Garcia vs Pajaro

Date: July 5, 2002

Petitioner: Sebastian Garcia
Respondents: Juanito Pajaro and the City of Dagupan

Ponente: Panganiban

Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City. He
was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of
his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him. However, Pajaro continued
reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer
acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him from the Office of
the City Mayor.
Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed that Garcia has been
rating unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters, which is the reason why he
was formally charged. Garcia was preventively suspended for ninety days since the
charge is a major offense. An investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed to appear and
testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro proceeded with an ex parte
investigation. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the
suspension. This was affirmed by the Regional Director. “
Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private respondent was vested with
legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and
employees.
The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been
fully observed by Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the
charges against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation,
petitioner chose not to answer those charges.

Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers over the petitioner

Held:

Ratio: At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local
Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local government units are
covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly
promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation
and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and
employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil
Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the
primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. They may be
removed or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of
guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the
respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with
that in the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and
cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a
subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an
agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.
 Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings
against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-
85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the
minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or
an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or
employees subordinate to them.
In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to
in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term “agency” refers to any of the
various units of the government including a department, a bureau, an office, an
instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a
distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office
of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under him.
Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner
and issue a preventive suspension order against him.
Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not
persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city
mayor “may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any
official or employee of the city.” This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the
1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline
subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city
mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions
against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision
under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the
Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same
token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against
petitioner.
As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. In
the present case, Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order
against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to
perform official duties and functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the
issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code.
Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the
investigation and issued the assailed Order.

Issue: WON Garcia was denied due process

Held: No

Ratio: In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the

opportunity to explain one’s side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times more creditably and
practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws.
First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge against him.
Second, Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1,
1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director, who
approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated
July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on
August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was
conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s
findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision,.
We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the
opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.
Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own
peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated.
As to petitioner’s claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not
be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
There was no such showing in the present case.