersto those thingswhichthe pessimist can bear the sightof but otherscannot.
33Furchtbaren und fragwiirdigen also can be translated as "terrible
illsthemostinteresting. If he formerly hadneedof a god, in a worlddisorder without he nowtakesdelight God,a theterrible, to whoseessence world of chance, the belong Insucha stateit is precisely theseductive. the ambiguous, (WP1019). goodthatneeds"justifying" Nietzscheis quite clear that what we previouslycalled good may well find a justification,but not "justification" in its previous sense: "If he in praxi advocates preservationof virtue, he does it for reasons that recognizein virtuea subtlety,a cunning,a form of lust for gain and power"(ibid.). The pessimismof strengthinvolvesthe use of pessimismas a hammer-as a philosophical technology-to destroy and to build. Pessimismis both a critiqueof existingmoralitiesand an instrumentin the construction of an alternativeapart from morality.Far from Nietzscheconsiders endingin despairand resignation, the moment when "my type of pessimism"appears, "the great noon,... [the] great point of departure" (WP 134). Pessimism may not be the end of the journey,but all roadsto the futurelead throughit, and it may be necessaryto remain pessimisticfor "a few millennia" (KGW7.3.210).Canwe saymore aboutthis alternative? In particular,what is Dionysian pessimism?
DIONYSIAN PESSIMISM
It is probably true that Nietzschewas less interestedin content to these hypothetical newvaluesthan assigning in demonstrating that they should exist. One note on "the pessimismof the energetic"emphasizesthat "the 'to what end?' after a terriblestruggle[is] ... itself a victory" (KGW8.2.62).The simpledesireto formulate new goals after overcomingearliermoralitiesis something to be celebrated. Although Nietzsche speaks often of a revaluationof values, he never providesa new set to replace the old. Indeed, given his wellknown sentimentthat "a will to a system is a lack of individ(TI, "Maxims," integrity" 26) and his radically ualistic belief that the formulationof new values is somethingeach of us shouldundertakeon our own (Z 1:22),it would be unfairto expect this from him. Still, we are not left simply with the imperiouslyvague to "createnewvalues."Dionysianpessimism injunction is not itself a value system,but it is an ethos that sheds some lighton whatit mightbe like to live a good life in the era followingthe deathof God. This pessimismis a sort of art of living.It is a life-practicethat Nietzsche recommends,althoughnot for everyone. Some sense of whatNietzschemeantby Dionysianis but the use of this word given in TheBirthof Tragedy, continuedto evolve (althoughhe often wrote as if all the later meaningswere implicitin the earlierones). If Dionysianpessimismis the one "no"thatevolvesout of to knowwhat one is approv"yes,"then it is important ing with a Dionysian"yes."Fromthe varioustexts and notes that bear on this question,the answerseems to be somethingon the orderof "life as a whole"or "the worldas it is andwill alwaysbe." But, as Nietzschewas fond of pointingout with regardto Hartmann, there is
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our best interest can ever be permanent.The Diony- trulypowerlessagainstsuffering, as Schopenhauer sugYes to life beyond death and gests, why not just withdraw?To this question, Nisian is "the triumphant etzschecannotgive the sortof answerthatprovidesany change; true life as collective continuation of life can come at comfort.He cannot offer any unrebutablereason for But this only throughprocreation" (ibid.). affirmation overdenial.In a worldof flux,no the cost of suffering,as the price to be paid for preferring continuousrebirth:"In the teachingof the mysteries, such "reason" can permanentlyexist. This is why the 'painsof childbirth' sanctifypain Nietzsche refers to strength-not because the strong pain is sanctified: in general-all becomingand growing,all that guaran- surviveand the weak die, but becausethose who affirm tees the future,postulatespain... All this is contained have the strengthto controltheir disgustlong enough in the word Dionysus"(ibid.). In Christianmorality, to give themselvesa local reason to live. The Dionysian "yes" is not a matter of taking a the pains of childbirthare the Curse of Eve, and sadistic pleasure in the sufferingof others. It is a sexualitythe sin which enables and stands for sin in general;it is this symbolism(and this generalization) decision to value the future over the present. To be which Nietzscheurges us to reverse.The Dionysianis glad that the world is one of becoming rather than not simplysexuality(Nietzsche is not Freud);rather, being meansto be gladthatthingsare alwayschanging, that the future is alwayscoming, and the present is the repressionof sexuality representsthe repressionof as such. Acceptingthe the "fearfuland questionable" alwayspassingaway.It means detachmentfromwhatever exists at present, which inevitably appears as aside the of these of goal things, setting necessity wisdom.Joy in callousnesstowardothers: "Dionysian as theultimate aimof a humanlife,is whatthe happiness the destruction of the most noble and at the sightof its Dionysian"yes"requires. ruin:in reality This does not mean that happinessmust disappear progressive joy in whatis comingand lies however overexisting from humanlife. Settingit aside as the finalgoal does in thefuture,whichtriumphs things, it altogether.But if happinessis to good" (WP 417, second emphasisadded).This is what not meanbanishing or be found, it can only be on these new terms. We can Nietzschehad in mindby suchphrasesas "amorfati" He is not sayingthatwe mustrelive only take our pleasuresin an acceptanceof this chaotic eternalrecurrence. and, we now know, painful condition. Pleasure and the pastagainandagain;rather,thispatternof destrucas the utilitarian or simplistic tion and creation is unalterableand must be borne paincannotbe separated, (WP 1041).And it cannotbe withstoodthroughfaithin pessimistscontendwith theireffortssimplyto seek one and avoid the other. Destructionmust be known and progress.We must learn to hope in the absenceof an as partof anything creativeor good. The expectationof progress.If this soundsalmostnonsenacknowledged true embrace of becoming at the expense of being sical to the modernear, perhapsit is becausewe have thataccompanies been told for so long that progressis the rationalthing meansto takepleasurein the suffering to hope for. is. the demiseof whatever The difference between the false pessimism of is onlypossible asthejoyof appearance[.] Thejoyof Being outand Nietzsche'sversionis explicitly Schopenhauer in the destruction of is onlypossible Thejoyof becoming in Zarathustra as a differencein their respective lined of "Beings," the beautiful the actuality visions,in the attitudestowardour fate of In the twentemporality. also of illusions. Inthedestruction annihilation pessimistic titled "On tieth section of the second book, Redempas its climax of beautiful illusions, Dionysian joy appears tion," Nietzsche traces two approachesto our timesee alsoEH,"Destiny," 8.1.114; 4). (KGW bound condition.First, he describesthe preachingof But madnessspeaksas Nietzscheonce did This is something we have great difficultydoing. "madness." Nietzscheknew such an idea would sound dreadfulto himself,by citing the aphorismof Anaximander-in a our condemnation slightlyalteredform to bringout what Nietzsche now most. It is not enough to withdraw It is not enough to retreatto an agnostic considersits vengefulness:"'Everything of suffering. passes away; suffering. thereforeeverythingdeservesto pass away.And this, shrugand agree to coexistwith "necessary" That would equate to being agnosticabout life itself. too, is justice, this law of time that it must devourits Instead, we must approve it. That is why Nietzsche children.'Thus preachedmadness"(Z 2:20). Madness depicts the idea of eternal recurrenceas something continues to speak more directly in the voice of whose solutionto the problemof time andthe "greatest weight"upon Schopenhauer, proposedby a "demon" one's conscience (GS 341). To will the eternal recur- is to withdrawfrom the life of the will insofar as is if there is rence is to will endless suffering. Why should we possible."Canthere be redemption humanly eternaljustice?Alas, the stoneIt wascannotbe moved: sanction suffering,even our own, much less that of others? all punishments must be eternal,too .... No deed can If Nietzsche's reply is simply "because it is an be annihilated:... This, this is what is eternal in the unalterable partof life,"then we are temptedto return punishmentcalled existence,that existencemust eterto the position of Schopenhauer. nally become deed and guilt again. Unless the will Indeed, perhapswe now can see the attractionsof that position most shouldat last redeemitself, andwillingshouldbecome not willing."To Nietzsche,this attitudeof resignation clearly. Why not reject this life we are offered, as towardour place in time can only be called madness, Schopenhauersuggests, if to endorse it means to endorse endless and unalterablesuffering?Nothing the productof "the spiritof revenge"or "thewill's ill in the suffering of others.Our will against time." It moves too quickly from the requiresus to participate of time to the idea that it enslavesus. every moral instinct rebels at the thought. If we are inescapability 934
AmericanPoliticalScience Review Second, Nietzsche contrasts this false redemption with a better one: Our temporalityconditionsus but does not imprisonus: "I led you awayfrom all these fables when I taughtyou, 'The will is a creator.'All 'it was' is a fragment,a riddle,a dreadfulaccident-until the creativewill saysto it, 'ButthusI willedit."'Rather as it were, Nietzschesuggeststhat than hate backward, we look forward.If the present is the result of an unalterable past, it is also the sourceof a veryalterable future:"I walk amongmen as amongthe fragments of Insteadof a the future-that futurewhichI envisage." of false redemptionthat is essentiallyan abandonment society, the true pessimist(pessimisticstill because he accepts our time-boundcondition and all it entails) sees an opportunity,whereas the false sees only a "Toredeemthosewho livedin the past and conclusion: to re-create all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'-that alone should I call redemption."Schopenhauer's romanticpessimismacknowledges the power of the past but not the open horizonof the future. It is madness because it seems to be based on a hostilityto existence that Nietzsche ultimatelyfinds inexplicableexcept as self-hatred.Temporalityis not just a limitationbut a source of potential. The redemption of the past to which Nietzschelooks forwardmaybe unlikely,but at His pessimismallowsfor least it is not an impossibility. possibilities. Dionysianpessimismmay be "fearfuland questionable," but the alternativeis worse. In a famous note Nietzsche embodiesthe two choices as "Dionysusand the Crucified": "It is not a differencein regardto their that is, in whether the two personificamartyrdom," tions of differentlife-practicessufferand die, "it is a differencein the meaningof it" (WP 1052). In other words, it is not a questionof how death and suffering can be minimized;in a pessimisticview, the greater portioncannotbe avoided."Theproblemis that of the whethera Christian meaningof suffering: meaningor a tragic meaning." We are only given the choice of it as a whole.34 acceptingthis life as a whole or rejecting There are more than two possiblemeaningsfor suffering, and we can surelystruggleto alter those elements of life withinour purview, but we will stillbe facedwith the largerquestionwhen we cannot pick and choose. is to rejectlife as a whole:"Thegod on One alternative the cross is a curse on life, a signpostto seek redemption fromlife."The otheris to embracelife, with all the sufferingentailed, both for ourselves and for others: "Dionysuscut to pieces is a promiseof life: it will be eternally reborn and return again from destruction" (ibid.).If one acceptsthe pessimisticassessmentof the worldas a place of chaos and dissonance,one faces the choice of retreatingfrom it or embracing it and trying to "leta harmony soundforthfromeveryconflict" (WP 852).
34 This is perhaps what Camus ([1955] 1983, 3) had in mind when he wrote: "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." See Cartwright 1998, 149.
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THE FUTUREOF DIONYSIAN PESSIMISM

The commonplace that pessimismmust understanding lead to hopelessnessand resignation is unjustified.35 In Dionysianpessimism,Nietzsche creates an alternative that is as ruthlessly skeptical toward all ideas of progressas is Schopenhauer's pessimismbut does not issue in despair(see Janaway 1998,25). It looks toward the future,not with the expectationthat better things are foreordained,but with a hope founded only on takingjoy in the constantprocessesof transformation and destructionthat markout the humancondition. The belief that pessimismmust lead to resignation makes one of two errors:Either it mistakesSchopenhauer's variant (or Wagner's or Buddha's) for the whole of pessimism,or it sees no other possible response to the realization that we live in a tragic, disordered, immoral world. Why is it commonly at the thoughtthat humanbeingsmustbe disappointed of a world in constant flux and where chaos, prospect no moral order can be sustained?The answeris the assumptionthat humanbeings are creaturesof order, that we are discomposedby chaos. To Nietzsche,we are no different from the world to which we are condemned;we are not islands of being in a sea of and develbecomingbut are constantlytransforming worldof the eternally oping.He envisionsa "Dionysian self-creating,the eternally self-destroying.., without goal... Do you want a name for this world?... This worldis thewilltopower-and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing besides!"(WP 1067).36 To restore "the innocence of to the world means likewiseto restoreit to becoming" ourselves and to face this chaotic world not as a creaturealien to it or fallen from it but as part of that which we find most threatening.Those who believe pessimismleads to resignationsee humansas "weak" creatureswho must have transcendental meaningsin order to survive.But pessimistsneed not believe that the demise of traditional beliefs must lead to aimlessness and suicide.It is ratherthose who fear pessimism, or fear the repeal of traditionalmoralities,that maintain this. What does it mean to go through life with no of or, more precisely,with an expectation expectations
has recently been elaborated byDumm 35The conceptof resignation
(1998), who finds affirmativepossibilities that deserve consideration. But I use the term in the widely accepted sense of despair or purposeful withdrawal from activity. 36 TObe sure, there is something paradoxical about this formulation. To imagine ourselves as will normally would imply our will has some object. Yet, if there are no permanent objects, only an eternal flux, including ourselves, then how is this possible? The paradox is not eliminated but mitigated in light of Nietzsche's critique of our subject-object grammar and his related critique of our ideas of causality. In GS 370, Nietzsche explicitly links these to the emergence of Dionysian pessimism. The seeming strangeness of what he proposes emerges as much from our ordinary grammar of "will" as it does from the propositions themselves. In this passage it seems clear that Nietzsche gives us an inaccurate shorthand "name" for what he describes only because we, his readers, demand it. Nietzsche's critique of causality is especially vivid in his discussion of dreams (see GS 22, 112; TI, "Four Great Errors," 4; WP 479; and Dienstag 1997, 96-100).
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Nietzsche'sDionysianPessimism nothing?To be sure, one is deflected from a certain kind of global ambition.The desire whollyto remake the worldin one's image,in whatevermanner,mustbe set aside once it is realizedthat the worldwill hold no imageat all for verylong.37Yet, Nietzschesaysnothing thatwoulddeter one fromseekingto organize"a small portionof it oneself' (WP 585), whichdoes not mean cultivatingone's own gardenso much as knowingthe limits to one's actions, however ambitious.Furthermore, there is a kind of freedom to be gained when one's existence is detached from the narrative of freedomfrom the past. If humanhistoryis a progress: narrative of progress, then one's fate is already scripted,in a sense, by what has come before; one is nothing more than "an angryspectatorof all that is past" (Z 2:20). Pessimism,by freeing us from this frees us fromenslavement to the script,simultaneously past. The destructionof all thingsby time is not a judgment of their worth, as Anaximander maintained,but to charta simplya conditionof life and an opportunity free of "the course stone It was." Nietzsche personal concludes, as a kind of modern version of Greek that"thebelief in time is good for one's "cheerfulness," health (pessimists after all)" (KGW 7.1.390). The constanttransformation remindsus thatour fate is not set. We have at least a role in determiningit. The burdenof the past is thuslessened,and the prospectof the futurebrightens. "Thetrustin life is gone:life itself has become a problem. Yet one shouldnot jumpto the conclusion that this necessarilymakes one gloomy. Even love of life is still possible, only one loves differently"(GS, "Preface,"3). Instead of being a creatureof the past,one canbe "abridgeto the future" (Z 2:20).Insteadof valuingoneself for being part of a long chain of progress,one can value the fresh start that one makes of oneself. Instead of searchingfor transcendentalmeanings, one can "give the earth a meaning,a humanmeaning"(Z 1:22.2). Such a techniquewill not be to everyone'staste nor within the ability of all. It is best suited to those Nietzsche calls "the most moderate":"those who do not requireanyextremearticlesof faith;those who not only concede but love a fair amountof accidentsand nonsense;those who can think of man with a considerable reductionof his value withoutbecomingsmall and weak on that account"(WP 55). These are the humanshe considers"the strongest"-not those who can destroythe most, but those who can withstandthe most destruction withoutgivingway to pity and resignation. CONCLUSION A curiousfact aboutNietzsche'swritingson pessimism emergesfromthe quotationsin the precedingsections. Nietzschewroteon the topicthroughout his career,but there is a remarkable concentration on the topic in the
37 Such a desire is permitted so long as one does not regret the fleeting character of the remaking (which obviously would alter the nature of the project).
December2001 series of introductionsprepared in 1886 for all his pre-Zarathustra writings,whichwere then in the process of being republished.It is almost as if, looking backover the developmentof his thought,he identifies a guidingprincipleunseenhithertoin its entirety,even by himself, and desires to reemphasizeit. He draws togetherhis variousposes into a unifiedattitude.Read together,these introductions (to TheBirthof Tragedy, Assorted Meditations, Human, All-too-Human, Untimely and Maxims,and Daybreak) describea pessiOpinions mismthat "hasno fear of the fearfuland questionable that characterizes all existence": Thishasbeenmypessimistic fromthe beginperspective is itnot?a perspective thateven ning-a novel perspective, To thisverymoment I todayis still novelandstrange? continue to adhere to it and,if youwillbelieve me,justas muchfor myselfas, occasionally at least, againstmyself... Doyouwant metoprove thisto you? Butwhat else doesthislongpreface-prove (AOM,"Preface," 7)?38 It wouldbe a mistaketo tryto understand Dionysian or pessimismby setting it against, say, utilitarianism Kantianethics and viewing it as a moral theory that a certainideal set of behaviorsand attempts prescribes to justifythem to an audienceof rationaldisputants. It is insteadboth a descriptionof the irrational world in whichwe find ourselvesand a prescription for coping with that situation.Nietzsche neither appeals to nor promisesrationalityand happinessin his attemptsto defend his stance. It is better to consider Dionysian pessimismas an attitudeand a practicethat can guide us through the world, "a remedy and an aid in the service of growingand struggling life" (GS 370). This does not mean that the self is the sole object of philosophyor action,but it underscoresthe idea that we mustrecognizethose limitsof the humancondition that optimistshave been loath to acknowledge. Rather than suggestresignation, this pessimismencouragesus to act while seekingto avoid the hubrisso commonto more systemicphilosophies.
38Nietzsche is playing on the meaning of beweisen (prove). The root weisen means "show," so that beweisen can mean "show" in an intransitive sense, that is, to "show oneself."
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Pessimism Nietzsche's Dionysian JOSHUA FOA DIENSTAG Universityof Virginia

See pessimism in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary.

(1967b); D = Daybreak (1982); EH = Ecce Homo (1967a); HH =

The task that The Birth of Tragedyset itself was to

Philosophy in the TragicAge of the Greeks, a posthu-

mistic (BT 14).15

may be brokenin auguryof a restoredoneness (BT 10).

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Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism Author(s): Joshua Foa Dienstag Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.

Vol. 95, No. 4 December2001

Pessimism Nietzsche's Dionysian JOSHUA FOA DIENSTAG Universityof Virginia

See pessimism in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary.

(1967b); D = Daybreak (1982); EH = Ecce Homo (1967a); HH =

The task that The Birth of Tragedyset itself was to

Philosophy in the TragicAge of the Greeks, a posthu-

mistic (BT 14).15

may be brokenin auguryof a restoredoneness (BT 10).

Vol. 95, No. 4

THE PESSIMISMOF STRENGTH

Vol. 95, No. 4

THE FUTUREOF DIONYSIAN PESSIMISM

Vol. 95, No. 4

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