De la Camara vs.

Enage [GR L-32951-2, 17 September 1971] Resolution En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail. Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough to discourage the accused from fleeing. Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condone. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court.

2. Yap vs. CA Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel? Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

Yap vs. Court of Appeals [GR 141529, 6 June 2001] Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur Facts: For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, Francisco Yap Jr. (@ Edwin Yap] was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years." He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 17 February 1999. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, Yap filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that Yap may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant." Yap filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, issued on 6 October 1999, upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General. A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by the court, but was denied in a resolution issued on 25 November 1999. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether the bail may be fixed at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which the accused is charged. Held: The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing bail to Yap on appeal. The court stated that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by Yap's admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00. The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseor vs. Abano, the Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions. At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty for the offense charged; (d) Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and health of the accused; (f) Weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the

accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements. Herein, where Yap was found to have left the country several times while the case was pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a hold-departure order against him. Under the circumstances, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of Yap's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which Yap is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this the Court cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

3. Obosa vs. Court of Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August 1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong. During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly, Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At the time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him as principal for the ambush-slaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver. In its decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6 September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the bailbond was validly approved by the trial court. Held: Since Obosa did file the written notice of appeal on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. While bail was granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990 when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed. As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the petition should be dismissed. Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Herein, while Obosa, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Obosa can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be observed in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin, which was promulgated in 1993, the Court laid down the guidelines

for the grant of bail. However, said guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by Administrative Circular 12-94, which was issued by the Supreme Court and which came into effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa made application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, the case would have been readily and promptly resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to amendments, not only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e of Paragraph 3, Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are present in Obosa's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive application of the said circular is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor Obosa's cause either. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in the present case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether Obosa will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6 years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a noncapital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. The trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

4. People vs. Mingoa [GR L-5371, 26 March 1953] En Banc, Reyes (J): 10 concur Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question. Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR 1988]

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" inthe office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formalcomplaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on thecomplaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavitswere in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavitsand counteraffidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.