The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism Author(s): Michael Devitt Source: Nos, Vol.

30, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, 1996 (1996), pp. 159-176 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216241 . Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:40
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1996 PhilosophicalPerspectives, 10, Metaphysics,

THE METAPHYSICS OF NONFACTUALISM

MichaelDevitt Universityof Maryland

of Nonfactualism 1. Usual Characterizations I am concerned with a doctrine that is often called "nonfactualism" and and that encompasses"noncognitivism," "emotivism," "projectivism," in SimonBlackburn's "quasi-realism" (1984, 1993a,1993b).Nonfactualism or eliminativism about that area. an area is obviously a sort of antirealism But what sort exactly? The usual answersin the literatureare along the about some areaof language-for example, followinglines. Nonfactualism moral language, causal language, or the theoreticallanguageof scienceis the view that the predicatesin that area do not denote, correspondto, Or it is the view that the indicativesentencesin that area etc., properties.1 are not assertionsor statements,2are not factual or descriptive,3 are not truth-conditional,4 and do not correspondto facts.5 Rather, those sentences have other functionslike expressingattitudesor emotions, or prescribingnormsor rules.6 These answersmake it seem as if nonfactualism at least, a is, primarily semantic doctrine, a doctrine about what sentences mean and predicates refer to.7 Yet implicitin the answersis a certainmetaphysical doctrine, a doctrine about the way the world is or is not. The answerssuggest that, aboutsome areais the view thatthere are no nonfactualism metaphysically, properties8or facts9appropriateto that area; for example, there are no moralpropertiesor facts. Of course, it is not surprisingthat nonfactualismshould have an implicit metaphysics. Intuitively, the central underlying idea of nonfactualism in an area is that the putative reality in that area is problematic or defective. This idea supplies the motivationfor giving nonfactualism's special treatment to the predicates and sentences of the language in the area. Thus, it is because some philosophersthink that there are no moral Propertiesthat they deny that mora)predicatesrefer. Yet, given the impact of the "linguisticturn"in philosophy,it is also not

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160/ Michael Devitt surprisingthat language, not the implicit metaphysics,is the focus of
discussion.

I think that the failure to focus on the metaphysicaldoctrine is a mistake.10 For, that doctrineis distinctfrom the semanticone and, as just indicated, importantlyprior to it. Indeed, concerningrealism issues in general,I have arguedthatwe shoulddistinguish metaphysical fromsemantic doctrines. (I shall return to this idea in section 3.) Furthermore,we should always "putmetaphysicsfirst"by establishinga metaphysical base with near enough no appealto semanticsand by arguingfromthat base for section4.12).11 Finally,in the case of a semantics(1991a;1996,particularly I shall argue,the failureto focuson the metaphysics nonfactualism, has left the doctrine unclear.And the unclarityis not only in the metaphysics:it so far as affectsthe semanticsas well. It is my aim to removethe unclarity, that is possible. I shall start with the metaphysics,leaving conclusions about the semanticsuntil the end. Characterizations 2. The Failureof the Metaphysical of nonfactualism, we see Immediatelywe do focus on the metaphysics of this in the literatureare unsatisfacthat the implicit characterizations overlook the extent to The problem is that the characterizations tory.12 which a philosopher'sattitudeto the metaphysics characterized might reflect a position on the generalissues of realismabout propertiesand facts areaof realitythat is the concern ratherthan on the particular problematic of the nonfactualist; for example,ratherthan a positionon morality.Thus, consider a nominalist.She will agree that there are no moral properties because she thinksthat there are no propertiesat all! Yet, manifestly,this alone does not commit her to nonfactualism;to thinking that there is something especially defective about moral reality, somethingthat motivates a special nonfactualsemanticsfor moral language.She might be as realist as could be about morality.Or, considersomeone like David Armstrong (1978) who is a selectiverealistabout properties.Armstrongthinks that emptypredicates,disjunctive predicates,andnegativepredicateshave no corresponding properties.He thinksthat some predicatesapplyto the he looks to scienceto worldin virtueof manyproperties.Mostimportantly, tell us whichpropertiesthere are. Such a personmightwell be a reductive realist about morality thinking that a moral predicatemay apply to an object in virtue of many propertiesnone of which are moralproperties; perhapsthey are social andpsychological properties.So he also agreeswith the metaphysics implicitlyattributed to nonfactualism andyet his metaphysto the antirealist ics of moralityis quite contrary one thatwe are attempting to characterize.Finally, consider the unselectiverealistwho thinks that there is a property for each predicate. A nonfactualistmight accept, as indeed Blackburndoes (1993a: 206), that moral terms are predicates.If

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I 161 TheMetaphysics of Nonfactualism

such a nonfactualistis an unselectiverealist she will think that there are moral properties, thus disagreeingwith the implicit characterization of moralnonfactualism. And even if the nonfactualist deniesthat moralterms are predicatesand hence that there are moralproperties,the implicitcharof her nonfactualism acterization is problematic: it "runsthe wrongway."It finds a defect in moral reality because of somethingspecial about moral languagewhere we need to find a defect in moral reality to motivate the view that morallanguageis special. The general issue of realism about propertiesis independentof the issue of nonfactualism. Similarly, the general issue of realismabout facts. If nonfactualismhas a coherent metaphysicsit should be possible for someone to embraceit or reject it whateverher position on these general issues. There should be a way of statingthat metaphysics that is appropriate whatever the truth of the matter about the reality of propertiesand facts. The problem spills over into the characterization of another sort of doctrine.The metaphysical contrast antirealism,usuallycalled the "error" between the two sorts is often broughtout by sayingthat whereasnonfactualismabout moralityclaimsthat there are no moralproperties,the error doctrineclaims that there are moral propertiesbut they are not instantiated.13 This characterization of the errordoctrineis unsuitablefor anyone but an unselectiverealistabout properties. It is easy enoughto remedythe situationfor the errordoctrinebecause that doctrinedoes not proposea specialsemantics.Let 'F be any predicate in the problematicarea. The metaphysics of the errordoctrineis: there are no Fs (or F things);for example, there are no good people, right actions, and so on. And this bringsout nicely an importantcontrastwith nonfacis happyto say that there are some Fs (or F tualism.For, the nonfactualist things). Indeed, it is both a markand an advantageof nonfactualism-as Blackburn(1993a) emphasizesin his ingeniousdefense of quasi-realismthat nonfactualismgoes along with realism in this respect. Whereas an errordoctrineclaimsthat all moralutterancesare false and so the practice is likelyto thinkthat manyof of makingthem is mistaken,the nonfactualist emotions or prescriptions and so the these utterancesexpress appropriate practiceof makingthem is fine. that makes the problem of It is precisely this mark of nonfactualism talks like a its metaphysicsseem puzzling.The nonfactualist characterizing realist while giving that talk a special interpretation.How then can we it from realism? describenonfactualism in a way that distinguishes A feeling of vertigo may set in at this point. We are attemptinga of the metaphysics characterization thatmustmotivatethe specialsemantic treatmentthat nonfactualism gives to a certainarea of language.Yet our attempts seem doomed to vitiation by that very semantictreatment.Attempts in the "ordinary" language of metaphysicalcommitmentwill fail

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162 / MichaelDevitt because that language is interpreted so that it has no such commitment. So attempts are made in a "philosophical" language that talks of properties and facts, apparently on the assumption that this language is spared the nonfactualist interpretation. But we have seen that these characterizations are unsatisfactory. (And we may wonder why the philosophical language is spared the interpretation.) Nonfactualism is supposed to be a sort of antirealism and yet it seems impossible to state its antirealism. Realism issues begin to evaporate. Indeed, Blackburn sometimes comes very close to claiming that they have evaporated (1993a: 4, 15-34, 55-9; 1993b: 368). 3. Can We Really Do Metaphysics without Doing Semantics? Before attempting to cure this vertigo, I pause to address a more general problem suggested by the discussion. The discussion may seem to threaten the whole enterprise of seeking nonsemantic metaphysical characterizations of antirealist doctrines. For, it casts doubt on my earlier assumption, argued for elsewhere, that we can sharply distinguish metaphysical issues about realism from semantic issues. The discussion suggests rather that metaphysical claims must be accompanied by a semantic theory about their interpretation. This suggestion is a common one and is an important reason why many philosophers insist on characterizing realism in semantic terms. Thus, objecting to my nonsemantic and objectual characterization of realism about common-sense and scientific physical entities (1991a), Michael Williams claims that any suchattemptto identifyrealismwithcommitment to a certainbodyof truths,ratherthan a view abouttruth,is boundto misfire.For we have to add the proviso that these truthsbe acceptedat "facevalue"and explaininghow and why this is so will inevitablyreinvolveus with questionsabout what the truth of propositionsof commonsense and science shouldbe understoodto consistin. (1993:212n) Here is one way to develop this objection. Merely stating such truths as 'There exist stones', 'There exist trees', 'There exist cats', and so on, does not ontologically commit you to stones, trees, and cats, and so on. That commitment depends on accepting the statements at face value so that they have certain truth conditions; for, on that interpretation, those entities must exist for the statements to be true. The ontological question becomes clear only when we move into the metalanguage and consider this semantic question.14 The disagreement between the realist and the antirealist is not over statements like the one above but over how such statements are to be understood. So the disagreement is a semantic one. It is indeed right that if object-language sentences like 'There exists cats' are to yield a commitment then they must, in some sense, be accepted

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TheMetaphysics of Nonfactualism / 163

at face value:we mustsimplyrely on our ordinary understanding of them.15 But it is wrong that this motivatesany move to a metalinguistic semantic statementof truthconditionsin orderto establisha commitment; for example, a move to "Catsexist' is true if and only if there exists thingsthat 'cat'
applies to'. For, the very same problem arises for the semantic statement: if

that statement is to establishcommitment,we must rely on our ordinary of it. 16 J don't claimthatthereis no problemin establishing understanding a commitmentin the object-language, but simplythat anyproblemthatthere is arises as much in the metalanguage.If any languageis to establish a commitmentto anything,we have to rely on our ordinary of understanding to claimthat the languagewe some language.But it would be preposterous rely on must be semantic;that commitmentmightcome from 'Thereexist things that 'cat' applies to' but could not come from 'There exist cats'. Languagedoes not suddenlybecome kosherwhen you startdoing semantics. The idea that talk about the world is unclearand in special need of interpretation,yet talk about language and its relation to the world is on the face of it, reflects the damage of years of living straightforward underthe linguisticturn. It is a truismthat a theory must be presentedto us in language.So to draw any conclusions at all from the theory, whether about ontological commitmentor the price of eggs, we have to understand the languagein whichit is presented.But this mundanefact suppliesno reasonfor supposing that we must move to a semantictheory to determinethe ontological commitmentof our object theory, because the fact covers the semantic theory too: even semantics requires language. A semantic theory of a sentence could clearlyhelp us to understand that sentencebut the theoryis not necessaryfor the understanding (else we wouldunderstand very little). And, equallyclearly,even when the theorydoes help, it does not makethe issue that concernsthe sentence semantic. I conclude that the enterpriseof seeking nonsemanticmetaphysical of antirealistdoctrinesis not threatened;we do not have characterizations to retreatinto semanticsto do metaphysics.I returnnow to our problems in particular. with nonfactualism 4. RejectingGlobalNonfactualism Consider,first, the idea - perhapsendorsedby nobody-that realism issues evaporate entirely because of the possibilityof "global"nonfactualism, the possibilitythat all of our languagethat seems to have realist commitments-in effect, all apparentlyfactualor descriptivelanguagewe need not take seriously. does not reallydo so. Thatis surelya possibility There certainlycould be a languagethat was entirelynonfactual,making no claims about how the world is; for example, consider a segment of Englishthat includesonly certaincommands.A realistdoctrinecould not

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164/ Michael Devitt be stated in such a language.Neither,of course, could any other doctrine. But we have the best reason in the world for thinkingthat English as a whole is not like this; that parts of it are factual. In this respect, it is noteworthythat the nonfactualist,like everyone else, seems to think that semantic claims are factual (and if they were not, nonfactualismitself would be nonfactual!). She also seems to think that the unsatisfactory characterizationof her metaphysicsin terms of properties and facts is factual. To dismiss global nonfactualismis not to claim that all apparently factuallanguagemust be taken as reallybeingfactual,thus makingnonfactualism impossible. We can adapt Quine's favorite image from Neurath: rebuildinga boat whilststayingafloaton it. We can rebuildany partof the boat but in so doingwe musttake a standon some otherpart.So we cannot rebuild it all at once. Analogously,we can reject any apparentlyfactual sentence as not really being so but in so doing we must take some other apparently factualsentencesfor granted.So we cannotrejectall apparently factualsentences at once. There must alwaysbe some factuallanguagewe take as really being factualin orderto stay afloat.17 To dismissglobal nonfactualism is not to claim either that some parts of our languagemust be truth-conditional. It is commonto assumethat the right semanticsfor factuallanguageis truth-conditional. Combinethis assumptionwith the rejection of global nonfactualism and it obviouslyfollows that some parts of our languageare indeed truth-conditional. I think that the assumptionis right, but I have done nothinghere to show that it is right. Non-truth-conditional semanticsfor factual language are possible. We shall returnto this matterin section 9. In sum, we need not worrythat realismissues will evaporatebecause all of our languagemightbe nonfactual.Yet, takingit for grantedthatsome of our languageis indeed factual, we still have a worry.The worryis that realism issues will evaporate because the languageof any issue might be entirely nonfactual.Perhapslanguageis so "compartmentalized" that the language of a realism issue in any given area can be interpretednonfactually and there is no way to use the factuallanguage"fromelsewhere"to in the given area. We cannot distinguishthe realist from the nonfactualist go nonfactualist everywhereat once but perhapswe can go entirelynonfactualist anywhere. I shallarguethatwe cannot.Roughly,languageis not entirelycompartmentalizedbecause realityis not. 5. Characterizing the Metaphysics of Nonfactualism To avoid the evaporationof the realism issue in some area, and to characterizethe metaphysicsof nonfactualism in that area, we must first find some languagethat is not just apparently factualbut is treatedby the

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TheMetaphysics of Nonfactualism / 165

nonfactualistas really factual.We mustthen examineher statementsusing that languageto find ones that disagreewith realist statementsabout the area. We have a reason to be optimisticthat we will find these disagreements. I have noted that the motivationfor a nonfactualistsemanticsin some area comes from dissatisfaction with the putativerealityin that area, a reality that the realist embraces(section 1). A nonfactualist's statement of this dissatisfaction must be in the uncontroversially factuallanguageif the dissatisfactionis really to play the motivationalrole. This statement disagreement with the realist. shouldprovidea genuinemetaphysical misguidedaboutattempting to There is thus somethingfundamentally in an area by claimingthat all the languagein that area defend antirealism the realismissue has a nonfactualsemantics.Sucha claimboth undermines and leaves the semanticsunmotivated.If the claimwere true there would in the area and hence be nothing to distinguishrealismfrom antirealism factual there would be no reasonfor any specialtreatmentof its apparently language. candidatesfor denial Twosorts of realistclaimare the most promising by the nonfactualist.First, realiststend to offer some explanationsof the should nature of the problematicrealityin languagethat the nonfactualist realityis constiagree is factual.For, the realistthinksthat the problematic for the tuted by, or superveneson, a realitythat shouldbe unproblematic nonfactualist.Even though the nonfactualistclaims to be able to accept reality,takingthem many sentences that seem to describethe problematic as expressive,prescriptive,or whatever,she shouldnot acceptthese explanationsbecause, loosely, she does not acceptthat there is any such reality facto be explained. Second, realistsmake claimsin the uncontroversially tual language about the causal role of the problematicreality. For the realist thinks that the problematicreality is the cause or effect of some The nonfactualistshould not accept these claims unproblematic reality.18 about the role of the problematicreality because, loosely again, on her view there is no such realityto play a role.19 Of course, this rejectionof realistclaimsabout the natureand role of the problematicreality may seem implausible.But that is the price that nonfactualism must pay for its motivation. It is interestingto comparethese realist claimswith others that have Take debate.20 been the subject of much discussionin the nonfactualism some simple sentence which, when affirmedon its own, is alleged to be for example, 'Lyingis wrong'. Now considerthe role of this nonfactual;, sentencein conditionals;for example,in 'If lyingis wrong,Alice shouldbe punished'. How can the special nonfactualistsemanticsof the sentence in the when occurring on its own be appliedto the sentencewhen occurring mustbe givencloselyrelatedmeaningsif The two occurrences conditional? the intuitivevalidityof certaininferencesis to be captured;for example,

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166/ Michael Devitt the inferencefromthese examplesof a simplesentenceanda conditionalto 'Alice should be punished'.The task of providingthe requiredsemantics may be impossibleand is certainlydifficult. I have suggested that the nonfactualistshould reject realist claims about the nature and role of the problematicreality.Could she similarly rejectthese conditionals,andthe arguments containing them, hence declining this difficulttask? Both the friends and foes of nonfactualism clearly thinknot. They are surelyright.Howeverimplausible it maybe for nonfactualismto reject the claimsabout natureand role, it would surelybe more so to reject the conditionals:it would make the nonfactualist view of the simple sentences very hard to accept. Furthermore,there is no pressing need to pay the price of this rejection, as there is the rejection of claims about nature and role, in orderto motivatenonfactualism. For, important as these conditionalsare in ordinarydiscourse,they are not centralexpressions of realistmetaphysics. I have suggestednonsemantic ways to characterize metaphysicaldis,agreementsbetween realistsand nonfactualists.Still, it must be acknowlin any particular case edged that the discoveryof such a characterization would be aided by some simplesemantics:by a precisestatementfromthe nonfactualistabout the boundarybetween the languageshe takes to be factual and the languageshe takes to be nonfactual.But this semanticsis to the characterization, not part only an aid to discovery.It is a preliminary is not necessary:a discussion of it. Furthermore, the semanticpreliminary of the natureand role of the problematic realitywill revealthe metaphysical disagreements. and the discussion,any Where we lack both the semanticpreliminary in an area, particularly nonfactualism attemptto characterize by a realist, mustbe tentative.We can hope to indicatethe generalareaof nonfactualist disagreementwith the realist but cannot be confident about the exact place. And, given that nonfactualism deprivesus of muchof our language for describingreality, we should not be surprisedthat neat and simple characterizations of the disagreement are hardto come by. Althoughrealism issues do not evaporatein the face of the possibilityof nonfactualism, What appearedto be they do become much more difficultto characterize. relativelytidy issues (to me, at least; 1991a)become decidedlymessy. I shall apply and develop these ideas for characterizing nonfactualism and by consideringthree examples:instrumentalist, moralnonfactualism, truth. deflationary
6. Instrumentalism

scienI start with a doctrinethat is no longer popular:the traditional tific instrumentalism urged with such successby the positivists.According to this instrumentalist, a theory is a partiallyinterpretedformalsystem.

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TheMetaphysics I 167 of Nonfactualism

The vocabularyof the theory is dividedinto two parts, an "observational" partwhichis fully interpretedand a "theoretical" partwhichis uninterpreted. In our terminology, the observational partis factualwhilstthe theoretical part is a nonfactual"instrument" for generatingfactualclaims. So far, all we have is semantics. What about metaphysics?The motivation for instrumentalism clearlycomes from some generaldoubts about unobservable realitybut the doubtsare inexplicit(reflecting,of course,the positivist horrorof all thingsmetaphysical).21 It would be nice if we could take these doubts, straightforwardly, as being aboutwhetherthe unobservables of scienceexist: the instrumentalist believes that they do not exist or that we cannot know that they exist. However, we will not find a simple expressionof instrumentalist doubt about, for example, the statement'Atoms exist'. The problemis that, for the instrumentalist, 'atom' is part of the uninterpreted nonfactualvocabulary and the statementis an implicitpartof a theorythat she is as readyto endorse as the realist.22 To find the appropriate expressionsof instrumentalist doubt we must look for realiststatementsthat are "aboutunobservables" and yet are in the observational, hence factual, language.

We can find these statementsin realist views about the natures and roles of unobservables.Thus, consider what a realist influencedby the kinetic theory of gases might say "aboutmolecules"withoutusing 'molecule': that there are spherical,elastic, smooth entities constitutinga gas; that their impact on the wall of a containingflask is responsiblefor the pressure exerted by the gas; that the temperaturesof two gases are the same when the mean kineticenergyof those constituting entitiesof the two and gases are the same; and so on. This languageall seems observational hence factual.Yet it posits entitiesthat areunobservable. So the instrumentalist should deny this realist claim or remainagnosticabout it. There are many other such realist claims. So the instrumentalist's antirealistmetaphysicsis characterized by her doubtsabout all these claims. Of course, this metaphysical positionis not a comfortableone for the instrumentalist because the realist claims she is doubtingare drawnfrom science. Yet she cannot accept the claims on pain of leaving her nonfactualistsemanticsunmotivated.23 7. MoralNonfactualism Considermoral nonfactualism next. Speakingloosely and intuitively, the moral nonfactualistholds that the only realityunderlying moralutterances is a realm of attitudes and/or emotions.24 The task is to specify precisely,in uncontroversially factualterms, the richerrealityof the moral realist that is thus denied. We shall have no successtryingto do this with existentialstatements.The nonfactualist thinksthat she can join the realist in saying, "thereare good people," "thereare rightactions,"and so on. To

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168/ Michael Devitt find what the nonfactualistis most likely to deny, we must considerwhat the realist says about the naturesand roles of good people, right actions, and so on. Realists claim that there are things about a person in virtueof which she is good, that make her good; for example, being kind, considerate, generous, honest, etc. Similarly,realistsclaim that there are things about an action in virtueof whichit is wrong, thatmake it wrong;for example, leading to unhappiness,being contraryto socially acceptedrules, and so on. The languageof these "in virtue of" clauses seems to be the sort that the nonfactualistwill count as factual. (If not, she must help us find some other clauses along the same lines that she will count as factual.) The nonfactualistmust reject all such "in virtue of" claims as totally misconceived. Considercrude "Boo-Hooray"nonfactualism,for example. Suplike anyone else, pose that Marksays, "Alice is good." The nonfactualist, that he thus may explainin virtue of what Markhas the "hooray-attitude" expresses: something about Mark, his disposition to behave in certain ways, a certainphysiologicalstate, or whatever,makes it the case that he has this attitude.But this is very differentfromexplainingin virtueof what Alice is good (supposingthat she is). The realistthinksthat there is something aboutAlice that explainsthis: it is her kindness,generosity,disposition to behave in certain ways, disposition to cause hooray-attitudes in rejectsanysuch others, or whatever,that make her good. The nonfactualist explanationof Alice's goodness. Realists think that explanationsmay be given of how a person came to be good: because she had loving parents, such and such genes, and so on. Realists think that there are consequencesof her being good: she is in others, is admired, is sought after as a friend, causes hooray-attitudes taken advantage of, and so on. Realists think that it is because Hitler and his associates were depraved that we believe that they were depraved. And it is because they were depravedthat they behaved as they did and that millions of people died in concentrationcamps. Realists think that there are consequencesof an act being wrong: it causes booattitudes;the person committingit is condemned, avoided, and so on.25 The language in the causal clauses of these explanationsseems to be It is not the factual. The nonfactualistmust reject all such explanations.26 case that there are any causes or effects of things being good, depraved, wrong, and so on. The moral realist thinks that there is a moral reality which, like any other reality,has a natureand has relationsto other realities;and that this The nonfactualistreveals nature and those relations need explanations.27 her antirealismby rejecting any such explanation.Even if she is right in thinking that she can join with the realist in accepting ordinarymoral judgements, she cannot join with him in his explanationof the reality whichhe takes those judgementsto describe.

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I 169 of Nonfactualism TheMetaphysics 8. Deflationary Truth

truth. Accordingto the deflationist,the Finally,I turn to deflationary functionof 'true'is not to describea sentence, at least not to describeit in the way that a normalpredicatelike 'green' describesan object. Rather, the functionof 'true'is logicalor expressive,a convenientdevice for making assertions about the largely nonlinguistic world. Thus, instead of repeat-

ing a person'ssentenceabouta movie, I can makethe samepoint aboutthe movie by saying 'That is true'. I can express general agreementwith an article about the behaviorof penguins by saying 'Most of that article is true'. I can assert Goldbach'sConjectureeven thoughI cannotremember conveit by saying 'Goldbach'sConjectureis true'. 'True'is particularly nient for the assertionof an infinitenumberof sentences. This is all about the semantics of 'true'. What is the deflationist's differfromthe semantic metaphysicsof truth?How does that metaphysics and the issue between the nonfactualist realist's?(Here, the metaphysical realist is, confusingly,itself semantic.) They do not differ over whether there are true (false) sentences. They agree that there are. They disagree aboutthe natureand role of truth. In virtueof what is a sentence, say 'Schneeist weiss', true?According to the realist the sentence is true because it is relatedin some way to the world. A substantialtheory is then requiredto describeand explain this relationship.The theory mightincludecausaltheoriesof reference,claims about warrantedassertability,or whatever. The deflationistrejects any here about the such realist explanationof truth. (There is no controversy she factualnatureof the languageused in the explanation.)Furthermore, has an interestingalternativealong the followinglines. Truthis basically There is nothingmore to it than is capturedby the infi"disquotational." nite set of appropriate instancesof the schema, s is true if and only if p. for 's' names a instanceis one where what is substituted An "appropriate" of the sentence substitutedfor 'p'. Given that 'snowis white' "translation" translates'Schnee ist weiss', 'Schnee ist weiss' is true, accordingto the deflationist,simply in virtue of it being the case that snow is white. No deeper explanationis called for. Realists give truth importantexplanatoryroles; for example, to explain the successof science or the successof people in meetingtheir goals. In my view, the most interesting realist role for truth is in a truthconditionalexplanationof meaning, where meaningitself plays a role in the explanationof behaviorand in guidingus to reality(1996). The deflaIn virtueof the logical roles for truth.28 tionist rejects all such explanatory role of 'true', if a sentence to which 'true'is appliedplays an explanatory

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170/ Michael Devitt role, then so does 'true'. But, for the deflationist, truth can have no explanatory role beyond this trivial one because, crudely, truth "isn't anything." In this example, as in the previoustwo, I have claimedthatthe nonfacfromthe realistby her denialof the realist'sexplanatualistis distinguished tions of the nature and role of the problematicreality. But what about someone who claimsto be a realistbut does not see the need for any such For example,considersomeonewho simplyinsiststhat truth explanations? but offers no explanationof it; and he thinks is "robust"or "substantive" not explanatory.29 It is hardto see how this that truth is "epiphenomenal" And this from nonfactualism. metaphysically position can be distinguished of the position. surelyadds to the implausibility 9. The Semanticsof Nonfactualism I turn finally to the special semanticsof nonfactualism. I began this of this semantics.Manyof these are paperwith the usualcharacterizations unsatisfactory. of of the metaphysics I have arguedthat the implicitcharacterization (sec. 2). It nonfactualism,talking of propertiesor facts, is unsatisfactory in of the special semanticsof nonfactualism follows that characterizations Thus, we cannotcapturethat semantics those termsare also unsatisfactory. with the claim that predicates in the problematicarea do not refer to properties;nor with the claimthat the sentencesin that area do not correspondto facts. A personmightacceptthese claimsbecauseof generalviews aboutpropertiesor facts, views that have nothingto do with nonfactualism about the problematicarea. that the senAnother common characterization is also inappropriate: This characterizatences in the problematicarea are not truth-conditional. tion is not generalenough. It is suitableonly for someonewho believesthat Manyhavethis the rightsemanticsforfactuallanguageis truth-conditional. to presupposeit in belief-and I am one of them-but it is inappropriate who It shouldbe possiblefor a verificationist nonfactualism. characterizing about, to be a nonfactualist rejects truth-conditional semanticsaltogether say, morality;indeed, Ayer, a famous moral nonfactualist,is presumably an actualexample. Yet, if even factualsentencesare not truth-conditional, then the distinctive thing about moral sentences that makes them nonfacAnd it shouldbe possitual cannot be that they are not truth-conditional. abouttruthto ble for someone who is a deflationist,hence a nonfactualist, be a nonfactualistabout somethingelse like morality.Yet a deflationistis moralones, are deflalikely to thinkthat all indicativesentences,including tionarilytruth-conditional.30 area are not The claimthat the indicativesentencesin the problematic of characterization assertionsor statementscomes closer to a satisfactory

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The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism / 171

nonfactualism.But the closest will usuallybe the claim that the problematic sentencesare not factualor descriptive but ratherexpressive,prescriptive, or whatever.We take it for grantedthatmanyindicativesentencesare factual (since global nonfactualism is not feasible). We take it for granted that many nonindicativesentences have other functions like expressing attitudesor emotions, or prescribing norms or rules. The nonfactualist is claimingthat, despite appearances,the problematicsentences have a semanticslike the latter not the former.If she is a truth-conditionalist about the factualsentences, she will thinkthat the problematic sentenceshave no truth conditions;if a verificationist,that they have no verificationcondicharacterization tions. (Even this usuallysatisfactory is unsuitable for deflationary truth, as Scott Soames has emphasizedto me. Here we say that 'true' does not have the semanticsof a normaldescriptivepredicate,perhaps not that of a predicateat all, but rathera certainlogicalor expressive role.) of nonfactualism's This characterization specialsemanticsmakesvivid of its metaphysics,a need the need for an independentcharacterization that I have been at painsto emphasize.For, althoughthis semanticcharacterizationmay seem a naturalbedfellowfor an antirealistmetaphysics,it it tells us nothingat fairlyobviouslydoes not entail any such metaphysics; all about the natureof nonlinguistic reality. 10. Conclusion I have argued that the usual characterizations of nonfactualismare The problempartlycomes fromfocusingon nonfactualism's unsatisfactory. that must motispecial semanticsinstead of on the antirealist metaphysics vate that semantics.The problemalso comes fromthe genuinedifficulty in characterizingthis metaphysicsbecause nonfactualismgoes along with many realist utterances,claimingto be able to interpretthem in a special of the metaphysics: way.I have rejectedthe usualimplicitcharacterizations that there are no propertiesor facts in the problematicarea. Using the and deflationary examplesof instrumentalist, moralnonfactualism, truth, this metaphysics: I have argued for a general method for characterizing make precisethe idea that, in the problematic area, there is no realitywith role. There should a natureto be explainedand with a causal-explanatory factual languagein which to state this always be some uncontroversially rejection of the problematicreality. Of course, the rejection may seem mustpayfor its motivaimplausible,but that is the pricethatnonfactualism tion. Finally,I turnedto the special semanticsof nonfactualism, rejecting accounts of this in terms of properties, facts, and truth conditions, but acceptingones that contrastthe apparently descriptiveor factualfunction of indicativesentences in the problematicarea with their alleged function as expressive,prescriptive,or whatever1

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172 / Michael Devitt

Notes 1. See, e.g., Ayer 1952:89; Sayre-McCord 1988c:7; Boghossian1990a:157-161;

166; 1990b: 266. 2. See, e.g., Ayer 1952: 103; Haldane and Wright 1993b: 11; Hale 1993: 337. 3. See, e.g., Ayer 1952: 107; Wright 1988: 29; Sayre-McCord 1988c: 4; Blackburn 1993a: 3, 60; Haldane and Wright 1993b: 11-12. 4. See, e.g., Ayer 1952: 103, 107; Sayre-McCord 1988c: 5; Boghossian 1990a: 160-1, 164; 1990b: 266; Blackburn 1993a: 60; Hale 1993: 337, 340; Haldane

and Wright1993b:11; 5. See, e.g., Wright1988: 29; Sayre-McCord 1988b:ix-x; Boghossian 1990a: 160;Haldaneand Wright1993b:12. 6. See, e.g., Ayer 1952:103, 107;Sayre-McCord 1988c:4, 8; Boghossian1990a: 160;Blackburn1993a:3, 60; 1993b:365; Hale 1993:337; Haldaneand Wright 1993b:11. Strictlyspeakingthese accountsof nonfactualism need qualification because the sentences in question may be partly assertions,partly truthconditional,andpartlyfactual.We can ignorethe qualification. 7. Cautionis requiredin takingwhatappearto be semanticclaimsas reallybeing so. The apparently semantictermsmaybe playingonly a "disquotational" role (see sec. 8). So a claim that a predicatedoes not refer may be just a way of claimingthat a propertydoes not exist. 8. See, e.g., Ayer 1952: 89; Boghossian 1990a: 157-9, 161-2; Blackburn 1993a:3. 9. See particularly 1988b:ix-x, 4; Blackburn Wright1988:29-30; Sayre-McCord 1993a:3, 52, 57; Hale 1993:337; Railton 1993:280. of course;for 10. Some "nofact of the matter"doctrinesdo focuson metaphysics, example, doctrinesabout absolute space-timeor invertedspectra.But these Those doctrinesdo not involve the semanticclaimsin my openingparagraph. I am concerned semantic claims are an essential part of the nonfactualism with. 11. In discussingrealism about the externalworld, I capturethese ideas in two
maxims:

Maxim2: Distinguishthe metaphysical (ontological)issue of realismfrom any semanticissue. (1991a:3) Maxim3: Settle the realismissue before any epistemicor semanticissue. (p. 4) Accordingto Maxim2 no semanticdoctrineabouttruthconstitutesthe metaphysicaldoctrineof realism.This is not to say that there are no connections in thinking,roughly, betweenthe two sortsof doctrine.I followDuhem-Quine I that everythingis evidentiallyconnectedto everythingelse. In particular, agree with many that the metaphysicaldoctrine of realism is very hard to supportif we arguefrom an epistemicview of truth(sec. 4.3). But, according to Maxim3, thatis the wrongway to argue:we shouldarguefrommetaphysics to semantics.So I reject John Haldaneand CrispinWright's implication-in arguingfor Michael Dummett's close connectionbetween metaphysicsand

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The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism / 173

semantics-that an evidence-transcendent doctrine of truth is a necessary "semanticalpreparation" and "groundwork" for the metaphysicaldoctrine (1993b:5-6). The metaphysical doctrineneedsno suchpreparation or groundwork. Rather,the doctrineof truthneeds the metaphysical groundwork. 12. The unsatisfactory ones include my own in discussingquasi-realism (1991a:
55).

13. E.g., see Boghossian1990b:265. A paradigm exampleof an errordoctrineis JohnMackie'sview of morality(1977). 14. This develops the objection so that it strikes at what I call, "the existence dimension"of the metaphysical doctrineof realism.Williamshimselfis more concernedwith whatI call "theindependence of the doctrine:the dimension" view that the world is, as he says, "objective" and "independent of how we think."The objectionencourageshim to continuethinkingthat "theobvious way to unpack"the independencedimensionis in termsof "a radicallynonepistemic"notion of truth(p. 193). I arguethatthe dimensioncan and should be unpackedwithoutany mentionof notionsof truth(1991a,particularly secs.
2.2, 13.5-13.7).

15. My discussionof this drawson my 1991a:50-7. 16. This point does not depend on any particular view of the natureof our ordiof a language.So the pointsurvivesthe common,thoughI naryunderstanding thinkmistaken,view thatthisunderstanding consistsin (tacit)semanticpropositionalknowledgeaboutthe language.I argue(most recentlyin 1996:ch. 2), that this commonview impliesan unarguedand implausible Cartesianaccess to semanticfacts. We should take our linguisticcompetenceto be simply a not knowledge-that. skill, a piece of knowledge-how 17. The argumentagainstglobalnonfactualism has certainparallels withthe arguThe conclusionof the latterargument againstglobal "response dependency." ment is that globalresponsedependencyamountsto constructivist antirealism
(1991a: 251-6).

Then the suggestionsof this para18. What if she is also a causal nonfactualist? graphwould have to be adjustedby replacingthe allegedlynonfactualcausal of what the nonfactualist talk with talk that is descriptive holds to be the only externalrealityunderlying causaltalk;say, constantconjunction. 19. It is usual to take realismto involve some claim about the objectivityand independenceof the problematicreality'snature and role. We need not be concernedwith such claims because nonfactualist comes "eardisagreement lier,"with the claimsthat there is a realitywith sucha natureand role. 20. See, e.g., Geach 1960;Dummett1973:ch. 10;Blackburn 1984:189-96; 1993a: ch. 10; 1993b;Wright1988;Hale 1993. 21. One mightbe dubiousof unobservable realityin general,or of some partsof it in some sense, withoutembracin particular, and hence be an instrumentalist is essentialto traditional instruing the describedsemantics.But thatsemantics I am discussmentalismand makesit an exampleof the sort of nonfactualism ing (cf. note 10). 22. My earlierdiscussionof this is, therefore,mistaken;1991a:129. 23. Can she accept the claims but resist the realist interpretationof them by as uninterpreted? treatinguses of 'there are' in "talk about unobservables"

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174 / Michael Devitt

She could (althoughI don't thinkthat she would), but doing so will not help use and the instrumenher. 'Thereare' wouldstill have its other,interpreted, talist cannotpreventthe realistfrom employingthat use in these claims.The muststill have doubtsaboutthe claims,so interpreted. instrumentalist 24. One sort of moralantirealistthinksthat a moraljudgementis implicitlyrelanorm.Thus a personought to tive to some norm;for example, the utilitarian do such and suchonly in thatshe oughtto do it relativeto some implicitnorm; respectin whichshe oughtto do it. This, combinedwith there is no "absolute" the view that no one normis objectivelybetter than any other, yields a fairly nonfactualistmetaphysics,as HartryField (1994: secs. 3-4) straightforward does not involvea Allan Gibbard(1990). This antirealism shows in discussing I am discussing. semanticsof the sort that is definitiveof the nonfactualism 25. Peter Railton(1986)and NicholasSturgeon(1988)are realistswho emphasize MichaelSlote (1971) emphathe explanatoryrole of moralreality.Similarly, role of aestheticreality.JohnMackie(1977) and Gilbert sizes the explanatory role of moralreality. who deny the explanatory Harman(1977)are antirealists may disagree: 26. Blackburn that there If you tell me that injusticecausedthe revolution,I understand is some propertythat you take to give rise to injustice,and that causedthe revolution.I must, in my own assessment,separatethe truthof the causal storyyou are pointingtoward,frommy own verdicton whetherit amounts
to injustice.... Perhaps I would not myself call [the causal feature indi-

cated] unjust, but I can assent to the explanationwithoutendorsingthe verdicton the feature. (1993a:205-6) He can but he surelyshouldnot. If he does not thinkthat the featureamounts to injusticethen he does not thinkthat injusticecausedthe revolution. agreeswith Note that this is true even of a subjectiverealist.The subjectivist the nonfactualist that only certainattitudesor emotionsunderliemoraltalk, but disagreesin thinkingthat moral utterancesdescriberatherthan express reality. that underlying wronglyclaiman explanatory Or should do, at least. Sometimesdeflationists truth;see, e.g., Horwich1990,p. 45, and my 1991b,pp. role for deflationary 278-80. ThomasNagel (1980:114n)thinksthat moralrealityneed not be explanatory. Ayer muddiesthe watersomewhatby denyingthat ethicalstatementsare true (pp. or false (1952: 103, 107). Given his view that truthis merelydeflationary 87-90), this denialmustbe a mistakeunlesshe believesthatethicalstatements should not be asserted. For, on his view, saying that a statementis true is simplyassertingit. So sayingthatit is truedoes not tell us thatit is factual,nor anythingelse aboutit. benefitedgreatlyfrom discussionswith Georges My views on nonfactualism Rey while writingDevitt and Rey 1991. Some of the presentpaperbuildson and modifiesa brief discussionof the issue in that paper. (That paperwas a response to Boghossian1990b, which was a responseto Devitt 1990, which was a responseto Boghossian1990a.) I thankthe followingfor helpfulcom-

27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

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The Metaphysics of Nonfactualism / 175

mentson a draftof this paper:DavidArmstrong, LisaBusch,KeithCampbell, HartryField, JudithLichtenberg,WilliamLycan, GeorgesRey, and Michael Slote. The paper has also benefitedfrom the discussionwhen a version was deliveredat PrincetonUniversity in October1995. References
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