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Cui v. CA (2 SCRA 205) FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University.

He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim. San Luis v. San Luis (Feb. 6, 2007) During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code. Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256. ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous. HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry

Manuel Rodriguez, FEU LAW

Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Velayo v. Shell Company Philippines (100 SCRA 186) Facts: Commercial Airlines (CALI) has been in debt to Shell in 1948. CALI offered its C-54 plane to Shell as a payment but Shell has declined as it believed that CALI has sufficient money for the payment of its debt. An informal meeting has been set up and in that meeting; the creditors have appointed representatives for a committee that would identify how Shell will be paid. It was discussed in the committee how CALIs assets should be divided. Shells representative informed Shell USA that Shell Philippines has assigned its credit to Shell USA and is collection the debt of CALI to Shell Philippines. The C54 plane has been the subject of writ of attachment that Shell USA petitioned to a court in California. The stockholders of CALI were unaware of what Shell Philippines did and have approved the selling of Calis assets to another airline company. The stockholders learned what Shell Philippines did and assigned Velayo in connection to the insolvency proceeding to recover the C-54 plane in California. He filed for a writ of injunction against the Shell Philippines to restrain the Shell USA from the proceeding to be in favor of CALI and to double to value of the C54 plane. Unfortunately, the plane was not recovered and Shell argued that it is not liable for its damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for the damages Ruling: Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that any person who willfully cause loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to the morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. Therefore, the Shell Company is liable for its damages even if there is no law that has been violated. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of the statue should be compensated. Carpio v. Valmonte (Sept. 9, 2004) FACTS: Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel to where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already there including the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held.

Manuel Rodriguez, FEU LAW

She went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when she entered. . It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner. ISSUE: W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages RULING: Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right o ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable Rellosa v. Pellosis (August 9, 2001) Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located Manila. Respondents had built their houses and underwent continuous improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor. Victor informed respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. Sometime without the knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name. Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for condemnationwith the Office of the Building Official, City of Manila, of the structures on the land. Respondents filed with the RTC for the Declaration of Nullity of the Sale, made in favor of petitioner Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been impinged upon the. Office of the Building Official issued a resolution, ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. Copies of the resolution were served upon respondents and their. The following day, Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition of respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police District, the intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of respondents' houses. Resultantly, respondents filed before the Regional Trial, praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of its findings and conclusions, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners abused their rights? Held:

Manuel Rodriguez, FEU LAW

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations. When a right is exercised in a manner resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible. Padilla v. CA (129 SCRA 558) FACTS: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. HELD: No. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.

Manuel Rodriguez, FEU LAW