Elements: Person

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila passed City Ordinance # 6537 in 1968 which requires all aliens to first secure a working permit before being employed and for other purposes. It imposed sanctions of imprisonment and fines if violated. The respondent herein who was employed in the City of Manila filed a petition praying for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction order and TRO. One of the contentions raised by Hiu Chiong is that the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The respondent judge granted the issuance, hence this present petition. Issues: Whether or not the ordinance violated the due process and equal protection clause. Held: The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Life
Buck v. Bell
Facts: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an

illegitimate feeble minded child. An Act on 1924 was passed to make sterile mental defectives for the health of the patient and welfare of the society. hat the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many defective persons who, if now discharged, would become [p206] a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society, and that experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c. The concerned patient is entitled to hearings and may appeal the order in case of objection, but in this case, txhe attack is not upon the procedure, but upon the substantive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified.

Issue: Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional for violating the due process and equal protection clause. Rule: Buck contends that the operation is illegal in that it violates her constitutional right of bodily integrity and therefore repugnant to the due process of law. This court in defining the meaning of deprivation of life said: The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The deprivation not only of life but whatever God has given to everyone with life. It is true the Act does provide for a hearing before the operation can be performed, and that the hearing may be in a court of law in case of appeal, but this fact standing alone does not meet the constitutional requirement of due process of law. In determining whether the constitutional requirement has been observed we must look into the substance rather than the form of the law; for the form of procedure cannot convert the process used into due process of law, if the result is to illegally deprive a citizen of some constitutional right. The test of the due process of law is that the proceedings shall be legal, preserving the liberty of the citizen. The inherent right of mankind to go through life without mutilation of organs of generation needs no constitutional declaration. The Act denies to the plaintiff and other inmates of the state colony for epileptics and feeble minded the equal protection clause . The mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute of the reach of the equality clause.

Aspects: Substantive Due Process

Kwong Sing v. City of Manila
The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments, must be decided on this appeal. Petitioner seeks to restrain the City from implementing the ordinance. n the lower court, the prayer of the complaint was for a preliminary injunction, afterwards to be made permanent, prohibiting the city of Manila from enforcing Ordinance No. 532, and for a declaration by the court that the said ordinance was null and void.

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "supress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. And, under the general welfare clause (subsection [ee], section 2444 of the Manila Charter), the business of laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments could be regulated, as this term is above construed, by an ordinance in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, peace good order, comfort, convenience, prosperity, and the general welfare. The purpose of the ordinance was to avoid disputes between n laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. Chinese laundrymen are here the protestants. Their rights, however, are not less because they may be Chinese aliens. The life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken without due process of law; they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws without regard to their race; and treaty rights, as effectuated between the United States and China, must be accorded them. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance employed lawful means Held: Our view, after most thoughtful consideration, is, that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each everyone of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them. Our holding is, that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is valid. This statement disposes of both assignments of error, for the improprietry of the question answered by a witness for the defense over the objection of plaintiff's attorney can be conceded without affecting the result.

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

Facts Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Act, was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in 1921. It provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance

with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect. Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand English, Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his books were seized.

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding judge. Arguments

By the petitioner Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his books in English or Spanish, he would have no means of verifying the correctness of the books. If he would employ a translator or interpreter, he might be at the mercy of his employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to the Act, he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set of accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to remain in total ignorance of the status of his business. The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese merchants out of business (They do 60% of the business in the country). The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese merchants of their liberty and property without due process of law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws. Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities as the citizens and subjects of Great Britain and Spain. By the respondent The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of proper legislative power. Due to the inability of internal revenue officials to check the books of the Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of money corresponding to taxes. Pronouncements of the Philippine Court

A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in languages other than those listed Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may keep his account books in Chinese, but he has to keep another set of books in the prescribed languages A third construction is that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books to facilitate governmental inspection of the same for tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds of books shall be kept. The Act is not unconstitutional under the Courts construction of the law. A literal interpretation would render it unconstitutional, so the Court made a reasonable construction to preserve the law. A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Philippine Supreme Courts decision denying an original petition for prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972, on the ground of its invalidity.

Issues

WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

Issue # 1 WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation. What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of great indefiniteness to conform to what the court assumes was, or ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained construction, in order to make a law conform to a constitutional limitation, cannot be sustained. It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. (US v. Reese) Issue # 2 WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due process of law, and denies them the equal protection of the laws. Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment were extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US) PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of their transactions. However, it is NOT within the police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in Chinese. To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the publicrequire such interference and 2) the means are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the legislatures police power is subject to the courts supervision. (Lawton v. Steel) We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaningviolates due process of law.

Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to affect them (as distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.

Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)

Facts: Congress passed a law R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of this act prohibits aliens from either persons or corporations from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with certain exceptions. Petitioner herein brought an action to declare the said act unconstitutional on the grounds that it (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival. Issue: Whether or not R.A. 1180 is unconstitutional

Held: a. The police power. It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the

police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. b. Limitations on police power. The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution: SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution) These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. c. The, equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.) d. The due process clause. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens. Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. The rule in general is as follows: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation. a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that: . . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . . xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.) Another authority states the principle thus: . . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights

secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . . xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. X. Conclusion Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction. The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Procedural Due Process (Twin Requirements: Notice and Hearing)

Vinta Maritime v. NLRC

Facts: n April 20, 1987, Leonides C. Basconcillo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint[1] with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc., herein petitioners. In their answer,[2] petitioners alleged that private respondent was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay, as exemplified by the recorded incidents caused by his negligence. Contrary to [private respondents] allegations, he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side in the foregoing incidents, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed. Because of his gross negligence and his failure to perform the duties for which he was hired, [petitioners] had no other choice than to terminate his services for cause pursuant to managements prerogative to terminate an employee because of gross and habitual neglectof his duties (Article 283, Labor Code). The respondent denied the allegations and he denied having been given a chance to explain his side regarding the mentioned incidents, the truth being that he was surprised when he was told of his dismissal.[3] Petitioners filed their position paper and supporting documents which however failed to rebut private respondents allegations. POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed which was also affirmed by NLRC. Hence this petition. The crew contract for his employment was effective for a fixed duration of one (1) year, with a stipulated monthly basic pay of $1,375.00 U.S. Dollars, and fixed overtime pay of $402.50 U.S. Dollars a month, or a total of $1,787.50 U.S. Dollars per month, with an additional 2 days leave a month. So on February 18, 1987, private respondent joined the vessel at the port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and assumed his duties and responsibilities as Chief Engineer. On April 2, 1987, or barely three (3) months after boarding the vessel, private respondent was informed by Captain Jose B. Orquinaza, the ships Master, that he was relieved of his duties per recommendation of the Marine Superintendent, Mr. Peter Robinson, due to his poor performance (Annex G, Petition). He was in effect terminated from the service. This came after private respondent had a verbal altercation with Robinson, a British national, regarding the discipline or lack thereof of the Filipino crew under private respondents supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal. Issue: Whether or not trial is indispensable in Administrative Due Process Held: Petitioners claim that Respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in upholding the POEAs decision, which was based on the position papers and documents submitted by the parties in view of a motion for trial which remained unacted upon. They insist that a hearing was an indispensable condition before a judgment could be rendered in this case. We do not agree. Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. As applied to these proceedings, due process requires only an opportunity to explain ones side. In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.[14] The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.[15] More often than not, a litigant may be

heard more creditably through pleadings than through oral arguments. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[16] Due process was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard, and an actual verbal hearing need not always be held.[17] The necessity of conducting a hearing is addressed to the sound discretion of the labor arbiter. In all, the Court concurs with the POEA administrator and Respondent Commission that a verbal hearing was dispensable. Petitioners belated insistence is a veiled attempt to reopen an otherwise decided case. Aside from being late, this attempt is purely dilatory, designed to unnecessarily prolong the resolution of the case. The Court holds that petitioners were not denied due process. No grave abuse of discretion was committed by Respondent Commission.

Judicial Due Process: Impartial and Competent Court

Ynot v. IAC
Facts: The petitioner herein challenges the validity of E.O. 626 A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of the said animal not complying with the age requirements set by E.O. 626. Whoever violates the said E.O. shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. Issue: Whether or not the questioned law is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

Held: Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion

in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12 The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

Javier v. COMELEC
Facts: Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,

Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga v. Azura
Facts: Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in his power. ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial. HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . . The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion

Notice and Hearing

David v. Aquilizan
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. Three months later, or on September 29, 1979, respondent Judge without conducting any hearing rendered judgment for private respondents and against herein petitioner finding that "...plaintiffs Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar (now private respondents) were tenants of defendant Filemon C. David (petitioner herein) at the time PD 27 was promulgated on October 21, 1972," 10 and thereafter declared them "owners" thereof. On the bases of the foregoing tactual and procedural antecedent petitioners seek to annul and set aside the aforesaid order and decision of respondent Judge Aquilizan on the grounds that: (a) he was denied due process of law; (b) the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the instant case, jurisdiction being legally lodged with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform: (c) assuming respondent Judge has jurisdiction thereof, the order of June 29, 1978 has already become final and no new decision novating the same may be rendered; and (d) the findings of facts, arrived at without hearing, are contrary to the evidence ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal. HELD: The following requisites, as set forth in a leading case before the 1935 Constitution took effect, must concur for procedural due process in civil cases: "(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing." 15 Thus, it is well-settled rule that "no one shall be personally bound until he has had a day in court", by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is a judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered.

DBP v. Bautista
Facts: As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the creditor bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged property in an extrajudicial sale. Thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the land in question being adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without, however, such debtor, as above noted, having been cited to appear in such court action. the lower court being of the view that with the due process requirement thus flagrantly disregarded, since she was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such a judgment could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a claim by the appellant bank. The complaint was thus dismissed by the lower court, then presided by Judge, now Justice, Magno Gatmaitan of the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal by appellant bank. Held: As stated at the outset, the decision must be affirmed. The fundamental due process requirement having been disregarded, appellee Bautista could not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the effects of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification. If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without being given a hearing would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.5

Lorenzana v. Cayetano
Facts: orenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been violated.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases. We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that respondent having been duly heard by the Court, she was not deprived of her day in court and was accorded the due process of law. It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process were sufficiently complied with because the respondent had been duly heard. Indeed, respondent was heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due process in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the property of the respondent because the premises of the respondent was not included in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property, much less demolish the same. In the leading case of El Banco-Espa;ol-Filipino v.

People v. Beriales
Facts: Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio and Pablito Custodio were convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of Leyte. They haveallegedly murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on September 14, 1974. Upon the hearing, appellants counsel moved for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. Trial court postponed hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974. The fiscal filed a motion to defer the hearing until such time as the reinvestigation shall have terminated. The trial court, however, motu proprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18 hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11, 1974. At the December 10 hearing, counsel of appellants manifested to the court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974 and had already sent subpoenas to the witnesses. The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next day, December 11. Upon appellants coun sels insistence, the court relying on constitutional mandate of the right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the hearing to December 13. On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the CityFiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be able to report on the reinvestigation. However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants. Appelants refused to give a plea because they are waiting for the fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of Not Guilty for each of them. Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial without the City Fiscal. For the same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses presented. Counsel reiterated that they do not agree with the trial when defense was called to present evidence. Trial court

considered the case to be submitted for decision and announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after the reinvestigation (2) Whether or not appellants were denied due process (3) Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings Held: (1) After the trial court granted the appellants motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation. (2) When the trial court ignored the appellants manifestations objecting to the arraignment and trial of the case, it committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. (3) Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor, he should be present during the proceedings. While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceeding.

Ang tibay v. CIR ( Requisites in Admin Procedure)

Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion for new trial of the National Labor Union. The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. Principles behind the case: 1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.

Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. 2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving proceedings of administrative character. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 3. Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings; Guidelines a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of

constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 4. New trial granted under circumstances The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.

Better Building v. NLRC

Facts: Halim Ysmael and Eliseo Feliciano, sales manager and chief supervisor respectively of the petitioner herein were illegally dismissed. A memo was sent then and there informing the two employees of their immediate termination. Unable to accept their termination, the two filed a complaint against BBI for illegal termination. The labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of the two employees directing BBI to reinstate them, award backwages and damages for the illegal termination. The decision was also affirmed by NLRC except minimizing the damages. Petitioner, not satisfied with the decision, has filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision of March 3, 1989 and the resolution of December 11, 1992. Ysmael entered into a compromise agreement with the petitioner, thus removing him from the case. Issue: Whether or not BBI illegally dismissed Feliciano. Held: The resolution will therefore only affect Feliciano. The petitioner contends that Feliciano was dismissed for breach of trust and confidence as the latter has engaged in the same line of business as that of the petitioner , and even getting the latters clients, and employing BBIs former employees. In

termination of employment cases, we have consistently held that two requisites must concur to constitute a valid dismissal: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, the elements of which are the opportunity to be heard and defend himself. First, on the substantive aspect, petitioner contends that private respondent was dismissed from his employment for engaging in business in direct competition with its line of service.8 Hence, said conduct constitutes a willful breach of trust which is justifiable cause for termination of employment.9 We sustain BBI. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that an employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.10 The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause In this jurisdiction, we have consistently ruled that in terminating an employee, it is essential that the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed.12 The written notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and at the same informs the employee concerned of the employers decision to dismiss him. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charge against him. Nor was he ever given the opportunity under the circumstances to answer the charge; his termination was quick, swift and sudden. vidently, the decision to dismiss respondent was merely based on the fact that petitioner was already convinced at the time that the private respondents were engaged in disloyal acts. As regards the procedural aspect, the failure to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing taints the dismissal with illegality. He was dismissed for a just cause but, the manner of terminating his employment was done in complete disregard of the necessary procedural safeguards. A mans job being a property right duly protected by our laws, for depriving private respondent the right to defend himself, petitioner is liable for damages .

Zambales Chromite v.CA

Due Process Administrative Due Process ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as

Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision t o be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process. HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.

Anzaldo v. Clave
Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman. ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment. In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.

Carag v. NLRC
FACTS: National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union(MACLU), on behalf of all of MACs rank and file employees, filed a complaint against MAC for illegal dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business. They included in their complaint MarivelesApparel Corporation s Chairman of the Board Antonio Carag in order to be solidarily liable for the illegal dismissal and illegal closure of business. According to the Labor Union of MAC, the Corporation suddenly closed its business without following the notice as laid down in the Labor Law of the Philippines. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the Labor Union and held that Antonio Carag being the owner of the corporation be solidarily liable for the payment of separation pay and backwages of the rank and file employees. Antonio Carag questioned the decision of the Labor Arbiter and alleged that the Corporation and its officers have separate and distinct personality and the latter cannot be held liable solidarily in cases of payment of damages. The complainants aver that respondent company prior to its closure did not even bother to serve written notice to employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month before the intended date of closure. The respondents did not even establish that its closure was done in good faith. Moreover, the respondents did not pay the affected employees separation pay, the amount of which is provided in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the complainants and the respondents. Issue:

1. Has petitioner Carag's right to due process been blatantly violated by holding him personally liable for over P50 million of the corporation's liability, merely as board chairman and solely on the basis of the motion to implead him in midstream of the proceedings as additional respondent, without affording him the right to present evidence and in violation of the accepted procedure prescribed by Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as to render the ruling null and void? 2. Assuming, arguendo, that he had been accorded due process, is the decision holding him solidarily liable supported by evidence when the only pleadings (not evidence) before the Labor Arbiter and that of the Court of Appeals are the labor union's motion to implead him as respondent and his opposition thereto, without position papers, without evidence submitted, and without hearing on the issue of personal liability, and even when bad faith or malice, as the only legal basis for personal liability, was expressly found absent and wanting by [the] Labor Arbiter, as to render said decision null and void? 3. Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reduce appeal bond?

Held: It is clear from the narration in Arbiter Ortiguerra's Decision that she only summoned complainants and MAC, and not Carag, to a conference for possible settlement. In her Decision, Arbiter Ortiguerra stated that she scheduled the conference "upon receipt of the record of the case." At the time of the conference, complainants had not yet submitted their position paper which contained the motion to implead Carag. Complainants could not have submitted their position paper before the conference since procedurally the Arbiter directs the submission of position papers only after the conference. were denied due process when the Labor Arbiter decided the case solely on the basis of the position paper and supporting documents submitted in evidence by Habana and De Guzman. We rule in the affirmative. The manner in which this case was decided by the Labor Arbiter left much to be desired in terms of respect for the right of private respondents to due process First, there was only one conciliatory conference held in this case. This was on 10 May 1996. During the conference, the parties did not discuss at all the possibility of amicable settlement due to petitioner's stubborn insistence that private respondents be declared in default. Second, the parties agreed to submit their respective motions - petitioner's motion to declare respondents in default and private respondents' motion for bill of particulars - for the consideration of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbitration Associate, one Ms. Gloria Vivar, then informed the parties that they would be notified of the action of the Labor Arbiter on the pending motions. Third, since the conference on 10 May 1996 no order or notice as to what action was taken by the Labor Arbiter in disposing the pending motions was ever received by private respondents. They were not declared in default by the Labor Arbiter nor was petitioner required to submit a bill of particulars. Fourth, neither was there any order or notice requiring private respondents to file their position paper, nor an order informing the parties that the case was already submitted for decision. What private respondents received was the assailed decision adverse to them. It is clear from the foregoing that there was an utter absence of opportunity to be heard at the arbitration level, as the procedure adopted by the Labor Arbiter virtually prevented private respondents from explaining matters fully and presenting their side of the controversy. They had no chance whatsoever to at least acquaint the Labor Arbiter with whatever defenses they might have to the charge that they illegally dismissed petitioner. In fact, private respondents presented their position paper and documentary evidence only for the first time on appeal to the NLRC. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Where, as in this case, sufficient opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or position paper and other pleadings is not accorded a party to a case, there is undoubtedly a denial of due process. It is true that Labor Arbiters are not bound by strict rules of evidence and of procedure. The manner by which Arbiters dispose of cases before them is concededly a matter of discretion. However, that discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of due process. They are mandated to use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case, speedily, objectively and without regard

to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of justice and for the purpose of accuracy and correctness in adjudicating the monetary awards.