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CIVIL LAW PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a]

marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."[50] The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."[51] Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,[52] in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,[53] but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.[54] Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.[55] Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.[56] The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.[57] Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.[58] Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.[59] The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the

Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.[60] Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."[61] There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."[62] At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."[63] These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,[64] wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[65] The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina[66] case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."[67] Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." [68]

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage."[69] At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."[70] We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:[71] Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[72] The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and

Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,[73] and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.[74] It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.[75] Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.[76] Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the

importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by

qualified psychiatrists psychologists.

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3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their

children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.[77] Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.[78] This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.[79] Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case. As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary

trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines. xxx On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,[96] then the opinion of canonical scholars,[97] before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.[98] Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"[99] and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."[100] However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.[101] This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,[102] the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.[103] Yet we approach this

present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level. We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted (Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. NO. 155800, March 10, 2006, penned by Justice Tinga).

JUSTICE BRION CASES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY [ G.R. No. 168335, June 06, 2011 ] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. NESTOR GALANG, RESPONDENT. BRION, J.: xxx The Petition and the Issues The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvy's psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvy's condition. [13] The respondent took the exact opposite view. The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondent's marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations. The Court's Ruling After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 of the Family Code and Related Jurisprudence Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." [14] In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., [15] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity

must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." [16] We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below. [17] These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. [18] In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos, [19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) [20] which provided that "the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged." Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te [21] placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the timetested Molina [22] guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all fours" with another. Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting [23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo, [24] however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina. [25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te [26] did not abandon Molina. [27] Far from abandoning Molina, [28] Ngo

Te [29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained that Suazo [30] that Ngo Te [31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. [32] The Present Case In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondent's evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latter's psychological report and evaluation -insufficient to prove Juvy's psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. a. The respondent's testimony The respondent's testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondent's ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondent's signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling. These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., [33] we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential thathe or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - had to be shown. [34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondent's testimony failed to show that Juvy's condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring, [35] we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. In like manner, Juvy's acts of falsifying the respondent's signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondent's ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvy's penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the family's income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist. b. The Psychologist's Report The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondent's cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material

time required by Article 36 of the Family Code. To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent's description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos [36] that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologist's report. Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologist's report simply stressed Juvy's negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvy's psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that "psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesn't manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible." [37] In the end, the psychologist opined - without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion - that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son." [38] We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvy's psychological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the

marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy's alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvy's condition. The report's pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible" [39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake. c. The Psychologist's Testimony The psychologist's court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvy's alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report - i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child - without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy's early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy's psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondent's efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological

incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [40] The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. [42] WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galang's petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang. [ G.R. No. 170729, December 08, 2010 ] ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN, PETITIONER, VS. ERLINDA AMPAROAGRAVIADOR AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. BRION, J.: xxx The Petition and Issues The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling, based on the following arguments: THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO ESTABLISH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]

THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;] THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE RESPONDENT[; and] THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.] The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner's marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court's Ruling We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent's psychological incapacity. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply

with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."[17] In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[19] It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals[20] (the Molina case) where we said: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill

to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[21] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[22] declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in

resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina. Ting v. Velez-Ting[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo[24] squarely met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioner's evidence insufficient to prove the respondent's psychological incapacity.xxx These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioner's testimony on the respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these exchanges the petitioner's theory that the respondent's psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.[26] The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[27] The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of

awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[28] In the present case, the petitioner's testimony failed to establish that the respondent's condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondent's defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent's condition; neither did he mention that the respondent's malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondent's means to undertake. The petitioner's declarations that the respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,[29] we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown. b. Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent."[30] Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties' second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report

can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.[31] We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[32] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[33] No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case. In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondent's condition by stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for example, why she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone; why she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondent's socalled inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.

Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent's condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondent's purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the "Background History" portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in augmenting the family's earnings; belittled the petitioner's income; continued her studies despite the petitioner's disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became "close" to a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that "Erlinda's lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to the family,"[34] there was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the respondent's condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Interestingly, Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondent's negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of

marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latter's death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioner's own questionable traits - his flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent every time he got jealous - were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondent's personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondent's condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Report's failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated the respondent's perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioner's cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify. Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[35] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.

The petitioner's marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.[36] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner. [ G.R. No. 165321, August 03, 2010 ] RICARDO P. TORING, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA M. TORING AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. BRION, J.: xxx THE PETITION ARGUMENTS AND THE PARTIES'

court - in declaring the nullity of the marriage - fully complied with Molina. In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC's decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court's guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Ricardo's Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10] These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed. THE COURT'S RULING We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTC's decision for lack of legal and factual basis. In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[12]

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the

petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.[13] Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing - was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[14] In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner's evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter's psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita. a. Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation and testimony Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her

by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita's disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable. To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage. We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage. In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologist's testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent's psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioner's statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husband's psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresita's psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[17] To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however,

does not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires. Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential - although from sources other than the respondent spouse - to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita's psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses' eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth. We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson's interview with the pyschologist: Richardson's statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father's alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).[19] We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of

marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems - finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous argument - a money problem involving Ricardo's financial remittances to the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist's evaluation never explained how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses' marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time. Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo's cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran's psychological evaluation to fully explain the details - i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when - of Teresita's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresita's personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita's alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita's psychological disorder. Dr. Albaran's testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran's cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresita's personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita's personal and family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality disorder."[20] Dr. Albaran's obvious uncertainty in her assessment

only proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined from meager information coming only from a biased source. b. Ricardo's testimony Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find Ricardo's characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[21] Ricardo's testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the family's finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresita's spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most, Teresita's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the family's financial support. Teresita's alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23] In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardo's added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresita's dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man,

would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresita's allegedly disordered personality. Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita's alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[24] In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36. Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with Ricardo's main argument against the assailed CA decision - i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresita's psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."[26] In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner - instead of stating a specific root cause - clearly described the physical manifestations indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case - that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition. Thus, contrary to Ricardo's position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root

cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides: SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. x x x x (d) What to allege.- - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption. To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their family's finances - a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.[28] WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner. [ G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010 ] JOCELYN M. SUAZO, PETITIONER, VS. ANGELITO SUAZO AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. BRION, J.: xxx THE PETITION Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments: 1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses vis--vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous"; 2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: (1) who lack the sufficient use of reason; (2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted; (3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature." The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name. Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage - without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence. Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."[10] The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not

THE COURT'S RULING We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. The Law, Molina and Te Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. A unique feature of this law is its intended openended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept - psychological incapacity that

physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12] Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.[13] A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,

juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15] Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the court's interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

All cases - involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code - that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines. Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise thatthe law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19] Te then sustained Santos' doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law. Going back to its basic premise, Te said: Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court's judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was crossexamined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. VelezTing[20] follows Te's lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21] To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows: By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. xxxx Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied] This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24] Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so

grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor - an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27] If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos' juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos' continuing doctrinal validity. The Present Case As the CA did, we find Jocelyn's evidence insufficient to establish Angelito's psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate court's appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn's presented evidence. a. The Expert Opinion Evidence Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito's alleged psychological condition. We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in

an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable. In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party's complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party's close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information. From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist's report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito's purported antisocial personality disorder, supported by the

characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony. For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito's personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist's own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed knowledge of Angelito's family background and upbringing. Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelito's personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito's awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn's cause. b. Jocelyn's Testimony The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist's testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn's testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito's psychological incapacity. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him - all of which occurred after the marriage.

Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place - whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness. The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn's account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites. On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which

is Jocelyn's main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner. [ G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009 ] ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, PETITIONER, VS. EDWARD RUMBAUA, RESPONDENT. BRION, J.: xxx The Petition and the Issues The petitioner argues in the present petition that the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina[22] (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and Dr. Tayags testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report. The petitioner prays that the RTCs and the CAs decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CAs decision be set aside and the RTCs decision be reinstated. The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial courts decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity.[23] The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.

THE COURTS RULING We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides: SEC. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took

effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997. The petitioners argument lacks merit. The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-1110-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26] Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the petitioners objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit. A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC

would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice. We do not find her arguments convincing. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented. In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to

securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case. Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioners requested remand. Petitioner failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to

assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b)

juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity, fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. VelezTing[33] when we explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband. Petitioners testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondents condition The petitioners evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged

to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case. In the present case, the respondents stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioners testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondents failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mothers death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondents act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later. To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35] Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or

perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. b. Dr. Tayags psychological report and court testimony We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayags conclusions about the respondents psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side the petitioner whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctors probes. Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioners narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who believes that the world revolves around him; and who used love as adeceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him. Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of love; made a generalization that respondent was a person who lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse, and who engaged in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool; and finally concluded that the respondents character traits reveal him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable. We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to

prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayags conclusion in her Report i.e., that the respondent suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondents psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayags subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report. We do not share this view. A careful reading of Dr. Tayags testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondents condition was grave and incurable. This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage and in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners case. Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[40] No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondents life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondents family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not

a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise permanently separated simply because they have fallen out of love, or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years. Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioners evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioners marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondents psychological incapacity. The Court commiserates with the petitioners marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with ones spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.[41] WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CAG.R. CV No. 75095. [ G.R. No. 150677, June 05, 2009 ] RENATO REYES SO, PETITIONER, VS. LORNA VALERA, RESPONDENT. BRION, J.: The Petition and Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously erred[28] in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial court's factual and conclusive finding that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab initio; in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that factual findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on appeal; and in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.[29] The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial court never made a definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of the parties' marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.[30] The petitioner filed a reply;[31] thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments. Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage, the basic issue before us is whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent null and void. THE COURT'S RULING We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and formal requisites of marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the trial court. 1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack of the essential and formal requisites of marriage The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision without touching on the trial court's ruling that there was absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage.

We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons. First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC definitively ruled that petitioner's marriage to respondent was null and void due to the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage. A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that "[ S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that the documents will be signed only when they get married." The trial court did not even mention the certified true copy of the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City. The petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit "D" to prove that there is a marriage contract registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between petitioner and respondent.[32] Out of this void came the dispositive portion "[D]eclaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991 null and void."[33] Faced with an RTC decision of this tenor, the CA could not have ruled on the validity of the marriage for essential and formal deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on this point to evaluate and rule upon on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before the CA, the RTC's declaration of nullity should be void for violation of the constitutional rule that "[No] decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."[34] Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned itself wholly with the declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After its recital of the "testimonies of witnesses," part of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and, from there, proceeded to its conclusion that psychological incapacity existed. In this light, the dispositive

portion declaring "the marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void," must be based on psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.[35] As a duly registered document, it is a public document, and is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner with the respondent. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the document's favor, the petitioner's contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[36] To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the marriage did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law, then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open to fraud.[37] At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take place must be supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons. 2. Petitioner failed to establish respondent's psychologicaincapacity As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish the respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)

incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."[39] More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals[40] (the Molina case) as follows: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application

of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts... (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[41] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[42] The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner and the respondent first met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a business, and even incurred indebtedness amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the CA described as "character faults and defects"; and had a well-described quarrel which the CA observed to be the "common reaction of an ordinary housewife

in a similar situation." Thus, unlike the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, cohabitation, and perception of psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a situation where there had been a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure, this factual unique situation does not change the requirement that psychological incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It does, however, raise novel and unavoidable questions because of the lapse of time the couple has been together and their intimate knowledge of each other at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how do these factors affect the claim of psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage, considering that marriage came near or at the end of the parties' relationship? Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are achieved if the respondent herself is actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the present case because the respondent simply failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the proceedings. Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place through the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for about three (3) hours.[43] In light of the differences in the appreciation of the psychologist's testimony and conclusions between the trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the records ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues submitted for resolution. Our own examination of the psychologist's testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this

while fully aware that the psychologist appeared at the petitioner's bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono.[44] While this circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the facts in mind. In examining the psychologist's Report, we find the "Particulars" and the "Psychological Conclusions" disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The "particulars" are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondent's life from which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be comprehensive enough to be reliable. For example, the psychologist's statements about the parties' sexual relationship appear to us to be rash, given that no parallel examination of the petitioner's own pattern of sexual behavior has been made. Sex with a partner is a two-way affair and while one partner can be more aggressive than the other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant behavior and may depend on the dynamics of the partners' relationship. To infer prior sexual experience because the respondent allegedly initiated intimate behavior, and to cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the respondent's sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent did pass her Dental Board Exam was glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam were highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that "she quit her dental practice and joined petitioner in his communications business." The respondent's business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as there could be reasons for her interference. With respect to employees, while the petitioner charged the respondent with being strict, he, at the same time, alleged that she gambled with the employees when there were no clients. The psychologist did not pursue these lines and, significantly, the petitioner's testimonies on this point are uncorroborated. The respondent's reaction to her husband's nights out was singled out and

slanted to indicate negative traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude when the petitioner stayed out late at night "is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation." To further quote the CA citing the transcripts, "[I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted that the reason respondent got angry and threw his things outside is because he came home late and drunk, which petitioner-appellee had done several times already on the pretext of closing business deals, which sometimes included going out nightclubbing with clients."[45] Why and how the couple incurred indebtedness of about P4 million may be usual in the communications business, but is certainly a matter that the psychologist should have further inquired into in relation with her alleged strictness in business affairs. As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 - developments that show a fair level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications business - traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioner's Memorandum[46] itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that time, the relationship between the petitioner and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was not an impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents." More than all these, the psychologist's testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondent's behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify to the respondent's impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. The psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently prove

that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder so grave and serious that the respondent would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondent's medical or psychological history before her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondent's capacity to achieve. Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace this to the time the respondent came to Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder was due to her separation from her parents and lack of guidance. Will common human experience, available through the thousands of students who over the years trooped from the provinces to Manila, accept the conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a disorder that can affect their capacity to marry? In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible because it is there.[48] Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and that change can happen if the "stimulus of the petitioner" is removed from her life? In other words, is the incapacity relative and reversible? In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." In the present case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse "snapshots" of the respondent's life showing her alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to

meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the marriage was celebrated. In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent deficiencies of her testimony tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence and accept the psychologist's Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the parties' marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any contradictory statements from the respondent, the fairer approach is to read between the lines of this Report and discern what indeed happened between the parties based on common human experience between married couples who have lived together in the way the parties did. From this perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA decision as a fairer assessment of the respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a more realistic appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article 36: Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of marriage between petitionerappellee and respondent. While she appears to be less than ideal mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological illness as described in Molina. Although the expert witness had clinically identified respondent's condition as "Adjustment Disorder," allegedly resulting from respondent's separation from her parents when she studied in Manila before she met petitioner-appellee, it was not established that such disorder or illness allegedly manifested in her carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of coping with her emotional and psychological stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature, "a supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effective incapacitates" the respondent from "really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." The clinical findings on respondent's alleged Adjustment Disorder have not established

such illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. And, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, although the Psychological Report stated that respondent's condition "appears to be irreversible," the expert witness did not substantiate her conclusion that respondent's condition was indeed incurable or permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of petitioner-appellee was it shown that respondent's allegedly carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while she was younger and had no children yet, continued throughout their marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary, her strict attitude towards the clients and employees is a clear indication that she takes their business concerns seriously, such attitude being a reflection of a mature and responsible personality.[49] Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one's situation and on one's husband are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation - a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[50] Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different

from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.[51] [Emphasis ours] WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CAG.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the petitioner.

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