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MIDDLE TEST FUNDAMENTALS OF SCIENCE Answer these questions below well and clearly in order you can et hi h score! "# $hat are the di%%erences between inducti&e reasonin and deducti&e reasonin and their %unctions in de&elo'in science and i&e your own e(a)'les es'ecially in *iolo y+ Deductive reasoning is scientific laws and theories then enable predictions and explanations to be made: a. Scientific laws result from generalisations about facts b. Consequences are deduced, using logic, from scientific laws and theories (deduction) c. his enables predictions and explanations to be made !or example: if metals expand when heated, railwa" trac#s will become distorted in the hot sun if there are no expansion gaps in them. he naive inductivit" believes the scientific method consists of the following steps: a. $b%ective and accurate observations are made (facts) b. &enerali'ations are drawn from observations (induction) c. Scientific laws and theories result from generali'ations (xample of inductive reasoning is metals expand when heated

,# E('lain and i&e your reasons that laws and theories %unction as 'redicti&e and e('lanatory de&ices in science! -i&e your own e(a)'les es'ecially in *iolo y

)nstrumentalism is not a popular view. Drawing lessons from ph"sics, *opper (+,-.) re%ects instrumentalism in favour of the view that better theories "ield better explanations and predictions because the" approach some external truth more closel". /owever, he admits that this meta0 ph"sical

view is completel" untestable (*opper +,-.) and therefore has no practical application in separating science from non0science. 1lthough *opper feels that predictive power is onl" a b"product of effective theor", he identifies this power as the best practical demarcation between science and non0science. 2an" ecologists accept the importance of predictive power, but feel that this alone is not the defining characteristic of a theor". )nstead or in addition, the" invo#e vaguel" defined concepts li#e 3explanator" power3 or 3biological realit"3, ignoring questions about how these additional claims can be demonstrated. !or example, 4roblews#i (+,-.) argues that predictive power is of secondar" importance to the development of 3d"namical explanation3 and therefore that the falsification of a theor" b" comparing observation and prediction is no impediment to insightful theor". Caswell (+,56) ma#es a similar claim when he suggests that a theor" ma" be falsified as a predictor but still corroborated as a theor", and 7oehle (+,-.) also feels that models, as explanator" theories, need not be critici'ed because the" predict dismall". 1ll distinguish between the model as precisel" defined in its constituent equations and the theor" reflected in the general, unarticulated relations these equations represent (*artridge et al. +,-89 a"lor +,--). hus theories can not onl" 3be right for the wrong reason3 (Da"ton +,5.) because successful prediction does not guarantee truth content, but if predictive success is not paramount, the" can also be wrong for the right reason. his view debilitates the criterion of predictive power and allows other criteria to confound the selection process b" which science winnows theor" and grows. (xample : (colog" is far from this state. $ur abilit" to predict the course of ever"da" events is small9 theoretical and experimental ecologists seem to have little in common (Caswell +,--), there are few theories for an ecological engineer to appl", and ecologists are more :el" to search *age ; for a single functional theor" than to compare two or more highl" successful alternatives. (colog" is not "et read" for its Copernicus or its <epler, much less its =ewton or (instein or its 4att and $ppenheimer because ecolog" has "et to develop even the consensus about what observations are interesting, much less develop the data base to ma#e scientists of these heroic proportions possible. 4e are closer, perhaps, to a lonel" priest of >r, scanning the night s#ies for patterns and crudel" calculating the future course of the heavens, despite gross misconceptions and uncertainties.

.# Can the 'rinci'le o% induction be /usti%ied+ E('lain and i&e your e(a)'les!

Science proceed from observation, observations provide a strong foundation for building scientific #nowledge. Scientific #nowledge, observation descriptions obtained from the induction. Critics of the view inductive validit" and %ustification of the principle of induction. he concept of the principle of induction. )f a represents the observed ? all have properties, it can be concluded that all of 1 has properties ?. the doubt is how the truth gets its %ustification@ )nductive actors respond with logic and experience. 7ogical argument to sa" that if the premise is true of course, and certainl" no conclusion is also true. ?ut in an inductive argument is not a valid argument logicall". (xample: 1ssuming the observed crows. he issue is not if the premise of an inductive inference is correct, then it must be true #esimpulnn"a. )nductive inference one could happen, while premisen"a true, and this happens without a contradiction. !or example, to this da" ) have made observations of a large number of crows in a wide variation of conditions and have watched them all blac#, and based on these facts, ) conclude that Aall crows are blac#A is a valid inductive inference and perfect. *remise of inference is a statement observations such as: B raven blac# plasticit" observed at the time. A1ll such information is correct. ?ut there is no logical guarantee that m" observation that free raven then no one brown, or pin#. if this is proven, then the conclusion: Aall blac# crowA is wrong. hus, inductive inference 0 a clear starting valid because it satisfies the criteria in the specification b" the principle of induction, can bring one to the conclusion that one, even though the facts show that all premisen"a true. here is no contradiction involved in the statement that all crows are blac# proved to have been observed, and also that not all crows are blac#. hus, it is clear that induces not be %ustified b" purel" logical.

0# E('lain that obser&ation and e('eri)ent are uided by theory and i&e your own e(a)'les in *iolo y+ heor" and observation are two inter0related. 4ithout theor" we ma" not be able to ma#e observations and observations are not possible without a theor" can be formed. Description observations are alwa"s made in the language of the theor" and will be exactl" li#e the theoretical or conceptual framewor# were used, whereas theories are carefull" formulated and clearl" is a prerequisite for the proper description of observation. herefore, theories precede observation. (xperiment also depends on the theor" that ma#es the theor" as the premise of an experiment. b" adhering to the theor" that has dominated the experiments will be run in accordance with the scientific facts and in accordance with the theor". !or example, we conducted experiments on native plants of the area, respectivel", then we would need a boo# or reference that we have to read and #uasain prior to observation and experiment. once we do, then we will compare whether the results of observations and experiments are in accordance with the theor".

1# E('lain and i&e your e(a)'les that inducti&is) is not conclusi&ely re%uted!

he theor"0dependence of observation discussed in this chapter certainl" undermines the inductivist claim that science starts with observation. /owever, onl" the most naive of inductivists would wish to adhere to that position. =one of the modern, more sophisticated inductivists would wish to uphold the literal version of it. he" can dispense with the claim that science must start with unbiased and unpre%udiced observation b" ma#ing a distinction between the wa" a theor" is first thought of or discovered on the one hand, and the wa" in which it is %ustified or its merits assessed on the other. 1ccording to this modified position, it is freel" admitted that new theories are conceived of in a variet" of wa"s and often b" a number of routes. he" ma" occur to the discoverer in a flash of inspiration, as in the m"thical stor" of =ewton3s discover" of the law of gravitation being triggered b" his seeing an apple fall from a tree. 1lternativel", a new discover" might occur as the result of an accident, as :oentgen was led to the discover" of B0ra"s b" the constant blac#ening of photographic plates stored in the vicinit" of his discharge tube. $r, again, a new discover" might be arrived at after a long series of observations and calculations, as exemplified b" <epler3s discoveries of his laws of planetar" motion. heories ma" be, and usuall" are, conceived of prior to the ma#ing of those observations necessar" to test them. !urther, according to this more sophisticated inductivism, creative acts, the most novel and significant of which require genius and involving as the" do the ps"cholog" of individual scientists, def" logical anal"sis. Discover" and the question of the origin of new theories is excluded from the philosoph" of science. /owever, once new laws and theories have been arrived at, no matter b" what route, there remains the question of the adequac" of those laws and theories. Do the" correspond to legitimate scientific #nowledge or don3t the"@ his question is the concern of the sophisticated inductivists. heir answer is roughl" as ) have outlined in Chapter +. 1 large number of facts relevant to a theor" must be ascertained b" observation under a wide variet" of circumstances, and the extent to which the theor" can be shown to be true or probabl" true in the light of those facts b" some #ind of inductive inference must be established.

he separation of the mode of discover" and the mode of %ustification does enable the inductivists to evade that part of the criticism levelled at them in this chapter which was directed at the claim that science starts with observation. /owever, the legitimac" of the separation of the two modes can be questioned. !or instance, it would surel" seem reasonable to suggest that a theor" that anticipates and leads to the discover" of new phenomena, in the wa" Cler# 2axwell3s theor" led to the discover" of radio waves, is more worth" of merit and more %ustifiable than a law or theor" devised to account for phenomena alread" #nown and not leading to the discover" of new ones. )t will, ) hope, become increasingl" clear as this boo# progresses that it is essential to understand science as an historicall" evolving bod" of #nowledge and that a theor" can onl" be adequatel" appraised if due attention is paid to its historical context. heor" appraisal is intimatel" lin#ed with the circumstances upon which a theor" first ma#es its appearance. (ven if we allow the inductivists to separate the mode of discover" and the mode of %ustification, their position is still threatened b" the fact that observation statements are theor" laden and hence fallible. he inductivist wishes to ma#e a fairl" sharp distinction between direct observation, which he hopes will form a sure foundation for scientific #nowledge, and theories, which are to be %ustified b" the extent to which the" receive inductive support from the secure observational foundation. hose extreme inductivists, the logical positivists, went so far as to sa" that theories onl" have meaning insofar as the" can be verified b" direct observation. his position is undermined b" the fact that the sharp distinction between observation and theor" cannot be maintained because observation, or rather the statements resulting from observation, are permeated b" theor". 1lthough ) have severel" critici'ed inductivist philosophies of science in this and the previous chapter, the arguments ) have presented do not constitute an absolutel" decisive refutation of that programme. he problem of induction cannot be regarded as a decisive refutation because, as ) have previousl" mentioned, most other philosophies of science suffer from a similar difficult". ) have %ust indicated one wa" in which criticism centred on the theor" dependence of observation can be to some extent evaded b" the inductivists, and ) am convinced that the" will be able to thin# of further ingenious defences. he main reason wh" ) thin# inductivism should be abandoned is that, compared with rival and more modern approaches, it has increasingl" failed to throw new and interesting light on the nature of science, a fact that led )mre 7a#atos to describe the programme as a degenerating one. he increasingl" more adequate, more interesting and more fruitful accounts of science developed in later chapters will constitute the strongest case against inductivism.

2# $hat are the di%%erences between rationalis) and relati&is) and i&e the e(a)n'les in science+ :ationalism is a stream which states that the source of #nowledge is adequate and reliable based on reason (ratio), while relativism is the flow which states that the guidelines in assessing a better theor" than other theories or previous theor" there is no standard of rationalit" are universal and historical or bound b" time !or example of :ationalism #nowledge of mathematics. )n mathematics, the result of + C + D ; is not acquired through experience or empirical observation, but rather through a logical thin#ing mind. (xample of :elativism is *"thagoras3s opinion Aman is the measure of all things, when he sa"s something is true then it is true that, if he said something wrong then it is wrong.A

3# $hat are the di%%erences between indi&idualis) and ob/ecti&is) and i&e the e(a)n'les in science+

a# Ob/ecti&is) is a &iew that has 4nowled e o% the nature and characteristics beyond belie% and awareness o% indi&iduals who desi n and thin4 about it# Ob/ecti&is) will be )ore easily understood when contrasted with indi&idualis)# Indi&idualis) is the &iew that 4nowled e is understood as belie%s held by indi&iduals# E(a)'le 5 a# when a scientist to see the %lowers are reen and ha&e )ucus so in reality or ob/ecti&e can not deny or bla)e6 that %lower is really sli)y reen %und# b# when we %ustif" <epler3s first law that planets move around the sun in an elliptical shape with =ewton3s laws. So we are not complete without the %ustification of =ewton3s laws %ustified b" experimental evidence, and will continue to require repetitive information that can provide proof.

b# indi&idualis)

In indi&idualist &iew6 4nowled e is understood as a s'eci%ic set o% belie%s held by indi&iduals6 and you ha&e in )ind or brain# An indi&idualist who recei&ed sense o% a con&iction6 will not acce't that all belie%s can %or) true 4nowled e# I% a con&iction would be re arded as true 4nowled e6 then it should be 'ossible that the /usti%ication %or the belie% that the belie% is true or )i ht be true with 'ro'er 'roo%# E(a)'le 5 a# in the ancient scientists conduct research indi&idually in accordance with the &iews and thou hts without )e)adan the &iews or o'inions o% others6 %or e(a)'le newton and albert einstein who in&ented &arious theories accordin to their own thou hts or o'inions# Newton7s theory o% theory and the theory o% einstein %orce o% the sun# b. 2axwell never reali'ed that the theor" predicts a new phenomenon, namel": radio waves that can be generated from the thrilling power sources. his new trial was presented and demonstrated b" &! !it'gerald in +--+, two "ears after 2axwell3s death. c. he formulation of 2axwell3s electromagnetic theor" of an earl" penggerowotan to the view that the whole world of ph"sics must be described as a material s"stem that is controlled b" =ewton3s laws. $b%ective relationship between 2axwell theor" with =ewton3s theor" that the theor" can not be disetaraf#an 2axwell with =ewton3s theor".

8# E('lain that science as a social 'ractice in i&e your own e(a)'les in *iolo y! Scientific #nowledge is achieved b" a complex social endeavour, and derives from the wor# of man" craftsmen in their ver" special interaction with the world of nature. 1n ob%ectivist characteri'ation of ph"sics at some stage in its development, then will include a specification of the theoretical propositions available for individual scientist to wor# on and the experimental and mathematical techniques available for them to wor# with. he example that science as a social practice is scientists who have the competence of the philosophical proved it can lead to human histor". So is the role of technolog", which when science has a ma%or role in the formation of the discourse that became the foundation of the 3truth3, Science echnolog" as the application form has a ma%or role in the social realit".

9# $hat are the di%%erences between realis) and instru)entalis) and i&e your e(a)'les in science+

:ealism is a theor" or who has a realistic understanding of nature. <nowledge b" description or coffee realism is true of what is in the real world. <nowledge or picture in mind is the result of the original coffee that is be"ond reason. )t3s li#e there is a picture in the photo. <nowledge is true and correct when in accordance with realit". (xamples of realism itself is in a room there is a table. 4hether or not people in this room table is still there. he table was not dependent on our ideas on the table, but it depends on the table itself. )nstrumentalism is an extreme form involves a sharp distinction between the concepts that appl" to the situation observed and theoretical concepts. goal of science is to produce theories with a comfortable device or instrument for connecting a set of circumstances that can be observed b" others. description of the world involving entities observed and performed b" describing what the world is reall" li#e this, but no description of the other s"stems that involve concepts that are not theoretical. so far the" are prepared to speculate that the theoretical entities according to their theor" of what actuall" exists in the world, more speculative realism and daring and less cautious and defensive than instrumentalists. (xamples of instrumentalism is a wave or particle theor" introduced b" 2axwell electricit". ?oth are ver" useful when there is a theor" of which is not befitting of a similar sub%ect.

":# $hy are so)e theories chan ed into other theories and i&e your e(a)'le+ some theories turn out to be a theor", or sometimes turn into a new theor" because the old theor" can be bro#en with a new theor" which can proved more capable and accountable. for example, the theor" that tear abioginesis bioginesis theor"6 is a theor" used to thin# that life originated from inanimate matter but over the times of life eventuall" emerged because of another life or longer life6 are other examples of theories about the landmar# theor" of evolution at the brea# b" darwin theor"#

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