Jacques

Derrida
Wri t i n g a n d D i ff e re n c e

Translated, with an introduction and additional notes, by Alan Bass

London and New York

Le tout sans nouveautt qu'un espacement de la lecture

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,+rce and Significati+n 6+git+ and t e ?ist+r. +f &adness /d(+nd Ja!6s and t e @uesti+n +f t e B++" Ai+'ence and &eta% .sicsB ;n /ssa. +n t e 0 +ug t +f /((anue' 5e:inas >1enesis and Structure> and * en+(en+'+g. 5a %ar+'e s+uff'ee ,reud and t e Scene +f Writing 0 e 0 eater +f 6rue't. and t e 6'+sure +f 2e%resentati+n ,r+( 2estricted t+ 1enera' /c+n+(.B ; ?ege'ianis( 7it +ut 2eser:e Structure) Sign) and *'a. in t e Disc+urse +f t e ?u(an Sciences /''i%sis

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

"Par la date de ces textes, nous voudrions marquer qu'a l'instant, pour les relier, de les relire, nous ne pouvons nous tenir a egale distance de chacun d'eux. Ce qui reste ici le deplacement dune question forme certes un systeme. Par quelque couture interpretative, noun aurions su apres-coup le dessiner. Nous n'en avons rien laisse paraitre que le pointille, y menageant on y abandonnant ces blancs sans lesquels aucun texte amais ne se propose comme tel. !i texte vent dire tissu, tons ces essais en out obstinement defini la couture comme faufilure. "#ecembre $%&&.'" (his note originally appeared appended to the bibliography of )'ecriture et la difference, a collection of #errida's essays *ritten bet*een $%+% and $%&, and published as a volume in the latter year. - glance at the list of sources "p. ..+ belo*' *ill sho* that although #errida has arranged the essays in order of their original publication, the essay that occupies the approximate middle of the volume *as actually *ritten in $%+%, and therefore precedes the others. /efore translating the note-in fact one of the most difficult passages in the boo0 to translate-let us loo0 at *hat #errida said about the chronology of his *or0s up to $%&, in an intervie* *ith 1enri 2onse published in )ettres frangaises, $3 #ecember $%&, and entitled "4mplications." "(his intervie*, along *ith t*o others, has been collected in a small volume entitled Positions, Paris5 6ditions de 7inuit, $%,3.' 1opefully this discussion of chronology

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will serve to orient the reading of Writing and Difference, and to clarify why the essay that is in many respects the first one-"'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology"-occupies the middle of the volume. he year !"#$ mar%s Derrida's emergence as a ma&or figure in contemporary 'rench thought. (a voi) et le phenomene *translated +y David ,llison as Speech and Phenomena, -vanston. /orthwestern 0niversity Press, !"$12, a wor% devoted to analy3ing 4usserl's ideas a+out the sign, and De la grammatologie *translated +y Gayatri Spiva% as 5f Grammatology, 6altimore. 7ohns 4op%ins 0niversity Press, !"$#2, devoted mainly to 8ousseau's "-ssay on the 5rigin on (anguages" seen in the light of the history of the idea of the sign, +oth appeared in !"#$, along with ('ecriture et 9n difference. 9n response to 8onse's :uestion a+out how to read these three +oo%s pu+lished one on the heels of the other, Derrida first says that De 9n grammatologie can +e considered a +ipartite wor% in the middle of which one could insert ('ecriture et 9n difference. 6y implication, this would ma%e the first half of De la grammatologie-in which Derrida demonstrates the system of ideas which from ancient to modern times has regulated the notion of the sign-the preface to ('ecriture et 9n difference. 9t would +e useful to %eep this in mind while reading ('ecriture et la difference, for while there are many references throughout the essays to the history of the notion of the sign, these references are nowhere in this volume as fully e)plicated as they are in the first half of De la grammatologie. Derrida e)plicitly states that the insertion of ('ecriture et la difference into De 9n grammatologie would ma%e the second half of the latter, devoted to 8ousseau, the twelfth essay of ('ecriture et la difference. 9nversely, Derrida goes on to say, De la grammatologie can +e inserted into the middle of ('ecriture et 9n difference, for the first si) essays collected in the latter wor% preceded en fait et en droit *de facto and de &uare-a favorite e)pression of Derrida's2 the pu+lication, in two issues of ;riti:ue *Decem+er !"#< and 7anuary !"##2, of the long essay which was further ela+orated into the first part of De 9n grammatologie-our preface +y implication to ('ecriture et la difference. he last five essays of ('ecriture et la difference, Derrida states, are situated or engaged in " l'ouverture grainmatologi:ue," the grammatological opening *Positions, p. !=2. ,ccording to Derrida's statements a +it later in the interview, this grammatological opening," whose theoretical matri) is ela+orated in the first half of De 9n grammatologie-which, to restate, systemati3es the

ideas a+out the sign, writing and metaphysics which are scattered throughout ('ecriture et 9n difference-can +e defined as the "deconstruc tion" of philosophy +y e)amining in the most faithful, rigorous way the "structured genealogy" of all of philosophy's concepts> and to do so in order to determine what issues the history of philosophy has hidden, for+idden, or repressed. he first step of this deconstruction of philosophy, which attempts to locate that which is present nowhere in philosophy. i.e., that which philosophy must hide in order to remain philosophy, is precisely the e)amination of the notion of presence as underta%en +y 4eidegger. 4eidegger, says Derrida, recogni3ed in the notion of presence the "destiny of philosophy," and the reference to the 4eideggerean deconstruction of presence is a constant throughout Derrida's wor%s. *9ndeed, the reader unfamiliar with 4eidegger may well +e mystified +y Derrida's fre:uent references to the notion of presence as the central target in the deconstruction of philosophy.2 he grammatological *from the Gree% gramma meaning letter or writing2 opening consists in the e)amination of the treatment of writing +y

philosophy, as a "particularly revelatory symptom" *Positions, p. !<2 +oth of how the notion of presence functions in philosophy and of what this notion serves to repress. Derrida arrived at this position through a close scrutiny of the philosophical genealogy of linguistics, especially the philosophical treatment of the sign. 'rom Plato to 4eidegger himself, Derrida demonstrates, there is a persistent e)clusion of the notion of writing from the philosophical definition of the sign. Since this e)clusion can always +e shown to +e made in the name of presence-the sign allegedly +eing most present in spo%en discourseDerrida uses it as a "symptom" which reveals the wor%ings of the "repressive" logic of presence, which determines Western philosophy as such. Derrida's division of ('ecriture et la difference into two parts, then, serves to remind the reader that +etween the si)th and seventh essays a "theoretical matri)" was ela+orated whose principles are to some e)tent derived from the first si) essays and are more systematically put to wor% in the last five. 4owever, 9 would li%e to propose another division of the +oo%, a division +etween the fifth *"'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology"2 and si)th essays. ?y reason for placing the division

at this point stems from what Derrida says a+out (a voi) et le phenomene,

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the other *or0 published in $%&,8 li0e this latter *or0 "'9enesis and !tructure' and Phenomenology" is devoted to 1usserl. 4n a "classical philosophical architecture," #errida says of the three boo0s published in $%&,, )a voix et 4e phenomene *ould have to be read first, for in it is posed, at a point *hich he calls "decisive," the "question of the voice and of phonetic *riting in its relationships to the entire history of the :est, such as it may be represented in the history of metaphysics, and in the most modern, critical and vigilant form of metaphysics5 1usserl's transcendental phenomenology" "Positions, p. $;'. (hus )a voix et $e phenomene could be bound to either #e la grammatologie or )'ecriture et 4n difference, #errida says, as a long note. :here *ould it be appended to )'ecriture et 4n difference< 4n the same paragraph of the intervie* #errida refers to another of his essays on 1usserl, his introduction to his o*n translation of 1usserl's (he =rigin of 9eometry, published in $%&3. 1e says that the introduction to (he =rigin of 9eometry is the counterpart of )a voix et le phenomene, for the "problematic of *riting *as already in place >in the former?, as such, and bound to the irreducible structure of >the verb?'differei >to differ and to defer, or, grossly put, difference in space and in time? in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the disappearance or deferral of the origin, etc." "p. $;'. #errida might have said that this problematic *as already in place in $%+%, for a passage from "'9enesis and !tructure' and Phenomenology" poses the question of *riting, again in relation to (he =rigin of 9eometry, in the same terms employed in the $%&, intervie*, i.e., in terms of *riting and difference5 "2eason, 1usserl says, is the logos *hich is produced in history. 4t traverses /eing *ith itself in sight, in order to appear to itself, that is, to state itself and hear itself as logos .... 4t emerges from itself in order to ta0e hold of itself *ithin itself, in the 'living present' of its selfpresence. 4n emerging from itself, >logos as? hearing oneself spea0 constitutes itself as the history of reason through the detour of *riting. (hus it differs from itself in order to reappropriate itself. (he =rigin of 9eometry describes the necessity of this exposition of reason in a *orldly inscription. -n exposition indispensable to the constitution of truth ... but *hich is also the danger to meaning from *hat is outside the sign >i.e., is neither the acoustic material used as the signifier, nor the signified concept the sign refers to?. 4n the moment of *riting, the sign can

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al*ays 'empty' itself .............4f )a voix et le phenomene, then, is the counterpart to the introduction to (he =rigin of 9eometry, and if it can be attached to )'ecriture et 4n difference as a long note, it seems that this *ould be the place to do so, for here the general conditions for a deconstruction of metaphysics based on the notions of *riting and difference, and first arrived at through a reading of ho* the notion of the sign functions in 1usserlian phenomenology, are explicitly stated. (his *ould ma0e )a voix et le phenomene the sixth essay of a hypothetical t*elve in )'ecriture et la difference, but in the form of a long footnote attached to the middle of the volume. Chronologically, of course, #errida's division of )'ecriture et 4n difference is

references to @ant and (ei+ni3 in the analysis of literary formalism in the first essay, "'orce and Signification." he conclusion of this +rief discussion of chronology with the metaphor of following a thread through a te)t +rings us to the translation of the note originally appended to the list of sources in ('ecriture et la difference. he translation is impossi+le without commentary, which will +e placed in +rac%ets. "6y means of the dates of these te)ts, we would li%e to indicate Amar:uer. to mar%B that in order to +ind them together Arelier. to put +etween covers the pages forming a wor%, originally +y sewingB, in rereading them Arelire. relier and relire are anagramsB, we cannot maintain an e:ual distance from each of them. What remains here the displacement of a :uestion certainly forms a system. With some interpretive sewing AcoutureB we could have s%etched this system afterward Aapres-coup> in German nachtrdglich. ;- "'reud and the Scene of Writing" for the analysis of this notion.B We have only permitted isolated points Ale pointille. originally a means of engraving +y pointsB of the system to appear, deploying or a+andoning in it those +lan% spaces A+lancs. Derrida's analysis of ?allarme, which was to +e written in !"#", focuses on the role of the +lunt in the te)t> see also the epigraph to this volume which refers to ?allarme's notion of espacement. "the whole without novelty e)cept a spacing of reading." 'or the analysis of the +lanc and espacement see "(a dou+le seance" in (a dissemination, Paris. Seuil, !"$=B without which no te)t is proposed as such. 9f te)t Ate)teB means cloth *tissu2, the word te)te, is derived from the (atin te)tus, meaning cloth *tissu2, and from te)ere, to weave *tisser2> in -nglish we have te)t and te)tile. Derrida comments on this derivation at the outset of (a pharmacie de Platon also in (a dissemination.B, all these essays have o+stinately defined sewing AcoutureB as +asting Afaufilure. the fau), "false," in fau-filure, or "false stringing," is actually an alteration of the earlier form of the word, farfrler or fourfiler, from the (atin fors, meaning outside. hus +asting is sewing on the outside which does not +ind the te)tile tightly.B *Decem+er !"##.2" he essays of Writing and Difference, then, are less "+ound" than "+asted" together. 9n turn, each essay is "+asted" to the material of the other te)ts it analy3es, for, as he has stated, Derrida's writing is "entirely consumed in the reading of other te)ts." 9f one reads Writing and Difference only in order to e)tract from it a system of deconstruction

which has +een our focus so far-one would overloo% the persistent import of Writing and Difference. o repeat Derrida's terms, these essays always affirm that the "te)ture" of te)ts ma%es any assem+lage of them a "+asted" one, i.e., permits only the %ind of fore-sewing that emphasi3es the necessary spaces +etween even the finest stitching. 9n practical terms, 9 would suggest a "+asted," well-spaced reading of Writing and Difference. 9nstead of reading through the +oo% as a unified, wellsewn volume, one could follow +oth its arguments and its design in a way that would ma%e them more comprehensi+le +y choosing any of the essays to start with, and +y reading the ma&or wor%s it refers to. *9 have provided all possi+le references to -nglish translations of the wor%s in :uestion.2 Derrida is difficult to read not only +y virtue of his style, +ut also +ecause he seriously wishes to challenge the ideas that govern the way we read. 4is te)ts are more easily grasped if we read them in the way he implicitly suggests-which is not always the way we are used to reading. he :uestion arises-and it is a serious one-whether these essays can +e read in a language other than 'rench. 9t is no e)aggeration to say that most of the crucial passages of ('ecriture et la difference re:uire the same %ind of commentary as was &ust given for a +i+liographical note. Some of the difficulties can +e resolved +y warning the reader that Derrida often refers +ac% to his own wor%s, and anticipates others, without e)plicitly saying so> some of these instances have +een annotated. his difficulty, however, is compounded +y fre:uent use of the terminology of classical philosophy, again without e)plicit e)planation or reference. 9 will indicate +elow some of the terms that appear most fre:uently in Writing and Difference> throughout the te)t 9 have annotated translations that presented pro+lems for specific essays, and have also provided some references not provided +y Derrida to wor%s under discussion without specifically +eing cited. ?ore important, however, are the general issues raised +y the :uestion of translata+ility. Derrida always writes with close attention to the resonances and punning humor of etymology. 5ccasionally, when the Gree% and (atin inheritances of -nglish and 'rench coincide, this aspect of Derrida's style can +e captured> more often it re:uires the %ind of la+orious annotation *impossi+le in a volume of this si3e2 provided a+ove. he translator, constantly aware of what he is sacrificing, is often tempted to use a language that

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is a compromise bet*een 6nglish as *e 0no* it and 6nglish as he *ould li0e it to be in order to capture as much of the original text as possible. (his compromise 6nglish, ho*ever, is usually comprehensible only to those *ho read the translation along *ith the original. 7oreover, despite #errida's often dense and elliptical style, he certainly does not *rite a compromise @rench. 4t has been my experience that ho*ever syntactically complex or lexically rich, there is no sentence in this boo0 that is not perfectly comprehensible in @rench-*ith patience. (herefore, 4 have chosen to try to translate into 6nglish as *e 0no* it. !ometimes this has meant brea0ing up and rearranging some very long sentences. -t other times it has been possible to respect the original syntax and to maintain some very long, complex sentences. !ome etymological *ord play has been lost, some has been annotated, and some translated. (hese empirical difficulties of translation are, of course, tied to the question of the sign itself Can any translation be made to signify the same thing as the original text< 1o* crucial is the play of the signifiersetymological play, stylistic play-to *hat is signified by the text< #errida has addressed himself to this question in the second intervie* in Positions "entitled "!emiologie et 9rammatologie"'. (he crux of the question is the inherited concept that the sign consists of a signifier and a signified, that is, of a sensible "i.e., relating to the senses, most often hearing' part *hich is the vehicle to its intelligible part "its meaning'. #errida states that the history of metaphysics has never ceased to impose upon semiology "the science of signs' the search for a "transcendental signified," that is, a concept independent of language "p. ;A'. 1o*ever, even if the inherited opposition bet*een signifier and signified can be sho*n to be programmed by the metaphysical desire for a transcendental, other*orldly meaning "that is often derived from the theological model of the presence of 9od', this does not mean that the opposition bet*een signifier and signified can simply be abandoned as an historical delusion. #errida states5 "(hat this opposition or difference cannot be radical and absolute does not prevent it from functioning, and even from being indispensable *ithin certain limits-very *ide limits. @or example, no translation *ould be possible *ithout it. -nd in fact the theme of a transcendental signified *as constituted *ithin the horiBon of an absolutely pure, transparent

and unequivocal translatability. :ithin the limits to *hich it is possible, or at least appears possible, translation practices the difference bet*een signified and signifier. /ut if this difference is never pure, translation no more so8 and for the notion of translation *e *ould have to substitute a notion of transformation5 a regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. :e *ill never have, and in fact have never had, any 'transfer' of pure signifieds-from one language to another, or *ithin one language-*hich *ould be left virgin and intact by the signifying instrument or 'vehicle' " "Positions, p. ;$'. (he translator, then, must be sure that he has understood the syntax and lexicon of the original text in order to let his o*n language carry out the *or0 of transformation, -gain, this is best facilitated by obeying the strictures of his language, for a precipitate bending of it into unaccustomed forms may be indicative more of his o*n miscomprehension than of difficulties in the original text. 4n this respect, the translator's position is analogous to that of the psychoanalyst *ho

attempts to translate the manifest language of dreams into a latent language. (o do so, the analyst must first be sure that he has understood the manifest language. -s #errida says in note ; of "Cogito and the 1istory of 7adness," "(he latent content of a dream "and of any conduct or consciousness in general' communicates *ith the manifest content only through the unity of a language8 a language *hich the analyst, then, must spea0 as *ell as possible." (he discussion of terms offered belo*, and the translator's footnotes in the text, are an attempt to provide a guide to the "manifest" language of :riting and #ifference. )i0e the analyst, ho*ever, the reader must let his attention float, and be satisfied *ith a partial understanding of a given essay on any particular reading. -s the manifest language begins to become more familiar, the persistence of the "latent" content-*hat #errida has called "the unconscious of philosophical opposition" "Positions, p. &A, note &8 my italics'*ill become a surer guide, a more salient thread in the *eave of these texts.

#errida's terms. :herever #errida uses diderance as a neologism 4 have left it untranslated. 4ts meanings are too multiple to be explained here fully, but *e may note briefly that the *ord combines in neither the active nor the passive voice the coincidence of meanings in the verb differer5 to

differ *in space2 and to defer *to put off in time, to postpone presence2. hus, it does not function simply either as difference *difference2 or as differance in the usual sense *deferral2, and plays on +oth meanings at once. Derrida's !"#C lecture "(a differance" *reprinted in ?arges, Paris. -ditions de ?inuit, !"$=2 is indispensa+le here. hroughout Writing and Difference Derrida lin%s the concept of differance to his play on the words totalitarian and solicitation. 4e sees structuralism as a form of philosophical totalitarianism, i.e., as an attempt to account for the totality of a phenomenon +y reduction of it to a formula that governs it totally. Derrida su+mits the violent, totalitarian structural pro&ect to the counterviolence of solicitation, which derives from the (atin sollicitare, meaning to sha%e the totality *from sollus, "all," and ciere, "to move, to sha%e"2, -very totality, he shows, can +e totally sha%en, that is, can +e shown to +e founded on that which it e)cludes, that which would +e in e)cess for a reductive analysis of any %ind. * he -nglish solicit should +e read in this etymological sense wherever it appears.2 his etymological metaphor covering a philosophical-political violence is also implied in the notion of archia *archie in 'rench> also a neologism2. ,rchia derives from the Gree% arche, which com+ines the senses of a founding, original principle and of a government +y one controlling principle. *4ence, for e)ample, the etymological lin% +etween archeology and monarchy.2 Philosophy is founded on the principle of the archia, on regulation +y true, original principles> the deconstruction of philosophy reveals the differential e)cess which ma%es the archia possi+le. his e)cess is often posed as an aporia, the Gree% word for a seemingly insolu+le logical difficulty. once a system has +een "sha%en" +y following its totali3ing logic to its final conse:uences, one finds an e)cess which cannot +e construed within the rules of logic, for the e)cess can only +e conceived as neither this nor that, or +oth at the same time-a departure from all rules of logic. Difference often functions as an aporia. it is difference in neither time nor space and ma%es +oth possi+le. 5usia and parousia are the Gree% words for +eing governed +y presence> parousia also contains the sense of reappropriation of presence in a second coming of ;hrist. -pe%eina tes ousias is the Platonic term for the +eyond of' +eing> Derrida has often used this concept as a steppingstone in his deconstructions. Signified and signifier have +een e)plained

a+ove. Derrida also consistently plays on the derivation of seas *meaning or sense> Sinn in German2 which includes +oth a supposedly intelligi+le, rational sense *a signified meaning2 and a vehicle dependent on the senses for its e)pression *the signifier2. 'urther, in 'rench sens also means direction> to lose meaning is to lose direction, to +e lost, to feel that one is in a la+yrinth. 9 have inflected the translation of sens to conform to its play of meanings wherever possi+le. 4eidegger's terms. While the concept of 6eing +elongs to the entire metaphysical tradition, its translation into -nglish has +ecome particularly difficult since 4eidegger's analyses of it. German and 'rench share the advantage that their infinitives meaning to +e *sein, etre2 can also +e used as su+stantives that mean 6eing in general. 'urther, in each language the present participle of the infinitive *seiend, etant2 can also +e used as a su+stantive meaning particular +eings. /o such advantage e)ists in -nglish, and since 4eidegger is always concerned with the distinction +etween Sein *etre, 6eing in general2 and Seiendes *etant, +eings2 the correct translation of these su+stantives +ecomes the first pro+lem for any consideration of 4eidegger in -nglish. * he ver+ forms present no difficulties. sent and etre as infinitives +ecome to +e, and the gerunds seiend and etant +ecome +eing.2 9 have followed the practice of 7ohn ?ac:uarrie and -dward 8o+inson in their translation of 6eing and ime */ew Dor%. 4arper and 8ow, !"#=2 and have translated the su+stantive *derived from the infinitive2 Sein *etre2 as "6eing" *with a capital initial2 wherever it appears in this volume. 4owever 9 have modified their translation of Seiendes *etant2-the su+stantive from the present participle-as "entity" or "entities," and have translated it as "+eing" or "+eings." ?ac:uarrie and 8o+inson, in fact, state that "there is much to +e said" for this translation *6eing and ime, p. ==, note 92. 9 feel that it is prefera+le to "entity" not only +ecause, as they state, "in recent 6ritish and ,merican philosophy the term 'entity' has +een used more generally to apply to anything whatsoever, no matter what its ontological status" *i+id.2, +ut also +ecause "entity" derives from ens, the (atin present participle for the ver+ to +e, else. /o one has +een more attentive than 4eidegger to the difficulties caused +y the translation of Gree% thought into (atin. he (atin inheritance of "entity" continues the tradition of these difficulties. 5nce more, we face the pro+lem of

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the transformation of one language +y another. here is one ma&or e)ception to the translation of etant +y "+eing," and this is in Eiolence and ?etaphysics, Derrida's essay on -mmanuel (evinas. he ma&or wor% +y (evinas under consideration in this essay, otalite et 9nfini, has +een translated into -nglish. Since much of this wor% is concerned with 4eidegger, 9 have maintained the translation of etant as "e)istent"-the solution chosen +y ,lphonso (ingis, the translator of otality and 9nfinityin all citations from this wor%. his translation is particularly pro+lematical in that it tends to confuse the distinction *in terms of 6eing and ime2 +etween the e)istential, ontological status of 6eing, and the ontical status of +eing. he reader is re:uested to read "+eing" for "e)istent" wherever the latter appears. his +rings us to another term, one from 4eidegger's later thoughtthat of difference. 'rom the e)istential analytic of Daseinman's 6eing-in 6eing and ime, 4eidegger moved to a contemplation of the difference +etween +eings and 6eing in his later wor%s. 4e calls this the onticoontological difference, and this idea itself is su+mitted to powerful scrutiny in his 9dentity and Difference. he title of this wor% alone should +ring it to the attention of the serious reader of Writing and Difference> in the introduction to "'reud and the Scene of Writing" Derrida gives a +rief indication of the importance of 9dentity and Difference to Writing and Difference when he spea%s of "differance and identity," "differance as the preopening of the ontico-ontological difference." 'rom 9dentity and Difference also comes the term onto-theology which characteri3es Western metaphysics as such. Eery roughly put, 4eidegger analy3es the contradictions of the logic of presence which is forced to conceive 6eing as the most general attri+ute of e)istence *onto-2, and as the "highest," most specific attri+ute of God *theo-2. (ogos is the true ver+. the spo%en discourse in which the notion of truth governed +y this onto-theo-logy of presence is revealed. ,lso from identity and Difference, among other places in 4eidegger, comes the concept of difference as it is inscri+ed in the "ontological dou+le genitive," i.e., the necessary fluctuation of the su+&ective and o+&ective cases in order to spea% of 6eing, which always means the 6eing of +eings and the +eings of 6eing. 'rom @ant and the Pro+lem of ?etaphysics, the wor% which immediately follows 6eing and ime, comes the term "auto-affection, which Derrida uses often, and which 9 have discussed +riefly in note =< of "'Genesis

and Structure' and Phenomenology." 6riefly here too, "auto-affection" refers to the classical notion of time as a self-produced, infinite chain of present moments that also, as scrutini3ed +y @ant and 4eidegger, causes some pro+lems for the traditional opposition of senses and intellect. does time +elong to the sensi+le or the intelligi+leF 'rom 4eidegger's e)tended confrontation with /iet3sche's doctrine of the will comes the concept of voluntarism. hroughout Writing and Difference "voluntarism" must +e read in its etymological sense of "doctrine of the will," deriving as it does from the (atin volumes *whence our "volition"2. he 'rench vouloir, to want, maintains its etymological resonances in more stri%ing fashion than do any of its -nglish e:uivalents> Derrida plays on these resonances especially in connection with vouloir dire, which means either "meaning" or "to mean," +ut has a strong connotation of "the will to say." he concluding paragraphs of ";ogito and the 4istory of ?adness" develop this point. 4usserl's terms. he most important terms from 4usserl are the lin%ed concepts of +rac%eting, epoche, and the phenomenological reduction. hese are carefully e)plained in sections 1!, 1=, and 11 of 9deas *translated +y W 8. 6oyce Gi+son, /ew Dor%. ?acmillan, !"#=2. 4usserl, following Descartes's attempt to find a+solutely certain truths +y putting everything into dou+t, proposes to put +etween +rac%ets *or parentheses2 "the general thesis which +elongs to the essence of the natural standpoint." his phenomenological "a+stention" *epoche2 prohi+its the use of any "&udgment that concerns spatio-temporal e)istence" *9deas, p. !GG2. "Pure consciousness" +ecomes accessi+le through this transcendental epoche, which 4usserl therefore spea%s of as the phenomenological reduction. he relationship of this "pure consciousness" to "pure essences" is governed +y intentionality, for all consciousness is consciousness of something, although again it is not a :uestion of a relationship to a psychological event *e)perience2 or to a real o+&ect. Sensory e)perience, the relationship to hyle *matter2 contains nothing intentional for 4usserl> it is intentional morphe *form, shape2 which +estows meaning on sensory e)perience. he opposition of hyle to morphe *matter to form2 leads 4usserl to divide "phenomenological +eing" into its hyletic and noetic *intentionally meaningful> from the Gree% nous, meaning mind or spirit2 sides. he pure form of the noesis is

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in noema, *hich 1usserl construes as the immanent meaning of perception, udgment, appreciation, etc. in the "pure," i.e., phenomenologically reduced, form of these experiences themselves. -s much of ideas is concerned *ith the theory of noetic-noematic structures, the reader *ill appreciate the inadequacy of these remar0s. 1egel's terms. (he most important term from 1egel, -ufhebung, is untranslatable due to its double meaning of conservation and negation. "(he various attempts to translate -ufhebung into 6nglish seem inadequate.' (he reader is referred to #errida's discussion of the term in "Ciolence and 7etaphysics," section 444, first subsection ""=f the =riginal Polemic', /, and to the translator's notes in "@rom 2estricted to 9eneral 6conomy," *here other terms from 1egel are discussed. (he 1egelian figure of the "unhappy consciousness" is discussed in note 3; of Ciolence and 7etaphysics, but there is also an important discussion of it at the beginning of "Cogito and the 1istory of 7adness." (he unhappy consciousness, for 1egel, is al*ays divided against itself8 its historical figure is -braham, the prototype of the "De*ish" consciousness for *hich there is an intrinsic conflict bet*een 9od and nature. 4n many *ays the theme of the unhappy consciousness runs throughout :riting and #ifference. "Ciolence and 7etaphysics" is epigraphically submitted to the conflict bet*een the 9ree0-"happy," at one *ith nature-and the 1ebraic-unhappyconsciousnesses. )i0e all inherited oppositions, this one too is programmed by the logic of presence *hich demands a choice bet*een the terms, or a resolution of the conflict. #errida pushes the unhappy consciousness to its logical limits in order to bring it to the point *here the division *ithin it becomes irreducible. (his occurs most importantly in the t*o essays devoted to Dabes, *hose poetry interrogates the meaning of the De*ish, divided consciousness. (his interrogation becomes particularly poignant for #errida in its ties to the De*ish, unhappy consciousness as the experience of the "people of the' /oo0 and :riting, for, as discussed above, these are the inherited concepts *hich are #errida's central targets. #errida has closed each of the essays on Dabes *ith the name of one of Dabes's imaginary rabbis5 2ica and #erissa. 4n this *ay he alerts us to the "latent," philosophically "unconscious" impact of :riting and #ifference5 an expanded concept of difference through the examination of *riting.

#errida's rebus-li0e play on his o*n name across this volume reminds us ho* unli0e the /oo0 this one is. -ll 9ree0 terms have been transliterated. Enless the 6nglish translation of a @rench or 9erman text is specifically referred to, citations of texts in these languages are of my o*n translation. 4 o*e a debt of than0s to Professor 2ichard 7ac0sey of the Dohns 1op0ins Eniversity for the assistance he offered me at the outset of this pro ect, and for his generous permission to revise his o*n fine translation of "!tructure, !ign and Play in the #iscourse of the 1uman !ciences." 7ost of the translation of this essay belongs to Professor 7ac0sey. 4 consulted Deffrey 7ehlman's translation of "@reud and the !cene of :riting," *hich appeared in Fale @rench !tudies, no. .G "$%,3'. -nd 4 have also profited greatly from the careful scholarship of 2odolphe 9asche's 9erman translation of )'ecriture et 4n difference "#ie !chrift and #ie #ifferenB, @ran0furt5 !uhr0amp Cerlag, $%,3'.

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FORCE AND SIGNIFICATION
9t might +e that we are all tattooed savages since Sophocles. 6ut there is more to ,rt than the straightness of lines and the perfection of surfaces. Plasticity of style is not as large as the entire idea.... We have too many things and not enough forms. *'lau+ert, Preface d la d'tcrivain) 9f it recedes one day, leaving +ehind its wor%s and signs on the shores of our civili3ation, the structuralist invasion might +ecome a :uestion for the historian of ideas, or perhaps even an o+&ect. 6ut the historian would +e deceived if he came to this pass. +y the very act of considering the structuralist invasion as an o+&ect he would forget its meaning and would forget that what is at sta%e, first of all, is an adventure of vision, a conversion of the way of putting :uestions to any o+&ect posed +efore us, to historical o+&ects-his own-in particular. ,nd, une)pectedly among these, the literary o+&ect. By way of analogy. the fact that universal thought, in all its domains, +y all its pathways and despite all differences, should +e receiving a formida+le impulse from an an)iety a+out language-which can only +e an an)iety of language, within language itself-is a strangely concerted development> and it is the nature of this development not to +e

able to display itself in its entirety as a spectacle for the historian, if, by chance, he *ere to attempt to recogniBe in it the sign of an epoch, the fashion of a season, or the symptom of a crisis. :hatever the poverty of our 0no*ledge in this respect, it is certain that the question of the sign is itself more or less, or in any event something other, than a sign of the times. (o dream of reducing it to a sign of the times is to dream of violence. 6specially *hen this question, an unexpectedly historical one, approaches the point at *hich the simple significative nature of language appears rather uncertain, partial, or inessential. 4t *ill be granted readily that the analogy bet*een the structuralist obsession and the anxiety of language is not a chance one. (herefore, it *ill never be possible, through some second- or thirdhand reflection, to ma0e the structuralism of the t*entieth century "and particularly the structuralism of literary criticism, *hich has eagerly oined the trend' underta0e the mission that a structuralist critic has assigned to himself for the nineteenth century5 to contribute to a "future history of imagination and affectivity."4 Nor *ill it be possible to reduce the fascination inherent in the notion of structure to a phenomenon of fashion,' except by reconsidering and ta0ing seriously the meanings of imagination, affectivity, and fashion-doubtless the more urgent tas0. 4n any event, if some aspect of structuralism belongs to the domains of imagination, affectivity, or fashion, in the popular sense of these *ords, this aspect *ill never be the essential one. (he structuralist stance, as *ell as our o*n attitudes assumed before or *ithin language, are not only moments of history. (hey are an astonishment rather, by language as the origin of history. /y historicity itself. -nd also, *hen confronted by the possibility of speech and al*ays already *ithin it, the finally ac0no*ledged repetition of a surprise finally extended to the dimensions of *orld culture-a surprise incomparable to any other, a surprise responsible for the activation of *hat is called :estern thought, the thought *hose destiny is to extend its domains *hile the boundaries of the :est are dra*n bac0. /y virtue of its innermost intention, and li0e all questions about language, structuralism escapes the classical history of ideas *hich already supposes structuralism's possibility, for the latter naively belongs to the province of language and propounds itself *ithin it. Nevertheless, by virtue of an irreducible region of irreflection and

spontaneity *ithin it, by virtue of the essential shado* of the undeclared, the structuralist phenomenon *ill deserve examination by the historian of ideas. @or better or for *orse. 6verything *ithin this phenomenon that does not in itself transparently belong to the question of the sign *ill merit this scrutiny8 as *ill everything *ithin it that is methodologically effective, thereby possessing the 0ind of infallibility no* ascribed to sleep*al0ers and formerly attributed to instinct, *hich *as said to be as certain as it *as blind. 4t is not a lesser province of the social science called history to have a privileged concern, in the acts and institutions of man, *ith the immense region of somnambulism, the almost-everything *hich is not the pure *a0ing state, the sterile and silent acidity of the question itself, the almost-nothing.' !ince *e ta0e nourishment from the fecundity of structuralism, it is too soon to dispel our dream. :e must muse upon *hat it might signify from *ithin it. 4n the future it *ill be interpreted, perhaps, as a relaxation, if not a lapse, of the attention given to force, *hich is the tension of force itself @orm fascinates *hen one no longer has the force to understand force from *ithin itself (hat is, to create. (his is *hy literary criticism is structuralist in every age, in its essence and destiny. Criticism has not al*ays 0no*n this, but understands it no*, and thus is in the process of thin0ing itself in its o*n concept, system and method. Criticism henceforth 0no*s itself separated from force, occasionally avenging itself on force by gravely and profoundly proving that separation is the condition of the *or0, and not only of the discourse on the *or0.' (hus is explained the lo* note, the melancholy pathos that can be perceived behind the triumphant cries of technical ingenuity or mathematical subtlety that sometimes accompany certain so-called "structural" analyses. )i0e melancholy for 9ide, these analyses are possible only after a certain defeat of force and *ithin the movement of diminished ardor. :hich ma0es the structural consciousness consciousness in general, as a conceptualiBation of the past, 4 mean of facts in general. - reflection of the accomplished, the constituted, the constructed. 1istorical, eschatalogical, and crepuscular by its very situation. /ut *ithin structure there is not only form, relation, and configuration. (here is also interdependency and a totality *hich is al*ays concrete. 4n literary criticism, the structural "perspective" is, according

to Dean-Pierre 2ichard's expression, "interrogative and totalitarian."+ (he force of our *ea0ness is that impotence separates, disengages, and emancipates. 1enceforth, the totality is more clearly perceived, the panorama and the panoramagram are possible. (he panoramagram, the very image of the structuralist instrument, *as invented in $G3., as )ittre states, in order "to obtain immediately, on a flat surface, the development of depth vision of ob ects on the horiBon." (han0s to a more or less openly ac0no*ledged schematiBation and spatialiBation, one can glance over the field divested of its forces more freely or diagrammatically. =r one can glance over the totality divested of its forces, even if it is the totality of form and meaning, for *hat is in question, in this case, is meaning rethought as form8 and structure is the formal unity of form and meaning. 4t *ill be said that this neutraliBation of meaning by form is the author's responsibility before being the critic's, and to a certain extent-but it is ust this extent *hich is in question-this is correct. 4n any event, the pro ect of a conceptualiBation of totality is more easily stated today, and such a pro ect in and of itself escapes the determined totalities of classical history. @or it is the pro ect of exceeding them. (hus, the relief and design of structures appears more clearly *hen content, *hich is the living energy of meaning, is neutraliBed. !ome*hat li0e the architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its s0eleton by some catastrophe of nature or art. - city no longer inhabited, not simply left behind, but haunted by meaning and culture. (his state of being haunted, *hich 0eeps the city from returning to nature, is perhaps the general mode of the presence or absence of the thing itself in pure language. (he pure language that *ould be housed in pure literature, the ob ect of pure literary criticism. (hus it is in no *ay paradoxical that the structuralist consciousness is a catastrophic consciousness, simultaneously destroyed and destructive, destructuring, as is all consciousness, or at least the moment of decadence, *hich is the period proper to all movement of consciousness. !tructure is perceived through the incidence of menace, at the moment *hen imminent danger concentrates our vision on the 0eystone of an institu tion, the stone *hich encapsulates both the possibility and the fragility of its existence. !tructure then can be methodically threatened in order to

?ability. (his operation is called "from the )atin' soliciting. 4n other *ords, sha0ing in a *ay related to the *hole "from sollus, in archaic )atin "the *hole," and from citare, "to put in motion"'. (he structuralist solicitude and solicitation give themselves only the illusion of technical liberty *hen they become methodical. 4n truth, they reproduce, in the register of method, a solicitude and solicitation of /eing, a historicometaphysical threatening of foundations. 4t is during the epochs of historical dislocation, *hen *e are expelled from the site, that this structuralist passion, *hich is simultaneously a frenBy of experimentation and a proliferation of schernatiBations, develops for itself (he baroque *ould only be one example of it. 1as not a "structural poetics" "founded on a rhetoric"& been mentioned in relation to the baroque< /ut has not a "burst structure" also been spo0en of, a "rent poem *hose structure appears as it bursts apart "<, (he liberty that this critical "in all the senses of this *ord'" disengagement assures us of, therefore, is a solicitude for and an opening into totality. /ut *hat does this opening hide< -nd hide, not by virtue of *hat it leaves aside and out of sight, but by virtue of its very po*er to illuminate. =ne continually as0s oneself this question in reading Dean 2ousset's fine boo05 @orme et signification5 6ssais sur les structures litteraires de Corneille d Claudel.% =ur question is not a reaction against *hat others have called "ingenuity" and *hat seems to us, except in a fe* instances, to be something more and something better. Confronted by this series of brilliant and penetrating exercises intended to illustrate a method, it is rather a question of unburdening ourselves of a mute anxiety, and of doing so at the point at *hich this anxiety is not only ours, the reader's, but also seems to conform, beneath the language, operations, and greatest achievements of this boo0, to the anxiety of y the author himself

2ousset certainly ac0no*ledges 0inships and affiliations5 /achelard, a. Poulet, 2aymond, Picon, !tarobins0i, 2ichard, etc. 1o*ever, despite the ' familial air, the many borro*ings and numerous respectful ac0no*ledgments, @orme et !ignification seems to us, in many respects, a solitary attempt. 4n the first place, this is due to a deliberate difference. 2ousset does not isolate himself *ithin this difference, 0eeping his distance8 rather, he scrupulously examines a community of intentions by bringing to the

be comprehended more clearly and to reveal not only its supports but also that secret place in *hich it is neither construction nor ruin but

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surface enigmas hidden beneath values that are today accepted and respected-modern values they may be, but values already traditional enough to have become the commonplaces of criticism, ma0ing them, therefore, open to reflection and suspicion. 2ousset presents his theses a remar0able methodological introduction that, along *ith the introduction to 4'Enivers imaginaire de 7allarme, should become an important part of the discourse on method in literary criticism. 4n multiplying his introductory references 2ousset does not muddle his discourse but, on the contrary, *eaves a net that tightens its originality. @or example5 that in the literary fact language is one *ith meaning, that form belongs to the content of the *or08 that, according to the expression of 9aeton Picon, "for modern art, the *or0 is not expression but creation" H-these are propositions that gain unanimous acceptance only by means of a highly equivocal notion of form or expression. (he same goes for the notion of imagination, the po*er of mediation or synthesis bet*een meaning and literality, the common root of the universal and the particular-as of all other similarly dissociated couples-the obscure origin of these structural frame*or0s and of the empathy bet*een "form and content" *hich ma0es possible both the *or0 and the access to its unity. @or Iant, the imagination *as already in itself an "art," *as art itself, *hich originally did not distinguish bet*een truth and beauty8 and despite all the differences, Iant spea0s of the same imagination in the Critique of Pure 2eason and the Critique of udgment as does 2ousset. 4t is art, certainly, but a "hidden art" 4' that cannot be "revealed to the eyes ."$B "No* since the reduction of a representation of the imagination to concepts is equivalent to giving its exponents, the aesthetic idea may be called an inexponible representation of the imagination "in its free play'."" 4magination is the freedom that reveals itself only in its *or0s. (hese *or0s do not exist *ithin nature, but neither do they inhabit a *orld other than ours. "(he imagination "as a productive faculty of cognition' is a po*erful agent for creating, as it *ere, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature."" (his is *hy intelligence is not neces sarily the essential faculty of the critic *hen he sets out to encounter imagination and beauty8 "in *hat *e call beautiful, intelligence is at the service of the imagination, and the latter is not at the service of intelligence."" @or "the freedom of the imagination consists precisely

in the fact that it schematiBes *ithout a concept."" (his enigmatic origin of the *or0 as a structure and indissociable unity-and as an ob ect for structuralist criticism-is, according to Iant, "the first thing to *hich *e must pay attention."" -ccording to 2ousset also. @rom his first page on, he lin0s "the nature of the literary fact," al*ays insuffi ciently examined, to the "role in art of imagination, that fundamental activity" about *hich "uncertainties and oppositions abound." (his notion of an imagination that produces metaphor-that is, everything in language except the verb to be-remains for critics *hat certain philo sophers today call a naively utiliBed operative concept. (o surmount this technical ingenuousness is to reflect the operative concept as a thematic concept. (his seems to be one of 2ousset's pro ects. (o grasp the operation of creative imagination at the greatest pos sible proximity to it, one must turn oneself to*ard the invisible interior of poetic freedom. =ne must be separated from oneself in order to be reunited *ith the blind origin of the *or0 in its dar0ness. (his experience of conversion, *hich founds the literary act "*riting or reading', is such that the very *ords "separation" and "exile," *hich al*ays designate the interiority of a brea0ing-off *ith the *orld and a ma0ing of one's *ay *ithin it, cannot directly manifest the experience8 they can only indicate it through a metaphor *hose genealogy itself *ould deserve all of our efforts." @or in question here is a departure from the *orld to*ard a place *hich is neither a non-place nor an other *orld, neither a utopia nor an alibi, the creation of "a universe to be added to the universe," according to an expression of @ocillon's cited by 2ousset "@orme et !ignification, p. $$'. (his universe articulates only that *hich is in excess of everything, the essential nothing on *hose basis everything can appear and be produced *ithin language8 and the voice of 7aurice /lanchot reminds us, *ith the insistence of profundity, that this excess is the very possibility of *riting and of literary inspiration in general. =nly pure absence-not the absence of

this or that, but the absence of everything in *hich all presence is announced-can inspire, in other *ords, can *or0, and then ma0e one *or0. (he pure boo0 naturally turns to*ard the eastern edge of this absence *hich, beyond or *ithin the prodigiousness of all *ealth, is its first and proper content. (he pure boo0, the boo0 itself, by virtue of *hat is most irreplaceable *ithin it, must be the "boo0 about nothing"

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that @laubert dreamed of-a gray, negative dream, the origin of the total /oo0 that haunted other imaginations. (his emptiness as the situation of literature must be ac0no*ledged by the critic as that *hich constitutes the specificity of his ob ect, as that around which he al*ays spea0s. =r rather8 his proper ob ect-since nothing is not an ob ect-is the *ay in *hich this nothing itself is determined by disappearing. 4t is the transition to the determination of the *or0 as the disguising of its origin. /ut the origin is possible and conceivable only in disguise. 2ousset sho*s us the extent to *hich spirits as diverse as #elacroix, /alBac, @laubert, Calery, Proust, (. !. 6liot, Cirginia :oolf, and many others had a sure consciousness of this. - sure and certain consciousness, although in principle not a clear and distinct one, as there is not intuition of a thing involved." (o these voices should be added that of -ntonin -rtaud, *ho *as less roundabout5 "4 made my debut in literature by *riting boo0s in order to say that 4 could *rite nothing at all. 7y thoughts, *hen 4 had something to say or *rite, *ere that *hich *as furthest from me. 4 never had any ideas, and t*o short boo0s, each seventy pages long, are about this profound, inveterate, endemic absence of any idea. (hese boo0s are 4'=mbilic des limbes and le Pese-nerfs.J3A (he consciousness of having something to say as the consciousness of nothing5 this is not the poorest, but the most oppressed of consciousnesses. 4t is the consciousness of nothing, upon *hich all consciousness of something enriches itself, ta0es on meaning and shape. -nd upon *hose basis all speech can be brought forth. @or the thought of the thing as *hat it is has already been confused *ith the experience of pure speech8 and this experience has been confused *ith experience

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!pea0ing frightens me because, by never saying enough, 4 also say too rnuch. -nd if the necessity of becoming breath or speech restricts meaning-and our responsibility for it-*riting restricts and con strains speech further still." :riting is the anguish of the 1ebraic ruah,K. experienced in solitude by human responsibility8 experienced by Deremiah sub ected to 9od's dictation ""(a0e thee a roll of a boo0, and *rite therein all the *ords that 4 have spo0en unto thee"', or by /aruch transcribing Deremiah's dictation "Deremiah ;&53,.'8 or further, *ithin the properly human moment of pneumatology, the science of pneuma, spiritus, or logos *hich *as divided into three parts5 the divine, the angelical and the human. 4t is the moment at *hich *e must decide *hether *e *ill engrave *hat *e hear. -nd *hether engraving pre serves or betrays speech. 9od, the 9od of )eibniB, since *e have ust spo0en of him, did not 0no* the anguish of the choice bet*een vari ous possibilities5 he conceived possible choices in action and disposed of them as such in his Enderstanding or )ogos8 and, in any event, the narro*ness of a passage*ay that is :ill favors the "best" choice. -nd each existence continues to "express" the totality of the Eniverse. (here is, therefore, no tragedy of the boo0. (here is only one /oo0, and this same /oo0 is distributed throughout all boo0s. 4n the (heodicy, (heodorus, *ho "had become able to confront the divine radiancy of the daughter of Dupiter," is led by her to the "palace of the fates8" in this palace "Dupiter, having surveyed them before the beginning of the existing *orld, classified the possibilities into *orlds, and chose the best of ail. 1e comes sometimes to visit these places, to en oy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of rene*ing his o*n choice, *hich cannot fail to please him." -fter being told all

itself. No*, does not pure speech require inscription3$ some*hat in the manner that the )eibniBian essence requires existence and pushes on to*ard the *orld, li0e po*er to*ard the act< 4f the anguish of *riting is not and must not be a determined pathos, it is because this anguish is not an empirical modification or state of the *riter, but is the responsi bility of angustia533 the necessarily restricted passage*ay of speech against *hich all possible meanings push each other, preventing each other's emergence. Preventing, but calling upon each other, provo0ing" each other too, unforeseeably and as if despite oneself, in a 0ind of autonomous overassemblage of meanings, a po*er of pure equivocal ity that ma0es the creativity of the classical 9od appear all too poor

this by Pallas, (heodorus is led into a hall *hich "*as a *orld." "(here *as a great volume of *ritings in this hall5 (heodorus could not *orld *hich *e are no* visiting, the 9oddess told him8 it is the boo0 of its fates. Fou have seen a number on the forehead of !extus. )oo0 in this boo0 for the place *hich it indicates. (heodorus loo0ed for it, and found there the history of !extus in a form more ample titan the outline he had seen. Put your finger on any line you please, detail that *hich the line broadly indicates. 1e obeyed, and he sa*

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coming into vie* all the characteristics of a portion of the life of that !extus."3+ (o *rite is not only to conceive the )eibniBian boo0 as an impossible possibility. 4mpossible possibility, the limit explicitly named by 7allarme. (o Cerlaine5 "4 *ill go even further and say5 the /oo0, for 4 am convinced that there is only =ne, and that it has >un*ittingly? been attempted by every *riter, even by 9eniuses."3& " ... revealing that, in general, all boo0s contain the amalgamation of a certain number of age-old truths8 that actually there is only one boo0 on earth, that it is the la* of the earth, the earth's true /ible. (he difference bet*een individual *or0s is simply the difference bet*een individual interpretations of one true and established text, *hich are proposed in a mighty gathering of those ages *e call civiliBed or literary."" (o *rite is not only to 0no* that the /oo0 does not exist and that forever there are boo0s, against *hich the meaning of a *orld not conceived by an absolute sub ect is shattered, before it has even become a unique meaning8 nor is it only to 0no* that the non-*ritten and the non-read cannot be relegated to the status of having no basis by the obliging negativity of some dialectic, ma0ing us deplore the absence of the /oo0 from under the burden of "too many textsL" 4t is not only to have lost the theological certainty of seeing every page bind itself into the unique text of the truth, the "boo0 of reason" as the ournal in *hich accounts "rationes' and experiences consigned for 7emory *as for merly called," the genealogical anthology, the /oo0 of 2eason this time, the infinite manuscript read by a 9od *ho, in a more or less deferred *ay, is said to have given us use of his pen. (his lost certainty, this absence of divine *riting, that is to say, first of all, the absence of

the De*ish 9od "*ho himself *rites, *hen necessary', does not solely and vaguely define something li0e "modernity." -s the absence and haunting of the divine sign, it regulates all modern criticism and aes thetics. (here is nothing astonishing about this. "Consciously or not," says 9eorges Canguilhem, "the idea that man has of his poetic po*er corresponds to the idea he has about the creation of the *orld8 and to the solution he gives to the problem of the radical origin of things. 4f the notion of creation is equivocal, ontological and aesthetic, it is not so by chance or confusion. "3% (o *rite is not only to 0no* that through *riting, through the extremities of style, the best *ill not

necessarily transpire, as )eibniB thought it did in divine creation, nor *ill the transition to *hat transpires al*ays be *illful, nor *ill that *hich is noted do*n al*ays infinitely express the universe, resembling and reassembling it." 4t is also to be incapable of ma0ing meaning absolutely precede *riting5 it is thus to lo*er meaning *hile simultaneously elevating inscription. (he eternal fraternity of theological optimism and of pessimism5 nothing is more reassuring, but nothing is more despairing, more destructive of our boo0s than the )eibniBian /oo0. =n *hat could boo0s in general live, *hat *ould they be if they *ere not alone, so alone, infinite, isolated *orlds< (o *rite is to 0no* that *hat has not yet been produced *ithin literality has no other d*elling place, does not a*ait us as prescription in some topos ouranios, or some divine understanding. 7eaning must a*ait being said or *ritten in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, by differing from itself, *hat it is5 meaning. (his is *hat 1usserl teaches us to thin0 in (he =rigin of 9eometry. (he literary act thus recovers its true po*er at its source. 4n a fragment of a boo0 he intended to devote to (he =rigin of (ruth, 7erleau-Ponty *rote5 "Communication in literature is not the simple appeal on the part of the *riter to meanings *hich *ould be part of an a priori of the mind8 rather, communication arouses these meanings in the mind through enticement and a 0ind of oblique action. (he *riter's thought does not control his language from *ithout8 the *riter is himself a 0ind of ne* idiom, constructing itself"" "7y o*n *ords ta0e me by surprise and teach me *hat 4 thin0,";3 he said else*here. 4t is because *riting is inaugural, in the fresh sense of the *ord, that it is dangerous and anguishing. 4t does not 0no* *here it is going, no 0no*ledge can 0eep it from the essential precipitation to*ard the meaning that it constitutes and that is, primarily, its future. 1o*ever, it is capricious only through co*ardice. (here is thus no insurance against the ris0 of *riting. :riting is an initial and graceless recourse for the *riter, even if he is not an atheist but, rather, a *riter. #id !aint Dohn Chrysostom spea0 of the *riter< "4t *ere indeed meet for us not at all to require the aid of the *ritten :ord, but to exhibit a life so pure, that the grace of the spirit should be instead of boo0s to our souls, and that as these are inscribed *ith in0, even so should our hearts be *ith the !pirit. /ut, since *e have utterly put a*ay from us

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this grace, come let us at any rate embrace the second best course." ;; /ut, all faith or theological assurance aside, is not the experience of secondarily tied to the strange redoubling by means of *hich constituted-*ritten-meaning presents itselfas prerequisitely and simultaneously read5 and does not meaning present itself as such at the point at *hich the other is found, the other *ho maintains both the vigil and the bac0-and-forth motion, the *or0, that comes bet*een *riting and reading, ma0ing this *or0 irreducible< 7eaning is neither before nor after the act. 4s not that *hich is called 9od, that *hich imprints every human course and recourse *ith its secondarity, the passage*ay of deferred reciprocity bet*een reading and *riting< or the absolute *itness to the dialogue in *hich *hat one sets out to *rite has already been read, and *hat one sets out to say is already a response, the third party as the transparency of meaning< !imultaneously part of creation and the @ather of )ogos. (he circularity and traditionality of )ogos. (he strange labor of conversion and adventure in *hich grace can only be that *hich is missing. (hus, the notion of an idea or "interior design" as simply anterior to a *or0 *hich *ould supposedly be the expression of it, is a pre udice5 a pre udice of the traditional criticism called idealist. 4t is not by chance that this theory-or, one could no* say, this theology-flo*ered during the 2enaissance. 2ousset, li0e so many others past or present, certainly spea0s out against this "Platonism" or "Neo-Platonism." /ut he does not forget that if creation by means of "the form rich in ideas" "Calery' is not the purely transparent expression of this form, it is nevertheless, simultaneously, revelation. 4f creation *ere not revelation, *hat *ould happen to the finitude of the *riter and to the solitude of his hand abandoned by 9od< #ivine creativity, in this case, *ould be reappropriated by a hypocritical humanism. 4f *riting is inaugural it is not so because it creates, but because of a certain absolute freedom of speech, because of the freedom to bring forth the already-there as a sign of the freedom to augur. - freedom of response *hich ac0no*ledges as its only horiBon the *orld as history and the speech *hich can only say5 /eing has al*ays already begun. (o create is to reveal, says 2ousset, *ho does not turn his bac0 on classical criticism. 1e comprehends it, rather, and enters into dialogue *ith it5 "Prerequisite secret and unmas0ing of this secret by the *or05 a reconciliation of ancient and modern aesthet

ics can be observed, in a certain *ay, in the possible correspondence of the preexisting secret to the 4dea of the 2enaissance thin0ers stripped of all NeoPlatonism." (his revelatory po*er of true literary language as poetry is indeed the access to free speech, speech unburdened of its signaliBing functions by the *ord "/eing" "and this, perhaps, is *hat is aimed at beneath the notion of the "primitive *ord" or the "theme-*ord," )eit*ort, of /uber'.;. 4t is *hen that *hich is *ritten is deceased as a signsignal that it is born as language8 for then it says *hat is, thereby referring only to itself, a sign *ithout signification, a game or pure functioning, since it ceased to be utiliBed as natural, biological, or technical information, or as the transition from one existent to another, from a signifier to a signified. -nd, paradoxically, inscription alonealthough it is far from al*ays doing sohas the po*er of poetry, in other *ords has the po*er to arouse speech from its slumber as sign. /y enregistering speech, inscription has as its essential ob ective, and indeed ta0es this fatal ris0, the emancipation of meaning-as concerns any actual field of perception-from the natural predicament in *hich everything refers to the disposition of a contingent situation. (his is *hy *riting *ill never be simple "voice-painting" "Coltaire'. 4t creates meaning by enregistering it, by entrusting it to an engraving, a groove, a relief, to a surface *hose essential characteristic is to be infinitely transmissible. Not that this characteristic is al*ays desired, nor has it al*ays been8 and *riting as the origin of pure historicity, pure traditionality, is only the telos of a history of *riting *hose philosophy is al*ays to come. :hether this pro ect of an infinite tradition is realiBed or not, it must be ac0no*ledged and respected in its sense as a pro ect. (hat it can al*ays fail is the mar0 of its pure finitude and its pure historicity. 4f the play of meaning can overflo* signification "signaliBation', *hich is al*ays enveloped *ithin the regional limits of nature, life and the soul, this overflo* is the moment of the attempt-to-*rite. (he attempt-to-*rite cannot be understood on the basis of voluntar

ism. (he *ill to *rite is not an ulterior determination of a primal *ill. =n the contrary, the *ill to *rite rea*a0ens the *illful sense of the *ill5 freedom, brea0 *ith the domain of empirical history, a brea0 *hose aim is reconciliation *ith the hidden essence of the empirical, *ith pure historicity. (he *ill and the attempt to *rite are not the

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desire to *rite, for it is a question here not of affectivity but of freedom and duty. 4n its relationship to /eing, the attempt-to-*rite poses itself as the only *ay out of affectivity. - *ay out that can only be aimed at, and *ithout the certainty that deliverance is possible or that it is outside affectivity. (o be affected is to be finite5 to *rite could still be to deceive finitude, and to reach /eing-a 0ind of /eing *hich could neither be, nor affect me by itself-from *ithout existence. (o *rite *ould be to attempt to forget difference5 to forget *riting in the presence of so-called living and pure speech." 4n the extent to *hich the literary act proceeds from this attempt-to*rite, it is indeed the ac0no*ledgment of pure language, the responsibility confronting the vocation of "pure" speech *hich, once understood, constitutes the *riter as such. 1eidegger says of pure speech that it cannot "be conceived in the rigor of its essence" on the basis of its "character-as-sign" "Keichenchara0ter', "nor even perhaps of its character-as-signification" "/edeutungschara0ter'.;& #oes not one thus run the ris0 of identifying the *or0 *ith original *riting in general< =f dissolving the notion of art and the value of "beauty" by *hich literature is currently distinguished from the letter in general< /ut perhaps by removing the specificity of beauty from aesthetic values, beauty is, on the contrary, liberated< 4s there a specificity of beauty, and *ould beauty gain from this effort< 2ousset believes so. -nd the structuralism proper to Dean 2ousset is defined, at least theoretically, against the temptation to overloo0 this specificity "the temptation that *ould be Poulet's, for example, since he "has little interest in art"' ,;, putting 2ousset close to )eo !pitBer and 7arcel 2aymond in his scrupulousness about the formal autonomy of the *or0an "independent, absolute organism that is self-sufficient" "@orme et !ignification p. xx'. "(he *or0 is a totality and al*ays gains from being experienced as such" "p. xxi'. /ut here again, 2ousset's position depends upon a delicate balance. -l*ays attentive to the unified foun-s dations of dissociation, he circumvents the "ob ectivist" danger denounced by Poulet by giving a definition of structure that is not purely ob ective or formal8 or circumvents the "ob ectivist" danger denounced by Poulet by giving a definition of structure that is not purely ob ective or formal8 or circumvents it by at least not in principle dissociating form from intention, or from the very act of the *riter5 "4

,=26/ ;ND SI1NI,I6;0I=N $+ *ill call 'structures' these formal constants, these liaisons that betray a mental universe reinvented by each artist according to his needs" "p. xii'. !tructure is then the unity of a form and a meaning. 4t is true that in some places the form of the *or0, or the form as the *or0, is treated as if it had no origin, as if, again, in the masterpiece-and 2ousset is interested only in masterpieces-the *ellbeing of the *or0 *as *ithout history. :ithout an intrinsic history. 4t is here that structuralism seems quite vulnerable, and it is here that, by virtue of one *hole aspect of his attempt-*hich is far from covering it entirely-2ousset too runs the ris0 of conventional Platonism. /y 0eeping to the legitimate intention of protecting the internal truth and meaning of the *or0 from historicism, biographism or psychologism "*hich, moreover, al*ays lur0 near the expression "mental universe"', one ris0s losing any attentiveness to the internal historicity of the *or0 itself, in its relationship to a sub ective origin that is not simply psychological or mental. 4f one ta0es care to confine classical literary history to its role as an "indispensable" "auxiliary," as "prologomenon and restraint" "p. xii, n. $&', one ris0s overloo0ing another history, more difficult to conceive5 the history of the meaning of the *or0 itself, of its operation. (his history of the *or0 is not only its past, the eve or the sleep in *hich it precedes itself in an author's intentions, but is also the impossibility of its ever being present, of its ever being summariBed by some absolute simultaneity or instantaneousness. (his is *hy, as *e *ill verify, there is no space of the *or0, if by space *e mean presence and synopsis. -nd, further on, *e *ill see *hat the consequences of this can be for the tas0s of criticism. 4t seems, for the moment, that if "literary history" "even *hen its techniques and its "philosophy" are rene*ed by "7arxism," "@reudianism," etc.' is only a restraint on the internal criticism of the *or0, then the structuralist moment of this criticism has the counterpart role of being the restraint on an internal geneti

cism, in *hich value and meaning are reconstituted and rea*a0ened in their proper historicity and temporality. (hese latter can no longer be ob ects *ithout becoming absurdities, and the structure proper to them must escape all classical categories. Certainly, 2ousset's avo*ed plan is to avoid this stasis of form, the stasis of a form *hose completion appears to liberate it from *or0, from imagination and from the origin through *hich alone it can

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continue to signify. hus, when he distinguishes his tas% from that of 7ean-Pierre 8ichard,1C 8ousset aims directly at this totality of thing and act, form and intention, entelechy and +ecoming, the totality that is the literary fact as a concrete form. "9s it possi+le to em+race simultaneously imagination and morphology, to e)perience and to comprehend them in a simultaneous actF his is what 9 would li%e to attempt, although well persuaded that this underta%ing, +efore +eing unitary, will often have to ma%e itself alternative Amy italicsB. 6ut the end in sight is indeed the simultaneous comprehension of a homogenous reality in a unifying operation" *p. ))ii2. 6ut condemned or resigned to alternation, the critic, in ac%nowledging it, is also li+erated and ac:uitted +y it. ,nd it is here that 8ousset's difference is no longer deli+erate. 4is personality, his style will affirm themselves not through a methodological decision +ut through the play of the critic's spontaneity within the freedom of the "alternative." his spontaneity will, in fact, un+alance an alternation construed +y 8ousset as a theoretical norm. , practiced inflection that also provides the style of criticism-here 8ousset's-with its structural form. his latter, ;laude (eviStrauss remar%s a+out social models and 8ousset a+out structural motifs in a literary wor%, "escapes creative will and clear consciousness" *p. )v2. What then is the im+alance of this preferenceF What is the preponderance that is more actuali3ed than ac%nowledgedF 9t seems to +e dou+le.

here are lines which are monsters.... , line +y itself has no meaning> a second one is necessary to give e)pression to meaning. 9mportant law. *Delacroi)2 Ealley is a common female dream sym+ol. *'reud2 5n the one hand, structure +ecomes the o+&ect itself, the literary thing itself. 9t is no longer what it almost universally was +efore. either a heuristic instrument, a method of reading, a characteristic particularly revelatory of content, or a system of o+&ective relations, independent of

content and terminology> or, most often, +oth at once, for the fecundity of structure did not e)clude, +ut, on the contrary, rather implied that relational configuration e)ists within the literary o+&ect. , structural realism has always +een practiced, more or less e)plicitly. 6ut never has structure +een the e)clusive term-in the dou+le sense of the word-of critical description. 9t was always a means or relationship for reading or writing, for assem+ling signification, recogni3ing themes, ordering constants and correspondences. 4ere, structure, the framewor% of construction, morphological correlation, +ecomes in fact and despite his theoretical intention the critic's sole preoccupation. 4is sole or almost sole preoccupation. /o longer a method within the ordo cognescendi, no longer a relationship in the ordo essendi, +ut the very +eing of the wor%. We are concerned with an ultrastructuralism. 5n the other hand *and conse:uently2, structure as the literary thing is this time ta%en, or at least practiced, literally. /ow, stricto sensu, the notion of structure refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the order of forms and sites. Structure is first the structure of an organic or artificial wor%, the internal unity of an assem+lage, a construction> a wor% is governed +y a unifying principle, the architecture that is +uilt and made visi+le in a location. "Super+es monuments de l'orgueil des humains, H Pyramides, tom+eau), dont la no+le structure H a temoigne :ue 'art, par !'adresse des mains H -t l'assidu travail pent vaincre la nature" *"Splendid monuments of human pride, pyramids, tom+s, whose no+le structure 6ears witness that art, through the s%ill of hands and hard wor%, can van:uish nature"-Scarron2. 5nly metaphorically was this topographical literality displaced in the direction of its ,ristotelean and topical signification *the theory of commonplaces in language and the manipulation of motifs or arguments.2 9n the seventeenth century they spo%e of "the choice and arrangement of words, the structure and harmony of the composition, the modest grandeur of the thoughts."1" 5r further. "9n +ad structure there is always something to +e added, or diminished, or changed, not simply as concerns the topic, +ut also the words."" 4ow is this history of metaphor possi+leF Does the fact that language can determine things only +y spatiali3ing them suffice to e)plain that, in return, language must spatiali3e itself as soon as it designates and

reflects upon itself< (his question can be as0ed in general about all language and all metaphors. /ut here it ta0es on a particular urgency. 1ence, for as long as the metaphorical sense of the notion of structure is not ac0no*ledged as such, that is to say interrogated and even destroyed as concerns its figurative quality so that the nonspatiality or original spatiality designated by it may be revived, one runs the ris0, through a 0ind of sliding as unnoticed as it is efficacious, of confusing meaning *ith its geometric, morphological, or, in the best of cases, cinematic model. =ne ris0s being interested in the figure itself to the detriment of the play going on *ithin it metaphorically. "1ere, *e are ta0ing the *ord "figure" in its geometric as *ell as rhetorical sense. 4n 2ousset's style, figures of rhetoric are al*ays the figures of a geometry distinguished by its suppleness.' No*, despite his stated propositions, and although he calls structure the union of formal structure and intention, 2ousset, in his analyses, grants an absolute privilege to spatial models, mathematical functions, lines, and forms. 7any examples could be cited in *hich the essence of his descriptions is reduced to this. #oubtless, he ac0no*ledges the interdependency of space and time "@orme et !ignification, p. xiv'. /ut, in fact, time itself is al*ays reduced. (o a dimension in the best of cases. 4t is only the element in *hich a form or a curve can be displayed. 4t is al*ays in league *ith a line or design, al*ays extended in space, level. 4t calls for measurement. No*, even if one does not follo* Claude )evi!trauss *hen he asserts that there "is no necessary connection bet*een measure and structure,"' one must ac0no*ledge that for certain 0inds of structuresthose of literary ideality in particular-this connection is excluded in principle. (he geometric or morphological elements of @orme et !ignification are corrected only by a 0ind of mechanism, never by energetics. 7utatis mutandis, one might be tempted to ma0e the same reproach to 2ousset, and through him to the best literary formalism, as )eibniB made to #escartes5 that of having explained everything in nature *ith figures and movements, and of ignoring force by confusing it *ith the quantity of movement. No*, in the sphere of language and *riting, *hich, more than the body, "corresponds to the soul," "the ideas of siBe, figure and motion are not so distinctive as is imagined, and ... stand for something imaginary relative to our perceptions.""

(his geometry is only metaphorical, it *ill be said. Certainly. /ut metaphor is never innocent. 4t orients research and fixes results. :hen the spatial model is hit upon, *hen it functions, critical reflection rests *ithin it. 4n fact, and even if criticism does not admit this to be so. =ne example among many others. -t the beginning of the essay entitled "Polyeucte, or the 2ing and the 1elix," the author prudently *arns us that if he insists upon "schemas that might appear excessively geometrical, it is because Corneille, more than any other, practiced symmetry." 7oreover, "this geometry is not cultivated for itself," for "in the great plays it is a means subordinated to the ends of passion" "p. ,'. /ut *hat, in fact, does this essay yield< =nly the geometry of a theater *hich is, ho*ever, one of "mad passion, heroic enthusiasm" "p. ,'. Not only does the geometric structure of Polyeucte mobiliBe all the resources and attention of the author, but an entire teleology of Corneille's progress is coordinated to it. 6verything transpires as if, until $&.;, Corneille had only gotten a glimpse of, or anticipated the design of, Polyeucte, *hich *as still in the shado*s and *hich *ould eventually coincide *ith the Corneillean design itself, thereby ta0ing on the dignity of an entelechy to*ard *hich everything *ould be in motion. Corneille's *or0 and development are put into perspective and interpreted teleologically on the basis of *hat is considered its destination, its final structure. /efore Polyeucte, everything is but a s0etch in *hich only *hat is missing is due consideration, those elements *hich are still shapeless and lac0ing as concerns the perfection to come, or *hich only foretell this perfection. "(here *ere several years bet*een )a galerie du palais and Polyeucte. Corneille loo0s for and finds himself 4 *ill not here trace the details of his progress, in *hich )e Cid and Cinna sho* him inventing his o*n structure" "p. %'. -fter Polyeucte< 4t is never mentioned. !imilarly, among the *or0s prior to it, only )a galerie du palais and )e Cid are ta0en into account, and these plays are examined, in the style of preformationism, only as structural prefigurations of Polyeucte. (hus, in )a galerie du patois the inconstancy of Celidee separates her from her lover. (ired of her inconstancy "but *hy<', she dra*s near him again, *hile he, in turn, feigns inconstancy. (hey thus separate, to be united at the end of the play, *hich is outlined as follo*s5 "4nitial accord, separation, median reunification that fails, second separation

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symmetrical to the first, final con unction. (he destination is a return to the point of departure after a circuit in the form of a crossed ring" "p. G'. :hat is singular is the crossed ring, for the destination as return to the point of departure is of the commonest devices. Proust himself ... "cf. p. $..'. (he frame*or0 is analogous in )e Cid5 "(he ring-li0e movement *ith a median crossing is maintained" "p. %'. /ut here a ne* signification intervenes, one that panorography immediately transcribes in a ne* dimension. 4n effect, "at each step along the *ay, the lovers develop and gro*, not only each one for himself, but through the other and for the other, according to a very Corneillean >my italic? la* of progressively discovered interdependence8 their union is made stronger and deeper by the very ruptures that should have destroyed it. 1ere, the phases of distanciation are no longer phases of separation and inconstancy, but tests of fidelity" "p. %'. (he difference bet*een )a galerie du pubis and )e Cid, one could be led to believe, is no longer in the design and movement of presences "distanceproximity', but in the quality and inner intensity of the experiences "tests of fidelity, manner of being for the

other, force of rupture, etc.'. -nd it could be thought that by virtue of the very enrichment of the play, the structural metaphor *ill no* be incapable of grasping the play's quality and intensity, and that the *or0 of forces *ill no longer be translated into a difference of form. 4n believing so one *ould underestimate the resources of the critic. (he dimension of height *ill no* complete the analogical equipment. :hat is gained in the tension of sentiments "quality of fidelity, *ay of being-for-the-other, etc.' is gained in terms of elevation8 for values, as *e 0no*, mount scale*ise, and the 9ood is most high. (he union of the lovers is deepened by an "aspiration to*ard the highest" "p. %'. -ltus5 the deep is the high. (he ring, *hich remains, has become an "ascend ing spiral" and "helical ascent." -nd the horiBontal flatness of )a galerie *as only an appearance still hiding the essential5 the ascending move ment. )e Cid only begins to reveal it5 "-lso the destination "in )e Cid', even if it apparently leads bac0 to the initial con unction, is not at all a return to the point of departure8 the situation has changed, for the characters have been elevated. (his is the essential >my italics?5 the Cornell lean movement is a movement of violent elevation.................."but *here has this violence and the force of movement, *hich is more than its quantity or

direction, been spo0en of<' ". . . of aspiration to*ard the highest8 oined to the crossing of t*o rings, it no* traces an ascending spiral, helical ascent. (his formal combination *ill receive all the richness of its signification in Polyeucte" "p. %'. (he structure thus *as a receptive one, *aiting, li0e a girl in love, ready for its future meaning to marry and fecundate it. :e *ould be convinced if beauty, *hich is value and force, *ere sub ect to regulation and schematiBation. 7ust it be sho*n once more that this is *ithout sense< (hus, if )e Cid is beautiful, it is so by virtue of that *ithin it *hich surpasses schemes and understanding. (hus, one does not spea0 of )e Cid itself, if it is beautiful, in terms of rings, spirals, and helices. 4f the movement of these lines is not )e Cid, neither *ill it become Polyeucte as it perfects itself still further. 4t is not the truth of )e Cid or of Polyeucte. Nor is it the psychological truth of passion, faith, duty, etc., but, it *ill be said, it is this truth according to Corneille8 not according to Pierre Corneille, *hose biography and psychology do not interest us here5 the "movement to*ard the highest," the greatest specificity of the schema, is none other than the Corneillean movement "p. $'. (he progress indicated by )e Cid, *hich also aspires to the heights of Polyeucte is a "progress in the Corneillean meaning" "ibid.'. 4t *ould be helpful here to reproduce the analysis of Polyeucte,.; in *hich the schema reaches its greatest perfection and greatest internal complication8 and does so *ith a mastery such that one *onders *hether the credit is due Corneille or 2ousset. :e said above that the latter *as too Cartesian and not )eibniBian enough. )et us be more precise. 1e is also )eibniBian5 he seems to thin0 that, confronted *ith a literary *or0, one should al*ays be able to find a line, no matter ho* complex, that accounts for the unity, the totality of its movement, and all the points it must traverse. 4n the #iscourse on 7etaphysics, )eibniB *rites, in effect5 "/ecause, let us suppose for example that someone ots do*n a quantity of points upon a sheet of paper helter s0elter, as do those *ho exercise the ridiculous art of 9eomancy8 no* 4 say that it is possible to find a geometrical line *hose concept shall be uniform and constant, that is, in accordance *ith a certain formula, and *hich line at the same time shall pass through all of those points, and in the same order in *hich the hand otted them do*n8 also if a continuous line be traced, *hich is no*

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straight, no* circular, and no* of any other description, it is possible to find a mental equivalent, a formula or an equation common to all the points of this line by virtue of *hich formula the changes in the direction of the line must occur. (here is no instance of a fact *hose contour does not form part of a geometric line and *hich can not be traced entire by a certain mathematical motion.".. /ut )eibniB *as spea0ing of divine creation and intelligence5 "4 use these comparisons to picture a certain imperfect resemblance to the divine *isdom.... 4 do not pretend at all to explain thus the great mystery upon *hich depends the *hole universe.".+ -s concerns qualities, forces and values, and also as concerns nondivine *or0s read by finite minds, this confidence in mathematical-spatial representation seems to be "on the scale of an entire civiliBation, for *e are no longer dealing *ith the question of 2ousset's language, but *ith the totality of our language and its credence' analogous to the confidence placed by Canaque artists.& in the level representation of depth. - confidence that the structural ethnographer analyBes, moreover, *ith more prudence and less abandon than formerly. =ur intention here is not, through the simple motions of balancing, equilibration or overturning, to oppose duration to space, quality to quantity, force to form, the depth of meaning or value to the surface of figures. Muite to the contrary. (o counter this simple alternative, to counter the simple choice of one of the terms or one of the series against the other, *e maintain that it is necessary to see0 ne* concepts and ne* models, an economy escaping this system of metaphysical oppositions. (his economy *ould not be an energetics of pure, shapeless force. (he differences examined simultaneously *ould be differences of site" and differences of force. 4f *e appear to oppose one series to the

-ssuming that, in order to avoid "abstractionism," one fixes uponas 2ousset does at least theoretically-the union of form and meaning, one then *ould have to say that the aspiration to*ard the highest, in the "final leap *hich *ill unite them ... in 9od," etc., the passionate, qualitative, intensive, etc., aspiration, finds its form in the spiraling movement. /ut to say further that this union-*hich, moreover authoriBes every metaphor of elevation-is difference itself, Corneille's o*n idiomis this to say much< -nd if this *ere the essential aspect of "Corneillean movement," *here *ould Corneille be< :hy is there more beauty in Polyeucte than in "an ascending movement of t*o rings"< (he force of the *or0, the force of genius, the force, too, of that *hich engenders in general is precisely that *hich resists geometrical metaphoriBation and is the proper ob ect of literary criticism. 4n another sense than Poulet's, 2ousset sometimes seems to have "little interest in art." Enless 2ousset considers every line, every spatial form "but every form is spatial' beautiful a priori, unless he deems, as did a certain medieval theology "Considerans in particular', that form is transcendentally beautiful, since it is and ma0es things be, and that /eing is /eautiful8 these *ere truths for this theology to the extent that monsters themselves, as it *as said, *ere beautiful, in that they exist through line or form, *hich bear *itness to the order of the created universe and reflect divine light. @ormosus means beautiful. :ill /uffon not say too, in his !upplement to Natural 1istory "vol. N4, p. .$,'5 "7ost monsters are such *ith symmetry, the disarray of the parts seeming to have been arranged in orderly fashion<"

other, it is because from *ithin the classical system *e *ish to ma0e apparent the noncritical privilege naively granted to the other series by a certain structuralism. =ur discourse irreducibly belongs to the system of metaphysical oppositions. (he brea0 *ith this structure of belonging can be announced only through a certain organiBation, a certain strategic arrangement *hich, *ithin the field of metaphysical opposition, uses the strengths of the field to turn its o*n stratagems against it, producing a force of dislocation that spreads itself throughout the entire system, fissuring it in every direction and thoroughly delimiting it."

Now, 2ousset does not seem to posit, in his theoretical 4ntroduction, that every form is beautiful, but only the form that is aligned *ith meaning, the form that can be understood because it is, above all, in league *ith meaning. :hy then, once more, this geometer's privilege< -ssuming, in the last analysis, that beauty lets itself be espoused or exhausted by the geometer, is he not, in the case of the sublime-and Corneille is said to be sublime-forced to commit an act of violence<

@urther, for the sa0e of determining an essential "Corneillean movement," does one not lose *hat counts< 6verything that defies a geometrical-mechanical frame*or0-and not only the pieces *hich cannot be constrained by curves and helices, not only force and quality, *hich are meaning itself, but also duration, that *hich is pure qualitative

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heterogeneity *ithin movement-is reduced to the appearance of the inessential for the sa0e of this essentialism or teleological structuralism. 2ousset understands theatrical or novelistic movement as -ristotle understood movement in general5 transition to the act, *hich itself is the repose of the desired form. 6verything transpires as if everything *ithin the dynamics of Corneillean meaning, and *ithin each of Corneille's plays, came to life *ith the aim of final peace, the peace of the structural energeia: Polyeucte. =utside this peace, before and after it, movement, in its pure duration, in the labor of its organiBation, can itself' be only s0etch or debris. =r even debauch, a fault or sin as compared to Polyeucte, the "first impeccable success." Ender the *ord "impeccable," 2ousset notes5 "Cinna still sins in this respect" "p. $3'. Preformationism, teleologism, reduction of force, value and durationthese are as one *ith geometrism, creating structure. (his is the actual structure *hich governs, to one degree or another, all the essays in this boo0. 6verything *hich, in the first 7arivaux, does not announce the schema of the "double register" "narration and loo0 at the narration' is "a series of youthful novelistic exercises" by *hich "he prepares not only the novels of maturity, but also his dramatic *or0s" "p. .,'. "(he true 7arivaux is still almost absent from it" >my italics?. "@rom our perspective, there is only one fact to retain ..." "ibid.'. (here follo*s an analysis and a citation upon *hich is concluded5 "(his outline of a dialogue above the heads of the characters, through a bro0en-off narration in *hich the presence and the absence of the author alternate, is the outline of the veritable 7arivaux.... (hus is s0etched, in a first and rudimentary form, the properly 7arivauldian combination of spectacle and spectator, perceived and

traditional form and creates a ne* structure. (he truth of the general structure thus restored does not describe the 7arivauldian organism along its o*n lines. -nd less so its force. Fet5 "(he structural fact thus described-the double register-appears as a constant.... -t the same time >my italics? it corresponds to the 0no*ledge that 7arivauldian man has of himself5 a 'heart' *ithout vision, caught in the field of a consciousness *hich itself is only vision" "p. &.'. /ut ho* can a "structural fact," traditional during this era "assuming that as it is defined, it is determined and original enough to belong to an era' "correspond" to the consciousness of "7arivauldian man"< #oes the structure correspond to 7arivaux's most singular intention< 4s 7arivaux not, rather, a good example-and it *ould have to be demonstrated why he is a good example-of a literary structure of the times and, through it, an example of a structure of the era itself< -re there not here a thousand unresolved methodological problems that are the prerequisites for a single structural study, a monograph on an author or a *or0< 4f geometrism is especially apparent in the essays on Corneille and 7arivaux, preformationism triumphs a propos of Proust and Claudel. -nd this time in a form that is more organicist than topographical. 4t is here too, that preformationism is most fruitful and convincing. @irst, because it permits the mastering of a richer sub ect matter, penetrated more from *ithin. "7ay *e be permitted to remar0 that *e feel that *hat is best about this boo0 is not due to its method, but to the quality of the attention given to its ob ects<' @urther, because Proust's and Claudel's aesthetics are profoundly aligned *ith 2ousset's.

perceiver. :e *ill see it perfect itself" "p. .G'. (he difficulties accumulate, as do our reservations, *hen 2ousset specifies that this "permanent structure of 7arivaux's," O% although invisible or latent in the *or0s of his youth, "belongs," as the "*illful dissolution of novelistic illusion," to the "burlesque tradition" "p. +A8 cf. also p. &A'. 7arivaux's originality, *hich "retains" from this trad sho*s the *or0 of the author and the author's reflection on his *or0, is then "critical consciousness" "p. +$'. 7arivaux's idiom is not to be found in the structure described but in the intention that animates a

@or Proust himself and the demonstration given leaves no doubt on this sub ect, if one still had any-the demands of structure *ere constant and conscious, manifesting themselves through marvels of "neither true nor false' symmetry, recurrence, circularity, light thro*n bac0*ard, superimposition "*ithout adequation' of the first and the last, etc. (eleology here is not a product of the critic's pro ection, but is the author's o*n theme. (he implication of the end in the beginning, the strange relationships bet*een the sub ect *ho *rites the boo0 and the sub ect of this boo0, bet*een the consciousness of the narrator and that of the heroall this recalls the style of becoming and the dialectic of the "*e" in the Phenomenology of the 7ind." :e are indeed concerned

*ith the phenomenology of a mind here5 "=ne can discern still more reasons for the importance attached by Proust to this circular form of a novel *hose end returns to its beginning. 4n the final pages one sees the hero and the narrator unite too, after a long march during *hich each sought after the other, sometimes very close to each other, sometimes very far apart8 they coincide at the moment of resolution, *hich is the instant *hen the hero becomes the narrator, that is, the author of his o*n history. (he narrator is the hero revealed to himself, is the person that the hero, throughout his history, desires to be but never can be8 he no* ta0es the place of this hero and *ill be able to set himself to the tas0 of edifying the *or0 *hich has ended, and first to the tas0 of *riting Combray, *hich is the origin of the narrator as *ell as of the hero. (he end of the boo0 ma0es its existence possible and comprehensible. (he novel is conceived such that its end engenders its beginning" "p. $..'. Proust's aesthetics and critical method are, ultimately, not outside his *or0 but are the very heart of his creation5 "Proust *ill ma0e this aesthetic into the real sub ect of his *or0" "p. $;+'. -s in 1egel, the philosophical, critical, reflective consciousness is not only contained in the scrutiny given to the operations and *or0s of history. :hat is first in question is the history of this consciousness itself. 4t *ould not be deceptive to say that this aesthetic, as a concept of the *or0 in general, exactly overlaps 2ousset's. -nd this aesthetic is indeed, if 4 may say so, a practiced preformationism5 "(he last chapter of the last volume," Proust notes, "*as *ritten immediately after the first chapter of the first volume. 6verything in bet*een *as *ritten after*ard." /y preformationism *e indeed mean preformationism5 the *ell0no*n biological doctrine, opposed to epigenesis, according to *hich the totality of hereditary characteristics is enveloped in the germ, and is already in action in reduced dimensions that nevertheless respect the forms and proportions of the future adult. - theory of encasement *as at the center of preformationism *hich today ma0es us smile. /ut *hat are *e smiling at< -t the adult in miniature, doubtless, but also at the attributing of something more than finality to natural life-providence in action and art conscious of its *or0s. /ut *hen one is concerned *ith an art that does not imitate nature, *hen the artist is a man, and *hen it is consciousness that engenders, preformationism no longer

ma0es us smile. )ogos spermati0os is in its proper element, is no longer an export, for it is an anthropomorphic concept. @or example5 after having brought to light the necessity of repetition in Proustian composition, 2ousset *rites5 ":hatever one thin0s of the device *hich introduces En amour de !*ann, it is quic0ly forgotten, so tight and organic is the liaison that connects the part to the *hole. =nce one has finished reading the Recherche, one perceives that the episode is not at all isolable8 *ithout it, the ensemble *ould be unintelligible. En amour de !*ann is a novel *ithin a novel, a painting *ithin a painting. .., it brings to mind, not the stories *ithin stories that so many seventeenth- or eighteenthcentury novelists encase in their narratives, but rather the inner stories that can be read the Vie de 7arianne, in /alBac or 9ide. -t one of the entry*ays to his novel, Proust places a small convex mirror *hich reflects the novel in abbreviated form" "p. $.&'. (he metaphor and operation of encasement impose themselves, even if they are finally replaced by a finer, more adequate image *hich, at bottom, signifies the same relationship of implication. - reflecting and representative 0ind of implication, this time. 4t is for these same reasons that 2ousset's aesthetic is aligned *ith Claudel's. 7oreover, Proust's aesthetic is defined at the beginning of the essay on Claudel. -nd the affinities are evident, above and beyond all the differences. (hese affinities are assembled in the theme of "structural monotony"5 "'-nd thin0ing once more about the monotony of Cinteuil's *or0s, 4 explained to -lbertine that great *riters have created only a single *or0, or rather have refracted the same beauty that they bring to the *orld through diverse elements' " "p. $,$'. Claudel5 "')e soulier de satin is The d'or in another form. 4t summariBes both The d'or and Portage de midi. 4t is even the conclusion of Partage de midi ... ' " "'- poet does hardly anything but develop a preestablished plan'" "p. $,3'. (his aesthetic *hich neutraliBes duration and force as the difference bet*een the acorn and the oa0, is not autonomously Proust's or Claudel's. 4t translates a metaphysics. Proust also calls "time in its pure state" the "atemporal" or the "eternal." (he truth of time is not temporal. -nalogously "analogously only', time as irreversible succession, is, according to Claudel, only the phenomenon, the epidermis, the surface image of the essential truth of the universe as it is conceived

and created by 9od. (his truth is absolute simultaneity. )i0e 9od, Claudel, the creator and composer, "has a taste for things that exist together" "-rt poetique'. u (his metaphysical intention, in the last resort, validates, through a series of mediations, the entire essay on Proust and all the analyses devoted to the "fundamental scene of Claudel's theater" "p. $G;', the "pure state of the Claudelian structure" "p. $,,' found in Portage de midi, and to the totality of this theater in *hich, as Claudel himself says, "time is manipulated li0e an accordion, for our pleasure" such that "hours last and days are passed over" "p. $G$'. :e *ill not, of course, examine in and of themselves this metaphysics or theology of temporality. (hat the aesthetics they govern can be legitimately and fruitfully applied to the reading of Proust or Claudel is evident, for these are their aesthetics, daughter "or mother' of their metaphysics. 4t is also readily demonstrable that *hat is in question is the metaphysics implicit in all structuralism, or in every structuralist proposition. 4n particular, a structuralist reading, by its o*n activity, al*ays presupposes and appeals to the theological simultaneity of the boo0, and considers itself deprived of the essential *hen this simultaneity is not accessible. 2ousset5 "4n any event, reading, *hich is developed in duration, *ill have to ma0e the *or0 simultaneously present in all its parts in order to be global.... !imilar to a 'painting in movement,' the boo0 is revealed only in successive fragments. (he tas0 of the demanding reader consists in overturning this natural tendency of the boo0, so that it may present itself in its entirety to the mind's scrutiny. (he only complete reading is the one *hich transforms the boo0 into a simultaneous net*or0 of reciprocal relationships5 it is then that surprises emerge" "p. xiii'. ":hat surprises< 1o* can simultaneity hold surprises in store< 2ather, it neutraliBes the surprises of nonsimultaneity. !urprises emerge from the dialogue bet*een the simultaneous and the nonsimultaneous. :hich suffices to say that structural simultaneity itself serves to reassure.' Dean-Pierre 2ichard5 "(he difficulty of every structural account resides in that it must desc P'be sequentially, successively, that *hich in fact exists all at once, simultaneously" ")'univers imaginaire de 7allarme, p. 3G'. (hus, 2ousset invo0es the difficulty of gaining access to the simultaneity *hich is truth *ithin reading, and 2ichard the difficulty of accounting for it

*ithin *riting. 4n both cases, simultaneity is the myth of a total reading or description, promoted to the status of a regulatory ideal. (he search for the simultaneous explains the capacity to be fascinated by the spatial image5 is space not "the order of coexistences" ")eibniB'< /ut by saying "simultaneity" instead of space, one attempts to concentrate time instead of forgetting it. "#uration thus ta0es on the illusory form of a homogeneous milieu, and the union bet*een these t*o terms, space and duration, is simultaneity, *hich could be defined as the intersection of time *ith space."+3 4n this demand for the flat and the horiBontal, *hat is intolerable for structuralism is indeed the richness implied by the volume, every element of signification that cannot be spread out into the simultaneity of a form. /ut is it by chance that the boo0 is, first and foremost, volume<+; -nd that the meaning of meaning "in the general sense of meaning and not in the sense of signaliBation' is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier< -nd that its force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality *hich gives signified meaning no respite, no rest, but engages it in its o*n economy so that it al*ays signifies again and differs< 6xcept in the )ivre irrealise by 7allarme, that *hich is *ritten is never identical to itself. EnrealiBed5 this does not mean that 7allarme did not succeed in realiBing a /oo0 *hich *ould be at one *ith itself-he simply did not *ant to. 1e unrealiBed the unity of the /oo0 by ma0ing the categories in *hich it *as supposed to be securely conceptualiBed tremble5 *hile spea0ing of an "identification *ith itself' of the /oo0, he underlines that the /oo0 is at once "the same and other," as it is "made up of itself." 4t lends itself not only to a "double interpretation," but through it, says 7allarme, "4 so*, so to spea0, this entire double volume here and there ten times." 54 #oes one have the right to constitute this metaphysics or aesthetics so *ell adapted to Proust and Claudel as the general method of structuralism<++ (his, ho*ever, is precisely *hat 2ousset does, in the extent to *hich, as *e have at least tried to demonstrate, he decides that everything not intelligible in the light of a "preestablished" teleological frame*or0, and not visible in its simultaneity, is reducible to the inconsequentiality of accident or dross. 6ven in the essays devoted to Proust and Claudel, the essays guided by the most comprehensive structure, 2ousset must decide to consider as "genetic accidents" "each

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episode, each character" *hose "eventual independence" from the "central theme" or "general organiBation of the *or0" is noticeable "p. $&.'8 lie must accept the confrontation of the "true Proust" *ith the "Novelist" to *hom, moreover, he can sometimes "do *rong," ust as the true Proust, according to 2ousset, is also capable of missing the "truth" of love, etc. "p. $&&'. 4n the same *ay that "the true /audelaire is perhaps only in the /aleen, and all of @laubert is in 7adame /ovary" "p. xix', the true Proust is not simultaneously every*here. 2ousset must also conclude that the characters of D'=tage are severed not by "circumstance," but, "to express it better," by the "demands of the Claudelian frame*or0" "p. $,%'8 he must deploy marvels of subtlety to demonstrate that in )e soulier de satin Claudel does not "repudiate himself' and does not "renounce" his "constant frame*or0" "p. $G;'. :hat is most serious is that this "ultrastructuralist" method, as *e have called it, seems to contradict, in certain respects, the most precious and original intention of structuralism. 4n the biological and linguistic fields *here it first appeared, structuralism above all insists upon preserving the coherence and completion of each totality at its o*n level. 4n a given configuration, it first prohibits the consideration of that *hich is incomplete or missing, everything that *ould ma0e the configuration appear to be a blind anticipation of, or mysterious deviation from, an orthogenesis *hose o*n conceptual basis *ould have to be a telos or an ideal norm. (o be a structuralist is first to concentrate on the organiBation of meaning, on the autonomy and idiosyncratic balance, the completion of each moment, each form8 and it is to refuse to relegate everything that is not comprehensible as an ideal type to the status of aberrational accident. (he pathological itself is not the simple absence of structure. 4t is organiBed. 4t cannot be understood as the deficiency, defect, or decomposition of a beautiful, ideal totality. 4t is not the simple undoing of telos. 4t is true that the re ection of finalism is a rule, a methodological norm, that structuralism can apply only *ith difficulty. (he re ection of finalism is a vo* of infidelity to telos *hich the actual effort can never adhere to. !tructuralism lives *ithin and on the difference bet*een its promise and its practice. :hether biology, linguistics, or literature is in question, ho* can an organiBed totality be perceived *ithout reference to its end, or *ithout presuming to 0no* its end, at least< -nd if

meaning is meaningful only *ithin a totality, could it come forth if the totality *ere not animated by the anticipation of an end, or by an intentionality *hich, moreover, does not necessarily and primarily belong to a consciousness< 4f there are structures, they are possible only on the basis of the fundamental structure *hich permits totality to open and overflo* itself such that it ta0es on meaning by anticipating a telos *hich here must be understood in its most indeterminate form. (his opening is certainly that *hich liberates time and genesis "even coincides *ith them', but it is also that *hich ris0s enclosing progression to*ard the future-becoming-by giving it form. (hat *hich ris0s stifling force under form. 4t may be ac0no*ledged, then, that in the rereading to *hich *e are invited by 2ousset, light is menaced from *ithin by that *hich also metaphysically menaces every structuralism5 the possibility of concealing meaning through the very act of uncovering it. (o comprehend the structure of a becoming, the form of a force, is to lose meaning by finding it. (he meaning of becoming and of force, by virtue of their pure, intrinsic characteristics, is the repose of the beginning and the end, the peacefulness of a spectacle, horiBon or face." :ithin this peace and repose the character of becoming and of force is disturbed by meaning itself. (he meaning of meaning is -pollonian by virtue of everything *ithin it that can be seen." (o say that force is the origin of the phenomenon is to say nothing. /y its very articulation force becomes a phenomenon. 1egel demonstrated convincingly that the explication of a phenomenon by a force is a tautology.+G /ut in saying this, one must refer to language's peculiar inability to emerge from itself in order to articulate its origin, and not to the thought of force. @orce is the other of language *ithout *hich language *ould not be *hat it is. 4n order to respect this strange movement *ithin language, in order not to reduce it in turn, *e *ould have to attempt a return to the metaphor of dar0ness and light "of self-revelation and selfconcealment', the founding metaphor of :estern philosophy as metaphysics. (he founding metaphor not only because it is a photological oneand in this respect the entire history of our philosophy is a photology, the name given to a history of, or treatise on, light-but because it is a metaphor. 7etaphor in general, the passage from one existent to

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*hich *e spo0e at the outset. -re *e mista0en in perceiving it beneath the praise of structural and Claudelian "monotony" *hich closes @orme et !ignification< :e should conclude, but the debate is interminable. (he divergence, the difference bet*een #ionysus and -pollo, bet*een ardor and structure, cannot be erased in history, for it is not in history. 4t too, in an unexpected sense, is an original structure5 the opening of history, historicity itself #ifference does not simply belong either to history or to structure. 4f *e must say, along *ith !chelling, that "all is but #ionysus," *e must 0no*-and this is to *rite-that, li0e pure force, #ionysus is *or0ed by difference. 1e sees and lets himself be seen. -nd tears out "his' eyes. @or all eternity, he has had a relationship to his exterior, to visible form, to structure, as he does to his death. (his is ho* he appears "to himself'. "Not enough forms ...," said @laubert. 1o* is he to be understood<

that *riting is first and al*ays something over *hich one bends. /etter still *hen letters are no longer figures of fire in the heavens. NietBsche *as certain, but Karathustra *as positive5 "1ere do 4 sit and *ait, old bro0en tables around me and also ne* half tables. :hen cometh mine hour<-(he hour of my descent, of my do*n-going. "&& "#ie !tunde meines Niederganges, Enterganges." 4t *ill be necessary to descend, to *or0, to bend in order to engrave and carry the ne* (ables to the valleys, in order to read them and have them read. :riting is the outlet as the descent of meaning outside itself *ithin itself5 metaphorfor-others-aimed-at-others-here-and-no*, metaphor as the possibility of others here-and-no*, metaphor as metaphysics in *hich /eing must hide itself if the other is to appear. 6xcavation *ithin the other to*ard the other in *hich the same see0s its vein and the true gold of its phenomenon. !ub44.sion in *hich the same can al*ays

#oes he *ish to celebrate the other of form< the "too many things *hich exceed and resist form< 4n praise of #ionysus< =ne is certain that this is not so. @laubert, on the contrary, is sighing, "-lasL not enough forms." - religion of the *or0 as form. 7oreover, the things for *hich *e do not have enough forms are already phantoms of energy, "ideas" "larger than the plasticity of style." 4n question is a point against )econte de )isle, an affectionate point, for @laubert "li0es that fello* a lot."&3 NietBsche *as not fooled5 "@laubert, a ne* edition of Pascal, but as an artist *ith this instinctive belief at heart5 '@laubert est tou ours haissable, l'homme nest rien, $'oeuvre est tout.' Q&; :e *ould have to choose then, bet*een *riting and dance. NietBsche recommends a dance of the pen in vain5 " . . . dancing *ith the feet, *ith ideas, *ith *ords, and need 4 add that one must also be able to dance *ith the pen-that one must learn ho* to *rite<"".'' @laubert *as a*are, and he *as right, that *riting cannot be thor oughly #ionysiac. "=ne can only thin0 and *rite sitting do*n," he said. Doyous anger of NietBsche5 "1ere 4 have got you, you nihilistL sedentary life is the real sin against the 1oly !pirit. =nly those thoughts that come *hen you are *al0ing have any value. "'! /ut NietBsche *as certain that the *riter *ould never be upright8

lose "itself'. Niedergang, Entergang. /ut the same is nothing, is not "it'self before ta0ing the ris0 of losing "itself'. @or the fraternal other is not first in the peace of *hat is called intersub ectivity, but in the *or0 and the peril of inter-rogation8 the other is not certain *ithin the peace of the response in *hich t*o affirmations espouse each other, but is called up in the night by the excavating *or0 of interrogation. :riting is the moment of this original Calley of the other *ithin /eing. (he moment of depth as decay. 4ncidence and insistence of inscription. "/ehold, here is a ne* table8 but *here are my brethren *ho *ill carry it *ith me to the valley and into hearts of flesh<J&,

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na"e indicates, cannot s!eak and above all "$st not answer back. nd when, as is the case here, the dialog$e is in danger of being taken ncorrectly) as a challenge, the disci!le knows that he alone finds hi" self already challenged by the "aster%s voice within hi" that !recedes

37

z COG ITO AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS

The Instant of Decision is Madness (Kierkegaard) In any event this book was terribly daring. trans!arent sheet se!arates it fro" "adness. (#oyce, s!eaking of Ulysses)

his own. (e feels hi"self indefinitely challenged, or re,ected or acc$sed- as a disci!le, he is challenged by the "aster who s!eaks within hi" and before hi", to re!roach hi" for "aking this challenge and to re,ect it in advance, having elaborated it before hi"- and having interiori.ed the "aster, he is also challenged by the disci!le that he hi"self is. This inter"inable $nha!!iness of the disci!le !erha!s ste"s fro" the fact that he does not yet know)or is still concealing fro" hi"selfthat the "aster, like real life, "ay always be absent. The disci!le "$st break the glass, or better the "irror, the reflection, his infinite s!ec$lation on the "aster. nd start to s!eak. s the ro$te that these considerations will follow is neither direct nor $nilinear)f ar fro" it)I will sacrifice any f$rther !rea"ble and go straight to the "ost general /$estions that will serve as the focal !oints of these reflections. 0eneral /$estions that will have to be deter"ined and s!ecified along the way, "any of which, "ost, will re"ain o!en. My !oint of de!art$re "ight a!!ear slight andifil

artica. In this 123 !age book, Michel &o$ca$lt devotes three !ages)and, "oreover, in a )o a certain !assage fro" the aness,oly, de"entia, insanity see", I e"!hasi.e see", dis"issed, e4cl$ded, and ostraci.ed

lect$re% clearly indicates, Michel &o$ca$lt%s book &olic et deraison' (istoire de% la folie

ny,enied entry to the !hilo ca consieration, ordered away fro" the bench as soon as s$""oned to it by Descartes)this last , ce, co$ not !ossibly be "ad. In alleging) correctly or incorrectly as will be dtid , eer"ne)that the sense of &o$ca$lt%s entire !ro,ect can be !in!ointed in these few all$ , an tat te reading of Descartes and the 5artesian 5ogito !ro!osed to $s engages in its !roble"atic the totality of this (istory of Madness as regards both its intention and its e askinglf the f "yse, in two series of /$estions, following' 1. &irst, and in so"e ways this is a !re,$dicial /$ti ih e so n ' s te i nt e r !retation of Descartes%s intention that is !ro!osed to $s ,$stifiable6 7hat

I%age

This book, ad"irable in so "any res!ects, !owerf$l in its breadth and style, is even "ore inti"idating for "e in that, having for"erly had the good fort$ne to st$dy $nder Michel &o$ca$lt, I retain the conscio$sness of an ad"iring and gratef$l disci!le. Now, the disci!le%s conscio$sness, when he starts, I wo$ld not say to dis!$te, b$t to engage in and silent dialog$e which "ade hi" into a disci!le)this disci!le%s conscio$sness is an $nha!!y conscio$sness. *tarting to enter into dialog$e in the world, that is, starting to answer back, he always feels +ca$ght in the act,+ like the +infant+ who, by definition and as hi

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4 here call interpretation is a certain passage, a certain semantic relationship proposed by @oucault bet*een, on the one hand, *hat #escartes said-or *hat lie is believed to have said or meant-and on the other hand, let us say, *ith intentional vagueness for the moment, a certain "historical structure," as it is called, a certain meaningful historical totality, a total historical pro ect through *hich *e thin0 *hat #escartes said-or *hat he is believed to have said or meant-can particularly be demonstrated. 4n as0ing if the interpretation is ustifiable, 4 am therefore as0ing about t*o things, putting t*o preliminary questions into one5 "a' 1ave *e fully understood the sign itself, in itself< 4n other *ords, has *hat #escartes said and meant been clearly perceived< (his comprehension of the sign in and of itself, in its immediate materiality as a sign, if 4 may so call it, is only the first moment but also the indispensable condition of all hermeneutics and of any claim to transition from the sign to the signified. :hen one attempts, in a general *ay, to pass from an obvious to a latent language, one must first be rigorously sure of the obvious meaning.' (he analyst, for example, must first spea0 the

or even by a philosophy, in the traditional sense of the *ord. -nd if it is true, as @oucault says, as he admits by citing Pascal, that one cannot spea0 of madness except in relation to that "other form of madness" b
that

*il alllpero*shmapsen "not to be mad," that is, except in relation to re as on,. be possible not to add anything *hatsoever to *hat

it @oucault has said, but perhaps only to repeat once more, on the site of this ,raps noess adventurous, perilous, nocturnal, and pathetic than the experience of cusatory o madness, that is, accusative and ob ectifying of it, than @oucault

tion5 once understood as a sign, does #escartes's stated intention have tionship assigned to it< #oes it have the historical meaning assigned to it< "#oes it have the historical meaning assigned to it<" (hat is, again, t*o ques tions in one5 #oes it have the historical meaning assigned to it< does it, have this meaning, a given meaning @oucault assigns to it< =r, second,5' exhausted by its historicity< 4n other *ords, is it fully, in each and 3. !econd series of questions "and here *e shall go some*hat beyond the case of #escartes, beyond the case of the Cartesian Cogtt *hich *ill be examined no longer in and of itself but as the index o more general problematic'5 in the light of the rereading of the Can sian Cogito that *e shall be led to propose "or rather to recall, for, let$

, accompany or follo* as faithfully as possible @oucault's intentions in reinscribing an interpretation of the Cartesian Cogito *ithin the total frame*or0 of the ecome appart ih go as reay @oucault. (o this end, it is necessary to recall the general plan of the d ti attempted-and this is osoo-to *rite a history of madness itself. 4tself. =f madness itself (hat is, by letting maness toe the sub ect of boo0 in every sense of the *od r5ts ih teme and its fi rst-person raBor, its author, madness spea0ing about itself. @oucault *anted to e a history of madness itlfh i ess spea0ing on the basis its o*n experience and under its o*n authority, and not a history of uage o reason, the language of n retorica dimensions of the ruseeneath rdriatry, dominated, beaten to the ground interned th i , ,ats to say, dress made into an ob ect and exiled as the other of a language and conuse *ith logos itself. ",

history of madness< Certain ones only, for @oucault's enterprise'is rich, branches out in too many directions to be preceded by a

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history not of psychiatry," @oucault says, "but of madness itself, in its most vibrant state, before being captured by 0no*ledge." 4t is a question, therefore, of escaping the trap or ob ectivist naivete that *ould consist in *riting a history of untamed madness, of madness as it carries itself and breathes before being caught and paralyBed in the nets of classical reason, from *ithin the very language of classical reason itself, utiliBing the concepts that *ere the historical instruments of the capture of madness-the restrained and restraining language of reason. @oucault's determination to avoid this trap is constant. 4t is the most audacious and seductive aspect of his venture, producing its admirable tension. /ut it is also, *ith all seriousness, the maddest aspect of his pro ect. -nd it is remar0able that this obstinate determination to avoid the trap-that is, the trap set by classical reason to catch madness and *hich can no* catch @oucault as he attempts to *rite a history of madness itself *ithout repeating the aggression of rationalism-this determination to bypass reason is expressed in t*o

spea0er or interlocutor, piled up upon itself, strangulated, collapsing before reaching the stage of formulation, quietly returning to the silence front *hich it never departed. (he calcinated root of meaning." (he history of madness itself is therefore the archaeology of a silence. /ut, first of all, is there a history of silence< @urther, is not an archae ology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an organiBed language, a pro ect, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a *or0< & :ould not the archaeology of silence be the most efficacious and subtle restoration, the repetition, in the most irreducibly ambiguous meaning of the *ord, of the act per petrated against madness-and be so at the very moment *hen this act is denounced< :ithout ta0ing into account that all the signs *hich allegedly serve as indices of the origin of this silence and of this stifled speech, and as indices of everything that has made madness an interrupted and forbidden, that is, arrested, discourse-all these signs and documents are borro*ed, *ithout exception, from the uridical province of interdiction. 1ence, one can inquire-as @oucault does also, at moments other than those *hen he contrives to spea0 of silence "although in too lateral and implicit a fashion from my point of vie*'-about the source and the status of the language of this archaeology, of this language *hich is to be understood by a reason that is not classical reason. :hat is the historical responsibility of this logic of archaeology< :here should it be situated< #oes it suffice to stac0 the tools of psychiatry neatly, inside a tightly shut *or0shop, in order to return to innocence and to end all complicity *ith the rational or political order *hich 0eeps madness captive< (he psychiatrist is but the delegate of this order, one delegate among others. Perhaps it does not suffice to imprison or to exile the delegate, or to stifle him8 and perhaps it does not suffice to deny oneself the conceptual material of psychiatry in order to exculpate one's o*n language. -ll our 6uropean languages, the language of everything that has participated, from near or far, in the adventure of :estern reason-all this is the immense delegation of the pro ect defined by @oucault under the rubric of the capture or ob ectifi cation of madness. Nothing *ithin this language, and no one among those o spea it can es th hiill , capeestorca guit-if there is one, and if it is 'storical in a classical sense-*hich @oucault apparently *ishes to put a trial. /ut such a trial may be impossible, for by the simple fact of

*ays difficult to reconcile at first glance. :hich is to say that it is expressed uneasily. !ometimes @oucault globally re ects the language of reason, *hich itself is the language of order "that is to say, simultaneously the language of the system of ob ectivity, of the universal rationality of *hich psychiatry *ishes to be the expression, and the language of the body, politic-the right to citiBenship in the philosopher's city overlapping here *ith the right to citiBenship any*here, the philosophical realm functioning, *ithin the unity of a certain structure, as the metaphor or the metaphysics of the political realm'. -t these moments he *rites sentences of this type "he has ust evo0ed the bro0en dialogue bet*een reason and madness at the end of the eighteenth century, a brea0 tha *as finaliBed by the annexation of the totality of language-and of the right to language-by psychiatric reason as the delegate of societal and psychiatry, *hich is a monologue of reason on madness, could be established only on the basis of such a silence. 4 have not tried to *rite the history of that language but, rather, the archaeology of tha silence."+ -nd throughout the boo0 runs the theme lin0ing madness t silence, to "*ords *ithout language" or "*ithout the voice of a sub ect," "obstinate murmur of a language that spea0s by itself, *itho

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their articulation the proceedings and the verdict unceasingly reiterate the crime. 4f the =rder of *hich *e are spea0ing is so po*erful, if its po*er is unique of its 0ind, this is so precisely by virtue of the universal, structural, universal, and infinite complicity in *hich it compromises all those *ho understand it in its o*n language, even *hen this language provides them *ith the form of their o*n denunciation. =rder is then denounced *ithin order. (otal disengagement from the totality of the historical language responsible for the exile of madness, liberation from this language in order to *rite the archaeology of silence, *ould be possible in only t*o *ays. 6ither do not mention a certain silence "a certain silence *hich, again, can be determined only *ithin a language and an order that *ill preserve this silence from contamination by any given muteness', or follo* the madman do*n the road of his exile. (he misfortune of the mad, the interminable misfortune of their silence, is that their best spo0esmen

43

is, an archaeology against reason doubtless cannot be *ritten, for, des pite all appearances to the contrary, the concept of history has al*ays been a rational one. 4t is the meaning of "history" or archia that should have been questioned first, perhaps. - *riting that exceeds, by ques tioning them, the values "origin," "reason," and "history" could not be contained *ithin the metaphysical closure of an archaeology. -s @oucault is the first to be conscious-and acutely so-of this daring, of the necessity of spea0ing and of dra*ing his language from the *ellspring of a reason more profound than the reason *hich issued forth during the classical age, and as he experiences a necessity of spea0ing *hich must escape the ob ectivist pro ect ofclassical reason-a necessity of spea0ing even at the price of a *ar declared by the language of reason against itself, a *ar in *hich language *ould recapture itself, destroy itself, or unceasingly revive the act of its o*n destruction-the allegation of an archaeology of silence, a purist, intransigent, nonviolent, nondialectical allegation, rs often counterbalanced, equilibrated, l should even say contradicted by a discourse in @oucault's boo0 that is not only the admission of a difficulty, but the formulation of another pro ect, a pro ect that is not an expediency, but a different and more ambitious one, a pro ect more effectively ambitious than the first one. (he admission of the difficulty can be found in sentences such as these, among others, *hich 4 simply cite, in order not to deprive you

are those *ho betray them best8 *hich is to say that *hen one attempts to convey their silence itself, one has already passed over to the side of the enemy, the side of order, even if one fights against order from *ithin it, putting its origin into question. (here is no (ro an horse unconquerable by 2eason "in general'. (he unsurpassable, unique, and another actual order or structure "a determined historical structure,8 one structure among other possible ones', is that one cannot spea0 out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from *ithin it8 and *ithin its domain, 2eason leaves us only the recourse to' strategems and strategies. (he revolution against reason, in the histor ical form of classical reason "but the latter is only a determined example of 2eason in general. -nd because of this oneness of 2eason the expression "history of reason" is difficult to conceptualiBe, as is also, consequently, a "history of madness"', the revolution against reason can be made only *ithin it, in accordance *ith a 1egelian la to *hich 4 myself *as very sensitive in @oucault's boo0, despite, th absence of any precise reference to 1egel. !ince the revolution again reason, from the moment it is articulated, can operate only *ithin reaO son, it al*ays has the limited scope of *hat is called, precisely in th language of a department of internal affairs, a disturbance. - history, tha

of their dense beauty5 "(he perception that see0s to grasp them >in question are the miseries and murinurings of madness? in their *ild state, necessarily belongs to a *orld that has already captured them. ress that holds madness prisoner. -nd there madness possesses only the morose sum of its prison experiences, its mute experience of persecu don, and *e-*e possess only its description as a man *anted." -nd, later, @oucault spea0s of a madness "*hose *ild state can never be restored in and of itself' and of an "inaccessible primitive purity.,, the language used to describe this history of madness, @oucault, in effect, ac0no*ledges the necessity of maintaining his discourse *ithin *hat he calls a "relativity *ithout recourse," that is, *ithout support from an absolute reason or logos. (he simultaneous necessity and

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impossibility of *hat @oucault else*here calls "a language *ithout support," that is to say, a language declining, in principle if not in fact, to articulate itself along the lines of the syntax of reason. 4n principle if not in fact, but here the fact cannot easily be put bet*een parentheses. (he fact of language is probably the only fact ultimately to resist all parenthiBation. "(here, in the simple problem of articulation," @oucault says later, "*as hidden and expressed the ma or difficulty of the enterprise." =ne could perhaps say that the resolution of this difficulty is practiced rather than formulated. /y necessity. 4 mean that the silence of madness is not said, cannot be said in the logos of this boo0, but is indirectly, metaphorically, made present by its pathos ta0ing this *ord in its best sense. - ne* and radical praise of folly *hose intentions cannot be admitted because the praise >eloge? of silence al*ays ta0es place *ithin logos,' the language of ob ectification. "(o spea0 *ell of madness" *ould be to annex it once more, especially *hen, as is the case here, "spea0ing *ell of is also the *isdom and happiness of eloquent speech. No*, to state the difficulty, to state the difficulty of stating, is not ye to surmount it-quite the contrary. @irst, it is not to say in *hich language, through the agency of *hat speech, the difficulty is stated. :ho perceives, *ho enunciates the difficulty< (hese efforts can be made neither in the *ild and inaccessible silence of madness, nor simply in the language of the ailer, that is, in the language of classical reason, but only in the language of someone for *hom is meaningful and before *hom appears the dialogue or *ar or misunderstanding or confrontation or double monologue that opposes reason and madness during the classical age. -nd thereby *e can envision the historic liberation of a logos in *hich the t*o monologues, or the bro0en dialogue, or especially the brea0ing point of the dialogue bet*een a determined reason and a,

and *ho is to understand, in *hat language and from *hat historical situation of logos, *ho *rote and *ho is to understand this history of madness< @or it is not by chance that such a pro ect could ta0e shape today. :ithout forgetting, quite to the contrary, the audacity of @oucault's act in the 1istory of 7adness, *e must assume that a certain liberation of madness has gotten under*ay, that psychiatry has opened itself up, ho*ever minimally, and that the concept of madness as unreason, if it ever had a unity, has been dislocated. -nd that a pro ect such as @oucault's can find its historical origin and passage*ay in the opening produced by this dislocation. 4f @oucault, more than anyone else, is attentive and sensitive to these 0inds of questions, it nevertheless appears that he does not ac0no*ledge their quality of being prerequisite methodological or philosophical considerations. -nd it is true that once the question and the privileged difficulty are understood, to devote a preliminary *or0 to them *ould have entailed the steriliBation or paralysis of all further inquiry. 4nquiry can prove through its very act that the movement of a discourse on madness is possible. /ut is not the foundation of this possibility still too classical< @oucault's boo0 is not one of those that abandons itself to the prospective lightheartedness of inquiry. (hat is *hy, behind the admission of the difficulty concerning the archaeology of silence, a different pro ect

must be discerned, one *hich perhaps contradicts the pro ected archaeology of silence. /ecause the silence *hose archaeology is to be underta0en is not an original muteness or nondiscourse, but a subsequent silence, a dis course arrested by command, the issue is therefore to reach the origin of the protectionism imposed by a reason that insists upon being sheltered, and that also insists upon providing itself *ith protective barriers against madness, thereby ma0ing itself into a barrier against madness8 and to reach this origin from *ithin a logos of free trade, that is, from *ithin a logos that preceded the split of reason and madness, a logos *hich *ithin itself permitted dialogue bet*een *hat *ere later called reason and madness "unreason', permitted their free circulation and exchange, ust as the medieval city permitted the free circulation of the mad *ithin itself (he issue is therefore to reach the point at *hich the dialogue *as bro0en off, dividing itself into t*o soliloquies-*hat

determined madness, could be produced and can today be understood and enunciated. "!upposing that they can be8 but here *e are assuming ,H @oucault's hypothesis.' (herefore, if @oucault's boo0, despite all the ac0no*ledged impossi bilities and difficulties, *as capable of being *ritten, *e have the right to as0 *hat, in the last resort, supports this language *ithout recourse 'H or support5 *ho enunciates the possibility of nonrecourse< :ho *rote '.

.& WRITING AND DIFFERENCE @oucault calls, using a very strong *ord, the #ecision. (he #ecision, through a single act, lin0s and separates reason and madness, and it must be understood at once both as the original act of an order, a fiat, a decree, and as a schism, a caesura, a separation, a dissection. 4 *ould prefer dissension, to underline that in question is a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general, interior to logos in general, a divison *ithin the very act of sentire. -s al*ays, the dissension is internal. (he exterior "is' the interior, is the fission that produces and divides it along the lines of the 1egelian 6ntB*eiung. 4t thus seems that the pro ect of convo0ing the first dissension of logos against itself is quite another pro ect than the archaeology of silence, and raises different questions. (his time it *ould be necessary to exhume the virgin and unitary ground upon *hich the decisive act lin0ing and separating madness and reason obscurely too0 root. (he

COGITO AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS 47 :hatever the momentary brea0, if there is one, of the 7iddle -ges *ith the 9ree0 tradition, this brea0 and this alteration are late and secondary developments as concerns the fundamental permanence of the logico-philosophical heritage. (hat the embedding of the decision in its true historical grounds has been left in the shado*s by @oucault is bothersome, and for at least t*o reasons5 $. 4t is bothersome because at the outset @oucault ma0es a some*hat enigmatic allusion to the 9ree0 logos, saying that, unli0e classical reason, it "had no contrary." (o cite @oucault5 "(he 9ree0s had a relation to something that they called hybris. (his relation *as not merely one of condemnation8 the existence of (hrasymacus or of Callicles suffices to prove it, even if their language has reached us already

reason and madness of the classical age had a common root. /ut this common root, *hich is a logos, this unitary foundation is much more ancient than the medieval period, brilliantly but briefly evo0ed by @oucault in his very fine opening chapter. (here must be a founding unity that already carries *ithin it the "free trade" of the 7iddle -ges, and this unity is already the unity of a logos, that is, of a reason8 an already historical reason certainly, but a reason much less determined than it *ill be in its so-called classical form, having not yet received the determinations of the "classical age." 4t is *ithin the element of this archaic reason that the dissection, the dissension, *ill present itself as a modification or, if you *ill, as an overturning, that is, a revolution bu an internal revolution, a revolution affecting the self, occurring *ithin the self. @or this logos *hich is in the beginning, is not only the common ground of all dissension, but also-and no less importantlyR phere in *hich a history of madness during the classical age not only appears in fact but is also by all rights stipulated and specified in terms o f

enveloped in the reassuri

had no contrary."' >=ne *ould have to assume, then, that the 9ree0 logos had no proximity to the elementary, primordial, and undivided )ogos *ith respect to *hich contradiction in general, all *ars or polemics, could only be ulterior developments. (his hypothesis forces us to admit, as @oucault above all does not, that the history and lineage of the "reassur ing dialectic of !ocrates" in their totality had already fallen outside and been exiled from this 9ree0 logos that had no contrary. @or if the , i so only in that it has already expulsed, excluded, ob ectified or "curiously amounting to the same thing' assimilated and mastered as one of it has tranquiliBed and reassured itself into a pre-Cartesian certainty a , sophrosyne, a *isdom, a reasonable good sense and prudence. entire posterity immediately parta0e in the 9ree0 logos that has no teassuring "*e may soon have occasion to sho* that it is no more reassuring than the Cartesian cogito'. 4n this case, in this hypothesis, een provo0ed

dilif ! n gae c t c oo cr a t e s . / ut t he 9 r e e 0 ) ogo s

narration, it might have been necessary to start by reflecting this on ginal logos in *hich the violence of the classical era played itself on age is not, if this need be said at all, a nocturnal and mute prehisto

to share of mytifitih h scaon *oseistorico-philosophical motivations

remain to be examined. =r "b' that the !ocratic moment and the victory over the Calliclesian hybris already are the mar0s of a deportation and an exile of logos from itself, the *ounds left in it by a decision, a difference8 and then the structure of exclusion *hich @oucault *ishes to describe in his boo0 could not have been born *ith classical reason. 4t *ould have to have been consummated and reassured and smoothed over throughout all the centuries of philosophy. 4t *ould be essential to the entirety of the history of philosophy and of reason. 4n this regard, the classical age could have neither specificity nor privilege. -nd all the signs assembled by @oucault under the chapter heading !tultifera navis *ould play themselves out only on the surface of a chronic dissension. (he free circulation of the mad, besides the fact that it is not as simply free as all that, *ould only be a socioeconomic epiphenomenon on the surface of a reason divided against itself since the da*n of its 9ree0 origin. :hat seems to me sure in any case, regardless of the hypothesis one chooses concerning *hat is doubtless only a false problem and a false alternative, is that @oucault cannot simultaneously save the affirmation of a reassuring dialectic of !ocrates and his postulation of a specificity of the classical age *hose reason *ould reassure itself by excluding its contrary, that is, by constituting its contrary as an ob ect in order to be protected from it and be rid of it. 4n order to loc0 it up. (he attempt to *rite the history of the decision, division, difference runs the ris0 of construing the division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation. (ruthfully, for one or the other of these hypotheses to be true and for there to be a real choice bet*een them, it must be assumed in general that reason can have a contrary, that there can be an other of reason, that reason itself can construct or discover, and that the opposition of reason to its other is symmetrical. (his is the heart of the matter. Permit me to hold off on this question. 1o*ever one interprets the situation of classical reason, notably as regards the 9ree0 logos "and *hether or not this latter experienced dissension' in all cases a doctrine of tradition, of the tradition of logos "is there any other<' seems to be the prerequisite implied by @oucault s enterprise. No matter *hat the relationship of the 9ree0s to hybris, a relationship that *as certainly not simple ... "1ere, 4 *ish to open a

parenthesis and a question5 in the name of *hat invariable meaning of "madness" does @oucault associate, *hatever the meaning of this association, 7adness and 1ybris< - problem of translation, a philosophical problem of translation is posed-and it is serious-even if 1ybris is not 7adness for @oucault. (he determination of their difference supposes a haBardous linguistic transition. (he frequent imprudence of translators in this respect should ma0e us very *ary. 4 am thin0ing in particular, and in passing, of *hat is translated by madness and fury in the Philebus ".+e'.% @urther, if madness has an invariable meaning, *hat is the relation of this meaning to the a posteriori events *hich govern @oucault's analysis< @or, despite everything, even if his method is not empiricist, @oucault proceeds by inquiry and inquest. :hat he is *riting is a history, and the recourse to events, in the last resort, is indispensable and determining, at least in principle. No*, is not the concept of madness-never submitted to a thematic scrutiny by @oucault-today a false and disintegrated concept, outside current and popular language *hich al*ays lags longer than it should behind its subversion by science and philosophy< @oucault, in re ecting the psychiatric or philosophical material that has al*ays emprisoned the mad, *inds up employing-inevitably-a popular and equivocal notion of madness, ta0en from an unverifiable source. (his *ould not be serious if @oucault used the *ord only in quotation mar0s, as if it *ere the language of others, of those *ho, during the period under study, used it as a historical instrument. /ut everything transpires as if @oucault 0ne* *hat "madness" means. 6verything transpires as if, in a continuous and underlying *ay, an assured and rigorous precomprehension of the concept of madness, or at least of its nominal definition, *ere possible and acquired. 4n fact, ho*ever, it could be demonstrated that as @oucault intends it, if not as intended by the historical current he is studying, the concept of madness overlaps everything that can be put under the rubric of negativity. =ne can imagine the 0ind of problems posed by such a usage of the notion of madness. (he same 0ind of questions could be posed concerning the notion of truth that runs throughout the boo0 ... 4 close this long parenthesis.' (hus, *hatever the relation of the 9ree0s to hybris, and of !ocrates to the original logos, it is in any event certain that classical reason, and medieval reason before it, bore a relation to 9ree0 reason, and that it is *ithin the

!= W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ milieu of this more or less immediately perceived heritage, *hich itself is more or less crossed *ith other traditional lines, that the adventure or misadventure of classical reason developed. 4f dissension dates from !ocrates, then the situation of the madman in the !ocratic and post!ocratic *orlds-assuming that there is, then, something that can be called mad-perhaps deserves to be examined first. :ithout this examination, and as @oucault does not proceed in a simply aprioristic fashion, his historical description poses the banal but inevitable problems of periodiBation and of geographical, political, ethnological limitation, etc. 4f, on the contrary, the unopposed and unexcluding unity of logos *ere maintained until the classical "crisis," then this latter is, if 4 may say so, secondary and derivative. 4t does not engage the entirety of reason. -nd in this case, even if stated in passing, !ocratic discourse *ould be nothing less than reassuring. 4t can be proposed that the classical crisis developed from and *ithin the elementary tradition of a logos that has no opposite but carries *ithin itself and says all determined contradictions. (his doctrine of the tradition of meaning and of reason *ould be even further necessitated by the fact that it alone can give meaning and rationality in general to @oucault's discourse and to any discourse on the *ar bet*een reason and unreason. @or these discourses intend above all to be understood.? 3. 4 stated above that leaving the history of the preclassical logos in the shado*s is bothersome for t*o reasons. (he second reason, *hich 4 *ill adduce briefly before going on to #escartes, has to do *ith the profound lin0 established by @oucault bet*een the division, the dissension, and the possibility of history itself. "(he necessity of madness, throughout the history of the :est, is lin0ed to the deciding gesture *hich detaches from the bac0ground noise, and from its continuous monotony, a meaningful language that is transmitted and consummated in time8 briefly, it is lin0ed to the possibility of history." Consequently, if the decision through *hich reason constitutes itself by excluding and ob ectifying the free sub ectivity of madness is indeed the origin of history, if it is historicity itself, the condition of meaning and of language, the condition of the tradition of meaning, the condition of the *or0 in general, if the structure of exclusion is th fundamental structure of historicity, then the "classical" moment o this exclusion described by @oucault has neither absolute privilege no

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archetypal exemplarity. 4t is an example as sample and not as model. 4n any event, in order to evo0e the singularity of the classical moment, *hich is profound, perhaps it *ould be necessary to underline, not the aspects in *hich it is a structure of exclusion, but those aspects in *hich, and especially for *hat end, its o*n structure of exclusion is historically distinguished from the others, from all others. -nd to pose the problem of its exemplarity5 are *e concerned *ith an example among others or *ith a "good example," an example that is revelatory by privilege< @ormidable and infinitely difficult problems that haunt @oucault's boo0, more present in his intentions than his *ords. @inally, a last question5 if this great division is the possibility of history itself, the historicity of history, *hat does it mean, here, "to *rite the history of this division"< (o *rite the history of historicity< (o *rite the history of the origin of history< (he hysteron proteron *ould not here be a simple "logical fallacy," a fallacy *ithin logic, *ithin an established rationality. -nd its denunciation is not an act of ratiocination. 4f there is a historicity proper to reason in general, the history of reason cannot be the history of its origin "*hich, for a start, demands the historicity of reason in general', but must be that of one of its determined figures. (his second pro ect, *hich *ould devote all its efforts to discovering the common root of meaning and nonmeaning and to unearthing the

original logos in *hich a language and a silence are divided from one another is not at all an expediency as concerns everything that could come under the heading "archaeology of silence," the archaeology *hich simultaneously claims to say madness itself and renounces this claim. (he expression "to say madness itself" is self-contradictory. (o say madness *ithout expelling it into ob ectivity is to let it say itself /ut madness is *hat by essence cannot be said5 it is the "absence of the *or0," as @oucault profoundly says. (hus, not an expediency, but a different and more ambitious design, one that should lead to a praise of reason "there is no praise >eloge?, by essence, except of reason',$A but this time of a reason more profound than that *hich opposes and determines itself in a historically deter mined conflict. 1egel again, al*ays ... Not an expediency, but a more ambitious ambition, even if @oucault *rites this5 ")ac0ing this inaccess ible primitive purity >of madness itself?, a structural study must go

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bac0 to*ard the decision that simultaneously lin0s and separates reason and madness8 it must aim to uncover the perpetual exchange, the obscure common root, the original confrontation that gives meaning to the unity, as *ell as to the opposition, of sense and non-sense" >my italics?. /efore describing the moment *hen the reason of the classical age *ill reduce madness to silence by *hat he calls a "strange act of force," @oucault sho*s ho* the exclusion and internment of madness found a sort of structural niche prepared for it by the history of another exclusion5 the exclusion of leprosy. Enfortunately, *e cannot be detained by the brilliant passages of the chapter entitled !tultifera navis. (hey *ould also pose numerous questions. :e thus come to the "act of force," to the great internment *hich, *ith the creation of the houses of internment for the mad and others in the middle of the seventeenth century, mar0s the advent and first stage of a classical process described by @oucault throughout his boo0. :ithout establishing, moreover, *hether an event such as the creation of a house of internment is a sign among others, *hether it is a fundamental symptom or a cause. (his 0ind of question could appear

exterior to a method that presents itself precisely as structuralist$ that is,

.!!

dependent and circular in such a *ay that the classical problems of Perhaps. /ut 4 *onder *hether, *hen one is concerned *ith history' "and @oucault *ants to *rite a history', a strict structuralism is pos-''8 the order of its o*n descriptions, such a study can avoid all etiological the structure. (he legitimate renunciation of a certain style of causality, perhaps does not give one the right to renounce all etiological5

as a prelude to the historical and sociopolitical drama, to set the tone for the entire drama to be played. 4s this "act of force," described in the dimension of theoretical 0no*ledge and metaphysics, a symptom, a cause, a language< :hat must be assumed or elucidated so that the meaning of this question or dissociation can be neutraliBed< -nd if this act of force has a structural affinity *ith the totality of the drama, *hat is the status of this affinity< @inally, *hatever the place reserved for philosophy in this total historical structure may be, *hy the sole choice of the Cartesian example< :hat is the exemplarity of #escartes, *hile so many other philosophers of the same era *ere interested or-no less significantly-not interested in madness in various *ays< @oucault does not respond directly to any of these more than methodological questions, summarily, but inevitably, invo0ed. - single sentence, in his preface, settles the question. (o cite @oucault5 "(o *rite the history of madness thus *ill mean the execution of a structural study of an historical ensemble-notions, institutions, uridical and police measures, scientific concepts-*hich holds captive a madness *hose *ild state can never in itself be restored." 1o* are these elements organiBed in the "historical ensemble"< :hat is a "notion"< #o philosophical notions have a privilege< 1o* are they related to scientific concepts< - quantity of questions that besiege this enterprise. 4 do not 0no* to *hat extent @oucault *ould agree that the prerequisite for a response to such questions is first of all the internal and autonomous analysis of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse. =nly *hen the totality of this content *ill have become manifest in its meaning for me "but this is impossible' *ill 4 rigorously be

great internment." 4t thus opens the boo0 itself, and its location at the beginning of the chapter is fairly unexpected. 7ore than any*here' S' else, the question 4 have ust as0ed seems to me unavoidable here. :e are not told *hether or not this passage of the first 7editation, inter preted by @oucault as a philosophical internment of madness, is destined,

able to situate it in its total historical form. 4t is only then that its reinsertion *ill not do it violence, that there *ill be a legitimate reinsertion of this philosophical meaning itself. -s to #escartes in particular, no historical question about him-about the latent historical meaning of his discourse, about its place in a total structure-can be ans*ered before a rigorous and exhaustive internal analysis of his manifest intentions, of the manifest meaning of his philosophical discourse has been made. :e *ill no* turn to this manifest meaning, this properly philosophical intention that is not legible in the immediacy of a first encounter. /ut first by reading over @oucault's shoulder.

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4 compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, *hose cerebella #escartes, then, is alleged to have executed the act of force in the first of the 7editations, and it *ould very summarily consist in a summary expulsion of the possibility of madness from thought itself 4 shall first cite the decisive passage from #escartes, the one cited by @oucault. (hen *e shall follo* @oucault's reading of the text. @inally, *e shall establish a dialogue bet*een #escartes and @oucault. #escartes *rites the follo*ing "at the moment *hen he underta0es to rid himself of all the opinions in *hich lie had hitherto believed, and to start all over again from the foundations5 a primis fundamentis. (o do so, it *ill suffice to ruin the ancient foundations *ithout being obliged to submit all his opinions to doubt one by one, for the ruin of the foundations brings do*n the entire edifice. =ne of these fragile foundations of 0no*ledge, the most naturally apparent, is sensation. (he senses deceive me sometimes8 they can thus deceive me all the time, and 4 *ill therefore submit to doubt all 0no*ledge *hose origin is in sensation'5 "-ll that up to the present time 4 have accepted as most true and certain 4 have learned either from the senses or through the senses8 but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is *iser not to trust entirely to any thing by *hich *e have once are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of blac0 bile, that they constantly assure us that they thin0 they are 0ings *hen they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple *hen they are really *ithout covering, or *ho imagine that they have an earthen*are head or are nothing but pump0ins or are made of glass . . . " -nd no* the most significant sentence in @oucault's eyes5 "/ut they are mad, sed amentes soot isti, and 4 should not be any the less insane "demens' *ere 4 to follo* examples so extravagant < E I I 4 interrupt my citation not at the end of this paragraph, but on the first *ords of the follo*ing paragraph, *hich reinscribe the lines 4 have ust read in a rhetorical and pedagogical movement *ith highly compressed articulations. (hese first *ords are Praeclare sane ... -lso translated as toutefois >but at the same time-trans.?. -nd this is the beginning of a paragraph in *hich #escartes imagines that he can al*ays dream, and that the *orld might be no more real than his dreams. -nd he generaliBes by hyperbole the hypothesis of sleep and dream ""No* let us assume that *e are asleep ... ''8 this hypothesis and this hyperbole *ill serve in the elaboration of doubt founded on natural reasons "for h

been deceived." #escartes starts a ne* paragraph. "/ut . . . " "sed forte ... 4 insist upon the forte *hich the #uc de )uynes left untranslated, an omission that #escartes did not deem necessary to correct *hen he *ent over the translation. 4t is better, as /aillet says, to compare "the @rench *ith the )atin" *hen reading the 7editations. 4t is only in the second @rench edition by Clerselier that the sed forte is given its full *eight and is translated by "but yet perhaps ... " (he import ance of this point *ill soon be demonstrated.' Pursuing my citation "/ut it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us con cerning things *hich are hardly perceptible, or very far a*ay, there are yet many others to be met *ith as to *hich *e cannot reasonably have anyy doubt ..." >my italics?. (here *ould be, there *ould perhaps be data of sensory origin *hich cannot reasonably be doubted. "-nd ho* could 4, deny that these hands and this body are mine, *ere it not perhaps that

there is also a hyperbolical moment of this doubt', beyond *hose *ill be only the truths of nonsensory origin, mathematical truths r notably, *hich are true "*hether 4 am a*a0e or asleep" and *hich *ill capitulate only to the artificial and metaphysical assault of the evil genius. 1o* does @oucault read this text< -ccording to @oucault, #escartes, encountering madness alongside "the expression alongside is @oucault's' dreams and all forms of sensory error, refuses to accord them all the same treatment, so to spea0. "4n the economy bet*een madness, on the one hand, and error, on the other ..." "4 note in passing that else*here @oucault often denounces the classical reduction of madness to error.' 1e pursues5 "#escartes does not avoid the peril of madness in the same way he circumvents the eventuality of dream and error." @oucault establishes a parallelism bet*een the follo*ing t*o procedures5 4. (he one by *hich #escartes *ishes to demonstrate that the

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senses can deceive us only regarding "things *hich are hardly perceptible, or very far a*ay. (hese *ould be the limits of the error of sensory origin. -nd in the passage 4 ust read, #escartes did say5 "/ut it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things *hich are hardly perceptible, or very far a*ay, there are yet many others to be met *ith as to *hich *e cannot reasonably have any doubt ..." Enless one is mad, a hypothesis seemingly excluded in principle by #escartes in the same passage. 3. (he procedure by *hich #escartes sho*s that imagination and dreams cannot themselves create the simple and universal elements *hich enter into their creations, as, for example, "corporeal nature in general, and its extension, or magnitude and number,"" that is, everything of sensory origin, thereby constituting the ob ects of mathematics and geometry, *hich themselves are invulnerable to natural doubt. 4t is along *ith @oucault, runs tempting to believe, find in the analysis "ta0ing this *ord in its strict sense' of dreams and sensation a nucleus, an element of proximity and to doubt. @oucault says, that 4 "circumvent" doubt and reconquer a certainty. Neither image-peopled sleep, nor the clear consciousness that the me point of s sense universality8 let us admit that our eyes deceive us, 'let us assume *e are asleep'-truth *ill not entirely slip out into the night. @or mad " )ater5 "in the economy of doubt, ness, it is other*ise. on the one hand, and dream and ergo mbalance bet*een madness, on the other. (heir situation in relation see structure of truth8 but madness is inadmissible for the doubtiit sub ect. 4t indeed appears, then, that #escartes does not delve experience of m is, to the point of reaching an irreducible nucleus *ould be interior to madness itself. #escartes is not interest.

madness, he does not *elcome it as a hypothesis, he does not consider it. 1e excludes it by decree. 4 *ould be insane if 4 thought that 4 had a body made of glass. /ut this is excluded, since 4 am thin0ing. -nticipating the moment of the Cogito, *hich *ill have to a*ait the completion of numerous stages, highly rigorous in their succession, @oucault *rites5 "impossibility of being mad that is essential not to the ob ect of thought, but to the thin0ing sub ect." 7adness is expelled, re ected, denounced in its very impossibility from the very interiority of thought itself @oucault is the first, to my 0no*ledge, to have isolated delirium and madness from sensation and dreams in this first 7editation. (he first to have isolated them in their philosophical sense and their methodological function. !uch is the originality of his reading. /ut if the classical interpreters did not deem this dissociation auspicious, is it because of their inattentiveness< /efore ans*ering this questio

n, or uat potca decree of the great internment, or corresponds to it, translates it, or t-this decree *ould have been impossible for a 7ontaigne, *ho *as, as *e 0no*, haunted by the very action of thought itself (he Cartesian decree therefore mar0s, says e avent of a ratio is not co-' structure of ,a event . :e have attempted to read @oucault )et us no* naivelytt . a em p t to 0eread #escartes and, before repeating the question of the relationship re,et us attempt to see, as 4 had er mentioned *hthfh tionship of signifier to signified.' rereading #escartes, 4 notice t*o things5 e,ready a

res vent the eventlitf uay o sensory error or of dreams, and does not

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"surmount" them "*ithin the structure of truth8" and all this for the simple reason that he apparently does not ever, nor in any *ay, surmount them or circumvent them, and does not ever set aside the possibility of total error for all 0no*ledge gained from the senses or from imaginary constructions. 4t must be understood that the hypothesis of dreams is the radicaliBation or, if you *ill, the hyperbolical exaggeration of the hypothesis according to *hich the senses could sometimes deceive me. 4n dreams, the totality of sensory images is illusory. 4t follo*s that a certainty invulnerable to dreams *ould be a fortiori invulnerable to perceptual illusions of the sensory 0ind. 4t therefore suffices to examine the case of dreams in order to deal *ith, on the level *hich is ours for the moment, the case of natural doubt, of sensory perception, and therefore also escape sensory error or imaginative and oneiric composition< (hey are certainties and truths of a nonsensory 4n effect, if 4 am asleep, everything 4 perceive *hile dreaming may be, as #escartes says, "false and illusory," particularly the existence of my hands and my body and the actions of opening my eyes, moving my head, etc. 4n other *ords, *hat *as previously excluded, according , *hy in a moment. /ut, says #escartes, let us suppose that all my oneiri representations of things as naturally certain as the body, hands, etc. tion to that *hich it represents. No*, *ithin these representations, these images, these ideas in the Cartesian sense, everything may be fictitious and false, as in the representations of those painters *hose imaginations, invent something so ne* that its li0e has never been seen the case of painting, at least, there is a final element *hich cannot be' (his is only an analogy, for #escartes does not posit the necessary exist *, ust as there al*ays remains in a painting, ho*ever inventive and but, imaginative it may be, an irreducibly simple and real element--color similarly, there is in dreams an element of noncounterfeit simpliat

presupposed by all fantastical compositions and irreducible to all

ana

coflysislor . /utas*thison timean ly-andanalo this gyisthis*hyelthe example of the painter and ement is neither sensory nor

@or, as a matter of fact, painters, even *hen they study *ith the great est s0ill to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them natures *hich are entirely ne*, but merely ma0e a certain medley of the members of different animals8 or if their imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar has ever before been seen, and that then their *or0 represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colours of *hich this is composed are necessarily real. -nd for the same reason, although these general things, to *it, a body, eyes, a head, hands, and such li0e, may be imaginary, *e are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other ob ects yet more simple and more universal, *hich are real and true8 and of these ust in the same *ay as *ith certain real colours, all these images of things *hich d*ell in our thoughts, *hether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed. (o such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in *hich they are, the time *hich measures their duration, and so on. (hat is possibly why our reasoning is not un ust *hen *e conclude from this that Physics, -stronomy, 7edicine and all other sciences *hich have as their end the consideration of composite things are

, very dubious and uncertain8 but that -rithmetic, 9eometry and other sciences ofthat 0ind *hich only treat of things that are very simple and very general, *ithout ta0ing great trouble to ascertain *hether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty and an element ofthe indubitable. @or *hether 4 am a*a0e or asleep, t*o and three together al*ays f fidh han four sides d it d apparent can be suspected of any falsity.';

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-nd 4 remar0 that the follo*ing paragraph also starts *ith a "nevertheless" "verumtamen' *hich *ill soon be brought to our attention. (hus the certainty of this simplicity of intelligible generaliBation*hich is soon after submitted to metaphysical, artificial, and hyperbolical doubt through the fiction of the evil genius-is in no *ay obtained by a continuous reduction *hich finally lays bare the resistance of a nucleus of sensory or imaginative certainty. (here is discontinuity and a transition to another order of reasoning. (he nucleus is purely intelligible, and the still natural and provisional certainty *hich has been attained supposes a radical brea0 *ith the senses. -t this moment of the analysis, no imaginative or sensory signification, as such, has been saved, no invulnerability of the senses to doubt has been experienced. -ll significations or "ideas" of sensory origin are excluded from the realm of truth, for the same reason as madness is excluded from it. -nd there is nothing astonishing about this5 madness is only a particular case, and, moreover, not the most serious one, of the sensory illusion *hich interests #escartes at this point. 4t can thus be stated that5 3. (he hypothesis of insanity-at this moment of the Cartesian order-seems neither to receive any privileged treatment nor to be submitted to any particular exclusion. )et us reread, in effect, the passage cited by @ou.cault in *hich insanity appears. )et us resituate it. #escartes has ust remar0ed that since the senses sometimes deceive us,'.

*hose ... and 4 should not be any the less insane *ere 4 to follo* examples so extravagant." (he pedagogical and rhetorical sense of the sed forte *hich governs this paragraph is clear. 4t is the "but perhaps" of the feigned ob ection. #escartes has ust said that all 0no*ledge of sensory origin could deceive him. 1e pretends to put to himself the astonished ob ection of an imaginary nonphilosopher *ho is frightened by such audacity and says5 no, not all sensory 0no*ledge, for then you *ould be mad and it thuldideasbeounreasodmen ma f nable to follo* the example of madmen, to put forth e . #escartes echoes this ob ection5 since 4 am here, *riting, and you understand me, 4 am not mad, nor are you, and *e are all sane. (he example of madness is therefore not indicative of the fragility of the sensory idea. !o be it. #escartes acquiesces to this nat ural point of vie*, or rather he feigns to rest in this natural comfort in order better, more radically and more definitively, to unsettle himself from it and to discomfort his interlocutor. !o be it, he says, you thin0 that 4 *ould be mad to doubt that 4 am sitting near the fire, etc., that 4 ould be insane to follo* the example of madmen. 4 *ill therefore propose a hypothesis *hich *ill seem much more natural to you, *ill not disorient you, because it concerns a more common, and more universal experience than that of madness5 the experience of sleep and dreams. #escartes then elaborates the hypothesis that *ill ruin all the sensory foundations of 0no*ledge and *ill lay bare only the intellectual foundations of certainty. (his hypothesis above all *ill not run from the possibility of an insanity-an epistemological one-much more serious than madness. (he reference to dreams is therefore not put off to one side-quite the contrary-in relation to a madness potentially respected or even excluded by #escartes. 4t constitutes, in the methodical order *hich here is ours, the hyperbolical exasperation of the hypothesis of madness. (his latter affected only certain areas of sensory perception, and in a contingent and partial *ay. 7oreover, #escartes is concerned here not *ith determining the concept of madness but *ith utiliBing the popular notion of insanity for uridical and methodological ends, in order to as0 questions of principle regarding only the truth of ideas. I* :hat must be grasped here is that from this point of view the sleeper, or the dreamer, is madder than the madman. =r, at least, the dreamer, insofar
*o

"it is *iser not to trust entirely to any thing by *hich *e have once' been deceived." 1e then starts a ne* paragraph *ith the sed forte *hich 4 brought to your attention a fe* moments ago. No*, the entire paragraph *hich follo*s does not express #escartes's final, definitive conclusions, but rather the astonishment and ob ections of the non philosopher, of the novice in philosophy *ho is frightened by this doubt and protests, saying5 4 am *illing to let you doubt certain sensory perceptions concerning "things *hich are hardly perceptible, or very far a*ay," but the othersL that you are in this place, sitting by the fire, spea0ing thus, this paper in your hands and other seeming certaintiesL #escartes then assumes the astonishment of this reader o naive interlocutor, pretends to ta0e him into account *hen he *rites "-nd ho* could 4 deny that these hands and this body are mine, *ere 4 not perhaps that 4 compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense

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as concerns the problem of 0no*ledge *hich interests #escartes here, is further from true perception than the madman. 4t is in the case of sleep, and not in that of insanity, that the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes suspect, is stripped of "ob ective value" as 7. 9ueroult puts it. (he hypothesis of insanity is therefore not a good example, a revelatory example, a good instrument of doubt-and for at least t*o reasons. "a' 4t does not cover the totality of the field of sensory perception. (he madman is not al*ays *rong about everything8 he is not *rong often enough, is never mad enough. "b' 4t is not a useful or happy example pedagogically, because it meets the resistance of the nonphilosopher *ho does not have the audacity to follo* the philosopher *hen the latter agrees that he might indeed be mad at the very

moment *hen he spea0s. )et us turn to @oucault once more. Confronted *ith the situation of the Cartesian text *hose principles 4 have ust indicated. @oucault couldand this time 4 am only extending the logic of his boo0 *ithout basing *hat 4 say on any particular text-@oucault could recall t*o truths that on a second reading *ould ustify his interpretations, *hich *ould then only apparently differ from the interpretation 4 have ust proposed. $. 4t appears, on this second reading, that, for #escartes, madness is thought of only as a single case-and not the most serious one-among. all cases of sensory error. "@oucault *ould then assume the perspective of the factual determination of the concept of madness by #escartes, and not his uridical usage of it.' 7adness is only a sensory and corporeal fault, a bit more serious than the fault *hich threatens all *a0ing but normal men, and much less serious, *ithin the epistemological order, than the fault to *hich *e succumb in dreams. @oucault *ould then doubtless as0 *hether this reduction of madness to an example, to a case of sensory error, does not constitute an exclusion, an internment and everything relative to the intellect and reason from madness. 4C madness is only a perversion of the senses-or of the imagination-it is corporeal, in alliance *ith the body. (he real distinction of substance expels madness to the outer shado*s of the Cogito. 7adness, to use an of the exterior and to the exterior of the interior. 4t is the other of the

Cogito. 4 cannot be mad *hen 4 thin0 and *hen 4 have clear and distinct ideas. 3. =r, *hile assuming our hypothesis, @oucault could also recall the follo*ing5 #escartes, by inscribing his reference to madness *ithin the problematic of 0no*ledge, by ma0ing madness not only a thing of the body but an error of the body, by concerning himself *ith madness only as the modification of ideas, or the faculties of representation or udgment, intends to neutraliBe the originality of madness. 1e *ould even, in the long run, be condemned to construe it, li0e all errors, not only as an epistemological deficiency but also as a moral failure lin0ed to a precipitation of the *ill8 for *ill alone can consecrate the intellectual finitude of perception as error. 4t is only one step from here to ma0ing madness a sin, a step that *as soon after cheerfully ta0en, as @oucault convincingly demonstrates in other chapters. @oucault *ould be perfectly correct in recalling these t*o truths to us if *e *ere to remain at the naive, natural, and premetaphysical stage of #escartes's itinerary, the stage mar0ed by natural doubt as it intervenes in the passage that @oucault cites. 1o*ever, it seems that these t*o truths become vulnerable in turn, as soon as *e come to the properly philosophical, metaphysical, and critical phase of doubt. 4& )et us first notice ho*, in the rhetoric of the first 7editation, the first toutefois >at the same time? *hich announced the "natural" hyperbole of dreams " ust after #escartes says, "/ut they are mad, and 4 should not be any the less insane," etc.' is succeeded by a second toutefois >nevertheless? at the beginning of the next paragraph." (o "at the same

time," mar0ing the hyperbolical moment *ithin natural doubt, *ill correspond " " a nevertheless, mar0ing the absolutely hyperbolical moment *hich gets us out of natural doubt and leads to the hypothesis of the evil genius. #escartes has ust admitted that arithmetic, geometry, and simple notions escape the first doubt, and he *rites, "Nevertheless 4 have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an all-po*erful 9od existed by *hom 4 have been created such as 4 am."" (his is the onset of the ell-0no*n movement leading to the fiction of the evil genius. No*, the recourse to the fiction of the evil genius *ill evo0e, con ure up, the possibility of a total madness, a total derangement over '*hich 4 could have no control because it is inflicted upon me hypothetically-leaving me no responsibility for it. (otal derangement

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is the possibility of a madness that is no longer a disorder of the body, of the ob ect, the body-ob ect outside the boundaries of the res cogitans, outside the boundaries of the policed city, secure in its existence as thin0ing sub ectivity, but is a madness that *ill bring subversion to pure thought and to its purely intelligible ob ects, to the field of its clear and distinct ideas, to the realm of the mathematical truths *hich escape natural doubt. (his time madness, insanity, *ill spare nothing, neither bodily nor purely intellectual perceptions. -nd #escartes successively udges

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apparently prephilosophical confidence is hidden the recognition of an essential and principled truth5 to *it, if discourse and philosophical communication "that is, language itself' are to have an intelligible meaning, that is to say, if they are to conform to their essence and vocation as discourse, they must simultaneously in fact and in principle escape madness. (hey must carry normality *ithin themselves. -nd this is not a specifically Cartesian *ea0ness "although #escartes never confronts the question of his o*n language', 3$ is not a defect or mysti fication lin0ed to a determined historical structure, but rather is an essential and universal necessity from *hich no discourse can escape, or it belongs to the meaning of meai 4 nng.t is an essential necessity , even te discourse *hich denounces a mystification or an act of force. -nd, paradoxically, *hat 4 am .r *e can no* appreciate the profundity of the follo*ing affirmation of @oucault's that curiously againstim5 "7adness is the absence of a *or0." (his is a fundamental motif of @oucault's boo0. No*, the *or0 starts *ith the most elementary discourse, *ith the first articulation of a meaning, *ith the first syntactical usage of an as s to mif .s normaity *ithin it, that is, !Be, in every sense of the *ord-#escartes's in particular. 4t carries normality and sense *ithin it, and does so *hatever the state, *hatever e health or madness of him *ho pd ropouns it, or *hom it passes articulated 4 i ,s , orca reason. -nd if madness nee, essentially and generan a *ound that open up
as historicity in general. Not a determined silence, imposed at one given ,

"a' (hat *hich he pretended not to admit *hile conversing *ith d" heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of *hich this genius has, availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity8 4 shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believin *ill be ta0en up again in the second 7editiation. :e are thus quite far "b' (hat *hich escapes natural doubt5 "/ut ho* do 4 0no* tha, 1ell "i.e., the deceiving 9od, before the recourse to the evil genius' has not brought it to pass that ... 4 am not deceived every time that 4 ad t*o and three, or count the sides of a square... <" J (hus, ideas of neither sensory nor intellectual origin *ill be sh, tered set aside as insanity is no* *elcomed into the most essential interio 4n question is a philosophical and uridical operation "but the, phase of doubt *as already such' *hich no longer names madness. subversion named insanity, although in fact and from a natural poin vie*, for #escartes, for his reader, and for us, no natural anxi possible regarding this actual subversion. "(ruthfully spea0ing, to. itself, the question of *hat is de facto and *hat de ute in the relati the Cogito and madness.' /eneath this natural comfort, benea

ul

prohibition _11

ce essentialy lin0ed to an "force and a

ich op hi thinxhe dimensionenstory and speech. 4n general. eernty, nor *ith an empirically , sience pays the irredu role of that *hich bears and haunts language, outside and against s e r e si mu l t a n e o u s ly

## WRITING AND DIFFERENCE designating the content from which form ta%es off +y force, and the adversary against whom 9 assure and reassure myself +y force. ,lthough the silence of madness is the a+sence of a wor%, this silence is not simply the wor%'s epigraph, nor is it, as concerns language and meaning, outside the wor%. (i%e nonmeaning, silence is the wor%'s limit and profound resource. 5f course, in essentiali3ing madness this way one runs the ris% of disintegrating the factual findings of psychiatric efforts. his is a permanent danger, +ut it should not discourage the demanding and patient psychiatrist. So that, to come +ac% to Descartes, any philosopher or spea%ing su+&ect *and the philosopher is +ut the spea%ing su+&ect par e)cellence2 who must evo%e madness from the interior of thought *and not only from within the +ody or some other e)trinsic agency2, can do so only in the realm of the possi+le and in the language of fiction or the fiction of language. here+y, through his own language, he reassures himself tive, another pro+lem-and can %eep his distance, the distance indispensa+le for continuing to spea% and to live. 6ut this is not a wea%ness or a search for security proper to a given historical language *for e)ample, the search for certainty in the ;artesian style2, +ut is rather inherent in the essence and very pro&ect of all language in gen eral> and even in the language of those who are apparently the maddest> and even and a+ove all in the language of those who, +y their praise of madness, +y their complicity with it, measure their own strength against the greatest possi+le pro)imity to madness. (anguage +eing the +rea% with madness, it adheres more thoroughly to its essence and vocation, ma%es a cleaner +rea% with madness, if it pits itself against madness more freely and gets closer and closer to it. to the point o +eing separated from it only +y the "transparent sheet" of which 7oyce spea%s, that is, +y itself-for this diaphaneity is nothing other than the language, meaning, possi+ility, and elementary discretion of a nothing'' that neutrali3es everything. 9n this sense, 9 would +e tempted to con sider 'oucault's +oo% a powerful gesture of protection and internment. , ;artesian gesture for the twentieth century. , reappropriation ofnegativity. o all appearances, it is reason that he interns, +ut, li%e possi+ility of meaning in general. Descartes, he chooses the reason
COGITO AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS 67 =.

,s for the second truth 'oucault could have countered with, it ly onseemsceasesvatolidreonlyectduring the natural phase of dou+t. Descartes not & madness during the phase of radical dou+t, he not only installs its possi+le menace at the very heart of the intelligi+le, he also in principle refuses to let any determined %nowledge escape from madness. , menace to all %nowledge, insanity-the hypothesis of insanity-is not an internal modification of %nowledge. ,t no point will %nowledge alone +e a+le to dominate madness, to master it in order to o+&ectify it-at least for as long as dou+t remains unresolved. 'or the end of dou+t poses a pro+lem to which we shall return in a moment. he act of the ;ogito and the certainty of e)isting indeed escape madness the first time> +ut aside from the fact that for the first time, it is no longer a :uestion of o+&ective, representative %nowledge, it can no longer literally +e said that the ;ogito would escape madness +ecause it %eeps itself +eyond the grasp of madness, or +ecause, as 'oucault says, "9 who thin%, 9 cannot +e mad"> the ;ogito escapes madness only +ecause at its own moment, under its own authority, it is valid even if 9 am mad, even if my thoughts are completely mad. here is a value and a meaning of the ;ogito, as of e)istence, which escape the alternative of a determined madness or a determined reason. ;onfronted with the critical e)perience of the ;ogito, insanity, as stated in the Discourse on ?ethod, is irremedia+ly on a plane with scepticism. hought no longer
too

so certain and so assured that all the most e)travagant suppositions +rought forward +y the sceptics were incapa+le of sha%ing it."=1 he certainty thus attained need not +e sheltered from an emprisoned madness, for it is attained and ascertained within madness itself it is valid even if 9 am mad-a supreme self-confidence that seems to re:uire neither the e)clusion nor the circumventing of madness. Descartes never interns madness, neither at the stage of natural dou+t nor at the the first stage, during the nonhyper+olical moment of natural dou+t. he hyper+olical audacity of the ;artesian ;ogito, its mad audacity, cartes's contemporary, we are too well assured of ourselves and too critical e)perience of it-its mad audacity would consist in the return to

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an original point *hich no longer belongs to either a determined reason or a determined unreason, no longer belongs to them as opposition or alternative. :hether 4 atn mad or not, Cogito, sum. 7adness is therefore, in every sense of the *ord, only one case of thought "*ithin thought'. 4t is therefore a question of dra*ing bac0 to*ard a point at *hich all determined contradictions, in the form of given, factual historical structures, can appear, and appear as relative to this Bero point at *hich determined meaning and nonmeaning come together in their com-n mon origin. @rom the point of vie* *hich here is ours, one could perhaps say the follo*ing about this Bero point, determined by #escartes as Cogito. 4nvulnerable to all determined opposition bet*een reason and unreason, it is the point starting from *hich the history of the determined forms of this opposition, this opened or bro0en-off dialogue, can appear as such and be stated. 4t is the impenetrable point of certainty in *hich the possibility of @oucault's narration, as *ell as of the narration of the totality, or rather of all the determined forms of the exchanges bet*een reason and madness are embedded. 4t is the point' at *hich the pro ect of thin0ing this totality by escaping it is *hich-*ithin existence-is possible only in the direction of infinity or nothingness8 for even if the totality of *hat 4 thin0 is imbued *ith even if nonmeaning has invaded the totality of the *orld, up to and including the very contents of my thought, 4 still thin0, 4 am *hile 4 thin0. 6ven if 4 do not in fact grasp the totality, if 4 neither understand.$ nor embrace it, 4 still formulate the pro ect of doing so, and this pro ect. is meaningful in such a *ay that it can be defined only in relation to a precomprehension of the infinite and undetermined totality. (his is, meaningful, *hich exceeds all that is real, factual, and existent, this pro ect is rnad, and ac0no*ledges madness as its liberty and its very possibility. (his is *hy it is not human, in the sense of anthropological itself in its *ar *ith the demon, the evil genius of nonmeaning8 by, pitting itself against the strength of the evil genius, and by resisting him through reduction of the natural man *ithin itself. 4n this sen

nothing is less reassuring than the Cogito at its proper and inaugural moment. (he pro ect of exceeding the totality of the *orld, as the totality of *hat 4 can thin0 in general, is no more reassuring than the dialectic of !ocrates *hen it, too, overflo*s the totality of beings, planting us in the light of a hidden sun *hich is epe0eina tes ousias. -nd 9laucon *as not mista0en *hen he cried out5 ")ordL *hat demonic hyperbole< daimonias hyperboles," *hich is perhaps banally translated as "marvelous transcendence."3+ (his demonic hyperbole goes further than the passion of hybris, at least if this latter is seen only as the pathological modification of the being called man. !uch a hybris 0eeps itself *ithin the *orld. -ssuming that it is deranged and excessive, it implies the fundamental derangement and excessiveness of the hyperbole *hich opens and founds the *orld as such by exceeding it. 1ybris is excessive and exceeds only *ithin the space opened by the demonic hyperbole. (he extent to *hich doubt and the Cartesian Cogito are punctuated by this pro ect of a singular and unprecedented excess-an excess in the direction of the nondeterinined, Nothingness or 4nfinity, an excess

of beings and determined meanings, the totality of factual history-is also the extent to *hich any effort to reduce this pro ect, to enclose it *ithin a determined historical structure, ho*ever comprehensive, ris0s missing the essential, ris0s dulling the point itself !uch an effort ris0s doing violence to this pro ect in turn "for there is also a violence applicable to rationalists and to sense, to good sense8 and this, perhaps, is *hat @oucaun5 * boo0 definitely demonstrates, for the victims of *hom he good sense hidden and oppressed by the determined "good sense" of the al*ays determined too quic0ly'-ris0s doing it violence in turn, and a and the origin of meaning." 4 use "totalitarian" in the structuralist bec0on each other historically. !tructuralist totalttariansim here *ould be responsible for an internment of the Cogito similar to the violences of the classical age. 4 am not saying that @oucault's boo0 is for at least at its outset it poses the question of the origin of historicity

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in general, thereby freeing itself of historicism8 4 am saying, ho*ever, that by virtue of the construction of his pro ect he sometimes runs the ris0 of being totalitarian. )et me clarify5 *hen 4 refer to the forced entry into the *orld of that *hich is not there and is supposed by the *orld, or *hen 4 state that the compelle intrare "epigraph of the chapter on "the great internment"' becomes violence itself *hen it turns to*ard the hyperbole in order to ma0e hyperbole reenter the *orld, or *hen 4 say that this reduction to intra*orldliness is the origin and very meaning of *hat is called violence, ma0ing possible all strait ac0ets, 4 am not invo0ing an other *orld, an alibi or an evasive transcendence. (hat *ould be yet another possibility of violence, a possibility that is, moreover, often the accomplice of the first one. 4 thin0, therefore, that "in #escartes' everything can be reduced to a determined historical totality except the hyperbolical pro ect. No*, this pro ect belongs to the narration narrating itself and not to the narration

6=1I0= AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS 71

*orld, *hich is given to us by 9od as terra firma. @or, finally, it is 9od alone *ho, by permitting me to extirpate myself from a Cogito that at its proper moment can al*ays remain a silent madness, also insures my representations and my cognitive determinations, that is, my discourse against madness. 4t is *ithout doubt that, for #escartes, 9od alone 3G protects me against the madness to *hich the Cogito, left to its o*n ea authority'sr, could only open itself up in the most hospitable *ay. -nd ding seems to me po*erful and illuminating not at the @oucault stage of the text *hich he cites, *hich is anterior and secondary to the Cogito, but from the moment *hich immediately succeeds the instantaneous experience of the Cogito at its most intense, *hen reason and madness have not yet been separated, *hen to ta0e the part of the Cogito is neither to ta0e the part of reason as reasonable order, nor the part of disorder and madness, but is rather to grasp, once more, the source mnatngrom the moment *hen the Cogito must reflect and proffer itself in an organiBed philosophical discourse. (hat is, almost al*ays. @or if the Cogito is valid even for the madman, to be mad-if once more, this expression has a singular philosophical meaning, *hich 4 do not believe5 ys the other of each determined form of the logos it simply say not to be able to reflect a n d t o s ay t h e C o g i t o , t h a t i s , n o t t o b e a b l e t o 0 h mae te Cogito appear e myself @rom the moment *hen #escartes Pronounces the Cogito, he inscribes it in a system of s *ellspring and constrain the error b o t t o m , l e av i n g i n si l e n c e t h e p r o b l emay mf hbe circumvented. -t o speec posed by the Cogito, #escartes seems to imply that thin0ing and saying *hat is clear and distinct are the same thing. =ne can say *hat one thin0s and that one in0s ogously-analogou sly =nly-!aint -nselm sa* in the insipiens, the insane man, someone *ho n *at he said. 7adness *as him, too, a silence, the voluble silef nce o a thought that did not ont *ic must be developed ther 4n any event, the Cogito is a *or0 as soon as it is assured of t it says. , maness. 4f the madman could uff the evil genius, he could not tell himself so. 1e therefore cannot
er.na

narrated by @oucault. 4t cannot be recounted, cannot be ob ectified as, 4 am sure that *ithin the movement *hich is called the Cartesian Cogito this hyperbolical extremity is not the only element that should be, li0e pure madness in general, silent. -s soon as #escartes has Cogito through 9od, to identify the act of the Cogito *ith a reasonable reason -nd he does so as soon as he proffers and reflects the Cogito. (hat is . to say, he must temporaliBe the Cogito, *hich itself is valid only during at the point, the sharpest point, of the instant. -nd here one should be raliBation. @or if the Cogito is valid even for the maddest madman, one must, in fact, not be mad if one is to reflect it and retain it, if one is to communicate it and its meaning. -nd here, *ith the reference to 9 and to a certain memory,3, *ould begin the hurried repatriation of mad and hyperbolical *anderings *hich no* ta0e shelter and given reassurance *ithin the order of reasons, in order once more ta0e possession of the truths they had left behind. :ithin #escartes text, at least, the internment ta0es place at this point. 4t is here hyperbolical and mad *anderings once more become itinerary method, "assured" and "resolute" progression through our exis

, 3 WRITING AND DIFFERENCE say so. -nd in any event, @oucault is right in the extent to *hich the pro ect of constraining any *andering already animated a doubt *hich *as al*ays proposed as methodical. (his identification of the Cogito *ith reasonable-normal-reason need not even a*ait-in fact, if not in principle-the proofs of the existence of a veracious 9od as the supreme protective barrier against madness. (his identification intervenes from the moment *hen #escartes determines natural light "*hich in its undetermined source should be valid even for the mad', from the moment *hen he pulls himself out of madness by determining natural light through a series of principles and axioms "axiom of causality according to *hich there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect8 then, after this axiom permits the proof of the existence of 9od, the axioms that "the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect"'." (hese dogmatic ally determined axioms escape doubt, are never even submitted to its scrutiny, are established only reciprocally, on the basis of the existence and truthfulness of 9od. #ue to this fact, they fall *ithin the province of the history of 0no*ledge and the determined structures of phil osophy. (his is *hy the act of the Cogito, at the hyperbolical moment *hen it pits itself against madness, or rather lets itself be pitted against madness, must be repeated and distinguished from the language or

COGITO AND THE HISTORY OF MADNESS 73 *ithin the chain of reasons. /ut it is our belief that this movement can be described *ithin its o*n time and place only if one has previously disengaged the extremity of hyperbole, *hich @oucault seemingly has not done. 4n the fugitive and, by its essence, ungraspable moment *hen it still escapes the linear order of reasons, the order of reason in general and the determinations of natural light, does not the Cartesian Cogito lend itself to repetition, up to a certain point, by the 1usserlian Cogito and by the critique of #escartes implied in it< (his *ould be an example only, for some day the dogmatic and historically determined grounds-ours-*ill be discovered, *hich the critique of Cartesian deductivism, the impetus and madness of the 1usserlian reduction of the totality of the *orld, first had to rest on, and then had to fall onto in order to be stated. =ne could do for 1usserl *hat @oucault has done for #escartes5 demonstrate ho* the neturaliBation of the factual *orld is a neutraliBation "in the sense in *hich to neutraliBe is also to master, to reduce, to leave free in a strait ac0et' of nonmeaning, the most subtle form of an act of force. -nd in truth, 1usserl increasingly associated the theme of normality *ith the theme

of the transcendental reduction. (he embedding of transcendental phenomenology in the metaphysics of presence, the entire 1usserlian thematic of the living present is the profound reassurance of the certainty of meaning. /y separating, *ithin the Cogito, on the one hand, hyperbole "*hich 4 maintain cannot be enclosed in a factual and determined historical structure, for it is the pro ect of exceeding every finite and determined totality', and, on the other hand, that in #escartes's philosophy "or in the philosophy supporting the -ugustinian Cogito or the 1usserlian Cogito as *ell' *hich belongs to a factual historical structure, 4 am not proposing the separation of the *heat from the tares in every philosophy in the name of some philosophia perennis. 4ndeed, it is exactly the contrary that 4 am proposing. 4n question is a w a y of accounting for the ery historicity of philosophy. 4 believe that historicity in general the latter *ould be impossible if *e possessed only hyperbole, on the one hand, or, on the other, only determined historical structures, finite :dtanschauungen. (he historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the dialogue bet*een hyperbole and the

the deductive system in *hich #escartes must inscribe it as soon as he proposes it for apprehension and communication, that is, as soon as he reflects the Cogito for the other, *hich means for oneself 4t is through this relationship to the other as an other self that meaning reassures reassurance given against the anguish of being mad at the point of greatest proximity to madness. (his silent and specific moment could' be called pathetic. -s for the functioning of the hyperbole in the struc ture of #escartes's discourse and in the order of reasons, our reading is therefore, despite all appearances to the contrary, profoundly aligned *ith @oucault's. 4t is indeed #escartes-and everything for *hich this' name serves as an index-it is indeed the system of certainty that first of all functions in order to inspect, master, and limit hyperbole, and does so both by determining it in the ether of a natural light *hose axioms are from the outset exempt from hyperbolical doubt, and by ma0ing of hyperbolical doubt a point of transition firmly maintained

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finite structure, bet*een that *hich exceeds the totality and the closed totality, in the difference bet*een history and historicity8 that is, in the place *here, or rather at the moment *hen, the Cogito and all that it symboliBes here "madness, derangement, hyperbole, etc.' pronounce and reassure themselves then to fall, necessarily forgetting themselves until their reactivation, their rea*a0ening in another statement of the excess *hich also later *ill become another decline and another crisis. @rom its very first breath, speech, confined to this temporal rhythm of crisis and rea*a0ening, is able to open the space for discourse only by emprisoning madness. (his rhythm, moreover, is not an alternation that additionally *ould be temporal. 4t is rather the movement of temporaliBation itself as concerns that *hich unites it to the movement of logos. /ut this violent liberation of speech is possible and can be pursued only in the extent to *hich it 0eeps itself resolutely and consciously at the greatest possible proximity to the abuse that is the usage of speech- ust close enough to say violence, to dialogue *ith itself as irreducible violence, and ust far enough to live and live as speech. #ue to this, crisis or oblivion perhaps is not an accident, but rather the destiny of spea0ing philosophy-the philosophy *hich lives only by emprisoning madness, but *hich *ould die as thought, and by a still *orse violence, if a ne* speech did not at every instant liberate previous madness *hile enclosing *ithin itself, in its present existence, the madman of the day. 4t is only by virtue of this oppression of madness that finite-thought, that is to say, history, can reign. 6xtending this truth to historicity in general, *ithout 0eeping to a determined historical moment, one could say that the reign of finite thought can be established only on the basis of the more or less disguised internment, humiliation, fettering and moc0ery of the madman *ithin us, of the madman *ho can only be the fool of a logos *hich is father, master, and 0ing. /ut that is another discourse and another story. 4 *ill conclude by citing @oucault once more. )ong after the passage on #escartes, some three hundred pages later, introducing 2ameau's Nephe* @oucault *rites, *ith a sigh of remorse5 "4n doubt's confrontation *ith its ma or dangers, #escartes realiBed that he could not be mad-though he *as to ac0no*ledge for a long time to come that all the po*ers of,8, unreason 0ept vigil around his thought."" :hat *e have attempted to do here this evening is to situate ourselves *ithin the interval of this

remorse, @oucault's remorse, #escartes's remorse according to @oucault8 and *ithin the space of stating that, "though he *as to ac0no*ledge for a long time to come," *e have attempted not to extinguish the other light, a blac0 and hardly natural light, the vigil of the "po*ers of unreason" around the Cogito. :e have attempted to requite ourselves to*ard the gesture *hich #escartes uses to requite himself as concerns the menacing po*ers of madness *hich are the adverse origin of philosophy. -mong all @oucault's claims to my gratitude, there is thus also that of having made me better anticipate, more so by his monumental boo0 than by the naive reading of the 7editations, to *hat degree the philosophical act can no longer no longer be in memory of Cartesianism, if to be Cartesian, as #escartes himself doubtless understood it, is to attempt to be Cartesian. (hat is to say, as 4 have at least tried to demonstrate, toattempt-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole from *hose heights thought is announced to itself, frightens itself, and reassures itself against being annihilated or *rec0ed in madness or in death. -t its height hyperbole, the absolute opening, the uneconomic expenditure, is al*ays reembraced by an economy and is overcome by economy. (he relationship bet*een reason, madness, and death is an economy, a structure of deferral *hose irreducible originality must be respected. (his attemptto-say-the-demonic-hyperbole is not an attempt among others8 it is not an attempt *hich *ould occasionally and eventually be completed by the saying of it, or by its ob ect, the direct ob ect of a *illful sub ectivity. (his attempt to say, *hich is not,, moreover, the antagonist of silence, but rather the condition for it, is the original profoundity of *ill in general. Nothing, further, *ould be more incapable of regrasping this *ill than voluntarism, for, as finitude and as history, this attempt is also a first passion. 4t 0eeps *ithin itself the trace of a violence. 4t is more *ritten than said, it is economiBed. (he economy of this *riting is a regulated relationship bet*een that *hich exceeds and the exceeded totality5 the differance of the absolute excess. (o define philosophy as the attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole is to confess-and philosophy is perhaps this gigantic confession-that by virtue of the historical enunciation through *hich philosophy tranquiliBes itself and excludes madness, philosophy also betrays itself "or betrays itself as thought', enters into a crisis and a forgetting of itself

that are an essential and necessary period of its movement. 4 philosophiBe only in terror, but in the confessed terror of going mad. (he confession is simultaneously, at its present moment, oblivion and unveiling, protection and exposure5 economy. /ut this crisis in *hich reason is madder than madness-for reason is nonmeaning and oblivion-and in *hich madness is more rational than reason, for it is closer to the *ellspring of sense, ho*ever silent or murmuring-this crisis has al*ays begun and is interminable. 4t suffices to say that, if it is classic, it is not so in the sense of the classical age but in the sense of eternal and essential classicism, and is also historical in an unexpected sense. -nd no*here else and never before has the concept of crisis been able to enrich and reassemble all its potentialities, all the energy of its meaning, as much, perhaps, as in 7ichel @oucault's boo0. 1ere, the crisis is on the one hand, in 1usserl's sense, the danger menacing reason and meaning under the rubric of ob ectivism, of the forgetting of origins, of the blan0eting of origins by the rationalist and transcendental unveiling itself #anger as the movement of reason menaced by its o*n security, etc. /ut the crisis is also decision, the caesura of *hich @oucault spea0s, in the sense of 0rinein, the choice and division bet*een the t*o *ays separated by Parmenides in his poem, the *ay of logos and the non*ay, the labyrinth, the palintrope in *hich logos is lost8 the *ay of meaning and the *ay of nonmeaning8 of /eing and of non-/eing. - division on *hose basis, after *hich, logos, in the necessary violence of its irruption, is separated from itself as madness, is exiled from itself, forgetting its origin and its o*n possibility. 4s not *hat is called finitude possibility as crisis< - certain identity bet*een the consciousness of crisis and the forgetting of it< =f the thin0ing of negativity and the reduction of negativity< Crisis of reason, finally, access to reason and attac0 of reason. @or *hat 7ichel @oucault teaches us to thin0 is that there are crises of reason in strange complicity *ith *hat the *orld calls crises of madness.

3
EDMOND JABES AND THE QUESTION OF THE BOOK
=ur rereadings of De bdtis ma demeure' *ill be better, henceforth. - certain ivy could have hidden or absorbed its meaning, could have turned its meaning in on itself 1umor and games, laughter and dances, songs, circled graciously around a discourse *hich, as it did not yet love its true root, bent a bit in the *ind. #id not yet stand upright in order to enunciate only the rigor and rigidity of poetic obligation. 4n )e livre des questions' the voice has not been altered, nor the intention abandoned, but the accent is more serious. - po*erful and ancient root is exhumed, and on it is laid bare an ageless *ound "for *hat Dabes teaches us is that roots spea0, that *ords *ant to gro*, and that poetic discourse ta0es root in a *ound'5 in question is a certain Dudaism as the birth and passion of *riting. (he passion of *riting, the love and endurance of the letter itself *hose sub ect is not decidably the De* or the )etter itself Perhaps the common root of a people and of *riting. 4n any event, the incommensurable destiny *hich grafts the history of a
race born of the book (Livre des questions, p. 3&'

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onto the radical origin of meaning as literality, that is, onto historicity itself. @or there could be no history *ithout the gravity and labor of literality, (he painful folding of itself *hich permits history to reflect itself as it ciphers itself. (his reflection is its beginning. (he only thing that begins by reflecting itself is history. -nd this fold, this furro*, is the De*. (he De* *ho elects *riting *hich elects the De*, in an exchange responsible for truth's thorough suffusion *ith historicity and for history's assignment of itself to its empiricity.
difficulty of being a Jew, which coincides with the difficulty of writing for Judais! and writing are but the sa!e waiting, the sa!e hope, the sa!e

4n question is a labor, a deliverance, a slo* gestation of the poet by the poem *hose father he is.
Little by little the book will finish !e. (L%espace blanc)

depletion.

"ibid., p. 132#

(he poet is thus indeed the sub ect of the boo0, its substance and its master, its servant and its theme. -nd the boo0 is indeed the sub ect of the poet, the spea0ing and 0no*ing being *ho in the boo0 *rites on the boo0. (his movement through *hich the boo0, articulated by the voice of the poet, is folded and bound to itself, the movement through *hich the boo0 becomes a sub ect in itself and for itself, is not critical or speculative reflection, but is, first of all, poetry and history. @or in its representation of itself the sub ect is shattered and opened. :riting is itself *ritten, but also ruined, made into an abyss, in its o*n representation. (hus, *ithin this boo0, *hich infinitely reflects itself and *hich develops as a painful questioning of its o*n possibility, the form of the boo0 represents itself5

(he exchange bet*een the De* and *riting as a pure and founding exchange, an exchange *ithout prerogatives in *hich the original appeal is, in another sense of the *ord, a convocation-this is the most persistent affirmation of the )ivre des questions5
You are he who writes and is written. And Reb Ilde: "What difference is there between choosing and being; chosen when we can do nothing but submit to the choice?" #he novel of &arah and 'ukel, through various dialogues and !editations attributed to i!aginary rabbis, is the story of a love destroyed by !en and by words. (t has the di!ensions of a book and the bitter obstinacy of a wandering question. (Livre des questions, p. 26#

"ibid., p. 30# -nd through a 0ind of silent displacement to*ard the essential *hich ma0es of this boo0 one long metonymy, the situation of the De* becomes exemplary of the situation of the poet, the man of speech and of *riting. (he poet, in the very experience of his freedom, findT himself both bound to language and delivered from it by a speech *hose master, nonetheless, he himself is.
"ords choose the poet....

:e *ill see that by another direction of metonymy-but to *hat extent is it other<-the )ivre des questions describes the generation of 9od himself. (he *isdom of the poet thus culminates its freedom in the passion of translating obedience to the la* of the *ord into autonomy. ':ithout *hich, and if passion becomes sub ection, the poet is mad.
#he !ad!an is the victi! of the rebellion of words. (Je batis !a de!eure)

#he art of the writer consists in little by little !aking words interest the!e$ selves in his books. (Je batis !a de!e()re)

-lso, through his understanding of this assignment of the root, and through the inspiration he receives from this in unction of the )a*, Dabes perhaps has renounced the verve, that is, the capriciousness of the early

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*or0s8 but he has in no *ay given up his freedom of speech. 1e has even ac0no*ledged that freedom must belong to the earth, to the root, or it is merely *ind5
* teaching that +eb ,alr translated with this i!age$ -'ou think that it is

assumes that the poet does not simply receive his speech and his la* from 9od. Dudaic heteronomy has no need of a poet's intercession. Poetry is to prophecy *hat the idol is to truth. 4t is perhaps for this reason that in Dabes the poet and the De* seem at once so united and disunited, and that the entire )ivre des questions is also a self- ustification addressed to the De*ish community *hich lives under heteronomy and to *hich the poet does not truly belong. Poetic autonomy, comparable to none other, presupposes bro0en (ables.
*nd +eb Li!a$ 1reedo!, at first, was engraved ten ti!es in the #ables of the Law, but we deserve it so little that the Prophet broke the! in his anger.

which we beco!e aware of our ties, like the sleeper of his senses then our acts finally have a na!e.-

@reedom allies and exchanges itself *ith that *hich restrains it, *ith everything it receives from a buried origin, *ith the gravity *hich ,,8,, Provided that this !ite is not a site, an enclosure, a place of province or a ghetto. :hen a De* or a poet proclaims the !ite, he is not declaring *ar. @or this site, this land, calling to us from beyond meets ory, is al*ays else*here. (he site is not the empirical and national 4ere , tradition as adventure. @reedom is granted to the nonpagan )and only if' it is separated from freedom by the #esert of the Promise. (hat is, by )and al*ays 0eeps itself beyond any proximity, illic5
'ukel, you have always been ill at ease with yourself, you are never ?/2/)

"4bid., P. 124# /et*een the fragments of the bro0en (ables the poem gro*s and the right to speech ta0es root. =nce more begins the adventure of the text as *eed, as outla* far from "the fatherland of the De*s," *hich is a "sacred text surrounded by commentaries" "p. $A%'. (he necessity of commentary, li0e poetic necessity, is the very form of exiled speech. 4n the beginning is hermeneutics. /ut the shared necessity of exegesis, .the interpretive imperative, is interpreted differently by the rabbi and the poet. (he difference bet*een the horiBon of the original text and exegetic *riting ma0es the difference bet*een the rabbi and the poet irreducible. @orever unable to reunite *ith each other, yet so close to each other, ho* could they ever regain the realm< (he original opening of interpretation essentially signifies that there *ill
always be rabbis and poets. -nd t*o interpretations of interpret ton.' (he )a* then becomes Muestion and the right to speech coincides *ith the duty to interrogate. (he boo0 of man is a boo0

"4bid., p..;;'
"hat are you drea!ing of./ #he Land./ 0ut you are on land./ l,o! drea!ing of the Land where ( will be./0ut we are right in front of ea
11

of question.
-#o every question, the Jew answers with a question.- +eb Le!a

which leads, as it is said, to the Land.

(he Poet and the De* are not born here but else*here. (hey *and separated from their true birth. -utochthons only of speech an *riting, -utochthons of the /oo0. -utonomous too, as *e said. :ht f

/ut if this right is absolute, it is because it does not depend upon ate accident *ithin history. (he brea0ing of the (ables articulates, first , 'a rupture *ithin 9od as the origin of history.U

23 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ 4o not forget that you are the nucleus of a rupture.

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*9+id., P. !1$2 God separated himself from himself in order to let us spea%, in order to astonish and to interrogate us. 4e did so not +y spea%ing +ut +y %eeping still, +y letting silence interrupt his voice and his signs, +y letting the a+les +e +ro%en. 9n -)odus God repented and said so at least twice, +efore the first and +efore the new a+les, +etween o n girial speech and writing and, within Scripture, +etween the origin and repetition *-)odus 1=.!I> 11.!$2. Writing is, thus, originally hermetic and secondary. 5ur writing, certainly, +ut already 4is, which starts with the stifling of his voice and the dissimulation of his 'ace. his difference, this negativity in God is our freedom, the transcendence and the ver+ which can relocate the purity of their negative origin only in the possi+ility of the Juestion. he :uestion of "the irony of God," of which Schelling spo%e, is first, as always, turned in on itself
5od is in perpetual revolt against 5od. (Livre des questions, P. !$$2

he clumsy, e:uivocal way of the detour, +orrowed +y God from God. 9rony of God, ruse of God, the o+li:ue way, +orn of God, the path toward God of which man is not a simple detour. he infinite detour. Way of God. "Du%el, spea% to us of the man who is a lie in God" *p. "I2. his way, preceded +y no truth, and thus lac%ing the prescription of truth's rigor, is the way through the Desert. Writing is the moment of the desert as the moment of Separation. ,s their name indicates-in ,ramaic-the Pharisees, those misunderstood men of literality, were also "separated ones." God no longer spea%s to us> he has interrupted himself. we must ta%e words upon ourselves. We must +e separated from life and communities, and must entrust ourselves to traces, must +ecome men of vision +ecause we have ceased hearing the voice from within the immediate pro)imity of the garden. "Sarah, Sarah with what does the world +eginF-With speechF-With visionF" *p. !$12. Writing is displaced on the +ro%en line +etween lost and promised speech. he difference +etween speech and writing is sin, the anger of God emerging from itself, lost immediacy, wor% outside the garden. " he garden is speech, the desert writing. 9n each grain of sand a sign surprises" *p. !#"2. he 7udaic e)perience as reflection, as separation of life and thought, signifies the crossing of the +oo% as an infinite anchoritism placed +etween two immediacies and two self-identifications. "Do%el, how many pages to live, how many to die, separate you from yourself, separate you from the +oo% to the a+andoning of the +oo%F" *p. II2. he desert-+oo% is made of sand, "of mad sand," of infinite, innumera+le and vain sand. "Pic% up a little sand, wrote 8e+ 9vri ... then you will %now the vanity of the ver+" *p. !==2. he 7ewish consciousness is indeed the unhappy consciousness, and (e livre des :uestions is its poem> is the poem inscri+ed &ust +eyond the phenomenology of the mind, which the 7ew can accompany only for a short while, without eschatological provision, in order not to limit his desert, close his +oo% and cauteri3e his cry.' "?ar% the first page of a +oo% with aredri++on,forthewoundisinscri+ed atits+eginning.8e+ -lce" *p. !==2. 9f a+sence is the heart of the :uestion, if separation can emerge only the rupture of God-with God-if the infinite distance of the 5ther is respected only within the sands of a +oo% in which wandering and mirages are always possi+le, then (e livre des :uestions is simultaneously the intermina+le song of a+sence and a +oo% on the +oo%. ,+sence attempts to produce itself in the +oo% and is lost in +eing pronounced>

5od is an interrogation of 5od.

*i+id., p. 152# @af%a said. "We are nihilist thoughts in the +rain of God." 9f God opens the :uestion in God, if he is the very opening of the Juestion, there can +e no simplicity of God. ,nd, thus, that which was unthin%a+le for the classical rationalists here +ecomes the o+vious itself. Proceeding within the duplicity of his own :uestiona+ility, God does not act in the simplest ways> he is not truthful, he is not sincere. Sincerity, which is simplicity, is a lying virtue. 9t is necessary, on the contrary, to accede to the virtue of the lie.
-+eb Jacob, who was !y first !aster, believed in the virtue of the lie, because, he said, there is no writing without a lie and writing is the way of 5od-. (P . 63)$

G. WRITING

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I!!"R"N#"

EDMOND JABS AND THE QUESTION OF THE BOOK

!"

it 0no*s itself as disappearing and lost, and to this extent it remains inaccessible and impenetrable. (o gain access to it is to lose it8 to sho* it is to hide it8 to ac0no*ledge it is to lie. "Nothing is our principle concern, said 2eb 4dar" "p. $GG', and Nothing-li0e /eing-can only 0eep silent and hide itself' -bsence. -bsence of locality, first of all. "!arah5 !peech annihilates distance, ma0es the locale despair. #o *e formulate speech or does it fashion us<" (he absence of a place is the title of one of the poems collected in De bdtis ma demeure. 4t began thus5 "Cague estate, obsessed page ..." -nd )e livre des questions resolutely 0eeps itself on the vague estate, in the non-place, bet*een city and desert, for in either the root is equally re ected or steriliBed. Nothing flourishes in sand or bet*een cobblestones, if not *ords. City and desert, *hich are neither countries, nor countrysides, nor gardens, besiege the poetry of Dabes and ensure that it *ill have a necessarily infinite echo, City and desert simultaneously, that is, Cairo, *hence Dabes comes to us8 he too, as is *ell 0no*n, had his flight from 6gypt. (he d*elling built by the poet *ith his "s*ords stolen from angels" is a

trace of footsteps had disappeared. /uried" "p. +&'. -nd again the transition from the desert to the city, the )imit *hich is the only habitat of *riting5 "When he returned to his neighborhood and his house-a nomad had ta0en him on camel's bac0 to the nearest outpost *here he had ta0en a seat in a military truc0 headed to*ard the city-so many *ords solicited him. 1e persisted, ho*ever in avoiding them" "p. +%'. -bsence of the *riter too. @or to *rite is to dra* bac0. Not to retire into one's tent, in order to *rite, but to dra* bac0 from one's *riting itself (o be grounded far from one's language, to emancipate it or lose one's hold on it, to let it ma0e its *ay alone and unarmed. (o leave speech. (o be a poet is to 0no* ho* to leave speech. (o let it spea0 alone, *hich it can do only in its *ritten form.' (o leave *riting is to be there only in order to provide its passage*ay, to be the diaphanous element of its going forth5 everything and nothing. @or the *or0, the *riter is at once everything and nothing. )i0e 9od5
If wrote Reb Servi, you occasionally think that God does not see you, it is because he has made himself so humble that you confuse him with the fly buzzin in the !ane of your window" But that is the !roof of his almi htiness# for he is, simultaneously, $verythin and %othin "

struc0 *ith infinity and the letter. /ro0en by the bro0en )a*. #ivided *ithin himself-"the 9ree0 tongue *ould doubtless tell us much about the strange relation bet*een la*, *andering, and nonidentification nomadism'. (he poet of *riting can only devote himself to the "unhappiness" that NietBsche invo0es upon, or promises to invo0e upon, him *ho "hides des erts *ithin him." (he poet-or the De* only in the desert', and his *riting "*hich can be traced only in the'
""" But I am not this man for

"4bid., p. 11#$

&s a child, when I wrote my name for the first time I felt that I was startin a book"

able path*ay to *hich no Cartesian resolution can impart rectilinearity'. paper is full of *ays.... :e *ill go over the same *ay ten times, a hundred times' ")ivre des questions, p. ++'. En*ittingly, *riting simultaneously designs and discovers an invisible labyrinth in the desert, a city in the sand. ":e their o*n path*ays.-=ther*ise they *ould not be path*ays" "p. ++'. (he entire the letter. "-t noon, he found himself once more facing infinity, the *hite page. 6very

this man writes and the writer is no one" I, Serafi, the absent one, I was born to write books" 'I am absent because I am the storyteller" (nly the story is real")

"4bid., p. 3G' "4bid., p.

&o'

-nd yet "this is only one of the contradictory postulations *hich cease lessly tear apart the pages of the )ivre des questions, and necessarily tear

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them apart5 9od contradicts himself already', only that *hich is *ritten gives me existence by naming me. 4t is thus simultaneously true that things come into existence and lose existence by being named. !acrifice of existence to the *ord, as 1egel said, but also the consecration of existence by the *ord. 7oreover, it does not suffice to be *ritten, for one must *rite in order to have a name. =ne must be called something. :hich supposes that "7y name is a question ... 2eb 6glal" "p. $3+'. ":ithout my texts, 4 am more anonymous than a bedsheet in the *ind, more transparent than a *indo*pane" "p. $3;'. (his necessary exchange of one's existence *ith or for the letter*hich is either to lose or to gain existence-is also imposed upon 9od5
I did not seek you Sarah" I sou ht you" )hrou h you, I ascend to the ori in of the si n, to the unformulated writin sketched by the wind on the sand and on the sea, the untamed writin of the bird and the mischievous fish" God, *aster of wind, *aster of sand, *aster of birds and fishes, e+!ected from man the book that man e+!ected from man# the one in order finally to be God, the other finally to be man"

language. (o allege that one reduces this lapse through narration, philosophical discourse, or the order of reasons or deduction, is to misconstrue language, to misconstrue that language is the rupture *ith totality itself. (he fragment is neither a determined style nor a failure, but the form of that *hich is *ritten. Enless 9od himself *rites-and he *ould still have to be the 9od of the classical philosophers *ho neither interrupted nor interrogated himself, did not stifle himself, as did the 9od of Dabes. "/ut the 9od of the classical philosophers, *hose actual infinity did not tolerate the question, precisely had no vital need for *riting.' -s opposed to /eing and to the )eibniBian /oo0,' the rationality of the )ogos, for *hich our *riting is responsible, obeys the principle of discontinuity. (he caesura does not simply finish and fix meaning5 "(he aphorism," says NietBsche, "the sentence, in *hich 4, as the first among the 9ermans, am a master, are the forms of eternity." /ut, primarily, the caesura ma0es meaning emerge. 4t does not do so alone, of course8 but *ithout interruption-bet*een letters, *ords, sentences, boo0s-no signification could be a*a0ened. -ssuming that Nature refuses the leap, one can understand *hy !cripture *ill never be Nature. 4t proceeds by leaps alone. :hich ma0es it perilous. #eath strolls bet*een letters. (o *rite, *hat is called *riting, assumes an access to the mind through having the courage to lose one's life, to die a*ay from nature.

"ibid., p. $G%'
&ll letters form absence" )hus God is the child of his name" Reb )al" "4bid., P. .,'

Dabes is very attentive to this generous distance bet*een signs.

)he li ht is in their absence which you read"

7aister 6c0hart said5 "9od becomes 9od *hen creation says 9od.' *riting's inability to "help itself' "Phaedrus'. 4s not the divine-the H disappearance of man-announced in this distress of *riting< 4f absence does not allo* itself to be reduced by the letter, this is so because it is the letter's ether and respiration. (he letter is the separation and limit in *hich meaning is liberated from its emprisonment in aphoristic solitude. No "logic," no proliferation of con unctive undergro*th can reach the end of its essential discontinuity and non-" contemporaneousness, the ingenuity of its under-stood >sous-entendu?' silences. (he other originally collaborates *ith meaning. (here is an essential lapse bet*een significations *hich is not the simple and tive fraudulence of a *ord, nor even the nocturnal memory of all

"4bid., P. 3+'
&ll letters form absence"

"4bid., P. .,' to signify, but it is also, in language's t*isting of itself, *hat letters say5 being enclosed in letters' net. -bsence, finally as the breath of the letter, for the letter lives. "(he name must germinate, other*ise it is false," says -ndre /reton. !ignifying absence or separation, the letter lives as aphorism. 4t is solitude,

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articulates solitude, and lives on solitude. 9t would no longer +e the letter of the law if it were outside difference, or if it left its solitude, or put an end to interruption, to distance, to respect, and to its relation to the other, that is, a certain nonrelation. here is, thus, an animality of the letter which assumes the forms of the letter's desire, an)iety, and solitude.
'our solitude is an alphabet of squirrels at the disposition of forests.

the conditions of metaphor, the +eyond-metaphor of metaphor, never say themselves. ?etaphor, or the animality of the letter, is the primary and infinite e:uivocality of the signifier as (ife, he psychic su+version of inert literality, that is to say, of nature, or of speech returned to nature. his overpowerfulness as the life of the signifier is produced within the an)iety and the wandering of the language always richer than %nowledge, the language always capa+le of the movement which ta%es it further than peaceful and sedentary certitude.

*"(a clef de voGte," in Je bdtis !a de!eure (i%e the desert and the city, the forest, in which the fearful signs swarm, dou+tless articulates the non-place and the wandering, the a+sence of prescri+ed routes, the solitary arising of an unseen root> +eyond the reach of the sun. oward a hidden s%y. 6ut the forest, outside the rigidity of its lines, is also trees clasped +y terrified letters, the wood wounded +y poetic incision.
#hey engraved the fruit in the pain of the tree of solitude.... Like the sailor who grafts a na!e 7n that of the !ast (n the sign you are alone.

8ow can ( say what ( know with words whose signification is !ultiple. (9e bdtis !a de!eure, p. .$'

6etrayed +y citation, the organi3ed power of the song %eeps itself +eyond the reach of commentary, in the (ivre des :uestions. 4ere in particular, is it not +orn of an e)traordinary confluence that weighs upon the canceling lines of words, the punctual singularity of -dmond 7a+es's e)perience, his voice, his styleF , confluence in which is recalled, con&oined, and condensed the suffering, the millennial reflection of a people, the "pain" "whose past and continuity coincide with those of writing," the destiny that summons the 7ew, placing him +etween the voice and the cipher> and he weeps for the lost voice with tears as +lac% as the trace of in%. 7e +dtis ma demeure *"9 +uild my dwelling"2 is a line +orrowed from (a voi) de !'encre *!"I"2 *" he voice of in%"2. ,nd (e livre des:uestions.
You gather that I attach great alue to what is said! more! "erha"s! than to what is written; for in what is written m y oice is missing and I belie e in it #$ mean the creati e oice! not the au%iliary oice which is a ser ant &'i re des (uestions! ". CC2

he tree of engraving and grafting no longer +elongs to the garden> it

have a choice only +etween a natural or an institutionali3ed solitude. he animality of the letter certainly appears, at first, as one metaphor or even ",ided +y on accomplice, a word sometimes changes its se) and its soul.".5r further. "Eowels, as they are written, resem+le the mouths of fish out of water pierced +y the B too%> consonants resem+le dispossessed scales. hey live uncomforta+ly in their acts, ie their hovels of in%. 9nfinity haunts them" Ap. #CB2. 6ut, a+ove all, it is metapho itself, the origin of language as metaphor in which 6eing and /othin

*9n the wor% of -mmanuel (evinas can +e found the same hesitation, Kthe same an)ious movement within the difference +etween the Socratic and the 4e+raic, the poverty and the wealth of the letter, the pneumatic and the grammatical.2' Within original aphasia, when the voice of the god or the poet is

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missing, one must be satisfied *ith the vicars of speech that are the cry and *riting. (his is )e livre des questions, the poetic revolution of our century, the extraordinary reflection of man finally attempting todayand al*ays in vain-to reta0e possession of his language "as if this *ere meaningful' by any means, through all routes, and to claim responsibility for it against a @ather of )ogos. =ne reads, for example, in )e livre de l'absent5 "- decisive battle in *hich the vanquished, betrayed by their *ounds, describe, as they fall to the ground, a page of *riting dedicated by the victors to the chosen one *ho un*ittingly set off the battle. 4n fact, it is in order to affirm the supremacy of the verb over man, of the verb over the verb, that the battle too0 place" ")ivre de 4'absent, p. &%'. 4s this confluence )e livre des questions< No. (he song *ould no longer be sung if its tension *as only confluential. Confluence must repeat the origin. (his cry sings because in its enigma, it brings forth *ater from a cleft roc0, the unique source, the unity of a spurting rupture. -fter *hich come "currents," "affluents," "influences." - poem al*ays runs the ris0 of being meaningless, and *ould be nothing *ithout this ris0 of being meaningless, and *ould be nothing *ithout this ris0. 4f Dabes's poem is to ris0 having a meaning, or if his question, at least, is to ris0 having a meaning, the source must be presumed8 and it must be presumed that the unity of the source is not due to a chance encounter, but that beneath this encounter another encounter ta0es place today. - first encounter, an encounter above all unique because it *as a separation, li0e the separ ation of !arah and Fu0el. 6ncounter is separation. !uch a proposition, *hich contradicts "logic," brea0s the unity of /eing-*hich resides in the fragile lin0 of the "is"-by *elcoming the other and difference into the source of meaning. /ut, it *ill be said, /eing must al*ays already be conceptualiBed in order to say these things-the encounter and the separation of *hat and of *hom-and especially in order to say that

4f, in the process of adding pitiful graffiti to an immense poem, as *e are doing here, one insisted upon reducing the poem to its "thematic structure," as it is called, one *ould have to ac0no*ledge that nothing *ithin it is original. (he *ell-*orn themes of the question *ithin 9od, of negativity *ithin 9od as the liberation of historicity and human speech, of man's *riting as the desire and question of 9od "and the double genitive is ontological before being grammatical, or rather is the embedding of the ontological and the grammatical *ithin the graphein',h$ of history and discourse as the anger of 9od emerging himself, etc., etc.these themes are not first proper to /ohme, to 9erman romanticism, to 1egel, to the final !cheler, etc., etc. Negativity in 9od, exile as *riting, the life of the letter are all already in the Cabala. :hich means "(radition" itself -nd Dabes is conscious of the Cabalistic resonances of his boo0. 1e even plays on them, occasionally "ci, for example, )e livre de l'absent, p. $3'. /ut traditionality is not orthodoxy. =thers, perhaps, *ill articulate the *ays in *hich Dabes also severs himself from the De*ish community, assuming that this last notion here has a sense, or has its classical sense. 1e does not sever himself from it only insofar as concerns dogma, but more profoundly still. @or Dabes, *ho ac0no*ledges a very late discovery of a certain *ay of being part of Dudaism, the De* is but the suffering allegory5 "Fou are all De*s, even the antisemites, for you have all been designated for martyrdom" ")ivre des questions, p. $GA'. 1e must ustify himself to his blood brothers and to rabbis *ho are no longer imaginary. (hey *ill all reproach him for this universalism, this essentialism, this eletal allegorism, this neutraliBation of the event in the realms of the symbolic and the imaginary.
&ddressin themselves to me, m y blood brothers said, -.ou are not /ewish" .ou do not come to the syna o ue"- "" " '0ivre des 1uestions, !" 23) )he rabbis whose words you cite are charlatans" 4ave they ever e+isted5 &nd you have nourished yourself on their im!ious words"""" .ou are /ewish for the others and so little /ewish for us"

encounter is separation. Certainly, but "must al*ays already" precisely8 signifies the original exile from the 0ingdom of /eing, signifies exile as the conceptualiBation of /eing, and signifies that /eing never is, never sho*s itself, is never present, 4s never no*, outside difference "in all the, senses today required by this *ord'." :hether he is /eing or the master of beings, 9od himself is, and appears as *hat he is, *ithin difference, that is to say, as difference and *ithin dissimulation.

&ddressin himself to me, the most contem!lative ofm y blood brothers said,

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"To make no dffierence between a Jew and him who is not Jewish, is this not already to cease being a Jew?" And they added: "Brotherhood is to give, give, give, and yo will never be able to give what yo are!" "triking my chest with my fist # tho ght: "# am nothing! # have a severed head! B t is not a man worth a man? And a deca$itated one worth a believer?"

7a+es is not a defendant in this dialogue, for he carries +oth it and the charges within him. 9n this noncoincidence of the self and the self, he is more and less 7ewish than the 7ew. 6ut the 7ew's identification with himself does not e)ist. he 7ew is split, and split first of all +etween the two dimensions of the letter. allegory and literality. 4is history would +e +ut one empirical history among others if he esta+lished or nationali3ed himself within difference and literality. 4e would have no history at all if he let himself +e attenuated within the alge+ra of an a+stract universalism. 6etween the too warm flesh of the literal event and the cold s%in of the concept runs meaning. his is how it enters into the +oo%. -verything enters into, transpires in the +oo%. his is why the +oo% is never finite. 9t always remains suffering and vigilant.
%A lam$ is on my table and the ho se is in the book! %& will finally live in the ho se!

'here is the book fo nd? %#n the book!

the other is also to negate oneself, and meaning is alienated from itself in the transition of writing. 9ntention surpasses itself and disengages from itself in order to +e said. "9 hate that which is pronounced in which already 9 am no longer" *p. !$2. 7ust as the end of writing passes +eyond writing, its origin is not yet in the +oo%. he writer, +uilder, and guardian of the +oo% posts himself at the entrance to the house. he writer is a ferryman and his destination always has a liminal signification. "Who are youF- he guardian of the house.-. . . ,re you in the +oo%F-?y place is on the threshhold" *p. !<2. 6ut-and this is the heart of the matter-everything that is e)terior in relation to the +oo%, everything that is negative as concerns the +oo%, is produced within the +oo%. he e)it from the +oo%, the other and the threshhold, are all articulated within the +oo%. he other and the threshhold can only +e written, can only affirm themselves in writing. 5ne emerges from the +oo% only within the +oo%, +ecause, for 7a+es, the +oo% is not in the world, +ut the world is in the +oo%. " he world e)ists +ecause the +oo% e)ists." " he +oo% is the wor% of the +oo%" " he +oo% multiplies the +oo%" *p. 112. o +e is to-+e-in-the-+oo%, even if 6eing is not the created nature often called the 6oo% of God during the ?iddle ,ges. "9f God is, it is +ecause 4e is in the +oo%" *p. 1=2. 7a+es %nows that the +oo% is possessed and threatened, that "its response is still a :uestion, that its dwelling is ceaselessly threatened" *p. 1=2. 6ut the +oo% can only +e threatened +y nothing, non-6eing, nonmeaning. 9f it came to +e, the threat-as is the case here-would +e avowed, pronounced, domesticated. 9t would +e of the house and of the +oo%. ,ll historic an)iety, all poetic an)iety, all 7udaic an)iety thus torments this poem of the intermina+le :uestion. ,ll affirmations and all negations, all contradictory :uestions are welcomed into the :uestion within the unity of the +oo%, in a logic li%e none other, in (ogic. 4ere we would have to say Grammar. 6ut does not this an)iety and this war, this unloosening of all the waters, rest upon the peaceful and silent +asis of a non:uestionF 9s not the writing of the :uestion, +y its deci ion, +y its resolution, the +eginning of repose and responseF he first violence as regards the :uestionF he first crisis and the first forgetting,

-very e)it from the +oo% is made within the +oo%. 9ndeed, the end of writing %eeps itself +eyond writing. "Writing that culminates in itself is only a manifestation of spite." 9f writing is not a tearing of the self toward the',, other within a confession of infinite separation, if it is a delectation of artist, then it destroys itself. 9t syncopates itself in the roundness 9 of the egg and the plenitude of the 9dentical. 9t is true that to go toward the necessary +eginning of wandering as history, that is to say, the very dissimulation of wanderingF he non:uestion of which we are spea%ing is not yet a dogma> and

"I

WRITING AN

I!!" R " N# "

EDMOND JABE`S AND THE QUESTION OF THE BOOK

#"

the act of faith in the +oo% can precede, as we %now, +elief in the 6i+le. ,nd can also survive it. he non:uestion of which we are spea%ing is the unpenetrated certainty that 6eing is a Grammar> and that the world is in all its parts a cryptogram to +e constituted or reconstituted through poetic inscription or deciphering> that the +oo% is original, that everything +elongs to the +oo% +efore +eing and in order to come into the world> that any thing can +e +orn only +y approaching the +oo%, can die only +y failing in sight of the +oo%> and that always the impassi+le shore of the +oo% is first. 6ut what if the 6oo% was only, in all senses of the word, an epoch of 6eing *an epoch coming to an end which would permit us to see 6eing in the glow of its agony or the rela)ation of its grasp, and an end which would multiply, li%e a final illness, li%e the garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain mori+unds, +oo%s a+out the dead +oo%2F 9f the form of the +oo% was no longer to +e the model of meaningF 9f 6eing was radically outside the +oo%, outside its letterF ,nd was such +y virtue of a transcendence which could no longer +e touched +y inscription and signification, a transcendence which would no longer lie on the page, and which a+ove all would have arisen +efore itF 9f 6eing lost itself in +oo%sF 9f +oo%s were the dissipation of 6eingF 9f the 6eing of the world, its presence and the meaning of its 6eing, revealed itself only in illegi+ility, in a radical illegi+ility which would not +e the accomplice of a lost or sought after legi+ility, of a page not yet cut from 7aspers's e)pression, "the manuscript of another," +ut primarily the>K other of every possi+le manuscriptF ,nd if it were always too soon to say "revolt is o page crumpled in the waste +as%et" *p. !$$2F ,nd always too soon to say that evil is only indeciphera+le, due to the effect of some lapsus calami' or of God's cacography, and that "our life, within -vil, has the form of anK ,nd if Death did not let itself +e inscri+ed in the +oo% in which, as is names of those who may liveF ,nd if the dead soul were more or less, something other in any event, than the dead letter of the law which should always +e capa+le of +eing reawa%enedF he dissimulation of an older or younger writing, from an age other than the age of the +oo%, the age of grammar, the age of everything announced under

the heading of the meaning of 6eingF he dissimulation of a still illegi+le writingF he radical illegi+ility of which we are spea%ing is not irrationality, is not despair provo%ing non-sense, is not everything within the domains of the incomprehensi+le and the illogical that is anguishing. Such an interpretation-or determination-of the illegi+le already +elongs to the +oo%, is enveloped within the possi+ility of the volume. 5riginal illegi+ility is not simply a moment interior to the +oo%, to reason or to logos> nor is it any more their opposite, having no relationship of symmetry to them, +eing incommensura+le with them. Prior to the +oo% *in the nonchronological sense2, original illegi+ility is therefore the very possi+ility of the +oo% and, within it, of the ulterior and eventual opposition of "rationalism" and "irrationalism." he 6eing that is announced within the illegi+le is +eyond these categories, +eyond, as it writes itself, its own name. 9t would +e ludicrous to impugn 7a+es for not having pronounced these :uestions in (e livre des :uestions. hey can only sleep within the literary act which needs +oth their life and their lethargy. Writing would die of the pure vigilance of the :uestion, as it would of the simple erasure of the :uestion. 9s not to write, once more, to confuse ontology and grammarF he grammar in which are inscri+ed all the dislocations of dead synta), all the aggressions perpetrated +y speech against language, every :uestioning of the letter itselfF he written :uestions addressed to literature, all the tortures inflicted upon it, are always transfigured, drained, forgotten +y literature, within literature> having +ecome modifications of itself, +y itself, in itself, they are mortifications, that is to say, as always, ruses of life. (ife negates itself in literature only so that it may survive +etter. So that it may +e +etter. 9t

does not negate itself any more than it affirms itself. it differs from itself, defers itself, and writes itself as differance. 6oo%s are always +oo%s of life *the archetype would +e the 6oo% of (ife %ept +y the God of the 7ews2 or of afterlife *the archetype would +e the 6oo%s of the Dead %ept radical interrogation, that is to say, finally, is man capa+le of literatureF" one could &ust as well say, on the +asis of a certain conceptuali3ation of life, "incapa+le" half the time. -)cept if one admits that pure literature is nonliterature, or death itself he :uestion a+out the origin of the

+oo%, the a+solute interrogation, the interrogation of all possi+le interrogations, the "interrogation of God" will never +elong to a +oo%. 0nless the :uestion forgets itself within the articulations of its memory, the time of its interrogation, the time and tradition of its sentence, and unless the memory of itself, the synta) +inding the :uestion to itself, does not ma%e a disguised affirmation of this origin. ,lready a +oo% of the :uestion +ecoming remote from its origin. 4enceforth, so that God may indeed +e, as 7a+es says, an interrogation of God, would we not have to transform a final affirmation into a :uestionF (iterature would then, perhaps, only +e the dreamli%e displacement of this :uestion. -#here is the book of 5od in which 5od questions hi!self, and there is the

book of ! a n which is proportionate to that of 5od.-

+eb +ida

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4e+raism and 4ellenism,-+etween these two points of influence moves our world. ,t one time it feels more powerfully the attraction of one of them, at another time of the other> and it ought to +e, though it never is, evenly and happily +alanced +etween them. *?atthew ,rnold, :ulture and *narchy) hat philosophy died yesterday, since 4egel or ?ar), /iet3sche, 5r 4eidegger-and philosophy should still wander toward the meaning of its death-or that it has always lived %nowing itself to +e dying *as is silently confessed in the shadow of the very discourse which declared philosophia perennis2> that philosophy died one day, within history, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens history +y opposing itself to nonphilosophy, which is its past and its concern, its death and wellspring> that +eyond the death, or dying nature, of philosophy, perhaps even +ecause of it, thought still has a future, or even, as is said today, is still entirely to come +ecause of what philosophy has

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held in store8 or, more strangely still, that the future itself has a futureall these are unans*erable questions. /y right of birth, and for one time at least, these are problems put to philosophy as problems philosophy cannot resolve. 4t may even be that these questions are not philosophical, are not philosophy's questions. Nevertheless, these should be the only questions today capable of founding the community, *ithin the *orld, of those *ho are still called philosophers8 and called such in remembrance, at very least, of the fact that these questions must be examined unrelentingly, despite the diaspora of institutes and languages, despite the publications and techniques that follo* on each other, procreating and accumulating by themselves, li0e capital or poverty. - community of the question, therefore, *ithin that fragile moment *hen the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy of an ans*er to have already initiated itself beneath the mas0 of the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have been already and fraudulently articulated *ithin the very syntax of the question. - community of decision, of initiative, of absolute initiality, but also a threatened community, in *hich the question has not yet found the language it has decided to see0, is not yet sure of its o*n possibility *ithin the community. - community of the question about the possibility of the question. (his is very little-almost nothing-but *ithin it, today, is sheltered and encapsulated an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. -n unbreathable responsibility. :hy unbreachable< /ecause the

impossible has already occurred. (he impossible according to the totality of *hat is questioned, according to the totality of beings, ob ects and determinations, the impossible according to the history of facts, has occurred5 there is a history of the question, a pure memory of the pure question *hich in its possibility perhaps authoriBes all inheritance and all pure memory in general and as such. (he question has already begun*e 0no* it has-and this strange certainty about an other abso lute origin, an other absolute decision that has secured the past of the , question, liberates an incomparable instruction5 the discipline of the ho* to read' this discipline, *hich is not yet even the inconceivable5 tradition of the negative "of negative determination', and *hich is completely previous to irony, to maieutics, to epoche, and to doubt, an

in unction is announced5 the question must be maintained. -s a question. (he liberty of the question "double genitive'' must be stated and protected. founded d*elling, a realiBed tradition of the question remaining a question. 4f this commandment has an ethical meaning, it is not in that it belongs to the domain of the ethical, but in that it ultimately authoriBes every ethical la* in general. (here is no stated la*, no commandment, that is not addressed to a freedom of speech. (here is therefore neither la* nor commandment *hich does not confirm and enclose-that is, does not dissimulate by presupposing itthe possibility of the question. (hus, the question is al*ays enclosed8 it never appears immediately as such, but only through the hermetism of a proposition in *hich the ans*er has already begun to determine the question. (he purity of the question can only be indicated or recalled through the difference of a hermeneutical effort. (hus, those *ho loo0 into the possibility of philosophy, philosophy's life and death, are already engaged in, already overta0en by the dialogue of the question about itself and *ith itself8 they al*ays act in remembrance of philosophy, as part of the correspondence of the question *ith itself 6ssential to the destiny of this correspondence, then, is that it comes to speculate, to reflect, and to question about itself *ithin itself (his is *here the ob ectification, secondary interpretation, and determination of the question's o*n history in the *orld all begin8 and this is *here the combat embedded in the difference bet*een the question in general and "philosophy" as a determinedfinite and mortalmoment or mode of the question itself also begins. (he difference bet*een philosophy as a po*er and adventure of the question itself and philosophy as a determined event or turning point *ithin this adventure. (his difference is better conceived today. (hat this difference has come to light, has been conceptualiBed as such, is doubtless an unnoticed and inessential sign for the historian of facts, techniques, and ideas. /ut, understood in all its implications, it is perhaps the most deeply inscribed characteristic of our age. -nd *ould not better thin0

ing this difference be 0no*ing that if something is still to transpire *ithin the tradition by *hich philosophers al*ays 0no* themselves to be overta0en, then the tradition's origin *ill have to be summoned forth and adhered to as rigorously as possible< :hich is not to

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stammer and huddle laBily in the depths of childhood, but precisely the opposite. Close to us and since 1egel, in his mighty shado*, the t*o great voices *hich have ordered us to this total repetition-*hich itself has recalled us to ourselves and has been ac0no*ledged as of utmost philosophical urgency-are those of 1usserl and 1eidegger. #espite the most profound dissimilarities, the appeal to tradition-*hich is in no *ay traditional-is shaped by an intention common to 1usserlian phenomenology and to *hat *e *ill call provisionally, by approximation and for reasons of economy, 1eideggerean "ontology."' (hus, very briefly5

(hese three motifs arrayed at the unique source of the unique phil osophy *ould indicate the only possible direction to be ta0en by any philosophical resource in general. -ny possible dialogue bet*een 1usserlian phenomenology and 1eideggerean "ontology," at every point *here they are more or less directly implicated, can be understood only from *ithin the 9ree0 tradition. -t the moment *hen the fundamental conceptual system produced by the 9reco-6uropean adventure is in the process of ta0ing over all of humanity, these three motifs *ould predetermine the totality of the logos and of the *orld*ide historico-philosophical situation. No philosophy could possibly dislodge them *ithout first succumbing to them, or *ithout finally destroying itself as a philosophical language. -t a historical depth *hich the science and philosophies of history can only presuppose, *e 0no* that *e are consigned to the security of the 9ree0 element8 and *e 0no* it *ith a 0no*ledge and a confidence *hich are neither habitual nor comfortable but, on the contrary, permit us to experience torment or distress in general. @or example, the consciousness of crisis is for 1usserl but the provisional, almost necessary covering up of a transcendental motif *hich in #escartes and in Iant *as already beginning to accomplish the 9ree0 aim5 philosophy as science. :hen 1eidegger says that "for a long time, too long, thought has been desiccated," li0e a fish out of *ater, the element to *hich he *ishes to return thought is still-already-the 9ree0 element, the 9ree0 thought of /eing, the thought of /eing *hose irruption or call produced 9reece. (he 0no*ledge and security of *hich *e are spea0ing are therefore not in the *orld5 rather, they are the possibility of our language and the nexus of our *orld. 4t is at this level that the thought of 6mmanuel )evinas can ma0e us tremble. -t the heart of the desert, in the gro*ing *asteland, this thought, *hich fundamentally no longer see0s to be a thought of /eing and phenomenality, ma0es us dream of an inconceivable process of dismantling and dispossession. $. 4n 9ree0, in our language, in a language rich *ith all the alluvia of its history-and our question ta0es shape already-in a language that admits to its po*ers of seduction *hile playing on them

$. (he entirety of philosophy is conceived on the basis of its 9ree source. -s is *ell 0no*n, this amounts neither to an occidentalisni, nor to a historicism.' 4t is simply that the founding concepts of philosophy are primarily 9ree0, and it *ould not be possible to philosophiBe, or to spea0 philosophically, outside this medium. (hat Plato, for 1usserl, *as the founder of a reason and a philosophical tas0 *hose telos *as still sleeping in the shado*s8 or that for 1eidegger, on the contrary, Plato mar0s the moment at *hich the thought of /eing forgets itself and is determined as philosophy-this difference is decisive only at the culmination of a common root *hich is 9ree0. (he difference is fraternal in its posterity, entirely submitted to the same domination. #omination of the same too, *hich *ill disappear neither in phenomenology nor in "ontology." 3. (he archaeology to *hich 1usserl and 1eidegger lead us by different paths entails, for both, a subordination or transgression, in any event a reduction of metaphysics. 6ven though, for each, this gesture has an entirely different meaning, or at least does so apparently. ;. @inally, the category of the ethical is not only dissociated from. metaphysics but coordinated *ith something other than itself, a previous and more radical function. :hen ethics is not treated this

*ay, *hen la*, the po*er of resolution, and the relationship to the other are once more part of the archia, they lose their ethical specificity.'

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unceasingly, this thought summons us to a dislocation of the 9ree0 logos, to a dislocation of our identity, and perhaps of identity in general8 it summons us to depart from the 9ree0 site and perhaps from every site in general, and to move to*ard *hat is no longer a source or a site "too *elcoming to the gods', but to*ard an exhalation, to*ard a prophetic speech already emitted not only nearer to the source than Plato or the pre-!ocratics, but inside the 9ree0 origin, close to the other of the 9ree0 "but *ill the other of the 9ree0 be the non-9ree0< -bove all, can it be named the non-9ree0< -nd our question comes closer.' - thought for *hich the entirety of the 9ree0 logos has already erupted, and is no* a quiet topsoil deposited not over bedroc0, but around a more ancient volcano. - thought *hich, *ithout philology and solely by remaining faithful to the immediate, but buried nudity of experience itself, see0s to liberate itself from the 9ree0 domination of the !ame and the =ne "other names for the light of /eing and of the phenomenon' as if from oppression itself-an oppression certainly comparable to none other in the *orld, an ontological or transcendental oppression, but also the origin or alibi of all oppression in the *orld. -

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0ind, it reaches a height and a level of penetration in its dialogue at *hich the 9ree0s-and foremost among them the t*o 9ree0s named 1usserl and 1eidegger-ar e called upon to respond. 4f the messianic eschatology from *hich )evinas dra*s inspiration see0s neither to assimilate itself into *hat is called a philosophical truism, nor even to "complete" "(4, p. 33' philosophical truisms, nevertheless it is developed in its discourse neither as a theology, nor as a De*ish mysticism "it can even be understood as the trial of theology and mysticism'8 neither as a dogmatics, nor as a religion, nor as a morality. 4n the last analysis it never bases its authority on 1ebraic theses or texts. 4t see0s to be understood from *ithin a recourse to experience itself. 6xperience itself and that *hich is most irreducible *ithin experience5 the passage and departure to*ard the other8 the other itself as *hat is most irreducibly other *ithin it5 =thers. - recourse not to be confused *ith *hat has al*ays been called a philosophical enterprise, but *hich reaches a point at *hich an exceeded philosophy cannot not be brought into question. (ruthfully, messianic eschatology is never mentioned literally5 it is but a question of designating a space or a hollo* *ithin na0ed experience *here this eschatology can be understood and *here it must resonate. (his hollo* space is not an opening among others. 4t is opening itself, the opening of opening, that *hich can be enclosed *ithin no category or totality, that is, everything *ithin experience *hich can no longer be described by traditional concepts, and *hich resists every philosopheme. :hat do this explication and this reciprocal surpassing of t*o origins and t*o historical speeches signify< #o a ne* elan and some strange community begin to ta0e shape, *ithout being the spiraling return of -lexandrian promiscuity< 4f *e recall that 1eidegger t

thought, finally, *hich see0s to liberate itself from a philosophy fascinated by the "visage of being that sho*s itself in *ar" *hich ' "is fixed in the concept of totality *hich dominates :estern philosophy" "(otality and 4nfinity >hereafter (4?, p. 3$'. 3. (his thought nevertheless see0s to define itself, in its primary possibility, as metaphysical "a 9ree0 notion ho*ever, if *e follo* vein of our question'. - metaphysics that )evinas see0s to raise up from its subordinate position and *hose concept he see0s to restore in opposition to the entire tradition derived from -ristotle ;. (his thought calls upon the ethical relationship-a nonviolentt relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the =ther'-as the only one capable of opening the space of transcendence and of liberating metaphysics. -nd does so *ithout supporting ethics' and metaphysics by anything other than themselves, and *ithout ma0ing them flo* into other streams at their source. 4n question, therefore, is a po*erful *ill to explication of the history A 9ree0 speech. Po*erful because, if this attempt is not the first of iS

,oo, see0s to open the passage*ay to a former speech *hich, supporting e outer or innh er reac es of philosophy, *hat do this other speech and this other passage*ay signify here< 4t is this space of interrogation that *e have chosen for a very partial' reading of )evinas's *or0. =f course it is not our intenti on .anty style of commentary *ill udacities of a thoughtdhi d -an tsespite several parentheses and notes

$ A . W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ *hich *ill enclose our perplexity. @aithful also to its history, *hose patience and anxiety capitulate and carry *ithin themselves the reciprocal interrogation of *hich *e *ish to spea0.' (hen *e *ill attempt to as0 several questions. 4f they succeed in approaching the heart of this explication, they *ill be nothing less than ob ections, but rather the questions put to us by )evinas. :e have ust spo0en of "themes" and of the "history of a thought." (he difficulty is classical and concerns not only method. (he brevity of these pages *ill only intensify it. :e *ill not choose. :e *ill refuse to sacrifice the history of )evinas's thought and *or0s to the order or aggregate of themes-*hich must not be called a system-assembled and enriched in the great boo0 (otality and 4nfinity. -nd if *e must, for once, have faith in him *ho stands most accused in the trial conducted by this boo0, the result is nothing *ithout its becoming.' /ut neither *ill *e sacrifice the self-coherent unity of intention to the becoming, *hich then *ould be no more than pure disorder. :e *ill not choose bet*een the opening and the totality. (herefore *e *ill be incoherent, but *ithout systematically resigning ourselves to incoherence. (he possibility of the impossible system *ill be on the horiBon to protect us from empiricism. :ithout reflecting here upon the philosophy of this hesitation, let us note bet*een parentheses that by simply articulating it *e have already come close to )evinas's o*n problematic.

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I THE VIOLENCE OF LIGHT

(he departure from 9reece *as discreetly premeditated in (heorie de $'intuition dons 4n phenomenologie de 1usserl. 4n @rance, in $%;A, this *as the first ma or *or0 devoted to the entirety of 1usserl's thought. (hrough a remar0able exposition of the developments of phenomenology, such as *ere then available from the published *or0s and teachings of the master, and through precautions *hich already ac0no*ledged the "surprises" that 1usserl's meditations and unpublished *or0s might "hold in store," a reticence *as announced. (he imperialism of theoria already bothered )evinas. 7ore than any other philosophy, phenomen ology, in the *a0e of Plato, *as to be struc0 *ith light. Enable to reduce the last naivete, the naivete of the glance, it predetermined /eing as ob ect.' J

-t this point, the accusation remains timid and is not of a piece. "a' @irst, it is difficult to maintain a philosophical discourse against light. -nd thirty years later, *hen the charges against theoretism and "1usserlian' phenomenology became the essential motifs in the brea0 *ith tradition, the nudity of the face of the other-this epiphany of a certain non-light before *hich all violence is to be quieted and disarmed-*ill still have to be exposed to a certain enlightenment. 6specially as concerns the violence implicit in phenomenology. "b' Next, it is difficult to overloo0 the fact that 1usserl so little pre determined /eing as ob ect that in ideas 4 absolute existence is accorded only to pure consciousness. (rue, it has often been argued that the difference hardly counts, and that a philosophy of consciousness is al*ays a philosophy of the ob ect. )evinas's read ing of 1usserl on this point has al*ays been nuanced, supple, contrasted. -s early as in the (heory of 4ntuition, theory is correctly distinguished from ob ectivity in general. -s *e shall see later, practical, axiological, etc., consciousness is for 1usserl too a consciousness of the ob ect. )evinas openly ac0no*ledges this. (herefore, the accusation is really directed against the irreducible primacy of the sub ect-ob ect correlation. /ut, later, )evinas *ill insist more and more on those aspects of 1usserlian phenomen ology *hich ta0e us to the inner or outer reaches of the "sub ect ob ect correlation." @or example, this *ould be "intentionality as a relationship *ith otherness," as an "exteriority *hich is not ob ective," sensibility, passive genesis, the movement of temporaliBation, etc." "c' @urther, for )evinas the sun of the epe0eina tes ousias *ill al*ays

illuminate the pure a*a0ening and inexhaustible source of thought "(4, p.$3,'. 4t is not only the 9ree0 ancestor of the infinite *hich transcends totality "the totality of being or of noema, the totality of the same or the ego', $3 but is also the instrument of destruction for the phenomenology and ontology sub ected to the neutral totality of the !ame as /eing or as 6go. -ll the essays in $%., grouped under the title #e l'existence a 4'existant *ill be placed under the sign of "the Platonic formulation placing the 9ood

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beyond /eing." "4n (otality and 4nfinity the "Phenomenology of 6ros" describes the movement of the epe0eina tes ousias in the very experience of the caress.' 4n $%., )evinas calls this movement, *hich is not theological, not a transcendence to*ard "a superior existence," "ex-cendence." :ith a foothold in being, excendence is a "departure from being and from the categories *hich describe it." (his ethical excendence designates the site-rather the nonsite-of metaphysics as metatheology, metaontology, metaphenomenology. :e *ill have to return to this reading of the epe0eina tes ousias and its relationship to ontology. !ince *e are spea0ing of light, let us note for the moment that the Platonic movement is interpreted such that it leads no longer to the sun but even beyond light and /eing, beyond the light of /eing. ":e thus encounter in our o*n *ay the Platonic idea of the 9ood beyond /eing," *e read at the end of (otality and infinity "p. 3%;-my italics', concerning creation and fecundity. 4n our o*n *ay, *hich is to say that ethical excendence is not pro ected to*ard the neutrality of the good, but to*ard the other, and that *hich "is' epe0eina tes ousias is not essen tially light but fecundity or generosity. Creation is but creation of the other8 it can be only as paternity, and the relations of the father to son escape all the logical, ontological, and phenomenological categories in *hich the absoluteness of the other is necessarily the

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says 1usserl, the act of valoriBation constitutes an axiological ob ect )ines "9e a genstd being specific in relation to the *orld of things8 consti g from a ne* region." )evinas also admits on several occasions that the importance accorded to theoretical ob ectivity has to do *ith the transcendental guide most often chosen in 4deas 45 the perception of extended things. "1o*ever, *e already 0no* that this guide could be only a provisional example.' #espite all these precautions, despite a constant oscillation bet*een the letter and the spirit of 1usserlianism "the former most often con tested in the name of the latter'," and despite )evinas's insistence upon *hat is called a "fluctuation in 1usserl's thought," a brea0 not to be reconsidered is signified. (he phenomenological reduction, *hose "historical role ... is not even a problem" for 1usserl, remains a prisoner of the natural attitude *hich is possible "in the extent to *hich the latter is theoretical."" "1usserl gives himself the liberty of theory as he gives himself theory itself" Chapter . of )a conscience theorique designates, *ithin a compressed and nuanced analysis, the point of departure5 one cannot simultaneously maintain the primacy of the ob ectifying act and the irreducible originality of nontheoretical consciousness. -nd if "the conception of consciousness in the +th Entersuchung seems to us not only to affirm a primacy of theoretical consciousness, but sees it as the only access to *hat creates the being of the ob ect" if "the existing *oldhi h
,

same. "/ut did not the Platonic sun already enlighten the visible sun, and did not excendence play upon the meta-phor of these t*o suns< :as not the 9ood the necessarily nocturnal source of all light< (he light of light beyond light. (he heart of light is blac0, as has often been noticed." @urther, Plato's sun does not only enlighten5 it engenders. (he good is the father of the visible sun *hich provides living beings *ith "creation, gro*th and nourishment" 2epublic, +AGa-+A%b.' "d' @inally, )evinas is certainly quite attentive to everything in 1us theoretical consciousness. 4n a paragraph devoted to nontheoretical consciousness, it is ac0no*ledged that the primacy of ob ectivity in general is not necessarily confused, in 4deas $, *ith the primacy of the theoretical attitude. (here are nontheoretical acts and ob ects "of' a ne* and irreducible ontological structure." "@or example8

r, *c is revealed to us, has the

nce, "the real *orld is the *orld of 0no*ledge," if "in his >1usserl's? philosophy ... 0no*ledge and representation $& is not a mode of life to the same degree as the others, nor a secondary mode," then "*e *ill have to ta0e our leave." =ne already foresees the unease to *hich a thought re ecting the excellence of theoretical rationality *ill have to resign itself later, especially in that it never ceases to appeal to the most uprooted rationalism and universalism against the violences oV mysticism ad history n , against the ravishing of enthusiasm and ecstasy =ne fo resees to th
.

o,e

oresm.or separation, distance or impas iveness heretofore have been the targets of the classical ob ections

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against theoretism and ob ectivism. =n the contrary, there *ill be more force-and danger-in denouncing the blindness of theoretism, its inability to depart from itself to*ards absolute exteriority, to*ards the totally-other, the infinitely-other "more ob ective than ob ectivity" "(4'. (he complicity of theoretical ob ectivity and mystical communion *ill be )evinas's true target. (he premetaphysical unity of one and the same violence. -n alternation *hich al*ays modifies the same confinement of the other.

4n $%;A )evinas turns to*ard 1eidegger against 1usserl. !ein and Keit is published, and 1eidegger's teaching begins to spread. 6verything *hich overflo*s the commentary and "letter" of 1usserl's texts moves to*ard "ontology," "in the very special sense 1eidegger gives to the term" "(heorie de L'intuition >hereafter (14?'. 4n his critique of 1usserl, )evinas retains t*o 1eideggerean themes5 "$' despite "the idea, so profound, that in the ontological order the *orld of science is posterior to the concrete and vague *orld of perception, and depends upon it," 1usserl "perhaps *as *rong to see in this concrete *orld, a *orld of perceived ob ects above all" "(14'. 1eidegger goes further, since for him this *orld is not primarily given over to the glance, but is rather-and *e *onder *hether 1eidegger *ould have accepted this formulation-"in its very /eing li0e a center of action, a field of activity or of solicitude" "ibid.'. "3' if 1usserl *as right in his opposition to historicism and naturalistic history, he neglected "the historical situanon of man... understood in another sense."" (here exist a histor icily and a temporality of man that are not only predicates but "the,8L very substantiality of his substance." 4t is "this structure ... *hich =ne already foresees the unease to *hich a thought re ecting the, man's historical situation as a theory see0ing to consider everything sub, specie aeternitatis" "(14' *ill have to resign itself later, especially in that it the 'beyond' of history *ithdra*s beings from history's urisdiction. (here is no contradiction here but rather a displacement of concepts in this case the concept of history-*hich *e must follo*. Perhaps then the appearance of' contradiction *ill vanish as the fantasy of a

philosophy enveloped in its o*n fundamental conceptions. - contra diction according to *hat )evinas often *ill call "formal logic." )et us follo* this displacement. (he respectful, moderate reproach directed against 1usserl in a 1eideggerean style *ill soon become the main charge of an indictment this time directed against 1eidegger, and made *ith a violence that *ill not cease to gro*. Certainly it is not a question of denouncing as militant theoretism a thought *hich, in its initial act, refused to treat the self-evidence of the ob ect as its ultimate recourse8 a thought for *hich the historicity of meaning, according to )evinas's o*n terms, "destroys clarity and constitution as authentic modes of the existence of the mind" "6n decouvrant L'existence >hereafter 6#6?'8 and for *hich, finally, "the self-evident is no longer the fundamental mode of intellection," for *hich "existence is irreducible to the light of the self-evident" and "the drama of existence" is played out "before light" "ibid.'. Nevertheless, at a singular depth-but the fact and the accusation are made only more significant by it-1eidegger still *ould have questioned and reduced theoretism from *ithin, and in the name of, a 9reco-Platonic tradition under the surveillance of the agency of the glance and the metaphor of light. (hat is, by the spatial pair insideoutside "but is this, in all its aspects, a spatial pair<' *hich gives life to the opposition of sub ect and ob ect. /y allegedly reducing this last schema, 1eidegger *ould have retained *hat made it possible and necessary5 light, unveiling, comprehension or precomprehension. (his is *hat the texts *ritten after 6n decouvrant L'existence tell us. "1eideggerean care, illuminated as it is by comprehension "even if comprehension offers itself as care', is already determined by the struc

ture inside-outside' that characteriBes light." 4n ma0ing the structure "inside-outside" tremble at the point *here it *ould have resisted 1eidegger, )evinas in no *ay pretends to erase it, or to deny its meaning and existence. Nor does he do so, moreover, *hen the opposition sub ectob ect or cogito-cogitatum is in question. 4n the style by *hich strong and faithful thought is recogniBed "this is 1eidegger's style philosophies *hose presuppositions he describes are in general neither refuted nor criticiBed. 1ere, for example, it is a question simply of revealing beneath this truth, as that *hich founds it and is dissimulated *ithin it, "a situation *hich precedes the division of /eing into an

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inside and an outside." 1o*ever it is also a question of inaugurating, in a *ay that is to be ne*, quite ne*, a metaphysics of radical separation and exteriority. =ne anticipates that this metaphysics *ill have some difficulty finding its language in the medium of a traditional logos entirely governed by the structure "inside-outside," "interior-exterior." (hus, "*ithout being 0no*ledge, 1eidegger's temporality is ecstasy, 'being outside itself' Not a transcendence of theory, but already deportation from an interior to*ard an exterior." (he structure of 7itsein's itself *ill be interpreted as a Platonic inheritance, belonging to the *orld of light. 4n effect, through the experience of eros and paternity, through the *aiting for death, there should arise a relationship to the other *hich can no longer be understood as a modification of "the 6leatic notion of /eing" ")e temps et lautre >hereafter (-?'. (he latter *ould demand that multiplicity be included in, sub ected to, the domination of unity. -nd it *ould still govern Plato's philosophy,

existent in its existence. (hese are the translations of !eiendes and !ein chosen by )evinas at this point "for reasons of euphony" "(-'.$% (his choice *ill al*ays retain a certain ambiguity5 by existent, in effect, )evinas almost if not al*ays understands the being *hich is man, being in the form of #asein. No*, thus understood, the existent is not being "!eiendes' in general, but refers to *hat 1eidegger calls 6xistenB-mainly because it has the same root-that is "the mode of /eing, and precisely, the /eing of the being *hich 0eeps itself open for the aperture of /eing, and *ithin it." ":as bedeutet '6xistenB' in !ein and Keit< #as *ort nennt eine :eise des !eins, and B*ar das !ein des enigen !eienden, das offen steht fur die =ffenheit des !eins, in der es steht, indem es sie aussteht" "4ntroduction to :as ist 7etaphysi0'. No* this solitude of the "existent" in its "existence" *ould be primordial and could not be conceived on the basis of the neutral unity of existence *hich )evinas often and profoundly describes under the heading of the "there is." /ut is not the "there is" the totality of indeterminate, neutral, anonymous beings rather than /eing itself< (he

according to )evinas, even unto its concept of femininity "conceived as matter in the categories of activity and passivity' and its concept of the city-state *hich "must imitate the *orld of ideas." "4t is ... to*ard a pluralism *hich does not fuse into unity that *e *ish to ma0e our *ay8 and, if it can be dared, to brea0 *ith Parme-" nides" "(-'. (hus, )evinas exhorts us to a second parricide. (he 9ree0 father *ho still holds us under his s*ay must be 0illed8 and this is *hit a 9ree0-Plato-could never resolve to do, deferring the act into a hal lucinatory murder. - hallucination *ithin the hallucination that' already speech. /ut *ill a non-9ree0 ever succeed in doing *hat 'a 9ree0 in this case could not do, except by disguising himself as a 9ree0, by spea0ing 9ree0, by feigning to spea0 9ree0 in order to get near the 0ing< -nd since it is a question of 0illing a speech, *ill *e ever 0no* *ho is the last victim of this stratagem< Can one feign spea0ing a language< (he 6leatic stranger and disciple of Parmenides had to give> language its due for having vanquished him5 shaping non-/eing according to /eing, he had to "say fare*ell to an unnamable opposite8 of /eing" and had to confine non-/eing to its relativity to /eing, that i;' :hy *as the repetition of the murder necessary according ,td multiplicity and alterity are not understood as the absolute solitude of th

theme of the "there is" calls for systematic confrontation *ith eidegger's allusions to the "es gibt" "/eing and (ime, )etter on 1umanism', and for a confrontation too, of terror, *hich )evinas opposes to 1eideggerean anguish, *ith the experience of fright, *hich 1eidegger says, in the Nach*ort to :as ist 7etaphysi0, "al*ays resides near essential anxiety." (he relationship to the other arises from the depths of this solitude. :ithout it, *ithout this primordial secret, parricide is philosophy's theatrical fiction. (o understand the secret on the basis of the unity of existence, on the pretext that it exists or that it is the secret of the existent, "is to confine oneself to unity, and to let Parmenides escape every parricide" "(-'. (herefore, )evinas henceforth *ill move to*ard a thought of original difference. 4s this thought in contradiction *ith 1eidegger's intentions< 4s there a difference bet*een this difference and the difference of *hich 1eidegger spea0s< 4s their uxtaposition anything but verbal< -nd *hich difference is more original< :e *ill consider these questions later. - *orld of light and of unity, a "philosophy of a *orld of light, a orld *ithout time." 4n this heliopolitics "the social ideal *ill be sought in an ideal of fusion ... the sub ect ... losing himself in a

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collective representation, in a common ideal.... 4t is the collectivity *hich says 'us,' and *hich, turned to*ard the intelligible sun, to*ard the truth, experience, the other at his side and not face to face *ith him.... 7iteinandersein also remains the collectivity of the *ith, and its authentic form is revealed around the truth." No*, "*e hope to sho*, for our part, that it is not the preposition mit *hich must describe the original relation *ith the other." /eneath solidarity, beneath companionship, before 7itsein, *hich *ould be only a derivative and modified form of the originary relation *ith the other, )evinas already aims for the face-to-face, the encounter *ith the face. "@ace to face *ithout intermediary" and *ithout "communion." :ithout intermediary and *ithout communion, neither mediate nor immediate, such is the truth of our relation to the other, the truth to *hich the traditional logos is forever inhospitable. (his unthin0able truth of living experience, to *hich )evinas returns ceaselessly, cannot possibly be encompassed by philosophical speech *ithout immediately revealing, by philosophy's

o*n light, that philosophy's surface is severely crac0ed, and that *hat *as ta0en for its solidity is its rigidity. 4t could doubtless be sho*n that it is in the nature of )evinas's *riting, at its decisive moments, to move along these crac0s, masterfully progressing by negations, and by negation against negation. 4ts proper route is not that of an "either this ... or that," but of a "neither this ... nor that." (he poetic force of metaphor is often the trace of this re ected alternative, this *ounding of language. (hrough it, in its opening, experience itself is silently'8 revealed. :ithout intermediary and *ithout communion, absolute proximity and absolute distance5 "eros in *hich, *ithin the proximity to the simultaneously of this proximity and this duality." - community of nonpresence, and therefore of nonphenomenality. Not a community *ithout light, not a blindfolded synagogue, but a community anterior to Platonic light. - light before neutral light, before the truth *hich arrives as a third party, the truth "*hich *e loo0 to*ard together," the udgmental arbitrator's truth. =nly the other, the totally other, can be manifested as *hat it is before the shared truth, *ithin a certain non manifestation and a certain absence. 4t can be said only of the other that its phenomenon is a certain nonphenomenon, its presence *is2 a

certain absence. Not pure and simple absence, for there logic could ma0e its claim, but a certain absence. !uch a formulation sho*s dearly that *ithin this experience of the other the logic of noncontradiction, that is, everything *hich )evinas designates as "formal logic," is contested in its root. (his root *ould be not only the root of our language, but the root of all of :estern philosophy, 3A particularly phenomenology and ontology. (his naivete *ould prevent them from thin0ing the other "that is from thin0ing8 and this *ould indeed be the reason *hy, although )evinas, "the enemy of thought," does not say so', and from aligning their discourse *ith the other. (he consequence *ould be double. "a' /ecause they do not thin0 the other, they do not have time. :ithout time, they do not have history. (he absolute alterity of each instant, *ithout *hich there *ould be no time, cannot be produced-constituted*ithin the identity of the sub ect or the existent. 4t comes into time through the =ther. /ergson and 1eidegger *ould have overloo0ed this "#e ?'existence a ?'existent >hereafter 66?', and 1usserl even more so. "b' 7ore seriously, to renounce the other "not by being *eaned from it, but by detaching oneself from it, *hich is actually to be in relation to it, to respect it *hile nevertheless overloo0ing it, that is, *hile 0no*ing it, identifying it, assimilating it', to renounce the other is to enclose oneself *ithin solitude "the bad solitude of solidity and self-identity' and to repress ethical transcendence. 4n effect, if the Parmenidean tradition*e 0no* no* *hat this means for)evinas--disregards the irreducible solitude of the "existent," by the same to0en it disregards the relationship to the other. 4t does not thin0 solitude, it does not appear to itself to be solitude, because it is the solitude of totality and opacity. "!olipsism is neither observation nor sophism8 it is the very structure of reason." (herefore, there is a soliloquy of reason and a solitude of light. 4ncapable of respecting the /eing and meaning of the other, phenomenology and ontology *ould be

philosophies of violence. (hrough them, the entire philosophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, *ould ma0e common cause *ith oppression and *ith the totalitarianism of the same. (he ancient clan destine friendship bet*een light and po*er, the ancient complicity be een theoretical ob ectivity and technico-political possession." "4f the other could be possessed, seiBed, and 0no*n, it *ould not be the other. (o possess, to 0no*, to grasp are all synonyms of po*er" "(-'. (o

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see and to 0no*, to have and to *ill, unfold only *ithin the oppressive and luminous identity of the same8 and they remain, for )evinas, fundamental categories of phenomenology and ontology. 6verything given to me *ithin light appears as given to myself by myself 1encefor*ard, the heliological metaphor only turns a*ay our glance, providing an alibi for the historical violence of light5 a displacement of technicopolitical oppression in the direction of philosophical discourse. @or it has al*ays been believed that metaphors exculpate, lift the *eight of things and of acts. 4f there is no history, except through language, and if language "except *hen it names /eing itself or nothing5 almost never' is elementally metaphorical, /orges is correct5 "Perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors." )ight is only one example of these "several" fundamental "metaphors," but *hat an exampleL :ho *ill ever dominate it, *ho *ill ever pronounce its meaning *ithout first being pronounced by it< :hat language *ill ever escape it< 1o*, for example, *ill the metaphysics of the face as the epiphany of the other free itself of light< )ight perhaps has no opposite8 if it does, it is certainly not night. 4f all languages combat *ithin it, modifying only the same metaphor and choosing the best light, /orges, several pages later, is correct again5 "Perhaps universal history is but the history of the diverse intonations of several metaphors" ")a sphere de Pascal8 my italics'.

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(hese measures *ere critical, but they obeyed the voice of full cer tainty. (hey appeared, through the essays, the concrete and subtle analyses concerning exoticism, the caress, insomnia, fecundity, *or , the instant, fatigue, only at the point, at the edge of the indescribable indestructible *hich opens up classical conceptuality, see0ing its o*n' conceptuality bet*een re ections. (otality and infinity, the great *or0, no only enriches these concrete analyses but organiBes them *ithin 'a itself beyond the disdain or disregard of the other, that is, beyond the" appreciation or possession, understanding and 0no*ledge of the other,,, metaphysics or ethics. 7etaphysical transcendence is desire. (his concept of desire is as anti-1egelian as it can possibly be. 4t does not designate a movement of negation and assimilation, the negation

of alterity first necessary in order to become "self-consciousness" "certain of itself" "Phenomenology of the 7ind and 6ncyclopedia'. @or )evinas, on the contrary, desire is the respect and 0no*ledge of the other as other, the ethico-metaphysical moment *hose transgression consciousness must forbid itself -ccording to 1egel, on the contrary, this gesture of transgression and assimilation is necessary and essential. )evinas sees in it a premetaphysical, natural necessity, and in several splendid analyses separates desire from en oyment-*hich 1egel does not appear to do. 6n oyment is only deferred in *or0533 thus, 1egelian desire *ould be only need, in )evinas's sense. /ut one rightly suspects that things *ould appear more complicated, if one follo*ed closely the movement of certitude and the truth of desire in the Phenomenology of the 7ind. #espite his anti-Iier0egaardian protests, )evinas here returns to the themes of @ear and (rembling5 the movement of desire can be *hat it is only paradoxically, as the renunciation of desire. Neither theoretical intentionality nor the affectivity of need exhaust the movement of desire5 they have as their meaning and end their o*n accomplishment, their o*n fulfillment and satisfaction *ithin the totality and identity of the same. #esire, on the contrary, permits itself to be appealed to by the absolutely irreducible exteriority of the other to *hich it must remain infinitely inadequate. #esire is equal only to excess. No totality *ill ever encompass it. (hus, the metaphysics of desire is a metaphysics of infinite separation. Not a consciousness of separation as a Dudaic consciousness, as an unhappy consciousness53; in the 1egelian =dyssey -braham's unhappiness is an expediency, the provisional necessity of a figure and a transition *ithin the horiBons of a reconciliatory return to self and absolute 0no*ledge. 1ere there is no return. @or desire is not unhappy. 4t is opening and freedom. @urther, a desired infinite may govern desire itself, but it can never appease desire by its presence. "-nd if desire *ere to cease *ith 9od W -h, 4 *ould envy you hell." "7ay *e cite Claudel to comment upon )evinas, *hen the latter also polemiBes against "this spirit admired since >our? earliest youth"<' (he infinitely other is the invisible, since vision opens up only the illusory and relative exteriority of theory and of need. - provisional exteriority, given only *ithin sight of its o*n consummation, its o*n consumption. 4naccessible, the invisible is the most high. (his

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expression-perhaps inhabited by the Platonic resonances )evinas evo0es, but more so by others more readily recogniBable-tears apart, by the superlative excess, the spatial literality of the metaphor, No matter ho* high it is, height is al*ays accessible8 the most high, ho*ever, is higher than height. No addition of more height *ill ever measure it. 4t does not belong to space, is not of this *orld. /ut *hat necessity compels this inscription of language in space at the very moment *hen it exceeds space< -nd if the pole of metaphysical transcendence is a spatial nonheight, *hat, in the last analysis, legitimates the expression of transascendance, borro*ed from Dean :ahl< (he theme of the face perhaps *ill help us understand it. (he ego is the same. (he alterity or negativity interior to the ego, the interior difference, is but an appearance5 an illusion, a "play of the !ame," the "mode of identification" of an ego *hose essential moments are called body, possession, home, economy, etc. )evinas devotes some splendid descriptions to them. /ut this play of the same is not monotonous, is not repeated as monologue and formal tautology. -s the *or0 of identification and the concrete production of egoity, it entails a certain negativity. - finite negativity, an internal and relative modification through *hich the ego affects itself by itself, *ithin its o*n movement of identification. (hus it alters itself to*ard itself *ithin itself (he resistance to *or0, by provo0ing it, remains a moment of the same, a finite moment that forms a system and a totality *ith the agent. 4t necessarily follo*s, then, that )evinas *ill describe history as a blinding to the other, and as the laborious procession of the same. =ne may *onder *hether history can be history, if there is history, *hen negativity is enclosed *ithin the circle of the same, and *hen *or0 does not truly meet alterity, providing itself *ith its o*n resistance. =ne *onders *hether history itself does not begin *ith this relationship to the other *hich )evinas places beyond history. (he frame*or0 of this question should govern the entire reading of (otality

tautology or of false "finite' heterology-this very difficult theme is proposed rather discreetly at the beginning of (otality and 4nfinity, but it conditions every affirmation made in the boo0. 4f negativity "*or0, history, etc.' never has a relation to the other, if the other is not the simple negation of the same, then neither separation nor metaphysical transcendence can be conceived under the category of negativity. Dust asas *e sa* above-simple internal consciousness could not provide itself *ith time and *ith the absolute alterity of every instant *ithout the irruption of the totally-other, so the ego cannot engender alterity *ithin itself *ithout encountering the =ther. 4f one is not convinced by these initial propositions authoriBing the equation of the ego and the same, one never *ill be. 4f one does not follo* )evinas *hen he affirms that the things offered to *or0 or to desirein the 1egelian sense5 for example, natural ob ectivity-belong to the ego, to the ego's economy "to the same', and do not offer the absolute resistance reserved for the other "=thers'8 if one is tempted to thin0 that this last resistance supposes, in its innermost meaning, the possibility of the resistance of things-the existence of the *orld *hich is not myself and in *hich 4 am, in as original a *ay as one may *ish, for example as origin of the *orld *ithin the *orld, although it is not to be confused *ith this possibility8 if one does not follo* )evinas *hen he affirms that the true resistance to the same is not that of things, is not real but rather is intelligible, $. and if one rebels against the notion of a purely intelligible resistance, then in all these cases one *ill follo* )evinas no further. Nor *ill one be able to follo*, *ithout an indefinable malaise, the conceptual operations liberated by the classical dissymetry of the same and other, as they are overturned8 or "as a classical mind *ould say', *hile they feign permitting themselves to be overturned, all the *hile remaining the same, impassive beneath an algebraic substitution. :hat, then, is this encounter *ith the absolutely-other< Neither representation, nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the same. (he ego and the other do not permit themselves to be dominated or made into totalities by a concept of relationship. -nd first of all because the concept "material of language', *hich is al*ays given to the other, cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other. (he dative or vocative dimension *hich opens the original direction of language, cannot lend

and 4nfinity. 4n any event, one observes the displacement of the concept of historicity of *hich *e spo0e above. 4t must be ac0no*ledged that *ithout this displacement no anti-1egelianism could be logically consequent. (he necessary condition for this anti-1egelianism is therefore fulfilled. - precaution must be made5 the theme of the concrete "nonformal'

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itself to inclusion in and modification by the accusative or attributive dimension of the ob ect *ithout violence. )anguage, therefore, cannot ma0e its o*n possibility a totality and include *ithin itself its o*n origin or its o*n end. (ruthfully, one does not have to *onder *hat this encounter is. 4t is the encounter, the only *ay out, the only adventuring outside oneself to*ard the unforeseeably-other. :ithout hope of return. 4n every sense of this expression, *hich is *hy this eschatology *hich a*aits nothing sometimes appears infinitely hopeless. (ruthfully, in )a trace de l'autre eschatology does not only "appear" hopeless. 4t is given as such, and renunciation belongs to its essential meaning. 4n describing liturgy, desire, and the *or0 of art as ruptures of the 6conomy and the odyssey, as the impossibility of return to the same, )evinas spea0s of an "eschatology *ithout hope for the self or *ithout liberation in my time." (herefore, there is no *ay to conceptualiBe the encounter5 it is made possible by the other, the unforeseeable "resistant to all categories." Concepts suppose an anticipation, a horiBon *ithin *hich alterity is amortiBed as soon as it is announced precisely because it has let itself be foreseen. (he infinitely-other cannot be bound by a concept, cannot be thought on the basis of a horiBon8 for a horiBon is al*ays a horiBon of the same, the elementary unity *ithin *hich eruptions and surprises are al*ays *elcomed by understanding and recogniBed. (hus *e are obliged to thin0 in opposition to the truisms *hich *e believed*hich *e still cannot not believe-to be the very ether of our thought and language. (o attempt to thin0 the opposite is stifling. -nd it is a question not only of thin0ing the opposite *hich is still in complicity

Present not as a total presence but as a trace. (herefore, before all dogmas, all conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy, experience itself is eschatological at its origin and in each of its aspects. @ace to face *ith the other *ithin a glance and a speech *hich both maintain distance and interrupt all totalities, this being-together as separation precedes or exceeds society, collectivity, community. )evinas calls it religion. 4t opens ethics. (he ethical relation is a religious relation "#ifficile liberte >hereafter #)?'. Not a religion, but the religion, the religiosity of the religious. (his transcendence beyond negativity is not accomplished by an intuition of a positive presence8 it "only institutes language at the point *here neither no nor yes is the first *ord" "(4' but an interrogation. Not a theoretical interrogation, ho*ever, but a total question, a distress and denuding, a supplication, a demanding prayer addressed to a freedom, that is, to a commandment5 the only possible ethical imperative, the only incarnated nonviolence in that it is respect for the other. -n immediate respect for the other himself-one might say, although *ithout follo*ing any literal indication by )evinas-because it does not pass through the neutral element of the universal, and through respect-in the Iantian sense 3&- for the la*. (his restitution of metaphysics then permits the radicaliBation and systematiBation of the previous reductions of phenomenology and ontology. (he act of seeing is at the outset a respectful 0no*ledge, and light passes for the medium *hich-as faithfully and neutrally as possible, as a third party-permits the 0no*n to be. 4t is not by chance that the theoretical relation has been the preferred frame*or0 of the metaphysical relation "cf (4'. :hen the third term, in its most neutral indetermination, is the light of /eing-*hich is neither a being nor a

*ith the classical alternatives, but of liberating thought and its lan guage for the encounter occurring beyond these alternatives. #oubtless this encounter, *hich for the first time does not ta0e the form of an intuitive contact "in ethics, in the sense given to it by )evinas, the principal, central prohibition is that of contact' but the form of a separation "encounter as separation, another rupture of "formal logic"'." #oubtless this encounter of the unforeseeable itself is the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure expend iture beyond history as economy. /ut this future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after history. 4t is present at the heart of experience.

non-being, *hile the same and the other are-the theoretical relation is ontology. -ccording to )evinas, the latter al*ays brings the other bac0 into the midst of the same and does so for the benefit of the unity of /eing. -nd the theoretical freedom *hich acceeds to the thought of /eing is but the identification of the same, the light in *hich 4 provide myself *ith *hat 4 claim to encounter, that is, an economic freedom, in the particular sense )evinas gives to this *ord. - freedom in immanence, a premetaphysical, one could almost say a physical freedom, an empirical freedom, even if it is called reason *ithin history. 2eason *ould be nature. 7etaphysics begins *hen theory criticiBes itself as

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ontology, as the dogmatism and spontaneity of the same, and *hen metaphysics, in departing from itself, lets itself be put into question by the other in the movement of ethics. -lthough in fact it is secondary, metaphysics as the critique of ontology is rightfully and philosophically primary. 4f it is true that ":estern philosophy most often has been an ontology" dominated since !ocrates by a 2eason *hich receives only *hat it gives itself,3, a 2eason *hich does nothing but recall itself to itself, and if ontology is tautotology and egology, then it has al*ays neutraliBed the other, in every sense of the *ord. Phenomenological neutraliBation, one might be tempted to say, gives the most subtle and modern form to this historical, political and authoritarian neutraliBation. =nly metaphysics can free the other from the light of /eing or from the phenomenon *hich "ta0es a*ay from /eing its resistance." 1eideggerean "ontology," despite its seductive appearance, *ould not escape this frame*or0. 4t *ould still remain "egology" and even "egoism"5 "!ein and Keit has argued perhaps but one sole thesis5 /eing is inseparable from the comprehension of /eing "*hich unfolds as time'8 /eing is already an appeal to sub ectivity. (he primacy of ontology for 1eidegger does not rest on the truism5 'to 0no* the existent it is neces sary to have comprehended the /eing of the existent.' (o affirm the priority of /eing over the existent is, indeed, to decide the essence of philosophy8 it is to subordinate the relation *ith someone, *ho is an existent "the ethical relation', to a relation *ith the /eing of the existent, *hich, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of the existent "a relationship of 0no*ing', subordinates ustice to free dom... the mode of remaining the same in the midst of the other" "(4, p. .+'. #espite all the misunderstandings *hich may be embedded in

nonetheless oppressive and possessive. /y another paradox, the phil osophy of the neutral communicates *ith a philosophy of the site, of rootedness, of pagan violence, of ravishment, of enthusiasm, a phil osophy offered up to the sacred, that is, to the anonymous divinity, the divinity *ithout the #eity "#)'. 4t is a "shameful materialism" in that it is complete, for at heart materialism is not primarily sensualism, but a recogniBed primacy of the neutral "(4'. (he notion of primacy, employed so frequently by )evinas, *ell translates the gesture of his entire critique. -ccording to the indication present in the notion of archia, the philosophical beginning is immediately transposed into an ethical or philosophical command. @rom the very first, primacy indicates principle and chief. -ll the classical concepts interrogated by )evinas are thus dragged to*ard the agora, summoned to ustify themselves in an ethico-political language that they have not al*ays sought-or believed that they sought-to spea0, summoned to transpose themselves into this language by confessing their violent aims. Fet they already spo0e this language in the city, and spo0e it *ell, by means of the detours of philosophy and despite philosophy's apparent disinterest, not*ithstanding its eventual return to po*er. 1ere *e find the premises for a non-7arxist reading of philosophy as ideology. (he *ays chosen by )evinas are decidedly difficult5 re ecting idealism and the philosophies of sub ectivity, he must also denounce the neutrality of a ")ogos *hich is the verb of no one" "(4'. "4t could no doubt be demonstrated that )evinas, uncomfortably situated in the difference bet*een 1usserl and 1eidegger-and, indeed, by virtue of the history of his thought-al*ays criticiBes the one in a style and according to a scheme borro*ed from the other, and finishes by sending them off into the *ings together as partners in the "play of the same" and as accomplices in the same historico-philosophical coup.' (he verb must not only be the verb of someone-it must overflo*, in its movement to*ard the other, *hat is called the spea0ing sub ect. Neither the philosophies of the neutral nor

this treatment of 1eideggerean thought-*e *ill study them for them selves later-)evinas's intention, in any event, seems clear. (he neutral thought of /eing neutraliBes the =ther as a being5 "=ntology as first philosophy is a philosophy of po*er" "(4, p. .&', a philosophy of the" sality. 1ere *e find the premises for a critique of the state's alienation , *hose anti-1egelianism *ould be neither sub ectivist, nor 7arxist8. nor anarchist, for it is a philosophy of the "principle, *hich can be'' only as a commandment." (he 1eideggerean "possibilities" remain. po*ers. -lthough they are pretechnical and preob ective, they are the philosophies of sub ectivity can ac0no*ledge this tra ectory of speech that no speech can ma0e into a totality. /y definition, if the other is the other, and if all speech is for the other, no logos as absolute (his incomprehensibility, this rupture of logos is not the beginning of irrationalism but the *ound or inspiration *hich opens speech and

$ 3 3 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ then ma0es possible every logos or every rationalism. - total logos still, in order to be logos, *ould have to let itself be proffered to*ard the other beyond its o*n totality. 4f, for example, there is an ontology or a logos of the comprehension of the /eing "of beings', it is in that "already the comprehension of /eing is said to the existent, *ho again arises behind the theme in *hich he is presented. (his 'saying to the other'-this relationship to the other as interlocutor, this relation *ith an existentprecedes all ontology8 it is the ultimate relation in /eing. =ntology presupposes metaphysics" "(4, pp. .,-.G'. "Prior to the unveiling of /eing in general, as the basis of 0no*ledge and meaning of /eing, there is a relationship *ith the existent *hich is expressed8 before the ontological level, the ethical level." 6thics is therefore metaphysics. "7orality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy." (he absolute overflo*ing of ontology-as the totality and unity of the same5 /eing-by the other occurs as infinity because no totality can constrain it. (he infinity irreducible to the representation of infinity, the infinity exceeding the ideation in *hich it is thought, thought of as more than 4 can thin0, as that *hich cannot be an ob ect or a simple "ob ective reality" of the idea-such is the pole of metaphysical transcendence. -fter the epe0eina tes ousias, the Cartesian idea of infinity made metaphysics emerge for a second time in :estern ontology. /ut *hat

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neither Plato nor #escartes recogniBed "along *ith several others, if *e may be permitted not to believe to the same extent as )evinas in their solitude among the philosophical cro*d *hich understands neither true transcendence nor the strange idea of 4nfinity' is that the expression of this infinity is the face. (he face is not only a visage *hich may be the surface of things or animal facies, aspect, or species. 4t is not only, follo*ing the origin of the *ord, *hat is seen, seen because it is na0ed. 4t is also that *hich sees. Not so much that *hich sees things-a theoretical relation-but that *hich exchanges its glance. (he visage is a face only in the face-to-face. -s !cheler said "but our citation must not ma0e us forget that )evinas i< nothing less than !chelerian'5 "4 see not only the eyes of an other, 4 see #id not 1egel say this too< "4f *e as0 ourselves no* in *hich point to the eye. @or in the eye the soul concentrates itself8 it not merely

uses the eye as its instrument, but is itself therein manifest. :e have, ho*ever, already stated, *hen referring to the external covering of the human body, that in contrast *ith the bodies of animals, the heart of life pulses through and throughout it. -nd in much the same sense it can be asserted of art that it has to invent every point of the external appearance into the direct testimony of the human eye, *hich is the source of soul-life, and reveals spirit."3G (his is perhaps the occasion to emphasiBe, concerning a precise point, a theme that *e *ill enlarge upon later5 )evinas is very close to 1egel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment *hen he is apparently opposed to 1egel in the most radical fashion. (his is a situation he must share *ith all anti 1egelian thin0ers, and *hose final significance calls for much thought. 1ere, in particular, on the relations bet*een desire and the eye, bet*een sound and theory, the convergence is as profound as the difference, being neither simply added to nor uxtaposed *ith it. 4n effect, li0e )evinas 1egel thought that the eye, not aiming at "consumption," suspends desire. 4t is the very limit of desire "and perhaps, thereby, its resource' and is the first theoretical sense. :e must not conceive light and the eye's opening on the basis of any physiology, but on the basis of the relation bet*een death and desire. -fter having spo0en of taste, touch, and smell, 1egel again *rites, in the -esthetics5 "!ight, on the other hand, possesses a purely ideal relation to ob ects by means of light, a material *hich is at the same time immaterial, and *hich suffers on its part the ob ects to continue in their free selfsubsistence, ma0ing them appear and reappear, but *hich does not, as the atmosphere or fire does, consume them actively either by imperceptible degrees or patently. 6verything, then is an ob ect of the appetiteless vision, >la vue exempte de desirs? *hich, ho*ever, in so far as it remains unimpaired in its integrity, merely is disclosed in its form and colour."3% (his neutraliBation of desire is *hat ma0es sight excellent for 1egel. /ut for )evinas, this neutraliBation is also, and for the same reasons, the first violence, even though the face is not *hat it is *hen the glance is absent. Ciolence, then, *ould be the solitude of a mute glance, of a face

by itself, contrary to *hat one may be led to believe, does not respect the other. 2espect, beyond grasp and contact, beyond touch, smell and

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taste, can +e only as desire, and metaphysical desire does not see% to consume, as do 4egelian desire or need. his is why (evinas places sound a+ove light. *" hought is language and is thought in an element analogous to sound and not to light." What does this analogy mean here, a difference and a resem+lance, a relation +etween the sensi+le sound and the sound of thought as intelligi+le speech, +etween sensi+ility and signification, the senses and senseF his is a :uestion also posed +y 4egel, admiring the word Sinn.2 9n otality and 9nfinity the movement of metaphysics is thus also the transcendence of hearing in relation to seeing. 6ut in 4egel's ,esthetics too. " he remaining ideal sense is hearing. his is in signal contrast to the one &ust descri+ed. 4earing is concerned with the tone, rather than the form and colour of an o+&ect, with the vi+ration of what is corporeal> it re:uires no process of dissolution, as the sense of smell re:uires, +ut merely a trem+ling of the o+&ect, +y which the same is in no wise impoverished. his ideal motion, in which through its sound what is as it were the simple individuality Asu+&ectiviteB the soul of the material thing e)presses itself, the ear receives also in an ideal way, &ust as the eye shape and colour, and suffers there+y what is ideal or not e)ternal in the o+&ect to appeal to what is spiritual or non-corporeal."" 6ut. 4earing, which, as also the sight, does not +elong to the senses of action ;lens pratiques< +ut those of contemplation ;sens th=oriques< and is, in fact, still more ideal than sight. 'or the unruffled, aesthetic o+servation of wor%s of art no dou+t permits the o+&ects to stand out :uietly in their freedom &ust as they are without any desire to impair that effect in any way> +ut that which it apprehends is not that which is itself essentially ideally composed, +ut rather on the contrary, that which receives its consistency in its sensuous e)istence. he ear, on the contrary, receives the result of that ideal vi+ration of material su+stance, without placing itself in a practical relation towards the o+&ects, a result +y means of which it is no longer the material o+&ect in its repose, +ut the first e)ample of the more ideal activity of the soul''

the passage to ideality. 'urther, in order to confront systematically 4egel's and (evinas's thoughts on the theme of the face, one would have to consult not only the pages of the Phenomenology of the ?ind devoted to physiognomy, +ut also paragraph I!! of the -ncyclopedia on mind, face, and language. 'or reasons now familiar to us, the face-to-face eludes every cat egory. 'or within it the face is given simultaneously as e)pression and as speech. /ot only as glance, +ut as the original unity of glance and speech, eyes and mouth, that spea%s, +ut also pronounces its hunger. hus it is also that which hears the invisi+le, for "thought is language," and "is thought in an element analogous to sound and not to light." his unity of the face precedes, in its signification, the dispersion of senses and organs of sensi+ility. 9ts signification is therefore irredu ci+le. ?oreover, the face does not signify. 9t does not incarnate, envelop, or signal anything other than self, soul, su+&ectivity, etc. hought is speech, and is therefore immediately face. 9n this, the thematic of the face +elongs to the most modern philosophy of language and of the +ody itself he other is not signaled +y his face, he is this face. ",+solutely present, in his face, the 5ther-without any metaphor-faces me."" he other, therefore, is given "in person" and without allegory only in the face. (et us recall what 'euer+ach, who also made the themes of height, su+stance, and face communicate with each other, said on this su+&ect. " hat which is situated highest in space is also in its :uality the highest part of man, that which is closest to him, that which one can no longer separate from him-and this is his head. 9f 9 see a man's head, it is the man himself who 9 see> +ut if 9 only see his torso, 9 see no more than his torso."11 hat which can no longer +e separated from.. is su+stance in its essential predicates and "in itself" (evinas also often says %ath'auto and "su+stance" in spea%ing of the other as face. he face is presence, ousia. he face is not a metaphor, not a figure. he discourse on the face is neither allegory nor, as one might +e tempted to +elieve, prosopopoeia. ;onse:uently the height of the face *in relation to the rest of the +ody2 perhaps determines in part *in part only, as we will see later2 the e)pression most-high which we e)amined a+ove. 9f the height of the mosthigh, as we might +e tempted to say, does not +elong to space *and this is why the superlative must destroy space as it constructs the metaphor2,

itself which is apprehended" he :uestion of the analogy would thus lead us +ac% to the notion of trem+ling, which seems to us decisive in 4egel's ,esthetics in that it opens

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it is not because it is foreign to space, but because "*ithin' space it is the origin of space, orienting space through speech and glance. through the face, the chief *ho commands body and space from above. "-ristotle, indeed, compares the transcendental principle of the good to the chief of the armies8 ho*ever, he overloo0s both the face, and the fact that the god of the armies is the @ace.' (he face does not signify, does not present itself as a sign, but expresses itself, offering itself in person, in itself, 0ath'auto5 "the thing in itself expresses itself" (o express oneself is to be behind the sign. (o be behind the sign5 is this not, first of all, to be capable of attending "to' one's speech, to assist it, according to the expression used in the Phaedrus as argument against (heuth "or 1ermes'-an expression )evinas ma0es his o*n on several occasions. =nly living speech, in its mastery and magisteriality, is able to assist itself8 and only living speech is expression and not a servile sign-on the condition that it is truly speech, "the creative voice, and not the accomplice voice *hich is a servant" "6. Dabes'. -nd *e 0no* that all the gods of *riting "9reece, 6gypt, -ssyria, /abylonia' have the status of auxiliary gods, servile secretaries of the great god, lunar and clever couriers *ho occasionally dethrone the 0ing of the gods by dishonorable means. (he *ritten and the *or0 are not expressions but signs for

)evinas. -long *ith the reference to the epe0eina tes ousias, this is at very least the second Platonic theme of (otality and 4nfinity. 4t is also to be found in Nicholas of Cusa. ":hile the *or0er abandons his *or0, *hich then pursues its independent destiny, the verb of the professor is inseparable from the very person *ho proffers it."" (he critique of the *or0 thus (his problematic requires separate consideration in and of itself. 4s sense, the "speech activity" in *hich 4 "am absent, missing from my products" *hich then betray me more than they express me< 4s the. "fran0ness" of expression essentially an aspect of living speech for him *ho is not 9od< (his question is meaningless for )evinas, *ho conH ceives the face in terms of the "resemblance" of man and 9od. -re no *eight and magisterial instruction an aspect of *riting< 4s it not pos sible to invert all of )evinas's statements on this point< /y sho*ing for example, that *riting can assist itself, for it has time and freedom

escaping better than speech from empirical urgencies. (hat, by neutraliBing the demands of empirical "economy," *riting's essence is more "metaphysical" "in )evinas's sense' than speech< (hat the *riter absents himself better, that is, expresses himself better as other, addresses himself to the other more effectively than the man of speech< -nd that, in depriving himself of the en oyments and effects of his signs, the *riter more effectively renounces violence< 4t is true that he perhaps intends only to multiply his signs to infinity, thus forgetting-at very least-the other, the infinitely other as death, and thus practicing *riting as deferral and as an economy of death. (he limit bet*een violence and nonviolence is perhaps not bet*een speech and *riting but *ithin each of them. (he thematic of the trace "*hich )evinas distinguishes from the effect, the path, or the sign *hich is not related to the other as the invisible absolute' should lead to a certain rehabilitation of *riting. 4s not the "1e" *hom transcendence and generous absence uniquely announce in the trace more readily the author of *riting than of speech< (he *or0, trans-economy, the pure expenditure as determined by )evinas, is neither play nor death. 4t is not simply to be confused *ith either the letter or *ith speech. 4t is not a sign, and therefore its concept cannot include the concept of the *or0 found in (otality and 4nfinity. )evinas is thus at once quite dose to and quite far from NietBsche and /ataille. 7aurice /lanchot spea0s of his disagreement *ith this preeminence of oral discourse, *hich resembles "the tranquil humanist and !ocratic speech *hich brings us close to the spea0er.";+ 7oreover, ho* could 1ebraism belittle the letter, in praise of *hich )evinas *rites so *ell< @or example5 "(o admit the action of literature on men-this is perhaps the ultimate *isdom of the :est, in *hich the people of the /ible *ill be recogniBed" "#)'8 and "(he spirit is free in the letter, and sub u

gated in the root"8 and then, "(o love the (orah more than 9od" is "protection against the madness of a direct contact *ith the !acred" "#)'. (he aspect of living and original speech itself *hich )evinas see0s to save is clear. :ithout its possibility, outside its horiBon, *riting is nothing. 4n this sense, *riting *ill al*ays be secondary. (o liberate it from this possibility and this horiBon, from this essential secondari ness, is to deny it as *riting, and to leave room for a grammar or a lexicon *ithout language, for cybernetics or electronics. /ut it is only

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in 9od that speech, as presence, as the origin and horiBon of *riting, is realiBed *ithout defect. =ne *ould have to be able to sho* that only this reference to the speech of 9od distinguishes )evinas's intentions from those of !ocrates in the Phaedrus8 and that for a thought of original finitude this distinction is no longer possible. -nd that if *riting is secondary at this point, nothing, ho*ever, has occurred before it. -s for )evinas's ties to /lanchot, it seems to us that despite the frequent rapprochements he proposes, the profound and incontestable affinities bet*een them all belong to the critical and negative moment, *ithin the hollo* space of finitude in *hich messianic eschatology comes to resonate, *ithin the expectation of expectation in *hich )evinas has begun to hear a response. (his response is still called expectation, of course, but )evinas no longer has to a*ait it. (he affinity ceases, it seems to us, at the moment *hen eschatalogical positivity retrospectively comes to illuminate the common route, to lift the finitude and pure negativity of the question, *hen the neutral is determined. /lanchot could probably extend over all of )evinas's propositions *hat he says about the dissymetry *ithin the space of communication5 "1ere, 4 believe, is *hat is decisive in the affirmation

*hich *e must hear, and *hich must be maintained independently of the theological context in *hich it occurs." /ut is this possible< 4ndependent of its "theological context" "an expression that )evinas *ould most li0ely re ect' does not this entire discourse collapse< (o be behind the sign *hich is in the *orld is after*ard to remain invisible to the *orld *ithin epiphany. 4n the face, the other is given over in person as other, that is, as that *hich does not reveal itself, as that *hich cannot be made thematic. 4 could not possibly spea0 of the =ther, ma0e of the other a theme, pronounce the =ther as ob ect, in the accusative. 4 can only, 4 must only spea0 to the other8 that is, 4 must call him in the vocative, *hich is not a category, a case of speech, bu rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech. Categories must be missing for the =ther not to be overloo0ed8 but for the =ther not to be overloo0ed, 1e must present himself as absence, and must appear as nonphenomenal. -l*ays behind its signs and its *or0s, al*ays *ithin ities through its freedom of speech, the face is not "of this *orld." 4t' the origin of the *orld. 4 can spea0 of it only by spea0ing to it8 and 4 may

reach it only as 4 must reach it. /ut 4 must only reach it as the inaccessible, the invisible, the intangible. !ecret, separate, invisible li0e 9y es ""the very condition of man"'-this is the very state, the very status of *hat is called the psyche. (his absolute separation, this natural atheism, this lying freedom in *hich truth and discourse ta0e root-all this is a "great glory for the creator." -n affirmation *hich, for once at least, is hardly disorienting. @or the face to present the other *ithout metaphor, speech must not only translate thought. #hought, of course, already must be speech, but above all the body must also remain a language. 2ational 0no*ledge must not be the first *ord of *ords. 4f one is to believe )evinas, 1usserl and 1eidegger, at bottom, accepted the classical subordination of language to thought, and body to language. =n the contrary, 7erleauPonty, "better than others," *ould have sho*n "that disincarnated thought, thin0ing of speech before spea0ing it, thought as constitutive of the *orld of speech, *as a myth." /ut by the force of a movement proper to )evinas, he accepts this extreme "modern" audacity only to redirect it to*ard an infinitism that this audacity itself must suppose, according to himself8 and the form of this infinitism is often quite classical, pre-Iantian rather than 1egelian. (hus, the themes of one's o*n body as language and as intentionality cannot get around the classical dangers, and thought cannot first be language unless it is ac0no*ledged that thought is first and irreducibly a relation to the other "*hich it seems to us did not escape 7erleau-Ponty'8;& but a relation to an irreducible other *ho summons me *ithout possibility of return from *ithout, for in this order is presented the infinity *hich no thought can enclose and *hich forbids all monologue "even if it had

the corporal intentionality' of 7erleau-Ponty." #espite all appearances and all habitual thin0ing, it must be ac0no*ledged here that the dissociation of thought and language, and the subordination of the latter to the former, are proper to a philosophy of finitude. -nd this demonstration *ould refer us once more to the Cartesian Cogito of the third 7editation, beyond 7erleau-Ponty, 1eidegger, and 1usserl. -nd does so according to a schema that seems to us to support the entirety of )evinas's thought5 the other is the other only if his alterity is absolutely

only be 4nfinity.

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-s speech and glance the face is not in the *orld, since it opens and exceeds the totality. (his is *hy it mar0s the limit of all po*er, of all violence, and the origin of the ethical. 4n a sense, murder is al*ays directed against the face, but thereby al*ays misses it. "7urder exerts a po*er over that *hich escapes po*er. !till, a po*er, for the face expresses itself in the sensible8 but already impotence, because the face rips apart the sensible." "(he =ther is the only being *ho 4 may *ish to 0ill," but the only one, also, *ho orders that "thou shalt commit no murders," and thus absolutely limits my po*er. Not by opposing me *ith another force in the *orld, but by spea0ing to me, and by loo0ing at me from an other origin of the *orld, from that *hich no finite po*er can restrict5 the strange, unthin0able notion of unreal resistance. !ince his $%+; article "already cited', )evinas no longer, to our 0no*ledge, spea0s of "intelligible resistance"-an expression *hose sense still belongs at least literally, to the realm of the same, and *hich *as utiliBed, apparently, only to signify an unreal resistance. 4n (otality and 4nfinity )evinas spea0s of "ethical resistance." (hat *hich escapes the concept as po*er, therefore, is not existence in general, but the existence of the =ther. -nd first of all because, despite all appearances, there is no concept of the =ther. :e *ould have to reflect upon this *ord "=ther" >-utrui? in an artisan-li0e *ay, in the realm *here philosophy and philology constrain each other, uniting their concerns and their rigor-this *ord "=ther" circumscribed in silence by the capital letter *hich ever increases the neutrality of the other, and *hich *e use so familiarly, even though it is the very disorder of our conceptuality. 4s it only a common noun *ithout concept< /ut, first of all, is it a noun< 4t is not an ad ective, or a pronoun8 therefore it is a substantive and such it is classed by the

language, that *hich is al*ays "in regimen" and in the least generality is, in its meaning, undeclinable and beyond genre. :hat is the origin of this case of meaning in language, of this regimen in *hich language places meaning< Nor is autrui a proper noun, even though its anonym ity signifies but the unnamable source of every proper noun. :e *ould have to examine patiently *hat emerges in language *hen the 9ree0 conception of heteron seems to run out of breath *hen faced by the alterhuic8 *hat happens *hen the heteron seems to become incapable of mastering *hat it alone, ho*ever, is able to precomprehend by concealing it as alterity "other in general', and *hich, in return, *ill reveal to heteron its irreducible center of meaning "the other as other >autrui?'. :e *ould have to examine the complicity of the concealment and the precomprehension *hich does not occur *ithin a conceptual movement, for the @rench *ord autrui does not designate a category of the genre autre. :e *ould have to examine this thought of the other in general "*hich is not a genre', the 9ree0 thought *ithin *hich this nonspecific difference realiBes "itself in' our history. =r, rather5 *hat does autre mean before its 9ree0 determination as heteron, and its DudeoChristian determination as autrui< (his is the 0ind of question *hich )evinas seems to contest profoundly5 according to him, only the irruption of the =ther permits access to the absolute and to the irreducible alterity of the other. :e *ould have to examine, therefore, this 1uic of autrui *hose transcendence is not yet that of a thou. 1ere, )evinas's opposition to /uber or to 9abriel 7arcel becomes meaningful. -fter opposing the magisterial height of the Fou to the intimate reciprocity of the 7e-(hou "(4', )evinas seems to move to*ard a philosophy of the 4lle, of the 1e "$$' in his meditation of the (race "that is, of the neighbor as a distant stranger, according to the original ambiguity of the *ord translated as the "neighbor" to be loved'. - philosophy of the 1e *ho *ould not be an impersonal ob ect opposed to the thou, but the invisible transcendence of the =ther." 4f the face's expression is not revelation, then the unrevealable is expressed beyond all thematiBation, beyond all constitutive analysis, all phenomenology. -t its various stages, the transcendental constitution of the alter ego-of *hich 1usserl

dictionaries-but a substantive *hich is not, as usual, a species of noun5' neither common noun, for it cannot ta0e, as in the category of the other in general, the heteron, the definite article. Nor the plural. "4n the chancellery location l'autrui >the =ther?, le must not be understood as the article of autrui5 implied is property, rights5 the property, the rights of others, J notes )ittre, *ho began thus5 "-utrui, from alter-huic, this other, in regi- , men5 this is *hy autrui is al*ays in regimen, and *hy autrui is less accident of thought, *e *ould have to account for this5 that, *ithin

attempts to reassemble the description in the fifth of the Cartesian 7editations-*ould presuppose that *hose genesis it allegedly traces "according to )evinas'. (he =ther could not be constituted as an alter

$ ; 3 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ ego, as a phenomenon of the ego, by and for a nomadic sub ect proceeding by appresentative analogy. -ll the difficulties encountered by 1usserl could be "surmounted" if the ethical relationship *ere recogniBed as the original face-to-face, as the emergence of absolute alterity, the emergence of an exteriority *hich can be neither derived, nor engendered, nor constituted on the basis of anything other than itself -n absolute outside, an exteriority infinitely overflo*ing the monad of the ego cogito. 1ere again, #escartes against 1usserl, the #escartes of the (hird 7editation allegedly misconstrued by 1usserl. :hile #escartes, in his reflections on the cogito, becomes a*are that infinity not only cannot be constituted as a "dubitable' ob ect, but has already made infinity possible as a cogito overflo*ing the ob ect, "a nonspatial overflo*ing, against *hich metaphor shatters', 1usserl, on the other hand, "sees in the cogito a sub ectivity *ith no support from *ithout, constituting the idea of infinity itself, and providing himself *ith it as ob ect" "(4'. No*, the infinite"-ly other' cannot be an ob ect because it is speech, the origin of meaning and the *orld. (herefore, no phenomenology can account for ethics, speech, and ustice. /ut if all ustice begins *ith speech, all speech is not ust. 2hetoric may amount to the violence of theory, *hich reduces the other *hen it leads the other, *hether through psychology, demagogy, or even pedagogy *hich is not instruction. (he latter descends from the heights of

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(ime. (his nudity of the face, speech, and glance, being neither theory nor theorem, is offered and exposed as denuding, as demanding supplication, as the unthin0able unity of a speech able to assist itself and a glance *hich calls for assistance. -symmetry, non-light, and commandment then *ould be violence and in ustice themselves-and, indeed, so they are commonly understood-if they established relations bet*een finite beings, or if the other *as but a negative determination of the "finite or infinite' same. /ut *e have seen that this is not the case. 4nfinity "as infinitely other' cannot be violent as is totality "*hich is thus al*ays defined by )evinas, al*ays determined by an option, that is, an initial decision of his discourse, as finite totality5 totality, for )evinas, means a finite totality. (his functions as a silent axiom.' (his is *hy 9od alone 0eeps )evinas's *orld from being a *orld of the pure and *orst violence, a *orld of immorality itself. (he structures of living and na0ed experience described by )evinas are the very structures of a *orld in *hich *ar *ould ragestrange conditional-if the infinitely other *ere not infinity, if there *ere, by chance, one na0ed man, finite and alone. /ut in this case, )evinas *ould no doubt say, there no longer *ould be any *ar, for there *ould be neither face nor true asymmetry. (herefore the na0ed and living experience in *hich 9od has already begun to spea0 could no longer be our concern. 4n other *ords, in a *orld *here the face *ould be fully respected "as that *hich is not of this *orld', there no longer *ould be *ar. 4n a *orld *here the face no longer *ould be absolutely respected, *here there no longer *ould be a face, there *ould be no more cause for *ar. 9od, therefore, is implicated in *ar.

the master, *hose absolute exteriority does not impair the disciple's freedom. /eyond rhetoric, speech uncovers the nudity of the face, *ithout *hich no nudity *ould have any meaning. -ll nudity, "even the nudity of the body experienced in shame," is a "figure of speech quite explicit in is =ntology @undamental< "(he nudity of the face is not a stylistic figure." -nd it is sho*n, still in the form of negative theology8 that this nudity is not even an opening, for an opening is relative to a "surrounding plenitude." (he *ord "nudity" thus destroys itself after serving to indicate something beyond itself. -n entire reading and interrogation of (otality and 4nfinity could be developed around thi affirmation. @or this affirmation seems to us quite implicitly-perhaps even too implicitly-to support the decisive division bet*een *hat' )evinas calls the face and that *hich is /eyond the @ace, the section *hich considers, aside from the Phenomenology of 6ros, )ove, @ecundity, and 1is name too, li0e the name of peace, is a function *ithin the system of ar, the only system *hose basis permits us to spea0, the only system hose language may ever be spo0en. :ith or *ithout 9od, there ould be no *ar. :ar supposes and excludes 9od. :e can have a relation to 9od only *ithin such a system. (herefore *ar-for *ar there isis the difference bet*een the face and the finite *orld *ithout a face. /ut is not this difference that *hich has al*ays been called the *orld, m *hich the absence-presence of 9od plays< =nly the play of the *orld permits us to thin0 the essence of 9od. 4n a sense that our language-and )evinas's alsoaccommodates poorly the play of the *orld precedes 9od.

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(he face-to-face, then, is not originally determined by )evinas as the visa-vis of t*o equal and upright men. (he latter supposes the face-toface of the man *ith bent nec0 and eyes raised to*ard the 9od on high. )anguage is indeed the possibility of the face-to-face and of beingupright, but it does not exclude inferiority, the humility of the glance at the father as the glance of the child made in memory of having been expulsed before 0no*ing ho* to *al0, and of having been delivered, prone and infans, into the hands of the adult masters. 7an, one might say, is a 9od arrived too early, that is, a 9od *ho 0no*s himself forever late in relation to the already-there of /eing. /ut it is certain that these last remar0s-and this is the least one might say-do not belong to the genre of commentary. -nd *e are not referring, here, to the themes 0no*n under the name of psychoanalysis, nor to the embryological or anthropological hypothesis on the structurally premature birth of man's offspring. )et it suffice us to 0no* that man is born. ;G 9od's name is often mentioned, but this return to experience, and to "things themselves," as a relation to the infinite"ly' other is not theological, even if it alone is capable, after*ard, of founding theological discourse, *hich up to no* has "imprudently considered the idea of the relationship bet*een 9od and creation in ontological terms" "(4'. (he foundation ofmetaphysics-in )evinas's sense-is to be encountered in the return to things themselves, *here *e find the common root of humanism and theology5 the resemblance bet*een man and 9od,

man's visage and the @ace of 9od. "(he =ther resembles 9od" "ibid.'. Cia the passage*ay of this resemblance, man's speech can be lifted up to*ard 9od, an almost unheard of analogy *hich is the very movement of )evinas's discourse on discourse. -nalogy as dialogue *ith 9od5' "#iscourse is discourse *ith 9od.... 7etaphysics is the essence of this language *ith 9od." #iscourse *ith 9od, and not in 9od as participation. #iscourse *ith 9od, and not discourse on 9od and his attributes as theology. -nd the dissymetry of my relation to the other, this "curvature of inter-sub ective space signifies the divine intention of all truth." 4 "is, perhaps, the very presence of 9od." Presence as separation, presence-absence-again the brea0 *ith Parmenides, !pinoBa and Presence as separation, presence-absence as resemblance, but a resem

blance *hich is not the "ontological mar0" of the *or0er imprinted on his product, or on "beings created in his image and resemblance" "7alebranche'8;% a resemblance *hich can be understood neither in terms of communion or 0no*ledge, nor in terms of participation and incarnation. - resemblance *hich is neither a sign nor an effect of 9od. Neither the sign nor the effect exceeds the same. :e are "in the (race of 9od." - proposition *hich ris0s incomparability *ith every allusion to the "very presence of 9od." - proposition readily converted into atheism5 and if 9od *as an effect of the trace< 4f the idea of divine presence "life, existence, parousia, etc.', if the name of 9od *as but the movement of erasure of the trace in presence< 1ere it is a question of 0no*ing *hether the trace permits us to thin0 presence in its system, or *hether the reverse order is the true one. 4t is doubtless the true order. /ut it is indeed the order of truth *hich is in question. )evinas's thought is maintained bet*een these t*o postulations. (he face of 9od disappears forever in sho*ing itself (hus are reassembled in the unity of their metaphysical signification, at the very heart of the experience denuded by )evinas, the diverse evocations of the @ace of Fah*eh, *ho of course is never named in (otality and 4nfinity. (he face of Fah*eh is the total person and the total presence of "the 6ternal spea0ing face to face *ith 7oses," but saying to him also5 "(hou canst not see my face5 for there shall be no man see me and live.... thou shalt stand upon a roc05 and it shall come to pass, *hile my glory passeth by, that 4 *ill put thee in a clift of the roc0, and *ill cover thee *ith my hand *hile 4 pass by5 -nd 4 *ill ta0e a*ay mine hand, and thou shalt see my bac0 parts5 but my face shall not be seen" "6xodus ;;53A3;'. (he face of 9od *hich commands *hile hiding itself is at once more and less a face than all faces. :hence, perhaps, despite all )evinas's precautions, the equivocal complicity of theology and metaphysics in (otality and 4nfinity. :ould )evinas subscribe to this infinitely ambiguous sentence from the /oo0 of Muestions by 6dmond

Dabes5 "-ll faces are 1is8 this is *hy 16 has no face"< (he face is neither the face of 9od nor the figure of man5 it is their resemblance. - resemblance *hich, ho*ever, *e must thin0 before, or *ithout, the assistance of the !ame..A

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III DI,,/2/N6/ ;ND /S6?;0=5=1D (he questions *hose principles *e no* *ill attempt to indicate are all, in several senses, questions of language5 questions of language and the question of language. /ut if our commentary has not been too unfaithful, it is already clear that there is no element of )evinas's thought *hich is not, in and of itself, engaged by such questions.
=f the original polemic @irst, let it be said, for our o*n reassurance5 the route follo*ed by )evinas's thought is such that all our questions already belong to his o*n interior dialogue, are displaced into his discourse and only listen to it, from many vantage points and in many *ays. -. (hus, for example, #e $'existence a $'existant and )e temps et l'autre seemed to proscribe the "logic of genre," as *ell as the categories of the !ame and =ther. (hese lac0ed the originality of the experience to *hich )evinas *ished to lead us bac05 "(o the cosmos *hich is Plato's *orld is opposed the *orld of the mind, in *hich the implications of eros are not reduced to the logic of genre, in *hich the ego is substituted for the some, and =thers for the other." No*, in (otality and 4nfinity, *here the categories of !ame and =ther return in force, the vis demonstrandi and very energy of the brea0 *ith tradition is precisely the adequation of 6go to the !ame, and of =thers to the =ther. :ithout using these terms themselves, )evinas often *arned us against confusing identity and ipseity, !ame and 6go5 idem and ipse. (his confusion, *hich, in a certain *ay, is immediately practiced by the 9ree0 concept of autos and the 9erman concept of selbst, does not occur as spontaneously in @rench8 nevertheless, it returns as a 0ind of silent axiom in (otality and 4nfinity .$. :e have seen this5 according to )evinas there *ould be no interior difference, no fundamental and autochthonous alterity *ithin the ego. 4f, formerly, interiority, the secret and original separation, had permit red the brea0 *ith the classical use of the 9ree0 concepts of !ame and =ther, the amalgamation of !ame and 6go "!ame and 6go horriogen iBed, and homogeniBed *ith the concept, as *ell as *ith the finite totality' no* permits )evinas to include *ithin the same condemna

)ion both the 9ree0 and the most modern philosophies of sub ectivity, the philosophies most careful to distinguish, as did )evinas previously, the 6go from the !ame and =thers from the other. :ithout close attention to this double movement, to this progress *hich seems to contest its o*n condition and its o*n initial stage, *e *ould miss the originality of this protest against the concept, the state and totality5 it is not made, as is generally the case, in the name of sub ective existence, but against it. !imultaneously against 1egel and against Iier0egaard. )evinas often *arns us against confusing-as one is so tempted to dohis anti-1egelianism *ith a sub ectivism, or *ith a Iier0egaardian type of existentialism, both of *hich *ould remain, according to )evinas, violent and premetaphysical egoisms. "4t is not 4 *ho do not accept the system, as Iier0egaard thought, it is the other." Can one not *ager that Iier0egaard *ould have been deaf to this distinction< -nd that he, in turn, *ould have protested against this conceptuality< 4t as sub ective existence, he *ould have remar0ed perhaps, that the other does not accept the system. (he other is not myself-and *ho has ever maintained that it is<-but it is an 6go, as )evinas must suppose in order to maintain his o*n discourse. (he passage from 6go to other as an 6go is the passage to the essential, nonempirical egoity of sub ective existence in general. (he philosopher Iier0egaard does not only plead for !oren Iier0egaard, ""the egoistic cry of a sub ectivity still concerned *ith Iier0egaard's happiness or salvation"', but for sub ective existence in general "a noncontradictory expression'8 this is *hy his discourse is philosophical, and not in the realm of empirical egoism. (he name of a philosophical sub ect, *hen he says 4, is al*ays, in a certain *ay, a pseudonym. (his is a truth that Iier0egaard adopted systematically, even *hile protesting against the "possibiliBation" of individual existence *hich resists the concept. -nd is not this essence of sub ective existence presupposed by the respect for the other, *hich can be *hat it is-the otheronly as sub ective existence< 4n order to re ect the Iier0egaardian notion of sub ective existence )evinas should eliminate even the notions of an essence and a truth of sub ective existence "of the 6go, and primarily of the 6go of the =ther'. 7oreover, this gesture *ould comply *ith the logic of the brea0 *ith phenomenology and ontology. (he least one might say is that )evinas does not do so, and cannot do so, *ithout renouncing philosophical discourse. -nd, if you

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*ill, the attempt to achieve an opening to*ard the beyond of philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical discourse, *hich can never be sha0en off completely, cannot possibly succeed *ithin language-and )evinas recogniBes that there is no thought before language and outside of it-except by formally and thematically posing the question of the relations bet*een belonging and the opening, the question of closure. @ormally-that is by posing it in the most effective and most formal, the most formaliBed, *ay possible5 not in a logic, in other *ords in a philosophy, but in an inscribed description, in an inscription of the relations bet*een the philosophical and the nonphilosophical, in a 0ind of unheard of graphics, *ithin *hich philosophical conceptuality *ould be no more than a function. )et us add, in order to do him ustice, that Iier0egaard had a sense of the relationship to the irreducibility of the totally-other, not in the egoistic and esthetic here and no*, but in the religious beyond of the concept, in the direction of a certain -braham. -nd did he not, in turn-for *e must let the other spea0-see in 6thics, as a moment of Category and )a*, the forgetting, in anonymity, of the sub ectivity of religion< @rom his point of vie*, the ethical moment is 1egelianism itself, and he says so explicitly. :hich does not prevent him from reaffirming ethics in repetition, and from reproaching 1egel for not having constituted a morality. 4t is true that 6thics, in )evinas's sense, is an 6thics *ithout la* and *ithout concept, *hich maintains its nonviolent purity only before being determined as concepts and la*s. (his is not an ob ection5 let us not forget that )evinas does not see0 to propose la*s or moral rules, does not see0 to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general. /ut as this determination does not offer itself as a theory of 6thics, in question then, is an 6thics of 6thics. 4n this case, it is perhaps serious that this 6thics of 6thics can occasion neither a determined ethics nor determined la*s *ithout negating and forgetting itself 7oreover, is this 6thics of 6thics beyond all la*s< 4s it not the )a* of la*s< - coherence *hich brea0s do*n the coherence of the discourse against coherence-the infinite concept, hidden *ithin the protest against the concept. 4f uxtaposition *ith Iier0egaard has often imposed itself upon us, despite the author's o*n admonitions, *e are certain that as concerns the essential in its initial inspiration )evinas's protest against

1egelianism is foreign to Iier0egaard's protest. 4nversely, a confrontation of )evinas's thought *ith @euerbach's anti-1egelianism *ould necessarily uncover, it seems to us, more profound convergences and affinities that the meditation of the (race *ould confirm further still. :e are spea0ing here of convergences, and not of influences8 primarily because the latter is a notion *hose philosophical meaning is not clear to us8 and next because, to our 0no*ledge, )evinas no*here alludes to @euerbach or to Daspers. /ut *hy does )evinas return to categories he seemed to have re ected previously in attempting this very difficult passage beyond the debate*hich is also a complicity-bet*een 1egelianism and classical anti1egelianism< :e are not denouncing, here, an incoherence of language or a contradiction in the system. :e are *ondering about the meaning of a necessity5 the necessity of lodging oneself *ithin traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it. :hy did this necessity finally impose itself upon )evinas< 4s it an extrinsic necessity< #oes it not touch upon only an instrument, only an "expression," *hich can be put bet*een quotation mar0s< =r does it hide, rather, some indestructible and unforeseeable resource of the 9ree0 logos< !ome unlimited po*er of envelopment, by *hich he *ho attempts to repel it *ould al*ays already be overta0en< /. #uring the same period, )evinas had expelled the concept of exteriority. (he latter referred to an enlightened unity of space *hich neutraliBed radical alterity5 the relation to the other, the relation of 4nstants to each other, the relation to #eath, etc.-all of *hich are not relations of an 4nside to an =utside. "(he relation *ith the other is a relation *ith a 7ystery. 4t is the other's exteriority, or rather his alterity, for exteriority is a property of space, and brings the sub ect bac0 to himself through the light *hich constitutes his entire being" "(-'. No* (otality and 4nfinity, subtitled 6ssay on 6xteriority, does not only abundantly employ the notion of exteriority. )evinas also intends to sho* that true exteriority is not spatial, for space is the !ite of the !ame. :hich means that the !ite is al*ays a site of the !ame. :hy is it necessary still to use the *ord "exteriority" "*hich, if it has a meaning, if it is not an algebraic N, obstinately bec0ons to*ard space and light' in order to signify a

$ . A :24(4N9 -N# #4@@626NC6 nonspatial relationship< -nd if every "relationship" is spatial, *hy is it necessary still to designate as a "nonspatial' "relationship" the respect *hich absolves the other< :hy is it necessary to obliterate this notion of exteriority *ithout erasing it, *ithout ma0ing it illegible, by stating that its truth is its untruth, that true exteriority is not spatial, that is, is not exteriority< (hat it is necessary to state infinity's excess over totality in the language of totality8 that it is necessary to state the other in the language of the !ame8 that it is necessary to thin0 true exteriority as nonexteriority, that is, still by means of the 4nside-=utside structure and by spatial metaphor8 and that it is necessary still to inhabit the metaphor in ruins, to dress oneself in tradition's shreds and the devil's patches-all this means, perhaps, that there is no philosophical logos *hich must not first let itself be expatriated into the structure 4nside-=utside. (his *ords8 they are E9 emb=ed)6NCded6 -inN# inhabit the proscribed 7person6(-orP1Fvicari!4C! $.$

deportation from its o*n site to*ard the !ite, to*ard spatial locality is the metaphor congenital to the philosophical logos. /efore being a rhetorical procedure *ithin language, metaphor *ould be the emergence of language itself -nd philosophy is only this language8 in the best of only spea0 it, state the metaphor itself, *hich amounts to thin0ing the metaphor *ithin the silent horiBon of the nonmetaphor5 /eing. !pace being the *ound and finitude of birth "of the birth' *ithout *hich one could not even open language, one *ould not even have a true or false " exteriority to spea0 of (herefore, one can, by using them, use up tradi-< tion's *ords, rub them li0e a rusty and devalued old coin8 one can say,, that true exteriority is nonexteriority *ithout being interiority, and one can *rite by crossing out, by crossing out *hat already has been crossed out5 for crossing out *rites, still dra*s in space. (he syntax of the !ite *hose archaic description is not legible on the metal of lan and its too shining brilliance. )anguage, son of earth and sun5 *riting =ne *ould attempt in vain, in order to *ean language from exteriority and interiority, in order to *ean language from *eaning, to forget the *ords "inside," "outside," "exterior," "interior," etc., and to bard h them by decree8 for one *ould never come across a language *ithou the rupture of space, an aerial or aquatic language in *hich, moreov alterity *ould be lost more surely than ever. @or the meanings *hit radiate from inside-=utside, from )ight-Night, etc., do not Drill

or , ously, at the very heart of conceptuality itself (his is because they do n signify an immersion in space. (he structure 4nside-=utside or n #ay-Night has no meaning in a pure space given over to itself and disoriented. 4t emerges on the basis of an included origin, an inscribed eastern horiBon *hich is neither *ithin nor *ithout space. (his text of the glance is also the text of speech. (herefore it can be called @ace. /ut one must not expect, henceforth, to separate language and space, to empty language of space, to snatch speech a*ay from light, to spea0 *hile a 1and hides 9lory. 4n vain *ould one exile any given *ord ""inside," "outside," "exterior," "interior," etc.', and in vain *ould one burn or emprison the letters of light, for language in its entirety already has a*a0ened as a fall into light. (hat is, if you *ill, language arises *ith the sun. 6ven if "the sun is never named... its po*er is in our midst" "!aint-Dohn Perse'. (o say that the infinite exteriority of the other is not spatial, is non-exteriority and non-interiority, to be unable to designate it other*ise than negatively-is this not to ac0no*ledge that the infinite "also mount to ac0no*ledging that the structure "inside-outside," *hich is language itself, mar0s the original finitude of speech and of *hatever befalls it< No philosophical language *ill ever be able to reduce the naturality of a spatial praxis in language8 and one *ould have to meditate the unity of )eibniB's disEnction bet*een "civil language" and "scholarly" or philosophical language. -nd here one *ould have to meditate even more patiently the irreducible complicity, despite all of the philh'
e

osopers rhetorical terfforts,e o m p l i c i t y bet*een everyday language and philosophical language8 or, bet

guages an philo ophical language. - certain ineradicable naturality, a certain original naivet eConcepto"fphilosophical language could be verified for each speculative except, of course, for the nonconcepts *hich are the name of Cod . speculationanguage belongs and irreducible to a system of

.uvocaty is original optt, tin0 it and be thought in it, must accommodate duplicity and difference *ithin y o posophical meaning. No one,

$ . 3 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ it seems to us, has attempted this more profoundly than 1egel. :ithout naively using the category of chance, of happy predestination or of the chance encounter, one *ould have to do for each concept *hat 1egel does for the 9erman notion of -ufhebung, *hose equivocality and presence in the 9erman language he calls delightful5 "-ufheben has in the 9erman language a double sense5 that of preserving, maintaining, and that of leaving off, bringing to an end. (o preserve, moreover, has a negative sense.... )exicologically, these t*o determinations of the -ufheben may be considered as t*o meanings of the *ord. 4t is remar0able that a language comes to use one and the same *ord to express t*o opposed meanings. !peculative thought is delighted >my italics? to find in language *ords *hich by themselves have a speculative sense8 the 9erman language possesses several of these" ":issenschaft der )ogi0 $, pp. 4 3.-3!'. 4n the Corlesungen fiber die Philosophie der 9eschichte ")ectures on the Philosophy of 1istory' 1egel also notes that the union of t*o meanings "historia rerun gestarum and res fiestas' of the *ord 9eschichte "in our language" is not a "simple exterior contingency." 1enceforth, if 4 cannot designate the "infinite' irreducible alterity of the =ther except through the negation of "finite' spatial exteriority, perhaps the meaning of this alterity is finite, is not positively infinite. (he infinitely other, the infinity of the other, is not the other as a positive infinity, as 9od, or as resemblance *ith 9od. (he infinitely =ther *ould not be *hat it is, other, if it *as a positive infinity, and if it did not maintain *ithin itself the negativity of the indefinite, of the apeiron. #oes not "infinitely other" primarily signify that *hich does not come to an end, despite my interminable labor and experience< Can one respect the =ther as =ther, and expel negativity-labor-from transcendence, as )evinas see0s to do< (he positive 4nfinity "9od'-if these *ords are meaningful-cannot be infinitely =ther. 4f one thin0s, as )evinas does, that positive 4nfinity tolerates, or even requires, infinite alterity, then one must renounce all language, and first of all the *ords infinite and other. 4nfinity cannot be understood as =ther except in the form of the in-finite. -s soon as one attempts to thin0 4nfinity as a positive plenitude "one pole of )evinas's nonnegative transcendence', the other becomes unthin0able, impossible, unutterable. Perhaps )evinas calls us to*ard this unthin0able-impossibleunutterable beyond "tradition's' /eing and )ogos. /ut it must not be possible

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either to thin0 or state this call. 4n any event, that the positive plenitude of classical infinity is translated into language only by betraying itself in a negative *ord "in-finite', perhaps situates, in the most profound *ay, the point *here thought brea0s *ith language. - brea0 *hich after*ard *ill but resonate throughout all language. (his is *hy the modern philosophies *hich no longer see0 to distinguish bet*een thought and language, nor to place them in a hierarchy, are essentially philosophies of original finitude. /ut then they should be able to abandon the *ord "finitude," forever prisoner of the classical frame*or0. 4s this possible< -nd *hat does it mean to abandon a classical notion< (he otlrer cannot be *hat it is, infinitely other, except in finitude and mortality "mine and its'. 4t is such as soon as it comes into language, of course, and only then, and only if the *ord other has a meaning-but has not )evinas taught us that there is no thought before language< (his is *hy our questions certainly *ould be less bothersome for a classical infinitism of the Cartesian type, for example, *hich *ould dissociate thought and language, the latter never going as fast or as far as the former. Not only *ould these questions be less bothersome for a classical infinitism, but they could be its o*n questions. 4n another *ay5 to neutraliBe space *ithin the description of the other, in order thereby to liberate positive infinity-is this not to neutraliBe the essential finitude of a face "glance-speech' *hich is a body, and not, as )evinas continually insists, the corporeal metaphor of etherealiBed thought< /ody5 that is, also exteriority, locality in the fully spatial, literally spatial, meaning of the *ord8 a Bero point, the origin of space, certainly, but an origin *hich has no meaning before the of, an origin inseparable from genitivity and from the space that it engenders and orients5 an inscribed origin. (he inscription is the *ritten origin5 traced and henceforth inscribed in a system, in a figure *hich it no longer governs. :ithout *hich there no longer *ould be a body proper to oneself. 4f the face of the other *as not also, irreducibly, spatial exteriority, *e *ould still have to distinguish bet*een soul and body, thought and speech8 or better, bet*een a true, nonspatial face, and its mas0 or metaphor, its spatial figure. (he entire 7etaphysics of the @ace *ould collapse. -gain, this question could be derived as much from a classical infinitism "duality of thought and language, but also of thought and body' as from the most modern philosophy of finitude. (his strange alliance in the

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question perhaps signifies that *ithin philosophy and *ithin language, *ithin philosophical discourse "supposing there are any others', one cannot simultaneously save the themes of positive infinity and of the face "the nonmetaphorical unity of body, glance, speech, and thought'. (his last unity, it seems to us, can be thought only *ithin the horiBon of infinite "indefinite' alterity as the irreducibly common horiBon of #eath and the =ther. (he horiBon of finitude or the finitude of the horiBon. /ut, let us repeat, all this *ithin philosophical discourse, *here the thought of #eath itself "*ithout metaphor' and the thought of a positive 4nfinity have never been able to understand each other. 4f the face is body, it is mortal. 4nfinite alterity as death Cannot be reconciled *ith infinite alterity as positivity and presence "9od'. 7etaphysical transcendence cannot be at once transcendence to*ard the other as #eath and transcendence to*ards the other as 9od. Enless 9od means #eath, *hich after all has never been excluded by the entirety of the classical philosophy *ithin *hich *e understand 9od both as )ife and as the (ruth of 4nfinity, of positive Presence. /ut *hat does this exclusion mean if not the exclusion of every particular determination< -nd that 9od is nothing "determined', is not life, because he is everything< and therefore is at once -ll and Nothing, )ife and #eath. :hich means that 9od is or appears, is named, *ithin the difference bet*een -ll and Nothing, )ife and #eath. :ithin difference, and at bottom as #ifference itself. (his difference is *hat is called 1istory. 9od is inscribed in it. 4t *ill be said that )evinas stands opposed to precisely this 0ind of philosophical discourse. /ut in this combat, he already has given up the best *eapon5 disdain of discourse. 4n effect, *hen confronted by the . classical difficulties of language *e are referring to, )evinas cannot provide himself *ith the classical resources against them. -t arms *ith the problems *hich *ere equally the problems of negative theology and of /ergsonism, he does not give himself the right to spea0, as they did, in a language resigned to its o*n failure. Negative theology *as spo0en in a speech that 0ne* itself failed and finite, inferior to logos as 9od's understanding. -bove all, negative theology never undertoo0 a #iscourse *ith 9od in the face to face, and breath to breath, of t*o free speeches8 and this despite the humility and the haughtiness of brea0ing off, or underta0ing, the exchange. -nalogously, /ergson had the right to announce the intuition of duration, and to denounce intellectual

spatialiBation, *ithin a language given over to space. 4t *as not a ques tion of saving, but of destroying discourse *ithin "metaphysics," the science *hich allegedly does *ithout symbols" "/ergson'. -ntagon istic metaphors *ere multiplied systematically in this autodestruction of language *hich advocated silent metaphysical intuition. )anguage being defined as a historical residue, there *as no contradiction in utiliBing it, for better or for *orse, in order to denounce its o*n betrayal, and then to abandon it to its o*n insufficiency as rhetorical refuse, speech lost to metaphysics. )i0e negative theology, a philosophy of intuitive communion gave itself the right "correctly or incorrectly, another problem' to travel through philosophical discourse as through a foreign medium. /ut *hat happens *hen this right is no longer given, *hen the possibility of metaphysics is the possibility of speech< :hen metaphysical responsibility is responsibility for language, because "thought consists of spea0ing" "(4', and metaphysics is a language *ith 9od< 1o* to thin0 the other, if the other can be spo0en only as exteriority and through exteriority, that is, nonalterity< -nd if the speech *hich must inaugurate and maintain absolute separation is by its essence rooted in space, *hich cannot conceive separation and absolute alterity< 4f, as )evinas says, only discourse "and not intuitive contact' is righteous, and if, moreover, all discourse essentially retains *ithin it space and the !ame does this not mean that discourse is originally violent< -nd that the philosophical logos, the only one in *hich peace may be declared, is inhabited by *ar< (he distinction bet*een discourse and violence.3 al*ays *ill be an inaccessible horiBon. Nonviolence *ould be the telos, and not the essence of discourse. Perhaps it *ill be said that something li0e discourse has its essence in its telos, and the presence of its present in its future. (his certainly is so, but on the condition that its future and its telos be nondiscourse5 peace as a certain silence, a certain beyond of speech, a certain possibility, a certain silent horiBon of speech. -nd telos has al*ays had the form of presence, be it a future presence. (here is *ar only after the opening of discourse, and *ar dies out only at the end of discourse. Peace, li0e silence, is the strange vocation of a language called outside itself by itself /ut since finite silence is also the medium of violence, language can only indefinitely tend to*ard ustice by ac0no*ledging and practicing the violence *ithin it. Ciolence against violence. 6conomy of

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violence. -n economy irreducible to *hat )evinas envisions in the *ord. 4f light is the element of violence, one must combat light *ith a certain other light, in order to avoid the *orst violence, the violence of the night *hich precedes or represses discourse. (his vigilance is a violence chosen as the least violence by a philosophy *hich ta0es history, that is, finitude, seriously8 a philosophy a*are of itself as historical in each of its aspects "in a sense *hich tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity', and a*are of itself, as )evinas says in another sense, as economy. /ut again, an economy *hich in being history, can be at home neither in the finite totality *hich )evinas calls the !ame nor in the positive presence of the 4nfinite. !peech is doubtless the first defeat of

Of transcendental v !lence

4n addition, metaphysics, unable to escape its ancestry in light, al*ays supposes a phenomenology in its very critique of phenomenology, and especially if, li0e )evinas's metaphysics, it see0s to be discourse and instruction.

violence, but paradoxically, violence did not exist before the possibility of speech. (he philosopher "man' must spea0 and *rite *ithin this *ar of light, a *ar in *hich he al*ays already 0no*s himself to be engaged8 a *ar *hich he 0no*s is inescapable, except by denying discourse, that is, by ris0ing the *orst violence. (his is *hy this avo*al of the *ar *ithin discourse, an avo*al *hich is not yet peace, signifies the opposite of bellicosity8 the bellicosity-and *ho has sho*n this better than 1egel<-*hose best accomplice *ithin history is irenics. :ithin history *hich the philosopher cannot escape, because it is not history in the sense given to it by )evinas "totality', but is the history of the departures from totality, history as the very movement of transcendence, of the excess over the totality *ithout *hich no totality *ould appear as such. 1istory is not the totality transcended by eschatology, metaphysics, or speech. 4t is transcendence itself. 4f speech is a move ment of metaphysical transcendence, it is history, and not beyond history. 4t is difficult to thin0 the origin of history in a perfectly finite totality "the !ame', as *ell as, moreover, in a perfectly positive infinity8 4f, in this sense, the movement of metaphysical transcendence is his tory, it is still violent, for-and this is the legitimate truism from *hich )evinas al*ays dra*s inspiration-history is violence. 7etaphysics' is economy5 violence against violence, light against light5 philosophy (in general'. -bout *hich it can be said, by transposing Claudel's inten tion, that everything in it "is painted on light as if *ith condensed light, li0e the air *hich becomes frost." (his becoming is *ar. ( polemic is language itself. 4ts inscription.

-. #oes metaphysics suppose this phenomenology only as a method, as a technique, in the strict sense of these *ords< -lthough he re ects the ma ority of the literal results of 1usserl's researches, )evinas 0eeps to the methodological inheritance5 "(he presentation and development of the notions employed o*es everything to the phenomenological method" "(48 #)'. /ut are not the presentation and development of ideas but the vestments of thought< -nd can a method be borro*ed, li0e a tool< (hirty years earlier, in the *a0e of 1eidegger, did not )evinas maintain that method cannot be isolated< @or method al*ays shelters, especially in 1usserl's case, "an anticipated vie* of the 'sense' of the being *hich one encounters" "(14'. )evinas *rote at this time5 "Consequently, in our exposition *e cannot separate the theory of intuition, as a philosophical method, from *hat might be called 1usserl's ontology" "(14'. No*, *hat the phenomenological method refers to, explicitly and in the last analysis "and this *ould be too easy to sho*', is :estern philosophy's very decision, since Plato, to consider itself as science, as theory5 that is, precisely as that *hich )evinas *ishes to put into question by the *ays and means of phenomenology.

/. /eyond its method, the aspect of "1usserl's essential teaching" "(4' *hich )evinas intends to retain is not only its supple and necessary descriptions, the fidelity to the meaning of experience, but also the concept of intentionality. -n intentionality enlarged beyond its repre sentative and theoretical dimension, beyond the noetico-noematical structure *hich 1usserl incorrectly *ould have seen as the primordial structure. 2epression of the infinite *ould have 0ept 1usserl from access to the true depths of intentionality as desire and as metaphysical transcendence to*ard the other beyond phenomenality or /eing. (his repression *ould occur in t*o *ays.

$ . G W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ =n the one hand, in the value of adequation. -s vision and theoretical intuition, 1usserlian intentionality *ould be adequation. (his latter *ould exhaust and interioriBe all distance and all true alterity. "Cision, in effect, is essentially an adequation of exteriority to interiority5 exteriority is reabsorbed in the contemplating soul, and, as an adequate idea, is revealed a priori, resulting in a !inngebung" "(4'. No*, "intentionality, in *hich thought remains adequation to its ob ect, does not define ... consciousness at its fundamental level." Certainly 1usserl is not named here, at the very moment *hen )evinas spea0s of intentionality as adequation8 one may al*ays suppose that by the expression "intentionality, in *hich thought remains adequation," )evinas means "an intentionality such that, etc., an intentionality in *hich at least, etc." /ut the context, numerous other passages and the allusion to the !inngebung, all clearly indicate that 1usserl, in the letter of his texts, *as unable to recogniBe that "as intentionality all 0no*ledge already supposes the idea of infinity, *hich is adequation par excellence" "(4'. (hus, supposing that 1usserl had foreseen the infinite horiBons *hich overflo* ob ectivity and adequate intuition, he *ould have interpreted them, literally, as "thoughts aiming at ob ects"5 ":hat does it matter if in 1usserlian phenomenology, understood literally, these unsuspected horiBons are interpreted, in turn, as thoughts aiming at ob ectsL" "cited above'. =n the other hand, supposing that the 1usserlian Cogito opened onto the infinite, according to )evinas, it *ould open onto an ob ectinfinity, an infinity *ithout alterity, a false infinity5 "4f 1usserl sees in the cogito a sub ectivity *ith no support outside itself, he is constituting the idea of infinity itself, giving it to himself as an ob ect." (he "false-infinity," a 1egelian expression *hich )evinas never uses, nevertheless seems to us, perhaps because it is 1egelian, to haunt numerous gestures of denunciation in (otality and 4nfinity. -s it *as for 1egel, the "false-infinity" for )evinas *ould be the indefinite, negative form of infinity. /ut, since )evinas conceives true alterity as nonnegativity "nonnegative transcendence', he can ma0e the other the true infinity, and ma0e the same "in strange complicity *ith negativity' the

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"false infinity"< =r inversely, ho* could absolute sameness not be infinity< 4f, as )evinas says, the same is a violent totality, this *ould mean that it is a finite totality, and therefore is abstract, more other than the other "than an other totality', etc. (he same as finite totality *ould not be the same, but still the other. )evinas *ould be spea0ing of the other under the rubric of the same, and of the same under the rubric of the other, etc. 4f the finite totality *as the same, it could not be thought, or posed as such, *ithout becoming other than itself "and this is *ar'. 4f it did not do so, it could not enter into *ar *ith others "finite totalities', nor could it be violent. 1enceforth, not being violent, it *ould not be the same in )evinas's sense "finite totality'. 6ntering into *ar-and *ar there isit is conceived, certainly, as the other's other, that is, it gains access to the other as an other "self'. /ut again, it is no longer a totality in )evinas's sense. 4n this language, *hich is the only language of :estern philosophy, can one not repeat 1egelianism, *hich is only this language coming into absolute possession of itself< Ender these conditions, the only effective position to ta0e in order not to be enveloped by 1egel *ould seem to be, for an instant, the follo*ing5 to consider the false-infinity "that is, in a profound *ay, original finitude' irreducible. Perhaps this is *hat 1usserl does, at bottom, by demonstrating the irreducibility of intentional incompleteness, and therefore of alterity8 and by sho*ing that since consciousness is irreducible, it can never possibly, by its o*n essence, become self-consciousness, nor be reassembled absolutely close to itself in the parousia of an absolute 0no*ledge. /ut can this be said, can one thin0 the "false infinity" as such "time, in a *ord', can one pause alongside it as alongside the truth of experience, *ithout already "an already *hich permits us to thin0 timeL' having let the true infinity, *hich then must be recogniBed as such, be indicated, presented, thought and stated< :hat *e call philosophy, *hich perhaps is not the entirety of thought, cannot thin0 die false, nor even choose the false, *ithout paying homage to the anteriority and the superiority of the true "same relationship bet*een the other and the same'. (his last question, *hich indeed could be )evinas's question to 1usserl, *ould demonstrate that as soon as he spea0s against 1egel, )evinas can only confirm 1egel, has confirmed him already. /ut is there a more rigorously and, especially, a more literally

false-infinity. :hich *ould have seemed absolutely mad to 1egel "and to all the metaphysics expanded and rethought in him'5 ho* can alterity be separated from negativity, ho* can alterity be separated from the

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1usserlian theme than the theme of inadequation< =f the infinite overflo*ing of horiBons< :ho *as more obstinately determined than 1usserl to sho* that vision *as originally and essentially the inadequation of interiority and exteriority< -nd that the perception of the transcendent and extended thing *as essentially and forever incomplete< (hat immanent perception occurred *ithin the infinite horiBon of the flux of experience< "cf, for example, 4deas $, paragraph G;, passim'. -nd above all, *ho better than )evinas first gave us to understand these 1usserlian themes< (herefore, it is not a question of recalling their existence, but of as0ing *hether 1usserl finally summariBed inadequation, and reduced the infinite horiBons of experience to the condition of available ob ects. -nd *hether he did so by the secondary interpretation of *hich )evinas accuses him. :e can hardly believe so. 4n the t*o intentional directions of *hich *e have ust spo0en, the 4dea in the Iantian sense designates the infinite overflo*ing of a horiBon *hich, by reason of an absolute and essential necessity *hich itself is absolutely principled and irreducible, never can become an ob ect itself, or be completed, equaled, by the intuition of an ob ect. 6ven by 9od's intuition. (he horiBon itself cannot become an ob ect because it is the unob ectifiable *ellspring of every ob ect in general. (his impossibility of adequation is so radical that neither the originality nor the apodicticity of evident truths are necessarily adequations. "Cf, for example, 4deas 4, sec. ;8 Cartesian 7editations, sec. %, passim.'

1usserl, on this point at least. 4s not intentionality respect itself< (he eternal irreducibility of the other to the same, but of the other appearing as other for the same< @or *ithout the phenomenon of other as other no respect *ould be possible. (he phenomenon of respect supposes the respect of phenomenality. -nd ethics, phenomenology. 4n this sense, phenomenology is respect itself, the development and becoming-language of respect itself (his *as 1usserl's aim in stating that reason does not tolerate being distinguished into theoretical, practical, etc. "cff above'. (his does not mean that respect as ethics is derived from phenomenology, that it supposes phenomenology as its premise, or as a previous or superior value. (he presupposition of phenomenology is of a unique 0ind. 4t "commands" nothing, in the *orldly "real, political, etc.' sense of commandment. 4t is the very neutraliBation of this 0ind of commandment. /ut it does not neutraliBe the *orldly type of commandment in order to substitute another type of commandment for it. 4t is profoundly foreign to all hierarchies. :hich is to say that ethics not only is neither dissipated in phenomenology nor submitted to it, but that ethics finds *ithin phenomenology its o*n meaning, its freedom and radicality. 7oreover, it seems incontestable to us that the themes of nonpresence "temporaliBation and alterity' contradict that *hich ma0es phenomenology a metaphysics of presence, *or0ing it ceaselessly, and *e emphasiBe this else*here.

"=f course, this does not imply that certain possibilities of adequate evident truths-particular and founded ones-are overloo0ed by 1usserl.' (he importance of the concept of horiBon lies precisely in its inability to ma0e any constitutive act into an ob ect, and in that it the *or0 of ob ectification to infinity. 4n phenomenology there is never a constitution of horiBons, but horiBons of constitution. (hat the infin ity of the 1usserlian horiBon has the form of an indefinite opening, and that it offers itself *ithout any possible end to the negativity of constitution "of the *or0 of ob ectification' does this not certainly 0eep it from all totaliBation, from the illusion of the immediate pres ence ence of a plenitudinous infinity in *hich the other suddenly becomes unfindable< 4f a consciousness of infinite inadequation to the infinite "and even to the finite' distinguishes a body of thought careful to respect exteriority, it is difficult to see ho* )evinas can depart from'",88

C. Can )evinas separate himself from 1usserl more legitimately as concerns theoretism and the primacy of the consciousness of the ob ect< )et us not forget that the "primacy" necessarily in question here is that of the ob ect or of ob ectivity in general. No* phenomenology has surely contributed nothing if not an infinite rene*al, enlargement, and suppling of the notion of ob ect in general. (he ultimate urisdiction of evident truths is infinitely open, is open for every type of possible ob ect, that is, for every conceivable sense present for consciousness in general. No discourse "for example, the discourse in (otality and infinity *hich see0s to rea*a0en ethical truths to their absolute independence, etc.' could be meaningful, could be thought or understood, if it did not dra* upon this layer of phenomenological evidence in general. 4t suffices that ethical meaning be Nought in order for 1usserl to be right. Not only nominal definitions

$ + 3 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ but, before them, possibilities of essence *hich guide all concepts, are presupposed *hen one spea0s of ethics, of transcendence, of infinity, etc. (hese expressions must have a meaning for concrete consciousness in general, or no discourse and no thought *ould be possible. (his domain of absolutely "prior" truths is the domain of the transcendental phenomenology in *hich a phenomenology of ethics must ta0e root. (his rooting is not real, does not signify a real dependence8 it *ould be vain to reproach transcendental phenomenology for being in fact incapable of engendering ethical values or behaviors "or, amounting to the same thing for being able to repress them, more or less directly'. !ince every determined meaning, every thought meaning, every noema "for example, the meaning of ethics' supposes the possibility of noerna in general, it is fitting to begin rightfully *ith transcendental phenomenology. (o begin rightfully *ith the general possibility of a noema *hich-let us recall this decisive point-is not a real "reell' moment for 1usserl, and therefore is *ithout any real "hierarchical or other' relationship to anything else5 anything else being capable of conception only in noematicity. 4n particular, this means that from 1usserl's point of vie* ethics in fact, in existence and in history, could

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such "for example, ethics or the metaphysical in )evinas's sense', *ith a theoretical 0no*ledge "in general', and 4 respect it as such, as *hat it is, in its meaning. 4 have regard .; for recogniBing that *hich cannot be regarded as a thing, as a facade, as a theorem. 4 have regard for the face itself #. /ut, as *e 0no*, the fundamental disagreement bet*een )evinas eand 1usserl is not here. Nor does it bear upon the ahistoricity of meaning *ith *hich )evinas formerly reproached 1usserl, and concerning *hich the latter had "held in store surprises" "as )evinas's eschatology *as to surprise us thirty years later in spea0ing "from beyond the totality or history" (4'. :hich supposes, once more, that the totality is finite "a supposition in no w a y inscribed in its concept', that history as such can be a finite totality, and that there is no history beyond the finite totality. Perhaps one *ould have to sho*, as *as suggested above, that history is impossible, meaningless, in the finite totality, and that it is impossible, meaningless, in the positive and actual infinity8 that history 0eeps to the difference bet*een totality and infinity, and that history precisely is that *hich )evinas calls transcendence and eschatology. system is neither finite nor infinite. - structural totality escapes this alternative in its functioning. 4t escapes the archaeological and the eschatological, and inscribes them in itself (he disagreement appears definite as concerns the =ther. -s *e have seen5 according to )evinas, by ma0ing the other, notably in the Cartesian 7editations, the ego's phenomenon, constituted by analogical appresentation on the basis of belonging to the ego's o*n sphere, 1usserl allegedly missed the infinite alterity of the other, reducing it to the same. (o ma0e the other an alter ego, )evinas says frequently, is to neutraliBe its absolute alterity.

not be subordinated to transcendental neutraliBation, nor be submitted to it in any *ay. Neither ethics, nor anything else in the *orld, moreover. (ranscendental neutraliBation is in principle, by its meaning, foreign to all factuality, all existence in general. 4n fact it is neither before nor after ethics. Neither before nor after anything that is. (hus, one may spea0 of ethical ob ectivity, or of ethical values or imperatives as ob ects "noemas' *ith all their originality, *ithout reducing this ob ectivity to any of those *hich incorrectly "but the fault is not 1usserl's' function as the model for *hat commonly is understood as ob ectivity "theoretical ob ectivity, political, technical,, s natural, etc. ob ectivity'. (ruthfully, there are t*o meanings of the-' aims at8 and the more hidden sense in *hich appearance in general i s maintained, including the appearance of the nontheoretical "in the first sense' in particular. 4n this second sense, phenomenology is indeed a theoretism, but it is so in the extent to *hich all thought and all language are tied to theoretism, de facto and de ute. Phenomenology. measures this extent. 4 0no* the meaning of the nontheoretical as

usser ta0es pains to respect, in its meaning the alt erity of the , =thi er, partcu larly in the Cartesian 7editations. 1e is concerned *ith describin hh go* te other as other, in its irreducible alterity, is presented to me. 4s presented a certan non-phenomenality *hich is irreducible for the ego as ego in general
.

,rgnary non pr

eo encounter the alter ego "in the

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very form of the encounter .. described by )evinas', impossible to respect it in experience and in language, if this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego "in general'. =ne could neither spea0, nor have any sense of the totally other, if there *as not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally other as such. No one more than 1usserl has been sensitive to the singular and irreducible style of this evidence, and to the original non-phenomenaliBation indicated *ithin it. 6ven if one neither see0s nor is able to thematiBe the other of *hich one does not spea0, but to *hom one spea0s, this impossibility and this imperative themselves can be thematiBed "as )evinas does' only on the basis of a certain appearance of the other as other for an ego. 1usserl spea0s of this system, of this appearance, and of the impossibility of thematiBing the other in person. (his is his problem5 "(hey, "the other egos' ho*ever, are not simple representations or ob ects represented *ithin me, synthetic unities of a process of verification ta0ing place '*ithin me,' but precisely 'others' ... 'sub ects for this same *orld ... sub ects *ho perceive the *orld ... and *ho thereby experience me, ust as 4 experience the *orld and in it, 'others' " "Cartesian 7editations'. 4t is this appearance of the other as that *hich 4 can never be, this originary nonphenomenality, *hich is examined as the ego's intentional phenomenon. "b' @or-and here *e are 0eeping to the most manifest and most massively incontestable meaning of the fifth of the Cartesian 7editations

*hose course is so maBeli0e-1usserl's most central affirmation con cerns the irreducibly mediate nature of the intentionality aiming at the other as other. 4t is evident, by an essential, absolute and definitive self evidence that the other as transcendental other "other absolute origin and other Bero point in the orientation of the *orld', can never be given to me in an original *ay and in person, but only through ana appresentation, far from signifying an analogical and assimilatory. the unsurpassable necessity of "nonob ective' mediation. 4f 4 did not approach the other by *ay of analogical appresentation, if 4 attained to, the other immediately and originally, silently, in communion *ith the, other's o*n experience, the other *ould cease to be the other Contrary to appearances, the theme of appresentative transposition'

translates the recognition of the radical separation of the absolute origins, the relationship of absolved absolutes and nonviolent respect for the secret5 the opposite of victorious assimilation. /odies, transcendent and natural things, are others in general for my consciousness. (hey are outside, and their transcendence is the sign of an already irreducible alterity. )evinas does not thin0 so8 1usserl does, and thin0s that "other" already means something *hen things are in question. :hich is to ta0e seriously the reality of the external *orld. -nother sign of this alterity in general, *hich things share here *ith others, is that something *ithin them too is al*ays hidden, and is indicated only by anticipation, analogy and appresentation. 1usserl states this in the fifth of the Cartesian 7editations5 analogical appresentation belongs, to a certain extent, to every perception. /ut in the case of the other as transcendent thing, the principled possibility of an originary and original presentation of the hidden visage is al*ays open, in principle and a priori. (his possibility is absolutely re ected in the case of =thers. (he alterity of the transcendent thing, although already irreducible, is such only by means of the indefinite incompleteness of !y original perceptions. (hus it is incomparable to the alterity of =thers, *hich is also irreducible, and adds to the dimension of incompleteness "the body of the =ther in space, the history of our relations, etc.' a more profound dimension of nonoriginality-the radical impossibility of going around to see things from the other side. /ut *ithout the first alterity, the alterity of bodies "and the =ther is also a body, from the beginning', the second alterity could never emerge. (he system of these t*o alterities, the one inscribed in the other, must be thought together5 the alterity of others, therefore, by a double po*er of indefiniteness. (he stranger is infinitely other because by his essence no enrichment of his profile can give me the sub ective face of his experience from his perspective, such as he has lived it. Never *ill this experience be given to me originally, li0e everything *hich is mir eigenes, *hich is

proper to me. (his transcendence of the nonproper no longer is that of the entirety, al*ays inaccessible on the basis of al*ays partial attempts5 transcendence of 4nfinity, not of (otality. )evinas and 1usserl are quite close here. /ut by ac0no*ledging in this infinitely other as such "appearing as such' the status of an inten tional modification of the ego in general, 1usserl gives himself the right

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to spea0 of the infinitely other as such, accounting for the origin and the legitimacy of his language. 1e describes the phenomenal system of nonphenornenality. )evinas in fact spea0s of the infinitely other, but by refusing to ac0no*ledge an intentional modification of the ego*hich *ould be a violent and totalitarian act for him-he deprives himself of the very foundation and possibility of his o*n language. :hat authoriBes him to say "infinitely other" if the infinitely other does not appear as such in the Bone he calls the same, and *hich is the neutral level of transcendental description< (o return, as to the only possible point of departure, to the intentional phenomenon in *hich the other appears as other, and lends itself to language, to every possible language, is perhaps to give oneself over to violence, or to ma0e oneself its accomplice at least, and to acquiesce-in the critical sense-to the violence of the fact8 but in question, then, is an irreducible Bone of factuality, an original, transcendental violence, previous to every ethical choice, even supposed by ethical nonviolence. 4s it meaningful to spea0 of a pre ethical violence< 4f the transcendental "violence" to *hich *e allude is tied to phenomenality itself, and to the possibility of language, it then *ould be embedded in the root of meaning and logos, before the latter had to be determined as rhetoric, psychagogy, demagogy, etc. "c' )evinas *rites5 "(he other, as other, is not only an alter ego. 4t is *hat 4 myself am not" "66 and (-'. "#ecency" and "everyday life" incorrectly lead us to believe that "the other is 0no*n through sym pathy, as an other li0e myself, as alter ego" "(-'. (his is exactly *hat 1usserl does not do. 1e see0s to recogniBe the other as other only in its form as ego, in its form of alterity, *hich cannot be that of things in the *orld. 4f the other *ere not recogniBed as a transcendental alter ego,

this is an absolute impossibility. (he other as alter ego signifies the other as other, irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego. (he egoity of the other permits him to say "ego" as 4 do8 and this is *hy he is =ther, and not a stone, or a being *ithout speech in my real economy. (his is *hy, if you *ill, he is face, can spea0 to me, understand me, and eventually command me. #issymmetry itself *ould be impossible *ithout this symmetry, *hich is not of the *orld, and *hich, having no real aspect, imposes no limit upon alterity and dissymmetry-ma0es them possible, on the contrary. (his dissymmetry is an economy in a ne* sense8 a sense *hich *ould probably be intolerable to )evinas. #espite the logical absurdity of this formulation, this economy is the transcendental symmetry of t*o empirical asymmetries. (he other, for me, is an ego *hich 4 0no* to be in relation to me as to an other. :here have these movements been better described than in (he Phenomenology of the 7ind< (he movement of transcendence to*ard the other, as invo0ed by )evinas, *ould have no meaning if it did not bear *ithin it, as one of its essential meanings, that in my ipseity 4 0no* myself to be other for the other. :ithout this, "4" "in general5 egoity', unable to be the other's other, *ould never be the victim of violence. (he violence of *hich )evinas spea0s *ould be a violence *ithout victim. /ut since, in the dissymmetry *hich he describes, the author of violence could never be the other himself, but al*ays the same "ego', and since all egos are others for others, the violence *ithout victim *ould be also a violence *ithout author. -nd all these propositions can be reversed *ithout difficulty. 4t *ill be easily understood that if the Parmenides of the Poem gives us to believe, through interposed historical phantasms, that he lent himself to parricide several times, the great and fearful *hite shado* *hich spo0e to the young !ocrates continues to smile

it *ould be entirely in the *orld and not, as ego, the origin of the *orld. (o refuse to see in it an ego in this sense is, *ithin the ethical order, the very gesture of all violence. 4f the other *as not recogniBed as ego, its entire alterity *ould collapse. (herefore, it seems that one may not suppose that 1usserl ma0es of the other an other li0e myself "in the factual sense of the *ord', or a real modification of my life, tions. 4f the =ther *as a real moment of my egological life, if "indu sion of an other monad *ithin my o*n" "Cartesian 7editations' *as real, 4' *ould perceive it originaliter. 1usserl does not cease to emphasiBe char hen *e underta0e grand discourses on separate beings, unity, differ ence, the same and the other. (o *hat exercises *ould Parmenides give himself over, at the frontiers of (otality and 4nfinity, if *e attempted to ma0e him understand that ego equals same, and that the other is *hat it is only as the absolute infinitely other absolved of its relationship to the !ame. @or example5 "$' (he infinitely other, he *ould say perhaps, can be *hat it is only if it is other, that is, other than. =ther than must be other than myself. 1enceforth, it is no longer absolved of a relation to an ego.

$+G W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ (herefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely other. 4t is no longer *hat it is. 4f it *as absolved, it *ould not be the other either, but the !ame. "3' (he infinitely other cannot be *hat it is-infinitely otherexcept by being absolutely not the same. (hat is, in particular, by being other than itself "non ego'. /eing other than itself, it is not *hat it is. (herefore, it is not infinitely other, etc. -t bottom, *e believe, this exercise is not ust verbiage, or dialectical virtuosity in the "play of the !ame." 4t *ould mean that the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely other" cannot be stated and thought simultaneously8 that the other cannot be absolutely exterior.+ to the same *ithout ceasing to be other8 and that, consequently, the same is not a totality closed in upon itself, an identity playing *ith itself, having only the appearance of alterity, in *hat )evinas calls economy, *or0, and history. 1o* could there be a "play of the !ame" if alterity itself *as not already in the !ame, *ith a meaning of inclusion doubtless betrayed by the *ord in< :ithout alterity in the same, ho* could the "play of the !ame" occur, in the sense of playful activity, or of dislocation, in a machine or organic totality *hich plays or *or0s< -nd it could be sho*n that for )evinas *or0, al*ays enclosed inside totality and history, fundamentally remains a game. - proposition that *e can accept, *ith several precautions, more easily than he. @inally, let us confess our total deafness to propositions of this type5 "/eing occurs as multiple, and as divided into !ame and =ther. (his is its ultimate structure" "(4'. :hat is the division of being bet*een the same

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and the other< 4s it a division bet*een the same and the other, *hich does not suppose, at very least, that the same is the other's other, and the other the same as oneself< :e are not only thin0ing of Parmenides exercise, playing *ith the young !ocrates. (he !tranger in the !ophist *ho, li0e )evinas, seems to brea0 *ith 6leatism in the name of alterity, 0no*s that alterity can be thought only as negativity, and above all, can be said only as negativity, *hich )evinas begins by refusing8 he 0no*s too, that differing from /eing, the other is al*ays relative, is stated pros,,, eteron, *hich does not prevent it from being an eidos "or a genre, in a itself" already supposing, as 1eidegger notes in 4dentity and #ifference,' e0sastan auto tauton'. )evinas, from his perspective, *ould refuse to

assimilate the =ther to the eteron in question here. /ut ho* can the "=ther" be thought or said *ithout reference-*e do not say reduction-to the alterity of the eteron in general< (his last notion, henceforth, no longer has the restricted meaning *hich permits its simple opposition to the notion of =ther, as if it *as confined to the region of real or logical ob ectivity. (he eteron, here, belongs to a more profound and original Bone than that in *hich this philosophy of sub ectivity "that is, of ob ectivity', still implicated in the notion of the =ther, is expanded. (he other, then, *ould not be *hat he is "my fello* man as foreigner' if he *ere not alter ego. (his is a self-evidence greatly prior to "decency" and to the dissimulations of "daily life." #oes not )evinas treat the expression alter ego as if alter *ere the epithet of a real sub ect "on a pre-eidetic level'< -s an ephithetical, accidental modification of my real "empirical' identity< No*, the transcendental syntax of the expression alter ego tolerates no relationship of substantive to ad ective, of absolute to epithet, in one sense or the other. (his is its strangeness. - necessity due to the finitude of meaning5 the other is absolutely other only if he is an ego, that is, in a certain *ay, if he is the sarne as 4. 4nversely, the other as res is simultaneously less other "not absolutely other' and less "the same" than 4. !imultaneously more and less other, *hich means, once more, that the absolute of alterity is the same. -nd this contradiction "in terms of a formal logic *hich )evinas follo*s for once, since he refuses to call the other alter ego', this impossibility of translating my relation to the =ther into the rational coherence of language-this contradiction and this impossibility are not the signs of "irrationality"5 they are the sign, rather, that one may no longer dra* inspiration from *ithin the coherence of the )ogos, but that thought is stifled in the region of the origin of language as dialogue and difference. (his origin, as the concrete condition of rationality, is

nothing less than "irrational," but it could not be "included" in language. (his origin is an inscribed inscription. @urther, every reduction of the other to a real moment of my life, its reduction to the state of empirical alter-ego, is an empirical possibility, o rather eventuality, *hich is called violence8 and violence presup poses the necessary eidetic relationships envisaged in 1usserl's descriptions. @or, on the contrary, to gain access to the egoity of the alter ego

$&A W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ as if to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture possible. :e do not say absolutely peaceful. :e say economical. (here is a transcendental and preethical violence, a "general' dissymmetry *hose archia is the same, and *hich eventually permits the inverse dissymmetry, that is, the ethical nonviolence of *hich )evinas spea0s. 4n effect, either there is only the same, *hich can no longer even appear and be said, nor even exercise violence "pure infinity or finitude'8 or indeed there is the same and the other, and then the other cannot be the other-of the sameexcept by being the same "as itself5 ego', and the same cannot be the same "as itself5 ego' except by being the other's other5 alter ego. (hat 4 am also essentially the other's other, and that 4 0no* 4 am, is the evidence of a strange symmetry *hose trace appears no*here in )evinas's descriptions. :ithout this evidence, 4 could not desire "or' respect the other in ethical dissymmetry. (his transcendental violence, *hich does not spring from an ethical resolution or freedom, or from a certain way of encountering or exceeding the other, originally institutes the relationship bet*een t*o finite ipseities. 4n effect, the necessity of gaining access to the meaning of the other "in its irreducible alterity' on the basis of its "face," that is, its nonphenomenal phenomenon, its nonthematic theme, in other *ords, on the basis of an intentional modification of my ego "in general', "an intentional modification upon *hich )evinas indeed must base the meaning of his discourse'8 and the necessity of spea0ing of the other as other, or to the other as other, on the basis of its appearing-for-me-as-*hat-it-is5 the other "an

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*hich, ho*ever, already signifies alteration of the same, of the other as *hat it is' could be determined rigorously on a purely ethical level, *ithout prior eidetic-transcendental analysis of the relations bet*een ego and alter-ego in general, bet*eeen several origins of the *orld in general. (hat the other appears as such only in its relationship to the same, is a self-evidence that the 9ree0s had no need to ac0no*ledge in the transcendental egology *hich *ould confirm it later8 and, it is violence as the origin of meaning and of discourse in the reign of finitude..& (he difference bet*een the same and the other, *hich is not a difference or a relation among others, has no meaning in the infinite, except to spea0, as 1egel does and against )evinas, of the anxiety of the infinite *hich determines and negates itself Ciolence, certainly, appears *ithin the horiBon of an idea of the infinite. /ut this horiBon is not the horiBon of the infinitely other, but of a reign in *hich the difference bet*een the same and the other, differance, *ould no longer be valid, that is, of a reign in *hich peace itself *ould no longer have meaning. -nd first of all because there *ould be no more phenomenality or meaning in general. (he infinitely other and the infinitely same, if these *ords have meaning for a finite being, is the same. 1egel himself recogniBed negativity, anxiety or *ar in the infinite absolute only as the movement of the absolute's o*n history, *hose horiBon is a final pacification in *hich alterity *ould be absolutely encapsulated, if not lifted up, in parousia.., 1o* are *e to interpret the necessity of thin0ing the fact of *hat is first of all on the horiBon in *hat is generally called the end of history< :hich amounts to as0ing *hat the thought of the other as other means, and *hether or not the light of the "as such" is dissimulation in this unique case. Enique case< No, *e must reverse the terms5 "other" is the name, "other" is the meaning of this unthin0able unity of light and

appearing *hich dissimulates its essential dissimulation, ta0es it out of the light, stripping it, and hiding that *hich is hidden in the other', as the necessity from *hich no discourse can escape, from its earliest origin-these necessities are violence itself, or rather the transcendental origin of an irreducible violence, supposing, as *e said above, that it is night. :hat "other" means is phenomenality as disappearance. 4s it a question, here, of a "third route excluded by these contradictory ones" appear, cannot be stated as tertiary. 4f it is called "trace," the *ord can emerge only as a metaphor *hose philosophical elucidation *ill cease lessly call upon "contradictions." :ithout *hich its originality-that *hich distinguishes it from the !ign "the *ord conventionally chosen by phenomenon supposes original contamination by the sign.

other, is at the same time nonviolence, since it opens the relation to the *ill permit access to the other to be determined, in ethical freedom, as violence "for example, as the dissimulation or oppression of the other by the same, a notion *hich )evinas employs as self-evident, and

$&3 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ :ar, therefore, is congenital to phenomenality, is the very emergence of speech and of appearing. 1egel does not abstain by chance from pronouncing the *ord "man" in the Phenomenology of the 7ind8 and he describes *ar "for example, the dialectic of the 7aster and the !lave' *ithout anthropological reference, *ithin the realm of a science of consciousness, that is, of phenomenality itself, in the necessary structure of its movement5 a science of experience and of consciousness. #iscourse, therefore, if it is originally violent, can only do itself violence, can only negate itself in order to affirm itself, ma0e *ar upon the *ar *hich institutes it *ithout ever being able to reappropriate this negativity, to the extent that it is discourse. Necessarily *ithout reappropriating it, for if it did so, the horiBon of peace *ould disappear into the night "*orst violence as previolence'. (his secondary *ar, as the avo*al of violence, is the least possible violence, the only *ay to repress the *orst violence, the violence of primitive and prelogical silence, of an unimaginable night *hich *ould not even be the opposite of day, an absolute violence *hich *ould not even be the opposite of nonviolence5 nothingness or pure non-sense. (hus discourse chooses itself violently in opposition to nothingness or pure non-sense, and, in philosophy, against nihilism. @or this not to be so, the eschatology *hich animates )evinas's discourse *ould have to have 0ept its promise already, even to the extent of no longer being able to occur *ithin discourse as eschatology, and as the idea of a peace "beyond history." (he "messianic triumph" "armed against evil's revenge" *ould have to have been ushered in. (his messianic triumph, *hich is the horiBon of )evinas's boo0, but *hich "overflo*s its frame*or0" "(4', could abolish violence only by suspending the difference "con unction or opposition' bet*een the same and the other, that is, by suspending the idea of peace. /ut here and no* "in a present in general', this horiBon cannot be stated, an end cannot be stated, eschatology is not possible, except through violence. (his infinite passage through violence is *hat is called history. (o overloo0 the irreducibility of this last violence, is to revert-*ithin the order of philosophical discourse *hich one cannot see0 to re ect, except by ris0ing the *orst violence-to an infinitist dogma tism in pre-Iantian style, one *hich does not pose the question of responsibility for its o*n finite philosophical discourse. 4t is true that the delegation of this responsibility to 9od is not an abdication, 9od

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not being a finite third party5 thus conceived, divine responsibility neither excludes nor diminishes the integrity of my o*n responsibility, the responsibility of the finite philosopher. =n the contrary, divine responsibility requires and calls for this latter responsibility, as its telos or its origin. /ut the fact of the inadequation of these t*o responsibilities, or of this unique responsibility for itself-this history or anxiety of the infinite-is not yet a theme for the pre-Iantian, or rather even pre-1egelian, rationalists. Nor *ill it be so for as long as the absolutely principial self-evidence, in )evinas's o*n terms, of "the impossibility for the ego not to be itself" is not dissolved. (he ego cannot not be itself even *hen it ventures out to*ard the other, nor could it venture forth *ith this impossibility, *hich thus "mar0s the innate tragedy of the ego, the fact that it is riveted to its o*n being" "66', according to )evinas's strong statement. -nd above all, mar0s the fact that the ego 0no*s this. (his 0no*ledge is the first discourse and first *ord of eschatology8 it is that *hich permits separation and spea0ing to the other. 4t is not a 0no*ledge among others, but is 0no*ledge itself. "4t is this 'al*ays-beingone-and-yet-al*ays-other' *hich is the fundamental characteristic of 0no*ledge, etc." "!chelling'. No philosophy responsible for its language can renounce ipseity in general, and the philosophy or eschatology of separation may do so less than any other. /et*een original tragedy and messianic triumph there is philosophy, in *hich violence is returned against violence *ithin 0no*ledge, in *hich original finitude appears, and in *hich the other is respected *ithin, and by, the same. (his finitude ma0es its appearance in an irreducibly open question *hich is the philosophical question in general5 *hy is the essential, irreducible, absolutely general and unconditioned form of experience as a venturing forth to*ard the other still egoity< :hy is an experience *hich *ould not be lived as my o*n "for an ego in general, in the eidetictranscendental sense of these *ords' impossible and unthin0able< (his unthin0able and impossible are the limits of reason in general. 4n other *ords5 *hy finitude, if, as !chelling had said, "egoity is the general principle of finitude"< -nd *hy 2eason, if it is true that "2eason and 6goity, in their true -bsoluteness, are one and the same" "!chelling', and true that "reason ... is a 0ind of universal and essential structure of transcendental sub ectivity in general" "1usserl'< (he philosophy *hich is

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the discourse of this reason as phenomenology cannot ans*er such a question by essence, for every ans*er can be made only in language, and language is opened by the question. Philosophy "in general' can only open itself to the question, *ithin it and by it. 4t can only let itself be questioned. 1usserl 0ne* this. -nd he called the irreducibly egoic essence of experience "archi-factuality" "Ertatsache', nonempirical factuality, transcendental factuality "a notion to *hich attention has never been paid, perhaps'. "(his 4 am is for me, for the 4 *ho says it and understands it accordingly, the primordial intentional foundation of my *orld "der intentionale Ergrund fur meine :elt'. %X.G 7y *orld is the opening in *hich all experience occurs, including, as the experience par excellence, that *hich is transcendence to*ard the =ther as such. Nothing can appear outside the appurtenance to "my *orld" for "4 am." ":hether it is suitable or not, *hether it appears to me monstrous "due to *hatever pre udices' or not, 4 must stand firm before the primordial fact "die Ertatsache, der ich standhalten muss', from *hich 4 cannot turn my glance for an instant, as a philosopher. @or philosophical children this indeed may be the dar0 corner to *hich the ghosts of solipsism, or of psychologism or relativism, return. (he true philosopher *ill prefer, instead of fleeing from these ghosts, to illuminate the dar0 corner.".% Enderstood in this sense, the intentional relationship of "ego to my *orld" cannot be opened on the basis of an infinite-other radically foreign to "my *orld," nor can it be imposed upon me by a 9od *ho determines this relationship5 "(he sub ective a priori is that *hich precedes the /eing of 9od and of everything, *ithout exception, *hich exists for me, a thin0ing being. 9od too, is for me *hat he is by my o*n conscious production8 4 cannot loo0 a*ay from this in the anguished fear of *hat may be considered blasphemy, but on the contrary must see in it the problem. 1ere too, ust as concerning the alter ego, 'conscious production' does not mean that 4 invent and fashion this supreme transcendence."+A 9od no more really depends upon me than does the alter-ego. /ut he has meaning only for an ego in general. :hich means that before all atheism or all faith, before all theology, before all language about 9od or *ith 9od, 9od's divinity "the infinite alterity of the infinite other, for example' must have a meaning for an ego in general. )et us note in passing that the "sub ective a priori" recogniBed by transcendental

phenomenology is the only possible *ay to chec0 the totalitarianism of the neutral, the impersonal "absolute )ogic," that is, eschatology *ithout dialogue and everything classed under the conventional-quite conventional-rubric of 1egelianism. (he question about egoity as transcendental archi-factuality can be repeated more profoundly in the direction of the archi-factuality of the "living present." @or egological life has as its irreducible and absolutely universal form the living present. (here is no experience *hich can be lived other than in the present. (he absolute impossibility of living other than in the present, this eternal impossibility, defines the unthin0able as the limit of reason. (he notion of a past *hose meaning could not be thought in the form of a "past' present mar0s the impossible-unthin0able-unstatable not only for philosophy in general but even for a thought of being *hich *ould see0 to ta0e a step outside philosophy. (his notion, ho*ever, does become a theme in the meditation of the trace announced in )evinas's most recent *ritings. 4n the living present, the notion of *hich is at once the most simple and most difficult of notions, all temporal alterity can be constituted and appear as such5 as other past present, other future present, other absolute origins relived in intentional modification, in the unity and actuality of my living present. =nly the actual unity of my living present permits other presents "other absolute origins' from appearing as such, in *hat is called memory or anticipation "for example, but in truth in the constant movement of temporaliBation'. /ut only the alterity of past and future presents permits the absolute identity of the living present as the self-identity of non-self identity. =ne *ould have to sho*s' on the basis of the Cartesian 7editations, and given the reduction of every problem of factual genesis, ho* the question of anteriority in the relation bet*een the constitution of other as other present and the constitution of the other as =thers is a false question, *hich must refer to a common structural root. -lthough in the Cartesian 7editations 1usserl evo0es only the analogy of the t*o movements "!ec. +3', in many of the unpublished *or0s he seems to hold them to be inseparable. 4n the last analysis, if one *ishes to determine violence as the necessity that the other not appear as *hat it is, that it not be respected except in, for, and by the same, that it be dissimulated by the same in the very freeing of its phenomenon, then time is violence. (his

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movement of freeing absolute alterity in the absolute same is the movement of temporaliBation in its most absolutely unconditioned universal form5 the living present. 4f the living present, the absolute form of the opening of time to the other in itself, is the absolute form of egological life, and if egoity is the absolute form of experience, then the present, the presence of the present, and the present of presence, are all originally and forever violent. (he living present is originally mar0ed by death. Presence as violence is the meaning of finitude, the meaning of meaning as history. /ut *hy< :hy finitude< :hy history<+3 -nd *hy may *e, on *hat basis may *e, examine this violence as finitude and as history< :hy the *hy< -nd from *hence does it permit itself to be understood in its philosophical determination< )evinas's metaphysics in a sense presupposes-at least *e have attempted to sho* this-the transcendental phenomenology that it see0s to put into question. -nd yet the legitimacy of this putting into question does not seem to us any less radical. :hat is the origin of the question about transcendental archi-factuality as violence< Epon *hat basis does one as0 questions about finitude as violence< Epon *hat basis does the original violence of discourse permit itself to be commanded to be returned against itself, to be al*ays, as language, the return against itself *hich recogniBes the other as other< =f course, one cannot ans*er these questions "for example, by saying that the question about the violence of finitude can be posed only on the basis of finitude's other and the idea of infinity', except by underta0ing a ne* discourse *hich once more *ill see0 to ustify transcendental phenomenology. /ut the na0ed opening of the question, its silent opening, escapes phenomenology, as the origin and end of phenom enology's logos. (he silent opening of the question about history as finitude and violence permits the appearance of history as such8 it is the call "to' "of' an eschatology *hich dissimulates its o*n opening, covers this opening *ith its o*n noise as soon as the opening stands

of the 9ree0s8 and a question *hich can be stated, as forgotten, only in the language of the 9ree0s. (he strange dialogue of speech and silence. (he strange community of the silent question of *hich *e spo0e above. 4t seems to us that this is the point at *hich, beyond any misunderstandings about 1usserl's literal ambitions, phenomenology and eschatology can open a dialogue interminably, be opened in it, calling each other to silence.

=f ontological violence
Si'ence is a 7+rd 7 ic 7 ic is n+t an +!Gect< (1< Batai''e# is n+t a 7+rd) and !reat an +!Gect

#oes not the movement of this dialogue also govern the explication *ith 1eidegger< 4t *ould not be surprising. (o be persuaded of this, it *ould suffice to notice, in the most schematic *ay possible, the follo*ing5 in order to spea0, as *e have ust spo0en, of the present as the absolute form of experience, one already must understand *hat time is, must understand the ens of the praes-ens, and the proximity of the /eing of this ens. (he present of presence and the presence of the present suppose the horiBon, the precomprehending anticipation of /eing as time. 4f the meaning of /eing al*ays has been determined by philosophy as presence, then the question of /eing, posed on the basis of the transcendental horiBon of time "first stage, in /eing and (ime' is the first tremor of philosophical security, as it is of self-confident presence. No*, 1usserl never unfolded this question of /eing. 4f phenomenology carries this question *ithin itself each time that it considers the themes of temporaliBation, and of the relationship to the alter ego, it nonetheless remains dominated by a metaphysics of presence. (he question of /eing does not govern its discourse. Phenomenology in general, as the passage*ay to essentiality, presupposes an anticipation of the esse of essence, the unity of the esse prior to its distribution into essence and existence. Cia another route, one could probably sho* that 1usserl silently presupposes a metaphysical anticipation or decision *hen, for example, he affirms /eing "!ein' as the nonreality "2ealitut' of the ideal "4deal'. 4deality is unreal, but it is-as

forth and is determined. (his is the opening of a question, in the inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, put to philosophy as logos,' finitude, history, violence5 an interpellation of the 9ree0 by the'' non-9ree0 at the heart of a silence, an ultralogical affect of speech, a question *hich can be stated only by being forgotten in the language

ob ect or as thought-being. :ithout a presupposed access to a meaning of /eing not exhausted by reality, the entire 1usserlian theory of ideality *ould collapse, and *ith it all of transcendental phenomenology. @or example, 1usserl could no longer *rite5 "=ffenbar muss uberhaupt eder Cersuch, das !ein des 4dealen in @in mogliches !ein von 2ealem umBudeuten, daran scheitern, dass 7oglich0eiten selbst *ieder ideale 9egenstande sind. !o *enig in der realen :elt Kahlen im allgemeinen, #reiec0e im allgemeinen Bu finden rind so *enig 7oglich0eiten" ""7anifestly every attempt to reinterpret the /eing of the ideal as a possible /eing of the real must fail, on the *hole, for the possibilities themselves are in turn ideal. 4n the real *orld, one finds as fe* possibilities as one does numbers in general, or triangles in general'." +; (he meaning of /eing-before each of its regional determinations-must be thought first, if one is to distinguish the ideal *hich is not only from the real *hich it is not, but also from the fictional *hich belongs to the domain of the possible real. ""Naturally, it is not our intention to place the /eing of the ideal on the same level as the /eing-thought of the fictional or the absurd."" 1undreds of analogous texts could be cited.' /ut if 1usserl can *rite this, and if, therefore, he presupposes access to a meaning of /eing in general, ho* can he distinguish his idealism as a theory of 0no*ledge from metaphysical idealism< (he latter too, posited the unreal /eing of the ideal. 1usserl doubtless *ould respond, thin0ing of Plato, that the ideal *as realiBed *ithin metaphysical idealism, that is, that it *as substantified, hypos tasiBed, as soon as it *as not understood essentially, in each of its aspects, as noema, and as soon as one imagined that it could be *ithout in some *ay being thought or envisaged. (his situation *ould not have been totally modified later *hen the eidos became originally and essen tially noema only in the Enderstanding or )ogos of an infinite sub ect5 9od. /ut to *hat extent does transcendental idealism, *hose *ay is opened thereby, escape the horiBon-at the very least-of this infinite sub ectivity< (his cannot be debated here. 1o*ever, if he had previously opposed 1eidegger to 1usserl, )evinas no* contests *hat he calls "1eideggerean ontology"5 "(he primacy of ontology for 1eidegger does not rest on the truism, '(o 0no* the existent it is necessary to have comprehended the /eing of the existent.' (o affirm the priority of /eing over the existent is to decide

the essence of philosophy8 it is to subordinate the relation *ith someone, *ho is an existent, "the ethical relation' to a relation *ith the /eing of the existent, *hich, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of the existent "a relationship of 0no*ing', subordinates ustice to freedom" "(4, p. .+'. (his ontology *ould be valid for every existent, "except for the other."" )evinas's phrase over*helms "ontology"5 not only *ould the thought of the /eing of the existent have the impoverished logic of the truism, but it escapes this poverty only in order to seiBe and to murder the =ther. 4t is a laughably self-evident but criminal truism, *hich places ethics under the heel of ontology. (herefore, *hat of "ontology" and the "truism" ""in order to 0no* the existent it is necessary to have comprehended the /eing of the existent"'< )evinas says that "the primacy of ontology does not rest" on a "truism." 4s this certain< 4f the truism "true, truth' is fidelity to truth "that is, to the /eing of *hat is as *hat it is, and such as it is', it is not certain that thought "1eidegger, for example' has ever sought to avoid it. ":hat is strange about this thought of /eing is its simplicity," says 1eidegger, at the very moment, moreover, *hen he demonstrates that this thought entertains no theoretical or practical aims. "(he accomplishment of this thought is neither theoretical nor practical8 no more does it consist in the union of these t*o modes of behavior."+& 4s not this gesture of return to *hat is *ithin the dissociation of theory and practice also )evinas's gesture<+, #oes he not have to define metaphysical transcendence, therefore, as a not "yet' practical ethics< :e are concerned here *ith some rather strange truisms. 4t is "by the simplicity of its essence" that "the thought of /eing ma0es itself un0no*able for us."" 4f, on the contrary, by "truism" one understands, in the realm of udgment, analytic affirmation and the poverty of tautology, then the incriminated proposition is perhaps the least analytic of all8 for if there *ere to be only one thought in the *orld *hich escapes the form of the truism, it *ould be this one. @irst, *hat )evinas envisages in the *ord "truism" is not a udicative proposition but a truth previous to udgment, *hich in turn founds all possible udgment. - banal truism is the repetition of the sub ect in the predicate. No*, /eing is not simply a predicate of the existent, no more than it is the existent's

sub ect. 4f it is ta0en as essence or as existence "as /eing-such or /eingthere', if it is ta0en as copula or as position of existence, or, more profoundly and more originally, if it is ta0en as the unitary focal point of all these possibilities, then the /eing of the existent does not belong to the realm of predication, because it is already implied in all predication in general, and ma0es predication possible. -nd it ma0es every synthetic or analytic udgment possible. 4t is beyond genre and categories, transcendental in the scholastic sense, before scholasticism had made of the transcendental a supreme and infinite existent, 9od himself. 4t must be a singular truism that, through *hich is sought, in the most profound *ay, as the most concrete thought of all thoughts, the common root of essence and existence, *ithout *hich no udgment, no language *ould be possible, and *hich every concept can only presuppose, by dissimulating it.+% /ut if "ontology" is not a truism, or at least a truism among others, and if the strange difference bet*een /eing and the existent has a meaning, or is meaning, can one spea0 of the "priority" of /eing in relation to the existent< -n important question, here, for it is this alleged "priority" *hich, for )evinas, *ould enslave ethics to "ontology. (here can be an order of priority only bet*een t*o determined things, t*o existents. /eing, since it is nothing outside the existent, a theme *hich )evinas had commented upon so *ell previously, could in no *ay precede the existent, *hether in time, or in dignity, etc. Nothing is more clear, as concerns this, in 1eidegger's thought. 1enceforth, one cannot legitimately spea0 of the "subordination" of the existent to /eing, or, for example, of the ethical relation to the ontological relation. (o precomprehend or explicate the implicit relation of /eing to the existent&A is not to submit the existent "for example, someone' to /eing in a violent fashion. /eing is but the /eing-of this existent, and does not exist outside it as a foreign po*er, or as a hostile or neutral impersonal element. (he neutrality so often denounced by )evinas can only be the characteristic of an undetermined existent, of an anonymous optic po*er, of a conceptual generality, or of a principle. No*, /eing is not a principle, is not a principial existent, an archia *hich *ould permit )evinas to insert the face of a faceless tyrant under the name of /eing. (he thought of /eing "of the existent' is radically foreign to the search for a principle, or even for a root "although

certain images lead us to believe this, occasionally', or for a "tree of 0no*ledge"5 it is, as *e have seen, beyond theory, and is not the first *ord of theory. 4t is even beyond all hierarchies. 4f every "philosophy," every "metaphysics," has al*ays sought to determine the first existent, the excellent and truly existent existent, then the thought of the /eing of the existent is not this metaphysics or first philosophy. 4t is not even ontology "cf. above', if ontology is another name for first philosophy. !ince it is not first philosophy concerned *ith the archi-existent, that is, the first thing or first cause *hich governs, then the thought of /eing is neither concerned *ith, nor exercises, any po*er. @or po*er is a relationship bet*een existents. "!uch thin0ing has no result. 4t produces no effect" "1umanismus'. )evinas *rites5 "=ntology, as first philosophy, is a philosophy of po*er" "(4'. (his is perhaps true. /ut *e have ust seen that the thought of /eing is neither ontology, nor first philosophy, nor. a philosophy of po*er. @oreign to every first philosophy, it is not opposed to any 0ind of first philosophy. Not even to morals, if, as )evinas says, "morals is not a branch of philosophy but first philosophy" "(4'. @oreign to the search for an ontic archia in general, for an ethical or political archia in particular, it is not foreign, in the sense understood by )evinas *ho accuses it precisely of this foreignness, in the *ay violence is foreign to nonviolence, or evil to good. =ne may say of it *hat -lain said of philosophy5 it "is no more politics" "or ethics' ... than it is agriculture." :hich does not mean that it is an industry. 2adically foreign to ethics, it is not a counterethics, nor a subordination of ethics to a function in the realm of ethics that is already secretly violent5 the neutral. )evinas al*ays reconstructs, and not only in the case of 1eidegger, the polis or 0ind of social organiBation *hose delicate outline he believes can be traced through a discourse offered neither as sociological, nor as political, nor as ethical. (hus it is paradoxical to see the 1eideggerean city governed by a neutral po*er, by an anonymous discourse, that is, by the "one" "man' *hose inauthenticity 1eidegger *as the first to describe. -nd if it is true, in a difficult sense, that the )ogos, according to 1eidegger, "is the )ogos of no one," this certainly does not mean that it is the anonymity of oppression, the impersonality of the !tate, or the neutrality of the "one says." 4t is anonymous only as the possibility of the name and of responsibility. "/ut if man must one day arrive in the neighborhood of

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/eing, he must first learn to exist in that *hich has no name" "1umanism'. #id not the Iabbala also spea0 of the unnameable possibility of the Name< (he thought of /eing, therefore, can have no human design, secret or not. (a0en by itself, it is doubtless the only thought *hich no anthropology, no ethics, and above all, no ethico-anthropological psychoanalysis *ill ever enclose." Muite the contrary. Not only is the thought of /eing not ethical violence, but it seems that no ethics-in )evinas's sense-can be opened *ithout it. (hought-or at least the precomprehension of /eingconditions "in its o*n fashion, *hich excludes every ontic conditionality5 principles, causes, premises, etc.' the recognition of the essence of the existent "for example someone, existent as other, as other self, etc.'. 4t conditions the respect for the other as *hat it is5 other. :ithout this ac0no*ledgment, *hich is not a 0no*ledge, or let us say *ithout this "letting-be" of an existent "=ther' as something existing outside me in the essence of *hat it is "first in its alterity', no ethics *ould be possible. "(o let be" is an expression of 1eidegger's *hich does not mean, as )evinas seems to thin0,&3 to let be as an "ob ect of comprehension first," and, in the case of the =ther, as "interlocutor after*ard." (he "letting-be" concerns all possible forms of the exist ent, and even those *hich, by essence, cannot be transformed into "ob ects of comprehension."&; 4f it belongs to the essence of the other first and foremost to be an "interlocutor" and to be "interpellated," then the "letting-be" *ill let the =ther be *hat it is, *ill respect it as interpellated-interlocutor. (he "letting-be" does not only, or by privil ege, concern impersonal things. (o let the other be in its existence and essence as other means that *hat gains access to thought, or "and' *hat thought gains access to, is that *hich is essence and that *hich is existence8 and that *hich is the /eing *hich they both presuppose. :ithout this, no letting-be *ould be possible, and first of all, the letting be of respect and of the ethical commandment addressing itself to freedom. Ciolence *ould reign to such a degree that it *ould no longer even be able to appear and be named. (herefore, the "relation to the /eing of the existent" cannot possibly dominate the "relation to the existent." 1eidegger not only *ould criticiBe the notion of a relation to /eing, ust as )evinas criticiBes that of

a relation to the other, but also the notion of domination5 /eing is not elevated, is not the land of the existent, for elevation belongs to the existent. (here are fe* themes *hich have demanded 1eidegger's insistence to this extent5 /eing is not an excellent existent. (hat /eing is not above the existent does not imply that it is beside it. @or then it *ould be another existent. (herefore, it is difficult to spea0 of "the ontological significance of the existent in the general economy of /eing-*hich 1eidegger simply places beside /eing through a distinction ..." "66' 4t is true that )evinas ac0no*ledges else*here that "if there is distinction, there is not separation" "(-'8 and this is already to ac0no*ledge the impossibility of every relationship of ontic domination bet*een /eing and existent. 4n reality, there is not even a distinction in the usual sense of the *ord, bet*een /eing and existent. @or reasons of essence, and first because /eing is nothing outside the existent, and because the opening amounts to the onticoontological difference, it is impossible to avoid the ontic metaphor in order to articulate /eing in language, in order to let /eing circulate in language. (his is *hy 1eidegger says of language that it is "lichtendverbergende -n0unft des seins sdbst" "1umanismus'. -t one and the same time language illuminates and hides /eing itself. Nevertheless, /eing itself is alone in its absolute resistance to every metaphor. 6very philology *hich allegedly reduces the meaning of /eing to the metaphorical origin of the *ord "/eing," *hatever the historical "scientific' value of its hypotheses, misses the history of the meaning of /eing. (his history is to such an extent the history of a liberation of /eing as concerns the determined existent, that one existent among others has come to be thought of as the eponymous existent of /eing, for example, respiration. 2enan and NietBsche, for example, refer to respiration as the etymological origin of the *ord /eing *hen they *ish to reduce the meaning of *hat they ta0e to be a concept-the indeterminate generality of /eing-to its modest metaphorical origin. "2enan5 =n the =rigin of )anguage. NietBsche5 (he /irth of Philosophy'." (hus is explained all of empirical history, except precisely for the essential, that is, the thought that respiration and non-respiration are, for example. -nd are in a determined *ay, among other ontic determinations. 6tymological empiricism, the hidden root of all empiricism, explains everything except that at a given moment the metaphor, has been thought as metaphor, that is, has been ripped apart as the veil of /eing.

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(his moment is the emergence of the thought of /eing itself, the very movement of metaphoricity. @or this emergence still, and al*ays, occurs beneath an other metaphor. -s 1egel says some*here, empiricism al*ays forgets, at very least, that it employs the *ords to be. 6mpiricism is thin0ing by metaphor *ithout thin0ing the metaphor as such. Concerning "/eing" and "respiration," let us permit ourselves a uxtaposition *hich does not only have the value of a historical curiosity. 4n a letter to N . . ., dated 7arch $&;G, #escartes explains that the proposition " '4 breathe, therefore 4 am' concludes nothing, if it has not been proven previously that one exists, or if one does not imply5 4 thin0 that 4 breathe "even if 4 am mista0en in this', therefore 4 am8 and it is nothing other to state in this sense 4 breathe, therefore 4 am than 4 thin0, therefore 4 am." :hich means, in terms of *hat concerns us here, that the meaning of respiration is al*ays but a dependent and particular determination of my thought and my existence, and a fortiori of thought and of /eing in general. !upposing that the *ord "/eing" is

derived from a *ord meaning "respiration" "or any other determined thing', no etymology or philology-as such, and as determined sciences-*ill be able to account for the thought for *hich "respiration" "or any other determined thing' becomes a determination of /eing among others. 1ere, for example, no philology *ill be able to account for the gesture of #escartes's thought. =ne must travel other roads-or an other reading of NietBsche-in order to trace the genealogy of the unheard-of meaning of /eing. (his is a first reason *hy the "relation *ith an existent," *ith some one "the ethical relation', cannot be "dominated" by "a relation *ith !econd reason5 the "relation *ith the /eing of the existent," *hich is in no *ay a relation, above all is not a "relation of 0no*ledge."&+ 4t is not a theory, as *e have seen, and teaches us nothing about *hat is. IA is because it is not science that 1eidegger sometimes refuses it even the name of ontology, after having distinguished it from metaphysics, and thought of /eing is not to be confused *ith the concept of pure /eing as undetermined generality. @ormerly, )evinas had given us to under stand this5 "Precisely because /eing is not an existent, it must not

apprehended per genus et differentiam specificam" "6#6'. No*, according to )evinas, all violence is a violence of the concept8 and both 4s =ntology @undamental< and (otality and 4nfinity interpret the thought of /eing as a concept of /eing. =pposing himself to 1eidegger, )evinas *rites, among many other similar passages5 "4n our relation *ith the =ther, the latter does not affect us on the basis of a concept" "4s =ntology @undamental<'. -ccording to )evinas, it is finally the absolutely undetermined concept of /eing *hich offers the =ther to our understanding, that is, to our po*er and our violence. No* 1eidegger is emphatic on this point5 the /eing which is in question is not the concept to *hich the existent "for example, someone' is to be submitted "subsumed'. /eing is not the concept of a rather indeterminate and abstract predicate, see0ing to cover the totality of existents in its extreme universality5 "$' because it is not a predicate, and authoriBes all predication8 "3' because it is "older" than the concrete presence of the ens8 ";' because belonging to /eing does not cancel any predicative difference, but, on the contrary, permits the emergence of every possible difference.&& /eing is therefore transcategorical, and 1eidegger *ould say of it *hat )evinas says of the other5 it is "refractory to the category" "(4'. "(he question of /eing as a question of the possibility of the concept of /eing arises from the preconceptual comprehension of /eing, 1161 *rites 1eidegger, opening a dialogue and a repetition, "as concerns the 1egelian concept of pure /eing as nothingness', *hich *ill not cease to deepen and, in the style *hich is almost al*ays that of 1eidegger's dialogue *ith the thin0ers of tradition, *ill not cease to permit 1egel's discourse to gro* and to spea0-1egel's discourse as that of all of

metaphysics "1egel included, or rather, being entirely included in 1egel'. (hus, the thought or pre-comprehension of /eing signifies nothing less than a conceptual or totalitarian com-prehension. :hat *e have ust said of /eing could also be said of the same .&/ (o treat /eing the same' as categories, or to treat the "relationship to /eing" as (4' posed after*ard, or subordinated to a determined relation "an ethical relation, for example'-is this not to forbid oneself every determination "the ethical one, for example' from the outset< 6very

$ , & W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ determination, in effect, presupposes the thought of /eing. :ithout it, ho* can one give meaning to /eing as other, as other self, to the irreducibility of the existence and the essence of the other, and to the consequent responsibility< etc. "(his prerogative ... of being ans*erable to oneself as essent, in short, this prerogative of existing, involves in itself the necessity of a comprehension of /eing."&% 4f to understand /eing is to be able to let be "that is, to respect /eing in essence and existence, and to be responsible for one's respect', then the understanding of /eing al*ays concerns alterity, and par excellence the alterity of the =ther in all its originality5 one can have to let be only that *hich one is not. 4f /eing is al*ays to be let be, and if to thin0 is to let /eing be, then /eing is indeed the other of thought. /ut since it is *hat it is only by the letting-be of thought, and since the latter is thought only by virtue of the presence of the /eing *hich it lets be, then thought and /eing, thought and the other, are the same8 *hich, let us recall, does not mean identical, or one, or equal. (his amounts to stating that the thin0ing of /eing does not ma0e of the other a species of the genre /eing. Not only because the other
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violences of the an-archy *hose possibility, in history, is still the accomplice of archism. Dust as he implicitly had to appeal to phenomenological self evidences against phenomenology, )evinas must ceaselessly suppose and practice the thought of precomprehension of /eing in his dis course, even *hen he directs it against "ontology." =ther*ise, *hat *ould "exteriority as the essence of /eing" mean "(4'< -nd that "eschatology places one in relation to /eing, beyond the totality or history, and not *ith /eing beyond past and present" "(4'< -nd "to support pluralism as the structure of /eing" "#)'< -nd that "the encounter *ith the face is, absolutely, a relation to *hat is. Perhaps man alone is substance, and this is *hy he is face"<" 6thico-metaphysical transcendence therefore presupposes ontological transcendence. (he epe0eina tes ousias "in )evinas's interpretation' *ould not lead beyond /eing itself, but beyond the totality of the existent or the existent-hood of the existent "the /eing existent of the existent', or beyond ontic history. 1eidegger also refers to the epe0eina tes ousias in order to announce ontological transcendence,,3 but he also sho*s that the undetermined agathon to*ard *hich transcendence brea0s through has been determined too quic0ly. (hus, the thought of /eing could not possibly occur as ethical violence. =n the contrary, *ithout it one *ould be forbidden to let be the existent, and one *ould enclose transcendence *ithin identification and empirical economy. /y refusing, in (otality and infinity, to accord any dignity to the ontico-ontological difference, by seeing in it only a ruse of *ar, and by calling the intra-ontic movement of ethical transcendence "the movement respectful of one existent to*ard another' metaphysics, )evinas confirms 1eidegger in his discourse5 for does not the latter see in metaphysics "in metaphysical ontology' the forgetting of

is "refractory to the category," but because /eing is not a category. )i0e the =ther, /eing is not at all the accomplice of the totality, *hether of the finite totality, "the violent totality of *hich )evinas spea0s' or of an infinite totality. (he notion of totality is al*ays related to the existent. 4t is al*ays a "metaphysical" or "theological" notion, and the notions of finite and infinite ta0e on meaning in relation to it.,A @oreign to the finite totality, or to the infinity of existents, foreign in the sense specified above, foreign *ithout being another existent or another totality of existents, /eing could not oppress or enclose the existent and its differences. 4f the glance of the command, then 4 must be able to let be the other in his freedom . -s /eing is not the lord of the existent, its priority "ontic metaphor'

/eing and the dissimulation of the ontico-ontological difference<

4t thin0s /eing in an implicit fashion, as is inevitable in every language. (his

into question, *hich ma0es the search for an archia tremble. =nly th thought of /eing can do so, and not traditional "philosophy 'o "metaphysics." (he latter are therefore "politics" *hich can esca ethical violence only by economy5 by battling violently agains

metaphysics, and must first occur as the metaphysics of metaphysics in the question ":hat is 7etaphysics<" /ut the difference bet*een the implicit and the explicit is the entirety of thought8 and if correctly determined, it imprints its form on all ruptures and on the most radical

$,G W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ questions. "4t is true," says 1eidegger once more, "that 7etaphysics represents the existent in its /eing, and thus thin0s the /eing of the existent. /ut it does not thin0 the difference of /eing and the existent." 1. @or 1eidegger, it is therefore metaphysics "or metaphysical on tology' *hich remains a closure of the totality, and transcends the existent only to*ard the "superior' existent, or to*ard the "finite or infinite' totality of the existent. (his metaphysics essentially *ould be tied to a humanism *hich never as0s itself "in *hat manner the essence of man belongs to the truth of /eing .",+ ":hat is proper to all metaphysics is revealed in its 'humanism 11111 No*, )evinas simul taneously proposes to us a humanism and a metaphysics. 4t is a ques tion of attaining, via the royal road of ethics, the supreme existent, the truly existent ""substance" and "in itself" are )evinas's expressions' as other. -nd this existent is man, determined as face in his essence as man on the basis of his resemblance to 9od. 4s this not *hat 1eidegger has in mind *hen he spea0s of the unity of metaphysics, humanism and onto-theology< "(he encounter *ith the face is not only an anthropological fact. 4t is, absolutely spea0ing, a relation *ith *hat is. Perhaps man alone is substance, and this is *hy he is face." Certainly. /ut it is the analogy bet*een the face and 9od's visage that, in the most classical fashion, distinguishes man from animal, and determines man's substantiality5 "(he =ther resembles 9od." 7an's substantiality, *hich permits him to be face, is thus founded in his resemblance to 9od, *ho is therefore both (he @ace and absolute substantiality. (he theme of the @ace thus calls for a second reference to #escartes. )evinas never formulates it5 it is, as recogniBed by the !choolmen, the ambiguity of the notion of substance as concerns 9od and his creatures "cff for example, Principes, 4, sec. +$'. /y means of more than one mediation *e thus are referred to the !cholastic problem of the analogy. :e do not intend to enter into it here." )et us simply notice that conceived on the

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basis of a doctrine of analogy, of "resemblance," the expression "human face" is no longer, at bottom, as foreign to metaphor as )evinas seems to *ish. ". . . (he =ther resembles 9od...." 4s this not the original metaphor< (he question of /eing is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schema8 *hich, let us note in passing, "atheistic humanism" employs precisely in order to denounce

the very process of alienation. (he question of /eing dra*s bac0 into this schema, this opposition of humanisms, in the direction of the thought of /eing presupposed by the determination of the existentman, the existent-9od, and the analogical relationship bet*een them8 for the possibility of this relationship can be opened solely by the preconceptual and pre-analogical unity of /eing. 4t is a question neither of substituting /eing for 9od, nor of founding 9od on /eing. (he /eing of the existent "for example, 9od'" is not the absolute existent, nor the infinite existent, nor even the foundation of the existent in general. (his is why the question of /eing cannot budge the metaphysical edifice of (otality and 4nfinity "for example'. 4t is simply forever out of reach for the "inversion of the terms" ontology and metaphysics that )evinas proposes. (he theme of this inversion, therefore, does not play an indispensable role, have meaning and necessity, except in the economy and coherence of )evinas's boo0 in its entirety. :hat *ould it mean, for metaphysics and for humanism, to as0 "in *hat manner the essence of man belongs to the truth of /eing" "1umanismus'< Perhaps this5 *ould the experience of the face be possible, could it be stated, if the thought of /eing *ere not already implied in it< 4n effect, the face is the inaugural unity of a na0ed glance and of a right to speech. /ut eyes and mouth ma0e a face only if, beyond need, they can "let be," if they see and they say *hat is such as it is, if they reach the /eing of *hat is. /ut since /eing is, it cannot simply be produced, but precisely must be respected by a glance and a speech8 /eing must provo0e them, interpellate them. (here is no speech *ithout the thought and statement of /eing. /ut as /eing is nothing outside the determined existent, it *ould not appear as such *ithout the possibility of speech. /eing itself can only be thought and stated. 4t is the contemporary of the )ogos, *hich itself can only be as the )ogos of /eing, saying /eing. :ithout this double genitivity, speech, cut off from /eing and enclosed in the determined existent, *ould be only "according to )evinas's terminology' the cry of need before desire, the gesture of the self in the realm of the homogenous. 4t is only then, in the reduction or subordination of thought to /eing, that "philosophical discourse itself" *ould not be "only a failed act, the pretext for an uninterrupted psychoanalysis or philology or sociology in *hich the appearance of discourse vanishes into the -ll" "(4'. 4t is

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only then that the relation to exteriority *ould no longer catch its breath. (he metaphysics of the face therefore encloses the thought of /eing, presupposing the difference bet*een /eing and the existent at the same time as it stifles it. 4f this difference is original, if to thin0 /eing outside the existent is to thin0 nothing, or if it is to thin0 nothing no more than it is to approach the existent other than in its /eing, doubtless one has some right to say *ith )evinas "excepting the ambiguous expression "/eing in general"' that "the relation to the expressed existent preexists ... the unveiling of /eing in general ... 8 at the ontological plane, the ethical one" "(48 my italics'. 4f preexistence has the ontic sense *hich it must have, then this is incontestable. 4n fact, in existence the relationship *ith the expressed existent precedes the unveiling, the explicit thin0ing, of /eing itself :ith the limitation that there is no expression, in the sense of speech and not of need, except if there is already, implicitly, thought of /eing. )i0e*ise, in fact, the natural attitude precedes the transcendental reduc tion. /ut *e 0no* that ontological or transcendental "priority" is not of this order, and no one has ever alleged that it *as. (his "priority" no more contradicts than it confirms ontic or factual precedence. 4t fol lo*s that /eing, since it is al*ays, in fact, determined as an existent and is nothing outside the existent, is al*ays dissimulated. )evinas's phrase-the preexistence of the relation to the existent-is the very

formula of this initial concealment. /eing not existing before the 6xistent-and this is *hy it is 1istory-it begins by hiding itself beneath its determination. (his determination as the revelation of the existent "7etaphysics' is the very veiling of /eing. (here is nothing accidental or regrettable about this. "(he unconcealing of the existent, the clarity accorded to it, dar0ens the light of /eing. /eing dra*s bac0 in that it is of the thin0ing of /eing as of a thought dominated by the theme of unveiling "(4'< :ithout this dissimulation of /eing by the existent, there *ould be nothing, and there *ould be no history. (hat /eing' occurs in all respects as history and as *orld means that it can only, historical "epochs" are metaphysical "ontotheological' determinations of the /eing *hich thus brac0ets itself, reserves itself beneath meta physical concepts. 4n the strange light of this being-history 1eidegget

permits the reemergence of the notion of "eschatology," as it appears, for example, in 1olB*ege5 "/eing itself ... is in itself eschatological" "p. ;A3'. (he relationship bet*een this eschatology and messianic eschatology requires closer examination. (he first supposes that *ar is not an accident *hich overcomes /eing, but rather /eing itself. "#as !ent selber das !trittige ist" "/rief uber den 1umanismus, p.$G%'. - proposition *hich must not be understood in consonance *ith 1egelianism5 here, negativity has its origin neither in negation, nor in the anxiety of an infinite and primary existent. :ar, perhaps, is no longer even conceivable as negativity. 1eidegger, as is *ell 0no*n, calls the original dissimulation of /eing beneath the existent, *hich is prior to the error in udgment, and *hich nothing precedes in the ontic order, erring >4rren5 erring, going astray?5 "6very epoch of *orld history is an epoch of erring" "1olB*ege p. ;$$'. 4f /eing is time and history, then erring and the epochal essence of /eing are irreducible. 1enceforth, ho* can one accuse this thought of interminable *andering of being a ne* paganism of the !ite, a complacent cult of the !endentary< "(4, #)'.,% 1ere, the solicitation of the !ite and the )and is in no *ay, it must be emphasiBed, a passionate attachment to territory or locality, is in no *ay a provincialism or particularism. 4t is, at very least, as little lin0ed to empirical "nationalism" as is, or should be, the 1ebraic nostalgia for the )and, a nostalgia provo0ed not by an empirical passion, but by the irruption of a speech or a promise." 4s not to interpret the 1eideggerean theme of the )and or the #*elling as a nationalism or a /arresism first of all to express an allergy-the *ord, the accusation, *hich )evinas plays upon so often-to the "climate" of 1eidegger's philosophy< )evinas ac0no*ledges, moreover, that his "reflections," after having submitted to inspiration by "the philosophy of 7artin 1eidegger, 4'll are governed by a profound need to depart from the climate of this philosophy"

"66'. 4n question here is a need *hose natural legitimacy *e *ould be the last to question8 *hat is more, *e believe that its climate is never totally exterior to thought itself. /ut does not the na0ed truth of the other appear beyond "need," "climate," and a certain "history"< -nd has ththi bh noaug u s t s e t t e r t a n ) ev i n a s < 1eidegger, as for the De* and the Poet. (he proximity of the !ite is

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al*ays held in reserve, says 1olderlin as commented on by 1eidegger.G$ (he thin0ing of /eing thus is not a pagan cult of the !ite, because the !ite is never a given proximity but a promised one. -nd then also because it is not a pagan cult. (he !acred of *hich it spea0s belongs neither to religion in general, nor to a particular theology, and thus cannot be determined by any history of religion. 4t is first the essential experience of divinity or of deity. -s the latter is neither a concept nor a reality, it must provide access to itself in a proximity foreign to mystical theory or affectivity, foreign to theology and to enthusiasm. -gain, in a sense *hich is neither chronological nor logical, nor ontical in general, it precedes every relationship to 9od or to the 9ods. (his last relationship, of *hatever type, in order to be lived and stated supposes some precomprehension of the #eity, of 9od's /eing-god, of the "dimension of the divine" of *hich )evinas also spea0s by saying that it "is opened on the basis of the human face" "(4'. (his is all, and as usual it is simple and difficult. (he sacred is the "only essential space of divinity *hich in turn opens only a dimension for the gods and the god . . .""1umanis-mus'. (his space "in *hich 1eidegger also names 6levation'G3 is *ithin faith and atheism. /oth presuppose it. "4t is only on the basis of the truth of /eing that the essence of the !acred can be thought. 4t is only on the basis of the essence of the !acred that the essence of #ivinity must be thought. 4t is only in the light of the essence of #ivinity that one can thin0 and say *hat the *ord '9od' must designate" "1umanismus'. (his precompre hension of the #ivine cannot not be presupposed by )evinas's dis course at the very moment *hen he see0s to oppose 9od to the !acred divine. (hat the gods or 9od cannot be indicated except in the !pace of the !acred and in the light of the deity, is at once the limit and the *ellspring of finite-/eing as history. )imit, because divinity is not 9od. 4n a sense it is nothing. "(he sacred, it is true, appears. /ut the god remains distant."G; :ellspring, because this anticipation as a thought of /eing "of the existent 9od' al*ays sees 9od coming, opens the possi bility "the eventuality' of an encounter *ith 9od and of a dialogue

from one another as heaven and earth.... 9od operates, deity does not operate, has nothing to operate, has no operation in it, has never any operation in vie*" "!ermon Nolite timere cos'. /ut this deity is still determined as the essence-of-the-threefold-9od. -nd *hen 7eister 6c0hart see0s to go beyond these determinations, the movement *hich he s0etches seems to remain enclosed in ontic transcendence. ":hen 4 said that 9od *as not a /eing and *as above /eing, 4 did not thereby contest his /eing, but on the contrary attributed to him a more elevated /eing" "Muasi stella matutina...'. (his negative theology is still a theology and, in its literality at least, it is concerned *ith liberating and ac0no*ledging the ineffable transcendence of an infinite existent, "/eing above /eing and superessential negation." 4n its literality at least, but the difference bet*een metaphysical ontotheology, on the one hand, and the thought of /eing "of difference', on the other, signifies the essential importance of the letter. !ince everything occurs in movements of increasing explicitness, the literal difference is almost the entire difference of thought. (his is *hy, here, *hen the thought of /eing goes beyond optic determinations it is not a negative theology, nor even a negative ontology. "=ntological" anticipation, transcendence to*ard /eing, permits, then, an understanding of the *ord 9od, for example, even if this understanding is but the ether in *hich dissonance can resonate. (his transcendence inhabits and founds language, and along *ith it the possibility of all /eing-together8 the possibility of a 7itsein much more original than any of the eventual forms *ith *hich it has often been confused5 solidarity, the team, companionship." 4mplied by the discourse of (otality and infinity, alone permitting to let be others in their truth, freeing dialogue and the face to face, the thought of /eing is thus as dose as possible to nonviolence. :e do not say pure nonviolence. )i0e pure violence, pure nonviolence is a contradictory concept. Contradictory beyond *hat )evinas calls "formal logic." Pure violence, a relationship bet*een beings *ithout face, is not yet violence, is pure nonviolence. -nd inversely5 pure nonviolence, the nonrelation of the same to the other "in the sense understood by )evinas' is pure violence. =nly a face can arrest violence, but can do so, in the first place, only because a face can provo0e it. )evinas says it *ell5 "Ciolence can only aim at the face" "")a violence ne pent

(hat the #eity of 9od, *hich permits the thin0ing and naming of 9od, is nothing, and above all is not 9od himself, is *hat 7eister 6c0hart, in particular, said this *ay5 "9od and the deity are as different

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viser qu'un visage" (4'. @urther, *ithout the thought of /eing *hich opens the face, there *ould be only pure violence or pure nonviolence. (herefore, the thought of /eing, in its unveiling, is never foreign to a certain violence." (hat this thought al*ays appears in difference, and that the same-thought "and' "of' /eing-is never the identical, means first that /eing is history, that /eing dissimulates itself in its occurrence, and originally does violence to itself in order to be stated and in order to appear. - /eing *ithout violence *ould be a /eing *hich *ould occur outside the existent5 nothing8 nonhistory8 nonoccurrence8 nonphenomenality. - speech produced *ithout the least violence *ould determine nothing, *ould say nothing, *ould offer nothing to the other8 it *ould not be history, and it *ould sho* nothing5 in every sense of the *ord, and first of all the 9ree0 sense, it *ould be speech *ithout phrase. 4n the last analysis, according to )evinas, nonviolent language *ould be a language *hich *ould do *ithout the verb to be, that is, *ithout predication. Predication is the first violence. !ince the verb to be and the predicative act are implied in every other verb, and in every common noun, nonviolent language, in the last analysis, *ould be a language of pure invocation, pure adoration, proffering only proper nouns in order to call to the other from afar. 4n effect, such a language *ould be purified of all rhetoric, *hich is *hat )evinas explicitly desires8 and purified of the first sense of rhetoric, *hich *e can invo0e *ithout artifice, that is, purified of every verb. :ould such a language still deserve its name< 4s a language free from all rhetoric possible< (he 9ree0s, *ho taught us *hat )ogos meant, *ould never have accepted this. Plato tells us in the Cratylus ".3+a', the !ophist "3&3 ad' and in )etter C44 ";.3b', that there is no 0o os *hich does not suppose the interlacing of nouns and verbs. @inally, if one remains *ithin )evinas's intentions, *hat *ould a language *ithout phrase, a language *hich *ould say nothing, offer to the other< )anguage must give the *orld to the other, (otality and 4nfinity tells us. master *ho forbids himself the phrase *ould give nothing. 1e *ould have no disciples but only slaves. (he *or0-or liturgy-that is the expenditure *hich brea0s *ith economy, and *hich must not be thought, according to )evinas, as a 9ame, *ould be forbidden to him.'

passage through /eing and the moment of the concept, )evinas's thought *ould not only propose an ethics *ithout la*, as *e said above, but also a language *ithout phrase. :hich *ould be entirely coherent if the face *as only glance, but it is also speech8 and in speech it is the phrase *hich ma0es the cry of need become the expression of desire. No*, there is no phrase *hich is indeterminate, that is, *hich does not pass through the violence of the concept. Ciolence appears *ith articulation. -nd the latter is opened only by "the at first preconceptual' circulation of /eing. (he very elocution of nonviolent metaphysics is its first disavo*al. )evinas doubtless *ould not deny that every historical language carries *ithin it an irreducible conceptual moment, and therefore a certain violence. @rom his point of vie*, the origin and possibility of the concept are simply not the thought of /eing, but the gift of the *orld to the other as totally-other "cf, for example, (4, p.$,+'. 4n its original possibility as offer, in its still silent intention, language is nonviolent "but can it be language, in this pure intention<'. 4t becomes violent only in its history, in *hat *e have called the phrase, *hich obliges it to articulate itself in a conceptual syntax opening the circulation of the same, permitting itself to be governed both by "ontology" and by *hat remains, for )evinas, the concept of concepts5 /eing. No*, for )evinas, the concept of /eing *ould be only an abstract means produced for the gift of the *orld to the other *ho is above /eing. 1ence, only in its silent origin, before /eing, *ould language be nonviolent. /ut *hy history< :hy does the phrase impose itself< /ecause if one does not uproot the silent origin from itself violently, if one decides not to spea0, then the *orst violence *ill silently cohabit the idea of peace< Peace is made only in a certain silence, *hich is determined and protected by the violence of speech. !ince speech says nothing other than the horiBon of this silent peace by *hich it has itself summoned and that it is its mission to protect and to prepare, speech indefinitely remains silent. =ne never escapes the economy of *ar. 4t is evident that to separate the original possibility of speech-as nonviolence and gift-from the violence necessary in historical actuality is to prop up thought by means of transhistoricity. :hich )evinas does explicitly, despite his initial critique of 1usserlian "anhistoricism." @or )evinas, the origin of meaning is nonhistory, is "beyond history." =ne *ould then have to as0 *hether it is any longer possible

(hus, in its most elevated nonviolent urgency, denouncing the

to identify thought and language as )evinas see0s to do8 and one *ould have to as0 *hether this transhistoricity of meaning is authentically 1ebraic in its inspiration8 and finally, *hether this nonhistory uproots itself from history in general, or only from a certain empirical or ontic dimension of history. -nd *hether the eschatology invo0ed can be separated from every reference to history. @or our o*n reference to history, here, is only contextual. (he economy of *hich *e are spea0ing does not any longer accommodate the concept of history such as it has al*ays functioned, and *hich it is difficult, if not impossible, to lift from its teleological or eschatological horiBon. (he ahistoricity of meaning at its origin is *hat profoundly separates )evinas from 1eidegger, therefore. !ince /eing is history for the latter, it is not outside difference, and thus, it originally occurs as "nonethical' violence, as dissimulation of itself in its o*n unveiling. (hat language, thereby, al*ays hides its o*n origin is not a contradiction, but history itself. 4n the ontological-historical0> violence *hich permits the thin0ing of ethical violence, in economy as the thought of /eing, /eing is necessarily dissimulated. (he first violence is this dissimulation, but it is also the first defeat of nihilistic violence, and the first epiphany of /eing. /eing, thus, is less the primum cognitum, as *as said, than the first dissimulated, and these t*o propositions are not contradictory. @or )evinas, on the contrary, /eing "understood as concept' is the first dissimulating, and the ontico-ontological difference thereby *ould neutraliBe difference, the infinite alterity of the totally-other. (he ontico-ontological difference, moreover, *ould be conceivable only on the basis of the idea of the 4nfinite, of the unanticipatable irruption of the totally-other existent. @or )evinas, as for 1eidegger, language *ould be at once a coming forth and a holding bac0 >reserve?, enlightenment and obscurity8 and for both, dissimulation *ould be a conceptual gesture. /ut for )evinas, the concept is on the plane of /eing8 for 1eidegger it is on the plane of ontic determination. (his schema accentuates their opposition but, as is often the case, also permits one to con ecture about their proximity5 the proximity of t*o "eschatologies" *hich by opposed routes repeat and put into question the entire "philosophical" adventure issued from Platonism. 4nterrogate it simultaneously from *ithin and *ithout, in the form of a question to 1egel, in *hom this adventure is thought and recapitulated. (his proximity *ould be indicated in questions of this type5 on the

one hand, is 9od "the infinite-other-existent' still an existent *hich can be precomprehended on the basis of a thought of /eing "singularly, of divinity'< 4n other *ords, can infinity be called an ontic determination< 1as not 9od al*ays been thought of as the name of that *hich is not a supreme existent precomprehended on the basis of a thought of /eing< 4s not 9od the name of that *hich cannot be anticipated on the basis of the dimension of the divine< 4s not 9od the other name of /eing "name because nonconcept', the thin0ing of *hich *ould open difference and the ontological horiBon, instead of being indicated in them only< =pening of the horiBon, and not in the horiBon. (hrough the thought of infinity, the ontic enclosure *ould have already been bro0en-but in a sense of the unthought that *ould have to be examined more closely-by means of *hat 1eidegger calls metaphysics and onto-theology. =n the other hand5 is not the thought of /eing the thought of the other before being the homogeneous identity of the concept, and the asphixiation of the same< 4s not the beyond-history of eschatology the other name of the transition to a more profound history, to 1istory itself< /ut to a history *hich, unable any longer to be itself in any original or final presence, *ould have to change its name< 4n other *ords, perhaps one might say that ontology precedes theology only by putting bet*een brac0ets the content of the optic determination *hich, in post-1ellenic philosophical thought, is called 9od5 to *it, the positive infinity. (he positive infinity *ould only have the "nominal' appearance of *hat is called an ontic determination. 4n truth, it *ould be that *hich refuses to be an ontic determination *hich is included as such in the thought of /eing, that is, on the basis and in the light of a thought of /eing. =n the contrary, it is infinity-as nondetermination and concrete operation-*hich *ould permit the thin0ing of the difference bet*een /eing and ontic determination. (he ontic content of infinity *ould destroy ontic closure. 4mplicitly or not, the thought of infinity *ould open the question, and the ontico ontological difference. Paradoxically, it *ould be this thought of infin ity "*hat is called the thought of 9od' *hich *ould permit one to affirm the priority of ontology over theology, and to affirm that the thought of /eing is presupposed by the thought of 9od. #oubtless, it is for this reason that #uns !cotus or 7alebranche, respectful of the pres ence in all thought of uniform /eing, or /eing in general, did not believe

!CC $RITING AND DIFFERENCE it necessary to distinguish +etween the levels of ontology *or metaphysics2 and theology. 4eidegger often reminds us of the "strange simplicity" of the thought of 6eing. this is +oth its difficulty and that which properly touches upon the "un%nowa+le." 'or 4eidegger, infinity would +e only one eventual determination of this simplicity. 'or ?ale+ranche, infinity is its very form. " he idea of the e)tended infinite thus encloses more reality than that of the heavens> and the idea of the infinite in all genres of 6eing, that which corresponds to this word, 6eing, the infinitely perfect +eing, contains infinitely more Areality2, although the perception with which this idea affects us is the slightest of all> and is slighter to the e)tent that it is more vast, and conse:uently infinitely slight +ecause infinite" *-ntretien d'un philosophe chretien avec on philosophe chinois.2 Since 6eing is nothing *determined2, it is necessarily produced i n difference *as difference2. 9s, on the one hand, to say that 6eing is infinite, or to say, on the other, that it is revealed as produced only "in simultaneity with" *in 6ins mit2 /othingness *What 9s ?etaphysicsF2-which means that it is "finite in its essence" *i+id.2 fundamentally to say anything elseF 6ut one would have to show that 4eidegger never meant "anything else" than classical metaphysics, and that the transgression of metaphysics is not a new metaphysical or onto-theological thesis. hus, the :uestion a+out the 6eing of the e)istent would not only introduce-among others the :uestion a+out :uestion, and as the answer within its :uestion. God always would +e implied in every :uestion a+out God, and would precede every

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nified in every signification of terms. 5r. Declare thy self more at large.... Id: Doth not the :uestion, whether a thing +e or no, presuppose the -ntitieF 5r. Des. Id: herefore when it is demanded of thee, whether God +e, *or whether there +e a GodF2 answer that which is presupposed, namely that he is> +ecause that is the -ntitie presupposed in the :uestion. So, if any man shall as% thee, what is GodF considering that this :uestion presupposeth a :uidditie to +e> thou shalt answer, that God is a+solute :uiddity itself. ,nd so for all things. /or need there +e any hesitation or dou+t in this> for God is the a+solute presupposition itself, of all things, which *after what manner soever2 are presupposed as in every effect the cause is presupposed. See therefore, 5ratour, how easie heologicall difficulty is.... 9f that which in every :uestion is presupposed, +e in divine matters an answer unto the :uestion, then of God there can +e no proper :uestion, +ecause the answer coincides with it."

6y ma%ing the origin of language, meaning, and difference the relation to the infinitely other, (evinas is resigned to +etraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse. he latter is understood, and instructs, only +y first permitting the same and 6eing to circulate within it. , classical schema here complicated +y a metaphysics of dialogue and instruction, of a demonstration which contradicts what is demonstrated +y the very rigor and truth of its development. he thousand-times-denounced circle of historicism, psychologism, relativism, etc. 6ut the true name of this inclination of thought to the 5ther, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence inspired +y a truth more profound than the "logic" of philosophical discourse,

and which cannot +e determined as an e)istent. he 9diot *9diota2, an God in every :uestion, and first in the :uestion of God. 'or e)ample. See how easie the difficultie is in divine things, that it always offers it self to the see%er, in the same manner that it is sought for. he O r a t o r : Without dou+t, there is nothing more wonderfull. Id: -very :uestion concerning God presupposeth the thing :uestioned> and that must +e answered, which in every :uestion concerning God, the :uestion presupposeth. for God, although he +e unsignifia+le, is sig
The Idiot:

transcendental hori3ons of language, is empiricism. 'or the latter, at +ot philosophy. ,nd the profundity of the empiricist intention must +e recogni3ed +eneath the naivete of certain of its historical e)pressions. 9t the dream of a purely heterological thought at its source. , pure thought of re difference. -mpiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical dy+rea%, as soon as language awa%ens. 6ut perhaps one will o+&ect that
is language which is sleeping. Dou+tless, +ut then one must, in a

certain way, become classical once more, and again find other grounds for the divorce bet*een speech and thought. (his route is quite, perhaps too, abandoned today. -mong others, by )evinas. /y radicaliBing the theme of the infinite exteriority of the other, )evinas thereby assumes the aim *hich has more or less secretly animated all the philosophical gestures *hich have been called empiricisms in the history of philosophy. 1e does so *ith an audacity, a profundity, and a resoluteness never before attained. /y ta0ing this pro ect to its end, he totally rene*s empiricism, and inverses it by revealing it to itself as metaphysics. #espite the 1usserlian and 1eideggerean stages of his thought, )evinas does not even see0 to dra* bac0 from the *ord empiricism. =n t*o occasions, at least, he spea0s for "the radical empiricism confident in the instruction of exteriority" "(4'. (he experience of the other "of the infinite' is irreducible, and is therefore "the experience par excellence" "(4'. -nd, concerning death *hich is indeed its irreducible resource, )evinas spea0s of an "empiricism *hich is in no *ay a positivism."" /ut can one spea0 of an experience of the other or of difference< 1as not the concept of experience al*ays been determined by the metaphysics of presence< 4s not experience al*ays an encountering of an irreducible presence, the perception of a phenomenality< (his complicity bet*een empiricism and metaphysics is in no *ay surprising. /y criticiBing them, or rather by limiting them *ith one and the same gesture, Iant and 1usserl indeed had recogniBed their solidarity. 4t calls for closer meditation. !chelling *ent quite far in this direction." /ut empiricism al*ays has been determined by philosophy, from Plato to 1usserl, as nonphilosophy5 as the philosophical pretention to nonphilosophy, the inability to ustify oneself, to come to one's o*n aid as speech. /ut this incapacitation, *hen resolutely assumed, contests the resolution and coherence of the logos "philosophy' at its root, instead of letting itself be questioned by the logos. (herefore, nothing can so profoundly solicit the 9ree0 logos-philosophy-than this irruption of the totally-other8 and nothing can to such an extent rea*a0en the logos to its origin as to its mortality, its other. /ut if one calls this experience of the infinitely other Dudaism "*hich is only a hypothesis for us', one must reflect upon the necessity in *hich this experience finds itself, the in unction by *hich it is

ordered to occur as logos, and to rea*a0en the 9ree0 in the autistic syntax of his o*n dream. (he necessity to avoid the *orst violence, *hich threatens *hen one silently delivers oneself into the hands of the other in the night. (he necessity to borro* the *ays of the unique philosophical logos, *hich can only invert the "curvature of space" for the benefit of the same. - same *hich is not the identical, and *hich does not enclose the other. 4t *as a 9ree0 *ho said, "4f one has to philosophiBe, one has to philosophiBe8 if one does not have to philosophiBe, one still has to philosophiBe "to say it and thin0 it'. =ne al*ays has to philosophiBe." )evinas 0no*s this better than others5 "=ne could not possibly re ect the !criptures *ithout 0no*ing ho* to read them, nor say philology *ithout philosophy, nor, if need be, arrest philosophical discourse *ithout philosophiBing" "#)'. "=ne must refer-4 am convinced-to the medium of all comprehension and of all understanding in *hich all truth is reflectedprecisely to 9ree0 civiliBation, and to *hat it produced5 to the logos, to the coherent discourse of reason, to life in a reasonable !tate. (his is the true grounds of all understanding" "#)'. !uch a site of encounter cannot only offer occasional hospitality to a thought *hich *ould remain foreign to it. -nd still less may the 9ree0 absent himself, having loaned his house and his language, *hile the De* and the Christian meet in his home "for this is the encounter in question in the text ust cited'. 9reece is not a neutral, provisional territory, beyond borders. (he history in *hich the 9ree0 logos is produced cannot be a happy accident providing grounds for understanding to those *ho understand eschatological prophecy, and to those *ho do not understand it at all. 4t cannot be outside and accidental for any thought. (he 9ree0 miracle is not this or that, such and such astonishing success8 it is the impossibil ity for any thought ever to treat its sages as "sages of the outside," according to the expression of !aint Dohn Chrysostom. 4n having proffered the epe0eina tes ousias, in having recogniBed from its second *ord "for example, in the !ophist' that alterity had to circulate at the origin of meaning, in *elcoming alterity in general into the heart of the logos, the 9ree0 thought of /eing forever has protected itself against every absolutely surprising convocation. -re *e De*s< -re *e 9ree0s< :e live in the difference bet*een the De* and the 9ree0, *hich is perhaps the unity of *hat is called history.

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:e live in and of difference, that is, in hy!ocrisy, about *hich )evinas so profoundly says that it is "not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a *orld attached to both the philosophers and the prophets" "(4, p. 3.'. -re *e 9ree0s< -re *e De*s< /ut *ho, *e< -re *e "not a chronological, but a pre-logical question' first De*s or first 9ree0s< -nd does the strange dialogue bet*een the De* and the 9ree0, peace itself, have the form of the absolute, speculative logic of 1egel, the living logic *hich reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology' after having thought prophetic discourse in the preface to the Phenomenology of the 7ind< =r, on the contrary, does this peace have the form of infinite separation and of the unthin0able, unsayable transcendence of the other< (o *hat horiBon of peace does the language *hich as0s this question belong< @rom *hence does it dra* the energy of its question< Can it account for the historical coupling of Dudaism and 1ellenisrn< -nd *hat is the legitimacy, *hat is the meaning of the copula in this proposition from perhaps the most 1egelian of modern novelists5 "De*gree0 is gree0 e*. 6xtremes meet"<%)

5
'GENESIS AND STRUCTURE' AND &HENOMENOLOGY
4 must begin *ith a precaution and a confession. :hen, in order to approach a philosophy, one is armed not only *ith a pair of concepts-here, "structure and genesis"-that has been determined or overburdened *ith reminiscences by a long problematical tradition, but also *ith a speculative grid in *hich the classical figure of an antagonism is apparent from the start, then the operative debate *hich one prepares to underta0e from *ithin this philosophy, or on the basis of it, is in danger of appearing to be not so much an attentive scrutiny as a putting into question, that is, an abusive investiga don *hich introduces beforehand *hat it see0s to find, and does

violence to the physiology proper to a body of thought. No doubt, to at a philosophy by introducing the forei n substance of a debate be efficacious, may surrender or set free the meanin of a latent

b t it begiih ns wt an a ression and an infidelit tltand, this is truer than ever A1sserlhasalwaysindt= o
,

anapor,a, thatis forrelfection

e wherebhh
elusion thti ,as, to close the 1uestion,

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to enclose his expectations or his concern in an option, a decision, a solution8 and this *ould be the result of a speculative or "dialectical" attitude, in the sense that 1usserl, at least, al*ays sought to ascribe to this *ord. Not only are the metaphysicians guilty of this attitude, but often, unbe0no*nst to themselves, so are the adherents of the empirical sciences5 both groups *ould be congenitally guilty of a certain sin of explicationism. (he phenomenologist, on the contrary, is the "true positivist" *ho returns to the things themselves, and *ho is selfeffacing before the originality and primordiality of meanings. (he process of a faithful comprehension or description, and the continuity of explication must dispel the shado* of a choice. (hus one might say, and in an entirely pre udicial fashion, that 1usserl, by his re ection of system and speculative closure, and by virtue of the style of his thought, is attuned to the historicity of meaning and to the possibility of its becoming, and is also already respectful of that *hich remains open *ithin structure. -nd even *hen one comes to thin0 that the opening of the structure is "structural," that is, essential, one already has progressed to an order heterogeneous to the first one5 the difference bet*een the "necessarily closed' minor structure and the structurality of an opening-such, perhaps, is the unlocatable site in *hich philosophy ta0es root. Particularly *hen it spea0s of and describes structures. (hus, the presumption of a conflict bet*een the genetic approach and the structural approach from the outset appears to be superimposed upon the specificity of *hat is given to a virgin glance. -nd if the question "structure or genesis" had been exposed to 1usserl ex abrupto, 4 *ager that he *ould have been quite astonished to see himself called into such a debate8 he *ould have ans*ered that it depends upon *hat one intends to spea0 about. (here are some givens *hich must be described in terms of structure, and others *hich must be described in terms of genesis. (here are layers of meaning *hich appear as systems, or complexes, or static configurations, *ithin

one use the language of genesis, supposing that there is one, or that there is only one. (he image of this fidelity to the theme of the description can be found in 1usserl's "at least apparent' fidelity to himself all along his itinerary. (o sho* this, 4 *ill ta0e t*o examples. $. (he transition from the genetic researches in the only boo0 *hose method, or some of *hose psychologistic presuppositions, 1usserl renounced "4 am thin0ing of Philosophie der -rithmeti0', to the )ogische Entersuchungen in particular "*here above all it *as a question of describing the ob ectivity of ideal ob ectivities in a certain atemporal fixedness, and in their autonomy as concerns a certain sub ective becoming'. (his transition has an explicative continuity, and 1usserl is so sure of this that more than forty years later he *rites5 "(his fixing of attention on the formal, and a first understanding of its meaning, 4 acquired through my Philosophie der -rithmeti0 "$G%$', *hich, despite its immaturity as a first text, nonetheless represented a first attempt to attain clarity as to the true meaning, the authentic and original meaning, of the concepts of set theory and number theory, and did so by returning to the spontaneous activities of colligation and numeration in *hich collections "'totalities', 'sets'' and numbers are given in an originally productive *ay. (herefore it *as, to use my later *ay of expressing myself, a research deriving from constitutive phenomenology ..." etc.' 4t *ill be ob ected that fidelity is easily explained here, since it is a question of grasping, in the dimension of the "transcendental gen

obey both the legality proper to and the functional significance of the found, sometimes more superficial, are given in the essential mode of. creation and movement, that is, in the modes of primordial origin, of becoming, or of tradition8 and these require that in spea0ing of them

esis," an intention that *as first attached perhaps more "naively" but *ith sure uncertainty to a psychological genesis. 3. /ut one cannot say the same about the transition-*ithin phenomenology this time-from the structural analyses of static constitution practiced in 4deen 4 "$%$;' to the analyses of genetic constitution *hich follo*, and *hich are sometimes quite ne* in their content. -nd yet this transition is still a simple progress *hich implies no "surpassing" "as it is called' and still less an option, and especially not a repentance. 4t is the deepening of a *or0 *hich leaves intact *hat has been uncovered, a *or0 of excavation in *hich the baring of both the genetic foundations and the original productivity not only neither sha0es nor ruins the superficial structures already unearthed, but also

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$%,

brings eidetic forms once again to light, that is the "structural a prioris"-this is 1usserl's expression-of genesis itself. (hus, in 1usserl's mind at least, there *as never a "structuregenesis" problem but only a privilege of one or the other of these t*o operative concepts, according to the space of description, the quid or the quomodo of the givens. 4n this phenomenology, *here, at first glance, and if one ta0es inspiration from traditional schemas, motifs of conflict or of tension appear numerous "it is a philosophy of essences al*ays considered in their ob ectivity, their intangibility, their apriority8 but, by the same to0en, it is a philosophy of experience, of becoming, of the temporal flux of *hat is lived, *hich is the ultimate reference8 it is also a philosophy in *hich the notion of "transcendental experience" designates the very field of reflection, in a pro ect *hich, in Iant's eyes for example, *ould have derived from teratology', one finds no clashes8 and the mastery of the phenomenologist at *or0 *ould have assured 1usserl of a perfect serenity in the usage of these t*o al*ays complementary operative concepts. Phenomenology, in the clarity of its intention, *ould be offended, then, by our preliminary question. 1aving ta0en these precautions as concerns 1usserl's aims, 4 must no* confess my o*n. 4n effect, 4 *ould li0e to attempt to sho*5 @irst, that beneath the serene use of these concepts is to be found a debate that regulates and gives its rhythm to the progression of the description, that gives to the description its "animation," and *hose incompleteness, *hich leaves every ma or stage of phenomonology unbalanced, ma0es ne* reductions and explications indefinitely necessary. !econd, that this debate, at every instant endangering the very principles of the method, appears-4 say "appears," for this is a hypothesis *hich even if it is not confirmed might permit us, at least, to accentuate the original characteristics of the 1usserlian attempt-appears thus to force 1usserl to transgress the purely descriptive space and transcendental pretention of his research, and to move to*ard a metaphysics of history in *hich the solid structure of a (elos *ould permit him to reappropriate, by ma0ing it essential and by in some *ay pre

4 *ill follo* alternately the thread of a debate interior to 1usserl's thought, and the thread of a combat on the flan0 of 1usserl's field of research into *hich he had to enter on t*o occasions8 4 refer to the t*o polemics *hich placed him in opposition to those philosophies of structure called #iltheyism and 9estaltism. 1usserl, thus, ceaselessly attempts to reconcile the structuralist demand "*hich leads to the comprehensive description of a totality, of a form or a function organiBed according to an internal legality in *hich elements have meaning only in the solidarity of their correlation or their opposition', *ith the genetic demand "that is the search for the origin and foundation of the structure'. =ne could sho*, perhaps, that the phenomenological pro ect itself is born of an initial failure of this attempt. 4n Philosophic der -rithmeti0, the ob ectivity of a structure, that of numbers and arithmetical series-and, correlatively, that of the arithmetical attitude-is tied to the concrete genesis *hich must ma0e it possible. @rom the start, 1usserl refuses, and *ill al*ays refuse, to accept the intelligibility and normativity of this universal structure as manna fallen from a "heavenly place" "topos ouranios',B or as an eternal truth created by an infinite reason. (o see0 out the sub ective origin of arithmetical ob ects and values, here, is to turn bac0 to*ard perception, to*ard perceptual ensembles, and to*ard the pluralities and totalities found in perception in a premathematical organiBation. /y virtue of its style this return to perception and to acts of colligation or numeration yields to the then frequent temptation vaguely named "psychologism."; /ut 1usserl indicates his reservations on more than one score and he never reaches the point of construing an actual genetic constitution as an epistemological validation, as )ipps, :undt, and several others had the tendency to do "although it is true that read attentively, and for themselves, they *ould appear more prudent and less simplistic than one *ould be tempted to believe on the basis of 1usserl's criticisms of them'. 1usserl's originality is to be recogniBed in that5 "a' he distinguishes number from concept, that is, from a constructum, a psychological artifact8 "b' he underlines that mathematical or logical synthesis is irreducible to the order-in both senses of the *ord of psychological

scribing its horiBon, an untamed genesis *hich gre* to greater and greater expanse, and seemed to accommodate itself less and less to phenomenological apriorism and to transcendental idealism.

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temporality8 "c' he bases his entire psychological analysis on the already given possibility of an ob ective et*as uberhaupt, *hich @rege *ill criticiBe under the denomination bloodless specter "blutloses 9espenst' but *hich designates the intentionalJ dimension of ob ectivity, the transcendental relation to the ob ect that no psychological genesis can institute but can only presuppose in its o*n possibility. Consequently, the respect for arithmetical meaning, for its ideality and its normativity, forbids 1usserl any psychological deduction of the number at the very moment *hen both his stated method and the tendencies of the period should have pushed him to*ard one, 4t remains that the intentionality presupposed by the movement of genesis is still conceived by 1usserl as a trait, as a psychological structure of consciousness, li0e character and the state of something factual. No*, the meaning of the number can do very *ell *ithout the intentionality of a factual consciousness. (his meaning, that is, this ideal ob ectivity and normativity is precisely independence from any factual consciousness8 and 1usserl quic0ly *ill be obliged to ac0no*ledge the legitimacy of @rege's criticisms5 the essence of the number derives from psychology to the same extent as does the existence of the North !ea. 7oreover, neither unity nor Bero can be engendered on the basis of a multiplicity of positive acts, facts, or psychic events. :hat is true for arithmetical unity is also true for the unity of every ob ect in general. 4f 1usserl gives up the psychological routes *hen confronted by all the difficulties of accounting for a structure of ideal meaning on the basis of a factual genesis, he no less re ects the logiciBing conclusion *ith *hich his critics *ished to corner him. :hether in the then current Platonic or Iantian style, this logicism *as preoccupied above all *ith the autonomy of logical ideality as concerns all consciousness in general, or all concrete and non-formal consciousness. 1usserl, for his part, see0s to maintain simultaneously the normative autonomy of logical or mathematical ideality as concerns all factual consciousness, and its original dependence in relation to a sub ectivity in general8 in general, but concretely. (hus he had to navigate bet*een the !cylla and Charybdis of logiciBing structuralism and psychologistic genetism "even in the subtle and pernicious form of the "transcendental psychologism" attributed to Iant'. 1e had to open up a ne* direction of philosophical attention and permit the discovery of a concrete, but

nonempirical, intentionality, a "transcendental experience" *hich *ould be "constitutive," that is, li0e all intentionality, simultaneously productive and revelatory, active and passive. (he original unity, the common root of activity and passivity is from quite early on the very possibility of meaning for 1usserl. -nd this common root *ill ceaselessly be experienced as the common root of structure and genesis *hich is dogmatically presupposed by all the ulterior problematics and dissociations concerning them. 1usserl *ill attempt to prepare an access to this common radicality through the diverse "reductions," *hich are presented initially as neutraliBations of psychological genesis and even of every factual genesis in general. (he first phase of phenomenology, in its style and its ob ects, is structuralist, because first and foremost it see0s to stay clear of psychologism and historicism. /ut it is not genetic description in general *hich is disqualified, but only the genetic description *hich borro*s its schemas from naturalism and causalism, and depends upon a science of "facts" and therefore on an empiricism8 and therefore, concludes 1usserl, depends upon a relativism incapable of insuring its o*n truth8 therefore, on a s0epticism. (he transition to the phenomenological attitude is made necessary, thus, by the impotence or philosophical fragility of genetism *hen the latter, by means of a positivism *hich does not understand itself, believes itself capable of enclosure by a "science-offacts" "(atsachen*issenschaft', *hether this be a natural science or a science of the mind. (he expression "*orldly genesis" covers the domain of these sciences. @or as long as the phenomenological space has not been uncovered, and for as long as the transcendental description has not been underta0en, the problem of "structure and genesis" seems to have no meaning. Neither the idea of structure, *hich isolates the different spheres of ob ective signification *ith respect for their static originality, nor the idea of genesis, *hich effects abusive transitions from one region to another, appears adequate to clarify the problem *hich is already 1usserl's, that is, the problem of the foundation of ob ectivity. (his might appear to be inconsequential5 can one not imagine, in effect, a methodological fecundity of these t*o notions in the various domains of the natural and social sciences to the extent that the latter, in their o*n movement and moment, in their actual labor, do not have

to ans*er for the meaning and value of their ob ectivity< Not at all. 6ven the most naive utiliBation of the notion of genesis, and especially of the notion of structure, supposes at very least that the natural regions and the domains of ob ectivity have been rigorously circumscribed. No*, this prior circumscription, this elucidation of the meaning of each regional structure can derive only from a phenomenological critique. (he latter is al*ays rightfully primary, because it alone can ans*er, before every empirical inquiry and in order for such an inquiry to be possible, questions of this 0ind5 *hat is the physical thing, *hat is the psychological thing, *hat is the historical thing, etc. etc. <-questions *hose ans*er *as more or less dogmatically implied by the structural or genetic techniques. )et us not forget that if Philosophic der -rithmeti0 is the contemporary of the most ambitious, systematic, and optimistic of psychogenetic attempts, 1usserl's first phenomenological *or0s *ere developed approximately at the same time as the first structuralist pro ects, or at least those *hich stated structure as a theme, for it *ould not be difficult to sho* that a certain structuralism has al*ays been philosophy's most spontaneous gesture. No*, 1usserl states his ob ections to #iltheyism and 9estaltism, those first philosophies of structure, in a *ay that is identical in principle to his ob ections to genetism. 4n 1usserl's eyes the structuralism of the :eltanschauungsphilosophie is a historicism. -nd despite #ilthey's vehement protests, 1usserl *ill persist in thin0ing that, li0e all historicism, and despite its originality, the :eltanschauungsphilosophie avoids neither relativism nor s0epticism.' @or it reduces the norm to a historical factuality, and it ends by confusing, to spea0 the language of )eibniB and of the )ogische Entersuchungen "vol. 4, p.$GG', the truths of fact and the truths of reason. Pure truth or the pretension to pure truth is missed in its meaning as soon as one attempts, as #ilthey does, to account for it from *ithin a determined historical totality, that is, from *ithin a factual totality, a finite totality all of *hose manifestations and cultural productions are structurally solidary and coherent, and are all regulated by the same function, by the same finite unity of a total sub ectivity. (his meaning of truth, or of the pretension to truth, is the requirement of an absolute, infinite omnitemporality and universality, *ithout limits of any 0ind. (he idea of truth, that is the 4dea of philosophy

or of science, is an infinite 4dea, an idea in the Iantian sense. 6very totality, every finite structure is inadequate to it. No* the idea or the pro ect *hich animates and unifies every determined historical structure, every :eltanschauung, is finite5' on the basis of the structural description of a vision of the *orld one can account for everything except the infinite opening to truth, that is, philosophy. 7oreover, it is al*ays something li0e an opening *hich *ill frustrate the structuralist pro ect. :hat 4 can never understand, in a structure, is that by means of *hich it is not closed. 4f 1usserl attac0ed #iltheyisme*ith such violence, it is that he found in #iltheyism a seductive attempt, a tempting aberration. #ilthey, in effect, has the merit of protesting against the positivist naturaliBation of the life of the mind. (he act of "understanding" that he opposes to explication and ob ectification must be the first and ma or route to be follo*ed by the sciences of the mind. 1usserl thus pays homage to #ilthey, and sho*s himself quite hospitable5 first, to the idea of a principle of "understanding" or of re-understanding, of "reliving" "Nachleben'notions simultaneously to be uxtaposed *ith the notion of 6infiihlung, borro*ed from )ipps and transformed by 1usserl, and *ith the notion of 2ea0tivierung, *hich is the active reliving of the past intention of an other mind and the rea*a0ening of a production of meaning-in question here is the very possibility of a science of the mind8 second, to the idea that there exist totalitarian structures endo*ed *ith a unity of internal meaning, spiritual organisms in a sense, cultural *orlds all of *hose functions and manifestations are solidary and to *hich :eltanschauungen correspond correlatively8 third, to the distinction bet*een physical structures, in *hich the principle of relationship is external causality, and mental structures, in *hich the principle of relationship is *hat 1usserl *ill call "motivation." /ut this rene*al is not fundamental, and it only intensifies the historicist menace. 1istory does not cease to be an empirical science of "facts" because it has reformed its methods and techniques, or because it has substituted a comprehensive structuralism for causalism, atomism, and naturalism, or because it has become more attentive to cultural totalities. 4ts pretension to founding normativity on a better understood factuality does not become more legitimate, but only

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increases its po*ers of philosophical seduction. - confusion of value and existence, and more generally, of all types of realities and all types of idealities is sheltered beneath the equivocal category of the historical.' (hus, the theory of the :eltanschauung must revert bac0 or be reduced to the strict limits of its o*n domain8 its contours are s0etched by a certain difference bet*een *isdom and 0no*ledge8 and by an ethical indictment and impatience. (his irreducible difference is due to an interminable delaying >differance? of the theoretical foundation. (he exigencies of life demand that a practical response be organiBed on the field of historical existence, and that this response precede an absolute science *hose conclusions it cannot a*ait. (he system of this anticipation, the structure of this interrupted response is *hat 1usserl calls :eltanschauung. =ne might say, *ith some precautions, that he sees in it the situation and meaning of a "provisional morality,"$A *hether it be personal or communal. Ep to no*, *e have been interested in the "structure-genesis" problem *hich first presented itself to 1usserl outside the borders of phenomenology. 4t is the radicaliBation of the presuppositions of psychology and history that made the transition to the phenomenological attitude necessary. )et us no* attempt to catch up *ith the same problem in the field of phenomenology, 0eeping in mind 1usserl's methodological premises, notably the "reduction" in its eidetic and transcendental forms. (ruthfully, *e *ill see that it cannot be a question of the same problem, but only of an analogous or "parallel" problem, as 1usserl *ould say8 and the meaning of this notion of "parallelism," *hich *e *ill touch upon shortly, presents problems that are not among the least difficult. 4f the first phase of the phenomenological description and the "constitutive analyses" "a phase of *hich 4deas is the most elaborated trace' is resolutely static and structural in its design, it seems to be so for at least t*o reasons. "-' 2eacting against the historicist or psychologistic genetism *ith *hich he continues to be at loggerheads, 1usserl systematically excludes every genetic preoccupation." (he protests made against this attitude perhaps have contaminated and indirectly have determined 1usserl's o*n attitude5 everything occurs as if at this point he considered every genesis as associative, causal, factual and *orldly. "/' Concerned above all else *ith formal ontology and *ith ob ectivity

in general, 1usserl applies himself especially to the articulation bet*een the ob ect in general "*hatever its regional appurtenance' and consciousness in general "Er-2egion'. 1e defines the forms of selfevidence in general, and thereby see0s to attain the ultimate critical and phenomenological urisdiction, under *hich the most ambitious genetic description later *ill be subsumed. (hus, if 1usserl distinguishes bet*een empirical and eidetic structure on the one hand, and bet*een empirical and eidetictranscendental structure on the other, at this time he has not yet ta0en the same step as concerns genesis. :ithin the pure transcendentality of consciousness, at this phase of the description, our problem *ould ta0e on at least-since *e must choose-t*o forms. -nd in both cases, it is a question of closure or of opening. $. #iffering from mathematical essences, the essences of pure consciousness are not, and in principle cannot be, exact. (he difference bet*een exactitude and rigor recogniBed by 1usserl is *ell 0no*n. -n eidetic descriptive science, such as phenomenology, may be rigorous, but it is necessarily inexact-4 *ould rather say "anexact" due to no failure on its part. 6xactitude is al*ays a product derived from an operation of "idealiBation" and of "transition to the limit" *hich can only concern an abstract moment, an abstract eidetic element "spatiality, for example' of a thing materially determined as an ob ective body, setting aside, precisely, the other eidetic elements of a body in general. (his is *hy geometry is a "material" and "abstract" science." 4t follo*s that a "geometry of experience," a "mathematics of phenomena" is impossible5 this is an "attempt doomed to miscarry."" (his means in particular, for *hat concerns us here, that the essences of consciousness, and therefore the essences of "phenomena" in general, cannot belong to a structure or "multiplicity" of the mathematical type. No* *hat is it that characteriBes such a multiplicity for 1usserl, and at this time< 4n a *ord, the possibility of closure." 1ere, *e cannot enter into the intramathematical difficulties al*ays raised by this 1usserlian conception of mathematical "definitude," especially *hen confronted by certain later developments of axiomatics and by 9odel's discoveries. :hat 1usserl see0s to underline by means of this comparison bet*een an exact and a morphological science, and *hat *e must retain here, is

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the principled, essential, and structural impossibility of closing a structural phenomenology. 4t is the infinite opening of *hat is experienced, *hich is designated at several moments of 1usserlian analysis by reference to an 4dea in the Iantian sense, that is, the irruption of the infinite into consciousness, *hich permits the unification of the temporal flux of consciousness ust as it unifies the ob ect and the *orld by anticipation, and despite an irreducible incompleteness. 4t is the strange presence of this 4dea *hich also permits every transition to the limit and the pro duction of all exactitude. 3. (ranscendental intentionality is described in 4deas 4 as an original structure, an archi-structure "Er-!tru0tur' *ith four poles and t*o correlations5 the noetico-noematic correlation or structure and the morphehyle correlation or structure. (hat this complex structure is the structure both of intentionality, that is, the structure of the origin of meanings and of the opening to the light of phenomenality, and that the occlusion of this structure is non-sense itself, is indicated by at least t*o signs5 "-' Noesis and noema, the intentional moments of the structure, can be distinguished in that the noema does not belong to consciousness in a real *ay. :ithin consciousness, in general there is an agency *hich does not really belong to it. (his is the difficult but decisive theme of the non-real "reell' inclusion of the noema.,+ Noema, *hich is the ob ectivity of the ob ect, the meaning and the "as such" of the thing for consciousness, is neither the determined thing itself in its untamed existence "*hose appearing the noema precisely is', nor is it a properly sub ective moment, a "really" sub ective moment, since it is indubit ably given as an ob ect for consciousness. 4t is neither of the *orld nor of consciousness, but it is the *orld or something of the *orld for consciousness. #oubtless it can rightfully be laid bare only on the basis of intentional consciousness, but it does not borro* from intentional consciousness *hat metaphorically *e might call, by avoiding the real of consciousness, its "material." (his real nonappurtenance to

must remain an eidetic reduction if one is to 0no* *hat one *ill continue to spea0 about, and if one is to avoid empirical or absolute idealism' may appear deceitful, since it does provide access to a determined region, *hatever its founding privilege. =ne might thin0 that once the nonreality of the noema *as ac0no*ledged, a conversion of the entire phenomenological method *ould have follo*ed, as *ell as an abandonment of transcendental idealism along *ith the 2eduction. /ut *ould this not have been, then, to condemn oneself to silence*hich is al*ays possible, moreover-and in any event to renounce a rigor that only the eidetic-transcendental limitation and a certain regionalism can ensure< 4n any event, the transcendentality of the opening is simultaneously the origin and the undoing, the condition of possibility and a certain impossibility of every structure and of every systematic structuralism. "/' :hile the noema is an intentional and non-real element, the hyle is a real but not intentional element of the experienced. 4t is the sensate "experienced and not real' material of affect before any animation by intentional form. 4t is the pole of pure passivity, of the nonintentionality *ithout *hich consciousness could not receive anything other than itself, nor exercise its intentional activity. (his receptiveness is also an essential opening. 4f, on the level at *hich 4deas remains, 1usserl renounces the description and interrogation of the hyle for itself and in its pure ingenuity, if he renounces the examination of the possibilities entitled formless materials and immaterial forms, $& if he 0eeps to the constituted hyle-morphic correlation, it is that his analyses are still developed "and *ill they not al*ays be so, in a certain *ay<' from *ithin a constituted temporality." No*, at its greatest depth and in its pure specificity the hyle is primarily temporal matter. 4t is the possibility of genesis itself (hus at these t*o poles of opening and from *ithin the very transcendental structure of all consciousness there *ould arise the necessity for the transition to a genetic constitution and for the ne* "transcendental aesthetic" *hich *ill be announced unceasingly but *ill be deferred al*ays, and *ithin *hich the themes of the other and of (ime *ere to have permitted their irreducible complicity to appear. 4t is that the constitution of the other and of time refers phenomenology to a Bone in *hich its "principle of principles" "as *e see it, its metaphysical principle5 the original self-evidence and presence of the thing itself in person' is radically put into question.

any region at all, even to the archi-region, this anarchy of the noema is the root and very possibility of ob ectivity and of meaning. (his irregionality of the noema, the opening to the "as such" of /eing and to the determination of the totality of regions in general, cannot be described, stricto sensu and simply, on the basis of a determined regional structure. (his is *hy the transcendental reduction "to the extent that it

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4n any event, as can be seen, the necessity of this transition from the structural to the genetic is nothing less than the necessity of a brea0 or a conversion. /efore follo*ing this movement interior to phenomenology and the transition to the genetic analyses, let us pause for a moment at a second border problem. -ll the problematical schemas *hich *e have ust indicated belong to the transcendental sphere. /ut might not a psychology rene*ed by the double influence of phenomenology and 9estalt psychology, $G one *hich maintains its distance from associationism, atomism, causalism, etc., alone pretend to assume such a description and such problematical schemas< 4n a *ord, can a structuralist psychology, one allegedly independent from transcendental phenomenology if not from phenomenological psychology, ma0e itself invulnerable to the reproach of psychologism formerly directed against classical psychology< 4t *as all the more tempting to thin0 so in that 1usserl himself prescribed the establishment of a phenomenological psychology, an "apriorical" psychology, to be sure, but also a *orldly one "in that it cannot exclude the position of the *orldly thing that the psyche is', and strictly parallel to transcendental phenomenology. No* the overcoming of the invisible difference *hich separates parallel things is not innocent5 it is the most subtle and ambitious gesture of psychologistic abuse. -nd this is the principle of the critiques *hich 1usserl addresses to the psychologies

(he profound unity of this genetic description is diffracted, *ithout being dispersed, along three lines. "-' (he logical route. (he tas0 of 6rfahrung and Erteil, @ormaler and (ransBendentaler )ogi0, and numerous analogous texts is to undo, to "reduce" not only the superstructures of scientific idealiBations and the values of ob ective exactitude, but also all predicative sedimentation belonging to the cultural layer of sub ectiverelative truths in the )ebens*elt. (his in order to regrasp and "reactivate" the emergence of theoretical or practical predication in general, and on the basis of the most untamed precultural life. "/' (he egological route. 4n a sense this route is already latent beneath the preceding one. @irst, because in the most general fashion, phenomenology cannot and may not ever describe anything but the intentional modifications of the eidos ego in general." Next, because the genealogy of logic 0ept to the realm of cogitata and the acts of the ego as if to its proper existence and life8 and these *ere read only on the basis of noematic signs and results, No* ho*ever, as stated in the Cartesian 7editations, it is a question of returning once more to the couple cogitocogitatum, if you *ill, in order to reapprehend the genesis of the ego itself, the ego existing for itself and "continuously constituting >itself? as existing."" -side from the delicate problems of passivity and activity, this genetic description of the ego *ill encounter limits *hich *e *ould be tempted to call definitive, but *hich 1usserl, of course, considers provisional. (hey derive from the fact, he says, that phenomenology is only at its beginnings." 4n effect the genetic description of the ego at every instant prescribes the formidable tas0 of a universal genetic phenomenology. (his is announced in the third route. "C' (he historico-teleological route5 "...a teleological reason >runs?

mentioned explicitly." (o avoid "naturalism" it does not suffice to escape atomism. -nd in order to clarify the distance *hich must separate a phenomenological psychology from a transcendental phenomen ology, one *ould have to examine the nothing *hich prevents them from coming together, the parallelism *hich liberates the space ofa transcendental question. (his nothing is *hat permits the transcendental to*ard this nothing in *hich the totality of meaning and the meaning of totality permit their origin to appear. (hat is, according to @in0s expression, the origin of the *orld. 4f *e had the time and the means, *e *ould no* have to approach the developed after 4deas. 4 *ill simply note the follo*ing points.

throughout all historicity"3; and particularly "the unity of the history of the ego."" (his third route, *hich is to provide access to the eidos of historicity in general "that is, to its telos, for the eidos of a historicity, and thus of the movement of meaning-*hich is a necessarily rational movement-can be only a norm, a value more essence' cannot be a route among others. (he eidetics of history cannot be an eidetics among others5 it embraces the totality of beings. 4n effect the irruption of the logos, the accession to human consciousness of the idea of an infinite tas0 of reason, does not occur only through a series of revolutions *hich at the same time *ould be

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self-conversions, seeming to tear open a previous finitude in order to lay bare the po*er of a hidden infinity and to give voice to the dynamis of a silence. (hese ruptures, *hich at the same time are unveilings, "and also coverings up, for the origin dissimulates itself immediately beneath the ne* domain of uncovered or produced ob ectivity' are al*ays already indicated, 1usserl recogniBes, "in confusion and in the dar0," that is, not only in the most elementary forms of life and human history, but closer and closer in animality and nature in general. 1o* can such an affirmation, made necessary by and in phenomenology itself, be totally certain *ithin phenomenology< @or it does not only concern phenomena that are experienced and self-evident. #oes its inability to be indicated rigorously any*here else than in a phenomenology prevent it from alreadyor still-being a metaphysical assertion, the affirmation of a metaphysics *hich articulates itself in a phenomenological discourse< 4 am satisfied only to raise these questions here. 2eason, thus, unveils itself. 2eason, 1usserl says, is the logos *hich is produced in history. 4t traverses /eing *ith itself in sight, in sight of appearing to itself, that is, to state itself and hear itself as logos. 4t is speech as auto-affection5 hearing oneself spea0.3+lt emerges from itself in order to ta0e hold of itself *ithin itself, in the "living present" of its self-presence. 4n emerging from itself, hearing oneself spea0 constitutes itself as the history of reason through the detour of *riting. (hus it differs from itself in order to reappropriate itself. (he =rigin of 9eometry describes the necessity of this exposition of reason in a *orldly inscription. -n exposition indispensable to the constitution of truth and the ideality of ob ects, but *hich is also the danger to meaning from *hat is outside the sign. 4n the moment of *riting, the sign can al*ays "empty" itself, ta0e flight from a*a0ening, from "reactivation," and may remain forever closed and mute. -s for Cournot, *riting here is the "critical

foreign empiricity into *hich both its metaphysical transcendence and the actuality of its infinite essence *ould descend and condescend. )ogos is nothing outside history and /eing, since it is discourse, infinite discursiveness and not an actual infinity, and since it is meaning. No*, the irreality of meaning *as discovered by phenomenology as one of its very o*n premises. 4nversely, no history as self-tradition and no /eing could have meaning *ithout the logos *hich is the meaning *hich pro ects and proffers itself. #espite all these classical notions, phenomenology does not abdicate itself for the benefit of a classical metaphysical speculation *hich on the contrary, according to 1usserl, *ould have to recogniBe in phenomenology the clarified energy of its o*n intentions. :hich amounts to saying that in criticiBing classical metaphysics, phenomenology accomplishes the most profound pro ect of metaphysics. 1usserl ac0no*ledges or rather claims this himself, particularly in the Cartesian 7editations. (he results of phenomenology are "metaphysical, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. =n the other hand, *hat *e have here is anything but metaphysics, in the

epoch." 1ere, one must become quite attentive to the fact that this lansonant phrases of 1egel's seemed to be for 1usserl, correctly o ncorrectly. @or this logos *hich calls to itself and summons itself by itself as telos, and *hose dynamis tends to*ard its energeia or entelechiathis logos does not occur in history and does not traverse /eing as a

customary sense *ith *hich metaphysics, as 'first philosophy,' *as instituted originally."3& "Phenomenology indeed excludes every naive metaphysics... but does not exclude metaphysics as such."" @or *ithin the most universal eidos of mental historicity, the conversion of philosophy into phenomenology *ould be the final degree of differentiation "stage, that is, !tufe, structural level or genetic stage'." (he t*o previous degrees *ould be, first, that of a pretheoretical culture, and next, that of the theoretical or philosophical pro ect "the 9reco6uropean moment'." (he presence of (elos or Corhaben-the infinite theoretical anticipation *hich simultaneously is given as an infinite practical tas0-for phenomenological consciousness is indicated every time that 1usserl spea0s of the 4dea in the Iantian sense. (he latter is offered *ithin phenomenological selfevidence as evidence of an essential overflo*ing of actual and adequate self-evidence. =ne *ould have to examine quite closely the intervention of the 4dea in the Iantian sense at various points along 1usserl's itinerary. Perhaps it *ould appear then that this 4dea is the 4dea or very pro ect of phenomenology, that *hich ma0es it possible by overflo*ing its system of self-evidences or factual

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GENESIS AND STRUCTURE

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determinations, or by overflo*ing this system as phenomenology's source or end. !ince (elos is totally open, is opening itself, to say that it is the most po*erful structural a priori of historicity is not to designate it as a static and determined value *hich *ould inform and enclose the genesis of /eing and meaning. 4t is the concrete possibility, the very birth of history and the meaning of becoming in general. (herefore it is structurally genesis itself, as origin and as becoming. -ll these formulations have been possible than0s to the initial distinction bet*een different irreducible types of genesis and structure5 *orldly genesis and transcendental genesis, empirical structure, eidetic structure, and transcendental structure. (o as0 oneself the follo*ing historico-semantic question5 ":hat does the notion of genesis in general, on *hose basis the 1usserlian diffraction could come forth and be understood, mean, and *hat has it al*ays meant< :hat does the notion of structure in general, on *hose basis 1usserl operates and operates distinctions bet*een empirical, eidetic, and transcendental dimensions mean, and *hat has it al*ays meant throughout its displacements< -nd *hat is the historico-semantic relationship bet*een genesis and structure in general<" is not only simply to as0 a prior linguistic question. 4t is to as0 the question about the unity of the historical ground on *hose basis a transcendental reduction is possible and is motivated by itself. 4t is to as0 the question about the unity of the *orld from *hich transcendental freedom releases itself, in order to ma0e the origin of this unity appear. 4f 1usserl has not as0ed these questions in terms of his

*as tempted to call "eternal" "*hich in his thought, in any event, means neither infinite nor ahistorical, quite the contrary' is called upon to as0 itself about everything, and particularly about the possibility of the unformed and na0ed factuality of the nonmeaning, in the case at hand, for example, of its o*n death.

torical philology, if he did not first as0 himself about the meaning of his operative instruments in general, it is not due to naivete, dogmatic precipitation, or a neglect of the historical *eight of language. 4t is rather because to as0 oneself about the meaning of the notions of structure or genesis in general, before the dissociations introduced by, reduction, is to interrogate that *hich precedes the transcendental reduction. No* the latter is but the free act of the question, *hich frees, itself from from the totality of *hat precedes it in order to be able to access to this totality, particularly to its historicity and its past. (h question of the possibility of the transcendental reduction cannot expect an ans*er. 4t is the question of the possibility of the question, opening itself, the gap on *hose basis the transcendental 4, *hich 1ussei.

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6
LA &AROLE SOUFFLEE
:hen 4 *rite there is nothing other than *hat 4 *rite. :hatever else 4 felt 4 have not been able to say, and *hatever else has escaped me are ideas or a stolen verb *hich 4 *ill destroy, to replace them *ith something else. "-rtaud, 2odeB, -pril $%.&' ... *hatever *ay you turn you have not even started thin0ing. "-rtaud, :ollected "orks (, p. G%' Naivete of the discourse *e begin here, spea0ing to*ard -ntonin -rtaud. (o diminish this naivete *e *ould have had to *ait a long time5 in truth, a dialogue *ould have to have been opened bet*een

madness and the *or0,' driving, primarily, at their enigmatic con unction. @or a thousand not simply material reasons, *e cannot evince, here, the questions that these essays seem to leave unresolved, even though *e ac0no*ledge the priority due these questions. :e feel that even if, in the best of cases, the common ground of the t*o discourses-the medical commentary and the other one-has been designated from afar, in fact the t*o have never been confused in any text. "-nd is this so because *e are concerned, first of all, *ith commentary< )et us thro* out these questions in order to see, further on, *here -rtaud necessarily ma0es them land.' :e have said in fact. #escribing the "extraordinarily rapid oscillations" *hich in >)aplanche's? 1olderlin et 4n question du pere produce the illusion of unity, "permitting, in both senses, the imperceptible transfer of analogical figures," and the crossing of the "domain included bet*eeen poetic forms and psychological structures," 7ichel @oucault concludes that a principled and essential con unction of the t*o is impossible. @ar from brushing aside this impossibility, he posits that it proceeds from a 0ind of infinite closeness5 "#espite the fact that these t*o discourses have a demonstrably identical content *hich can al*ays be transferred from one to the other, they are profoundly incompatible. - con oined deciphering of poetic and psychological structures *ill never reduce the distance bet*een them. -nd yet, they are al*ays infinitely close to one another, ust as is close to something possible the possibility that founds it8 the continuity of meaning bet*een the *or0 and madness is possible only on the basis of the enigma of the some *hich permits the absoluteness of the rupture bet*een them to appear." /ut @oucault adds a little further on5 "-nd this is not an abstract figuration but a historical relationship in *hich our culture must question itself"' Could not the fully historical field of this interrogation, in *hich the overlapping of the t*o discourses is as much to be constituted as it is to be restored, sho* us ho* something that is impossible de facto

let us say as quic0ly as possible--critical discourse and clinical discourse. -nd the dialogue *ould have to have borne upon that *hich is beyond their t*o tra ectories, pointing to*ard the common elements of their origin and their horiBon. 1appily for us, this horiBon and this origin8' 7ichel @oucault, and Dean )aplanche have questioned the problematic passing of a discourse *hich, *ithout doubling itself, *ithout even distributing itself "along the division bet*een the critical and the clinical', but *ith a single and simple characteristic spea0s of

could present itself as impossible de ute< 4t *ould still be necessary to conceive historicity, and the difference bet*een the t*o impossi bilities, in an unexpected *ay, and this initial tas0 is not the easiest. (his historicity, long since eliminated from thought, cannot be more thoroughly erased than at the moment *hen commentary, that is,

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precisely, the "deciphering of structures," has commenced its reign and determined the position of the question. (his moment is even more absent from our memory in that it is not *ithin history. :e feel, indeed, that if clinical commentary and critical commentary every*here demand their o*n autonomy and *ish to be ac0no*ledged and respected by one another, they are no less complicit-by virtue of a unity *hich refers, through as yet unconceived mediations, to the mediation *e sought an instant ago-in the same abstraction, the same misinterpretation and the same violence. -t the moment *hen criticism "be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, etc.' allegedly protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a *or0 against psychomedical reductions, it comes to the same result >that a reduction *ould come to? through the opposite path5 it creates an example. (hat is to say, a case. - *or0 or an adventure of thought is made to bear *itness, as example or martyr, to a structure *hose essential permanence becomes the prime preoccupation of the commentary. @or criticism to ma0e a case of meaning or of value, to ta0e them seriously, is to read an essence into the example *hich is falling bet*een the phenomenological brac0ets. -nd this happens according to the most irrepressible movement of even the commentary *hich most respects the untamed singularity of its theme. -lthough they are radically opposed for good reasons that are *ell 0no*n, the psychological reduction and the eidetic reduction function in the same *ay *hen confronted *ith the problem of the *or0 or of madness, and un*ittingly pursue the same end. -ssuming that psychopathology, *hatever its style, could attain in its reading the sure profundity of a /lanchot, *hatever mastery it could gain of the case of -rtaud *ould result in the same neutraliBation of "poor 7. -ntonin -rtaud." :hose entire adventure, in )e livre d venir, becomes exemplary 4n question is a reading-an admirable one, moreover-of the "unpo*er" "-rtaud spea0ing of himself' "essential to thought" "/lanchot'. "4t is as if, despite himself and through a pathetic error from *hence come his cries, he touched upon the point at *hich to

relations bet*een truth, error, and history.' "(hat poetry is lin0ed to this impossibility of thought *hich is thought itself, is the truth that cannot be revealed, for it al*ays turns a*ay, thereby obliging him to experience it belo* the point at *hich he *ould truly experience it."+ -rtaud's pathetic error5 the *eight of example and existence *hich 0eeps him remote from the truth he hopelessly indicates5 the nothingness at the heart of the *ord, the "lac0 of being," the "scandal of thought separated from life," etc. (hat *hich belongs to -rtaud *ithout recourse-his experience itself-can *ithout harm be abandoned by the critic and left to the psychologists or doctors. /ut "for our sa0e, *e must not ma0e the mista0e of reading the precise, sure, and scrupulous descriptions he gives us of this state as psychological analyses." (hat *hich no longer belongs to -rtaud, as soon as *e can read it through him, and thereby articulate, repeat, and ta0e charge of it, that to *hich -rtaud is only a *itness, is a universal essence of thought. -rtaud's entire adventure is purportedly only the index of a transcendental structure5 "@or never *ill -rtaud accept the scandal of thought separated from life, even *hen he is given over to the most direct and untamed experience ever undergone of the essence of thought understood as separation, the experience of thought's inability to affirm anything opposed to itself as the limit of its infinite po*er."' (hought separated from life-this is, as is *ell 0no*n, one of the great figurations of the mind of *hich 1egel gave several examples.' -rtaud, thus, *ould be another. -nd /lanchot's meditation stops there5 *ithout questioning for themselves either that *hich irreducibly amounts to -rtaud, or the idiosyncratic affirmation' *hich supports the nonacceptance of this scandal, or *hat is "untamed" in this experience. 1is meditation stops there or almost5 it gives itself ust the time to invo0e a temptation *hich *ould have to be avoided but *hich, in fact, never has been5 "4t *ould be tempting to uxtapose *hat -rtaud tells us *ith *hat 1olderlin and 7allarme tell us5 that inspiration is primarily the pure point at *hich it is missing. /ut *e must resist the temptation to ma0e overgeneraliBed affirmations. 6ach poet says the same, *hich, ho*ever, is not the same, is the unique, *e feel. :hat is -rtaud's is his alone. :hat he says has an intensity that *e should not bear" -nd in the concluding lines that follo* nothing is said of the unique. :e return to

thin0 is al*ays already to be able to thin0 no more5 'unpo*er,' as he calls it, *hich is as if essential to thought."' (he pathetic error is that part of the example *hich belongs to -rtaud himself5 it *ill not be retained in the decoding of the essential truth. (he error is -rtaud's history, his erased trace on the *ay to truth. - pre-1egelian concept of the

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essentiality5 ":hen *e read these pages, *e learn *hat *e cannot ever come to learn5 that the fact of thin0ing can only be over*helming8 that *hat is to be thought is that *hich turns a*ay from thought *ithin thought, inexhaustibly exhausting itself *ithin thought8 that to suffer and to thin0 are lin0ed in a secret *ay."% :hy this return to essentiality< /ecause, by definition, there is nothing to say about the unique< :e *ill not rush to*ard this too solid commonplace here. /lanchot must have been even more tempted to assimilate -rtaud and 1olderlin in that his text devoted to the latter, )a folie par excellence,$A is advanced *ithin the same frame*or0. :hile asserting the necessity of escaping the alternative of the t*o discourses ""for the mystery stems also from this simultaneously double reading of an event *hich, ho*ever, is no more situated in one than in the other of the t*o versions," and primarily because this event is a demonic one *hich "0eeps itself outside the opposition sic0ness-health"', /lanchot narro*s the field of medical 0no*ledge *hich misses the singularity of the event and masters every surprise in advance. "@or medical 0no*ledge, this event is in 'the rules,' or at least is not surprising8 it corresponds to *hat is 0no*n about patients inspired to *rite by nightmare" "p. $+'. (his reduction of the clinical reduction is an essentialist reduction. :hile protesting, here too, against "over-generaliBed ... formulations," /lanchot *rites5 "=ne cannot be content *ith vie*ing 1olderlin's fate as that of an admirable or sublime individuality *hich, having too strongly desired something great, had to go to the brea0ing point. 1is fate belongs only to him, but he himself belongs to *hat he has expressed and discovered, *hich exists not as his alone, but as the truth and affirmation of the essence of poetry ... 1e does not decide upon his fate but upon the fate of poetry, the meaning of the truth that he has set out to achieve.... and this movement is not his alone but the very achievement of truth, *hich, despite him, at a certain point demands that his personal reason become the pure impersonal tran scendence from *hich there is no return" "p. 3&'. (hus the unique is hailed in vain8 it is indeed the very element *hich disappears from this commentary. -nd not by chance. (he disappearance of unicity is even presented as the meaning of the truth of 1olderlin5 "-uthentic speech, the speech that mediates because the mediator disappears *ithin it, puts an end to its particularities and returns to the element from

*hence it came" "p. ;A'. -nd thus, *hat authoriBes one to say "the poet" instead of 1olderlin, *hat authoriBes this dissolution of the unique is a conception of the unity or unicity of the unique-here the unity of madness and the *or0-as con unction, composition or "combination"5 "- li0e combination is not encountered t*ice" "p. 3A'. Dean )aplanche reproaches /lanchot for his "idealist interpretation," "resolutely anti-'scientific' and anti-'psychological' " and proposes to substitute another type of unitary theory for the theory of 1ellingrath, *hich /lanchot, despite his o*n differences, also leans to*ard." Not *anting to renounce unitarism, )aplanche *ants "to include *ithin a single movement his >1olderlin's? *or0, and his evolution to*ard and *ithin madness, even if this movement has the scansion of a dialectic and the multilinearity of counterpoint" "p. $;'. 4n fact, one very quic0ly realiBes that this "dialectic" scansion and this multilinearity do nothing but, as @oucault correctly says, increase the rapidity of oscillations, until the rapidity is difficult to perceive. -t the end of the boo0, *e are still out of breath searching for the unique, *hich itself, as such, eludes discourse and al*ays *ill elude it5 "(he assimilation of the evolution of schiBophrenia to the evolution of the *or0 that *e are proposing leads to results *hich absolutely cannot be generaliBed5 in question is the relationship of poetry to mental illness *ithin a particular, perhaps unique, case" "p. $;3'. -gain, a con oined and chance unicity. @or, once one has from afar even mentioned it as such, one returns to the expressly criticiBed exemplarism'3 of /lanchot. (he psychological style and, opposed to it, the structuralist or essentialist style have almost totally disappeared, certainly, and the philosophical gesture is seductive5 it is no longer a question of understanding the poet 1olderlin on the basis of a schiBophrenic or a transcendental structure *hose meaning *ould be 0no*n to us, and *hich *ould hold in store no surprises. =n the contrary, in 1olderlin *e must read, and see designated, an access, the best one perhaps, an exemplary access to the essence of schiBophrenia in general. -nd this essence of schiBophrenia is not a psychological or anthropological fact available to the determined sciences called psychology or anthropology5 "4t is he >1olderlin? *ho reopens the question of schiBophrenia as a universal problem" "p.$;;'. - universal and not only human problem, not a primarily human problem because a true anthropology could be

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constituted upon the possibility of schiBophrenia-*hich does not mean that the possibility of schiBophrenia can in fact be encountered in beings other than man. !chiBophrenia simply is not one among other attributes of an essence of man that *ould have to be constituted and ac0no*ledged as the prerequisite basis of the study of man. Dust as "in certain societies, the accession to )a*, to the !ymbolic has fallen to institutions other than that of the father" "p. $;;'-*hose precomprehension the institution of paternity thus permits-similarly, analogically, schiBophrenia is not one among other dimensions or possibilities of the existent called man, but indeed the structure that opens the truth of man. (his opening is produced in an exemplary *ay in the case of 1olderlin. 4t could be thought that, by definition, the unique cannot be an example or case of a universal figure. /ut it can. 6xemplarity only apparently contradicts unicity. (he equivocality lodged in the notion of example is *ell 0no*n5 it is the resource of the complicity bet*een clinical discourse and critical discourse, the complicity bet*een the discourse *hich reduces meaning or value and the one that attempts to restore them. (his is *hat permits @oucault to conclude for his purposes5 "1olderlin occupies a unique and exemplary place" "p. 3A%'. !uch is the case that has been made of 1olderlin and -rtaud. =ur intention is above all not to refute or to criticiBe the principle of these readings. (hey are legitimate, fruitful, true8 here, moreover, they are admirably executed, and informed by a critical vigilance *hich ma0es us ma0e immense progress. 4f, on the other hand, *e seem unsure of the treatment reserved for the unique, it is not because *e thin0, and this credit *ill have to be granted us, that sub ective existence, the originality of the *or0 or the singularity of the beautiful, must be protected against the violence of the concept by means of moral or aesthetic precautions. No, inversely, *hen *e appear to regret a silence or defeat before the unique, it is because *e believe in the necessity of reducing the unique, of analyBing it and decomposing it by shattering it even further. /etter5 *e believe that no commentary can escape these defeats, unless it destroys itself as commentary by exhuming the unity in *hich is embedded the differences "of madness and the *or0, of the psyche and the text, of example and essence, etc.' *hich implicitly support both criticism and the clinic. (his ground, *hich *e are approaching only by the negative route here, is historical in a sense

*hich, it seems to us, has never been given thematic value in the commentaries of *hich *e have ust spo0en, and *hich truthfully can hardly be tolerated by the metaphysical concept of history. (he tumultuous presence of this archaic ground *ill thus magnetiBe the discourse *hich *ill be attracted into the resonance of the cries of -nton in -rtaud. :ill be attracted from afar, again, for our initial stipulation of naivete *as not a stipulation of style. -nd if *e say, to begin, that -rtaud teaches us this unity prior to dissociation, *e do not say so in order to construe -rtaud as an example of *hat he teaches. 4f *e understand him, *e expect no instruction from him. -lso, the preceding considerations are in no *ay methodological prologomena or generaliBations announcing a ne* treatment of the case of -rtaud. 2ather, they indicate the very question that -rtaud *ants to destroy from its root, the question *hose derivativeness, if not impossibility, he indefatigably denounced, upon *hich his cries furiously and unceasingly hurled themselves. @or *hat his ho*ls promise us, articulating themselves under the headings of existence, flesh, life, theater, cruelty is the meaning of an art prior to madness and the *or0, an art *hich no longer yields *or0s, an artist's existence *hich is no longer a route or an experience that gives access to something other than itself8 -rtaud promises the existence of a speech that is a body, of a body that is a theater, of a theater that is a text because it is no longer enslaved to a *riting more ancient than itself, an ur-text or an ur-speech. 4f -rtaud absolutely resists-and, *e believe, as *as never done before-clinical or critical exegeses, he does so by virtue of that part of his adventure "and *ith this *ord *e are designating a totality anterior to the separation of the life and the *or0' *hich is the very protest itself against exemplification itself. (he critic and the doctor are *ithout resource *hen confronted by an existence that refuses to signify, or by an art *ithout *or0s, a language *ithout a trace. (hat is to say, *ithout difference. 4n pursuit of a manifestation *hich *ould not be an expression but a pure creation of life, *hich *ould not fall far from the body then to decline into a sign or a *or0, an ob ect, -rtaud attempted to destroy a history, the history of the dualist metaphysics *hich more or less subterraneously inspired the essays invo0ed above5 the duality of the body and the soul *hich supports, secretly of

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course, the duality of speech and existence, of the text and the body, etc. (he metaphysics of the commentary *hich authoriBed "commentaries" because it already governed the *or0s commented upon. Nontheatrical *or0s, in the sense understood by -rtaud, *or0s that are already deported commentaries. /eating his flesh in order to rea*a0en it at the eve prior to the deportation, -rtaud attempted to forbid that his speech be spirited a*ay >souffle?" from his body. !pirited >soufe?5 let us understand stolen by a possible commentator *ho *ould ac0no*ledge speech in order to place it in an order, an order of essential truth or of a real structure, psychological or other. (he first commentator, here, is the reader or the listener, the receiver *hich the "public" must no longer be in the theater of cruelty." -rtaud 0ne* that all speech fallen from the body, offering itself to understanding or reception, offering itself as a spectacle, immediately becomes stolen speech. /ecomes a signification *hich 4 do not possess because it is a signification. (heft is al*ays the theft of speech or text, of a trace. (he theft of a possession does not become a theft unless the thing stolen is a possession, unless it has acquired meaning and value through, at least, the consecration of a vo* made in discourse. -nd this proposition could only foolishly be interpreted as the dismissal of every other theory of theft advanced *ithin the order of morals, eco nomics, or politics. @or this proposition is anterior to such discourses, because it explicitly, and *ithin a single question, establishes com munication bet*een the essence of theft and the origin of discourse in general. No* every discourse on theft, each time that it is determined by a given set of circumstances, has already obscurely resolved or repressed this question, has already reassured itself into the familiarity of an initial 0no*ledge5 everyone 0no*s *hat theft means. /ut the theft of speech is not a theft among others8 it is confused *ith the very possibility of theft, defining the fundamental structure of theft. -nd if -rtaud ma0es us thin0 this, it is no longer as the example of a structure, because in question is the very thing-theft-*hich constitutes the structure of the example as such. !pirited >!ouffle?5 at the same time let us understand inspired by an other voice that itself reads a text older than the text of my body or than the theater of my gestures. 4nspiration is the drama, *ith several characters, of theft, the structure of the classical theater in *hich the invisibility of

the prompter >souffleur? ensures the indispensable diflerance and intermittence bet*een a text already *ritten by another hand and an interpreter already dispossessed of that *hich he receives. -rtaud desired the conflagration of the stage upon *hich the prompter >souffleur? *as possible and *here the body *as under the rule of a foreign text. -rtaud *anted the machinery of the prompter >souffleur? spirited a*ay >souflle?, *anted to plunder the structure of theft. (o do so, he had to destroy, *ith one and the same blo*, both poetic inspiration and the economy of classical art, singularly the economy of the theater. -nd through the same blo* he had to destroy the metaphysics, religion, aesthetics, etc., that supported them. 1e *ould thus open up to #anger a *orld no longer sheltered by the structure of theft. (o restore #anger by rea*a0ening the stage of crueltythis *as -ntonin -rtaud's stated intention, at very least. 4t is this intention that *e *ill follo* here, *ith the exception of a calculated slip. Enpo*er, *hich appears thematically in the letters to Dacques 2iviere,$+ is not, as is 0no*n, simple impotence, the sterility of having "nothing to say, or the lac0 of inspiration. =n the contrary, it is inspiration itself5 the force of a void, the cyclonic breath >souffle? of a prompter >souffleur? *ho dra*s his breath in, and thereby robs me of that *hich he first allo*ed to approach me and *hich 4 believed 4 could say in my o*n name. (he generosity of inspiration, the positive irruption of a speech *hich comes from 4 0no* not *here, or about *hich 4 0no* "if 4 am -ntonin -rtaud' that 4 do not 0no* *here it comes from or *ho spea0s it, the fecundity of the other breath >souffle? is unpo*er5 not the absence but the radical irresponsibility of speech, irresponsibility as the po*er and the origin of speech. 4 am in relation to myself *ithin the ether of a speech *hich is al*ays spirited a*ay >souffle? from me, and *hich steals from me the very thing that it puts me in relation to. Consciousness of speech, that is to say, consciousness in general is not 0no*ing *ho spea0s at the moment *hen, and in the place *here, 4 proffer my speech. (his consciousness is thus also an unconsciousness ""4n my unconsciousness it is others *hom 4 hear," $%.&', in opposition to *hich another consciousness *ill necessarily have to be reconstituted8 and this time, consciousness *ill be cruelly present to itself and *ill hear itself spea0. 4t is *ithin the province of neither morals, nor logic, nor aesthetics to define this irresponsibility5

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it is a total and original loss of existence itself. -ccording to -rtaud it also, and primarily, occurs in my /ody, in my )ife-expressions *hose sense must be understood beyond any metaphysical determinations and beyond the "limitations of being" *hich separated body from soul, speech from gesture, etc. )oss, precisely, is the metaphysical determination into *hich 4 *ill have to slip my *or0s if they are to be understood *ithin a *orld and a literature un*ittingly governed by the metaphysics for *hich Dacques 2iviere served as delegate. "1ere, too, 4 fear a misunderstanding. 4 *ould li0e you to realiBe that it is not a matter of the higher or lo*er existence involved in *hat is 0no*n as inspiration, but of a total absence, of a veritable d*indling a*ay" "-rtaud -nthology, >!an @rancisco, 1965; hereafter --?, p. 8). -rtaud ceaselessly repeated this5 the origin and urgency of speech, that *hich impelled him into expression, *as confused *ith his o*n lac0 of speech, *ith "having nothing to say" in his o*n name. "(he dispersiveness of my poems, their formal defects, the constant sagging of my thin0ing, are to be attributed not to lac0 of practice, of mastery of the instrument 4 *ield, of intellectual development, but to a central collapse of the mind, to a 0ind of erosion, both essential and fleeting, of my thin0ing, to the passing nonpossession of the material gains of my development, to the abnormal separation of the elements of thought .. (here is thus something that is destroying my thin0ing, a something *hich does not prevent me from being *hat 4 might be, but *hich leaves me, if 4 may say so, in abeyance. - something furtive *hich ta0es a*ay from me the *ords *hich 4 have found" "--, pp. $A-$$8 -rtaud's italics'. 4t *ould be tempting, easy, and, to a certain extent, legitimate to underline the exemplarity of this description. (he "essential" and "fleeting" erosion, "both essential and fleeting," is produced by the "something furtive *hich ta0es a*ay from me the *ords *hich 4 have found." (he furtive is fleeting, but it is more than fleeting. @urtivenessin )atin-is the manner of the thief, *ho must act very quic0ly in order to steal from me the *ords *hich 4 have found. Cery quic0ly, because he must invisibly slip into the nothing that separates me from my *ords, and must purloin them before 4 have even found them, so

al*ays empties out speech as it eludes itself !po0en language has erased the reference to theft from the *ord "furtive," the subtle subterfuge *hich ma0es signification slip-and this is the theft of theft, the furtiveness that eludes itself through a necessary gesture-to*ard an invisible and silent contact *ith the fugitive, the fleeting and the fleeing. -rtaud neither ignores nor emphasiBes the proper sense of the *ord, but stays *ithin the movement of erasure5 in Nerve-!cales, apropos of "*asting," "loss," "traps in our thought" he spea0s, *ithout being simply redundant, of "stealthy abductions" "rapes furtifs' "Collected :or0s >)ondon, 1971; hereafter C:?, 1:70-71). -s soon as 4 spea0, the *ords 4 have found "as soon as they are *ords' no longer belong to me, are originally repeated "-rtaud desires a theater in *hich repetition$& is impossible. C6 (he (heater and its #ouble >Ne* For0, 1958; hereafter (#?, p. 82). I must first hear myself 4n soliloquy as in dialogue, to spea0 is to hear oneself -s soon as 4 am heard, as soon as 4 hear myself, the 4 *ho hears itself *ho hears me, becomes the 4 *ho spea0s and ta0es speech from the 4 *ho thin0s that he spea0s and is heard in his o*n name8 and becomes the 4 *ho ta0es speech *ithout ever cutting off the 4 *ho thin0s that he spea0s. 4nsinuating itself into the name of the person *ho spea0s, this difference is nothing, is furtiveness itself5 it is the structure of instantaneous and original elusion *ithout *hich no speech could ever catch its breath >souffle?. 6lusion is produced as the original enigma, that is to say, as the speech or history "ainos' *hich hides its origin and meaning8 it never says *here it is going, nor *here it is coming from, primarily because it does not 0no* *here it is coming from or going to, and because this not 0no*ing, to *it, the absence of its o*n sub ect, is not subsequent to

this enigma but, rather, constitutes it. 6lusion is the initial unity of that stand elusion as rapt or as rape exclusively or fundamentally is *ithin the province of a psychology, an anthropology, or a metaphysics of sub ectivity "consciousness, unconsciousness, or the individual body'. No doubt that this metaphysics is po*erfully at *or0 in -rtaud's thought. 1enceforth, *hat is called the spea0ing sub ect is no longer the person himself, or the person alone, *ho spea0s. (he spea0ing sub ect discovers his irreducible secondarity, his origin that is al*ays already

divested of them. @urtiveness is thus the quality of dispossession *hich

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eluded8 for the origin is al*ays already eluded on the basis of an organiBed field of speech in *hich the spea0ing sub ect vainly see0s a place that is al*ays missing. (his organiBed field is not uniquely a field that could be described by certain theories of the psyche or of linguistic fact. 4t is first-but *ithout meaning anything else-the cultural field from *hich 4 must dra* my *ords and my syntax, the historical field *hich 4 must read by *riting on it. (he structure of theft already lodges "itself in' the relation of speech to language. !peech is stolen5 since it is stolen from language it is, thus, stolen from itself, that is, from the thief *ho has al*ays already lost speech as property and initiative. /ecause its forethought cannot be predicted, the act of reading perforates the act of spea0ing or *riting. -nd through this perforation, this hole, 4 escape myself. (he form of the hole-*hich mobiliBes the discourse of a certain existentialism and a certain psychoanalysis for *hich "poor 7. -ntonin -rtaud" provides examples-communicates *ith a scatotheological thematic in -rtaud's *or0s *hich *e *ill examine later. (hat speech and *riting are al*ays unavo*ably ta0en from a reading is the form of the original theft, the most archaic elusion, *hich simultaneously hides me and purloins my po*ers of inauguration. (he mind purloins. (he letter," inscribed or propounded speech, is al*ays stolen. -l*ays stolen because it is al*ays open. 4t never belongs to its author or to its addressee, and by nature, it never follo*s the tra ectory that leads from sub ect to sub ect. :hich amounts to ac0no*ledging the autonomy of the signifier as the letter's historicity8 before me, the signifier on its o*n says more than 4 believe that 4 mean to say, and in relation to it, my meaning-to-say is submis sive rather than active. 7y meaning-to-say finds itself lac0ing some thing in relation to the signifier, and is inscribed passively, *e might say, even if the reflection of this lac0 determines the urgency of expres sion as excess5 the autonomy of the signifier as the stratification and historical potentialiBation of meaning, as a historical system, that is, a system that is open at some point." (he oversignification *hich overburdens the *ord "spirit" >souffle?, for example, has not finished illustrating this.

inspiration that is missing from inspiration as loss. 9ood inspiration is the spirit-breath >souffle? of life, *hich *ill not ta0e dictation because it does not read and because it precedes all texts. 4t is the spirit >souffle? that *ould ta0e possession of itself in a place *here property *ould not yet be theft. (his inspiration *ould return me to true communication *ith myself and *ould give me bac0 speech5 "(he difficult part is to find out exactly *here one is, to re-establish communication *ith one's self (he *hole thing lies in a certain flocculation of ob ects, the gathering of these mental gems about one as yet undiscovered "a trouver' nucleus. W1ere, then, is *hat 4 thin0 of thought5 8 I N * 9 I : T I ; N 5<:T IN=> <?I*T*+ '67 $5,3' (he expression "as yet undiscovered" >a trouver? *ill later punctuate another page. 4t *ill then be time to *onder *hether -rtaud does not thereby designate, each time, the undiscoverable itself 4f *e *ish to gain access to this metaphysics of life, then life, as the source of good inspiration, must be understood as prior to the life of *hich the biological sciences spea05 "@urthermore, *hen *e spea0 the *ord 'life,' it must be understood *e are not referring to life as *e 0no* it from its surface of fact, but that fragile, fluctuating center *hich forms never reach. -nd if there is still one hellish, truly accursed thing in our time, it is our artistic dallying *ith forms, instead of being li0e victims burnt at the sta0e, signaling through the flames" "(#, p.$;'. )ife referred to "from its surface of fact" is thus the life of forms. 4n !ituation of the @lesh -rtaud *ill oppose to it "the life-force"" "C: $5$&+'. (he theater of cruelty *ill have to reduce this difference bet*een force and form. :hat *e have ust called elusion is not an abstraction for -rtaud. (he category of furtiveness is not valid solely for the disincarnated voice or for *riting. 4f difference, *ithin its phenomenon, is the sign of theft or of the purloined breath >souffle?, it is primarily, if not in itself, the total dispossession *hich constitutes me as the deprivation of myself, the elusion of my existence, and this ma0es difference the simultaneous theft of both my body and my mind5 my flesh. 4f my speech is not my breath >souffle?, if my letter is not my speech, this is so because my spirit *as already no longer my body, my body no longer my gestures, my gestures no longer my life. (he integrity of the flesh torn by all these differences must be restored in the theater. (hus the metaphysics of

)et us not overextend the banal description of this structure. -rtaud does not exemplify it. 1e *ants to explode it. 1e opposes to this inspiration of loss and dispossession a good inspiration, the very

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flesh *hich determines /eing as life, and the mind as the body itself, as unseparated thought, "obscure" thin0ing "for "Clear mind is a property of matter," C: $5$&+'-this is the continuous and al*ays unperceived trait *hich lin0s (he (heater and 4ts #ouble to the early *or0s and to the theme of unpo*er. (his metaphysics of the flesh is also governed by the anguish of dispossession, the experience of having lost life, of separation from thought, of the body exiled far from the mind. !uch is the initial cry. "4 am reflecting on life. -ll the systems 4 could devise *ould never equal these cries by a man occupied in rebuilding his life .... 7y reason *ill certainly one day have to receive these unformulated forces exteriorly shaped li0e a cry *hich are besieging me, and they may then supplant higher thought. (hese are intellectual cries, cries *hich stem from the marro*'s delicacy. (his is *hat 4 personally call the @lesh. 4 do not separate my thought from my life .... /ut *hat am 4 in the midst of this theory about the @lesh or more correctly, 6xistence< 4 am a man *ho has lost his life and *ho is see0ing every *ay of re-integrating it in its proper place .... /ut 4 must loo0 into this aspect of the flesh *hich is supposed to give me a metaphysics of /eing and a positive understanding of life" "C: $5$&.-&+' )et us not be detained here by a possible resemblance to the essence of the mythic itself5 the dream of a life *ithout difference. )et us as0, rather, *hat difference *ithin the flesh might mean for -rtaud. 7y body has been stolen from me by effraction. (he =ther, the (hief, the great @urtive =ne, has a proper name5 9od. 1is history has ta0en place. 4t has its o*n place. (he place of effraction can be only the opening of an orifice. (he orifice of birth, the orifice of defecation to *hich all other gaps refer, as if to their origin. "4t is filled, W it is not filled, W there is a void, W a lac0 W a missing something W *hich is al*ays ta0en by a parasite on flight" "-ugust $%.,'. @light5 the pun is certain. 6ver since 4 have had a relation to my body, therefore, ever since my birth, 4 no longer am my body. 6ver since 4 have had a body 4 am not this body, hence 4 do not possess it. (his deprivation institutes and informs my relation to my life. 7y body has thus al*ays been stolen from me. :ho could have stolen it from me, if not an =ther, and ho* could he have gotten hold of it from the beginning unless he had slipped into my place inside my mother's belly, unless 4 had been stolen

from my birth, unless my birth had been purloined from me, "as if being born has for a long time smelled of dying"< "G., p.$ $' #eath yields to conceptualiBation *ithin the category of theft8 it is not *hat *e believe *e can anticipate as the termination of the process or adventure that *e "assuredly' call life. #eath is an articulated form of our relationship to the =ther. 4 die only of the other5 through him, for him, in him. 7y death is represented, let one modify this *ord as one *ill. -nd if 4 die by representation, then at the "extreme moment of death" this representative theft has not any less shaped the entirety of my existence, from its origin. (his is *hy, in the last extremity " . . . one does not commit suicide alone. W No one *as ever born alone. W Nor has anyone died alone ... W ... -nd 4 believe that there is al*ays someone else, at the extreme moment of death, to strip us of our o*n life" "--, pp. $&$&3'. (he theme of death as theft is at the center of ")a mort et $'homme" "!ur un dessin de 2odeB, in G., no. $;'. -nd *ho could the thief be if not the great invisible =ther, the furtive persecutor *ho doubles me every*here, that is, redoubles and surpasses me, al*ays arrives before me *here 4 have chosen to go, li0e "the body *hich pursued me" "persecuted me' "and did not follo*" "preceded me'-*ho could he be if not 9od< "- N# :1-( 1-C6 F=E #=N6 :4(1 7F /=#F, 9 = # < " "G., p. $AG'. -nd here is the ans*er5 ever since the blac0 hole of my birth, god has "flayed me alive W during my entire existence W and has done so W uniquely because of the fact that W it is 4 W *ho *as god, W truly god, W 4 a man W and not the socalled ghost W *ho *as only the pro ection into the clouds W of the body of a man other than myself, W *ho called himself the W #emiurge W No*, the hideous history of the #emiurge W is *ell 0no*n W 4t is the history of the body W *hich pursued "and did not follo*' mine W and *hich, in order to go first and be born, W pro ected itself across my body W and W *as born W through the disembo*eling of my body W of *hich he 0ept a piece W in order to W pass himself off W as me. W No*, there *as no one but he and 4, W he W an ab ect body W un*anted by space, W 4 W a body being mad W consequently not yet having reached completion W but evolving W to*ard integral purity W li0e the body of the so-called #emiurge, W *ho, 0no*ing that he has no chance of being received W and yet *anting to live at any price, 4 found nothing better W in order to be W than to be born at the price of my assassination.

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W #espite everything, my body reshaped itself W against and through a thousand attac0s of evil W and of hatred W *hich each time deteriorated him W and left me dead. W -nd it is thus that through dying W 4 have come to achieve real immortality. W -nd W this is the true story of things W as they really happened W and not W as seen in the legendary atmosphere of myths W *hich obscure reality" "G., pp. $AG-$A'. 9od is thus the proper name of that *hich deprives us of our o*n nature, of our o*n birth8 consequently he *ill al*ays have spo0en before us, on the sly. 1e is the difference *hich insinuates itself bet*een myself and myself as my death. (his is *hy-such is the concept of true suicide according to -rtaud-4 must die a*ay from my death in order to be reborn "immortal" at the eve of my birth. 9od does not ta0e hold of any one of our innate attributes, but of our innateness itself, of the innateness proper to our being itself5 "(here are some fools *ho thin0 of themselves as beings, as innately being. W 4 am he *ho, in order to be, must *hip his innateness. W =ne *ho must be a being innately, that is, al*ays *hipping this sort of nonexistent 0ennel, AL bitches of impossibility" "C:, $5 $%'. :hy is this original alienation conceived as pollution, obscenity, "filthiness," etc.< :hy does -rtaud, bemoaning the loss of his body, lament a loss of purity as much as he laments dispossession, lament the loss of propriety as much as the loss of property< "4 have been tortured too much ... W ... W 4 have *or0ed too hard at being pure and strong W ... W 4 have sought to have a proper body too much" "G., p. $;+'. /y definition, 4 have been robbed of my possessions, my *orth, my value. 7y truth, *hat 4 am *orth, has been purloined from me by some =ne *ho in my stead became 9od at the exit from the =rifice, at birth. 9od is false value as the initial *orth of that *hich is born. -nd this false value becomes Calue, because it has al*ays already doubled true value *hich has never existed, or, amounting to the same thing, existed only prior to its o*n birth. 1enceforth, original value, the ur-value that 4 should have retained *ithin myself, or rather should have retained as myself, as my value and my very being, that *hich *as stolen from me as soon as 4 fell far from the =rifice, and *hich is stolen from me again each time that a part of me falls far from myself-this is the *or0, excrement, dross, the value that is annulled because it has not been retained, and *hich can become, as is *ell 0no*n, a persecuting arm,

an arm eventually directed against myself #efecation, the "daily separation *ith the feces, precious parts of the body" "@reud', is, as birth, as my birth, the initial theft *hich simultaneously depreciates 3A me and soils me. (his is *hy the history of 9od as a genealogy of stolen value is recounted as the history of defecation. "#o you 0no* anything more outrageously fecal W than the history of 9od ..." "")e theatre de la cruaute," in G., p. $3$'. 4t is perhaps due to 9od's complicity *ith the origin of the *or0 that -rtaud also calls him the #emiurge. 4n question is a metonym of the name of 9od, the proper name of the thief and the metaphorical name of myself5 the metaphor of myself is my dispossession *ithin language. 4n any event, 9od-the-#emiurge does not create, is not life, but is the sub ect of teuvres and maneuvers, is the thief, the tric0ster, the counterfeiter, the pseudonymous, the usurper, the opposite of the creative artist, the artisanal being, the being of the artisan5 !atan. 4 am 9od and 9od is !atan8 and as !atan is part of 9od's creation "... "the history of 9od W of his being5 S;0;N < < < E in G., p. $3$', 9od is of my o*n creation, my double *ho slipped into the difference that separates me from my origin, that is, into the nothing that opens my history. :hat is called the presence of 9od is but the forgetting of this nothing, the eluding of elusion, *hich is not an accident but the very movement of elusion5 " . . . !atan, W *ho *ith his overflo*ing nipples W hid from us W only Nothingness<" "ibid.'. (his history of 9od is thus the history of the *or0 as excrement. !cato-logy itself (he *or0, as excrement, supposes separation and is produced *ithin separation. (he *or0 thus proceeds from the separation of the mind from a pure body. 4t belongs to the mind, and to relocate an unpolluted body is to reconstitute oneself as a body *ithout a *or0. "@or one must have a mind in order W to shit, W a pure body cannot W shit. W :hat it shits W is the glue of minds W furiously determined to steal something from him W for *ithout a body one cannot exist" "G., p. $$;'. =ne can read in Nerve-!cales5 "#ear @riends, :hat you too0 to be my *or0s *ere only my *aste matter" "C: $5,3'. 7y *or0, my trace, the excrement that robs me of my possessions after 4 have been stolen from my birth, must thus be re ected. /ut to re ect it is not, here, to refuse it but to retain it. (o 0eep myself, to 0eep my body and my speech, 4 must retain the *or0 *ithin me, 3$ con oin

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myself *ith it so that there *ill be no opportunity for the (hief to come bet*een it and me5 it must be 0ept from falling far from my body as *riting. @or "*riting is all trash" "C: $5,+'. (hus, that *hich dispossesses me and ma0es me remote from myself, interrupting my proximity to myself, also soils me5 4 relinquish all that is proper to me. Proper is the name of the sub ect close to himself-*ho is *hat he is-and ab ect the name of the ob ect, the *or0 that has deviated from me. 4 have a proper name *hen 4 am proper. (he child does not appropriate his true name in :estern society-initially in school-is not *ell named until he is proper, clean, toilet-trained. (he unity of these significations, hidden beneath their apparent dispersion, the unity of the proper as the nonpollution of the sub ect absolutely close to himself, does not occur before the )atin era of philosophy "proprius is attached to proper'8 and, for the same reason, the metaphysical determination of madness as the disease of alienation could not have begun its development before this era. "4t goes *ithout saying that *e are not construing the linguistic phenomenon as a cause or a symptom5 the concept of madness, quite simply, is solidified only during the era of the metaphysics of a proper sub ectivity.' -rtaud solicits this metaphysics, sha0es it *hen it lies to itself and establishes the proper departure from that *hich is proper to oneself "the alienation of alienation' as the condition for the phenomenon of the proper8 and -rtaud still summons this metaphysics, dra*s upon its fund of values, and attempts to be more faithful to it than it is to itself by means of an absolute restoration of the proper to the eve prior to all dissociation. )i0e excrement, li0e the turd, *hich is, as is also *ell 0no*n, a metaphor of the penis,d3 the *or0 should stand upright. /ut the *or0, as excrement, is but matter *ithout life, *ithout force or form. 4t al*ays falls and collapses as soon as it is outside me. (his is *hy the *or0-be it poetic or other-*ill never help me stand upright. 4 *ill never be erect in it. (hus salvation, status, uprightness *ill be possible only in an art *ithout *or0s. (he *or0 al*ays being the *or0 of death, the art *ithout *or0s dance or the theater of cruelty-*ill be the art of life itself "4 have therefore said 'cruelty' as 4 might have said 'life"' "(#, p. $$.'. 2igid *ith rage against 9od, convulsed *ith anger against the *or0, -rtaud does not renounce salvation. =n the contrary, soteriology *ill

be the eschatology of one's proper body. "4t is the state of my W body *hich *ill ma0e W the )ast Dudgment" "G., p. $; $'. =ne's-properbodyupright-*ithout-detritus. 6vil, pollution, resides in the critical or the clinical5 it is to have one's speech and body become *or0s, ob ects *hich can be offered up to the furtive haste of the commentator because they are supine. @or, by definition, the only thing that is not sub ect to commentary is the life of the body, the living flesh *hose integrity, opposed to evil and death, is maintained by the theater. #isease is the impossibility of standing upright in dance and in the theater. "(here is plague, W cholera W smallpox W only because dance W and consequently theater W have not yet begun to exist" "G., p.$3,'. (he tradition of mad poets< 1olderlin5 "Fet, fello* poets, us it behoves to stand W /are headed beneath 9od's thunderstorms, W (o grasp the @ather's rays, no less, *ith our o*n t*o hands W -nd, *rapping in song the heavenly gift, W (o offer it to the people."NietBsche5 24 need 4 add that one must also be able to dance *ith the pen =r further5 "=nly those thoughts that come by *al0ing have any value."" =n this point, as on many others, one could be tempted to envelop these three mad poets, in the company of several others, *ithin the thrust of a single commentary and the continuity of a single genealogy." - thousand other texts on standing upright and on the dance could effectively encourage such a pro ect. /ut *ould it not then miss -rtaud's essential decision< @rom 1olderlin to NietBsche, stand ing upright and the dance remain metaphorical, perhaps. 4n any event, erection is not obliged to exile itself into the *or0 or to delegate itself to the poem, to expatriate itself into the sovereignty of speech or *riting, into the literal uprightness of the letter or the tip of the pen. (he uprightness of the *or0, to be more precise, is the reign of literal ity over breath >souffle?. NietBsche had certainly denounced the gram matical structure embedded *ithin a metaphysics to be demolished8 but, did he ever question, as to its origin, the relationship bet*een grammatical security, *hich he ac0no*ledged, and the uprightness of the letter< 1eidegger foretells this relationship in a brief suggestion in the 4ntroduction to 7etaphysics5 "4n a certain broad sense the 9ree0s loo0ed on language from a visual point of vie*, that is, starting from the *ritten language. 4t is in *riting that the spo0en language comes to stand. )anguage is, i.e. it stands, in the *ritten image of the *ord, in

the *ritten signs, the letters, grammata. Consequently, grammar represents language in being. /ut through the flo* of speech language seeps a*ay into the impermanent. (hus, do*n to our time, language has been interpreted grammatically."" (his does not contradict, but confirms, paradoxically, the disdain of *riting *hich, in the Phaedrus for example, saves metaphorical *riting as the initial inscription of truth upon the soul-saves it and initially refers to it as to the most assured 0no*ledge and the proper meaning of *riting "3,&a'. 4t is metaphor that -rtaud *ants to destroy. 1e *ishes to have done *ith standing upright as metaphorical erection *ithin the *ritten *or0." (his alienation of the *ritten *or0 into metaphor is a phenomenon that belongs to superstition. -nd ":e must get rid of our superstitious valuation of texts and *ritten poetry" "(#, p. ,G'. !uperstition is thus the essence of our relation to 9od, of our persecution by the great furtive one. (he death of 9od 3% *ill ensure our salvation because the death of 9od alone can rea*a0en the #ivine. 7an's name-man as the scato-theological being, the being capable of being soiled by the *or0 and of being constituted by his relation to the thieving 9od-designates the historical corruption of the unnamable #ivine. "-nd this faculty is an exclusively human one. 4 *ould even say that it is this infection of the human *hich contaminates ideas that should have remained divine8 for far from believing that man invented the supernatural and the divine, 4 thin0 it is man's age-old intervention *hich has ultimately corrupted the divine *ithin him" "(#, p. G'. 9od is thus a sin against the divine. (he essence of guilt is scato-theological. (he body of thought in *hich the scato-theological essence of man appears as such cannot simply be a metaphysical anthropology or humanism. 2ather it points to the *ay beyond man, beyond the meta physics of :estern theater *hose "preoccupations ... stin0 unbeliev ably of man, provisional, material man, 4 shall even say carrion man" "(#, p. .3. Cf. also, in C: ;, the letter of insults to the Comedie-@rancaise *hich, in explicit terms, denounces the scatological vocation of that institution's concept and operations'. /y virtue of this re ection of the metaphorical stance *ithin the *or0, and despite several stri0ing resemblances "here, the passage beyond man and 9od', -rtaud is not the son of NietBsche. -nd even less so of 1olderlin. (he theater of cruelty, by 0illing metaphor

"upright-being-outside-itself-*ithin-the-stolen-*or0', pushes us into "a ne* idea of #anger" "letter to 7arcel #alio in 6uvres completes, >Paris, $%,A?, +5%+'. (he adventure of the Poem is the last anguish to be suppressed before the adventure of the (heater." /efore /eing in its proper station. 1o* *ill the theater of cruelty save me, give me bac0 the institution of my flesh itself< 1o* *ill it prevent my life from falling outside me< 1o* *ill it help me avoid "having lived W li0e the '#emiurge' W *ith W a body stolen by effraction" "G., p. $$;'< @irst, by summarily reducing the organ. (he first gesture of the destruction of classical theater-and the metaphysics it puts on stageis the reduction of the organ. (he classical :estern stage defines a theater of the organ, a theater of *ords, thus a theater of interpretation, enregistration, and translation, a theater of deviation from the ground*or0 of a preestablished text, a table *ritten by a 9od--uthor *ho is the sole *ielder of the primal *ord. - theater in *hich a master disposes of the stolen speech *hich only his slaves-his directors and actors-may ma0e use of. "4f, then, the author is the man *ho arranges the language of speech and the director is his slave, there is merely a question of *ords. (here is here a confusion over terms, stemming from the fact that, for us, and according to the sense generally attributed to the *ord director, this man is merely an artisan, an adapter, a 0ind of translator eternally devoted to ma0ing a dramatic *or0 pass from one language into another8 this confusion *ill be possible, and the director *ill be forced to play second fiddle to the author, only so long as there is a tacit agreement that the language of *ords is superior to others and that the theater admits none other than this one language" "(#, p. $$%'." (he differences upon *hich the metaphysics of =ccidental theater lives "author-text W directoractors', its differentiation and its divisions, transform the "slaves" into commentators, that is, into organs. 1ere, they are recording organs. No*, ":e must believe in a sense of life rene*ed by the theater, a sense of life in *hich man fearlessly ma0es himself master of *hat does not yet exist "my italics', and brings it into being. -nd everything that has not been born can still be brought to life if *e are not satisfied to remain mere recording organisms" "(#, p. $;'. /ut *hat *e *ill call organic differentiation had already raged

*ithin the body, before it had corrupted the metaphysics of the theater. =rganiBation is articulation, the interloc0ing of functions or of members "artho, anus', the labor and play of their differentiation. (his constitutes both the "membering" and dismembering of my proper body. @or one and the same reason, through a single gesture, -rtaud is as fearful of the articulated body as he is of articulated language, as fearful of the member as of the *ord. @or articulation is the structure of my body, and structure is al*ays a structure of expropriation. (he division of the body into organs, the difference interior to the flesh, opens the lac0 through *hich the body becomes absent from itself, passing itself off as, and ta0ing itself for, the mind. No*, "there is no mind, nothing but the differentiation of bodies" "7arch, 1@A2). (he body, *hich "al*ays see0s to reassemble itself,"" escapes itself by virtue of that *hich permits it to function and to express itself8 as is said of those *ho are ill, the body listens to itself and, thus, disconcerts itself. "(he body is the body, it is alone W and has no need of organs, W the body is never an organism, W organisms are the enemies of bodies, W everything one does transpires by itself *ithout the aid of any organ, W every organ is a parasite, it overlaps *ith a parasitic function W destined to bring into existence a being *hich should not be there" (BA, !. 1C1). (he organ thus *elcomes the difference of the stranger into my body5 it is al*ays the organ of my ruin, and this truth is so original that neither the heart, the central organ of life, nor the sex, the first organ of life, can escape it5 "4t is thus that there is in fact nothing more ignominiously useless and superfluous than the organ called the heart W *hich is the dirtiest means that any being could have invented for pumping life inside me. W (he movements of the heart are nothing other than a maneuver to *hich being ceaselessly abandons itself above me, in order to ta0e from me that *hich 4 ceaselessly deny it" (BA, !. 1C3). @urther on5 "- true man has no sex" "p. $$3'." - true man has no sex for he must be his sex. -s soon as the sex becomes an organ, it becomes foreign to me, abandons me, acquiring thereby the arrogant autonomy of a s*ollen ob ect full of itself. (his s*elling of the sex become a separate ob ect is a 0ind of castration. "1e said he sa* a great preoccupation *ith sex in me. /ut *ith taut sexual organs, s*ollen li0e an ob ect" "-rt and #eath, in 57 1'1CB). (he organ5 place of loss because its center al*ays has the form of an

orifice. (he organ al*ays functions as an embouchure. (he reconstitution and reinstitution of my flesh *ill thus al*ays follo* along the lines of my body's closing in on itself and the reduction of the organic structure5 "4 *as alive W and 4 have been here since al*ays. W #id 4 eat< W No, W but *hen 4 *as hungry 4 retreated *ith my body and did not eat myself W but all that has been decomposed, W a strange operation has ta0en place ... W #id 4 sleep< W No, 4 did not sleep, W one must be chaste to 0no* not to eat. W (o open one's mouth is to give oneself over to miasms. W No mouth, thenL W No mouth, W no tongue, W no teeth, W no larynx, W no esophagus, W no stomach, W no belly, W no anus. W 4 *ill reconstruct the man that 4 am" "November 1@A2, in BA, !. $A3'. @urther on5 ""4t is not especially a question of the sex or the anus W *hich, moreover, are to be he*n off and liquidated'" (BA, !. $3+'. (he reconstitution of the body must be autarchic8 it cannot be given any assistance and the body must be remade of a single piece5 "4t is W 4 W *ho W 4 *ill be W remade W by me W myself W entirely W ... by myself W *ho am a body W and have no regions *ithin me" "7arch 1@A2). (he dance of cruelty punctuates this reconstruction, and once more in question is a place to be found5 "2eality has not yet been constructed because the true organs of the human body have not yet been assembled and put in place. W (he theater of cruelty has been created to complete this putting into place and to underta0e, through a ne* dance of the body of man, the disruption of this *orld of microbes *hich is but coagulated nothingness. W (he theater of cruelty *ants to ma0e eyelids dance chee0 to chee0 *ith elbo*s, patellas, femurs and toes, and to have this dance be seen" (BA, !. 1C1). (hus, theater could not have been a genre among others for -rtaud, *ho *as a man of the theater before being a *riter, poet, or even a man of the theater5 an actor as much as an author, and not only because he acted a great deal, having *ritten but a single play, and having demonstrated for an "aborted theater," but because theater summons the totality of existence and no longer tolerates either the incidence of interpretation or the distinction bet*een actor and author. (he initial urgent requirement of an in-organic theater is emancipation from the text. -lthough the rigorous system of this emancipation is found only in (he (heater and 4ts #ouble, protest against the letter had al*ays been

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-rtaud's primary concern. Protest against the dead letter *hich absents itself far from breath >souffle? and flesh. -rtaud initially dreamed of a graphism *hich *ould not begin as deviation, of a nonseparated inscription5 an incarnation of the letter and a bloody tatoo5 "4n deference to this letter "from Dean Paulhan, 1923) I continued for a further month to *or0 at *riting a verbally, not a grammatically, successful poem. W (hen 4 gave up. -s far as 4 *as concerned, the problem *as not to find out *hat might manage to *orm its *ay into the structures of *ritten language, W but into the *eb of my living soul. W /y *hich *ords entered li0e 0nives in lasting carnation, W a fitting, dying incarnation under a span, the burning island of a gallo*s lantern" "C:, $5$G'.;. /ut the tattoo paralyBes gesture and silences the voice *hich also belongs to the flesh. 4t represses the shout and the chance for a still unorganiBed voice. -nd later, proposing the *ithdra*al of the theater from text, prompter >souffleur?, and the omnipotence of a primary logos, -rtaud *ill not simply *ish to give it over to mutism. 1e *ill only attempt the resituation and subordination of speech-the until no* enormous, pervasive, ubiquitous, bloated speech >parole soufflee?*hich had exorbitantly *eighed upon theatrical space. :ithout disappearing, speech *ill no* have to 0eep to its place8 and to do so it *ill have to modify its very function, *ill have no longer to be a language of *ords, of terms "in a single defined sense" "(#, p. $$G', of concepts *hich put an end to thought and life. 4t is *ithin the silence of definition-*ords that "*e could listen more closely to life" "ibid.'. (hus, onomatopoeia, the gesture dormant in all classical speech, *ill be rea*a0ened, and along *ith it sonority, intonation, intensity. -nd the syntax governing the succession of *ord gestures *ill no longer be a grammar of predication, a logic of "clear thin0ing" or of a 0no*ing consciousness. ":hen 4 say 4 *ill perform no *ritten play, 4 mean that 4 *ill perform no play based on *riting and speech ... and that even the spo0en and *ritten portions *ill be spo0en and *ritten in a ne* sense" "(#, p. $$$'. "4t is not a question of suppressing the spo0en language, but of giving *ords approximately the importance they have in dreams" "(#, p. 94).;+ @oreign to dance, as immobile and monumental as a definition, materialiBed, that is to say, part of "clear thin0ing," the tattoo is thus

still all too silent. 4t maintains the silence of a liberated letter that spea0s on its o*n and assigns itself more importance than speech has in dreams. (he tatoo is a depository, a *or0, and it is precisely the *or0 that must be destroyed, as *e no* 0no*. - fortiori the masterpiece5 "no more masterpieces" "the title of one of the most important texts of (he (heater and 4ts #ouble'. 1ere again, to overthro* the po*er of the literal *or0 is not to erase the letter, but only to subordinate it to the incidence of illegibility or at least of illiteracy. "4 am *riting for illiterates";& -s can be seen in certain non-:estern civiliBations, precisely the ones that fascinated -rtaud, illiteracy can quite *ell accommodate the most profound and living culture. (he traces inscribed on the body *ill no longer be graphic incisions but *ounds received in the destruction of the :est, its metaphysics and its theater, the stigmata of this pitiless *ar. @or the theater of cruelty is not a ne* theater destined to escort some ne* novel that *ould modify from *ithin an unsha0en tradition. -rtaud underta0es neither a rene*al, nor a critique, nor a ne* interrogation of classical theater8 he intends the effective, active, and nontheoretical destruction of :estern civiliBation and its religions, the entirety of the philosophy *hich provides traditional theater *ith its ground*or0 and decor beneath even its more apparently innovative forms. (he stigmata and not the tattoo5 thus, in the resume of *hat should have been the first production of the theater of cruelty "(he Conquest of 7exico', incarnating the "question of coloniBation," and *hich "revives in a brutal and implacable *ay the ever active fatuousness of 6urope" "(#, p.126), the stigmata are substituted for the text. "=ut of this clash of moral disorder and Catholic monarchy *ith pagan order, the sub ect can set off unheard-of explosions of forces and images, so*n here and there *ith brutal dialogues. 7en battling hand to hand, bearing *ithin themselves, li0e stigmata, the most opposed ideas" "(#, p.127). (he subversive efforts to *hich -rtaud thus had al*ays submitted the imperialism of the letter had the negative meaning of a revolt for as long as they too0 place *ithin the milieu of literature as such. (hus, the initial *or0s surrounding the letters to Dacques 2iviere. (he revolutionary" affirmation *hich *as to receive a remar0able theoretical treatment in (he (heater and its #ouble nevertheless had surfaced in (he -lfred Darry (heater (1926-30). (here *e already find prescribed a descent

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to*ard the depth at *hich the distinction of theatrical organs "authortext W director-actor-public', in the manifestation of forces, no longer *ould be possible. No* this system of organic divisions, this difference, has never been possible, except *hen distributed around an ob ect, boo0, or libretto. (he depth sought after must thus be the depth of illegibility5 ":hatever is part of ... illegibility" "*e *ant to see spar0le and triumph on stage" "C: 353;'. 4n theatrical illegibility, in the night that precedes the boo0, the sign has not yet been separated from force." 4t is not quite yet a sign, in the sense in *hich *e understand sign, but is no longer a thing, *hich *e conceive only as opposed to the sign. 4t has, then, no chance to become, in this state, a *ritten text or an articulated speech8 no chance to rise and to inflate itself above energeia in order to be invested, according to 1umboldt's distinction, *ith the somber and ob ective impassivity of the ergon. No* 6urope lives upon the ideal of this separation bet*een force and meaning as text, at the very moment *hen, as *e suggested above, in purportedly elevating the mind above the letter, it states a preference for metaphorical *riting. (his derivation of force *ithin the sign divides the theatrical act, exiles the actor far from any responsibility for meaning, ma0es of him an interpreter *ho lets his life be breathed into >insoufe? him, and lets his *ords be *hispered >soufe? to him, receiving his delivery as if he *ere ta0ing orders, submitting li0e a beast to the pleasure of docility. )i0e the seated public, he is but a consumer, an aesthete, a "pleasure-ta0er." (he stage is no longer cruel, is no longer the stage, but a decoration, the luxurious illustration of a boo0. 4n the best of cases, another literary genre. "#ialogue-a thing *ritten and spo0en-does not belong specifically to the stage, it belongs to boo0s, as is proved by the fact that in all hand-boo0s of literary history a place is reserved for the theater as a subordinate branch of the history of the spo0en language" "(#, p. ;,'. (o let one's speech be spirited a*ay >souffle? is, li0e *riting itself, the urphenomenon of the reserve5 the abandoning of the self to the furtive, to discretion and separation, is, at the same time, accumulation, capital iBation, the security of the delegated or deferred decision. (o leave one's speech to the furtive is to tranquiliBe oneself into deferral, that is to say, into economy. (he theater of the prompter >souffleur? thus con

the learned machinations of its materialiBed meditations. -nd, as *e 0no*, -rtaud, li0e NietBsche, but through the theater, *ants to return us to #anger as /ecoming. "(he comtemporary theater is decadent because ... it has bro0en a*ay from ... #anger" "(#, p. .3', bro0en a*ay from /ecoming5 "4t seems, in brief, that the highest possible idea of the theater is one that reconciles us philosophically *ith /ecoming" "(#, p. $A%'. (o re ect the *or0, to let one's speech, body, and birth be spirited a*ay >souffle? by the furtive god is thus to defend oneself against the theater of fear *hich multiplies the differences bet*een myself and myself 2estored to its absolute and terrifying proximity, the stage of cruelty *ill thus return me to the autarchic immediacy of my birth, my body and my speech. :here has -rtaud better defined the stage of cruelty than in 1ere )ies, outside any apparent reference to the theater5 "4, -ntonin -rtaud, am my son W my father, my mother W and myself" "--, p. 3;G'< /ut does not the theater *hich is no longer a colony succumb to its o*n cruelty< :ill it resist its o*n danger< )iberated from diction, *ithdra*n from the dictatorship of the text, *ill not theatrical atheism be given over to improvisational anarchy and to the actors' capricious inspirations< 4s not another form of sub ugation in preparation< -nother flight of language into arbitrariness and irresponsibility< (o th*art this danger, *hich in*ardly threatens danger itself, -rtaud, through a strange movement, disposes the language of cruelty *ithin a ne* form of *riting5 the most rigorous, authoritarian, regulated, and mathematicalthe most formal form of *riting. (his apparent incoherence suggests a hasty ob ection. 4n truth, the *ill to maintain speech by defending oneself against it governs, *ith its omnipotent and infallible logic, a reversal that *e *ill have to follo* here. (o Dean Paulhan5 "4 do not believe that if you had once read my 7anifesto you could persevere in your ob ections, so either you have not read it or you have read it badly. 7y plans have nothing to do *ith Copeau's improvisations. 1o*ever thoroughly they are immersed in the concrete and external, ho*ever rooted in free nature and not in the narro* chambers of the brain, they are not, for all that, left to the caprice of the *ild and thoughtless inspiration of the actor, especially

structs the system of fear, and manages to 0eep fear at a distance *ith

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the actor *ho, once cut off from the text, plunges in *ithout any idea of *hat he is doing. 4 *ould not care to leave the fate of my plays and of the theater to that 0ind of chance. No" "(#, pp. $A%-$A'. "4 give myself up to feverish dreams, but 4 do so in order to deduce ne* la*s. 4n delirium, 4 see0 multiplicity, subtlety and the eye of reason, not rash prophecies" "C: $5$&,'. 4f it is necessary, thus, to renounce "the theatrical superstition of the text and the dictatorship of the *riter" "(#, p. $3.', it is because they could not have imposed themselves *ithout the aid of a certain model of speech and *riting5 the speech that represents dear and *illing thought, the "alphabetic, or in any event phonetic' *riting that represents representative speech. Classical theater, the theater of diversions, *as the representation of all these representations. -nd this deferral, these delays, these stages of representation extend and liberate the play of the signifier, thus multiplying the places and moments of elusion. @or the theater to be neither sub ected to this structure of language, nor abandoned to the spontaneity of furtive inspiration, it *ill have to be governed according to the requirements of another language and another form of *riting. (he themes, but also occasionally the models, of *riting doubtless *ill be sought outside 6urope, in /alinese theater, in the ancient 7exican, 1indu, 4ranian, 6gyptian, etc., cosmogonies. (his time, *riting not only *ill no longer be the transcription of speech, not only *ill be the *riting of the body itself, but it *ill be produced, *ithin the movements of the theater, according to the rules of hieroglyphics, a system of signs no longer controlled by the institution of the voice. "(he overlapping of images and movements *ill culminate, through the collusion of ob ects, silences, shouts, and rhythms, or in a genuine physical language *ith signs, not *ords, as its root" "(#, p. 3G,'. :ords themselves *ill once more become physical signs that do not trespass to*ard concepts, but "*ill be construed in an incantational, truly magical sense-for their shape and their sensuous emanations" "(#, p. $3+'. :ords *ill cease to flatten theatrical space and to lay it out horiBontally as did logical speech8 they *ill reinstate the "volume" of theatrical space and *ill utiliBe this volume "in its undersides "dons ses dessous'" "(#, p. $3.'. 4t is not by chance, hence forth, that -rtaud spea0s of "hieroglyphics" rather than ideograms5 "-nd it can be said that the spirit of the most ancient hieroglyphs *ill

preside at the creation of this pure theatrical language" "ibid.'. "4n saying hieroglyphics, -rtaud is thin0ing only of the principle of the *riting called hieroglyphic, *hich, as *e 0no*, did not in fact set aside all phoneticism.' Not only *ill the voice no longer give orders, but it *ill have to let itself be punctuated by the la* of this theatrical *riting. (he only *ay to be done *ith the freedom of inspiration and *ith the spiriting a*ay of speech >la parole soufYee? is to create an absolute mastery over breath >le souffle? *ithin a system of nonphonetic *riting. :hence -n -ffective -thleticism, the strange text in *hich -rtaud see0s the la*s of breath in the Cabbala and in Fin and Fang, and *ants "through the hieroglyph of a breath ... to recover an idea of the sacred theater" "(#, p. $.$'. 1aving al*ays preferred the shout to the text, -rtaud no* attempts to elaborate a rigorous textuality of shouts, a codified system of onomatopoeias, expressions, and gestures-a veritable theatrical pasigraphy reaching beyond empirical languages,;% a universal grammar of cruelty. "!imilarly the ten thousand and one expressions of the face caught in the form of mas0s can be labeled and catalogued, so they may eventually participate directly and symbolically in this concrete language of the stage" "(#, p. %.'. -rtaud even attempts to recogniBe, beneath their apparent contingency, the necessity of unconscious formations8 he therefore, after a fashion, traces the form of theatrical *riting from the model of unconscious *riting. (his is perhaps the unconscious *riting of *hich @reud spea0s in the "Note on the 7ystic :riting Pad," as a *riting *hich erases and retains itself8 although @reud spea0s of this *riting after having *arned, in (he 4nterpretation of #reams, against metaphoriBing the unconscious as an original text subsisting alongside the Emschrift "transcription', and after having compared dreams, in a short text from $%$;, to "a system of *riting" and even of "hieroglyphic" *riting, rather than to "a language." #espite all appearance, that is, despite the entirety of :estern metaphysics, this mathematiBing formaliBation *ould liberate both the festival and repressed ingenuity. "(his may perhaps shoc0 our 6uropean sense of stage freedom and spontaneaous inspiration, but let no one say that this mathematics creates sterility or uniformity. (he marvel is that a sensation of richness, of fantasy and prodigality emanates from this spectacle ruled *ith a maddening scrupulosity and consciousness"

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"(#, p. ++'. "(he actors *ith their costumes constitute veritable living, moving hieroglyphs. -nd these three-dimensional hieroglyphs are in turn brocaded *ith a certain number of gestures-mysterious signs *hich correspond to some un0no*n, fabulous, and obscure reality *hich *e here in the =ccident have completely repressed" "(#, p. &$'. 1o* are this liberation and this raising of the repressed possible< -nd not despite, but *ith the aid of a totalitarian codification and rhetoric of forces< :ith the aid of cruelty, *hich initially signifies 'rigor" and "submission to necessity" "(#, p. $A3'< 4t is that by prohibiting chance and by repressing the play of the machine, this ne* theatrical arrangement sutures all the gaps, all the openings, all the differences. (heir origin and active movement-differing, deferralare enclosed. -t this point, eluded speech is definitively returned to us. -nd at this point, perhaps, cruelty pacifies itself *ithin its regained absolute proximity, *ithin another summary reduction of becoming, *ithin the perfection and economy of its return to the stage. "4, -ntonin -rtaud, am my son, W my father, my mother, W and myself." !uch is, according to -rtaud's stated desire, the la* of the house, the initial organiBation of a d*elling space, the ur-stage. (he ur-stage is then present, reassembled into its presence, seen, mastered, terrifying, and pacifying. @urtive difference could not have insinuated itself *ith the aid of *riting but, rather, slipped in bet*een t*o forms of *riting, thereby placing my life outside the *or0 and ma0ing its origin-my flesh-into the epigraph and breathless >essoufle? sarcophagous of my discourse. =nly through *riting made flesh, only through the theatrical hieroglyphic, could the necessary destruction of the double ta0e place, and *ith it the erasure of apo-cryphal *riting *hich eludes my being as life, 0eeping me at a remove from hidden force. #iscourse can no* be reunited *ith its birth in a perfect and permanent self-presence. "4t happens that this mannerism, this excessively hieratic style, *ith its rolling alphabet, its shrie0s of splitting stones, noises of branches, noises of the cutting and rolling of *ood, compose a sort of animated material murmur in the air, in space, a visual as *ell as audible *his pering. -nd after an instant the magic identification is made5 :6 IN=: 4( 4! :6 :1= :626 !P6-I4N9" "(#, p. &,'. (he present 0no*ledge of the proper-past of our speech.

- magic identification, of course. (he temporal differences *ould sufficiently bear *itness to this. -nd to say that it is magic is to say very little. 4t could even be demonstrated that it is the very essence of magic. magic and, *hat is more, an unfindable identification. Enfindable is "the grammar of this ne* language," *hich -rtaud concedes "is still to be found" "(#, p. $$A'. 4n fact, against all his intentions, -rtaud had to reintroduce the prerequisite of the *ritten text into "productions" ... "rigorously composed and fixed once and for all before being played" "C6uvres completes >hereafter =C?, +5.$'. "-ll these groupings, researches, and shoc0s *ill culminate nevertheless in a *or0 *ritten do*n, fixed in its least details, and recorded by ne* means of notation. (he composition, the creation, instead of being made in the brain of an author, *ill be made in nature itself, in real space, and the final result *ill be as strict and as calculated as that of any *ritten *or0 *hatsoever, *ith an immense ob ective richness as *ell" "(#, pp. $$-$$3'. 6ven if -rtaud had not, as in fact he did,.A had to respect the rights of the *or0 and of the *ritten *or0, does not his very pro ect "the reduction of the *or0 and of difference, therefore of historicity' indicate the very essence of madness< /ut this madness, as the metaphysics of inalienable life and historic indifference-the "4 spea0 W from above time" "--, p. 3.G'-no less legitimately has denounced, *ith a gesture that does not give shelter to another metaphysics, the other madness, as the metaphysics *hich lives *ithin difference, *ithin metaphor and the *or0, and thus *ithin alienation8 and lives *ithin them *ithout conceiving them as such, beyond metaphysics. 7adness is as much alienation as inalienation. 4t is the *or0 or the absence of the *or0." (hese t*o determinations indefinitely confront one another *ithin the closed field of metaphysics, ust as those *hom -rtaud calls evident or authentic madmen confront the other madmen *ithin history. (hey necessarily confront one another and exchange themselves for each other8 they articulate themselves *ithin the categories-ac0no*ledged or not, but al*ays recogniBable-of a single historico-metaphysical discourse. (he concepts of madness, alienation, or inalienation irreducibly belong to the history of metaphysics. =r, more narro*ly5 they belong to the epoch of metaphysics that determines /eing as the life of a proper sub ectivity. No* difference-or deferral, *ith all the modifications laid bare by -rtaud-can only be conceived as such beyond

metaphysics, to*ards the #ifference-or #uplicity-of *hich 1eidegger spea0s. 4t could be thought that this latter #ifference, *hich simultaneously opens and conceals truth, and in fact distinguishes nothing-the invisible accomplice of all speech-is furtive po*er itself, if this *ere not to confuse the metaphysical and metaphorical category of the furtive *ith that *hich ma0es it possible. 4f the "destruction"" of the history of metaphysics, in the rigorous sense understood by 1eidegger, is not a simple surpassing of this history, one could then, so ourning in a place *hich is neither *ithin nor *ithout this history, *onder about *hat lin0s the concept of madness to the concept of metaphysics in general5 the metaphysics *hich -rtaud destroys and *hich he is still furiously determined to construct or to preserve *ithin the same movement of destruction. -rtaud 0eeps himself at the limit, and *e have attempted to read him at this limit. =ne entire side of his discourse destroys a tradition *hich lives *ithin difference, alienation, and negativity *ithout seeing their origin and necessity. (o rea*a0en this tradition, -rtaud, in sum, recalls it to its o*n motifs5 self-presence, unity, self-identity, the proper, etc. 4n this sense, -rtaud's "metaphysics," at its most critical moments, fulfills the most profound and permanent ambition of *estern metaphysics. /ut through another t*ist of his text, the most difficult one, -rtaud affirms the cruel "that is to say, in the sense in *hich he ta0es this *ord, necessary' la* of difference8 a la* that this time is raised to the level of consciousness and is no longer experienced *ithin metaphysical naivete. (his duplicity of -rtaud's text, simultaneously more and less than a stratagem, has unceasingly obliged us to pass over to the other side of the limit, and thereby to demonstrate the closure of the presence in *hich he had to enclose himself in order to denounce the naive implications *ithin difference. -t this point, different things ceaselessly and rapidly pass into each other, and the critical experience of difference resembles the naive and metaphysical implications *ithin difference, such that to an inexpert scrutiny, *e could appear to be criticiBing -rtaud's metaphysics from the standpoint of metaphysics itself, *hen *e are actually delimiting a fatal complicity. (hrough this complicity is articulated a necessary dependency of all destructive discourses5 they must inhabit the structures they demolish, and *ithin them they must shelter an indestructible desire for full presence, for nondifference5

simultaneously life and death. !uch is the question that *e have attempted to pose, in the sense in *hich one poses a net, surrounding the limit of an entire textual net*or0, forcing the substitution of discourse, the detour made obligatory by sites, for the punctuality of the position. :ithout the necessary duration and traces of this text, each position immediately veers into its opposite. (his too obeys a la*. (he transgression of metaphysics through the "thought" *hich, -rtaud tells us, has not yet begun, al*ays ris0s returning to metaphysics. !uch is the question in *hich *e are posed. - question *hich is still and al*ays enveloped each time that speech, protected by the limits of a field, lets itself be provo0ed from afar by the enigma of flesh *hich *anted properly to be named -ntonin -rtaud.U U)ong after having *ritten this text, 9 read in a letter of -rtaud's to P )oeb "cf. )ettres Nouvelles, no. 59, -pril 195$/0
t(i) (*+e *, t(e (*++*- .et-ee/ t-* .e++*-)

[soufets] + f

which were not ...

"!eptember 1919/

f+rce

,2/9D ;ND 0?/ S6/N/ =, W2I0IN1 2.%

FREUD AND THE SCENE OF $RITING

(his text is the fragment of a lecture given at the 4nstitut de psychanalyse "#r. 9reen's seminar'. -t that time *e *ere concerned *ith opening a debate around certain propositions advanced in previous of my essays, notably, 9rammatology ""#e la grammatologie," Critique 33;-3.'. Could these propositions-*hich here *ill remain present in the bac0ground-have a place *ithin the field of psychoanalytic questioning< 2egarding such a field, *here *ere these propositions to be maintained, as concerns their concepts and syntax< (he first part of the lecture touched upon this question in its greater generality. (he central concepts of this section *ere those of presence and of archi-trace. :e *ill indicate cursorily, by their general headings, the principal stages of this first part. $. #espite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy. (hese appearances5 the analysis of a historical repression and suppression of *riting since Plato. (his repression constitutes the origin of philosophy as episteme, and of truth as the unity of logos and phone. 2epression, not forgetting8 repression, not exclusion. 2epression, as @reud says, neither repels, nor flees, nor excludes an exterior force8 it

contains an interior representation, laying out *ithin itself a space of repression. 1ere, that *hich represents a force in the form of the *riting interior to speech and essential to it has been contained outside speech. -n unsuccessful repression, on the road to historical dismantling. 4t is this dismantling that interests us, this unsuccessfulness *hich confers upon its becoming a certain legibility and limits its historical opaqueness. "2epressions that have failed *ill of course have more claim on our interest than those that may have been successful8 for the latter *ill for the most part escape our examination" "!tandard 6dition of the Complete Psychological :or0s of !igmund @reud, hereafter !6, N4C, $+;'. (he symptomatic form of the return of the repressed5 the metaphor of *riting *hich haunts 6uropean discourse, and the systematic contradictions of the ontotheological exclusion of the trace. (he repression of *riting as the repression of that *hich threatens presence and the mastering of absence. (he enigma of presence "pure and simple"5 as duplication, original repetition, auto-affection, and differance. (he distinction bet*een the mastering of absence as speech and the mastering of absence as *riting. (he *riting *ithin speech. 1allucination as speech and hallucination as *riting. (he relationship bet*een phone and consciousness. (he @reudian concept of verbal representation as preconsciousness. )ogophonocentrism is not a philosophical or historical error *hich the history of philosophy, of the :est, that is, of the *orld, *ould have rushed into pathologically, but-is rather a necessary, and necessarily finite, movement and structure5 the history of the possibility of symbolism in general "before the distinction bet*een man and animal, and even before the distinction bet*een the living and the nonliving'8 the history of differance, history as differance *hich finds in philosophy as episteme, in the 6uropean form of the metaphysical or onto theological pro ect, the privileged manifestation, *ith *orld*ide dominance, of dissimulation, of general censorship of the text in general. 3. -n attempt to ustify a theoretical reticence to utiliBe @reudian concepts, other*ise than in quotation mar0s5 all these concepts,

*ithout exception, belong to the history of metaphysics, that is, to the system of logocentric repression *hich *as organiBed in order to exclude or to lo*er "to put outside or belo*', the body of the *ritten trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or excrement. @or example, logocentric repression is not comprehensible on the basis of the @reudian concept of repression8 on the contrary, logocentric repression permits an understanding of ho* an original and individual repression became possible *ithin the horiBon of a culture and a historical structure of belonging. :hy it is a question neither of follo*ing Dung, nor of follo*ing the @reudian concept of the hereditary mnemic trace. Certainly, @reudian discourse-in its syntax, or, if you *ill, its labor-is not to be confused *ith these necessarily metaphysical and traditional concepts. Certainly it is not exhausted by belonging to them. :itness the precautions and the "nominalism" *ith *hich @reud manipulates *hat he calls conventions and conceptual hypotheses. -nd a conception of difference is attached less to concepts than to discourse. /ut @reud never reflected upon the historical and theoretical sense of these precautions. (he necessity of an immense labor of deconstruction of the metaphysical concepts and phrases that are condensed and sedimented *ithin @reud's precautions. (he metaphysical complications of psychoanalysis and the so-called human "or social' sciences "the concepts of presence, perception, reality, etc.'. )inguistic phonologism. (he necessity of an explicit question concerning the meaning of presence in general5 a comparison of the underta0ings of 1eidegger and of @reud. (he epoch of presence, in the 1eideggerian sense, and its central support, from #escartes to 1egel5 presence as consciousness, selfpresence conceived *ithin the opposition of consciousness to unconsciousness. (he concepts of archi-trace and of difference5 *hy they are neither @reudian nor 1eideggerian. #ifference, the pre-opening of the ontic-ontological difference "ef #e la grammatologie, p. $A3%', and of all the differences *hich furro* @reudian conceptuality, such that they may be organiBed, and this is only an example, around the difference bet*een "pleasure" and "reality," or may be derived from this difference. (he difference bet*een the

pleasure principle and the reality principle, for example, is not uniquely, nor primarily, a distinction, an exteriority, but rather the original possibility, *ithin life, of the detour, of deferral "-ufschub' and the original possibility of the economy of death "cf /eyond the Pleasure Principle, !6 NC444'. #ifference and identity. #ifference *ithin the economy of the same. (he necessity of *ithdra*ing the concepts of trace and of difference from all classical conceptual oppositions. Necessity of the concept of archi-trace and the erasure of the archia. (his erasure, *hich maintains the legibility of the archia, signifies a conceived relationship of belonging to the history of metaphysics "#e la grammetologie, 35; 3'. 4n *hat *ays *ould the @reudian concepts of *riting and trace still be threatened by metaphysics and positivism< (he complicity of these t*o menaces *ithin @reud's discourse.

Worin die Bahnung sonst besteht bleibt dahingestellt [In what pathbreaking consists remains undetermined]. 'Pro8ect fore Scientific Psychology, 1895)
=ur aim is limited5 to locate in @reud's text several points of reference, and to isolate, on the threshhold of a systematic examination, those elements of psychoanalysis *hich can only uneasily be contained *ithin logocentric closure, as this closure limits not only the history of philosophy but also the orientation of the "human sciences," notably of a certain linguistics. 4f the @reudian brea0-through has an historical originality, this originality is not due to its peaceful coexistence or theoretical complicity *ith this linguistics, at least in its congenital phonologism.' 4t is no accident that @reud, at the decisive moments of his itinerary, has recourse to metaphorical models *hich are borro*ed not from spo0en language or from verbal forms, nor even from phonetic *riting, but from a script *hich is never sub ect to, never exterior and posterior to, the spo0en *ord. @reud invo0es signs *hich do not transcribe living, full speech, master of itself and self-present. 4n fact, and this *ill be our problem, @reud does not simply use the metaphor of nonphonetic *riting8 he does not deem it expedient to manipulate scriptural metaphors for didactic ends. 4f such metaphors are

3+A

WRITING AND DIFFERENCE

FREUD AND THE SCENE '! WRITING

2!

indispensable, it is perhaps because they illuminate, inversely, the meaning of a trace in general, and eventually, in articulation *ith this meaning, may illuminate the meaning of *riting in the popular sense. @reud, no doubt, is not manipulating metaphors, if to manipulate a metaphor means to ma0e of the 0no*n an allusion to the un0no*n. =n the contrary, through the insistence of his metaphoric investment he ma0es *hat *e believe *e 0no* under the name of *riting enigmatic. - movement un0no*n to classical philosophy is perhaps underta0en here, some*here bet*een the implicit and the explicit. @rom Plato and -ristotle on, scriptural images have regularly been used to illustrate the relationship bet*een reason and experience, perception and memory. /ut a certain confidence has never stopped ta0ing its assurance from the meaning of the *ell-0no*n and familiar term5 *riting. (he gesture s0etched out by @reud interrupts that assurance and opens up a ne* 0ind of question about metaphor, *riting, and spacing in general. :e shall let our reading be guided by this metaphoric investment. 4t *ill eventually invade the entirety of the psyche. Psychical content *ill be represented by a text *hose essence is irreducibly graphic. (he structure of the psychical apparatus *ill be represented by a *riting machine. :hat questions *ill these representations impose upon us< :e shall not have to as0 if a *riting apparatus-for example, the one described in the "Note on the 7ystic :riting Pad"-is a good metaphor for representing the *or0ing of the psyche, but rather *hat apparatus *e must create in order to represent psychical *riting8 and *e shall have to as0 *hat the imitation, pro ected and liberated in a machine, of something li0e psychical *riting might mean. -nd not if the psyche is indeed a 0ind of text, but5 *hat is a text, and *hat must the psyche be if it can be represented by a text< @or if there is neither machine nor text *ithout psychical origin, there is no domain of the psychic *ithout text. @inally, *hat must be the relationship bet*een psyche, *riting, and spacing for such a metaphoric transition to be possible, not only, nor primarily, *ithin theoretical discourse, but *ithin the history of psyche, text, and technology<

Breaching and Difference

@rom the Pro ect "$G%+' to the "Note on the 7ystic :riting-Pad" "$%3+', a strange progression5 a problematic of breaching' is elaborated only to conform increasingly to a metaphorics of the *ritten trace. @rom a system of traces functioning according to a model *hich @reud *ould have preferred to be a natural one, and from *hich *riting is entirely absent, *e proceed to*ard a configuration of traces *hich can no longer be represented except by the structure and functioning of *riting. -t the same time, the structural model of *riting, *hich @reud invo0es immediately after the Pro ect, *ill be persistently differentiated and refined in its originality. -ll the mechanical models *ill be tested and abandoned, until the discovery of the :underbloc0, a *riting machine of marvelous complexity into *hich the *hole of the psychical apparatus *ill be pro ected. (he solution to all the previous difficulties *ill be presented in the :underbloc0, and the "Note," indicative of an admirable tenacity, *ill ans*er precisely the questions of the Pro ect. (he :underbloc0, in each of its parts, *ill realiBe the apparatus of *hich @reud said, in the Pro ect5 ":e cannot off-hand imagine an apparatus capable of such complicated functioning" "!6, 4, 3%%', and *hich he replaced at that time *ith a neurological fable *hose frame*or0 and intention, in certain respects, he *ill never abandon. 4n $G%+, the question *as to explain memory in the manner of the natural sciences, in order "to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science5 that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles" "4, 3%+'. No*, a "main characteristic of nervous tissue is memory5 that is, quite generally, a capacity for being permanently altered by single occurrences" "4, 3%%'. -nd a "psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an explanation of 'memory"' "ibid.'. (he crux of such an explanation, *hat ma0es such an apparatus almost unimaginable, is the necessity of accounting simultaneously, as the "Note" *ill do thirty years later, for the permanence of the trace and for the virginity of the receiving substance, for the engraving of furro*s and for the perennially intact bareness of the perceptive surface5 in this case, of the neurones. "4t *ould seem, therefore, that neurones must be both influenced and also unaltered, unpre udiced "unvoreingenommen'" "ibid.'. 2e ecting a

distinction, *hich *as common in his day, bet*een "sense cells" and "memory cells," @reud then forges the hypothesis of "contactbarriers" and "breaching" "/ahnung, lit. pathbrea0ing', of the brea0ing open of a path "/ahn'. :hatever may be thought of the continuities and ruptures to come, this hypothesis is remar0able as soon as it is considered as a metaphorical model and not as a neurological description. /reaching, the tracing of a trail, opens up a conducting path. :hich presupposes a certain violence and a certain resistance to effraction. (he path is bro0en, crac0ed, fracta, breached. No* there *ould be t*o 0inds of neurones5 the permeable neurones "A', *hich offer no resistance and thus retain no trace of impression, *ould be the perceptual neurones8 other neurones "pp', *hich *ould oppose contact-barriers to the quantity of excitation, *ould thus retain the printed trace5 they "thus afford a possibility of representing "darBustellen' memory" "ibid.'. (his is the first representation, the first staging of memory. "#arstellung is representation in the *ea0 sense of the *ord, but also frequently in the sense of visual depiction, and sometimes of theatrical performance. =ur translation *ill vary *ith the inflection of the context.' @reud attributes psychical quality only to these latter neurones. (hey are the "vehicles of memory and so probably of psychical processes in general" "4, ;AA'. 7emory, thus, is not a psychical property among others8 it is the very essence of the psyche5 resistance, and precisely, thereby, . an opening to the effraction of the trace. No* assuming that @reud here intends to spea0 only the language of full and present quantity, assuming, as at least appears to be the case, that he intends to situate his *or0 *ithin the simple opposition of quantity and quality "the latter being reserved for the pure transparency of a perception *ithout memory', *e find that the concept of breaching sho*s itself intolerant of this intention. -n equality of resistance to breaching, or an equivalence of the breaching forces, *ould eliminate any preference in the choice of itinerary. 7emory *ould be paralyBed. 4t is the difference bet*een breaches *hich is the true origin of memory, and thus of the psyche. =nly this difference enables a "path*ay to be preferred ":egbevorBugung'"5 "7emory is represented "dargestellt' by the differences in the facilitations of the y,-neurones" "$, ;AA'. :e then must not say that breaching *ithout difference is insufficient for memory8 it must be stipulated that there is no pure

breaching *ithout difference. (race as memory is not a pure breaching that might be reappropriated at any time as simple presence8 it is rather the ungraspable and invisible difference bet*een breaches. :e thus already 0no* that psychic life is neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of force but the difference *ithin the exertion of forces. -s NietBsche had already said.' (hat quantity becomes psyche and mneme through differences rather than through plenitudes *ill be continuously confirmed in the Pro ect itself. 2epetition adds no quantity of present force, no intensity8 it reproduces the same impression-yet it has the po*er of breaching. "(he memory of an experience "that is, its continuing operative po*er' depends on a factor *hich is called the magnitude of the impression and on the frequency *ith *hich the same impression is repeated" "4, ;AA'. (he number of repetitions is thus added to the quantity "M$,' of the excitation, and these t*o quantities are of t*o absolutely heterogeneous types. (here are only discrete repetitions, and they can act as such only through the diastem *hich maintains their separation. @inally, if breaching can supplement a quantity presently at *or0, or can be added to it, it is because breaching is certainly analogous to quantity, but is other than it as *ell5 "quantity plus facilitation resulting from Qrf are at the same time something that can replace Qr)" (I, ;AA-;A$'. )et us not hasten to define this other of pure quantity as quality5 for in so doing *e *ould be transforming the force of memory into present consciousness and the translucid perception of present qualities. (hus, neither the difference bet*een full quantities, nor the interval bet*een repetitions of the identical, nor breaching itself, may be thought of in terms of the opposition bet*een quantity and quality.' 7emory cannot be derived from this opposition, and it escapes the grasp of "naturalism" as *ell as of "phenomenology." -ll these differences in the production of the trace may be reinterpreted as moments of deferring. 4n accordance *ith a motif *hich *ill continue to dominate @reud's thin0ing, this movement is described as the effort of life to protect itself by deferring a dangerous cathexis, that is, by constituting a reserve "Corrat'. (he threatening expenditure or presence are deferred *ith the help of breaching or repetition. 4s this not already the detour "-ufschub, lit. delay' *hich institutes the relation of pleasure to reality "/eyond .......................................!6, NC444'< 4s it not already death at the

origin of a life *hich can defend itself against death only through an economy of death, through deferment, repetition, reserve< @or repetition does not happen to an initial impression8 its possibility is already there, in the resistance offered the first time by the psychical neurones. 2esistance itself is possible only if the opposition of forces lasts and is repeated at the beginning. 4t is the very idea of a first time *hich becomes enigmatic. :hat *e are advancing here does not seem to contradict *hat @reud *ill say further on5 "@acilitation is probably the result of the single "einmaliger' passage of a large quantity." 6ven assuming that his affirmation does not lead us little by little to the problem of phylogenesis and of hereditary breaches, *e may still maintain that in the first time of the contact bet*een t*o forces, repetition has begun. )ife is already threatened by the origin of the memory *hich constitutes it, and by the breaching *hich it resists, the effraction *hich it can contain only by repeating it. 4t is because breaching brea0s open that @reud, in the Pro ect, accords a privilege to pain. 4n a certain sense, there is no breaching *ithout a beginning of pain, and "pain leaves behind it particularly rich breaches." /ut beyond a certain quantity, pain, the threatening origin of the psyche, must be deferred, li0e death, for it can ruin psychical "organiBation." #espite the enigmas of the "first time" and of originary repetition "needless to say, before any distinction bet*een "normal" and "pathological" repetition', it is important that @reud attributes all this *or0 to the primary function, and that he excludes any possible derivation of it. )et us observe this nonderivation, even if it renders only more dense the difficulty of the concepts of "primariness" and of the timelessness of the primary process, and even if this difficulty does not cease to intensify in *hat is to come. "1ere *e are almost involuntarily reminded of the endeavor of the nervous system, maintained through every modification, to avoid being burdened by a MrW or to 0eep the burden as small as possible. Ender the compulsion of the exigencies of life, the nervous system *as obliged to lay up a store of Mq. (his necessitated an increase in the number of its neurones, and these had to be impermeable. 4t no* avoids, partly at least, being filled *ith Mil "cathexis', by setting up facilitations. 4t *ill be seen, then, that facilitation serve the primary function" "4, ;A$'. No doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, differance "deferral'. /ut *e must be *ary of this formulation5 there is no life present at first

*hich *ould then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itself in differance. (he latter constitutes the essence of life. =r rather5 as differance is not an essence, as it is not anything, it is not life, if /eing is determined as ousia, presence, essenceWexistence, substance or sub ect. )ife must be thought of as trace before /eing may be determined as presence. (his is the only condition on *hich *e can say that life is death, that repetition and the beyond of the pleasure principle are native and congenital to that *hich they transgress. :hen @reud *rites in the Pro ect that "facilitations serve the primary function," he is forbidding us to be surprised by /eyond the Pleasure Principle. 1e complies *ith a dual necessity5 that of recogniBing differance at the origin, and at the same time that of crossing out the concept of primariness5 *e *ill not, then, be surprised by the (raumdeutung, *hich defines primariness as a "theoretical fiction" in a paragraph on the "delaying" "Cersputung' of the secondary process. 4t is thus the delay *hich is in the beginning.' :ithout *hich, differance *ould be the lapse *hich a consciousness, a self-presence of the present, accords itself (o defer "differer' thus cannot mean to retard a present possibility, to postpone an act, to put off a perception already no* possible. (hat possibility is possible only through a differance *hich must be conceived of in other terms than those of a calculus or mechanics of decision.' (o say that differance is originary is simultaneously to erase the myth of a present origin. :hich is *hy "originary" must be understood as having been crossed out, *ithout *hich differance *ould be derived from an original plenitude. 4t is a non-origin *hich is originary. 2ather than abandon it, *e ought perhaps then to rethin0 the concept of differer. (his is *hat *e should li0e to do, and this is possible only if differance is determined outside any teleological or eschatological horiBon. :hich is not easy. )et us note in passing that the concepts of Nachtrdglich0eit and Cerspatung, concepts *hich govern the *hole of @reud's thought and determine all his other concepts, are already present and named in the Pro ect. (he irreducibility of the "effect of deferral"-such, no doubt, is @reud's discovery. @reud exploits this discovery in its ultimate consequences, beyond the psychoanalysis of the individual, and he thought that the history of culture ought to confirm it. 4n 7oses and 7onotheism "$%;,', the efficacy of delay and of action subsequent to the event is at *or0 over large historical intervals.

(he problem of latency, moreover, is in highly significant contact *ith the problem of oral and *ritten tradition in this text. -lthough "breaching" is not named *riting at any time in the Pro ect, the contradictory requirements *hich the 7ystic :riting Pad *ill fulfill are already formulated in terms *hich are literally identical5 "an unlimited receptive capacity and a retention of permanent traces" "!6 N4N,33,'. #ifferences in the *or0 of breaching concern not only forces but also locations. -nd @reud already *ants to thin0 force and place simultaneously.' 1e is the first not to believe in the descriptive value of his hypothetical representation of breaching. (he distinction bet*een the categories of neurones "has no recogniBed foundation, at least insofar as morphology "i.e., histology' is concerned." 4t is, rather, the index of a topographical description *hich external space, that is, familiar and constituted space, the exterior space of the natural sciences, cannot contain. (his is *hy, under the heading of "the biological standpoint," a "difference in essence" ":esensverschiedenheit' bet*een the neurones is "replaced by a difference in the environment to *hich they are destined" "!chic0sals-7ilieuverschiedenheit' "4, ;A.'5 these are pure differences, differences of situation, of connection, of localiBation, of structural relations more important than their supporting terms8 and they are differences for *hich the relativity of outside and inside is al*ays to be determined. (he thin0ing of difference can neither dispense *ith topography nor accept the current models of spacing. (his difficulty becomes more acute *hen it becomes necessary to explain those differences that are pure par excellence5 differences of quality, that is, for @reud, differences of consciousness. 1e must provide an explanation for "*hat *e are a*are of, in the most puBBling fashion "rutselhaft', through our 'consciousness' " "4, ;A,'. -nd "since this consciousness 0no*s nothing of *hat *e have so far been assumingquantities and neurones-it >the theory? should explain this lac0 of 0no*ledge to us as *ell" "4, ;AG'. No* qualities are clearly pure differences5 "Consciousness gives us *hat are called qualitiessensations *hich are diferent "antlers' and *hose difference "-nders, lit. otherness' is distinguished "unterschieden *ird, lit. is differentiated' according to its relations *ith the external *orld. :ithin this difference there are series, similarities, and so on, but there are in fact no

quant ties in it. 4t may be as0ed ho* qualities originate and *here qualities originate" "$, ;AG'. Neither outside nor inside. (hey cannot be in the external *orld, *here the physicist recogniBes only quantities, "masses in motion and nothing else" "4, ;AG'. Nor in the interiority of the psyche "i.e., of memory', for "reproducing or remembering" are "*ithout quality "qualitatslos'" "ibid,'. !ince re ection of the topographical model is out of the question, "*e must summon up courage to assume that there is a third system of neurones perhaps >perceptual neurones-*hich is excited along *ith perception, but not along *ith reproduction, and *hose states of excitation give rise to the various qualities-are, that is to say, conscious sensations" "4, ;A%'. @oreshado*ing the interpolated sheet of the mystic *ritingpad, @reud, annoyed by this " argon," tells @liess "letter ;%, $ Dan. $G%&' that he is inserting, "slipping" "schieben' the perceptual neurones "*' bet*een the ?// and CW-neurones. (his last bit of daring results in "*hat seems li0e an immense difficulty"5 *e have ust encountered a permeability and a breaching *hich proceed from no quantity at all. @rom *hat then< @rom pure time, from pure temporaliBation in its con unction *ith spacing5 from periodicity. =nly recourse to temporality and to a discontinuous or periodic temporality *ill allo* the difficulty to be resolved, and *e must patiently consider its implications. "4 can see only one way out.... !o far 4 have regarded it >the passage of quantity? only as the transference of @q from one neurone to another. 4t must have another characteristic, of a temporal nature" "4, ;$A'. 4f the discontinuity hypothesis "goes further," @reud emphasiBes, than the "physical clarification" due to its insistence on periods, it is because in this case differences, intervals, and discontinuity are registered, "appropriated" *ithout their quantitative support. Perceptual neurones, incapable of receiving @q >quantities?, appropriate the period of the excitation" "ibid.'. Pure difference, again, and difference bet*een diastems. (he concept of a period in general precedes and conditions the opposition bet*een quantity and quality, and everything governed by this opposition. @or "*-neurones too have their period, of course8 but it is *ithout quality, or more correctly, monotonous" "ibid.'. -s *e shall see, this insistence on discontinuity *ill faithfully become the occupation of the "Note on the 7ystic :riting Pad"5 as

=<C

W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/

FREUD AND THE SCENE OF $RITING 4"5

in the Pro&ect, it will +e a last +old move resolving a final logical difficulty. he rest of the Pro&ect will depend in its entirety upon an incessant and increasingly radical invocation of the principle of difference. 6eneath an indicial neurology, which plays the representational role of an aritficial model, we repeatedly find a persistent attempt to account for the psyche in terms of spacing, a topography of traces, a map of +reaches> and we repeatedly find an attempt to locate consciousness or :uality in a space whose structure and possi+ility must +e rethought, along with an attempt to descri+e the "functioning of the apparatus" in terms of pure differences and locations, an attempt to e)plain how ":uantity of e)citation is e)pressed in t9i by comple)ity and :uality +y topography." 9t is +ecause the nature of this system of differences and of this topography is radically new and must not allow any omissions that 'reud, in his setting up of the apparatus, multiplies "acts of +oldness," "strange +ut indispensa+le hypotheses" *concerning "secreting" neurones or "%ey" neurones2. ,nd when he renounces neurology and anatomical locali3ations, it will +e not in order to a+andon his topographical preoccupations, +ut to transform them. race will +ecome gramme> and the region of +reaching a ciphered spacing.
T(e &ri/t a/d t(e Ori0i/a+ S122+e3e/t

, few wee%s after the Pro&ect is sent to 'liess, during a "night of wor%," all the elements of the system arrange themselves into a "machine." 9t is not yet a writing machine. "-verything fell into place, the cogs meshed, the thing really seemed to +e a machine which in a moment would run of itself" C 9n a moment. in thirty years. 6y itself. almost. , little more than a year later, the trace starts to +ecome writing. 9n letter <= *# Dec. !C"#2, the entire system of the Pro&ect is reconstituted in terms of a graphic conception as yet un%nown in 'reud. 9t is not surprising that this coincides with the transition from the neurological to the psychical. ,t the heart of the letter. the words "sign" *Leichen2, registration */iederschrift2, transcription *0mschrift2. /ot only is the communication +etween trace and delay *i.e., a present which does not constitute +ut is originally reconstituted from "signs" of memory2 e)plicitly defined in this letter, +ut ver+al phenomena are assigned a

place within a system of stratified writing which these phenomena are far from dominating. ",s you %now, 9 am wor%ing on the assumption that our psychic mechanism has come into +eing +y a process of stratification *,ufeinanderschichtung2> the material present in the form of memory-traces *-rrinerungsspuren2 +eing su+&ected from time to time to a rearrangement *0mordnung2 in accordance with fresh circumstances to a retranscription *0mschrift2. hus, what is essentially new a+out my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once +ut several times over, that it is laid down *niederlegt2 in various species of indications ALeichen, lit. signsB ....9 cannot say how many of these registrations */iederschriften2 there are. at least three, pro+a+ly more .... he different registrations are also separated *not necessarily topographically2 according to the neurones which are their vehicles .... Perception. hese are neurones in which perceptions originate, to which consciousness attaches, +ut which in themselves retain no trace of what has happened. 'or consciousness and memory are mutually e)clusive. 9ndication of perception. the first registration of the perceptions> it is :uite incapa+le of consciousness and arranged according to associations +y simultaneity ....0nconscious is a second registration .... Preconscious is the third transcription, attached to word-presentations and corresponding to our official ego .... his secondary thought-consciousness is su+se:uent in time and pro+a+ly lin%ed to the hallucinatory activation of word-presentations" *9, =1<2. his is the first move toward the "/ote." 'rom now on, starting with the raumdeutung *!"GG2, the metaphor of writing will appropriate simultaneously the pro+lems of the psychic apparatus in its structure and that of the psychic te)t in its fa+ric. he solidarity of the two pro+lems should ma%e us that much more attentive. the two series of metaphors-te)t and machine--do not come on stage at the same time. "Dreams generally follow old facilitations," said the Pro&ect. opographical, temporal, and formal regression in dreams must thus +e interpreted, henceforth, as a path +ac% into a landscape of writing. /ot a writing which simply transcri+es, a stony echo of muted words, +ut a lithography +efore words. metaphonetic, nonlinguistic, alogical. *(ogic o+eys consciousness, or preconsciousness, the site of ver+al images, as well as the principle of identity, the founding e)pression of a philosophy of presence. "9t was only a logical contradiction, which does not have much import," we read in he Wolf-?an.2 With dreams

D1C $RITING AND DIFFERENCE dis!laced into a forest of scri!t, the Tra$"de$t$ng, the inter!retation of drea"s, no do$bt, on the first a!!roach will be an act of reading and decoding. Eefore the analysis of the Ir"a drea", &re$d engages in considerations of "ethod. In one of his fa"iliar gest$res, he o!!oses the old !o!$lar tradition to so)called scientific !sychology. s always, it is in order to ,$stify the !rofo$nd intention which ins!ires the for"er. 9o!$lar tradition "ay err, of co$rse, when according to a +sy"bolical+ !roced$re, it treats drea" content as an indivisible and $nartic$lated whole, for which +It a second, be !ossibly as !ro!hetic the whole "ay be s$bstit$ted. E$t &re$d is not far fro" acce!ting the +other !o!$lar "ethod+' "ight described %decoding% "ethod (5hiffrier"ethode), since it treats drea"s as a kind of cry!togra!hy (0ehei"schrift) in which each sign can be translated into another sign having a known "eaning, in accordance with a fi4ed key (*chl$ssel)+ (IF, @2). =et $s retain the all$sion to a !er"anent code' it is the weakness of a "ethod to which &re$d attrib$tes, nevertheless, the "erit of being analytic and of s!elling o$t the ele"ents of "eaning one by one. strange e4a"!le, the one chosen by &re$d to ill$strate this trad) itional !roced$re' a te4t of !honetic writing is cathected and f$nctions as a discrete, s!ecific, translatable and $n!rivileged ele"ent in the overall writing of the drea". 9honetic writing as writing within writing. ss$"e, for e4a"!le, says &re$d, that I have drea"ed of a letter (Erief 8 e!istola), then of a b$rial. ;!en a Tra$"b$ch, a book in which the keys to drea"s are recorded, an encyclo!edia of drea" signs, the drea" dictionary which &re$d will soon re,ect. It teaches $s that letter "$st be translated (fberset.en) by s!ite, and b$rial by engage"ent to be "arried. Th$s a letter (e!istola) written with letters (litterae), a doc$"ent co"!osed of !honetic signs, the transcri!tion of verbal disco$rse, "ay be translated by a nonverbal signifier which, inas"$ch as it is a deter"ined affect, belongs to the overall synta4 of drea" writing. The verbal is cathected, and its !honetic transcri!tion is bo$nd, far fro" the center, in a web of silent scri!t. &re$d then borrows another e4a"!le fro" rte"idoro$s of Daldis (second cent$ry), the a$thor of a treatise on the inter!retation of drea"s. =et it be a !rete4t for recalling that in the eighteenth cent$ry an <nglish theologian, known to &re$d, had already invoked rte"idor$s

FREUD AND THE SCENE OF $RITING 461

describes the syste" of hierogly!hics, and discerns in it (rightly or wrongly it is of no concern to $s here) vario$s str$ct$res (hierogly!hics strictly s!eaking or sy"bolical ones, each ty!e being either c$riological or tro!ological, the relation here being of analogy or of !art to whole) which o$ght to be syste"atically confronted with the "echanis"s of drea") work (condensation, dis!lace"ent, overdeter"ination). Now 7arb$rton, interested, for reasons of self),$stification, in de"onstrating, against &ather Kircher, +the high anti/$ity of <gy!tian learning,+ chooses the e4a"!le of an <gy!tian science which draws all its reso$rces fro" hierogly!hic writing. That science is Tra$"de$t$ng, also known as oneirocriticis". 7hen all is said and done, it was only a science of writing in !riestly hands. 0od, the <gy!tians believed, had "ade "an a gift of writing ,$st as he ins!ired drea"s. Inter!reters, like drea"s the"selves, then had only to draw $!on the c$riological or tro!ological storeho$se. They wo$ld readily find there the key to drea"s, which they wo$ld then !retend to divine. The hierogly!hic code itself served as a Tra$"b$ch. n alleged gift of 0od, in fact constr$cted historically, it had beco"e the co""on so$rce fro" which was drawn oneiric disco$rse' the setting and the te4t of the drea"%s "ice en scene. *ince drea"s are constr$cted like a for" of writing, the kinds of trans!osition in drea"s corres!ond to condensations and dis!lace"ents already !erfor"ed and enregistered in the syste" of hierogly!hics. Drea"s wo$ld only "ani!$late ele"ents (stoicheia, says 7arb$rton, ele"ents or letters) contained in the storeho$se of hierogly!hics, so"ewhat as written s!eech wo$ld draw on a written lang$age' +*o that the /$estion will be, on what gro$nds or r$les of inter!retation the ;nirocritics !roceded, when, if a "an drea"t of a dragon, the inter!reter ass$red hi" it signified "a,esty- if of a ser!ent, a disease- a vi!er, "oney- frogs, i"!ostors.++ 7hat then did the her"ene$ts of that age do6 They cons$lted writing itself'

Now the early Interpreters of dreams were not ,$ggling i"!ostors- b$t, like the early ,$dicial &strolo ers, "ore s$!erstitio$s than their neighbors- and so the first who fell into their own del$sions. (owever, s$!!ose the" to have been as arrant cheats as any of their s$ccessors, yet at their first setting $! they "$st have had "aterials !ro!er for their trade- which co$ld never be the wild workings of each "an%s

with an intention that is do$btless worthy of co"!arison.% 7arb$rton

D 1D W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ !rivate fancy. Their c$sto"ers wo$ld look to find a known analogy, beco"e venerable by long a!!lication to "ysterio$s wisdo", for the gro$ndwork of their deci!hering- and the Deci!herers the"selves wo$ld as nat$rally fly to so"e confessed a$thority, to s$!!ort their !retended *cience. E$t what gro$nd or a$thority co$ld this be, if not the "ysterio$s learning of symbolic characters? (ere we see" to have got a sol$tion of the diffic$lty. The $ y!tian !riests, the first inter!reters of drea"s, took their r$les for this s!ecies of D9E9/, 95/, fro" their symbolic riddling, in which they were so dee!ly read' gro$nd of Inter!retation which wo$ld give the strongest credit to the rt- and e/$ally satisfy the diviner and the 5ons$lter' for by this ti"e it was generally believed that their 0ods have given the" hieroglyphic writing. *o that nothing was "ore nat$ral than to i"agine that these 0ods, who in their o!inion gave dreams likewise, had e"!loyed the sa"e "ode of e4!ression in both revelations.+ It is here that the &re$dian break occ$rs. &re$d do$btless conceives of the drea" as a dis!lace"ent si"ilar to an original for" of writing which !$ts words on stage witho$t beco"ing s$bservient to the"- and he is thinking here, no do$bt, of a "odel of writing irred$cible to s!eech which wo$ld incl$de, like hierogly!hics, !ictogra!hic, ideogra""atic, and !honetic ele"ents. E$t he "akes of !sychical writing so originary a !rod$ction that the writing we believe to be designated by the !ro!er sense of the word)a scri!t which is coded and visible +in the world+ wo$ld only be the "eta!hor of !sychical writing. This writing, for e4a"!le the kind we find in drea"s which +follow old facilitations,+ a si"!le "o"ent in a regression toward a +!ri"ary+ writing, cannot be read in ter"s of any code. It works, no do$bt, with a "ass of ele"ents which have been codified in the co$rse of an individ$al or collective history. E$t in its o!erations, le4icon, and synta4 a !$rely idio"atic resid$e is irred$cible and is "ade to bear the b$rden of inter!retation in the co""$nication between $nconscio$snesses. The drea"er invents his own gra""ar. No "eaningf$l "aterial or !rere/$isite te4t e4ists which he "ight si"!ly $se, even if he never de!rives hi"self of the". *$ch, des!ite their interest, is the li"itation of the 5hiffrier"ethode and the Tra$"b$ch. li"itation is a f$nction of s "$ch as it is a f$nction of the generality and the rigidity of the code, this

,2/9D ;ND 0?/ S6/N/ =, W2I0IN1

26B

an e4cessive !reocc$!ation with content, and an ins$fficient concern for relations, locations, !rocesses, and differences' +My !roced$re is not so convenient as the !o!$lar decoding "ethod which translates any given !iece of a drea"%s content by a fi4ed key. I, on the contrary, a" !re!ared to find that the sa"e !iece of content "ay conceal a different "eaning when it occ$rs in vario$s !eo!le or in vario$s conte4ts+ (*< IF, 1CG). <lsewhere, in s$!!ort of that state"ent, &re$d thinks it !ro!er to add$ce the case of 5hinese writing' +They Hthe drea" sy"bolsI fre/$ently have "ore than one or even several "eanings, and, as with 5hinese scri!t, the correct inter!retation can only be arrived at on each occasion fro" the conte4t+ (F, 3G3). The absence of an e4ha$stive and absol$tely infallible code "eans that in !sychic, writing, which th$s !refig$res the "eaning of writing in general, the difference between signifier and signified is never radical. Jnconscio$s e4!erience, !rior to the drea"

which

+follows

old

facilitations,+ does not borrow b$t !rod$ces its own signifiers- does not create the" in their "ateriality, of co$rse, b$t !rod$ces their stat$s)as) "eaningf$l (signifiance). (enceforth, they are no longer, !ro!erly s!eaking, signifiers. nd the !ossibility of translation, if it is far fro" being eli"inated)for e4!erience !er!et$ally creates distances between the !oints of identity or between the adherence of signifier to signified)is nevertheless in !rinci!le and by definition li"ited. *$ch, !erha!s, is &re$d%s $nderstanding, fro" another stand!oint, in the article on +:e!ression+ ' +:e!ression acts, therefore, in a highly individ$al "anner+ (?IF, 1GC). (Individ$ality, here does not refer !ri"arily to the re!ression !racticed by individ$als b$t to that of each +derivative of the re!ressed,

which "ay have its own s!ecial vicissit$de.+) Translation, a syste" of

translation, is !ossible only if a !er"anent code allows a s$bstit$tion or transfor"ation of signifiers while retaining the sa"e signified, always !resent, des!ite the absence of any s!ecific signifier. This f$nda"ental !ossibility of s$bstit$tion wo$ld th$s be i"!lied by the co$!led conce!ts signified8signifier, and wo$ld conse/$ently be i"!lied by the conce!t of the sign itself <ven if, along with *a$ss$re, we envisage the distinction between signified and signifier only as the two sides of a sheet of !a!er, nothing is changed. ;riginary writing, if there is one, "$st !rod$ce the s!ace and the "ateriality of the sheet itself

4t *ill be said5 and yet @reud translates all the time. 1e believes in the generality and the fixity of a specific code for dream *riting5 ":hen *e have become familiar *ith the abundant use made by symbolism for representing sexual material in dreams, the question is bound to arise of *hether many of these symbols do not occur *ith a permanently fixed meaning, li0e the 'grammalogues' in short8 and *e shall feel tempted to dra* up a ne* 'dream-boo0' on the decoding principle" "C.;+$'. -nd, in fact, @reud never stopped proposing codes, rules of great generality. -nd the substitution of signifiers seems to be the essential activity of psychoanalytic interpretation. Certainly, @reud nevertheless stipulates an essential limitation on this activity. =r, rather, a double limitation. 4f *e consider first verbal expression, as it is circumscribed in the dream, *e observe that its sonority, the materiality of the expression, does not disappear before the signified, or at least cannot be traversed and transgressed as it is in conscious speech. 4t acts as such, *ith the efficacy -rtaud assigned it on the stage of cruelty."(he materiality of a *ord cannot be translated or carried over into another language. 7ateriality is precisely that *hich translation relinquishes. (o relinquish materiality5 such is the driving force of translation. -nd *hen that materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry. 4n this sense, since the materiality of the signifier constitutes the idiom of every dream scene, dreams are untranslatable5 "4ndeed, dreams are so closely related to linguistic expression that @erencBi has truly remar0ed that every tongue has its o*n dream language. 4t is impossible as a rule to translate a dream into a foreign language, and this is equally true, 4 fancy, of a boo0 such as the present one" "4C, %%, n. 4 '. :hat is valid for a specific national language is a fortiori valid for a private grammar. 7oreover, this horiBontal impossibility of translation *ithout loss has its basis in a vertical impossibility. :e are spea0ing here of the *ay in *hich unconscious thoughts become conscious. 4f a dream cannot be translated into another language, it is because *ithin the psychical apparatus as *ell there is never a relation of simple translation. :e are *rong, @reud tells us, to spea0 of translation or transcription in describing the transition of unconscious thoughts through the preconscious to*ard consciousness. 1ere again the metaphorical concept of translation "EbersetBung' or transcription "Emschrift' is dangerous, not

because it refers to *riting, but because it presupposes a text *hich *ould be already there, immobile5 the serene presence of a statue, of a *ritten stone or archive *hose signified content might be harmlessly transported into the milieu of a different language, that of the preconscious or the conscious. 4t is thus not enough to spea0 of *riting in order to be faithful to @reud, for it is then that *e may betray him more than ever. (his is *hat the last chapter of the (raumdeutung explains. -n entirely and conventionally topographical metaphor of the psychical apparatus is to be completed by invo0ing the existence of force and of t*o 0inds of processes of excitation or modes of its discharge5 "!o let us try to correct some conceptions >intuitive illustrations5 -nschauungen? *hich might be misleading so long as *e loo0ed upon the t*o systems in the most literal and crudest sense as t*o localities in the mental apparatusconceptions *hich left their traces in the expressions 'to repress' and 'to force a *ay through.' (hus, *e may spea0 of an unconscious thought see0ing to convey itself into the preconscious so as to be able then to force its *ay through into consciousness. :hat *e have in mind here is not the forming of a second thought situated in a ne* place, li0e a transcription "Emschrift' *hich continues to exist alongside the original8 and the notion of forcing a *ay through into consciousness must be 0ept carefully free from any idea of a change of locality" "C, &$A'. " )et us interrupt our quotation for a moment. (he conscious text is thus not a transcription, because there is no text present else*here as an unconscious one to be transposed or transported. @or the value of presence can also dangerously affect the concept of the unconscious. (here is then no unconscious truth to be rediscovered by virtue of having been *ritten else*here. (here is no text *ritten and present else*here *hich *ould then be sub ected, *ithout being changed in the process, to an operation and a temporaliBation "the latter belonging to consciousness if *e follo* @reud literally' *hich *ould be external to it, floating on its surface. (here is no present text in general, and there is not even a past present text, a text *hich is past as having been present. (he text is not conceivable in an originary or modified form of presence. (he unconscious text is already a *eave of pure traces, differences in *hich meaning and force are united-a text no*here present,

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WRITING AND DIFFERENCE

!R"3

AN

T+" -#"N" '! WRITING

26

consisting of archives *hich are al*ays already transcriptions. =riginary prints. 6verything begins *ith reproduction -l*ays already5 repositor ies of a meaning *hich *as never present, *hose signified presence is al*ays reconstituted by deferral, nachtrtiglich, belatedly, supplementarily5 for the nachtraglich also means supplementary. (he call of the supplement, is primary, here, and it hollo*s out that *hich *ill be reconstituted by deferral as the present. (he supplement, *hich seems to be added as a plenitude to a plenitude, is equally that *hich compensates for a lac0 "qui supplee'. "!uppleer5 $. (o add *hat is missing, to supply a necessary surplus," says )ittre, respecting, li0e a sleep*al0er, the strange logic of that *ord. 4t is *ithin its logic that the possibility of deferred action should be conceived, as *ell as, no doubt, the relationship bet*een the primary and the secondary on all levels." )et us note5Nachtrag has a precise meaning in the realm of letters5 appendix, codicil, postscript. (he text *e call present may be deciphered only at the bottom of the page, in a footnote or postscript. /efore the recurrence, the present is only the call for a footnote." (hat the present in general is not primal but, rather, reconstituted, that it is not the absolute, *holly living form *hich constitutes experience, that there is no purity of the living formidable for metaphysics, *hich @reud,

case for @reud, *ho *ants to respect simultaneously the /eing-in-the*orld of the psyche, its /eing-situated, and the originality of its topology, *hich is irreducible to any ordinary intra*orldliness, *e perhaps should thin0 that *hat *e are describing here as the labor of *riting erases the transcendental distinction bet*een the origin of the *orld and /eing-in-the-*orld. 6rases it *hile producing it5 the medium of the dialogue and misunderstanding bet*een the 1usserlian and 1eideggerian concepts of /eing-in- the-*orld.' Concerning this nontranscriptive *riting, @reud adds a fundamental specification. (his specification *ill reveal5 "$' the danger involved in immobiliBing or freeBing energy *ithin a naive metaphorics of place8 "3' the necessity not of abandoning but of rethin0ing the space or topology of this *riting8 ";' that @reud, *ho still insists on representing the psychical apparatus in an artificial model, has not yet discovered a mechanical model adequate to the graphematic conceptual scheme he is already using to describe the psychical text. -gain, *e may spea0 of a preconscious thought being repressed or driven out and then ta0en over by the unconscious. (hese images, derived from a set of ideas (Vorstellungskreis relating to a struggle for a piece of ground, may tempt us to suppose that it is literally true that a mental grouping "An!rdn#n$% in one locality has been brought to an end and replaced by a fresh one in another locality. )et us replace these metaphors by something that seems to correspond better to the real state of affairs, and let us say that some particular mental grouping has had a cathexis of energy "Ener$ e&eset'#n$% attached to it or *ithdra*n from it, so that the structure in question has come under the s*ay of a particular agency or been *ithdra*n from it. :hat *e are doing here is once again to replace a topographical *ay of representing things by a dynamic one. :hat *e regard as mobile "d!s Be(e$l c)e% is not the psychical structure itself but its innervation >C, &$o-&ii?. )et us once more interrupt our quotation. (he metaphor of translation as the transcription of an original text *ould separate force and extension, maintaining the simple exteriority of the translated and the translating. (his very exteriority, the static and topological bias of the metaphor, *ould assure the transparency of a neutral translation, of a

present-such is the theme, in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself, *ould have us pursue. (his pursuit is doubtless the only one *hich is exhausted neither * !ince the transition to consciousness is not a derivative or repetitive *riting, a transcription duplicating an unconscious *riting, it occurs in an original manner and, in its very secondariness, is originary and irreducible. !ince consciousness for @reud is a surface exposed to the external *orld, it is here that instead of reading through the metaphor in the usual sense, *e must, on the contrary, understand the possibility of a *riting advanced as conscious and as acting in the *orld "the visible exterior of the graphism, of the literal, of the literal becoming literary, etc.' in terms of the labor of the *riting *hich circulated li0e psychical energy bet*een the unconscious and the conscious. (he "ob ectivist" or "*orldly" consideration of *riting teaches us nothing is not made to a space of psychical *riting- ":e might say5

of transcendental *riting in the event that, *ould see the psyche as a region of the *orld. /ut since this is also the'

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phoronomic and nonmetabolic process. @reud emphasiBes this5 psychic *riting does not lend itself to translation because it is a single energetic system "ho*ever differentiated it may be', and because it covers the entirety of the psychical apparatus. #espite the difference of agencies, psychical *riting in general is not a displacement of meanings *ithin the limpidity of an immobile, pregiven space and the blan0 neutrality of discourse. - discourse *hich might be coded *ithout ceasing to be diaphanous. 1ere energy cannot be reduced8 it does not limit meaning, but rather produces it. (he distinction bet*een force and meaning is derivative in relation to an archi-trace8 it belongs to the metaphysics of consciousness and of presence, or rather of presence in the *ord, in the hallucination of a language determined on the basis of the *ord or of verbal representation. (he metaphysics of preconsciousness, @reud might say, since the preconscious is the place he assigns to the verbal. :ithout that, *ould @reud have taught us anything ne*< @orce produces meaning "and space' through the po*er of "repetition" alone, *hich inhabits it originarily as its death. (his po*er, that is, this lac0 of po*er, *hich opens and limits the labor of force, institutes translatability, ma0es possible *hat *e call "language," transforms an absolute idiom into a limit *hich is al*ays already transgressed5 a pure idiom is not language8 it becomes so only through repetition8 repetition al*ays already divides the point of departure of the first time. #espite appearances, this does not contradict *hat *e said earlier about untranslatability. -t that time it *as a question of recalling the origin of the movement of transgression, the origin of repetition, and the becominglanguage of the idiom. 4f one limits oneself to the datum or the effect of repetition, to translation, to the obviousness of the distinction bet*een force and meaning, not only does one miss the originality of @reud's aim, but one effaces the intensity of the relation to death as *ell. :e ought thus to examine closely-*hich *e cannot do here-all that @reud invites to thin0 concerning *riting as "breaching" in the psychical repetition of this previously neurological notion5 opening up of its o*n space, effraction, brea0ing of a path against resistances, rupture and irruption becoming a route "rupta, via rupta', violent inscription of a form, tracing of a difference in a nature or a matter *hich are conceiv able as such only in their opposition to *riting. (he route is opened in nature or matter, forest or *ood (hyle), and in it acquires a reversibility

of time and space. :e should have to study together, genetically and structurally, the history of the road and the history of *riting." :e are thin0ing here of @reud's texts on the *or0 of the memory-trace "6rin nerungsspur' *hich, though no longer the neurological trace, is not yet "conscious memory," ""(he Enconscious," !6 N4C, $GG', and of the itinerant *or0 of the trace, producing and follo*ing its route, the trace *hich traces, the trace *hich brea0s open its o*n path. (he metaphor of pathbrea0ing, so frequently used in @reud's descriptions, is al*ays in communication *ith the theme of the supplementary delay and *ith the reconstitution of meaning through deferral, after a mole-li0e progression, after the subterranean toil of an impression. (his impression has left behind a laborious trace *hich has never been perceived, *hose meaning has never been lived in the present, i.e., has never been lived consciously. (he postscript *hich constitutes the past present as such is not satisfied, as Plato, 1egel, and Proust perhaps thought, *ith rea*a0ening or revealing the present past in its truth. 4t produces the present past. 4s sexual deferral the best example or the essence of this movement< - false question, no doubt5 the "presumably 0no*n' sub ect of the questionsexuality-is determined, limited, or unlimited only through inversion and through the ans*er itself @reud's ans*er, in any event, is decisive. (a0e the :olf-7an. 4t is by deferral that the perception of the primal scene*hether it be reality or fantasy hardly matters-is lived in its meaning, and sexual maturation is not the accidental form of this delay. "-t age one and a half, he received impressions the deferred understanding of *hich became possible for him at the time of the dream through his development, exaltation and sexual investigations." -lready in the Pro ect, concerning repression in hysteria5 ":e invariably find that a memory is repressed *hich has become a trauma only after the event "nur nachtrdglich'. (he reason for this state of things is the retardation "Cerspdtung' of puberty as compared *ith the remainder of the individual's development." (hat should lead, if not to the solution, at least to a ne* *ay of posing the formid able problem of the temporaliBation and the so-called "timelessness" of the unconscious. 1ere, more than else*here, the gap bet*een @reud's intuition and his concepts is apparent. (he timelessness of the unconscious is no doubt determined only in opposition to a common concept of time, a traditional concept, the metaphysical concept5 the

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271

time of mechanics or the time of consciousness. We ought perhaps to read 'reud the way 4eidegger read @ant. li%e the cogito, the unconscious is no dou+t timeless only from the standpoint of a certain vulgar conception of time." Dioptrics and 4ieroglyphics (et us not hasten to conclude that +y invo%ing an energetics, as opposed to a topography, of translation 'reud a+andoned his efforts at locali3ation. 9f, as we shall see, he persists in giving a pro&ective and spatial-indeed, purely mechanical-representation of energetic pro cesses, it is not simply for didactic reasons. a certain spatiality, insepara+le from the very idea of system, is irreduci+le> its nature is all the more enigmatic in that we can no longer consider it as the homogeneous and serene milieu of dynamic and economic processes. 9n the raumdeutung, the metaphoric machine is not yet adapted to the scriptural analogy which already governs-as shall soon +e clear-'reud's entire descriptive presentation. 9t is an optical machine. (et us return to our :uotation. 'reud does not want to a+andon the topographical model against which he has &ust warned us. "/evertheless, 9 consider it e)pedient and &ustifia+le to continue to ma%e use of the figurative image *anschauliche Eorstellung. intuitive representation, metaphor2 of the two systems. We can avoid any possi+le a+use of this method of representation *mode de mise en scene> Darstellungsweise2 +y recollecting that ideas *Eorstellungen. representations2, thoughts and psychical structures in general must never +e regarded as locali3ed in organic elements of the nervous system +ut rather, as one might say, +etween them, where resistance and facilitations provide the corresponding correlates. -verything that can +e an o+&ect *Gegenstand2 of our internal perception is virtual, li%e the image produced in a telescope +y the passage of light rays. 6ut we are &ustified in assuming the e)istence of the systems *which are not in any way psychical entities themselves Amy italicsB and can never +e accessi+le to our psychical perception2 li%e the lenses of the telescope, which cast the image. ,nd, if we pursue this analogy, we compare the censorship +etween two systems to the refraction Athe +rea%ing of the ray. Strahlen+rechungB which ta%es place when a ray of light passes into a new medium" *E, #!!2

his representation already cannot +e understood in terms of the spatiality of a simple, homogenous structure. he change in medium and the movement of refraction indicate this sufficiently. (ater, in a further reference to the same machine, 'reud proposes an interesting differentiation. 9n the same chapter, in the section on "8egression," he attempts to e)plain the relation +etween memory and perception in the memory trace. What is presented to us in these words is the idea of shall entirely disregard the idea that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also %nown to us in the form of an anatom ical preparation la+oratory preparationB, and 9 shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. 9 shall remain upon psychological ground, and 9 propose simply to follow the suggestion that we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions as resem+ling a compound microscope, or a photographic apparatus, or something of the %ind. 5n that +asis, psychical locality will correspond to a place *5rt2 inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into +eing. 9n the microscope and telescope, as we %now, these occur in part at ideal points, regions in which no tangi+le component of the apparatus is situated. 9 see no necessity to apologi3e for the imperfections +f this or +f any similar imagery % <1#B.
psychical locality. ( ;Preparat$

6eyond its pedagogical value, this illustration proves useful for its distinction +etween system and psyche. the psychical system is not psychical, and in this description only the system is in :uestion. /e)t, it is the operation of the apparatus which interests 'reud, how it runs and in what order, the regulated timing of its movements as it is caught and locali3ed in the parts of the mechanism. "Strictly spea%ing, there is no need for the hypothesis that the psychical systems are actually arranged in a spatial order. 9t would +e sufficient if a fi)ed order were esta+lished +y the fact that in a given psychical process the e)citation passes through the systems in a particular temporal se:uence" *E, <1$2. 'inally, these optical instruments capture light> in the e)ample of photography they register it." 'reud wants to account for the photographic negative or inscription of light, and this is the differentiation *Differen3ierung2 which

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478

he introduces. 9t will reduce the "imperfections" of his analogy and perhaps "e)cuse" them. ,+ove all it will throw into relief the apparently contradictory re:uirement which has haunted 'reud since the Pro&ect and will +e satisfied only +y a writing machine, the "?ystic Pad". /e)t, we have grounds for introducing a first differentiation at the sensory end Aof the apparatusB. , trace (&pur) is left in our psychical apparatus of the perceptions which impinge upon it. his we may descri+e as a "memory-trace" (=rrinerungsspur) and to the function relating to it we give the name of "memory." 9f we are in earnest over our plan of attaching psychical processes to systems, memory-traces can only consist in permanent modifications of the elements of the systems. 6ut, as has already +een pointed out elsewhere, there are o+vious difficulties involved in supposing that one and the same system can accurately retain modifications of its elements and yet remain perpetually open to the reception of fresh occasions for modification N" <1CB. wo systems will thus +e necessary in a single machine. his dou+le system, com+ining freshness of surface and depth of retention, could only distantly and "imperfectly" +e represented +y an optical machine. "6y analysing dreams we can ta%e a step forward in our understanding of the composition of that most marvelous and most mysterious of all instruments. 5nly a small step no dou+t> +ut a +eginning." hus do we read in the final pages of the raumdeutung *E, #GC2. 5nly a small step. he graphic representation of the *nonpsychical2 system of the psychical is not yet ready at a time when such a representation of the psychical has already occupied, in the raumdeutung itself, a large area. (et us measure this delay. We have already defined elsewhere the fundamental property of writing, in a difficult sense of the word, as spacing. diastem and time +ecoming space> an unfolding as well, on an original site, of meanings which irreversi+le, linear consecution, moving from present point to present point, could only tend to repress, and *to a certain e)tent2 could only fail to repress. 9n particular in so-called phonetic writing. he latter's complicity with logos *or the time of logic2, which is dominated +y the principle of noncontradiction, the cornerstone of all

metaphysics or presence, is profound. /ow in every silent or not wholly phonic spacing out of meaning, concatenations are possi+le which no longer o+ey the linearity of logical time, the time of consciousness or preconsciousness, the time of "ver+al representations." he +order +etween the non-phonetic space of writing *even "phonetic" writing2 and the space of the stage *scene2 of dreams is uncertain. We should not +e surprised then, if 'reud, in order to suggest the strangeness of the logico-temporal relations in dreams, constantly adduces writing, and the spatial synopses of pictograms, re+uses, hieroglyphics and nonphonetic writing in general. Synopsis and not stasis. scene and not ta+leau. he laconic, lapidary :uality of dreams is not the impassive presence of petrified signs." 9nterpretation has spelled out the elements of dreams. 9t has revealed the wor% of condensation and displacement. 9t is still necessary to account for the synthesis which composes and stages the whole. he resources of the mise en scene *die Darstellungsmittel2 must +e :uestioned. , certain polycentrism of dream representation is irreconcila+le with the apparently linear unfolding of pure ver+al representations. he logical and ideal structure of conscious speech must thus su+mit to the dream system and +ecome su+ordinate to it, li%e a part of its machinery. he different portions of this complicated structure stand, of course, in the most manifold logical relations to one another. hey can represent foreground and +ac%ground, digressions and illustrations, conditions, chains of evidence and counter-arguments. When the whole mass of these dream-thoughts is +rought under the pressure of the dream-wor%, and its elements are turned a+out, +ro%en into fragments and &ammed togetheralmost li%e pac%-ice-the :uestion arises of what happens to the logical connections which have hitherto formed its framewor%. What representation *mise en scene) do dreams provide for "if," "+ecause," "&ust as," "although," "either-or," and all the other con&unctions without which we cannot understand sentences or speechesF" AE, 312I< his type of representation *mise en scene2 may at first +e compared to those forms of e)pression which are li%e the writing within speech. the

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painting or sculpture of signifiers *hich inscribe in a common space elements *hich the spo0en chain must suppress. @reud sets them off against poetry, "*hich can ma0e use of speech "2ede'." /ut may the dream as *ell not use spo0en language< "4n dreams *e see but *e do not hear," said the Pro ect. 4n point of fact, @reud, li0e -rtaud later on, meant less the absence than the subordination of speech on the dreamstage."' @ar from disappearing, speech then changes purpose and status. 4t is situated, surrounded, invested "in all senses of the *ord',' constituted. 4t figures in dreams much as captions do in comic strips, those picto-hieroglyphic combinations in *hich the phonetic text is secondary and not central in the telling of the tale5 "/efore painting became acquainted *ith the la*s of expression by *hich it is governed ... in ancient paintings small labels *ere hung from the mouths of the persons represented, containing in *ritten characters "als !chrift' the speeches *hich the artist despaired of representing pictorially" >C, ;$3?. (he overall *riting of dreams exceeds phonetic *riting and puts speech bac0 in its place. -s in hieroglyphics or rebuses, voice is circumvented. @rom the very beginning of the chapter on "(he #ream:or0," *e are left in no doubt on this sub ect, although @reud still uses the concept of translation on *hich he *ill later cast suspicion. "(he dreamthoughts and the dream-content "the latent and manifest' are presented to us li0e t*o versions "mises en scene' of the same sub ectmatter in t*o different languages. =r, more properly, the dreamcontent seems li0e a transcript "Ebertragung' of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, *hose characters and syntactic la*s it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. (he dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as *e have learnt them. (he dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it *ere in a pictographic script "/ilderschrift', the characters of *hich have to be transposed individually into the language of the dreamthoughts" "4C, 3,,'. /ilderschrift5 not an inscribed image but a figurative script, an image inviting not a simple, conscious, present perception of the thing itself-assuming it exists-but a reading. "4f *e attempted to read these characters according to their symbolic relation "KeichenbeBiehung', *e should clearly be led into error.... - dream is a picture puBBle "/ilderrdtsel' of this sort and our predecessors in the field of

dream-interpretation have made the mista0e of treating the rebus as a pictorial composition" "4C, !""#"$ % (he figurative content is then indeed a form of *riting, a signifying chain in scenic form. 4n that sense, of course, it summariBes a discourse, it is the economy of speech. (he entire chapter on "2epresentability" "-ptitude a la mise en scene& #arstell bar0eit' sho*s this quite *ell. /ut the reciprocal economic transform ation, the total reassimilation into discourse, is, in principle, impossible or limited. (his is first of all because *ords are also and "primarily" things. (hus, in dreams they are absorbed, "caught" by the primary process. 4t is then not sufficient to say that in dreams, *ords are con densed by "things"8 and that inversely, nonverbal signifiers may be interpreted to a certain degree in terms of verbal representations. 4t must be seen that insofar as they are attracted, lured into the dream, to*ard the fictive limit of the primary process, *ords tend to become things pure and simple. -n equally fictive limit, moreover. Pure *ords and pure things are thus, li0e the idea of the primary process, and consequently, the secondary process, "theoretical fictions" "C, &A;'. (he interval in "dreams" and the interval in "*a0efulness" may not be distinguished essentially insofar as the nature of language is concerned. ":ords are often treated as things in dreams and thus undergo the same operations as thing presentations."" 4n the formal regression of dreams, *ords are not overta0en by the spatialiBation of representation (muse en scene'. @ormal regression could not even succeed, moreover, if *ords had not al*ays been sub ect in their materiality to the mar0 of their inscription or scenic capacity, their #arstellbar0eit and all the forms of their spacing. (his last factor could only have been repressed by socalled living, vigilant speech, by consciousness, logic, the history of language, etc. !patialiBation does not surprise the time of speech or the ideality of meaning, it does not happen to them li0e an accident. (emporaliBation presupposes the possibility of symbolism, and every symbolic synthesis, even before it falls into a space "exterior" to it, includes *ithin itself spacing as difference. :hich is *hy the pure phonic chain, to the extent that it implies differences, is itself not a pure continuum or flo* of time. #ifference is the articulation of space and time. (he phonic chain or the chain of phonetic *riting are al*ays already distended by that minimum of essential spacing upon *hich the dream-*or0 and any formal regression in general can begin to

operate. 4t is not a question of a negation of time, of a cessation of time in a present or a simultaneity, but of a different structure, a different stratification of time. 1ere, once more, a comparison *ith *ritingphonetic *riting this time-casts light on *riting as *ell as on dreams5 (hey >dreams? reproduce logical connection by si!ultaneity in ti!e. 1ere they are acting li0e the painter *ho, in a picture of the !chool of -thens or of Parnassus, represents in one group all the philosophers or all the poets *ho *ere never, in fact, assembled in a single hall or on a single mountain top.... #reams carry this mode of reproduction (!ise en scene' do*n to details. :henever they sho* us t*o elements close together, this guarantees that there is some specially intimate connection bet*een *hat corresponds to them among the dreamthoughts. 4n the same *ay, in our system of *riting, "ab" means that the t*o letters are to be pronounced in a single syllable. 4f a gap is left bet*een the "a" and the "b," it means that the "a" is the last letter of one *ord and the "b" is the first of the next one >4C, ;$.?. (he model of hieroglyphic *riting assembles more stri0inglythough *e find it in every form of *riting-the diversity of the modes and functions of signs in dreams. 6very sign-verbal or other*isemay be used at different levels, in configurations and functions *hich are never prescribed by its "essence," but emerge from a play of differences. !ummariBing all these possibilities, @reud concludes5 "Fet, in spite of all this ambiguity, it is fair to say that the productions "raises en scene' of the dream-*or0, *hich, it must be remembered, are not made *ith the intention of being understood, present no greater difficulties to their translators than do the ancient hieroglyphic scripts to those *ho see0 to read them" "C, ;.$'. 7ore than t*enty years separate the first edition of the (raumdeutung from the "Note on the 7ystic :riting-Pad." 4f *e continue to follo* the t*o series of metaphors-those concerning the nonpsychical system of the psychical and those concerning the psychical itself-*hat happens< =n the one hand, the theoretical import of the psychographic metaphor *ill be increasingly refined. - methodological inquiry *ill, to a certain extent, be devoted to it. 4t is *ith a graphematics still to come, rather

than *ith a linguistics dominated by an ancient phonologism, that psychoanalysis sees itself as destined to collaborate. @reud recommends this literally in a text from $%$;, and in this case *e have nothing to add, interpret, alter." (he interest *hich psychoanalysis brings to linguistics presupposes an "overstepping of the habitual meaning of the *ord 'speech.' @or in *hat follo*s 'speech' must be understood not merely to mean the expression of thought in *ords, but to include the speech of gesture and every other method, such, for instance, as *riting, by *hich mental activity can be expressed" "N444, $,&'. -nd having recalled the archaic character of expression in dreams, *hich accepts contradiction 3. and valoriBes visibility, @reud specifies5 4t seems to us more appropriate to compare dreams *ith a system of *riting than *ith language. 4n fact, the interpretation of a dream is completely analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as 6gyptian hieroglyphics. 4n both cases there are certain elements *hich are not intended to be interpreted "or read, as the case may be' but are only designed to serve as "determinatives," that is to establish the meaning of some other element. (he ambiguity of various elements of dreams finds a parallel in these ancient systems of *riting .... 4f this conception of the method of representation in dreams (!ise en scene' has not yet been follo*ed up, this, as *ill be readily understood, must be ascribed to the fact that psycho-analysts are entirely ignorant of the attitude and 0no*ledge *ith *hich a philologist *ould approach such a problem as that presented by dreams >N$$$,$,,?. =n the other hand, the same year, in the article on "(he Enconscious," the problematic of the apparatus itself *ill begin to be ta0en up in terms of scriptural concepts5 neither, as in the Pro ect, in a topology of traces *ithout *riting, nor, as in the (raumdeutung, in the operations of optical mechanisms. (he debate bet*een the functional hypothesis and the topographical hypothesis concerns the locations of an inscription "Niederschrift'5 ":hen a psychical act "let us confine ourselves here to one *hich is in the nature of an idea >Corstellung, lit. representation? is transposed from the systems Ecs. into the system Cs. "or *#s4/, are *e to suppose that this transposition involves a fresh record-as it *ere,

D 2B W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ a second registration)of the idea in /$estion which "ay th$s be sit$ated as well in a fresh !sychical locality, and alongside of which the original $nconscio$s registration contin$es to e4ist6 ;r are we rather to believe that the trans!osition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the sa"e "aterial and occ$rring in the sa"e locality6+ (?IF, 12A) The disc$ssion which follows does not directly concern $s here. =et $s si"!ly recall that the econo"ic hy!othesis and the diffic$lt conce!t of anticathe4is (0egenbeset.$ng' +the sole "echanis" of !ri"al re!ression,+ ?IF, 1B1) which &re$d introd$ces after ref$sing to decide on the last /$estion, do not eli"inate the to!ogra!hical difference of the two inscri!tions.+ nd let $s note that the conce!t of inscri!tion still re"ains si"!ly the gra!hic ele"ent of an a!!arat$s which is not itself a writing "achine. The difference between the syste" and the !sychical is still at work' the gra!his" itself is reserved for the descri!tion of !sychical content or of an ele"ent in the "achine. 7e "ight think that the "achine itself is s$b,ect to another !rinci!le of organi.ation, another destination than writing. This is !erha!s the case as well, for the "ain thread of the article on +The Jnconscio$s,+ its e4a"!le, as we have e"!hasi.ed, is the fate of a re!resentation after it is first registered. 7hen !erce!tion)the a!!arat$s which originally enregistered and inscribes)is described, the +!erce!t$al a!!arat$s+ can be nothing b$t a writing "achine. The +Note on the Mystic 7riting 9ad,+ twelve years later, will describe the !erce!t$al a!!arat$s and the origin of "e"ory. =ong dis,ointed and o$t of !hase, the two series of "eta!hors will then be $nited.

,2/9D ;ND 0?/ S6/N/ =, W2I0IN1 2 7-

written will be "ore readily re!resented as a !art e4tracted fro" the a!!arat$s and +"ateriali.ed.+ *$ch is the first analogy'

#f #

distr$st "y "e"ory)ne$rotics, as we know, do so to a re"arkable

e4tent, b$t nor"al !eo!le have every reason for doing so as well)I a" able to s$!!le"ent and g$arantee (ergan)en and versichern* its working by "aking a note in writing

(schrifiliche An)eichn ng*! In that case the s$rface

$!on which this trace is !reserved, the !ocket)book or sheet of !a!er, is

(ein materialisiertes "t ck* of "y "ne"ic a!!arat$s (des +rinner ngsa$$arates*, the rest of which I carry abo$t with "e
as it were a "ateriali.ed !ortion invisible. I have only to bear in "ind the !lace where this +"e"ory+ has been de!osited and I can then +re!rod$ce+ it at any ti"e I like, with the certainty that it will have re"ained $naltered and so have esca!ed the !ossible distortions to which it "ight have been s$b,ected in "y act$al "e"ory+ H?I?, 33,?. &re$d%s the"e here is not the absence of "e"ory or the !ri"al and nor"al finit$de of the !owers of "e"ory- even less is it the str$ct$re of the te"!orali.ation which gro$nds that finit$de, or this str$ct$re%s essential relation to censorshi! and re!ression- nor is it the !ossibility and the necessity of the <rgdn.$ng, the hy!o"ne"ic s$!!le"ent which the !sychical "$st !ro,ect +into the world+- nor is it that which is called for, as concerns the nat$re of the !syche, in order for this s$!!le"entation to be !ossible. t first, it is si"!ly a /$estion of considering the conditions which c$sto"ary writing s$rfaces i"!ose on the o!eration of "ne"ic s$!!le"entation. Those conditions fail to satisfy the do$ble re/$ire"ent defined since the 9ro,ect' a !otential for indefinite !reservation and an $nli"ited ca!acity for rece!tion. is /$ickly sat$rated. sheet of !a!er !reserves indefinitely b$t whose virginity "ay always be ll slate,

Fre1d') &ie9e *, $a: a/d t(e T(ree A/a+*0ie) *, $riti/0

In this si4)!age te4t, the analogy between a certain writing a!!arat$s and the !erce!t$al a!!arat$s is de"onstrated in !rogressive ste!s. Three stages in the descri!tion res$lt each ti"e in an increase in rigor, inwardness, and differentiation. s has always been done)at least since 9lato)&re$d first considers writing as a techni/$e s$bservient to "e"ory, an e4ternal, a$4iliary techni/$e of !sychical "e"ory which is not "e"ory itself' hy!o"nesis rather than "ne"e said the 9haedr$s.D1 E$t here)so"ething not !ossible for 9lato)the !sychical is ca$ght $! in an a!!arat$s, and what is

reconstit$ted by erasing the i"!rints on it, does not conserve its traces.

the classical writing s$rfaces offer only one of the two advantages and always !resent the co"!le"entary diffic$lty. *$ch is the res e4tensa and the intelligible s$rface of classical writing a!!arat$ses. In the !rocesses which they s$bstit$te for o$r "e"ory, an $nli"ited rece!tive ca!acity and a retention of !er"anent traces see" to be "$t$ally e4cl$sive+ (?I?, DD2). Their e4tension belongs to classical geo"etry and is intelligible in its ter"s as !$re e4terior witho$t

relation to itself. - different *riting space must be found, a space *hich *riting has al*ays claimed for itself. -uxiliary apparatuses "1ilfsapparate', *hich, as @reud notes, are al*ays constituted on the model of the organ to be supplemented "e.g., spectacles, camera, ear trumpet' thus seem particularly deficient *hen memory is in question. (his remar0 ma0es even more suspect the earlier reference to optical apparatuses. @reud recalls, nevertheless, that the contradictory requirement he is presenting had already been recogniBed in $%AA. 1e could have said in $G%+. "-s long ago as in $%AA $ gave expression in (he 4nterpretation of #reams to a suspicion that this unusual capacity *as to be divided bet*een t*o different systems "or organs of the mental apparatus'. -ccording to this vie*, *e possess a system Pcpt.-Cs., *hich receives perceptions but retains no permanent trace of them, so that it can react li0e a clean sheet to every ne* perception8 *hile the permanent traces of the excitations *hich have been received are preserved in 'mnemic systems' lying behind the perceptual system. )ater, in /eyond the Pleasure Principle "$%3A', 4 added a remar0 to the effect that the inexplicable phenomenon of consciousness arises in the perceptual system instead of the permanent traces" "N4N, 33G'. 3, - double system contained in a single differentiated apparatus5 a perpetually available innocence and an infinite reserve of traces have at last been reconciled by the "small contrivance" placed "some time ago upon the mar0et under the name of the 7ystic :riting-Pad," and *hich "promises to perform more than the sheet of paper or the slate." 4ts appearance is modest, "but if it is examined more closely, it *ill be found that its construction sho*s a remar0able agreement *ith my hypothetical structure of our perceptual apparatus." 4t offers both advantages5 an ever-ready receptive surface and permanent traces of the inscriptions that have been made on it" "ibid.'. 1ere is its description5 (he 7ystic Pad is a slab of dar0 bro*n resin or *ax *ith a paper edging8 over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of *hich is firmly secured to the slab *hile its bottom end rests upon it *ithout being fixed to it. (his transparent sheet is the more interesting part of the little device. 4t itself consists of t*o layers *hich can be detached from each other except at their t*o ends. (he upper layer is a

transparent piece of celluloid8 the lo*er layer is made of thin translucent *axed paper. :hen the apparatus is not in use, the lo*er surface of the *axed paper adheres lightly to the upper surface of the *ax slab. (o ma0e use of the 7ystic Pad, one *rites upon the celluloid portion of the covering-sheet *hich rests upon the *ax slab. @or this purpose no pencil or chal0 is necessary, since the *riting does not depend on material being deposited upon the receptive surface. 4t is a return to the ancient method of *riting upon tablets of clay or *ax5 a pointed stilus scratches the surface, the depressions upon *hich constitute the "*riting." 4n the case of the 7ystic Pad this scratching is not effected directly, but through the medium of the covering-sheet. -t the points *hich the stilus touches, it presses the lo*er surface of the *axed paper on to the *ax slab, and the grooves are visible as dar0 *riting upon the other*ise smooth *hitish-gray surface of the celluloid. 4f one *ishes to destroy *hat has been *ritten, all that is necessary is to raise the double covering-sheet from the *ax slab by a light pull, starting from the free lo*er end.Be (he close contact bet*een the *axed paper and the *ax slab at the places *hich have been scratched "upon *hich the visibility of the *riting depended' is thus brought to an end and it does not recur *hen the t*o surfaces come together once more. (he 7ystic Pad is no* clear of *riting and ready to receive fresh inscriptions >N4N, 33G-3%?. )et us note that the depth of the 7ystic Pad is simultaneously a depth *ithout bottom, an infinite allusion, and a perfectly superficial exteriority5 a stratification of surfaces each of *hose relation to itself, each of *hose interior, is but the implication of another similarly exposed surface. 4t oins the t*o empirical certainties by *hich *e are constituted5 infinite depth in the implication of meaning, in the unlimited envelopment of the present, and, simultaneously, the pellicular essence of being, the absolute absence of any foundation. Neglecting the device's "slight imperfections," interested only in the analogy, @reud insists on the essentially protective nature of the celluloid sheet. :ithout it, the fine *axed paper *ould be scratched or ripped. (here is no *riting *hich does not devise some means of protection, to protect against itself, against the *riting by *hich the

"sub ect" is himself threatened as he lets himself be *ritten5 as he exposes himself "(he layer of celluloid thus acts as a protective sheath for the *axed paper." 4t shields the *axed paper from "in urious effects from *ithout." " $ may at this point recall that in /eyond the Pleasure Principle,' 4 sho*ed that the perceptual apparatus of our mind consists of t*o layers, of an external protective shield against stimuli *hose tas0 it is to diminish the strength of excitations coming in, and of a surface behind it *hich receives the stimuli, namely the system Pcpt.-Cs" "N4N, 3;A'. /ut this still concerns only reception or perception, the most superficial surface's openness to the incision of a scratch. (here is as yet no *riting in the flatness of this extensia. :e must account for *riting as a trace *hich survives the scratch's present, punctuality, and stigme. "(his analogy," @reud continues, "*ould not be of much value if it could not be pursued further than this." (his is the second analogy5 "4f *e lift the entire coveringsheet-both the celluloid and the *axed paper-off the *ax slab, the *riting vanishes, and, as 4 have already remar0ed, does not re-appear again. (he surface of the 7ystic Pad is clear of *riting and once more capable of receiving impressions. /ut it is easy to discover that the permanent trace of *hat *as *ritten is retained upon the *ax slab itself and is legible in suitable lights" "ibid.'. (he contradictory requirements are satisfied by this double system, and "this is precisely the *ay in *hich, according to the hypothesis *hich 4 mentioned ust no*, our psychical apparatus performs its perceptual function. (he layer *hich receives the stimuli-the system Pcpt.-Cs.forms no permanent traces8 the foundations of memory come about in other, supplementary, systems" "ibid.'. :riting supplements perception before perception even appears to itself >is conscious of itself?. "7emory" or *riting is the opening of that process of appearance itself (he "perceived" may be read only in the past, beneath perception and after it30 :hereas other *riting surfaces, corresponding to the prototypes of slate or paper, could represent only a materialiBed part of the mnemic system in the psychical apparatus, an abstraction, the 7ystic Pad represents the apparatus in its entirety, not simply in its perceptual layer. (he *ax slab, in fact, represents the unconscious5 "4 do not thin0 it is too farfetched to compare the *ax slab *ith the unconscious behind the system Pcpt.-Cs." "N4N, 3;A-;$'. (he becoming-visible *hich

alternates *ith the disappearance of *hat is *ritten *ould be the flic0ering-up "-ufleuchten' and passing-a*ay "Cergehen' of consciousness in the process of perception. (his introduces the third and final analogy. 4t is certainly the most interesting. Entil no*, it has been a question only of the space of *riting, its extension and volume, reliefs and depressions. /ut there is as *ell a time of *riting, and this time of *riting is nothing other than the very structure of that *hich *e are no* describing. :e must come to terms *ith the temporality of the *ax slab. @or it is not outside the slab, and the 7ystic Pad includes in its structure *hat Iant describes as the three modes of time in the three analogies of experience5 permanence, succession, simultaneity. #escartes, *hen he *onders quaenam veto est haec cera, can reduce its essence to the timeless simplicity of an intelligible ob ect." @reud, reconstructing an operation, can reduce neither time nor the multiplicity of sensitive layers. -nd he *ill lin0 a discontinuist conception of time, as the periodicity and spacing of *riting, to a *hole chain of hypotheses *hich stretch from the )etters to @liess to /eyond the Pleasure Principle, and *hich, once again, are constructed, consolidated, confirmed, and solidified in the 7ystic Pad. (emporality as spacing *ill be not only the horiBontal discontinuity of a chain of signs, but also *ill be *riting as the interruption and restoration of contact bet*een the various depths of psychical levels5 the remar0ably heterogeneous temporal fabric of psychical *or0 itself :e find neither the continuity of a line nor the homogeneity of a volume8 only the differentiated duration and depth of a stage, and its spacing5
But I (ust ad(it t at I a( inc'ined t+ %ress t e c+(%aris+n sti'' fur t er < =n t e &. s t i c * ad t e 7r iti n g :ani s ed e:er . ti ( e t e c' + se c+ntact is !r+"en !et7een t e %a%er 7 ic recei:es t e sti(u'us and t e 7aJ s'a! 7 ic %reser:es t e i(%ressi+n< 0 is agrees 7it a n+ti+n 7 ic I a:e '+ng ad a!+ut t e (et +d in 7 ic t e %erce %tu a' a%% ar atu s +f +u r ( i n d fun ct i +n s ) !ut 7 i c I a: e it er t+ "e%t t+ (.se'f KCIC) 231I<

(his hypothesis posits a discontinuous distribution-through rapid periodic impulses-of "cathectic innervations" "/esetBungsinnervationen', from *ithin to*ard the outside, to*ard the permeability of the system

3G.

$RITING AND DIFFERENCE

FREUD AND THE SCENE OF $RITI N1 2$5

Pcpt.-Cs. (hese movements are then "*ithdra*n" or "removed." Consciousness fades each time the cathexis is *ithdra*n in this *ay. @reud compares this movement to the feelers *hich the unconscious *ould stretch out to*ard the external *orld, and *hich it *ould *ithdra* *hen these feelers had sampled the excitations coming from the external *orld in order to *arn the unconscious of any threat. "@reud had no more reserved the image of the feeler for the unconscious-*e find it in chapter . of /eyond the Pleasure principle ;3-than he had reserved the notion of cathectic periodicity, as *e noted above.' (he "origin of our concept of time" is attributed to this "periodic non-excitability" and to this "discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt. Cs." (ime is the economy of a system of *riting. (he machine does not run by itself. 4t is less a machine than a tool. -nd it is not held *ith only one hand. (his is the mar0 of its temporality. 4ts maintenance is not simple. (he ideal virginity of the present "maintenant' is constituted by the *or0 of memory. -t least t*o hands are needed to ma0e the apparatus function, as *ell as a system of gestures, a coordination of independent initiatives, an organiBed multiplicity of origins. 4t is at this stage that the "Note" ends5 "4f *e imagine one hand *riting upon the surface of the mystic :riting-Pad *hile another

as the idea of the primary process. @or that idea is contradicted by the theme of primal repression. :riting is unthin0able *ithout repression. (he condition for *riting is that there be neither a permanent contact nor an absolute brea0 bet*een strata5 the vigilance and failure of censorship. 4t is no accident that the metaphor of censorship should come from the area of politics concerned *ith the deletions, blan0s, and disguises of *riting, even if, at the beginning of the (raumdeutung, @reud seems to ma0e only a conventional, didactic reference to it. (he apparent exteriority of political censorship refers to an essential censorship *hich binds the *riter to his o*n *riting. 4f there *ere only perception, pure permeability to breaching, there *ould be no breaches. :e *ould be *ritten, but nothing *ould be recorded8 no *riting *ould be produced, retained, repeated as legibility. /ut pure perception does not exist5 *e are *ritten only as *e *rite, by the agency *ithin us *hich al*ays already 0eeps *atch over perception, be it internal or external. (he "sub ect" of *riting does not exist if *e mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. (he sub ect of *riting is a system of relations bet*een strata5 the 7ystic Pad, the psyche, society, the *orld. :ithin that scene, on that stage, the punc

concrete representation of the *ay in *hich 4 tried to picture the (races thus produce the space of their inscription only by acceding to the period of their erasure. @rom the beginning, in the "present" of tition and erasure, legibility and illegibility. - t*o-handed machine, a multiplicity of agencies or origins-is this not the original relation to the other and the original temporality of *riting, its "primary" com plication5 an originary spacing, deferring, and erasure of the simple, origin, and polemics on the very threshhold of *hat *e persist in tions," *as a stage of *riting. /ut this is because "perception," the first pared representation. :e must be several in order to *rite, and even o "perceive." (he simple structure of maintenance and manuscription li0e every intuition of an origin, is a myth, a "fiction" as "theoretical'

describe the structure, it is not enough to recall that one al*ays *rites for someone8 and the oppositions sender-receiver, code-message, etc., remain extremely coarse instruments. :e *ould search the "public" in vain for the first reader5 i.e., the first author of a *or0. -nd the "soci ology of literature" is blind to the *ar and the ruses perpetrated by the author *ho reads and by the first reader *ho dictates, for at sta0e here is the origin of the *or0 itself. (he sociality of *riting as drama requires an entirely different discipline. (hat the machine does not run by itself means something else5 a mechanism *ithout its o*n energy. (he machine is dead. 4t is death. Not because *e ris0 death in playing *ith machines, but because the 'gin of machines is the relation to death. 4n a letter to @liess, it *ill be called, @reud, evo0ing his representation of the psychical apparatus, had the impression of being faced *ith a machine *hich *ould soon by itself. /ut *hat *as to run by itself *as the psyche and not its 'tation or mechanical representation. @or the latter does not live.

3G&

W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/

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2epresentation is death. :hich may be immediately transformed into the follo*ing proposition5 death is "only' representation. /ut it is bound to life and to the living present *hich it repeats originarily. - pure representation, a machine, never runs by itself !uch at least is the limitation *hich @reud recogniBes in his analogy *ith the 7ystic Pad. )i0e the first section of the "Note," his gesture at this point is extremely Platonic. =nly the *riting of the soul, said the Phaedrus, only the psychical trace is able to reproduce and to represent itself spontaneously. =ur reading had s0ipped over the follo*ing remar0 by @reud5 "(here must come a point at *hich the analogy bet*een an auxiliary apparatus of this 0ind and the organ *hich is its prototype *ill cease to apply. 4t is true, too, that once the *riting has been erased, the 7ystic Pad cannot 'reproduce' it from *ithin8 it *ould be a mystic pad indeed if, li0e our memory, it could accomplish that" "N4N, 3;A'. -bandoned to itself, the multiplicity of layered surfaces of the apparatus is a dead complexity *ithout depth. )ife as depth belongs only to the *ax of psychical memory. @reud, li0e Plato, thus continues to oppose hypomnemic *riting and *riting en tei psychei, itself *oven of traces, empirical memories of a present truth outside of time. 1enceforth, the 7ystic Pad, separated from psychical responsibility, a repre sentation abandoned to itself, still participates in Cartesian space and mechanics5 natural *ax, exteriority of the memory aid. -ll that @reud had thought about the unity of life and death, ho* ever, should have led him to as0 other questions here. -nd to as0 them explicitly. @reud does not explicitly examine the status of the "material iBed" supplement *hich is necessary to the alleged spontaneity of memory, even if that spontaneity *ere differentiated in itself, th*arted by a censorhsip or repression *hich, moreover, could not act on a perfectly spontaneous memory. @ar from the machine being a pure absence of spontaneity, its resemblance to the psychical apparatus, its existence and its necessity bear *itness to the finitude of the mnemic spontaneity *hich is thus supplemented. (he machine-and, con sequently, representation-is death and finitude *ithin the psyche. Nor does @reud examine the possibility of this machine, *hich, in the *orld, has at least begun to resemble memory, and increasingly resembles it more closely. 4ts resemblance to memory is closer than that of the innocent 7ystic Pad5 the latter is no doubt infinitely more

complex than slate or paper, less archaic than a palimpsest8 but, com pared to other machines for storing archives, it is a child's toy. (his resemblance-i.e., necessarily a certain /eing-in-the-*orld of the psyche-did not happen to memory from *ithout, any more than death surprises life. 4t founds memory. 7etaphor-in this case the analogy bet*een t*o apparatuses and the possibility of this represen tational relation-raises a question *hich, despite his premises, and for reasons *hich are no doubt essential, @reud failed to ma0e explicit, at the very moment *hen he had brought this question to the thresh old of being thematic and urgent. 7etaphor as a rhetorical or didactic device is possible here only through the solid metaphor, the "unnatural," historical production of a supplementary machine, added to the psychical organiBation in order to supplement its finitude. (he very idea of finitude is derived from the movement of this supplementarity. (he historico-technical production of this metaphor *hich survives individual "that is, generic' psychical organiBation, is of an entirely different order than the production of an intrapsychical metaphor, assuming that the latter exists "to spea0 about it is not enough for that', and *hatever bond the t*o metaphors may maintain bet*een themselves. 1ere the question of technology "a ne* name must perhaps be found in order to remove it from its traditional problematic' may not be derived from an assumed opposition bet*een the psychical and the nonpsychical, life and death. :riting, here, is recline as the relation bet*een life and death, bet*een present and representation, bet*een the t*o apparatuses. 4t opens up the question of technics5 of the apparatus in general and of the analogy bet*een the psychical apparatus and the nonpsychical apparatus. 4n this sense *riting is the stage of history and the play of the *orld. 4t cannot be exhausted by psychology alone (hat *hich, in @reud's discourse, opens itself to the theme of *riting results in psychoanalysis being not simply psychology-nor simply psychoanalysis. (hus are perhaps augured, in the @reudian brea0through, a beyond and a beneath of the closure *e might term "Platonic." 4n that moment of *orld history "subsumed" by the name of @reud, by means of an unbelievable mythology "be it neurological or metapsychological5 for *e never dreamed of ta0ing it seriously, outside of the question *hich disorganiBes and disturbs its literalness, the metapsychological fable,

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*hich mar0s perhaps only a minimal advance beyond the neurological tales of the Pro ect', a relationship to itself of the historicotranscendental stage of *riting *as spo0en *ithout being said, thought *ithout being thought5 *as *ritten and simultaneously erased, metaphoriBed8 designating itself *hile indicating intra*ordly relations, it *as represented. (his may perhaps be recogniBed "as an example and let this be understood prudently' insofar as @reud too, *ith admirable scope and continuity, performed for us the scene of *riting. /ut *e must thin0 of this scene in other terms than those of individual or collective psychology, or even of anthropology. 4t must be thought in the horiBon of the sceneWstage of the *orld, as the history of that sceneWstage. @reud's language is caught up in it. (hus @reud performs for us the scene of *riting. )i0e all those *ho *rite. -nd li0e all *ho 0no* ho* to *rite, he let the scene duplicate, repeat, and betray itself *ithin the scene. 4t is @reud then *hom *e *ill allo* to say *hat scene he has played for us. -nd from him that *e shall borro* the hidden epigraph *hich has silently governed our reading. 4n follo*ing the advance of the metaphors of path, trace, breach, of the march treading do*n a trac0 *hich *as opened by effraction through neurone, light or *ax, *ood or resin, in order violently to inscribe itself in nature, matter, or matrix8 and in follo*ing the untiring reference to a dry stilus and a *riting *ithout in08 and in follo*ing the inexhaustible inventiveness and dreamli0e rene*al of mechanical models-the metonymy perpetually at *or0 on the same metaphor, obstinately substituting trace for trace and machine for machine-*e have been *ondering ust *hat @reud *as doing. -nd *e have been thin0ing of those texts *here, better than any*here else, he tells us *orin die /ahnung sonst besteht. 4n *hat pathbrea0ing consists. =f the (raumdeutung5 "4t is highly probable that all complicated machinery and apparatuses occurring in dreams stand for the genitals "and as a rule male ones', in describing *hich dream-symbolism is as indefatigable as the o0e-*or0 ":itBarbeit' " "C, ;+&'. (hen, of 4nhibitions, !ymptoms, and -nxiety5 "-s soon as *riting, *hich entails ma0ing a liquid flo* out of a tube onto a piece of *hite paper,

assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as *al0ing becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both *riting and *al0ing are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual act" "NN, %A'. (he last part of the lecture concerned the archi-trace as erasure5 erasure of the present and thus of the sub ect, of that *hich is proper to, the sub ect and of his proper name. (he concept of a "conscious or unconscious' sub ect necessarily refers to the concept of substanceand thus of presence-out of *hich it is born. (hus, the @reudian concept of trace must be radicaliBed and extracted from the metaphysics of presence *hich still retains it "particularly in the concepts of consciousness, the unconscious, perception, memory, reality, and several others'. (he trace is the erasure of selfhood, of one's o*n presence, and is constituted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable disappearance, of the disappearance of its disappearance. -n unerasable trace is not a trace, it is a full presence, an immobile and uncorruptible substance, a son of 9od, a sign of parousia and not a seed, that is, a mortal germ. .(his erasure is death itself, and it is *ithin its horiBon that *e must conceive not only the "present," but also *hat @reud doubtless believed to be the indelibility of certain traces in the unconscious, *here "nothing ends, nothing happens, nothing is forgotten." (his erasure of the trace is not only an accident that can occur here or there, nor is it even the necessary structure of a determined censorship threatening a given presence8 it is the very structure *hich ma0es possible, as the movement of temporaliBation and pure auto-affection, something that can be called repression in general, the original synthesis of original repression and secondary repression, repression "itself." !uch a radicaliBation of the thought of the trace "a thought because it escapes binarism and ma0es binarism possible on the basis of nothing', *ould be fruitful not only in the deconstruction of logocentrism, but in a 0ind of reflection exercised more positively in different fields, at different levels of *riting in general, at the point of articulation of riling in the current sense and of the trace in general. (hese fields, *hose specificity thereby could be opened to a thought fecundated by psychoanalysis, *ould be numerous. (he problem of

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WRITING AND DIFFERENCE

FREUD AND T + " -# " N " ' ! W RIT IN G

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their respective limits would +e that much more formida+le to the conceptual opposition. e)tent that this pro+lem could not 9n :uestion, first, would +e. !. , psychopathology of everyday life in which the study of writing would not +e limited to the interpretation of the lapsus calami, and, moreover, would +e more attentive to this latter and to its originality than 'reud himself ever was. "Slips of the pen, to which 9 now pass, are so closely a%in to slips of the tongue that we have nothing new to e)pect from them',K *ME, #"2. his did prevent 'reud from raising the fundamental &uridical" pro+lem of responsi+ility, +efore the tri+unal of psychoanalysis, as =. , history of writing, an immense field in which only wor% has +een done up to now> however admira+le this wor% has +een, it still gives way, +eyond its empirical discoveries, to un+ridled speculation. 1. , +ecoming-literary of the literal. 4ere, despite several attempts made +y 'reud and certain of his successors, a psychoanalysis of literature respectful of the originality of the literary signifier has not yet +egun, and this is surely not an accident. 0ntil now, only the analysis of literary signifieds, that is, nonliterary signified meanings, has +een underta%en. 6ut such :uestions refer to the entire history of literary forms themselves, and to the history of everything within them which was destined precisely to authori3e this disdain of the signifier. I. 'inally, to continue designating these fields according to traditional and pro+lematic +oundaries, what might +e called a new psychoanalytic graphology, which would ta%e into account the contri+utions of the three %inds of research we have &ust outlined roughtly. 4ere, ?elanie @lein perhaps opens the way. ,s concerns the forms of signs, even within phonetic writing, the cathe)es of gestures, and of movements, of letters, lines, points, the elements of the writing apparatus *instrument, surface, su+stance, etc.2, a te)t li%e he 8ole of the School in the (i+idinal Development of the ;hild *!"=12 indicates the direction to +e ta%en *cf. also, Strachey, Some 0nconscious 'actors in 8eading2. ?elanie @lein's entire thematic, her analysis of the constitution of good and +ad o+&ects, her genealogy of morals could dou+tless +egin to illuminate, if followed prudently, the entire pro+lem of the

archi-trace, not in its essence *it does not have one2, +ut in terms of valuation and devaluation. Writing as sweet nourishment or as e)crement, the trace as seed or mortal germ, wealth or weapon, detritus andHor penis, etc. 4ow, for e)ample, on the stage of history, can writing as e)crement separated from the living flesh and the sacred +ody of the hieroglyph *,rtaud2, +e put into communication with what is said in /um+ers a+out the parched woman drin%ing the in%y dust of the law> or what is said in -)e%iel a+out the son of man who fills his entrails with the scroll of the law which has +ecome sweet as honey in his mouthF

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THE THEATER OF CRUELTY AND THE CLOSURE OF RE& RE SE NTATION ,*r &a1+e T(e;e/i/
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everything that it must ravage in its *a0e, "the theater of cruelty W is not the symbol of an absent void." 4t affirms, it produces affirmation itself in its full and necessary rigor. /ut also in its most hidden sense, the sense most often buried, most often diverted from itself5 "implacable" as it is, this affirmation has "not yet begun to exist." 4t is still to be born. No* a necessary affirmation can be born only by being reborn to itself. @or -rtaud, the future of the theater-thus, the future in general-is opened only by the anaphora *hich dates from the eve prior to birth. (heatricality must traverse and restore "existence" and "flesh" in each of their aspects. (hus, *hatever can be said of the body can be said of the theater. -s *e 0no*, -rtaud lived the morro* of a dispossession5 his proper body, the property and propriety of his body, had been stolen from him at birth by the thieving god *ho *as born in order "to pass himself off W as me."' 2ebirth doubtless occurs through-rtaud recalls this often-a 0ind of reeducation of the organs. /ut this reeducation permits the access to a life before birth and after death ""...through dying W 4 have finally achieved real immortality," p. $$A', and not to a death before birth and after life. (his is *hat distinguishes the affirmation of cruelty from romantic negativity8 the difference is slight and yet decisive. )ichtenberger5 "4

Enique fois au monde, parce qu'en raison d'un cvenement tou ours que 'expliquerai, it n'est pas de Present, non-un present n'existe pas "7allarme, 9uant au Iivre) """ as for my forces, they are only a supplement, the supplement of an acutal state, it is that there has never been an origin "-rtaud, & Dune $%.,'

cannot rid myself of this idea that 4 *as dead before 4 *as born, and that through death 4 *ill return to this very state.... (o die and to be eborn *ith the memory of one's former existence is called fainting8 to a*a0en *ith other organs *hich must first be reeducated is called birth." @or -rtaud, the primary concern is not to die in dying, not to let the thieving god divest him of his life. "-nd 4 believe that there is al*ays someone else, at the extreme moment of death, to strip us of !imilarly, :estern theater has been separated from the force of its essence, removed from its affirmative essence, its vis affirmative. -nd this dispossession occurred from the origin on, is the very movement of origin, of birth as death. (his is *hy a "place" is "left on all the stages of stillborn theater" "")e theatre et l'anatomie," in )a rue, Duly $%.&'. (he theater is born in its o*n disappearance, and the offspring of this movement has a name5 man. (he theater of cruelty is to be born by separating death from birth and by erasing the name of man. (he theater has al*ays been made to

"... #ance W and consequently the theater W have not yet begun to exist." (his is *hat one reads in one of -ntonin -rtaud's last *ritings earlier, the theater of cruelty is defined as "the affirmation W of-a'"5 terrible W and, moreover, implacable necessity." -rtaud, therefore, does ' . not call for destruction, for a ne* manifestation of negativity. #espite

do that for *hich it *as not made5 "(he last *ord on man has not been said.... (he theater *as never made to describe man and *hat he does.... 6t le theatre est cc patin degingande, qui musique de troncs par barbes metalliques de barbeles nous maintient en etat de guerre contre l'homme qui nous corsetait.... 7an is quite ill in -eschylus, but still thin0s of himself some*hat as a god and does not *ant to enter the membrane, and in 6uripides, finally, he splashes about in the membrane, forgetting *here and *hen he *as a god" "ibid.'. 4ndeed, the eve of the origin of this declining, decadent, and negative :estern theater must be rea*a0ened and reconstituted in order to revive the implacable necessity of affirmation on its 6astern horiBon. (his is the implacable necessity of an as yet inexistent stage, certainly, but the affirmation is not to be elaborated tomorro*, in some "ne* theater." 4ts implacable necessity operates as a permanent force. Cruelty is al*ays at *or0. (he void, the place that is empty and *aiting for this theater *hich has not yet "begun to exist," thus measures only the strange distance *hich separates us from implacable necessity, from the present "or rather the contemporary, active' *or0 of affirmation. :ithin the space of the unique opening of this distance, the stage of cruelty rears its enigma for us. -nd it is into this opening that *e *ish to enter here. 4f throughout the *orld today-and so many examples bear *itness to this in the most stri0ing fashion-all theatrical audacity declares its fidelity to -rtaud "correctly or incorrectly, but *ith increasing insistency', then the question of the theater of cruelty, of its present inexistence and its implacable necessity, has the value of a historic question. - historic question not because it could be inscribed *ithin *hat is called the history of theater, not because it *ould be epoch-ma0ing *ithin the becoming of theatrical forms, or because it *ould occupy a position *ithin the succession of models of theatrical representation. (his question is historic in an absolute and radical sense. 4t announces the limit of representation. (he theater of cruelty is not a representation. 4t is life itself, in the extent to *hich life is unrepresentable. )ife is the nonrepresentable origin of representation. "4 have therefore said 'cruelty' as 4 might have said 'life"' "(#, p. $$.'. (his life carries man along *ith it, but is not primarily the life of man. (he latter is only a representation of life, and such is the

limit-the humanist limit-of the metaphysics of classical theater. "(he theater as *e practice it can therefore be reproached *ith a terrible lac0 of imagination. (he theater must ma0e itself the equal of life-not an individual life, that individual aspect of life in *hich C1-2-C(62! triumph, but the sort of liberated life *hich s*eeps a*ay human individuality and in *hich man is only a reflection" "(#, p. $$&'. 4s not the most naive form of representation mimesis< )i0e NietBscheand the affinities do not end there--rtaud *ants to have done *ith the imitative concept of art, *ith the -ristotelean aesthetics' in *hich the metaphysics of :estern art comes into its o*n. "-rt is not the imitation of life, but life is the imitation of a transcendental principle *hich art puts us into communication *ith once again" "=C .5; $A'. (heatrical art should be the primordial and privileged site of this destruction of imitation5 more than any other art, it has been mar0ed by the labor of total representation in *hich the affirmation of life lets itself be doubled and emptied by negation. (his representation, *hose structure is imprinted not only on the art, but on the entire culture of the :est "its religions, philosophies, politics', therefore designates more than ust a particular type of theatrical construction. (his is *hy the question put to us today by far exceeds the bounds of theatrical technology. !uch is -rtaud's most obstinate affirmation5 technical or theatrological reflection is not to be treated marginally. (he decline of the theater doubtless begins *ith the possibility of such a dissociation. (his can be emphasiBed *ithout *ea0ening the importance or interest of theatrological problems, or of the revolutions *hich may occur *ithin the limits of theatrological problems, or of the revolutions *hich may occur *ithin the limits of theatrical technique. /ut -rtaud's intention indicates these limits. @or as long as these technical and intratheatrical revolutions do not penetrate the very foundations of :estern theater, they *ill belong to the history and to the stage that -ntonin -rtaud *anted to explode. :hat does it mean to brea0 this structure of belonging< 4s it possible to do so< Ender *hat conditions can a theater today legitimately invo0e -rtaud's name< 4t is only a fact that so many directors *ish to be ac0no*ledged as -rtaud's heirs, that is "as has been *ritten', his "illegitimate sons." (he question of ustification and legality must also

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be raised. :ith *hat criteria can such a claim be recog-niBed as unfounded< Ender *hat conditions could an authentic "theater of cruelty" "begin to exist"< (hese simultaneously technical and "metaphysical" questions "metaphysical in the sense understood by -rtaud', arise spontaneously from the reading of all the texts in (he (heater and 4ts #ouble, for these texts are more solicitations than a sum of precepts, more a system of critiques sha0ing the entirety of =ccidental history than a treatise on theatrical practice. (he theater of cruelty expulses 9od from the stage. 4t does not put a ne* atheist discourse on stage, or give atheism a platform, or give over theatrical space to a philosophiBing logic that *ould once more, to our greater lassitude, proclaim the death of 9od. (he theatrical practice of cruelty, in its action and structure, inhabits or rather produces a nontheologicalspace. (he stage is theological for as long as it is dominated by speech, by a *ill to speech, by the layout of a primary logos *hich does not belong to the theatrical site and governs it from a distance. (he stage is theological for as long as its structure, follo*ing the entirety of tradition, comports the follo*ing elements5 an author-creator *ho, absent and from afar, is armed *ith a text and 0eeps *atch over, assembles, regulates the time or the meaning of representation, letting this latter represent him as concerns *hat is called the content of his thoughts, his intentions, his ideas. 1e lets representation represent him through representatives, directors or actors, enslaved interpreters *ho represent characters *ho, primarily through *hat they say, more or less directly represent the thought of the "creator." 4nterpretive slaves *ho faithfully execute the providential designs of the "master." :ho moreover-and this is the ironic rule of the representative structure *hich organiBes all these relationships-creates nothing, has only the illusion of having created, because he only transcribes and ma0es available for reading a text *hose nature is itself necessarily representative8 and this representative text maintains *ith *hat is called the "real "the existing real, the "reality" about *hich -rtaud said, in the "-vertissement" to )e moine, that it is an "excrement of the mind"' an

of "en oyers"-as NietBsche and -rtaud both say-attending a production that lac0s true volume or depth, a production that is level, offered to their voyeuristic scrutiny. "4n the theater of cruelty, pure visibility is not exposed to voyeurism.' (his general structure in *hich each agency is lin0ed to all the others by representation, in *hich the irrepresentability of the living present is dissimulated or dissolved, suppressed or deported *ithin the infinite chain of representationsthis structure has never been modified. -ll revolutions have maintained it intact, and most often have tended to protect or restore it. -nd it is the phonetic text, speech, transmitted discourse-eventually transmitted by the prompter *hose hole is the hidden but indispensable center of representative structure-*hich ensures the movement of representation. :hatever their importance, all the pictorial, musical and even gesticular forms introduced into :estern theater can only, in the best of cases, illustrate, accompany, serve, or decorate a text, a verbal fabric, a logos *hich is said in the beginning. "4f then, the author is the man *ho arranges the language of speech and the director is his slave, there is merely a question of *ords. (here is here a confusion over terms, stemming from the fact that, for us, and according to the sense generally attributed to the *ord director, this man is merely an artisan, an adapter, a 0ind of translator eternally devoted to ma0ing a dramatic *or0 pass from one language into another8 this confusion *ill be possible and the director *ill be forced to play second fiddle to the author only so long as there is a tacit agreement that the language of *ords is superior to others and that the theater admits none other than this one language" "(#, p. $$%'. (his does not imply, of course, that to be faithful to -rtaud it suffices to give a great deal of importance and responsibility to the "director" *hile maintaining the classical structure. /y virtue of the *ord "or rather the unity of the *ord and the concept, as *e *ill say later-and this specification *ill be important' and beneath the theological ascendancy both of the "verb >*hich? is the measure of our impotency" "=C .53,,' and of our fear, it is indeed he stage *hich finds itself threatened throughout the :estern tradition. (he =ccident-and such is the energy of its essence-has *or0ed only for the erasure of the stage. @or a stage *hich does nothing but illustrate a discourse is no longer entirely a stage. 4ts relation to speech is its malady, and "*e repeat that the epoch is sic0" "=C .53G A'.

imitative and reproductive relationship. @inally, the theological stage comports a passive, seated public, a public of spectators, of consumers,

(o reconstitute the stage, finally to put on stage and to overthro* the tyranny of the text is thus one and the same gesture. "(he triumph of pure raise en scene" "=C .5;A+'. (his classical forgetting of the stage is then confused *ith the history of theater and *ith all of :estern culture8 indeed, it even guaranteed their unfolding. -nd yet, despite this "forgetting," the theater and its arts have lived richly for over t*enty-five centuries5 an experience of mutations and perturbations *hich cannot be set aside, despite the peaceful and impassive immobility of the fundamental structures. (hus, in question is not only a forgetting or a simple surface concealment. certain stage has maintained *ith the "forgotten," but, in truth, violently erased, stage a secret communication, a certain relationship of betrayal, if to betray is at once to denature through infidelity, but also to let oneself be evinced despite oneself, and to manifest the foundation of force. (his explains *hy classical theater, in -rtaud's eyes, is not simply the absence, negation, or forgetting of theater, is not a nontheater5 it is a mar0 of cancellation that lets *hat it covers be read8 and it is corruption also, a "perversion," a seduction, the margin of an aberration *hose meaning and measure are visible only beyond birth, at the eve of theatrical representation, at the origin of tragedy. =r, for example, in the realm of the "=rphic 7ysteries *hich sub ugated Platoo" or the "7ysteries of 6leusis" stripped of the interpretations *ith *hich they have been covered, or the "pure beauty of *hich Plato, at least once in this *orld, must have found the complete, sonorous, streaming na0ed realiBation" "(#, p. +3'. -rtaud is indeed spea0ing of perversion and not of forgetting, for example, in this letter to /en amin Cremieux5 (he theater, an independent and autonomous art, must, in order to revive or si!ply to live, realiBe *hat differentiates it from text, pure speech, literature, and all other fixed and *ritten means. :e can perfectly *ell continue to conceive of a theater based upon the authority of the text, and on a text more and more *ordy, diffuse, and boring, to *hich the esthetics of the stage *ould be sub ect. /ut this conception of theater, *hich consists of having people sit on a certain number of straight-bac0ed or overstuffed chairs placed in a ro* and tell each other stories, ho*ever marvelous, is, if not the absolute

negation of theater-*hich does not absolutely require movement in order to be *hat it should-certainly its "er ersion ;#4, p. io&8 my
italics).

2eleased from the text and the author-god, mise en scene *ould be returned to its creative and founding freedom. (he director and the participants "*ho *ould no longer be actors or spectators' *ould cease to be the instruments and organs of representation. 4s this to say that -rtaud *ould have refused the name representation for the theater of cruelty< No, provided that *e clarify the difficult and equivocal meaning of this notion. 1ere, *e *ould have to be able to play upon all the 9erman *ords that *e indistinctly translate *ith the unique *ord representation. (he stage, certainly, *ill no longer represent, since it *ill not operate as an addition, as the sensory illustration of a text already *ritten, thought, or lived outside the stage, *hich the stage *ould then only repeat but *hose fabric it *ould not constitute. (he stage *ill no longer operate as the repetition of a present, *ill no longer re-present a present that *ould exist else*here and prior to it, a present that *ould exist else*here and prior to it, a present *hose plenitude *ould be older than it, absent from it, and rightfully capable of doing *ithout it5 the being-present-to-itself of the absolute )ogos, the living present of 9od. Nor *ill the stage be a representation, if representation means the surface of a spectacle displayed for spectators. 4t *ill not even offer the presentation of a present, if present signifies that *hich is maintained in front of me. Cruel representation must permeate me. -nd nonrepresentation is, thus, original representation, if representation signifies, also, the unfolding of a volume, a multidimensional milieu, an experience *hich produces its o*n space. !pacing >espacement?, that is to say, the production of a space that no speech could condense or comprehend "since speech primarily presupposes this spacing', thereby appeals to a time that is no longer that of so-called phonic linearity, appeals to "a ne* notion of space" and "a specific idea of time" "(#, p. $3.'. ":e intend to base the theater upon spectacle before everything else, and *e shall introduce into the spectacle a ne* notion of space utiliBed on all possible levels and in all degrees of perspective in depth and height, and *ithin this notion a specific idea of time *ill be added to that of movement . .

3 C C W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ Th$s, theater s!ace will be $tili.ed not only in its di"ensions and vol$"e b$t, so to s!eak, in its $ndersides (dons ses desso$s)+ (#4 , p. A3)) . Th$s, the clos$re of classical re!resentation, b$t also the reconstit$tion of a closed s!ace of original re!resentation, the archi"anifestation of force or of life. closed s!ace, that is to say a s!ace !rod$ced fro" within itself and no longer organi.ed fro" the vantage of an other absent site, an illocality, an alibi or invisible $to!ia. The end of re!resentation, b$t also original re!resentation- the end of inter!retation, b$t also an original inter!retation that no "aster)s!eech, no !ro,ect of "astery will have !er"eated and leveled in advance) visible re!resentation, certainly, rta$d insists $!on directed against the s!eech which el$des sight)and

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that the e!och wants, I a" e4aggerating, for in reality it is inca!able of wanting anything- it is the victi" of a for"al habit which it absol$tely cannot shake. It see"s to $s that the kind of diff$se !oetry which we identify with nat$ral and s!ontaneo$s energy (b$t all nat$ral energies are not !oetic) "$st find its integral e4!ression, its !$rest, shar!est and "ost tr$ly se!arated e4!ression, in the theater+ (7:, )$32?). Th$s, we can disting$ish the sense of cr$elty as necessity and rigor. and of +irreversible of cr$elty, and and absol$te not deter"ination+ of rta$d of certainly invites $s to think only of +rigor, i"!lacable intention and decision,+

(#4,

p.

1C1),

+deter"inis",+ +s$b"ission to necessity+ ( #4 , p . A? 3) , etc., $nder the heading necessarily +sadis",+ +horror,+ +bloodshed,+ +cr$cified ene"ies+ (ibid.), etc. ( nd certain !rod$ctions today inscribed $nder rta$d%s na"e are !erha!s violent, even bloody, nd, first of b$t are not, for all that, cr$el.) Nevertheless, there is always a "$rder at the origin of cr$elty, of the necessity na"ed cr$elty. all, a !arricide. The origin of theater, s$ch as it "$st be restored, is the hand lifted against the ab$sive wielder of the logos, against the father, against the 0od of a stage s$b,$gated to the !ower of s!eech and te4t.% In "y view no one has the right to call hi"self a$thor, that is to say creator, e4ce!t the !erson who controls the direct handling of the stage. nd e4actly here is the v$lnerable !oint of the theater as it is tho$ght of not only in &rance b$t in <$ro!e and even in the ;ccident as a whole' ;ccidental theater recogni.es as lang$age, assigns the fac$lties and !owers of a lang$age, !er"its to be called lang$age (with that !artic$lar intellect$al dignity generally ascribed to this word) only artic$lated lang$age, gra""atically artic$lated lang$age, i.e., the lang$age of s!eech, and of written s!eech, s!eech which, !rono$nced or $n!rono$nced, has no greater val$e than if it is "erely written. In the theater as we conceive it, the te4t is everything :);, 9. 117I< 7hat will s!eech beco"e, henceforth, in the theater of cr$elty6 7ill it si"!ly have to silence itself or disa!!ear6 In no way. *!eech will cease to govern the stage, b$t will be !resent $!on it. *!eech will occ$!y a rigoro$sly deli"ited !lace, will have a

the !rod$ctive i"ages witho$t which there wo$ld be no theater (theao"ai))b$t whose visibility does not consist of a s!ectacle "o$nted by the disco$rse of the "aster. :e!resentation, then, as the a$to!resentation of !$re visibility and even !$re sensibility.% It is this e4tre"e and diffic$lt sense of s!ectac$lar re!resentation that another !assage fro" the sa"e letter atte"!ts to deli"it' +*o long as the raise en scene re"ains, even in the "inds of the boldest directors, a si"!le "eans of !resentation, an accessory "ode of e4!ressing the work, a sort of s!ectac$lar inter"ediary with no significance of its own, it will be val$able only to the degree it s$cceeds in hiding itself behind the works it is !retending to serve. nd this will contin$e as long as the "a,or interest in a !erfor"ed work is in its te4t, as long as literat$re takes !recedence over the kind of !erfor"ance i"!ro!erly called s!ectacle, with everything !e,orative, accessory, e!he"eral and e4ternal that that ter" carries with it+ (TD, !!. 1CG)1). *$ch, on the stage of cr$elty, wo$ld be +s!ectacle acting not as reflection, b$t as force+ (7: )$ 36> ) . The ret$rn to original re!resentation th$s i"!lies, not si"!ly b$t above all, that theater or life "$st cease to +re!resent+ an other lang$age, "$st cease to let the"selves be derived fro" an other art, fro" literat$re, for e4a"!le, be it !oetic literat$re. &or in !oetry, as in literat$re, verbal re!resentation !$rloins scenic re!resen tation. 9oetry can esca!e 7estern +illness+ only by beco"ing theater. +7e think, !recisely, that there is a notion of !oetry to be dissociated, e4tracted fro" the for"s of written !oetry in which an e!och at the height of disorder and illness wants to kee! all !oetry. nd when I say

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function *ithin a system to *hich it *ill be coordinated. @or it is 0no*n that the representations of the theater of cruelty had to be painsta0ingly determined in advance. (he absence of an author and his text does not abandon the stage to dereliction. (he stage is not forsa0en, given over to improvisatory anarchy, to "chance vaticination" " = C .5 3 ; .' , to "Copeau's improvisations" "(#, p. $A%', to "!urrealist empiricism" " = C .5 ; $ ; ' , to commedia dell'arte, or to "the capriciousness of untrained inspiration" "ibid.'. 6verything, thus, *ill be prescribed in a *riting and a text *hose fabric *ill no longer resemble the model of classical representation. (o *hat place, then, *ill speech be assigned by this necessary prescription called for by cruelty itself< !peech and its notation-phonetic speech, an element of classical theater-speech and its *riting *ill be erased on the stage of cruelty only in the extent to *hich they *ere allegedly dictation5 at once citations or recitations and orders. (he director and the actor *ill no longer ta0e dictation5 "(hus *e shall renounce the theatrical superstition of the text and the dictatorship of the *riter" "(#, p . $ 3 . ' . (his is also the end of the diction *hich made theater into an exercise of reading. (he end of the fact that for "certain theatrical amateurs this means that a play read affords ust as definite and as great a satisfaction as the same play performed" "(#, p. $$G'. 1o* *ill speech and *riting function then< (hey *ill once more become gestures8 and the logical and discursive intentions *hich speech ordinarily uses in order to ensure its rational transparency, and in order to purloin its body in the direction of meaning, *ill be reduced or subordinated. -nd since this theft of the body by itself is indeed that *hich leaves the body to be strangely concealed by the very thing that constitutes it as diaphanousness, then the deconstitution of diaphanousness lays bare the flesh of the *ord, lays bare the *ord's sonority, intonation, intensity-the shout that the articulations of language and logic have not yet entirely froBen, that is, the aspect of oppressed gesture *hich remains in all speech, the unique and irreplaceable movement *hich the generalities of concept and repetition have never finished re ecting. :e 0no* *hat value -rtaud attributed to *hat is called-in the present case, quite incorrectly-onomatopoeia. 9lossopoeia, *hich is neither an imitative language nor a creation of names, ta0es us bac0 to the borderline of the moment *hen the *ord

has not yet been born, *hen articulation is no longer a shout but not yet discourse, *hen repetition is almost impossible, and along *ith it, language in general5 the separation of concept and sound, of signified and signifier, of the pneumatical and the grammatical, the freedom of translation and tradition, the movement of interpretation, the difference bet*een the soul and the body, the master and the slave, 9od and man, author and actor. (his is the eve of the origin of languages, and of the dialogue bet*een theology and humanism *hose inextinguishable reoccurrence has never not been maintained by the metaphysics of :estern theater.' (hus, it is less a question of constructing a mute stage than of constructing a stage *hose clamor has not yet been pacified into *ords. (he *ord is the cadaver of psychic speech, and along *ith the language of life itself the "speech before *ords"& must be found again. 9esture and speech have not yet been separated by the logic of representation. "4 am adding another language to the spo0en language, and 4 am trying to restore to the language of speech its old magic, its essential spellbinding po*er, for its mysterious possibilities have been forgotten. :hen 4 say 4 *ill perform no *ritten play, 4 mean that 4 *ill perform no play based on *riting and speech, that in the spectacles 4 produce there *ill be a preponderant physical share *hich could not be captured and *ritten do*n in the customary language of *ords, and that even the spo0en and *ritten portions *ill be spo0en and *ritten in a ne* sense" "(#, p. $$$'. :hat of this "ne* sense"< -nd first, *hat of this ne* theatrical *riting< (his latter *ill no longer occupy the limited position of simply being the notation of *ords, but *ill cover the entire range of this ne* language5 not only phonetic *riting and the transcription of speech, but also hieroglyphic *riting, the *riting in *hich phonetic elements are coordinated to visual, pictorial, and plastic elements. (he notion of hieroglyphics is at the center of the @irst 7anifesto5 "=nce a*are of this language in space, language of sounds, cries, lights, onomatopoeia, the theater must organiBe it into veritable hieroglyphs, *ith the help of characters and ob ects, and ma0e use of their symbolism and interconnections in relation to all organs and on all levels" "(#, p. %A'. =n the stage of the dream, as described by @reud, speech has the

3CA W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ sa"e stat$s. This analogy re/$ires !atient "editation. In The Inter!retation of Drea"s and in the Meta!sychological *$!!le"ent to the Theory of Drea"s the !lace and f$nctioning of writing are deli"ited. 9resent in drea"s, s!eech can only behave as an ele"ent a"ong others, so"eti"es like a +thing+ which the !ri"ary !rocess "ani!$lates according to its own econo"y. +In this !rocess tho$ghts are transfor"ed into i"ages, "ainly of a vis$al sortthat is to say, word !resentations are taken back to the thing)!resentations which corres!ond to the", as if, in general the !rocess were do"inated by considerations of re!resentability (Darstellbarkeit).+ +It is very noteworthy how little the drea")work kee!s to word)!resentations- it is always ready to e4change one word for another till it finds the e4!ression which is "ost handy for !lastic re!resentation+ (*< 1A'DDB). s!eaks of a +vis$al and !lastic "ateriali.ation of s!eech+ (TD, !. 1@) and of "aking $se of s!eech +in a concrete and s!atial sense+ in order to +"ani!$late it like a solid ob,ect, one which overt$rns and dist$rbs things+ (TD, !. 2D). nd when &re$d, s!eaking of drea"s, invokes sc$l!t$re and !ainting, or the !ri"itive !ainter who, in the fashion of the a$thors of co"ic stri!s, h$ng +s"all labels ... fro" the "o$ths of the !ersons re!resented, containing in written characters the s!eeches which the artist des !aired of re!resenting !ictorially+ (*< A'3 1D), we $nderstand what s!eech can beco"e when it is b$t an ele"ent, a circ$"scribed site, a circ$"vented writing within both general writing and the s!ace of re!resentation. This is the str$ct$re of the reb$s or the hierogly!hic. +The drea")content, on the other hand, is e4!ressed as it were in a !ictogra!hic scri!t+ (*< A'DD2). nd in an article fro" 1@13' +&or in what follows %s!eech% "$st be $nderstood not "erely to "ean the e4!ression of tho$ght in words b$t to incl$de the s!eech of gest$re and every other "ethod, s$ch, for instance, as writing, by which "en tal activity can be e4!ressed.... If we reflect that the "eans of re!re sentation in drea"s are !rinci!ally vis$al i"ages and not words, we shall see that it is even "ore a!!ro!riate to co"!are drea"s with a syste" of writing than with a lang$age. In fact the inter!retation of drea"s is co"!letely analogo$s to the deci!her"ent of an ancient !ictogra!hic scri!t s$ch as <gy!tian hierogly!hs+ (*< 13'121)22)%. It is diffic$lt to know the e4tent to which rta$d, who often referred to !sychoanalysis, had a!!roached the te4t of &re$d. It is in any event rta$d too,

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re"arkable that he describes the !lay of s!eech and of writing on the stage of cr$elty according to &re$d%s very ter"s, a &re$d who at the ti"e was hardly el$cidated. lready in the &irst Manifesto'
0?/ 5;N19;1/ =, 0?/ S0;1/B It is not a /$estion of s$!!ressing the

s!oken lang$age, b$t of giving words a!!ro4i"ately the i"!ortance they have in drea"s. Meanwhile new "eans of recording this lang$age "$st be fo$nd, whether these "eans belong to "$sical transcri!tion or to so"e kind of code. s for ordinary ob,ects, or even the h$"an body, raised to the <ternal laws, those of all !oetry dignity of signs, it is evident that one can draw one%s ins!iration fro" hierogly!hic characters [TD , p !"# and all viable lang$age, and, a"ong other things, of 5hinese ideogra"s and ancient <gy!tian hierogly!hs. (ence, far fro" restricting the !ossibilities of theater and lang$age, on the !rete4t that I will not !erfor" written !lays, I e4tend the lang$age of the stage and "$lti!ly its !ossibilities
[TD, p iii#

s concerns !sychoanalysis and es!ecially !sychoanalysts,

rta$d was no

less caref$l to indicate his distance fro" those who believe that they can retain disco$rse with the aid of !sychoanalysis, and thereby can wield its initiative and !owers of initiation. &or the theater of cr$elty is indeed a theater of drea"s, b$t of cr$el drea"s, that is to say, absol$tely necessary and deter"ined drea"s, drea"s calc$lated and given direction, as o!!osed to what rta$d believed to be the e"!irical disorder of s!ontaneo$s drea"s. The ways and fig$res of drea"s can be "astered. The s$rrealists read (ervey de *aint) Denys.B In this theatrical treat"ent of drea"s, +!oetry and science "$st henceforth be identical+ (TD, !. 1AC). To "ake the" s$ch, it is certainly necessary to !roceed according to the "odern "agic that is !sychoanalysis. +I !ro!ose to bring back into the theater this ele"entary "agic idea, taken $! by "odern !sychoanalysis+ (TD, !. BC). E$t no concession "$st be "ade to what rta$d believes to be the faltering of drea"s and of the $nconscio$s. It is the law of drea"s that "$st be !rod$ced or re!rod$ced' +I !ro!ose to reno$nce o$r e"!iricis" of i"agery, in which the $nconscio$s f$rnishes i"ages at rando", and which the !oet arranges at rando" too+ (ibid.). Eeca$se he wants +to see s!arkle and tri$"!h on stage+ +whatever is

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part of the illegibility and magnetic fascination of dreams" "C: 353;', -rtaud therefore re ects the psychoanalyst as interpreter, secondremove commentator, hermeneut, or theoretician. 1e *ould have re ected a psychoanalytic theater *ith as much rigor as he condemned psychological theater. -nd for the same reasons5 his re ection of any secret interiority, of the reader, of directive interpretations or of psychodramaturgy. "(he subconscious *ill not play any true rule on stage. :e've had enough of the confusion engendered bet*een author and audience through the medium of producers and actors. (oo bad for analysts, students of the soul and surrealists.... :e are determined to safeguard the plays *e put on against any secret commentary" "C: 35;%'. % /y virtue of his situation and his status, the psychoanalyst *ould belong to the structure of the classical stage, to its societal form, its metaphysics, its religion, etc. (he theater of cruelty thus *ould not be a theater of the unconscious. -lmost the contrary. Cruelty is consciousness, is exposed lucidity. "(here is no cruelty *ithout consciousness and *ithout the application of consciousness" "(#, p. $A3'. -nd this consciousness indeed lives upon a murder, is the consciousness of this murder, as *e suggested above. -rtaud says this in "(he @irst )etter on Cruelty"5 "4t is consciousness that gives to the exercise of every act of life its blood-red

color, its cruel nuance, since it is understood that life is al*ays someone's death" "(#, p. $A3'. Perhaps -rtaud is also protesting against a certain @reudian description of dreams as the substitutive fulfillment of desire, as the function of vicariousness5 through the theater, -rtaud *ants to return their dignity to dreams and to ma0e of them something more original, more free, more affirmative than an activity of displacement. 4t is perhaps against a certain image of @reudian thought that he *rites in the @irst 7anifesto5 "(o consider the theater as a second-hand psychological or moral function, and to believe that dreams themselves have only a substitute function, is to diminish the profound poetic bearing of dreams as *ell as of the theater" "(#, p. %3'. @inally, a psychoanalytic theater *ould ris0 being a desacraliBing theater, and thereby *ould confirm the :est in its pro ect and its tra ectory. (he theater of cruelty is a hieratic theater. 2egression to*ard the unconscious "cf. (#, p. .,' fails if it does not rea*a0en the sacred, if'

it is not both the "mystic" experience of "revelation" and the manifestation of life in their first emergence." :e have seen the reasons *hy hieroglyphics had to be substituted for purely phonic signs. 4t must be added that the latter communicate less than the former *ith the imagination of the sacred. "-nd through the hieroglyph of a breath 4 am able to recover an idea of the sacred theater" "(#, p. $.$'. - ne* epiphany of the supernatural and the divine must occur *ithin cruelty. -nd not despite but than0s to the eviction of 9od and the destruction of the theater's theological machinery. (he divine has been ruined by 9od. (hat is to say, by man, *ho in permitting himself to be separated from )ife by 9od, in permitting himself to be usurped from his o*n birth, became man by polluting the divinity of the divine. "@or far from believing that man invented the supernatural and the divine, 4 thin0 it is man's age-old intervention *hich has ultimately corrupted the divine *ithin him" "(#, p. G'. (he restoration of divine cruelty, hence, must traverse the murder of 9od, that is to say, primarily the murder of the man-9od." Perhaps *e no* can as0, not about the conditions under *hich a modern theater could be faithful to -rtaud, but in *hat cases it is surely unfaithful to him. :hat might the themes of infidelity be, even among those *ho invo0e -rtaud in the militant and noisy fashion *e all 0no*< :e *ill content ourselves *ith naming these themes. :ithout a doubt, foreign to the theater of cruelty are5 $. -ll non-sacred theater. 3. -ll theater that privileges speech or rather the verb, all theater of *ords, even if this privilege becomes that of a speech *hich is selfdestructive, *hich once more becomes gesture of hopeless reoccurrence, a negative relation of speech to itself, theatrical nihilism, *hat is still called the theater of the absurd. !uch a theater *ould not only be consumed by speech, and *ould not destroy the functioning of the classical stage, but it also *ould not be, in the sense understood by -rtaud "and doubtless by NietBsche', an affirmation. ;. -ll abstract theater *hich excludes something from the totality of art, and thus, from the totality of life and its resources of signification5 dance, music, volume, depth of plasticity, visible images, sonority, phonicity, etc. -n abstract theater is a theater in *hich the totality of sense and the senses is not consumed. =ne *ould incorrectly conclude

from this that it suffices to accumulate or to uxtapose all the arts in order to create a total theater addressed to the "total man"$B "cf. (#, p. $3;'. Nothing could be further from addressing total man than an assembled totality, an artificial and exterior mimicry. 4nversely, certain apparent exhaustions of stage technique sometimes more rigorously pursue -rtaud's tra ectory. -ssuming, *hich *e do not, that there is some sense in spea0ing of a fidelity to -rtaud, to something li0e his "message" "this notion already betrays him', then a rigorous, painsta0ing, patient and implacable sobriety in the *or0 of destruction, and an economical acuity aiming at the master parts of a still quite solid machine, are more surely imperative, today, than the general mobiliBation of art and artists, than turbulence or improvised agitation under the moc0ing and tranquil eyes of the police. .. -ll theater of alienation. -lienation only consecrates, *ith didactic insistence and systematic heaviness, the nonparticipation of spectators "and even of directors and actors' in the creative act, in the irruptive force fissuring the space of the stage. (he Cerfremdungseffe0t" remains the prisoner of a classical paradox and of "the 6uropean ideal of art" *hich "attempts to cast the mind into an attitude distinct from force but addicted to exaltation" "(#, p. $A'. !ince "in the 'theater of cruelty' the spectator is in the center and the spectacle surrounds him" "(#, p. G$', the distance of vision is no longer pure, cannot be abstracted from the totality of the sensory milieu8 the infused spectator can no longer constitute his spectacle and provide himself *ith its ob ect. (here is no longer spectator or spectacle, but festival "cf. (#, p. G+'. -ll the limits furro*ing classical theatricality "representedWrepresenter, signifiedWsignifier, authorWdirectorWactorsWspectators, stageWaudience, textWinterpretation, etc.' *ere ethicometaphysical prohibitions, *rin0les, grimaces, rictusesthe symptoms of fear before the dangers of the festival. :ithin the space of the festival opened by transgression, the distance of representation should no longer be extendable. (he festival of cruelty lifts all footlights and protective barriers before the "absolute danger" *hich is "*ithout foundation"5 "4 must have actors *ho are first of all beings, that is to say, *ho on stage are not afraid of the true sensation of the touch of a 0nife and the convulsionsabsolutely real for them-of a supposed birth. 7ounet-!ully believes in *hat he does and gives the illusion of it, but he 0no*s that he is

behind a protective barrier, me-4 suppress the protective barrier" "letter to 2oger /lin, !eptember $%.+'. -s regards the festival, as invo0ed by -rtaud, and the menace of that *hich is "*ithout foundation," the "happening" can only ma0e us smile5 it is to the theater of cruelty *hat the carnival of Nice might be to the mysteries of 6leusis. (his is particularly so due to the fact that the happening substitutes political agitation for the total revolution prescribed by -rtaud. (he festival must be a political act. -nd the act of political revolution is theatrical. +. -ll nonpolitical theater. :e have indeed said that the festival must be a political act and not the more or less eloquent, pedagogical, and superintended transmission of a concept or a politico-moral vision of the *orld. (o reflect-*hich *e cannot do here-the political sense of this act and this festival, and the image of society *hich fascinates -rtaud's desire, one should come to invo0e "in order to note the greatest difference *ithin the greatest affinity' all the elements in 2ousseau *hich establish communication bet*een the critique of the classical spectacle, the suspect quality of articulation in language, the ideal of a public festival substituted for representation, and a certain model of society perfectly present to itself in small communities *hich render both useless and nefarious all recourse to representation at the decisive moments of social life. (hat is, all recourse to political as *ell as to theatrical representation, replacement, or delegation. 4t very precisely could be sho*n that it is the "representer" that 2ousseau suspects in (he !ocial Contract, as *ell as in the )etter to 7. d'-lembert, *here he proposes the replacement of theatrical representations *ith public festivals lac0ing all exhibition and spectacle, festivals *ithout "anything to see" in *hich the spectators themselves *ould become actors5 "/ut *hat then *ill be the ob ects of these entertainments< ... Nothing, if you please.... Plant a sta0e cro*ned *ith flo*ers in the middle of a square8 gather the people together there, and you *ill have a festival. #o better yet8 let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves8 ma0e them actors themselves. "$. &. -ll ideological theater, all cultural theater, all communicative, interpretive "in the popular and not the NietBschean sense, of course' theater see0ing to transmit a content, or to deliver a message "of

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*hatever nature5 political, religious, psychological, metaphysical, etc.' that *ould ma0e a discourse's meaning intelligible for its listeners8,+ a message that *ould not be totally exhausted in the act and present tense of the stage, that *ould not coincide *ith the stage, that could be repeated *ithout it. 1ere *e touch upon *hat seems to be the profound essence of -rtaud's pro ect, his historico-metaphysical decision. -rtaud *anted to erase repetition in general.'H @or him, repetition *as evil, and one could doubtless organiBe an entire reading of his texts around this center. 2epetiton separates force, presence, and life from themselves. (his separation is the economical and calculating gesture of that *hich defers itself in order to maintain itself, that *hich reserves expenditure and surrenders to fear. (his po*er of repetition governed everything that -rtaud *ished to destroy, and it has several names5 9od, /eing, #ialectics. 9od is the eternity *hose death goes on indefinitely, *hose death, as difference and repetition *ithin life, has never ceased to menace life. 4t is not the living 9od, but the #eath-9od that *e should fear. 9od is #eath. "@or even the infinite is dead, W infinite is the name of a dead man W *ho is not dead" "G.'. -s soon as there is repetition, 9od is there, the present holds on to itself and reserves itself, that is to say, eludes itself "(he absolute is not a being and *ill never be one, for there can be no being *ithout a crime committed against myself, that is to say, *ithout ta0ing from. me a being *ho *anted one day to be god *hen this is not possible, 9od being able to manifest himself only all at once, given that he manifests himself an infinite number of times during all the times of eternity as the infinity of times and eternity, *hich creates perpetuity" "!eptember $%.+'. -nother name of repetition5 /eing. /eing is the form in *hich the infinite diversity of the forms and forces of life and death can indefinitely merge and be repeated in the *ord. @or there is no *ord, nor in general a sign, *hich is not constituted by the possibility of repeating itself. - sign *hich does not repeat itself, *hich is not already divided by repetition in its "first time," is not a sign. (he signifying referral therefore must be ideal-and ideality is but the assured po*er of repetition-in order to refer to the same thing each time. (his is *hy /eing is the 0ey *ord of eternal repetition, the victory of 9od and of #eath over life. )i0e NietBsche "for example in (he /irth of Philosophy', -rtaud refuses to subsume )ife to

/eing, and inverses the genealogical order5 "@irst to live and to be according to one's soul8 the problem of being is only their consequence" "!eptember $%.+' "(here is no greater enemy of the human body than being." "!eptember $%.,' Certain other unpublished texts valoriBe *hat -rtaud properly calls "the beyond of being" "@ebruary $%.,', manipulating this expression of Plato's "*hom -rtaud did not fail to read' in a NietBschean style. @inally, #ialectics is the movement through *hich expenditure is reappropriated into presence-it is the economy of repetition. (he economy of truth. 2epetition summariBes negativity, gathers and maintains the past present as truth, as ideality. (he truth is al*ays that *hich can be repeated. Nonrepetition, expenditure that is resolute and *ithout return in the unique time consuming the present, must put an end to fearful discursiveness, to uns0irtable ontology, to dialectics, "dialectics >a certain dialectics? being that *hich finished me" "!eptember $%.+'." #ialectics is al*ays that *hich has finished us, because it is al*ays that *hich ta0es into account our re ection of it. -s it does our affirmation. (o re ect death as repetition is to affirm death as a present expenditure *ithout return. -nd inversely. (his is a schema that hovers around NietBsche's repetition of affirmation. Pure expenditure, absolute generosity offering the unicity of the present to death in order to ma0e the present appear as such, has already begun to *ant to maintain the presence of the present, has already opened the boo0 and memory, the thin0ing of /eing as memory. Not to *ant to maintain the present is to *ant to preserve that *hich constitutes its irreplaceable and mortal presence, that *ithin it *hich cannot be repeated. (o consume pure difference *ith pleasure. !uch, reduced to its bloodless frame*or0, is the matrix of the history of thought conceptualiBing itself since 1egel.$G (he possibility of the theater is the obligatory focal point of this thought *hich reflects tragedy as repetition. (he menace of repetition is no*here else as *ell organiBed as in the theater. No*here else is one so close to the stage as the origin of repetition, so close to the primitive repetition *hich *ould have to be erased, and only by detaching it from itself as if from its double. Not in the sense in *hich -rtaud spo0e of (he (heater and its #ouble," but as designating

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the fold, the interior duplication *hich steals the simple presence of its present act from the theater, from life, etc., in the irrepressible movement of repetition. "=ne time" is the enigma of that *hich has no meaning, no presence, no legibility. No*, for -rtaud, the festival of cruelty could ta0e place only one time5 ")et us leave textual criticism to graduate students, formal criticism to esthetes, and recogniBe that *hat has been said is not still to be said8 that an expression does not have the same value t*ice, does not live t*o lives8 that all *ords, once spo0en, are dead and function only at the moment *hen they are uttered, that a form, once it has served, cannot be used again and as0s only to be replaced by another, and that the theater is the only place in the *orld *here a gesture, once made, can never be made the same *ay t*ice" "(#, p. ,+'. (his is indeed ho* things appear5 theatrical representation is finite, and leaves behind it, behind its actual presence, no trace, no ob ect to carry off. 4t is neither a boo0 nor a *or0, but an energy, and in this sense it is the only art of life. "(he theater teaches precisely the uselessness of the action *hich, once done, is not to be done, and the superior use of the state unused by the action and *hich, restored, produces a purification" (#4, p. G3'. 4n this sense the theater of cruelty *ould be the art of difference and of expenditure *ithout economy, *ithout reserve, *ithout return, *ithout history. Pure presence as pure difference. 4ts act must be forgotten, actively forgotten. 1ere, one must practice the a0tive Cergesslich0eit *hich is spo0en of in the second dissertation of (he 9enealogy of 7orals, *hich also explicates "festivity" and "cruelty" "9rausom0eit'. -rtaud's disgust *ith nontheatrical *riting has the same sense. :hat inspires this disgust is not, as in the Phaedrus, the gesture of the body, the sensory and mnemonic, the hypomnesiac mar0 exterior to the inscription of truth in the soul, but, on the contrary, *riting as the site of the inscription of truth, the other of the living body, *riting as ideality, repetition. Plato criticiBes *riting as a body8 -rtaud criticiBes it as the erasure of the body, of the living gesture *hich ta0es place only once. :riting is space itself and the possibility of repetition in general. (his is *hy ":e should get rid of our superstitious valuation of texts and *ritten poetry. :ritten poetry is *orth reading once, and then should be destroyed" $TD, p ,G'.

4n thus enumerating the themes of infidelity, one comes to understand very quic0ly that fidelity is impossible. (here is no theater in the *orld today *hich fulfills -rtaud's desire. -nd there *ould be no exception to be made for the attempts made by -rtaud himself 1e 0ne* this better than any other5 the "grammar" of the theater of cruelty, of *hich he said that it is "to be found," *ill al*ays remain the inaccessible limit of a representation *hich is not repetition, of a representation *hich is full presence, *hich does not carry its double *ithin itself as its death, of a present *hich does not repeat itself, that is, of a present outside time, a nonpresent. (he present offers itself as such, appears, presents itself, opens the stage of time or the time of the stage only by harboring its o*n intestine difference, and only in the interior fold of its original repetition, in representation. 4n dialectics. -rtaud 0ne* this *ell5 "a certain dialectics @or if one appropriately conceives the horiBon of dialectics-outside a conventional 1egelianism-one understands, perhaps, that dialectics is the indefinite movement of finitude, of the unity of life and death, of difference, of original repetition, that is, of the origin of tragedy as the absence of a simple origin. 4n this sense, dialectics is tragedy, the only possible affirmation to be made against the philosophical or Christian idea of pure origin, against "the spirit of beginnings"5 "/ut the spirit of beginnings has not ceased to ma0e me commit idiocies, and 4 have not ceased to dissociate myself from the spirit of beginnings *hich is the Christian spirit" "!eptember $%.+'. :hat is tragic is not the impossibility but the necessity of repetition. -rtaud 0ne* that the theater of cruelty neither begins nor is completed *ithin the purity of simple presence, but rather is already *ithin representation, in the "second time of Creation," in the conflict of forces *hich could not be that of a simple origin. #oubtless, cruelty could begin to be practiced *ithin this conflict, but thereby it must also let itself be penetrated. (he origin is al*ays penetrated. !uch is the alchemy of the theater. Perhaps before proceeding further 4 shall be as0ed to define *hat 4 mean by the archetypal, primitive theater. -nd *e shall thereby

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approach the very heart of the matter. 4f in fact *e raise the question of the origins and raison d'etre "or primordial necessity' of the theater, *e find, metaphysically, the materialiBation or rather the exterioriBation of a 0ind of essential drama, already dis!osed and divided, not so much as to lose their character as principles, but enough to comprise, in a substantial and active fashion "i.e. resonantly', an infinite perspective of conflicts. (o analyBe such a drama philosophically is impossible8 only poetically .... -nd this essential drama, *e come to realiBe, exists, and in the image of something subtler than Creation itself, something *hich must be represented as the result of one :ill alone-and *ithout conflict" :e must believe that the essential drama, the one at the root of all the 9reat 7ysteries, is associated *ith the second phase of Creation, that of difficulty and of the #ouble, that of matter and the materialiBation of the idea. 4t seems indeed that *here simplicity and order reign, there can be no theater nor drama, and the true theater, li0e poetry as *ell, though by other means, is born out of a 0ind of organiBed anarchy >(#, pp. +o-+t?. Primitive theater and cruelty thus also begin by repetition. /ut if the idea of a theater *ithout representation, the idea of the impossible, does not help us to regulate theatrical practice, it does, perhaps, permit us to conceive its origin, eve and limit, and the horiBon of its death. (he energy of :estern theater thus lets itself be encompassed *ithin its o*n possibility, *hich is not accidental and serves as a constitutive center and structuring locus for the entire history of the :est. /ut repetition steals the center and the locus, and *hat *e have ust said of its possibility should prohibit us from spea0ing both of death as a horiBon and of birth as a past opening. -rtaud 0ept himself as close as possible to the limit5 the possibility and impossibility of pure theater. Presence, in order to be presence and self-presence, has al*ays already begun to represent itself, has al*ays already been penetrated. *ffir!ation itself must be penetrated in repeating itself :hich means that the murder of the father *hich opens the history of representation and the space of tragedy, the murder of the father that -rtaud, in sum, *ants to repeat at the greatest proximity to its origin but only a single time-this murder is endless and is repeated indefinitely. 4t begins by penetrating its o*n commentary

and is accompanied by its o*n representation. 4n *hich it erases itself and confirms the transgressed la*. (o do so, it suffices that there be a sign, that is to say, a repetition. Enderneath this side of the limit, and in the extent to *hich he *anted to save the purity of a presence *ithout interior difference and *ithout repetition "or, paradoxically amounting to the same thing, the purity of a pure difference', 3A -rtaud also desired the impossibility of the theater, *anted to erase the stage, no longer *anted to see *hat transpires in a locality al*ays inhabited or haunted by the father and sub ected to the repetition of murder. 4s it not -rtaud *ho *ants to reduce the archi-stage *hen he *rites in the 1ere-lies5 "4 -ntonin -rtaud, am my son, W my father, my mother, W and myself' "--, p. 3;G'< (hat he thereby 0ept himself at the limit of theatrical possibility, and that he simultaneously *anted to produce and to annihilate the stage, is *hat he 0ne* in the most extreme *ay. #ecember $%.&5 -nd no* 4 am going to say something *hich, perhaps, is going to stupify many people. 4 am the enemy of theater. 4 have al*ays been. -s much as 4 love the theater, 4 am, for this very reason, equally its enemy. :e see him immediately after*ard5 he cannot resign himself to theater as repetition, and cannot renounce theater as nonrepetition5 (he theater is a passionate overflo*ing a frightful transfer of forces from body to body. (his transfer cannot be reproduced t*ice. Nothing more impious than the system of the /alinese *hich consists, after having produced this transfer one time, instead of see0ing another,

; $& W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ in resorting to a system of particular enchantments in order to deprive astral photography of the gestures thus obtained. (heater as repetition of that *hich does not repeat itself, theater as the original repetition of difference *ithin the conflict of forces in *hich "evil is the permanent la*, and *hat is good is an effort and already a cruelty added to the other cruelty"-such is the fatal limit of a cruelty *hich begins *ith its o*n representation. /ecause it has al*ays already begun, representation therefore has no end. /ut one can conceive of the closure of that *hich is *ithout end. Closure is the circular limit *ithin *hich the repetition of difference infinitely repeats itself (hat is to say, closure is its playing space. (his movement is the movement of the *orld as play. "-nd for the absolute life itself is a game" "=C .53G3' (his play is cruelty as the unity of necessity and chance. "4t is chance that is infinite, not god" "@ragmentations'. (his play of life is artistic." (o thin0 the closure of representation is thus to thin0 the cruel po*ers of death and play *hich permit presence to be born to itself, and pleasurably to consmne itself through the representation in *hich it eludes itself in its deferral, (o thin0 the closure of representation is to thin0 the tragic5 not as the representation of fate, but as the fate of representation. 4ts gratuitous and baseless necessity. -nd it is to thin0 *hy it is fatal that, in its closure, representation continues.

9
FROM RESTRICTED TO GENERAL ECONOMY A He0e+ia/i)3 -it(*1t re)er;e

1e >1egell? did not 0no* to *hat extent he *as right. . "9eorges /ataille' "=ften 1egel seems to me self-evident, but the self-evident is a heavy burden" ")e coupable'. :hy today-even today-are the best readers of /ataille among those for *hom 1egel's self evidence is so lightly borne< !o lightly borne that a murmured allusion to given fundamental concepts-the pretext, sometimes, for avoiding the details-or a complacent conventionality, a blindness to the text, an invocation of /ataille's complicity *ith NietBsche or 7arx, suffice to undo the constraint of 1egel. Perhaps the self-evident *ould be too heavy to bear, and so a shrug of the shoulders is preferred to discipline. -nd, contrary to /ataille's experience, this puts one, *ithout seeing or 0no*ing it, *ithin the very self-evidence of 1egel one often thin0s oneself unburdened of. 7isconstrued, treated lightly, 1egelianism only extends its historical domination, finally unfolding its immense enveloping

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resources *ithout obstacle. 1egelian self-evidence seems lighter than ever at the moment *hen it finally bears do*n *ith its full *eight. /ataille had feared this too5 heavy, "it *ill be even more so in the future." -nd if /ataille considered himself closer to NietBsche than anyone else, than to anyone else, to the point of identification *ith him, it *as not, in this case, as a motive for simplification5 NietBsche 0ne* o f 1egel only the usual vulgariBation. (he ,enealogy of -orals is the singular proof o f the state o f general ignorance in *hich remained, and remains today, the dialectic o f the master and the slave, *hose lucidity is blinding.... no one 0no*s anything of h i!self if he has not grasped this movement *hich determines and limits the successive possibilities o f man ./0e1$erience interie re "hereafter 6l', p. 140) n! I I <

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(o bear the self-evidence of 1egel, today, *ould mean this5 one must, in every sense, go through the "slumber of reason," the slumber that engenders monsters and then puts them to sleep8 this slumber must be effectively traversed so that a*a0ening *ill not be a ruse of dream. (hat is to say, again, a ruse of reason. (he slumber of reason is not, perhaps, reason put to sleep, but slumber in the form of reason, the vigilance of the 1egelian logos. 2eason 0eeps *atch over a deep slumber in *hich it has an interest. No*, if "evidence received in the slumber of reason loses or *ill lose the characteristics of *a0efulness" "ibid.', then it is necessary, in order to open our eyes "and did /ataille ever *ant to do other*ise, correctly certain that he *as thereby ris0ing death5 "the condition in *hich 4 *ould see *ould be to die"', to have spent the night *ith reason, to have 0ept *atch and to have slept *ith her5 and to have done so throughout the night, until morning, until the other da*n *hich resembles, even to the point of being ta0en for it-li0e daybrea0 for nightfall-the hour *hen the philosophical animal can also finally open its eyes. (hat morning and none other. @or at the far reaches of this night something *as contrived, blindly, 4 mean in a discourse, by means of *hich philosophy, in completing itself, could both include *ithin itself and anticipate all the figures of its beyond, all the forms and resources of its exterior8 and could do so in order to 0eep these forms and resources close to itself by simply ta0ing

hold of their enunciation. 6xcept, perhaps, for a certain laughter. -nd yet. (o laugh at philosophy "at 1egelianism'-such, in effect, is the form of the a*a0ening-henceforth calls for an entire "discipline," an entire "method of meditation" that ac0no*ledges the philosopher's by*ays, understands his techniques, ma0es use of his ruses, manipulates his cards, lets him deploy his strategy, appropriates his texts. (hen, than0s to this *or0 *hich has prepared it-and philosophy is *or0 itself according to /ataille-but quic0ly, furtively, and unforeseeably brea0ing *ith it, as betrayal or as detachment, drily, laughter bursts out. -nd yet, in privileged moments that are less moments than the al*ays rapidly s0etched movements of experience8 rare, discreet and light movements, *ithout triumphant stupidity, far from public vie*, very close to that at *hich laughter laughs5 close to anguish, first of all, *hich must not even be called the negative of laughter for fear of once more being suc0ed in by 1egel's discourse. -nd one can already foresee, in this prelude, that the impossible meditated by /ataille *ill al*ays have this form5 ho*, after having exhausted the discourse of philosophy, can one inscribe in the lexicon and syntax of a language, our language, *hich *as also the language of philosophy, that *hich nevertheless exceeds the oppositions of concepts governed by this communal logic< Necessary and impossible, this excess had to fold discourse into strange shapes. -nd, of course, constrain it to ustify itself to 1egel indefinitely. !ince more than a century of ruptures, of "surpassings" *ith or *ithout "overturnings," rarely has a relation to 1egel been so little definable5 a complicity *ithout reserve accompanies 1egelian discourse, "ta0es it seriously" up to the end, *ithout an ob ection in philosophical form, *hile, ho*ever, a certain burst of laughter exceeds it and destroys its sense, or signals, in any event, the extreme point of "experience" *hich ma0es 1egelian discourse dislocate itself8 and this can be done only through close scrutiny and full 0no*ledge of *hat one is laughing at. /ataille, thus, too0 1egel seriously, and too0 absolute 0no*ledge seriously.' -nd to ta0e such a system seriously, /ataille 0ne*, *as to prohibit oneself from extracting concepts from it, or from manipulating isolated propositions, dra*ing effects from them by transportation into a discourse foreign to them5 "1egel's thoughts are interdependent

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to the point of it being impossible to grasp their meaning, if not in the necessity of the movement *hich constitutes their coherence" "6l, p. $%;'. /ataille doubtless put into question the idea or meaning of the chain in 1egelian reason, but did so by thin0ing the chain as such, in its totality, *ithout ignoring its internal rigor. =ne could describe as a scene, but *e *ill not do so here, the history of /ataille's relations to 1egel's different faces5 the one that assumed "absolute rending"8' the one *ho "thought he *ould go mad"8' the one *ho, bet*een :olff and Comte and "the clouds of professors" at the "village *edding" that is philosophy, as0s himself no questions, *hile "alone, his head aching, Iier0egaard questions"8' the one *ho "to*ards the end of his life," "no longer put the problem to himself," "repeated his courses and played cards8" the "portrait of the aged 1egel" before *hich, as "in reading the Phenomenology of the 7ind," "one cannot help being seiBed by freeBing impression of completion."+ @inally, the 1egel of the "small comic recapitulation."& /ut let us leave the stage and the players. (he drama is first of all textual. 4n his interminable explication *ith 1egel, /ataille doubtless had only a restricted and indirect access to the texts themselves.' (his did not prevent him from bringing his reading and his question to bear on the crucial point of the decision. (a0en one by one and immobiliBed outside their syntax, all of /ataille's concepts are 1egelian. :e must ac0no*ledge this *ithout stopping here. @or if one does not grasp the rigorous effect of the trembling to *hich he submits these concepts, the ne* configuration into *hich he displaces and reinscribes them, barely reaching it ho*ever, one *ould conclude, according to the case at hand, that /ataille is 1egelian or anti-1egelian, or that he has muddled 1egel. =ne *ould be deceived each time. -nd one *ould miss the formal la* *hich, necessarily enunciated by /ataille in a nonphilosophical mode, has constrained the relationship of all his concepts to those of 1egel, and through 1egel's concepts to the concepts of the entire history of metaphysics. -ll of /ataille's concepts, and not only those to *hich *e must limit ourselves here, in order to reconstitute

The epoch of meaning: lordship and sovereignty

(o begin *ith, does not sovereignty, at first glance, translate the lordship "1errschaft' of the Phenomenology<' (he operation of lordship indeed consists in, *rites 1egel, "sho*ing that it is fettered to determinate existence, that it is not bound at all by the particularity every*here characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up *ith life" "1egel, p. 3;3'. !uch an "operation" "this *ord, constantly employed by /ataille to designate the privileged moment or the act of sovereignty, *as the current translation of the *ord (un, *hich occurs so frequently in the chapter on the dialectic of the master and the slave' thus amounts to ris0ing, putting at sta0e "mettre en ea, *agen, daransetBen8 mettre en eu is one of /ataille's most fundamental and frequently used expressions' the entirety of one's o*n life. (he servant is the man *ho does not put his life at sta0e, the man *ho *ants to conserve his life, *ants to be conserved "servus'. /y raising oneself above life, by loo0ing at death directly, one acceeds to lordship5 to the for-itself >pour soi, fur sich?, to freedom, to recognition. @reedom must go through the putting at sta0e of life "#aransetBen des )ebens'. (he lord is the man *ho has had the strength to endure the anguish of death and to maintain the *or0 of death. !uch, according to /ataille, is the center of 1egelianism. (he "principal text" *ould be the one, in the Preface to the Phenomenology, *hich places 0no*ledge "at the height of death."% (he rigorous and subtle corridors through *hich the dialectic of master and slave passes are *ell 0no*n. (hey cannot be summariBed *ithout being mistreated. :e are interested, here, in the essential displacements to *hich they are submitted as they are reflected in /ataille's thought. -nd *e are interested, first of all, in the difference bet*een lordship and sovereignty. 4t cannot even be said that this difference has a sense5 it is the difference of sense, the unique interval *hich separates meaning from a certain non-meaning. )ordship has a meaning. (he putting at sta0e of life is a moment in the constitution of meaning, in the presentation of essence and truth. 4t is an obligatory stage in the history of self-consciousness and phenomenality, that is to say, in the presentation of meaning. @or history-that is, meaning-to form a continuous chain, to be *oven, the master must experience his truth. (his is possible only under t*o conditions *hich cannot be

the enunciation of this la*.

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separated5 the master must stay alive in order to en oy *hat he has *on by ris0ing his life8 and, at the end of this progression so admirably described by 1egel, the "truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman" "1egel, p. 3;,'. -nd *hen servility becomes lordship, it 0eeps *ithin it the trace of its repressed origin, "being a consciousness *ithin itself "Buruc0gedrungtes /e*usstsein', it *ill enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence" "ibid.'. 4t is this dissymmetry, this absolute privilege given to the slave, that /ataille did not cease to meditate. (he truth of the master is in the slave8 and the slave become a master remains a "repressed" slave. !uch is the condition of meaning, of history of discourse, of philosophy, etc. (he master is in relation to himself, and selfconsciousness is constituted, only through the mediation of servile consciousness in the movement of recognition8 but simultaneously through the mediation of the thing, *hich for the slave is initially the essentiality that he cannot immediately negate in pleasurable consumption, but can only *or0 upon, "elaborate" "bearbeiten'8 *hich consists in inhibiting "hemmen' his desire, in delaying "aufhalten' the disappearance of the thing. (o stay alive, to maintain oneself in life, to *or0, to defer pleasure, to limit the sta0es, to have respect for death at the very moment *hen one loo0s directly at it-such is the servile condition of mastery and of the entire history it ma0es possible. 1egel clearly had proclaimed the necessity of the master's retaining the life that he exposes to ris0. :ithout this economy of life, the "trial by death, ho*ever, cancels both the truth *hich *as to result from it, and there*ith the certainty of self altogether" "1egel, p. 3;;'. (o rush headlong into death pure and simple is thus to ris0 the absolute loss of meaning, in the extent to *hich meaning necessarily traverses the truth of the master and of self-consciousness. =ne ris0s losing the effect and profit of meaning *hich *ere the very sta0es one hoped to *in. 1egel called this mute and nonproductive death, this death pure and simple, abstract negativity, in opposition to "the negation characteristic of consciousness, *hich cancels in such a *ay that it preserves and maintains *hat is sublated "#ie Negation des /e*usstseins *elches so aufhebt, doss es das -ufgehobene aufbe*ahrt and erhalt', and thereby survives its being sublated "und hiermit sent -ufgehoben*erden uberlebt'. 4n this experience

self-consciousness becomes a*are that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" "1egel, p. 3;.'. /urst of laughter from /ataille. (hrough a ruse of life, that is, of reason, life has thus stayed alive. -nother concept of life had been surreptitiously put in its place, to remain there, never to be exceeded, any more than reason is ever exceeded "for, says )'erotisme, "by definition, the excess is outside reason"'. (his life is not natural life, the biological existence put at sta0e in lordship, but an essential life that is *elded to the first one, holding it bac0, ma0ing it *or0 for the constitution of selfconsciousness, truth, and meaning. !uch is the truth of life. (hrough this recourse to the -ufhebung, *hich conserves the sta0es, remains in control of the play, limiting it and elaborating it by giving it form and meaning "#ie -rbeit ... bildet', this economy of life restricts itself to conservation, to circulation and self-reproduction as the reproduction of meaning8 henceforth, everything covered by the name lordship collapses into comedy. (he independence of self-consciousness $A becomes laughable at the moment *hen it liberates itself by enslaving itself, *hen it starts to work, that is, *hen it enters into dialectics. )aughter alone exceeds dialectics and the dialectician5 it bursts out only on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute ris0ing of death, *hat 1egel calls abstract negativity. - negativity that never ta0es place, that never presents itself, because in doing so it *ould start to *or0 again. - laughter that literally never appears, because it exceeds phenomenality in general, the absolute possibility of meaning. -nd the *ord "laughter" itself must be read in a burst, as its nucleus of meaning bursts in the direction of the system of the sovereign operation ""drun0enness, erotic effusion, sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic behavior, anger, absurdity," etc., cf. 7ethode de meditation'. (his burst of laughter ma0es the difference bet*een lordship and sovereignty shine, *ithout sho*ing it ho*ever and, above all, *ithout saying it. !overeignty, as *e shall verify, is more and less than lordship, more or less free than it, for example8 and *hat *e are saying about the predicate "freedom" can be extended to every characteristic of lordship. !imultaneously more and less a lordship than lordship, sovereignty is totally other. /ataille pulls it out of dialectics. 1e *ithdra*s it from the horiBon of meaning and 0no*ledge. -nd does so to such a degree that, despite the characteristics that ma0e it resemble lordship,

1=I

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sovereignty is no longer a figure in the continuous chain of phenomenology. 8esem+ling a phenomenological figure, trait for trait, sovereignty is the a+solute alteration of all of them. ,nd this difference would not +e produced if the analogy was limited to a given a+stract characteristic. 'ar from +eing an a+stract negativity, sovereignty *the a+solute degree of putting at sta%e2, rather, must ma%e the seriousness of meaning appear as an a+straction inscri+ed in play. (aughter, which constitutes sovereignty in its relation to death, is not a negativity, as has +een said.'' ,nd it laughs at itself, a "ma&or" laughter laughs at a "minor" laughter, for the sovereign operation also needs life-the life that welds the two lives together in order to +e in relation to itself in the pleasura+le consumption of itself hus, it must simulate, after a fashion, the a+solute ris%, and it must laugh at this simulacrum. 9n the comedy that it there+y plays for itself, the +urst of laughter is th almost-nothing into which meaning sin%s, a+solutely. "Philosophy," should have "considered laughter first" *i+id.2. his is why laughter is a+sent from the 4egelian system, and not in the manner of a negative or a+stract side of it. "9n the 'system' poetry, laughter, ecstasy are nothing. 4egel hastily gets rid of them. he %nows no other aim than %nowledge. o my eyes, his immense fatigue is lin%ed to his horror of the +lind spot" *-l, p. !I=2. What is laugha+le is the su+mission to the selfevidence of meaning, to the force of this imperative. that there>> must +e meaning, that nothing must +e definitely lost in death, or further, that death should receive the signification of "a+stract negativ ity," that a wor% must always +e possi+le which, +ecause it defers en&oyment, confers meaning, seriousness, and truth upon the "putting at sta%e." his su+mission is the essence and element of philosophy, of 4egelian ontologics. ,+solute comicalness is the anguish e)perienced fice of meaning. a sacrifice without return and without reserves. he notion of ,ufhe+ung *the speculative concept par e)cellence, says 4egel, the concept whose untranslata+le privilege is wielded +y the German language2" is laugha+le in that it signifies the +usying of a discourse losing its +reath as it reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it wor%s the "putting at sta%e" into an investment, as it amorti3es a+solute e)penditure> and as it gives meaning to death, there+y simultaneously>

+linding itself to the +aselessness of the nonmeaning from which the +asis of meaning is drawn, and in which this +asis of meaning is e)hausted. o +e indifferent to the comedy of the ,ufhe+ung, as was 4egel, is to +lind oneself to the e)perience of the sacred, to the heedless sacrifice of presence and meaning. hus is s%etched out a figure of e)perience-+ut can one still use these two wordsF-irreduci+le to any phenomenology, a figure which finds itself displaced in phenomenology, li%e laughter in philosophy of the mind, and which mimes through sacrifice the a+solute ris% of death. hrough this mime it simultaneously produces the ris% of a+solute death, the feint through which this ris% can +e lived, the impossi+ility of reading a sense or a truth in it, and the laughter which is confused, in the simulacrum, with the opening of the sacred. Descri+ing this simulacrum, unthin%a+le for philosophy, philosophy's +lind spot, 6ataille must, of course, say it, feign to say it, in the 4egelian logos. 9 will spea% later a+out the profound differences +etween the man of sacrifice, who operates ignorant *unconscious2 of the ramifications of what he is doing, and the Sage *4egel2, who surrenders to a %nowledge that, in his own eyes, is a+solute. Despite these differences, it is always a :uestion of manifesting the /egative *and always in a concrete form, that is, at the heart of the otality whose constitutive elements are insepara+le2. he privileged manifestation of /egativity is death, +ut death, in truth, reveals nothing. 9n principle, death reveals to ?an his natural, animal +eing, +ut the revelation never ta%es place. 'or once the animal +eing that has supported him is dead, the human +eing himself has ceased to e)ist. 'or man finally to +e revealed to himself he would have to die, +ut he would have to do so while living-while watching himself cease to +e. 9n other words, death itself would have to +ecome *self2 consciousness at the very moment when it annihilates conscious +eing. 9n a sense this is what ta%es place *or at least is on the point of ta%ing place, or which ta%es place in a fugitive, ungraspa+le manner2 +y means of a su+terfuge. 9n sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies with the animal struc% +y death. hus he dies while watching himself die, and even, after a fashion, dies of his own volition, as one with the sacrificial arm. 6ut this is a comedyN 5r at least it would +e a comedy if there were some other method of revealing the

326 W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ encr+ac (ent +f deat u%+n t e 'i:ingL t is c+(%'eti+n +f t e finite !eing) 7 ic a'+ne acc+(%'is es and can a'+ne acc+(%'is is Negati%ity which &ills hi', finishes hi' and definiti%ely suppresses hi' 0 us it is necessar.) at an. c+st) f+r (an t+ 'i:e at t e (+(ent 7 en e tru'. dies) +r it is necessar. f+r i( t+ 'i:e 7it t e i(%ressi+n +f truly dying This
difficulty foreshadows the necessity of

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+f t e +t er is a'7a.s t e i(age +f +ne>s +7n deat < N+ +ne c+u'd enG+. i(se'f t us) if e did n+t acce%t +ne c+nditi+nB t e dead (an) 7 + is an +t er) is assu(ed t+ !e in agree(ent) and t us t e dead (an t at t e drin"er 7i'' !ec+(e) in turn) 7i'' a:e n+ +t er (eaning
than the first one

.2egel, la

'ort, p 12#

s$ectacle,

or

generally

of

re$resentation,

w ithout the repetiti on of whic h we could re(ain f+reign

t+ and ign+rant +f deat ) as ani(a's a%%arent'. re(ain< In effect) n+t ing is 'ess ani(a' t an t e ficti+n) (+re +r 'ess>B =n'. t e accent +n si(u'acru( and su!terfuge interru%t t e ?ege'ian c+ntinuit. +f t is teJt< ,urt er +n) gaiet. (ar"s t e differenceB In GuJta%+sing it 7it sacrifice and t ere!. 7it t e %ri(ar. t e(e +f

is gaiet. is n+t %art +f t e ec+n+(. +f 'ife) d+es n+t c+rres%+nd Et+ t e desire t+ den. t e eJistence +f deat )E a't +ug it is as c'+se t+ t is desire as %+ssi!'e< 1aiet. is n+t t e c+n:u'si+n t at f+''+7s anguis ) t e (in+r 'aug 7 ic (e'ts a7a. at t e (+(ent 7 en +ne as ad Ea d+se ca'')E and 7 ic is in re'ati+n t+ anguis a'+ng t e 'ines +f t e re'ati+ns i% +f %+siti:e t+ negati:eB =n t e c+ntrar.) gaiet.) tied t+ t e 7+r" +f deat ) fi''s (e 7it anguis ) is accentuated !. an anguis and) in eJc ange) eJas%erates t is anguis B fina''.) ga. anguis ) anguis ed gaiet. %resent (e 7it Ea!s+'ute rendingE in an as%ic in 7 ic it is (. G+. t at fina''. rends (e asunder) !ut in 7 ic a!ate(ent 7+u'd f+''+7 if I 7as t+ta''. t+rn apart, without
'easure

re$resentation

$art, festi%als, spectacles(, I ha%e wanted to show that

'ence t e eJ%ressi+n t at traditi+n

as re%eated infinite'.<<<< It 7as essential for )egel to become conscious of *egati%ity as such, to grasp its +rr+r) in t is case t e +rr+r +f deat ) 7 i'e su%%+rting t e 7+r"+f deat and '++"ing at it fu'' in t e face< In t is fas i+n) ?ege' is o p po s e d l e s s t o t h o se w h o + d r a w b a c & + t ha n t o th o s e w h o s a y : + i t is, n+t ing<E ?e see(s (+st re(+:ed fr+( t +se 7 + react gai'.< I a( i ns i s t i ng upo n th e opp osi t io n o f th e na i% e att it ud e t o th at of th e abso'ute 7isd+( +f ?ege') 7anting t+ (a"e t e +%%+siti+n !et7een t e( e'erge as clearly

.2egel, la

'ort, p 1!#

0 e !'ind s%+t +f ?ege'ianis() ar+und 7 ic can !e +rganiMed t e re%resentati+n +f (eaning) is t e %+int at 7 ic destructi+n) su%%ressi+n) deat and sacrifice c+nstitute s+ irre:ersi!'e an eJ%enditure) s+ radica' a negati:it.- ere 7e 7+u'd a:e t+ sa. an eJ%enditure and a negati%ity
without

reserve%that t h e y

can no longer be deter'ined as nega

ti:it. in a %r+cess +r a s.ste(< In disc+urse (t e unit. +f %r+cess and +ne< I 7i'' cite a %arad+Jica' eJa(%'e +f a ga. reacti+n !ef+re t e 7+r" +f deat < 0 e Iris and We's cust+( +f t e 7a"e is 'itt'e "n+7n) !u was J+.ce>s 'ast 7+r") ,innegan-s .a&e, ,innegan>s funera' :igi' (!ut t e reading +f t is fa(+us n+:e' is at 'east uneas.#< In Wa'es) t e c+ffin
was placed open and upright in the place of honor of the house Th dead person was dressed in his /unday best and his top hat 2 fa'ily in%ited all his friends, who increasingly honored the one wh

it.< Negati:it. cann+t !e s%+"en +f) n+r as it e:er !een eJce%t in t is

abric of 'eaning *ow, the so%ereign operation, the point of

nonreserve,

is

eJce%t !. cr+ssing +ut %redicates +r !. %racticing a c+ntradict+r. su%eri(%ressi+n t at t en eJceeds t e '+gic +f % i'+s+% .<E /:en

this respect, that the i''ense re%olutions of 3ant and )egel only
+n +f negati:it. (7it a'' t e c+nce%ts s.ste(atica''. ent7ined and it in ?ege'B idea'it.) trut ) (eaning) ti(e) ist+r.) etc<#< 0 e

ad 'eft t e( as t e. danced +n and dran" str+nger t+asts t+

h e a l t h I n 0 ue s t i o n i s th e d e at h o f a n thedea

other, but

in such cases

3 D B W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ i""ense revol$tion consisted)it is al"ost te"!ting to say consisted si"!ly)in taking the negative serio$sly. In giving "eaning to its labor. -% Now, Eataille does not take the negative serio$sly. E$t he "$st "ark his disco$rse to show that he is not, to that e4tent, ret$rning to the !ositive and !re)Kantian "eta!hysics of f$ll !resence. In his disco$rse he "$st +% "ark the !oint of no ret$rn of destr$ction, the instance of an e4!endit$re witho$t reserve which no longer leaves $s the reso$rces with which to think of this e4!endit$re as negativity. &or negativity is a reso$rce. In na"ing the witho$t)reserve of absol$te e4!endit$re +abstract negativity,+ (egel, thro$gh !reci!itation, blinded hi"self to that which he had laid bare $nder the r$bric of negativity. nd did so
%>

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against !lay, against chance. (e has blinded hi"self to the !ossibility of%

his

own bet, to the fact that the conscientio$s s$s!ension of !lay (for e4a"!le, the !assage thro$gh the certit$de of oneself and thro$gh lordshi! as the inde!endence of self)conscio$sness) was itself a !hase +% of !lay- and to the fact that !lay incl$des the work of "eaning or the "eaning of work, and incl$des the" not in ter"s of knowledge, b$t in ter"s of inscri!tion' "eaning is a f$nction of !lay, is inscribed in a certain !lace in the config$ration of a "eaningless !lay. *ince no logic governs, henceforth, the "eaning of inter!retation, beca$se logic is an inter!retation, (egel%s own inter!retation can be reinter!reted)against hi". This is what Eataille does. :einter!retation is a si"$lated re!etition of (egelian disco$rse. In the co$rse of this re!etition a barely !erce!tible dis!lace"ent dis,oints all the artic$lations and !enetrates all the !oints welded together by the i"itated disco$rse. tre"bling s!reads o$t which then "akes the entire old shell crack. In effect, if (egel%s attit$de o!!oses scientific conscio$sness and an endless ordering of disc$rsive tho$ght to the naivete of sacrifice, this conscio$sness and this ordering still have a !oint of obsc$rity' it co$ld not be said that (egel "isconstr$ed the +"o"ent+ of sacrifice' this +"o"ent+ is incl$ded, i"!lied in the entire "ove"ent of the 4heno'enology, in which it is the Negativity of death, insofar as "an ass$"es it, that "akes a "an of the h$"an ani"al. E$t not having seen that sacrifice by itself bore witness to the entire "ove"ent of death, the 9reface to the 4heno'enology was first of all initial and u n i % e r s a l 5 h e did not know to what e4tent he was right)with what e4actit$de he described the "ove"ent of Negativity '(egel, la !ort, 99. 3G)31I. In do$bling lordshi!, sovereignty does not esca!e dialectics. It co$ld not be said that it e4tracts itself fro" dialectics like a "orsel of dialectics which has s$ddenly beco"e inde!endent thro$gh a !rocess of decision and tearing away. 5$t off fro" dialectics in this way, sovereignty wo$ld be "ade into an abstract negation, and wo$ld consolidate ontologics. &ar fro" interr$!ting dialectics, history, and the "ove"ent of "eaning, sovereignty !rovides the econo"y of reason with its

thro$gh !reci!itation toward the serio$sness of "eaning and the was right.+

nd was wrong for being right, for having tri$"!hed over the

negative. To go +to the end+ both of +absol$te rending+ and of the negative witho$t +"eas$re,+ witho$t reserve, is not !rogressively to !$rs$e logic to the !oint at which, within disco$rse, the $fheb$ng (disco$rse itself) "akes logic collaborate with the constit$tion and interiori.ing "e"ory of "eaning, with <rinner$ng. ;n the contrary, it is conv$lsively to tear a!art the negative side, that which "akes it the reass$ring other s$rface of the !ositive- and it is to e4hibit within the negative, in an instant, that which can no longer be called negative. nd can no longer be called negative !recisely beca$se it has no reserved $nderside- beca$se it can no longer !er"it itself to be converted into !ositivity, beca$se it can no longer collaborate with the contin$o$s linking)$! of "eaning, conce!t, ti"e and tr$th in disco$rse- beca$se it literally can no longer labor and let itself be interrogated as the +work of the negative.+ (egel saw this witho$t seeing it, showed it while concealing it. Th$s, he "$st be followed to the end, witho$t reserve, to the !oint of agreeing with hi" against hi"self and of wresting his discovery fro" the too conscientio$s inter!retation he gave of it. No "ore than any other, the (egelian te4t is not "ade of a !iece. 7hile res!ecting its fa$ltless coherence, one can deco"!ose its strata and show that it inter!rets itself' each !ro!osition is an inter!retation s$b"itted to an inter!retive decision. The necessity of logical contin$ity is the decision or inter!retive has bet "ilie$ of all (egelian inter!retations. In inter!reting negativity as labor, in betting for disco$rse, "eaning, history, etc., (egel

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element, its milieu, its unlimiting boundaries of non-sense. @ar from suppressing the dialectical synthesis, $& it inscribes this synthesis and ma0es it function *ithin the sacrifice of meaning. 4t does not suffice to ris0 death if the putting at sta0e is not permitted to ta0e off, as chance or accident, but is rather invested as the *or0 of the negative. !overeignty must still sacrifice lordship and, thus, the presentation of the meaning of death. @or meaning, *hen lost to discourse, is absolutely destroyed and consumed. @or the meaning of meaning, the dialectic of the senses and sense, of the sensory and the concept, the meaningful unity of the *ord "sense," to *hich 1egel *as so attentive," has al*ays been lin0ed to the possibility of discursive signification. 4n sacrificing meaning, sovereignty submerges the possibility of discourse5 not sim

*riting, "the commentary on its absence of meaning." :ithout *hich poetry *ould be, in the *orst of cases, subordinated and, in the best of cases, "inserted." @or then, "laughter, drun0enness, sacrifice and poetry, eroticism itself, subsist autonomously, in a reserve, inserted into a sphere, li0e children in a house. :ithin their limits they are minor sovereigns *ho cannot contest the empire of activity" "ibid.'. 4t is *ithin the interval bet*een subordination, insertion, and sovereignty that one should examine the relations bet*een literature and revolution, such as /ataille conceived them in the course of his explication *ith !urrealism. (he apparent ambiguity of his udgments on poetry is included *ithin the configuration of these three concepts. (he poetic image is not subordinated to the extent that it "leads from the 0no*n to the un0no*n8" but poetry is almost entirely fallen poetry in that it retains, in order to maintain itself *ithin them, the metaphors that it has certainly torn from the "servile domain," but has immediately "refused to the inner ruination *hich is the access to the un0no*n." "4t is unfortunate to possess no more than ruins, but this is not any longer to possess nothing8 it is to 0eep in one hand *hat the other gives."" -n operation that is still 1egelian. -s a manifestation of meaning, discourse is thus the loss of sovereignty itself !ervility is therefore only the desire for meaning5 a proposition *ith *hich the history of philosophy is confused8 a proposition that determines *or0 as the meaning of meaning, and techne as the unfolding of truth8 a proposition po*erfully reassembled in the 1egelian moment, and a proposition that /atailie, in the *a0e of NietBsche, *anted to bring to the point of enunciation, and *hose denunciation he *ished to *rest from the non-basis of an inconceivable nonsense, finally placing it *ithin ma or play. (he minor play consisting in still attributing a meaning, *ithin discourse, to the absence of meaning."

ply by means of an interruption, a caesura, or an interior *ounding of discourse "an abstract negativity', but, through such an opening, by means of an irruption suddenly uncovering the limit of discourse and the beyond of absolute 0no*ledge. (o be sure, /ataille sometimes opposes poetic, ecstatic sacred speech to "significative discourse" ""/ut intelligence, the discursive thought of 7an, developed as a function of servile *or0. =nly sacred, poetic speech, limited to the level of impotent beauty, 0ept the po*er o manifesting full sovereignty. !acrifice is a sovereign, autonomous *ay of being only in the extent to *hich it is not informed by significative discourse." 1egel, la mort, p. .A', but this sovereign speech is not another discourse, another chain un*ound alongside significative discourse. (here is only one discourse, it is significative, and here one cannot get around 1egel. (he poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse *hich can open itself up to the absolute loss of its sense, to the "non-'base of the sacred, of nonmeaning, of un-0no*ledge or of play, to the s*oon from *hich it is rea*a0ened by a thro* of the dice. :hat is poetic in sovereignty is announced in "the moment *hen poetry renounces theme and meaning" "6l, p. 3;%'. 4t is only announced in this renunciation, for, given over to "play *ithout rules," poetry ris0s letting itself be domesticated, "subordinated," better than ever. (his ris0 is properly modern. (o avoid it, poetry must be "accompanied by an affirmation of sovereignty" "*hich provides," /ataille says in an admirable, untenable formulation *hich could serve as the heading for everything *e are attempting to reassemble here as the form and torment of his

T)e t(! f!r*s !f (r t n$ (hese udgments should lead to silence yet 4 *rite. (his is not paradoxical "6l, p. G%' /ut *e must spea0. "(he inadequation of all speech ... at least, must be said,"" in order to maintain sovereignty, *hich is to say, after a

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fashion, in order to lose it, in order still to reserve the possibility not o its meaning but of its nonmeaning8 in order to distinguish it, through this impossible "commentary," from all negativity. :e must find a speech *hich maintains silence. Necessity of the impossible5 to say in languagethe language of servility-that *hich is not servile. "(hat *hich is not servile is unspea0able.... (he idea of silence "*hich is the inaccessible' is disarmingL 4 cannot spea0 of an absence of meaning, except by giving it a meaning it does not have. !ilence is bro0en because 4 have spo0en. !ome lamma sabachtani al*ays ends history, and cries out our total inability to 0eep still5 4 must give a meaning to that *hich does not have one5 in the end, being is given to us as impossible" (<l, !. D1G). 4f the *ord silence "among all *ords," is "the most perverse or the most poetic," it is because in pretending to silence meaning, it says nonmeaning, it slides and it erases itself, does not maintain itself, silences itself, not as silence, but as speech. (his sliding simultaneously betrays discourse and nondiscourse. 4t can be imposed upon us, but sovereignty can also play upon it in order rigorously to betray the meaning *ithin meaning, the discourse *ithin discourse. ":e must find," /ataille explains to us, in choosing "silence" as "an example of a sliding *ord," "*ords" and "ob ects" *hich "ma0e us slide" ... (<l, !. D@). (o*ard *hat< (o*ard other *ords, other ob ects, of course, *hich announce sovereignty. (his sliding is ris0y. /ut since it has this orientation, *hat it ris0s is meaning and the loss of sovereignty in the figure of discourse. 4t ris0s ma0ing sense, ris0s agreeing to the reasonableness of reason, of philosophy, of 1egel, *ho is al*ays right, as soon as one opens one's mouth in order to articulate meaning. 4n order to run this ris0 *ithin language, in order to save that *hich does not *ant to be saved-the possibility of play and of absolute ris0-*e must redouble language and have recourse to ruses, to stratagems, to simulacra." (o mas0s5 "(hat *hich is not servile is unspea0able5 a reason for laughing, for ... 5 the same holds for ecstasy. :hatever is not useful must be hidden "under a mas0'" (<l, !. D1A). 4n spea0ing "at the limit of silence," *e must organiBe a strategy and "find >*ords? *hich reintroduce-at a point the sovereign silence *hich interrupts articulated language." !ince it excludes articulated language, sovereign silence is therefore,

seems to erase discontinuity, and this is ho* *e must, in effect, understand the necessity of the continuum *hich /ataille unceasingly invo0es, ust as he does communication." (he continuum is the privileged experience of a sovereign operation transgressing the limit of discursive difference. /ut-and here *e are touching upon, as concerns the movement of sovereignty, the point of greatest ambiguity and greatest instabilitythis continuum is not the plenitude of meaning or of presence, as this plenitude is envisaged by metaphysics. Pushing itself to*ard the nonbasis of negativity and of expenditure, the experience of the continuum is also the experience of absolute difference, of a difference *hich *ould no longer be the one that 1egel had conceived more profoundly than anyone else5 the difference in the service of presence, at *or0 for "the' history "of meaning'. (he difference bet*een 1egel and /ataille is the difference bet*een these t*o differences. (his enables one to dispel the equivocality *hich might *eigh upon the concepts of communication, continuum, or instant. (hese concepts, *hich seem to be identical to each other li0e the accomplishing of presence, in fact mar0 and sharpen the incision of difference. "- fundamental principle is expressed as follo*s5 'communication' cannot ta0e place from one full and intact being to another5 it requires beings *ho have put the being *ithin themselves at sta0e, have placed it at the limit of death, of nothingness" "!ur NietBsche'. -nd the instant-the temporal mode of the sovereign operation-is not a point of full and unpenetrated presence5 it slides and eludes us bet*een t*o presences8 it is difference as the affirmative elusion of presence. 4t does not give itself but is stolen, carries itself off in a movement *hich is simultaneously one of violent effraction and of vanishing flight. (he instant is the furtive5 "En-0no*ledge implies at once fundamentally anguish, but also the suppression of anguish. 1enceforth, it becomes possible furtively to undergo the furtive experience that 4 call the experience of the instant" "Conferences sur le Non-savoir'. :ords, therefore, *e must "find *hich reintroduce-at a pointthe sovereign silence *hich interrupts articulated language." !ince it is a certain sliding that is in question, as *e have seen, *hat must be found, no less than the *ord, is the point, the place in a pattern at *hich a *ord dra*n from the old language *ill start, by virtue of having been placed there and by virtue of having received such an impulsion, to slide and to ma0e the entire discourse slide. - certain strategic t*ist must be

in a certain fashion, foreign to difference as the source of signification. 4t

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imprinted upon language8 and this strategic t*ist, *ith a violent and sliding, furtive, movement must inflect the old corpus in order to relate its syntax and its lexicon to ma or silence. -nd to the privileged moment of the sovereign operation, "even if it too0 place only once," rather than to the concept or meaning of sovereignty. -n absolutely unique relation5 of a language to a sovereign silence *hich tolerates no relations, tolerates no symmetry *ith that *hich tilts itself and slides in order to be related to it. - relation, ho*ever, *hich must rigorously, scientifically, place into a common syntax both the subordinated significations and the operation *hich is nonrelation, *hich has no signification and freely 0eeps itself outside syntax. 2elations must scientifically be related to nonrelations, 0no*ledge to un0no*ledge. "(he sovereign operation, even if it *ere possible only once, the science relating ob ects of thought to sovereign moments is possible" "7ethode de meditation'. "1enceforth, an ordered reflection, founded on the abandoning of 0no*ledge, begins" "Conferences'. (his *ill be even more difficult, if not impossible, in that sovereignty, since it is not lordship, cannot govern this scientific discourse in the manner of a founding basis or a principle of responsibility. )i0e lordship, sovereignty certainly ma0es itself independent through the putting at sta0e of life8 it is attached to nothing and conserves nothing. /ut, differing from 1egelian lordship, it does not even *ant to maintain itself, collect itself, or collect the profits from itself or from its o*n ris08 it "cannot even be defined as a possession." "4 hold to it, but *ould 4 hold to it as much if 4 *as not certain that 4 could ust as *ell laugh at it<" "7ethode de meditation'. -t sta0e in the operation, therefore, is not a selfconsciousness, an ability to be near oneself, to maintain and to *atch oneself :e are not in the element of phenomenology. -nd this can be recogniBed in the primary characteristic-illegible *ithin philosophical logic-that sovereignty does not govern itself. -nd does not govern in general5 it governs neither others, nor things, nor discourses in order to produce meaning. (his is the first obstacle in the *ay of this science *hich, according to /ataille, must relate its ob ects to sovereign moments and *hich, li0e every science, requires order, relatedness and the difference bet*een the original and the derivative. (he 7ethode de meditation does not hide the "obstacle" "the expression is /ataille's'5 "Not only is the sovereign operation not subordinate to anything, but it

ma0es nothing subordinate to itself, is indifferent to any possible results8 if after*ard 4 *ish to pursue the reduction of subordinate thought to sovereign thought, 4 may do so, but *hatever is authentically sovereign is not concerned *ith this, and at every moment disposes of me other*ise" "p. 3G;'. =nce sovereignty has to attempt to ma0e someone or something subordinate to itself, *e 0no* that it *ould be reta0en by dialectics, *ould be subordinate to the slave, to the thing and to *or0, 4t *ould fail for having *anted to be victorious, and for having alleged that it 0ept the upper hand. )ordship, on the contrary, becomes sovereign *hen it ceases to fear failure and is lost as the absolute victim of its o*n sacrifice." 7aster and sovereign thus fail equally,3. and both succeed in their failure, the one by giving it meaning through sub ugation to the mediation of the slave-*hich is also to fail for having lost failureand the other by failing absolutely, *hich is simultaneously to lose the very meaning of failure by gaining nonservility. (his almost imperceptible difference, *hich is not even the symmetry of an upper and a lo*er side, should regulate all the "slidings" of sovereign *riting. 4t should cut into the identity of sovereignty *hich is al*ays in question. @or sovereignty has no identity, is not self, for itself, to*ard itself, near itself 4n order not to govern, that is to say, in order not to be sub ugated, it must subordinate nothing "direct ob ect', that is to say, be subordinated to nothing or no one "servile mediation of the indirect ob ect'5 it must expend itself *ithout reserve, lose itself, lose consciousness, lose all memory of itself and all the interiority of itself8 as opposed to 6rinnerung, as opposed to the avarice *hich assimilates meaning, it must practice forgetting, the a0tive Cergesslich0eit of *hich NietBsche spea0s8 and, as the ultimate subversion of lordship, it must no longer see0 to be recogniBed." (he renunciation of recognition simultaneously prescribes and prohibits *riting. =r rather, discerns t*o forms of *riting. 4t forbids the form that pro ects the trace, and through *hich, as the *riting of lordship, the *ill see0s to maintain itself *ithin the trace, see0s to be recogniBed *ithin it and to reconstitute the presence of itself (his is servile *riting as *ell8 /ataille, therefore, scorned it. /ut this scorned servility of *riting is not the servility condemned by tradition since Plato. (he latter has in mind servile *riting as an irresponsible techne,

+ecause the presence of the person who pronounced discourse has disappeared within it." 6ataille, on the contrary, has in mind the servile pro&ect of serving life-the phantom of life-in presence. 9n +oth cases, it is true, a certain death is feared, and this complicity demands consideration. he pro+lem is even more difficult in that sovereignty simultaneously assigns itself another form of writing. the one that produces the trace as trace. his latter is a trace only if presence is irremedia+ly eluded in it, from its initial promise, and only if it constitutes itself as the possi+ility of a+solute erasure. ,n unerasa+le trace is not a trace. We would thus have to reconstruct the system of 6ataille's propositions on writing, his propositions on these two relations-let us call them minor and ma&or-to the trace. !. 9n one whole group of te)ts, the sovereign renunciation of recognition en&oins the erasure of the written te)t. 'or e)ample, the erasure of poetic writing as minor writing. his sacrifice of reason is apparently imaginary, it has neither a +loody conse:uence, nor anything analogous. 9t nevertheless differs from poetry in that it is total, holds +ac% no en&oyment, e)cept through ar+itrary sliding, which cannot +e maintained, or through a+andoned laughter. 9f it leaves +ehind a chance survivor, it does so un+e%nownst to itself, li%e the flower of the fields after the harvest. his strange sacrifice which supposes an advanced state of megalomania-we feel ourselves +ecome Godnonetheless has ordinary conse:uences in one case. if en&oyment is concealed +y sliding, and megalomania is not entirely consumed, we remain condemned to ma%e ourselves "recogni3ed," to want to +e a God for the crowd> a condition favora+le to madness, +ut to nothing else.... 9f one goes to the end, one must erase oneself, undergo solitude, suffer harshly from it, renounce +eing recogniBed$ one must +e there as if a+sent, deranged, and su+mit without will or hope, +eing elsewhere. hought *+ecause of what it has at its +ase2 must +e +uried alive. 9 pu+lish this %nowing it misconstrued in advance, necessarily so.... 9 can do nothing, and it along with me, +ut sin% into non-sense to this degree. hought ruins, and its destruction is incommunica+le to the crowd> it is addressed to the least wea% ;=l, p. $""B.

he sovereign operation engages these developments. they are the residues +oth of a trace left in memory and of the su+sistence of functions> +ut to the e)tent that it occurs, the sovereign operation is indifferent, and defies these residues ;=l, p. 3CD<. or, further. he survival of that which is written is the survival of the mummy A(e
coupable p. !I#!

=. 6ut there is a sovereign form of writing which, on the contrary, must interrupt the servile complicity of speech and meaning. "9 write in order to annihilate the play of su+ordinate operations within myself' *-l, p. =I=2. he putting at sta%e, the one which e)ceeds lordship, is therefore the space of writing> it is played out +etween minor writing and ma&or writing, +oth un%nown to the master, the latter more than the former, the ma&or play more than the minor play *"'or the master, play was nothing, neither minor nor ma&or" ;onferences2. Why is this uni:uely the space of writingF Sovereignty is a+solute when it is a+solved of every relationship, and %eeps itself in the night of the secret. he continuum of sovereign communication has as its milieu this night of secret difference. 5ne would understand nothing a+out it in thin%ing that there was some contradiction +etween these two re:uisites. 9n fact, one would understand only that which is understood in the logic of philosophical lordship. +ecause for this logic, on the contrary, one must conciliate the desire for recognition, the +rea%ing of secrecy, discourse, colla+oration, etc., with discontinuity, articulation, and negativity. he opposition of the continuous and the discontinuous is constantly displaced from 4egel to 6ataille. 6ut this displacement is powerless to transform the nucleus of predicates. ,ll the attri+utes ascri+ed to sovereignty are +orrowed from the *4egelian2 logic of "lordship." We cannot, and 6ataille neither could, nor should dispose of any other concepts or any other signs, any other unity of word and meaning. he sign "sovereignty" itself, in its opposition to servility, was issued from the same stoc% as that of "lordship."

Considered outside its functioning, nothing distinguishes it from "lordship." =ne could even abstract from /ataille's text an entire Bone throughout *hich sovereignty remains inside a classical philosophy of the sub ect and, above all, inside the voluntarism3, *hich 1eidegger has sho*n still to be confused, in 1egel and NietBsche, *ith the essence of metaphysics. !ince the space *hich separates the logic of lordship and, if you *ill, the nonlogic of sovereignty neither can nor may be inscribed in the nucleus of the concept itself "for *hat is discovered here is that there is no nucleus of meaning, no conceptual atom, but that the concept is produced *ithin the tissue of differences'8 it *ill have to be inscribed *ithin the continuous chain "or functioning' of a form of *riting. (his-ma or*riting *ill be called *riting because it exceeds the logos "of meaning, lordship, presence etc.'. :ithin this *riting-the one sought by /ataillethe same concepts, apparently unchanged in themselves, *ill be sub ect to a mutation of meaning, or rather *ill be struc0 by "even though they are apparently indifferent', the loss of sense to*ard *hich they slide, thereby ruining themselves immeasurably. (o blind oneself to this rigorous precipitation, this pitiless sacrifice of philosophical concepts, and to continue to read, interrogate, and udge /ataille's text from *ithin "significative discourse" is, perhaps, to hear something *ithin it, but it is assuredly not to read it. :hich can al*ays be done-and has it not been<*ith great agility, resourcefulness occasionally, and philosophical security. Not to read, is, here, to ignore the formal necessity of /ataille's text, to ignore its o*n fragmentation, its relationship to the narratives *hose adventure cannot simply be uxtaposed *ith aphorisms or *ith "philosophical" discourses *hich erase their signifiers in favor of their signified contents. #iffering from logic, such as it is understood in its classical concept, even differing from the 1egelian /oo0 *hich *as Io eve's theme, /ataille's *riting, in its ma or instance, does not tolerate the distinction of form and content." :hich ma0es it *riting, and a requisite of sovereignty. (his *riting "and *ithout concern for instruction, this is the example it provides for us, *hat *e are interested in here, today' folds itself in order to lin0 up *ith classical concepts-insofar as they are inevitable ""4 could not avoid expressing my thought in a philosophical

mode. /ut 4 do not address myself to philosophers" 7ethode'-in such a *ay that these concepts, through a certain t*ist, apparently obey their habitual la*s8 but they do so *hile relating themselves, at a certain point, to the moment of sovereignty, to the absolute loss of their meaning, to expenditure *ithout reserve, to *hat can no longer even be called negativity or loss of meaning except on its philosophical side8 thus, they relate themselves to a nonmeaning *hich is beyond absolute meaning, beyond the closure or the horiBon of absolute 0no*ledge. Carried a*ay in this calculated sliding,3% concepts become nonconcepts, they are unthin0able, they become untenable. ""4 introduce untenable concepts," )e petit'. (he philosopher is blind to /ataille's text because he is a philosopher only through the desire to hold on to, to maintain his certainty of himself and the security of the concept as security against this sliding. @or him, /ataille's text is full of traps5 it is, in the initial sense of the *ord, a scandal. (he transgression of meaning is not an access to the immediate and indeterminate identity of a nonmeaning, nor is it an access to the possibility of maintaining nonmeaning. 2ather, *e *ould have to spea0 of an epoch6 of the epoch of meaning, of a-*ritten-putting bet*een brac0ets that suspends the epoch of meaning5 the opposite of a phenomenological epoch6, for this latter is carried out in the name and in sight of meaning. (he phenomenological epoch6 is a reduction that pushes us bac0 to*ard meaning. !overeign transgression is a reduction of this reduction5 not a reduction to meaning, but a reduction of meaning. (hus, *hile exceeding the Phenomenology of the 7ind, this transgression at the same time exceeds phenomenology in general, in its most modern developments "cf. 6l, p. $%'. :ill this ne* *riting depend upon the agency of sovereignty< :ill it obey the imperatives of sovereignty< :ill it subordinate itself to that *hich subordinates nothing< "-nd does so, one might say, by essence, if sovereignty had an essence.' (he ans*er is, not at all8 and this is the unique paradox of the relation bet*een discourse and sovereignty. (o relate the ma or form of *riting to the sovereign operation is to institute a relation in the form of a nonrelation, to inscribe rupture in the text, to place the chain of discursive 0no*ledge in relation to an un0no*ledge *hich is not a moment of 0no*ledge5 an absolute un0no*ledge from *hose nonbasis is launched chance, or the *agers

1IG W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ of meaning, history, and the hori3ons of a+solute %nowledge. he inscription of such a relation will +e "scientific," +ut the word "science" su+mits to a radical alteration. without losing any of its proper norms, it is made to trem+le, simply +y +eing placed in relation to an a+solute un%nowledge. 5ne can call it science only within the transgressed closure, +ut to do so one will have to answer to all the re:uirements of this denomination. he un%nowledge e)ceeding science itself, the un%nowledge that will %now where and how to e)ceed science itself, will not have scientific :ualification *"Who will ever %now what it is to %now nothingF" (e petit2. 9t will not +e a determined un%nowledge, circumscri+ed +y the history of %nowledge as a figure ta%en from *or leading toward2 dialectics, +ut will +e the a+solute e)cess of every episteme, of every philosophy and every science. 5nly a dou+le position can account for this uni:ue relation, which +elongs neither to "scientism" nor "mysticism."" ,s the affirmative reduction of sense, rather than the position of non-sense, sovereignty therefore is not the principle or foundation of this inscription. , nonprinciple and a nonfoundation, it definitively eludes any e)pectation of a reassuring archia, a condition of possi+ility or transcendental of discourse. 4ere, there are no longer any philosophical preliminaries. he ?ethode de meditation teaches us that the disciplined itinerary of writing must rigorously ta%e us to the point at which there is no longer any method or any meditation, the point at which the sovereign operation +rea%s with method and meditation +ecause it cannot +e conditioned +y anything that precedes or even prepares it. 7ust as it see%s neither to +e applied nor propagated, neither to last nor to instruct *and this is also why, according to 6lanchot's e)pression, its authority e)piates itself2, and &ust as it does not see% recognition, so too it has no movement of recognition for the discursive and prere:uisite la+or that it could not do without. Sovereignty must +e ungrateful. "?y sovereignty ... gives me no than%s for my wor%" *?ethode2. he conscientious concern for preliminaries is precisely philosophical and 4egelian. he criticism addressed +y 4egel to Schelling *in the preface to the no less decisive. he preliminary efforts o f the operation are not within the reach of an unprepared intelligence *as
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4egel says. it would +e similarly senseless, if one were not a shoema%er, to ma%e a shoe2. hese efforts, through the mode of application which +elongs to them, nevertheless inhi+it the sovereign operation *the +eing which goes as far as it possi+ly can2. Sovereign +ehavior precisely demands a refusal to su+mit its operation to the condition o f preliminaries. he operation ta%es place only if the urgency for it appears. and if the operation does +ecome urgent, it is no longer time to underta%e efforts whose essence is to +e su+ordinate to ends e)terior to them, whose essence is not to +e ends them selves &'ethode() /ow, if one muses upon the fact that 4egel is dou+tless the first to have demonstrated the ontological unity of method and historicity, it must indeed +e concluded that what is e)ceeded +y sovereignty is not only the "su+&ect" *?ethode, p. $<2, +ut history itself /ot that one returns, in classical and pre-4egelian fashion, to an ahistorical sense which would constitute a figure of the Phenomenology of the ?ind. Sovereignty transgresses the entirety of the history of meaning and the entirety of the meaning of history, and the pro&ect of %nowledge which has always o+scurely welded these two together. 0n%nowledge is, then, superhistorical," +ut only +ecause it ta%es its responsi+ilities from the completion of history and from the closure of a+solute %nowledge, having first ta%en them seriously and having then +etrayed them +y e)ceeding them or +y simulating them in play." 9n this simulation, 9 conserve or anticipate the entirety of %nowledge, 9 do not limit myself to a determined and a+stract %ind of %nowledge or un%nowledge, +ut 9 rather a+solve myself of a+solute %nowledge, putting it +ac% in its place as such, situating it and inscri+ing it within a space which it no longer dominates. 6ataille's writing thus relates all semantemes, that is, philosophemes, to the sovereign operation, to the consummation, without return, of meaning. 9t draws upon, in order to e)haust it, the resource of meaning. With minute audacity, it will ac%nowledge the rule which constitutes that which it efficaciously, economically must deconstitute. hus proceeding along the lines of what 6ataille calls the general economy

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+r t n$ and $eneral ec!n!*,

The writing of sovereignty confor"s to general econo"y by at least two characteristics' (1) it is a science- (D) it relates its ob,ects to the destr$ction, witho$t reserve, of "eaning. The Methode de "editation anno$nces la 9art "a$dite in this w ay$ The science of relating the ob,ect of tho$ght to sovereign "o"ents, in fact, is only a general econo!y which envisages the "eaning of these ob,ects in relation to each other and finally in relation to the loss of "eaning. The /$estion of this general econo!y is sit$ated on the level of political econo"y, b$t the science designated by this na"e is only a restricted econo"y, (restricted to co""ercial val$es). In /$estion is the essential !roble" for the science dealing with the $se of wealth. The general econo!y, in the first !lace, "akes a!!arent that e4cesses of energy are !rod$ced, and that by definition, these e4cesses cannot be $tili.ed. The e4cessive energy can only be lost witho$t the slightest ai", conse/$ently witho$t any "eaning. It is this $seless, senseless loss that is sovereignty. ;=l, !. D33,.33 Insofar as it is a scientific for" of writing, general econo"y is certainly not sovereignty itself Moreover, there is no sovereignty itself *overeignty dissolves the val$es of "eaning, tr$th and a gras!)of)the)thing)itself. This is why the disco$rse that it o!ens above all is not tr$e, tr$thf$l or
11

antici!ated knowledge.

ltho$gh general writing also has a "eaning,

since it is only a relation to non"eaning this order is reversed within it. nd the relation to the absol$te !ossibility of knowledge is s$s!ended within it. The known is related to the $nknown, "eaning to non"eaning. +This knowledge, which "ight be called liberated (b$t which I !refer to call ne$tral), is the $sage of a f$nction detached (liberated) fro" the servit$de fro" whence it s!rings' the f$nction in /$estion related the $nknown to the known (the solid), while, dating fro" the "o"ent it is detached, it relates the known to the $nknown+ (Methode). that is only sketched, as we have seen, in the +!oetic i"age.+ Not that the !heno"enology of the "ind, which !roceeded within the hori.on of absol$te knowledge or according to the circ$larity of the =ogos, is th$s overt$rned. Instead of being si"!ly overt$rned, it is co"!rehended' not co"!rehended by knowledge)gathering co") !rehension, b$t inscribed within the o!ening of the general econo"y along with its hori.ons of knowledge and its fig$res of "eaning. 0eneral econo"y folds these hori.ons and fig$res so that they will be related not to a basis, b$t to the nonbasis of e4!endit$re, not to the telos of "eaning, b$t to the indefinite destr$ction of val$e. Eataille%s atheology 31 is also an a) teleology and an aneschatology. <ven in its disco$rse, which already "$st be disting$ished fro" sovereign affir"ation, this atheology does not, however, !roceed along the lines of negative theology- lines that co$ld not fail to fascinate Eataille, b$t which, !erha!s, still reserved, beyond all the re,ected !redicates, and even +beyond being,+ a +s$!eressentiality-+ 32 beyond the categories of beings, a s$!re"e being and an indestr$ctible "eaning. 9erha!s' for here we are to$ching $!on the li"its and the greatest a$dacities of disco$rse in 7estern tho$ght. 7e co$ld de"onstrate that the distances and !ro4i"ities do not differ a"ong the"selves. *ince it relates the s$ccessive fig$res of !heno"enality to a knowledge of "eaning that always already has been antici!ated, the !heno"enology of the "ind (and !heno"enology in general) corres!onds to a restricted econo"y' restricted to co""ercial val$es, one "ight say, !icking $! on the ter"s of the definition, a +science dealing with the $tili.ation of wealth,+ li"ited to the "eaning and the established val$e of ob,ects, and to their circ$lation. The circ$larity of absol$te knowledge "ove"ent

sincere.++

*overeignty is the i"!ossible, therefore it is not, it isEataille writes this word in italics)+this loss.+ The writing of sovereignty !laces disco$rse in relation to absol$te non)disco$rse. =ike general econo"y, it is not the loss of "eaning, b$t, as we have ,$st read, the +relation to this loss of "eaning.+ It o!ens the /$estion of "eaning. It does not describe $nknowledge, $nknowledge. for +In this s$", is it i"!ossible, wo$ld be b$t only the to effect s!eak of of i"!ossible

$nknowledge, while we can s!eak of its effects.+ 3G To this e4tent, we do not ret$rn to the $s$al order of knowledge) gathering science. The writing of sovereignty is neither sovereignty in its o!eration nor c$rrent scientific disco$rse. This latter has as its "eaning (as its disc$rsive content and direction) the relation oriented fro" the $nknown to the known or knowable, to the always already known or to

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could dominate, could comprehend only this circulation, only the circuit of reproductive consumption. (he absolute production and destruction of value, the exceeding energy as such, the energy *hich "can only be lost *ithout the slightest aim, consequently *ithout any meaning"all this escapes phenomenology as restricted economy. (he latter can determine difference and negativity only as facets, moments, or conditions of meaning5 as *or0. No* the nonmeaning of the sovereign operation is neither the negative of, nor the condition for, meaning,. even if it is this also, and even if this is *hat its name gives us to understand. 4t is not a reserve of meaning. 4t 0eeps itself beyond the opposition of the positive and the negative, for the act of consumption, although it induces the loss of sense, is not the negative of presence, presence maintained or loo0ed on in the truth of its meaning "its be*ahren'. !uch a rupture of symmetry must propagate its effects throughout the entire chain of discourse. (he concepts of general *riting can be read only on the condition that they be deported, shifted outside the symmetrical alternatives from *hich, ho*ever, they seem to be ta0en, and in *hich, after a fashion, they must also remain. !trategy plays upon this origin and "bac0*ardation." @or example, if one ta0es into account this commentary on nonmeaning, then that *hich indicates itself as nonvalue, *ithin the closure of metaphysics, refers beyond the opposition of value and nonvalue, even beyond the concept of value, as it does beyond the concept of meaning. (hat *hich indicates itself as mysticism, in order to sha0e the security of discursive 0no*ledge, refers beyond the opposition of the mystic and the rational." /ataille above all is not a ne* mystic. (hat *hich indicates itself as interior. experience is not an experience, because it is related to no presence, to no plentitude, but only to the "impossible" it "undergoes" in torture. (his experience above all is not interior5 and if it seems to be such

because it is related to nothing else, to no exterior "except in the modes of nonrelation, secrecy, and rupture', it is also completely exposed-to torture-na0ed, open to the exterior, *ith no interior reserve or feelings, profoundly superficial. =ne could submit all the concepts of general *riting "those of science, the unconscious, materialism, etc.' to this schematiBation. (he predicates are not there in order to mean something, to enounce or to signify, but in order to ma0e sense slide, to denounce it or to deviate

from it. (his *riting does not necessarily produce ne* conceptual unities8 and its concepts are not necessarily distinguished from classical concepts by mar0ed characteristics in the form of essential predicates, but rather by qualitative differences of force, height, etc., *hich themselves are qualified in this *ay only by metaphor. (radition's names are maintained, but they are struc0 *ith the differences bet*een the ma or and the minor, the archaic and the classic." (his is the only *ay, *ithin discourse, to mar0 that *hich separates discourse from its excess. 1o*ever, the *riting *ithin *hich these stratagems operate does not consist in subordinating conceptual moments to the totality of a system in *hich these moments *ould finally ta0e on meaning. 4t is not a question of subordinating the slidings and differences of discourse, the play of syntax, to the entirety of an anticipated discourse. =n the contrary. 4f the play of difference is indispensable for the correct reading of the general economy's concepts, and if each notion must be reinscribed *ithin the la* of its o*n sliding and must be related to the sovereign operation, one must not ma0e of these requirements the subordinate moment of a structure. (he reading of /ataille must pass through these t*o dangerous straits. 4t must not isolate notions as if they *ere their o*n context, as if one could immediately understand *hat the content of *ords li0e "experience," "interior," "mystic," '*ord," "material," "sovereign," etc. means. 1ere, the error *ould consist in ta0ing as an immediate given of reading the blindness to a traditional culture *hich itself *ishes to be ta0en as the natural element of discourse. /ut inversely, one must not submit contextual attentiveness and differences of signification to a system of meaning permitting or promising an absolute formal mastery. (his *ould amount to erasing the excess of nonmeaning and to falling bac0 into the closure of 0no*ledge5 *ould amount, once more, to not reading /ataille. =n this point the dialogue *ith 1egel is again decisive. -n example5 1egel, and follo*ing him, *hoever installs himself *ithin the sure element of philosophical discourse, *ould have been unable to read, in its regulated sliding, a sign li0e that of "experience." 4n 4'6rotisme, /ataille notes, *ithout explaining any further5 "4n 1egel's mind, *hat is immediate is bad, and 1egel certainly *ould have related *hat 4 call experience to the immediate." No*, if in its ma or moments, interior experience brea0s *ith mediation, interior experience is not, ho*ever,

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immediate. 4t does not pleasurably consume an absolutely close presence, and, above all, it cannot enter into the movement of mediation, as can the 1egelian immediate. 4mmediacy and mediacy, such as they are presented in the elements of philosophy, in 1egel's logic, or in phenomenology, are equally "subordinated." 4t is thus that they can pass one into the other. (he sovereign operation therefore also suspends subordination in the form of immediacy. 4n order to understand that it does not, at this point, enter into *or0 and phenomenology, one mus exit from the philosophical logos and thin0 the unthin0able. 1o* can mediacy and immediacy be transgressed simultaneously< 1o* can "subordination," in the sense of the "philosophical' logos be exceeded in its totality< Perhaps through ma or *ritings5 "4 *rite in order to annihilate the play of subordinate operations *ithin myself "*hich is after all, superfluous'" "7ethode'. =nly perhaps, and this is "after a ll superfluous," for this *riting must assure us of nothing, must give u no certitude, no result, no profit. 4t is absolutely adventurous, is a chance and not a technique.

operation is not content *ith neutraliBing the classical operations in discourse8 in the ma or form of experience it transgresses the la* or prohibitions that form a system *ith discourse, and even *ith the *or0 of neutraliBation. (*enty pages after having proposed a "neutral 0no*ledge"5 "4 am establishing the possibility of neutral 0no*ledge< my sovereignty *elcomes it in me as the bird sings, and gives me no than0s for my *or0." -lso the destruction of discourse is not simply an erasing neutraliBation. 4t multiplies *ords, precipitates them one against the other, engulfs them too, in an endless and baseless substitution *hose only rule is the sovereign affirmation of the play outside meaning. Not a reserve or a *ithdra*al, not the infinite murmur of a blan0 speech erasing the traces of classical discourse, but a 0ind of potlatch of signs that burns, consumes, and *astes *ords in the gay affirmation of death5 a sacrifice and a challenge." (hus, for example5

$ % h

T(e tra/)0re))i*/ *, t(e /e1tra+ a/d t(e di)2+a9e3e/ *, t(e Aufhebung

/eyond the classical oppositions, is the *riting of sovereignty blan0 o& neutral< =ne might thin0 so, because the *riting of sovereignty c a n enounce nothing, except in the form of neither this, nor that. 4s this not one of the affinities bet*een the thought of /ataille and that o /lanchot< -nd does not /ataille propose a neutral 0no*ledge< "(hi 0no*ledge, *hich might be called liberated "but *hich 4 prefer to call neutral', is the usage of a function detached "liberated' from the servitude from *hence it springs.... 4t relates the 0no*n to the un0no*n" "cited above'. /ut here, *e must attentively consider the fact that it is not -th sovereign operation, but discursive 0no*ledge that is neutral. Neutrali. has a negative essence "ne-uter', is the negative side of transgression !overeignty is not neutral even if it neutraliBes, in its discourse, all th contradictions and all the oppositions of classical logic. NeutraliBatio is produced *ithin 0no*ledge and *ithin the syntax of *riting, but is related to a sovereign and transgressive affirmation. (he soverei

Previously, 4 designated the sovereign operation under the names of interior e+!erience or e+tremity of the !ossible" %ow, I am also designat ing it under the name +f meditation" (he change +f *ords signifies the bothersomeness of using any *ords at all (sovereign operation is the most loathsome of all the names5 in a sense, co!ic operation *ould be less deceptive'8 4 prefer meditation, but it has a pious appearance ;=l, P. 3;,'. :hat has happened< 4n sum, nothing has been said. :e have not 8 stopped at any *ord8 the chain rests on nothing8 none of the concepts satisfies the demand, all are determined by each other and, at the same time, destroy or neutraliBe each other. /ut the rule of the game or, rather, the game as rule has been affirmed8 as has been the necessity of transgressing both discourse and the negativity of the bothersomeness of using any *ord at all in reassuring identity of its meaning. /ut this transgression of discourse "and consequently of la* in gen eral, for discourse establishes itself only by establishing normativity or the value of meaning, that is to say, the element of legality in general' must, in some fashion, and li0e every transgression, conserve or confirm that *hich it exceeds." (his is the only *ay for it to affirm itself as transgression and thereby to acceed to the sacred, *hich "is presented in

the violence of an infraction.+ Now, describing +the contradictory e4!erience of !rohibition and transgression,+ in =%erotis"e, Eataille adds a note to the following sentence' +E$t transgression differs fro" the %ret$rn to nat$re%' it dis!els the !rohibition witho$t s$!!ressing it. (ere is the note' +It is $seless to insist $!on the (egelian character of this o!eration, which corres!onds to the "o"ent of dialectics e4!ressed by the $ntranslatable 0er"an verb $fheben (to s$r!ass while "aintaining).+ Is it +$seless to insist+6 5an one, as Eataille says, $nderstand the "ove"ent of transgression $nder the (egelian conce!t of the constit$tion of "eaning6 (ere, we "$st inter!ret Eataille against Eataille, or rather, "$st inter!ret one strat$" of his work fro" another strat$".+ Ey !rotesting against what, for Eataille, see"s to go witho$t saying in this note, we will !erha!s shar!en the fig$re of dis!lace"ent to which the entire (egelian disco$rse is s$b"itted here. In which Eataille is even less (egelian than he thinks. The (egelian $fheb$ng is !rod$ced entirely fro" within disco$rse, fro" deter"ination is negated one !asses to infinite within the syste" or the work of signification. for"er. &ro" infinite indeter"ination $fheb$ng, which, we have seen often eno$gh, re!resents the victory of the slave and

transgressive relationshi! which links the world of "eaning to the world of non"eaning. This dis!lace"ent is !aradig"atic' within a for" of writing, an intra!hiloso!hical conce!t, the s!ec$lative conce!t !ar e4cellence, is forced to designate a "ove"ent which !ro!erly constit$tes the e4cess of every !ossible !hiloso!he"e. This "ove"ent then "akes !hiloso!hy a!!ear as a for" of nat$ral or naive conscio$sness (which in (egel also "eans c$lt$ral conscio$sness). &or as long as the $fheb$ng re"ains within restricted econo"y, it is a !risoner of this nat$ral conscio$sness. The +we+ of the 9heno"enology of the Mind !resents itself in vain as the knowledge of what the naive conscio$sness, e"bedded in its history and in the deter"inations of its fig$res, does not yet know- the +we+ re"ains nat$ral and v$lgar beca$se it conceives the !assage fro" one fig$re to the ne4t and the tr$th of this !assage only as the circ$lation of "eaning and val$e. It develo!s the sense, or the desire for sense, of nat$ral conscio$sness, the conscio$sness that encloses itself in the circle in order to know sense- which is always where it co"es fro", and where it is going to. A3 It does not see the nonbasis of !lay $!on which (the) history (of "eaning) is la$nched. To this e4tent, !hiloso!hy, (egelian s!ec$lation, absol$te knowledge and everything that they govern, and will govern endlessly in their clos$re, re"ain deter"inations of nat$ral, servile and v$lgar conscio$sness. *elf)conscio$sness is servile. Eetween e4tre"e knowledge and v$lgar knowledge)the "ost generally dis!osed of)the difference is nil. In (egel, the knowledge of the world is that of the firstco"er (the firstco"er, not (egel, decides $!on the key /$estion for (egel' to$ching $!on the difference between "adness and reason' on this !oint +absol$te knowledge+ confir"s the v$lgar notion, is fo$nded on it, is one of its for"s). F$lgar knowledge is in $s like another In a sense, the condition in which would see wo$ld be to get o$t of, to
tissueE . . . (

and conserved in another deter"ination which reveals the tr$th of the deter"ination, and this transition, !rod$ced by the an4iety of the infinite, contin$o$sly links "eaning $! to itself The $fheb$ng is incl$ded within the circle of absol$te knowledge, never e4ceeds its clos$re, never s$s!ends the totality of disco$rse, work, "eaning, law, etc. *ince it never dis!els the veiling for" of absol$te knowledge, even by "aintaining this for", the (egelian $fheb$ng in all its !arts belongs to what Eataille calls +the world of work,+ that is, the world of the !rohibition not !erceived as s$ch, in its totality. + nd the h$"an collectivity, in !art devoted to work, is ,$st as "$ch defined by !rohibitions, witho$t which it wo$ld not have beco"e the world of work that it essentially is+ (=%erotis"e). The (egelian $fheb$ng th$s belongs to restricted econo"y, and is the for" of the !assage fro" one !rohibition to another, the circ$lation of !rohibitions, history as the tr$th of the !rohibition. Eataille, th$s, can only $tili.e the e"!ty for" of the $fheb$ng, in an analogical fashion, in order to designate, as was never done before, the

e"erge fro" the +tiss$e+K nd do$btless I "$st i""ediately say' the condition in which would see wo$ld be to die. t no "o"ent wo$ld I have
(

the chance to see* &+,-

p)

222I<

If the entire history of "eaning is reasse"bled and re!resented, at a !oint of the canvas, by the fig$re of the slave, if (egel%s disco$rse, =ogic, and the Eook of which Ko,eve s!eaks are the slave(%s) lang$age, that is,

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the wor%er*'s2 language, then they can +e read from left to right or from right to left, as a reactionary movement or as a revolutionary movement, or +oth at once. 9t would +e a+surd for the transgression of the 6oo% +y writing to +e legi+le only in a determined sense. 9t would +e at once a+surd, given the form of the ,ufhe+ung which is maintained in transgression, and too full of meaning for a transgression of meaning. 'rom right to left or left to right. these two contradictory and too- meaningful propositions e:ually lac% pertinence. ,t a certain determined point. , very determined point. hus, the effects of ascertaining nonpertinence would have to +e watched as closely as possi+le. 5ne understands nothing a+out general strategy if one a+solutely renounces any regulation of ascertaining nonpertinence. 9f one loans it, a+andons it, puts it into any hands. the right or the left. ................................................. ................................................. the condition in which would see would +e to get out of, to emerge from the "tissue"N ,nd dou+tless 9 must immediately say. the condition in which would see would +e to die. ,t no moment would 9 have the chance see)
I I to

1=
STRUCTURE< SIGN AND &LAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES
We need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things. *?ontaigne2 Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could +e called an "event," if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural-or structuralist-thought to reduce or to suspect. (et us spea% of an "event," nevertheless, and let us use :uotation mar%s to serve as a precaution. What would this event +e thenF 9ts e)terior form would +e that of a rupture and a redou+ling. 9t would +e easy enough to show that the concept of structure and even the word "structure" itself are as old as the episteme-that is to say, as old as Western science and Western philosophy-and that their roots thrust deep into the soil of ordinary language, into whose deepest recesses the episteme plunges in order to gather them up and to ma%e them part of itself in a metaphorical displacement. /evertheless, up to the event which 9 wish to mar% out and define, structure-or rather the

hus, there is the vulgar tissue of a+solute %nowledge and the mortal opening of an eye. , te)t and a vision. he servility of meaning and the awa%ening to death. , minor writing and a ma&or illumination. 'rom one to the other, totally other, a certain te)t. Which in silence traces the structure of the eye, s%etches the opening, ventures to contrive "a+solute rending," a+solutely rends its own tissue once more +ecome "solid" and servile in once more having +een read.

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structurality of structure-although it has al*ays been at *or0, has al*ays been neutraliBed or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. (he function of this center *as not only to orient, balance, and organiBe the structure-one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganiBed structurebut above all to ma0e sure that the organiBing principle of the structure *ould limit *hat *e might call the play of the structure. /y orienting and organiBing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. -nd even today the notion of a structure lac0ing any center represents the unthin0able itself Nevertheless, the center also closes off the play *hich it opens up and ma0es possible. -s center, it is the point at *hich the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible. -t the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements "*hich may of course be structures enclosed *ithin a structure' is forbidden. -t least this permutation has al*ays remained interdicted "and 4 am using this *o d deliberately'. (hus it has al*ays been thought that the center, *hich is by definition unique, constituted that very thing *ithin a structure *hich *hile governing the structure, escapes structurality. (his is *hy classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, *ithin the structure and outside it. (he center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality "is not part of the totality', the totality has its center else*here. (he center is not the center. (he concept of centered structurealthough it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science-is contradictorily coherent. -nd as al*ays, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire.' (he concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, *hich itself is beyond the reach of play. -nd on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it *ere at sta0e in the game from the outset. -nd again on the basis of *hat *e call the center "and *hich, because it can be either inside or outside, can also indifferently be called the origin or end, arche or telos', repetitions,

substitutions, transformations, and permutations are al*ays ta0en from a history of meaning >sens?-that is, in a *ord, a history-*hose origin may al*ays be rea*a0ened or *hose end may al*ays be anticipated in the form of presence. (his is *hy one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology, li0e that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and al*ays attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence *hich is beyond play. 4f this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of *hich *e are spea0ing, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a lin0ed chain of determinations of the center. !uccessively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. (he history of metaphysics, li0e the history of the :est, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. 4ts matrix-if you *ill pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to come more quic0ly to my principal theme-is the determination of /eing as presence in all senses of this *ord. 4t could be sho*n that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have al*ays designated an invariable presence-eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia "essence, existence, substance, sub ect' aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, 9od, man, and so forth. (he event 4 called a rupture, the disruption 4 alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably *ould have come about *hen the structurality of structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is *hy 4 said that this disruption *as repetition in every sense of the *ord. 1enceforth, it became necessary to thin0 both the la* *hich someho* governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification *hich orders the displacements and substitutions for this la* of central presence-but a central presence *hich has never been itself, has al*ays already been exiled from itself into its o*n substitute. (he substitute does not substitute itself for anything *hich has someho* existed before it. 1enceforth, it *as necessary to begin thin0ing that there *as no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it *as not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in *hich an infinite number of sign-substitutions

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came into play. (his *as the moment *hen language invaded the universal problematic, the moment *hen, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse-provided *e can agree on this *ord-that is to say, a system in *hich the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. (he absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely. :here and ho* does this decentering, this thin0ing the structurality of structure, occur< 4t *ould be some*hat naive to refer to an event, a doctrine, or an author in order to designate this occurrence. 4t is n doubt part of the totality of an era, our o*n, but still it has al*ays already begun to proclaim itself and begun to *or0. Nevertheless, if *e *ished to choose several "names," as indications only, and to recall those authors in *hose discourse this occurrence has 0ept most closely to its most radical formulation, *e doubtless *ould have to cite the NietBschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of /eing and truth, for *hich *ere substituted the concepts of play8 critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the"," more radically, the 1eideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto theology, of the determination of /eing as presence. /ut all these bet*een the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history, of metaphysics. (here is no sense in doing *ithout the concepts o metaphysics in order to sha0e metaphysics. :e have no language-no nounce not a single destructive proposition *hich has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of pre cisely *hat it see0s to contest- (o ta0e one example from many5 the metaphysics of presence is sha0en *ith the help of the concept of sign;. /ut, as 4 suggested a moment ago, as soon as one see0s to demonstrate that the domain or play of signification henceforth has no limit, on cisely *hat cannot be done. @or the signification "sign" has al*.

been understood and determined, in its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a signified, a signifier different from its signified. 4f one erases the radical difference bet*een signifier and signified, it is the *ord "signifier" itself *hich must be abandoned as a metaphysical concept. :hen )evi-!trauss says in the preface to (he 2a* and the Coo0ed that he has "sought to transcend the opposition bet*een the sensible and the intelligible by operating from the outset at the level of signs, "3 the necessity, force, and legitimacy of his act cannot ma0e us forget that the concept of the sign cannot in itself surpass this opposition bet*een the sensible and the intelligible. (he concept of the sign, n each or out the totality of its history. 4t has lived only on this opposition and its system. /ut *e cannot do *ithout the concept of the sign, for *e cannot give up this metaphysical complicity *ithout also giving up the critique *e are directing against this complicity, or *ithout the ris0 of erasing difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier into itself or, amounting to the same thing, simply expelling its signifier outside itself @or there are t*o heterogenous *ays of erasing

ately in submitting the sign to thought8 the other, the one *e are using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in *hich the preceding reduction functioned5 first and foremost, the that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it *as reducing. (he opposition is systematic *ith the reduction. -nd hat *e are saying here about the sign can be extended to all the concepts and all the sentences of metaphysics, in particular to the discourse on "structure." /ut there are several *ays of being caught in this circle. (hey are all more or less naive, more or less empirical, more or less systematic, more or less close to the formulation-that is, to the formaliBation-of this circle. 4t is these differences *hich explain the multiplicity of destructive discourses and the disagreement bet*een example, *or0ed *ithin the inherited concepts of metaphysics. !ince these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are ta0en from syntax and a system, every particular borro*ing brings along *ith it

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the *hole of metaphysics. (his is *hat allo*s these destroyers to destroy each other reciprocally-for example, 1eidegger regarding NietBsche, *ith as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and mis construction, construction, as the last metaphysician, the last "Platonist," do the same for 1eidegger himself, for @reud, or for a number o others. -nd today no exercise is more *idespread. :hat is the relevance of this formal schema *hen *e turn to *hat are called the "human sciences"< =ne of them perhaps occupies a privil eged place-ethnology. 4n fact one can assume that ethnology could have been born as a science only at the moment *hen a decentering had come about5 at the moment *hen 6uropean culture-and, in con sequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts-had been dislocated, driven from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference. (his moment is not first and foremost a moment of philosophical or scientific discourse. 4t is also a moment *hich is political, economic, technical, and so forth. =ne can say *ith total security that there is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the critique of ethnocentrism-the very condition for ethnology-should be systematically and historically contemporaneous *ith the destruc-. tion of the history of metaphysics. /oth belong to one and the same. era. No*, ethnology-li0e any science-comes about *ithin the elem H ent of discourse. -nd it is primarily a 6uropean science employing traditional concepts, ho*ever much it may struggle against them. Con sequently, *hether he *ants to or not-and this does not depend on 'a decision on his part-the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment *hen he denouncesS them. (his necessity is irreducible8 it is not a historical contingency' :e ought to consider all its implications very carefully. /ut if no one, can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for' giving in to it, ho*ever little he may do so, this does not mean that all the *ays of giving in to it are of equal pertinence. (he quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor *ith *hich this relation to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought. 1ere it is a question both of a critical relation to the language of the social sciences and a critical responsibility of the discourse itself. 4t is a question of explicitly and systematically posing.

the problem of the status of a discourse *hich borro*s from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself problem of economy and strategy. 4f *e consider, as an example, the texts of Claude )evi-!trauss, it is not only because of the privilege accorded to ethnology among the social sciences, nor even because the thought of )evi-!trauss *eighs heavily on the contemporary theoretical situation. 4t is above all because a certain choice has been declared in the *or0 of )evi-!trauss and because a certain doctrine has been elaborated there, and precisely, .n a more or less explicit manner, as concerns both this critique of language and this critical language in the social sciences. 4n order to follo* this movement in the text of )evi-!trauss, let us choose as one guiding thread among others the opposition bet*een nature and culture. #espite all its re uvenations and disguises, this opposition is congenital to philosophy. 4t is even older than Plato. 4t is at least as old as the !ophists. !ince the statement of the opposition physisWnomos, physisWtechn6, it has been relayed to us by means of a *hole historical chain *hich opposes "nature" to la*, to education, to art, to technics-but also to liberty, to the arbitrary, to history, to society, to the mind, and so on. No*, from the outset of his researches, and from his first boo0 "(he 6lementary !tructures of Iinship' on, )evi-!trauss simultaneously has experienced the necessity of utiliBing this opposition and the impossibility of accepting it. 4n the 6lementary !tructures, he begins from this axiom or definition5 that *hich is universal and spontaneous, and not dependent on any particular culture or on any determinate norm, belongs to nature. 4nversely, that *hich depends upon a system of norms regulating society and therefore is capable of varying from one social structure to another, belongs to culture. (hese t*o definitions are o the traditional type. /ut in the very first pages of the 6lementary !tructures )evi-!trauss, *ho has begun by giving credence to these con cepts, encounters *hat he calls a scandal, that is to say, something *hich no longer tolerates the natureWculture opposition he has accepted, something *hich simultaneously seems to require the predicates of nature and of culture. (his scandal is the incest prohibition. (he incest prohibition is universal8 in this sense one could call it natural. /ut it is also a prohibition, a system of norms and interdicts8 in this sense one could it cultural5

ca''

3GB W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ =et $s s$!!ose then that everything $niversal in "an relates to the nat$ral order, and is characteri.ed by s!ontaneity, and that everything s$b,ect to a nor" is c$lt$ral and is both relative and !artic$lar. 7e are then confronted with a fact, or rather, a gro$! of facts, which, in the light of !revio$s definitions, are not far re"oved fro" a scandal' we refer to that co"!le4 gro$! of beliefs, c$sto"s, conditions and instit$tions described s$ccinctly as the !rohibition of incest, which !resents, witho$t the slightest a"big$ity, and inse!arably co"bines, the two characteristics in which we recogni.e the conflicting feat$res of two "$t$ally e4cl$sive orders. It constit$tes a r$le, b$t a r$le which, alone a"ong all the social r$les, !ossesses at the sa"e ti"e a $niversal character.%

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!hilological nor a !hiloso!hical action in the classic sense of these words. To concern oneself with the fo$nding conce!ts of the entire history of !hiloso!hy, to deconstit$te the", is not to $ndertake the work of the !hilologist or of the classic historian of !hiloso!hy. Des!ite a!!earances, it is !robably the "ost daring way of "aking the beginnings of a ste! o$tside of !hiloso!hy. The ste! +o$tside !hil) oso!hy+ is "$ch "ore diffic$lt to conceive than is generally i"agined by those who think they "ade it long ago with cavalier ease, and who in general are swallowed $! in "eta!hysics in the entire body of disco$rse which they clai" to have disengaged fro" it. The other choice (which I believe corres!onds "ore closely to =evi) *tra$ss%s "anner), in order to avoid the !ossibly sterili.ing effects of the first one, consists in conserving all these old conce!ts within the do"ain of e"!irical discovery while here and there deno$ncing their

;bvio$sly there is no scandal e4ce!t within a syste" of conce!ts which accredits the difference between nat$re and c$lt$re. Ey co") "encing his work with the fact$" of the incest !rohibition, =evi)*tra$ss th$s !laces hi"self at the !oint at which this difference, which has always been ass$"ed to be self)evident, finds itself erased or /$es) tioned. &or fro" the "o"ent when the incest !rohibition can no longer be conceived within the nat$re8c$lt$re o!!osition, it can no longer be said to be a scandalo$s fact, a n$cle$s of o!acity within a longer a scandal one "eets with or co"es $! against in the do"ain of traditional conce!ts- it is so"ething which esca!es these conce!ts and certainly !recedes the")!robably as the condition of their !ossibility. It co$ld !erha!s be said that the whole of !hiloso!hical conce!t$ali.ation, which is syste"atic with the nat$re8c$lt$re o!!osition, is designed to leave in the do"ain of the $nthinkable the very thing that "akes this conce!t$ali.ation !ossible' the origin of the !rohibition of incest. This e4a"!le, too c$rsorily e4a"ined, is only one a"ong "any others, b$t nevertheless it already shows that lang$age bears within itself the necessity of its own criti/$e. Now this criti/$e "ay be $ndertaken along two !aths, in two +"anners.+ ;nce the li"it of the nat$re8 c$lt$re o!!osition "akes itself felt, one "ight want to /$estion sys te"atically and rigoro$sly the history of these conce!ts. This is a first action. *$ch a syste"atic and historic /$estioning wo$ld be neither a

li"its, treating the" as tools which can still be $sed. No longer is any tr$th val$e attrib$ted to the"- there is a readiness to abandon the", if necessary, sho$ld other instr$"ents a!!ear "ore $sef$l. In the "eanti"e, their relative efficacy is e4!loited, and they are e"!loyed to destroy the old "achinery to which they belong and of which they the"selves are !ieces. This is how the lang$age of the social sciences critici.es itself. =evi) *tra$ss thinks that in this way he can se!arate "ethod fro" tr$th, the instr$"ents of the "ethod and the ob,ective significations envisaged by it. ;ne co$ld al"ost say that this is the !ri"ary affir"ation of =evi) *tra$ss- in any event, the first words of the <le"entary *tr$ct$res are' + bove all, it is beginning to e"erge that this distinction between nat$re and society (%nat$re% and %c$lt$re% see" !referable to $s today), while of no acce!table historical significance, does contain a logic, f$lly ,$stifying its $se by "odern sociology as a "ethodological tool.%
a

=evi)*tra$ss will always re"ain faithf$l to this do$ble intention' to !reserve as an instr$"ent so"ething whose tr$th val$e he critici.es. ;n the one hand, he will contin$e, in effect, to contest the val$e of the nat$re8c$lt$re o!!osition. More than thirteen years after the <le"entary *tr$ct$res, The *avage Mind faithf$lly echoes the te4t I have ,$st /$oted' +The o!!osition between nat$re and c$lt$re to which I attached "$ch i"!ortance at one ti"e . . . now see"s to be of !ri"arily "ethodological i"!ortance.+ nd this "ethodological val$e is not affected by

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its "ontological" nonvalue "as might be said, if this notion *ere not suspect here'5 "1o*ever, it *ould not be enough to reabsorb particular humanities into a general one. (his first enterprise opens the *ay for others *hich ... are incumbent on the exact natural sciences5 the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life *ithin the *hole of its physico-chemical conditions."+ =n the other hand, still in (he !avage 7ind, he presents as *hat he calls bricolage *hat might be called the discourse of this method. (he bricoleur, says )evi-!trauss, is someone *ho uses "the means at hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those *hich are already there, *hich had not been especially conceived *ith an eye to the operation for *hich they are to be used and to *hich one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them *henever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogenous-and so forth. (here is therefore a critique of language in the form of bricolage, and it has even been said that bricolage is critical language itself 4 am thin0ing in particular of the article of 9. 9enette, "!tructuralisme et critique litteraire," published in homage to )evi-!trauss in a special issue of )'-rc "no. 3&, $%&+', *here it is stated that the analysis of bricolage could "be applied almost *ord for *ord" to criticism, and especially to "literary criticism." 4f one calls bricolage the necessity of borro*ing one's concepts from

species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in *hich it too0 on its meaning brea0s do*n. (his brings us to the second thread *hich might guide us in *hat is being contrived here. )evi-!trauss describes bricolage not only as an intellectual activity but also as a mythopoetical activity. =ne reads in (he !avage 7ind, ")i0e bricolage on the technical plane, mythical reflection can reach brilliant unforeseen results on the intellectual plane. Conversely, attention has often been dra*n to the mythopoetical nature of bricolage."& /ut )evi-!trauss's remar0able endeavor does not simply consist in proposing, notably in his most recent investigations, a structural science of myths and of mythological activity. 1is endeavor also appears-4 *ould say almost from the outset-to have the status *hich he accords to his o*n discourse on myths, to *hat he calls his "mythologicals." 4t is here that his discourse on the myth reflects on itself and criticiBes itself. -nd this moment, this critical period, is evidently of concern to all the languages *hich share the field of the human sciences. :hat does )evi-!trauss say of his "mythologicals"< 4t is here that *e rediscover the mythopoetical virtue of bricolage. 4n effect, *hat appears most fascinating in this critical search for a ne* status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center, to a sub ect, to a privileged reference, to an origin, or to an absolute archia. (he theme of this decentering could be follo*ed throughout the "=verture" to his last boo0, (he 2a* and the Coo0ed. 4 shall simply remar0 on a fe* 0ey points. $. @rom the very start, )evi-!trauss recogniBes that the /ororo myth

the text of a heritage *hich is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is bricoleur. (he engineer, *hom )evi-!trauss opposes to the bricoleur, should be the one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon. 4n this sense the engineer is a myth. sub ect *ho supposedly *ould be the absolute origin of his o*n dis-e course and supposedly *ould construct it "out of nothing," "out of," *hole cloth," *ould be the creator of the verb, the verb itself (he notion of the engineer *ho supposedly brea0s *ith all forms of bricolage 'H is therefore a theological idea8 and since )evi-!trauss tells us else*here that bricolage is mythopoetic, the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the bricoleur. -s soon as *e cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse *hich brea0s *ith the received historical discourse, and as soon as *e admit that every finite discourse is bound ' by a certain bricolage and that the engineer and the scientist are also

*hich he employs in the boo0 as the "reference myth" does not merit t this name and this treatment. (he name is specious and the use of the myth improper. (his myth deserves no more than any other its referential privilege5 "4n fact, the /ororo myth, *hich 4 shall refer to from no* on as the 0ey myth, is, as 4 shall try to sho*, simply a transformation, to a greater or lesser extent, of other myths originating either in the same society or in neighboring or remote societies. 4 could, therefore, have legitimately ta0en as my starting point any one representative myth of the group. @rom this point of vie*, the 0ey myth is interesting not because it is typical, but rather because of its irregular position *ithin the group."'

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=. here is no unity or a+solute source of the myth. he focus or the source of the myth are always shadows and virtualities which are elusive, unactuali3a+le, and none)istent in the first place. -verything +egins with structure, configuration, or relationship. he discourse on the acentric structure that myth itself is, cannot itself have an a+solute su+&ect or an a+solute center. 9t must avoid the violence that consists in centering a language which descri+es an acentric structure if it is not to shortchange the form and movement of myth. herefore it is necessary to forego scientific or philosophical discourse, to renounce the episteme which a+solutely re:uires, which is the a+solute re:uirement that we go +ac% to the source, to the center, to the founding +asis, to the principle, and so on. 9n opposition to epistemic discourse, structural discourse on myths-mythological discourse-must itself +e mythomorphic. 9t must have the form of that of which it spea%s. his is what (eviStrauss says in he 8aw and the ;oo%ed, from which 9 would now li%e to :uote a long and remar%a+le passage. he study of myths raises a methodological pro+lem, in that it cannot +e carried out according to the ;artesian principle of +rea%ing down the difficulty into as many parts as may +e necessary for finding the solution. here is no real end to methodological analysis, no hidden unity to +e grasped once the +rea%ing-down process has +een completed. hemes can +e split up ad infinitum" &ust when you thin% you have disentangled and separated them, you reali3e that they are %nitting together again in response to the operation of une)pected affinities. ;onse:uently the unity of the myth is never more than tendential and pro&ective and cannot reflect a state or a particular moment of the myth. 9t is a phenomenon of the imagination, resulting from the attempt at interpretation> and its function is to endow the myth with synthetic form and to prevent its disintegration into a confusion of opposites. he science of myths might therefore +e termed "anaclastic," if we ta%e this old term in the +roader etymological sense which includes the study of +oth reflected rays and +ro%en rays. 6ut unli%e philosophical reflection, which aims to go +ac% to its own source, the reflections we are dealing with here concern rays whose only source is hypothetical.... ,nd in see%ing to imitate the spontaneous movement of mythological thought, this essay, which is also +oth too +rief

and too long, has had to conform to the re:uirements of that thought and to respect its rhythm. 9t follows that this +oo% on myths is itself a %ind of myth.' his statement is repeated a little farther on. ",s the myths themselves are +ased on secondary codes *the primary codes +eing those that provide the su+stance of language2, the present wor% is put forward as a tentative draft of a tertiary code, which is intended to ensure the reciprocal translata+ility of several myths. his is why it would not +e wrong to consider this +oo% itself as a myth. it is, as it were, the myth of mythology."" he a+sence of a center is here the a+sence of a su+&ect and the a+sence of an author. " hus the myth and the musical wor% are li%e conductors of an orchestra, whose audience +ecomes the silent performers. 9f it is now as%ed where the real center of the wor% is to +e found, the answer is that this is impossi+le to determine. ?usic and mythology +ring man face to face with potential o+&ects of which only the shadows are actuali3ed.... ?yths are anonymous."" he musical model chosen +y (evi-Strauss for the composition of his +oo% is apparently &ustified +y this a+sence of any real and fi)ed center of the mythical or mythological discourse. hus it is at this point that ethnographic +ricolage deli+erately assumes its mythopoetic function. 6ut +y the same to%en, this function ma%es the philosophical or epistemological re:uirement of a center appear as mythological, that is to say, as a historical illusion. /evertheless, even if one yields to the necessity of what (evi-Strauss has done, one cannot ignore its ris%s. 9f the mythological is mythomorphic, are all discourses on myths e:uivalentF Shall we have to a+andon any epistemological re:uirement which permits us to distinguish +etween several :ualities of discourse on the mythF , classic, +ut inevita+le :uestion. 9t cannot +e answered-and 9 +elieve that (eviStrauss does not answer it-for as long as the pro+lem of the relations +etween the philosopheme or the theorem, on the one hand, and the mytheme or the mythopoem, on the other, has not +een posed e)plicitly, which is no small pro+lem. 'or lac% of e)plicitly posing this pro+lem, we condemn ourselves to transforming the alleged transgression of philosophy into an unnoticed fault within the philosophical realm. -mpiricism would +e the genus of which these faults would

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always +e the species. ransphilosophical concepts would +e transformed into philosophical naivetes. ?any e)amples could +e given to demonstrate this ris%. the concepts of sign, history, truth, and so forth. What 9 want to emphasi3e is simply that . the passage +eyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy *which usually amounts to philosophi3ing +adly2, +ut in continuing to read philosophers in a certain way. he ris% 9 am spea%ing of is always assumed +y (evi-Strauss, and it is the very price of this endeavor. 9 have said that empiricism is the matri) of all faults menacing a discourse which continues, as with (evi-Strauss in particular, to consider itself scientific. 9f we wanted to pose the pro+lem of empiricism and +ricolage in depth, we would pro+a+ly end up very :uic%ly with a num+er of a+solutely contradictory propositions concerning the status of discourse in structural ethnology. 5n the one hand, structuralism &ustifia+ly claims to +e the criti:ue of empiricism. 6ut at the same time there is not a single +oo% or study +y (evi-Strauss which is not proposed as an empirical essay which can always +e completed or invalidated +y new information. he structural schemata are always proposed as hypotheses resulting from a finite :uantity of information and which are su+&ected to the proof of e)perience. /umerous te)ts could +e used to demonstrate this dou+le postulation. (et us turn once again to the "5verture" of he 8aw and the ;oo%ed, where it seems clear that if this postulation is dou+le, it is +ecause it is a :uestion here of a language on language. 9f critics reproach me with not having carried out an e)haustive inventory of South ,merican myths +efore analy3ing them, they are ma%ing a grave mista%e a+out the nature and function of these documents. he total +ody of myth +elonging to a given community is compara+le to its speech. 0nless the population dies out physically or morally, this totality is never complete. Dou might as well critici3e a linguist for compiling the grammar of a language without having complete records of the words pronounced since the language came into +eing, and without %nowing what will +e said in it during the future part of its e)istence. -)perience proves that a linguist can wor% out the grammar of a given language from a remar%a+ly small num+er of sentences.... ,nd even a partial grammar or an outline grammar is a precious ac:uisition when we are dealing with un%nown languages. Synta) does

not +ecome evident only after a *theoretically limitless2 series of events has +een recorded and e)amined, +ecause it is itself the +ody of rules governing their production. What 9 have tried to give is an outline of the synta) of South ,merican mythology. Should fresh data come to hand, they will +e used to chec% or modify the formulation of certain grammatical laws, so that some are a+andoned and replaced +y new ones. 6ut in no instance would 9 feel constrained to accept the ar+itrary demand for a total mythological pattern, since, as has +een shown, such a re:uirement has no meaning." otali3ation, therefore, is sometimes defined as useless, and sometimes as impossi+le. his is no dou+t due to the fact that there are two ways of conceiving the limit of totali3ation. ,nd 9 assert once more that these two determinations coe)ist implicitly in (evi-Strauss's discourse. otali3ation can +e &udged impossi+le in the classical style. one then refers to the empirical endeavor of either a su+&ect or a finite richness which it can never master. here is too much, more than one can say. 6ut nontotali3ation can also +e determined in another way. no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, +ut from the standpoint of the concept of play. 9f totali3ation no longer has any meaning, it is not +ecause the infiniteness of a field cannot +e covered +y a finite glance or a finite discourse, +ut +ecause the nature of the fieldthat is, language and a finite language-e)cludes totali3ation. his field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite su+stitutions only +ecause it is finite, that is to say, +ecause instead of +eing an ine)hausti+le field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of +eing too large, there is something missing from it. a center which arrests and grounds the play of su+stitutions. 5ne could sayrigorously using that word whose scandalous signification is always o+literated in 'renchthat this movement of play, permitted +y the lac% or a+sence of a center or origin, is the movement of supplementarity. 5ne cannot determine the center and e)haust totali3ation +ecause the sign which replaces the center, which supplements it, ta%ing the center's place in its a+sencethis sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a supplement." he movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more, +ut this addition is a floating one +ecause it comes to perform a vicarious function, to

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supplement a lac0 on the part of the signified. -lthough )evi-!trauss in his use of the *ord "supplementary" never emphasiBes, as 4 do here, the t*o directions of meaning *hich are so strangely compounded *ithin it, it is not by chance that he uses this *ord t*ice in his "4ntroduction to the :or0 of 7arcel 7auss," at one point *here he is spea0ing of the "overabundance of signifier, in relation to the signifieds to *hich this overabundance can refer"5 4n his endeavor to understand the *orld, man therefore al*ays has at his disposal a surplus of signification "*hich he shares out amongst things according to the la*s of symbolic thought-*hich is the tas0 of ethnologists and linguists to study'. (his distribution of a supple!en tary allo*ance ;ration supply !entaire</if it is permissible to put it that *ay-is absolutely necessary in order that on the *hole the available signifier and the signified it aims at may remain in the relationship of complementarity *hich is the very condition of the use of symbolic thought."" "4t could no doubt be demonstrated that this ration supplementaire of signification is the origin of the ratio itself' (he *ord reappears a little further on, after )evi-!trauss has mentioned "this floating signifier,' *hich is the servitude of all finite thought"5 4n other *ords-and ta0ing as our guide 7auss's precept that all social phenomena can be assimilated to language-*e see in !ana, "akau, oranda and other notions of the same type, the conscious expression of a semantic function, *hose role it is to permit symbolic thought to operate in spite ofthe contradiction *hich is proper to it. 4n this way are explained the apparently insoluble antinomies attached to this notion.... -t one and the same time force and action, quality and state, noun and verb8 abstract and concrete, omnipresent and localiBed-mana is in effect all these things. /ut is it not precisely because it is none of these things that !ana is a simple form, or more exactly, a symbol in the pure state, and therefore capable of becoming charged *ith any sort of symbolic content *hatever< 4n the system of symbols constituted by all cosmologies, mana *ould simply be a Bero symbolic value, that is to say, a sign mar0ing the necessity of a

symbolic content supple!entary ;!y italics? to that *ith *hich the signified is already loaded, but *hich can ta0e on any value required, provided only that this value still remains part of the available reserve and is not, as phonologists put it, a group-term." )evi-!trauss adds the note5 ")inguists have already been led to formulate hypotheses of this type. @or example5 '- Bero phoneme is opposed to all the other phonemes in @rench in that it entails no differential characters and no constant phonetic value. =n the contrary, the proper function of the Bero phoneme is to be opposed to phoneme absence.' "2. Da0obson and D. )utB, "Notes on the @rench Phonemic Pattern," :ord +, no. 3 >-ugust $%.%?5 $++'. !imilarly, if *e schematiBe the conception 4 am proposing here, it could almost be said that the function of notions li0e mana is to be opposed to the absence of signification, *ithout entailing by itself any particular signification." 14 (he overabundance of the signifier, its supplementary character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lac0 *hich must be supplemented. 4t can no* be understood *hy the concept of play is important in )evi-!trauss. 1is references to all sorts of games, notably to roulette, are very frequent, especially in his Conversations," in 2ace and 1istory, $& and in (he !avage 7ind. @urther, the reference to play is al*ays caught up in tension. (ension *ith history, first of all. (his is a classical problem, ob ections to *hich are no* *ell *orn. 4 shall simply indicate *hat seems to me the formality of the problem5 by reducing history, )evi-!trauss has treated as it deserves a concept *hich has al*ays been in complicity *ith a teleological and eschatological metaphysics, in other *ords, paradoxically, in complicity *ith that philosophy of presence to *hich it *as believed history could be opposed. (he thematic of historicity, although it seems to be a some*hat late arrival in philosophy, has al*ays been required by the determination of /eing as presence. :ith or *ithout etymology, and despite the classic antagonism *hich opposes these significations throughout all of classical thought, it could be sho*n that the concept of episteme has al*ays called forth that of historia, if history is al*ays the unity of a becoming, as the tradition of

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truth or the development of science or %nowledge oriented toward the appropriation of truth in presence and self-presence, toward %nowledge in consciousness-of-self. 4istory has always +een conceived as the movement of a resumption of history, as a detour +etween two presences. 6ut if it is legitimate to suspect this concept of history, there is a ris%, if it is reduced without an e)plicit statement of the pro+lem 9 am indicating here, of falling +ac% into an ahistoricism of a classical type, that is to say, into a determined moment of the history of metaphysics. Such is the alge+raic formality of the pro+lem as 9 see it. ?ore concretely, in the wor% of (evi-Strauss it must +e recogni3ed that the respect for structurality, for the internal originality of the structure> compels a neutrali3ation of time and history. 'or e)ample, the appearance ance of a new structure, of an original system, always comes a+out and this is the very condition of its structural specificity-+y a rupture with its past, its origin, and its cause. herefore one can descri+e what'K. is peculiar to the structural organi3ation only +y not ta%ing into account, in the very moment of this description, its past conditions. +y, omitting to posit the pro+lem of the transition from one structure to another, +y putting history +etween +rac%ets. 9n this " structuralist"' & moment, the concepts of chance and discontinuity are indispensa+le. ,nd (evi-Strauss does in fact often appeal to them, for e)ample, as concerns that structure of structures, language, of which he says in the 9ntroduction to the Wor% of ?arcel ?auss" that it "could only have +een +orn in one fell swoop". Whatever may have +een the moment and the circumstances of it appearance on the scale of animal life, language could only have +een +orn in one fell swoop. hings could not have set a+out ac:uiring signification progressively. 'ollowing a transformation the study of "

aside all the facts" at the moment when he wishes to recapture the specificity of a structure. (i%e 8ousseau, he must always conceive of the origin of a new structure on the model of catastrophe-an overturning of nature in nature, a natural interruption of the natural se:uence, a setting aside of nature. 6esides the tension +etween play and history, there is also the ten sion +etween play and presence. Play is the disruption of presence. he presence of an element is always a signifying and su+stitutive reference inscri+ed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always play of a+sence and presence, +ut if it is to +e thought radically, play must +e conceived of +efore the alternative of presence and a+sence. 6eing must +e conceived as presence or a+sence on the +asis of the possi+ility of play and not the other way around. 9f (evi-Strauss, +etter than any other, has +rought to light the play of repetition and the repetition of play, one no less perceives in his wor% a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of presence and self-presence in speech-an ethic, nostalgia, and even remorse, which he often pres ents as the motivation of the ethnological pro&ect when he moves toward the archaic societies which are e)emplary societies in his eyes. hese te)ts are well %nown." urned towards the lost or impossi+le presence of the a+sent origin, this structuralist thematic of +ro%en immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, 8ousseauistic side of the thin%ing of play whose other side would +e the /iet3schean affirmation, that is the &oyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of +ecoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. his affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center. ,nd it plays without security. 'or there is a sure play. that which is limited to the su+stitution of given and e)isting, present, pieces. 9n a+solute chance, affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace. here are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. he one see%s to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an e)ile. he other, which is no

and psychology, a transition came a+out from a stage where nothing' had a meaning to another where everything possessed it.'$ his standpoint does not prevent (evi-Strauss from recogni3ing the slowness, the process of maturing, the continuous toil of factual trans-' formations, history *for e)ample, 8ace and 4istory2. 6ut, in accordance with a gesture which was also 8ousseau's and 4usserl's, he must "set

; , A W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/ longer turned to*ard the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being *ho, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology-in other *ords, throughout his entire history-has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play. (he second interpretation of interpretation, to *hich NietBsche pointed the *ay, does not see0 in ethnography, as )evi-!trauss does, the "inspiration of a ne* humanism" "again citing the "4ntroduction to the :or0 of 7arcel 7auss"'. (here are more than enough indications today to suggest *e might perceive that these t*o interpretations of interpretation-*hich are absolutely irreconcilable even if *e live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy-together share the field *hich *e call, in such a problematic fashion, the social sciences. @or my part, although these t*o interpretations must ac0no*ledge and accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, 4 do not believe that today there is any question of choosing-in the first place because here *e are in a region "let us say, provisionally, a region of historicity' *here the category of choice seems particularly trivial8 and in the second, because *e must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the difference of this irreducible difference. 1ere there is a 0ind of question, let us still call it historical, *hose conception, formation, gestation, and labor *e are only catching a glimpse of today. 4 employ these *ords, 4 admit, *ith a glance to*ard the operations of childbearing-but also *ith a glance to*ard those *ho, in a society from *hich 4 do not exclude myself, turn their eyes a*ay *hen faced by the as yet unnamable *hich is proclaiming itself and *hich can do so, as is necessary *henever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.

11
ELLI&SIS ,*r Ga.rie+ B*1/*re
1ere or there *e have discerned *riting5 a nonsymmetrical division designated on the one hand the closure of the boo0, and on the other the opening of the text. =n the one hand the theological encyclopedia and, modeled upon it, the boo0 of man. =n the other a fabric of traces mar0ing the disappearance of an exceeded 9od or of an erased man. (he question of *riting could be opened only if the boo0 *as closed. (he oyous *andering of the graphein then became *andering *ithout return. (he opening into the text *as adventure, expenditure *ithout reserve. -nd yet did *e not 0no* that the closure of the boo0 *as not a simple limit among others< -nd that only in the boo0, coming bac0 to it unceasingly, dra*ing all our resources from it, could *e indefinitely designate the *riting beyond the boo0< :hich brings us to consider )e retour an livre' "(he 2eturn to the /oo0'. Ender this heading, 6dmond Dabes first tells us *hat it is "to abandon the boo0." 4f closure is not end, *e protest or deconstruct in vain,

God succeeds God and the Book succeeds the Book.

/ut *ithin this movement of succession, riting 0eeps its vigil,

bet*een 9od and 9od, bet*een the /oo0 and the /oo0. -nd if *riting ta0es shape on the basis of both this vigil and the beyond of the closure, then the return to the boo0 does not enclose us *ithin the boo0. (he return is a moment of *andering, it repeats the epoch of the boo0, its totality suspended bet*een t*o forms of *riting, its *ithdra*al, and that *hich is reserved *ithin it.
* book which is the interfacing of a risk.... ... Fy life, fro! the book on, will have been a vigil of writing in the interval of li!its.

2epetition does not reissue the boo0 but describes its origin from the vantage of a *riting *hich does not yet belong to it, or no longer belongs to it, a *riting *hich feigns, by repeating the boo0, inclusion in the boo0. @ar from letting itself be oppressed or enveloped *ithin the volume, this repetition is the first *riting. (he *riting of the origin, the *riting that retraces the origin, trac0ing do*n the signs of its disappearance, the lost *riting of the origin.
#o write is to have the passion of the origin.

/ut *hat disposes it in this *ay, *e no* 0no*, is not the origin, but that *hich ta0es its place8 *hich is not, moreover, the opposite of an origin. 4t is not absence instead of presence, but a trace *hich replaces a presence *hich has never been present, an origin by means of *hich nothing has begun. No*, the boo0 has lived on this lure5 to have given us to believe that passion, having originally been impassioned by something, could in the end be appeased by the return of that something. )ure of the origin, the end, the line, the ring, the volume, the center. -s in the first /oo0 of Muestions, imaginary rabbis ans*er each other, in the !ong on (he2ing.
#he line is the lure +eb &eab 7ne of ! y greatest anGieties, said +eb *ghi!, was to see, without being able to stop it, !y life curve itself to for! a ring.

=nce the circle turns, once the volume rolls itself up, once the boo0 is repeated, its identification *ith itself gathers an imperceptible difference *hich permits us efficaciously, rigorously, that is, discreetly, to exit from closure. 4n redoubling the closure of the boo0, one cuts it in half. =ne then furtively escapes from it, bet*een t*o passage*ays through the same boo0, the same line, along the same ring, "vigil of *riting in the interval of limits." (his exit from the identical into the same' remains very slight, *eighs nothing itself, thin0s and *eighs the boo0 as such. (he return to the boo0 is then the abandoning of the boo08 it has slipped in bet*een 9od and 9od, the /oo0 and the /oo0, in the neutral space of succession, in the suspense of the interval. (he return, at this point, does not reta0e possession of something. 4t does not reappropriate the origin. (he latter is no longer in itself :riting, passion of the origin, must also be understood through the sub ective genetive. 4t is the origin itself *hich is impassioned, passive, and past, in that it is *ritten. :hich means inscribed. (he inscription of the origin is doubtless its /eingas-*riting, but it is also its /eing-asinscribed in a system in *hich it is only a function and a locus. (hus understood, the return to the boo0 is of an elliptical essence. !omething invisible is missing in the grammar of this repetition. -s this lac0 is invisible and undeterminable, as it completely redoubles and consecrates the boo0, once more passing through each point along its circuit, nothing has budged. -nd yet all meaning is altered by this lac0. 2epeated, the same line is no longer exactly the same, the ring no longer has exactly the same center, the origin has played. !omething is missing that *ould ma0e the circle perfect. /ut *ithin the ellipsis, by means of simple redoubling of the route, the solicitation of closure, and the ointing of the line, the boo0 has let itself be thought as such.
*nd 'ukel said$ #he circle is acknowledged. 0reak the curve. #he route doubles the route. #he book consecrates the book.

(he return to the boo0 here announces the form of the eternal return.' (he return of the same does not alter itself-but does so absolutely-except by amounting to the same. Pure repetition, *ere it to change neither thing nor sign, carries *ith it an unlimited po*er of perversion and subversion.

;,.

W2I0IN1 ;ND DI,,/2/N6/

/55I*SIS

;,+

(his repetition is *riting because *hat disappears in it is the selfidentity of the origin, the self-presence of so-called living speech. (hat is the center. (he first boo0, the mythic boo0, the eve prior to all repetition, has lived on the deception that the center *as sheltered from play5 irreplaceable, *ithdra*n from metaphor and metonymy, a 0ind of invariable first name that could be invo0ed, but not repeated. (he center of the first boo0 should not have been repeatable in its , o*n representation. =nce it lends itself a single time to such a representation-that is to say, once it is *ritten-*hen one can read a boo0 in the boo0, an origin in the origin, a center in the center, it is the abyss, is the bottomlessness of infinite redoubling. (he other is in the same,
*he +lsewhere within ... *he center is the well.. . "Where is the center?" screamed Reb ,adies. "*he scorned water "ermits the falcon to pursue his prey.#he center, perhaps, is the displace!ent of the question. Ho center there where the circle is i!possible. - F a y ! y death co!e fro! !yself,- said +eb 0ekri. -1or ( would then be, all at once, both the servitude of the ring and the caesura.-

#he center is the threshold. +eb Ha!an said$ -5od is the center this is why great !inds have proclai!ed that 2e did not eGist, for if the center of an apple or the star is the heart of the heavenly body or of the fruit, which is the true !iddle of the orchard and the night<" *nd 'ukel said$ #he center is failure. -"here is the center. ;7iu est le centre<? /Under ashes. >!ous la cendre?" +eb &elah -#he center is !ourning.-

Dust as there is a negative theology, there is a negative atheology. -n accomplice of the former, it still pronounces the absence of a center, *hen it is play that should be affirmed. /ut is not the desire for a center, as a function of play itself, the indestructible itself< -nd in the repetition or return of play, ho* could the phantom of the center not call to us< 4t is here that the hesitation bet*een *riting as decentering and *riting as an affirmation of play is infinite. (his hesitation is part of play and lin0s it to death. 1esitation occurs *ithin a "*ho 0no*s<" *ithout sub ect or 0no*ledge.
#he last obstacle, the ultimate li!it is, who 0no*s< the center. 1or then everything comes to us fro! the end of the night, fro! childhood.

-s soon as a sign emerges, it begins by repeating itself :ithout this, it *ould not be a sign, *ould not be *hat it is, that is to say, the nonselfidentity *hich regularly refers to the same. (hat is to say, to another sign, *hich itself *ill be born of having been divided. (he grapheme, repeating itself in this fashion, thus has neither natural site nor natural center. /ut did it ever lose them< 4s its excentricity a decentering< Can one not affirm the nonreferral to the center, rather than bemoan the absence of the center< :hy *ould one mourn for the center< 4s not the center, the absence of play and difference, another name for death< (he death *hich reassures and appeases, but also, *ith its hole, creates anguish and puts at sta0e< (he passage through negative excentricity is doubtless necessary8 but only liminary.

4f the center is indeed "the displacing of the question," it is because the unnamable bottomless *ell *hose sign the center *as, has al*ays been surnamed8 the center as the sign of a hole that the boo0 attempted to fill. (he center *as the name of a hole8 and the name of man, li0e the name of 9od, pronounces the force of that *hich has been raised up in the hole in order to operate as a *or0 in the form of a boo0. (he volume, the scroll of parchment, *as to have insinuated itself into the dangerous hole, *as to have furtively penetrated into the menacing d*elling place *ith an animal-li0e, quic0, silent, smooth, brilliant, sliding motion, in the fashion of a serpent or a fish. !uch is the anxious desire of the boo0. 4t is tenacious too, and parasitic, loving and breathing

III

thro$gh a tho$sand "o$ths that leave a tho$sand i"!rints on o$r skin, a "arine "onster, a !oly!.
Ridiculous, this !osition on your belly" .ou are crawlin " .ou are borin in the mornin , on a road" &nd this will to stand u!ri ht, des!ite fati ue and hun er5 & hole, it was only a hole, the chance for a book" '& hole<octo!us, your work5 :=n tro$)!ie$vre, ton oe$vre6I )he octo!us was hun s!arkle") It was only a hole from the ceilin and his tentacles be an to a hole

re,ected and called for book,+ the book ceaselessly beg$n and taken $! again on a site which is neither in the book nor o$tside it, artic$lating itself as the very o!ening which is reflection witho$t e4it, referral, ret$rn, and deto$r of the labyrinth. The latter is a way which encloses in itself the

throu h the wall at its base" .ou ho!e to esca!e, like a rat" 0ike shadows,

ways o$t of itself, which incl$des its own e4its, which itself o!ens its own
doors, that is to say, o!ening the" onto itself, closes itself by thinking its own o!ening. This contradiction is tho$ght as s$ch in the third book of /$estions. This is why tri!licity is its fig$re and the key to its serenity. To its co"!osition, too' the third book says,
I am the first book in the second" &nd .ukel said, )hree 1uestions have seduced the book and three 1uestions will finish it" )hat which ends three times be ins" )he book is three" )he world is three &nd God, for man, the three answers"

in the wall
so narrow that you never could have otten into it to flee" Beware of dwellin s" )hey are not always hos!itable"

The strange serenity of s$ch a ret$rn. :endered ho!eless by re!etition, and yet ,oyo$s for having affir"ed the abyss, for having inhabited the labyrinth as a !oet, for having written the hole, +the chance for a book+ into which one can only !l$nge, and that one "$st "aintain while destroying it. The dwelling is inhos!itable beca$se it sed$ces $s, as does the book, into a labyrinth. The labyrinth, here is an abyss' we !l$nge into the hori.ontality of a !$re s$rface, which itself re!resents itself fro" deto$r to deto$r.
)he book is the labyrinth" .ou think you have left it, you are !lun ed into it" .ou have no chance to et away" .ou must destroy the work" .ou cannot resolve yourself to do so" I notice the slow but sure rise of your an uish" 7all after wall" 7ho waits for you at the end5<%o one"""" .our name has folded over on itself,

Three' not beca$se the e/$ivocality, the d$!licity of everything and nothing, of absent !resence, of the black s$n, of the o!en ring, of the el$ded center, of the elli!tical ret$rn, finally wo$ld be s$""ari.ed and red$ced in so"e dialectic, in so"e conciliating final ter". The !as and the !acte of which >$kel s!eaks at Midnight or the third /$estion, are another na"e for the death affir"ed since Dawn or the first /$estion and Midday or the second /$estion.
&nd .ukel said, -)he book has led from death to death,

!e

like the hand on the white ar".

from dawn to twili ht,

In the serenity of this third vol$"e, The Eook of L$estions is f$lfilled. &$lfilled as it sho$ld be, by re"aining o!en, by !rono$ncing nonclos$re, si"$ltaneo$sly infinitely o!en and infinitely reflecting on itself, +an eye in

;,G W2I0IN1

;ND DI,,/2/N6/

with your shado* >avec ton ombre?, &arah, within the nu!ber >dans le nombre', 'ukel, at the end of !y questions, at the foot of the three

questions ... #eath is at the da*n because everything has begun *ith repetition. =nce the center or the origin have begun by repeating themselves, by redoubling themselves, the double did not only add itself to the simple. 4t divided it and supplemented it. (here *as immediately a double origin plus its repetition. (hree is the first figure of repetition. (he last too, for the abyss of representation al*ays remains dominated by its rhythm, infinitely. (he infinite is doubtless neither one, nor empty, nor innumerable. 4t is of a ternary essence. (*o, li0e the second /oo0 of questions "(he /oo0 of Fu0el', li0e Fu0el, remains the indispensable and useless articulator of the boo0, the sacrificed mediator *ithout *hich triplicity *ould not be, and *ithout *hich meaning *ould not be *hat it is, that is to say, different from itself5 in play, at sta0e. (o articulate is to oint. =ne could say of the second boo0 *hat is said of Fu0el in the second part of the 2eturn to the boo05
-8e was liana and lierne in the boo0, before being eGpelled fro! it.-

NOTES

@or abbreviations used in text and notes, see chapter ., note 1L chapter &, note G8 chapter ,, note 38 and chapter %, note &. (ranslator's notes are indicated at the beginning of each such note by the abbrevation (N. (ranslator's interpolations in author's notes are enclosed in brac0ets.
1B @=2C6 -N# !49N4@4C-(4=N

4f nothing has preceded repetition, if no present has 0ept *atch over the trace, if, after a fashion, it is the "void *hich reempties itself and mar0s itself *ith imprints," . then the time of *riting no longer follo*s the line of modified present tenses. :hat is to come is not a future present, yesterday is not a past present. (he beyond of the closure of the boo0 is neither to be a*aited nor to be refound. 4t is there, but out there, beyond, *ithin repetition, but eluding us there. 4t is there li0e the shado* of the boo0, the third party bet*een the hands holding the boo0, the deferral *ithin the no* of *riting, the distance bet*een the boo0 and the boo0, that other hand. =pening the third part of the third /oo0 of Muestions, thus begins the song on distance and accent5 -#o!orrow is the shado* and refleGibility of our hands.+eb #erissa

4n L%univers i!aginaire de Fallar!e "Paris5 6ditions du !euil, $%&$, p. ;A, n. 3,', Dean-Pierre 2ichard *rites5 ":e *ould be content if our *or0 could provide some ne* materials for a future history of imagination and affectivity8 this history, not yet *ritten for the nineteenth century, *ould probably be an extension of the *or0s of Dean 2ousset on the /aroque, Paul 1aBard on the eighteenth century, -ndre 7onglond on preromanticism." 3. 4n his *nthropology "Ne* For05 1arcourt, /race and :orld, $%.G, p. ;3+' -. ). Iroeber notes5 "'!tructure' appears to be ust a yielding to a *ord that has a perfectly good meaning but suddenly becomes fashionably attractive for a decade or so-li0e 'streamlining'-and during its vogue tends to be applied indiscriminately because of the pleasurable connotations of its sound." (o grasp the profound necessity hidden beneath the incontestable phenomenon of fashion, it is first necessary to operate negatively5 the
1<

4ll

c +ice +f a 7+rd is first an ense(!'e-a structura' ense(!'e) +f c+urse-+f eJc'usi+ns< 0+ "n+7 7 . +ne sa.s EstructureE is t+ "n+7 7 . +ne n+ '+nger 7is es t+ say eidos, Eessence)E f+r() 1esta't) Eense(!'e)E Ec+(%+siti+n)E Ec+(%'eJ)E Ec+nstructi+n)E Ec+rre'ati+n)E Et+ta'it.)E EIdea)E E+rganis()E Estate)E Es.ste()E etc< =ne (ust understand n+t +n'. 7 . eac +f t ese 7+rds s +7ed itse'f t+ !e insufficient !ut a's+ 7 . t e n+ti+n +f structure c+ntinues t+ !+rr+7 s+(e i(%'icit significati+n fr+( t e( and t+ !e in a!ited !. t e(< 0N< 0 e (+st c+nsistent'. difficu't secti+ns +f Derrida>s teJts are is E%refat+r.E re(ar"s) f+r reas+ns t at e as eJ%'ained in E?+rs-'i:re)E t e %reface t+ /a dissemination (*arisB Seui') 1-72#< 0 e questi+n inges u%+n t e c'assica' difference !et7een a % i'+s+% ica' teJt and its %reface) t e %reface usua''. !eing a reca%itu'ati+n +f t e trut %resented !. t e teJt< Since Derrida c a''enges t e n+ti+n t at a te1t can $resent a trut ) is %refaces-in 7 ic t is c a''enge is antici%ated(ust es%ecia''. (ar" t at 7 ic (a"es a teJt eJ%'+de t e c'assica' ideas +f trut and %resence< ;nd t e. (ust d+ s+ 7it +ut 'etting t e %reface antici%ate t is Ec+nc'usi+nE as a sing'e) c'ear) 'u(in+us trut < 0 us t e com$lication +f t ese %refaces< =ne 7a. +f c+(%'icating a %reface is t+ 'ea:e as a "n+t t at 7 ic 7i'' 'ater !ec+(e se:era' strands< ?ere) t e re'ati+ns i% !et7een ist+r.) s+(na(!u'is() t e Equesti+nE and t e difference !et7een a'(+st-e:er.t ing and a'(+stn+t ing is n+t eJ%'ained) f+r t e unra:e'ing +f t is questi+n t+uc es at 'east +n t e t+%ics +f t e re'ati+ns i% !et7een ist+r. and % i'+s+% . (cf< !e'+7) EAi+'ence and &eta% .sicsE#) and t e re'ati+n +f !+t +f t ese) as 7riting +r teJts) t+ ,reud>s ana'.sis +f t e EteJt +f s+(na(!u'is()E i<e<) The inter$retation of 3reams (cf< !e'+7) E,reud and t e Scene +f WritingE#< =n t e t e(e +ft e se$aration +f t e 7riter) cf) %articu'ar'. c a%ter 3 +f Jean 2+usset>s intr+ducti+n +f is 4orme et "ignification! De'acr+iJ) Dider+t) Ba'Mac) Baude'aire) &a''ar(e) *r+ust) Aa'er.) ?enr. Ja(es) 0< S< /'i+t) Airginia W++'f are ca''ed u%+n t+ !ear 7itness t+ t e fact

d0ecrivain (*arisB Seui') 1-63#< ;ttenti:e t+ t e fact t at t e critic ta"es is

(ateria' fr+( t e 7+r" rat er t an !ringing an.t ing t+ it) ,'au!ert 7ritesB E=ne 7rites criticis( 7 en +ne cann+t create art) Gust as +ne !ec+(es a s%. 7 en +ne cann+t !e a s+'dier <<<< *'autus 7+u'd a:e 'aug ed at ;rist+t'e ad e "n+7n i(N 6+rnei''e resisted i( a'' e c+u'dN A+'taire i(se'f 7as !e'itt'ed !. B+i'eauN We 7+u'd a:e !een s%ared (uc e:i' in (+dern dra(a 7it +ut Sc 'ege'< ;nd 7 en t e trans'ati+n +f ?ege' is finis ed) 5+rd "n+7s 7 ere 7e 7i'' end u%NE (B+''e(e) %< 42#< 0 e trans'ati+n +f ?ege' asn>t !een finis ed) t an" t e 5+rd) t us eJ%'aining *r+ust) J+.ce) ,au'"ner and se:era' +t ers< 0 e difference !et7een &a''ar(e and t ese aut +rs is %er a%s t e reading +f ?ege'< =r t at &a''ar(e c +se) at 'east) t+ a%%r+ac ?ege'< In an. e:ent) genius sti'' as s+(e res%ite) and trans'ati+ns can !e 'eft unread< But ,'au!ert 7as rig t t+ fear ?ege'B E=ne (a. 7e'' +%e t at art 7i'' c+ntinue t+ ad:ance and %erfect itse'f) !ut its f+r( as ceased t+ !e t e ig est need +f t e s%irit< In a'' t ese re'ati+ns i%s art is and re(ains f+r us) +n t e side +f its ig est :+cati+n) s+(et ing %astE (EA+r'esungen u!er die ;est eti")E in &artin ?eideggerB 5oetry, /ang age, 0 +ug t) trans< ;'!ert ?+fstadter KNe7 D+r"B ?ar%er and 2+7) 1-71I#< 0 e citati+n c+ntinuesB EIt KartI as '+st) f+r us) its trut and its 'ife< It in:ites us t+ a % i'+s+% ica' ref'ecti+n 7 ic d+es n+t insure it an. rene7a') !ut rig+r+us'. rec+gniMes its essence<E 5< 2ic ard) /0 nivers imaginaire de -allarme, %< 14< 6< 6f< 1erard 1enette) E9ne %+etique structura'e)E Tel 6 el, n+< 7) ;utu(n 1-61) %< 13< 7< 6f< Jean 2+usset) 5a litterat re de loge baro7 e en 4rance, :+'< 1B 8irce et le

$aon (*arisB J+se 6+rti) 1-54#< In %articu'ar) t e f+''+7ing %assage a %r+%+s

+f a 1er(an eJa(%'e) can !e readB E?e'' is a 7+r'd in %ieces) a %i''age t at t e %+e( i(itates c'+se'. t r+ug its dis+rdered s +uts) !rist'ing 7it scattered t+rtures in a t+rrent +f eJc'a(ati+ns< 0 e sentence is reduced t+ its dis+rdered e'e(ents) t e fra(e7+r" +f t e s+nnet is !r+"enB t e 'ines are t++ s +rt +r t++ '+ng) t e quatrains un!a'ancedL t e %+e( !urstsE (i!id<) %< 1-4#< $< 0N< 0 e %'a. is +n t e et.(+'+g. +f t e 7+rd critic, 7 ic c+(es fr+( t e 1ree" :er! krinein, (eaning !+t Et+ se%arate) t+ cut int+E and Et+ discern) t+ Gudge<E -< Jean 2+usset) 4orme et "ignification: +ssais sur 'es str ct res litteraires de :orneille d :laudel (*arisB J+se 6+rti) 1-62#<
10< ;fter citing (i!id<) %< :ii# t is %assage +f *ic+nB EBef+re (+dern art) t e

4< t at se%arati+n is dia(etrica''. +%%+sed t+ critica' i(%+tenc.< B. insisting u%+n t is se%arati+n !et7een t e critica' act and creati:e f+rce) 7e are +n'. designating t e (+st !ana''. essentia'-+t ers (ig t sa.) structura'-necessit. attac ed t+ t ese t7+ acti+ns and (+(ents< I(%+tence) ere) is a %r+%ert. n+t +f t e critic !ut +f criticis(< 0 e t7+ are s+(eti(es c+nfused< ,'au!ert d+es n+t den. i(se'f t is c+nfusi+n< 0 is is !r+ug t t+ 'ig t in t e ad(ira!'e c+''ecti+n +f 'etters edited !. 1ene:ie:e B+''e(e and entit'ed 5reface d la vie

7+r" see(s t+ !e t e eJ%ressi+n +f a %re:i+us eJ%erience <<<< t e

3$2 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 6-7 7+r" sa.s 7 at as !een c+ncei:ed +r seenL s+ (uc s+ t at fr+( t e eJ%erience t+ t e 7+r" t ere is +n'. t e transiti+n t+ t e tec niques +f eJecuti+n< ,+r (+dern art t e 7+r" is n+t eJ%ressi+n !ut creati+nB it (a"es :isi!'e 7 at 7as n+t :isi!'e !ef+re it) it f+r(s instead +f ref'ect i(%+rtant difference and) in +ur e.es) an i(%+rtant c+nquest +f (+dern art) or rather of the c+nsci+usness of the creative process achieved by this art !!!" ((. scious today +f t e creative process in general). ,+r *ic+n) t e (utati+n affects art and n+t +n'. t e (+dern c+nsci+usness +f art< ?e 7r+te e'se7 ereB E0 e ist+r. +f (+dern %+etr. is entire'. t at +f t e su!stituti+n +f a 'anguage +f creati+n f+r a 'anguage +f eJ%ressi+n <<<< 5anguage (ust n+7 %r+duce t e 7+r'd t at it can n+ '+nger eJ%ressE (#ntrod ction d ne estheti7 e de la #itterat re, :+'< 1: /0ecrivain et son ombre K*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-531) *< 1-5#< 11 :ritique of Pure +eason, trans'ated !. N+r(an 4e(% S(it (5+nd+nB &ac(i''an and 6+<) 1-2-#< 0 e teJts +f 4ant t+ 7 ic 7e 7i'' referand nu(er+us +t er teJts 7 ic 7e 7i'' ca'' u%+n 'ater-are n+t uti'iMed !. 2+usset< It 7i'' !e +ur ru'e t+ refer direct'. t+ t e %age nu(!ers +f 4orme et "ignification eac ti(e t at a citati+n %resented !. 2+usset is in questi+n< 12< I!id< 13< The :ritique ofIudg!ent, trans< Ja(es 6reed &eridit (5+nd+nB =Jf+rd 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-52#) %< 212< 14< I!id<) %< 176< 15< I!id<) %< $$< 16< I!id<) %< 43< &9! :ritique of Pure +eason. 1$< 0N< =n t e n+n(eta% +ricit. +f t e :er! to be and t e % i'+s+% ica' i(%'icati+ns +f tracing a 7+rd>s genea'+g. t r+ug its et.(+'+g.) cf< EAi+'ence and &eta% .sics)E III) 1) B) and E=f =nt+'+gica' Ai+'ence<E In questi+n is t e n+ti+n +f (eta% +r) 7 ic i(%'ies t e transfer +ft e na(e +f a t ing t+ an+t er t ing 7it a different na(e< In a sense) an. a%%'icati+n +f a na(e t+ a t ing is a'7a.s (eta% +rica') and f+r (an. % i'+s+% ies (e<g<) t +se +f 2+usseau and 6+ndi''ac# (eta% +r is t e +rigin +f 'anguage< 0 e questi+n) t en) is 7 et er t ere is an origin +f (eta% +r) an a!s+'ute'. n+n(eta% +rica' c+nce%t) as) f+r eJa(%'e) t e :er! to be, +r t e n+ti+n +f !reat ing) f+r 7 ic NietMsc e sa.s t e n+ti+n +f Being is a (eta% +r (in ,reek 5hiloso$hy d ring the Tragic ;ge#< If it c+u'd !e s +7n t at t ere is n+ a!s+'ute +rigin +f (eta% +r)

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 7-- 3$3

t e se%arati+n +r s%ace i(%'ied in (eta% +r as transfer 7+u'd !ec+(e %r+!'e(atica') as it 7+u'd t en !e n+nreduci!'e< 1- 0N< 0 e reference is t+ Descartes) f+r 7 +( e:er.t ing %ercei:ed c'ear'. and distinct'. ad t+ !e s+(et ing understanda!'e) c+u'd n+t !e n+t ing< 6f< Feditations. 20< 6ited !. &aurice B'anc +t in /0Arche, n+s) 27-2$ (;ugust-Se%te(!er) 1-4$#) %< 133< Is n+t t e sa(e situati+n descri!ed in (0#ntrod ction d la !ethode de /eonard de :inci? 21 Is it n+t c+nstituted !. t is require(entO Is it n+t a "ind +f %ri:i'eged re%resentati+n +f Inscri%ti+nO 22< 0N< 0 e %'a. is +n t e et.(+'+g. +f ang ish, fr+( t e 5atin ang stia, (eaning narr+7ness +r distress< 23< ;'s+) t e anguis +f a !reat t at cuts itse'f +ff in +rder t+ reenter itse'f) t+ as%irate itse'f and return t+ its +rigina' s+urce< Because t+ s%ea" is t+ "n+7 t at t +ug t m st !ec+(e a'ien t+ itse'f in +rder t+ !e %r+n+unced and t+ a%%ear< It 7is es) t en) t+ ta"e itse'f !ac" !. +ffering itse'f< 0 is is 7 . +ne senses t e gesture +f7it dra7a') +f reta"ing %+ssessi+n +f t e eJ a'ed 7+rd) !eneat t e 'anguage +f t e aut entic 7riter) t e 7riter 7 + 7is es t+ (aintain t e greatest %r+Ji(it. t+ t e +rigin +f is act< 0 is t++ is ins%irati+n< =ne can sa. +f +rigina' 'anguage 7 at ,euer!ac sa.s +f % i'+s+% ica' 'anguageB E* i'+s+% . e(erges fr+( (+ut +r %en +n'. in +rder t+ return i((ediate'. t+ its %r+%er so rce; it d+es n+t s%ea" f+r t e %'easure +f s%ea"ing-7 ence its anti%at . f+r fine % rases-!ut in +rder n+t t+ s%ea") in +rder t+ think !!!! 0+ de(+nstrate is si(%'. t+ s +7 t at 7 at I sa. is trueL si(%'. t+ gras% +nce (+re t e a'ienati+n (+nta sser ng* +f t +ug t at t e original so rce +f t +ug t< 0 us t e significati+n +f t e de(+nstrati+n cann+t !e c+ncei:ed 7it +ut reference t+ t e significati+n +f 'anguage< 5anguage is n+t ing +t er t an t e reali)ation ofthe s$ecies, t e (ediati+n !et7een t e I and t e t +u 7 ic is t+ re%resent t e unit. +f t e s%ecies !. (eans +f t e su%%ressi+n (A fheb ng* +f t eir indi:idua' is+'ati+n< 0 is is why t e e'e(ent +f s%eec is air) t e (+st s%iritua' and (+st uni:ersa' :ita' (ediu(E (< r Jritik der 8egelschen Philosophie, 1$3-) in 5< ,euer!ac ) "amtliche "erke, :+'< 2 KStuttgart Bad 6anstatt) 1-5-1) ** 16--70#< But did ,euer!ac (use u%+n t e fact t at va$ori)ed 'anguage f+rgets itse'fO 0 at air is n+t t e e'e(ent in 7 ic ist+r. de:e'+%s if it d+es n+t rest (itse'f# +n eart O ?ea:.) seri+us) s+'id eart < 0 e eart t at is 7+r"ed u%+n) scratc ed) 7ritten u%+n< 0 e n+ 'ess uni:ersa' e'e(ent in 7 ic (eaning is engra:ed s+ t at it 7i'' 'ast<

3$4 N=0/S 0= *;1/S --10 ?ege' 7+u'd !e +f (+re assistance ere< ,+r e:en t +ug e t++) in a s%iritua' (eta% +riMati+n +f natura' e'e(ents) t in"s t at Eair is t e unc anging fact+r) %ure'. uni:ersa' and trans%arentL 7ater) t e rea'it.> t at is f+re:er !eing res+':ed and gi:en u%L fire) t eir ani(ating unit.) e ne:ert e'ess %+sits t at Eeart is t e tig t'. c+(%act "n+t +f t is articu'ated 7 +'e) t e su!Gect in 7 ic t ese rea'ities are, 7 ere t eir %r+cesses ta"e effect) t at 7 ic t e. start fr+( and t+ 7 ic t e. returnE (Pheno!enology of the Find, trans< J< B< Bai''ie K5+nd+nB 1e+rge ;''en 3 9n7in) 1-31I) *< 51$< 0 e %r+!'e( +f t e re'ati+n !et7een 7riting and t e eart is a's+ t at +f t e %+ssi!i'it. +f suc a (eta% +riMati+n +f t e e'e(ents< =f its +rigin and (eaning< 0N< 0 e ?e!re7 rush, 'i"e t e 1ree" $ne ma, (eans !+t 7ind +r !reat and s+u' +r s%irit< =n'. in 1+d are !reat and s%irit) s%eec and t +ug t) a!s+'ute'. identica'L (an can a'7a.s !e du%'icit+us) is s%eec can !e +t er t an is t +ug t< 25< 1< W< 5ei!niM) #heodicy$

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 10-14 3$5

d+es (+re t an f+rete'' t e (+st a%%arent'. +rigina' t e(es +f E(+de(E aest etics< *articu'ar'. t r+ug a certain anti-*'at+nis( 7 ic d+es n+t eJc'ude) as 6angui' e( de(+nstrates) a %r+f+und a''iance 7it *'at+) !e.+nd *'at+nis( Eunderst++d 7it +ut (a'ice<E 30< 0N< ;cc+rding t+ 5ei!niM) eac (+nad-t e s%iritua' (n+n(ateria'# !ui'ding !'+c"s +f t e uni:erse-is t e re%resentati+n +f t e entire uni:erse as %re+rdained !. 1+d< 6f< -onadology! 31< &aurice &er'eau-*+nt.) E;n 9n%u!'is ed 0eJt)E trans< ;r'een B< Ba''er.) in #he Primacy of Perception, ed< Ja(es &< /die (/:anst+nB N+rt 7estern 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-64#) %%< $--< 0 e teJt 7as first %u!'is ed in t e +evue de !etaphysique et de !orale, =ct+!er-Dece(!er) 1-62< 32< E*r+!'e(es actue's de 'a % en+(en+'+gie)E in *ctes du colloque inter/ rationale de phtno!=nologie (*aris) 1-52#) *< -7< 33< Saint J+ n 6 r.s+st+() 8o!ilies on the 5ospel of

Saint Matthew,

Essays on the 5oodness of 5od, the 1reedo! of M a n , and the Origin of Evil, trans< /< &< ?uggard (Ne7 ?a:enB
Da'e 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-52#) %%< 370-72< K;t issue again is t e distincti+n !et7een t e di:ine and t e u(an) t e B++" and !++"s< ,+r 5ei!niM) 1+d>s t +ug t is is acti+n and e is n+t in t e 7+r'dL !ut f+r (an) 7 +se acti+n is 'i(ited !ut 7 +se t +ug ts are n+t) !eing in t e 7+r'd (eans t at e (ust a'7a.s c ++se !et7een a'ternati:es< &an>s 7i'') t e %+7er t+ c ++se !et7een a'ternati:es as a functi+n +f t eir (erits) i(%'ies t at e is finite) t at is acti+ns d+ n+t a'7a.s equa' is t +ug t< 1+d is infinite beca se is t +ug t and is acti+n are c+eJtensi:e) !ecause e is eJtra7+r'd'.) transcendent<-0rans<I

26< Ste% ane &a''ar(e) &elected Poe!s, =ssays and Letters, trans< Bradf+rd 6++" (Ba'ti(+reB J+ ns ?+%"ins 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-56#) %- 15< 27< E < < < ; i''u(iner ceci-que) %'us +u (+ins) t+us 'es 'i:res c+ntiennent au (+nde sa '+i-!i!'e c+((e 'a si(u'ent 'es nati+ns< 5a difference) d>un +u:rage

a I>autre) +ffrant autant de 'e4+ns %r+%+sees c'ans un))

i((ense c+unc+urs %+ur 'e teJte :eridique) entre 'es ages Bits ci:i'ises-+u 'ettres<E I!id<) %%< 41-42< during t e &idd'e ;ges< 2-< E2ef'eJi+ns sur 'a creati+n artistique se'+n ;'ain)E +evue de !etaphy sique et de !orale, ;%ri'-June 1-52) %<171< 0 is ana'.sis (a"es e:identL t at t e &yste!e des beauG/arts, 7ritten during t e ,irst W+r'd War,,

1+ +f t e &elect Library of the Hicene and Post/Hicene 1athers of the :hristian :hurch, ed< * i'i% Sc aff (1rand 2a%idsB Wi''ia( B< /erd(an) 1-56#) %< )< 34< 0N< In is trans'ati+n +f t e ='d 0esta(ent) Bu!er atte(%ted t+ rest+re as (uc as %+ssi!'e t e %+'.se(antic structure +f certain "e. 7+rds u%+n 7 ic e !ased is inter%retati+ns< Derrida ere is atte(%ting t+ eJa(ine t e %resu%%+siti+ns +f c+nstruing certain 7+rds +r ideas as t e s+urce +f t e %'a. +f difference i(%'ied in 'inguistic (u'ti:a'ence< 0 e idea t at see(s t+ su%%+rt t e neJt fe7 sentences (in t e teJt# is t at if t ere is n+ s+urce +fEBeing)E EBeingE (ust t en !e underst++d 'i"e a ga(e) t at is) +n'. in functi+n +f itse'f< 5anguage 7+u'd t en (+st accurate'. Ea%%r+Ji(ateE Being 7 en it) t++) functi+ns +n'. in re'ati+n t+ itse'f-E%+etr.E-7it +ut atte(%ting t+ adequate itse'f t+ an. %articu'ar eJistent< =ne c+u'd t en !e 'ed t+ s%ea" +f 'anguage as a:ing n+ reference t+ signified (eanings !ut rat er as creating t ese (eanings t r+ug t e %'a. +f signifiers< 0 e signifier is a'7a.s t at 7 ic is inscri!ed +r 7ritten< 35< 0N< ,initudeB e(%iricit. and ist+ricit.< Derrida>s :+ca!u'ar. ere is ?eideggerean-7 ic is n+t t+ sa. t at e is si(%'. ad+%ting ?eidegger>s ideas) !ut is rat er gradua''. %utting ?eidegger int+ questi+n< 0+ suggest t at t e idden essence +f t e e(%irica' is ist+ricit.) t+ dea' 7it affecti:it. as t e indeJ +f finitude-t ese are a'' ?eideggerean t e(es re'ated t+ t e %r+!'e( +f transcendence as discussed at 'engt ) and unre%r+duci!'.) in ?eideggei s Jant and the @uestion of Fetaphysics, trans< Ja(es S< 6 urc i'' (B'++(ingt+nB Indiana 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-62#<

vol.

3$6 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 1 4 - 2 2 36< EBrief u!er den >?u(anis(us)> E in 'egmarken (,ran"furt) 1g67#)H %< 15$< 37< 2+usset) 4orme et "ignification, %< J:iii) E,+r t is :er. reas+n) 1e+rges 'anguage and in f+r(a' structuresL e sus%ects t e( +f >+!Gecti:it.>B t e critic runs t e ris" +f gras%ing t e( fr+( 7it +ut<E and s+ c+n:incing t at +ne (ust agree 7it i() regarding is +7n questi+ns< But in c+nf+r(it. 7it is +7n %ers%ecti:es) e is %ri(ari'. interested in t e t an in t e 7+r">s (+r% +'+g. and st.'e<E 3-< 1ueM de Ba'Mac) !++" $) 'etter 15< 40< Aauge'as) =em!, :+'< 2) %< i+i< 41< 6'aude 5e:i-Strauss) "tr ct ral Anthro$ology, trans< 6< Jac+!s+n and B< 1< Sc +e%f (Ne7 D+r"B Basic B++"s) 1-63#) *< 2$3< 1< W< 5ei!niM) 3isco rse on -eta$hysics, 8orres$ondence with Arna ld and -onadology, trans< 1e+rge 2< &+ntg+(er. (5aSa''e) I''<B =%en 6+urt *u!'is ing 6+<) 1-6$#) %%< 1$-1-< 42< t e essa.B E;n itinerar. and a (eta(+r% +sis) 7e said after t e ana'.sis +f t e first and fift acts) as c+ncerns t eir s.((etr. and +f 6+rnei''ean dra(aB t e (+:e(ent it descri!es is an ascending (+:e(ent t+7ard a center situated in infinit.<E (In t is s%atia' is) is n+t +n'. t e irreduci!'e s$ecificity +f t e E(+:e(ent)E !ut a's+ its 7 alitative s%ecificit.O# EIts nature can !e furt er s%ecified< ;n

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 22-2$ 3$7

46< 6f<) f+r eJa(%'e) &aurice 5een ardt) /0art oceanien: ,ens de la grarrde terre, $! --L D+ kamo, $$! 1--21< 47< 0N< I<e<) +f structure as a (eta% +r f+r '+ca'it.) site< 4$< 0N< 0 is is t e questi+n +f t e c'+sure +f (eta% .sics) f+r (eta% .s ics c+ntains e:er. disc+urse t at atte(%ts t+ e(erge fr+( it< ;cc+rding t+ Derrida) (eta% .sics can +n'. !e destr+.ed fr+( 7it in) !. (a"ing its +7n 'anguage-7 ic is t e +n'. 'anguage 7e a:e-7+r" against it< 4-< ?ere are se:era' f+r(u'ati+ns +f t is E%er(anent structureEB E7 ere is t e true %'a.O It is in t e su%eri(%+sing and inter7ea:ing +ft e t7+ 'e:e's) in t e se%arati+ns and eJc anges esta!'is ed !et7een t e() +ffering us t e su!t'e %'easure +f !in+cu'ar :ie7ing and d+u!'e readingE (2+usset) 4orme et "ignification, %< 56#< E,r+( t is %+int +f :ie7) a'' +f &ari:auJ>s %'a.s c+u'd !e defined as an +rganis( eJisting +n t7+ 'e:e's 7 +se designs gradua''. a%%r+ac unti' t e. are c+(%'ete'. G+ined< 0 e %'a. is +:er 7 en t e t7+ 'e:e's are indistinguis a!'e) t at is) 7 en t e gr+u% +f er+es 7atc ed !. t e s%ectat+rs sees itse'f as t e s%ectat+r-c aracters sa7 t e(< 0 e rea' res+'uti+n is n+t t e (arriage %r+(ised t+ us at t e fa'' +f t e curtain !ut t e enc+unter +f eart and :isi+nE (i!id<) %< 5$# EWe are in:ited t+ f+''+7 t e de:e'+%(ent +f t e %'a. in t7+ registers) 7 ic +ffer us t7+ %ara''e' cur:es t at are se%arated) +7e:er) different in t eir i(%+rtance) t eir 'anguage) and t eir functi+nB t e +ne ra%id'. s"etc ed) t e +t er fu''. dra7n in a'' its c+(%'eJit.) t e first 'etting us guess t e directi+n t at t e sec+nd 7i'' ta"e) t e sec+nd dee%'. ec +ing t e first) %r+:iding its definiti:e (eaning< 0 is %'a. +f interi+r ref'ecti+ns c+ntri!utes t+ t e i(%arting +f a rig+r+us and su%%'e ge+(etr. t+ &ari:auJ>s %'a.) 7 i'e at t e sa(e ti(e c'+se'. 'in"ing t e t7+ registers) e:en u% t+ t e (+:e(ents +f '+:eE (i!id<) %< 5-#< 5+< 0N< In t e 5henomenology ?ege' ta"es t e reader +n a E:+.age +f disc+:er.E t at ?ege' i(se'f as a'read. (ade< 0 e dia'ectica' turn ing %+ints +f t e 5henomenology are a'7a.s (ar"ed !. t e reader>s !eing !r+ug t t+ a %+int 7 ere e can gras% 7 at ?ege' as a'read. gras%ed) t e c+nce%t in questi+n !ec+(ing true Ef+r us)E t e distance !et7een su!Gect and +!Gect a:ing !een anni i'ated< ?ege' defines t e structure +f t e Phenomenology as circu'ar) a return t+ its %+int +f de%arture< 51< 6ited in 1or!e et &ignification, p. 1$-< ;nd 2+usset) in fact) c+((entsB EN+t is+'ated) suc a dec'arati+n is :a'id f+r a'' +rders +f rea'it.< /:er. t ing +!e.s t e 'a7 of com$osition, 7 ic is t e 'a7 +f t e artist as it is

+f t e eJ%ressi+n E!e.+nd t e %'a. itse'fOE# E <<< *au'ine and *+'. eac +t er and +n a ig er %'ane) in t e t ird act) +n'. t+ se%arate againL t e. c'i(! u% an+t er 'e:e' and reunite in t e fift act) t e in a fina' 'ea% 7 ic 7i'' unite t e( definiti:e'.) at t e su%re(e %+int +f freed+( and triu(% ) in 1+dE (2+usset) 4orme et "ignification, *< 6#< 44< 5ei!niM) 3isco rse on -eta$hysics, $! 10< 45< I!id<

3$$ N=0/S 0= *;1/S 2 $ - 3 2 +f t e 6reat+r< ,+r t e uni:erse is a si(u'taneit.) !. :irtue +f 7 ic t ings at a re(+:e fr+( eac +t er 'ead a c+ncerted eJistence and f+r( a ar(+nic s+'idarit.L t+ t e (eta% +r t at unites t e( c+rres%+nds) in t e re'ati+ns !et7een !eings) '+:e) t e 'in" !et7een se%arated s+u's< It is t us natura' f+r 6'aude'>s t +ug t t+ ad(it t at t7+ !eings se:ered fr+( eac +t er !. distance can !e c+nG+ined in t eir si(u'taneit.) encef+rt res+nating 'i"e t7+ n+tes +f a c +rd) 'i"e *r+u eMe and 2+drigue in t eir ineJtinguis a!'e re'ati+ns i%<E 52< Bergs+n) /ssai s r les donnees immediates de la conscience! 53< ,+r t e (an +f 'iterar. structura'is( (and %er a%s +f structura'is( in genera'#) t e 'etter +f !++"s-(+:e(ent) infinit.) 'a!i'it.) and insta!i'it. +f (eaning r+''ed u% in itse'f in t e 7ra%%ing) t e :+'u(e- as n+t .et re%'aced (!ut can it e:erO# t e 'etter +f t e f'attened) esta!'is ed 5a7B t e c+((and(ent +n t e 0a!'es< 54< =n t is Eidentificati+n 7it itse'fE +f t e &a''ar(ean !++") cf< Jacques Sc erer) /e 0/ivre0 de -allarmg, $! -5 and 'eaf -4) and %< 77 and 'ea:es 12--30<

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 32-36 3$-

7 et er e is c+ncerned 7it an aut +r ta"en !. i(se'f +r 7it an< is+'ated 7+r"< Is t ere +n'. +ne funda(enta' structure eac ti(eO ?+7 is it t+ !e rec+gniMed and gi:en its %ri:i'egeO 0 e criteri+n can !e essence< It is t e %r+!'e( +f inducti+n 7 ic %resents itse'f t+ a struts> tura'ist science c+ncerned 7it 7+r"s) t at is t+ sa.) 7it t ings 7 +se structure is n+t a%ri+rica'< Is t ere a (ateria' a %ri+ri +f t e 7+r"O But %r+!'e(s< 56< 0N< 0 is is a reference t+ 5e:inas and is atte(%ted %acificati+n +f % i'+s+% . t r+ug t e n+ti+n +f t e =t er as face< ,+r Derrida) * i' +s+% .) (eta% .sics) is irreduci!'. :i+'ent) %ractices an ec+n+(. :i+'ence< 6f< EAi+'ence and &eta% .sics<E t e Di+n.sian (scu'%tureP(usic) indi:iduati+nPunificati+n +f t e (an. 7it t e +ne) tranqui'it.P!acc ana'# in The Birt of Tragedy! 0N< 0 is eJ%'icati+n is t+ !e f+und in t e c a%ter +ft e 5henomenology entit'ed E,+rce and 9nderstanding<E 0 e tit'e +f t at c a%ter a'+neB de(+nstrates its re'ati+ns i% t+ t is essa.< 0N< 6f< a!+:e) n+te 1$< 0N< Derrida ere is s%ecif.ing se:era' c aracteristics +f (eta% .sics
I

7it +ut de(+nstrating t eir interre'atedness< 1< E?e'i+centric (eta% .sicsE refers t+ t e % i'+s+% ica' 'anguage f+unded +n (eta% +rs +f 'ig t and dar") e<g<) trut as 'ig t) err+r as dar") etc< 2< 0 is 'anguage a'7a.s i(%'ies a %ri:i'eged %+siti+n +f Eac+ustics)E i<e<) a %ri:i'ege acc+rded t+ a % +n+'+gica') s%+"en (+de' +f t e $resence +f trut in 'i:ing) s%+"en disc+urse) and a c+nc+(itant a!ase(ent +f t e si'ent 7+r" +f t e Ef+rceE +f differentiati+n< 0 is a!ase(ent is t.%ica''. re:ea'ed in t e % i'+s+% ica' treat(ent +f 7riting< 3< 0 is s.ste( is set in (+ti+n !. *'at+nis() 7 +se d+ctrine +f t e eidos i(%'ies !+t %+ints Gust (enti+ned< 61< ,riedric NietMsc e) The Twilight of the idols, trans'ated !. ;nt +n. &< 5ud+:ici (Ne7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64#) %< 67< 62< ,'au!ert) 5reface d la vie d0ecrivain, %< 111< 63< ,riedric NietMsc e) ENietMsc e c+ntra Wagner)E in The 8ase of 'agn e r , trans< ;nt +n. &< 5ud+:ici (Ne7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64# %< 116< KIn NietMsc e>s teJt t e ,renc is 'eft untrans'atedB E,'au!ert is a'7a.s des%ica!'e) t e (an is n+t ing) t e 7+r" e:er.t ing<EI It is n+t 7it +ut interest) %er a%s) t+ GuJta%+se t is !ar! +f NietMsc e>s 7it t e f+''+7ing %assage fr+( 4orme et "ignification: E,'au!ert>s c+rres%+ndence is %reci+us) !ut in ,'au!ert t e 'etter 7riter I cann+t find ,'au!ert t e n+:e'istL 7 en 1ide states t at e %refers t e f+r(er I a:e t e fee'ing t at e c ++ses t e 'esser ,'au!ert +r) at 'east) t e ,'au!ert t at t e n+:e'ist did e:er.t ing t+ e'i(inateE (2+usset) %< JJ#< 64< NietMsc e) The Twilight of the #dols, %< 5-< 65< I!id<) %< 6< 66< ,riedric NietMsc e) Th s "$ake Qarat rustra) trans< 0 +(as 6+((+n (Ne7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64#) %< 23-< 67< I!id<) %< 242< s'ig t'. (+dified<

o$"

LB2B 6=1I0= ;ND 0?/ ?IS0=2D =, &;DN/SS 1 Wit t e eJce%ti+n +f se:era' n+tes and a s +rt %assage (in !rac"ets#) t is %a%er is t e re%r+ducti+n +f a 'ecture gi:en 4 &arc 1-63 at t e 6+''ege * i'+s+% ique< In %r+%+sing t at t is teJt !e %u!'is ed in t e =ev e de meta$hysi7 e et de morale, &< Jean Wa ' agreed t at it s +u'd retain its first f+r() t at +f t e s%+"en 7+rd) 7it a'' its require(ents and) es%ecia''.) its %articu'ar 7ea"nessesB if in genera') acc+rding t+ t e re(ar" in t e * aedrus) t e 7ritten 7+rd is de%ri:ed +f Et e assistance +f its fat er)E if it is a fragi'e Eid+'E fa''en fr+( E'i:ing and ani(ated disc+urseE una!'e t+ E e'% itse'f)E t en is it n+t (+re eJ%+sed

5-<
I%

3-0 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 36-3and disar(ed t an e:er 7 en) (i(ing t e i(%r+:isati+n +f t e :+ice) it (ust gi:e u% e:en t e res+urces and 'ies +f st.'eO 2< &ic e' ,+ucau't) 4iche et deraison: 2istoire de la folie a 5age classi7 e (*arisB *'+n) 1-61#L trans< 2ic ard ?+7ard -adness and 8ivili)ation: A 2istory of #nsanity in the Age of =eason (Ne7 D+r"B *ant e+n) 1-65#< K?+7ard as trans'ated t e a!ridged :ersi+n +f ,+ucau't>s !++"< W ene:er %+ssi!'e I a:e used ?+7ard>s trans'ati+ns +f %assages cited !. Derrida) ;'' n+nf++tn+ted trans'ati+ns +f ,+ucau't are (. +7n<I In 0 e #nter$retation of 3reams (trans< and ed< Ja(es Strac e. in The "tandard +dition of the 8om$lete 5sychological W+r"s of "igm nd 4re d, :+'< 3< 4 5+nd+nB ?+gart *ress) 1-55) %< --) n<1#) s%ea"ing +f t e 'in" !et7een drea(s and :er!a' eJ%ressi+n) ,reud reca''s ,erencMi>s re(ar" t at e:er. 'anguage as its +7n drea( 'anguage< 0 e 'atent c+ntent +f a drea( (and +f an. !e a:i+r +r c+nsci+usness in genera'# c+((unicates 7it t e (anifest c+ntent +n'. t r+ug t e unit. +f a 'anguage-a 'anguage t at t e ana'.st (ust t us s%ea" as 7e'' as %+ssi!'e< (=n t is su!Gect cf< Danie' 5agac e) ESur 'e %+'.g'+ttis(e dans (>ana'.se)E in /a $sychanalyse, :+'< 1 K*arisB 1-56I) %%< 167-7$<# ;s well as

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 3--55 3-1

$ossible: %r+gress in t e "n+7'edge and %ractice +f a 'anguage !eing !.

nature infinite'. +%en (first !. :irtue +f t e +rigina' and essentia' equi:+ca'it. +f t e signifier) at 'east in t e 'anguage +f Ee:er.da. 'ife)E its indeter(inateness and %'a.ing-s%ace !eing %recise'. t at 7 ic 'i!erates t e difference !et7een idden and stated (eaningL t en) !. :irtue +f t e +rigina' and essentia' c+((unicati+n !et7een different 'anguages t r+ug +ut ist+r.L finally, !. :irtue +f t e %'a.) t e re'ati+n t+ itse'f) +r Esedi(entati+n)E +f e:er. 'anguage#) are n+t t e insecurities and insufficiencies +f ana'.sis aJi+(atic +r irreduci!'eO ;nd d+es n+t t e ist+rian +f % i'+s+% .) 7 ate:er is (et +d +r %r+Gect) a!and+n i(se'f t+ t e sa(e dangersO /s%ecia''. if +ne ta"es int+ acc+unt a certain e(!edding +f % i'+s+% ica' 'anguage in n+n% i'+s+% ica' 'anguage< 0 at a'' ist+r. can +n'. !e) in t e 'ast ana'.sis) t e ist+r. +f (eaning) t at 4< is) +f 2eas+n in genera') is 7 at ,+ucau't c+u'd n+t fai' t+ eJ%erience-7e s a'' c+(e t+ t is in a (+(ent< W at e c+u'd n+t fai' t+ eJ%erience is t at t e genera' (eaning +f a difficu't. e attri!utes t+ t e Ec'assica' eJ%erienceE is :a'id 7e'' !e.+nd t e Ec'assica' age<E 6f<) f+r eJa(%'eB E;nd 7 en it 7as a questi+n) in see"ing it in its (+st 7it dra7n essence) +f %ee'ing it a7a. t+ its 'ast structure) 7e 7+u'd disc+:er) in +rder t+ f+r(u'ate it) +n'. t e very lang age of reason

e(%'+.ed in t e i(%ecca!'e '+gic +f de'iriu(L %recise'. t at 7 ic (ade it accessi!'e c+unterfeited it as (adness<E 0 e :er. 'anguage +f reas+n <<< !ut 7 at is a 'anguage t at 7+u'd n+t !e +ne +f reas+n in general? ;nd if t ere is n+ ist+r.) eJce%t +f rati+na'it. and (eaning in genera') t is (eans t at % i'+s+% ica' 'anguage) as s++n as it s%ea"s) rea%%r+%riates negati:it.-+r f+rgets it) 7 ic is t e sa(e t inge:en 7 en it a''eged'. affir(s +r rec+gniMes negati:it.< &+re sure'. t en) %er a%s< 0 e ist+r. +f trut is t eref+re t e ist+r. +f t is economy +f t e negati:e< It is necessar.) and it is %er a%s ti(e t+ c+(e !ac" t+ t e a ist+rica' in a sense radica''. +%%+sed t+ t at +f c'assica' % i'+s+% .B n+t t+ (isc+nstrue negati:it.) !ut t is ti(e t+ affir( itsi'ent'.< It is negati:it. and n+t %+siti:e trut t at is t e n+n ist+rica' ca%ita' +f ist+r.< In questi+n t en 7+u'd !e a negati:it. s+ negati:e t at it c+u'd n+t e:en !e ca''ed suc an. '+nger< Negati:it. as a'7a.s !een deter(ined !. dia'ectics-t at is t+ sa.) !. (eta% .sics-as work in t e ser:ice +f t e c+nstituti+n +f (eaning< 0+ affir( negati:it. in si'ence is t+ gain access t+ a n+nc'assica' t.%e +f diss+ciati+n !et7een t +ug t and 'anguage< ;nd %er a%s t+ a diss+ciati+n +f t +ug t and % i'+s+% . as disc+urse) if 7e are c+nsci+us +f t e fact t at t is sc is( cann+t !e enunciated) t ere!. erasing itse'f) eJce%t 7it in % i'+s+% .< 5< ,+ucau't) 4olic et deraison, %%< J-Ji< KI a:e (+dified ?+7ard>s trans'ati+n +f t is sentence t+ inc'ude t e E+nE 7 +se d+u!'e sense 7as %'a.ed u%+n a!+:e) %< 34<I 6< 0N< I a:e c+nsistent'. trans'ated oe vre as E7+r"E t r+ug +ut t is essa. t+ a:+id c+nfusi+ns t at c+u'd !e caused !. trans'ating it as E7+r" +f art)E as ?+7ard d+es< 0+ trans'ate ,+ucau't>s definiti+n +f (adness) c+((ented u%+n !. Derrida) as Et e a!sence +f t e 7+r" +f artE ((0absence d0oe vre* d+es n+t c+n:e. ,+ucau't>s sense +f t e a!sence +f a 7+r" g+:erned !. instituti+na'iMed rati+na'is(< 7< 0N< Derrida is (a"ing use +f t e fact t at t e 7+rd eloge (%raise# is deri:ed fr+( t e sa(e 7+rd as E'+g+s<E $< ,+ucau't) 4iche et deraison, %< Ji< -< 6f< a's+) f+r eJa(%'e) "ym$osi m 217eP21$!L 5haedr s 244!- cP245 aP 24-P265a ff<L Theatet s 257eL "o$hist 22$dP22-aL Time s >?b; =e$ blic 3$2cL /aws C $$$a< 10< 0N< 6f< n+te 7 a!+:e< 11< 0N< The 5hiloso$hical 'orks of 3escartes, trans'ated !. /'iMa!et S< ?a'dane and 1< 2< 0< 2+ss (6a(!ridgeB 0 e 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-70#) %< 146<

3-2 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 5 6- 6 5

12< 0N< I!id<) %< 146<

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 65-70 3-3

13< 0N< I!id<) **< 146-47< 14< 0N< I!id<) %< 145< 15< *adness, theme or inde+, 7 at is significant is t at Descartes) at !+ t+() ne:er s%ea"s +f (adness itse'f in t is teJt< &adness is n+t e%iste(+'+gica' :a'ue< It 7i'' !e said) %er a%s) t at t is is t e sign +f %r+f+und eJc'usi+n< But t is si'ence +n (adness itse'f si(u'tane+us' signifies t e +%%+site +f an eJc'usi+n) since it is not a 1uestion a madness in t is teJt) if +n'. t+ eJc'ude it< It is n+t in t e 'editations t a Descartes s%ea"s +f (adness itse'f< 7+u'd a:e t+ s%ecif. t at t e eJ%ressi+ns Esens+r. +r c+r%+rea' fau't> +r Ec+r%+rea' err+rE c+u'd a:e n+ (eaning f+r Descartes< 0 ere is n c+r%+rea' err+r) %articu'ar'. in i''nessB Gaundice +r (e'anc +'. are +n' t e occasions +f an err+r t at itse'f is !+rn +n'. 7it t e c+nsent o affir(ati+n +f t e 7i'' in Gudg(ent) 7 en E+ne 7 + is i'' 7it Gaundic Gudges e:er.t ing t+ !e .e''+7 !ecause is e.e is tinged 7it .e''+7< S fina''.) t++) 7 en t e i(aginati+n is diseased) as in cases +f (e'an c +'ia) and a (an t in"s t at is +7n dis+rder'. fancies re%resent rea

t e Sc ++'s (Rule ,ll$ and 7 ic (ust a's+ !e carefu''. distinguis ed fr+( t e Eter(s +f +rdinar. 'anguageE 7 ic a'+ne can Edecei:e usE '*editations II#< 22< 0 at is t+ sa.) as s++n as) (+re +r 'ess i(%'icit'.) Bein is called u!on (e:en !ef+re its deter(inati+n as essence and eJistence#-7 ic can +n'. (ean) t+ be called u!on by Bein " Being 7+u'd n+t !e 7 at it is if s%eec simply %receded +r in:+"ed it< 5anguage>s fina' %r+tecti:e !ar rier against (adness is t e (eaning +f Being< 23< ?a'dane and 2+ss) %< t+t< 24< It is a questi+n 'ess +f a point t an +f a te(%+ra' +rigina'it. in genera'< 25< 0N< 0 e reference is t+ *'at+>s Republic 5+g!-c< 26< It ris"s erasing t e eJcess !. 7 ic e:er. % i'+s+% . (+f (eaning# is re'ated) in s+(e regi+n +f its disc+urse) t+ t e n+nf+undati+n +f un(eaning< 27< In t e neJt t+ 'ast %aragra% +f t e siJt -editation, t e t e(e +f n+r(a'it. c+((unicates 7it t e t e(e +f (e(+r.) at t e (+(ent 7 en t e 'atter) (+re+:er) is c+nfir(ed !. a!s+'ute 2eas+n as Edi:ine :eracit.)E etc< 1enera''. s%ea"ing) d+es n+t 1+d>s c+nfir(ati+n +f t e re(e(!rance +f +!:i+us trut s signif. t at +n'. t e %+siti:e infinit. +f di:ine reas+n can a!s+'ute'. rec+nci'e te(%+ra'it. and trut O In t e infinite a'+ne) !e.+nd a'' deter(inati+ns) negati+ns) EeJc'usi+nsE and Eintern(ents)E is %r+duced t e rec+nci'iati+n +f ti(e and t +ug t (trut # 7 ic ?ege' c'ai(ed 7as t e tas" +f nineteent -centur. % i'+s+% .) 7 i'e t e rec+nci'iati+n +f t +ug t and s%ace 7as t+ a:e !een t e ai( +f t e s+-ca''ed E6artesianE rati+na'is(s< 0 at t is di:ine infinit. is t e %r+%er '+cati+n) c+nditi+n) na(e) +r +riM+n +f t ese t7+ rec+nci'iati+ns is 7 at as ne:er !een c+ntested !. an. meta$hysician, neit er !. ?ege') n+r !. t e (aG+rit. +f t +se) suc as ?usser') 7 + a:e atte(%ted t+ t in" and t+ na(e t e essentia' te(%+ra'it. +r ist+ricit. +f trut and (eaning< ,+r Descartes) t e crisis +f 7 ic 7e are s%ea"ing 7+u'd fina''. a:e its intrinsic (t at is) intellectual$ +rigin in ti(e itse'f) as t e a!sence +f a necessar. 'in" !et7een its %arts) as t e c+ntingenc. and disc+ntinuit. +f t e transiti+n fr+( instant t+ instantL 7 ic su%%+ses t at ere 7e f+''+7 a'' t e inter%retati+ns +%%+sed t+ 5a%+rte>s +n t e questi+n +f t e r+'e +f t e instant in Descartes>s % i'+s+% .< In t e 'ast ret+rt) +n'. c+ntinu+us creati+n) uniting c+nser:ati+n and creati+n) 7 ic Ediffer +n'. as c+ncerns +ur 7a. +f t in"ing)E rec+nci'es te(%+ra'it. and trut < It is 1+d 7 + eJc'udes (adness and crisis) t at is t+ sa.) e(!races t e( in t e

itse'f) at its +7n 'e:e' and at its %r+%er (+(ent) ne:er decei:es usL or t e +!Gect %resented t+ it) Gust as it is gi:en t+ it eit er first and +r !. (eans +f an i(ageL and if it (+re+:er refrain fr+( Gudging t at t e i(aginati+n fait fu''. re%+rts t e +!Gects +f t e senses) +r t at t e senses ta"e +n t e true f+r(s +f t ings) +r in fine t at eJterna' t ings a'7a.s are as t e. a%%ear t+ !eE K?a'dane and 2+ss) %< 441<# 17< 0N< 0 e %aragra% +rganiMati+n +f ?a'dane and 2+ss d+es n+t c+rres%+nd t+ t e %aragra% +rganiMati+n +f t e editi+n +f Descartes cited !. Derrida< 1$< ?a'dane and 2+ss) %< 147< 194 ?a'dane and 2+ss) %< 14$< 2 0 < I!id< It is a questi+n ere +ft e +rder +f reas+ns) as it is f+''+7ed in t e 'editations) It is 7e'' "n+7n t at in t e 3isco rse (%art 4# d+u!t :er. %r+(%t'. attac"s t e Esi(%'est ge+(etrica' questi+nsE in 7 ic (en s+(eti(es Ec+((it %ara'+gis(s<E
21< 5i"e 5ei!niM) Descartes

as c+nfidence in EscientificE +r E% i'+

3-4 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 7 0 - 7 1 %resence t at enc+(%asses a'' traces and differences< W ic a(+unts t+ sa.ing t at crisis) an+(a'.) negati:it.) etc< are irreduci!'e 7it in t e eJ%erience +f finitude) +r +f a finite (+(ent) a deter'ination +f a!s+'ute reas+n) +r +f reas+n in genera'< 0+ atte(%t t+ den. t is) and a''eged'. t+ affir( %+siti:it. (t e %+siti:it. +f trut ) (eaning) n+r(s) etc<# +utside t e +riM+n +f t is infinite reas+n (reas+n in genera') !e.+nd a'' its s%ecific deter(inati+ns#) is t+ atte(%t t+ erase negati:it.) and is t+ f+rget finitude at t e :er. (+(ent 7 en +ne a''eged'. den+unces as (.stificati+n t e t e+'+gis( +f t e great c'assica' rati+na'is(s< 2$< But 1+d is t e +t er na(e +f t e a!s+'ute +f reas+n itse'f) +f reas+n and (eaning in genera'< ;nd 7 at c+u'd eJc'ude) reduce) +ra(+unting t+ t e sa(e t ing-a!s+'ute'. e'brace (adness) if n+t reas+n in genera') a!s+'ute and undeter(ined reas+n) 7 +se +t er na(e is 1+d) f+r t e c'assica' rati+na'istsO =ne cann+t accuse t +se) indi:idua's +r s+cieties) 7 + use 1+d as a rec+urse against (adness +f see"ing t+ shelter the'sel%es, t+ !e sure +f a:ing %r+tecti+ns against (adness-t e safe !+undaries +f as.'u(s-eJce%t !. c+nstruing t is s e'ter as a f i n i t e +ne) 7it in t e 7+r'd) !. (a"ing 1+d a t ird %art. +r finite %+7er) t at is) eJce%t !. decei:ing +nese'fL !. decei:ing +nese'f n+t c+ncerning t e c+ntent and effecti:e fina'it. +f t is gesture in ist+r.) !ut c+ncerning t e % i'+s+% ica' s%ecificit. of t e idea and na(e of 1+d< If % i'+s+% . as ta"en %'ace-7 ic can a'7a.s !e c+ntested-it is +n'. in t e eJtent t+ 7 ic it as f+r(u'ated t e ai( +f t in"ing !e.+nd t e finite s e'ter< B. descri!ing t e ist+rica' c+nstituti+n +f t ese finite %r+tecti:e !arriers against (adness 7it in t e (+:e(ent +f indi:idua's) s+cieties and a'' finite t+ta'ities in genera'-a 'egiti(ate) i((ense) and necessar. tas"+ne can fina''. descri!e e:er.t ing eJce%t t e % i'+s+% ica' %r+Gect itse'f< ;nd eJce%t t e %r+Gect +f t is descri%ti+n itse'f< =ne cann+t a''ege t at t e % i'+ s+% ica' %r+Gect +f t e Einfiniti:istE rati+na'is(s ser:ed as an instru (ent +r as an a'i!i f+r a finite ist+ric+-%+'itic+-s+cia' :i+'ence (7 ic is d+u!t'ess t e case# 7it +ut first a:ing t+ ac"n+7'edge and res%ect t e intenti+na' (eaning +f t is %r+Gect itse'f< N+7) 7it in its +7n intenti+na' (eaning) t is %r+Gect %resents itse'f as t e c+nce%tua'iMa ti+n +f t e infinite) t at is) +f t at 7 ic cann+t !e eJ austed !. an. finite t+ta'it.) !. an. functi+n +r !. an. instru(enta') tec nica') +r %+'itica' deter(inati+n< It 7i'' !e said t at t is %resentati+n +f t e % i'+s+% ica' %r+Gect !. itse'f as suc is its greatest 'ie) its :i+'ence

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 71-$1 3-5

structure 7 ic 'in"s t is intenti+n t+ eJceed t e 7+r'd t+ t e t+ta'it. +f ist+r. (ust !e descri!ed rig+r+us'.) and its ec+n+(. (ust !e deter(ined< But 'i"e a'' ruses) t ese ec+n+(ic +nes are %+ssi!'e +n'. f+r finite 7+rds and finite intenti+ns) su!stituting +ne finitude f+r an+t er< =ne cann+t 'ie 7 en +ne sa.s nothing (t at is finite +r deter(ined#) +r 7 en +ne sa.s 1+d) Being) +r N+t ingness) +r 7 en +ne d+es n+t (+dif. t e finite !. t e dec'ared (eaning +f+ne>s 7+rds) +r 7 en +ne sa.s t e infinite) t at is) 7 en +ne 'ets t e infinite (1+d) Being) +r N+t ingness) f+r %art +f t e (eaning +f t e infinite is its ina!i'it. t+ !e an +ntic deter(inati+n a(+ng +t ers# !e said and c+ncei:ed< 0 e t e(e +f di:ine :eracit. and t e difference !et7een 1+d and t e e:i' genius are t us i''u(inated !. a 'ig t 7 ic is +n'. a%%arent'. indirect< In s +rt) Descartes "ne7 t at) 7it +ut 1+d) finite t +ug t ne:er ad t e right t+ eJc'ude (adness) etc< W ic a(+unts t+ sa.ing t at (adness is ne:er eJc'uded) eJce%t in fact, :i+'ent'.) in ist+r.L +r rat er t at t is eJc'usi+n) t is difference !et7een t e fact and t e %rinci%'e is ist+ricit.) t e %+ssi!i'it. +f ist+r. itse'f< D+es ,+ucau't sa. +t er7iseO -#he necessity of (adness <<< is 'in"ed t+ t e $ossibility of history" (aut +r>s ita'ics#< 2-< ?a'dane and 2+ss) %< 171< 30< ,+ucau't) ,olie et deraison, %< 1--< 3B /D&=ND J;B/S ;ND 0?/ @9/S0I=N =, 0?/ B==4

Je botis ma de'eure: 4oe'es, 1-43-1-57 (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-5-#< 0 is c+''ecti+n as !een ad(ira!'. %refaced !. 1a!rie' B+un+re< 0 ere a:e n+7 !een (aG+r studies de:+ted t+ Ja!esB &aurice B'anc +t) E5>interru%ti+n)E Houvelle revue frangaise, &a. 1-64L 1a!rie' B+un+re) E/d(+nd Ja!esB 'a de(eure et 'e 'i:re)E Fercure de 1rance, Januar. 1-65L and E/d(+nd Ja!es) +u 'a gueris+n %ar 'e 'i:re)E 6es lettres no velles, Ju'.Se%te(!er 1-66< 2< 0N< Ja!es) Le Livre des questions (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-63#< 3< 0N< 0 e t7+ inter%retati+ns +f inter%retati+n are again eJa(ined at t e end of EStructure) Sign) and *'a.)E t is :+') c a%< 1+< 0 e Era!!inica'E inter%retati+n +f inter%retati+n is t e +ne 7 ic see"s a fina' trut ) 7 ic sees inter%retati+n as an unf+rtunate'. necessar. r+ad !ac" t+ an +rigina' trut < 0 e E%+etica'E inter%retati+n +f inter%retati+n d+es n+t see" trut +r +rigin) !ut affir(s t e %'a. of inter%retati+n< 4< 0N< 6f< t e end of E,+rce and Significati+n)E t is :+'<) c a%< 1) f+r t e
1.

and its (.stificati+n-+r) furt er) its !ad fait < ;nd) certain'.) t e

!r+"en ta!'es in NietMsc e as t e. re'ate t+ 7riting as t e (ar" +f +t erness) t e Eru%tureE t at E!eginsE ist+r.< 5< 0N< Derrida is referring ere t+ t e (+(ent +f t e un a%%. c+nsci+usness in ?ege'>s 4heno'enology +f t e -ind! ?ege'>s first (+de' f+r t e un a%%. c+nsci+usness 7as ;!ra a(< 6< 0N< 0 e si'ence and iding +f Being are ?eideggerean t e(es) f+r t e. are) as ?eidegger sa.s) Et e questi+n +f N+t ing<E 7< 0N< E0+ 'ea:e s%eec E is t+ 'ea:e !e ind a trace 7 ic a'7a.s (eans t at t e 7riter is n+t %resent< $< 0N< =n t e 5ei!niMian B++") cf< E,+rce and Significati+n)E c a%< 1 a!+:e) n+te 25< -< 0N< =n t ese questi+ns) cf< EAi+'ence and &eta% .sics<E 10< 0N< 0 at Being is neit er %resent n+r +utside difference are t e t e(es +f identity and 3ifference !. ?eidegger< ii< 0N < 0 e +nt+'+gica' d+u!'e geniti:e is a's+ a t e(e +f Identity and

3ifference!

4B AI=5/N6/ ;ND &/0;*?DSI6S

1< /((anue' 5e:inas) Theorie de

(0int ition dons (a $henomenologie de )usserl (1st ed<) *arisB ;'can) 1-30L 2d ed<) Arin) 1-63#L De $-e7istence a #0e1istant (,+ntaine) 1-47#L /e tem$s et #0a tre, in /e 8hoi1, le 8onde, $-97istence, 6a iers du 6+''ege % i'+s+% ique (;rt aud) 1-4-#L /n deco vrant $-e7istence, avec 2 sserl et 2eidegger (Arin) 1-4-#L Totalite et infini, +ssai s rl0e1teriorite (0 e ?agueB &artinus NiG +ff) 1-61#L 3ffci(e liberte,
9ssaissurle:udais'e (;'!in &ic e') 1-63#<

I s a'' a's+ refer t+ se:era' artic'es 7 ic I s a'' (enti+n at t e %r+%er (+(ent< 0 e %rinci%a' 7+r"s 7i'' !e designated !. t e initia's +f t eir tit'esB Theorie de (0int ition !!! : T ) I ; 3e $-e7istence a l-e7istant: 9 9 ; /e tem$s et #0a tre: TA; 9n deco vrant $-e7istence: +3+; Totalite et infini: T# Ksee !e'+7IL 3 @cile liberte: 3/! 0 is essa. 7as a'read. 7ritten 7 en t7+ i(%+rtant teJts !. /((anue' 5e:inas a%%earedB E5a trace de I>autreE) in Tydschr@ voor ,ilosofie, Se%te(!er 1-63L and E5a significati+n et 'e sens)E =ev e de 'etaphysi0ue et de morale, 1-64) n+< 2< 9nf+rtunate'. 7e can (a"e !ut !rief a''usi+ns t+ t ese teJts ere< K0 e (aG+r 7+r" referred t+ in t is essa. as a%%eared in /ng'is B 0+ta'it. and #nfinity, trans< ;'% +ns+ 5ingis (*itts!urg B Duquesne 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-6-#< ;'' %age references t+ T# are t+ 5ingis>s trans'ati+n<I 2< 0N< =n t e d+u!'e geniti:e cf< a!+:e) c a%< 3) n+te 11<

3< ;fter desiring t+ rest+re t e %r+%er'. +nt+'+gica' intenti+n d+r(ant 7it in (eta% .sics) after a:ing rea7a"ened t e Efunda(enta' +nt+'+g.E !eneat E(eta% .sica' +nt+'+g.)E ?eidegger) faced !. t e tenacit. +f traditi+na' a(!iguit.) fina''. %r+%+ses t+ a!and+n t e ter(s E+nt+'+g.E and E+nt+'+gica'E (#ntrod ction to 8etaphysics( 0 e questi+n +f Being cann+t !e su!(itted t+ an +nt+'+g.< 4< 0 at is) t+ re'ati:is(B t e trut +f % i'+s+% . d+es n+t de%end u%+n its re'ati+n t+ t e actua'it. +f t e 1ree" +r /ur+%ean e:ent< =n t e c+ntrar.) 7e (ust gain access t+ t e 1ree" +r /ur+%ean eidos t r+ug an irru%ti+n +r a ca'' 7 +se %+int +f de%arture is :ari+us'. deter(ined !. ?usser' and ?eidegger< It re(ains t at) f+r !+t ) Et e irru%ti+n +f % i'+s+% .E (E;uf!ruc +der /in!ruc der * i'+s+% ie)E ?usser') Arisis <<<# is t e E+rigina'E % en+(en+n 7 ic c aracteriMes /ur+%e as a Es%iritua' figureE (i!id<#< ,+r !+t ) t e E7+rd $hiloso$hia te''s us t at % i'+s+% . is s+(et ing 7 ic ) first +f a'') deter(ines t e eJistence +f t e 1ree" 7+r'd< N+t +n'. t at-% i'+s+% ic a's+ deter(ines t e inner(+st !asic feature +f +ur Western-/ur+%ean ist+r.) t e +ften eard eJ%ressi+n >Western/ur+%ean % i'+s+% .> is) in trut ) a taut+'+g.< W .O Because % i'+s+% . is 1ree" in its natureL 1ree") in t is instance) (eans t at in +rigin t e nature +f % i'+s+% . is +f suc a "ind t at it first a%%r+%riated t e 1ree" 7+r'd) and +n'. it) in +rder t+ unf+'d<E ?eidegger) .hat Is 4hilosophy?, trans< Wi''ia( 4'u!ac" and Jean 0< Wi'de (5+nd+nB Aisi+n *ress) 1-5$#) **< 2--31< 5< ?usser'B E2eas+n d+es n+t suffer !eing distinguis ed int+ >t e+retica')> >%ractica')> +r >est etic)> etc<E (:erite et liberte, trans< *< 2ic+eur#< ?eideggerB E0er(s suc as >'+gic)> >et ics)> >% .sics)> a%%ear +n'. at t e (+(ent 7 en +rigina' t in"ing '+ses its +'dE (Brief fiber den +)u'anis'us,+ in .eg'er&en K,ran"furt) 1-67I) %< 147#< 6< 0N< 5ingis>s n+te) 0I) %< 24B EWit t e aut +r>s %er(issi+n) 7e are trans'ating >autrui> (t e %ers+na' =t er) t e .+u# !. >=t er)> and 0a tre0 !. >+t er<> In d+ing s+) 7e regretta!'. sacrifice t e %+ssi!i'it. +f re%r+ducing t e aut +r>s use +f ca%ita' +r s(a'' 'etters 7it !+t t ese ter(s in t e ,renc teJt<E I a:e f+''+7ed 5ingis>s %ractice t r+ug +ut t is teJt< 7< *artia' n+t +n'. due t+ t e %+int +f :ie7 c +sen) t e a(%'itude +f t e 7+r"s) t e (ateria' and +t er 'i(its +f t is essa.< But a's+ !ecause 5e:inas>s 7riting) 7 ic 7+u'd (erit an entire se%arate stud. itse'f) and in 7 ic st.'istic gestures (es%ecia''. in Totality and #nfinity* can 'ess t an e:er !e distinguis ed fr+( intenti+n) f+r!ids t e %r+saic dise(!+di(ent int+ c+nce%tua' fra(e7+r"s t at is t e first :i+'ence

3-$ N=0/S 0= *;1/S 103-7

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 107-11 3--

ing +f +!Gectif.ing intenti+na'it. !. transcendenta' intenti+na'it. c+n ce%ti+ns<> E (W+u'd ?usser' +f t e disc+urse< a:e su!scri!ed t+ t is inter%retati+n +f is

suc a questi+n<# 0 ere f+''+7s a descri%ti+n +f t e %re+!Gecti:e s% ere +f an intenti+na' eJ%erience a!s+'ute'. de%arting fr+( itse'f t+7ard t e +t er (a descri%ti+n) +7e:er) 7 ic as ne:er see(ed t+ us t+ eJceed certain ?usser'ian 'itera'it.#< Sa(e sc e(a in

Totality

%ure'. deducti:e< It %r+ceeds 7it t e infinite insistence +f 7a:es on !eac B return and re%etiti+n) a'7a.s) +f t e sa(e 7a:e against t a's+ infinite'. rene7s and enric es itse'f< Because +f a'' t ese c a'< 'enges t+ t e c+((entat+r and t e $< ;t t e end +f 3ocile liberte, under t e tit'e ESignature)E 7i'' !e f+und t e references f+r a % i'+s+% ica' !i+gra% . +f 5e:inas< -< 0N< 0 e reference is t+ ?ege'< t e :isua' (eta% +rs in t e 1ree" deri:ati+ns +f t e+r. (fr+( theorein;
11< 6f E5a tec nique % en+(en+'+gique)E in 8usserl$ :ohiers de +oyou

and #nfinity: ?usser'>s Eessentia' teac ingE is +%%+sed t+ its E'etterEB

EW at d+es it (atter if in t e ?usser'ian % en+(en+'+g. ta"en 'itera''. t ese unsus%ected +riM+ns are in t eir turn inter%reted as t +ug ts 15< ; %r+%+siti+n t at ?usser' d+u!t'ess 7+u'd n+t a:e acce%ted easi'.< %aragra% 117 +f Ideas (#heory

of (ntuition, p. 1-2# ta"e int+ acc+unt t e

eJtra+rdinar. en'arge(ent +f t e n+ti+ns +f thesis and d+Ja effected !. ?usser') 7 + is a'read. s +7ing suc care in res%ecting t e +rigina'it. +f t e (eaning +f t e reducti+n) it is true t at in 1-30) and in is %u!'is ed 7+r"s) ?usser' ad n+t .et (ade it int+ a t e(e< We 7i'' c+(e !ac" t+ t is< ,+r t e (+(ent 7e are n+t interested in ?usser'ian trut ) !ut in 5e:inas>s itinerar.< ;s c+ncerns re%resentati+n) an i(%+rtant (+tif in t e di:ergence) as +7e:er) ne:er see(s t+ a:e st+%%ed esitating< But again) a'(+st t++ !et7een 'a7 and fact< 0 is (+:e(ent can !e f+''+7ed t r+ug t e f+''+7ing %assagesB #8(, pp. -+ff<L =4=, %%< 22-23) es%< %< 52L

, (+nt) and EIntenti+nna'ite et (eta% .sique)E +evue 12< 0 e +t er ancest+r) t e 5atin =ne) 7i'' !e 6artesianB t e idea +f Infinit. ann+uncing itse'f t+ t +ug t as t at 7 ic a'7a.s +:erf'+7s it< We aside-t+ta''. acquitted) Gudged inn+cent !. 5e:inas< /Jce%t f+r t ese infinit.) t e Efa'se infinit.E inca%a!'e +f a!s+'ute'. +:erf'+7ing t e Sa(eB t e infinite as indefinite +riM+n) +r as t+ta'it. +:er its %arts< 13< 6f< t e % i'+s+% ica' and %+etic eJa(%'es gi:en !. Bac e'ard in 5a terre et les reveries du repos, pp. 22ff< 14< 0 is sc e(a a'7a.s regu'ates 5e:inas>s re'ati+ns t+ ?usser'< 0 e+< retis( and +!Gecti:is( 7+u'd !e its c+nc'usi+n) t e ?usser'ian 'etter f+r eJa(%'e) (ntentionalite et !etaphysique$ E0 e great c+ntri!uti+n o$ ?usser'ian % en+(en+'+g. is in t e idea t at intenti+na'it.) +r t e re'ati+n t+ a'terit.) is n+t fr+Men !. %+'ariMati+n int+ su!Gect-+!Gect<

La tech/

nique pheno!enologique, pp. -$---L 0I) %%< -5ff In +3+, at a ti(e (1-40-4-# 7 en t e sur%rises in t is area 7ere n+ '+nger e'd in st+re) t e t e(e +f t is criticis( sti'' 7i'' !e centra'B EIn ist+r.<E (We d+ n+t (ean t+ sa.) ere) t at t is sentence is f i n a l l y in c+ntradicti+n 7it ?usser'>s t en "n+7n intenti+ns< But are n+t t e 'atter) 7 ate:er t e definiti:e eart +f t e (atter) a'read. (+re %r+! 'e(atica' t an 5e:inas see(s t+ !e'ie:eO# 1$< 0N< 0 e reference is t+ t e structure +f Being%with ana'.Med in Being 1-< 0N< ;'t +ug ) as n+ted in t e intr+ducti+n a!+:e) I a:e atte(%ted t+

400 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 1 1 1 - 1 "ee% t+ t e %ractice +f trans'ating "ein !. EBeing)E and "eiendes by E!eing)E I s a'' (+st +ften use EeJistentE f+r E!eingE ("eiendes, etant* t r+ug +ut t is essa. in +rder t+ a:e (. :+ca!u'ar. c+nf+r( t+ 5e:inas>s< E/JistentE as !een (aintained in t e /ng'is trans'ati+n +f

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 11--31 401

Totality and #nfinity!

20< ?ege' i(se'f 7+u'd n+t esca%e t e ru'e< 6+ntradicti+n 7+u'd !e

ere 7+u'd !e t+ turn t e accusati+n +f f+r(a'is( against ?ege') and t+ den+unce s%ecu'ati:e ref'ecti+n as a '+gic +f understanding) as taut+'+gica'< =ne can i(agine t e difficu't. +f t e tas"< 21< ;n+t er disc+(f+rtB 5e:inas ne:er si(%'. c+nde(ns tec n+'+g.< It can rescue fr+( a 7+rse :i+'ence) t e Ereacti+nar.E :i+'ence +f sacred ra:is (ent) +f ta"ing r++t) +f t e natura' %r+Ji(it. +f 'andsca%e< E0ec n+'+g. ta"es us +ut +f t e ?eideggerean 7+r'd and t e su%erstiti+ns +f *'ace<E It +ffers t e c ance Et+ 'et t e u(an face s ine in its nudit.E (D5#< We 7i'' return t+ t is< ?ere) 7e +n'. 7is t+ f+res ad+7 t at within ist+r.-!ut is it (eaningfu' e'se7 ereO-e:er. % i'+s+% . +f n+n:i+'ence can +n'. c ++se t e 'esser :i+'ence 7it in an economy of violence" 22< 0N< 0 e reference is t+ t e dia'ectic +f t e (aster and t e s'a:e in
)he Phenomenolo y of the *ind, t e (aster enG+.s and c+nsu(es t e

%r+duct +f t e s'a:e>s 7+r"< 0 e s'a:e defers t is enG+.(ent in t eB eJ%erience +f 7+r" and t eref+re) acc+rding t+ ?ege') negates rea'it. in a (+re a!stract) s%ecu'ati:e fas i+n< 0 e s'a:e) t us) is t e trut +f t e (aster< 6f< c a%< -) E,r+( 2estricted t+ 1enera' /c+n+(.<E 23< 0N< In ?ege'>s 5henomenology t e (+de' +f t e un a%%.) s%'it c+n sci+usness is ;!ra a() f+rced t+ c ++se !et7een 1+d>s c+((and t+ !eginning +f E6+git+ and t e ?ist+r. +f &adness)E c a%< 2 a!+:e< - > 24< E5i!erte et c+((and(ent)E Revue de meta!hysi1ue et de morale, 1-33< 25< ;(+ng t e nu(er+us %assages den+uncing t e i(%+tence +f so' ca''ed Ef+r(a' '+gicE 7 en c+nfr+nted 7it na"ed eJ%erience) 'et us> %+int +ut in %articu'ar 0I) %%< 1-4) 260) 276) 7 ere t e descri%ti+n +f

t is natureO ?ad it n+t) rat er) 7e'c+(ed t e(O# 26< ;n affir(ati+n at +nce %r+f+und'. fait fu' t+ 4ant (E2es%ect is a%%'ied) +n'. t+ %ers+nsE-*ractica' 2eas+n# and i(%'icit'. anti-4antian) f+r 7it +ut t e f+r(a' e'e(ent +f uni:ersa'it.) 7it +ut t e %ure +rder t e 'a7) res%ect f+r t e +t er) res%ect and t e +t er n+ '+nger esca%e

e(%irica' and %at +'+gica' i((ediac.< Ne:ert e'ess) +7 d+ t e. esca%e acc+rding t+ 5e:inasO It is %er a%s t+ !e regretted t at n+ s.ste(atic and %atient c+nfr+ntati+n as !een +rganiMed 7it 4ant in %articu'ar< 0+ +ur "n+7'edge) +n'. an a''usi+n is (ade t+ t e E4antian ec +s)E and Et+ 4ant>s %ractica' % i'+s+% . t+ 7 ic 7e fee' %articu'ar'. c'+se)E-and t is !are'. in %assing-in +ne artic'e (E5>+nt+'+gie est-e''e f+nda(enta'eOE Revue de meta!hysi1ue et de morale 1-51L re%rinted in 5h9nomtnologie, +1istence!* 0 is c+nfr+ntati+n is ca''ed f+r n+t +n'. !ecause +f t e et ica' t e(es !ut a's+ !ecause +f t e difference !et7een t+ta'it. and infinit.) a!+ut 7 ic 4ant) a(+ng +t ers and %er a%s (+re t an +t ers) ad a nu(!er +f t +ug ts< 27< 5e:inas +ften (a"es accusati+ns against t e S+cratic (aster. 7 ic teac es n+t ing) teac es +n'. t e a'read. "n+7n) and (a"es e:er.t ing arise fr+( t e se'f) t at is fr+( t e /g+) +r fr+( t e Sa(e as &e(+r.< ;na(nesis t++) 7+u'd !e a %r+cessi+n +f t e Sa(e< =n t is %+int) at 'east) 5e:inas cann+t +%%+se i(se'f t+ 4ier"egaard (cf<) f+r eJa(%'e) J< Wa ') $tudes >ierke aardiennes, !!" 30$--#) f+r is critique +f *'at+nis( ere is 'itera''. 4ier"egaardian< It is true t at 4ier"egaard +%%+sed S+crates t+ *'at+ eac ti(e t at re(iniscence 7as in questi+n< 0 e 'atter 7+u'd !e'+ng t+ t e *'at+nic Es%ecu'ati+nE fr+( 7 ic S+crates Ese%aratesE i(se'f 'Post scri$t m*! 2$< 1< W< ,< ?ege'< )he Philoso!hy of ?ine &rt, trans< ,< *< B< =s(ast+n (5+nd+nB 6< Be'' and S+ns) 1-20# 1B206-7< 2-< I!id<) 3B15< 30< I!id< 31< I!id<) *< 341 32< E; %ri+ri et su!Gecti:ite)E Revue de meta!hysi1ue et de morale, 1-62< 33< 5ud7ig ,euer!ac ) >leine !hiloso!hische Schrfen (5ei%Mig 1-50#) *< 1-1< 34 &< de 1+ndi''ac) #ntrod ction au+ oeuvres choisies de %icolas de 6ues, *< 35< 35< %ouvelle revue fran aise, Dece(!er 1-61) E6+nnaissance d e I>inc+nnu<E 36< It is true t at f+r &er'eau-*+nt.-differing fr+( 5e>:inas-t e % en+(en+n +f a'terit. 7as %ri(+rdia''.) if n+t eJc'usi:e'.) t at +f t e (+:e(ent +f te(%+ra'iMati+n< 37< W i'e defending i(se'f against Et e ridicu'+us %retensi+n +f>c+rrecting> Bu!erE (0I#) 5e:inas) in su!stance) re%r+ac es t e I-0 +u re'a ti+ns i% (1# f+r !eing reci%r+ca' and s.((etrica') t us c+((itting :i+'ence against eig t) and es%ecia''. against se%arateness) and

of

402 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 1 3 1 - 3 6 secreti:enessL (2# f+r !eing f+r(a') ca%a!'e +f Euniting (an t+ t ings) as (uc as &an t+ (anE (0I#L (3# f+r %referring %reference) t e E%ri:ate re'ati+ns i%)E t e Ec'andestine natureE +f t e c+u%'e 7 ic is Ese'fsufficient and f+rgetfu' +f t e uni:erseE (0I#< ,+r t ere is a's+ in 5e:inas>s t +ug t) des%ite is %r+tests against neutra'it.) a su((+ning +f t e t ird %art.) t e uni:ersa' 7itness) t e face +f t e 7+r'd 7 ic "ee%s us fr+( t e Edisdainfu' s%iritua'is(E +f t e I-0 +u< =t ers 7i'' deter(ine) %er a%s) 7 et er Bu!er 7+u'd rec+gniMe i(se'f in t is inter%retati+n< It can a'read. !e n+ted in %assing t at Bu!er see(s t+ a:e f+reseen t ese reser:ati+ns< Did e n+t s%ecif. t at t e I-0 +u re'ati+ns i% 7as neit er referentia' n+r eJc'usi:e in t at it is %re:i+us t+ a'' e(%irica' and e:entua' (+dificati+nsO ,+unded !. t e a!s+'ute I0 +u) 7 ic turns us t+7ard 1+d) it +%ens u%) +n t e c+ntrar.) t e %+ssi!i'it. +f e:er. re'ati+ns i% t+ =t ers< 9nderst++d in its +rigina' aut enticit.) it is neit er det+ur n+r di:ersi+n< 5i"e (an. +f t e c+ntradicti+ns 7 ic a:e !een used t+ e(!arrass Bu!er) t is +ne .ie'ds) as t e *+stscri%t t+ I5Thou te''s us) Et+ a su%eri+r 'e:e' +f Gudg(entE and t+ Et e %arad+Jica' descri%ti+n +f 1+d as t e a!s+'ute *ers+n <<<< It is as t e a!s+'ute *ers+n t at 1+d enters int+ a direct re'ati+n 7it us <<<< 0 e (an 7 + turns t+ i( t eref+re need n+t turn away fr+( an. +t er I-0 +u re'ati+nL !ut e %r+%er'. !rings t e( t+ i() and 'ets t e( !e fu'fi''ed >in t e face +f 1+d> E (# and Thou, trans< 2+na'd 1reg+r S(it ) Ne7 D+r"B Scri!ner>s) 1-5$#< 3$< =n t e t e(e +f t e eig t +f 1+d in its re'ati+n t+ t e %r+ne %+siti+n +f c i'd +r (an (f+r eJa(%'e) +n is sic" !ed +r deat !ed#) +n t e re'ati+ns !et7een t e clinic and theology, cf., f+r eJa(%'e) ,euer!ac (see 3- n+te 33 a!+:e#) %< 233< ?ere 7e +ug t t+ eJa(ine &a'e!ranc e t++ gra%%'ing 7it t e %r+!'e( 40< +f 'ig t and +f t e face +f 1+d $cf es%ecia''. 5+t 9claircisse'ent( We 7i'' n+t g+ !e.+nd t is sc e(a< It 7+u'd !e use'ess t+ atte(%t) ere) t+ enter int+ t e descri%ti+ns de:+ted t+ interi+rit.) ec+n+(.) enG+.(ent) a!itati+n) fe(ininit.) /r+s) t+ e:er.t ing suggested under t e tit'e 0eyond the 1ace, (atters t at 7+u'd d+u!t'ess deser:e (an. questi+ns< 0 ese ana'.ses are n+t +n'. an indefatigua!'e and free as c+ncerns traditi+na' c+nce%tua'it.) t at a c+((entar. running se:era' %ages 7+u'd !etra. t e( i((easura!'.< 5et it suffice t+ state t at t e. de%end u%+n t e c+nce%tua' (atriJ 7e a:e Gust +ut'ined) 7it +ut !eing deduced fr+( it !ut cease'ess'. regenerating it< =n t ese 41< decisi:e t e(es +f identit.) i%seit. and equa'it.) and t+ c+n

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 136-54 403

fr+nt ?ege' and 5e:inas) cf< n+ta!'. Jean ?.%%+'ite) <enese et str ct re de la pheno!=nologie de (0es$rit, 1B147ff<L and ?eidegger) #dentity and 4ifference. ?ere 7e are t in"ing +f t e distincti+n !et7een disc+urse and :i+'ence %articu'ar'. c+((+n t+ 5e:inas and t+ /ric Wei'< It d+es n+t a:e t e sa(e (eaning f+r !+t < 5e:inas n+tes t is in %assing and) 7 i'e %a.ing +(age t+ Wei' f+r is Es.ste(atic and :ig+r+us use +f t e ter( :i+'ence in its +%%+siti+n t+ disc+urse)E c'ai(s t+ gi:e Edifferent (eaningE t+ t is distincti+n (D5#< We 7+u'd !e te(%ted t+ gi:e a dia(etrica''. +%%+sed (eaning< 0 e disc+urse 7 ic Wei' ac"n+7'edges as n+n:i+'ent is +nt+'+g.) t e %r+Gect +f +nt+'+g.< $=f 6ogi0ue de la philosophie, e.g., %%< 2$ff< E5a naissance de I>+nt+'+gie) 'e disc+urs<E# E?ar(+n. !et7een (en 7i'' !e esta!'is ed !. itse'f if (en are n+t c+ncerned 7it t e(se':es) !ut 7it 7 at isLE its %+'arit. is infinite c+ erence) and its st.'e) at 'east) is ?ege'ian< 0 is c+ erence in +nt+'+g. is :i+'ence itse'f f+r 5e:inasB t e Eend +f ist+r.E is n+t a!s+'ute 5+gic) t e a!s+'ute c+ erence +f t e 5+g+s 7it itse'f in itse'fL n+r is it ar(+n. in t e a!s+'ute S.ste() !ut *eace in se%arati+n) t e dias%+ra +f a!s+'utes< In:erse'.) is n+t %eacefu' disc+urse) acc+rding t+ 5e:inas) t e disc+urse 7 ic res%ects se%arati+n and reGects t e +riM+n +f +nt+'+gica' c+ erence) :i+'ence itse'f f+r Wei'O 5et us sc e(atiMeB acc+rding t+ Wei') :i+'ence 7i'' !e) +r rat er 7+u'd !e) reduced +n'. 7it t e reducti+n +f a'terit.) +r t e 7i'' t+ a'terit.< 0 e re:erse is true f+r 5e:inas< But f+r 5e:inas c+ erence is a'7a.s finite (t+ta'it.) in t e (eaning e gi:es t+ t e 7+rd) reGecting an. %+ssi!'e (eaning f+r t e n+ti+n +f infinite t+ta'it.#< ,+r Wei') it is t e n+ti+n +f a'terit.) +n t e c+ntrar.) 7 ic i(%'ies irreduci!'e finitude< But f+r !+t ) +n'. t e infinite is n+n:i+'ent) and it can !e ann+unced +n'. in disc+urse< =ne s +u'd eJa(ine t e c+((+n %resu%%+siti+ns +f t is c+n:ergence and di:ergence< =ne s +u'd as" 7 et er t e %redeter(inati+n) c+((+n t+ t ese t7+ s.ste(s) +f :i+'ati+n and +f %ure '+g+s) and) a!+:e a'') t e %redeter(inati+n +f t eir inc+(%ata!i'it.) refers t+ an a!s+'ute trut ) +r %er a%s t+ an e%+c +f t e ist+r. +f t +ug t) t e ist+r. +f Being< 5et us n+te t at Batai''e t++) in 9roticis', dra7s ins%irati+n fr+( Wei'>s c+nce%ts) and states t is eJ%'icit'.< 0N< Derrida is %'a.ing +n t e d+u!'e sense +f regard as et ica' c+ncern and as +!Gectif.ing g'ance< 6f< n+te 1 + a!+:e< ;t !+tt+() it is t e :er. n+ti+n +f a Ec+nstituti+n +f an a'ter eg+E t+ 7 ic 5e:inas refuses an. (erit< ?e 7+u'd %r+!a!'. sa.) 7it 43< 44< Sartre) E=ne encounters t e =t er) +ne d+es n+t c+nstitute itE (0eing and

404 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 1 5 4 - 6 1 N+t ingness#< 0 is is t+ understand t e 7+rd Ec+nstituti+nE in a sense t at ?usser' +ften 7arns is reader against< 6+nstituti+n is n+t +%%+sed t+ enc+unter< It g+es 7it +ut sa.ing t at c+nstituti+n creates) c+nstructs) engenders) n+t ingB neit er eJistence) n+r t e fact) 7 ic is e:ident) n+r e:en (eaning) 7 ic is 'ess e:ident !ut equa''. certain) %r+:ided t at +ne ta"es s+(e %atient %recauti+ns) and %r+:ided t at +ne distinguis es t e (+(ents +f %assi:it. and acti:it. 7it in intuiti+n) in ?usser'>s sense) and t e (+(ent in 7 ic t e distincti+n !ec+(es i(%+ssi!'e< 0 at is) in 7 ic t e entire %r+!'e(atic +%%+sing Eenc+unterE t+ Ec+nstituti+nE is n+ '+nger (eaningfu') +r as +n'. a deri:ati:e and de%endent (eaning< 9na!'e t+ enter int+ t ese difficu'ties ere) 'et us si(%'. reca'' t is 7arning +f ?usser'>s) a(+ng s+ (an. +t ersB E?ere t++) as c+ncerns t e a'ter eg+) t e >c+nstituti+n +f c+nsci+usness> (Bew sstseinleist ng* d+es n+t (ean t at I in:ent (erfinde* and t at I make (mache* t is su%re(e transcendence<E (In questi+n is 1+d<# In:erse'.) d+es n+t t e n+ti+n +f enc+unter-a n+ti+n t+ 7 ic +ne (ust refer) if +ne reGects a'' c+nstituti+n) in t e ?usser'ian sense +f t e ter(-aside fr+( !eing %re. t+ e(%iricis() 'et it !e underst++d t at t ere is a ti(e and an eJ%erience 7it +ut E+t erE before t e enc+unterO 0 e difficu'ties int+ 7 ic +ne is dri:en can !e i(agined< ?usser'>s % i'+s+% ica' %rudence +n t is (atter is eJe(%'ar.< 0 e 8artesian -editations +ften e(% asiMe t at in fact, really, n+t ing %recedes t e eJ%erience +f =t ers< =r at 'east cann+t !e) +r !e an.t ingL and it is indeed t e aut +rit. +f Being 7 ic 5e:inas %r+f+und'. questi+ns< 0 at is disc+urse (ust sti'' su!(it t+ t e c+ntested agenc. is a necessit. 7 +se ru'e 7e (ust atte(%t 45< t+ inscri!e s.ste(atica''. in t e teJt< 0 is c+nnatura'it. +f disc+urse and +f :i+'ence d+es n+t a%%ear t+ us t+ a:e emerged in ist+r.) n+r t+ !e tied t+ a gi:en f+r( +f c+((unicati+n) +r again t+ a gi:en 46< E% i'+s+% .<E We 7is t+ s +7 ere t at t is c+nnatura'it. !e'+ngs t+ t e :er. essence +f ist+r.) t+ transcendenta' ist+ricit.) a n+ti+n 7 ic ere can +n'. !e underst++d in t e res+nance +f a s%eec c+((+n-in a 7a. t at sti'' ca''s f+r c'arificati+n-t+ ?ege') ?usser') and ?eidegger< ?ist+rica' +r et n+s+ci+'+gica' inf+r(ati+n ere can +n'. c+nfir( +r su%%+rt) under t e ru!ric +f t e factua' eJa(%'e) t e eidetictranscendenta' e:idence< /:en if t is inf+r(ati+n is (ani%u'ated (gat ered) descri!ed) eJ%'icated# 7it t e greatest % i'+s+% ica' +r (et +d+'+gica' %rudence) t at is) e:en if it is articu'ated c+rrect'. 7it

N=0/S 0=*;1/S 161-70 405

t e essentia' reading) and if it res%ects a'' 'e:e's +f eidetic genera'it.) in n+ case c+u'd it fo nd +r demonstrate an. necessit. +f essence< ,+r eJa(%'e) 7e are n+t sure t at t ese tec nica') as 7e'' as transcendenta' %recauti+ns are ta"en !. 6'aude 5e:i-Strauss 7 en) in Tristes tro$i7 es, a(+ngst (an. !eautifu' %ages) e ad:ances t e E .%+t esisE Et at t e %ri(ar. functi+n +f 7ritten c+((unicati+n it t+ faci'itate ser:itude<E If 7riting-and) indeed) s%eec in genera'-retains 7it in it an essentia' :i+'ence) t is cann+t !e Ede(+nstratedE +r E:erifiedE +n t e !asis +f Efacts)E 7 ate:er s% ere t e. are !+rr+7ed fr+( and e:en if t e t+ta'it. +f t e EfactsE in t is d+(ain 7ere a:ai'a!'e< =ne can +ften see in t e descri%ti:e %ractice +f t e Es+cia' sciencesE t e (+st sed ctive (in e:er. sense +f t e 7+rd# c+nfusi+n +f e(%irica' in:estigati+n) inducti:e .%+t esis and intuiti+n +f essence) 7it +ut an. %recauti+ns as t+ t e +rigin and functi+n +f t e %r+%+siti+ns ad:anced< 47< ;'terit.) difference) and ti(e are n+t s $$ressed !ut retained !. a!s+'ute "n+7'edge in t e f+r( +f t e ;uf e!ung< B>! 4ormale and trans)endentale /ogik (?a''e 1-2-#) %< 20-< ?usser'>s ita'ics< 4-< I!id<) %%< 20--10< 50< I!id<) %< 222< 51< =f c+urse 7e cann+t d+ s+ ere< ,ar fr+( t in"ing t at t is fift +f t e 8artesian -ediations (ust !e ad(ired in si'ence as t e 'ast 7+rd +n t is %r+!'e() 7e a:e s+ug t ere +n'. t+ !egin t+ eJ%erience and t+ res%ect its %+7er +f resistance t+ 5e:inas>s criticis(s< 52< EDie ,rage des Waru( ist urs%rung'ic ,rage nac der 1esc ic te<E ?usser' (un%u!'is ed /) III) -) 1-31<# 53< 5+gisc e Cnters ch ngen (00!ingen 1-6$#) :+'<2) I) %ara< 4) *< 115< 54< I!id<) %< 124< 55< 5>+nt+'+gie est%elle f ndamentale? 56< Brief berden02 manism s,0 %< 1-2< 57< EWe g+ furt er) and at t e ris" +f see(ing t+ c+nfuse t e+r. and %ractice) 7e treat t e +ne and t e +t er as (+des +f (eta% .sica' transcendence< 0 e a%%arent c+nfusi+n is 7i''fu') and c+nstitutes +ne +f t e t eses +f t is !++"E (0I#< 5$< Brief ber den 02 manism s,0 %< 1-2< 5-< =n t is turning !ac" t+ Being 7it in t e %redicati:e) 7it in t e articu 'ati+n essence-eJistence) etc<) cf<) a(+ng a t +usand eJa(%'es) 4ant and the 5roblem of -eta$hysics, %%< 4+ff< 6+< B. t e eJ%ressi+n EBeing +f t e eJistent)E t e s+urce +f s+ (an.

406 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 1 7 0 - 7 5 c+nfusi+ns) 7e d+ n+t understand) ere) as ?eidegger d+es +ccasi+na''. 7 en t e c+nteJt is c'ear en+ug t+ %re:ent (isunderstanding) t e BeingeJistent +f t e eJistent) eJistent ++d $/eiendheit(, !ut rat er t e Being +f eJistent ++d) 7 ic ?eidegger a's+ ca''s t e trut +f Being< 61< E0 e t +ug t 7 ic as"s t e questi+n +f t e trut +f Being <<< is neit er et ics n+r +nt+'+g.< 0 is is 7 . t e questi+n +f t e re'ati+ns i% !et7een t ese t7+ disci%'ines is encef+rt 7it +ut f+undati+n in t is d+(ain<E '4umanismus !" 1$$#<

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 175-77 407 !hysik 'Introduction to *eta!hysics) !!" 3+ff<L and 4olzwe e" ;nd) %ri

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0'ontolo ie est<elle fondamentale5

63< ;n eJ%'icit t e(e in Bein and )ime, f+r eJa(%'e< 6f< t e +%%+siti+n +f "orge, besor en and ?ursor e in secti+n 26< 64< In t e sa(e %r+!'e(atica' +riM+n) +ne (a. c+nfr+nt ?eidegger>s %r+cedures (f+r eJa(%'e) in t e introd ction to 8etaphysics, E=n t e 1ra((ar and /t.(+'+g. +f t e W+rd >Being> E# 7it Ben:eniste>s (E/tre et a:+ir c'ans 'eurs f+ncti+ns 'inguistiques)E in ProblBmes de lin uisti1ue

g9nr role*!
65< ?ere 7e c+u'd refer t+ a undred %assages fr+( ?eidegger< 2at er) 'et us cite 5e:inas) 7 + ad 7ritten) +7e:erB E,+r ?eidegger) t e c+(%re ensi+n +f Being is n+t a %ure'. t e+retica' act < an act +f "n+7'edge 'i"e an. +t erE '$;$)" 66< It is n+t necessar. t+ return t+ t e %re-S+cratics ere< ;rist+t'e a'read. ad rig+r+us'. de(+nstrated t at Being is neit er genre n+r %rinci%'e< (6f< f+r eJa(%'e) 8etaphysics B) 3) --$ ! 20#< D+es n+t t is de(+nstrati+n) (ade at t e sa(e ti(e as a critique +f *'at+) in trut c+nfir( +ne +f t e /ophist-s intenti+nsO 0 ere) Being 7as certain'. defined as +ne +f t e E'argest genres)E and as t e (+st uni:ersa' +f %redicates) !ut a's+ as t at 7 ic %er(its a'' %redicati+n in genera'< ;s t e +rigin and %+ssi!i'it. +f %redicati+n) it is n+t a %redicate) n+t) at 'east) a %redicate 'i"e an. +t er) !ut a transcendental +r transcategorical %redicate< ,urt er) t e " o$h is t% a nd t is is its t e(e-teac es us t+ t in" t at Being-7 ic is +t er t an t e +t er and +t er t e sa(e) is t e sa(e as itse'f) and is i(%'ied !. a'' genres t+ t e eJtent t at t e. are-far fr+( c'+sing difference) +n t e c+ntrar. 'i!erates it) and itse'f is 7 at it is +n'. !. t is 'i!erati+n< 67< 4ant and the Problem of *eta!hysics, trans< Ja(es S< 6 urc i'' (B'++(ingt+nB Indiana 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-62#) %< 233< =n t e n+nc+nce%tua' c aracter +f t e t +ug t +f Being) cf<) a(+ng +t er %'aces :om 7esen des Grundes '(n the $ssence of Reason) in 7e marken %%< 29ff!; 4umanismus, !!" 16$ff<L $infuhrun in die *eta

(ari'.) secti+n 1 of Bein and )ime" 6$< 0 e essentia' re'ati+ns !et7een t e sa(e and t e +t er (difference# are suc t at e:en t e .%+t esis +f a su!su(%ti+n +f t e +t er !. t e sa(e-:i+'ence) acc+rding t+ 5e:inas- as n+ (eaning< 0 e sa(e is n+t a categ+r.) !ut t e %+ssi!i'it. +f e:er. categ+r.< ?ere) 7e s +u'd attenti:e'. c+(%are 5e:inas>s t eses 7it ?eidegger>s teJt entit'ed Identity and ;ifference (1-57#< ,+r 5e:inas) t e sa(e is t e c+nce%t) Gust as Being and unit. are c+nce%ts) and t ese t ree c+nce%ts i((ediate'. c+((unicate a(+ng eac +t er (cf< 0I %< 274) f+r eJa(%'e#< ,+r ?eidegger) t e sa(e is n+t t e identica' (cf< 2 manis (us) f+r eJa(%'e#< ;nd) (ain'.) !ecause it is n+t a categ+r.< 0 e sa(e is n+t t e negati+n +f difference) n+r is Being< 6-< 4ant and the Problem of *eta!hysics !!" 235-36< 70< In is :er. fine stud.) 4 e i d e e r et la !enste de la finitude, ?enri Birau't s +7s +7 t e t e(e +f 9ndlich&eit is %r+gressi:e'. a!and+ned !. ?eidegger) f+r -the same reason 7 ic ad (+ti:ated its use at a cer tain ti(eE due t+ Ec+ncern f+r se%arating fr+( t e t +ug t +f Being n+t +n'. t e sur:i:a's and (eta(+r% +ses +f 6 ristian t e+'+g.) !ut sti'' t e theological itse'f) 7 ic is a!s+'ute'. c+nstituti:e +f (eta% .sics as suc < In effect) if t e ?eideggerean c+nce%t +f 9ndlich&eit 7as ne:er t e 6 ristian-t e+'+gica' c+nce%t +f finitude) it ne:ert e'ess re(ains t at t e idea +f finite Being is in itse'f ontologically t e+'+gica' and) as suc ) is inca%a!'e +f satisf.ing a t +ug t 7 ic dra7s !ac" fr+( &eta% .sics +n'. t+ (editate) in t e 'ig t +f t e f+rg+tten trut +f Being) t e sti'' idden unit. +f its +nt+-t e+'+gica' essenceE $>e%ue internationale de !hiloso!hie, 1g6+) n+< 52#< ; t +ug t 7 ic see"s t+ g+ t+ its :er. end in its 'anguage) t+ t e end +f 7 at it en:isages under t e na(e +f +rigina' finitude +r finitude +f Being) t eref+re s +u'd a!and+n n+t +n'. t e 7+rds and t e(es +f t e finite and t e infinite) !ut a's+) 7 ic is d+u!t'ess i'possible, e:er.t ing t at t e. g+:ern in 'anguage) in t e dee%est sense +f t e 7+rd< 0 is 'ast i(%+ssi!i'it. d+es n+t signif. t at t e !e.+nd +f (eta% .sics is i(%ractica!'eL +n t e c+ntrar.) it c+nfir(s t e necessit. f+r t is inc+((ensura!'e +:erf'+7 t+ ta"e su%%+rt fr+( (eta% .sics< ; necessit. c'ear'. rec+gniMed !. ?eidegger< Indeed) it (ar"s t at +n'. difference is funda(enta') and t at Being is n+t ing +utside t e eJistent< E5i!erte et c+((ande(ent)E Revue de mIta!hysi1ue 71< et de morale, 1-53< @om 7esen des Grundes !!" 56ff< and +inf hr ng in die 72< *eta!hysik %< 150<

9D! 2 manism s, %< 154<

74< I!id< 75< I!id<) %< 133< 76< I!id< 77< 2at er) 'et us cite a %assage fr+( Ef 5earned #gnorance in 7 ic Nic + 'as +f 6usa sa.sB E0 e creature c+(es fr+( 1+d) .et it cann+t) in c+nsequence +f t at) add an.t ing t+ ?i( 7 + is t e &aJi(u( KBeingI< ?+7 are 7e g+ing t+ !e a!'e t+ f+r( an idea +f creature as suc OE ;nd in +rder t+ i''ustrate Et e d+u!'e %r+cess +f en:e'+%(ent and de:e'+%(entE E7 +se (+de is a!s+'ute'. un"n+7n)E e 7ritesB EIt is as if a face 7ere re%r+duced in its +7n i(age< Wit (u'ti%'icati+n +f t e i(age 7e get distant and c'+se re%r+ducti+ns +f t e face< (I d+ n+t (ean distance in s%ace !ut a gradua' distance fr+( t e true face) since 7it +ut t at (u'ti%'icati+n 7+u'd !e i(%+ssi!'e<# In t e (an. different i(ages +f t at face +ne face 7+u'd a%%ear in (an.) different 7a.s) !ut it 7+u'd !e an a%%earance t at t e senses 7+u'd !e inca%a!'e +f rec+gniMing and t e (ind +f understanding<E Ef /earned #gnorance, trans< ,at er 1er(ain ?er+n K5+nd+nB 2+ut'edge and 4egan *au') 1-54I) *< 7-< 7$< 0 e t +ug t +f Being is 7 at %er(its us t+ sa.) 7it +ut nai:ete) reducti+n) +r !'as% e(.) E1+d) f+r eJa(%'e<E 0 at is) t+ think 1+d as 7 at e is 7it +ut (a"ing an +!Gect +f i(< 0 is is 7 at 5e:inas) ere in agree(ent 7it a'' t e (+st c'assica' infinist (eta% .sics) 7+u'd Gudge t+ !e i(%+ssi!'e) a!surd) +r %ure'. :er!a'B +7 t+ t in" 7 at +ne sa.s 7 en +ne %r+%+ses t e eJ%ressi+n) ,od%or t e infinite for e1am$le? But t e n+ti+n +f eJe(%'ariness 7+u'd +ffer (+re t an +ne %iece +f resistance t+ t is +!Gecti+n< 7-< In a :i+'ent artic'e (2eidegger, ,agarine et n+un in 3@cile liberte, ?eidegger is designated as t e ene(. +f tec n+'+g. and c'assed a(+ng t e Eene(ies +f industria' s+ciet.)E 7 + E(+st +ften are reacti+naries<E 0 is is an accusati+n t+ 7 ic ?eidegger as s+ frequent'. and s+ c'ear'. res%+nded t at 7e can d+ n+ !etter t an t+ refer t+ is 7ritings) in %articu'ar t+ /a 7 estion de la techni7 e, 7 ic treats tec n+'+g. as a E(+de +f un:ei'ingE (inE/ssais et conferences*, t+ t e 5etter +n 2 manism, and t+ t e #ntrod ction t+ -eta$hysics (The /imitati+n of Being*, 7 ere a certain :i+'ence) +f 7 ic 7e 7i'' s%ea" in a (+(ent) is 'in"ed in a n+n%eG+rati:e and n+net ica' 7a. t+ tec n+'+g. in t e un:ei'ing +f Being (dainon%techne*! In an. e:ent) 7e can see t e s%ecificit. +f t e accusati+n (ade !. 5e:inas< Being (as c+nce%t# 7+u'd !e t e :i+'ence +f t e neutra'< 0 e

sacred 7+u'd !e t e ne trali)ation +f t e %ers+na' 1+d< 0 e Ereacti+nE against tec n+'+g. 7+u'd n+t a:e as its target t e danger +f tec nica' de%ers+na'iMati+n) !ut %recise'. t at 7 ic 'i!erates fr+( ra:is (ent !. t e Sacred and i(%'antati+n in t e Site< $+< Since 7e cann+t unf+'d t is de!ate ere) 7e 7i'' refer t+ t e c'earest +f ?eideggei s teJts +n t is %+intB (a* "ein and QeitB t e t e(es +fessentia' Cnheimlichkeit, +f t e Enudit.E +f !eing-in-t e-7+r'd) Ea's 9nMu ause<E It is %recise'. t is aut entic c+nditi+n t at t e ne tral eJistence +f t e =ne f'ees fr+(< (b* 2 manism s: c+ncerning ?+'der'in>s %+e( =et rn, ?eidegger n+tes t at in is c+((entar. t e 7+rd Ec+untr.E is Et +ug t in an essentia' sense) n+t at a'' a %atri+tic sense) n+r a nati+na'ist sense) !ut rat er) fr+( t e %+int +f :ie7 +f t e ?ist+r. +f Being<E (c# In t e sa(e '+cati+n) ?eidegger 7rites in %articu'arB E=n t e (eta% .sica' %'ane) e:er. nati+na'is( is an ant r+%+'+gis() and as suc ) a su!Gecti:is(< Nati+na'is( is n+t +:erc+(e !. %ure internati+na'is() !ut is rat er en'arged and Set u% as a s.ste(<E (d# ,ina''.) as c+ncerns t e d7e''ing and t e +(e (7 +se %raises 5e:inas a's+ understands i(se'f t+ sing) !ut) it is true) as a (+(ent +f interi+rit.) and %recise'. as ec+n+(.#) ?eidegger indeed s%ecifies t at t e +(e d+es n+t (eta% +rica''. deter(ine Being +n t e !asis +f its ec+n+(. !ut) +n t e c+ntrar.) can +n'. !e deter(ined as suc +n t e !asis +f t e essence +f Being< 6f< a's+ <<< 5> +((e habite en %+ete) in 7 ic ) 'et us n+te in %assing) ?eidegger distinguis es t e Sa(e and t e /qua' (d+s Se'!edas ,leiche*: E0 e Sa(e sets t+ +ne side an. aste t+ res+':e differences in t e /qua')E in /ssais et conferences! $1< 6f<) f+r eJa(%'e) /r'auterungen Mu 2olderlins 3icht ng (,ran"furt) 1-63#) *< 14< $2< I!id< $3< I!id<) %< 27< $4< 6f< a's+ :om Wesen des ,r ndes! 0 e+'+g.) t e t in"ing +f t e eJistent1+d) +f t e essence and eJistence +f 1+d) t us 7+u'd su%%+se t e t in"ing +f Being< ?ere 7e need n+t refer t+ ?eidegger in +rder t+ understand t is (+:e(ent) !ut first t+ Duns Sc+tus) t+ 7 +( ?eidegger ad de:+ted +ne +f is first 7ritings) as is 7e'' "n+7n< ,+r Duns Sc+tus) t e t +ug t +f c+((+n and unif+r( Being is necessari'. %ri+r t+ t e t +ug t +f t e deter(ined eJistent (deter(ined) f+r eJa(%'e) as finite +r infinite) created +r uncreated) etc<#< W ic d+es n+t (eanB ,irst) t at c+((+n and unif+r( Being is a genre) and t at Duns Sc+tus re:i:es t e ;rist+te'ian de(+nstrati+n 7it +ut ne:ert e'ess

410

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referring t+ t e ana'+g.< (=n t is su!Gect) cf n+ta!'. /tienne 1i's+n) Jean 3 ns Sc+t) #ntrod ction d ses %+siti+ns fonda'entales, %%< 104-5<# Sec+nd) t at t e d+ctrine +f t e unif+r(it. +f Being is inc+(%ati!'e 7it t e ;rist+te'ian-0 +(ist d+ctrine and 7it t e ana'+g. 7 ic ) as 1i's+n s +7s (i!id<) %%< $4-115#) is situated +n an+t er %'ane) and

!et7een 5e:inas and ?eidegger-Eis t eref+re %+sed +n a terrain) +rder t+ %enetrate it) +ne (ust first a:e e(erged fr+( t e di'e((a > i(%+sed !. ;rist+te'ianis( !et7een t e uni:ersa' and t e singu'ar) t e >first> and t e >sec+nd)> and t ere!. a:e esca%ed t e necessit. +f c ++sing !et7een t e ana'+g+us and t e unif+r() 7 ic can +n'. !e acc+(%'is ed !. is+'ating a n+ti+n +f Being in s+(e 7a. (eta% .sica''. %ure +f a'' deter(inati+nE (i!id<) %< $-#< It f+''+7s t at if t e t +ug t +f Being (7 ic 1i's+n) differing fr+( ?eidegger) ere ca''sL E(eta% .sicsE# is i(%'ied in a'' t e+'+g.) it d+es n+t %recede it) +r g+:ern it in an. 7a.) as 7+u'd a %rinci%'e +r a c+nce%t< 0 e re'ati+ns +f $5< Sartre) 'i"e 5e:inas) ad ear'ier inter%reted t e -itsein in t e sense +f

$$< Nic +'as +f 6usa) The #diot, trans'ated (1650# fr+( #diota (1450#) edited !. *< 2adin (San ,rancisc+B 6a'if+rnia State 5i!rar. =ccasi+na' *a%ers) 2e%rint Series n+< 1-) 1-40#) **< 15-16< >9! +ntre de 1 mondes (EBi+gra% ie s%iritue''e de ,ranM 2+senM7eigE in 5a conscience @ ive K*arisB *<9<,< 1-63I) %< 126#< 0 is 'ecture) a'+ng 7it an artic'e !. ;< Ne er (8ahiers de #0#nstit t de science +conomi7 e a$$li7 ?, 1-5-) is t e +n'. i(%+rtant teJt de:+ted t+ 2+senM7eig) !etter "n+7n in ,rance as t e aut +r +f 2egel and der "toat t an +f Der "tern der =rldsung (The "tar of +ede!ption, 1-21#< 2+senM7eig>s inf'uence +n 5e:inas see(s t+ a:e !een %r+f+und< EWe 7ere i(%ressed !. t e +%%+siti+n t+ t e idea +f t+ta'it. in ,ranM 2+senM7eig>s "tern der +rl os ng, a 7+r" t++ +ften %resent in t is !++" t+ !e citedE 0I) %< 2$< -+< In is =Gposition of Philosophical +m$iricism Sc e''ing 7r+teB E0 us 1+d 7+u'd !e Being enc'+sed in itse'f in an a!s+'ute (anner) 7+u'd !e su!stance in t e (+st e'e:ated sense) free +f every re'ati+n< But f r o m t e :er. fact t at 7e c+nsider t ese deter(inati+ns as %ure'. i((a nent) as re'ating t+ n+t ing eJterna') +ne finds +nese'f in t e necessit. +f a:ing t+ c+ncei:e t e( !. %arting fr+( 2 i m , t at is) t+ c+ncei:e i( as t e $ri s, t at is as t e a!s+'ute $ri s! ;nd it is t us t at) %us ed t+ its fina' c+nsequences) e(%iricis( 'eads us t+ t e su%ra e(%irica'<E Natura''.) !. Eenc'+sedE and Eenf+'dedE +ne is n+t t+ understand finite c'+sure and eg+istic (uteness) !ut rat er a!s+'ute a'terit.) 7 at 5e:inas ca''s t e Infinite a!s+':ed +f re'ati+n< ;n ana'+g+us (+:e(ent is +ut'ined in Bergs+n) 7 +) in is #ntrod ction to &eta% .sics) criticiMes t e e(%iricist d+ctrines unfait fu' t+ %ure eJ%erience in t e na(e +f true e(%iricis() and c+nc'udesB E0 is true e(%iricis( is t e true (eta% .sics<E *ure difference is n+t a!s+'ute'. 9&! different (fr+( n+ndifference#< ?ege'>s critique +f t e c+nce%t +f %ure difference is f+r us ere) d+u!t'ess) t e (+st uncircu(:enta!'e t e(e< ?ege' t +ug t a!s+'ute difference) and s +7ed t at it can !e %ure +n'. !. !eing i(%ure< In t e &cience of /ogic, as c+ncerns *bsolute 4ifference, ?ege' 7rites) f+r eJa(%'eB E0 is difference is difference inand-f+r-itse'f) a!s+'ute difference) t e difference +f /ssence< It is difference in-and-f+r-itse'f n+t !. t e effect +f an eJterna' cause) !ut a difference in re'ati+n t+ itse'f) t us a si(%'e difference< It is essentia' t+ see in a!s+'ute difference a si(%'e difference <<< Difference in itse'f is difference in re'ati+n t+ itse'fL t us it is its +7n negati:it.) difference n+t in re'ati+n t+ an other, !ut in re'ati+n t+ itse'f <<< W at differentiates difference is identit.< Difference) t us) is !+t itse'f and identit.< B+t t+get er (a"e

/e conce$t d monde che) 2eidegger! #n t is 7+r") Wa'ter Bie(e') 7it

(uc %recisi+n and c'arit.) c+nfr+nts t is inter%retati+n 7it ?eidegger>s intenti+ns (%%< g+'f#< 5et us add si(%'. t at t e w i t h +f t e 8itsein originally n+ (+re den+tes t e structure +f a tea( ani(ated (ated !. a neutra' c+((+n tas" t an d+es t e w i t h +f t e E'anguage w i t h 1+dE (0I#< 0 e Being 7 ic can inter%e''ate t e 8itsein is n+t) as 5e:inas +ften gi:es us t+ understand) a t ird ter() a c+((+n trut ) etc< ,ina''.) t e n+ti+n +f 8itsein descri!es an +rigina' structure +f t e (eaning +f Eenc+unterE +r +f Ec+nstituti+n)E t at is) t+ t e de!ate 7 ic 7e (enti+ned a!+:e< $=f a's+ Being and Time: "'ith and also (ust !e underst++d as eJistentia'es and n+t as categ+ries<E# $6< 6f< #ntrod ction t+ -eta$hysics (es%ecia''. E0 e 5i(itati+n +f BeingE#< $7< We (ust s%ecif. ere) t at E+nt+'+g.E d+es n+t refer t+ t e c+nce%t +f +nt+'+g. 7 ic ?eidegger %r+%+ses t+ ren+unce (cf< a!+:e Kn+te 4I#) !ut t+ t e unfinda!'e eJ%ressi+n !. 7 ic it (ust !e re%'aced< 0 e 7+rd E ist+rica'E a's+ (ust !e (+dified in +rder t+ !e underst++d in c+ns+nance 7it t e 7+rd E+nt+'+gica')E +f7 ic it is n+t an attri!ute) and in re'ati+n t+ 7 ic it (ar"s n+ deri:ati+n<

412 N=0/S 0= *;1/ 1-2 differenceL difference is !+t t e ;'' and its +7n (+(ent< It can Gust as (uc !e said t at difference) as si(%'e) is n+t difference at a''L it is suc first in re'ati+n t+ identit.L !ut as suc ) difference c+ntains !+t itse'f and t is re'ati+ns i%< Difference is t e ;'' and its +7n (+(ent) Gust as identit. is t e ;'' and its +7n (+(entE ('issenschaft der /ogik, K5ei%Mig 0 JI) 2B4$ -4-#< -2< Ja(es J+.ce) Clysses; %< 622 But 5e:inas d+es n+t care f+r 9'.sses) n+r f+r t e ruses +f t is eJcessi:e'. ?ege'ian er+) t is (an +f n+st+s and t e c'+sed circ'e) 7 +se ad:enture is a'7a.s su((ariMed in its t+ta'it.< 5e:inas +ften re%r+ac es i(< E0+ t e (.t +f 9'.sses returning t+ It aca) 7e 7+u'd %refer t+ +%%+se t e st+r. +f ;!ra a( 'ea:ing is c+untr. f+re:er f+r an as .et un"n+7n 'and) and f+r!idding is ser:ant t+ ta"e !ac" e:en is s+n t+ t e %+int +f de%artureE (/a trace d e #0a tre*! 0 e i(%+ssi!i'it. +f t e return d+u!t'ess 7as n+t +:er'++"ed !. ?eideggerB t e +rigina' ist+ricit. +f Being) t e +rigina'it. +f difference) and irreduci!'e 7andering a'' f+r!id t e return t+ Being itself 7 ic is n+t ing< 0 eref+re) 5e:inas ere is in agree(ent 7it ?eidegger< In:erse'.) is t e t e(e +f t e return as un e!raic as a'' t atO W i'e c+nstructing B'++( and Ste% en (Saint Ste% en) t e ?e''enic-Je7#) J+.ce t++" great interest in t e t eses +f Aict+r Berard) 7 + sa7 9'.sses as a Se(ite< It is true t at EJe7gree" is gree"Ge7E is a ne tral %r+%+siti+n) an+n.(+us in t e sense eJecrated !. 5e:inas) inscri!ed in 5.nc >s head$iece! E5anguage +f n+ +ne)E 5e:inas 7+u'd sa.< &+re+:er) it is attri!uted t+ 7 at is ca''ed Efe(inine '+gicEB EW+(an>s reas+n< Je7gree" is gree"Ge7<E =n t is su!Gect) 'et us n+te in %assing t at 0+ta'it. and #nfinity %us es t e res%ect f+r diss.((etr. s+ far t at it see(s t+ us i(%+ssi!'e) essentia''. i(%+ssi!'e) t at it c+u'd a:e !een 7ritten !. a 7+(an< Its % i'+s+% ica' su!Gect is (an (:ir#< (6f<) f+r eJa(%'e) t e * en+(en+'+g. of +ros, 7 ic +ccu%ies suc an i(%+rtant %'ace in t e !++">s ec+n+(.<# Is n+t t is %rinci%'ed i(%+ssi!i'it. f+r a !++" t+ a:e !een 7ritten !. a 7+(an unique in t e ist+r. +f (eta% .sica' 7ritingO 5e:inas ac"n+7'edges e'se7 ere t at fe(ininit. is an E+nt+'+gica' categ+r.<E S +u'd t is re(ar" !e %'aced in re'ati+n t+ t e essentia' :iri'it. +f (eta% .sica' 'anguageO But %er a%s (eta% .sica' desire is essentia''. :iri'e) e:en in 7 at is ca''ed 7+(an< It a%%ears t at t is is 7 at ,reud (7 + 7+u'd a:e (isc+nstrued seJua'it. as t e Ere'ati+ns i% 7it 7 at is a!s+'ute'. +t er)E T#*, t +ug t) n+t +f desire) certain'.) !ut +f 'i!id+< 5B 1/N/SIS ;ND S0296092/

N=0/S 0= *;1/S I-5-200 413

i< ?usser') 4ormale and trans)endentale /ogik (?a''e) 1-2-#) %< 76< 2< ?usser') 5+gisc e Cnters ch ngen (0u!ingen) 1-6$#) 2) I) sec< 21) %< 101< 3< ?usser' sa.s at t is ti(e t at it is a questi+n +f) E%re%aring !. a series +f >%s.c +'+gica' and '+gica' researc es> t e scientific f+undati+ns f+r a future structure +n 7 ic t+ erect (at e(atics and % i'+s+% .E (* i'+s+% ie der Arithmetik, 2 sserliana, :+'< 12 K0 e ?ague) 1-70I *< 5#< In t e /ogische Cnters ch ngen e 7ritesB EI set +ut fr+( an a!s+'ute c+n:icti+n t at) 'i"e '+gic in genera') t e '+gic +f deducti:e science a7aited its % i'+s+% ica' c'arificati+n fr+( %s.c +'+g. (i!id<) :+'< 1) %< :i#< ;nd an artic'e 7ritten s +rt'. after t e 5hiloso$hic der Arithmetik, ?usser' asserts againB EI !e'ie:e it %+ssi!'e t+ (aintain t at n+ t e+r. +f Gudg(ent 7i'' e:er !e in agree(ent 7it t e facts if it is n+t !ased u%+n a %r+f+und stud. +f t e descri%ti:e and genetic re'ati+ns !et7een intuiti+ns and re%resentati+nsE (E*s.c +'+gisc e Studien Mur e'e(entaren 5+gi")E 5hiloso$hische -onatshefte DD KBer'in) 1$-4IB 1$7 ((. ita'ics#< 4< 0 e 5hiloso$hie derArithmetik is dedicated t+ Brentan+< 5< S%ea"ing +f t e atte(%t (ade in 5hiloso$hie der Arithmetik, ?usser' n+tes) in t e %reface t+ t e /ogische Cnters ch ngen: E6+rres%+nding'.) t e %s.c +'+gica' researc es +ccu%. a :er. 'arge %'ace in t e first (and +n'. %u!'is ed# :+'u(e +f (. % i'+s+% . +f arit (etic< 0 is %s.c +'+gica' f+undati+n ne:er see(ed t+ (e t+ suffice f+r certain de:e'+%(ents< W ene:er it 7as a questi+n +f t e +rigin +f (at e(atica' deter(inati+ns) +r +f t e in fact %s.c +'+gica''. deter(ined s a%ing +f %ractica' (et +ds) t e resu'ts +f %s.c +'+gica' ana'.sis a%%eared t+ (e t+ !e c'ear and instructi:e< But as s++n as t e transiti+n fr+( t e %s.c +'+gica' de:e'+%(ents +f t +ug t t+ t e '+gica' unit. +f t e c+ntent +f t +ug t (t e unit. +f t e+r.# 7as (ade) n+ rea' c+ntinuit. +r c'arit. 7as a%%arentE (i!id<) :+'< 1) %< :ii#< 6< ?usser' 7ritesB EI d+ n+t understand +7 e KDi't e.I !e'ie:es t at e as gained decisi:e gr+unds against s"e%ticis( +n t e !asis +f is :er. instructi:e ana'.sis +f t e structure and t.%+'+g. +f 'eltanscha ngen" (5hiloso$hie als strenge 'issenschaft K,ran"furt 1-65I) %< 53#< Natura''.) ist+ricis( is c+nde(ned +n'. t+ t e eJtent t at it is necessari'. tied t+ an e(%irica' ist+r.) t+ a ist+r. as Tatsachenwissenschaft! E? ist+r.) t e em$irical science +f t e (ind in genera') is inca%a!'e +f deciding !. its +7n (eans 7 et er +r n+t re'igi+n s +u'd !e distinguis ed

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 2 00 - 3

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 203-5

415

as a %articu'ar f+r( +f cu'ture fr+( re'igi+n as idea) t at is) as :a'id re'igi+nL +r 7 et er art s +u'd !e distinguis ed as a f+r( +f cu'ture fr+( :a'id art) ist+rica' rig t f rom :a'id rig t) and fina''.) if % i'+s+% . in t e ist+rica' sense s +u'd !e distinguis ed fr+( :a'id % i'+s+% .E (i!id<#< 7< 6f< 5hiloso$hie als strenge 'issenschaft, %< 61< $< 0 e %+'e(ic 7i'' !e %ursued !e.+nd 5hiloso$hie als strenge Wissen sc aft< 8f! 5hdnomenologische 5sychologie: :orles ngen "ommersemester, 1-25< -< S%ea"ing +f t e fee'ing +f %+7er 7 ic can ensure ist+rica' re'ati: is() ?usser' 7ritesB EWe insist u%+n t e fact t at t e %rinci%'es +f suc re'ati:e e:a'uati+ns !e'+ng t+ t e idea' s% ere) and t at t e ist+rian 7 + e:a'uates) and d+es n+t +n'. see" t+ understand %ureR de:e'+%(ents K+f factsI) can +n'. %resu%%+se) !ut cann+t) as a ist+r< ian) ensure t eir f+undati+n< 0 e n+r( +f (at e(atics is f+und in t e (at e(atica') t at +f '+gic in t e '+gica') t at +f et ics in t e et ica')

etc!" (5hiloso$hie als strenge 'issenschaft, $! FB*

i+< EWisd+( +r 'eltanscha ng!!! !e'+ng t+ t e cu'tura' c+((unit. and t+ t e ti(es) and in re'ati+n t+ its (+st %r+n+unced f+r(s t ere is a and 'eltanscha ng, !ut +f an entire e%+c >s<E It is t is 7isd+() ?us ser' c+ntinues) 7 ic gi:es Et e re'ati:e'. (+st %erfect ans7er t+ t e t+r. c'arificati+n) in t e !est %+ssi!'e 7a.) +f t e t e+retica') aJi+ '+gica') and %ractica' disagree(ents +f 'ife) 7 ic eJ%erience) 7isd+() and t e %ure a%%re ensi+n +f 'ife and t e 7+r'd can res+':e +n'. i(%erfect'.E (5hiloso$hie als strenge 'issenschaft, %%< 5$-5-#< EIn t e urgenc. +f 'ife) in t e %ractica' necessit. t+ ta"e a %+siti+n) (an cann+tB a7ait-%er a%s f+r (i''ennia-t at science !e t ere) su%%+sing t at e a'read. "n+7s t e idea +f rig+r+us scienceE (i!id<) %< 64#<

ii< 8f! notably #deas, trans! '! =! Boyce ,ibson (/ondon: Allen and Cnwin, 1-31#) I) sec< 1) %< 51) n< 1< 12< I!id<) I) secs< - and 25< 13< I!id<) sec< 71) %< 202< 14< EWit t e e'% +f aJi+(s) i<e<) +f %ri(+rdia' 'a7s +f /ssentia' Being

and in t e f+r( +f eJact deter(ining c+nce%ts 7 ic re%resent essences t at re(ain as a ru'e estranged fr+( +ur intuiti+n) all f+r(s t at >eJist> .e1istierendenG in s%ace) i<e<) a'' s%atia' f+r(s t at are idea''. %+ssi!'e and a'' t e essentia' re'ati+ns t at c+ncern t e(< 0 e essen

tia' generic nature +f t e d+(ain +f ge+(etr.) and in re'ati+n t eret+ t e %ure essentia' nature +f s%ace) is s+ +rdered t at ge+(etr. can !e fu''. certain +f !eing a!'e t+ c+ntr+' 7it eJact %recisi+n) t r+ug its (et +d) rea''. a'' t e %+ssi!'e cases< In +t er 7+rds) t e :ariet. +f s%atia' f+r(ati+ns genera''. as a re(ar"a!'e '+gica' !asic %r+%ert.) t+ indicate 7 ic 7e intr+duce t e name 0definite0 manifold +r>rnat e(at ical manifold in the $regnant sense of the term!0 #t has the following distinctive feat re, that a finite n mber of conce$ts and $ro$ositions !! ! determines com$letely and nambig o sly on lines of $ re logical necessity the totality of all $ossible formations in the domain, so that in $rinci$le, t eref+re) nothing f rther remains +%en 7it in itE (i!id<) sec< 72) %< 204#< 05< 6f< Ideas) n+ta!'. t ird %art) c a%s< 2 and 4< 16< I!id<) sec< $5) *< 247< 17< In t e %aragra% de:+ted t+ hyle and mor$he ?usser' 7rites) (+st n+ta!'.) E;t t e 'e:e' +f discussi+n t+ 7 ic 7e a:e s+ far !een 'i(ited) 7 ic st+%s s +rt +f descending int+ t e +!scure de%t s +f t e u'ti(ate c+nsci+usness 7 ic c+nstitutes t e 7 +'e sc e(e +f intenti+na' eJ%erienceE (i!id<) %< 246#< ,urt er +nB E;t a'' e:ents) in t e 7 +'e % en+(en+'+gica' d+(ain (in t e 7 +'e) t at is) 7it in t e stage +f c+nstituted te(%+ra'it.) as (ust a'7a.s !e !+rne in (ind#) t is re(ar"a!'e dua'it. and unit. +f sensi'e hyle and intentional mor$he %'a.s a d+(inant %artE (%< 247#< *re:i+us'.) after a:ing c+(%ared t e s%atia' and te(%+ra' di(ensi+ns +f t e .'e ?usser' indicated) 7 i'e Gustif.ing t e() t e 'i(its +f static descri%ti+n and t e necessit. +f (a"ing t e transiti+n t+ genetic descri%ti+nB E,+r t e rest) as 7i'' !e a%%arent in t e 'ig t +f t e studies t+ !e underta"en 'ater) 0i(e is t e name for a com$letely self%contained s$here of $roblems and one of eJce%ti+na' difficu't.< It 7i'' !e seen t at in a certain sense +ur %re:i+us eJ%+siti+n as !een si'ent) and necessari'. s+) c+ncerning a 7 +'e di(ensi+n) s+ as t+ (aintain free +f c+nfusi+n 7 at first !ec+(es trans%arent fr+( t e % en+(en+'+gica' stand%+int a'+ne <<< 0 e transcendenta' >;!s+'ute> 7 ic 7e a:e 'aid !are t r+ug t e reducti+ns is in trut n+t u'ti(ateL it is s+(et ing 7 ic in a certain %r+f+und and 7 +''. unique sense c+nstitutes itse'f) and as its %ri(e:a' s+urce .Cr7 elleG in 7 at is u'ti(ate'. and tru'. a!s+'uteE (i!id<) %< 236#< Wi'' t is 'i(itati+n e:er disa%%ear in t e 7+r"s e'a!+rated 'aterO =ne enc+unters reser:ati+ns +f t is t.%e in a'' t e great 'ater !++"s) %articu'ar'. in +rfahr ng and Crteil (%%< 72) 116) 1-4) etc<# and e:er. ti(e t at a Etranscendenta' aest eticE is ann+unced

(6+nc'usi+n +f ,+r(a'e and trans)endentale 5+gi" and 8artesian -edi% tati+ns) see< 61#< 1$< N+ta!'. t is is t e %r+Gect +f 4+ 'er) f+r 7 +( %s.c +'+g. (ust surrender t+ E% en+(en+'+gica' descri%ti+n)E and +f 4+ff"a) a disci%'e +f ?usser' 7 + see"s t+ s +7) in is 5rinci$les of ,estalt 5sychology, t at t e E%s.c +'+g. +f f+r(E esca%es t e criticis( +f %s.c +'+gis( !. (eans +f its structura'is(< 0 e c+nGuncti+n +f % en+(en+'+g. and t e E%s.c +'+g. +f f+r(E 7as readi'. f+reseea!'e< N+t at t e (+(ent 7 en ?usser' ad t+ EreturnE t+ t e En+ti+n +f >c+nfigurati+n> and e:en +f 1esta'tE in t e 6risis) as &er'eau-*+nt. suggests (5henomenologie de la $erce$tion, %< 62) n< 1#) !ut) +n t e c+ntrar.) !ecause ?usser' a'7a.s a''eged) and 7it s+(e Gustificati+n) t at ,estalt$sychologie !+rr+7ed is +7n c+nce%ts) %articu'ar'. t e c+nce%t +f E(+ti:ati+nE (cf< #deas, sec< 47) and 8artesian -editations, sec< 37# 7 ic ad a'read. a%%eared in t e 5+gisc e 9ntersuc ungen) and t e c+nce%t +f an +rganiMed t+ta'it.) t e unified %'ura'it.) a'read. %resent in 5hiloso$hie der Arithmetik (1$$7--1#< 6+ncerning a'' t ese questi+ns 7e refer t+ ;< 1ur7itsc >s i(%+rtant 7+r"

Theorie d cham$ de la conscience!

1-< (?a''e) 1-13#) %%< 564ff< 20< ESince t e (+nadica''. c+ncrete eg+ inc'udes a's+ t e 7 +'e +f actua' and %+tentia' c+nsci+us 'ife) it is c'ear t at t e %r+!'e( +f eJ%'icating t is (+nadic ego $henomenologically (t e %r+!'e( +f is c+nstituti+n f+r i(se'f# (ust inc'ude a'' c+nstituti+na' $roblems witho t e1ce$tion! 6+nsequent'.) t e % en+(en+'+g. +f t is self%constit tion c+incides 7it $henomenology as a whole!" (8artesian -editations, trans< D+rian 6airns K0 e ?agueB &artinus NiG +ff) 1g6+I) see< 33) %< 6$#< 21< EN+7) +7e:er) 7e (ust ca'' attenti+n t+ a great ga% in +ur eJ%+siti+n< 0 e eg+ is i(se'f e1istent for himself in c+ntinu+us e:idenceL t us) in i(se'f) e is contin o sly constit ting himself as e1isting! ?eret+f+re 7e a:e t+uc ed +n +n'. +ne side +f t is se'f-c+nstituti+n) 7e a:e '++"ed at +n'. t e flowing cogito! 0 e eg+ gras%s i(se'f n+t +n'. as a f'+7ing 'ife !ut a's+ as I) 7 + 'i:e t is and t at su!Gecti:e %r+cess) 7 + 'i:e t r+ug t is and t at c+git+ as t e sa(e I< Since 7e 7ere !usied u% t+ n+7 7it t e intenti+na' re'ati+n +f c+nsci+usness t+ +!Gect) c+git+ t+ c+gitatu( <<<E etc< (i!id<) %< 66#< 22< E;ccess t+ t e u'ti(ate uni:ersa'ities in:+':ed in %r+!'e(s +f eidetic % en+(en+'+g. is) +7e:er) :er. difficu't< 0 is is %articu'ar'. true 7it res%ect t+ an ltimate genesis! 0 e !eginning % en+(en+'+gist is !+und in:+'untari'. !. t e circu(stance t at e ta"es i(se'f as is

initia' eJa(%'e< 0ranscendenta''. e finds i(se'f as t e eg+) t en as generica''. an eg+) 7 + a'read. as (in c+nsci+us fas i+n# a 7+r'd-a 7+r'd +f +ur uni:ersa''. fa(i'iar +nt+'+gica' t.%e) 7it Nature) 7it cu'ture (sciences) fine art) (ec anica' art and s+ f+rt #) 7it %ers+na'ities +f a ig er +rder (state) c urc #) and t e rest< 0 e % en+(en+'+g. de:e'+%ed at first is (ere'. >static>L its descri%ti+ns are ana'+g+us t+ t +se +f natura' ist+r.) 7 ic c+ncerns %articu'ar t.%es and) at !est) arranges t e( in t eir s.ste(atic +rder< @uesti+ns +f uni:ersa' genesis and t e genetic structure +f t e eg+ in is uni:ersa'it.) s+ far as t at structure is (+re t an te(%+ra' f+r(ati+n) are sti'' far a7a.L and) indeed) t e. !e'+ng t+ a ig er 'e:e'< But e:en 7 en t e. are raised) it is 7it a restricti+n< ;t first) e:en eidetic +!ser:ati+n 7i'' c+nsider an eg+ as suc 7it t e restricti+n t at a c+nstituted 7+r'd a'read. eJists f+r i(< 0 is) (+re+:er) is a necessar. 'e:e'L +n'. !. 'a.ing +%en t e 'a7-f+r(s +f t e genesis %ertaining t+ t is 'e:e' can +ne see t e %+ssi!i'ities +f a ma1imally niversal eidetic % en+(en+'+g.E (i!id<) %%< 76-77#< 23< The 8risis of + ro$ean "ciences and Transcendental 5henomenology! trans< Da:id 6arr (/:anst+nB N+rt 7estern 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-70#) %< 37$< K0 is citati+n is fr+( E0 e =rigin +f 1e+(etr.)E trans'ated int+ ,renc !. Derrida-0rans<I 2B! 8artesian -editations, sec< 37) %< 75< 25< 0N< ;ut+-affecti+n refers a's+ t+ ?eidegger>s ana'.sis +f 4ant>s n+ti+n +f ti(e in Aant and the 5roblem of -eta$hysics! ;s can !e seen in t e neJt fe7 sentences t e c+nce%t +f aut+-affecti+n is c+ncerned 7it ti(e as t e se'f-generating infinite series +f resen! (+(ents< ?ere Derrida is !eginning t e i(%+rtant ana'.sis +f s%eec as t at 7 ic (a"es trut %resent< It is t is ana'.sis 7 ic 7i'' a''+7 i( t+ :ie7 t e treat(ent +f 7riting !. % i'+s+% . as an indeJ +f t e si(i'ar %arad+Jes c+ntained 7it in t e n+ti+ns +f s%eec and %resence< Derrida>s !++" +n ?usser') /a voi+ et le !henomene (*arisB *<9<,<) 1-67# c+ntains an eJtended ana'.sis +f s%eec as aut+-affecti+n< 26< 8artesian -editations, sec< 6+) %< 13-< 27< I!id<) sec< 64) %< 156< 2$< 0 ese eJ%ressi+ns fr+( 'ate ?usser' are +rdered as in ;rist+te'ean (eta% .sics) 7 ere eidos, logos, and telos deter(ine t e transiti+n fr+( %+7er t+ act< 6ertain'.) 'i"e t e na(e +f 1+d) 7 ic ?usser' a's+ ca''s /nte'ec .) t ese n+ti+ns are designated !. a transcendenta' indeJ) and t eir (eta% .sica' :irtue is neutra'iMed !. % en+(en+'+gica' !rac"ets< But) +f c+urse) t e %+ssi!i'it. +f t is neutra'iMati+n)

41$ N=0/S 0= *;1/S 20-- 15 t e %+ssi!i'it. +f its %urit.) its c+nditi+ns) +r its Ei((+ti:ati+n)E 7i'' ne:er cease t+ !e %r+!'e(atica'< N+r did it e:er cease t+ !e s+ f+r ?usser' i(se'f) 'i"e t e %+ssi!i'it. +f t e transcendenta' reducti+n itse'f< 0 e 'atter (aintains an essentia' affinit. 7it (eta% .sics< 2-< 3ie Arisis der e ro$aischen 'issenschaften and die trans)endentale

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 215-25 41-

5hdnomenologie (0 e ?agueB &artinus NiG +ff) 1-54#) **< 502-3< 6B 5;

*;2=5/ S=9,,5// i< 0N< =n t e questi+n +f (adness and t e 7+r") cf< a!+:e) E6+git+ and t e ?ist+r. +f &adness)E in 7 ic Derrida eJa(ines at 'engt ,+ucau't>s definiti+n +f (adness as Et e a!sence +f t e 7+r"<E 2< &ic e' ,+ucau't E5e >n+n> d $ere," 8riti7 e, &arc 1-62) %%< 207-$< I,+ucau't>s artic'e is a re:ie7 +f Jean 5a%'anc e>s 2olderlin et la 7 es

tion d $ere; *arisB *<9<,<) 1-61<I 3< 0N< &aurice B'anc +t) /e livre a venir (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-5-#) *< 4$< 4< 0N< 0 is is a %re-?ege'ian c+nce%t +f t e re'ati+ns !et7een trut ) err+r) and ist+r. !ecause) f+r ?ege') ist+rica' Eerr+rE is dia'ectica''. intrinsic t+ ist+rica' trut ) and indi:idua' eJ%erience is ne:er is+'ated
fr+( ist+rica' %r+cess< 5< B'anc +t) /e livre a venir, %< 4$< 6< I!id<) %< 57< 7< 0N< 0 is is t e figure +f t e E!eautifu' s+u'E fr+( t e 5henomenology! ?ege' is genera''. c+nsidered t+ a:e !een descri!ing N+:a'is in is ana'.sis +f t e E!eautifu' s+u'<E Derrida see(s t+ !e sa.ing ere t at Gust as ?ege' (a"es N+:a'is an eJa(%'e +f a transcendenta' structure 7it +ut c+nsidering an.t ing in N+:a'is t at d+es n+t %artici%ate in t is structure) s+ B'anc +t is (a"ing an eJa(%'e +f ;rtaud) ine:ita!'. reducing t+ t e 'e:e' +f err+r t at 7 ic is %articu'ar t+ ;rtaud< $< 0 is affir(ati+n) 7 +se na(e is Et e t eater +f crue't.)E is %r+n+unced after t e 'etters t+ Jacques 2i:iere and after t e ear'. 7+r"s) !ut it a'read. g+:erns t e(< E0 e t eater +f crue't. P is n+t t e s.(!+' +f an a!sent :+id) P +r a +rrif.ing ina!i'it. t+ rea'iMe +nese'f 7it in +ne>s 'ife P as a %ers+n) P it is t e affir(ati+n P +f a terrif.ing P and) (+re+:er) una:+ida!'e necessit.E (5e theatre de to cr o te, $4) n+s< 5-6 K1-4$I) %<124#< K0 ere is n+ c+(%'ete trans'ati+n +f;rtaud>s 7+r" int+ /ng'is < 2eferences t+ =6 are t+ t e fu:res com$letes (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-70#) !. :+'u(e and $age! T3 refers t+ The Theater and #ts 3o ble, trans< &ar. 6ar+'ine 2ic ards (Ne7 D+r"B 1r+:e *ress) 1-5$#L ;; refers t+ t e ;rtaud ;nt +'+g.) ed< Jac" ?irsc (an (San ,rancisc+B 6it. 5ig ts

B++"s) 1-65#L 6W refers t+ :+'u(e and %age +f t e =ollected .or&s, trans< Aict+r 6+rti (5+nd+nB 6a'der 3 B+.ars) 1-71#<I -< B'anc +t) Le livre a venir, %< 52< 10< *reface t+ 4ar' Jas%ers> &trindberg et :an 1+g ) 2olderlin et &wedenborg (*arisB /diti+ns de &inuit) 1-53#< 0 e sa(e essentia'ist sc e(a) e:en (+re !are t is ti(e) a%%ears in an+t er teJt +f B'anc +t>sB E5a crue''e rais+n %+etique)E in ;rtaud et le Theatre de n+tre te(%s (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-5$#< 11< 0N< 5a%'anc e (see n+te 2 a!+:e#) %< 11< ?e''ingrat 7as a ?+'der'in sc +'ar and edit+r +f is c+''ected 7+r"s< 12< E?+'der'in>s eJistence t us 7+u'd !e a %articu'ar'. g++d eJa(%'e +f %+etic fate) 7 ic B'anc +t 'in"s t+ t e :er. essence +f s%eec as t e >re'ati+n t+ a!sence<> E 5a%'anc e) %< 1+< 13< 0N< 0 e na(e +ft is essa. is untrans'ata!'e !ecause it %'a.s +n a'' t e (eanings +f so ffler, s+(e +f 7 ic Derrida is a!+ut t+ eJ%'ain< We a:e c +sen Es%irited a7a.E !ecause it (aintains t e c+nnecti+ns 7it t eft) !reat (from t e 5atin s$irare*, and t e (u'ti%'e (eanings +f in-s%irati+n< 0 e ,renc 7+rd f+r E%r+(%terE (so ffle r* (ig t !est !e rendered !. t e ne+'+gis( Eins%irat+r<E /:er. use +f a deri:ati:e +f souffler in t e +rigina' teJt as !een indicated in !rac"ets< 14< 0 e %u!'ic is n+t t+ eJist +utside) !ef+re +r after t e stage +f crue't.) is n+t t+ a7ait it) t+ c+nte(%'ate it) +r t+ sur:i:e it-is n+t e:en t+ eJist as a %u!'ic at a''< W ence an enig(atic and 'a%idar. f+r(u'ati+n) in #he #heater and (ts 4ouble, in t e (idst +f a!undant) ineJ austi!'e definiti+ns +f Edirecting)E t e E'anguage +f t e Stage)E E(usica' instru(ents)E E'ig ting)E Ec+stu(es)E etc< 0 e %r+!'e( +f t e %u!'ic is t ere!. eJ austedB +The 4ublic ,irst +f a'' t is t eater (ust eJistE (#4, P. --#< 15< 0 e 7+rd a%%ears in Herve/&cales, :" 1B72< KIn t e :ollected "orks, t e +rigina' im$o voir 7 ic 7e a:e trans'ated as Eun%+7er)E is trans'ated as E%+7er'essness<EI 16< 0N< =e$etition in ,renc (eans !+t re%etiti+n and re earsa'< 17< 0N< 0 e reference t+ *+e>s E0 e *ur'+ined 5etterE see(s de'i!erate< 0 is st+r. 7as t e f+cus +f a se(inar !. Jacques 5acan in 7 ic e eJ%+unded is t e+r. +ft e signifier) as d+es Derrida ere< 1$< 0N< 0 e eJcess in questi+n (a. !e c+nstrued as t at 7 ic +'ds a%art and unites (u'ti%'e (eanings in +ne signifier< 0 at a ist+rica' s.ste( (ust !e +%en at s+(e %+int (eans t at it (ust !e f+unded +n s+(et ing 'i"e t is eJcess< ?ist+r. !egins 7it 7riting< 1-< Wit t e %r+%er %recauti+ns 7e c+u'd s%ea" +f ;rtaud>s Bergs+nian

:ein< 0 e c+ntinu+us transiti+n +f is (eta% .sics +f 'ife int+ is t e+r. +f 5anguage) and is critique +f t e 7+rd) dictated a great nu(!er +f t e+retica' f+r(u'ati+ns and (eta% +rs +f energ. t at are rig+r+us'. Bergs+nian< 6f<) in %articu'ar) =6 5B15) 1$) 56) 132) 141) etc< 20< /ac ti(e t at it +%erates 7it in t e fra(e7+r" t at 7e are atte(%ting t+ rest+re ere) ;rtaud>s 'anguage as a %recise rese(!'ance) in its s.ntaJ and :+ca!u'ar.) t+ t at +f t e .+ung &arJ< In t e first +f t e +conomic and 5olitical -an scri$ts of 1$44) t e 'a!+r 7 ic %r+duces t e work and gi:es it :a'ue (:erwert ng* %r+%+rti+nate'. increases t e de-%reciati+n (+ntwert ng* +f its aut +r< E5a!+r>s rea'iMati+n is its +!Gectificati+n< In t e s% ere +f %+'itica' ec+n+(. t is rea'iMati+n +f 'a!+r a%%ears as '+ss o f reali)ation f+r t e 7+r"ersL +!Gectificati+n as loss of the obIect and bondage t+ itL a%%r+%riati+n as estrangement, as alienation" (4ar' &arJ) +conomic and P h i l o s o p h i c -an scri$ts of & > B B , trans< &artin &i''igan KNe7 D+r"B Internati+na' *u!'is ers) 1-64I) %< 41< 0 is GuJta%+siti+n esca%es t e rea'(s +f inte''ectua' %uttering +r +f ist+rica' curi+sit.< Its necessit. 7i'' a%%ear 'ater 7 en t e questi+n +f 7 at !e'+ngs t+ t at 7 ic 7e ca'' t e (eta% .sics +f t e %r+%er (+r +f a'ienati+n# is %+sed< 21< It g+es 7it +ut sa.ing t at 7e a:e de'i!erate'. a!stained fr+( an.t ing t at c+u'd !e ca''ed a E!i+gra% ica' reference<E If it is %recise'. at t is %+int t at 7e reca'' t at ;rtaud died +f cancer +f t e rectu() 7e d+ n+t d+ s+ in +rder t+ a:e t e eJce%ti+n %r+:e t e ru'e) !ut !ecause 7e t in" t at t e status (sti'' t+ !e f+und# +f t is re(ar") and +f +t er si(i'ar +nes) (ust n+t !e t at +f t e s+-ca''ed E!i+gra% ica' reference<E 0 e ne7 status-t+ !e f+und-is t at +f t e re'ati+ns !et7een eJistence and t e teJt) !et7een t ese t7+ f+r(s +f teJtua'it. and t e genera'iMed 7riting 7it in 7 +se %'a. t e. are articu'ated< 22< In t e *reface t+ is 8ollected W+r"s) ;rtaud 7ritesB E0 e cane +f >0 e Ne7 2e:e'ati+ns +f Being> fe'' int+ t e !'ac" c.st a'+ng 7it t e 'itt'e s7+rd< I a:e g+t an+t er cane read. t+ acc+(%an. (. c+''ected 7+r"s in and t+ and c+(!at) n+t 7it ideas) !ut 7it t +se (+n"e.s 7 + ne:er st+% riding t e( t+ deat fr+( +ne end +f (. c+nsci+us se'f t+ t e +t er) as 7e'' as t r+ug (. +rganis( t e. a:e !'ig ted <<< &. cane 7i'' !e t is furi+us !++" ca''ed f+rt !. ancient %e+%'es n+7 dead) s%+tted t r+ug +ut (. ner:+us fi!res 'i"e daug ters s ed<E 6W 1B21< 23< ,riedric ?+'der'in) 5oems and 4ragments, trans< &ic ae' ?a(!urger

5ud+:ici (Ne7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64#) *< 5- E0+ seiMe t e %aterna' 'ig tning) itse'f) in +ne>s +7n ands <<<E E0+ !e a!'e t+ dance 7it t e %en <<<E E0 e cane <<< t e 'itt'e s7+rd <<< an+t er cane <<<< &. cane 7i'' !e t is furi+us !++"<E ;nd in #he Hew +evelations of Being: EBecause) +n t e t ird +f June) 1-37) t e fi:e ser%ents a%%eared) 7 + 7ere a'read. in t e s7+rd 7 +se strengt +f decisi+n is re%resented !. a staffN W at d+es t is (eanO It (eans t at I 7 + a( s%ea"ing a:e a S7+rd and a Staff> (;;) %< -2#< 0+ !e GuJta%+sed 7it t is teJt !. 1enetB E;'' !urg'ars 7i'' understand t e dignit. 7it 7 ic I 7as arra.ed 7 en I e'd (. Gi((.) (. >%en<> ,r+( its 7eig t) (ateria') and s a%e) and fr+( its functi+n t++) e(anated an aut +rit. t at (ade (e a (an< I ad a'7a.s needed t at stee' %enis in +rder t+ free (.se'f c+(%'ete'. fr+( (. fagg+tr.) fr+( (. u(!'e attitudes) and t+ attain t e c'ear si(%'icit. +f (an'inessE (Jean 1enet) Firacle of the =ose, trans< Bernard ,rec t(an KNe7 D+r"B 1r+:e *ress) 1-66I) %< 27#< 25< NietMsc e) #wilight of the #dols, %< 6< 26< 5et us ac"n+7'edge t at ;rtaud is t e first t+ atte(%t t+ reasse(!'e) +n a (art.r+'+gica' tree) t e :ast fa(i'. +f (ad(en +f genius< ?e d+es s+ in :an ,ogh, le s icide de la socitt+ (1-47#) +ne +f t e rare teJts in 7 ic NietMsc e is na(ed) a(+ng +t er EsuicidesE (Baude'aire) *+e) Ner:a') NietMsc e) 4ier"egaard) ?+'der'in) 6+'eridge#< ;rtaud 7rites furt er +nB EN+) S+crates did n+t a:e t is e.eL %er a%s t e +n'. +ne !ef+re Aan 1+g 7as t e un a%%. NietMsc e 7 + ad t e sa(e %+7er t+ undress t e s+u') t+ %'uc" t e !+d. fr+( t e s+u') t+ 'a. t e !+d. +f (an !are) !e.+nd t e su!terfuges +f t e (indE (;;) %< 16+#< 27< &artin ?eidegger) ;n #ntrod ction t+ -eta$hysics, trans< 2a'% &an ei( (Ne7 ?a:enB Da'e 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-5-#) %< 64< 2$< EI t+'d .+uL n+ 7+r"s) n+ 'anguage) n+ 7+rds) n+ (ind) n+t ing< N+t ing) eJce%t fine Ner:e-Sca'es< ; s+rt +f i(%enetra!'e st+% in t e (idst +f e:er.t ing in +ur (indsE (Herve/&cales, :" 1B75#< 2-< E,+r e:en t e infinite is deadPinfinit. is t e na(e +f a dead (anE ($4) %< 11$#< W ic (eans t at 1+d did n+t die at a gi:en (+(ent +f ist+r.) !ut t at 1+d is Dead !ecause e is t e na(e +f Deat itse'f) t e na(e +f t e deat 7it in (e and t e na(e +f t at 7 ic ) having stolen mefrom my !irt ) as %enetrated (. 'ife< ;s 1+d-Deat is difference 7it in 'ife) e as ne:er ceased t+ die) t at is t+ sa.) t+ 'i:e< E,+r e:en t e infinite is deadPinfinite is t e na(e +f a dead (an) 7 + is n+t deadE (i!id<#< =n'. 'ife 7it +ut difference) 'ife 7it +ut deat 7i'' :anquis deat and 1+d< But it 7i'' d+ s+ !. negating itse'f as 'ife) 7it in deat ) and !. !ec+(ing 1+d i(se'f< 1+d) t us) is Deat B infinite 5ife)

24< (;nn ;r!+rB 9ni:ersit. +f &ic igan *ress) 1-67#) %%< 375-77< ,riedric NietMsc e) #he #wilight of the #dols, trans< ;nt +n. &<

422 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 232 - 33 5ife 7it +ut difference) as it is attri!uted t+ 1+d !. t e c'assica' +nt+t e+'+g. +r (eta% .sics (7it t e a(!igu+us and re(ar"a!'e eJce%ti+n +f ?ege'# t+ 7 ic ;rtaud sti'' !e'+ngs< But Gust as deat is t e na(e +f difference 7it in 'ife) +f finitude as t e essence +f 'ife) s+ t e infinit. +f 1+d) as 5ife and *resence) is t e +t er na(e +f finitude< But t e +t er na(e +f t e sa(e t ing does not mean t e sa(e t ing as t e first na(e) is n+t synonymo s with it and this is t e entirety +f ist+r.< K=n t is 'ast %+int) cf< a!+:e) n+te 18." 30< 0 is is 7 . %+etr. as suc re(ains an a!stract art in ;rtaud>s e.es) 7 et er %+etic s%eec +r 7riting are in questi+n< =n'. t e t eater is t e t+ta' art in 7 ic is %r+duced) aside fr+( %+etr.) (usic and dance) t e Esurrecti+nE +f t e !+d. itse'f< ;'s+) 7 en 7e primarily see in ;rtaud a %+et) t e centra' ner:e +f is t +ug t esca%es us< 9n'ess) +f c+urse) 7e (a"e %+etr. int+ an un'i(ited genre) t at is) t e t eater 7it its rea' s%ace< 0+ 7 at eJtent can +ne f+''+7 &aurice B'anc +t 7 en e 7rites) E;rtaud as 'eft us a (aG+r d+cu(ent 7 ic is n+t ing +t er t an an Ars poetica. I ac"n+7'edge t at e is s%ea"ing +f t e t eater in t is teJt) !ut 7 at is in questi+n are t e de(ands +f %+etr. suc t at %+etr. can !e fu'fi''ed +n'. !. reGecting 'i(ited genres and !. affir(ing a (+re +rigina' 'anguage <<<< It is n+ '+nger a questi+n +f t e rea' s%ace %resented !. t e stage) !ut +f an other s%aceEO 0+ 7 at eJtent d+es +ne a:e t e rig t t+ add E+f %+etr.E in !rac"ets 7 en +ne is citing a sentence +f ;rtaud>s defining Et e ig est idea +f t eaterEO (6f< La cr elle raison po=tique, p. K6.) 31< ;gain) t e strange rese(!'ance +f ;rtaud t+ NietMsc e< 0 e %raise +f t e (.steries +f /'eusis (cf< #4, p. D3) and a certain disdain +f 5atinit. (#4, pp. )?/)A) 7+u'd furt er c+nfir( t is rese(!'ance< ?+7e:er) a difference is idden in t is rese(!'ance) as 7e said a!+:e rat er 'a%idari'.) and t is is t e %'ace t+ s%ecif. it< In 0 e Birt of Tragedy, at t e (+(ent 7 en (di:< 19) NietMsc e designates ES+cratic cu'tureE in its Eintrinsic su!stance)E and 7it its (+st EdistinctE na(e) as t e Ecu'ture +f t e +%eraE (%< 142), NietMsc e 7+nders a!+ut t e !irt +f recitati:e and t e stilo ra$$resentativo! 0 is !irt can +n'. refer t+ unnatura' instincts f+reign t+ a'' aest etics) !e t e. ;%%+''+nian +r Di+n.sian< 2ecitati:e) t e su!Gecti+n +f (usic t+ 'i!rett+) fina''. c+rres%+nds t+ fear and t+ t e need f+r securit.) t+ t e E.earning f+r t e id.'')E t+ Et e !e'ief in t e %re ist+ric eJistence +f t e artistic) g++d (anE (%< 144). E0 e recitati:e 7as regarded as t e redisc+:ered 'an guage +f t is %ri(iti:e (anE (%< 144). =%era 7as Ea s+'ace <<< f+und f+r t e %essi(is(E in erent in a situati+n +f Efrig tfu' uncertaint.E

N=0/S 0= *;1/ 233 423

(%<145#< ;nd ere) as in #he #heaterand (ts 4ouble, t e %'ace +f t e teJt is rec+gniMed as t at +f usur%ed (aster. and as t e %r+%er) nonmeta % +rica') %ractice +f s'a:er.< 0+ a:e t e teJt at +ne>s dis%+siti+n is t+ !e a (aster< E=%era is t e !irt +f t e t e+retica' (an) +f t e critica' 'a.(an) n+t +f t e artistB +ne +f t e (+st sur%rising facts in t e 7 +'e ist+r. +f art< It 7as t e de(and +f t +r+ug '. un(usica' earers t at t e 7+rds (ust a!+:e a'' !e underst++d) s+ t at acc+rding t+ t e( a re-!irt +f (usic is +n'. t+ !e eJ%ected 7 en s+(e (+de +f singing as !een disc+:ered in 7 ic t e teJt-7+rd '+rds +:er t e c+unter%+int as t e (aster +:er t e ser:antE (,riedric NietMsc e) #he Birth of #r$ge%y, trans< Wi''ia( ;< ?+uss(an KNe7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 16 K4I *< 145#< ;nd e'se7 ere) a %r+%+s +f t e cust+(ar. tendenc. t+ enG+. t e teJt se%arate'. !. reading it) +f t e re'ati+ns !et7een t e screa( and t e c+nce%t) !et7een Egestures.(!+'is(E and t e Et+ne +f t e s%ea"erE (E=n &usic and W+rds)E in =arly 5reek Philosophy, trans< &aJi(i'ian ;< &ugge KNe7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64I) %< 31#) and a %r+%+s +f t e E ier+g'.% icE re'ati+n !et7een t e teJt +fa %+e( and (usic (i!id<) %< 37#) t e (usica' i''ustrati+n +f t e %+e( and t e %r+Gect +f i(%arting t+ (usic an inte''igi!'e 'anguage (EW at a %er:erted 7+r'dN ; tas" t at a%%ears t+ (. (ind 'i"e t at +f a s+n 7anting t+ create is fat erNE i!id< *< 33#-nu(er+us f+r(u'ati+ns ann+unce ;rtaud< But ere it is (usic) as e'se7 ere dance) t at NietMsc e 7ants t+ 'i!erate fr+( t e teJt and fr+( recitati+n< D+u!t'ess) an a!stract 'i!erati+n in ;rtaud>s e.es< =n'. t e t eater) t e t+ta' art inc'uding and uti'iMing (usic and dance a(+ng +t er f+r(s +f 'anguage) can acc+(%'is t is 'i!erati+n< It (ust !e n+ted t at if ;rtaud) 'i"e NietMsc e) +ften su%%+rts dance) e ne:er a!stracts it fr+( t e t eater< If +ne eed'ess'. ta"es dance 'itera''.) and n+t) as 7e said a!+:e) in an ana'+gica' sense) it 7+u'd n+t !e t e entiret. +f t eater< ;rtaud) %er a%s) 7+u'd n+t sa.) as NietMsc e did) EI can +n'. !e'ie:e in a 1+d 7 + 7+u'd dance<E N+t +n'. !ecause 1+d c+u'd n+t dance) as NietMsc e "ne7) !ut !ecause dance a'+ne is an i(%+:eris ed t eater< 0 is s%ecificati+n 7as e:en (+re necessar. in t at Qarat ustra c+nde(ns %+ets and %+etic 7+r"s as t e a'ienati+n +f t e !+d. int+ (eta% +r< &n Poe!s !egins t us<B E > Since I a:e "n+7n t e !+d. !etter)> said Qarat ustra t+ +ne +f is disci%'es->t e s%irit at +n'. !een t+ (e s.(!+'ica''. s%iritL and a'' t at is >i(%eris a!'e>0 at is a's+ !ut a si(i'e<> >S+ a:e I eard t ee sa. +nce !ef+re)> ans7ered t e disci%'e >and t en t +u addedstB EBut t e %+ets 'ie t++ (uc <E W . didst t +u sa. t at t e %+ets 'ie t++ (uc O> < < < >;nd fain

7+u'd t e. t ere!. %r+:e t e(se':es rec+nci'ersB !ut (ediaries and (iJers are t e. unt+ (e) and a'f-and- a'f) and i(%ureN ; ) I cast indeed (. net int+ t eir sea) and (eant t+ catc g++d fis L !ut a'7a.s did I dra7 u% t e ead +f s+(e ancient 1+d> E (NietMsc e) Thus /po&e ?arathustra, :+'< 2) trans< 0 +(as 6+((+n KNe7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64I) **< 151) 154#< NietMsc e a's+ disdained s%ectac'e (ES%ectat+rs) see"et t e s%irit +f t e %+et-s +u'd t e. e:en !e !uffa'+esNE i!id<) %< 155#) and 7e "n+7 t at f+r ;rtaud t e :isi!i'it. +f t e t eater 7as t+ cease !eing an +!Gect +f s%ectac'e< In t is c+nfr+ntati+n 7e are n+t c+ncerned 7it "n+7ing 7 et er it is NietMsc e +r ;rtaud 7 + 7ent t e furt est in destructi+n< 0+ t is questi+n) 7 ic is f++' is ) 7e see( t+ ans7er ;rtaud< In an+t er directi+n) 7e c+u'd a's+ 'egiti(ate'. su%%+rt t e +%%+site< In 8entre%Hoe ds, 2+deM< ;%ri' 1-46< *u!'is ed in@uin, n+< 1$< 07ent. .ears ear'ier) in A'bilical 6i'bo: EI suffer !ecause t e (ind is n+t in 'ife and 'ife is n+t &ind< I suffer !ecause t e &ind is an +rgan) t e &ind is an inter%reter +r t e &ind inti(idates t ings t+ acce%t t e( in t e &ind<E 6W 1B4-< ?arathustra: =eading and .riting: E=f a'' t at is 7ritten) I '+:e +n'. 7 at a %ers+n at 7ritten 7it is !'++d< Write 7it !'++d) and t +u 7i't find t at !'++d is s%irit< P It is n+ eas. tas" t+ understand unfa(i'iar !'++dL I ate t e reading id'ers< P ?e 7 + "n+7et t e reader) d+et n+t ing (+re f+r t e reader< ;n+t er centur. +f readers-and s%irit itse'f 7i'' stin"E (0 us "$oke ?aruthustra, %<43#< W . n+t %'a. t e seri+us ga(e +f GuJta%+sed citati+nsO It as !een 7ritten sinceB E0 at t e drea( uses 7+rds $la parole( (a"es n+ difference since f+r t e unc+nsci+us t e. are !ut +ne a(+ng se:era' e'e(ents +f t e %erf+r(ance $'ise en scene*" (Jacques 5acan) E0 e Insistence +f t e 5etter in t e 9nc+nsci+us)E trans< Jan &ie') Bale 4rench "t dies, =ct+!er 1-66#< 34< ite'. (+re s re7is (aid) r+ug er t+ +:erride 7 en ta"en as an innate fact< P ,+r t +ug t is a (atr+n 7 + as n+t a'7a.s eJisted< P But 'et (. 'ife>s inf'ated 7+rds inf'ate t e(se':es t r+ug 'i:ing in t e !-a-!a +f c+(%+siti+n (de I-ecrit( I a( 7riting f+r i''iteratesE (6W 1B1--20#< 37< 2e:+'uti+nar. in t e fu'' sense) and in %articu'ar t e %+'itica' sense< ;'' + f The Theater and Its Double c+u'd !e read-t is cann+t !e d+ne ere-as a %+'itica' (anifest+) and (+re+:er a ig '. a(!igu+us +ne< 2en+uncing i((ediate %+'itica' acti+n) gueri''a acti+n) an.t ing t at 7+u'd a:e !een a 7aste +f f+rces in t e ec+n+(. +f is %+'itica'

intenti+ns) ;rtaud intended t e %re%arati+n +f an unrea'iMa!'e t eater) 7it +ut t e destructi+n +f t e %+'itica' structures +f +ur s+ciet.< EDear friend) I did n+t sa. t at I 7anted t+ act direct'. +n +ur ti(esL I said t at t e t eater I 7anted t+ create assu(ed) in +rder t+ !e %+ssi!'e) in +rder t+ !e %er(itted !. t e ti(es t+ eJist) an+t er f+r( +f ci:i'iMati+nE (T3, $$! 116-17#< *+'itica' re:+'uti+n (ust first ta"e %+7er fr+( 'itera'it. and t e 7+r'd +f 'etters< See) f+r eJa(%'e) t e 4ost5/cript t + t e -anifesto f or an Abortive Theater: in t e na(e +f t e re:+'uti+n against literature, ;rtaud) ai(ing at t e Surrea'ists) t +se E!+g-%a%er re:+'uti+nariesE E7it t eir !+7ing d+7n t+ 6+((unis()E articu'ates is disdain f+r t e E'aM. (an>s re:+'uti+n)E f+r re:+'uti+n as si(%'e Etransferring K+fI %+7er<E EB+(!s need t+ !e t r+7n) !ut t e. need t+ !e t r+7n at t e r++t +f t e (aG+rit. +f %resent-da. a!its +f t +ug t) 7 et er /ur+%ean +r n+t< I can assure .+u) t +se gent'e(en) t e Surrea'ists) are far (+re affected !. suc a!its t an <<<< t e (+st urgent'. needed re:+'uti+n is a s+rt +f retr+-acti+n in ti(e< We +ug t t+ return t+ t e state +f (ind) +r si(%'. e:en t e %ractices +f t e &idd'e ;gesE (6W 2B24-25#< E0rue cu'ture +%erates !. eJa'tati+n and f+rce) 7 i'e t e /ur+%ean idea' +f art atte(%ts t+ cast t e (ind int+ an attitude distinct fr+( 3$< f+rce !ut addicted t+ eJa'tati+nE (T3, $! 1+#< ; c+ncern f+r uni:ersa' 7riting a%%ears !eneat t e surface +f t e /ettres de =ode)! ;rtaud a''eged t at e ad 7ritten in Ea 'anguage 7 ic 7as n+t ,renc ) !ut 7 ic e:er.+ne c+u'd read) regard'ess +f is nati+na'it.E (t+ ?enri *aris+t#< ;rtaud did n+t +n'. reintr+duce t e 7ritten 7+r" int+ is t e+r. +f t e t eaterL e is) in t e 'ast ana'.sis) t e aut +r +fa !+d. +f 7+r"s< ;nd e "n+7s it< In a 'etter fr+( 1-46 (cited !. &aurice B'anc +t in I-Arche 27-2$ K1-4$I) %< 133# e s%ea"s +f t e Et7+ :er. s +rt !++"sE (The A'bilical 40< and Herve%"cales* 7 ic Ecircu'ate ar+und t e %r+f+und) in:eterate) ende(ic a!sence +f an. idea<E E;t t e (+(ent) t e. see(ed t+ (e t+ !e fu'' +f crac"s) ga%s) %'atitudes and as if stuffed 7it s%+ntane+us a!+rti+ns <<<< But after t7ent. .ears g+ne !.) t e. a%%ear stu%ef.ing) n+t as (. +7n triu(% s) !ut in re'ati+n t+ t e ineJ%ressi!'e< It is t us t at 7+r"s are !+tt'ed and a'' lie in re'ati+n t+ t e aut +r) c+nstituting a !iMarre trut !. t e(se':es <<<< S+(et ing ineJ%ressi!'e eJ%ressed !. 7+r"s 7 ic are +n'. %art de!ac'es<E 0 in"ing t en) +f;rtaud>s c+n:u'sed reGecti+n +f t e 7+r") can +ne n+t sa.< 7it t e sa(e int+nati+n) t e +%%+site +f 7 at B'anc +t sa.s in /e li%re a %enir? N+t Enatura''.) t is is n+t a 7+r"E (%< 4-#) !ut Enatura''.) t is is

426 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 2 4 3 - 5 3 sti'' !ut a 7+r"EO 0+ t is eJtent) t e 7+r" aut +riMes t e effracti+n +f c+((entar. and t e :i+'ence +f eJe(%'ificati+n) t e :er. :i+'ence 7 ic 7e c+u'd n+t a:+id at t e (+(ent 7 en 7e intended t+ %r+scri!e it< But %er a%s 7e can !etter c+(%re end) n+7) t e necessit. +f t is inc+ erence< 0N< 0 is is a reacti+n t+ ,+ucau't>s definiti+n +f (adness as Et e 41 a!sence +f t e 7+r"<E 6f< c a%< 2 a!+:e) E6+git+ and t e ?ist+r. +f &adness)E n+te 6< ;nd t+da.) (adness 'ets itse'f !e Edestr+.edE !. t e sa(e destructi+n as 42< +nt+-t e+'+gica' (eta% .sics) t e 7+r" and t e !++"< We d+ n+t sa. t e sa(e +f t e teJt<

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 253-60 427

7B ,2/9D ;ND 0?/ S6/N/ =, W2I0IN1

1< 0N< * +n+'+gis( is Derrida>s a!!re:iated fas i+n +f descri!ing +ne +f t e

(eta% .sica' gestures in erent in (+st 'inguisticsB t e %ri:i'ege gi:en t+ a (+de' +f 'anguage !ased +n s%eec ) !ecause s%eec is t e (+st $resent f+r( +f 'anguage) is %resence in 'anguage< 0 is is equi:a'ent t+ t e (eta% .sica' re%ressi+n +f 7riting) i<e<) +f difference< ?ere) t++) Derrida (ig t !e c a''enging Jacques 5acan) 7 +se state(ent a!+ut t e unc+nsci+us !eing structured 'i"e a 'anguage see(s t+ de%end u%+n (an. +f t e 'inguistic c+nce%ti+ns 7 ic Derrida c+nsiders t+ !e uncritica''. (eta% .sica'< 2< 0N< EBreac ingE is t e trans'ati+n 7e a:e ad+%ted f+r t e 1er(an 7+rd Bahnun " Bahnun is deri:ed fr+( Bohn, r+ad) and 'itera''. (eans %at !rea"ing< Derrida>s trans'ati+n +f Bahnun is fraya e, 7 ic as an idi+(atic c+nnecti+n t+ %at !rea"ing in t e eJ%ressi+n) se frayer un chemin" EBreac ingE is c'u(s.) !ut it is crucia' t+ (aintain t e sense +f t e force t at !rea"s +%en a %at 7a.) and t e s$ace +%ened !. t is f+rceL t us) E!reac ingE (ust !e underst++d ere as a s +rt and f+r t ese (eanings< In t e Standard /diti+n Bahn ng as !een trans'ated as Efaci'itati+n)E and 7e a:e) +f c+urse) (aintained t is in a'' citati+ns fr+( t e Standard /diti+n< 6itati+ns fr+( The Standard $dition of the 6om!lete Psycholo ical 7orks of Si mund ?reud, 5+nd+nB ?+gart *ress (a!!re:iated as S/# are !. :+'u(e and %age nu(!er< 3< 0N< 6f< t e end +f E,+rce and Significati+n)E !e'+7 f+r a discussi+n +f differences +f f+rce in NietMsc e< 4< ?ere (+re t an e'se7 ere) c+ncerning t e c+nce%ts +f difference) quantit.) and qua'it.) a s.ste(atic c+nfr+ntati+n !et7een NietMsc e

and ,reud is ca''ed f+r< 6f<) f+r eJa(%'e) a(+ng (an. +t ers) t is frag(ent fr+( )he 7ill to Power" E=ur >"n+7ing> 'i(its itse'f t+ esta!'is ing quantitiesL !ut 7e cann+t e'% fee'ing t ese differences in quantit. as qua'ities< @ua'it. is a %ers%ecti:e trut f+r usL n+t an >initse'f<> <<< If 7e s ar%ened +r !'unted +ur senses tenf+'d) 7e s +u'd %eris L i<e<) 7it regard t+ (a"ing %+ssi!'e +ur eJistence 7e sense e:en re'ati+ns !et7een (agnitudes as qua'itiesE (NietMsc eB )he 7ill to 5ower, trans< Wa'ter 4auff(ann KNe7 D+r"B 2and+( ?+use) 1-67I) %< 304# 5< 0 e c+nce%ts +f +riginar. diff+rance and +f de'a. are unt in"a!'e 7it in t e aut +rit. +f t e '+gic +f identit. +r e:en 7it in t e c+nce%t +f ti(e< 0 e very a!surdit. !etra.ed by the ter(s %r+:ides t e %+ssi!i'it.-if +rganiMed in a certain (anner-+f t in"ing !e.+nd t at '+gic and t at c+nce%t< 0 e 7+rd Ede'a.E (ust !e ta"en t+ (ean s+(et ing +t er t an a re'ati+n !et7een t7+ E%resentsEL and t e f+''+7ing (+de' (ust !e a:+idedB 7 at 7as t+ a%%en (s +u'd a:e a%%ened# in a (%ri+r# %resent ;) +ccurs +n'. in a %resent B< 0 e c+nce%ts +f +riginar. diff+rance and +riginar. Ede'a.E 7ere i(%+sed u%+n us !. a reading +f ?usser'< 6< 0N< In E6+git+ and t e ?ist+r. +f &adnessE (c a%< 2 a!+:e#) Derrida !egins t+ e'a!+rate +n t e (eta% .sica' nature +f t e c+nce%t +f decisi+n< Decisi+n in 1ree" is krinein, 7 ence c+(es +ur Ecritic<E 0 e critic a'7a.s decides +n a (eaning) 7 ic can !e c+ncei:ed +n'. in ter(s +f %resence< Since diff+rance su!:erts (eaning and %resence) it d+es n+t
decide"

7< 0N< =n t e re'ati+n +f f+rce and %'ace (site) t+%+s# see E,+rce and Significati+nE (c a%< 2 a!+:e#< $< 5etter 32 (i+ =ct< 1$-5#< 0 e (ac ineB E0 e t ree s.ste(s +f neur+nes) t e >free> and >!+und> states +f quantit.) t e %ri(ar. and sec+ndar. %r+cesses) t e (ain trend and t e c+(%r+(ise trend +f t e ner:+us s.ste() t e t7+ !i+'+gica' ru'es +f attenti+n and defence) t e indicati+ns +f qua'it.) rea'it. and t +ug t) t e state +f t e %s.c +-seJua' gr+u%) t e seJua' deter(inati+n +f re%ressi+n) and fina''. t e fact+rs deter(ining c+nsci+usness as a %erce%tua' functi+n-t e 7 +'e t ing e'd t+get er) and sti'' d+es< I can ard'. c+ntain (.se'f 7it de'ig t< If I ad +n'. 7aited a f+rtnig t !ef+re setting it a'' d+7n f+r .+uE (,reudB )he (ri ins of Psychoanalysis, 0etters to 7ilhelm ?liess, 3rafts and %otes, trans< /ric &+s!ac er and Ja(es Strac e. KNe7 D+r"B Basic B++"s) 1-54I) *< 12-#< -< War!urt+n) t e aut +r +f )he ;ivine 0e ation of *oses" 0 e f+urt %art

+f is 7+r" 7as trans'ated in 1744 under t e tit'eB /ssai sur 'es hierogl y$hes des =gyptiens, o #0on volt (%origine et le $ r o g r e s du langage, Pan tiquite des sciences en =gypte, et (%origine du culte des ani!auG. 0 is 7+r") 7 ic 7e s a'' discuss e'se7 ere) ad c+nsidera!'e inf'uence< ;'' +f t at era>s ref'ecti+ns +n 'anguage and signs !+re its (ar"< 0 e edit+rs +f t e +ncyclo$edia, 6+ndi''ac) and) t r+ug i() 2+usseau a'' dre7 s%ecific ins%irati+n fr+( it) !+rr+7ing in %articu'ar t e t e(e +f t e +rigina''. (eta% +rica' nature +f 'anguage< 1+< Wi''ia( War!urt+nB The 4ivine Legation of Foses 4e!onstrated, ' +t ed<) (5+nd+nB 0 +(as 0egg) 1$46# 2B220< 11< I!id<) %< 221< 12< 0N< Derrida discusses ;rtaud>s stri"ing'. si(i'ar f+r(u'ati+ns a!+ut s%eec as !ut +ne e'e(ent +f 'anguage and re%resentati+n a(+ng +t ers in E0 e 0 eater +f 6rue't. and t e 6'+sure +f 2e%resentati+nE (c a%< $ !e'+7#) cf< es%ecia''. n+te 7< 13< The +go and the #d ("+ I#I, c a%< 2# a's+ undersc+res t e danger +f a t+%+gra% ica' re%resentati+n +f %s.c ica' facts< 0N< Derrida>s fu''est 14< discussi+n +f su%%'e(entarit. is in 3e # a grammatologie!
15< 0N< Derrida fu''. de:e'+%s t e su%%'e(entar. status +f t e f++tn+te

la greffe%in /a do ble s e a n c e in 5a disse(inati+n< 16< 0N< =n r+ads) 7riting) and incest see EDe 'a gra((at+'+gie)E 8riti7 e 2 23-24) **< 14-ff< ;n /ng'is trans'ati+n !. 1a.atn 6< S%i:a") =n ,rammatology (Ba'ti(+reB J+ ns ?+%"ins 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-77#) a%%eared after I ad finis ed t e %resent trans'ati+n< ;'' references are t+ t e +rigina' ,renc :ersi+n< 17< 0N< In 0eing and T i m e , and es%ecia''. Aant and the 5roblem of Feta$hysics, ?eidegger Edec+nstructsE 4ant>s %+sited ti(e'essness +f t e cogito, a %+siti+n ta"en +:er fr+( Descartes) in +rder t+ de:e'+% an Eaut enticE te(%+ra'it.< 1$< 0 e (eta% +r +f a % +t+gra% ic negati:e +ccurs frequent'.< 6f< E0 e D.na(ics +f 0ransferenceE (&= L( (). 0 e n+ti+ns +f negati:e and c+%. are t e %rinci%a' (eans +f t e ana'+g.< In t e ana'.sis +f D+ra) ,reud defines t e transference in ter(s +f editi+ns< In EN+tes +n t e 6+nce%t +f t e 9nc+nsci+us in *s.c +ana'.sis)E 1-13 ("+ I##, 264#< ,reud c+(%ares t e re'ati+ns !et7een t e c+nsci+us and t e unc+nsci+us t+ a % +t+gra% ic %r+cessB E0 e first stage +f t e % +t+gra% is t e >negati:e>L e:er. % +t+gra% ic %icture as t+ %ass t r+ug t e >nega ti:e %r+cess)> and s+(e +f t ese negati:es 7 ic a:e e'd g++d in eJa(inati+n are ad(itted t+ t e >%+siti:e %r+cess> ending in t e

%icture<E ?er:e. de Saint-Den.s de:+tes an entire c a%ter +f is !++" t+ t e sa(e ana'+g.< 0 e intenti+ns are t e sa(e< 0 e. suggest a %recauti+n t at 7e 7i'' find again in t e EN+te +n t e &.stic Writing *adEB E&e(+r.) c+(%ared t+ a ca(era) as t e (ar:e'+us su%eri+rit. +f natura' f+rcesB t+ !e a!'e t+ rene7 !. itse'f its (eans +f acti+n<E i-< EDrea(s are %arsi(+ni+us) indigent) 'ac+nic<E Drea(s are Esten+gra% icE (cf< a!+:e#< 20< 0N< 6f< n+te 12 a!+:e< 21< 0N< EIn:ested in a'' senses +f t e 7+rdE inc'udes t e s%ecifica''. ,reudian sense +f Beset) ng +r 'i!idina' in:est(ent) 7 ic as !een trans'ated int+ /ng'is as Ecat eJis<E 0 e ,renc investissement is (uc c'+ser t+ t e +rigina' 1er(an< 22< 0 e E&eta%s.c +'+gica' Su%%'e(ent t+ t e 0 e+r. +f Drea(s)E 1-16 (&= L(M) de:+tes an i(%+rtant de:e'+%(ent t+ f+r(a' regressi+n) 7 ic ) acc+rding t+ t e (nterpretation of 3reams, entai's t e su!stituti+n +f E%ri(iti:e (et +ds +f eJ%ressi+n and re%resentati+n (7 ic # ta"es t e %'ace +f t e usua' +nesE (A) 54$#< ,reud insists a!+:e a'' +n t e r+'e +f :er!a' re%resentati+nsB EIt is :er. n+te7+rt . +7 'itt'e t e drea(-7+r" "ee%s t+ t e 7+rd-%resentati+nsL it is a'7a.s read. t+ eJc ange +ne 7+rd f+r an+t er ti'' it finds t e eJ%ressi+n (+st and. f+r %'astic re%resentati+nE (CIA) 22$#< 0 is %assage is f+''+7ed !. a c+(%aris+n) fr+( t e %+int +f :ie7 +f 7+rd-re%resentati+ns and t ingre%resentati+ns) +f t e drea(er>s 'anguage and t e 'anguage +f t e sc iM+% renic< It s +u'd !e ana'.sed c'+se'.< We 7+u'd %er a%s find (against ,reudO# t at a rig+r+us deter(inati+n +f t e an+(a'. is i(%+ssi!'e< =n t e r+'e +f :er!a' re%resentati+n in t e %rec+nsci+us and t e (c+nsequent'.# sec+ndar. c aracter +f :isua' e'e(ents) cf< The +go and the #d, c a%< 2< 23< E0 e 6'ai( +f *s.c +ana'.sis t+ Scientific InterestE (S/ CIII#< 0 e sec+nd %art +f t is teJt) de:+ted t+ En+n-%s.c +'+gica' sciences)E is c+ncerned first +f a'' 7it t e science +f 'anguage (%< 176#-!ef+re % i'+s+% .) !i+'+g.) ist+r.) s+ci+'+g.) %edag+g.< 24< ;s is "n+7n) t e n+te +n E0 e ;ntit etica' &eaning +f *ri(a' W+rds)E 1-1+ (S/ CI# tends t+ de(+nstrate) after ;!e') and 7it a great a!undance +f eJa(%'es !+rr+7ed fr+( ier+g'.% ic 7riting) t at t e c+ntradict+r. +r undeter(ined (eaning +f %ri(a' 7+rds c+u'd !e deter(ined) c+u'd recei:e its difference and its c+nditi+ns +f +%erati+n) +n'. t r+ug gesture and 7riting< =n t is teJt and ;!e'>s .%+t esis) cf< /(i'e Ben:eniste) 5roblemes de ling isti7 e generate (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-64#) c a%< 7<

430 N'T"- T' *AG"- 2 7 7 - $ 4 25< *< 22$< 0 is is t e %assage 7e qu+ted ear'ier) and in 7 ic t e (e(+r.> trace 7as distinguis ed fr+( E(e(+r.<E 26< 0N< ,+r a c+(%'ete discussi+n +f hy$omnesisJmnesis in *'at+) cf< E5a % ar(acie de *'at+nE) in 0a dissemination" 27< 6f< c a%ter 4 +f Beyond the Pleasure Princi!le" 2$< 0 e "tandard +dition n+tes ere a s'ig t infide'it. in ,reud>s descri%ti+n< E0 e %rinci%'e is n+t affected<E We are te(%ted t+ t in" t at ,reud inf'ects is descri%ti+n e'se7 ere as 7e'') in +rder t+ suit t e ana'+g.< 2-< 0 is is sti'' in c a%ter 4 +f Beyond the Pleasure Princi!le" 30< 0N< In 0a voi+ et le !henomene ')he @oice and the Phenomenon) trans< Da:id ;''is+n (/:anst+nB N+rt 7estern 9ni:ersit. *ress) 1-73#) t ere is a fu'' Edec+nstructi+nE +f %erce%ti+n as a %ast t at 7as %resent< 31< 0N< EN+7 7 at is t is 7aJ <<<OE 0 e reference is t+ t e "econd -editation,

N'T"- T' *AG"- 2-3-304 431

$B 0?/ 0?/;0/2 =, 629/50D ;ND 0?/ 65=S92/ =, 2/*2/S/N0;0I=N $4) %< i+-< ;s in t e %receding essa. +n ;rtaud) teJts referred t+ !. dates are un%u!'is ed< K,+r t e a!!re:iati+ns used t+ refer t+ t e /ng'is trans'ati+ns +f ;rtaud) cf! /a parole soufflee- c a%< 6 a!+:e) n+te $<I 2< E0 e %s.c +'+g. +f +rgas( c+ncei:ed as t e fee'ing +f a su%er a!undance +f :ita'it. and strengt ) 7it in t e sc+%e +f 7 ic e:en %ain acts as a sti(u'us) ga:e (e t e "e. t+ t e c+nce%t of tragic fee'ing) 7 ic as !een (isunderst++d n+t +n'. !. ;rist+t'e) !ut a's+ e:en (+re !. +ur %essi(istsE (,riedric NietMsc e) )he T.ilight of the idols, trans< ;nt +n. 5ud+:ici KNe7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'') 1-64I) %< i15/4 ;rt) as t e i(itati+n +f nature) c+((unicates in an essentia' .ay 7it t e t e(e +f cat arsis< EN+t in +rder t+ esca%e fr+( terr+r and %it.) n+t t+ %urif. +ne>s se'f +f a danger+us %assi+n !. disc arging it 7it :e e(encet is is +7 ;rist+t'e underst++d it !ut t+ !e far !e.+nd terr+r and %it. and t+ !e t e eterna' 'ust +f !ec+(ing itse'f-t at 'ust 7 ic a's+ in:+':es t e 'ust of destr ction! ;nd 7it t is I +nce (+re c+(e int+ t+uc 7it t e s%+t fr+( 7 ic I +nce set +ut-t e >Birt +f 0raged.> 7as (. first trans:a'uati+n +f a'' :a'uesB 7it t is again I ta"e (. stand u%+n t e s+i' fr+( +ut +f 7 ic (. 7i'' and (. ca%acit. s%ring-I) t e 'ast disci%'e +f t e % i'+s+% er Di+n.sus-I) t e %r+% et +f eterna' recurrenceE (i!id<) %< 120#< 0N< 0 at re%resentati+n is t e aut+3< %resentati+n +f %ure :isi!i'it. and %ure sensi!i'it.) a(+unts t+ %+stu'ating t at %resence is an effect +f re%etiti+n< 4< 0N< =n t e questi+n +f %arricide and t e Efat er +f t e 5+g+s)E cf! E5a % ar(acie de *'at+n)E %%< $4ff< in La dissemination! 5< )he )heater and its ;ouble 7+u'd a:e t+ !e c+nfr+nted 7it )he $ssay on the 0rigin of 0an ua es, )he Birth of )ra edy, and a'' t e c+nnected teJts +f 2+usseau and NietMsc eB t e "ystem +f t eir ana'+gies and +%%+siti+ns 7+u'd a:e t+ !e rec+nstituted< 6< 0D) %%< 6+) 1164 In t is sense t e 7+rd is a sign) a s.(%t+( +f 'i:ing s%eec >s fatigue) +f 'ife>s disease< 0 e 7+rd) as c'ear s%eec su!Gected t+ trans(issi+n and t+ re%etiti+n is deat in 'anguage< E=ne c+u'd sa. t at t e (ind) a!'e t+ g+ +n n+ '+nger) resigned itse'f t+ t e c'arities +f s%eec E (6W 4B2$-#< =n .hy it is necessar. t+ Ec ange t e r+'e +f s%eec in t e t eater)E cf" ); !!" 72-73) -4--5< 7< 0N< =n t ese questi+ns) cf! E,reud and t e Scene +f Writing)E c a%< 7 a!+:e) n+te 12<

t e ti(e'essness +f Descartes>s %iece +f 7aJ is s.(%t+(atic +f t e (eta% .sica' re%ressi+n +f 7riting and difference< 8f! n+te 17 a!+:e< 32< We find it again) t e sa(e .ear) in t e artic'e +n ENegati+nE ("+ I#I*! In a %assage 7 ic c+ncerns us ere f+r its rec+gniti+n +f t e re'ati+n !et7een negati+n in t +ug t and d fferance, de'a.) det+ur '&ufschub, ;enkaufschub) 'differance, uni+n +f /r+s and 0 anat+s#) t e sending +ut +f fee'ers is attri!uted n+t t+ t e unc+nsci+us !ut t+ t e eg+< =n 3enka fsch b, +n t +ug t as retardati+n) %+st%+ne(ent) sus%ensi+n) res%ite) det+ur) differance as +%%+sed t+-+r rat er d fferante (deferring) differing# fr+(-t e t e+retica') ficti:e) and a'7a.s a'read. transgressed %+'e +f t e E%ri(ar. %r+cess)E cf a'' +f c a%ter 7 +f t e #nter
!retation of ;reams" 0 e c+nce%t +f t e Ecircuit+us %at E (Um.eg$ is

centra' t+ it< E0 +ug t identit.)E entire'. 7+:en +f (e(+r.) is an ai( a'7a.s a'read. su!stituted f+r E%erce%tua' identit.)E t e ai( +f t e E%ri(ar. %r+cess)E and d o s gau/e 3enken ist nur ein Um.eg ))) (E;'' t in"ing is n+ (+re t an a circuit+us %at )E S$ @, 602#< 6f" a's+ t e E9(7ege Mu( 0+deE in Beyond the Pleasure Princi!le" E6+(%r+(ise)E in ,reud>s sense) is a'7a.s differance! But t ere is n+t ing !ef+re t e c+(%r+(ise<

432 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 3 0 5 - 1 0 $< 5es reves et les !oyens de les diriger (1$67# is in:+"ed at t e +%ening +f

N=0/S 0= *;1/ 5 310-16

433

/es vases co!!unicants.

-< E&isera!'e) i(%r+!a!'e %s.c e t at t e carte' +f %s.c +'+gica' %resu%%+siti+ns as ne:er ceased %inning int+ t e (usc'es +f u(anit.E ('etter 7ritten fr+( /s%a'i+n t+ 2+ger B'in) 25 &arc 1-46<# E=n'. a :er. fe7 ig '. c+ntesta!'e d+cu(ents +n t e &.steries +f t e &idd'e ;ges re(ain< It is certain t at t e. ad) fr+( t e %ure'. scenic %+int +f :ie7) res+urces t at t e t eater as n+t c+ntained f+r centuries) !ut +ne c+u'd a's+ find +n t e re%ressed de!ates +f t e s+u' a science t at (+dern %s.c +ana'.sis as !are'. redisc+:ered and in a (uc 'ess efficaci+us and (+ra''. 'ess fruitfu' sense t an in t e (.stica' dra(as %'a.ed +n t e %ar:isE (,e!ruar. 1-45#< 0 is frag(ent (u'ti%'ies aggressi+ns against %s.c +ana'.sis<
10< #4, PP. 46 -47< 6+< 11< ;gainst t e %act +f fear 7 ic

na(e'.) t+ !e t+rn t+ %ieces !. t e &aenads <<<< But n+7 t e o$era !egins) acc+rding t+ t e c'earest testi(+nies) 7it t e demand +f the listener to nderstand the word! W atO 0 e 'istener demands? 0 e 7+rd is t+ !e underst++dOE (E=n &usic and W+rds)E in +arly ,reek 5hiloso$hy, trans< &aJi(i'ian &ugge KNe7 D+r"B 2usse'' and 2usse'')
1

-64I) **< 40-41#<

gi:es !irt t+ (an and t+ 1+d (ust !e rest+red t e unit. +f e:i' and 'ife) +f t e Satanic and t e di:ineB EI) &< ;nt+nin ;rtaud) !+rn in &arsei''es 4 Se%te(!er 1$-6) I a( Satan and I a( g+d and I d+ n+t 7ant an.t ing t+ d+ 7it t e ?+'. AirginE (7ritten fr+( 2+deM) Se%te(!er 1-45#<

%anied !. a''usi+ns t+ %artici%ati+n as an Einterested e(+ti+nEB t e critique +f est etic eJ%erience as disinterestedness< It reca''s NietMsc e>s critique +f 4ant>s % i'+s+% . +f art< N+ (+re in NietMsc e t an in ;rtaud (ust t is t e(e c+ntradict t e :a'ue +f gratuit+us %'a. in artistic creati+n< @uite t+ t e c+ntrar.< 13< 0N< Brec t is t e (aG+r re%resentati:e +f t e t eater +f a'ienati+n< Letter 14< to F. d%*le!bert, trans) ;''an B'++( (1'enc+eB ,ree *ress) 1-60#) %< 126< K0 ese questi+ns recei:e an eJtended treat(ent in de la ,rammatologie, %%< M35ffI 15< 0 e t eater +f crue't. is n+t +n'. a s%ectac'e 7it +ut s%ectat+rs) it is s%eec 7it +ut 'isteners< NietMsc eB E0 e (an in a state +f Di+n.sean eJcite(ent as a 'istener Gust as 'itt'e as t e +rgiastic cr+7d) a 'istener t+ 7 +( e (ig t a:e s+(et ing t+ c+((unicate) a 'istener 7 ic t e e%ic narrat+r) and genera''. s%ea"ing t e ;%+''+nian artist) t+ !e sure) %resu%%+ses< It is rat er in t e nature +f t e Di+n.sean art) t at it as n+ c+nsiderati+n f+r t e 'istenerB t e ins%ired ser:ant +f Di+n.sus is) as I said in a f+r(er %'ace) underst++d +n'. !. is c+(%eers< But if 7e n+7 i(agine a 'istener at t +se ende(ic +ut!ursts +f Di+n.sean eJcite(ent t en 7e s a'' a:e t+ %r+% es. f+r i( a fate si(i'ar t+ t at 7 ic *ent eus t e disc+:ered ea:esdr+%%er suffered)

16< 0N< =e$etition a's+ (eans Ere earsa'E in ,renc < 17< 0N< =n t e ec+n+(. +f dia'ectics) cf< !e'+7 E,r+( 2estricted t+ 1enera' /c+n+(.<E =n trut ) re%etiti+n and t e !e.+nd +f !eing) cf< E5a % ar(acie de *'at+n)E %%< 1-2-1-5 in /a dissemination! 1$< 0N< Derrida see(s t+ !e (a"ing a %+int ere 7 ic is de:e'+%ed (uc (+re fu''. in E,r+( 2estricted t+ 1enera' /c+n+(.E (see t is :+'u(e) c a%< -#< ?e see(s t+ !e referring) if rat er e''i%tica''.) t+ t e ?ege'ian dia'ectic +f t e (aster and t e s'a:e) in 7 ic t e (aster) 7 + !+t ris"s deat and cons mes 7it %'easure) d+es n+t maintain t e $resent! 0 e s'a:e is t e trut +f t e (aster !ecause e (aintains t e %resent t r+ug is re'ati+n t+ work, is deferred c+nsu(%ti+n +f t e %resent< 0 us e is a's+ t e e(!+di(ent +f t e dia'ectica' E(e(+r.E +rinner ng! B+t (aster and s'a:e are %+ssi!i'ities +f (eta% .sics) +f $resence, and t+ c+nfir( t e +ne +r t e +t er-as a%%ens ine:ita!'.is t+ re%eat a (eta% .sica' gesture< 1-< 5etter t+ Jean *au' an) 25 Januar. 1-36B EI t in" I a:e a suita!'e tit'e f+r (. !++"< It 7i'' !e #he #heater and (ts 4ouble, f+r if t eater d+u!'es 'ife) 'ife d+u!'es true t eater <<<< 0 is tit'e c+rres%+nds t+ a'' t e d+u!'es +f t e t eater t at I !e'ie:e t+ a:e f+und +:er t e c+urse +f s+ (an. .earsB (eta% .sics) t e %'ague) crue't. <<< It is +n t e stage t at t e uni+n +f t +ug t) gesture and act is rec+nstitutedE (6W 5272-73# 20< 0+ atte(%t t+ reintr+duce a %urit. int+ t e c+nce%t +f difference) +ne returns it t+ n+ndifference and fu'' %resence< 0 is (+:e(ent is fraug t 7it c+nsequences f+r an. atte(%t +%%+sing itse'f t+ an indicati:e anti-?ege'ianis(< =ne esca%es fr+( it) a%%arent'.) +n'. !. c+ncei:ing difference +utside t e deter(inati+n +f Being as %resence) +utside t e a'ternati:es +f %resence and a!sence and e:er.t ing t e. g+:ern) and +n'. !. c+ncei:ing difference as +rigina' i(%urit.) t at is t+ sa. as differance in t e finite ec+n+(. +f t e sa(e< 21< NietMsc e again< 0 ese teJts are 7e'' "n+7n< 0 us) f+r eJa(%'e) in t e 7a"e +f ?erac'itusB E;nd si(i'ar'.) Gust as t e c i'd and t e artist %'a.) t e eterna''. 'i:ing fire %'a.s) !ui'ds u% and destr+.s) in inn+cenceand t is ga(e t e aeon %'a.s 7it i(se'f<<<< 0 e c i'd t r+7s a7a.

434 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 3 1 6 - 2 0 is t+.sL !ut s++n e s++n +7e:er as t e c i'd !ui'ds e c+nnects) G+ins and f+r(s 'a7fu''. LBH c+nte(%'ated !. t e aest etic (an) 7 + as 'earned fr+( t e artist and t e genesis +f t e 'atter>s 7+r") +7 t e strugg'e +f %'ura'it. can .et ear 7it in itse'f 'a7 and Gustice) +7 t e artist stands c+nte(%'ati:e a!+:e) and 7+r"ing 7it in t e 7+r" +f art) +7 necessit. and %'a.) antag+nis( and ar(+n. (ust %air t e(se':es f+r t e %r+creati+n +f t e 7+r" +f artE (E* i'+s+% . During t e 0ragic ;ge +f t e 1ree"s)E in +arly 5reek Philosophy, p. Ao2).

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 320-21

435

-B ,2=& 2/S02I60/D 1/N/2;5 /6=N=&D

1< E&. intenti+n is t+ (ini(iMe ?ege'>s attitudeO But it is t e +%%+site

t at is trueN I a:e 7anted t+ de(+nstrate t e inc+(%ara!'e !readt +f is underta"ing< 0+ ac ie:e t is I c+u'd n+t :ei' t e very s'ig t (and e:en ine:ita!'e# degree +f fai'ure< 0+ (. (ind) it is rat er t e eJce%ti+na' assuredness +f t is underta"ing t at e(erges fr+( (. GuJta%+siti+ns< If e fai'ed) +ne cann+t sa. t at t e fai'ure 7as t e resu't +f an err+r< 0 e sense +f t e fai'ure itse'f differs fr+( t e sense +f 7 at caused itB t e err+r a'+ne is f+rtuit+us< ?ege'>s >fai'ure> (ust !e s%+"en +f in genera' ter(s) as +ne 7+u'd s%ea" +f an aut entic (+:e(ent) %regnant 7it (eaningE (8egel, la !ort et le sacrifice K ereafter 2egel, la mortG, in 3e calion 5 KNeuc ate') 1-55I) *< 42#< 2< I!id< 3< EDe I>eJistentia'is(e au %ri(at de I>ec+n+(ie)E ritique 1- (*aris) 1-47#B EIt is strange t+ %ercei:e t+da. 7 at 4ier"egaard c+u'd n+t "n+7B t at ?ege') 'i"e 4ier"egaard) eJ%erienced t e reGecti+n +f a'' su!Gecti:it. !ef+re t e a!s+'ute idea< In %rinci%'e) +ne 7+u'd i(agine-t e reGecti+n !eing ?ege'>s-t at it 7as a questi+n +f c+nce%tua' +%%+siti+nL +n t e c+ntrar.< 0 e fact is n+t deduced fr+( a % i'+s+% ica' teJt) !ut fr+( a 'etter t+ a friend t+ 7 +( e c+nfides t at f+r t7+ .ears e t +ug t e 7+u'd g+ (ad <<<< In a sense) ?ege'>s ra%id % rase %er a%s as a f+rce t at 4ier"egaard>s '+ng &ry d+es n+t a:e< It is an. 'ess 7it in eJistence-7 ic tre(!'es) and eJceeds-t at t is cr.)E etc< ). Le petit, in =vres com$letes (1-70L ereafter =6#) 2B4-< 5< EDe I>eJistentia'is(e<E 6< ES(a'' c+(ic reca%itu'ati+n< ?ege') I i(agine) t+uc ed t e eJtre(e< ?e 7as sti'' .+ung and t +ug t e 7+u'd g+ (ad< I e:en i(agine t at

e e'a!+rated t e s.ste( in +rder t+ esca%e (an. "ind +f c+nquest) d+u!t'ess) is due t+ a (an f'eeing a danger#< 0+ c+nc'ude) ?ege' reac es satisfaction and turns is !ac" +n t e eJtre(e< " $$lication is dead within i(< 0 at +ne s +u'd see" sa':ati+n is in itse'f ad(issi!'eB +ne c+ntinues t+ 'i:e) +ne cann+t !e sure) +ne (ust c+ntinue t+ su%%'icate< ?ege' gained sa':ati+n 7 i'e sti'' a'i:e and "i''ed su%%'icati+n) m tilated himself! N+t ing 7as 'eft +f i( !ut a !r++( and'e) a (+dern (an< But !ef+re (uti'ating i(se'f) e d+u!t'ess t+uc ed t e eJtre(e and "ne7 su%%'icati+nB is (e(+r. ta"es i( !ac" t+ t e %ercei:ed a!.ss) in +rder t+ annihilate itK 0 e s.ste( is anni i'ati+nE (L%eGperience interieure K ereafter +l; *arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-43I) %< 6+#< 7< =n t e ist+r. +f Batai''e>s reading +f ?ege') fr+( t e first artic'es +f t e 3oc ments (1-2-# t+ L%eGperience interieure (1-43#) and +n t e eJ%erience +f t e instructi+n +f 4+.re) and a!+:e a'') 4+Ge:e) 7 +se (ar" d+(inates :isi!'.) cf< 2< @ueneau) E*re(ieres c+nfr+ntati+ns a:ec ?ege')E 8riti7 e, 1-5--6< 5et us n+te ere and n+7 t at at 'east f+r Batai''e t ere 7as n+ funda(enta' ru%ture !et7een 4+Ge:e>s reading +f ?ege') t+ 7 ic e +%en'. su!scri!ed a'(+st t+ta''.) and t e true instructi+n +f &arJis(< In a !i!'i+gra% . 7 ic 7as t+ acc+(%an. an un%u!'is ed #heorie de la religion, +ne can read t is in %articu'arB E0 is 7+r" ((ntroduction t+ the +eading of 8egel by 4+Ge:e# is an eJ%'icati+n o f #he Pheno!enology of the -ind! 0 e ideas t at I a:e de:e'+%ed are a'' ere in su!stance< It re(ains t+ s%ecif. t e c+rres%+ndence !et7een ?ege'ian ana'.sis and t is >t e+r. +f re'igi+n>B t e differences !et7een +ne re%resentati+n and t e +t er see( t+ (e t+ !e easi'. reduci!'e<E EI insist again +n under'ining t e fact t at ;'eJandre 4+Ge:e>s inter%retati+n d+es n+t de%art fr+( &arJis( in an. 7a.B si(i'ar'.) it is a'7a.s eas. t+ %ercei:e t at t e %resent >t e+r.> is a'7a.s rig+r+us'. f+unded +n t e ana'.sis +f ec+n+(.<E 2. #H. Bai''ie) t e /ng'is trans'at+r +f ?ege'>s Pheno!enology, trans'ates 2errschaft as E'+rds i%)E 7 i'e ?.%%+'ite) t e ,renc trans'at+r) trans'ates 2err as maitre, (a"ing t e E(aster>sE +%erati+n maitrise!% -attrise a's+ as t e sense +f (aster.) +f gras%) and Derrida c+ntinua''. %'a.s +n t is d+u!'e sense) 7 ic is '+st in /ng'is < 0 e difference !et7een s+:ereignt. and '+rds i% (maitriser* is t at s+:ereignt. d+es n+t see" t+ gras% (maitriser* c+nce%ts !ut rig+r+us'. t+ eJ%'+de t e(< ;'' citati+ns fr+( ?ege' are indicated in t e teJtL and are fr+( The Pheno!enology of the Find, trans< J< B< Bai''ie (Ne7 D+r"B ?ar%er 0+rc !++"s) 1-67#< -< E; %assage fr+( t e %reface t+ t e Pheno!enology of the Find

f+rcefu''. eJ%resses t e necessit. +f suc an attitude< N+ d+u!t t at t is ad(ira!'e teJt) fr+( t e initia' c+ntact) is +f ca%ita' i(%+rtance)> n+t +n'. f+r understanding ?ege') !ut in e:er. senseB >Deat ) as 7e (a. ca'' t at unrea'it.) is t e (+st terri!'e t ing) and t+ "ee% and +'d fast 7 at is dead de(ands t e greatest f+rce +f a''< Beaut.) %+7er'ess and e'%'ess) ates understanding) !ecause t e 'atter eJacts fr+( it 7 at it cann+t %erf+r(< But t e 'ife +f (ind is n+t +ne t at s uns deat ) and "ee%s c'ear +f destructi+nL it endures deat and in deat (aintains its !eing< It +n'. 7ins t+ its trut 7 en it finds itse'f utter'. t+rn asunder< It is t is (ig t. %+7er) n+t !. !eing a %+siti:e 7 ic turns a7a. fr+( t e negati:e) as 7 en 7e

say

+f an.t ing it is n+t ing +r it is

fa'se) and !eing t en d+ne 7it it) %ass +ff t+ s+(et ing e'seB +n t e c+ntrar.) (ind is t is %+7er +n'. !. '++"ing t e negati:e in t e face) and d7e''ing 7it it< 0 is d7e''ing !eside it is t e (agic %+7er t at c+n:erts t e negati:e int+ !eing<> E (2egel, $! -3#< Batai''e) 7 +( 7e are qu+ting ere) 7 i'e referring t+ t e trans'ati+n K+f t e 5henomenology int+ ,renc I !. Jean ?.%%+'ite) sa.s t at e is re%r+ducing a trans'ati+n !. ;'eJandre 4+Ge:e) 7 ic e is n+t d+ing eJact'.< If +ne ta"es int+ acc+unt t at ?.%%+'ite and 4+Ge:e ad since (+dified t eir trans'ati+ns) +ne as at +ne>s dis%+sa' at 'east fi:e f+r(s +f t e teJt) t+ 7 ic c+u'd !e added t e E+rigina')E t at +t er 'ess+n< 10< 0N< 0 e inde%endence +f se'f-c+nsci+usness is t e resu't +f t e dia'ectic +f t e (aster and s'a:e< 11< EBut 'aug ter) ere) is t e negative, in t e ?ege'ian sense<E J<-*< Sartre) E9n n+u:eau (.stique) in "it ations & (*arisB 1a''i(ard) 1-47#) %< 16+< 5aug ter is n+t t e negati:e !ecause its b rst d+es n+t maintain itse'f) is neit er 'in"ed u% t+ itse'f n+r su((ariMed in a disc+urseB 'aug s at t e 12< 8onferences s r le non%savoir, in Tel 6 el 10< 13< 0N< Derrida is %'a.ing +n t e idea t at A fheb ng (eans t+ negate and

A fheb ng!

t+ c+nser:e at t e sa(e ti(e< In t e 5henomenology eac ste% a'+ng t e 7a. is E'ifted u% and interi+riMed)E negated and c+nser:ed) in t e neJt ste%< 0 us t e A fheb ng 'ea:es n+t ing !e ind) and is t e !est +f s%ecu'at+rs !ecause it 7astes n+t ing and %r+fits fr+( e:er.t ing< Batai''e) Derrida is de(+nstrating) is n+t a Es%ecu'at+rE !ecause e is c+ncerned %recise'. 7it 7 at is 'eft !e ind) 7it t e eJcess 7 ic t e A fheb ng eJc'udes !ecause it cann+t %r+fit (i<e<) (a"e sense# fr+( it< 2egel, %%< 32-33< 8f! a's+) in /0e1$erience interie re t e entire E*+stscri%tu( au su%%'ice)E n+ta!'. %%< 1-3ff 14<

15< &ic e' ,+ucau't) in fact) s%ea"s +f a En+n%+siti:e affir(ati+n)E E*reface a 'a transgressi+n)E :ritique, 1-5--6) *< 756< 16< E=f t e ?ege'ian trinit.) e su%%resses t e (+(ent +f s.nt esis<E Sartre) "it ations &, %< 144< 17< :f. Jean ?.%%+'ite) Logique et e1istence; +ssai s r la logique de 8egel (*arisB *<9<,<#) %< 2$< 1$< E*+st-scri%tu( au su%%'ice)E in +l, %< 1$-< 1-< E=n'. t e seri+us as a meaning: %'a.) 7 ic n+ '+nger as +ne) is seri+us +n'. in t e eJtent t+ 7 ic >t e a!sence +f (eaning is a's+ a (eaning)> !ut is a'7a.s '+st in t e nig t +f an indifferent n+n(eaning< Seri+usness) deat and %ain are t e !asis +f its +!tuse trut < But t e seri+usness +f deat and %ain is t e ser:i'it. +f t +ug t<E (E*+stscri%tu()E in /') %< 253# 0 e unit. +f seri+usness) (eaning) 7+r") ser:i'it.) disc+urse) etc<) t e unit. +f (an) s'a:e and 1+d-suc ) in Batai''e>s e.es) is t e %r+f+und c+ntent +f (?ege'ian# % i'+s+% .< ?ere) 7e can +n'. refer t+ t e (+st eJ%'icit teJts< (;<# /') %< 105B EIn t is (. eff+rts rec+((ence and und+ ?ege'>s 5henomenology! ?ege'>s c+nstructi+n is a % i'+s+% . +f 7+r") +f t e >%r+Gect<> ?ege'ian (anBeing and 1+d-is fu'fi''ed in t e adequati+n +f t e %r+Gect <<<< 0 e s'a:e <<<< after (an. (eanders) acceeds t+ t e su((it +f t e uni:ersa'< 0 e +n'. +!stac'e t+ t is 7a. +f t in"ing (7 ic is) (+re+:er) +f an unequa'ed) and in s+(e way inaccessi!'e) %r+fundit.# is t at (an is irreduci!'e t+ t e %r+GectB n+ndiscursi:e eJistence) 'aug ter) ecstas.)E etc< (B<# /e co $able, %< 133B EIn e'a!+rating t e % i'+s+% . +f 7+r" (t is is t e knecht, t e e(anci%ated s'a:e) t e 7+r"er) 7 + in t e 5henomenology !ec+(es 1+d#) ?ege' as su%%ressed c ance-and 'aug ter)E etc< (6<# In 2egel, la mort es%ecia''.) Batai''e s +7s t r+ug 7 at slidin g%which, in t e s%eec +f s+:ereignt.) 7i'' a:e t+ !e s%ecifica''. +%%+sed !. an+t er s'iding?ege' (isses a s+:ereignt. t at e Ea%%r+ac ed as (uc as e c+u'd)E and t at e (isses Ef+r t e !enefit +f ser:itude<E E0 e s+:ereignt. +f ?ege'>s attitude s%rings fr+( a (+:e(ent re:ea'ed by disco rse and 7 ic ) in t e Sage>s (ind) is ne:er se%arated fr+( its re:e'ati+n< It cann+t) t eref+re) !e fu''. s+:ereignB t e Sage) in effect) cann+t fai' t+ su!+rdinate it f+r t e ends +f a Wisd+( 7 ic assu(es t e c+(%'eti+n +f disc+urse <<< ?e gat ered u% s+:ereignt. 'i"e a 7eig t) 7 ic e dr+%%edE (%%< 41-42#< 20< 8onferences s r le non%savoir! 21< 8f! t e EDiscussi+n sur 'e %ec eE in 3ie vivant, B (1-45#) and *ierre 4'+ss+7s"i) E; %r+%+s du si(u'acre dans 'a c+((unicati+n de 1e+rges Batai''e)E 8riti7 e, 1-5--6<

43$ N=0/S 0= *;1/S 3 3 3 - 3 $ 22< /') %%< 1+5 and 213< 7it is :icti()E etc<

N=0/S 0= *;1/S 33$-42 43-

S>Sartre>s stud.) cited a!+:e) G+ints its first and sec+nd %arts 7it t e

as gras%ed) t at n+ +ne e:er 7i'' gras% <<<< In t e 5henomenologyL and t e slave (t e (an su!Gugated t+ 7+r"#) 7 ic is at t e +rigin>+ t e 6+((unist t e+r. +f c'ass strugg'e) ?ege' !rings t e s'a:e> t+ 7i'' +f ser:itudeL f+r its %art) s+:ereignt. as +n'. t e "ingd+()><+ 25< 0N< +rinner ng is t e ?ege'ian) s%ecu'ati:e c+nce%t +f interi+riMing (e(+r.< 5i"e A fheb ng (cf! n+te 13 a!+:e# it 'ea:es n+t ing !e ind<

-<<E; dis'+dging) !ut a7are use +f 7+rds)E sa.s S+''ers (EDe grandes Lfirregu'arites de 'angage)E ritique- &9F%9?* 5-<3 =ne +ft e essentia' t e(es +f Sartre>s stud. (Cn nouveau !ystique) is a's+ t e accusati+n +f scientis() G+ined 7it t at +f (.sticis(< (ESci 49n"n+7'edge is ist+rica') as Sartre n+tes (E9n"n+7'edge is essen tia''. ist+rica') since it can !e designated +n'. as a certain eJ%erience t at a certain (an ad at a certain date)E %< 140#) +n'. +n its discursi:e)

s'a:e t at %er(its t e A lheb ng, t e (aster>s interi+riMing +f t e) ter interi+nMes ser:i'it. t r+ug s%ecu'ati:e c+nce%ts) s+:ereignt.) as d+es t e (aster) f+r t is ine:ita!'. 'eads t+ ser:i'it.<

'edge< 0 e Eedif.ing narrati:eE-t is is +7 Sartre qua'ifies interior e1$erience i((ediate'. after7ard-is) +n t e c+ntrar.) +n t e side +f "n+7'edge) ist+r.) and (eaning< =n t e +%erati+n 7 ic c+nsists in miming absol te knowledge, at 7 +se ter(inati+n Eun"n+7'edge a:ing !een attained) a!s+'ute "n+7'edge !ec+(es +ne "ind +f "n+7'edge a(+ng +t ers)E cf< %%<

?ege'ian (+de' (Ecircu'arit.E# +f "n+7'edge< 33< =ne 7+u'd c+((it a gr+ss err+r in inter%reting t ese %r+%+siti+ns in inaut entic< :f. E5a % ar(acie de *'at+n)E in 5a disse!ination, %%<120ff in effect) (anifest :+'untaris() an entire % i'+s+% . +f t e o$eratihg: acti:it. +f a su!Gect< S+:ereignt. is a $ractical o$eration (cf!, f+r eJa(%'e) t e 8 o n f e r e n c e s sin 'e non%savoir, %< 14#< But +ne 7+u'd n+t read Batai''e>s teJt if +ne did n+t 7ea:e t ese %r+%+siti+ns int+ t e t e( 7it in) t e(se':es< 0 us) a %age furt er +nB E;nd it d+es n+t e:en suffice t+ sa.B +ne cann+t s%ea" +f t e s+:ereign (+(ent 7it +ut a'tering it) 7it +ut a'tering it ins+far as it is tru'. s+:ereign< 0+ t e sa(e eJtent as t+ s%ea" +f it) t+ s e e k t ese (+:e(ents is c+ntradict+r.< ;t t e (+(ent 7 en 7e see" s+(et ing) 7 ate:er it is) 7e d+ n+t 'i:e in s+:ereign fas i+n) 7e su!+rdinate t e %resent (+(ent t+ a Ereacti+nar.E sense< 0 e c+nsu(%ti+n +f t e eJcess +f energ. !. a deter(ined c'ass is n+t t e destructi:e c+nsu(ing +f (eaning) !ut t e significati:e rea%%r+%riati+n +f a sur%'us :a'ue 7it in t e s%ace +f restricted ec+n+(.< ,r+( t is %+int +f :ie7) s+:ereignt. is a!s+'ute'. re:+'uti+nar.< But it is a's+ re:+'uti+nar. as c+ncerns a re:+'uti+n 7 ic 7+u'd +n'. re+rganiMe t e 7+r'd +f 7+r" and 7+u'd redistri!ute :a'ues 7it in t e s%ace +f (eaning) t at is t+ sa.) sti'' 7it in restricted ec+n+(.< 0 is 'ast (+:e(ent-+n'. s'ig t'. %ercei:ed) ere and t ere) !. Batai''e (f+r eJa(%'e) in /a $art ma dite! 7 en e e:+"es t e Eradica'is( +f &arJE and t e Ere:+'uti+nar. sense t at &arJ f+r(u'ated a%%r+Ji(ati+ns (f+r eJa(%'e in t e fift %art of /a $art m a d i t e * % i s rig+r+us'. necessar.) !ut as a % ase 7it in t e strateg. +f genera'

(+(ent f+''+7ing +ur eff+rt) and) in effect) it is %+ssi!'e t at an eff+rt is necessar.) !ut !et7een t e ti(e +f t e eff+rt and s+:ereign t ere is necessari'. a cut-+ff) and) +ne c+u'd e:en sa.) an a!.ss<E

time

insincere< It is %ure'. fictive in a sense +f t is 7+rd t at t e c'assica' +%%+siti+ns +f true and fa'se) essence and a%%earance) 'ac"< It

7it dra7s itse'f fr+( every t e+retica' +r et ica' questi+n< Si(u'tane+us'.) it +ffers itse'f t+ t ese questi+ns +n its (in+r side) t+ 7 ic it is united) as Batai''e sa.s) in 7+r") disc+urse and (eaning< (EW at +!'iges (e t+ 7rite) I i(agine) is t e fear +f g+ing (ad)E " r

Hiet)sche!* =n t is side +ne can 7+nder) as easi'. and 'egiti(ate'. as

%+ssi!'e) if Batai''e is Esincere<E W ic Sartre d+esB E?ere t en is an in:itati+n t+ '+se +urse':es 7it +ut f+ret +ug t) 7it +ut c+unter%art) 7it +ut sa':ati+n< Is it sincereOE (%< 162#< ,urt er +nB E,+r) after a'') &< Batai''e 7rites) +ccu%ies a %+siti+n at t e Bi!'i+t eque Nati+na'e) reads) (a"es '+:e) eatsE (%< 163#< :onferences sur le non/savoir. 0 e =!Gects +f science are) t en) EeffectsE +f "n+7'edge< /ffects +f n+n(eaning< 0 is is) f+r eJa(%'e) 1+d) ins+far as an +!Gect +f t e+'+g.< E1+d is a's+ an effect +f un-"n+7'edgeE (i!id<#< 36< 0N< /0e1$erience interie re 7as t+ !e %art +f a %r+Gected series t+ !e ca''ed &o!!e atheologique. 37< 6f< &eister /c" art) f+r eJa(%'e< 0 e negati:e (+:e(ent +f t e disc+urse +n 1+d is +n'. a % ase +f %+siti:e +nt+t e+'+g.< E1+d is na(e'ess <<<< If I sa. 1+d is a !eing) it is n+t trueB e is a transcendenta' essence) a su%eressentia' n+t ingE (0e ye renewed in the spirit). 0 is 7as +n'. a turn +r det+ur +f 'anguage f+r +nt+t e+'+g.B EBut 7 en I sa. 1+d is n+t !eing) is su%eri+r t+ !eing) I d+ n+t 7it t at den. i( !eingB I dignif. and eJa't it in i(E (Like the !orning star) (,ranM *feiffer) -eister +ckhart K5+nd+nB J+ n &< Wat"ins) 1-56I) %%< 246 and 211#< 3$< In +rder t+ define t e %+int at 7 ic e de%arts fr+( ?ege' and 4+Ge:e) Batai''e s%ecifies 7 at e (eans !. Ec+nsci+us (.sticis()E E!e.+nd c'assica' (.sticis(EB E0 e at eistic (.stic) conscio s of himself c+nsci+us +f a:ing t+ die and t+ disa%%ear) 7+u'd 'i:e) as ?ege' sa.s) evidently about hi!self, >in a!s+'ute rending>L !ut f+r ?ege') it 7as +n'. a questi+n +f a % aseB as +%%+sed t+ ?ege') t e at eist (.stic 7+u'd ne:er e(erge fr+( it) >c+nte(%'ating t e Negati:e quite direct'.)> !ut ne:er a!'e t+ trans%+se it int+ Being) refusing t+ d+ s+ and (aintaining i(se'f in a(!iguit.E (8egel). 3-< ?ere) again) t e difference c+unts (+re t an t e c+ntent +f t e ter(s< ;nd t ese t7+ series +f +%%+siti+ns ((aG+rP(in+r) arc aicPc'assic# s +u'd !e c+(!ined 7it t e series 7e e'a!+rated a!+:e as c+ncerns t e %+etic (s+:ereign n+nsu!+rdinati+nPinserti+nPsu!+rdinati+n#< 0+ arc aic s+:ereignt.) E7 ic indeed see(s t+ a:e i(%'ied a "ind +f i(%+tenc.)E and 7 ic ) ins+far as it is Eaut enticE s+:ereignt.) refuses

Et e eJercise +f %+7erE (su!Gugating '+rds i%#) Batai''e +%%+ses Et e c'assic idea +f s+:ereignt.)E 7 ic Eis 'in"ed t+ t e idea +f c+((andE and c+nsequent'. 7ie'ds a'' t e attri!utes 7 ic are refused) nder the sa!e word, t+ t e s+:ereign +%erati+n (free) :ict+ri+us) se'f-c+nsci+us) ac"n+7'edged) etc<) su!Gecti:it.) 7 ic is t eref+re (ediated and turned a w a y fr+( itse'f) returning t+ itse'f f+r a:ing !een turned a7a. fr+( itse'f !. t e 7+r" +f t e s'a:e#< N+7) Batai''e de(+nstrates t at t e E(aG+r %+siti+nsE +f s+:ereignt.) as (uc as t e (in+r +nes) can !e inserted int+ t e s% ere +f acti:it.E (-ethode*! 0 e difference !et7een t e (aG+r and t e (in+r is t eref+re +n'. ana'+g+us t+ t e difference !et7een t e arc aic and t e c'assic< ;nd neit er t e +ne n+r t e +t er (ust !e underst++d in a c'assic +r (in+r fas i+n< 0 e arc aic is n+t t e +riginar. +r t e aut entic) as t e. are deter(ined !. % i'+s+% ica' disc+urse< 0 e (aG+r is n+t +%%+sed t+ t e (in+r 'i"e !ig t+ 'itt'e) ig t+ '+7< In EAiei''e tau%eE (='d &+'e#) (an un%u!'is ed artic'e) reGected b y Bif rs*, t e +%%+siti+ns +f ig t+ '+7) and +f a'' t e significati+ns in s r%, s $er% (surrea') su%er(an# and in s b% (su!terranean) etc<#) +f t e i(%eria'ist eag'e and t e %r+'etarian (+'e) are eJa(ined in a'' t e %+ssi!i'ities +f t eir re:ersa's< 40< E*'a. is n+t ing if n+t an +%en and unreser:ed c a''enge t+ e:er.t ing +%%+sed t+ %'a.E ((argina' n+te in t e un%u!'is ed E0 e+rie de 'a re'igi+n)E 7 ic Batai''e a's+ %'anned t+ entit'e E0+ die 'aug ing and t+ 'aug at d.ingE#< 41< E; gesture <<< irreduci!'e t+ c'assica' '+gic and f+r 7 ic n+ '+gic see(s t+ !e c+nstitutedE sa.s S+''ers in /e toit, 7 ic !egins !. un(as"ing) in their syste!aticity, a'' t e f+r(s +f %seud+transgressi+n) t e s+cia' and ist+rica' figurati+ns in 7 ic can !e read t e c+(%'icit. !et7een Et e (an 7 + 'i:es 7it +ut %r+test under t e .+"e +f t e 'a7) and t e (an f+r 7 +( t e 'a7 is n+t ing<E In t is 'ast case) re%ressi+n is +n'. Ered+u!'edE (Le toit$ =ssai de lecture syste!atique, in /ogi7 es K*arisB Seui') 1-6$I) %< 16$#< 42< 5i"e e:er. disc+urse) 'i"e ?ege'>s) Batai''e>s disc+urse as t e f+r( +f a structure +f inter%retati+ns< /ac %r+%+siti+n) 7 ic is a'read. inter%reti:e in nature) can !e inter%reted !. an+t er %r+%+siti+n< 0 eref+re) if 7e %r+ceed %rudent'. and a'' t e 7 i'e re(ain in Batai''e>s teJt) 7e can detac an inter%retati+n fr+( its reinter%retati+n and su!(it it t+ an+t er inter%retati+n !+und t+ +t er %r+%+siti+ns +f t e s.ste(< W ic ) 7it +ut interru%ting genera' s.ste(aticit.) a(+unts t+ rec+gniMing t e str+ng and 7ea" (+(ents in t e inter%retati+n +f a !+d. +f t +ug t !. itse'f) t ese differences +f f+rce "ee%ing t+ t e

strategic necessit. +f finite disc+urse< Natura''. +ur +7n inter%reti:e reading as atte(%ted t+ %ass t r+ug 7 at 7e a:e inter%reted as t e (aG+r (+(ents) and as d+ne s+ in +rder t+ !ind t e( t+get er< 0 is E(et +dE-7 ic 7e na(e t us 7it in t e c'+sure +f "n+7'edge-is Gustified !. 7 at 7e are 7riting ere) in Batai''e>s 7a"e) a!+ut t e sus%ensi+n +f t e e%+c +f (eaning and trut < W ic neit er frees n+r %r+ i!its us fr+( deter(ining t e ru'es +f f+rce and +f 7ea"nessB 7 ic are a'7a.s a functi+n +fB (1# t e distance fr+( t e (+(ent +f s+:ereignt.L (2# t e (isc+nstruing +f t e rig+r+us n+r(s +f "n+7'edge< 0 e greatest f+rce is t e f+rce +f a 7riting 7 ic ) in t e (+st audaci+us transgressi+n) c+ntinues t+ (aintain and t+ ac"n+7'edge t e necessit. +f t e s.ste( +f %r+ i!iti+ns ("n+7'edge) science) % i'+s+% .) 7+r") ist+r.) etc<#< Writing is a'7a.s traced !et7een t ese t7+ sides +f t e 'i(it< ;(+ng t e 7ea" (+(ents +f Batai''e>s disc+urse) certain +nes are signa'ed !. t e deter(ined un"n+7'edge 7 ic

10B S0296092/) SI1N) ;ND *5;D IN 0?/ DIS6=92S/ =, ?9&;N

S6I/N6/S
1 0N< 0 e reference) in a restricted sense) is t+ t e ,reudian t e+r. +f

is a certain % i'+-

s+% ica' ign+rance< ;nd Sartre Gust'. n+tes t at E e as :isi!'. n+t underst++d ?eidegger) +f 7 +( e +ften and c'u(si'. s%ea"sE and t at t en E% i'+s+% . a:enges itse'fE ("it ations #, %< 145#< ?ere) t ere 7+u'd !e (uc t+ sa. a!+ut t e reference t+ ?eidegger< We 7i'' atte(%t t+ d+ s+ e'se7 ere< 5et us +n'. n+te t at +n t is %+int and se:era' +t ers) Batai''e>s Efau'tsE ref'ected t e fau'ts 7 ic ) at t at ti(e) (ar"ed t e reading +f ?eidegger !. Es%ecia'iMed % i'+s+% ers<E 0+ ad+%t 6+r!in>s trans'ati+n +f Dasein as h man%reality (a (+nstr+sit. +f un'i(ited c+nsequences t at t e first f+ur %aragra% s +f "ein and <eit ad 7arned against#) t+ use t is trans'ati+n as an e'e(ent +f a disc+urse) t+ s%ea" insistent'. a!+ut

a E u(anis( c+((+n t+ NietMsc e and

+ur aut +r KBatai''eI)E (%< 165# etc<-t is) t++) 7as % i'+s+% ica''. :er. risky +n Sartre>s %art< Dra7ing attenti+n t+ t is %+int in +rder t+ i''u(inate Batai''e>s teJt and c+nteJt) 7e d+u!t neit er t e ist+ric necessit. +f t is ris") n+r t e functi+n +f a7a"ening 7 +se %rice it 7as) 7it in a c+nGuncture t at is n+ '+nger +urs< ;'' t is (erits rec+gniti+n< ;7a"ening and ti(e a:e !een necessar.< 43< 0N< "ens, in ,renc ) (eans !+t sense and directi+n< 0+ '+se sense) t+ '+se (eaning) is t+ '+se +ne>s 7a.) t+ '+se a'' sense +f directi+n<

neur+tic s.(%t+(s and +f drea( inter%retati+n in 7 ic a gi:en s.(!+' is underst++d c+ntradict+ri'. as !+t t e desire t+ fu'fi'' an i(%u'se and t e desire t+ su%%ress t e i(%u'se< In a genera' sense t e reference is t+ Derrida>s t esis t at '+gic and c+ erence t e(se':es can +n'. !e underst++d c+ntradict+ri'.) since t e. %resu%%+se t e su%%ressi+n o f d ferance, E7ritingE in t e sense +f t e genera' ec+n+(.< 6f< E5a % ar(acie de *'aten)E in 0a dissemination, !!" 125-26) 7 ere Derrida uses t e ,reudian (+de' +f drea( inter%retati+n in +rder t+ c'arif. t e c+ntracti+ns e(!edded in % i'+s+% ica' c+ erence< 2! )he Raw and the 6ooked, trans< J+ n and D+reen Wig t(an (Ne7 D+r"B ?ar%er and 2+7) 1-6-#) %< 14< K0rans'ati+n s+(e7 at (+dified<I D! )he $lementary Structures of >inshi!, trans< Ja(es Be'') J+ n :+n Stur(er) and 2+dne. Need a( (B+st+nB Beac+n *ress) 1-6-#) %< $< 4< I!id<) %< 3< F! )he Sava e *ind (5+nd+nB 1e+rge Weidenfe'd and Nic+'s+nL 6 icag+B 0 e 9ni:ersit. +f 6 icag+ *ress) 1-66#) %< 247< 6< I!id<) %< 17< 9 ! )he Raw and the 6ooked, !" 2< $< I!id<) **< 5-6< -< I!id<) %< 12< 10< I!id< %%< 17-1$< ii< I!id<) **< 7-$< 12< 0N< 0 is d+u!'e sense +f su%%'e(ent-t+ su%%'. s+(et ing 7 ic is (issing) +r t+ su%%'. s+(et ing additi+na'-is at t e center +f Derrida>s dec+nstructi+n +f traditi+na' 'inguistics in ;e la rammatolo ie" In a c a%ter entit'ed E0 e Ai+'ence +f t e 5etterB ,r+( 5e:i-Strauss t+ 2+usseauE (%%< 14-ff#) Derrida eJ%ands t e ana'.sis +f 5e:i-Strauss !egun in t is essa. in +rder furt er t+ c'arif. t e 7a.s in 7 ic t e c+ntradicti+ns +f traditi+na' '+gic E%r+gra(E t e (+st (+dern c+nce%tua' a%%aratuses +f 'inguistics and t e s+cia' sciences< 13< EIntr+ducti+n

a I>+eu:re de &arce' &auss)E in &arce' &auss) "ociologie

et anthro!olo ie (*arisB *<9<,<) 1-50#) %< J'iJ< AB" I!id<) %%< J'iJ-I<

15< 1e+rge 6 ar!+nnier) $ntretiens avec 6laude 0evi<Strauss (*arisB *'+n) 1-61#< 16< Race and 4istory (*arisB 9nesc+ *u!'icati+ns) 1-5$#<

444 N=0/S 0= *;1/S 3 6 $ - 7 $ 17< EIntr+ducti+n a I>+eu:re de &arce' &auss)E %< J':i< 1$< 0N< 0 e reference is t+ Tristes tr+%iques) trans< J+ n 2usse'' (5+nd+nB ?utc ins+n and 6+<) 1-61#<

iiB /55I*SIS

i< 0 is is t e tit'e +f t e t ird :+'u(e +f t e /ivre des 7 estions (1-65#< 0 e sec+nd :+'u(e) t e 0ivre de .ukel, a%%eared in 1-64< 6f< c a%< 3 a!+:e) E/d(+nd Ja!es and t e @uesti+n +f t e B++"<E 2< 0N< 0 e eJit fr+( t e identica' int+ t e sa(e reca''s t e E'ea% +ut +f (eta% .sicsE int+ t e questi+n +f difference) 7 ic is a's+ t e ques ti+n +f t e sa(e) as e'a!+rated !. ?eidegger in Identity and ;ifference" 3< 0N< 0 e eterna' return is t e NietMsc ean c+nce%ti+n +f t e sa(e< 4< Jean 6atess+n) EJ+urna' n+n-inti(e et %+ints cardinauJ)E -eas res, n+< 4) =ct+!er 1-37<

SOURCES

1 E,+rce et significati+n<E

8riti7 e, n+s< 1-3--4) June-Ju'. 1-63<

2 E6+git+ et I> ist+ire de 'a f+'ie<E 5ecture de'i:ered 4 &arc 1-63 at t e 6+''ege * i'+s+% ique and %u!'is ed in Revue de meta!hysi1ue et de morale, 1-64) n+s< 3 and 4< E/d(+nd Ja!es et 'a questi+n du 'i:re<E 8riti7 e, n+< 201) Januar. 1-64< 4 EAi+'ence et (eta% .siqueB /ssai sur 'a %ensee d>/((anue' 5e:inas<E Revue de meta!hysi1ue et de morale, 1-64) n+s< 3 and 4< 5 E>1enese et structure> et 'a % en+(en+'+gie<E 5ecture de'i:ered 1-5- at 6eris.-'a-Sa''e and %u!'is ed in ,enese et str ct re, edited !. 6andi''ac) 1+'d(ann and *iaget< 0 e ?agueB &+ut+n) 1-64< 6 E5a %ar+'e s+uff'ee<E Tel 6 el, n+< 20) 7inter 1-65< 7 E,reud et 'a scene de I>ecriture<E 5ecture de'i:ered at t e Institut de *s.c ana'.se and %u!'is ed in Tel 6 el, n+< 26) su((er 1-66< $ E5e t eatre de 'a cruaute et 'a c'+ture de 'a re%resentati+n<E 5ecture de'i:ered at t e ;rtaud c+''+quiu() Internati+na' ,esti:a' +f 9ni:ersit. 0 eater) *ar(a) ;%ri' 1-66) and %u!'is ed in 8riti7 e, n+< 230) Ju'. 1-66< - EDe I>ec+n+(ie restreinte ; I>ec+n+(ie genera'eB 9n ege'ianis(e sans reser:e<E 0'arc, &a. 1-67< t+ E5a structure) 'e signe et 'e Geu c'ans 'e disc+urs des sciences u(aines<E 5ecture de'i:ered 21 =ct+!er 1-66 at t e Internati+na'

AA1 !=E2C6!
#ollo7uiu8 on #ritical (an5ua5es and the -ciences o9 )an, The :ohns +o;<ins 3ni=ersity, Balti8ore4 ii >(?elli;se4> !irst ;ublished in 6-9criture et la difference, 191%4

'o(!le%ge )l$ssi*s
9et inside a great mind
The 0ift
with a 9oreword by )ary ) ar c e l )a u s s ?The teachin5 o9 )arcel )auss was one to which 9ew can be co8;ared4 No ac<nowled5e8ent o9 hi8 can be ;ro;ortionate to our debt4? *laude (e=i@-trauss In this se8inal wor<, )ichael )auss utterly re=olutioniAed our understandin5 o9 the ;rocess o9 eBchan5e thereby callin5 into 7uestion the rationale behind society?s 8ost cherished assu8;tions4 In a world increasin5ly obsessed by runaway consu8;tion The <ift has ne=er been o9 5reater rele=ance and, as (c=i@-trauss re8ar<ed, 9ew can read this boo< without 9eelin5 that they are so8ehow ?;resent at a decisi=e e=ent in the e=olution o9 science4? ou5las

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0eneral Theory of Magic

?It is enou5h to recall that )auss? in9luence is not li8ited to ethno5ra;hers, none o9 who8 could clai8 to ha=e esca;ed it, but eBtends also to lin5uists, ;sycholo5ists, historians o9 reli5ion and or reli5ion and orientalists4? =laude 6e%i5 /trauss As a study o9 8a5ic in ?;ri8iti=e? societies and its sur=i=al today in our thou5hts and social actions, A General Theory of 8agic re;resents what #laude (C=i@ -trauss called the astonishin5 8odernity o9 the 8ind o9 one o9 the century?s 5reatest thin<ers4 At a ;eriod when art, 8a5ic and science a;;ear to be crossin5 ;aths once a5ain, A <eneral Theory of 8agic ;resents itsel9 as a classic 9or our ti8es4

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