Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 6

How does the media shape foreign policy decision-making?

The role of the media in foreign policy decision-making is a matter of some debate. There are two general models to discuss, with opposing viewpoints on the matter. First we have the pluralist model. This model suggests that there is a dispersal of power throughout society, meaning that the media has the capability to shape or influence foreign policy decision-making to differing extents. ithin this model falls the idea of the !"" effect, which suggests that constant news media coverage of international events causes pressure to be put on policy makers to act in a certain way. This concept is an evolution of the media#s role during the $ietnam war, which demonstrated the power of the media to shape public opinion through the displaying of often unpleasant images of war. !ontrary to these ideas, we also have the elite model. This model differs from the pluralist model in that it suggests that power in concentrated in the hands of an elite and this elite is able to dominate both politics and society. %o, rather than the media being able to shape foreign policy decision-making, it is more a case of an elite being able to shape the media and foreign policy decision-making. ithin this elite model are a number of theories, including Herman and !homsky#s propaganda model, which suggests that factors such as media ownership, funding and sourcing lead to the media being propagandistic in often parroting the elite consensus, and &ennett#s indexing hypothesis which suggests that 'ournalists often follow elites when it comes to setting the agenda and framing foreign affairs issues. (n estern democracies, we tend to expect the pluralist model to be true and have a belief in a free media independent of any political or social elites, but the )uestion is whether or not this actually rings true, and the media does provide independent coverage and is able to set the agenda with regards to foreign policy decision-making, or not, and the media is not as independent as we may like to believe and rather than setting the agenda, simply sticks to the elite#s line. To begin, we shall examine some of the ideas behind the pluralist model of media, specifically the concept of the !"" effect and the notion of an agenda-setting media. The !"" effect suggests that the emergence of *+ hour news coverage, such as that provided by !"", puts pressure on policy makers to take certain actions during times of crisis ,-obinson, *../, p01/2. 3f course, the !"" effect is not limited to the news channel !"", nor is it now necessarily limited to *+ hour news channels, the !"" effect simply has to do with the vast amount of news coverage available and how it potentially influences policy makers. 4erhaps, in this day and age, more relevant to the !"" effect is the growth of new media, such as social networking sites, rather than news channels such as !"" itself. The idea that the media could significantly impact policy makers# decisions goes back to the $ietnam ar, which was itself described as 5merica#s first television war. 6uring the

$ietnam war, the media broadcast a great deal more violent images of the war than had been the case with previous conflicts, which led some to suggest that the war may have been lost partly due to growing opposition to the war which can, to an extent, be attributed to the media#s displaying of some of the grim realities of the war ,-obinson, *../, p0+*2. 4resident "ixon ,078/, cited by -obinson, *../, p0+*2 himself claimed that9 :television showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war... the result was a demorali;ation of the home front, raising the )uestion whether 5merica would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and strength of purpose at home.: %o, even "ixon was somewhat convinced that the media#s coverage of $ietnam played a significant role in decreasing public support for the war and therefore potentially had some power to influence policy, demonstrating the growing power of the media. $ietnam was certainly something of a turning point with regards to people#s understanding of the role of the media. (t demonstrated that the media was potentially capable of not only setting an agenda, but genuinely influencing the actions of policy makers. 5fter the $ietnam war, the idea that the media could put pressure on policy makers to take a certain course of action became more popular, with the idea of the !"" effect being developed. The growth of the news media into a huge, round the clock service has, according to the !"" effect, created an increased exposure of international events and by doing so has increased pressure on policy makers to act on issues raised by the media. &ased on this, it would be easy to believe in the pluralist model, as the !"" model clearly suggests that the media has a certain degree of power over policy makers in acting independently and demonstrating the dispersal of power between the media and the government. However, perhaps it is possible that the !"" effect is somewhat exaggerated by those who espouse it. %trobel ,077<2 argues that there are many myths regarding the !"" effect and its power over policy makers. The first :myth: put forward by %trobel is that !"" ,or, indeed, any other large, round the clock news service2 makes life difficult for foreign policy makers. (f we were to believe in the power of the !"" effect, we would be forgiven for thinking that channels such a !"" could be a potential thorn in the side of foreign policy makers, leading policy in directions that policy makers may not intend or desire. %trobel argues that this is not so, suggesting instead that !"" can be very useful to policy makers, in that it enables them to put their spin on events almost instantly, due to the news being broadcast *+ hours a day. (n this sense, the creation of around the clock news coverage has actually proved useful to policy makers and elites in pushing their own agenda, rather than allowing the media to put pressure on policy makers to act in a certain way.

5nother of the :myths: %trobel talks about is that news channels like !"" are able to dictate the foreign policy agenda. !iting %omalia as an example, %trobel suggests that, while the media did a lot to bring the situation in %omalia to the attention of the public and policy makers, it is important to note that the news media was being used by relief agencies working in %omalia in order to secure government action, so this makes the news media here appear to be more of a middle-man, with the agenda-setting being done by international relief organisations. =ermin ,0778, p1702 also demonstrates that, with regards to %omalia, the media coverage was low prior to the decision by the &ush administration to initiate an airlift. 6uring the airlift, coverage increased greatly, before dropping off again. This shows that the role of the media as dictating any sort of foreign policy agenda is overstated. %trobel also suggests that the idea that images of suffering force officials to intervene in international situations in a myth. hen images of %erbian detention camps were broadcast by (T" during the &osnian war, the &ush administration did not intervene, as it had already been decided that sending troops to aid the situation would result in them potentially being stuck there for years. hat this shows is that, although images of suffering can influence the agenda and public opinion ,as was the case with $ietnam2, it is not correct to suggest that, by being shown images of suffering, governments will suddenly be compelled to act. Hoskins and 3#>oughlin ,*.0., p0.12 make the same point, but in a more recent context, referring to then-4rime =inister of the ?@ Aordon &rown suggesting that, thanks to the birth of sites such as Twitter, a disaster such as -wanda would never happen again. They point out that here again is the :myth of the !"" effect... as if the very existence and real-time delivery of images will lead publics to notice and force policy makers to act.: The !"" effect, in this instance, is, somewhat exaggerated, and therefore so too is the ability of the media to shape foreign policy decision-making. e should now examine some theories and ideas which fall under the elitist model, that is, the idea that there exist elite groups capable of dominating politics and society. e can begin by taking another look at the media#s coverage of the $ietnam war. 6espite the media#s coverage of the $ietnam war often being claimed to have been critical of the war and unafraid of showing disturbing images of war, it should be noted that this is not how coverage of $ietnam was presented throughout the entire duration of the war. =c"air ,*..8, p0/12 states that the conflict in $ietnam began in :secrecy and disinformation:, with troops being sent to %outh-Bast 5sia without the knowledge of !ongress or the public. (n 07<8, 4resident Cohnson set up the $ietnam (nformation Aroup with the purpose of supplying good news stories to the media. 4ropaganda was spread regarding %outh $ietnamese successes and "orth $ietnamese failures. !learly, it is not satisfactory to simply claim that $ietnam coverage in the media was all entirely honest and therefore the media is totally independent and capable of influencing public opinion and foreign policy. 6aniel Hallin

,07/<, cited in -obinson, *../, p0+*2 argues that the ?% media never took an oppositional stance toward the ?% war in $ietnam. 5ccording to Hallin, media coverage was largely supportive of the war until 07</, when some critical reporting did begin to emerge. However, Hallin argues that the critical reporting which appeared post-07</ was not a result of 'ournalists themselves taking an anti-war stance, but rather it was more due to arguments within the Cohnson administration over the course of the war. The critical reporting of the war was simply mirroring the debate that was already going on within the foreign policy elite. The argument put forward by Hallin is similar to >ance &ennett#s ,077., cited in -obinson, *../, p0+12 index hypothesis, which suggests that 'ournalists simply follow foreign policy elites when it comes setting the news agenda. Hallin also points out that the ?% media rarely reported the views of the anti-war movement, who were arguing not that the war was unwinnable, but that the war itself was immoral. Hallin#s perspective on the media#s coverage of the $ietnam war is interesting, because it challenges the view that the media took a critical stance. hat Hallin is instead arguing that is the media did not honestly take a stance at all, at least not one that was independent of ?% foreign policy elites. This challenges the notion that the media is able to deliberately shape foreign policy decision-making. However, perhaps what is more important in the case of $ietnam is the result, rather than the actual intentions of those within the media, and it is undeniable that the coverage of $ietnam was rather ground breaking in showing certain grim realities of war and, perhaps unintentionally, helping to shape public opinion. 5lso falling under the title of the elite model is Herman and !homsky#s ,07//2 propaganda model. This model suggests that five filters determine what news is reported and how it is to be reported. These filters are the ownership of the medium, the medium#s funding sources, the sourcing of information, flak and ideology ,which at the time was anti-communism, but according to !homsky can now better be defined simply as :fear:2. &y applying these filters, Herman and !homsky argue that concentration of ownership of media, funding coming from business advertisements, information often being sourced from government ,or business2 sources all add up to meaning that the mass media often behaves almost like a propaganda arm of the elite. 5n example of the media behaving in a way that could be seen under this model at propagandistic would be the ?% media#s coverage of the *..1 invasion of (ra). atchdog group Fairness and 5ccuracy in -eporting ,*..12 claim that there was a disproportionate focus on pro-war sources, with anti-war sources making up 'ust 0.D of the media. There was also very little comment in the ?% media regarding the legality of the war, despite a ma'ority of the public only supporting the war with ?" backing. The propaganda model does have its problems. alter >aferber ,07//2 suggests that the case for the propaganda model is overstated and points specifically to the case of aid to the "icaraguan !ontra rebels being blocked, asking how such a powerful propaganda system could allow that to happen. 4erhaps,

however, it is unfair to attempt to claim that the whole model is overstated based on the case of the aid to the !ontras. The example of the *..1 invasion of (ra) shows that the model is certainly not without merit and does help to explain the behaviour of the mass media. The propaganda model )uite clearly challenges any idea that the media can somehow shape foreign policy decision-making independently, as it shows that the mass media itself is closely tied to foreign policy elites and so is unlikely to shape the agenda, but instead more likely to follow the already set agenda of the elites. (t would seem that, overall, the ability of the media to shape foreign policy decision-making is largely overstated by proponents of the !"" effect. hile a !"" effect may exist to some extent, to claim that showing images of suffering will somehow compel policy makers to take action to end that suffering is highly naive. 4olicy makers are likely to have their own reasons to decide whether they should intervene or not and, as was demonstrated in the case of the &osnian war, images of suffering are not highly likely to change that. The $ietnam war is often cited as an example of media setting an agenda and leading opinion, but it seems that perhaps the role of the media during the $ietnam war has been largely misinterpreted by many as being hostile to the war, when in reality it was never really discussed as to whether or not the war was the right thing to do. Blite theory appears far more convincing than the often overly optimistic pluralist theory when it comes to matters of the media. The media#s coverage of the *..1 invasion of (ra) is testament to this, with news media toeing the line and supporting the ideology of, as !homsky would put it, :fear:. (t seems far more likely that the media follows the agenda of the elites, rather than sets the agenda for the foreign policy elites.

&ibliography Herman, B.%. E !homsky, ". 07//. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. >ondon9 $intage Hoskins, 5. E 3#>oughlin, &. *.0.. War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War. !ambridge9 4olity 4ress >aferber, . 07//. Whose News? 5vailable from9

http9FFwww.nytimes.comF07//F00F.<FbooksFwhose-news.html? scpG0Es)G=anufacturingHconsentEstGnyt I5ccessed /th =ay *.0*J =c!ombs, =axwell B., and %haw, 6.>. 078*. The 5genda-%etting Function of =ass =edia. Public !inion "uarterly 1<,*29 08< -0/8. =c"air, &. *..8. #n $ntroduction to Political Communication. 5bingdon9 -outledge =ermin, C. 0778. Television "ews and 5merican (ntervention in %omalia9 The =yth of a =edia6riven Foreign 4olicy. Political %cience "uarterly 00*,129 1/K-+.1. -obinson, 4. 0777. The !"" Bffect9 !an the "ews =edia 6rive Foreign 4olicy? &e'iew of $nternational %tudies *K,.*29 1.0-1.7. -obinson, 4. *../. The -ole of media and public opinion. (n9 %. %mith, 5. Hadfield E T. 6unne ,eds.2 (oreign Policy: Theories) #ctors) Cases. 3xford9 3xford ?niversity 4ress, pp01/-0K1 %trobel, .4. 077<. The CNN Effect. 5vailable from http9FFwww.a'r.orgFarticle.asp?idG1K8*

I5ccessed /th =ay *.0*J

Вам также может понравиться