Law On Public Officers Reviewer (Dean Roy)

Law of Public Officers | Dean Roy
SESSION 1 I. CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE 1. LAUREL v DESIERTO
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FACTS During the Aquino administration, an Administrative Order was issued for the formation of a committee that would be in charge of the Centennial celebrations. This was reconstituted during the Ramos administration and was dubbed as the National Centennial Commission. It was to be chaired by Salvador Laurel and was described to be an ad-hoc commission, to be dissolved upon the completion of the centennial celebrations. Consequently, EXPOCORP was incorporated, wherein Laurel was one of the directors/incorporators. On a later date, Coseteng delivered a privileged speech in the Senate alleging anomalies connected with the Centennial celebrations. This was followed by an investigation by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Saguisag commission formed by President Estrada. Both recommended the further investigation and possible prosecution of Laurel. This led to an investigation by the Ombudsman who filed a complaint later on against Laurel. Now, Laurel questions the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, contending that he is not to be considered a public officer. HELD The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The appointment of a portion of sovereign function is the most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not. The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies set forth by law. In relation to the Administrative Order and Executive Order creating the commission, the policies and objectives for its creation was set forth. It was not only primarily for the coordinated planning for a centennial celebration but also for the furtherance of arts and culture as well as enrichment of national economic development. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions and its Chair is a public officer. 2. MATHAY JR. v CA
FACTS During his administration, Simon appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the PD wasnt published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didnt become a proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the appointees to the created Department of Public Order and Safety. The said department didnt quite reach fruition due to insufficiency of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled. The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried over by the next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of the said contractual appointments, it was no longer approved, prompting the private respondents to file a complaint with the CSC. The CSC ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the previous ordinance issued. HELD The CSC has no authority to direct the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. Applying the old LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through the ordinance dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council through a simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the absorption of specific persons to certain positions. In upholding the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that the doctrine of separation of powers doesnt apply to local governments, which is wrong. The powers of the city council and the mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated in the old LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power to create,

consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions supported by local funds belongs to the city council.
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By ordering the mayor to reinstate private respondents, the CSC substituted its own judgment to the appointing power of the mayor. This cannot be done. The CSCs power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It doesnt have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 1. FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President. It is the petitioners contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause since the said law didnt repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of candidacy. HELD Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, doesnt violate the one subject- one title rule. The Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. 2. NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC
FACTS Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that to exercise absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be fulfilled. HELD RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to
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exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections 3. KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v ERMITA
FACTS Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding Ongs citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition. HELD First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importancethe citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the Supreme Court. Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. other acts that will complete the appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointeehe must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It doesnt end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesnt pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesnt provide really that there is a period to accept or reject an appointment.

III. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS 1. TORNALI v CSC
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FACTS Tornali was appointed as Department Management Officer II by the then Executive Director of the Office of Muslim Affairs. She assumed her duties four months after and during this time, the records of her appointment werent transmitted to the CSC for approval. Given that her appointment was incomplete, upon the entrance of a new Executive Director, her appointment was revoked and she was replaced by Lucma. This prompted Tornali to question the validity of Lucmas appointment when she was already appointed to the position. She protested this but her protests were dismissed. HELD An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed. Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office canyet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure. It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director, therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better qualified for the position. The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner. 2. MALALUAN v COMELEC
FACTS Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluans continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en musse denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. HELD We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-
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contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. COMELECs reasoning in awarding the damages in question is fatally flawed. The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial court. Assuming that this is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on the part of petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not, in the absence of clear proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorneys fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having been a clearly unfounded one under the aforementioned circumstances. Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction. COMELEC sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that since petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the strength merely of an order granting execution pending appeal, the petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper. Petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has haa possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office. 3. PEOPLE v GARCIA
FACTS Garcia was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and was sentenced to death by Judge Guzman. The judgment was promulgated on the 20th of February. On April of the same year, the judge filed for disability retirement and such was approved. Its effectivity was then made retroactive to the 16th of February. Here now comes the accused assailing the judgment against him, given that Judge Guzman had no longer authority to promulgate judgment given the retroactivity of his judgment. HELD Accuseds contention is without merit. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision is valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto A judge de jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the expiration of his term are void. However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time the decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.

SESSION 2 IV. CIVIL SERVICE 1. ANDAYA V. RTC
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FACTS There was a vacancy in the position of chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu police Andaya submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to the mayor of Cebu. However, the mayor refused to appoint one because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due to being disqualified. RTC ruled in favor of the mayor, granting the appointment of Sarmiento. ISSUE W/N the mayor can require the Regional Director to include the mayors protg in the list HELD NO. The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It its the prerogative of the regional director of the police to choose the eligible person who should be included in the list without intervention from local executives - based on the National Police Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the qualifications of a chief of police. In case of disagreement, the issue should be elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall resolve the issue within 5 working days. The authority of the mayor is limited, no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the list. The purpose is to enhance professionalism and isolate police service from political domination 2. JAVIER V. REYES
FACTS Javier was appointed chief of police in Malolos by Mayor Aldaba. He already took oath and discharged his functions as chief of police. However, the municipal mayor was assumed by Reyes, who recalled his appointed. Reyes even illegally ousted Javier and replaced him with Clements. Javier took this up in CSC. It appears that there were already 2 appointments for the chief of police Javier and Bernardo. The CSC ruled that Javier should be the one appointed, as Bernardo was not confirmed by the counsel of Malolos. But Reyes still refused to instill Javier in the position. ISSUE W/N Javier should prevail as chief of police HELD YES. Javier should be chief of police. He already took oath and performed the functions of his office. This amounts to acceptance by Javier. Javier acted immediately when his position was taken and filed a mandamus suit, this also amounts to acceptance. On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office. He did not even contested Javiers right to the position. His motion to intervene in court was way too late. It seems that there was no acceptance of appointment for his part. Acceptance is important in appointments. It is what makes the appointments complete. 3. DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR
FACTS The case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him. The appointment was issued on November 19, 1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following day, the SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991, SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar and declaring void the recall issued by Secretary Santos. Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents (SPES) to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.

ISSUE W/N Docenas appointment was already complete?
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HELD YES. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment. 4. FABELLA V. CA
FACTS On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had th been staged to demand payment of 13 month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. ISSUE W/N private respondents were denied due process? HELD YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
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Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them. 5. MIRALLES VS GO
FACTS This case is about a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the SACNapolcom finding Miralles administratively liavble for grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal. On Dec. 7, 1977 an administrative complaint was filed against Miralles, alleging that Miralles committed grave misconduct by wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with the intent to kill assaulted Pat. Ressurrecion by use of firearms, which directly caused the death of Pat. Resurrecion and Merculio. After the investigation it was recommended that Miralles be dismissed from service, the decision was appealed by Miralles to the Adjudication Board, which was denied. The petitioner then appealed to the Special Appellate Committee of NAPOLCOM. The appeal was also dismissed at this point., subsequently the issue was appealed to the CA, and the CA ruled that the action of Miralles was pre-mature and it should have filed its action before the Civil Service Commission. Despite this procedural error, the CA went on to decide on the case and it affirmed the decision of the lower courts. ISSUES 1. W/N CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2. W/N the dismissal of the petition can be sustained by the evidence presented/used. 3. W/N the petitioner sufficiently establish his alibi of self-defense. HELD The Court ruled that Miralles should have filed his appeal in the Civil Service Commission first, pursuant to RA 6975. The court found that the contention of Miralles is untenable, he argued that the decision was promulgated in 1989, years before the implementation of RA 6975, therefore he should be not be covered by the said RA. However the Court said that, it is true that the decision was promulgated on 1989, however Miralles only received such copy of the decision sometime in 1991, and by then the RA was already implemented, therefore Miralles should have filed its action before the CSC. The Court went on and say that the right to appeal is a statutory right, therefore one who seeks to avail the right, must comply with the statute or the rile in effect when the right arose, in this case the right arose or vested when the notice was delvered to Miralles, therefore Miralles should have complied with the new rule. Lastly the Court went on to say that the issues is moot and academic. Regarding the evidence used against Miralles, according to him it was all hearsays which should not be entertained by the Court, Miralles alleged that the evidence did not properly identified the persons who executed them, hence such becomes inadmissible. The Court however has a different opinion, it states the except exhibits B and C, the rest of the documents are public documents, hence they are prima facie evidence. Furthermore the contention of Miralles that the testimony of Lamsen was recanted by Lamsen in a cross-examination, the court by searching the record proved that there was no recantation by Lamsen during the cross examination. In fact the said recantation was actually a statement made by Lamsen as a witness for the defense, in which Lamsen was never cross-examined, making his defense testimony inadmissible. Lastly, the Court found that the facts of the case has been consistently the same under the lower court and committees, it ruled that the Supreme Court respects the integrity of the facts finding of the lower court, and according to such Miralles failed to establish his defense of self-defense sufficiently. With all things considered the Court affirmed the decision of the CA. 6. LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY
FACTS Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a coaccused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
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by the authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges. The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesnt have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him. ISSUES: 1. W/N the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith. HELD The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being wilfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner. As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled to backwages. 7. MACALINCAG V. CHANG
FACTS Roberto E. Chang, acting municipal treasurer of Makati, was charged administratively by Lorinda Carlos and Victor Macalincag, acting Finance Secretary, for illegal disbursements as well as failure to remit collections to the Bureau of Treasury. Included in the charge was on Order of Preventive Suspension for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) seeking the implementation of the preventive suspension. The Officer-in-Charge of the MMC furnished Chang a copy of the order through ordinary mail dated October 6, 1989. Chang, on the other hand, filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and in the meantime, the RTC temporarily restrained Carlos and Macalincag from implementing the said order. Upon examination of the pleadings, the RTC denied Changs petition. Chang filed a motion for reconsideration, citing a new argument by invoking Sec. 8 of EO No. 932 which created the Metro Manila Authority and thereby transferred the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The RTC reconsidered and set aside the previous ruling, this time, ruled in favor of Chang.
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Macalincag argues that the order took effect upon the receipt of Chang, which was on October 6, 1989, before the effectivity of EO No.392. On the other hand, Chang argues that the preventive suspension would only be implemented upon the happening of 2 conditions, 1) service of a copy of the order to the respondent and 2) designation of replacement. It is the latters argument which trial court curried favor on. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang? HELD YES. The Supreme Court held that the trial courts ruling is untenable given that the designation of a replacement is not required in implementing preventive suspension. The Order of Preventive Suspension took effect upon the receipt of Chang, hence, the applicability of EO No., 392 would be immaterial. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is under the Department of Finance, hence, Macalincag has the power to suspend Chang. Assuming arguendo that EO No. 932 was applicable, one only has to bring in my mind that department secretaries are alter egos of the President, making it still within the authority of the Macalincag as Secretary of Finance to preventively suspend Chang. 8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. JUDGE MATAS AND EDUARDO TORRES
FACTS Judge Jesus Matas and Eduardo Torres, the OIC Clerk of Court, were accused of violating RA 3019 which caused then Deputy Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano to recommend that the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file administrative charges against the two but said charges will be suspended pending the out come of the criminal case. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas and Torres, in connivance with one George Mercado, concealed from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his knowledge of the petition for issuance of new owners duplicate copies as well as taking cognizance of the case which was allegedly outside of the jurisdiction of his court, the land being in Kapalong, Davao. Notwithstanding that the land in question was owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons, Judge Matas still ordered the posing of the order and ultimately issued instructed the Register of Deeds for the issuance a new owners duplicate to George Mercado. Justice Imperial was tasked with the investigations. Hearing with the OCA commence but after presenting two witnesses, it moved for suspension of the proceedings to amend the complaint adding the grounds of gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law as well as modifying other portions of the complaint. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas and Torres acted with bad faith and partiality in ruling in favour of George Mercado. ISSUE 1. W/N Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case? 2. W/N Judge Matas acted with gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law in ruling in favor of George Mercado? HELD 1. NO. The subject parcel of land was well within the jurisdiction of the court of Judge Matas. The so-called municipality of Sto Tomas in Davao never legally existed because it was created only by then President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. The land was actually part of Kapalong which is within the coverage of Branch 1 of the RTC of Davao del Norte where Judge Matas sits. It was a mere impropriety of venue which may be waived by the parties. 2. NO. There was no gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law given that Judge Matas actually ordered the required posting to give notice. Also, he only ordered the RD to issue a duplicate of copy existing in record of the Registry and not issue new ones in the name of George Mercado. SIDE ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO BE RELATED TO ADMIN LAW: The SC said that the investigating Justice or Judge designated by the Court to Conduct an investigation, submit a report, and make the appropriate recommendation does not have an authority to grant or deny a motion to dismiss the case. Also, the initial recommendation of the Court Administrator regarding the suspension of the administrative proceedings pending the criminal case is inappropriate since administrative cases must be resolved as expeditiously as possible. There are different quantum of evidence, procedure to be followed and sanctions imposed, hence, the finding of one shouldnt be necessarily binding on the other.
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9. SANDOVAL V MANALO
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FACTS On or about 12am of May, inside his house in Coron-Province,Palawan, Jermaine Echague shot Alexander Sandoval (hitting the right part of his nose bridge) using an unlicensed 38 caliber revolver, Smith Wesson, without serial number, snub nose (paltik.) The latter died. Thereafter, Echague, in order to hide the body, removed the body of the victim, tied it up with an empty oxygen tank and threw it into the sea. Antonio Sandoval filed a criminal complaint for murder with the MCTC of Palawan against Echague for killing his son. Judge Manalo issued a warrant for the arrest of Echague and recommended no bail. Since Echague did not file the required counter-affidavits and evidence to support his case, the judge issued an order declaring that Echague had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie against him. He forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. Chief of Police also filed against Echague a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms (paltik used) and on the same date, Manalo issued a warrant of arrest for Echague. It seemed however that Echague could not be found nor located. The victims father, Antonio Sandoval, filed a complaint against the presiding judge (Manalo.) The complaint charges the judge with ignorance of law, dereliction of duty and grave abuse of authority for hastily lifting the warrant of arrest previously issued without giving the prosecution reasonable time to file any pleading regarding the motion. Judge Manalo contends that he only lifted the warrant of arrest based on humanitarian considerations. (Echague was only 18 ! years old; he voluntarily surrendered; his counsel attested that releasing him would not frustrated the ends of justice.) He also contends that as an investigating judge, he had the power to exercise his discretion in issuing warrants in cases during preliminary investigation. Subsequently, Antonio Sandoval filed a desistance to the administrative complaint against the judge stating that he is satisfied with the outcome of the criminal case. He also stated that he didnt know that what his counsel let him sign was a complaint against a judge. He thought that it was just an affidavit to be filed in court in order that the accused would be put back to prison. He did not know that it was a complaint against the judge since it was written in English. ISSUE W/N the acts of Judge Manalo renders him liable regardless of the desistance of Sandoval HELD YES. Desistance of Sandoval does not affect the truth and integrity of the affidavit-complaint against Judge Manalo. Judge Manalo did not even dispute the facts alleged therein. Disciplinary actions against public officers and employees do not involve purely private or personal matters. They are impressed with public interest by virtue of a public trust character of the public office. Administrative actions are not therefore made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. A mere reprimand is not enough since Manalo did not commit a mere error of judgment but has disregarded the laws and rules governing preliminary investigation of criminal cases cognizable by the RTC. Having thus determined a prima facie case for murder against Echague, Judge Manalo has no legal justification toe release the accused on a mere plea of the latter as the provision that it will not frustrate the ends of justice no longer applies after the conclusion of his preliminary investigation. Judge Manalo deliberately set aside the aforementioned laws and rules on preliminary investigation to accommodate the accused making him liable for misconduct or grave abuse of authority or dereliction of duty. He was fined and warned. 10. GREGO V COMELEC FACTS Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon finding of serious misconduct, for the second time, in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. His retirement benefits were forfeited and the decision of the court included this statement: with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCCs. In 1988, he ran as a candidate for Councilor in Manila and won.
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He sought re-election in 1992 and won again. However, his victory was contested. Another candidate alleged his ineligibility to be elected on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. This was dismissed. Basco, for the third time, ran again for councilor in 1995. His right to office was contested by Grego who filed a petition for disqualification against Basco and prayed for the suspension of Bascos proclamation and Maranans declaration as the citys th 6 duly elected councilor. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case. Before the parties were able to submit their respective memoranda, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly th elected councilor for the Second District of Manila (6 place.) Due to the said proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation. COMELECs first division dismissed the petion for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him. COMELEC en banc dismissed Gregos MR. ISSUE W/N the Tordesillas decision barred Basco from running for any elective position. HELD NO. Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person who was previously separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. In light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position. 11. CSC V. DACOYCOY FACTS Pedro O Dacoycoy was charged of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. The Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the supervision of Respondent Dacoycoy. ISSUE 1) 2) W/N Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism? W/N the Civil Service Commission is the property party to appeal the suit.
HELD 1) YES. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. (see page 435 of the case for the exceptions: not really important in the case) To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree f consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Undoubtedly, Respondent can be held responsible for the appointment of his 2 sons. Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator, He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under his immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. 2) YES, SC said that CSC was the proper party to appeal the suit because it was impleaded in the case and that the exoneration of Dcoycoy by the CA seriously prejudiced the civil service system. In this case, the SC expressly abandoned the prior rulings that an aggrieved party refers only to government employees adversely affected by the decision. In other words, the SC overruled prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges Summary of opinions MELO, J., Dissenting and Concurring
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PD. 807 has disallowed appeals by the government in cases of exoneration in an administrative case. Such has not yet been amended. The prerogative to amend such belongs to the Legislature and not to the Judiciary through its interpretations. ROMERO, J., Dissenting PD. 807 included only government employees, either the one who filed the complaint or the one charged, is considered an aggrieved party. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. In this case, CSC or government instrumentalities was not included thus they are not the proper party to appeal the case. Also CSC exercises quasi-judicial function and by analogy a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. PUNO, J., Concurring CSC may appeal the case by certiorari to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the respondent (Judicial Review.) The question at bar is basically a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. 12. BONAFE V. ZUBANO FACTS Petitioner, a policeman of Malilipot, Albay, was suspended by respondent Mayor Marciano Bitara because of four criminal cases filed against him in the Municipal Court of Tabaco, Albay, to wit: assault upon an agent (another policeman) of a person in authority with homicide less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence; illegal passion of firearms and alarm and scandal. Before the cases could be tried on the merits, the prosecution moved for their provisional dismissal on account of the desistance of the offended parties who had been paid by petitioner. The motion was granted by the court. Petitioner later sought a modicfication of the provisional dismissal to an absolute dismissal, which was also granted by the court. Petitioner then filed with the CSC a petition for reinstatement and payment of salaries he failed to receive during his suspension invoking Police Act of 1966 which basically says that he is entitled to such when he is acquitted from the criminal case ISSUE W/N petitioner is entitled to backwages based on acquittal HELD NO. Mere dismissal of the case will not suffice to entitle him to backwages. Dismissal does not necessarily amount to acquittal (except in 2 cases: demurrer of evidence and violation of speedy trial.) SC elaborated more on the difference which Im sure you still remember from crimpro. Also the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. His petition for reinstatement was pending in CSC when this case was filed. 13. GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE FACTS The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from service. The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service ruling saying o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified that part of the ruling.
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CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments. ISSUE W/N the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments HELD YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC 14. LAYUG v QUISUMBING FACTS Teacher Layug filed charges against Principal Presto for harassment. In counterclaim, Principal Presto filed charges of incompetence and undesirability against Layug. Both locked horns like angry bulls and ultimately Layug found himself suspended. DECS Secretary Quisumbing affirmed the suspension. Later on, the order of suspension was lifted and Layug was reinstated. Unfortunately, he did not receive his old job as a teacher of English and Biology. The poor fella was kicked into the CAT/YDT department. Layug demanded his old job as an English/Bio teacher and Principal Presto asserted that those positions were filled. The petition was denied, and Layug then found himself shuffled to temporary assignment in the Guidance Office. Layug howled again. Presto chastised him saying that if he did not accept, he will be terminated. Layug claims that the law mandates that he be given back his job as a Bio/English teacher since this was his appointment. ISSUE W/N Layug has the right to teach the old subjects HELD NO. Layugs contention, that he should be reinstated to his former assignment as a teacher of English and Biology subjects, has no legal basis. The law only provides that he shall be reinstated in the service, i.e., to his position as a high school teacher appearing in his appointment. A teacher may not be compelled to accept, and neither may he demand to be given, an assignment not specified in his appointment. His appointment is that of a TEACHER. That is all he may demand. The selection of the subjects which Layug may teach is a matter for his principal and the DECS regional director to determine based on his qualifications and the prevailing conditions in the school. As explained by Presto, the English and Biology subjects which Layug used to teach had been assigned to other teachers after Layug's suspension, and, since changing teachers in the middle of the school year would be prejudicial to the students. Presto rightfully assigned Layug to teach YDT/CAT subjects instead (which he rejected). Layugs petition is denied. 15. GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under
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preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them). ISSUE W/N the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated. HELD YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded. 16. DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the 5 day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six months suspension. However in view of the length of time that the teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without back wages. ISSUE 1. 2. HELD 1. W/N the teachers conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of service. W/N the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3 years pending their appeal deducting the 6 months suspension eventually meted out to them. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within reasonable limits. The public school teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return to work order. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in administrative disciplinary cases.
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17. KENNETH NEELAND V. ILDIFONSO VILLANUEVA FACTS Sugarland Motor Sales placed the highest bid price of P40,000 for a motor vehicle owned by Kenneth Neeland which was the subject of an auction sale. The Sheriff who conducted the sale turned over the amount of the mortgage obligation to Sugarland. The Clerk of Court, Ildifonso Villanueva (respondent) issued a certificate of sale but failed to turn over the balance to Neeland thus an administrative complaint was filed against the Sheriff and the Clerk of Court. The RTC ruled that both should be dismissed for gross misconduct. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Villanueva should be dismissed
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HELD NO. Although the SC did affirm that Villanueva indeed was remiss in his duties in turning over the balance of the proceeds of the auction sale and the payment of the sheriffs commission in court and thus should be held accountable. However, for lack of previous derogatory record, the penalty was reduced. He was only fined P5,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. 18. ARMANDO BERNARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS/ CSC / LBP FACTS Armando Bernardo entered the government service as Claims Adjuster of Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and became the Head of the Loans and Discount Divisions. He also maintained a Savings Account with the LBP. He deposited P500,000 in his own account and photocopied the page reflecting this in his passbook and on the same day withdrew the same. He then executed, as Treasurer-in-Trust of Markay Trading and Manpower Services (MTMSI) a treasurers certificate certifying that 25% of the authorized capital stock has been subscribed and 25% of the subscription, which was P500,000 had been paid and received y him. He also executed a letter-authority to the SEC authorizing their office to examine and verify the deposit in the LBP in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust for MTMSI. The Articles of Incorporation of MTMSI was signed by Bernardo and he became one of its incorporators and was elected as member in the Board of Directors and as Treasurer. He never opened an account with the LBP for the corporation though he was elected Treasurer and in the meantime he was promoted Assistant Branch Manager of LBP. Because of this, LBP filed a formal charge against Bernardo for gross neglect, grave misconduct, and serious violation of the CSC rules namely engaging in a private business without the permission and authority required by the CS rules and regulations. After the formal investigation, the hearing officer issued a resolution finding Bernardo guilty and be meted out with the penalty of forced resignation. The LBP approved the recommendation which was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB). The CSC likewise affirmed the penalty but based its findings on a different ground, that he made use of his being an employee of LBP to do an irregular act of depositing and withdrawing the paid up capital without the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company. Bernardo filed an MR alleging that the acts used as basis for finding his guilt was not raised in the formal charge thus violating his right to due process and that his acts were not violative of the CSC rules and regulations. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Bernardo violated the CSC rules and regulations HELD YES. The evidence on record shows that not only was he an incorporator, he was also a member of the Board of Directors and was the treasurer of MTMSI. He and his wife even signed vouchers of the corporation. Before he can do this, he must first secure a permit from a competent authority of the LBP but failed to do so. However, the SC found that the CSC erred in finding him guilty of grounds not alleged in the formal charges thus violating his right to be informed of the charges against him. But it did not err in finding him guilty of grave misconduct. The constitution enunciates the policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service and these are not mere rhetorical words but must be taken as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. 19. SANTIAGO V. COMELEC FACTS Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly approving applications for legalization of the stay of a number of aliens in the Philippines. She was charged in relation to her position as the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena suspended Miriam from her position as Senator of the Philippines and from any govt position she was holding for 90 days. This is in the form of a preventive suspension pending investigation of the case before the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE Was the act of the Sandiganbayan valid? RULING YES. RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.
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It is also the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. The court reiterated that the preventive suspension is not a penalty since if acquitted, the accused is reinstated to his previous position plus back wages. The order of suspension under RA 3019 is different from the power of Congress to discipline its members under the Constitution. The constitutional provision is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring member. On the other hand, R.A. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. V. AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 1. SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19, 1960. He was married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 childrenSi Beng, Si Son and Si Lunaall born in China and allegedly out of their marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration admitted into the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong on the basis of the finding that they were children of Sichangco, a Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of Commissioners of Immigration (BCI), it noted the decision. The Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo Order No. 9) setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been collectively deliberating on the cases filed before it. Thus, the BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from the Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these minors, Sichangco filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the BCI excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted the petition. The BCI appealed. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Justice may validly issue Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the BCI HELD YES. The BCI was and still is under the supervision and control of the DOJ. By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, as well as the act of noting of the decision by the BCI. He can even directly exercise the powers of the chief of the bureau or office under him pursuant to Sec. 37, Act No. 4007, which provides that: The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division, or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division, or service. Moreover, BCIs act of noting the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was NOT a valid decision of affirmance by the BCI in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under the Immigration Act of 1940. The word noted simply meant that the members of BCI had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. 2. GONZALES v RAQUIZA
FACTS In 1967, the Commissioner of Public Highways (Baltazar Aquino) entered into 2 separate contracts for the importation of construction equipment with Continental Ore (Phil.) Inc., which acted as the representative of Huber Corporation (contract #1), and as agent of Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors Corporation (contract #2). Under Contract #1, the Philippines was obligated to pay Huber Corporation $13.39M in the form of irrevocable, confirmed and divisible letters of credit in favor of Continental Ore Corporation for the purchase of road construction equipment and spare parts. Under Contract #2, the Philippines was obligated to pay Continental Ore Corp. $21.08M in the form of irrevocable, confirmed, and divisible letters of credit; Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors Corporation would sell, transfer and convey to the Philippines road construction equipment and spare parts under the same terms and conditions stated in the first contract. Both of these contracts were duly approved by Secretary Raquiza (Public Works and Communications) and the AuditorGeneral. Upon application of the Bureau of Public Highways for the establishment of letters of credit with PNB, the latter approved such letters of credit provided that these be secured by the guaranty of the national government to be given by the Secretary
17
2D 2012
of Finance and upon approval by the Office of the President. Accordingly, the Office of the President directed the Secretary of Finance to extend the necessary guaranty for the letters of credit in favor of these American corporations. Gonzales, as taxpayer and stockholder of PNB, questioned the validity of the contracts on the ground that there was no appropriation for the payments and no certificate of availability of funds, as required by the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. 606, 607, 608), and for being violative of the PNB Charter since the accommodation or loan to the Philippines was beyond the lending capacity of the bank. ISSUE W/N the contracts are valid HELD YES. These contracts do NOT involve directly the expenditure of public funds but a financing scheme under different laws. Sections 606 and 607 of the Revised Administrative Code are without question an implementation of Art. VI, Sec 23, Clause 2 of the 1935 Constitution (then applicable), which provides that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Said provision was restated in toto in the 1975 Constitution and in the present Constitution. The contracts do not involve an immediate payment but a repayment over a period of several years. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. Thus, no money can be taken out of the Treasury without an appropriation, which must be made only for the amounts demandable. These contracts constitute negotiated sale on credit where the Bureau of Public Works is not required to make direct or immediate payment. Without abandoning the constitutional and legal safeguards against the indiscriminate disbursements of the public funds, the Court takes judicial notice of the imperatives of national development that demand immediate implementation of programs, the funding of which cannot be appropriated simply because there are no sufficient funds. Moreover, under RA 4680, the President is authorized to contract indebtedness to finance economic development projects, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon for the purpose of financing economic development purposes or projects authorized by law, including the construction and improvement of highways and bridges. Indeed, RA 4680 authorizes procurement on credit when there are no available funds or appropriation. SESSION 3 VI. INHIBITIONS 1. MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
FACTS Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company. A year after the companys registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging: that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed against him.
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ISSUE 1. 2.
2D 2012
W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the partition case. W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion. Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.
HELD 1.
2.
NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said provision. Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are considered to have committed corrupt practices, which include having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision because there is no showing that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the corporation in which he participated has obviously no relation to his judicial office. Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does NOT apply to members of the Judiciary, who are covered under RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the power to remove or dismiss judges is vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 groundsserious misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution, only the SC can discipline judges of the inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees because the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary department. Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges, however, are not within this classification, as they are considered to be non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee. Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain from making personal investments in enterprises, which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court. Judge Asuncion and his wife, however, had withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares to third parties only 22 days after its incorporation, which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized that their interest in the corporation contravenes said Canon. The Court even commended the spouses for such act.
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2. MAHARLIKA PUBLISHING CORP V TAGLE
2D 2012
FACTS GSIS owned a parcel of land with a building and printing equipment in Paco, Manila. It was sold to Maharlika in a Conditional Contract of Sale with the stipulation that if Maharlika failed to pay monthly installments in 90 days, the GSIS would automatically cancel the contract. Because Maharlika failed to pay several monthly installments, GSIS demanded that Maharlika vacate the premises. Even though Maharlika refused to do so, the GSIS published an advertisement inviting the public to bid in a public auction. A day before the scheduled bidding, Adolfo Calica, the President of Maharlika, gave the GSIS head office 2 checks worth 11,000 and a proposal for a compromise agreement. The GSIS General Manager Roman Cruz gave a not to Maharlika saying Hold Bidding. Discuss with me. However, the public bidding took place as scheduled and the property was subsequently awarded to Luz Tagle, the wife of the GSIS Retirement Division Chief. Maharlika demanded that the sale be considered null and void, as Mrs. Tagle should have been disqualified from bidding for the GSIS property. RTC and CA both ruled that the Tagles were entitled to the property and Maharlika should vacate the premises. ISSUE W/N Tagle are entitled to the property HELD NO. The sale to them was against public policy. First of all, the GSIS head office was stopped from claiming that they did not give the impression to Maharlika that they were accepting the proposal for a compromise agreement. The act of the general manager is binding on GSIS. Second, Article 1491 (4) of the CC provides that public officers and employees are prohibited from purchasing the property of the state or any GOCC or institution, the administration of which has been entrusted to them cannot purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another. The SC held that as an employee of the GSIS, Edilberto Tagle and his wife are disqualified from bidding on the property belonging to the GSIS because it gives the impression that there was politics involved in the sale. It is not necessary that actual fraud be shown, for a contract which tends to injure the public service is void although the parties entered into it honestly and proceeded under it in good faith. 3. RABE V FLORES
FACTS An administrative complaint was filed by petitioner Narita Rave against respondent Delsa Flores, Interpreter III of the RTC of Panabo, Davao for conduct unbecoming a government employee, acts prejudicial to the interest of the service and abuse of authority. It was alleged that Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at the public market when she is not among those awarded the markets stalls by the court in a civil case. Also, she is said to have destroyed petitioners stall and brought the materials to the police station of the municipality. The court in a resolution absolved her of the charge. However, she was made to explain the following: (a) why she had a certification that she started working as an interpreter on May 16, 1991, and another declaring that she was Assessment Clerk I under the office of the Municipal Assessor from February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991; (b) why she did not report said business interest (market stall) in her sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth, disclosure of business interests and financial connections, and identification of relatives in the government service for the years 1991-1994; (c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within 60 days from assumption of office, and; (d) why she has claimed that she reported for work in certain 21 working days when her contract of lease with the municipal government required her to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall. Upon referral to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the latter found respondent guilty for dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and recommended a dismissal. ISSUE W/N respondent is guilty of the above charges, and should be dismissed from service.
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2D 2012
HELD YES. Indeed! ! She has failed to satisfactorily explain why she still collected her salary from the municipality when the glaring fact was she was already employed at the RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to the same, but she took it nonetheless. What according to her is an overriding need for money aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her salary from the court in no way justifies receipt of salary not due her. Also, that she is the sole breadwinner of the family is not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If she was really in merely in need of money, then she should have returned the salary to the municipal government as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. But she didnt do this. Instead, she only refunded after receipt of the courts resolution, on the pretext of forgetting about it. Forgetfulness is, again, never a rational or acceptable explanation. Pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Civil Service Lawas, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. A public office is a public trust. Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Flores should also be held liable for failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Her market stall is undoubtedly a business interest. The OCA even found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the stall. Her contention that her contract of lease of market stall was never implemented because it became the subject of a civil case also fails to convince. The case she was referring to was filed in 1995; earlier than this, she was already collecting rentals as early as 1991. Therefore, she should have declared said business interest for the years 19911995. RA No. 6713 provides that it is the obligation of an employee to submit a sworn statement of his assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interest, because the public has a right to know. Violation of this also constitutes sufficient cause for removal or dismissal. 4. PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
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2D 2012
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan ISSUE W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. HELD The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of intervention that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law. The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied. Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo: Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
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VII. SALARY AND PERQUISITES 1. FLORES V DRILON
2D 2012
FACTS Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of st the SBMA...provided that for the 1 year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority. ISSUES (1) W/N the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) W/N the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. (3) *W/N the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post. (4) W/N there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. (5) *W/N Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment. *Relevant to the Chapter on Salaries HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents. (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
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2. CANTILLO V ARRIETA
2D 2012
FACTS October 1962: Jose Cantillo was originally appointed Temporary Municipal Policeman of Maramag Bukidnon, took his oath and served as such. His appointment was attested to by the Provincial Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Civil Service. At the time of his original appointment, he was 41 years old and still only at second year high school. November 1964: Petitioner was given another appointment in the same municipality, took his oath, acted and qualified as such. However, this appointment was only Provisional. The same was attested by the Provincial Treasurer and Commissioner of Civil Service. January 1967: Petitioner was given another appointment, same municipality, took oath, acted and qualified, attested to by Prov. Treasurer and Commissioner of Civil Service. October 1967: Petitioner was suspended from the service due to filing of criminal charges for Infidelity in the Custody of the Prisoner. The Provincial Fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence. After the dismissal, petitioner presented oral and written request for reinstatement and claimed for payment of back salaries pursuant to Sec 4 of Republic Act 557 stating that when a municipal policeman is charged and subsequently acquitted, he shall be entitled to back wages. ISSUE W/N Cantillo is entitled to back wages. HELD NO. Section 9 of the same law enumerates the qualifications for municipal police, namely: not less than 23 nor more than 33 years old; and completed high school. As to the first, he was already 41 years old as of his first appointment and 46 years during his last appointment. As the second, he only reached second year. These infirmities precluded the reinstatement; it was not mere absence of civil service eligibility but of qualifications for the office. 3. PPA V MONSERATE
FACTS In 1977, Monserate started her government service as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office, PPA, Iloilo City. A year after, she was promoted to Cashier II. Two year after, she was promoted to Finance Officer (SG 16). In 1988, PPA was reorganized and Monserate applied for the permanent position of Manager II (SG 19) of the Resource st Management Division, PPA. In the Comparative Data Sheet, she ranked 1 among 6 aspirants to said position. Eventually, the GM of PPA, Dumlao, appointed her to the position of Manager II (RMD). Consequently, she assumed office and discharged its functions. Months after, the CSC approved her appointment. However, Anino (ranked 2 to Monserate), filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against her appointment. The PPA Appeals Board sustained the appeal and rendered ineffective Monserates appointment based on certain documents, which were not extensively discussed or explained. The new GM of PPA, Dayan, issued a Special Order creating PPAs Manager Pool, where Monserate was excluded from the pool-list and placed instead the name of Anino as Manager II, RMD. Monserate filed with PPA GM an appeal/request for clarification and questioned her replacement under the Special Order, claiming that the proceeds were irregular since she was not notified of the hearing, she was not furnished a copy of the protest filed by Anino, she was not informed of the reasons behind her replacement, and their Port Manager was not included in the proceedings. Pending her appeal, GM Dayan issued another Special Order, which officially reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer (SG 15), which was the former position of Anino and lower than her previous post. Unheeded, she filed an appeal with the CSC, protesting Aninos appointment and the propriety of the Resolution of the Appeals Board. After 6 years, CSC ruled in favor of the Appeals Board and sustained Aninos appointment, contending that the appointing authority may still withdraw the appointment if a protest is seasonably filed, in accordance with the Omnibus Rules. Monserate filed a petition for review with the CA, which it granted in her favor and nullified the appointment Anino, due to lack of proper proceeding and evidence to support the PPA Appeals Board Resolution. ISSUE W/N there was due process when Anino replaced Monserato as RMD Manager II
nd
24
2D 2012
HELD NO. Contrary to petitioners claim, Monserate was demoted, not by reason of the PPA reorganization, but due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution, sustaining Aninos protest against her appoiment. Unfortunately, the Court cannot accord validity to the Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board upholding the appointment of Anino since there was no appointment to uphold in the first place. Anino was appointed 2 months after the Resolution. Moreover, the Court found questionable the grounds for which the PPA Appeals Board demoted Monserate as these were incomprehensible for lack of discussion or explanation to enable Monserate to know the reason for her demotion. It upheld the findings of the CA that the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of proper notice to Monserate. Thus, her demotion was deemed as tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as RMD Manager II and was a patent violation of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due process. Although the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed office, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. In this case, there was no evidence of justifying the revocation of Monserates appointment by demoting her. The CA reinstated her to her post as RMD Manager II. Since her demotion was void, her post as such was never vacant. BACKWAGES: CA reinstated her to her post as RMD Manager II without backwages. Monserate, during the proceedings, assumed her lower position as Administrative Officer. Although his appointment is void, Anino was considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency. The rule is that, where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is NOT entitled to emoluments attached to the office. However, this cannot be applied in this case. Monserate assumed under protest the position of Administrative Officer. Since then, she had been receiving the emoluments, salary and other compensation attached to such post. Thus, she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials. 4. ALLIAN V CHAIRMAN OF CSC
FACTS Joel Allian was a Personnel Specialist II when he was illegally dismissed from his work. He received a written notification that he was separated from service through reorganization. He then found out he was dismissed incurring unauthorized leaves of absence. He petitioned to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB) which held that he must be reinstated since he was illegally dismissed. When he got reappointed, he didnt receive his back wages, which prompted him to remind the Commission about it. He argued that under RA 6656, illegally dismissed people must be reinstated without losing seniority and shall be entitled to back wages for the period of separation. The commission denied his claim. ISSUE Whether Allian is entitled to back wages for the period of his illegal separation. HELD In cases where an employee had incurred absences without leave (AWOL), a notification stating to report back to work must first be sent to the employee. He cannot be dismissed outright with such notice to report back to work. The RAB also found out that the records show no proof that would lead to his termination. Since he was illegally dismissed, under RA 6656, he is entitled to all the back wages he should have received during the period he was separated from work by reason of such illegal dismissal. 5. TAN V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS Francisco Tan Jr, petitioner, was dismissed from the service as Fisheries Regional Director on 30 April 1986. He was found guilty of the offense grave misconduct, oppression and violation of the Civil Service Laws by the Minister of Agriculture (MAF). He appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) but was referred to the Office of the President (OP) for being a Career Executive Officer. The OP set aside the initial decision of the MAF, exonerated Tan of all the charges and ordered the reinstatement of Tan to his former or equivalent position. However, back salaries were not granted to him pursuant to the policy of no work no pay. ISSUE W/N petitioner is entitled to back salaries.
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HELD YES. It was erroneous for the OP to rely on Sec 42 of PD 807 which does not expressly provide for any payment of back salaries to govt officials who were found to be illegally dismissed and were ordered to be reinstated. The provision refers to preventive suspensions during the pendency of investigations and does not cover dismissed civil servants who were later exonerated and ordered reinstatement. This argument finds support in the case of Cristobal vs Melchor which provides that when a govt. employee in the classified civil service who had been illegally dismissed and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to allrights and priveleges that accrue to him by virtue of his office such as back salaries. 6. IN RE: REQUEST OF CLERK OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR
FACTS On January 5, 1999, Justice Buena , the then Presiding Justice of CA got promoted to the Supreme Court. A vacancy in the position of Presiding Justice in the CA entails replacement, and as a result of this, by operation of law, the most senior justice from CA, Justice Jorge Imperial assumed the Presiding Justice Position. On February 4, 1999, just a month after he assumed the position, Justice Imperial resigned. The Clerk of Court, Gatmaitan sent a letter to the Chief Justice asking on what basis shall the retirement benefits of Justice Imperial be computed. According to the Revised Internal Rules of the CA, upon retirement, a justice of CA, shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years gratuity computed on the basis of the highest month salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living, and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement. (emphasis supplied) The court administrator asserts on the other hand that this highest month salary rate as defined in the Rules shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. Justice Imperial is not entitled to the salary rate of the Presiding Justice. ISSUE W/N the retirement benefits of Justice Imperial should be computed on the basis of the salary rate of a Presiding Justice HELD YES. The Supreme Court ruled allowing retirement benefits to be computed on the basis of the Salary rate of a Presiding Justice. By virtue of Judiciary Reorganization Act, and the Revised Internal Rules of Court of Appeals or RIRCA, it is clear that Justice Imperial became Acting Presiding Justice of CA by operation of law, at a time when the position of Presiding Justice of the CA was vacant. The Memorandum Circular by GSIS refuted the submission of the Court Administrator as it provides that the computation of the gratuity payable to a retiring government official or employee shall be on the basis of highest salary received. 7. BELICENA V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS Belicena was appointed Acting Undersecretary in the Department of Finance and forthwith assumed office. While acting as such, the President designated him as Acting Secretary of Finance while the Secretary of Finance was in Hongkong on official business for the government. Belicena took his oath of office and Acting Executive Secretary Liwanag confirmed the designation. The President extended his service as Acting Undersecretary of Finance and in anticipation of his impending compulsory retirement, Belicena filed an application for termination leave. His application was not acted upon by the Secretary. When a new Secretary of Finance assumed office, he approved the application. The voucher for his pay was not signed because in computation of Belicenas terminal leave pay, it was alleged that his one day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance should not be considered as his last month salary. ISSUE W/N the monetary value of Belicenas terminal leave credits should be computed based on his 1-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance
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HELD YES. When the President designated Belicena as acting secretary, he did so under a well considered opinion that absence of then Secretary Ocampo was of such extent that he would be unable to perform his duties and by reason of that opinion the President extended to Belicena a temporary designation. Since the 1-day salary received by Belicena as Acting Secretary of Finance by virtue of a valid designation by the President is his highest monthly salary, the monetary value of his terminal leave should be computed on such basis as provided for by law. 8. KMG V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS RA No. 7305, also known as the Magna Carta for Public Health Workers was enacted in 1992 to promote and improve the economic and social well-being as well as the living and working conditions of health workers in the public sector. The law provides, in addition to their basic salary, for hazard pay, among others. In 1996, Health Secretary Juan Flavier granted the request for payment of hazard pay of 5 departments of the GSIS. Subsequently, the Secretary likewise granted the request of the remaining units of the Social Insurance Group (SIG) of GSIS for hazard pay benefits under RA no. 7305. However, GSIS Resident Auditor Ma. Crisitina Dimagiba issued a notice of disallowance regarding the payment of allowances under said RA to the SIG personnel. This retroactive disallowance was made in accordance with a letter from the Department of Budget Management (DBM) stating that employees belonging to the SIG are not considered as health-related workers and are therefore not qualified to receive hazard pay under RA 7305. Thereafter, Dimagiba issued another notice, this time disallowing the payment of hazard pay to the SIG personnel from January 1998 to the present. The employees in the SIG moved for a reconsideration of the notice , but Dimagiba maintained her stance. The KMG, the recognized employees union in the GSIS, appealed the disallowance to the COA. COA affirmed Dimagiba. Principally, the KMG claims that the previous grant of hazard pay by the GSIS was well within its right as authorized by the DOH, the agency tasked to implement the RA. It insists that since their processing of numerous medical claims inevitably exposes them to infected persons, documents and objects, thereby entitling them to the hazard pay. Further, it argues that since theyve been receiving hazard pay for several years already, such grant in their favor has ripened into a vested right. ISSUE W/N the SIG employees are health-related workers and are therefore qualified to receive hazard pay under RA 7305. HELD NO. The records show that the functions of the SIG personnel are not principally related to health. They perform tasks for the processing of GSIS members claims for life insurances, retirement, disability and surviving benefits. These functions are not similar to those of persons working in health-related establishments such as clinics or medical departments of government agencies. Undoubtedly, they cannot be considered public health workers under RA 7305. Assuming arguendo that they may be considered as public health workers, they would still not qualify to be the recipient of hazard pay benefits, as they failed to prove that they work in establishment specifically mentioned in Section 21 of RA 7305 (health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn or embattled areas, distressed or isolated stations, prison camps, mental hospitals, disease-infected areas, etc.), much less show that they have been exposed to specific kinds of hazard for at least 50% of his working hours. Also, it has been previously held that practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors. Hence, the payment of hazard pay benefits to the SIG personnel may validly be discontinued by the government, being inconsistent with the pertinent law.
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SESSION 4 VIII. LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 1. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA v IAC
2D 2012
FACTS Initially, there was a Civil Case wherein cases of rayon and synthetic textiles were garnished and consigned to Cotabato Palay and Corn Producers, Inc. The textiles were with the Customs of Manila, and was then transferred to a bonded warehouse by the Sheriff, specifically reminding the warehouseman that no release shall be made without his written authorization. However, 9 days later, through the purported customs agent of Cotabato Palay, the textiles were released, allegedly with clearance from the shipping agent and the sheriff. It was found that the authorizations were forgeries. Thus, when judgment in the Civil Case was rendered, and the textiles were ordered to be released, Customs Collector Jose Viduya found that said items were no longer in the possession of the warehouseman. The garnishers, Bravo and Ferrer, filed a motion to hold the sheriff and the Customs Collector personally liable for the value of the textiles. RTC ruled against them, but the CA ruled in their favor, stating that the Collector of Customs is liable for the misdelivery of goods either by himself or by his subordinates. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration through then SolGen Mendoza who averred that the Customs Collector is not personally liable, but is only officially liable. Judgment, however, became final, and was served upon the successor of Viduya, who claimed that the liability is official, and must be satisfied by the Bureau itself. The Customs Commissioner, however, maintained that the liability of Viduya is personal. The same was opined by the SolGen Ordonez (successor of SolGen Mendoza). ISSUE W/N the Collector of Customs can be held personally liable? HELD YES. The Tariff and Customs Code provide that a collector shall not be personally liable for any official ruling, and that in the absence of his own abuse of authority, he shall not be liable to any person for a loss occasioned either by his own official act or the act of his subordinates. But it will be noted that an exception for such liability is made for a misdelivery of merchandise. Thus, Viduya should be held personally liable, specially due to his negligence in the misdelivery of the goods, whose burden should not be shouldered by the Government. 2. NESSIA v. FERMIN
FACTS Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Fermin and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored and caused non-payment of the vouchers because he defied the latters request to register and vote in the local elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessias claims could not be approved because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its part, added that Nessia was also at fault since he did not give justification for drawing funds in excess of the budget. RTC decided in favour of Nessia. Both of them elevated the case to the Court of Appeals: Nessia praying for an increase in award of damages; Fermin seeking exoneration from liability; Municipality did not appeal. ISSUE W/N Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, hence liable under Art. 27 of the Civil Code. HELD YES. It is contended that Nessia may not claim relief under Art 27 because his theory of unjust inaction is incompatible with his allegations in the complaint that Fermin denied/refused the vouchers. However, the allegations alluded to, i.e. plaintiff presented the said claims to defendant Mayor Fermin, but refused and continue to refuse to pay, should be construed as admission of the act of disapproval of the claims. Refusal to pay is not inferred solely from disapproval of claims but from inaction thereon as well. Accordingly, said allegations cannot be considered as contradictory to Nessias theory of unjust inaction. He may be held liable under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. 3. ABERCA v. VER
FACTS Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against CommunistTerrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants,
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arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint. ISSUES 1. W/N immunity from suit may be invoked 2. W/N petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution 3. W/N the superior officers who gave the orders are liable HELD 1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered acts done in their official duties. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility. 2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights. 3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint. 4. COJUANCO v. CA
FACTS Petitioner owns several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates landing first, second or third places. He sent demand letters to Carascoso Jr(private respondent), who was then the PCSO chairman, for the collection of prizes due to him (petitioner). Carascoso Jr, consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on the advice of the Commissioner of the PCGG. Petitioner then filed a case in RTC for the collection of prizes but before summons could be served, PCGG advised Carascoso Jr to remit the prize winnings. This was immediately communicated to petitioner but the latter refused arguing that there was already a cased filed. ISSUE W/N petitioner acted in bad faith in withholding the winnings that entitles petitioner for damages. HELD Private respondent did not act in bad faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose and conscious doing of a wrong that partakes the nature of fraud. In the case at bar, Carascoso Jr withheld the winnings to avoid any possible violation of the sequestration order against the property of the petitioner for alleged ill gotten wealth. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued agains the property of Cojuanco Jr.(petitioner). He only acted upon the advise of PCGG Commissioner. Furthermore, EO 2 has just been issued by Pres. Aquino freezing all assets and properties in the Phils of former President Marcos including his close friends cronies, etc. The rule is that moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of public duties shall not be awarded unless there is bad faith. Attorneys fees cannot be awarded either for lack of any grounds as stated in the Civil Code. However, private respondent can still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code for violation of the right against the deprivation of property without due process. Under this provision, bad faith is unnecessary. It is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner even on the pretext of good faith. In this case, the petitioners right to use his property was impeded. A little exercise of prudence would have revealed that there was no specific writ of sequestration issued against the racehorse winnings of petitioner. Thus, there was a violation of a property right without due process of law. Award of nominal damages were deemed proper by the court.
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5. OBRA v. CA
2D 2012
FACTS Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio. On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet, belonging to Gillies 1 2 family. On the same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit requesting assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by Sps. Brett in illegal mining. The next day, Obra wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspeciton and field investigation and requesting them to be present so that all... matters... shall be gathered and collated in order for this Office to take appropriate action. Elements of RUC-1 under Maj. Densen seized the truck as it was entering Mamakar mining area. It was impounded by the 4 military and prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions . Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC as the truck was seized without due provess in violation of their constitutional rights under Art. 32 5 of the Civil Code . ISSUE W/N petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were authorized to seize the vehicle in the absence of any finding of probably cause (PC). HELD NO. Although peittioners have authority to order seizure and confiscation via PD. 1281, Art IV, S3 of the 1973 Constitution merely validated the grant by law to nonjudicial officers of the power to issue warrants but did not in any way exempt them from the duty of determining the eixstence of probable cause. Petitioner Obras letters to private respondents and Grybos clearly stated that an investigation was to be held on July 2-5, 1985 to determine the veracity of the allegations of Grybos complaint. His only basis was an alleged certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to the Sps. 6 However, such certification was not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be justified under the moving vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of probable cause. The doctrine does not give poblice officers umliminted discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming the RTCs decision that petitioners are liable for damages (P100,000) and attorneys 1 fees (P10,000) in violation of the Sps. Rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code. 6. OROCIO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
3
FACTS On May 25, 1982 an accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Based on the accident report, tube leaks were confirmed at 2:30 am. The tubes were drained and prepared for repair by maintenance personnel. By 8:45 am the system was declared safe for repair. From that time on until 11:10 work ensued, until the plug from the leaking tube gave way. The leaking tube spew hot steam and water, injuring two personnel making the repairs. One of the men injured was a contractual janitor employed by OP Landritos General Services (OPLGS), NPCs janitorial contractor. His hospitalization expenses amounted to P50,802.26. NPC initially advanced the amount, but later on reimbursed itself by deducting the amount, on a staggered basis, from OPLGSs billings to NPC. Subsequently OPLGS requested for a refund of the said amount. NPCs Legal Services Division Chief, Orocio, found negligence on their part (quasi-delict), he therefore recommended the reimbursement to OPLGS of the said amount. But later on it was disallowed by the COA. COA made certain officers of NPC liable for the disallowance (approving authority, chief accountant, etc), including Orocio. ISSUE Is Orocio personally liable for the disallowance considering that he was merely performing his function?
Commanding General of the Regional Unified Comman I (RUC-I) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Colored blue and yellow lining An Isuzu Elf truck (ABX-587) 4 Transporting sick soliders and workers to the hospital and when used to buy food supplies for the men inside the camp. 5 Art. 32. Any public officer of employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, degeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs an of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. xxx (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law. 6 Actually, in BMGSs resolution on May 12, 1986, it found that it was the Gillies family which had no permit or lease from the government.
2 3
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HELD NO. Under Sec 103 of the Govt Auditing Code, expenditures of govt funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found directly responsible therefore. In the instant case, though it was petitioner who rendered the opinion relied upon for the disbursement, it cannot be said that he was directly responsible therefore. His was only a legal opinion which the governing board of the NPC or any of its authorized officials could adopt or reject. The Court added that although Orocio was performing his official functions only, he could still be made liable if it was found that he acted with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority. But whether petitioner acted in such way could only be determined through a proper hearing to be conducted by the COA. Since it was not done, it will be in violation of Orocios right to due process if he was made liable therefore. 7. OLAGUER v DOMINGO FACTS As a government corporation, National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) provides home financing to people in the lower income bracket. Under its authority, the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) was introduced to assist residents of blighted areas to own the lots they occupy or the lots where they shall be relocated through low income financing. Petitioners are all career service professionals of NHMFC, while respondents are officers of COA. Upon request of Pajaron (GM of Gonzales Construction Co), Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) conducted an appraisal of the property in Angeles City for community mortgage purposes. It found that the land is valued at P60/sqm or P600K/ha. Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation (SPCDFI), serving as a link between community-based orgs and NHMFC, applied with the latter for a Purchase Commitment Line of P91M to cover various CMP projects, including an application for a P34M loan by AMAKO, a sub-federation of SPCDFI. However, this application was not acted upon due to incomplete requirements. Nelson Concepcion, as President of SPCDFI, applied with NHMFC for accreditation as originator of land and housing projects through a Purchase Commitment Line, which embraced several project sites including the land in Angeles City (AMAKO Project). Meanwhile, Task Force on CMP was created within the NHMFC, where Olaguer was appointed as its head, Salvador as its Executive Assistance and Fuentes as its Unit Head, Documentation and Processing Unit to act upon the loan applications in connection with community mortgage purposes. AMAKO submitted another application for accreditation with the NHMFC with an increase in the loan from P34M to P36.8M. APED (Accreditation and Project Evaluation Department) of NHMFC recommended the approval of the AMAKO Project and the grant of a loan of P36.8M. Consequently, the NHMFC Board approved the recommendation. Thereafter, the CMP Task Force (Olaguer et al) conducted an investigation of AMAKO, where it found several problems regarding the sitenon-existence of right of way, lack of public transportation, charging of beneficiaries beyond the actual cost incurred, land being an interior lot. NHMFC resident auditor, Razon (another respondent), conducted an audit and disallowed in the audit the loan of AMAKO (however, the loan was already released by NHMFC) due to non-compliance with the requirements/documents to be submitted and irregular and excessive expenditures. Moreover, he found the petitioners, as officers of NHMFC, liable for the release of the loan. ISSUE W/N respondents (COA officers, NHMFC resident) gravely abused their discretion in affirming the audit disallowance where petitioner, as officers of NHMFC, were found liable for the loan of P36.8M to SPCDFI-AMAKO HELD NO. Petitioners were the officers directly charged with the power of processing, reviewing and evaluating CMP loan documents, where the AMAKO Project was deemed included (community mortgage purposes). In its exercise of the power to process, review, and evaluate CMP loan applications, petitioners had the power to compel submission of documentary requirements such as the Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and the reproduction of the Affidavit of Income of Beneficiaries. They also had the power to conduct surveys and ocular inspection on the property. However, they were remiss of their obligations to do so. As instructed by the NHMFC President to conduct such activities, Olaguer did not send anyone to verify the lack of a road right of way and other characteristics essential to the viability of the project.
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Notably, despite non-compliance with the requirements, AMAKOs application was approved by APED in a span of only 3 days. PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines), Sec. 103 states that Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefore. 8. QUIMPO v. MENDOZA (CITY TREASURER)
FACTS The case is about the basis for computing the penalty for real estate taxes. Quimpo is the owner of a parcel of land in City of Cagayan De Oro (CDO) City valued at 20,000 P in 1969. The realty tax for this property is 400.00 pesos annually payable in 4 equal instalments. He paid on time for the first 3 installments amounting to 300.00 but he defaulted with the last payment th and it was only on the 27 of August the next year that he settled the last instalment. He tried paying to the City Treasurer of CDO for 124.00 inclusive of the penalty however the Treasurer declined payment saying that he ought to pay 196.00 (100 pesos for the unpaid tax and 96 pesos representing the penalty). As such, Quimpo filed action for mandamus with damages against the City Treasurer and consigned 124.00 pesos before the Court of First Instance. He asserts that he suffered mental anguish caused by the Treasurer thereby praying for 12,000 Peso worth of Moral, Actual and Exemplary damages. ISSUE/S & HELD 1. The basis of computing the penalty of unpaid instalment. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the provision of the Charter of CDO being invoked by the City Treasurer is not applicable in the case at bar. It was repealed impliedly by RA 5447. Since petitioner is allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal instalments due and payable on four specified due dates and having paid the three instalments religiously and faithfully, it is manifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth and last instalment. Accordingly, petitioners total liability as of August 27 when he tendered payment to City Treasurer is computed as follows: 100.00 (the fourth and last instalment) plus 16.00 penalty (8 months of delinquency from January to August, at two percentum on the amount of the delinquent tax of (100.00) which totals 116.00 pesos. 2. Whether damages can be obtained by Quimpo against the City Treasurer. NO. The city treasurers actuations and decisions were not tainted with bad faith. As held in one case an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award of damages. 9. YNOT v. IAC
FACTS Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcoss Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial courtas guaranteed by due process. ISSUE W/N EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. HELD YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.
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In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirementsthat is, the carabao, as a poor mans tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption. 10. GENSON v ADARLE FACTS Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk and other unserviceable government property in the Highway District Engineers Office of Roxas City. Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul the junk. On a non-working day, when Adarle and Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader fell and injured Adarle to the point of paralyzing his lower extremities. Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin, Buensalido, Marcelino (Civil Engineer), and Genson (Highway District Engineer). RTC ruled in favor of Adarle. IAC modified the previous ruling, absolving Marcelino from liability, and averring that the liability of Genson is based on fault, by allowing Arbatin and his men to work on the premises on a non-working day, in contravention of his offices policy. Petitioner Genson then appealed the decision to the SC, stating that the facts upon which the IAC declared that his liability is based on fault by allowing the men to work on a non-working holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he contends that by filing a suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit against the Republic, which violates the non-suability of the State. ISSUE W/N Genson should be held liable, personally or officially? HELD NO. With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle filed a suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as the Highway District Engineer, and not the State or his office. As for the main issue, there was no evidence to prove Gensons presence when the accident occurred, nor was there any basis for the lower courts to hold that Genson was at fault by authorizing Arbatin and his men to work on a non-working day. It might even be proven that working on a Saturday for the specific purpose of hauling junk would be the time when the most work can be done, as it has less traffic. The Master-Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply either, since despite the fact that Buensalido, Gensons employee, was moonlighting on a non-working holiday, Buensalidos arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature, and had nothing to do with his being employed under Genson. Thus, absent the showing of malice, bad faith or gross negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot be held liable for the acts committed by Buensalido and Arbatin.
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11. TUZON v. COURT OF APPEALS
2D 2012
FACTS The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 9. Said resolution authorized the municipal treasurer to enter into an agreement with all thresher operators who apply for a Permit to Thresh Palay to donate 1% of all the palay threshed by them. Thereafter, Jurado offered to pay the license fee for thresher operators. Municipal Treasurer Magapu refused to accept payment and required him to first secure a Mayors permit. Mayor Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued. Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan for mandamus, and another with the same court for judgement against the said resolution. CFI upheld the Resolution, and dismissed the claim for damages. CA affirmed the validity of the Resolution and found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurados application. ISSUE W/N petitioners are liable in damages for having withheld Mayors permit and license because of respondents refusal to comply with said Resolution. HELD NO. Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. There was no evidence offered to show that petitioners singled out respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue the mayors permit and license. Moreover, the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without preference. A public officer is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority and in line of his official duty. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring said Resolution invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it. An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor amount to bad faith. 12. MENDOZA v. ALLAS FACTS Petitioner became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received promotions until he became Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, while respondent was temporarily appointed to take his old position. In 1994, a letter was sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from the services of the Bureau of Customs. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which the court granted. Allas appealed, but became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Customs Assessment and Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion for execution of its decision, it was denied because Godofredo Olores was appointed to take his old position. CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE W/N a petition for quo warranto extends to the position claimed HELD NO, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the successor in office, even though the successors title comes from the same source. It is always directed to a person, in this case, Allas. Olores had never become part of the case; hence the decision cannot extend to him. Since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement, he cannot be reappointed. Neither can he claim from Allas his back wages, nor compel the Bureau of Customs to pay said back wages. SESSION 5 IX. TERMINATION 1. PUNZALAN v. MENDOZA
FACTS Cicero Punsalan brings a petition for quo warranto and prohibition seeking the ouster of Hon. Estelito P. Mendoza from the governorship of Pampanga. As Kilusang Bagong Lipunan bets for the 1980 elections, Mendoza and Punsalan won for governor and vice-governor, respectively. However, in the 1984 elections, the only KBL survivor placed fourth for the three seats as representatives to the Batasan. Respondent, as KBL campaign manager, tendered his resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post effective at the Presidents pleasure. Six weeks later, the President appointed him Minister of the Peace and concurrently Member of the Batasan Pambansa. Subsequently, Mendoza again tendered his
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resignation and sent a letter to the Minister of Local Government requesting that he be considered on leave of absence while the matter was pending consideration by the president. Punsalan then took his oath as governor of Pampanga (not 7 acting governor) relying on a press release of Bulletin Today . The following year, respondent unexpectedly appeared and occupied the office. Respondent resigned from his Batasan membership which was accepted by the President two days later. ISSUE W/N the respondent did resign from the gubernatorial seat. HELD NO. The tender of resignation says that it was effective at the pleasure of the President meaning it was not effective immediately. Acceptance was necessary. Implied acceptance by the President of the tender of resignation by respondent cannot be held to have taken place as the President shelved the same pursuant to a KBL caucus recommendation for respondent to reassume the governorship. Based on an approved request from the Minister of Local Government to go on leave, his failure to perform his duty for 5 months as governor cannot be considered an abandonment of office. TEEHANKEE, dissenting: 2.
8
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA
FACTS Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes on March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of quorum. As a result, the provincial council was reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation, private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent void for lacking the essential qualification of being the president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused. ISSUE 1. 2. W/N Antonios resignation was complete. W/N respondent abandoned his membership in the SB.
HELD The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.
7 The press said that the inhibition against Batasan members from holding two elective positions is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised but it allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan Member is appointed Prime Minister or Member of the Batasan. 8 The president accepted the resignation as can be seen from the subsequent events. The President appointed Mendoza as Minister of Justice. The day following his tender of resignation, the President appointed him as Member of the Batasan pambansa. The president even announced through the established press his accpetance of peititoners resignation from the ogvernorship in order to assume his cabinet positiong and his membership in the Batasan. Punsalan assumed the positiong of governor while Nepomuceno, who was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan sa Pampanga, assumed office as vice. The presdient, upont recommendation of Mendoza, appointed Atty. Snatiago as acting member of the Sanggunian to fill the resulting vacancy. They were all duly recognized as such by all the national and local officers. They collected and were paid all emoluments and salaries appertaining to the new positions. It is clear that he resigned his old position. Respondent had to resign when he accepted and assumed the incompatible office of member of parliament.
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In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the act of giving up of an ifficer by which he declines his office andrenounces the further right to use it. It can be express or implied. To constitute a complete and operative resignation the folloving must be present. (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the private respondents resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Although the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation it provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of resignation and should be acted upon by the Sangunian concerned. The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing power. Therefore, the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as the presidents alter ego. Tackling the second issue, abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and contro thereof. It is a species of resignation. While resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment by non-user. There are 2 essential elements of abandonment : (1) an intention to abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was manifested on the following instances: (1) private respondents failure to perform his function as SB; (2) his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second element was demonstrated by the following: (1) his letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and (4) his recept of renumeration for such post. 3. TRISTE v MACARAIG
FACTS Triste during the Marcos regime was an Assistant Regional Director in COA. He was later reassigned by Marcos to the DPWH as Assistant Secretary of Comptrollership and Financial Managment. After the EDSA revolution, Pres. Cory issued Proclamation No. 1 required, all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. Hence, Triste submitted his courtesy resignation to the Minister of DPWH. Minister Mercado accepted Tristes courtesy resignation on August 25, 1986. Ten days later, Triste wrote a letter to the Career Executive Service Board requesting for reinstatement. He also appealed this matter to the Office of the President. DPWH denied Tristes request because Alvarez was already appointed to the position he previously held, in fact Alvarez has already taken his oath. ISSUE W/N Triste could be reinstated to his former position after tendering his courtesy resignation. HELD NO, he cannot be reinstated to his former position. The Court said that petitioners resignation as Assistant Secretary for Comptrollership and Financial Management submitted in obedience to Corys Proclamation No.1 was involuntary, and in derogation of his right to security of tenure. But despite such a declaration the Court still ruled that Triste tenure was effectively terminated when: 1. His successor, Alvarez, was designated on May 22, 1986 by Secretary Mercado; formally appointed on July 23, 1986 by Executive Secretary Joker P. Arroyo "by authority of the President;" and reappointed by the President herself on July 21, 1987; 2. His courtesy resignation was accepted by Secretary Mercado on August 4, 1986; and 3. He applied for, and received, retirement and other benefits under Republic Act No. 1616 (p. 166, Rollo) as provided in Section 3, Article III of the Provisional Constitution. His application for retirement benefits validated his otherwise vitiated consent to his resignation. He could not thereafter reclaim the position from which he had resigned. He could not eat his cake and have it too. 4. ISBERTO v RAQUIZA
FACTS In 1957, Isberto was appointed as a Building Foreman in the Office of the District Engineer of Pangasinan in a permanent capacity (salary of P2040 p.a.). Months after, he was diagnosed with Pott's disease (TB of the bone), which prompted him to apply for a leave of absence. This was initially granted with pay, but later on, without pay. It took him 4 years to recover from the disease.
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In 1961, he sent a letter to Bandong (District Engineer) requesting his return to his position, which was denied since it had already been occupied by Alegre. Since he could not go back to his old position, he looked for another and luckily, he was appointed as a construction foreman in 1964 with the same salary as Alegre's. In 1969, Isberto filed a suit to recover his back salaries amounting to P11K, from 1961 (when he requested to return) to 1964 (when he was appointed) on the ground that he was unjustly or unlawfully removed from his old position during that period. The defendants contend that upon his application for leave of absence, he had abandoned his post and was already considered automatically separated from the service. Lower court ordered the defendants to pay Isberto his back wages amounting to P11K. ISSUE W/N Isberto was legally separated from the service HELD YES. Pursuant to Rule XVI, Sec. 33 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, That he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date he will be dropped from the service." In this case, Isberto went on leave (with permission) for 129 days--29 days with pay, 100 days without pay. After this period, he was AWOL--absence without official leave. Based on Sec 33, his one-year leave of absence without pay would have ended in Jan 1959, but he only asked to be reinstated in June 1961. It may be argued that Isberto was not given a written notice within a reasonable period before expiration of his LOA without pay, as required under Sec 33. However, this is immaterial since Isberto did not even have a proper LOA without pay because his official LOA without pay was only until Apr 1958 and he did not extend it. His failure to claim for reinstatement for a period a 2.5 years shows a clear case of abandonment--he was deemed automatically separated from the service. For that period, all he did was to write a letter requesting his reinstatement and did not file any action to contest the legality of his separation. He did not likewise contest the title of Alegre to the office. "A person claiming rights to a position in the civil service must institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within the period of one year from the date of separation, otherwise he will be considered as having abandoned his office, or even acquiesced or consented to his removal and, therefore, not entitled to bring action for his reinstatement. The rationale of this doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claiming to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as agent another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so." Thus, in this case, Isberto was legally separated from the service, based on abandonment and pursuant to Sec 33. As such, he was not entitled to back wages. 5. SALVADOR v CA
FACTS Conrado Salvador (petitioner) has been employed as a Forestry Supervisor II for 8 years in DENR. Sometime in 1987, DENR was reorganized and the petitioner was constrained to accept the lower position of Senior Executive Assistant, a coterminous employment, with a term not to exceed 3 years. Later on, he was promoted as Forester III however this position is still lower in rank compared to Forestry Supervisor which he previously held. In January 1992, he received a letter from the Director of DENR stating that he was deemed terminated his position being a coterminous one. Salvador, joined his other employees who were illegally dismissed as well through a complaint-inintervention. Decision was rendered in favour of the complainants, including Salvador. This decision (GR103121) became final and executory. Civil Service Commission instructed DENR to appoint the illegally dismissed employees but DENR did not heed CSCs instructions. 3 years after, Salvador filed a petition to hold the directors of DENR in contempt for wilfully failing to comply the execution of judgement ISSUE 1. W/N Salvadors acceptance of a coterminous position excludes him within the scope of the decision which attained
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finality W/N the respondents could be held in contempt
2D 2012
2.
HELD 1. NO. The high tribunal ruled in favour of Salvador. Although the DENR Memorandum states that among those people to be excluded from the Decision are those who accepted coterminous appointments, the SC held that Salvadors acceptance of the coterminous appointment was brought about by necessity. Petitioners application for and acceptance of a lower position in DENR, under the circumstances, was the practical and responsible thing to do, and cannot be construed against him such as to foreclose his right to question the legality of his termination and to claim the position he held previous to the organization SC ordered the DENR officials to reinstate Salvador 2. NO. Notwithstanding respondents non-compliance with the decision in GR103121, this court believes that the same does not constitute a indirect contempt of court. Disobedience of or resistance to a judgement of a court, to be punishable as contempt must be willful. In this case, this court finds that public respondent Secretary of the DENR acted in good faith. True, respondent Secretary committed error in judgement, but that per se cannot be considered contumacious. 6. CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI v CSC
FACTS Private respondent Eusebia R. Galzote, a clerk in the Department of Engineering and Public Works of Makati, was arrested without a warrant and detained allegedly for kidnapping for ransom with physical injuries. Thereafter, she was subjected to inquest, followed by the filing of a criminal case against her. As she was incarcerated, she wasnt able to report for work as a result of which she was suspended from office until the final disposition of her case by petitioner City Government. However, thereafter, the City Government changed its policy. Without notice to private respondent who was then already detained, and even during the pendency of the trial against her, she was dropped from the rolls of municipal employees for being absent from work for more than one (1) year without official leave. Three (3) years later, Galzote was acquitted; she then requested for the lifting of her suspension and reinstatement to her former position. Close to a year has passed but the City Government still took no action, so she brought her request to the CSC. The CSC found merit in her submissions and ordered her immediate reinstatement with back wages. The City Government through a Petition for Review of the Resolution of the CSC elevated the case to the CA, but the latter sustained the resolution of the CSC. Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner wants to have Galzote declared on AWOL and faults her for failing to file an application for leave of absence under Secs. 20 and 35 of the CSC Rules, thereby rejecting the CSCs ruling of an automatic leave of absence for the period of her detention since the current Civil Service Law and Rules do not contain any provision on such. ISSUE W/N Galzote should have still filed a formal application for LOA to ensure her reinstatement under the circumstances. HELD NO. There is no more need for this because of the act of the City Government in advising her 3 days after her arrest that she had been placed under suspension until the final disposition of her criminal case. This measure taken by the petitioner shows its recognition of private respondents predicament, and thus, in effect, allowed her to forego reporting for work during the pendency of her criminal case without the needless exercise of strict formalities. At the very least, this official communication should be taken as an equivalent of a prior approved LOA since it was her employer itself which placed her under suspension and thus excused her from further formalities in applying for such leave. The arrangement also bound the City Government to allow Galzote to return to her work after the termination of her case, i.e., upon acquittal. Thus, this pledge serves as a valid ground to altogether dispense with the formal application for leave. The contention that there is no specific provision in the CSC rules on automatic leaves should be overruled. While the general rule requires--pursuant to Secs. 20 and 52, as well as Secs. 35 and 63 of Administrative Code of 1987an approved LOA to avoid being on AWOL, these provisions cannot be interpreted as exclusive and referring only to 1 mode of securing approval, which requires an employee to actually apply for it (formalities and all) before exceeding 30 days of absence. There are, after all, other means of seeking and granting approved LOA, one of which is the CSC recognized rule of automatic LOA under specified circumstances. Situations of illness are not the only instances of force majeure; other events beyond the control of the employee also force him to be absent from work, such as when he is kidnapped or arrested and detained from alleged crimes. It is the latter cases which the CSC sought to address in interpreting the CSC rules on LOA as including or contemplating an automatic LOA. In these force majeure instances, the employee is excused from filing provided that he informs the employer of the unfortunate event behind his absence. Here, the Court is convinced that Galzote has sufficiently informed the City Government of her predicament.
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DISSENT OF J. PANGANIBAN To begin with, the current Civil Service Law and Rules do not contain any provision of automatic leaves of absence. The rules unmistakably say that that government employees who are AWOL for at least 30 days shall be dropped from the servicemaking no distinction or qualification whatsoever as to the reason for the absence. Simply, one who fails to report continuously for the required minimum number of days without an approved leave is considered AWOL. Here, Galzote did not file an application for any type of leave, hence theres no way that she can have an approve one. True that she could not have physically reported for work but there was nothing to stop her from writing to petitioner, informing the latter of her plight and applying for leave. Ethical Standards Law requires public officials and employees to observe utmost integrity and strictest discipline. They cannot be allowed to just disappear from their jobs and then, after many years, claim that their absence was due to circumstances beyond their control. 7. ADIONG v CA
FACTS Mayor Batua issued a permit appointment to Nasiba Nuska to the position of Local Register. It was approved by the CSC. On June 30, 1995, Mayor Adiong issued a memorandum ordering all municipal employees of the termination of their appointment and directing them to clear themselves from money and property accountabilities. This was followed up by another memorandum clarifying that the mass termination only applies to temporary or casual workers and requiring those holding permanent appointment to submit copies of their appointments. Nuskas failure to submit a copy of her appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy call to Adiong as the new mayor resulted to the termination of her services and Adiong appointed Samporna in her stead. Nuska wrote Adiong requesting for her reinstatement and payment of salaries but the mayor failed to act on her request. The CSC issued a resolution ordering Nuskas reinstatement. ISSUE W/N the termination of Nuskas reinstatement was proper HELD Nuska had a permanent appointment to the position of municipal civil registrar. She enjoyed security of tenure as guaranteed by law. Nuska is entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the classified service. She could not be removed or dismissed from service without just cause and observing the requirements of due process. Failure to make a courtesy call to ones superior is not an offense much less a ground to terminate employment. Failure to submit her appointment papers is not a cause for outright dismissal. Failure to report to work does not tantamount to abandonment because she did not resign and in fact requested for her reinstatement. Although she was physically absent in the office premises, she had an intention to return. Nuskas failure to perform her duties was involuntary. There were no just causes for terminating her employment and assuming there were, still it was illegal because it was done without compliance of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or rule complained of. It does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Nuska is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. 8. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v CSC
FACTS Dr. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines, Los Banos (UPLB). He served as the Philippines Governments official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific (CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for a 1 year extension of said leave of absence, but it was denied. Petitioner was advised to report for duty at UPLB but petitioner said that he had no choice but to continue working in CIRDAP. UPLB warned the petitioner that failure to report within 30 days would result to the latters being dropped from the rolls of the personnel. After 5 years, petitioner wrote that he was reporting back for duty; however, he was informed that since his leave of absence was unapproved, he was considered AWOL and thus had to re-apply.
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ISSUE W/N the petitioners automatic separation from the civil service due to prolonged absence without leave was valid. HELD YES. Petitioner was never actually dropped from the service of UPLB. He remained in the roll of academic personnel even after being warned of the possibility of being dropped from service: no notice of dropping from the rolls was issued by UPLB; petitioners salary was increase several times during his absence; his appointment was reclassified with promotion in rank. These acts are clearly inconsistent with serparation or dropping from service. Despite Section 33, Rule XVI or the Revised Civil Service Rules which authorizes automatic separation, such is not applicable to UP because of its academic freedom. This freedom encompasses autonomy to choose who should teach and who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. 9. UMALI v GUINGONA
FACTS Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of BIR by Pres. Ramos. Barely a year later, Ramos received a confidential 9 memorandum against petitioner for malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance . Ramos then authorized Umalis 10 preventive suspension and referred the complaint to the PCAGC for investigation. PCAGC then issued a resolution finding a prima facie evidence to support 6 of the 12 charges against him. Hence, Ramos issued an administrative order dismissing him with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Umali contends that as Regional Director, he belongs to the Career Executive Service with tenurial protection who can only be removed for cause even if he is a presidential appointee under the direct authority of the President. ISSUES W/N he may be validly removed from office. HELD Petitioner failed to prove that his is a CESO eligible, which is fatal to the case. NEVERTHELESS, the court allowed him to retire with full benefits by the exercise of the Supreme Courts equity powers. This is because the Commissioner of the BIR manifested to the Ombudsman that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, hence, giving no more basis to the Administrative order. 10. PHILCOA v GARRIDO FACTS Garrido, respondent, on July 1993 verbally sought permission from PCA administrator David to take a 5 month vacation in connection with his intention to accept a job offer in West Africa. David advised respondent to make sure that his(respondent) request conforms to the Civil Service Rules and to prepare the necessary documents. On 21 July 1993, respondent filed his application for leave for 98 days which would run from 28 July 1993 to 17 December 1993. Respondent, on 28 July 1993, commenced his vacation leave and departed for West Africa. However, on September 1993 or 2 months after the application for leave, David issued a memorandum disapproving respondents application for leave which was received through his (respondent) office. On 18 December 1993, respondent arrived in the Philippines and reported back to his office. It was only then that he found out the letter of disapproval. 3 days after, he was confined to the hospital until his discharge on 2 January 1994. Days after he was discharged in the hospital, he re-filed his vacation leave and incorporated therein his sick leave. However, on 4 February 1994, he received a letter from David informing him that he was already dropped from the rolls effective 26 December 1993 for being absent without official leave (AWOL) for more than 30 days pursuant to a Civil Service Memorandum. Respondent appealed his case in the CSC but lost and was later overturned by the CA hinging on the reasoning of lack of due notice hence the appeal of Philcoa. ISSUE W/N respondent was illegally dismissed.
9 Some of which are issuance of Letters of Authority to investigate taxpayers despite the ban on investigations, termination of tax cases without the submission of the required investigation reports, termianted cases with reports were submitted and approved by Umali without being reviewed by the Assessment division etc. 10 Presidential Commission on Anti-graft and corruption
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HELD YES, although the granting or disapproval of leaves depends upon the need of the service and is discretionary upon the head of the agency, such discretion was not exercised properly in this case. David disapproved the leave only on 15 September 1993 or 2 months after the application for leave was filed. Such unexplained inaction by David gave respondent the impression that there was no impediment to his(respondent) application. Moreover, respondent complied with Davids initial instruction when he verbally sought the latters permission. Thus, it would be baseless to conclude that respondent went on leave without an approved application. 11. GREGORIO v CA FACTS Ordinance no.49 was approved by the city of La Carlota, abolishing the positions held by petitioners and company, resulting to the termination of their employment. Petitioners claim that their termination was done in bad faith. ISSUE W/N the termination was done in bad faith HELD NO. it was not done in bad faith. The city had an outstanding credit of P997, 729.19, while the remaining available balance is P224.01 in cash, and P4,858.13 in credit. Its loan of P120,000 to pay salaries was even denied because it still had a loan balance of P150,000. To top it off, It has other monetary obligations amounting to almost P300,000. The lay-off was in response to the recommendation of the city auditor, and these positions were never restored or recreated, nor the other employees retained or reappointed. It therefore cannot be said that it was politically motivated or done in bad faith. 12. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB v ZAMORA FACTS On June 1987 Pres. Cory issued EO 127, establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the Ministry of Finance. Aquino issued another memo providing that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti smuggling operations in all land areas and inland water and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. On January 2000 Pres. Estrada issued EO 191 entitled Deactivation of the EIIB. The order of deactivation was motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other exiting agencies of the government. On March 200, Estrada issued EO 223 providing for the separation from the service of all personnel of EIIB pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting in the abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. ISSUES a. Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive department? b. How shall the reorganization be carried out? RULING a. YES, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. Bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department are under the Presidents power of control. Hence he is justified in deactivating the functions of a particular office, or in carrying out reorganizations when a certain law grants him such power. Sec. 31, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code provides the President with the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President in order to achieve economy and efficiency. b. The reorganization should be carried out in good faith. The EOs issued by Estrada was motivated by the fact that the functions of EIIB are also being performed by other agencies. The Court also pointed out that the deactivation of EIIB was intended to lessen the expenses of the government.
13. RUBIO v PEOPLES HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION FACTS RA 3469 authorized the construction of Multi-Storey Tenement Buildings, which the respondent PHHC is tasked to administer and maintain. It issued original and permanent appointments to petitioners Rubio in these projects, holding regular and permanent positions provided for in the Plantilla of personnel of the projects. In 1966, PHHC issued a resolution (No. 686), which abolished the positions and terminated the services of those employees who were granted original appointment from Jan 1965 up to the date of the resolution. This was the basis for the termination of the services of petitioners. Another resolution (No. 133) was issued, which authorized the hiring of 36 casuals. Based on this, PHHC hired 31 casuals
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from those who had been working from then on.
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Petitioners Rubio, then, questioned their termination, contending that Resolution 686 does not apply to them. CFI of Quezon City rendered a decision, which ordered the PHHC to reinstate the petitioners and to pay their backwages and allowances that they may have had earned. ISSUE W/N PHHC's Resolution 686 is applicable to petitioners Rubio HELD NO, the petitioners were dismissed without cause. The Resolution was a mere pretext to replace the petitioners and in fact, no abolition of positions was effected. The subsequent "casual" employees were not really casual, but more or less permanent, because their salaries had been appropriated in the budget for the following year. Moreover, petitioners may not be considered as employees of PHHC, but employees of the Multi-Storey Tenement Housing Project because their salaries were derived from the rentals of the buildings, not from the appropriations made by the PHHC. BP 337 (Local Government Code) was passed in 1983. Under it, Sec 76 provides that when a position of an official or employee under the civil service is abolished, the official or employee shall be reinstated in another vacant position. If there is no vacant position, s/he shall be entitled to a separation pay, equivalent to one-month salary for each year of service over and above the monetary privileges granted to them under existing laws. Although this provision may seem to be applicable only to local government positions, the Court found it proper to apply it to personnel of the government, including the petitioners. However, 32 years have already passed and the Court found it doubtful if reinstatement would be possible--many might have found a new job, others might have reached their retirement age, some might have died already. Thus, it ordered PHHC to pay the petitioners separation pay in accordance to BP 337, Sec 76 as well as back salaries corresponding to a period of 5 years without qualification or deduction. 14. UP BOARD OF REGENTS v RASUL FACTS The UP Board of Regents appointed Dr. Felipe Estrella as the Director of Philippine General Hospital or PGH from September 1986 till April 1992. Barely 2 weeks after appointment, Dr. Abuava, as the President of the UP sent a memorandum to the Board of Regents to Reorganize PGH. Upon this recommendation, the Board of Regents approved the re-organization plan and Nomination Committee was formed. This committee ought to choose a replacement for Dr. Estrella as to fill up the alleged vacant UP-PGH Director. Dr. Estrella filed an injunction case against the Nominiation Committee and the Board of Regents to forestall the removal or dismissal of Dr Estrella ISSUE Whether Dr Estrella can be rightfully removed because of PGHs reorganization HELD NO. As held in numerous cases, appointees of the UP Board of Regents enjoy security of tenure during their term of office. Moreover, it is clear from the record that PGH itself was not abolished in the reorganization plan approved by the UP Board of Regents. The PGH was merely renamed UP-PGH Medical Center and some of its functions and objects were expanded or consolidated. The UP-PGH Medical Center is essentially the same as PGH hence, the Medical Center Director will be performing duties very similar to the present PGH director. It cannot be invoked to sustain the argument that respondent is not entitled to security of tenure It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the incumbent the right to security of tenure. However in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of the PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. 15. ROMULO v YNIGUEZ FACTS Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
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consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment complaint attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the petitioners contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings. ISSUEs 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? 2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint? 3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional? HELD No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would serve no purpose to proceed any further when it is obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint for impeachment as in the dismissal of Mitras motion in the case makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained had already been consummated. They are fait accompli.
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16. ESTRADA v DESIERTO (356 SCRA 108) FACTS (same facts as Estrada v. Desierto, March 2, 2001)
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ISSUES W/N the use of the Angara diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. HELD The Angara diary contains statements of the petitioner, which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Sec. Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. This has long been a quiet area of our law on the evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur. Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided in Sec. 11, Art. VII. We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If he feels aggrieved, he should have recourse to Congress and not from courts. There is nothing in Sec.11 of the Constitution which states that the declaration by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be prior or before the VP assumes the presidency. In the case at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact that the events, which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioners letter claiming inability to govern. In case of Resignation of the President, it is not disputed that the SC has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, Sec.11 gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and the petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by the SC. 17. ESTRADA v DESIERTO (445 SCRA 655) FACTS The BIR placed Eraps foreign currency deposit account at Citibank Greenhills under constructive distraint. He then filed a complaint against BIR deputy commissioner Lilian Hefti, revenue officers and citibank officers for vilation the Foreign currency deposits act, the revised penal code and the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. ISSUES W/N Heftis acts of putting the account under constructive distraint was proper considering that only the Commissioner can do such. HELD YES. While it is true that under Sec. 206 of the NIRC, the Commissioner and not any officer of the BIR was the one granted with the power to issue a notice of distraint, when respondent Hefti exercised such function, she was then designatied officerin-charge by Pres. Arroyo through a memorandum of aapointment. When she issued such notice of distraint, Hefti was clothed authority, hence, the charge for Usurpation of Official function does not apply. She was authorized to temporarily act as the head of the said bureau until the appointment of the regular commissioner. 18. CUENCO v OMBUDSMAN FACTS Complainant Cuenco filed an untitled pleading which the Supreme Court treated as a consolidation of 3 actions: (1) a second Motion for Reconsideration of the decision dated July 23, 1987 said decision became final and executor thus, MoR invalid; (2) a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts En Banc Resolution of February 17, 1988 said MoR was for an administrative case for disbarment filed by Cuenco against Justice Fernan which was dismissed by the Court for utter lack of merit; (3) Compliance with the directive in aforesaid Resolution of Feb 17, 1988 - requires complainant Cuenco to show why he should not be administratively dealt with for having made unfounded and serious accusations against Justice Fernan.
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ISSUE W/N Cuenco should be administratively liable for having made serious accusations against Justice Fernan.
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RULING: YES Cuenco has not only declined to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan but has also chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume the complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he has made against Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support with anything but his own bare assertion. The Court is compelled to conclude that those accusations were in bad faith. 19. FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FACTS On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 10 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
9
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the 11 House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General 12 of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of 13 Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word initiate to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period. ISSUE/S 1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid? HELD 1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states: (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. xxxxxxx (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended initiate to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the
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Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint. 2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
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