CIV PRO Examination of Obligor of Judgment Obligor RULE 39

YSMAEL V. CA 318 SCRA 215 (1999)

LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Ri zal and obtained a favorable judgment in 1980. The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners were unable to locate property belonging to private res pondents. In 1989, Petitioners filed a case for revival of judgment which was granted by the RTC. Writ of execution was issued. Defendant-spouses Lejanos parcels of land covered by nine (9) TCTs registered in the Register of Deeds of Batangas were levied on execution. In a public auction Petitioners through their counsel of record Atty. Arguelles, Jr. bought the lands in July 25 1995 for PhP 700,000.00, subject to a 1-year period of redemption from date of registration of the certificate of sale. This sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995. On July 16 1996, Private Respondents wrote to Petitioners counsel to exercise right of redemption premising on the expiration date of said redemption on July 25, 1996. Both petitioners and deputy Sheriff Villarin did not reply. Thus, Private respondents believed that the 1-year period will on 25 July 1996. When Defendants tried to tender payment (through 2 cashiers check PhP 700,000.00 for the amount paid and PhP 84,000.00 for the interest) to Petitioners, the latter was always not available so private respondents consigned the amount to the Court on July 26, 1996. Petitioner now claimed that the 12-month period for redemption has already expired on July 19, 1996. But, both the RTC and the respondent Court of Appeals ruled for the private respondents. Hence, this motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not private respondents can still redeem their property. Held: AFFIRMATIVE. The SC held that considering that 1996 was a leap year, the 12-month period expired on July th 19, 1996 (on the 360 day). Under the old Rules (1964 Rules of Court) Rule 39, Section 30 provides that within twelve months after the sale, the judgment debtor may redeem the property sold at public auction, thus:
Section 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser from, at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale, the amount of his purchase, with one percentum per month interest thereof in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.

However, private respondents committed an honest mistake on a question of law because the certificate of sale stated that the period of redemption will expire 1-year from the date of registration (hence, July 25 1996 as to their belief). The court said that RULE 39, section 28 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the period of redemption shall be at any time within one (1) ye rom the purchaser from the date or registration of the certificate of sale, so that the period is now to be understood as compose d of 365 days. Neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected private respondents mistaken impression leading the latter to believe that July 25, 1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption. Further, they informed Petitioners of their intention to exercise their right to redeem on July 16, 1996 (within 12-month period). More so, they tried to tender payment and upon failure, consigned the amount to the Court. The tender of payment made on July 25, 1996 is considered as an affirmation of timely notice to redeem, even if such tender was made 6 days after expiration of redemption period. The rule on redemption must be liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS AFFIRMED. #