Vanessa Arrha A.

De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 1

Penera v. COMELEC, Andanar Facts: 1. Petition to nullify the resolution of COMELEC ordering the disqualification of herein petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte in the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. 2. Penera & Andanar are mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica for thr 1997 elections. 3. Andanar filed a petition for disqualification with the Office of the Regional Election Director against Penera et al. alleging that they unlawfully engaged in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period -> Penera et al. went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. | In violation of Sec. 68 & 80 4. Answer by Penera: No premature compaigning; a. Motorcade that took place was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. b. No speech c. Jurisprudence that allows a motorcade to accompany the filing of the COC. 5. Not decided before elections; Penera ended up being proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta. Ana. Penera assumed office. 6. COMELEC resolved to disqualify Penera. a. 2 Jeepneys & 10 motorcycles b. Presence of banners and ads in the vehicles c. One of the trucks was a public speaker sound subsystem announcing their intent to run in the coming elections d. After filing of COC, motorcade proceeded almost 9 km from Sta. Monica e. Penera et al aboard throwing candies to residents & onlookers 7. Penera's defense: Such acts do not constitute campaigning; Evidence given was grossly insufficient; Motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned and supporters merely joined Penera et al along the way to and after the filing of their COCs. Issue: 1. 2. WON there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC I finding Penera engaged in premature campaigning? NO. WON premature campaigning can still be committed in view of RA 8436 Sec. 15 as amended by RA 9369? YES. [ Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period? --> w/ regard to this note that motorcade happened before Penera became a candidate and not being a candidate his acts cannot be deemed as unlawful

Ratio: 1. Court will not decide on a question of fact, one which Penera raises in this petition. 2. The Resolution of the COMELEC are sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. a. OEC, Section 80 i. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election. b. According to Sec. 68, the violation of Sec. 80, if declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of or found by the Commission would be disqualification as a candidate or be prevented from holding office if candidate was already elected. c. In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanars evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. d. The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 2

political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate e. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to: i. introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or ii. to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters come election time. iii. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates. To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both. a. Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate. b. Past violations may be punished once a person becomes a candidate. True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. c. When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. d. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. e. The provision that provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. *Purpose of prohibition against premature campaigning: to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser -known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity f.

4.

3.

WHEREFORE petition is dismissed. Penera 2009 case: SC discusses ratio of previous decision: the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. Issue: WON the decision is valid? No. Contrary to existing law. *Eto ang illogical, adopting the Lanot doctrine that there should be an element of a "candidate" but then showing that candidate is not a candidate unless at the start of the campaign period. Tapos hindi pa inaddress kung ano yung mangyayari sa provision regarding premature campaigning. 1. Adopting the ruling in Lanot: (Main question faced by the Court is WON Eusebio was a candidate when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period?) a. 3 essential elements constituting violation of Sec. 80 of OEC are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 3

of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. i. The second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a candidate. ii. The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. b. Assuming that all potential candidates filed their COCs on the last day, which (under Sec 75) is the day before the start of the campaign period then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no particular candidate or candidates to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done outside the campaign period. (Me: Why is the person the one punished and not the candidate himself who may have hired/instigated the person to prematurely campaign?) c. Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. d. Lanot doctrine: Person is only considered a candidate upon the start of the campaign period. In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436 -> note use of the word only a. "x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x." b. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. -> (Me: Doesn't this mean na never na pwedeng ma-commit talaga and premature campaigning) Acts committed by Penera prior to the date when she became a candidate, even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. 4. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

5.

WHEREFORE we GRANT the MR. Chavez v. COMELEC, ABALOS, AMORA-LADRA (acting director), SOLGEN Facts: 1. Petition by Chavez as taxpayer and citizen asking the enjoinment of Sec. 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6250 2. Sec. 32: a. Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. 3. Oct & Nov 2003 - Chavez entered into agreements with certain establishments (clothing and video games) to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up basically showing Chavez with such products. 4. Dec 2003 - Chavez filed his COC for the position of Senator 5. Later on, he was directed by COMELEC's Law Department to comply with the provision of the resolution 6. Chavez sent a letter asking for exemption since these were product endorsements and not election paraphernalia intended for campaigning > Denied. 7. Chavez contention: Sec. 32 is unconstitutional a. a gross violation of the non-impairment clause;

2.

3.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 4

b. c. d. an invalid exercise of police power; in the nature of an ex-post facto law; contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and i. Chavez: under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. invalid due to overbreadth. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning b. Valid means employed -> No overbreath i. There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. ii. The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. Only disallows after filing of COC and before the start of the campaign period. COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. a. Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides: i. Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. b. Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. iii.

e.

Issue: 1. Is Section 32 an invalid exercise of police power? NO. 2. WON it was within the powers of the COMELEC to prohibit these billboards? YES. 3. Does such billboards constitute election campaigning? YES. 4. WON such provision is a gross violation of the non-impairment clause? NO. 5. WON Sec 32 is an ex post facto law? NO. 6. WON prohibition of billboards is a violation of the Fair Elections Act? NO. 2. Ratio: 1. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals? a. There is a valid purpose: i. examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser -known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power ii. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 5

3. Chavez cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. a. election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities: i. Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate ii. Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; iii. Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office; iv. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or v. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate b. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. a. Greater purpose: Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. The offense punished is non-removal of the propaganda materials 3 days after effectivity of the resolution -> Non-removal is a prospective act after the law. Hence not ex post facto The offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials of a person who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. b. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. SC approves SOLGEN argument that there is no prohibition just mere regulation again for a relevant purpose. a.

6.

WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED. Vda De Halili (as administatrix of Fortunato Halili) v. CA, Suntay Facts: 1. Appeal from CA decision holding: a. That four promissory notes and the lease contract executed by Federico Suntay were void because their object or purpose was illegal for being in contravention of sections 47 and 48 of the Revised Election Code which, respectively, deal with prohibited contributions and limit the expenses of candidates in an election campaign. b. Halili liable to pay Suntay P8K as annual rental fee for the latter's fishpond from Oct 1955 until possession is surrendered to Suntay 2. Federico Suntay was the official gubernatorial candidate of the Liberal Party in Bulacan in the 1951 elections. a. Fortunato F. Halili -> the incumbent governor, head of the Liberal Party in Bulacan, Suntay's campaign manager. b. At the same time, Halili was a public utility operator. 3. Halili agreed to make cash advances to Suntay in order for the latter to finance his campaign 4. However they were aware of a prohibition in the Revised Elections Code which made it unlawful for any entity operating a public utility from contributing or making any expenditure in connection with an election campaign. a. Further, another limitation: Candidate for his election campaign cannot spend more than the total amount of the emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate (P5K) 5. Laundering scheme: the advances or loans were made in the names of Halili's trusted employees as dummies a. Suntay executed promissory notes in favor of Halili's Ees (5K, 30K, 20K -> 55K)

4.

5.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 6

Halili executed a lease agreement with such Ees for a four -year period beginning October 1, 1951 (the period is as long as the gubernatorial four-year term) c. Lease was assigned by said Ees to Halili d. ** According to Suntay, he never received the rentals nor the proceeds of the notes. That was denied by Halili After end of lease, Suntay filed a complaint to nullify the promissory notes and the lease for lack of consideration and for being against election laws TC: Nullified notes & lease CA: Affirmed except for the ruling of payment of 8K by Halili to Suntay a. Moreover, "the consideration involved in the said promissory notes and the lease contract was evidently designed to promote an unlawful object -- to be spent in the election campaign b. Cited an American case [Brock v. Wilson]: There is a ruling that money knowingly loaned to be corruptly used in an election cannot be recovered That contention is not well-taken. The word "entity" in section 47 may refer to an individual. If a corporation operating a public utility is prohibited from making a political contribution or expenditure, there is no valid reason for not applying the prohibition to a natural person operating a public service business. a. Purpose of prohibition with the view on public utility: i. A public utility operator is prohibited from making a contribution or expenditure in an election campaign because such a disbursement would diminish his or its income and would be a controversial disbursement since it would embroil a public utility operator in partisan politics. ii. The diminution of the income would constrain the public utility operator to ask for an increase in the rates which may be charged. Any increase in rates would be detrimental to the public. From the finding that the lease and the promissory notes were illegal, the logical corollary is that Halili and Suntay were in pari delicto or particeps criminis or were equally guilty in violating sections 47 and 48. Suntay, as the candidate and beneficiary of the contributions, and Halili, as the contributor or financial backer and campaign manager, disbursing the Campaign funds, were co-principals. a. Effect: The rule is that, if both parties are in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other c.

3.

6.

7. 8.

Issue: 1. WON Sec. 48 is applicable because Suntay did not prove that Halili knew that the loans and the rental for the lease would be used by Suntay "as would exceed" the governor's salary for one year in the sum of P5,000? NO. Sec. 48 is applicable. 2. WON Sec. 48 applies to a non-candidate (Halili)? YES. 3. WON Sec. 47 applies to a natural person? YES. 4. WON Halili was in pari delicto with Suntay or he was less guilty than him? In pari delicto -> Equal liability Ratio: 1. That factual contention is devoid of merit because Halili admitted the allegations in Suntay's complaint that Halili was aware that Suntay would incur campaign expenses exceeding the governor's annual and that Suntay's disbursements exceeded that amount (pp. 4 and 34, Record on Appeal). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that "Halili was fully aware of the purpose and objective in consummating the lease contract and the promissory notes, that is, to sustain the campaign funds of plaintiff Suntay" and that "Halili cannot feign lack of knowledge" of that purpose. 2. Appellant's contention is not tenable under section 184 of the Revised Election Code which speaks of principals and accomplices. a. HALILI was no ordinary lender and He knew that the rental and the loans would be spent for Suntay's candidacy. He was not only Suntay's financial backer but, as campaign manager, he had a hand in the expenditure of the funds supplied by him to Suntay. b. He was Suntay's co-principal

4.

WHEREFORE CA decision is affirmed. PILAR v. COMELEC Facts: 1. Petition assailing resolution of COMELEC 2. Mar 1992 - Pilar filed COC for position as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela Province 3. Later on (3 days later), he withdrew his COC 4. In 1993 & 1994 - COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures -> Filed a petition with COMELEC en banc: DENIED Issue:

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 7

1. WON Pilar is liable for the fine? YES. with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required. The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act. Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender. It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures. For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied). Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied). WHEREFORE Petition is DISMISSED.

Ratio: 1. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. a. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. b. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. c. Resolution by COMELEC -> calls for the submission of such statement by all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy d. It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. e. OEC Sec 73: [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. f. Purpose: i. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections ii. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. * Laws involved: RA 7166, Section 14: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 8

AKBAYAN-YOUTH, various orgs v. COMELEC Facts: 1. Petitioners seeks to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189 2. Raul Roco invited the COMELEC to a public hearing to discuss a possible extension a. There was a discussion. 3. Consultation meeting among regional heads & representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. a. Consensus of the group: To disapprove i. Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election ii. Commission has no more time left to accomplish all preelection activities b. Later on resolution thus disapproved the request Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001? NO. 2. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections? NO. provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. a. Substantive: Sec 1, Art V of the Constitution: i. SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE. b. Procedural: the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. i. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register... ii. Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. iii. The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even preelection activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. iv. On petition for exclusion. Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the

Ratio: 1. To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. n light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 9

permanent voters list [cannot be filed 100 days before a regular election] v. In real-world terms, this means that if a special voters registration is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voters list since we would already be well into the 100day prohibitive period. vi. Purpose of the period: Serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take them at face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a voters list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and ghosts x x x. vii. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. c. On residual powers of COMELEC (as argued by petitioners) i. SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Preelection Acts - If it should no longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain preelection acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage. ii. SC: the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. 1. Section 28 of R.A. 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law. In its comment COMELEC painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the operational impossibility[12] of conducting a special registration, which in its on language, can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission. iv. Law does not ask that COMELEC do what is impossible if such is indeed impossible. d. Petitioners did not come to the court with clean hands and they had in fact admitted that they "slept on their rights". iii. Romualdez v. RTC-Tacloban Facts: The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines (the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos) Petitioner, decided to live in Tolosa, Leyte and thus caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as Barangay Captain of the place. After People Power, being a relative of the first lady, fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While abroad, he took special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance. Early 1987 - he decided to come back to the Philippines to run for a congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. Later on he arrived in the Philippines without any government document because of a US Govt. directive that he will be aborted if he did not leave at a specified period. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters 11 May 1992 elections, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. He was allowed to register. Private respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and RA 7166. 8 Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 10

the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Answer by Romualdez: He has been a resident since 1980. He has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991. RTC disqualified him as a voter. context that these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice." It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed. 23 We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those entitled and bound to exercise it.

6.

Issue: WON Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte? NO. Ratio: 1. Court: No evidence of abandonment by Romualdez 2. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. 3. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. 4. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 21 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. a. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 5. The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the

Siawan v. Inopiquez (Judge) Facts: 1. Complaint by Datu Siwan against Judge Inopiquez of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with the latters handling of a criminal case and two election cases for inclusion of voters. 2. Two identical complaints against the judge were filed. 3. An investigating judge assigned to the administrative matter found the following facts: - found him guilty of grave abuse of official functions and/ or oppression and recommended that he be fined the sum of P15,000.00 and/ or suspended for a period of six months. a. Crim case i. In Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco . . ., the accused then was charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions under Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, involving as the complaint states, a paquiao contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; ii. Accused therein filed a motion for inhibition because of the relation of the Judge with people helping the complainant. > Denied by judge iii. Said case was dismissed because of an affidavit of desistance. But after dismissal, the accused in that case sued the person who filed the complaint. And so as a result of that complainant wants to file again against the accused. Accused opposed but herein judge decided to continue.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 11

Judge however inhibited himself because of process. Nevertheless the same action was filed by the same complainant using essentially the same files. v. Later on, Judge issued the Order... inhibiting himself from trying the case (Exh. 6) on the ground that the counsel for the offended party is related to the Presiding Judge; -> Denied by RTC vi. Nevertheless Judge dismissed because there was no intervention of the public prosecutor in the filing of the complaint. 1. MR by complainant 2. Judge ordered accused to comment despite the fact that the former still had not acquired jurisdiction over the latter (not arrested) b. Exclusion cases i. RESP is presiding judge in such Municipal Trial Court. ii. Respondent has had relatives who ran for public office while he assumed as such presiding judge. [brother-in-law, son, daughter] iii. In all these elections, the respondent never inhibited [himself] from hearing inclusion and exclusion cases except for once wherein his sister-in-law, Charito Laurente, was the petitioner in an inclusion proceedings iv. In another case (for inclusion), where his uncle was the petitioner, he did not inhibit himself iv. Issue: 1. WON Resp Judge should be punished as recommended? YES. Ratio: 1. Crim case a. Thus, respondent could have recused himself from the moment his disqualification was sought by the accused Julia Enriqua Seco in Criminal Case No.594. Respondent hung on to the case as long as he could until this case was filed against him. i. Although respondent is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to Atty Otadoy, the evidence shows that because of his relationship not only to Atty Otadoy but also to those helping the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, one of whom, Guillermo Laurente, is respondent's father-in-law, while the other one, Atty. Felix Sun, is his brother-in-law, respondent judge acted with obvious partiality for complainant in the criminal case. ii. Without addressing the issues raised by accused Seco, respondent denied her motion for inhibition in his order, dated May 22, 1987, on the pretext that the motion was filed with the assistance of Atty. Camilo A. Superable, who was then not the counsel of record of accused Seco.[12] Apparently realizing that the motion for disqualification was meritorious, respondent, after partially hearing the case, dismissed it on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Restituto Pedrano. iii. Nevertheless when Seco sued, Judge ordered for the revival of the case [recalled his order of dismissal] iv. Indeed, respondent's bias towards the private complainant showed when he allowed his father-in-law to advise the private complainant, who is said to be his political leader during the proceedings v. Irregular actuations of respondent in the same Crim. Case No.584 wherein he granted the motion of the private prosecutor to withdraw or detach the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant 1) without the approval of the private prosecutor; 2) despite the fact that the dismissal of the case was already final; and 3) stating in the order that the accused was not yet arraigned, when the truth is the prosecution has already rested when the case was dismissed on December 22, 1992. b. Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons.[16] i. A judge should not handle a case where he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary Admin case a. Faulted for not inihibiting himself: Rule 137, 1 of the Rules of Court provides: i. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to

2.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 12

either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: i. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where: (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree; Under these provisions, respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge. Wrong application of the law i. Election case of uncle -> no merit 1. In Election Case No.333, the petitioner, respondent's uncle, Ponciano C. Inopiquez, alleged that he was a resident of Barangay. Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte; that he had the qualifications of a voter and none of the disqualifications; that he had not voted for two consecutive elections in Metro Manila; that he was unable to register in Barangay Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte, because he could not book a plane for Leyte on that day; and that it was his intention to vote in Leyte as he was already retired as judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, of Manila. 2. Thus, under the law, a petition for inclusion may be filed only by a person (a) whose application for registration has been disapproved by the board of election inspectors or (b) whose name has been stricken out from the list of voters. No exception is provided by the law. The petition of former Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez does not fall within the coverage of the law, since he was neither refused registration by the board nor his name ordered stricken from the list of voters of Barangay Talisay, Matag-ob, Leyte. No notice given to board of election inspectors 1. The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333[25] and Election Case No. 292[26] named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that the board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted on such inclusion proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice posted in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set for the hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the above provision. 2. The failure of respondent to observe the requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because it can be assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.

ii.

b.

c.

d.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law. Mercado v. Judge Dysangco, Clerk of court Facts: 1. In a complaint, petitioners charged judge with grave misconduct. a. Allegations: i. prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, fortyeight (48) persons filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list. ii. Of these forty-eight (48) petitioners, nine (9) were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while thirtynine (39) were supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales.

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 13

Mercado and Gonzales were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija. iv. Mercado filed opposition against the inclusion of his nonsupporters. v. In a hearing, the supporters of Gonzales did not appear and so judge dismissed their petitions in open court. Furthermore, he made an assurance that he did not issue any order for the inclusion of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. vi. On the day of the elections however complainants were surprised to find thirty-four (34) of the thirty-nine (39) petitioners with an Order signed by respondent judge and attested by respondent clerk of court,[2] directing their inclusion in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. Judge denied committing any anomaly in ordering the inclusion of the thirtyfour (34) petitioners in the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan. He explained that his Order was based on his interviews with those petitioners,[3] who registered as voters in the said barangay Investigating judge found that the only basis for inclusion of such voters was the personal interview with the judge (no sign that counsels were present; no hearing) -> Fine of P5K with a warning iii. is the fact that the thirty-nine (39) petitioners failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings. How then could they present evidence? iii. The minutes of the interview merely show that it is a superficial and mechanical inquiry on each petitioners age, citizenship, residence and years of residence in Barangay Kabulihan. The petitioners were not required to swear under oath or to present proof of their residence.[13] Their lawyers were not even notified. These incidents render the bare assertions of the thirty-four (34) petitioners doubtful and unreliable. iv. Despite respondent judges allegation that the petition for inclusion was set for hearing on April 25, no notice of hearing was sent to the parties and their counsel. v. And, second, respondent judge issued the Order beyond the ten-day period required by Section 143. The petitions of the thirty-nine (39) Gonzales supporters were filed prior to April 17, 1997,[16] yet the Order granting them was issued only on May 9, 1997. In releasing the Order on a Friday and two days before the Barangay Elections, respondent judge effectively deprived the complainants of their right to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. Clearly, they were deprived of their right to due process. b. Respondent judge likewise committed gross misconduct constituting violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. That respondent judge exhibited partiality in favor of candidate Gonzales, being supported by the thirty-four (34) petitioners, is shown by the fact that he granted their petitions despite their absence on the scheduled hearings and their failure to present evidence. Surely, he did not accord the same treatment to the petitioners supporting complainant Mercado. * SEC. 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters. -(a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be received. (b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state the place, day and hour in which such petition

2.

3.

Issue: 1. WON Judge is guilty? YES. Ratio: 1. We find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended. a. Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, explicitly lays down the procedure governing petitions for inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters* i. The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis of the evidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to render a decision within 10 days from the filing of the petition. Respondent judge, unfortunately, does not know the above legal provisions. ii. He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He could not have done so. Extant in the record

Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170 Pub Off Digests Page 14

shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by registered mail or by personal delivery or by leaving it in the possession of a person of sufficient discretion in the residence of the said person or, in the event that the foregoing procedure is not practicable, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or municipality, at least ten days prior to the day set for the hearing. In the interest of justice and to afford the challenged voter every opportunity to contest the petition for exclusion, the court concerned may, when the challenged voter fails to appear in the first day set for the hearing, order that notice be effected in such manner and within such period of time as it may decide, which time shall in no case be more than ten days from the day the respondent is first found in default. (c) Each petition shall refer to only one precinct. (d) No costs shall be assessed in these proceedings. However, if the court should be satisfied that the application has been filed for the sole purpose of molesting the adverse party and causing him to incur expenses, it may condemn the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses. (e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his evidence. (f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the registered voter is fictitious. In no case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation of facts. (g)These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The decision shall be rendered within six hours after the hearing and within ten days from the date of its filing in court. Cases appealed to the regional trial court shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal in the office of the clerk of court. In any case, the court shall decide these petitions not later than the day before the election and the decision rendered thereon shall be immediately final and executory, notwithstanding the provision of Section 138 on the finality of decisions. (Emphasis supplied) The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis