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[G.R. Nos. L-21938-39. May 29, 1970.

]
VICENTE URIARTE, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER "ALL MATTERS OF
PROBATE." Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph (e), Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate.
2. ID.; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; VENUE; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PROVINCE WHERE
DECEDENT INHABITANT OF PHILIPPINES RESIDED AT TIME OF HIS DEATH OR WHERE INHABITANT OF FOREIGN
COUNTRY HAD ESTATE. The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding
should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the
court of first instance in the province of which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be
settled is that of a non-resident alien like the decedent in the instant case the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. Testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice
that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a
clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; PROBATE OF WILL SHOULD BE FILED IN SAME COURT WHERE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN
COMMENCED. Where intestate proceedings had already been commenced before a court of first instance, as in the
case at bar, the probate of the will of the decedent should be submitted to the same court, either in a separate
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose in the intestate proceedings. It is not in accord with public
policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if
several courts would be involved. Furthermore, the party seeking the probate of the will in the instant case knew
before filing the petition for probate with another court of first instance of the pendency of the intestate proceedings .
5. ID.; ID.; VENUE; WRONG VENUE WAIVABLE; WAIVER BY LACHES; INSTANT CASE. It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect. Petitioner, in the instant case, has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT NOT INCLINED TO ANNUL PROCEEDINGS REGULARLY HAD IN LOWER COURT ON THE
GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE. This Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower Court even
if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of the same jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
7. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; NATURAL CHILD: QUESTION OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT MAY BE PRESENTED

IN INDEPENDENT ACTION FOR COMPULSORY ACKNOWLEDGMENT OR IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS. A party claiming


to be an acknowledged natural child of testator is entitled to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as a natural child of said deceased testator in the proceeding instituted precisely for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural child, or intervene in proceedings for the probate of will of testator if it is still open,
or to ask for its re-opening, if it has already been closed, the probate having jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.
8. ID.; PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; DISMISSAL AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC; INSTANT CASE. The supplemental
petition for mandamus, in the case at bar, has become moot and academic for if the said petition is successful it will
only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders
of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of the said court dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioners motion for the reconsideration of
said order of dismissal. Said order being, as a result of what has been said heretofore, beyond petitioners power to
contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or worse still,
would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938
against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively
praying:

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". . . that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex H) and 11 July
1963 (Annex I) of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and
the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex K) of respondent Manila court denying petitioners omnibus motion to intervene and
to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the
settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396; supra of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
"For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court."

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Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:


"6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself
the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the
Negros court."

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The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment
be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding
said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a

resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken
up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioners contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of
the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No.
6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioners motion the Negros
Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set
the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The
record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as
special administrator.

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On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the abovementioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioners capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396
in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and
on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to
proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to
initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition
for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamaconas motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27,
1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing
from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December
7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:

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"Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been filed
out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, v. Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Et Al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on
questions of law which is tantamount to petitioners abandoning his appeal from this Court.

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"WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved."

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In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila
Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings
had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for
his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action,
as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of
Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed
to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the
Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for
probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the
Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner Vicente Uriartes Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition
and Annulment of said proceedings.

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Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by
Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the
Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the
Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for
its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly
erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding
No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question,
the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly,
when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of
First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the

Negros and the Manila Courts province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable
properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no
longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

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It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for
the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344
or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted
said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public
policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if
several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila
Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriartes petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the
Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he
knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending
in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is
concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioners petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had
expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioners contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue
therefor.

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It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed

his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with
notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by
the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on
his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in
a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that
he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted
Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this
proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the
proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No.
51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed
interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for
compulsory acknowledgment."

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We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde v. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249;
Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez v. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on v. Belmonte, 47 O.G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental
petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner
was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of
said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioners motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore, beyond
petitioners power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of
said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a
result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus
docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside.
With costs against petitioner.

[G.R. No. 55509. April 27, 1984.]


ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, Petitioner, v. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; PROBATE THEREOF, MANDATORY; INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS FILED PRIOR TO
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITH LATTER. We hold that respondent Judge did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss the petition for
probate of Grimm's two wills. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved add allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code, Sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court). The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot v.
Pao, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate
proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in
the Utah district court).

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Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm, and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two
children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B, pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside
the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said:
"I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm
McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my
Philippine property." (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. La Var Tate on March 7, 1978 in
Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53,
Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the
codicil. It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for
Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. La Var Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,

Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and
by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.

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In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives
(administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in
the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa
Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate." It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp.
49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024. At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
moved that she be appointed special administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco
(partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case), withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000
on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co.,
Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate
case).

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Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and
others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not
signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine
one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.

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Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer,
who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot

considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale
with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78,
testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979.
It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection
to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with
its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate
case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's
lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in
collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the
firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then
superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm, in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be
set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses,
that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died
testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.
Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
or, alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

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Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot v. Pao, L-42088,
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge

assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
Short summary: Intestate proceedings already commenced and was about to be closed (there already been a project of partition) when testate
proceedings initiated. The decedent left 2 wills which the petitioners for the intestate proceedings knew. Court held that probate proceedings are proper
and intestate proceedings should be consolidated with the testate proceedings.

Facts:
-Edward Grimm died in Makati Med
-Heirs
1st marriage (ended in divorce) children:
Juanita Grimm Morris
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden)
2nd marriage: 2nd wife MAXINE
Son Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete)
Daughter Linda Grimm
-he left 2 wills: 1 for his properties in RP (conjugal property w/ 2nd wife), the other for his estate outside RP wherein the daughters in the 1st marriage
were intentionally not given anything
-43 days after decedent's death, ETHEL filed Intestate proceedings, was named special administrator
>>>Maxine (2nd wife/stepmom) filed OPPOSITION + MTD:
there's Utah proceedings for the probate of will
Prayed that she be appointed special administratrix
>>>w/drawn by Maxine
INTESTATE COURT: since the parties wanted it, Maxine, Pete and Ethel were all appointed as joint administrators (Intestate court already knew there
was a will but did not do anything about it)
-Administrators submitted an inventory
-Palawan Pearl Project (business owned by deceased) sold to Makiling Management Co (owned by Ethel and husband and lawyer), acquiesced by Linda
(daughter in 2nd marriage) and Juanita (other daughter in 1st marriage)
-PROJECT PARTITION APPROVED BY INTESTATE COURT
-Ethel filed MOTION for accounting so that Estate properties can be partitioned among heirs and intestate estate be closed.
TESTATE COURT: filed 2 years after intestate proceedings
-sought to set aside the 1979 partition approved by intestate court
-Ethel filed MTD - denied for lack of merit
WON THE TESTATE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR PROBATE? NO
-A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
-The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
-so dismissed Ethel's petition for certiorari

[G.R. No. L-26694. December 18, 1973.]


NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, Petitioner, v. HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge,
Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, Respondents.
I
Nature of the Case
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an Order of Hon. Rosendo Baltazar, as
Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the residential house of petitioner. 1
Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo stationed at Iloilo City, approving said demolition. 2
II
Facts of the Case
The record of this case discloses the following facts:

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Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La
Paz, Iloilo City. 3 Many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of
private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a
monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay the lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an
action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as
judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City. 5 The filing of
said case spawned various court suits.
Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No. L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of
merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on
December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way
of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7, 1967. 8
Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964,
with private respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement inter alia, provides as follows:

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1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove . . . the residential house therefrom . . .
before December 31, 1966;
2. For the use and occupation . . . of the said premises . . . from June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said defendant
will pay plaintiff a monthly rent . . . of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month . . .;
3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any . . . provision of the amicable settlement within . . . fifty (50)
days . . . the plaintiff shall be entitled to `immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the premises and to
recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated by defendant;
4. Defendant waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to bar enforcement of the execution of the
judgment in the case at anytime within one (1) year from December 31, 1969.

In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement and enjoined the
parties to comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the settlement within the 50day period, private respondent Laguda moved for execution which the Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10
On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution, but before the Court could
resolve the motion, petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the case to the Court of
Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an opposition to the petitioners July 14, 1965,
motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally authorized to enter into the
amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be
executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who
replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12
Denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution on September 30, 1965, the City
Court however, held in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the Court of First Instance of.
Iloilo stamped its imprimatur, considering the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the
properties involved therein are in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on October 25, 1965, private respondent Laguda
moved the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of the City Courts order of
execution which was granted despite petitioners opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioners motion for
reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was brought before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36989-R) which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15
On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon representations of
private respondent Laguda, copies of which were served by the sheriff upon the petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros
in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No.
1469. 16
On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon motion of private
respondent Laguda and over petitioners opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, respondent
Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469,
praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis. 18
On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:

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1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement
became due and payable;
2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to reimbursement as a
builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in transferring the same to another place;
and
3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion for the issuance of an order of
demolition; 19
On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioners claim and supported the legality of the
courts ruling. 20 On the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469 approved the order of
demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39,

of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional mandate on due process, petitioner moved to reconsider the same but
the motion was denied by the Court on September 26, 1966. 22 Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of
Demolition, petitioner brought this present action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to
the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the
order of demolition in Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the
respondents, the building in question was already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioners posting a bond of
P1,000.00, this Court on November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein
respondents from proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24
III.
Issues of the Case
The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:

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1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and
binding upon her successor;
2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or reasonable
expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place;
3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in
connection with the motion for the issuance of the order of demolition.
IV.
Discussion
Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the estate of her late
husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the
amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced.
Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioners lawful acts before the
revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such
revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to
terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good
faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights
acquired under a previous grant of administration.25

cralaw:red

In connection with the petitioners contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to
reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place,
the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good
faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they
cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises
until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of
lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects. 26
It is next urged by petitioner that there was denial of due process for failure of private respondent to notify the
guardian ad litem of the minor children of the deceased, Bamon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.

A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that there
was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger, guardian
ad litem of the minor children of the late Bamon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed
special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated
August 4, 1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of private
respondents counsel at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with the same Court.
V.
Conclusion
The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that the
respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned orders.
"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment
as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient by
itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent,
and it must be shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case made out by the present
petition. 30
There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the
case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein presents a
glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its
disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before
the Court of Appeals 32 , Once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo 33 , and twice before this Court. 34 The
present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt
termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and
her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy
of certiorari which should only be resorted to in cases of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by an inferior
court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that
they could well devote to really meritorious cases.
VI.
Judgment
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966, is immediately set aside.
Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth.

LUZON SURETY V. QUEBAR


Short summary: Surety company entered into an indemnity agreements wherein they agreed to become sureties to 2 administrator's bond in favor of
Pastor Quebar, and the latter agreed to pay them. Quebar submitted a project of partition and accounts which was approved by the court, so Quebar
argues that the bond should now be cancelled (thus, not paying anything more to the surety). Surety sues the administrator for amounts due to it. Court
held that the administrators bond still exists, coterminous with the probate proceedings. And even if there's already a project of partition, as long as not
all of the debts are paid, the administrator's job is not yet done, thus, the bond still subsists and the administrator is still liable to pay the surety.

Facts:
-Luzon Surety Company entered into an indemnity agreement w/ Pastor Quebar:
Luzon Surety Company would issue 2 administrator's bond, P15k each, for 2 Special proceedings
Quebar and Kilayco would pay Luzon Surety P300 in advance as premium for every 12 months.or renewed by them
Quebar and Kilayco also agrees to indemnify Luzon Surety for all damages, losses.expenses
-Quebar paid for the first year, P304.50 each
-Quebar submitted a Project Partition and Accounts
>>>CFI approved it
-when Luzon Surety demanded payment of premiums and documentary stamps for the years after the first.
-Quebar and Kilayco filed a MOTION FOR CANCELLATION AND/OR REDUCTION OF EXECUTOR'S BOND: heirs already received their shares (so
tapos na dapat trabaho nila, di na kelangan ng bond)
>>>CFI: cancelled bonds. - As a result, Kilayco and Quebar refused to pay the amount demanded by Luzon Surety (which amounted to almost P2.5k
each ~ P5k)
-Luzon Surety filed for collection.
CFI: allowed Luzon Surety to recover: defendants liable under terms of the Indemnity Agreements, even if they did not renew it, because they were still
in force and effect until cancelled by Court order. - Quebar and Kilayco appealed
CA: referred case to SC, questions of law involved

HELD: With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the risk involved, that is, in case defendant-appellant Pastor T.
Quebrar defaults in his administrative duties. The surety became liable under the bond for the faithful administration of the estate by the
administrator/executor. Hence, for as long as defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar was administrator of the estates, the bond was held liable and
inevitably, the plaintiff-appellee's liability subsists since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator

HOW TO INTERPRET LIABILITY FOR THE BOND: Look on the language of the bond itself
-HERE: the bond is practically the same as R81.1, ROC
-The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts into the bond any condition prescribed by statute
-PURPOSE OF BOND: indemnify creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust
- the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the
liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the
course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111 NY 531, 19 NE 94), it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity
agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship.
-EFFECT OF APROVAL OF PROJECT OF PARTITION: NONE
...liquidation: the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses - here, not all expenses were paid yet
project partition: estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Even w/ the approval of the partition, the
CFI could still exercise jurisidction over the administration proceedings
WHEN SURETY LIABLE: as long as probate proceedings are ongoing

The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does
not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law
-As long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability (Deobold vs. Oppermann, supra)
notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
CAN'T INTERPRET THE TWO BONDS SEPARATELY: the terms of the bond makes them jointly and severally liable
-so 1 can't claim that the bond and the indemnity agreement failed to have effect since
approval of the project partition
nonpayment of stated premiums
WON PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AND DST ARE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO EFFECTIVITY OF BONDS? NO
-no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will terminate at the end of the first year if the premium for continuation thereafter is not paid.
And there is no clause by which its obligation is avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual premium
-Even on a failure to pay an annual premium, the contract ran on until affirmative action was taken to avoid it. The obligation of the bond was therefore
continuous
-The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and not as a condition
-"the one-year period mentioned therein refers not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely to the payment of premiums, and, consequently,
does not affect at all the effectivity or efficacy of such bond. But such non-payment alone of the premiums for the succeeding years . . . does not
necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in the contract making such non-payment
of premiums a cause for the extinguishment or termination of the undertaking. . . . There is no necessity for an extension or renewal of the agreement
because by specific provision thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made dependent upon the existence of the original bond."
CORPORATE SURETY: Suretyship became regarded as insurance
-no need to interpret the contract because NO AMBIGUITY

URIARTE V. CFI
Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros
Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while
he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not yet done).
Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate of the will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed, contending that Negros courts
already had exclusive jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special proceeding, and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will.
Petitioner contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a non-resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the proceedings.
But since probate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue was improper, petitioner
considered to have waived the defect by laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized as the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene
in the probate proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.
Facts:
-Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negro. -The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed
petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings for
compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was still pending . -PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB
failed to qualify. OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan): Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated
- submitted before Negros court. ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable . JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced
SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts . Since there's a will, no need for intestate
proceedings before Negros Courts. Vicente had no legal personality to sue
>>>OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same
NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it. VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal of petition for
probate + annulment of proceedings - DENIED
-Manila court admitted to probate the last will
WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO.
Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left property may take
cognizance of settlement of his estate
-here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros
Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court
special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in
accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose.
So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy
VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID
-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court earlier: Manila court already
*appointed an administrator
*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier
-court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction
As to interest of Vicente in the case
-two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

VIUDA DE BACALING V. LAGUDA


Short summary: The lessees of the land were sought to be evicted but since they put up a residential house on the property, they refused to do so. The
lessee, who was also the judicial administratrix of her husband co-lesee, entered into an amicable settlement w/ the owner of the property wherein she
agreed to leave the property. She was however replaced as judicial administratrix so she now claims that the amicable settlement cannot be enforced
against her. Court held that her acts bound the next administrator of the estate, thus, they should leave the property.

Facts:
-Hector Laguda owned a residential lot in La Paz, Iloilo
-He allowed Dr. Ramon Bacaling and her wife Nelita to build a residential house on a portion of the lot, upon payment of monthly rentals
-since the spouses were unable to pay the rentals, an action for ejectment was filed against Nelita (Dr. Ramon already died) as the judicial administratrix
of the estate of her husband
-suffering many legal setbacks and unable to have the action for ejectment dismissed, she entered (as the judicial administratrix) an compromise
agreement w/ Hector where she agreed to pay the accrued rents and vacate the premises and demolish the house.
-Compromise agreement approved by the courts
-Nelia refused to comply with the agreement
-Hector moved for execution of the compromise agreement
-pending this, Nelia was discharged as the judicial administrator of her husband's estate so she was claiming in a motion to quash that the settlement
was not binding on the new administrator - denied
-Alias writ of execution issued by court
-to stop the demolition of the house, Nelia filed certiorari proceedings w/ TRO before SC

WON ACTS OF NELIA AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX PRIOR TO HER DISCHARGE OR REMOVAL ARE VALID AND BINDING
UPON HER SUCCESSOR? YES
-Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall
have the same validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of
administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the
revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration.

WON NELIA WAS A BUILDER IN GF? NO


-Lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the
lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their
improvements if the lessor so elects.

WON THERE WAS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
OF THE DECEASED OF THE MOTION FOR EXECUTION? NO
-there was evidence that the guardian ad litem has been duly apprised, as shown by the certification of the counsel for Nelia at the foot of her opposition
to the motion for execution