Case Digests 2

CIVIL PROCEDURE 2014 | ATTY.
CUSTODIO TRICIA CRUZ JDCTR DLSU LAW

DISMISSAL CASES Amigo v CA DOCTRINE: The issue of jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in the answer, otherwise, it shall be deemed waived. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. FACTS: Petitioners Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda. de Salinas leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo, a parcel of land registered in the lessors name. Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot. Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein private respondent Jesus Wee Eng. TCTs were issued to the two vendees. Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City Government of Davao. Bosquit and Wee exchanged a portion of their lot for also a portion of another lot in the name of the city. The transaction was authorized and approved by the City Council of Davao. Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners before the City Court. After almost 7 years (19 July 1976), the city court finally dismissed the action on the technicality that the plaintiffs did not observe the required 15-day period from the sending of the letter of demand before filing the action, the letter having been sent instead on 19 September 1969 or only twelve days before the filing of the action. On October 1976, Bosquit sold his rights and interests over his lots to Wee. TCT was issued. On July 1977, Wee, herein private respondent, filed a complaint against petitioners in the then Court of First Instance of Davao, for recovery of the real property in question. After the petitioners had filed their answer, the court appointed a geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey. Wee sought an amendment of complaint. Complaint prayed not only for recovery of real property and damages but also for an abatement of nuisance over the portion of the improvements introduced by petitioners. TC: in favor of Wee Petitioners contended among many others, that the judgment rendered by the LC was void for want of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their person? RULING: YES. Petitioners maintain that the judgment of the trial court is void for being coram non judice. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint. It should hardly be of any consequence that the merits of the case are later found to veer away from the claims asseverated by the plaintiff. The suit below is aimed at recovering real property, an action clearly well within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On the contrary, it appears that private respondent has been, and still is; the registered owner of the lots in question. Neither may petitioners feign absence of jurisdiction over their persons. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.22 In this case, by their filing of an answer and later an amended answer, petitioners must be deemed to have formally and effectively appeared before the lower court. Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however, as has been so held lately in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, must be
CIVIL PROCEDURE 2014 | ATTY. CUSTODIO TRICIA CRUZ JDCTR DLSU LAW
seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. The records bear out the fact that petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the rendition of the judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over their person, a somersault that neither law nor policy will sanction. PETITION DENIED. La Naval v CA DOCTRINE: Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate/disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply. The Court must refrain from taking up claims of the contending parties for damages which may be ventilated in separate proceedings. FACTS: Yao is present owner of a commercial bldg a portion of which is leased to P under a contract of lease which expired year 1989. P exercised its option to lease same bldg for another 5 years but P & R disagreed on the rental rate. P, to resolve controversy, submitted to arbitration pursuant to RA 876. R appointed Alamarez as arbitrator while P chose Sabile as its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of a third arbitrator Tupang, was held in abeyance because P instructed Sabile to defer the same until the BoD could convene approve Tupangs appointment. R prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Arbirtration Law, Sabile and Alamarez be directed to proceed with the arbitration in acc with Sec. 7 of the Contract and the applicable provisions of the law; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to convene and resolve controversy. P denied the averments of petition theorizing that such petition is premature since there was failure of notice on the part of R requiring both arbitrators to appoint third member of the BoA. It gave the arbitrators a free hand in choosing the third arbitrator, thus, R has no cause of action against it. R filed an amended petition for Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with Damages; praying that petitioner be ordered to pay interest on the unpaid rents (prevailing interest) and exemplary damages. P answered, contending among others, that amended petition should be dismissed OTG of non-payment of requisite filing fees; and it being in the nature of an ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial is necessary. P presented a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing of its special and affirmative defenses which are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Resp Court announced that the two arbitrators chose Narciso as third arbitrator. It also ordered the parties to submit position papers re: w/n resp Yaos claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. P argued that respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and not competent to act on Rs claim for damages which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. However, appellate court considered P in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings Rs claim for damages, it (P) having itself filed similarly its counterclaim with the court a quo.
ISSUE/S: W/N the court it has jurisdiction over the person? W/N the court a quo has jurisdiction over the subject matter? RULING: 1. Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue. proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of it. FACTS: Engr. Egdon Sabio was employed as Manager of the Engineering Department of Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative (ISECO), herein petitioner, in May 1982. He was relieved of his duties and later on dismissed pursuant to ISECO's Board Resolution. Sabio wrote to the ISECO Board of Directors, thru its President, Atty. Manuel Agpalo, about the expenses incurred by Acting General Manager, Atty. Efren Bautista, in the total amount of P131K from May 1988 to May 1989 for his travel to the office of the National Electrification Administration and places outside the area serviced by the cooperative. Sabio revealed that in 1 year, Bautista was away for 220 days, while in contrast the previous Acting General Manager, Genaro Cada, who stayed out of the cooperative for not more than 30 days for the same length of time spent not more than P10K. Bautista summoned Sabio to his office and asked him to file a letter of irrevocable resignation with the assurance that separation benefits will be granted to him. Bautista also suggested to Sabio to apply as Acting General Manager of Abra Electric Cooperative. When asked why he made such request, Bautista could not give any satisfactory answer. Bautista also offered Sabio a one-month vacation leave with pay but Sabio refused the offer. Sabio sent a letter of apology to Bautista with copies furnished to the Board of Directors, Department Managers and Sub-Area Managers, but maintaining that he had not violated any of the cooperative's rules and regulations. However, on that same day Sabio was relieved from his position as Engineering Manager without giving any reason. Bautista issued a memo requiring Sabio to explain in writing within 24 hours upon receipt why he should not be separated from the service for grave and serious misconduct.
2.
In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed." The proceedings are summary in nature. All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue.
Ilocos Sur Electric v NLRC DOCTRINE: NLRCs jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in the partition. Petitioners did not question such jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or their answer. While jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the case, a partys active participation in the
Sabio submitted his answer denying all the charges against him. Bautista placed him under preventive suspension without pay which prompted Sabio to file a complaint for illegal suspension and a claim for representation/travel allowances before the Labor Arbiter. Bautista issued Office Memo No. 69-89, creating an ad hoc committee; to investigate the case against Sabio. Thereafter, the ad hoc committee submitted a report recommending Sabios dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, after considering the evidence on record, held in his decision that Sabio was illegally and unjustly dismissed without due process of law. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. The NLRC found that petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision on January 20, 1990 but interposed their appeal only on January 1, 1990 which was beyond the 10-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules of the NLRC, specifically Rule VIII section I(a). A motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the NLRC in its resolution of November 16, 1990. 10 A notice of appeal to the President was filed. consistently held by this Court that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. **Well settled is the rule that the employer's prerogative/power to dismiss an employee must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause, otherwise the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure would be rendered nugatory. Moreover, it must be done without abuse of discretion. In the case, at bench records show that petitioner Bautista acted with grave abuse of discretion in having Sabio dismissed. On the other hand, Sabio was held to be acting in GF and merely exercising his bounden duty. PETITION DISMISSED.
ISSUE: W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case of Engr. Sabio? RULING: YES. There is no dispute that Sabio is an employee of ISECO whose services as manager of the Engineering Department of ISECO were terminated. The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC pursuant to Section 217 of the Labor Code. Moreover, the NLRC 's jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in this petition. Petitioners did not question the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer. In fact, petitioners participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, as well as in the NLRC to which they appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision. It has been
Andaya v Abadia DOCTRINE: It is elementary that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action." FACTS: Petitioner Andaya sued respondents (directors of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc./AFPSLAI for acting in concerts and pursuant to an illegal and nefarious scheme to oust petitioner without lawful cause from his then positions as President and General Manager of the AFPSLAI and praying for issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
respondents from implementing the illegally conducted reorganization management of AFLPSLAI. TC granted petition for TRO and set the hearing for injunctive relief. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint raised intra-corporate controversies over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, and not the court a quo, has exclusive original jurisdiction. Before the TC could rule on the motion to dismiss, petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading as additional defendants then Central bank Gov Jose Cuisia Jr., Central Bank Managing Director and CB SES Acting Director. Respondents filed an Omnibus motion contending that the filing of an amended complaint seeking to confer jurisdiction on the court was improper and should not be allowed. Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the court a quo issued an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction insofar as herein respondents were concerned and denied petitioner's motions to declare respondents in contempt of court. The determination of the rights of petitioner arising from the alleged illegal convening of the meeting of AFPSLAI Board of Directors and his subsequent ouster from corporate offices as a result of the voting for the reorganization of management are obviously intra-corporate controversies subject to the jurisdiction of SEC as provided in P.D. No. 902-A which states:
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations . . . it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving . . . . (b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate . . . relations . . . . (c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations . . .
ISSUE: W/N TC has jurisdiction? RULING: NONE. The Court finds no reason to change its lack of resolution dismissing the instant complaint FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION insofar as the original defendants While it may be said that the same corporate acts also give rise to civil liability for damages, it does not follow that the case is necessarily taken out of the jurisdiction of the SEC as it may award damages which can be considered consequential in the exercise of its adjudicative powers. Besides, incidental issues that properly fall within the authority of a tribunal may also be considered by it to avoid multiplicity of actions. Consequently, in intra-corporate matters such as those affecting the corporation, its directors, trustees, officers, shareholders, the issue of consequential damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC.
Even the supposed allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, as in par. 7 of the Complaint which states that "certain parties, including defendant SANTOS, "masterminded a plot to degrade plaintiff and to denigrate his accomplishments in the AFPSLAI by spreading false and derogatory rumors against plaintiff," are all treated in the complaint as mere components of the general scheme allegedly perpetrated by respondents as directors to oust him from his corporate offices, and not as causes of action independent of intra-corporate matters. In sum, what petitioner filed against respondents before the court a quo was an intra-corporate case under the guise of an action for injunction and damages. The foregoing notwithstanding, remedial rights and privileges under the Rules of Court are utterly useless in a forum that has no jurisdiction over the case. It should be noted that the court a quo dismissed the case against respondents on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof which mainly involves intracorporate controversies. Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even on appeal, and even if the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. It is elementary that
jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the action." In this sense, dismissal for lack jurisdiction may be ordered by the court motu propio. Applying this notion to the case at bar, with the dismissal of the case against respondents for lack of jurisdiction, it then becomes inconsequential whether the court acted on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the requisite notice as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The determination of lack of jurisdiction over respondents being apparent from the face of the amended complaint, the defect of want of prior notice and hearing of the Omnibus Motion could not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo. PETITION DISMISSED. distilled spirits (wines and liquors) in Davao City and North Cotabato. Private respondents filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against petitioner before the RTC of Davao. In the complaint, Denate alleged that he was entitled to commissions from petitioner but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused to pay the same. Petitioner likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondent with the RTC of Kalookan. Petitioner alleged in the complaint that private respondent still owed a certain sum after deducting commissions and remittances. Petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it. RTC found the said motion without merit and held that the Davao case involves the same parties, and involves substantial identity in the case of action and reliefs sought, as in the instant case. PR filed a MFR which was denied by the TC. CA set aside such order.
Andresons Group v CA DOCTRINE: The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier one. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated, is which is the more appropriate action or which court would be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area. FACTS: Private respondent Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of
ISSUE: Should the action in Kalookan RTC be dimissed OTG of lis pendens? RULING: YES. Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the case on hand. All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan cases are the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As observed by the
appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious. The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier one. The criterion used in determining which case should be abated, is which is the more appropriate action or which court would be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area. DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED. organized and 99.5%-owned by the Salgado spouses. Later renamed Mindanao Insurance Co., Inc., said corporation was placed under receivership and liquidation lodged in the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, upon application of Insurance Commissioner Gregoria Cruz-Ansaldo who was appointed receiver. Thereafter respondent P. R. Roman, Inc. purchased from Mindanao Insurance the Salgado fishpond for P950K. The deed of sale was signed by the receiver and duly approved by the liquidation court. Due to this devt., sps. Ortanez refused to accept from petiti oner the advance rentals on the fishpond. Petitioner then filed before the CFI of Manila against the spouses and P.R. Roman Inc, the latter for taking possession of the land while the former for consignation of the sum of P70K representing advance rentals. P.R. Roman Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly laid, the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action or suit. In its motion to dismiss, P.R. Roman Inc. cited the pendency before the then CFI of Bataan instituted by it against Ramos to quiet its title over the Salgado fishpond. Respondent CFI of Manila issued an order dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner against spouses and P.R. Roman Inc. It held that the case should be dismissed principally because there is already a case pending between the same parties for the same cause which is precisely for the ownership of the subj matter of the property allegedly leased to the plaintiff herein. All the issues respecting the fishpond, including the lease contract, are necessarily involved in the case pending now in Bataan.
Ramos v Peralta DOCTRINE: The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in the Bataan case and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction. FACTS: Petitioner started occupying the Salgado fishpond in 1964 by virtue of a lease contract executed in his favor by private respondents spouses Ortanez. The original lease for a term of five (5) years was renewed several times, the last renewal under a "Kasunduan sa Pag-upa" for a period of 3 years. Unknown to petitioner, title to said property was in the name of Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., a corporation founded,
ISSUE: W/N the subsequent filing of civil case before CFI of Bataan is a bar to the prosecution of the civil case filed in the CFI of Manila? RULING: YES. The requisites of litis pendentia are present in the case at st bar. (1 element): one of the errors invoked by petitioner in his petition for review is that the respondent court erred in not holding that the
parties in the Bataan case are not the same as the parties in Manila case. However, in his brief, no further mention of this assigned error was made; a clear indication of petitioner's admission of the identity of parties in both civil cases particularly as he filed a third party complaint in another civil nd case against the spouses Ortanez and Mindanao Insurance; (2 element): While the immediate relief sought for petitioner in his consignation case is to compel therein defendants to accept his advance rentals, the ultimate purpose of such action is to compel the new owner of the fishpond to recognize his leasehold rights and right of occupation. Thus, the issue involved in the Manila case is the right of possession over the fishpond intertwined with the validity and effectivity of the lease contract. This is the same issue involved in Bataan case because although an action for quieting of title refers to ownership, one of the principal issues is the possession of the fishpond subj matter of the lease supposed rents of rd which are supposed to be consignated in the instant case; (3 element): That whatever decision may be handed down in the Bataan case would constitute res judicata in the Manila case is beyond cavil. Should the Bataan court rule that the lease contract is valid and effective against P. R. Roman, Inc., the petitioner can compel it to accept his proffered payment of rentals; otherwise, he may not do so. Finally, the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in the Bataan case and the location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the Bataan court's jurisdiction. DECISION OF CFI OF MANILA AFFIRMED. (1) The judgment/decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same/any tribunal. (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits is the same. FACTS: The subject lot of this case was originally registered in the name of Gabina Machoca, as her paraphernal property. Petitioners herein are the children of the late spouses Leonardo Arcadio and said Gabina Machoca. Gabina Machoca mortgaged the said lot for P425 to private respondent Franklin Ang and delivered to him her aforesaid certificate of title in connection therewith. Gabina again borrowed an additional sum of P 175 from Ang. Petitioners claim that on the same date, Ang caused the preparation of a deed of sale over the subject lot to which document Gabina Machoca, being illiterate, affixed her thumbmark in the belief that this second instrument was similar to the deed of mortgage executed by her on their previous transaction. When Gabina went home, her children, herein petitioners, informed her that the second document was not a deed of mortgage but a contract of sale. Gabina went back to Ang and demanded the reformation of the aforesaid instrument. Franklin Ang, instead of reforming the instrument, prepared a deed of agreements. Pursuant to the provisions of said deed of agreement, Gabina's right to repurchase the property was to expire three years from when the deed of sale was executed.
Vda de Cruzo v Cariaga DOCTRINE: The principle of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows:
Ang caused the registration of the deed of sale in his name. No redemption having been made, Ang sold said lot to private respondent Melecio Suarez who then obtained a TCT in his name. Gabina Machoca died, leaving herein petitioners as her only heirs. It appears that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed land until private respondents Melecio Suarez and Pilar de los Reyes filed an action against Pedro, Inocenta and Lazaro, all surnamed Pliego before the City Court of the City of Ozamiz for unlawful detainer with damages. The city court rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs therein to be the real owners of the disputed lot and ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and pay the costs. Judgment was entered by the CA. Consequently, a writ of execution and an order of demolition 10 were issued by the city court. Records reveal that during the pendency of the aforesaid unlawful detainer case petitioners filed a petition for against City Court Judge Ceferino Ong and herein private respondents to restrain Judge Ong from further proceeding with the trial in the UD case for alleged lack of jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed and no appeal was taken by said petitioners. It further appears that likewise during the pendency of UD case, petitioners filed a complaint, with the same Court of First at Ozamiz City, involving the same lot against Franklin Ang, Bonifacio Longayan, Melecio Suarez and Pilar de los Reyes, for "removal of clouds of title and declaring title of defendants as null and void or cancelled, or reconveyance and damages." Complaint was dismissed. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order but the motion was denied. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. No appeal having been made, the order of dismissal became final. Finally, the same petitioners filed a Special Civil Case with the RTC of Ozamiz City for conventional redemption and damages against herein private respondents over the same subject lot. Upon motion of the defendants therein, the complaint was dismissed by the court on the ground of res judicata. ISSUE: W/N there was res judicata? RULING: YES. The principle of res judicata in actions in personam is found in Section 49 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: xxx (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The principle of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (3) The judgment/decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same/any tribunal. (4) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits is the same. Stated otherwise, when we speak of resjudicata in its concept as a "bar by former judgment," the judgment rendered in the first case is
an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain that judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein. This is the concept in which the termres judicata is more commonly and generally used and in which it is understood as the bar by prior judgment constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases. There is no question that the order of dismissal rendered in the prior action, had become final for failure of herein petitioners to appeal the same after their motions for reconsideration were denied. Furthermore, while the dismissal was for failure to prosecute, it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits, and operates as res judicata, since the court did not direct that the dismissal was without prejudice. The Civil Case (removal of clouds) and Special Civil Case (conventional redemption and damages) seek to have the Deed of Agreement considered as a mere equitable mortgage and to have the titles for the same thing and seeking the same relief that is to recover possession and ownership. Both actions are anchored on exactly the same cause of action, are based on identical facts and even claim the same relief. Order of dismissal of petitioners claim in special civil action is DISMIS SED. Petitioner San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. (SLVAI) and San Lorenzo Company, Inc. (SLCI) were the respondents in the petition filed before the lower court by private respondent Almeda Development and Equipment Corporation (ADEC). Petitioner is the owner of that parcel of land with building and other improvements situated at Pasay Road, San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila. Its ownership thereto is evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by Ponciano L. Almeda, married to Eufemia Perez-Almeda. In their TCT, it was stipulated that the owner of this lot or his successor in interest is required to be and is automatically a member of the San Lorenzo Village Association. The lot may not be subdivided. The lot shall only be used for residential purposes. Only one single storey or one (duplex) house may be constructed on a single lot, although separate servant's quarter or garage may be built. The condition prevailing along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) the date when the restrictions were imposed by the SLCI to lot and house owners in SLV when the Deed of Restrictions is no longer the same compared today. At that time, houses located along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) were used purely for residential purposes. Today, what are found along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) are commercial/industrial buildings such as the matter of security and garage (sic) collections are taken care of by their buyers. Accordingly, the San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. is no longer relevant in so far as the building and lot owners along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) are concerned. It was also stipulated that the petitioner does not intend to be a member of the San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. The petitioner has its own security guards and garbage trucks. The petitioner can effectively protect its ownership and possession without the assistance and intervention of the San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. The petitioner intends to construct a taller building on the lot. ADEC prayed for the issuance of a TRO directing the San Lorenzo Company, Inc. and its agents "to cease and desist from making the
San Lorenzo v CA DOCTRINE: The allegation of ADEC that it is the owner of the property on the strength of the deed should be deemed hypothetically admitted giving it capacity to file the proceedings below. TC was correct in saying that plaintiff has shown its interests in the subject property, a successor-ininterest of the registered owner, plaintiff step into the shoes of the latter, thus it can sue and be sued. FACTS:
petitioner a member of the San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. and prohibiting the petitioner from constructing a taller building on its lot and the SLVI from collecting membership fee and monthly dues and other assessments." SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of ADEC's personality to sue. It alleged that ADEC was not a registered owner of the disputed parcel of land; that the sale of the property by Ponciano L. Almeda to ADEC could not bind third parties; that ADEC had had no demandable right against the SLVAI not being a landowner or a member, thus it had no right to pray for its cancellation. LC denied the MTD. SLVAI filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order but this was later on denied by the lower court. SLVAI questioned the LCs order before the CA through a petition for certiorari. The CA denied this. nullified not only because it is contrary to law but also because the conditions under which they were imposed had ceased to exist. In fact, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADEC's vendor, the execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latter's status as the vendor's successor-in-interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well within the hypothetical-admission principle. These averments satisfy the three (3) elements of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint did state a cause of action. In view of such, SLVAI cannot successfully invoke the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of action" in its motion to dismiss. What SLVAI essentially puts at issue is whether substantively, ADEC, as plaintiff in the case below, possesses a tenable right of action. As discussed, said issue is NOT a ground for a motion to dismiss. As a matter of law, neither are the efficacy of the sale to pass title to the property, and consequently, ADEC's acquisition of the status of successor-in-interest, specific mandatory modes to challenge the restrictions in question, or the change in the physical environment along Pasay Road, grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Instead, the aforementioned issues may be properly raised in the Answer. Regarding the third issue of whether ADEC is a real party in interest, said issue is likewise not a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. Certainly, as successor-in-interest of the original vendor, who is the unquestioned title holder, ADEC has the prerogative to assert all the latter's rights, including the impugnation of the restrictions on the title. The tenability of the grounds for that impugnation, while proper under the pleadings, should be threshed out at the trial on the merits. The only other issue raised is that even assuming ADEC became owner of the property, it cannot seek cancellation because, under SLVAI's rules, the cancellation process can only be initiated by "members" of the SLVAI who are the registered owners of the lots in the village. However, those rules were not dealt with in the complaint at all. They may thus be raised only by
ISSUE: W/N there was a failure/absence to state a cause of action that will justify the dismissal of the case? RULING: NONE. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice. However, it should be pointed out at the outset that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint, but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of action". The complaint asserts that plaintiff purchased the property in question from the person admittedly holding title thereto. It then infers that by this mode, it became the successor-in-interest of the vendor, if not indeed the owner of the property. Hence, the restrictions in the title should be
way of defense in the Answer, but not as ground for a motion to dismiss available as cause for dismissal of the action at this early stage. PETITION DISMISSED. saw the deceased take a lethal dose of malathion and the report of Pat. Bernabe. Nearly two years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dismissing the murder charge, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand Calalang impleading the spouses Calalang RTC of Manila on the claim that they are jointly and severally liable for actual and compensatory damages, loss of earnings, attorneys fees and other expenses. Plaintiffs, the heirs of Erlinda Gruta, Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta in their own rights and co-heirs of the late Erlinda Gruta, are all with capacity to sue and be sued while defendants are likewise with capacity to sue and be sued and may be served with summons and court processes. Subsequently later, a case of Murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan, which was however dismissed on the alleged ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged. Petitioners filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. A preliminary hearing was later on conducted. Finding merit to the prayer for dismissal OTG of lack of cause of action based on the affirmative defenses, LC dismissed the case accordingly. This was set aside by the IAC.
Calalang v IAC DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, the question submitted for determination is sufficiency of allegation in the complaint itself. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon by way of affirmative defenses state other matters. Thus the trial court, in the case at bar, did not commit any error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of herein petitioners. The TC dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based on the ground that there is not valid cause of action against him. This is NOT a ground for dismissal of action. FACTS: Erlinda Gruta, 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as househelper in the household of petitioners spouses Dr. Fidel Calalang and Dra. Maria Gener Calalang and their son Ferdinand Calalang, in Bulacan. Erlinda Gruta died of malathion poisoning. Ferdinand Calalang, son of petitioner sps. was charged with murder for allegedly poisoning her. A complaint for murder was later on filed against him. Respondent Ferdinand Calalang never appeared nor presented his counter affidavit, instead his mother Maria Gener Calalang presented a counter affidavit and two affidavits of her maids who
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed OTG of failure to state a cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs? RULING: NONE. The trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against him. This is not a ground for dismissal of action under Rule 16; but the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The pleadings, memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition, thereto, might show that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang; still, the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. As long as there is a cause of action in the complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the
merits with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." Therefore, the plaintiffs should be given their day in court to vindicate their claim to the fullest. There is no valid legal ground for impleading the spouses Dr. and Mrs. Maria Calalang. The complaint shows that except for the fact that the spouses Calalang are said to be the employer of the deceased Erlinda Gruta; and, that the other defendant Ferdinand Calalang is their son, there is nothing in the complaint which would connect them to the untimely death of Erlinda Gruta representatives of Defendant Corporation who were signatories in the Promissory Note or alternatively, in their personal capacities if they be found to be in BF. Defendant Jose Jalandoni is impleaded herein in his personal capacity also as alternative Defendant, as the owner of 94% of the subscribed capital stock Defendant Corporation. Respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint had failed to state a cause of action against them. Petitioner Bank filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, citing among other things, Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Respondents in turn filed a Reply to petitioner Bank's Opposition. RTC then resolved respondents' Motion to Dismiss by denying that Motion "considering that the grounds raised by [respondents] Emmanuel F. Del Mundo and Jose V. Fajardo in their motion to dismiss are not indubitable." Respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo then went directly to this Court on Petition for Certiorari. LC resolved to refer the case to the CA. Before the CA, respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo basically alleged that petitioner Bank's complaint did not set forth any cause of action as against them personally, and that Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on alternative defendants was not applicable to the case at bar. Examination of paragraph 1.6 shows that petitioner Bank there seeks to distinguish between (a) respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their capacity as "agents and/or representative of" J.J. Mining; and (b) respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their individual and personal capacities. As noted earlier, the text of the promissory note shows that respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo had signed for and in behalf of J.J. Mining. Analysis of the allegations of the petitioner Bank's complaint thus shows, firstly, that the defendants who are being sued in the alternative are the following: (a) the borrowing corporation, J.J. Mining; and
Perpetual v Fajardo DOCTRINE: The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendant. FACTS: J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation executed and delivered to petitioner Perpetual Savings Bank (PSB) a promissory note. The promissory note was executed for J.J. Mining by officers of J.J. Mining. Petitioner Bank filed a complaint with the RTC of Manila against J.J. Mining, Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni and herein respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, for collection of the amounts due under the promissory note. In its complaint, it alleged that defendants Fajardo and Del Mundo are impleaded herein as agents/or
(b) respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities, and, secondly, that two (2) alternative but related grounds for holding Fajardo and Del Mundo responsible to petitioner Bank, personally and individually, have been pleaded by the Bank. ISSUE: Did the complaint filed in the civil case state a cause of action against a respondent Fajardo and Del Mundo as distinguished from J.J. Mining in whose behalf they had purported to act? RULING: YES. The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegation of facts made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. The allegations set forth in the complaint sufficiently reveal a cause of action. It was premature for the CA to consider evidence outside the 4 corners of the complaint and to reach a conclusion, since the fraud consisting of false representation has yet to be proved by Perpetual in the course of trial. Also, respondents innocence and non -utilization of fraud and conversion, of the loan proceeds are defenses to be proved by respondent in the course of trial. The Court held that it substantially meets the established test and that the complaint does state cause(s) of action not only against the borrower corporation, J.J. Mining, but also against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities. FACTS: PR Merlita Cardeno is the owner of the disputed parcel of land. The petitioner, City of Cebu, filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent with RTC of Cebu City seeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance No.1418. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. She asseverated that the allegations contained in paragraph VII of the complaint. Petitioner sought to establish compliance with the abovecited requirement by alleging in its Comment and Opposition to private respondents Motion to Dismiss its desire to pursue to acquire the property concerned. The RTC nevertheless dismissed the complaint. The Court is of the opinion that the City of Cebu has not complied with the condition precedent, hence, the complaint does not state a cause of action. Furthermore, in disregarding petitioners allegations in its Comment and Opposition, the RTC invoked the oft-cited rule that where the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency can only be determined from the facts alleged in the complaint and no other. While petitioner reiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently states compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer, private respondent insists that the term negotiations is too broad to be equated with the said requirement. ISSUE: W/N there was a failure/lack of cause of action warranting the dismissal of the case? City of Cebu v CA DOCTRINE: A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein. RULING: NONE. SC found that that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action. What may perhaps be conceded is only the relative ambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of the complaint. However, time and again, a complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated therein for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but rather for a bill of particulars.
university status in view of the latter's advertisement in [the] Manila Bulletin. Dr. Vera formally referred the aforesaid letter to Chairman Alcala with a request that the concerned Regional Office of [CHED] be directed to conduct appropriate investigation on the alleged misrepresentation by [petitioner]. CHED referred the matter to its Regional Director in Cebu City, requesting said office to conduct an investigation and submit its report. The report explained that there was a violation committed by his institution [when it used] the term university unless the school had complied with the basic requirement of being a university as prescribed in CHED Memorandum Order No. 48, s. 1996. As a consequence of said Report, [respondent's] Legal Affairs Service was requested to take legal action against [petitioner]. Subsequently, [respondent] directed [petitioner] to desist from using the term University, including the use of the same in any of its alleged branches. In the course of its investigation, [respondent] was able to verify from the SEC that [petitioner had] filed a proposal to amend its corporate name from Indiana School of Aeronautics to Indiana Aerospace University, which was supposedly favorably recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The appeal of petitioner was however rejected by respondent and the latter ordered the former to cease and desist from using the word 'University.' However, prior to said date, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for Writ of Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction and TRO against respondent. Respondent filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, based on 1) improper venue; 2) lack of authority of the person instituting the action; and 3) lack of cause of action. Public respondent judge, denied [respondent's] Motion to Dismiss and at the same time, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of [petitioner]. CA ruled that petitioner had no cause of action against respondent. Petitioner failed to show any evidence that it had been granted university status by respondent as required under
In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein. All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. Additionally, the general rule is that a truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Thus, ordinance no. is not only incorporated in to the complaint for eminent domain filed by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted by the private respondent. PETITION GRANTED.
Indiana Aerospace University v CHED DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court. FACTS: Sometime in October 1996, Dr. Reynaldo B. Vera, Chairman of Technical Panel for Engineering, Architecture, and Maritime Education (TPRAM) of [CHED], received a letter dated October 18, 1998 from Douglas R. Macias, Chairman, Board of Aeronautical Engineering, Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) and Chairman, Technical Committee for Aeronautical Engineering (TPRAME) inquiring whether [petitioner] had already acquired
existing law and CHED rules and regulations. A certificate of incorporation under an unauthorized name does not confer upon petitioner the right to use the word "university" in its name. The evidence submitted by respondent showed that the SEC had denied that petitioner had ever amended its AoI to include "university" in its corporate name. CA also ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction had improvidently been issued. The doubtful right claimed by petitioner is subordinate to the public interest to protect unsuspecting students and their parents from the unauthorized operation and misrepresentation of an educational institution. Petitioner claims that the CA went beyond its limited jurisdiction under Rule 65 when it reversed the trial court and dismissed the Complaint on the ground that petitioner had failed to state a cause of action. The RTC had yet to conduct trial, but the CA already determined the factual issue regarding petitioner's acquisition of university status, a determination that is not permitted in certiorari proceedings. The CA ruled that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action because of petitioner's lack of legal authority or right to use the word "university." It held that dismissal of [petitioner's] Complaint for lack of a valid cause of action should have been the proper action taken by the trial court judge. In the case at bar, there is no grave abuse of discretion in RTC's denial of the Motion to Dismiss. The CA erred in ruling otherwise. The trial court stated in its Decision that petitioner was an educational institution, originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as the "Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc." That name was subsequently changed to "Indiana Aerospace University" after the Department of Education, Culture and Sports had interposed no objection to such change. Respondent issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing petitioner to stop using the word "university" in its corporate name. Petitioner had been ordered closed by the respondent for illegal advertisement, fraud and misrepresentation of itself as a university. Such acts, according to the RTC undermined the public's confidence in petitioner as an educational institution. This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.
ISSUE: DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT RULING: YES. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
Bangko Silangan v CA DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. FACTS: Private respondent Leonida Umandal-Bausas had been maintaining an account in petitioner bank. She attempted to withdraw 5K from that savings account but, to her surprise, the bank teller told her that the withdrawal could not be done because her brother, Antonio Umandal, had already
withdrawn the amount of 15K allegedly with her written authorization and that her remaining balance was only 800K. Respondent Bausas sought the assistance of a family friend, Edmundo Villadolid, who was then the President-Manager of the Rural Bank of Nasugbu, Batangas Villadolid sent petitioner letter informing them of petitioners experience and warned them that he would be constrained to elevate the matter to higher authorities should there be no reasonable settlement. Petitioner BSDB informed respondent Bausas that the investigation it had conducted on the matter revealed that on a certain date, respondents brother, Antonio Umandal, bearing her passbook and the withdrawal slip to which her signature was affixed, withdrew the amount of 15K. Respondent Bausas sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Batangas. Petitioner BSDB filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages against respondent Bausas, Villadolid, the Philippine Journalists, Inc. and its staff. The complaint alleged that the "series of publications" were "clearly defamatory and libelous", and that the publication constituted the crime defined and penalized under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code that damaged the reputation of the 21-year old bank. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, respondent Bausas and Villadolid alleged that the withdrawal slip was a forgery and that Villadolid's actions were moved by a "sense of moral duty" to respondent Bausas and her family. While the case was pending in the RTC of Manila, respondent Bausas, joined by her husband Ricardo, filed another civil case a complaint for a sum of money, with damages, against petitioner BSDB before the RTC of Batangas. Instead of filing a responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioner BSDB filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that (a) there was another action pending between the same parties for the same case (sic); (b) the action caused the splitting of the cause of action raised in the answer and counterclaim in another civil case; (c) the action violated the principle of multiplicity of suits, and; (d) the filing of the complaint constituted forum-shopping. RTC of Batangas DENIED the motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a MFR which was later on denied. Petitioner BSDB elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. CA dismissed petitioner BSDB's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N CA committed error in dismissing petitioners p etition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus? RULING: NO. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss. The Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to dismiss are merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. PETITION DENIED.
Yutingco v CA DOCTRINE: As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari/mandamus. Petitioners recourse is to file an answer and interpose as defenses the objections raised in their motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. Exceptions: a) When the trial court issued the order w/o or in excess of jurisdiction;
b) When there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the TC, or would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendants to needlessly go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets with another futile case. FACTS: Private respondent DBP filed a complaint against petitioners for the collection of a sum of money with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, with the RTC of Makati. DBP alleged that it granted a credit accommodation for 150K to Nikon Industrial Corporation (Nikon) under the terms and conditions of the Credit Line Agreement. In consideration of the credit accommodation, petitioners, as the controlling stockholders of Nikon, bound themselves as primary obligors on any availment thereon. Nikon executed promissory notes as guarantees. The complaint alleged that Nikon defaulted on the payment of the interest. It likewise alleged that Nikon with other corporations filed a petition for suspension of payments with the SEC. Also, DBP claims that the filing of the petition for suspension of payment with the SEC constituted another default as stipulated in the agreement. PR sought petitioners payment of the obligation by virtue of the Continuing Suretyship Agreement by filing the collection suit. Respondent Judge granted private respondents motion and issued a writ of attachment. Petitioners filed a MTD on the ground that (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) a condition precedent for the filing of the claim was not complied with; and (3) the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contended that they could not be held liable under the promissory notes and credit line agreement since EYCO had not yet defaulted on their obligations. They averred that the mere filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the SEC did not constitute default and that even assuming that Nikon was in default, there was yet no extra-judicial demand, a condition precedent to the filing of the suit before the RTC against petitioners. Respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed MFR which was denied. Petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a petition for certiorari which was also denied. Petitioners also filed before RTC a Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the SEC order with Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial. Petitioners assert that their petition should not have been dismissed on a technicality considering that was being questioned in their petition for certiorari before the CA was the propriety of the LCs denial of the motion to dismiss,
ISSUE: Petitioners recourse after denial of its motion to dismiss RULING: As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. Petitioners recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in their motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. Of course, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule. Among them are: (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) when there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, or (c) when appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendants to needlessly go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets with another futile case. In the present case, however, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss since it perceived the issue therein was one of default, a factual issue which must await trial. Clearly, petitioners cause is not covered by any of
the recognized exceptions. They should proceed to trial and if the result is unfavorable to them, then their recourse is to elevate the entire case on appeal in accordance with the rules.
referring the case to the Philippine Mediation Center for arbitration. The arbitration proceedings were, however, unsuccessful. Thus, the case was referred back to the RTC for a full-blown trial. In order to simplify the issues to be threshed out in the trial, another pre-trial conference was scheduled, which respondent failed to attend. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the collection suit OTG of the non-appearance of respondent at the pre-trial which was granted, without prejudice, by the RTC. Respondent filed with the RTC a MFR which was later on denied. Respondent filed with a CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. CA granted the Petition of respondent and reversed the assailed RTC orders which dismissed the collection suit.
PRE-TRIAL CASES Anson Trade Center v. Pacific Banking DOCTRINE: In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss. FACTS: Petitioners ATCI and AEC are corporations engaged in retail and/or wholesale general merchandising. Petitioner Chen is the Vice Head of said commercial entities. Respondent is a closed banking institution undergoing liquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Petitioner ATCI obtained several loans from respondent. As security for the said loan obligations, petitioner Chen, with the late Keng Giok, executed, on behalf of petitioners ATCI and AEC, two Continuing Suretyship Agreements. The Continuing Suretyship Agreements provided that, as security for any and all the indebtedness or obligation of petitioners ATCI and AEC, the respondent had the right to retain a lien upon any and all moneys or other properties and/or the proceeds thereof in the name or for the account or credit of petitioners ATCI and AEC deposited or left with respondent. Subsequently, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loans. This prompted respondent to file before the RTC a collection case against petitioners. Petitioner Chen, instead of filing an Answer to collection complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners ATCI and AEC, together with the Estate of Keng Giok, also jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied the Motions to Dismiss. After petitioners filed their joint Answer to the Complaint, a pretrial conference was set by the RTC. All the parties were present at the scheduled pre-trial where the RTC first explored the possibility of an amicable settlement among the parties by
ISSUE: W/N the reversal of the trial courts order dismissing respondents complaint for its failure to appear at the pre-trial was in accordance with the Rules? RULING: YES. Pre-trial, by definition, is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. It is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Pursuant to Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the RoC, non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown therefor. Such a valid cause extant in the case at bar. There is no question that herein respondent received notice of the pre-trial conference but it failed to attend the same. Such non-appearance
notwithstanding, the Court Of Appeals annulled the Order of the RTC dismissing the collection suit after finding that respondent did not intentionally snub the pre-trial conference. The Monetary Board ordered the closure of respondent by reason of insolvency on 5 July 1985, and it has since been represented by its liquidator PDIC in all its undertakings. Still in the course of the liquidation of respondent, its liquidator PDIC was reorganized in the late 2004 to early 2005. The four departments in the PDIC handling litigation were reduced to one, with the new Litigation Department having only four in-house counsels who assumed thousands of cases arising from the closure by the Monetary Board of more than 400 banks. It is understandable how the notice for the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 01-102198 scheduled on 10 October 2005 could be lost or overlooked, as the PDIC was still coping and adjusting with the changes resulting from its reorganization. It is important to note that the respondent was not remiss in its duties to prosecute its case. Except for the lone instance of the pre-trial conference on 10 October 2005, respondent promptly and religiously attended the hearings set by the RTC. In fact, it appears on the records that a pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 01-102198 was first held on 4 April 2005, during which respondent was present. When the RTC did not immediately act on the Motions to Dismiss of petitioners, it was respondent which filed two Motions to Resolve. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DENIED. credit and trust receipt to petitioner Interlining Corporation for the importation of raw materials for its business. Petitioner corporation availed of respondents credit facilities. Partial payments were made by petitioner corporation but it failed to pay in full its obligations, which amounted to over P2 million by June 1984, despite repeated demands. Respondent filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against petitioner corporation and the individual petitioners before the RTC of Manila. Pre-trial hearings were duly conducted by the trial court. The trial court issued its Pre-Trial Conference Order, wherein some of the defendants were excluded and relieved from their obligations between plaintiff and the corporation. The content of said Order was based on the transcript of the pretrial conference. The trial court issued its 1st Supplemental Pre-Trial Order. The trial court issued its Decision finding for the respondent. However, it ordered petitioner corporation to answer solely for its obligation. The trial court absolved the individual petitioners from their joint and solidary liability for the debt of petitioner corporation although there was no novation of the loan contract between the parties. It held that the total liability for the obligation was assumed by the petitioner corporation as per the parties stipulation during the 1991 Pre-Trial Conference, particularly paragraph 5 thereof. Respondent moved for reconsideration insofar as the trial court absolved the individual petitioners from solidary liability. When its motion was denied, respondent sought recourse before the CA. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals found for the respondent. It held that the Deed of Undertaking of Suretyship was not abrogated and remained in full force and effect. Petitioners insist that as per the records, respondents counsel agreed in the stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Conference Order that the individual petitioners would be relieved from their solidary obligations. Petitioners also charge that the contents of this Pre-Trial Conference Order were
Interlining Corp. v. Phil Trust Co. DOCTRINE: it is a basic legal precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial. FACTS: Respondent Philippine Trust Company (Philtrust) granted a P.5 million packing credit line and a P1.5 million domestic letter of
confirmed by respondents counsel during the pre-trial hearing of the case. Hence, petitioners contend that respondent should be held as bound by said agreement and the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding this stipulation. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners anchor their appeal on the alleged Pre-Trial Conference Order, where it was allegedly agreed upon by the parties counsels that the individual petitioners shall be relieved of their solidary obligation. However, respondent argues that petitioners conveniently ignored subsequent proceedings and pleadings where both parties submitted the issue of solidary liability for resolution by the trial court. proposed facts and issues but at no time did they commit themselves to stipulate on any of the matters brought out during said conference. Nor did the trial judge ask any of the counsels whether they agreed to stipulate on any of the matters presented therein. In fact, what appears on the March 6, 1989 transcript was a mere enumeration of the proposed stipulations by both counsels, most of which were only copied by the stenographer from the counsels pre-trial briefs. There was no agreement whatsoever on the proposed facts. PETITION DISMISSED. Espiritu v. Lazaro DOCTRINE: The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining. Plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. FACTS: Petitioners Jazmin L. Espiritu and Porfirio Lazaro, Jr., together with a certain Mariquit Lazaro, filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and preliminary attachment against respondents, Vladimir G. Lazaro, Ma. Corazon S. Lazaro, Ma. Esperanza S. Lazaro, Vladi Miguel S. Lazaro, China Banking Corporation, and Winifrida B. Sison. Petitioners, Mariquit Lazaro and respondent Vladimir Lazaro are the legitimate children and only surviving heirs of the late Porfirio Lazaro, Sr. The trial court granted the prayer for preliminary attachment and the corresponding writ was subsequently issued after petitioners posted a bond. Five real properties were levied upon. Respondents Lazaro filed an urgent motion to set aside and discharge the attachment, which was opposed by petitioners. They, likewise, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Respondent Sison also filed a motion to dismiss on the same ground.
ISSUE: whether or not the counsel of respondent agreed to stipulate as to the release of the individual petitioners from their solidary liability. RULING: NO. The conduct of a pre-trial in civil actions has been mandatory as early as January 1, 1964, upon the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Court. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it, as in the case at bar. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial. A careful and thorough review of the records, particularly the pre-trial hearings and the subsequent pleadings in the case, reveals that respondents counsel did not agree to relieve the individual petitioners of their obligation. A close scrutiny of the transcript of the pre-trial conference shows that the parties counsels merely stated their proposed stipulations. A close scrutiny of the transcript of the March 6, 1989 pretrial conference shows that the parties counsels merely stated their proposed stipulations. Specifically, the trial judge opened the proceedings on said day by inquiring from the counsels of the parties their respective positions on the facts and issues of the case. Both counsels presented their
The trial court denied the motion to discharge the attachment and the two motions to dismiss and directed respondents to file their answer. Respondent Sison filed her Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim. Respondents Lazaro questioned the Order in a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. When the latter did not rule favorably, they elevated the case to the SC. SC denied the petition. The Resolution became final and executory. Respondents Lazaro filed a Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and a Motion to File a Supplemental/Amended Answer. The instant Cautionary Answer with Manifestation was admitted and defendants were given a twenty-day period within which to file a Supplemental/Amended Answer. The TC dismissed the complaint due to petitioners failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. The court noted that despite the lapse of time since respondents filed a cautionary answer, petitioners failed to file a motion to set the case for pretrial, which under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is petitioners duty as plaintiffs. The trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said order. CA affirmed the dismissal of the case and cited Olave v. Mistas, the CA stressed that it is plaintiffs duty to promptly set the case for pre-trial, and that failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the case. According to the CA, petitioners should not have waited for a supplemental answer or an order by the trial court and done nothing for more than 11 months from the receipt of the last pleading. Petitioners cite A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreTrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) which allegedly provides that it is not solely the duty of the plaintiff to set the case for pre-trial as the Clerk of Court is likewise directed to issue the notice of pre-trial should the plaintiff fail to do so. RULING: NO. Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules. Respondents Lazaro filed the Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and Motion to File a Supplemental/Amended Answer on July 19, 2002, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 5, 2002. Believing that the pending motion had to be resolved first, petitioners waited for the court to act on the motion to file a supplemental answer. Despite the lapse of almost one year, petitioners kept on waiting, without doing anything to stir the court into action. In any case, petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the motion to file a supplemental answer or for the defendants to file a supplemental answer. As previously stated, the rule clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Since respondents already filed a cautionary answer and [petitioners did not file any reply to it] the case was already ripe for pre-trial. The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining. Plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants right to have a speedy disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses from being impaired. Since the incidents occurred prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on August 16, 2004, the guidelines stated therein should not be made applicable to this case. Instead, the prevailing rule and jurisprudence at that time should be utilized in resolving the case.
ISSUE: W/N CA committed error in its dismissal of the case? Polanco v. Cruz
DOCTRINE: While "heavy pressures of work" was not considered a persuasive reason to justify the failure to set the case for pre-trial, in this case, failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and only technical lapse during the entire proceedings. Neither has she manifested an evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. FACTS: Respondent Carmen Cruz, through her attorney-in-fact, Virgilio Cruz, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for allegedly destroying her palay crops. Respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by the trial court in an Order. It held that it has jurisdiction over the case because the allegations in the Complaint made a claim for damages and not an agrarian dispute which should be referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); and that the Complaint was properly filed because the Certification of Non-forum Shopping was signed by respondents attorney-in-fact. Petitioners simultaneously filed an Answer to the complaint and a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit in an Order. The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case due to respondents failure to prosecute. CA reversed and held that the trial court erred in finding that the parties failed to take necessary action regarding the case because the records plainly show that petitioners filed an Answer to the complaint, while respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation Re: Answer of Defendants. It further stated that the previous acts of respondent do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute the case; that since filing the Complaint, respondent filed an Opposition to petitioners Motion to Dismiss, an Answer to petitioners counterclaim, and a Comment to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration; that respondent did not ignore petitioners Motion to Dismiss nor did she repeatedly fail to appear before the court; that no substantial prejudice would be caused to petitioners and that strict application of the rule on dismissal is unjustified considering the absence of pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case on the part of the respondent. ISSUE: W/N CA committed error in dismissing the case? RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to promptly move ex parte to have the case set for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 17 provides that failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with said duty without any justifiable cause may result to the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules of procedure. It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pretrial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the instant case, CA correctly held that the dismissal of respondents complaint is too severe a sanction for her failure to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial. It must be pointed out that respondent prosecuted her action with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch since filing the complaint she filed an opposition to petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint; a comment to petitioners motion for reconsideration of the December 4, 2000 Order of the trial court; and an Answer to Counterclaim of petitioners.
the matter to the attention of the RTC, the petitioners-defendants are deemed to have effectively forfeited a procedural right granted them under the Rules. Issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel FACTS: Respondent spouses are the absolute owners of two parcels of land at Sampaloc, Manila. The properties have a combined area of two-hundred seventy (270) square meters. Respondents-plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the properties through an accion publiciana filed with the RTC of Manila against Gregorio Miranda and his family (Mirandas) and two other unnamed defendants. After the pre-trial conference, the unnamed defendants were identified as the present petitioners and summons were duly served on them. These defendants are referred to in this Decision as the petitioners-defendants. The Mirandas are no longer parties to the present case; they did not appeal the lower court decision to the CA. Resp sps. alleged that they acquired the properties from the sps. Procopio and Encarnacion Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale. They merely tolerated the petitioners-defendants continued occupancy and possession until their possession became illegal when demands to vacate the properties were made. Petitioners continued to occupy and unlawfully withhold possession of the properties from the respondents-plaintiffs despite several demands, to their damage and prejudice. Efforts to amicably settle the case proved futile, leaving the respondents-plaintiffs no recourse but to file a complaint for ejectment which the lower court dismissed because the respondents-plaintiffs should have filed an accion publiciana. Thus, they filed their complaint for accion publiciana, praying for recovery of possession of the properties, payment of rentals and damages. The Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by virtue of an oral sale made in his favor by the original owner Antonio. They claimed that Gregorio Miranda was
While "heavy pressures of work" was not considered a persuasive reason to justify the failure to set the case for pre-trial in Olave v. Mistas, however, unlike the respondents in the said case, herein respondent never failed to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the trial court at any other time. Failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and only technical lapse during the entire proceedings. Neither has she manifested an evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the case nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Besides, petitioners would not be prejudiced should the case proceed as they are not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law. Finally, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the new Guidelines To Be Observed By Trial Court Judges And Clerks Of Court In The Conduct Of Pre-Trial And Use Of Deposition-Discovery Measures, which took effect on August 16, 2004, aims to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to further implement the pre-trial guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999. A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC states that: "Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial." As such, the clerk of court of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos should issue a notice of pre-trial to the parties and set the case for pretrial. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DENIED.
Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy DOCTRINE: Where, as in this case, the trial proceeded without any objection on the part of the petitioners-defendants by their failure to bring
Antonios carpenter, and they had a verbal contract for Miranda to stay in, develop, fix and guard the properties. Antonio gave the properties to Gregorio Miranda in consideration of his more than 20 years of loyal service. Petitioner-defendant Bernardo also asserted ownership over the portion he occupies based on an oral sale to him by Antonio. Petitioner-defendant Madrid, for his part, claimed that he started occupying a portion of the properties in 1974, and constructed a house on this portion in 1989 with the permission of Bernardo, the son of Gregorio Miranda. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent spouses. The petitioners-defendants elevated the RTC decision to the CA via an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. One of their many arguments is that the RTC should not have applied the pretrial order to them, since they had not then been served with summons and were not present during the pre-trial. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed as a consequence, the RTC decision. The CA observed that the RTC did not err in applying the pre-trial order to the petitioners-defendants because they derive the right of possession from the principal defendants, the Mirandas, who were duly represented at the pre-trial; they waived their right to pre-trial by failing to move that one be held. Petitioners-defendants anchored their right to possess the property on the defenses raised by the original defendant, Gregorio Miranda, their predecessor-in-interest. While belatedly summoned, the petitionersdefendants did not raise a substantial matter in their answer differently from those propounded by Gregorio Miranda; they merely echoed Mirandas positions and arguments. Thus, no prejudice could have resulted to the petitioners-defendants, especially after they entered trial and had the opportunity to fully ventilate their positions.
Heirs of Reyes v. CA DOCTRINE: Determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal. A pre-trial is meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent trials from being carried on in the dark. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pretrial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matters. The rule, however, is not to be applied with rigidity and admits of certain exceptions. FACTS: The case stemmed from the action for partition and accounting filed by the children of the siblings of the late Eustaquia Reyes against Magno Sarreal, Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino, Eustaquias husband and nieces, respectively, in relation to a parcel of land. The property was originally registered in the name of Eustaquia under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26031 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and was inherited by her prior to her marriage to Magno Sarreal. Eustaquia leased a portion of the property to ACME Abrasive Manufacturing Corporation (ACME) for a period of twenty (20) years. The lease contract provided that ACME as the lessee shall
ISSUE: Pre-trial based objection RULING: The petitioners-defendants, having been belatedly served summons and brought into the case, were entitled to a pre-trial as ordained by Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Unless substantial prejudice is shown, however, the trial courts failure to schedule a case for new trial does not render the proceedings illegal or void ab initio. Where, as in this case, the trial proceeded without any objection on the part of the petitioners-defendants by their failure to bring the matter to the attention of the RTC, the petitioners-defendants are deemed to have effectively forfeited a procedural right granted them under the Rules. Issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel
have the right to build, construct and place additional improvements within the property during the term of the lease subject to the condition, among others, that upon the expiration of such term, the ownership of all the improvements found within the leased property would automatically be transferred to the lessor without need for reimbursement. The contract was thumbmarked by Eustaquia as the lessor, with Magno Sarreal likewise affixing his signature to the instrument to indicate his marital consent to the transaction. Eustaquia purportedly sold the property to private respondents Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino in a notarized document entitled "Patuluyang Pagbibili ng Lupa" (Deed of Absolute Sale). In the second paragraph of the deed, Eustaquia expressly stated that the property was paraphernal or exclusive in character and did not belong to the conjugal partnership because it formed part of her inheritance. Eustaquia died. The children of the siblings of Eustaquia who predeceased her filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for partition and accounting with receivership against Magno Sarreal and private respondents herein, Anatalia Reyes and Gloria Reyes-Paulino. They allegedly just discovered that the property was clandestinely, fraudulently and unlawfully divided between private respondents who caused its registration in their names by means of simulated or fictitious and unlawful conveyances. Private respondents filed a joint answer to the complaint claiming, among others, that 1) the complaint does not state any cause of action; 2) they are the owners in fee simple of the disputed lots; 3) complainants are not compulsory heirs of Eustaquia; and 4) the title to the property has been transferred in the names of private respondents pursuant to a valid sale long before the death of Eustaquia. A separate answer was filed on behalf of Magno Sarreal by his purported guardian ad litem and natural daughter, Aida Sarreal, which admitted virtually all the allegations of the complaint except the portion which stated that the property belonged exclusively to Eustaquia. After the parties presented their respective evidence, another motion for the appointment of a receiver was filed by the children of Eustaquias siblings but before a ruling could be made thereon, there was an RTC decision ruled in favor of petitioners which declared the DoD null and void, etc. CA reversed. The CA pointed out that during pre-trial, the parties agreed that the sole issue that would limit or control the course of the trial was whether the conveyance of the property to private respondents was simulated or fictitious. The CA ruled that the burden of proof, which rested upon complainants in this instance, was not met, after finding that the testimonies of the complainants two witnesses to the effect that private respondents had no means or source of income that would enable them to buy the property and that they merely lived with the spouses Eustaquia and Magno Sarreal during their lifetime were mere generalities and fell short of the "clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence necessary to overcome the notarized deed of sale." The CA held that the RTC showed undue bias in favor of complainants by resolving the case on issues not agreed upon during the pre-trial, particularly with regard to the true nature of the property and whether the same was paraphernal or conjugal. It should be kept in mind that because the property was deemed conjugal, the RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale which did not bear Magnos signature was void. RTC concluded on the basis of the evidence presented that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for not embodying the consent of Eustaquias husband. The conclusion was drawn upon the finding of the RTC that the property subject of the deed was conjugal in character due to the improvements constructed thereon at the expense of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, in reversing the decision of the trial court, the CA pointed out that the RTC had gone beyond the scope of the lone issue agreed upon by the parties during pre-trial, that is, whether the sale of the property to private respondents was simulated or fictitious.
There is a clear absence of Magno Sarreals signature in the Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of Gloria Reyes-Paulino and Anatalia Reyes. Contrary to the assumption made by the CA, the deed was clearly not nullified on the basis that it was simulated or fictitious. Rather, the ruling was that the absence of Magnos conformity rendered the deed of absolute sale fatally defective.
ISSUE: Pre-trial RULING: Determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal. A pre-trial is meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent trials from being carried on in the dark. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pretrial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matters. The rule, however, is not to be applied with rigidity and admits of certain exceptions. There is merit in petitioners claim that the limitation upon the issue embodied in the pre-trial order did not control the course of the trial. The issue on the nature of the property was embodied in the pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the complaint and was actively litigated by them without any objection on the part of private respondents. In view thereof, the latter are deemed to have given their implied consent for the RTC to try this issue. It is worthy to note that a careful perusal of the RTC decision would reveal that the trial court found it unnecessary to make a categorical finding as to whether the deed was simulated or fictitious, the focal point being the character of the property at the time of the transfer to private respondents. While it is true that the RTC cited the evidence introduced by petitioners to establish that the sale was simulated or fictitious, it did not make a clear and definitive ruling on this matter, and instead stated as follows: While these circumstances may be considered in the determination of the alleged fraud in the transfer of property by way of Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Eustaquia Reyes in favor of defendants Gloria Reyes-Paulino and Anatalia Reyes, the Court is nevertheless confronted with a significant factual element which, by and in itself alone and independent of circumstances indicative of fraud, nullifies the said Deed of Sale.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE 2014 | ATTY.

CUSTODIO TRICIA CRUZ JDCTR DLSU LAW

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