Article III BILL OF RIGHTS Significance. Government is powerful. When limited, it becomes tyrannical.

It is ag u a r a n t e e t h a t there are certain areas of persons life, l i b e r t y o r p r o p e r t y w h i c h government power may not touch. All the powers of the government (police power, power of eminent domain and power of taxation) are limited by the Bill of Rights. Classification of Rights: 1.Political Rights granted by law to members of a community in relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of government. 2.Civil Rights rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of privateindividuals for the purpose of securing them the enjoyment of their means of happiness. 3.Social and Economic Rights these are the rights which generally requireimplementing legislation. (Article XIII)

a n d i m m e d i a t e d a n g e r o f a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. Sec. 1, Art. III No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual.

A.DUE PROCESS OF LAW That which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Applies to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color or nationality Artificial personscovered but only insofar as their property is concerned. Extends to aliens Includes the means of livelihood Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA849) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable. Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal r e s t r a i n t o r s e r v i t u d e . x x x It includes the right of the citizen t o b e f r e e t o u s e h i s faculties in all lawful ways. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660) Property is anything that come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them. P u b l i c o f f i c e i s n o t a property which one may acquire a v e s t e d r i g h t , i t i s nevertheless a protected right. (Bince vs. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782)

Doctrine of Preferred Freedom (Hierarchy of Rights) some rights are preferred PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights o v e r p r o p e r t y i s recognized. Because these freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of s a n c t i o n s , t h e y n e e d breathing space to survive, permitting g o v e r n m e n t regulation only with narrow specificity. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory n o r o p p r e s s i v e w o u l d suffice to validate a law which restricts o r i m p a i r s property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a m o r e s t r i n g e n t criterion, nam ely existence of a grave

Scope/Aspects of Due Process: Procedural Due Process the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It serves as a restriction on

actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the government. Requisites: (non-criminal cases) a.An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear anddetermine matter before it; b.Jurisdiction p r o p e r l y a c q u i r e d o v e r p e r s o n o f d e f e n d a n t a n d o v e r property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; c.Opportunity to be heard; and d.Judgment r e n d e r e d u p o n l a w f u l hearing and based on e v i d e n c e adduced. Impartial Court or Tribunal Judges must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.In Anzaldo vs. Clave Jacobo Clave, acting as Chairman of CSC, rendered a decision against petitioner. When petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, the same Jacobo Clave, but this time acting as Presidential Executive Assistant, upheld his own earlier decision. The SC held that this violates fundamental fairness required by due process. A public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge. People vs. Mendenilla (2001), judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions t h a t w o u l d elicit the facts on the issues involved, c l a r i f y a m b i g u o u s r e m a r k s b y witnesses and address the points overlooked by counsel. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are within the prerogative of a judge to ask. Sec. 14 (1), Art. III No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. ---This is procedural due process in criminal cases Requisites of Criminal Due Process: a.Accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction; b.Accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law; c.Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard; d.Judgment rendered within authority of constitutional law If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. (Mejia vs. Pamaran, No. L-56741, April 15, 1988) 2. Substantive Due Process i t requires that the law itself, not m e r e l y t h e procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just. This serves as a

restriction on the governments law and rule-making powers; a prohibition of arbitrary laws. The heart to substantive due process is the reasonableness, or the absence of exercise of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of every case. As a general rule, when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty, or property, the presumption is that the action is valid. In rare cases, as in prior restraint, there is a presumption of invalidity. Requisites: a. I n t e r e s t o f t h e p u b l i c ; b. Means employed are reasonably necessary for accomplishment of purpose and not unduly oppressive. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Void-for-vagueness Rule a criminal statute that fails to give a p e r s o n o f ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning . A law is vague as not to satisfy the due process need for notice when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.It is injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 aspects 1.It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and 2.It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either saving clause or by construction. (People vs. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163,January 24, 2001) Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose m a y n o t b e achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Facial Challenge a facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.On its face invalidation of

statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), Motion for reconsideration . xxx[T]he clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clause d o e s n o t m e a n that the legislature may make the law e f f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. I t i s n o t c o r r e c t t o s a y that under the disputed clause p u b l i c a t i o n m a y b e dispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-The conclusive presumption thate v e r y p e r s o n knows the law presupposes that the law h a s b e e n p u b l i s h e d i f t h e presumption is to have any legal justification at all. T h e t e r m Laws s h o u l d r e f e r t o a l l l a w s a n d n o t o n l y t o t h o s e o f g e n e r a l application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l , like a relative of Pres. Marcos who w a s d e c r e e d i n s t a n t naturalization. RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Coverage: Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. In the exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued b y administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number o f t h e P D , t h e t i t l e o f such decree, its whereabouts, the s u p p o s e d d a t e o f effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG cannot satisfy the publicationrequirement. This is not even substantial compliance.

Publication of laws is part of substantive due process. It is imperative to the validity of laws, PDs, EOs, Administrative rules and regulations except interpretative legislations. (Taada vs. Tuvera, No. L-63915, December 29, 1986) Notes : In the original case Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) , the SC ruled that as a matter of substantive due process, any law must be published before the people can be expected to observe them. But, according to a split decision, publication need not be made in the Official Gazette. It is enough that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation. After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the original judgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in the Official Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise" that is, a different mode of publication. What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not of general application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislative grant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of asubstantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith , that is, immediately . Where? Only in the Official Gazette Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (2000), an extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. During the evaluation stage, right to know is withheld to accommodate the more compelling interest of the Stateto prevent escape of potential extradite which may be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition. Roxas vs. Vasquez (2001), lack of notice to, participation of complainants at the REINVESTIGATION does not render the resolution of the Ombudsman null and void.(But in preliminary investigation, their participation is needed.) Exceptions to Notice and Hearing Requirements P hi l com sat vs. Al c ua z (1 98 9) without conducting any hearing, NTC o r d e r e d PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by 15%. PHILCOMSAT challenged the validity of the order on the ground that it is an exercise of a quasijudicial power without the required hearing. NTC replied that the order was merely interlocutory. The SC held that fixing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the exercise of quasi-legislative power,it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period covered. BUT, in Radio Communications vs. NTC (1990)

the Court upheld the temporary rates granted by the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTC to approve temporary rate requested by public service agency provided hearings are held within 30 days thereafter. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its QUASI JUDICIAL function. In the exercise of its EXECUTIVE or LEGISLATIVE functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Suntay vs. People (1957) the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime may be cancelled without notice and hearing. Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004, the Sc ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Banks dishonor of Calderons credit card, in asmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which provided that the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card privilege would be automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder. Appeal and due process Appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process; generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion. But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of due process. Where there is statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes a denial of due process. Preliminary Investigation and due process Preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a r i g h t conferred by statute (Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,2003). It may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it (Benedicto vs. CA, G.R.No. 125359, September 4, 2001). The right may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal (People vs. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8,1997).G o v s . C A , 2 0 6 S C R A 1 3 8 , when there is statutory grant of the r i g h t t o preliminary investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process c l a u s e . T h e r i g h t t o p r e l i m i n a r y investigation is substantive, not merely f o r m a l o r technical. To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right todue process. (Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001) Prejudicial Publicity To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of

publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicitybecause these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. (Webb vs. De Leon,1995) Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a p a r t y i n a n administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintain the dignity of government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by theConstitution or law. (Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125) Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest once the petition for extradition is filed in court? Both on statutory and constitutional grounds, the answer is no. Government of USA vs. Hon. Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002: 1.On the basis of Extradition Law Sec. 6 of PD 1069Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify thearrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by settingfor hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices tothe opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving themtime to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to ah e a r i n g c a n n o l o n g e r b e considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a m e a n s o f impairing a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant or arrest should be issued. By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such an early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression A prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.2.On the basis of the Constitution E v e n S e c . 2 of Article III does not require a notice a n d h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e issuance of a warrant of

arrest.To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest war rants, the Constitution itself requires only examination--under oath or affirmationof complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrant of arrest. B.EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE The equal protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Section 1 of Article III to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue f avoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted p a r t i a l i t y o r prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. It simply requires that all persons or things, similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustlydiscriminate against others.It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or thingswithout distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, wouldbenefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requiresi s equality among equals as determined according to a valid c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . B y classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certainparticulars and different from all others in these same particulars. (Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703) Who are protected all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Natural and juridical personsare entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy theprotection only insofar as their property is concerned. Scope:Political, Economic and Social EqualityArt. XIII, Secs. 1&2 (social justice) political & economic Section 1 The Congress shall give highest p r i o r i t y t o t h e e n a c t m e n t o f measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.T o t h i s e n d , t h e S t a t e s h a l l regulate the acquisition, ownership, u s e , a n d disposition of property and its increments. Section 2 The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment tocreate economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (protection to labor)Article XII, Section 10 (nationalization of business)

FILIPINO FIRST POLICY TheCongress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when thenational interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum (60%) of whose capital is owned by such citizens,or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments withinits national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. Art. XII, Sec. 2(2) (reservation of marine resources) economic The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively toFilipino citizens. Art. III, Sec. 11 (free access to the courts) political & economic Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (l egal aid to the poor) xxx Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure inall courts, the admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to theunderprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for thespeedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by theSupreme Court. Art. IX-C, Sec. 10 (protection of candidates) political Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. Art. II, Sec. 26 (public service) The State shall guarantee equal a c c e s s t o opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Art. II, Sec. 14 (equality of w omen and men) The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. TheConstitution itself acknowledges this in various places exploitation of marine wealth(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2), certain areas of investment (Article XII, Section 10),to name a few. In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937) , the SC upheld the validity of t h e l a w w h i c h nationalized the retail trade. For the

p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e l a w c a n b e observed by the national interest. But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason thatthey cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they areadmitted to the country as immigrants. Valid Classification: Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treateddifferently if there is a basis for valid classification. The requisites are:1 . C l a s s i f i c a t i o n m u s t b e b a s e d o n substantial distinctions which make for r e a l differences; 2.The distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law the distinctions whichare the bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law ;3.Not limited to existing conditions only; and4.It must apply to all members of the same class. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, The withdrawal of frankingp r i v i l e g e s f o r m e r l y granted to the judiciary but remained w i t h t h e e x e c u t i v e a n d legislative departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situated. Villegas vs. Hui Chiong, the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon alla l i e n s d e s i r o u s o f o b t a i n i n g employment in the City of Manila w a s d e c l a r e d unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and itfailed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens whowere required to pay it. Sexual Discrimination Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, female domesticworking abroad were in a class by themselves because of the special risks to whichtheir class was exposed. Administration of Justice Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1988, Special grant of exemption inf a v o r o f t h e Marcoses as contained in the agreement entered into by PCGG w i t h Marcos Family to compromise the ill-gotten wealth cases (exempt from all taxes) filedb y t h e former against the latter is a CLASS LEGISLATION, vilative of the e q u a l protection clause. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999 petitioners andintervenors right to equal protection was not violated by the enactment of RA 8249because the law was not directed only to Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classificationmade by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law mustpresent proof of arbitrariness.

Public Policy Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, The law excluding residents of Mandaue Cityfrom voting for provincial candidates was justified as a matter of legislative discretionand that equal protection would be violated only if group within the city were allowed tovote while others were not. Olivares vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700, when the mayor issued permit in favor of unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon Baclaran Credit Cooperatives, he violated the equal protection clause when failed to show that the two were not similarly situated. Tiu vs. CA, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, the executive order granting tax and d u t y incentives only to business and residents within the secured area of S u b i c Special Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the zone but outsidesuch fenced in territory is VALID.The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enoughthat all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privilegesand required to follow the same obligations.Classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate theequal protection clause. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845,June 1, 2000, there were no reasonable distinctions between the services rendered byforeign - hires and local hires as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to those teachers. Relative Constitutionality: Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, December 15,2004, the constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by am e r e c o m p a r i s o n of its provisions of the Constitution s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e m a y b e constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in application to another.A s t a t u t e v a l i d a t o n e time may become void at another time because of alteredcircumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation b e c o m e s a r b i t r a r y o r confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open toinquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government. In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidatesc o n v i c t e d o r s i m p l y c h a r g e d with national security offenses was s t r u c k d o w n a s unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately theequal political protection.

Sec. 2, Article IIISearches and Seizures The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Scope: The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may berequired to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of police and taxing powers.T h e r i g h t i s personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383) . As such, the right may be waived e i t h e r expressly or impliedly, but the waiver must be made by the person whose right isinvaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver. (People vs.Damaso, 212 SCRA 457) SEARCH WARRANT may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant isbeing issued. WARRANT OFARREST said to particularly describe the person t o b e s e i z e d i f i t contains the name of the person to be arrested. Requisites of a valid warrant: 1.I t m u s t b e b a s e d u p o n probable cause such facts and circumstances v antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient toinduce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.It consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstancessufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to becommitting the offense or to be guilty of the offense. For a search warrant such facts and circumstances which w o u l d l e a d a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committedand that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to (Burgos v. Chief of Staff ,133 SCRA 800) For a warrant of arrest such facts and circumstances which would lead areasonably and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested

(Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23,1995) In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issuedfor alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, andt h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e . T h e S C voided the warrants on the ground that i t w a s impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of lawsa l l e g e d t o h a v e b e e n v i o l a t e d b y the petitioner. How could he even know w h a t particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this, how could itbe determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably guiltythereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicileand privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable cause, therule is: One crime, one warrant. 2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge.The judge shall:a . P e r s o n a l l y evaluate the report and the s u p p o r t i n g d o c u m e n t s submitted by the public prosecutor regarding the existence of probablecause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or b. If the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard theprosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavitsof witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive andmuch abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the1973 Constitution has been removed. The judge must personally examinedi n t h e f o r m o f s e a r c h i n g Q & A s , i n writing and under oath, the complainantand any witnesses he may produce onfacts personally known to them. The determination of probable caused e p e n d s to a large extent upon thefinding or o p i n i o n o f t h e j u d g e w h o vI t i s n o t necessary that the judge s h o u l d p er s on a l l y ex a m in e t h e complainant and his witnesses; t h e judge would simply personally review t h e i n i t i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e prosecutor to see if it is supported bysubstantial evidence.

Judge determines the probability, notthe certainty, of the guilt of the accused conducted the required examination of the applicant and the witnesses.and, in so doing, he need not conduct ade novo hearing. 3. The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions. The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainantand his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someoneelse, like the clerk of court. So said the Court in

Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) .In this case, when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of ahearing, the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine andtake the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with thehearing, he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished,asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to,after which he issued the search warrant in question. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be basedon the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies.The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report.Otherwise, the warrant is void. T h u s , i n Burgos v. Chief of Staff , (1984), r e i t e r a t i n g t h e 1 9 3 7 c a s e o f Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper WeForum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so wasinadmissible. Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based oninvestigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive wereheld to be not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid. 4. It must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or thingsto be seized. S e a r c h w a r r a n t W a r r a n t o f a r r e s t The description of the property to b e seized need not be technically accuratenor necessarily precise, and its nature willnecessarily vary according to whether theidentity of the property or its character is am a t t e r o f c o n c e r n ; t h e description is General warrants are proscribed andunconstitutional. However, a J o h n D o e Warrant (a warrant for the apprehensionof a person whose true name is unknown)satisfies the constitutional requireme3nt of p a r t i c u l a r i t y i f there is some descriptio P a g e 7 1 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y

71 required to be specific only insofar as thecircumstances will allow. personae which will enable the officer toidentify the accused.Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seizedmakes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff

, the description which read "subversive documents,leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, theL i g h t a Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be p a r t i c u l a r descriptions, thus making the warrant a general warrant. In Corro v. Lising , the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the descriptionwas not at all particular or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants. When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out infull. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction tos e i z e " s u b v e r s i v e materials" is not valid because the determination of whether amaterial is subversive or not is not for the police o f f i c e r t o d e c i d e ; n o u n f e t t e r e d discretion must be granted to him.The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searchedfor the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoiddelegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.Properties subject to Seizure:1.Property subject of the offense;2.Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and3.Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.Permissible Area of SearchIn People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2002, the warrantless search andseizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the onearrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.Admissibility of Illegally Seized EvidenceA r t i c l e s illegally seized are not admissible as e v i d e n c e . T h e r u l e h a s b e e n constitutionally affirmed in Section 3(2), Article III, which provides that such evidence shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Such evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree. However, it is submitted that it may nonetheless be used in the judicial or administrative action that may be filed against the officer responsible for itsillegal seizure.I t h a s a l s o b e e n h e l d t h a t w h e r e the accused did not raise the issue of t h e admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized,such omission constitutes a waiver of the protection granted by Section 3, and theillegally seized evidence could then be admitted against him. (People vs. Exala, 221SCRA 494) WARRANTLESS ARREST 1.W hen a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, o r i s attempting to commit an offense;2.When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believebased on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to bearrested has committed it; and 3.

When the person to be arrested is an escapee or a detention prisoner. (Section5, Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure) The Rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicatethat he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.The officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about tocommit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also becommitted in his presence or within his view. (People vs. Tudtud & Bolong, G.R. No.144037, September 26, 2003) WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (a) When search is made of moving vehicles The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specificallyauthorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant. C h e c k p o i n t s are valid in some instances depending o n t h e p u r p o s e ( e . g . apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that thecriminal is inside the car). There is no question that when a child has been reportedkidnapped in a community, the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child isin any one of them.(b) When search is an incident to a valid arrest . Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest -A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything thatproves the commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be madewithin the area of control of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest. In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985), Milagros Roque and CynthiaNolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30a . m . , h a v i n g b e e n w a n t e d a s high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 n o o n , R o q u e ' s apartment located 2 blocks away, was searched and some documents seized. The SCat first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing todescribe with particularity the things to be seized, because it was an incident of a validarrest.But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean thatthe search was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest,i.e., not separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidentalsearches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a validincidental search. The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (byfrisking him for instance) because (1) a weapon held by the arrested person may beturned against his captor and (2) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrestedofficer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge. If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest,there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if thed o c u m e n t s i n t h e

apartment were 2 blocks away, the s e a r c h w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy thedocuments, having been arrested already.In People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, while a contemporaneous searchof a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to thearea within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannotbe reversed.In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines thevalidity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majorityof these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before asearch can be madethe process cannot be reversed.In the case of People vs. Go, 354 SCRA 338 (2001), the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No searchwas conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any licensefor the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effectcommitting a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest wasnecessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under theRules.As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfullys e a r c h e d f o r d a n g e r o u s weapons or anything which may u s e d a s p r o o f o f t h e commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section12. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in hiscar of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which, was later identified asshabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearms wascommitted, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal. As such, the seizeditems do not fall within the exclusionary clause. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonoustree, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and thedrug paraphernalia, can be used as evidenced against appellant. Besides, it has beenheld that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.In People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174 (2001), to constitute a valid in flagrantedelito arrest, two (2) requisites must concur: 1) the person to be arrested must executea n o v e r t a c t indicating that he has just committed, i s a c t u a l l y c o m m i t t i n g , o r i s attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer.In People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003, the arrestingofficer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latters person that which:1.Was used in the commission of the crime;2 . W a s t h e f r u i t o f the crime;3.May provide the person arrested with the means of committing v i o l e n c e o r escaping;4.May be used in

evidence in the trial of the case.T h e search, however, must be contemporaneous to the arrest and m a d e w i t h i n a permissible area of search.Requisite: the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause ineffecting the arrest which could be considered as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrest enumerated in Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. P a g e 7 5 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y

75

crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA668) Requisites: 1.Valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police a r e legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;2.The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;3.The evidence must be immediately apparent; and4.Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.(d) Stop-and-Frisk It is defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a P a g e 7 6 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y

2008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials,www.pinoylaw.net , etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos In the case of People vs. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998, theofficer could reasonably assume since the informant was by their side and had soi n f o r m e d t h e m a n d p o i n t e d o u t t h e culpritthat the drugs were in the a p p e l l a n t s luggage, and it would have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd, for them to adopt a wait-and-see attitude at the risk of eventually losing their quarry.(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party People vs. Hedishi Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003, whenever the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure is challeng ed, an individual may choosebetween invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent tothe search and seizure. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixedformula but is to be resolved according to the facts of the case. Plain View Doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of the objectis in the plain view of the police officer.The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an intrusion or properly be in aposition from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawfulintrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed tosight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the objectseized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and thereforecannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious toan observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that itcontains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must beimmediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a

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2008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials,www.pinoylaw.net , etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of hisexperience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he isdealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigatingthis behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, andwhere nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in thearea to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in anattempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer toa p p r o a c h a p e r s o n , i n appropriate circumstances and manner, f o r p u r p o s e s o f investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable causeto make an actual arrest.Requisites for Stop-and-Frisk1.The police officer should properly introduce himself and make the initial inquiries,approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.2.The apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief thatthe person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede thearrest for the principle of stop-and-frisk to apply.(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently . Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did noto b j e c t t o the search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for

t h e authorities. The waiver must be expressly made. It must be given by the person whoseright is violated.In People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in thebaggage of the accused was found by (private) security officers of the interislandpassenger vessel who then reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. Thesearch and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out withoutgovernment intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.(f) Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of fishery, immigration and customs law (g) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders for violation o f immigration and smuggling laws P a g e 7 7 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y

to be able to easily perpetrate their maliciousdesigns.T h e r e i s n o n e e d f o r checkpoints to be announced. Not o n l y i t w o u l d b e impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badgeso f legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and t h e regularized manner in which they are operated. (People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754) Knock and Announce Principle General Rule: Police officers are obliged to give notice, show their authority anddemand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice and demand,such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search.Exceptions: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when: P a g e 7 8 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y

77 78 2008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials,www.pinoylaw.net , etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos (h) I nspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations (i) Conduct of areal target zoning and saturation drive in the exercise of military powers of the President (j) Visual search at checkpoints Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings"; doctrine of exigentcircumstances The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right and can be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable arenot forbidden. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and areconducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routinecheckpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage withoutinterruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief questionor two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to abody search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routinechecks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonablesearch. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even lessintrusive.The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced bythe COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputizedagents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purposefor which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said periodwould know that they only need a car

2008 Political Law and Public International LawPersonal Review Notes (taken from various sources: Sandoval lectures, Nachura, Bernas, Cruz, Agpalo, SBC & SSC-Rreview materials,www.pinoylaw.net , etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos 1.A party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand,to open it;2.When such person already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority andpersons;3.When the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb;4 . W h e n t h o s e i n the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside, are thenengaged in an activity which justifies the officers t o b e l i e v e t h a t a n e s c a p e o r t h e destruction of evidence is being attempted. (People vs. Huang Zhen Hua and Lee,G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004) In People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, the constitutional protection againstu n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d seizures refers to the immunity of ones p e r s o n f r o m interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by privateindividuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. Do the ordinary right against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to searchesconducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security procedures?

In the case of People vs. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18,2000, persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of t h e i r p e r s o n s o r property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjectivee x p e c t a t i o n o f p r i v a c y , which expectation society is p r e p a r e d t o r e c o g n i z e a s reasonable.

Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increasedconcern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at thena tions airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass throughmetal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage, are routinelysubjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspiciousobjects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There islittle question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, thegravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associatedwith airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public addresssystems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.T h e s e a n n o u n c e m e n t s p l a c e passengers on notice that ordinary c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protection against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, a search madep u r s u a n t t o a r o u t i n e airport security procedure is allowed u n d e r R A 6 2 3 5 , w h i c h provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that handcarried luggage,e t c . , s h a l l b e s u b j e c t t o search, and this condition shall form p a r t o f t h e c o n t r a c t between the passenger and the air carrier. To limit the action of the airport securitypersonnel to simply refusing the passenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home(as suggested by the appellant), and thereby depriving the security personnel of abilityand facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of suchcircumstances, would be sanctioned impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, P a g e 7 9 7 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 8 s a y , etc.)Ma. Luisa Angeles Ramos to the detriment of the society. The strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.Procedure for Seizure of Pornographic Materials:To justify a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest mustbe on account of a crime having been committed;1 . T h e r e must be a criminal charge against the person for purveying the p o r n o materials;2.Application for search warrant must be obtained from the judge;3.Materials must be brought to court in the prosecution of the accused for the crimecharged;4.Determination whether the items confiscated are pornographic materials; 5. Judgment rendered by the court. (Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362)