NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

GUY M. ROBINSON* & ALMA POBRIR**

*School of Geography, Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey, KT1 2EE, UK. E-mail: g.robinson@kingston.ac.uk **Department of Geography, University of Sarajevo, Zmaja od Bosne 3335, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina. E-mail: apobric@pmf.unsa.ba Received in nal version: November 2005 ABSTRACT The Dayton Accords, concluded in November 1995 following the recent bloody conict in the former Yugoslavia, established Bosnia-Hercegovina as a country of two entities: a Croat-Muslim federation and Republika Srpska, dominated by Bosnian Serbs. The conict created a substantial refugee problem and a transformation through ethnic cleansing of the mosaic of ethnically intermingled communities that was characteristic of pre-war Bosnia. Within this turmoil of dislocation, trauma and continuing distrust between the ethnic groups the new state is gradually being established. Reconstruction is progressing; new institutions are being created and new (or redened) identities are emerging in response to the changing economic and political circumstances. This paper draws upon ethno-symbolic arguments and elements of banal nationalism to analyse contradictory aspects of evolving nationalist identities in Bosnia, especially within the Muslim (Bosniak) population. Drawing upon recent ethnographic eld-work, it focuses both on visible elements of nationalism and identity within the urban landscapes of the capital, Sarajevo, and the city of Mostar to the south, and less tangible cultural signiers as symbolised in the emergence of the term Bosniak and the reconstruction of the national (formerly regional) museum. Key words: Nationalism, identity, Bosnia-Hercegovina, ethnography, cultural signiers

INTRODUCTION The invoking of the past in the creation of a modern state has been repeated in many instances during the last century, but its implementation in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina is taking place in extenuating circumstances related to recent conict, which has reinforced polarisation based on ethnic divisions. The state was brought into existence by the Dayton Accords, signed in November 1995, marking the formal end of hostilities in this province of the former Yugoslavia. The bloody ghting in the early 1990s had killed 250,000 inhabitants (Samary 1995; Woodward 1995; Lamp 1996).

Over half of the pre-war population of 4.4 million was displaced, with 1.5 million refugees and nearly one million internally displaced persons (Allcock 2000, p. 432; Black 2002; Job 2002, p. 185). Over one million refugees and internally displaced persons have not returned to their former homes (UNDP 2002). The Accords established a new state consisting of two entities: roughly half the population belonging to a federation of Muslims and Croats, and the other half to Serbs (as Republika Srpska) (Figure 1). The divisions between the Croats and the Muslims were not recognised at Dayton but had concrete expression on the ground. Hence the Accords created a series

Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geograe 2006, Vol. 97, No. 3, pp. 237252. 2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

238

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC

Figure 1. Bosnia-Hercegovina.

of de facto partitions of Bosnia-Hercegovina into ethno-nationalist entities that both acknowledged and effectively rewarded ethnic cleansing (OTuathail & Dahlman 2004): what Campbell (1999) refers to as the apartheid logic of partition. In Bosnia-Hercegovina there have been three potential nations associated with long-term cleavages between Croats, Serbs and Muslims. The Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs have been able to link themselves to a greater Croatia and a greater Serbia respectively while the Muslims have had an identity dened by their religious afliation and a territorial dimension
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

related to the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina that includes large areas dominated by Croats and Serbs. Therefore there may have been a less well-dened relationship between the Muslims and territory than there has been for their Croatian and Serbian counterparts (Denich 1994, 1996; Lovrenovi 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that ethnic divisions, evident in the recent conict, were often regarded as relatively insignicant by the Muslims at many times in the past (Lockwood 1976; Donia & Fine 1994), especially in what Allcock (2000, p. 348) refers to as the urban ecumenism of Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital.

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS In all parts of Bosnia, political leaders embarked upon their own ethnically-based agendas, containing competing ethno-nationalist expressions, as illustrated by manifestations of what Billig (1995) terms banal nationalism, referring to the ideological habits that enable nationalism to be reproduced. At the heart of these nationalisms are appeals to history, with new appeals now being developed in the political climate created after the signing of the Accords. These include the design of new banknotes and stamps, the renaming of streets in the capital, Sarajevo, the reconstruction of the National Museum and the creation of various national documents for the new state of BosniaHercegovina, e.g. the Atlas Islamskoga Svijeta, a beautifully produced Bosnian governmentsponsored tome on Islam around the world and emphasising Islam in Bosnia. In the creation of these symbols of the new state and of the constituent entities, there has been a conscious invoking of collective memories, recalling certain historical events to enhance group identity. Of signicance is the selective nature of these memories. The events and individuals most typically commemorated by the Bosnian Muslims are from the period of the Ottoman Empire (dating back to 1434), but include some signicant events and individuals from the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (18781918). For example, streets in Sarajevo, formerly with the names of communist worthies, now bear the names of writers, poets, military, political and mythological heroes, readily identiable as Bosniaks (Bosnjaks) rather than Serbs or Croats. The legal tender of the Muslim-Croat federation incorporates symbols relating to the Bogumil Church from the fourteenth and fteenth centuries, an appeal to earlier roots of Bosnian Muslims and other Bosnians when Bosnia covered a larger territory. Tangible illustrations of how competing nationalisms are being established and redened in Bosnia can be compared with similar developments elsewhere. For example, in their analysis of the partitioning of Cyprus into separate Greek and Turkish entities, Kliot & Manseld (1997, p. 504) refer to a recognisable landscape of partition manifested in various ways: a border separating the entities; changes in population patterns, distribution and settlement;

239

new public and political institutions; major changes in the pattern, distribution and symbolic contents of the cultural landscape, including place names, monuments and other symbolic elements; and the partitioned economy and infrastructure. This paper focuses on two key aspects of the components identied by Kliot & Manseld, namely: borders between ethnic groups (in contrast to Cyprus, though Bosnia has multiple borders and hence the term division is preferred to that of partition), and abstract and concrete symbols. This comprises a focus both on the visible elements of a reshaping of identity within the urban landscapes of the capital, Sarajevo, and the southern city of Mostar, and less tangible cultural signiers, for example in the emergence of the term Bosniak. The paper draws upon theory contained in the so-called ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism and the new nationalism as applied recently in the context of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Kaldor (2004). It also utilises material gathered through ethnographic research conducted in 2004, which extended earlier work in 1999 and 2000. NATIONALISM, ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND THE NEW NATIONALISM It has been argued recently that neither of the two main theories of nation and nationalism, namely primordialism and constructivism, adequately account for the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia because they are both only partial explanations that ignore specic and crucial contextual considerations (e.g. Ljubisi 2004). Primordialism is the view proposed in some of the seminal writings of Anthony Smith (1986) that nations are essentially pre-modern formations. In contrast, constructivists argue that nations are socially-constructed categories (Hobsbawm 1983) or imagined communities (Anderson 1991), which have emerged as modern creations in the so-called age of nationalism. Both theories give emphasis to ethnic nationalism as the key to the destruction of Yugoslavia. For example, in a strongly primordialist reading, Huntington (1996) refers to the surfacing of ancient hatreds in the former Yugoslavia and a clash of civilisations between Catholics, the Orthodox church and Muslims. An
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

240 alternative view is that of Yugoslavia as a failed imagined community (Hayden 1996), producing a reversion to more dominant imaginations based on ethnic identities. Both ideals oversimplify the complexities of the situation in which multiple historical, ethnic and national identities were highly intermingled within Bosnia before the recent conict, but both emphasise the ethnic dimensions of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. Smith (1999, p. 9) elaborates these ethnic dimensions in terms of associated symbolism, stressing the pre-existing cultures and ethnicities of nations that have subsequently emerged in modern times. It emphasises the role of myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols because these are such powerful differentiators and reminders of unique identities. For Bosnian Muslims, the ethno-symbolic can be seen in the celebration of a past that has distinctive ethnic traditions, religion and history, symbols of territory and community, and ethnohistories that have been mobilised recently to reinforce a distinctive identity that is now being linked to the newly created state (Bringa 2002). Smith (2004, p. 24) argues that in general such pleas to the past are specically aimed at using the past as an inspiration and means for renewing current society so that it can become viable and condent to withstand contemporary pressures. In the case of the Bosnian Muslims these pressures are linked to the competing agendas of their Croat and Serb neighbours. Hence, distinct identities for all three ethnic groups are being rened following the end to open conict a decade ago and with the additional history from the conict involving atrocities, destruction and displacement of peoples that has added sharp distinctions to the different histories. Eriksen (2004) argues that recent events have increased opportunities for the various ethnic groups to contrast themselves against others. Such contrasting and the growth of inward-looking personal networks are often crucial aspects of national discourses. Indeed, contrasts, differentiation and networks that exclude those labelled as others have been dominant features of the break-up of the Yugoslav state, with its ethnic cleansing and spatial segregation. In Bosnia, for example, militantly nationalistic parties have been allowed to stand for election throughout the country despite
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC their association with ethnic cleansings (Malik 2000). They continue to be associated with blatantly racist propaganda, and with suspected war criminals active in elections and positions of power. Near monopoly of these parties in certain areas has enabled them to exert complete control of local economies and to subvert the basic goals enshrined in the Dayton Accords (Manning 2004a, b). There is, though, an alternative discourse to that based on contrasts between ethnic groups. This has been termed the new nationalism (e.g. Kaldor 2004). It is non-violent, open and inclusive, and stresses cultural diversity not cultural homogeneity, by embracing democratic processes to create a cosmopolitan entity incorporating openness towards different peoples, places and experiences. Kaldor (2004, p. 173) observes that elements of the cosmopolitan are present at every turn in the streets of Sarajevo, reecting the fact that different cultures have survived there side by side for centuries: the mosque, the orthodox church, the catholic church and the synagogue are all within a hundred yards of each other (p. 174). It is possible then that, at least in this part of Bosnia, there may be potential for the development of a nonethnically-based cosmopolitan nationalism. Cosmopolitanism respects diversity, different religious practices and conditions that maintain their co-existence. However, it can be argued that attempts to retain diversity in Sarajevo exist alongside a much narrower nationalism that seeks to claim ownership of the city for Bosnian Muslims: an instance of one imagination, constructed identity or historical interpretation competing with a different version. These competing views are investigated herein utilising material gathered through ethnographic research conducted in Sarajevo, Mostar and along the Croatia-Hercegovina border in the summer of 2004. Interviews were carried out with a range of academics, public ofcials, museum curators and local business people. On-the-spot translations were provided for the English-only-speaking author by the co-author. The former took notes of the conversations. Some of the interviews were formally arranged at set times with ofcials and adhered largely to a pre-determined schedule of questions; others were simply conversations conducted as part of participant observation, especially in Mostar

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS and Hercegovina, which were visited in the weeks preceding and following the ofcial reopening of the Stari Most bridge in Mostar on 11 July 2004. BOSNIAK IDENTITY Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is the past; what justies one nation against others is the past . . . (Hobsbawm 1996, p. 255). Banac (1994) contends that the Bosnian Muslims have been ethnicised by the recent conict; that is they have been made brutally aware of the differences that exist between themselves and neighbouring Croats and Serbs. One response has been for Muslims to establish a recognisable Bosnianness or Bosnianhood (Bosnja Etvo), with the category of Bosniak (Bosnjak) (Bochniaques in French) established to denote independent Bosnians as opposed to Croatians or Serbians (Rolland 2004). Hence Bosniak, as a recognisable identity, is closely entwined with the Muslim inheritance of the region, though not submerged by it (Allcock 2000, p. 336). This is not an uncontested term, but Bosniak is now commonly recognised in the country and is widely used instead of Bosnian Muslim. In part the non-application of the label Muslim reects a strong and ongoing secular tendency among the Bosnian Muslims despite recent investment from Muslim nations, notably Saudi Arabia, to rebuild damaged mosques. In linking the term Bosniak to an identity based on nationalism and nationalist aspirations, Maga3 (2003) refers to Bosnianness as a common identity in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries based on the existence of a Bosnian nation on the eve of Ottoman conquest. She argues that Serb and Croat nationalisms subsequently undermined Bosnianness, and, following conquest, the Bosnian national ideal had no living state tradition or forms of institutional autonomy. Indeed, within both Croatia and Serbia today there remain irredentist claims to Bosnian territory as well as secessionist aspirations among Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Nevertheless, this Bosnianness has been recognised by non-Bosnians from the former Yugoslavia. For example, Job (2002, p. 157), a Croat who was one of Titos partisans,

241

notes that there was a certain, almost ineffable, but nonetheless unmistakeable Bosnianness, the distinct way all Bosnians, Serb, Croat or Muslim, inected their one Serbo-Croat . . . language; their laidback ways; their easy commingling despite all the banal interruptions of history; their very own idiosyncratic, self-deprecating wit, as well as their self-description as Bosnians and their pride in the beauty of their Bosnian countryside. This is further emphasised by Mahmutehajis (2003) claim that pre-1990 Bosnia exhibited unity through diversity. One of the tragedies of the recent conict is that a tripartite division has superseded this wider multi-ethnic view of Bosnianness. In effect, Bosniak is a neologism that has emerged in the current ethnic partitioning. Ljubisi (2004, p. 117) claims it refers exclusively to Bosnian Muslims while Samary (1995, p. 162) states: The ofcial terminology has changed in Bosnia, and been codied in the constitution of the new Croat-Muslim federation. The term Muslim now refers only to religion. A member of the Muslim ethnic national community is now called a Bosnjak (Bosniak) as distinct from Bosanac (Bosnian), which refers to a citizen of Bosnia in general. This use of a clear new label to signify a particular identity has special signicance because of the multi-faceted problem of identity and nationalism within Bosnia-Hercegovina. For example, Ljubisi (2004) stresses the extent to which some pre-war residents of Bosnia had difculties in identifying themselves as any of the three principal ethnic groups of Bosnia. He highlights the invention of the category of Eskimo by some individuals in the 1991 Census: like Yugoslavs a catch-all for those unwilling to be classied as Croats, Muslims or Serbs. At this time 44 per cent of the 4.4 million population declared themselves Muslims, 31.5 per cent Serbs, 17 per cent Croats, 5.5 per cent Yugoslavs, and 2 per cent as others (including Eskimos). However, it is estimated that 16 per cent of those aged less than 16 years were from mixed marriages (Hayden 1996, p. 789). Hence, the ethnic cleansing that has occurred has cut not only through territories but also through families (Crnobrnja 1994, p. 23). Indeed, at the heart of the conict were attempts by the various separate nationalist political movements to destroy the co-existence
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

242 of the intermingled ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia especially in the regions of greatest ethnic diversity, many of which were in BosniaHercegovina. This diversity is described by Samary (1995, p. 87) as the Bosnian blend. Ljubisi (2004, p. 117) argues that this generally meant that prior to the conict most of Bosnias inhabitants described themselves as simultaneously Yugoslavs or Bosnians, though above all they were Serbs, Croatians or Muslims, perhaps with Bosnian as a sufx. Hence Yugoslav was an indication of their citizenship while a different term and its accompanying nationalist and cultural connotations dened their ethnicity. In the 1991 Census use of the term Eskimo or Yugoslav was a way of rejecting any local ethnic identity inherent to the region. These people have now been excluded from mainstream accounts of the outcomes of the recent conict: it is not possible to be a Yugoslav, a Bosnian or an Eskimo in a situation in which ethnic nationalism has transcended all else and in which there are intensely localised variations in identity and national sentiments. However, the survival of Eskimos within Bosnia today needs further investigation: it is possible that some might readily claim a non-ethnically dened identity if this had a greater social signicance. Yet, even in Sarajevo, Bosnias capital, long acknowledged as a cosmopolitan city and home to both ethnically distinct and mixed communities, Bosniak is the term overwhelmingly used by the Muslim population to distinguish themselves from other Bosnians. LANDSCAPES OF DIVISON: 1. MOSTAR Within the Muslim-Croat federation, the two principal ethnic groups tend to occupy their own exclusive territories and maintain much ongoing mutual antagonism. This has created several unofcial borders or divisions that are readily apparent in the landscape. Some are quite permeable, with close social contact across the border, while others represent gulfs between two distinct, separate and inwardlooking worlds. One particular border received the attention of a worldwide television audience in July 2004 when international dignitaries attended the formal reopening of the sixteenth century stone bridge (Stari Most) over the river
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC Neretva in the city of Mostar. Here conict between Croat and Muslim forces was at its sharpest in the recent war, with Croat forces destroying the bridges middle arches in 1993 (Pasi 1995; Merrill 1995; Lovrenovi 2001, p. 203; Coward 2002). The border between the two ethnic groups to the west of the river is still marked by the partially destroyed buildings that bore the brunt of shellre in the war, with Croats to the west and Bosniaks to the east. The ancient bridge is located in the old Muslim quarter (Stari Grad ) and so its reconstruction, hailed by the international community as a sign of reconciliation between the two sides, does not physically unite the two ethnic groups. However, the interpretation of the bridges reconstruction highlights elements within both the ideals of new nationalism and the further consolidation of ethno-nationalist cleavages in Bosnia. Pre-1992 Mostar had the highest percentage of mixed-faith marriages in Bosnia (Grodach 2002), and the city was portrayed to tourists as multicultural and multi-faith. Today the city is sharply divided into east and west. In the war thousands of liberal ecumenical Mostarians ed from the west of the city to be replaced by Croat peasants driven into the town and radicalised by their experience of ethnic cleansing (Bougarel 1999; Bose 2002). In the smaller eastern quarter today lives a predominantly Muslim population, with its numbers also swollen by refugees from the countryside. Few remain of the Serbs who pre-war comprised one-fth of the population. There are two football teams, two hospitals, two universities and two bus services. However, following the intervention of the United Nations High Representative, the city now has a single local assembly as a condition of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the Bosnian Government and the European Union (EU) that, potentially, is the rst step towards Bosnian membership of the EU (OTuathail 2005). Foreign aid has helped rebuild the bridge, and also contributed to other reconstruction including the rst block of ats in Bulevar, the street that was the front line in clashes between the Bosnia-Hercegovina Federation Army and Bosnian Croat forces. In the heavily-shelled Muslim quarter there is now reconstruction too, but without the presence of the Serbian

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS Orthodox Church, blown up in the war. Nearby the restoration of the heavily damaged seventeenth century Koski Mehmet Pasha mosque has been completed and the mosque reopened. Meanwhile to the west, on Hum Hill, which physically dominates the city, the Catholic Church has completed one new cathedral and has started on another. Some residents in the old Muslim quarter described the new Franciscan church of St. Peter and Paul, with a new overscaled campanile that can be seen for miles, as a giant one-nger gesture to local Muslims! For many outside observers the conicts sharp ethnic segregation between Croats and Bosniaks was symbolised in the destruction of the Stari Most Bridge. Hence, its rebuilding has been hailed as a representation of reconciliation, reuniting two opposing parts of the city (Merrill 1995; Sells 1996). This is part of an external wish for a new nationalism based on reconciliation and mutual tolerance. As outlined by Grodach (2002), this view sees the rebuilding of the bridge both as a counter to ethno-nationalism and as a step towards social and economic stability. He links it to the growing importance of international tourism in Mostar, which, he argues, demands that the rebuilding is equated with reconciliation. Indeed, the symbol of the Stari Most as a bridge between cultures and of a multicultural past for Mostar has been at the heart of the rebuilding project funded by the World Bank and with technical support from the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Hence, in part, this symbolism represents an externally imposed view and it contrasts with that held by Croats in Mostar. In conversation with Croats living in western Mostar the bridge was referred to as an ongoing symbol of the Islamic occupation of the city, central to the history of Bosnian Muslims but not to that of Bosnian Croats. Hence its destruction was a symbolic attack on Muslim cultural history and its rebuilding does not constitute reconciliation. This is summarised by Jezernik (2004, p. 205): the deliberate destruction of this unique cultural monument in 1993 amounts to the deliberate destruction of a symbol of the Muslim presence in Hercegovina and a brutal attempt to change the identity of the town. Local Bosnian Croats further argued that, as the Nerteva was not the historic border

243

between Muslims and Croats, so the rebuilding of the bridge could not, even symbolically, reunite the two halves of the city. Meanwhile, the separation on ethnic lines continues as Bosnian Croats in western Mostar are allocating former Muslim-owned apartments to Bosnian Croats. The attempt to ethnically cleanse parts of the surrounding Hercegovinian countryside also continues. It is most apparent in the attempt to deny the existence of previous settlement by Muslims in towns and villages now dominated by Croats. For example, in the small towns of Stolac and Trebinje, where mosques have been destroyed, the trickles of Muslims attempting to return to their former homes have been refused permission to rebuild mosques. Throughout Bosnia both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat authorities have either discovered evidence of pre-existing churches on Muslim sites or have denied the existence of mosques, as in the case of Zvornik and Foca (despite the fact that in the latter there were four dating from the sixteenth century) (Lovrenovi 2001, pp. 208210). In Stolac, the dynamited main mosque is being used as a car park, two others are now a bus station and a market place. This is an attempt at the destruction of cultural heritage to deny any claim that the Muslims might have. Terms such as warchitecture and urbicide are being applied to these practices, a parallel to the Talibans dynamiting of the giant Bamiyan Buddhas, the destruction of historic Tibetan Lhasa by the Chinese, and the redevelopment of the Magharbeh quarter of Jerusalem following the 1948 war (Coward 2002; Grodach 2002; Jezernik 2004). During the recent conict and in its immediate aftermath there was a separate de facto entity, Herceg-Bosna, centred on Mostar, where the military and police forces of extreme neoUstasha Croatian nationalists exerted a strong degree of control and where it is claimed that concentration camps for Muslims were operated (Sells 1996, pp. 105113; Mahmutehaji 1999). (The Ustasha Independent State of Croatia, containing large parts of western Bosnia-Hercegovina, was established by the Axis powers in 1941). In the early 1990s there was strong support from the Croat population in this area for the creation of a Greater Croatia, with backing from the Tudjman Government in
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

244 Zagreb. With the election of a more moderate Croatian government, this ofcial support has been removed, but very close ties remain between Croatia and the area of Herceg-Bosna. For example, Croatia has extended rights of citizenship and voting rights in Croatian elections to Bosnian Croats. This has afforded some Bosnian Croats considerable social assistance, raising household incomes in parts of HercegBosna well above those in most other parts of the two entities. To the south of Mostar, Croat nationalist sentiment is clearly expressed near the town of Capljina, where the reconstructed bridge over the Neretva river has been renamed in honour of Franjo Tudjman, the leader of Croatia during the recent conict. Grafti on buildings throughout this part of Hercegovina show strong support for the HDZ(BiH), the Croat nationalist party. However, it is clear that Tudjmans aim of a Greater Croatia embracing Herceg-Bosna will not be realised. In 2001 the European Stability Initiative (2001, p. 10) acknowledged that the leadership of the HDZ(BiH) has neither the (nancial) resources nor the political support (from Croatia) for such a policy. The pre-conditions of HerzegBosna no longer exist. Yet, from conversations with shopkeepers in Croat-dominated western Mostar and with the operators of small businesses in Posu3je, north-east of Mostar, and the religious tourist centre of Medjugorje, south of Mostar, the impression conveyed was of a continuing desire for more formal ties with Croatia than exist at present. The current political realities have produced a situation in which a Greater Croatia still exists in the minds of many Bosnian Croats, but, instead of a political realisation of this desire, there is further cementation of familial and economic ties between the Herceg-Bosna heartland and Croatia. There is also an ongoing political statement being made by the high support for the HDZ(BiH) (the Croatian Democratic Union), though most of the Bosnian Croat politicians who were advocating a Herceg-Bosna in the mid-1990s are no longer active. Moreover, the political changes in Croatia itself have meant that the government in Zagreb, at least from the outside, appears more concerned with normalisation of relations with the EU than with encouraging a pan-Croatian vision.
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC LANDSCAPES OF DIVISION: 2. VI=EGRAD A further illustration of the many landscapes of division in Bosnia is provided in Republika Srpska, where the fate of another historic bridge symbolises the attitude of the dominant Bosnian Serb ethnic group to Muslims. The Cuprija na Drina (Bridge over the River Drina), at Vi3egrad, 70 km east of Sarajevo, was built between 1571 and 1577 during the period of the Ottoman Empire to link Bosnia to Istanbul. At the time, echoing some claims for the Mostar bridge, it was referred to as the bridge that linked Christian Europe to Islamic Asia. Moreover, although the Turkish architect, Kodza Mimar Sinan, designed its 171-metres span with eleven arches, it was commissioned by Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Sokolovi, a Serb who rose to one of the most powerful positions in the Ottoman court. The bridge was immortalised in the writing of Vi3egrads Nobel Prize winning novelist, Ivo Andri, notably in his The Bridge on the Drina (1959). The key event in the book is when the Turks and Bosnian Muslims impale a Serb rebel who tries to destroy the bridge. Serb nationalist leaders have used this atrocity as one of many justications for attacks on Muslims. Indeed, the mixed community of Vi3egrad was the scene of ethnic cleansing when Serb paramilitaries slaughtered Muslims in the town in 1992. Some Muslims were killed on the bridge and their bodies dumped into the river below, with local Serb militia claiming revenge for Turkish and Muslim injustice dating back to the time of Sokolovi. Koranic inscriptions on the bridge have been defaced with blue paint. Today the bridge is in danger of collapse through neglect and damage by recent ghting. The Bosniak chair of the Bosnian governments Commission to Preserve National Monuments argues that the local municipality and the Bosnian Serb authorities in Republika Srpska do not regard repair of the bridge as a priority as it is not seen as representative of Serbian or Serb Orthodox culture despite the historic role of Grand Vizier Sokolovi. The bridge is generally regarded as a symbol of the mixing of cultures and of multiethnicity and so is anathema to those believing in a mono-ethnic Republika Srpska. Yet, the division of opinions is not simply one of a Bosniak view versus a Serb view,

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS as the campaign to restore the bridge does have some local Bosnian Serb supporters who argue for restoration, in part on the grounds of the historic Serbian connections it represents. Another consideration is economic, with both the Bosnian and the Republika Srpska governments protesting that they cannot afford the costs of restoration. A contrast can be drawn with the rebuilding of the Stari Most bridge in Mostar where international funding was vital, being obtained in part as a symbol of Western support for Bosnia and the ongoing intention of the EU to work towards a multiethnic democracy and a capitalist economy. The Red Bull logo (from the Austrian manufacturer of this soft drink) at the centre of the south-facing arch of the rebuilt Stari Most bridge testies to this desire. As yet there has been far less concern of the West to invest in Republika Srpska, with its close ties to Serbia and with the strong probability that it harbours wanted war criminals, notably Radovan Karadzi, former leader of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Hence, at present, the new nationalism vision for Mostar cannot be extended into the ethno-nationalist strongholds of either Republika Srpska or Herceg-Bosna. Even within Mostar, despite the recent growth of international tourism, the reconstructed Stari Most bridge exists within a divided city. LANDSCAPES OF DIVISION: 3. RENAMING SARAJEVOS STREETS Billig (1995) uses the term banal nationalism to refer to the ideological habits which enable nationalism to be reproduced. These habits can be found in everyday life so that the nation is constantly signalled to the citizenry. This is the concept of nationalism as an endemic condition whereby banal everyday objects, such as money, stamps, street names, museum displays and buildings assume a nationalist signicance. They can come to represent almost subliminal messages to the populace, conveying particular meanings and mobilising nationalist sentiment. National ags often carry symbolic meanings, while currency and stamps typically bear national emblems that can symbolise the elements of a collective memory, present in taken for granted transactions. Similarly, street names often carry a symbolic meaning; more so when

245

their names are deliberately changed as they have been recently in Sarajevo. Street names are laden with political meanings and are often supportive of the hegemonic socio-political order: the political aspect of a renaming operation involves both ideological considerations and decision-making procedures which control and direct the eventual process (Azaryahu 1997, p. 480). Hence street names may be embedded into the structures of power and authority (p. 480) and they can be used as a means of enshrining and canonising a particular vision of the past into the contemporary urban landscape. This has been termed a naming process that represents a register of sacred history (Schwartz 1982, p. 377). The street names are part of an authorised, ofcial version of history accompanying various massproducing traditions utilised within broader discourses of nationalism (Hobsbawm 1983). They are at the heart of the banal nationalism by which nation-states are reproduced: part of the daily routine and a backdrop to everyday life, but containing a message about identity that is absorbed into the environment (Billig 1995, pp. 4041). One of the rst aspects of renewal and reconstruction in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, postDayton was performed under the jurisdiction of a newly appointed administrative Commission for the city, established by the new government of the local canton. The 15-member Commission included artists, writers and historians, all residents in Sarajevo and mainly Muslims (the majority population of the city), nominated by the new canton government. They were charged with the specic task of renaming the streets, with popular support for removal of symbols associated with Sarajevos wartime enemies, principally connections with Serbs and Serbian territorial aggrandisement (Robinson et al. 2001, pp. 966967). Accompanying the renaming of streets was the removal of old signs in Cyrillic script, deemed to be reminders of Serbian (and communist) domination, and wholesale adoption of the Latin alphabet for street names. Many streets were renamed as the Commission aimed to restore old, traditional names that had been removed or lost under federal Yugoslav inuence. In all nearly 40 per cent of streets in the city and two-thirds in the neighbouring
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

246 settlement of Ilidza, formerly with a large Bosnian Serb community, have been renamed (Robinson et al. 2001; Pobri et al. 2003). In the city centre, with its nucleus of buildings dating from the fteenth century, names relating to old families and individuals have been remembered, generally as reintroductions of names that were removed at the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Commission identied many of the names introduced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as belonging to Croats and Serbs. In their place the names of Bosniaks have appeared, primarily Bosniaks from Sarajevo or from other parts of the new state. Nine streets referring to the partisans of the Second World War have been renamed as have streets with references to Lenin, Rosa Luxembourg, Marx, Engels and even Tito, though one of the main thoroughfares still bears the latters name and popular regard for Tito remains high. This was evident when a recent suggestion was made by the Commission to rename the main road bearing Titos name. In September 2004 there were protests by hundreds of residents against this proposed renaming of Marshal Tito Street after late president Alija Izetbegovi, who led the Bosniaks during the recent conict. Pro-Tito factions took to the streets and hung a huge banner across the street proclaiming, This is Marshal Titos street. In other parts of the former Yugoslavia, people nostalgic for the certainties of his rule have voiced similar pro-Tito sentiments, a reminder that, for some, a desire for both the old order and identication with Yugoslavia as opposed to its newly created constituent states has not been entirely lost. This has been termed Yugonostalgia (Ljubisi 2004, p. 145) and was evident among many Bosniaks interviewed in both Sarajevo and Mostar. The renaming committee has endeavoured to provide a sense of shared past to enhance Sarajevos social cohesiveness at a crucial time in its modern history. In itself the act of renaming streets has enshrined a set of profound political statements about who has power in the city and about what people and events in the past should be deemed relevant to contemporary reality. Whereas renaming of streets has frequently been associated with revolutionary change, as in the cases of the French and
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC Russian revolutions, for Sarajevo the process marks an ongoing act of resistance. The new names assert the survival of the city in the face of the siege by Serbian militia (locally termed Chetniks). This assertion also carries two strong symbolic and ideological messages that are contradictory but representative of emerging attitudes within the new state. First, many of the renamings celebrate the ethnic diversity of Sarajevo, and hence names of famous citizens from all ethnic groups are commemorated. For example, Miss Irby Street refers to an English teacher, Adelene Paula Irby (18331911), who ran a school for Serbian children in Sarajevo in the 1870s. Her high standing within the community 130 years ago is now recalled in a street name in the heart of the city even though she was primarily connected to Bosnian Serbs. This might be regarded as representative of Kaldors new nationalism in which nationalism has dimensions other than just simple ethnic ties. Second, there is a recognisable attempt to highlight the Bosniak/Muslim character of the city by replacing street names associated with non-Bosniaks. While it seems natural to commemorate events and people from the majority community in the city, it is instructive to note the symbolic and ethno-nationalist signicance of the removal of some names of people, places and events not directly associated with Bosniaks. Earlier work by the authors on this topic presented the renaming of Sarajevan streets primarily as part of a nation-building exercise for Bosniaks. However, it must be emphasised that renaming also represents a form of cleansing, by removing names that are regarded as objectionable in some way by those in authority. It is possible that by erasing some names that might remind people that Sarajevo was a very multiethnic city before the war, this might have the capacity to act as a means of dissuading some people from returning to their former homes or, if they do, to tacitly acknowledge the new local authorities. Indeed, a referee for an earlier version of this paper suggested that the Sarajevo street renaming is as provocative in some cases as Serb efforts to rename municipalities to include Srpska in their name. None of the Bosniak or Bosnian Croat residents of Sarajevo who discussed this topic had voiced the referees perspective on the street renaming process, but this may reect the constituency of the interviewees:

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS academics, government ofcials, local business people and predominantly Bosniaks. It may also reect the fact that the street renaming has not merely involved insertion of Bosniak heroes and events but has included references to events and names associated with other ethnic groups living in Sarajevo and so contains elements that transcend a narrow ethno-nationalism. Overall, the renaming appears to have a strong degree of popular resonance among the residents who survived the siege of the city, by appealing to folk memory, tradition and custom. CULTURAL SYMBOLS: 1. BOSNIAN BANKNOTES Links to the past are present in the design of the new states banknotes and stamps, which bear portraits of writers, poets and artists from Bosnias past. The currency and stamps are parts of the everyday life that form the states ofcial iconography. They create a link between the states political identity project and its citizens (Raento et al. 2004, p. 930). This is critical to the building of an imagined community. In particular, money and stamps are excellent exemplars of Billigs (1995) banal nationalism as they both build the states boundaries and a territorial sense of us, and because the validity of a currency ends at the border. Of special signicance is the use of ethnonationalist symbols on some of the bank-notes issued by the Central Bank of Bosnia-Hercegovina from 1998. The images on the back of several of the new notes are of fourteenth and fteenth century fragments of tombstones and stone reliefs relating to the Bogumil Church. A widely-held belief by Bosnian Muslims is that the Bogumils were independent of both the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and so their presence facilitated the widespread conversion of the Bosnian population to Islam at the beginning of Ottoman rule (Racki 1931; Kniewald 1964; Solovejec 1959). Hence Bosnian Muslims today can possibly trace their current ethnic distinctiveness not only to their current religion but also to a Christian past, accepting this as part of their own tradition (Fine 1975, 2002; Maga3 2003, p. 21). In contrast, the Yugoslav Nobel laureate, Ivo Andri (1990), portrays those Bosnian Slavs who converted to Islam as cowardly and greedy and as heathen

247

elements of a young race (p. 16). Serbian and Croatian politicians frequently repeated this view of Bosnian Muslims during the recent conict. In the nineteenth century the Franciscan monk Franjo Juki propagated this idea of a common heritage for Bosnians as adherents to the Bogumil church. He now appears as the front image of the one Marka note as a symbol of both a distinctive Bosnian Muslim nationalism and also of a wider pan-Slavic nationalism. This multi-layered symbolism embraces both the idea of Bosnia comprising people with a common past and Bosnia with Muslims at its core. Ironically, the possibility that the Muslims are descended from forebears who were Christians has enabled some Croats and Serbs to claim that the Muslims are really either Croats or Serbs and that all of Bosnia-Hercegovina therefore belongs to either a greater Croatia or a greater Serbia (Bringa 1995). There are mixed messages within this appeal to a greater Bosnia. It hints at a single Bosnian identity devoid of the current ethno-nationalist categories of Croat, Serb or Muslim, but it also confers a distinction upon Bosnian Muslims as having historic differences with their neighbours through their conversion to Islam, while possibly introducing the notion of Muslim Bosnia with wider territorial boundaries. CULTURAL SYMBOLS: 2. THE NATIONAL MUSEUM The establishment of a National Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina is being accomplished as part of EU aid for reconstruction. The former State Museum was badly damaged by shellre during the siege of Sarajevo, but most of its contents have survived. The collections are now being restored to establish a facility with a national rather than just a local dimension. There is an opportunity here to develop a more specically Bosniak character by emphasising a distinctive history associated with Turkish inuence in the region (Sijari 1993). In this ongoing establishment of the National Museum there is scope for what Anderson (1991, pp. 181183) terms political museumizing, enabling those in authority to determine exactly what is represented in the collections and so inuence the message conveyed. In effect,
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

248 this can provide support to particular views regarding the specic characteristics of nationality. In applying this to Bosnia-Hercegovina at present the difculty lies in the fact that there are competing nationalisms and that a distinctive Bosniak nationality is still emerging and being shaped by this very competition. The initial stages of the Museums restoration have focused on archaeology and ethnology, emphasising a Bosnian history that embraces the long-term presence of the three main ethno-nationalist groups, but especially the Bosnian Muslims, as a recognisable and distinct group, and dened in ethno-nationalist terms alongside Croats and Serbs. The Museums ethnographic section portrays the life of a well-to-do Muslim family in Sarajevo towards the end of Ottoman rule. There are also exhibits showing traditional craft skills of Bosnian Muslims. Other sections portray the history and fauna and ora from across the newly-created state. However, amid the ongoing reconstruction, sponsored by Swedish and Norwegian institutions, the Museums centrepiece, in a climate-controlled room, presents a distinctive message: that of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. The exhibit is the Haggadah, an ancient Jewish codex, which was smuggled out of Spain in the late fteenth century when Sephardic Jews were purged, and small communities of Sephardic Jews were established in Bosnia in Mostar, Sarajevo and Travnik. However, the history of the Haggadah is unknown between 1609 and 1894 when it was offered for sale to the Museum. The Haggadah is a 109-page lavishly illustrated manuscript with illuminated paintings. It is a traditional book of prayers, poems and stories about the Jewish exodus from Egypt, produced in fourteenth century Spain. Its presence in Sarajevo has had wide signicance, symbolising Jewish presence in the Balkans. Its protection, rst against the Nazis in the 1940s and more recently from shellre in the recent conict, has also symbolised the resistance of Sarajevo to external aggressors and a desire to preserve a multicultural character. Today, the celebration of a holy Jewish tome emphasises Sarajevos multi-ethnic history and its retention of an old Jewish synagogue and Jewish Museum. Although this restoration and its prominence owes much to funding from the United Nations
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC and various Western organisations, it is a reminder that, within the more dominant context of ethnic division and separation within Bosnia, an important strand of Bosniak identity is not exclusively Muslim but embraces a history of ethnic diversity and tolerance, especially in the context of Sarajevo. This is the essence of new nationalism, though in both the example of the Haggadah and the reconstructed Stari Most bridge, it is the Western powers that have provided the nance and the commitment to support this particular nationalism. CONCLUSION The preceding discussion has concentrated on landscapes of division and symbols of an evolving Bosniak nationalism. The context within which identity is being redened is dominated by increased spatial separation of the three principal ethnic groups, while politicians on all sides have promoted their interests largely in terms of ethno-nationalist division (Campbell 1998). Hence it remains to be seen to what extent the evolving Bosniak identity can avoid further emphasising the schism along ethnic lines that has been a central outcome of the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. That schism seems an almost inevitable consequence of the Dayton Accords (Pasi 1995; Vuillamy 1998), which legitimised exclusivist projects (Campbell 1999, p. 35) by conating ethnic with national and producing partition on ethnic lines to create separate national spaces (Chandler 2000; Bose 2002). However, there are certain countervailing forces to schism that affect both identity and political development. These include impacts from many external agencies such as international authorities (Tuathail 2002; Caplan 2004), the geopolitical situation in the Balkans and some traditions of multiethnicity within Bosnia itself. Throughout this paper a contrast has been drawn between the exclusivity and homogeneity associated with ethno-nationalist agendas in the former Yugoslavia and a more inclusive, liberal and tolerant new nationalism closely linked to the inuence of external, Western inuences. Within Bosnia the immediate legacy of the recent conict is the dominance of ethnonationalism, as reected in the estimate that 90 per cent of the population now live in ethnically

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS homogeneous communities (King 2004, p. 42). The trauma of war and ethnic cleansing has polarised and poisoned relations between communities, attened and simplied identications, destroyed social trust and condence, and constrained (at best) the development of democratic institutions (Spencer & Wollman 2002, p. 141). Bosniak, Croat and Serb versions of this ethno-nationalism have become more entrenched in particular territories because of the conict and the nature of the Dayton Accords. Indeed, it can be argued that the Accords themselves have been a major source of instability because they failed to deal with the dynamics of nationalism that had produced the conict. Despite the dominant model based on ethnonationalism, there are counter developments that can be recognised in Bosnia related both to the maintenance of particular historical traditions and to the impact of involvement of the Western powers in the construction and development of the new state. These represent a liberal version of nationalism that embraces pluralism and tolerance of the other. This has been described as a new nationalism, but in the context of Bosnia it may represent a continuation of traditions exemplied in centuries-old inter-marriages between the ethnic groups or simply an everyday acceptance of diversity and difference. This does not necessarily preclude peoples attachment to other forms of nationalism, so that the liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reection and choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty and solidarity . . . can indeed accommodate one another (Tamir 1993, p. 279). In some quarters this liberal nationalism has been interpreted as progressive and benign, in contrast to the reactionary and malign ethno-nationalism, as argued in the seminal work of Kohn (1965) forty years ago. While the notions of good and bad nationalism grossly oversimplify such a complex topic, in the case of Bosnia it is easy to see these two polar opposites in the component parts of Kliot & Manselds landscapes of nationalism examined herewith. The stark division of Mostar and the destruction of mosques and churches can be contrasted with the celebrations and symbolism associated with the rebuilding of the Stari

249

Most bridge and the use of the Haggadah as the National Museums new centrepiece. However, these two examples of good or new nationalism have been heavily reliant on external funding and pressure. This is in contrast to local Bosniak attempts to maintain some diversity in the Sarajevo street renaming exercise, and the evident pride of having retained mosques alongside the Catholic cathedral, the Orthodox church and the synagogue despite the three-year siege of the city from 1992 to 1995. Grodach (2002) emphasises the economic impacts of Western tourists in the drive to rebuild the Stari Most bridge. This external input to the reconstruction process has led to portrayals of the bridge as a symbol of reconciliation, conicting both with past histories of Mostar and the present deep divisions between Bosniaks and Croats in the city. In December 2004 the UN-sponsored Tirana Declaration was signed by six Balkan countries (including Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia) to reafrm that mutual respect, rooted in open dialogue and nourished by multi-ethnicity, multi-culturality and multi-religiosity is indispensable for the preservation of peace. The sentiments of this declaration, celebrating a mixture of a Muslim and a multiethnic Bosnia, are echoed in aspects of daily life and government activity within Bosnia, but always against the powerful backdrop of ethno-nationalism. Part of the evolving Bosniak identity embraces non-Muslim elements too and has had a political manifestation in an anti-ethno-nationalist coalition that succeeded in the 2000 elections. It remains to be seen how this identity is shaped by the conflicting forces of internal division and continuing commitment by the international community to a Bosnian state of three constituent groups whose rights must be protected.
Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the Elisabeth Barker Fund of the British Academy for an award that enabled the research upon which this paper is based. Thanks are also due to Dr. Susan Robinson for assistance with eldwork in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics at the University of Sarajevo for the assistance of various members of its staff.
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

250 REFERENCES
Allcock, J.B. (2000), Explaining Yugoslavia. London: Hurst & Co. Anderson, B. (1991), Imagined Communities: Reections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: New Left Books. AndriA, I. (1959), The Bridge on the Drina. New York: Macmillan (originally published in 1942). AndriA, I. (1990), The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Inuence of Turkish Rule. Duke University Press, Durham (originally published in 1924). Azaryahu, M. (1997), German Reunication and the Politics of Street Names: The Case of East Berlin. Political Geography 16, pp. 479 493. Banac, I. (1994), The Recent History of the Bosnian Muslims. In: M. Pinson, ed., The Muslims of BosniaHercegovina: their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, pp. 129 153. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Billig, M. (1995), Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications. Black, R. (2002), Conceptions of Home and the Political Geography of Refugee Repatriation: Between Assumption and Contested Reality in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Applied Geography 22, pp. 123 138. Bose, S. (2002), Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. New York: Hurst & Co. Bougarel, X. (1999), Yugoslav Wars: The Revenge of the Countryside between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth. East European Quarterly 33, pp. 157175. Bringa, T.R. (1995), Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bringa, T.R. (2002), Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: M. Shatzmiller, ed., Islam and Bosnia: Conict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-ethnic States, pp. 24 35. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. Campbell, D. (1998), National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Campbell, D. (1999), Apartheid Cartography: The Political Anthropology and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia. Political Geography 18, pp. 395 436. Caplan, R. (2004), International Authority and State
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC

Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Global Governance 10, pp. 53 65. Chandler, D. (2000), Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. London: Pluto Press. Coward, M. (2002), Community as Heterogeneous Ensemble: Mostar and Multiculturalism. Alternatives 27, pp. 29 66. Crnobrnja, M. (1994), The Yugoslav Drama. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Denich, B. (1994), Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. American Ethnologist 21, pp. 367390. Denich, B. (1996), Ethnic Nationalism: the Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Donia, R.J. & J. Fine (1994), Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. New York: Columbia University Press. Eriksen, T.H. (2004), Place, Kinship and the Case for Non-ethnic Nations. Nations and Nationalism 10, pp. 49 62. European Stability Initiative (2001), Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia Part III: The End of the Nationalist Regimes and the Future of the Bosnian State. Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative. Fine, J.V.A. (1975), The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly. Fine, J.V.A. (2002), The Various Faiths in the History of Bosnia: Middle Ages to the Present. In: M. Shatzmiller, ed., Islam and Bosnia: Conict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-ethnic States. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. Grodach, C. (2002), Reconstituting Identity and History in Post-war Mostar. City 6, pp. 6182. Hayden, R.M. (1996), Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia. American Ethnologist 23, pp. 783 801. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1983), Mass-producing Traditions: Europe 1870 1914. In: E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, pp. 263 308. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobsbawm, E.J. (1996), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today. In: G. Balakrishnan, ed., Mapping the Nation, pp. 255266. London: Verso. Huntington, S.P. (1996), The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jezernik, B. (2004), Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers. London: Saqi and the Bosnian Institute.

NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY IN POST-DAYTON ACCORDS

Job, C. (2002), Yugoslavias Ruin: The Bloody Lessons of Nationalism, a Patriots Warning. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld Publishers. Kaldor, M. (2004), Nationalism and Globalisation. Nations and Nationalism 10, pp. 161177. King, H. (2004), Has Dayton Facilitated the Building of a Multi-ethnic Bosnia? An Examination of Refugee Return and Reintegration after the Dayton Accords. (Unpublished MSc thesis. London: Kingston University). Kliot, N. & Y. Manseld (1997), The Political Landscape of Partition: The Case of Cyprus. Political Geography 16, pp. 495 521. Kniewald, D. (1964), Hierarchie und Kultus Bosnicher Christien, Accademia Nazionale Deilincei LOriente Christiano nella Storia della Civilta (Rome), quaderno 62. Kohn, H. (1965), Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. New York: Anvil. Kumar, R. (1997), Divide and Fall: Bosnia and the Annals of Partition. London: Verso. Lamp, J. (1996), Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LjubisiA, D. (2004), A Politics of Sorrow: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Toronto: Black Rose Books. Lockwood, W.G. (1976), European Moslems: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia. New York and San Francisco: Academic Press. LovrenoviA, I. (2001), Bosnia: A Cultural History. New York: New York University Press. MagaB, B. (2003), On Bosnianness. Nations and Nationalism 9, pp. 1924. MahmutAehajiA, R. (1999), The War against BosniaHercegovina. East European Quarterly 33, pp. 219 232. MahmutCehajiC, R. (2003) Sarajevo Essays: Politics, Ideology and Tradition. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Malik, J. (2000), The Dayton Agreement and Elections in Bosnia: Entrenching Ethnic Cleansing through Democracy. Stanford Journal of International Law 36, pp. 303 355. Manning, C. (2004a), Elections and Political Change in Post-war Bosnia-Hercegovina. Democratization 11, pp. 60 87. Manning, C. (2004b), Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique. Studies in Comparative International Development 39, pp. 59 76. Merrill, C. (1995), The Old Bridge: The Third Balkan War and the Age of the Refugee. Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions.

251

OTuathail, G. (2002), Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States Response to the War in Bosnia. Political Geography 21, pp. 601628. OTuathail, G. (2005), Embedding BosniaHercegovina in Euro-Atlantic Structures: from Dayton to Brussels. Eurasian Geography and Economics 46, pp. 5167. OTuathail, G. & C. Dahlman (2004), The Effort to Reverse Ethnic Cleansing in BosniaHercegovina: The Limits of Returns. Eurasian Geography and Economics 45, pp. 439 464. PajiA, Z. (1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina: from Multiethnic Co-existence to Apartheid . . . and Back. In: P. Akhavan & R. Howse, eds., Yugoslavia, the Former and the Future, pp. 152163. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Parekh, B. (1995), Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse. Nations and Nationalism 1, pp. 25 52. PasiA, A. (1995), The Old Bridge in Mostar. Istanbul: IRCICA Press. PobriA, A., G.M. Robinson & S. Engelstoft (2003), Dbaptiser les Rues de Sarajevo et lidentit Bosniaque. In: Y. Richard & A-L. Sanguin, eds., LEurope de lest Quinze Ans aprs la Chute du Mur: Des Pays Baltes lex-Yugoslavie, pp. 325 330. Paris: LHarmattan. Racki, F. (1931), Bogumil i Patareni. Srpska kraljeva akademija, posebna izdanja 87. Raento, P., A. Hmlinen, H. Ikonen, & N. Mikkonen (2004), Striking Stories: A Political Geography of European Coinage. Political Geography 23, pp. 929 956. Robinson, G.M., S. Engelstoft & A. PobriA (2001), Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism since the Dayton Accords. Political Geography 20, pp. 957 980. Rolland, S. (2004), Autochtones trangers: les Dpalacs Mostar aprs la Guerre de BosnieHerzgovine. Balkanologie 8, pp. 189 209. Samary, C. (1995), Yugoslavia Dismembered. New York: Monthly Review Press. Schwartz, B. (1982), The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory. Social Forces 82, pp. 374 402. Sells, M.A. (1996), The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. SijariA, R. (1993), World of Museums: Update on the Zemaljski Muzej, Sarajevo. Museum Management and Curatorship 12, pp. 195 206.
2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG

252
Smith, A.D. (1986), The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, A.D. (1989), The Origins of Nations. Ethnic and Racial Studies 12, pp. 341367. Smith, A.D. (1994), Nationalism and Peace: Theoretical Notes for Research and Political Agendas. Innovation 7, pp. 219 236. Smith, A.D. (1999), Myths and Memories of a Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, A.D. (2004), History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarication. Nations and Nationalism 10, pp. 195202. Solovejec, A. (1959), Bogumilentum und Bogumilengraber inden Sudslawischen Landen. In: W. Gulich, ed., Volker und Kulturen Sudo-

GUY M. ROBINSON & ALMA POBRIC

steuropa, pp. 182186. Munich: Sdosteuropa Verlagsgesellschaft. Spencer, P. & H. Wollman, (2002), Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage Publications. Tamir, Y. (1993), Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2002), Early Warning System: Bosnia and Hercegovina 2002 Election Special. Sarajevo: UNDP. Vuillamy, E. (1998), Bosnia: the Victory of Appeasement. International Affairs 74, pp. 73 92. Woodward, S. (1995), Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Disintegration after the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

2006 by the Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG