Abayon Vs Hret

District vs Party-list Rep
ABAYON VS HRET CONTENTION: ABAYON 2007 ELECT, AANGAT TAYO SHE IS NOT ELIGIBLE NOT HAVING REPRESENTED THE MARGINALIZED and underrepresented sectors Abayon countered COMELEC has already confirmed status of Aangat TAYO as a national multi-sectoral organization rep. workers, youth, women, urban poor and elderly, she belonging to the women sector. Palparan. It is contended, he does not rep the m&U sectors. [CAFGU victim of members of communists] One Lesaca filed a Petition for quo warranto ousting palparan. Palparan raised same argument (HRET Hhad no jurisdiction). ISSUE is whether or not HRET had jursidiction to hear complaints re: DQ as HR members? HELD: under the Consti, 2 kinds of HR member (1) elected by political constituents [district rep], and (2) by the marginalized sector [party-list rep]. SInce they have been THUS ELECTED, they are members of HR. The Consti vests on HRET jursidiction as sole judge of questions involving DQ's of members of the HR.
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MARIANO JR. VS COMELEC G.R. No. 118627 Ponente: Puno, J. 07 March 1995
FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
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Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
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Montejo vs. COMELEC 242 SCRA 415 March 16, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. Held: Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside. The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress. Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that: Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.
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Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.) Notes: Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.
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Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC FACTS: A representative of the city of Cagayan de Oro file and sponsored a bill (HB No.5859) which later became a law (RA No. 9371). The said law increased the citys legislative district from one to two. COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said law for election purposes. Herein petitioner, filed a petition against COMELEC arguing that it cannot implement the law without the commencement of a plebiscite of which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local government unit. In relation to this, petitioner prayed for a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. Both were not granted, and the Nationaland Local elections proceeded. ISSUE(S): Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a local government unit HELD: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. RATIO/DOCTRINE: Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. They are related but are different from each other. Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested authority of the legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another. In the case at bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. CDO city politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial line. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and
the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts.
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District vs Party-list Rep Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010] Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
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District vs Party-list Rep Issue: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held: We deny the petition.
Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

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District vs Party-list Rep ALDABA VS. COMELEC Jan. 25, 2010
Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Held: We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
Ruling: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be Page 9 of 50
District vs Party-list Rep 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
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Gerrymandering
NAVARRO v ERMITA Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not
being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous
decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO),2 the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows: Mainland 281,111 Surigao City 118,534 Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354 Dinagat Island 106,951 Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands.3 In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.4 The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.5
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Gerrymandering
On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.6 On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence.7
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional? Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an
exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections
442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution.
Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
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Qualifications Theory of LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY

The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise: . . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI. 11 Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995, established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely four (4) months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by the Constitution is inapplicable.
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Qualifications
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA 300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she
became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
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Qualifications
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To
add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
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Qualifications
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondents Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.: The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions. FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile. Page 16 of 50
Qualifications Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
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Natural-Born Citizens
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001 FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen. Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election. ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. HELD: petition dismissed YES Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship
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Natural-Born Citizens
may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. ** Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
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Term vs Tenure Dimaporo v. Mitra FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election. He wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds when term maybe shortened: 1.Holding any officer or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. 2.Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3.Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4.Voluntary renunciation of office ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position? HELD: No. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
Page 20 of 50
Term vs Tenure
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve
the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
seems to
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
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INCREASE IN COMPENSATION PHILCONSA vs GIMENEZ FACTS: PHILCONSA is a a non-profit civic organization. It filed the petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress). The petition seeks to prohibit respondents from passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities.
The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions: 1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. 2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
3. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. 4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:
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INCREASE IN COMPENSATION
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective seats; 2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution) 3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise; 4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party; 5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and 6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution) In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their term of office. It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the checks and balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation act including other emoluments? It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each. Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187) This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 19402 The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement
benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments.
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
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INCREASE IN COMPENSATION From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
-VOID.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years salary.Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.4The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186. On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeantsat-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members. Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in its title
XXX UNCONSTUTIONAL XXX Page 24 of 50
INCREASE IN COMPENSATION
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
PHILCONSA v ISMAEL MATHAY Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Held:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
QF: Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642 increasing salaries of Members of the House of Reps for the year of 1965-1966. Philconsa seeks to enjoin the Acting Auditor General to pass this in audit on the ground that 8 of the senators who enacted the bill have terms that will expire on 1969 thus, it violates Art VI, Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution. Petition granted. DOCTRINE: The language of the provision on salaries of Members of Congress is clear. It refers to the expiration of the full term of all the Members of both Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. RATIONALE: To remove personal interest from the increase
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PRIVILEGES - Parliamentary Immunity
Col. JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

Facts: Bartolome Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including Col. Jimenez, associating them in purported operational plans for a coup detat. Petitioners instituted this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his defense, Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the letter in question a privileged communication protected by Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
Held: The court ruled in the negative. Speech or debate therein used in Art VI Sec 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressman in the performance of their official functions while Congress is in session. Cabangbang made the open letter to the president when Congress was not in session. And in causing the communication to be so published, Cabangbang was not performing his official duty as a Member of Congress.
Hence, the communication is not absolutely privileged.

- We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
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PRIVILEGES - Parliamentary Immunity
Osmena v. Pendatun
Facts: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. "The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . ." Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23.
Issue: Whether
the Resolution violated petitioners constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
Whether petitioners words constituted actionable conduct;
Whether petitioner is protected by Rule XVII Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate he shall not be held to answer therefore nor be subject to censure by the House.
Held: Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Ratio: On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain.
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PRIVILEGES - Freedom from Arrest
People v. Jalosjos [Feb. 3, 2000]

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. 3, 2000 Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
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TRILLANES V. PIMENTEL G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
FACTS: Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in relation to the Oakwood Incident. In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is
indicted for coup d'etat which is
regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. xxx A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
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substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants like Jalosjos. xxx Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion
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PROHIBITIONS AND INHIBITIONS Incompatible or Forbidden Office
Zandueta v. Judge Dela Costa

November 28, 1938 G.R. No. L-46267
NATURE This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent
FACTS Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by
virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National AssemblyOn November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the Commonwealth
a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan-
The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment-Another ad interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new oathAfter his appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive judge, performed several executive actsOn May 19, 1938, the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner-On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments
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ISSUE
WON the petitioner may question the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145 to entitle him to repossess the office occupied by him prior to the appointment issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed statute?
HELD When a judge of first instance, presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by
another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First Instance, in addition to another court of the same
category, both of which belong to a new judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters
virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts
into the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old office and cannot claim to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If the petitioner believed that Commonwealth Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not.The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law(art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be stopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to the petitioner.
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FLORES V DRILON FACTS Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority. ISSUES (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. (3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. (5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment. HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents. (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
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Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the VicePresident for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his
tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
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Liban v. Gordon,
G.R. 175352January 18, 2011
FACTS Richard J. Gordon (respondent) filed for a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration on the promulgated Decision by the Court on July 15, 2009. The case brought about by the petitioners was regarding to Gordons forfeiture of his seat in the Senate when he accepted the Chairmanship in the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). The court ruled that it was not the case, as PNRC is not agovernment-owned and controlled corporation for the purpose of prohibition inSect. 13, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Court, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter (as in R.A. 95) insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and ExchangeCommission if it wants to be a private corporation. Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. 95 was not an issue in theaforementioned case; the petitioners did not raise its constitutionality. As the court decided, the petitioners did not have standing to file the instant petition. Hence, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter. ISSUE Are the provisions of R.A. No. 95 valid and constitutional? HELD Yes. Richard J. Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision inG.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009 were granted. The constitutionality of R.A.No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court. The structure of the PNRC, being neither strictly private nor public innature, R.A. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay
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PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
FACTS: In an election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corp., the Puyat Group won 6 seats to gain control of the Board of management of the Company. The Acero Group, which won only 5 seats, questioned the said election in a quo warranto proceeding filed with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where they claimed that the stockholders votes were not properly counted. In the said case,
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds, thus discouraging the Assemblyman from further appearing therein as counsel.
Subsequently however, the Assemblyman acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject company representing 10 shares out of 262, 843 outstanding shares. On the basis of which, he filed an urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case raising real interest therein.
The respondent Associate Commissioner of SEC granted the leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez ownership of 10 shares. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON Assemblyman Atty. Fernandez circumvented the constitutional prohibition against appearance as counsel before an administrative body HELD: YES, Atty. Fernandez cannot appear as counsel. He acquired the 10 shares after the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel so he could intervene.
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SESSIONS
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal. ISSUE: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. RULING: Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such midnight or last-minute appointments (350 appointees).
We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacaan submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.
Case dismissed.
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OFFICERS
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES: 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and minority leader exercising the position of Senate
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review). The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus,
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OFFICERS
the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue. SECOND ISSUE There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
FOURTH ISSUE
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
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RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
Avelino vs. Cuenco

GR L-2821, 4 March 1949
FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum the majority required of the 24-member Senate. ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? (2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.
Yes, MAY QUORUM. Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
"each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the
petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
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G.R. No. 127255. June 26, 1998 JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, andRONALDO B. ZAMORA, Petitioners vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THESECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents . Facts: The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing Sin Taxes) by filing a petition for for certiorari and/or prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution when the Chair of the Committee(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep. Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420. Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation:(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996(4) the published version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity? Held: The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.
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NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege? HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege: 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
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Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
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DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
OSMENA V PENDATUN, SUPRA SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is
FACTS: A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that
petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
RULING: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that eachx x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
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ENROLLED BILL
Astorga vs. Villegas

G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.
FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING: Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
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ENROLLED BILL
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. When courts may turn to the journal Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. Facts; House bill No. 9266, defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice Mayor of Manila became a law under RA 4065 after both houses and the President signed it. However, it was later on found out that the said law was not the same as the version approved by the Senate as it was going thru its revision. With this finding, the Senate President and the President himself sent out a statement saying they are withdrawing their signatures from the House Bill No. 9266, therefore, it should not be considered as a law. Issue; WON the petition for mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be granted and compel the respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Ruling; The Supreme Court recognized the withdrawal of the President and the Senate Presidents' signatures from RA 4065 or House Bill 9266, therefore it did not become a law. The temporary restraining order was also made permanent.The intent of the law making body based on its journals prevailed over technicality of the legal process of enacting a bill.
Page 46 of 50
ENROLLED BILL U.S. V. PONS, G.R. NO. L-11530 AUGUST 12, 1916 FACTS: The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. Affirmed the decision. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
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ENROLLED BILL
CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.
Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069. Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Ratio: It
is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
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ENROLLED BILL
PHIL JUDGES ASSOC v. DOTC SEC. PRADO, et al

Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails [free of charge] amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Facts; Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it
becoming a law.
Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.
Page 49 of 50
ENROLLED BILL
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
- Violative of the Equal protection clause
Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Page 50 of 50

Abayon Vs Hret

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District vs Party-list Rep

District vs Party-list Rep

District vs Party-list Rep

District vs Party-list Rep

District vs Party-list Rep

District vs Party-list Rep

new second legislative district.

Held: We deny the petition.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

District vs Party-list Rep ALDABA VS. COMELEC Jan. 25, 2010

Qualifications Theory of LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

XXX UNCONSTUTIONAL XXX Page 24 of 50

In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased

PRIVILEGES - Parliamentary Immunity

Col. JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG

Hence, the communication is not absolutely privileged.

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Whether petitioners words constituted actionable conduct;

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indicted for coup d'etat which is

regarded as a "political offense."

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virtue of a legal and valid appointment, accepts

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The communications are covered by executive privilege

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PHIL JUDGES ASSOC v. DOTC SEC. PRADO, et al

which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

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