Institutionalization as a Creative Process: The Sociological Importance of Cornelius Castoriadis's Political Philosophy Crossroads in the Labyrinth.

by Cornelius Castoriadis; Kate Soper; Martin H. Ryle; The Imaginary Institution of Society. by Cornelius Castoriadis; Kathleen Blamey; Domaines de l'homme: Les carrefours du labyrinthe II. by Cornelius Castoriadis Review by: Hans Joas and Raymond Meyer American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, No. 5 (Mar., 1989), pp. 1184-1199 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780470 . Accessed: 15/07/2013 18:44
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Review Essay: Institutionalization as a Creative Process: The Sociological Importance of Cornelius Castoriadis's Political Philosophy
Crossroadsin the Labyrinth.By CorneliusCastoriadis.Translatedby Kate Soper and Martin H. Ryle. Cambridge:MIT Press, 1984. Pp. xxxi+ 345. $12.50 (paper). The Imaginary Institution ofSociety. By CorneliusCastoriadis.Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. Pp. 418. $35.00. I. By Cornelius Domaines de l'homme:Les carrefours du labyrinthe Castoriadis.Paris: Editionsdu Seuil, 1986. Pp. 455. Fr 150. Hans Joas Universitit Erlangen-Niirnberg If it is not to lapse intoacademic sterility, sociologicaltheory mustconpublicissues and approachesto social thetinually debate theimportant theory sociological orythatarise outsideits own boundaries.Otherwise, without withmerely self-posed problems is in dangerof occupying itself and riskinga creepingloss of hope of capturingthe public's interest disciplines. influence withinthe familyof social- and human-scientific of Jiirgen The extraordinarily evinced in the writings stronginterest of soHabermas and Anthony Giddens in recentAmericandiscussions of thisneed to testifies to a recognition by sociologists ciologicaltheory expand theirenquiries,but it is also clear thatthisneed cannotbe fully satisfied means and resources. by its own intellectual ofa decade-oldFrenchbook The publication oftheEnglishtranslation to theworkof a social theorist providesan occasionforcallingattention to thatof whosestature as a thinker qualification, comparable is, without theaforementioned butwhoseworkhas heretofore gonealmost theorists, unnoticed Certainof CorneliusCastoriadis'sideas have by sociologists. of Alain Tourexerciseda surreptitious influence the writings through a wealth of empiricaldata at the expense aine, which, however,offer is nota sociologist, and he oftheoretical exactness.CorneliusCastoriadis as it is, moreover, quite skepticalabout the sociologicalprojectinsofar seeks to replace the old politicalphilosophy with technicalknowledge to immediate modeledon the positivesciencesand oriented application.
? 1989 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved. .50. 0002-9602/89/9405-0007$01

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Review Essay predisposeshim forthe role of a Castoriadis'sentirepersonal history betweenphilosophy and sciboundarycrosserbetweenthe disciplines, and engagement in systematization ence, and also betweentheoretical social movements. partyas a Born in Greece in 1922, he joined the Greek Communist German againstthe occupying youngman and took partin the struggle ofthatparty, he switched, character army.Disappointedby theStalinist FourthInternational, even beforethe end of the war, to the Trotskyist intellectuwhichfora timeembodiedformanyEuropean and American socialism.However,soon and revolutionary als thehope of a democratic he broke in Paris, wherehe intended to studyphilosophy, after arriving ofother, now-famous witha number withthisorganization too. Together journal, French intellectuals,he founded a political and theoretical active as an economist, he Socialisme ou barbarie.While professionally publishedmany analyses of capitalism,of the Soviet system,and of quality Whilethehighintellectual pseudonyms. Marxism, usingdifferent of these articlesis undeniable,it is also true that theywere politically ineffectual fora long timeand burdenedby the radical Left'ssectarian fortheunexinspirations was one oftheintellectual polemics.Castoriadis thisuprising, he had pectederuption of May 1968 in Paris. Even before ofMarxismthatwas, forhim,tantamount assessment published a critical to a rupture Duringthisperiod,he changedprofessions withthattheory. But ifthiswereall, I would not and became a practicing psychoanalyst. thefashionable intelbe discussing himhere. Castoriadiswithdrew from in his ofthetimeand workedforyearson a new start lectualmovements own thinking, thebasis ofan alternative to buildwithlaboriousreflection Marxism. theory on the ruinsof a discredited in two respects fromcrucial clearlydiffers Castoriadis'sundertaking structuralist (or features after1968. It is neither of the Frenchzeitgeist workon a theory of extensive poststructuralist) norliberal. Castoriadis's at theverypoint primarily to engagestructuralism languageis intended on whichthistheory bases its scientific claims.He seeksa nonstructuralcritique ist theory of the sign and of the symbolical.But his trenchant of Marxism does not make him an uncritical championof liberalism, is the ideal or the as if the failureof Marxism"proved"thatliberalism (Domaines de l'homme[DH], only acceptable form of government and the alternative of psychoanalysis p. 106). The criticalexamination first ofall: offered negatively, theory by Castoriadiscan be characterized and theform oftherhe polemicizes againstbothJacquesLacan's theory in thewritings apy Lacan advocated and practiced.Speakingpositively, of thistransitional to the tenets of a postperiod,Castoriadissubscribes of science:"The illusionsabout successiveapproximaempiricist theory of results, about the gradualand systemtions,about the accumulation atic conquestof a simplerationalorderpre-existing within theworldare [CL], p. xiv). For Casbeing dissipated"(Crossroadsin the Labyrinth does notgivecarteblancheforrelativthisrecognition toriadis, however, 1185

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American Journalof Sociology it poses afresh theproblem of ism or forintellectual arbitrariness; rather, ofscientific self-reflection and thehistory ofsciencewithin theframework hencethe problemof history in general. Castoriadis'sprincipalwork,now available in English,containsboth thecritical assessment ofMarxismthathe developedin the 1960sand the of his own theory that mostcomprehensive and systematic presentation however, he has written to date. Since thatwork'soriginalpublication, a new collectionof his essays has appeared in France, Domaines de writings are l'homme.Here forthe first timeCastoriadis'sphilosophical printed together witharticlesabout thepoliticaleventsoftheday. Comwithstatements on moretranplex and profound essaysare intermingled Even so, Castoriadis's sientissues, wearying the readerwithrepetition. writings make a favorable impression on thereader,who sensesthatthey were written projectsare long by a tenaciousthinker whose intellectual term,who argueswithexactitude, and who pays no heed to disciplinary du vide, as he calls it, thatis boundaries.In the midstof the industrie an old-fashioned rampant in Paris and elsewhere, Castoriadischampions of authentic publicdiscussion, not moralresponsibility fortheprotection it, but also againstthe deonlyagainstthe state'sattempts to influence le bluff, la demagogie et la forming effects of commercialization, "contre prostitution de l'esprit" (DH, p. 25). the forces Castoriadis'sown motivating Now, in orderto understand and critique ofMarxism. theory, it is necessary to examinehis assessment of action, he findsfaultwith First, fromthe standpointof the theory Marx forignoring of humanbeingsand thereby becomthe real activity are charing deterministic. Accordingto Castoriadis,Marx's assertions acterizedby technological doctrinaleconomics,or quasi determinism, the developutilitarianism. logic underlying By positing an autonomous mentoftheforces ofproduction, Marx failsto addressthequestionofthe social conditionsrequiredfor the originand choice of particulartechof, thesetechnologiesand of the culturalresponseto, and processing he nologies.When Marx conceivesof the economyas a closed system, in that conception; which are immanent quicklyencounters difficulties, the dominanceof the law of value in the capitalisteconomyrestson a influenced definition of value thatis an object of controversy culturally of the value of and struggleand that enters into the determination in a quasi-utilitarian commodified labor power. By conceiving, manner, of human action as arisingsolelyfromeconomicmotives,he endangers the the applicabilityof his theorybeyond capitalismand contradicts of economicanthropology. findings Castoriadishas givenlong and careful thoughtto the labor theoryof value and, in a marvelousessay, and from "Value, Equality, Justice,Politics: From Marx to Aristotle Aristotle to Ourselves" (CL, pp. 260-339), he demonstrates that Marx of capitalism within vacillatedamongthreeinterpretations continuously the framework of value. of the labor theory It is not clear in Marx's analysiswhether the capitalist actueconomy 1186

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Review Essay ally transforms humanbeingsand their diversekindsoflabor intosomething thatis homogeneous thateconomy and measurable, or whether only makesvisiblesomething thathas alwaysbeenso buthas remained hidden from humanbeingsby their system ofideas, or,last, whether thequalitativesamenessof"abstract labor"is onlyan appearanceresulting from the reification effected by capitalism,an appearance that stems fromthe transformation oflaborpowerintoa commodity. This lack ofclarity is an indication ofa morefundamental ambiguity aboutwhya particular value is a value. Had Marx clearlyaddressedthisquestion,he would have had to abandon the hope of elaborating a scienceof capitalism'sbasic processes,independent ofcultural preconditions. ofMarx's Withthiscritique labortheory ofvalue, Castoriadisrejects theveryheartofMarx's critique ofpoliticaleconomy, life'swork.Castoriadis does thecoreofhis scientific not,however, rejectit in favorofthemarginalist revolution's subjectivist theory ofvalue. For Castoriadis, thisconception oftheeconomy as a logic of the choiceof means is vitiatedby a fundamentally untenableview of therelationship of meansand ends in social life.His critique differs from thatof Habermas, who maintainsthatthe conditions of forthe validity thistheory obtainonlyduring Habera certain stageofliberalcapitalism. mas concludesthat,with the increasing ecoprevalenceof monopolies, nomicintervention bythestate,and thescientific ofproducorganization tion,the possibilities of applying Marx's theory are also eliminated, and the whole "production paradigm"becomesobsolete.Since Castoriadis's is moreimmanent thanthatofHabermas,thesignificance ofthe critique concernsinforming the labor theoryof value and the "philosophy of praxis"are not lost if Marx's theory is not valid. These concerns, howin the"production ever,cannotbe adequatelyexpressed paradigm."The unresolved contradiction betweenMarx's deterministic of hureduction man actionand a practicalphilosophy of revolution is of crucialimportance. For Castoriadis,a false scientistic is intrinsic to ideal of theory Marx's inconsistencies. As an alternative to the positivesciences' conceptionof theory, not Marx but Aristotle is thedecisiveauthority forCastoriadis's understanding of a practicalphilosophy. Using politicalthought (but also pedagogical and medicalthinking), Castoriadisexplainsthenatureof a nontechnical relation between knowledge and action. In all these domains, comprehensive of lawlikeproposiknowledgedoes not assume the form tionsemployed to realizeexternal and predetermined goals. Instead,nontechnical actionbears its end withinitself; the knowledge corresponding to it is always fragmentary and must relyon continuousexpansionof itself withinconcrete action,without, however,ever becoming a theory aboutan object-"To think: to elucidate,notto 'theorise.' Theoryis only one moment of elucidation, and always lacunaryand fragmentary" (CL, p. 84). In thisrecourse in thepraxisof to theorigin ofpractical philosophy the Greekpolis, Castoriadisdiffers from othercritics of a latentpositivism in Marx's thought, such as Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci.In this 1187

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of Sociology American Journal ideal reservations about the cognitive regard,and in his fundamental of the social sciences, he resemblesMartin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Hannah Arendt, and, today,AlasdairMacInGadamer,Joachim Ritter, modelof use in thetheoretical tyre.But none of thesemake such intense thatis present but practicalphilosophy as Castoriadisdoes of a moment the creativenatureof "praxis." marginalized in Marx's thought: analysesof the In both his conceptof labor and his historiographical in France, Marx ascribedto humanactiona creativecaclass struggles Castoriadis pacity, an ability to producenew objectsor new socialforms. practidoes nottry path alongwhichAristotelian to tracetheintellectual cal philosophy by Germanidealismand German became so transformed pointofhis own romanticism thatMarx was able to use it as thestarting straddlesAristotle reflections. But because Castoriadis'sown thinking transformed and Marx, he is sensitiveto the traces of a romantically Marx chargesthe conceptof praxis Aristotelianism in Marx's thought. with the meaning that classical philosophycounterposedto techne': "poiesis," which is not imitativebut creative. Castoriadis takes this to do a book,to make "To do something, understanding ofpraxisfurther: a child, a revolution, oneselfintoa or just doing as such, is projecting which, future situation whichis opened up on all sides to theunknown, in thought, but whichone must therefore, one cannotpossessbeforehand in its aspects relevantto present decinecessarily assume to be defined sions" (The ImaginaryInstitutionof Society [IIS], p. 87). He veheof creating new the reduction of thispossibility mently opposes,though, to thecontingency of unforeseeable events.Admitthings or social forms of historical characteristics tedly,contingency is one of the fundamental In humanhistory, the distinguishing feature. processes, but it is nottheir of naturalprocessesis mitigated because man "can provide contingency (IIS, new responsesto the 'same' situationsor create new situations" p. 44). is workFor sociological thismeans,first ofall, thatCastoriadis theory of actionthatcannotbe made to fitthe ing withconceptsof the theory normamodelsofrationalactionand their of theoretical rigiddichotomy tive critique(see my critiqueof Jeffrey Alexanderin Inquiry31, forthplanned mocoming).Castoriadisdoes not considerthe goal-oriented, mentas the primary of actionbecause it constitutes onlythe component of conditions, technicalmomentof an activity that requiresthe setting of this position,however,extend goals, and means. The implications status of socialfurther and lead to a questioningof the theoretical in general. ofaction, scientific theories Justas theplan is butone moment so too is theexplanatory of a historical selftheory onlya singlemoment in science. Historicaland social processes reflection that expressesitself ofpractical intentions or of becomeintelligible theframework onlywithin are themschemesof action; all metatheoretical categorialframeworks selves partof the history theyset out to explain. This idea was by no meansforeign to Marx. He regarded his scientific 1188

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Review Essay laborsas partofa praxisthatwould bring about a worldwide revolution. But he undercut thisidea because, following Hegel's example,he considered it possibleto anticipatethe goal of humanhistory. By holdingthis position, Marx joined his leaningstowarda causallydeterministic science of the historical with a teleologicalconception of history. Inasmuchas Marxismdemands,writes Castoriadis, that"by asserting thateverything mustbe graspedin termsof causationand at the same timethateverything mustbe thought in terms ofmeaning, thatthere is butone immense causal chain whichis simultaneously chain of meaning,it one immense exacerbates thetwo poles of the enigmato thepointof makingit impossible to thinkrationally about it" (llS, p. 53). However, the historical character of human action,and knowledgeof it, acquiresits existential seriousness only when the opennessof history, its always only partial rationality, and the irreversibility of humanactionsare recognized. The driving force behindCastoriadis's penetrating critique ofMarxism is his horror of thestatesthathave elevatedMarxismto an official ideolof ogy. In his eyes, his theoryis not a rejectionbut a radicalization Marxism:"Starting from revolutionary Marxism,we have arrivedat the Marxist and remaining pointwherewe have to choosebetween remaining revolutionaries" view, thedeterministic ver(11S, p. 14). In Castoriadis's sions of Marxismuphold bureaucratic and dominaclaims to authority tion. Whereas democratic to this institutions serve as a counterweight in capitalism,the social model repreembodiment of formalrationality sentedbytheSovietUnionis characterized bythetotaldominance ofthis one principle.The ideologyof legitimation of "scientific socialism"is in and ofitself undemocratic, sincetheclaimto providescientific answers to questionsabout politicalgoals invalidatesauthentic decisionmakingby the members of a society.In oppositionto that ideologyand its consesuch quences, Castoriadisadvocates forms of politicalself-organization, as councils and models of industrialself-management, that have apinstances.It is notmypurposeto pearedonlyin isolatedand short-lived of thisorientation but to cast pass judgmenton the politicalplausibility lighton thebackground of Castoriadis's For this theoretical innovations. orientation to the model suppliedby revolutionary actiongives him the to demonstrate strength thecreativity thatis properto all action,just as Herder and Germanromanticism of aesthetic built on an examination praxis,pragmatists investigated experimental scientific praxis,and Marx reflected on materially productivepraxis. This theory of action is the foundation ofCastoriadis's whichis builtaroundthe political philosophy, conceptof the institution and also providesthe basis forhis efforts to elaboratean "ontology of indeterminacy." to the Creativeaction refers creationof institutions and to the world as a sphereof possibility for action. The conceptof the institution is one of the mostimportant categories for both sociologyand anthropology. It was given its most ambitious theoretical formulation in Durkheim'stheory of religion, whichParsons 1189

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American Journalof Sociology tendedto undermine of institutionalization by conceiving processes more as therealization ofpreexisting values thanas thecreation ofnew values. in the nonfunctionalist Castoriadisis clearlyinterested components of Durkheim'slater theories.His theory of the institution is intended as a critiqueof the functionalist interpretation of institutions, whichseeks to explainsocial phenomena bymeansofsystem imperatives yetis unableto stateany stable human needs or system requirements. If, however,sysin cultural temimperatives themselves consist thenthepossidefinitions, bilityof struggling over and arguingabout thesedefinitions withinthe framework of social systems mustalso be considered. These imperatives do notrepresent nominalvalue but irreducible independent, conceptions of a possiblefuture. "The modernview of theinstitution," declaresCastoriadis, "whichreducesits signification to thefunctional aspect,is only To theextent thatitpresents partially correct. itself as thetruth aboutthe problemof the institution, it is only a projection.It projectsonto the the actual reality wholeof history an idea takennoteven from oftheinstitutions to the Westerncapitalistworld (which,despitethe belonging vast movement of rationalization, have neverbeen and are stillno more thanpartially butfrom whatthisworldwouldlikeitsinstitufunctional), tionsto be" (llS, p. 131). of thisview of examination Although one mightwish thatthe critical the institution of Talcott Parwere broaderand includedan assessment theoretical little can be added to Cassons'senormous accomplishments, toriadis's The readersensesthe greatinfluence critiqueof structuralism. of this French school of thoughton Castoriadis'swork. Inasmuch as of theinstitution, structuralism dimension apprehends onlythesymbolic it is a one-sided view of social phenomenathat complements funcone-sidedunderstanding of them.In his essays, Castoriadis tionalism's and criticizes it foreliminating arguesagainstthe"structuralist ideology" of the subject and therewith the meaning-producing accomplishments In contrast, the subject'sresponsibility forand powerover history. The Institution a thoroughgoing and systematic Imaginary ofSocietypresents ofMauriceMerleau-Ponty, alternative. Castoriadis Taking up reflections centralargument, thatlinguistic deniesstructuralism's has shown theory is theresult ofa combination ofsigns,merely thatmeaning thedifference among the bearersof meaning.It is truethat the relationbetweenthe is not an empiricalor a logical one; what is and the signifier signified of a signto a meaning is theresult decisive,however,is thattherelation of theinstitutionalization of a signsystem and thatsignsystems mustbe with theirextrasystemic understood references to what is pertogether ceivedand intended. The arbitrary character ofthesign,to whichstrucis retained,but it is accountedfor turalismattachessuch importance, In thisway, Castoradisrevealsthe by a processof institutionalization. of the subject,behindstructuralmeaning-originating accomplishments ism's back, as it were. of linguistic For the determination meaningis never completedbut 1190

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Review Essay can be continued indefinitely. Everylinguistic utterance becomesunderstandable only when placed in its proper context;this contextcomprehends boththesignsystem oftheentire languageand thecomplexes of affairs makingup theuniverse. In "The Sayableand theUnsayable"(CL, pp. 119-44), Castoriadisexplains,in reference to Merleau-Ponty, that structuralism should be understoodas merelythe reverseside of the phenomenological in contrast, idea of a constitutive his consciousness; own theory oflanguagemakesit possibleto preserve subjectivity without making it all-important. In thelanguageit shareswithothers, thesubject is not obligated to make specificutterancesbut ratheris aware-in Merleau-Ponty's "a void whichis words-of a "significative intention," in the sense thatthe one who is about to speak knowsthat determined is something there otherand moreto be said thanwhathas alreadybeen said, but knowsnothing positivebeyondthatfact,beyondthefactthatit is notsaid bywhathas alreadybeen said" (CL, p. 132). In languagethere is an interplay of individualsignification and institutions thatcannotbe graspedwiththetypical theoretical modelsused by scienceto understand the social and the historical. In his critique of thefalsetheoretical ideals of thenon-Marxist human and social sciences,Castoriadisrepeatsthestagesofhis critique ofMarxism. The transfer intothosesciencesofphysical or logicalmodelscan lead to a failureto grasp what is unique about human societyand human history. These attempts to define society and history separately convince him of the fundamental falsity of such models. Also of importance for sociology, he objects (IIS, pp. 177 ff.)to identifying the distinguishing features of human societywith the emergence of supraindividual phenomenaor withtheprimacy ofthecollectivity. Not collectivity and emergencebut thespecific structure ofhumancollectivity and individuality is at issue. For history, thispositionentailsa refusalof deterministic, predictivestatements: "L'histoireest cre'ation du sens-et il ne peut pas y avoir d"explication'd'une creation,il ne peut y avoir qu'une comprehensionex postfacto de son sens" (history is the creationof meaningtherecan be no "explanation" of a creation; therecan be onlya comprehensionex postfactoof its meaning) (DH, p. 220). Thus thecentral idea of Castoriadis'stheory of action,the creativedimension of action,reappears as the centraldeterminant of the peculiarity of the social and the historical.Social realityis describedas "the union and the tensionof instituting society and ofinstituted society, ofhistory made and ofhistory in themaking"(llS, p. 108). What thefalsemodelsfailto accountforis precisely the creationof things thatare radicallynew, a creation arising out of the inherent potentials of the imaginary. For Castoriadis,the imis an ultimate aginary determination; it cannotbe accountedforby anything else, norshoulditbe confused witha copyoftheperceived world,a meresublimation ofanimaldrives,or a strictly ofthe rational elaboration given.Thus, the titleof Castoriadis'sprincipal work,whichmay at first seemstrange to thereader,becomesunderstandable: society is theresult 1191

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of Sociology American Journal ofan institutionalization process,and thisprocess,because it arisesfrom the imaginary, fromthe human capacityto conceivemeaning,has an irreducibly creativedimension. This insight can be pursuedin a number ofdifferent directions. First,it can be applied empirically to the collectiveaction of social movements thatalteras well as produceinstitutions. This pathhas been followed by Alain Touraine, althoughnot by Castoriadishimself, raisingquestions aboutthecritical analysisofthepresent-the current significance ofsuch social movements and theimaginary coreofmodern and Western culture of othercultures.In this connection, Castoriadisstrongly suggeststhe of rationality centralimportance as an imaginary schemaunderlying the culturaldominanceof technology, science,bureaucracy, and economic his positionfrom efficiency. However, he does not clearlydifferentiate similar modelssuch as thatofMax Weberor from theoretical competing of this ways of thinking. Second, the culturaland intellectual history theoryof creativity and of the social institution can be traced in the publishedfragments of the major studythathe has announced.Perhaps the most impressiveexample is the studyof the Greek polis and the "creation"of democracy (DH, pp. 261-306). In this essay, Castoriadis investigates theintertwined origins ofdemocracy and philosophy, finding that theyshare a disavowal of mere social unrestand of myth.In the of thepolis,an institutionalization ofthecollective democracy shapingof social institutions into appears forthe first time;in philosophy, inquiry the truth and the ethicalrightness of receivedideas and beliefs. In his principalwork to date, however,Castoriadisfollowsa third ofindeterminacy as a presupposition path:theelaboration ofan ontology forcreation.The starting pointforthisundertaking is Castoriadis's clear grasp of the problemsposed fora philosophy of praxis or a theory of actionwhen thesereston traditional metaphysical premises.How is intentional actionpossibleiftheworldis a cosmosofendless,deterministic or else a chaos that can acquire concatenations of causes and effects, ofhumanschematizations? form theimposition determinate onlythrough in theself-understanding of the For Castoriadis,the problems contained in thesescisocial and naturalscienceshave theiressentialfoundation In order ences' unexamined of determinacy. dependenceon an ontology of the interplay to escape from thispredicament, he broadenshis theory between and theinstituting thatwhichhas been instituted agencyintoan of "magma," of a fluidsubstrate of all determinate ontology being. In statusof doingso, he is not seekingto establishtheexclusive,privileged thisindeterminacy, as did Bergsonand Heidegger;rather, he acknowlof determinacy foreverydayaction and edges the pragmaticnecessity speech. Using the Greekterms"legein"and "teukhein," Castoriadisinin an ocean of indeterminacy. theseislandsof determinacy vestigates In thisinvestigation, he persuasively demonstrates the inadequacyof the traditional in particular mode of thinking, through an examination ofthephenomenon oftimeand oftheexperience oftime.To sociologists, 1192

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Review Essay theseproblems might notseemto affect positive research. However,since the postempiricist turnof the theory of science,no scientist can permit him-or herself theluxury ofindifference to themetaphysical implications ofhis or hermethods. Furthermore, is able to explainthesigCastoriadis nificance of his reflections foran adequate theoretical of understanding His reflections on thesetopics,are, I find, and oftemporality. personality mostsimilarto the late workof GeorgeHerbertMead, whichhas also been littleunderstood, ofJohnDewey from thesame and to thewritings time.For theseAmericanthinkers, ofactionled to a too, thephilosophy of the possibility of action. of time and of natureas conditions theory is important Castoriadis's forsociologists fora secontological enterprise ond reason. At the presenttime, at least in the Federal Republic of Germany,Niklas Luhmann's attemptto develop functionalist systems on thebasis ofrecent theory further, intoa theory of"autopoiesis," develin thebiological is one ofthemostinfluential opments ofcognition, theory theoretical approaches.How else shouldthediscussion ofthisapproach, which,like thatof Castoriadis,focuseson the self-origination of system thatare structures, proceedthanby reflection on theontological premises in Luhmann'sprogram? implicit For Castoriadis, leave of leave ofMarxismdoes notmeantaking taking a conceptof centralimportance at least fortheyoungMarx: alienation. On thecontrary. to a concept of His theory oftheinstitution leads directly in theinstitualienation: "Alienation occurswhentheimaginary moment tionbecomesautonomous and predominates, whichleads to the institution'sbecomingautonomousand predominating withrespectto society . . . in other words (society)does not recognizein the imaginary of institutions something thatis its own product"(IIS, p. 132). Thus, it is notthenatureoftheinstitutions as such,buttherelationship ofa society to itsinstitutions, thatis ofdecisiveimportance forthequestion ofalienation. Witha pathosof enlightenment equal to thatof Kant, Castoriadis counterposes to alienation thepositiveconceptof autonomy. He uses the term in complete accordance with its etymological sense; autonomy meansa society's or an individual's making thelaws bywhichit is bound. In a reformulation of Freud's dictum,Castoriadisexpresses the goal of thus:"WhereNo one was, there autonomy We shall be" (CL, p. 40). The projectofautonomy is characterized bythepractical dissolution ofgovernance by othersand of subjectionto unrecognized mechanisms. If thisprojectis to be morethantheproclamation of thevalues ofthe youngMarx typicalof humanistic postwarMarxism,then Castoriadis mustanswerseveralquestions:In what kindof a relationship does individual autonomy standto social autonomy? Whatare theconsequences of the findings of psychoanalysis and of its program forour conceptions of individual autonomy?By what means can autonomybe gained and, speakingwithKant, theimmaturity forwhichwe are ourselves responsible be leftbehind? Castoriadis's to thefirst responses and last ofthesequestionsundoubt1193

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Journalof Sociology American edlymake his tasktoo easy. Social autonomy is brought about byrevolution:"The socialistrevolution aims at transforming society through the autonomousaction of people and at establishing a societyorganizedto promote the autonomy of all its members" (IIS, p. 95). However, as a result of his rejection ofMarxismand, since 1968,his loss ofbelief in the historical mission oftheworking class, theidentity oftheactorswho will carryout the revolution has become uncertain.Clingingto the act of of his Marxrevolution thusseems,at least primafacie,to be a remnant ism, and his overemphasis on it may be a responseto accusationsof and resignation. I will return accommodation to thispointlater.The way is similarly unsatisfacCastoriadisjoins individualand social autonomy tory.Accordingto his theoretical model, individualautonomyis only of social autonomy.Habermas has corpossiblewithinthe framework the boundsof theAristoterectly pointedout thatCastoriadisoversteps lian conceptof praxiswhenhe givesit far-reaching thatare implications oftheEnlightenment. Castoriadis consonant withtheenterprise supplies no arguments modelsof autonomy thatare valid onlyfora againstelitist of whether thesemodels particular individualor forthe few,regardless are of the Nietzscheanor colonial sort. That is not to say that moral philosophy cannot demonstrate the necessity of linkingindividualand demsocial autonomy. Rather,Castoriadisdoes notprovidea convincing onstration. This criticism cannotbe made of Castoriadis's ofindividual discussion in lightof the recognition autonomy of the drive-based and corporeally conditioned natureof our egos, a recognition thathas been asserted most consistently by psychoanalysis. Justas social autonomy was understood as a different of societyto its institutions, relationship Castoriadishas developeda conceptof individualautonomy notas completely conscious intentionality but as a changed relationbetweenconsciousand unconin sciousintentions. is expressed If, forFreud, thegoal ofpsychoanalysis the precept:"Wherethe id was, therethe ego shouldcome to be," then Castoriadisadds to the Freudiandictumthe injunction: "Wheretheego is, therethe id shouldshow itself." was When Germanromanticism turned away from Kant, theproblem raised of how to adhere to a conceptof moral autonomy thatmightbe whichitself achievedonlyat the cost of the imagination, requiredfreedomfrom ofreason.Does moralautonomy a thecontrol necessarily imply repressive relationship to oneself?Does self-control requireself-represofself-control? sion,and does creativity demandrenunciation Within the psychoanalytic systemof concepts,Castoriadisseeks to apprehendthe conflict between drivesand reality, whichappearsnotto be susceptible to in a manner from thatofKant. He makestheimagiarbitration, different nary reactionto, and processingof, both drives and realitya central of the subjectrentheoretical concern.The imaginary accomplishments dermoralautonomy to reality and in relation to possible,bothin relation the drives.I can learn to accept statements as trueeven if about reality
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Review Essay I can learnto acknowledge they contradict myown wishes.Similarly, my drivesas theyare even ifI do notwant to followthem."An autonomous subjectis one," declaresCastoriadis,"thatknowsitself to be justified in concluding:this is indeed true, and: this is indeed my desire" (IIS, p. 104). This theoretical transposition, whichhas analoguesin ego psychologyand in the theories of the selfproposedby psychoanalysis and symbolic interactionism, does notput forward thegoal ofan ideal person who has once and forall achievedcontrol over himself and has silenced the voice of his unconscious,but ratherof a personwho has as open relationto and dealings with himself as with others,and who allows himself to be surprised over and over again by the unforeseeable wealth of his own fantasies and ideas. This conceptof moral autonomy, groundedin a way different from thatin Kant's philosophy, is immanently tied to a theory of the human If intentionality being'scorporeality. cannotbe limitedto the sphereof of a perconsciousintentions, but insteadrequiresa new understanding son's relationto his unconsciousand unexaminedintentions, then the in the worldmustbe body as the locus of an unexamined involvement does notpursuethis considered partofour conceptofaction.Castoriadis insight to elaboratea theory of actionfrom the standpoint of philosophical anthropology but develops,withexclusivereference to psychoanalysis, the basic outlinesof a theory of socialization (IIS, pp. 273-339) that followsfromhis model of the imaginary.Since, for Castoriadis,the imaginary mustnotbe understood of causally,it cannotbe a causal result theactivity ofthedrives.He thusinverts therelationship between drives and imagination or because he does notregard fantasies as theexpression the compensatory satisfaction of drives but insteadposits an originary imagination thatis prior to theorganization ofthedrivesand thataids the drivesto attainpsychical representation. But how shouldwe conceiveof thisoriginary In a radicalmanner, imagination? Castoriadis putshimself in thesituation ofthechildbefore thedifferentiation ofsubjectand object has takenplace. In thissituation, even theimagination is unableto make a mentalrepresentation ofobjectsthatsatisfy needsand drives.Thus the imagination can originally apprehendonlyan undifferentiated unityof thechildand theworld,ofsubjectand object,whichis satisfying in itself. However,thisstateis one thatis incapableofeverappearing as a mental representation: "What is missing and will alwaysbe missing is theunrepresentable ofan initial'state,'thatwhichis before element separation and differentiation, a proto-representation whichthe psycheis no longercapable of producing, which has always servedas a magnetforthe psychical field as the presentification of an indissociableunityof figure, meaningand pleasure"(IIS, p. 296). Castoriadis goes so faras to refer to thisforever-lost as the stateofunity primordial monadicstateofthesubjectand identifies suchphenomena as thewishfortotalunionwithanother or theaspiration to totalintellectual apprehension of the worldwiththe longingto return to thisprimordial
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American Journalof Sociology in whichwell-known of state.He developsa theory ofsocialization theses ofthe Freud are reformulated-for example,thestagesoftheadaptation such as propsycheto social institutions and the psychicalmechanisms jectionand identification. Socialization, however,is nevera social shaping of the inherent possibilities of the drives that may vary over an and conflictual unrestricted range;it is, rather, a processofconfrontation interaction betweenthe imaginative lifeof the individualand social inThis stitutions as the embodiment of collectivementalrepresentations. the socialization confrontation, whichconstitutes process,is like thelife in general,a processhavingunforeseeable results. ofinstitutions Psychoof analysisis an elucidation not only"of the way in whichthe creations societyand history findanalytic'support'withinthe individualpsyche, but of thepsychic sap whichthelatter constantly suppliesto theformer" ofthesocialityoftheactormustnotbe paid (CL, p. 95). The recognition ofgrasping thecreativity oftheindividforwiththeloss ofthepossibility ual imaginative life. Castoriadis'sreference to the "primordial monadic state" mightgive the impression that his conceptionof socializationlacks an adequate "mediationof individualand society,"a criticism advanced by HaberI consider mas, adducingMead as a counterexample. thiscriticism misplaced, sinceCastoriadisdoes regard individuation as theresult ofsocialization.He refuses onlyto derivetheunconscious motivations and mental imagesoftheindividualfrom thesocial conditions ofthissocialization. If we considerthat in his category of the "I" Mead, too, counterposed a biologicalroot of spontaneity to the sociallyproducedagencies of the "me" and the "generalized other,"thenthereis no perceptible difference betweenMead and Castoriadison this point. It would be a Parsonian of Mead to stripthe"I" entirely of thecharacter of an misunderstanding extrasocial dimension thatMead, admittedly, conceivesof as biological. WhereasMead first of instincts accepts the premisesof the psychology and thenadoptsFreudianideas ofthefundamental impulses to solidarity and aggression, ofthechild'searlyexperiCastoriadisdevelopshistheory ence of unityas the basis of the evolutionof the drives.Unfortunately, Castoriadishimself almostforceshis readerintothismisunderstanding. of a biological Withhis talk of the monad, as well as his explicit refusal in thepresocialcharacter basis ofhumansocial behaviorand his belief of in The Imaginary Inprehumanhistory (IIS, p. 205 ff.),his argument stitution of embedding his theory of ofSocietyprecludesthe possibility socializationin a philosophicalanthropology that recognizesthe conof animalsand humanbeings. and discontinuity tinuity This weakness is directly relatedto a further difficulty. Castoriadis's " ofthepsycheled necessarily to theidea ofa "protorepresentation. theory On theotherhand, his descriptions ofthechild'spsycherecognize thatin the early stages of our development, just as in the unconsciousof the as separatefrom adult, we cannoteven thinkof mentalrepresentations affects and intentions. Then, however,thereis no "protorepresentation" 1196

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Review Essay butrather a "protoexperience" forwhichthecategories ofthelater,more differentiated stages of psyche'sdevelopment are not suited. However, ofthemanner in whichthe Castoriadis does notdevelopa positivetheory childpractically withhis world.He does notlink confronts and interacts the body of psychoanalytic knowledgewith that gained by a developmentalpsychology that,like Piaget's,does not startfrom mentalrepresentationsbut frommodes of behavior, sensory-motor circuits.Castoriadis's inability to relateprehuman and humansociality to each other has a parallelin his inability to treatthe unity of mentalrepresentation, affect, and quasi intentionality of theyoungchild's thatis characteristic behavioras practicalschematarather thanas somesortof"mental representation,"a concept that belongsto the terminology of a mentalistic of consciousness. psychology This is, certainly, In contrast not a superficial to Piaget shortcoming. and the pragmatists, relation Castoriadisdoes not develop a functional betweenmentalrepresentations and action. Unlike them,he does not interpret mental representations as the mediatinglink in problematic of action situations.Undoubtedly, for Castoriadiseveryinterpretation the imaginary fromthe standpoint is a reduction.Yet the of function did notbelievethattheywerebeingreductionists whenthey pragmatists rootedcreative intelligence in thenecessity ofthehumanspeciesto adapt to its environment. The problemsof such adaptationare not given by naturebut are mediatedby culturaldefinitions; indeed, the solutionof theseproblemsis at the heartof the verycreationthatCastoriadisanalyzes. The relationbetweenan actionproblemand its solution does not have to be causal. Nor is it necessary to denythatthereis any relation betweena problem and its solution in orderto oppose a falsely deterministicrelation between them.Pragmatism mayhave falsely generalized the of applicabilityof the experimental scientific method (its prototype to encompasspoliticaland artistic creativity) Marxcreativity. Certainly, ism tied the creativity of actionso closelyto humanbeings'material life thatonlyfeebletracesoftheliberating possibilities and powerofproduction could still be detected.AfterHerder,the Germantradition of the of expressivity anthropology was faced repeatedly with the problemof of a being that is not teleologically conceptualizing the self-expression defined. is right Castoriadis whenhe seeksto riseabove narrow modelsof experimentation, production,and expressionwithoutabandoningthe framework of a philosophy of praxis. But it cannotend well if the Gordian knotof theseproblems is severedwitha singleblow, forthere then remainsonlythe abstractidea of creationex nihilo,an unaccounted-for an ungroundable conception, project. the act of revolution Politically, seen as the autonomousself-institutionalization of a better societyassumes ever stronger voluntaristic featuresin Castoriadis'swritings. In bitter analysesof present-day Western societies,which are admittedly essayistic and lack empiricalgrounding fortheir conclusions, he sees an absenceofcreativity and ofvisionsofthe 1197

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American Journalof Sociology to these towardanomie. Counterposed future and pervasivetendencies society. fora better pessimistic analysesthereare onlyvague prospects His critique (CL, pp. 229-59) arguesforitstransformation oftechnology of the potentials of individualsand into a means forthe freeunfolding of such a groups. But the real problemsbegin only afterproclamation praiseworthy goal. does notlinkhisdemandfora radicalequalizaCastoriadis consciously resulting efficiency tion of income with the questionof the productive to breaksymfrom in levels of income,sincehe is concerned differences " But one would reallylike withtheideology of"productionism. bolically to know how the masses of people mightreact to the possible loss of loss of inproductive efficiency in theireconomyand to the consequent come and Castoriadis's political assessmentof these reactions. The to these"internal affairs" program withregard vaguenessofCastoriadis's of his analysesof "forstandsin contrast and decisiveness to the clarity focuseshis In thelatter, he, like manyformer Trotskyites, eignaffairs." attention on the SovietUnion and on thearmament policiesand relative and Easternblocs.In 1981,he published military strength oftheWestern to a book in whichhe assertsthatthe SovietUnion is militarily superior the West (quantitatively stronger) and, furequivalentand strategically over the SovietUnion in ther,deniesthatthe West enjoysa superiority His analysesreconcile withtheindistheseassertions military technology. of the Soviet Union by arguingthat the putable economicinferiority is domithatis, Soviet society Soviet Union is ruledby a "stratocracy"; and thestatebut of theCommunist party natednotby thebureaucracies in his mostrecomplex.The politicalwritings by its military-industrial to the ofessaysare fullofpassionateappeals forresistance centcollection Soviet Union. The declarationof martiallaw in Poland especiallyoutof and cultural boycott ragedhimand led himto call fora totaleconomic thegovernment to him-"Gauleiter"Jaruzelski. of-as Castoriadisrefers This reviewis not the place to begin a politicaldiscussionwithCaswhichhe toriadis.However,thestrident tonesofhis politicalstatements, does not omitfromhis philosophical and scientific writings, providean call into questionCasLet me first occasion fora few briefcriticisms. of Jaruzelski toriadis'sassessment and also the thesis-which was pubof incapacity lishedafter Gorbachevhad assumedoffice-oftheessential is the Soviet Union to reform itself.The pathos of a call fora boycott oftena short-lived affair.Only the foreseeable consequencesof a total demarcation betweenEast and West in CentralEurope are politically has learnedin the postwarera is that real. One of the lessonsGermany hostile withthestatesin theSovietsphere and intransigent confrontation of thesestates. of power has not advanced the internal democratization rapprochement" was the slogan coinedin the "Transformation through of detenteand 1960s by Egon Bahr (WillyBrandt'sadviserin matters can also thisstrategy thisrecognition. Certainly, disarmament) to express as less be wrong.If it is to be morerealistic, thenit mustnotbe criticized 1198

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Review Essay ethicalthana strategy of"combatting totalitarianism." Castoriadis's militaryanalyses are a rathersterilecontribution to the discussionof the relative military superiority of therivalblocs and open no new prospects forEurope in the nuclearage. In thisconnection, of shared theposition safety (or else shareddestruction) is certainly morecreative. I am deeplypained by the ostentatious Speakingpersonally, indifferto Germanthought-withwhichhe ence-despite his deep attachment describes thesecurity interests of theFederal Republicof Germany as of no importance to NATO strategy (DM, p. 124). Thus Castoriadis's political worldview is composedofa utopianchampioning ofrevolution in the sphereofinternal politicalaffairs and ofan aggressive, peace-threatening foreign policytowardtheSovietUnion. Especiallythosewho sympathize withhis theoretical endeavorswishthatCastoriadis had arguedbetter on thistopic. The linkingof a new program of reform-motivated by the new social movements and joined to the interests of the traditional constituency of European labor parties-with policies of European and worldwide of a shift to defensive and ofjoint disarmament, armaments, can also be understood security as thepolitical ofhistheory concretization of social autonomy. It is, after all, notjust the"revolution" thatarticulates autonomy politically. Many years ago, Mead describeddemocracy as "institutionalized revolution," expressing thecapacityforself-transformation thatis associated withthe idea of democracy.Etzioni'smodelof the activesociety is likewisean attempt to analyze,withsociological theory, thestructures of a society thatis institutionally creativeand able to learn. In his political writings, Castoriadisbothavoids and displacesthecentral problem posed of society, by his theory which is, afterall, based on the philosophy of praxis:How can we continueto believein, and striveto carryout, the projectof autonomy when the myth of the revolution is dead? (Translatedby RaymondMeyer)

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