Public Policy: The Essential Readings (Theodoulou & Cahn) Part I: The Nature of Public Policy (Summari ed by:

!uheli "utt)

Chapter 1: The Contemporary language of Public Policy (Stella Theodoulou)

1. We need to be able to distinguish between what go ernments intend to do and what they actually do !. PP in ol es all le els of go t. and is not restricted to formal actors ". PP is an intentional course of action with an accomplished end goal as its ob#ecti e $. PP is both long term and short term

Policy is an ongoing process% it in ol es not only the decision to enact a law but also the subse&uent actions of implementation' enforcement and e aluation. PP does at least one or more of the following: it reconciles conflicting claims on scarce resources% it establishes incenti es for cooperation and collecti e action that would be irrational without go t. influence% it prohibits morally unacceptable beha ior and pro ides direct benefits to citi(ens.

)pproaches to Studying Public Policy

1.

Cycle*process approaches: The basic assumption in these approaches is that policy ma+ers respond to the demands placed on them. The focus is on the process of policy ma+ing. a. Systems Theory: PP is a political system,s response to demands arising from the en ironment. The political system is thus a mechanism by which popular demands and popular support for the state are combined to produce those policy outputs that best endure the long term stability of the political system. The basic idea is that political systems should be seen as analogues to operating mechanical systems with feedbac+ loops and clear goals. Wea+ness of this approach: it says little about how decisions are determined or how they arri e into the decision*ma+ing structures. )lso' it stresses the importance of stability rather than change. b. Structural -unctionalism: .oo+s at the necessary /functions0 that must be carried out in any political system if it to cope with its en ironment and achie e its goals. )lso loo+s at the location of /structures0 1 political parties and sociali(ing agencies 1 that facilitate that functioning. This approach ac+nowledges that the structures' arrangements' and procedures of political institutions ha e important conse&uences for the adoption and content of public policy. 2nstitutions pro ide part of the conte3t for policy ma+ing and need to be considered along with more dynamic aspects li+e political parties' groups' and opinions. Wea+ness of this approach: it tends to fragment the study of policy ma+ing by focusing on the arious structures' thus ma+ing it difficult to concisely draw all of the different elements in ol ed in the policy process together. c. Policy Cycle: This approach iews the policy process as a cycle that is

deliberati e' staged' recursi e' and administrati e. Policy ma+ing is thus seen as a

dynamic ongoing process. Policies are described in two different senses: how they are made' and how they can be made better.

!.

4odels of who ma+es Public Policy: These models loo+ at how the policy process operates and' most importantly' who controls or dominates the process and who benefits from it. a. 5roup Theory6Pluralism: PP is a product of group struggle. The central argument is that societies consist of a number of social' ethnic' or economic groups' who are more or less well organi(ed. The public interest tends to emerge out of the struggle of competing indi idual and group claims. PP is the result of a uni&ue process of interaction. The basic elements of this approach are multiple centers of powers and optimum policy de elopments through competing interests. b. 7lite Theory: Policies are made by a relati ely small group of influential leaders who share common goals and outloo+s. PP is not a product of group conflict and demands but rather as determined by the preferences of the minority ruling class who ha e political and economic power. c. Corporatism: 2nterest groups do not merely attempt to influence PP but themsel es become a part of the decision ma+ing and implementation system' thereby ma+ing society more manageable for the state or go t. d. Subgo ernments: The go t. alone does not ma+e policy choices but endorses decisions made by groups li+e members of Congress' the bureaucracy' and interest groups. These structures de elop around particular policy areas and in ol e the rele ant legislators' bureaucrats' and interest groups. Therefore policy outcomes are determined

by the relationship of these groups with the go t. and not #ust the go t. alone. This perspecti e has been outmoded in recent years among political scientists since there are a much larger number of interested actors in the policy ma+ing process' not #ust the three posited by this model.

Types of Public Policy 1. Classic typology: attributed to Theodore .owi. PP is classified according to whether it is regulatory' distributi e' or redistributi e in nature. !. 4aterial6 Symbolic: )ttributed to 4urray 7delman. PP is either material or symbolic. 4aterial policies pro ide tangible resources or substanti e power to their beneficiaries and may impose costs on those who are ad ersely affected. Symbolic policies appeal to the alues held in common by indi iduals in society. They can be used to di ert public attention or satisfy public demand when no substanti e benefits are being produced. ". Substanti e6Procedural: )ttributed to 8ames )nderson. Substanti e policies are what the go t. intends to do and they pro ide ad antages6disad antages and costs6benefits of any gi en policy. Procedural policies loo+ at how something will be done or who will do it. $. .iberal6Conser ati e: .iberal polices see+ go t. inter ention to bring about social change while conser ati e policies oppose such inter ention. 9owe er this distinction has been blurred in recent years' with the emphasis being not on whether the go t. should inter ene or not' but in what areas' in what form' and on whose behalf.

Chapter !: Political Science and Public Policy (Paul Sabatier)

Public policy did not appear as a significant subfield of political science until the 1:;<s and 1:=<s. Policy research by political scientists can be di ided into $ types: 1. Substanti e area research: This loo+s at the politics of a specific policy' such as health' education' transportation' or foreign policy. This wor+ has consisted mainly of detailed' largely atheoretical' case studies. While being informati e' they are probably less useful than theoretical case studies on implementation or agenda setting. !. 7 aluation and 2mpact Studies: 4ostly based on contributions from other disciplines' these studies ha e broadened the criteria of e aluation from traditional social welfare functions to include process criteria such as opportunities for effecti e citi(en participation. ". Policy process: This loo+s at the factors affecting policy formulation and implementation' as well as the subse&uent effects of policy. The focus on the policy process pro ides opportunities for applying and integrating accumulated +nowledge concerning political beha ior in arious institutional settings. $. Policy design: This approach focuses on such topics as the efficacy of different types of policy instruments.

Sources of strain between political scientists and the subfield of policy scholars: 1. >ifference in the fundamental conception of the purpose of go t. and political life. Policy scholars tend to iew go t. in instrumental terms: go ts are there to impro e the welfare

of members of society 1 to pro ide public health' pro ide for common defense' correct e3ternalities' impro e public safety' etc. Political scientists iew citi(enship and political participation as ends in themsel es rather than as a means of influencing policy decisions. !. >ifference in the normati e assumptions. Policy scholars try to influence policy in areas in which they are specialists. Con ersely' political scientists try to understand the way the world operates within their areas of speciali(ation with lesser emphasis on trying to influence political beha ior in the system. ". Contributions to the field: 2n the eyes of political scientists' policy scholars ha e made only modest contributions to de eloping generali(able and empirically erified theories of the policy process.

2n addition' the dominant paradigm of the policy process 1 the stages heuristic 1 is not really a causal theory. 2nstead' it di ides the policy process into se eral stages (agenda setting' formulation and adoption' implementation' and e aluation)' but contains no coherent assumptions about what forces are dri ing the process from stage to stage and ery few

falsifiable hypotheses. While the stages heuristic has helped to di ide the policy process into manageable units of analysis' researchers ha e tended to focus e3clusi ely on a single stage with little recognition of wor+ in other stages. )lso' the real world process often does not fit the se&uence of stages en isaged.

?n the other hand' a great deal of policy research has been methodologically sophisticated and guided by e3plicit theory. 73amples include studies on agenda setting% implementation% long term policy change% and institutional arrangements for managing common property resources.

9owe er' none of these sources of strain should pose serious obstacles to close collaborations between political scientists and the subfield of policy scholars 1 both groups share a common interest in de eloping a better understanding of the policy process' i.e. the range of factors that affect go ernmental policy decisions and the impacts of those decisions on society.

Chapter ": >istribution' @egulation' @edistribution: The -unctions of 5o t. (Theodore .owi)

>istributi e Policies: characteri(ed by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by unit' with each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. These policies can also be called /Patronage0 policies' in that they are highly indi iduali(ed decisions that can be called policy only by accumulation. 2n these policies the recipient and the depri ed need ne er come in direct confrontation.

@egulatory Policies: li+e distributi e policies' these are also specific and indi idual in their impact' but they are not capable of the le el of disaggregation typical of distributi e policies. @egulatory policies in ol e direct choices about who will be indulged and who depri ed. Policies cannot be disaggregated to the le el of the indi idual firm (as in the case of distributi e policies)' since decisions are made by the application of a general rule. @egulatory decisions are cumulati e largely along sectoral lines' and are disaggregable only down to the sector le el.

@edistributi e policies are similar to regulatory policies in that relations among broad categories of pri ate indi iduals are in ol ed. 9owe er' on all other counts there are great differences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader' approaching social classes. @oughly spea+ing' they are ha es and ha e*nots% bigness and smallness% and bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim in ol ed is not the use of property but property itself% not e&ual treatment but e&ual possession% not beha ior' but being. The nature of a redistributi e issue is not determined by the outcome of a battle o er how redistributi e a policy is going to be.

)renas of Power ?nce one posits the general tendency of these areas of policy or go ernmental acti ity to de elop characteristic political structures' a number of hypotheses become compelling. These hypotheses begin to resemble the three general theories of political process. 1. The distributi e arena: >istributi e issues indi iduali(e conflict and pro ide the basis for highly stable coalitions that are irtually irrele ant to the larger policy outcomes% thousands of obscure decisions are merely accumulated into a /policy0 of protection or of natural* resources de elopment or of defense subcontracting. The structure of the relationships usually lead to the Congress and this structure is relati ely stable because all who ha e access of any sort usually support whoe er are leaders. )nd there tend to be /elites0 of a particular sort in the Congressional committees whose #urisdictions include the sub#ect matter in &uestion. -or e3ample' the Public Wor+s Committee is irtually the go t. on ri ers and harbors. Similarly' until recently' for tariff matters the 9ouse Ways and 4eans Committee was the go erning authority. 2t is a bro+er leadership but /policy0 is best understood as cooptation rather than conflict and compromise. !. @egulatory arena: Composed of a multiplicity of groups organi(ed around tangential relations or /shared attitudes0. ?wing to the relatedness of regulatory issues (as opposed to the unrelatedness of distributi e issues where the acti ities of single participants need not be related) these decisions in ol e direct confrontations of indulged and depri ed' and the typical political coalition is born of conflict and compromise among tangential interests that usually in ol e a total sector of the economy. Therefore the power structure in regulatory politics is far less stable than that in the distributi e arena. Since coalitions form

around shared interests' the coalitions will shift as the interests change or as conflicts of interest emerge. With such group*based and shifting patterns of conflict built into e ery regulatory issue' it is in most cases impossible for a Congressional committee' an administrati e agency' a pea+ association go erning board' or a social elite to contain all the participants long enough to establish a stable power elite. Policy outcomes seem ine itably to be the residue remaining after all the reductions of demands by all participants ha e been made in order to e3tend support to ma#ority si(e. 9owe er' in regulatory decision*ma+ing' relationships among group leadership elements and between them on any one or more points of go ernmental access are far too unstable to form a single policy* ma+ing elite. )s a conse&uence' decision*ma+ing tends to pass from administrati e agencies and Congressional committees to Congress' the place where uncertainties in the policy process ha e always been settled. Congress as an institution is the last resort for brea+downs in bargaining o er policy. Aeginning with reciprocity in the 1:"<s' the tariff began to lose its capacity for infinite disaggregation because it slowly underwent redefinition' mo ing away from its purely domestic significance towards that of an instrument of international politics. 2t became a means of regulating the domestic economy for international purposes. The significant feature here is not the international but the regulatory part of the redefinition. )s the process of redefinition too+ place' a number of significant shifts in power relations too+ place as well' since it was no longer possible to deal with each dutiable item in isolation. Ay the 1:;<s the tariff had emerged as a regulatory policy with a de eloping regulatory arena. ". @edistributi e )rena: 2ssues that in ol e redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and acti ate interests in what are roughly class terms. 2f there is e er any

cohesion within pea+ associations' it usually occurs on redistributi e issues. There is also a structure of communications fa oring generali(ed and ideological demands% this structure consists of the pea+ associations' and it is highly effecti e when the issues are generali(able. This is the case consistently for redistributi e issues' almost ne er for distributi e issues' and only seldom for regulatory issues. Where the pea+ associations ha e reality' their resources and access are bound to affect power relations. ?wing to their stability and the impasse (or e&uilibrium) in relations among broad classes of the entire society' the political structure of the redistributi e arena seems to be highly stabili(ed. 2ts stability' unli+e that of the distributi e arena' deri es from shared interests. Aut in contrast to the regulatory arenas' these shared interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to pro ide the foundation for ideologies.

The following table summari(es the hypothesi(ed differences in the political relationships described abo e:

#renas and Political Relationshi$s: # "iagrammatic Sur%ey

#rena Primary Political &nit Relation #mong &nits Po'er Structure Stability of Structure Stable Primary "ecisional (ocus Congressional committee and6or agency Im$lementation

>istribution

2ndi idual' -irm' Corporation

.og*rolling' mutual non* interference' uncommon

Bon* conflictual elite with support groups Pluralistic' multi* centered /theory of balance0 Conflictual elite' i.e. elite and counterelite

)gency centrali(ed to primary functional unit

@egulation

5roup

interests /The Coalition0' shared sub#ect*matter interest'

Cnstable

Congress' in classic role

(/bureau0) )gency decentrali(ed from center by /delegation0% mi3ed control

@edistribution

)ssociation

bargaining The /pea+ association0' class' ideology

Stable

73ecuti e and pea+ associations

)gency centrali(ed toward top (abo e bureau)' elaborate standards

Chapter $: Symbols and Political Duiescence (4urray 7delman)

2f the regulatory process is e3amined in terms of a di ergence between political and legal promises on the one hand and resource allocations and group reactions on the other hand' the largely symbolic character of the entire process becomes apparent. Some generali(ations are commonly made: 1. Tangible resources and benefits are frequently not distributed to unorganized political group interests as promised in regulatory statutes and the propaganda attending their enactment. This is true of the alues held out to (or demanded by) groups which regard themsel es as disad antaged and which presumably anticipate benefits from a regulatory policy. !. When it does happen, the deprived groups often display little tendency to protest or to assert their awareness of the deprivation . )lthough the presumed beneficiaries of

regulatory legislation often show little or no concern with its failure to protect them' they are ne ertheless assumed to constitute a potential base of political support for the retention of these statutes in the law boo+s. ". The most intensive dissemination of symbols commonly attends the enactment of legislation which is most meaningless in its effects upon resource allocation. 2n the legislati e history of particular regulatory statutes the pro isions least significant for resource allocation are most widely publici(ed and the most significant pro isions are least widely publici(ed.

$. Policies severely denying resources to large numbers of people can be pursued indefinitely without any serious controversy. Two broad patterns of group interest acti ity is*E* is public regulatory policy are e idently identifiable on the basis of these arious modes of obser ing the social scene. These can be summari(ed as: 1) Pattern ): ) relati ely high degree of organi(ation 1 rational' cogniti e procedures 1 precise information 1 an effecti e interest in specifically identified' tangible resources 1 a fa orably percei ed strategic position with respect to reference groups 1 relati ely small numbers !) Pattern A: shared interest in impro ement of status through protest acti ity 1 an unfa orably percei ed strategic position with respect to reference groups 1 distorted' stereotyped' ine3act information and perception 1 response to symbols connoting suppression of threats 1 relati e ineffecti eness in securing tangible resources through political acti ity 1 little organi(ation for purposeful action 1 &uiescence 1 relati ely large numbers.

Signs and symbols in themsel es do not ha e any magical forces as narcotics. They are' rather' the only means by which groups not in a position to analy(e a comple3 situation rationally may ad#ust themsel es to it' through stereotypi(ation' o ersimplification' and reassurance. There ha e been many instances of effecti e administration and enforcement of regulatory statutes. 2n each such instance it will be found that organi(ed groups ha e had an informed interest in effecti e administration. Sometimes the e3istence of these groups is e3plicable as a holdo er from the campaign for legislati e enactment of the basic statute% and often the initial administrati e

appointees are informed' dedicated adherents of these interests. They are thus in a position to secure pertinent data and to act strategically' helping furnish /organi(ation0 to the groups they represent. Sometimes the resources in ol ed are such that there is organi(ation on both sides% or the more effecti e organi(ation may be on the reform side. The securities e3change legislation is an illuminating e3ample' for after @ichard Whitney,s con iction for embe((lement' +ey officials of the Bew For+ Stoc+ 73change recogni(ed their own interest in supporting controls o er less scrupulous elements. This interest configuration helps to e3plain the relati e popularity of the S7C in the thirties both with regulated groups as well as organi(ed liberal groups.

Chapter G: The )nalysis of Public Policy: ) Search for Theories and @oles (@obert Salisbury)

?ne may distinguish three ma#or positions on what we mean by policy. 1. Public policy consists in authoritati e or sanctioned decisions by go ernmental actors. 2t refers to the /substance0 of what go t. does and is to be distinguished from the processes by which decisions are made. Policy here means the outcomes or outputs of go ernmental processes. !. Policy consists of a general framewor+ of authoritati e rules' and' while the precise boundary between policy and non*policy is nearly always debatable in the particular situation' the distinction crops up ministerial acts0' /contro ersy ery often' with terms li+e /discretionary ersus

ersus routine0' and /policy

ersus administration0

suggesting the manifold permutations on the theme of policy. ". Policy refers to those actions calculated to achie e goal or purpose' and all political acti ity should be iewed as policy oriented. This conception is summed up in -riedrich,s definition of policy: /a proposed course of action of a person' group or go t. within a gi en en ironment pro iding obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utili(e and o ercome in an effort to reach a goal or reali(e an ob#ecti e or purposeH. 2t is essential for the policy concept that there be a goal' ob#ecti e' or purpose.0 )ccording to -riedrich' there is a difference between specific decisions and actions' and a program or course of action' and that it is the latter to which the term /policy0 refers. 2t is patterns of beha ior' rather than separate' discrete acts which constitute policy.

Policy typologies may be based on data that are composed of perceptions of the actors. Thus whether a particular policy is classified as (ero sum or non*(ero sum may depend on how the rele ant actors percei e it' and similarly' with the distinction between symbolic and material policies. .owi' on the other hand' attempts to classify policies as distributi e' redistributi e' or regulatory in part' according to their impact on society. 9owe er' /impact on society0 appears to be beyond our present capacity to measure in any way that goes beyond the plausible hunch. This criterion then becomes a special case of the criterion of actor,s perceptions' with obser ers replacing decision*ma+ers as the acti e party.

-rom the array of e3tant possibilities' we employ a typology that is adapted from .owi,s formulation and uses data deri ed from actor perceptions. Policies are classified as distributi e' redistributi e' regulatory' and self*regulatory. ) &uestion that immediately arises is how this formulation fits the distinction between (ero*sum and non*(ero sum policies. ?ne may argue that none of the four types necessarily implies (ero*sum conditions. >istributi e and self*regulatory policies can be definitely considered non (ero*sum' while redistributi e and regulatory policies may approach (ero*sum conditions. 9owe er' in general' )merican politics are mostly decided in distinctly positi e sum games.

Chapter ;: With the Consent of )ll (@obert >ahl)

There are at least four reasons for insisting that go ernments ought' ideally' to deri e their #ust powers from the consent of the go erned. -irst' go t. without consent is inconsistent with personal freedom. Second' go t. without consent can be an affront to human dignity and respect (a+a concentration camps). Third' one may demand solely out of self*interest that a go t. rest on consent (no dictatorships' etc). -inally' consent is necessary because go ts that deri e their power from the consent of the go erned are more li+ely to be durable and stable.

While it is relati ely easy to state why go ts should deri e their #ust powers from the consent of the go erned' it is difficult to state how this should be accomplished. The difficulty stems from the ine itable element of conflict in the human condition: people li ing together simply will not always agree. When people disagree' how can a decision be based on the consent of allI

7 en if people cannot always agree specific policies' a solution may be to gain their consent for a process. Thus the consent of the go erned may be interpreted to mean their appro al of the processes by which decisions are arri ed at and their willingness to abide by these decisions' e en if these seem wrong. This solution is what lin+s consent with democracy. 2n the real world' democracies don,t always satisfy all the conditions implied by this solution% but it ser es as one standard against which to measure their success and failure.

Aut how is this solution to be appliedI What sort of democracy are we tal+ing about: decision ma+ing by a so ereign ma#ority' or pluralistic democracyI >ecision ma+ing by a so ereign ma#ority: 2n this ision of democracy' the citi(ens of a gi en country all appro e of the principle of ma#ority rule' according to which all conflicts o er the policies of go t. are settled by a ma#ority of citi(ens or oters' either directly in a referendum or public assembly' or indirectly through elected representati es. To appro e of a system that applies the principle of ma#ority rule' one needs to belie e that during this historical period and in this particular society the principle represents the fullest attainable achie ement of one,s alues. 2t is reasonable to con#ecture that the more di erse the beliefs held among a body of people' the less li+ely it is that they will appro e of the idea of ma+ing decisions by ma#ority rule.

Possible ways to maintain homogeneity among the population' such as ostracism and secession' are painful and present serious moral and practical difficulties. )lso' there is one further difficulty in trying to apply the ma#ority rule which has special significance for )mericans. That some people may ha e oted in the distant past to accept the Constitution of the Cnited States is surely no reason to feel bound to accept their erdict e en today. 2deally then' e ery new generation must be free to ma+e their own constitution and throw out the old rules. The >eclaration of 2ndependence contains these ringing phrases:

/HThat whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends (.ife' .iberty' and the Pursuit of 9appiness) it is the ight of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a

new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most li!ely to effect their "afety and #appiness$%

Se enty years later' confronted by secession' and on the e e of war' .incoln reaffirmed: /This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the e&isting Government, they can e&ercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it$%

Aut the phrase /the People0 is ambiguous. >oes it mean that any ma#ority is free to change the 5o t.I 2f so' then what is the significance of the ConstitutionI 2s there no legitimate way in which minority groups can recei e guarantees that the rules they agree to abide by will not change at the whim of the ne3t legislatureI These are difficult &uestions to answer and no answers seem to command uni ersal agreement. To gain /consent of all0 applying the ma#ority principle gi es rise to serious problems' both practical and logical. 2n practice' popular go ts ha e mo ed towards a rather different solution' that of a pluralistic democracy.

) Pluralistic Solution: The practical solutions that democratic countries ha e e ol ed are a lot less clear than the straightforward application of the principle of ma#ority rule. These solutions seem less logical' less coherent' more untidy' and more unattainable. Patterns of democratic go t. do not reflect a logically concei ed philosophical plan so much as a series of responses to problems of di ersity and conflict' by leaders who ha e sought to build and maintain a nation' to gain the loyalty and obedience of its citi(ens' and at the same time to conform to aspirations for democracy.

9owe er' some common elements can be disco ered. -or one thing' in practice' countries with democratic regimes use force' as other regimes do' to repel threats to the integrity of the national territory. Conse&uently' secession is usually either impossible' or e3tremely costly. Second' many matters of policy (e.g. religious beliefs) are beyond the legal authority of any go t. Third' many &uestions of policy are placed in the hands of pri ate' semi*public' and local go ernmental organi(ations such as churches' families' business firms' trade unions' towns' cities' etc. These &uestions of policy are also outside of the reach of any national policy. -ourth' whene er a group of people belie e that they are ad ersely affected by national policies or are about to be' they generally ha e e3tensi e opportunities for presenting their case for negotiations that may produce a more acceptable alternati e.

2n addition to all these' the Cnited States has limited the so ereignty of the ma#ority in still other ways. 2n fact' it is sometimes called a pluralistic system' the fundamental a3iom in theory and practice of which is: 2nstead of a single center of so ereign power there must be multiple centers of power' none of which is or can be wholly so ereign. )lthough the only legitimate so ereign is the people' in the perspecti e of )merican pluralism e en the people ought ne er be an absolute so ereign% conse&uently no part of the people' such as a ma#ority' ought to be absolutely so ereign.

Chapter J: 2mperfect Competition (@alph 4iliband)

What is wrong with the pluralist*democratic society is its implicit assumption that the ma#or organi(ed /interests0 in these societies' and notably capital and labor' compete on more or less e&ual terms' and that none of them therefore is able to achie e a decisi e and permanent ad antage in the process of competition. 2n reality' business en#oys a massi e superiority both inside and outside the state system' in terms of immensely stronger pressures which' as compared with labor and any other interest' it is able to e3ercise in the pursuit of its purposes.

?ne such form of pressure is the per asi e and permanent pressure upon go ts. and the state generated by the pri ate control of concentrated industrial' commercial and financial resources. ?f course' go ts. do ha e the formal power to impose their will upon business by the e3ercise of legitimate authority. 9owe er' the control of large businesses' especially those in crucially important areas of economic life ma+es it e3tremely difficult for go ts to impose upon them policies to which they are firmly opposed. What is in ol ed here is not acti e resistance but the inert power of business: the failure to do things that are not positi ely commanded by the state but merely as+ed for' and the doing of other things' which are not strictly illegal but are not recommended by the state either.

2n the abstract' go ts. do indeed ha e the power to /wield the big stic+0 against business' but in practice find it politically and economically difficult to do so. These difficulties are best epitomi(ed in the phrase /loss of confidence0. 2t is an implicit testimony to the power of business

that all go ts. ha e been profoundly concerned to gain and retain the /confidence0 of business more than they ha e for any other organi(ed interest group. The presidency of 8ohn - Kennedy pro ides some illuminating instances of this. Soon after he came to office' he found himself engaged in a power struggles with the Ausiness )d isory Council (A)C)' a group of top corporate e3ecuti es that had en#oyed a special relationship with the go t. since 1:"". )fter a series of difficulties' (which included the insistence of the Secretary of Commerce to modify the manner of appointment of the A)C' the subse&uent se ering of official connections by the A)C and its renaming as the Ausiness Council' the go t,s plans to create a new A)C 1 a plan which ne er &uite materiali(ed) the president was faced with the insistence that he was /anti*business0 and he turned full circle from his earlier' firm' bold posture towards the A)C. 2n spite of the labor leaders, complaint against inflationary wage increases' the president placed emphasis on restoring a good wor+ing relationship with the Ausiness Council.

Bowadays' it is not only with the power of their own business class that go ts. ha e to rec+on: they also ha e to rec+on with the power and pressure of outside capitalist interests and forces' such as large foreign firms' powerful and conser ati e foreign go ts.' central ban+s' pri ate international finance' and organi(ations li+e the 24- and World Aan+. 5i en that capitalism is now a ma#or international system whose constituent economies are closely related and interlin+ed' most go ts depend on the goodwill and cooperation of the international capitalist community.

2n the light of the strategic position that capitalist enterprise en#oys in its dealings with go t.' simply by irtue of its control o er economic resources' the basic notion of the pluralist theory

that there are se eral / eto groups0 in society is &uestionable. ?f these other groups' the power of labor as an /interest group0 in society is often assumed to e&ual the power of capital. 2n reality' howe er' labor has nothing of the power of capital in the day*to*day decision ma+ing process of the capitalist enterprise. What a firm produces% whether it e3ports or not% whether it in ests and in what% whether it absorbs or gets absorbed by other firms 1 these are decisions o er which labor has minimal influence. 2n this sense' labor lac+s a firm basis of economic power' and conse&uently much less pressure potential is*E* is the state and therefore go ts. are not as concerned about obtaining the /confidence0 of labor as they are about business.

The one important weapon that labor wields as an interest group is the stri+e% and where it has been used with real determination' its effecti eness as a means of pressure has been clearly demonstrated. 9owe er' determination is the problem because labor is e3tremely ulnerable to man internal and e3ternal influences calculated to erode its will and persistence. )mong the wea+nesses of labor as a group are: its inability to spea+ with the same sort of authority as business% and the e3tent of di isions within the labor group' both in sectoral and ideological terms. Aecause of the effecti eness of these influences' go ts. ha e generally found it unnecessary to treat labor with the same sort of deference that they ha e accorded to business.

Chapter :: 5roup Politics and @epresentati e >emocracy (>a id Truman)

2n recent decades' the ast multiplication of interests and organi(ed groups in the political process is not a peculiarly )merican phenomenon. The causes of this growth lie in the increased comple3ity of techni&ues for dealing with the en ironment' in the speciali(ations that these in ol e' and in associated disturbances of the manifold e3pectations that guide indi idual beha iour in a comple3 and interdependent society. 2n the Cnited States' the multiplicity of interest groups not only has been fostered by the e3tent of technical speciali(ation' but also has been stimulated by the di ersity of the social patterns that these changes affect. >i ersity of interests is a concomitant of speciali(ed acti ity' and di ersity of groups is a means of ad#ustment. The acti ities of political interest groups imply contro ersy and conflict' the essence of politics.

2nterest 5roups and the Bature of the State Predictions concerning the conse&uences of gi en political acti ities are based upon conceptions of the go ernmental process. ) ma#or difficulty in political prediction is that' in part because the rele ant processes are e3tremely comple3' our understanding of them is often not ade&uate% that is' the conceptions do not always account for all the ariables and specify their relati e

importance. Such conceptions being inade&uate in these respects' predictions based upon them are not always reliable' with their accuracy often being a matter of chance. 9owe er' we cannot escape the necessity to predict. ) second handicap in political prediction is that the underlying conceptions are often almost completely implicit. 4any' if not most' predictions about the

significance and implications of organi(ed interest groups on the )merican scene rest on unreliable' implicit conceptions' often relying on inade&uate and unac+nowledged theory of the political process.

People participate in established patterns of continuing interactions (interest groups) with almost all such interactions in ol ing power. )n increasing proportion of interest groups in the Cnited States are politici(ed' that is' they ma+e claims through or upon the institutions of go ernment. The institutions of go t. are centers of interest*based power. 2n order to ma+e claims' political interest groups will see+ access to the +ey points of decision within these institutions. The e3tent to which a group achie es effecti e access to the institutions of go t. is the resultant of a comple3 of interdependent factors. Aroadly' these can be classified into three (somewhat o erlapping) categories: (1) -actors relating to the group,s strategic position in society: This includes the group,s status or prestige in society% the e3tent to which go t. officials are formally or informally /members0 of the group% and the usefulness of the group as a source of political and technical +nowledge. (!) -actors relating to the internal characteristics of the group: This includes the degree and appropriateness of the group,s organi(ation% the degree of cohesion it can achie e in a gi en situation' especially in the light of competing group demands% the s+ills of the leadership% and the group,s resources in numbers and money. (") -actors peculiar to the go ernmental institutions themsel es: This includes the operating structure of go t. institutions since these affect the group,s ad antages and handicaps% and the effects of the group life of particular units or branches of go t.

) characteristic feature of the go ernmental system in the Cnited States is that it contains a multiplicity of points of access. The federal system establishes decentrali(ed and more or less independent centers of power' antage points from which to secure pri ileged access to the national go t. The peculiar character of the )merican party system is both a sign and cause of the strength of the constituent units within the federal scheme. Bational parties tend to be poorly cohesi e leagues of locally based organi(ations rather than unified and inclusi e structures. Thus' especially at the national le el' the party is an electing*de ice and only in limited measure an integrated means of policy determination. Within the Congress' furthermore' controls are diffused among committee chairmen and other leaders in both chambers. The ariety of these points of access if further supported by relationships stemming from the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers' from related chec+s and balances' and at the State and local le el from the common practice of choosing an array of e3ecuti e officials by popular election. )t the -ederal le el the formal simplicity of the e3ecuti e branch has been complicated by a Supreme Court decision that has placed a number of administrati e agencies beyond the remo al of the powers of the President.

>epending on the whole political conte3t in a gi en period' and on the relati e strength of contending interests' one or another of the centers of power in the formal go t. or in the parties may become the ape3 of a hierarchy of controls. The total pattern of go t. o er a period of time thus represents a protean comple3 of crisscrossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and standing of interests' organi(ed and unorgani(ed.

Chapter 1<: The Power 7lite (C. Wright 4ills)

The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary en ironments of ordinary citi(ens' and to ma+e decisions ha ing ma#or impacts on the li es of these citi(ens. They are in command of the ma#or hierarchies and organi(ations of modern society. The power elite are not solitary rulers. Political ad isors and spo+esmen often influence their thoughts and decisions. 2mmediately below the elite are professional politicians (both in the Congress as well as in pressure groups)' and below them are professional celebrities who' e en if they are not the head of any dominating hierarchy themsel es' often ha e the power to attract public attention.

The power of the )merican elite has been e3plained in two broad ways: through historical e ents that ha e led some people to influence and control others% and through the personal awareness of the actors in ol ed and the perception of others about their assumed powers. 9owe er' while both these are rele ant' in order to understand the power of the )merican elite' we ha e to loo+ beyond these factors towards the ma#or institutions of modern society. Within )merican society' ma#or national power now resides in the economic' the political' and the military domains (referred to as the big three). Typically' the decisions made within the political domain determine economic acti ities and military programs. ?ther institutions such as religious' family' and educational institutions are considered subordinate to the big three and are shaped by them.

Within each of the big three' the typical institutional unit has become enlarged and administrati e' and in the power of its decisions' has become centrali(ed. The means of power at the disposal of the decision ma+ers ha e increased enormously% their central e3ecuti e powers ha e been enhanced' and within each of them modern administrati e routines ha e been elaborated and tightened up. )s each of these domains becomes enlarged and centrali(ed' the conse&uences of its acti ities become greater' and its traffic with the others increases. The decisions of a handful of corporations bear upon the economic' political and military de elopments of the rest of the world. 2n a structural sense' the big three form a triangle of power' which is the source of the interloc+ing directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present. This interloc+ing is clearly re ealed at each of the points of crisis of modern capitalist society 1 slump' war' and boom. 2n each' men of decision are led to an awareness of the interdependence of the ma#or institutional orders. )s each of these domains coincide with the others' and as decisions tend to become total in their conse&uence' the leading men in each of these three domains of power 1 the warlords' the corporate chieftains' and the political directorate 1 tend to come together' to form the power elite of )merica.

The power elite are considered people who ha e the most of whate er there is to ha e in society' which generally includes money' power' and prestige 1 as well as the lifestyles that they wish to lead. Aut the elite themsel es would not ha e these if it were not for their positions in great institutions' these institutions being the necessary bases of power' wealth and prestige' and at the same time the chief means of e3ercising power' of ac&uiring and retaining wealth' and of cashing in the higher claims for prestige. )ccordingly' no one can be truly powerful or wealthy unless

they ha e access to the command of ma#or institutions' while great prestige increasingly follows the ma#or institutional units of the social structure.

The people of the higher circles may also be concei ed as members of a top social stratum' as a set of groups whose members +now one another' see one another socially and at business' and so' in ma+ing decisions' ta+e one another into account. )ccording to this conception' the elite feel themsel es to be the inner circle of the Lupper social classes,. They form a more or less compact social and psychological entity and beha e toward one another differently from the way they beha e with members of the other (or lower) classes.

2n eras of e&ualitarian rhetoric' the more intelligent or the more articulate among the lower and middle classes' as well as guilty members of the upper' may come to entertain ideas of a counter* elite. 2n western society' there is a long tradition of considering the poor' the e3ploited and the oppressed as the truly irtuous' the wise' and the blessed.

The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding de elopments and the coincidence of interests among economic' political' and military organi(ations. 2t also rests upon the similarity of origin and outloo+' and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies. This con#unction of institutional and psychological forces' in turn' is re ealed by the hea y personnel traffic within and between the big three institutional orders' as well as by the rise of go*betweens in the high le el lobbying. The )merican power elite has also planned and plotted 1 once the con#unction of structural trend and of the personal will to utili(e it ga e rise to the ruling elite class. 9owe er' claims that the

ruling elite was founded by plotting cannot be gi en any real weight. So far as e3plicit organi(ation 1 conspiratorial or not 1 is concerned' the power elite' by its ery nature' is more li+ely to use e3isting organi(ations' wor+ing within and between them' than to set up e3plicit organi(ations whose membership is strictly limited to its own members. With the wide secrecy that usually co er their operations and decisions' the power elite can mas+ their intentions' operations' and further consolidation. There is nothing hidden about the power elite' though its acti ities are not publici(ed% as an elite it is not organi(ed' though its members +now one another% and there is nothing conspiratorial about it' although its decisions are often publicly un+nown and its mode of operation manipulati e than e3plicit.