Midterm # 1 Review Sheet POLS 110: Introduction to International Politics Prof. Eric Reinhardt, Fall 2012 [NO E: !

" #ro$idin% this re$ie& sheet, &e do not 'ind oursel$es to as(in% only a'out the to#ics, conce#ts, and e)a*#les listed here. +se this as a rou%h %uide onl"., It &ill 'e a closed-'oo( and closed-note e)a*. he *idter* &ill 'e co*#osed of *ulti#le choice and short ans&ers of $arious t"#es, #lus a short essa". For the short ans&ers, "ou *a" 'e as(ed to e)#lain and #ossi'l" criti.ue a rele$ant conce#t or theor" or inter#ret so*e #ro$ided e$idence as it 'ears on theories and de'ates in the stud" of international #olitics. /once#ts Actors - the 'asic unit for the anal"sis of international #olitics can 'e indi$iduals or %rou#s of #eo#le &ith co**on interest Interests- &hat actors want to achieve through political action, their preferences o$er the outco*es that *i%ht result fro* their #olitical outco*es. Funda*ental 'uildin% 'loc(s of #olitics Interactions - the &a"s in &hich the choices of two or more actors co*'ine to produce political outcomes Institutions - a set of rules known and shared '" the co**unit" that structure #olitical interactions in #articular &a"s. State - central authorit" &ith the a'ilit" to *a(e and enforce la&s, rules and decisions &ithin a s#ecified territor" Sovereignty - the e)#ectation that states ha$e le%al and #olitical su#re*ac" - or ultimate authority within their territory bureaucracy & military-industrial complex levels o analysis ! the $ariet" of actors and institutions that #la" a role in &orld #olitics "omestic - su' national actors &ith different interest - #oliticians, 'ureaucrats, 'usiness and la'or %rou#s , $oters interact &ithin do*estic institutions to deter*ine the countries forei%n #olic" choices international# - the re#resentati$es of states &ith different interests interact &ith one another, so*eti*es in the conte)t of international institutions such as the +N or 0 O $ransnational - %rou#s &hose *e*'ers s#an 'oarders such as *ultinational cor#orations, transnational ad$ocac" net&or(s, terrorist or%ani1ations - #ursue interest '" tr"in% to influence 'oth do*estic and international #olic" $heory - a lo%icall" consistent set of state*ents that e)#lains a #heno*enon of interest descri'e, #redict, #rescri'e 2educted fro* assu*#tions that are lo%icall" coherent %robabilistic - *ost of the ti*e ) ha##ens - 3soft science4 deter*inistic clai*s ) ha##ens all the ti*e - 3hard science & 'pu((le& - o'ser$ations a'out the &orld that de*and e)#lanations alsi iable theory - can 'e #ro$en false natural experiment - o'ser$ational stud" Anarchy - the a'sence of a central authorit" &ith the a'ilit" to *a(e and enforce la&s that 'ind all actors. 'purposive& or rational action - actions in accordance &ith #olitical #references strategic interaction - #ur#oseful non rando* non-strategic behavior - rando* bargaining interactions - an interaction in &hich actors *ust choose outco*es that *a(e one better off at the expense of another , 'ar%ainin% is redistri'uti$e, it in$ol$es allocatin% a fi)ed su* of $alue 'et&een different actors 1

)ooperation - an interaction in &hich t&o or *ore actors ado#t #olicies that *a(e at least one actor 'etter off relati$e to the status .uo without making the other worse off. %areto rontier - n a Pareto efficient economic allocation, no one can be made better off without making at least one individual worse off Mercantilism - an econo*ic doctrine 'ased on a 'elief that *ilitar" #o&er and econo*ic influence &ere co*#le*ents ,a##lied es#eciall" to colonial e*#ires in the 15 th - 16 th centuries . Fa$ored the *other countr" o$er its colonies and o$er its co*#etitors *egemony - #redo*inance of one nation state o$er others & hegemon - rulin% countr" Superpower - do*inant #osition in international s"ste* %i$es "ou #o&er and influence o$er the affairs of other countries %ower - the a'ilit" of actor a to %et actor ' to do so*ethin% that ' &ould other&ise not do , *a(e other side *a(e concessions and a$oid ha$in% to *a(e concessions oneself. +ational interest - interests attri'uted to the state itself usuall" securit" and #o&er ,public interests vs- 'particularistic& or 'special& interests coordination problems - actors *ust si*#l" coordinate their actions &ith one another and once their actions are coordinate there is no #otential 'enefit fro* deflectin%, a t"#e of coo#erati$e interaction in &hich actors 'enefit fro* all *a(in% the sa*e choices and su'se.uentl" ha$e no incenti$e to not co*#l" I.e &e all 'enefit fro* dri$in% on the sa*e side of the road. collaboration problems - a *ore serious 'arrier to coo#eration arises if actors ha$e an indi$idual incenti$e to defect fro* coo#eration. %risoner.s "ilemma - colla'oration #ro'le* - t&o cri*inals ro' a 'an( and stashed *one", the" are 'oth cau%ht '" #olice 'ut 27 doesn8t ha$e enou%h e$idence to con$ict the*, #uts the #risoner8s in se#arate roo*s and tells the* 3 if "ou #ro$ide e$idence a%ainst "our acco*#lice, I &ill let "ou %o and #ut hi* in 9ail for 10 "ears ho&e$er I a* *a(in% the sa*e offer to hi* and if he #ro$ides e$idence a%ainst "ou, "ou &ill 'e 'ehind 'ars , if "ou 'oth tell "ou 'oth end u# in #rison collectively prisons do best by coopering with each other and staying silent, but each has an incentive to rat out his accomplice. :: the" 'oth reason the sa*e &a" thus 'oth end u# in 9ail ::: individual incentive to deflect undermines collective interest. ')oordination /ame& fa game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally, based on coordination problem meaning situations in which all parties can realize mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions 'public good#& - indi$iduall" and sociall" desira'le %oods that are ine)cusa'le and non ri$al in consu*#tion such as national defense +on rival in consumption# - if one #erson consu*es or 'enefits fro* the #u'lic %ood, this does not di*inish the .uantit" a$aila'le to others. non excludable - if the %ood is #ro$ided to one #erson , other cannot 'e e)cluded fro* en9o"in% it ie. If one #erson in a countr" is #rotected fro* forei%n in$asion , all other citi1ens are also #rotected collective action problem - o'stacles to coo#eration that occur &hen actors ha$e incenti$es to colla'orate 'ut each acts in antici#ation that others &ill #a" the costs of coo#eration ; #ro'le* of #u'lic %oods< ree-riding - fail to contri'ute to a #u'lic %ood &hile 'enefitin% fro* others contri'ution 'scarce good& - resource &ith li*ited a$aila'ilit" and hi%h de*and 'bargaining range& - set of deals 'oth #arties #refer to &ar the bargaining model o war - Sees &ar as 3#olitics all the &a" do&n4 = &ar as a continuation of the 'ar%ainin% #rocess, rather than a 'rea(do&n. Fi%htin% 'rea(s out &hen t&o sides cannot reach a 'ar%ain that 'oth #refer to &ar and each side fi%hts to i*#ro$e its chances of %ettin% a desira'le 2

settle*ent. 0ar ends &hen the t&o sides stri(e a 'ar%ain that 'oth #refer to continuin% the &ar, 7ssu*es that &ar is costl", 'oth sides *ust #a" the cost of fi%htin%, re%ardless of &ho &ins. 0essens incentive to de ect repeated interaction - coo#eration is *ore li(el" to ha##en &hen actors ha$e the o##ortunit" to coo#erate o$er ti*e and across issues Iteration - re#eated interaction &ith the sa*e #artner , #unish cheater fro* &ithholdin% %ains in the future coo#eration lin1age- the lin(in% of coo#eration on one issue to interactions of a second issue , allo&s $icti*s to retaliate '" &ithholdin% coo#eration on other issues I.e us and !rittan tied to%ether on so *an" issues , *ust coo#erate &ith each other 'Shadow o the 2uture& - %ood 'eha$ior toda" is induced '" the fear of loosin% 'enefits fro* coo#eration to*orro& Reciprocity - *utual a%ree*ents to lo&er tariffs and other 'arriers to trade. I*#licit or e)#licit arran%e*ent for one %o$ern*ent to e)chan%e trade #olic" concessions &ith another coercive diplomacy3 the use of threats to influence the outco*e of a 'ar%ainin% interaction outside option3 the alternati$es to 'ar%ainin% &ith a s#ecific actor agenda-setting power3 a 3first *o$er4 ad$anta%e that hel#s an actor to secure a *ore fa$ora'le 'ar%ain war3 an e$ent in$ol$in% the or%ani1ed use of *ilitar" force '" at least t&o #arties that satisfies so*e *ini*u* threshold of se$erit" interstate war: a &ar in &hich the *ain #artici#ants are states civil war3 a &ar in &hich the *ain #artici#ants are &ithin the sa*e state, such as the %o$ern*ent and a re'el %rou# compellence3 an effort to chan%e the status .uo throu%h the threat of force deterrence3 an effort to #reser$e the status .uo throu%h the threat of force extended vs- general deterrence3 the effort to deter attac( on one8s o&n countr" is %eneral deterrence and its an acti$it" that states are constantl" en%a%ed in. 7nother for* of deterrence, e)tended deterrence, occurs &hen a state see(s to #rotect a friend. In this case, the deterrent *essa%e ta(es the for* of 32on8t attac( *" all" > or else.4 herefore, the threatener atte*#ts to e)tend #rotection to another state. E)tended deterrence is crucial in the conte)t of alliances incomplete in ormation3 a situation in &hich #arties in a strate%ic interaction lac( infor*ation a'out other #arties8 interests and or ca#a'ilities transparency3 the a'ilit" the outsiders to #eer into a state and learn a'out the factors that influence its decision-*a(in% a'out &ar and #eace. 7 state8s *ilitar" ca#a'ilities are #ro'a'l" the easiest factor to render trans#arent. International or%ani1ations *a" also enhance trans#arenc" '" #ro$idin% neutral o'ser$ers of a state8s *ilitar" acti$ities resolve3 the &illin%ness of an actor to endure costs in order to ac.uire so*e %ood credibility3 'elie$a'ilit"? a credi'le threat is a threat that the reci#ient 'elie$es &ill 'e carried out. 7 credi'le co**it*ent is a co**it*ent or #ro*ise that the reci#ient 'elie$es &ill 'e honored. commitment problems# esp- arising rom bargaining over goods that increase military power# and rom expectations o shi ts in power he sources of 'ar%ainin% failure all arise fro* a co**on underl"in% challen%e: the difficult" that states can ha$e *a(in% credi'le #ro*ises not to use force to re$ise the settle*ent at a later date. 7 co**it*ent #ro'le* arises &hen a state cannot *a(e such a #ro*ise in a credi'le *anner. States 'ar%ain territor" all the ti*e, 'ut in so*e cases the #iece of territor" in .uestion is *ilitaril" si%nificant, #erha#s 'ecause it contains hi%h %round fro* &hich one &ould 'e a'le to launch an effecti$e attac(. he @olan Aei%hts, for e)a*#le, on the 'order 'et&een Israel and 3

S"ria, is such a #iece of territor". !ecause this territor" %i$es its occu#ier a co**andin% #osition o$er northern Israel, an" dealin% that *i%ht hand the @olan Aei%hts 'ac( to S"ria &ould *a(e Israel *ore $ulnera'le to attac(. costly signals3 those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat, thereby revealing information about the actual commitment of a state to defend against an attack. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict. brin1manship3 a strate%" in &hich ad$ersaries ta(e actions that increase the ris( of accidental &ar, &ith the ho#e that the other &ill 3'lin(4 or lose its ner$e, first and *a(e concessions tying hands3 If threats e)#ose state leaders to audience costs, the" can ha$e the effect of 3t"in% their hands.4 his #hrase co*es fro* Ao*er8s Od"sse" in &hich the *ain character, Od"sseus, as(s to ha$e his hands tied to the *ast of his shi# as the" sail #ast the sirens. State leaders in a crisis tie their hands for si*ilar reasons: 'ecause threats are costl" to carr" out, the" (no& that the" *i%ht choose not to follo& throu%h if faced &ith that decision. !" e)#osin% the*sel$es to audience sots, the" 'lunt the te*#tation to 'ac( do&n fro* their threats and there'" tie their o&n hands. Leaders sa" 3I cannot 'ac( do&n? hence *" threat is co*#letel" credi'le.4 audience costs3 ne%ati$e re#ercussions for failin% to follo& throu%h on a threat or to honor a co**it*ent the 'security dilemma&3 asserts that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to other nations. If a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others. On the other hand, if a nation is too weak, great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status uo powers are weak in capability or resolve.! "hus, directly and indirectly, both strength and weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations. preventive war vs- preemptive war3 7 #re$enti$e &ar is a &ar fou%ht &ith the intention of #re$entin% an ad$ersar" fro* 'eco*in% stron%er in the future. he" arise 'ecause states &hose #o&er is increasin% cannot co**it not to e)#loit that #o&er in future 'ar%ainin% interactions. Pree*#ti$e &ar is a &ar fou%ht &ith the antici#ation that an attac( '" the other side is i**inent irst-stri1e advantage3 the situation that arises &hen *ilitar" technolo%", *ilitar" strate%ies, and or %eo%ra#h" %i$e a si%nificant ad$anta%e to &hiche$er state attac(s first in a &ar indivisibility3 a conce#t that descri'es %oods that cannot 'e di$ided &ithout di*inishin% its $alue the 'rally 4round the lag e ect&3 the idea that leaders can further their o&n #olitical interest '" fi%htin% a &ar flo&s fro* the so-called rall"-round-the fla% effect, or rall" effect for short. It refers to #eo#le8s tendenc" to 'eco*e *ore su##orti$e of their countr"8s %o$ern*ent &hen it e)#eriences dra*atic international e$ents, such as &ars. his effect is *ost a##arent in countries in &hich #u'lic o#inion #ollin% re%ularl" *easures the le$el of su##ort for a leader. he *ost dra*atic rall" e$en follo&ed the terrorist attac(s of Se#te*'er 11, 2001 &hich caused Pres. !ush8s a##ro$al ratin% to 9u*# i**ediatel" fro* B1 to 65 #ercent. diversionary war3 &ar started to %ain #u'lic su##ort at ho*e diversionary incentive3 the incenti$e that state leaders ha$e to start international crises in order to rall" #u'lic su##ort at ho*e 'gambling or resurrection&3 2i$ersionar" incenti$es are te*#tin% to leaders &ho are insecure do*esticall", 'ecause of discontent &ith their #olicies or hard econo*ic ti*es. Such a leader *a" decided that she &ill surel" lose office if she does nothin%, so &a%in% &ar and in$o(in% the rall" effect *a" 'e an a##ealin% %a*'le. his #heno*enon has 'een called %a*'lin% for resurrection: ta(in% a ris(" action, such as startin% a &ar, &hen the alternati$e is certain to 'e $er" 'ad. Aistorical and /onte*#orar" E)a*#les $he $hirty 5ears. 6ar3 was a series of wars principally fought in #entral $urope, involving most of the countries of $urope. It was one of the longest and most destructive conflicts in $uropean history, and one of the longest continuous wars in modern history. "he origins of the conflict and goals of the participants were 4

comple%, and no single cause can accurately be described as the main reason for the fighting. Initially, it was fought largely as a religious war between &rotestants and #atholics in the 'oly (oman $mpire, although disputes over internal politics and the balance of power within the $mpire played a significant part. )radually, it developed into a more general conflict involving most of the great powers of the time. In this general phase the war became less specifically religious and more a continuation of the *ourbon+'absburg rivalry for $uropean political pre-eminence, leading in turn to further warfare between ,rance and the 'absburg powers. %eace o 6estphalia - ended C0 "r &ar ended reli%ious fi%htin%, %a$e &a" to idea of state so$erei%nt"? often said to ha$e created the *odern state s"ste* 'ecause it included a %eneral reco%nition of the #rinci#les of so$erei%nt" and noninter$ention %ax 7ritannica, the '*undred 5ears. %eace&3 3!ritish Peace4, a centur"-lon% #eriod 'e%innin% &ith Na#oleon8s defeat at 0aterloo in 161B and endin% &ith the out'rea( of 0orld 0ar I in 1D1E durin% &hich !ritain8s econo*ic and di#lo*atic influence contri'uted to econo*ic o#enness and relati$e #eace 6orld 6ar I & diplomacy leading up to it# /erman strategy or the war at outset

ain causes of war! "ysfunction within internationalization and mistakes of the principal actors# $efore %orld %ar &ne was a weakening of the balance of power# "iplomats took the balance of power for granted to the point that the factors that contributed to the weakening of the balance of power may also be seen as causes of the war# 'or e(ample! the polarization of the alliance system, an armaments race, a new military metaphysic))foreign policymakers became increasingly responsive to military leaders and ironclad timetables , Public opinion fed by a yellow press impatient with compromise#, *rave mistakes resulting from miscalculations of the responses of potential enemies#, +tatesmen and military leaders warped by personal ambition# ,he events leading up to war! assassination of -rchduke of 'ranz 'erdinand, -ustria.s ultimatum to +erbia demanding +erbia must allow the -ustrian '$/ to come in and round up anti)-ustrian suspects among the populace, +erbia.s reply, -ustrian declaration of war and the mobilization of 0ussia#

$reaty o 8ersailles3 the #eace treat" 'et&een the 7llies and @er*an" that for*all" ended 0orld 0ar I on Fune 26, 1D1D the 0eague o +ations3 a collecti$e doctrine 'ased on a 'elief that *ilitar" #o&er and econo*ic influence &ere co*#le*ents? a##lied es#eciall" to colonial e*#ires in the si)teenth throu%h ei%hteenth centuries. Gercantilist #olicies fa$ored the *other countr" o$er its colonies and o$er its co*#etitors 6orld 6ar II & diplomacy leading up to it# esp- 7ritish & 2rench crisis diplomacy with *itler.s /ermany during )(echoslova1 and %olish crises Euro#e descended once a%ain into &ar. 0orld 0ar II lar%el" #itted the fascist %o$ern*ents that had turned a%ainst the %lo'al econo*", one the one hand, a%ainst the de*ocratic #o&ers that re*ained co**itted to so*e for of international econo*ic coo#eration. he three *a9or fascist #o&ers: @er*an", Ital" and Fa#an, for*ed an alliance, the 7)is ai*ed at restorin% and increasin% their *ilitar" *i%ht and territor". !" in$asion, coercion, and #ersuasion, the" 'uilt a net&or( of follo&ers, #rotectorates and colonies. 7n e)#ansionist Na1i @er*an" anne)ed 7ustria in 1DC6 and occu#ied /1echoslo$a(ia in 1DCD. In 1DCD, @er*an" attac(ed Poland and .uic(l" o$er#o&er it, leadin% !ritain and France to declare &ar on @er*an" in su##ort of their Polish all". @er*an" in$aded France, &hich it defeated and occu#ied &ithin si) &ee(s. he 7)is thus controlled $irtuall" all of Euro#e and 7sia e)ce#t for !ritain and Russia. In 2ece*'er, Fa#an attac(ed the +S na$al 'ase at Pearl Aar'or. he +S had 'een su##ortin% the !ritish &ith su##lies, 'ut the Pearl Aar'or attac( o$erca*e an" lin%erin% 7*erican reluctance to %et in$ol$ed in another &orld &ar. Fro* then on, the &ar #itted the 7)is a%ainst the three *a9or 7llies-+S, @! and S+. he 'ul( of the &ar &as fou%ht alon% the eastern front, 'et&een the @er*ans and the 1

So$iets, &here *illions of troo#s faced each other o$er thousands of *iles of territor". he !ritish and 7*ericans carried out o#erations in North 7frican 'efore in$adin% Ital" and France. In Ga" 1DEB, @er*an" surrendered unconditionall". In 7u%ust, in an atte*#t to force a Fa#anese surrender, the +S dro##ed nuclear &ea#ons on the Fa#anese cities of Airoshi*a and Na%asa(i? the Fa#anese surrendered se$eral da"s later. 9apanese con:uest o Manchuria in 1;<1 & )hina later in the 1;<=s> 9apanese attac1 on ?S at %earl *arbor in 1;@1 See above rival )old 6ar blocs# 6arsaw %act & +orth Atlantic $reaty Argani(ation 6arsaw %act3 a *ilitar" alliance for*ed in 1DBB to 'rin% to%ether the So$iet +nion and its /old 0ar allies in eastern Euro#e and else&here? dissol$ed on Garch C1, 1DD1, as the /old 0ar ended +ato3 a *ilitar" alliance created in 1DED to 'rin% to%ether *an" &estern Euro#ean nations, the +S and /anada, for*in% the foundation of the 7*erican-led *ilitar" 'loc durin% the /old 0ar. oda", N7 O8s role includes handlin% re%ional #ro'le*s and de$elo#in% a ra#id reaction force. !retton 0oods s"ste*: the econo*ic order ne%otiated a*on% allied nations at !retton &oods, Ne& Aa*#shire in 1DEE, &hich led to a series of coo#erati$e arran%e*ents in$ol$in% a co**it*ent to relati$el" lo& 'arriers to international trade and in$est*ent 7erlin crisis & airli t# 1;@B-@;3 On se$eral occasions, crises 'et&een the t&o ca*e to the 'rin( of &ar, such as the 1DED !erlin airlift and the 1D52 /u'an *issile crisis. In the after*ath of the @er*an surrender, @er*an" &as di$ided into four 1ones, controlled res#ecti$el" '" the 7*ericans, !ritish, French and So$iets. In Fune 1DE6, the So$iet +nion 'loc(aded land and rail routes into !erlin fro* the 0estern 1ones. his cut 0est !erlin off fro* su##lies of e$er"thin% fro* food to coal. he So$iets clearl" e)#ected the 0estern allies to either &ithdra& or accede to se$eral So$iet de*ands a'out the occu#ation. !ut the allies .uic(l" or%ani1ed a *assi$e airlift that lasted nearl" a "ear and in$ol$ed al*ost C00,000 fli%hts, #ro$idin% *illions of tons of su##lies to the residents of 0est !erlin. In Ga" 1DED, the So$iets finall" 'ac(ed do&n and once a%ain #er*itted trans#ort 'et&een the 0estern occu#ation 1ones and 0est !erlin. !ut the le$el of tension 'et&een East and 0est had 'een raised su'stantiall". So*e scholars re%ard the !erlin 'loc(ade and airlift as the o#enin% sal$o in the /old &ar. )uban Missile )risis# Actober 1;CD3 On se$eral occasions, crises 'et&een the t&o ca*e to the 'rin( of &ar, such as the 1DED !erlin airlift and the 1D52 /u'an *issile crisis. Perha#s the *ost dra*atic confrontation of the /old 0ar too( #lace al*ost 1B "ears later in /u'a. In 1DBD, a left&in% nationalist *o$e*ent headed '" Fidel /astro succeeded in oustin% #ro-7*erican dictator !atista. O$er the ne)t se$eral "ears, the ne& re$olutionar" %o$ern*ent of /u'a *o$ed .uic(l" left&ard and allied itself &ith the So$iet +nion. 7n 7*erican-s#onsored in$asion in 7#ril 1D51 failed, 'ut the /u'a %o$ern*ent &as dee#l" fearful of 7*erican atte*#ts to under*ine it. Gean&hile, the So$iet %o$ern*ent under Hhrushche$ &as concerned that it &as losin% the nuclear ar*s race to the +nited States. In Octo'er 1D52, 7*erican s#" #lanes s#otted the *issile installations, &hich the +.S. %o$ern*ent re%arded as a clear and #resent dan%er to 7*erican national securit". 7*erican shi#s encircle the island, #re#ared to #re$ent So$iet na$al $essels fro* reachin% it, and #lans for an 7*erican in$asion &ere de$elo#ed, e$en thou%h *an" of the #artici#ants reali1ed that this *i%ht lead to a nuclear &ar 'et&een the t&o sides. Finall", t&o sides a%reed to a deal: the So$iets &ould dis*antle their *issiles in /u'a if the +S &ithdre& its nuclear *issiles fro* ur(e". his re#resented a *a9or concession '" the So$iets, es#eciall" as the ur(ish &ithdra&al &as secret at the ti*e? it a##eared to *ost o'ser$ers that Hhrushche$ had 'ac(ed do&n.
7erlin crisis & airli t# 1;@B-@;: he crisis had its ori%ins in 0orld 0ar II=era a%ree*ents on the occu#ation of #ost&ar @er*an" that #laced a 9ointl" occu#ied !erlin a##ro)i*atel" 110 *iles &ithin So$ietoccu#ied territor". !et&een 1DEB and 1DE6 relations 'et&een the international forces stationed in @er*an" deteriorated, &ith the %ro&in% conflict co*in% to a head in *id-1DE6. Protestin% the *er%in% of the !ritish,

French, and 7*erican occu#ation 1ones, So$iet officials in @er*an" &al(ed out of the 7llied /ontrol /ouncil, the .uadri#artite %o$ernin% 'od", and the 0est i*#le*ented currenc" refor* in the 0estern 1ones. In res#onse, the So$iets announced that the" &ere ta(in% ste#s to #reser$e the econo*ic inte%rit" of the So$iet occu#ation 1one and that effecti$e 2E Fune Itechnical difficultiesI &ould #re$ent land access 'et&een the 0estern 1ones of @er*an" and !erlin. Once it 'eca*e clear that the So$iets had in fact 'loc(aded !erlin, President Aarr" ru*an res#onded &ith a fir* decision that the +nited States &ould *aintain its ri%ht to 'e in !erlin e$en at the ris( of &ar. 7s a te*#orar" effort to *aintain the s*all 0estern *ilitar" %arrisons in the cit", !ritish and 7*erican forces i*#le*ented a s*all-scale airlift. he airlift 'rou%ht in the E, B00 tons !erlin needed dail" to su##ort its industr" and the cit"Js #o#ulation of t&o *illion. he airlift #lanes ;t&o-thirds 7*erican and one-third !ritish< &ere harassed '" So$iet #lanes, 'ut &ere not shot at. )uban Missile )risis# Actober 1;CD3 Ga9or confrontation 'et&een the +.S. and the So$iet +nion o$er the #resence of So$iet nuclear *issiles in /u'a. In Octo'er 1D52 a +.S. s#" #lane detected a 'allistic *issile on a launchin% site in /u'a. Pres. Fohn F. Henned" #laced a na$al 'loc(ade around the island, and for se$eral da"s the +.S. and the So$iet +nion ho$ered on the 'rin( of &ar. So$iet #re*ier Ni(ita Hhrushche$ finall" a%reed to re*o$e the *issiles in return for a secret co**it*ent fro* the +.S. to &ithdra& its o&n *issiles fro* ur(e" and to ne$er in$ade /u'a. he incident increased tensions durin% the /old 0ar and fueled the nuclear ar*s race 'et&een the t&o countries. E)a*#le of 'rin(*anshi#. Ira:.s 1;EF negotiations with Iran.s Shah over the Shatt al Arab3 Shatt al 7ra' is a tidal ri$er, 120 *i ;1DC (*< lon%, for*ed '" the confluence of the i%ris and Eu#hrates ri$ers, flo&in% SE to the Persian @ulf, for*in% #art of the Ira.-Iran 'order? the Harun is its chief tri'utar". Ira. and Iran ha$e dis#uted na$i%ation ri%hts on the Shatt al 7ra' since 1DCB, &hen an international co**ission %a$e Ira. total control of the Shatt al 7ra', lea$in% Iran &ith control onl" of the a##roaches to 7'adan and Hhorra*shahr, its chief #orts, and una'le to de$elo# ne& #ort facilities in the delta. o #reclude Ira.i #olitical #ressure and interference &ith its oil and frei%ht shi#*ents on the Shatt al 7ra', Iran 'uilt #orts on the Persian @ulf to handle forei%n trade. Iran and Ira. ne%otiated territorial a%ree*ents o$er the Shatt al 7ra' &ater&a" in 1DKB. he 1DKB treat" &as ne%otiated 'et&een the Shah of Iran and Sadda* ;at the ti*e Ira.Js de facto second-in-co**and<. In return for ehran haltin% its su##ort for a Hurdish re'ellion in northern Ira., Sadda* conceded the thal&e% line as the 'order. Ao&e$er, '" the end of the decade s(ir*ishes in the area 'eca*e #re$alent. Full-scale &ar 'et&een the t&o countries 'ro(e out in Se#t., 1D60, leadin% to ei%ht "ears of attac(s on coastal areas. Ira:.s 1;;= invasion o Guwait and the 1;;=-;1 ?S,?+-Ira: /ul 6ar3 International conflict tri%%ered '" Ira.Js in$asion of Hu&ait in 7u%ust 1DD0. hou%h 9ustified '" Ira.i leader on %rounds that Hu&ait &as historicall" #art of Ira., the in$asion &as #resu*ed to 'e *oti$ated '" Ira.Js desire to ac.uire Hu&aitJs rich oil fields and e)#and its #o&er in the re%ion. he +nited States, fearin% Ira.Js 'roader strate%ic intentions and actin% under +N aus#ices, e$entuall" for*ed a 'road coalition, &hich included a nu*'er of 7ra' countries, and 'e%an *assin% troo#s in northern Saudi 7ra'ia. 0hen Ira. i%nored a +N Securit" /ouncil deadline for it to &ithdra& fro* Hu&ait, the coalition 'e%an a lar%e-scale air offensi$e ;Fan. 151K, 1DD1<. 7 %round offensi$e '" the coalition ;Fe'ruar" 2E26< .uic(l" achie$ed $ictor". Esti*ates of Ira.i *ilitar" deaths ran%e u# to 100,000? coalition forces lost a'out C00 troo#s. he Ira.i re%i*e su'se.uentl" faced &ides#read #o#ular u#risin%s, &hich it 'rutall" su##ressed. 7 +N trade e*'ar%o re*ained in effect after the end of the conflict, #endin% Ira.Js co*#liance &ith the ter*s of the ar*istice. he fore*ost ter* &as that Ira. destro" its nuclear, 'iolo%ical, and che*ical &ea#ons #ro%ra*s.

?S-Ira: 6ar D==<3 0ar in Ira. that consisted of t&o #hases: a 'rief conflict in 200C 'et&een Ira. and a co*'ined force of troo#s lar%el" fro* the +.S. and @reat !ritain? and a su'se.uent +.S.-led occu#ation of Ira. and #rotracted Ira.i ar*ed insur%enc" a%ainst it. +.S. Pres. @eor%e 0. !ush ar%ued that the Se#te*'er 11 attac(s on the +.S. in that sa*e "ear hi%hli%hted the threat to +.S. securit" #osed '" hostile countries such as Ira.. In No$e*'er 2002 the +N issued Securit" /ouncil Resolution 1EE1 de*andin% that Ira. read*it &ea#ons ins#ectors and co*#l" &ith all #re$ious resolutions. 7lthou%h ins#ectors did return to Ira., !ush and !lair declared in earl" 200C ;des#ite o'9ections '" *an" &orld leaders< that Ira. &as continuin% to hinder +N ins#ections and that it still retained #roscri'ed &ea#ons. On Garch 20 the +.S. and !ritain ;&ith s*aller troo# contin%ents fro* other countries< launched a series of air attac(s on Ira., and a %round in$asion follo&ed. Ira.i

forces &ere ra#idl" defeated, and on 7#ril D +.S. forces too( control of the ca#ital, !a%hdad. !ritish forces co*#leted their occu#ation of the southern cit" of 7l-!arah the sa*e da", and '" Ga" 1 the *a9or co*'at o#erations of the in$asion had 'een co*#leted. Ao&e$er, the +.S. and other occu#"in% forces &ere soon e*'roiled in escalatin% %uerrilla &arfare in Ira. that hindered Ira.Js reco$er" and (illed thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of ci$ilians. he &ar, lon% o##osed '" *an" throu%hout the &orld, also 'eca*e increasin%l" un#o#ular in the +.S. Sectarian fi%htin% and insur%ent attac(s on +.S. and Ira.i forces #ea(ed in 2005 and 200K. In earl" 200K the +.S. i*#le*ented a strate%" that ca*e to 'e (no&n as the sur%e te*#oraril" increasin% the nu*'er of troo#s in Ira. '" *ore than 20,000 in a 'id to sta'ili1e the countr". !" the end of the "ear, $iolence had decreased su'stantiall", althou%h the role of the sur%e in i*#ro$in% securit" re*ained a source of de'ate. In 2006 the +.S. 'e%an to %raduall" reduce the nu*'er of its troo#s in Ira., co*#letin% its &ithdra&al in 2ece*'er 2011. ?S,+A$A invasion o A ghanistan D==1# diplomacy with $aliban leading up to it3 he ali'an had risen to #o&er in the *id D0Js in reaction to the anarch" and &arlordis* that arose after the &ithdra&al of So$iet forces. he ali'an sou%ht to i*#ose an e)tre*e inter#retation of Isla*--'ased u#on the rural Pashtun tri'al code--on the entire countr" and co**itted *assi$e hu*an ri%hts $iolations, #articularl" directed a%ainst &o*en and %irls. Fro* the *id-1DD0s the ali'an #ro$ided sanctuar" to Osa*a 'in Laden. !in Laden and 7lLaida ha$e ac(no&led%ed their res#onsi'ilit" for the Se#te*'er 11, 2001 terrorist attac(s a%ainst the +nited States. Follo&in% the ali'anJs re#eated refusal to e)#el 'in Laden and his %rou# and end its su##ort for international terroris*, the +.S. and its #artners in the anti-terrorist coalition 'e%an a *ilitar" ca*#ai%n on Octo'er K, 2001. +nder #ressure fro* +.S. *ilitar" and anti- ali'an forces, the ali'an disinte%rated ra#idl", and Ha'ul fell on No$e*'er 1C, 2001. 7f%han factions o##osed to the ali'an *et at a +nited Nationss#onsored conference in !onn, @er*an" in 2ece*'er 2001 and a%reed to restore sta'ilit" and %o$ernance to 7f%hanistan--creatin% an interi* %o$ern*ent and esta'lishin% a #rocess to *o$e to&ard a #er*anent %o$ern*ent. +nder the I!onn 7%ree*ent,I an 7f%han Interi* 7uthorit" &as for*ed and too( office in Ha'ul on 2ece*'er 22, 2001 &ith Aa*id Har1ai as /hair*an. he Interi* 7uthorit" held #o&er for a##ro)i*atel" 5 *onths &hile #re#arin% for a nation&ide ILo"a Fir%aI ;@rand /ouncil< in *id-Fune 2002 that decided on the structure of a ransitional 7uthorit". the ?S occupation and the A ghanistan civil war3 he So$iet +nion in$aded 7f%hanistan in 2ece*'er 1DKD to re#lace the e)istin% co**unist %o$ern*ent. 7f%hanistanJs resistance forces, (no&n as the *u9ahideen, fou%ht a%ainst the So$iet in$asion of 7f%hanistan. So*e factions recei$ed su##ort '" the +nited States. he So$iet-'ac(ed 7f%han co**unist re%i*e sur$i$ed for three *ore "ears until the fall of Ha'ul in 1DD2. In 1DD2, the 7f%han #olitical #arties a%reed on the Pesha&ar 7ccords &hich esta'lished the Isla*ic State of 7f%hanistan and a##ointed an interi* %o$ern*ent. Gilitia %rou#s o##osed the a%ree*ent and started a 'o*'ard*ent ca*#ai%n a%ainst Ha'ul &ith Pa(istani su##ort, &hile other *ilitias en%a%ed in a $iolent &ar a%ainst each other in Ha'ul su'ur's. Re%ional #o&ers such as Pa(istan, Iran, Saudi 7ra'ia and +1'e(istan see(in% influence o$er the strate%icall" located 7f%hanistan each su##orted and in so*e cases controlled one of those *ilitias. In late 1DDEMearl" 1DDB as the Isla*ic StateJs *inister of defense 7h*ad Shah Gassoud had 'een a'le to defeat *ost of the *ilitia %rou#s in Ha'ul and had restored so*e cal* to the ca#ital. he ali'an e*er%ed as a ne& faction threatenin% Ha'ul. the ?S# Israel# and global e orts to compel Iran to cease developing nuclear weapons> coercive diplomacy attempts in this e ort3 Ira:i Sunni-Shiite civil war o mid-D===s3

0ibyan civil war o D=11 & ?nited +ations Security )ouncil action on 0ibyan intervention3 he Li'"an /i$il 0ar &as an ar*ed conflict in the North 7frican state of Li'"a, fou%ht 'et&een forces lo"al to /olonel Gua**ar @addafi and those see(in% to oust his %o$ern*ent. he &ar &as #receded '" #rotests in !en%ha1i, &hich led to clashes &ith securit" forces that fired on the cro&d. he #rotests escalated into a re'ellion that s#read across the countr". 7 *ulti-state coalition 'e%an a *ilitar" inter$ention in Li'"a to i*#le*ent +nited Nations Securit" /ouncil Resolution 1DKC, &hich &as ta(en in res#onse to e$ents durin% the Li'"an ci$il &ar. Gilitar" o#erations 'e%an &ith +S forces and one !ritish su'*arine firin% cruise *issiles, the French 7ir Force, +nited States 7ir Force and !ritish Ro"al 7ir Force underta(in% sorties across

Li'"a, and a na$al 'loc(ade '" the Ro"al Na$". Since the 'e%innin% of the inter$ention, the initial coalition of !el%iu*, /anada, 2en*ar(, France, Ital", Nor&a", Latar, S#ain, +H and +S has e)#anded to se$enteen states, &ith ne&er states *ostl" enforcin% the no-fl" 1one and na$al 'loc(ade or #ro$idin% *ilitar" lo%istical assistance. he effort &as initiall" lar%el" led '" the +nited States. @addafi &as ca#tured and (illed in Octo'er and, the National ransitional /ouncil Ideclared the li'eration of Li'"aI and the official end of the &ar on Octo'er 2C, 2011.

Gosovo war o independence rom Serbia# & current Serb-Gosovo territorial dispute3 7 'rief &ar fou%ht in 1DDD 'et&een N7 O and Ser'ia, the *ain re*nant of the for*er Nu%osla$ia, o$er the status of the Nu%osla$ian #ro$ince of Hoso$o. In 1DD6, the Ser'ian #resident sent Ser'ian troo#s to ta(e 'ac( areas of Hoso$o controlled '" ethnic 7l'anian %uerrillas, tri%%erin% a N7 O air ca*#ai%n in 1DDD. he &ar ended &hen Ser'ia a%reed to a #eace a%ree*ent s#onsored '" the +nited Nations. he Hoso$o 0ar &as N7 OJs first *ilitar" en%a%e*ent. It &as contro$ersial in #art 'ecause N7 O &as not re#ellin% an attac( on *e*'er states 'ut inter$enin% in &hat &as ar%ua'l" an internal affair. Hoso$o officiall" declared its inde#endence in 2006. 7lthou%h Ser'ia has *aintained that the unani*ous declaration of inde#endence has ne$er 'een acce#ted, it is ta(in% #art in the E+-ad*inistered tal(s in order to hel# resol$e the situation to so*e e)tent and to deal &ith the ur%ent issues. he *a9orit" of the citi1ens are Ser's, &ho refuse to acce#t the 9urisdiction of the ne& state. he *ost recent #ro'le* arose re%ardin% the .uestion of Ser'ian institutions still in #lace in the north of Hoso$o, 'order control and i*#osition of trade 'an on %oods fro* Ser'ia ;&hich &as done in res#onse to a Ser'ian 'an on #roducts fro* Hoso$o<. he road'loc(s set '" the Ser's in the north, as a si%n of #rotest of Hoso$ar 'order controls, are still in #lace, thou%h there has 'een no $iolence. Ser'ia insists that an"thin% 'ut ne%otiations leadin% to a di#lo*atic solution is out of .uestion. he %o$ern*ent is torn 'et&een the #ro*ise of E+ *e*'ershi# and fi%htin% for its territorial inte%rit". Sudan.s civil war with south Sudan & coercive diplomacy & oil politics in D=1D3 he Second Sudanese /i$il 0ar &as a conflict fro* 1D6C to 200B 'et&een the central Sudanese %o$ern*ent and the Sudan Peo#leJs Li'eration 7r*". It &as lar%el" a continuation of the First Sudanese /i$il 0ar of 1DBB to 1DK2. 7lthou%h it ori%inated in southern Sudan, the ci$il &ar s#read to the Nu'a *ountains and !lue Nile. he Second Sudanese /i$il 0ar is often #resented as the on%oin% conflict 'et&een cultures and reli%ions na*el" the 7ra' Gusli* North and the /hristian 7frican South. It is no& o'$ious that the ci$il &ar in the Sudan is lar%el" 'ased around the recourses found in the North and South. 7%riculture ;s#ecificall" sor%hu*, cotton and sesa*e< is a *a9or econo*ic acti$it" of the Sudanese and ha##ens to occur *ainl" in the South. he Sudanese %o$ern*ent had introduced unfair tradin% la&s re%ardin% the e)#loitation of &ater, oil and land &hich fell &ell in fa$or of the North e$en thou%h the *a9orit" of these resources &ere found in the South. Ao&e$er, all the #rofits *ade fro* the a%ricultural as#ects in the South &ent *ainl" to the Northern Sudanese elite and as a result, increasin% the di$ision and hatred 'et&een the North and South. 7fter the end of the ci$il &ar, &hich resulted in creation of a so$erei%n South Sudanese state, a treat" &as i*#le*ented to resol$e a dis#ute o$er ho& South SudanJs oil &ealth &ill 'e distri'uted. In 2011, Hhartou* allo&ed the South to secede &ith the understandin% that !ashirJs %o$ern*ent &ould recei$e u# to OB.E 'illion in co*#ensation for the loss of 2MCrds of the countr"Js oil--as &ell as a fa$ora'le cut of Southern oil re$enues, &hich de#end u#on a #i#eline that ter*inates in Port Sudan. In Fe'ruar", the South decided it &ould rather shut do&n its entire oil sector than #a" OC0 a 'arrel transit fees to the northern %o$ern*ent, a le$" that is nearl" 1B ti*es the *ar(et rate. he oil shutdo&n &as a *utuall"-destructi$e %a*'it, and 'oth North Sudan and the SouthJs fled%lin% %o$ern*ent also #ushed itself to the 'rin( of 'an(ru#tc" in order to force its o##onentJs hand. 0ocali(ed spontaneous cease- ires across the trenches in 6orld 6ar I3

?S-Soviet nuclear arms race during the )old 6ar3 he nuclear ar*s race &as a co*#etition for su#re*ac" in nuclear &arfare 'et&een the +nited States, the So$iet +nion, and their res#ecti$e allies durin% the /old 0ar. 2urin% the /old 0ar, in addition to the 7*erican and So$iet nuclear stoc(#iles, other countries de$elo#ed nuclear &ea#ons, thou%h none en%a%ed in &arhead #roduction on nearl" the sa*e scale as the t&o su#er#o&ers. None of these defensi$e *easures &ere secure, and in the 1DB0s 'oth the +nited States and So$iet +nion had nuclear #o&er to o'literate the other side. !oth sides de$elo#ed a ca#a'ilit" to launch a de$astatin% attac( e$en after sustainin% a full assault fro* the other side ;es#eciall" '" *eans of su'*arines<, called a second stri(e.[6, his #olic" &as #art of &hat 'eca*e (no&n as Gutual 7ssured 2estruction: 'oth

sides (ne& that an" attac( u#on the other &ould 'e de$astatin% to the*sel$es, thus in theor" restrainin% the* fro* attac(in% the other. !oth So$iet and 7*erican e)#erts ho#ed to use nuclear &ea#ons for e)tractin% concessions fro* the other, or fro* other #o&ers such as /hina, 'ut the ris( connected &ith usin% these &ea#ons &as so %ra$e that the" refrained fro* 'rin(*anshi#. ?nited +ations# ?+ /eneral Assembly# and ?+ Security )ouncil and ?+S).s decisionma1ing,voting rules> the 0eague o +ations and its )ouncil voting rules3 International or%ani1ation founded ;1DEB< at the end of 0orld 0ar II to *aintain international #eace and securit", de$elo# friendl" relations a*on% nations on e.ual ter*s, and encoura%e international coo#eration in sol$in% intracta'le hu*an #ro'le*s. he ter* ori%inall" referred to the countries that o##osed the 7)is #o&ers. he @eneral 7sse*'l" is one of si) #rinci#al co*#onents of the +nited Nations and the onl" one in &hich all +N *e*'ers are re#resented. It *eets annuall" or in s#ecial sessions. It acts #ri*aril" as a deli'erati$e 'od"? it *a" discuss and *a(e reco**endations a'out an" issue &ithin the sco#e of the +N charter. he Securit" /ouncil is the #er*anent #eace(ee#in% facet of the +N, co*#osed of fi$e #er*anent *e*'ers ;/hina, France, Russia, the +nited Hin%do*, and the +nited States< and ten elected *e*'ers. he Securit" /ouncil in$esti%ates dis#utes that threaten international #eace and ad$ises on ho& to resol$e the*. o #re$ent or halt a%%ression, it *a" i*#ose di#lo*atic or econo*ic sanctions or authori1e the use of *ilitar" force. Each of the #er*anent *e*'ers holds $eto #o&er in decisions on su'stanti$e *atters, such as the a##lication of sanctions. 2ecisions on 'oth su'stanti$e and #rocedural *atters re.uire nine affir*ati$e $otes, includin% the affir*ati$e $ote of all fi$e #er*anent *e*'ers ;thou%h in #ractice a #er*anent *e*'er *a" a'stain &ithout i*#airin% the $alidit" of a decision<. he Lea%ue of Nations &as &orld or%ani1ation esta'lished in 1D20 to #ro*ote international coo#eration and #eace. he Lea%ue suffered fro* t&o handica#s. First, so*e of the *ost i*#ortant &orld #o&ers &ere not *e*'ers: @er*an" &as e)cluded until 1D25, the !olshe$i( %o$ern*ent in Russia denounced it as a ca#italist clu' and did not 9oin until 1DCE? &orst of all, 0ilson failed to #ersuade the +S Senate to ratif" the treat" and the *ost #o&erful nation of the &orld &as therefore a'sent. Secondl", the Lea%ue had no ar*ed force of its o&n and *e*'er states &ere reluctant to #ro$ide troo#s: it &as therefore o'li%ed to rel" u#on econo*ic sanctions, &hich &ere difficult to enforce and slo& to ta(e effect. Essentiall" #o&erless, it &as officiall" dissol$ed in 1DE5. )osta Rica v- ?S 6orld $rade Argani(ation legal dispute over underwear imports3 In Garch 1DDB the +nited States clai*ed that its do*estic under&ear industr" &as 'ein% seriousl" da*a%ed or threatened &ith actual da*a%e '" i*#orted cotton and *an-*ade-fi'er under&ear fro* /osta Rica and si) other countries. he +nited States initiated consultations &ith the countries alle%ed to 'e da*a%in% or threatenin% its industr" &ith the intention of in$o(in% the transitional safe%uard #ro$isions of the 7%ree*ent on e)tiles and /lothin%. So*e countries a%reed to .uantitati$e restrictions on the i*#orted under&ear that &ould 'e allo&ed into the +nited States, 'ut the +.S. failed to reach a%ree*ents &ith /osta Rica and a fe& others. he +nited States introduced restrictions on the i*#ortation of cotton and *an-*ade-fi'er under&ear. 0ith the unilateral introduction of restrictions, the case &as referred to the e)tile Gonitorin% !od" ; G!<, &hich could not reach consensus on &hether the e)istence of an actual threat of serious da*a%e had 'een de*onstrated, and thus reco**ended further consultations a*on% the #arties. he +nited States and /osta Rica &ere una'le to reach a *utual understandin% after additional consultations. On 22 2ece*'er 1DDB /osta Rica 'e%an the dis#ute settle*ent #rocess under 7rticle >>III of the @eneral 7%ree*ent on ariffs and rade ;@7 1DDE< and the corres#ondin% #ro$isions of the 7 /. 2es#ite the concerns a'out #ursuin% the case and *ana%in% its #rosecution, /osta Rica #re$ailed in 'oth the dis#ute settle*ent #rocess and the su'se.uent le%al a##eal. Not onl" did /osta Rica recei$e fa$ora'le rulin%s, 'ut the +nited States also acce#ted and confor*ed to the decisions. Mexican-American 6ar o 1B@C-1B@B3 0ar 'et&een the +.S. and Ge)ico. It %re& fro* a 'order dis#ute after the +.S. anne)ed e)as in 16EB? Ge)ico clai*ed that the southern 'order of e)as &as the Nueces Ri$er, &hile the +.S. clai*ed it &as the Rio @rande. 7 secret *ission '" Fohn Slidell to ne%otiate the dis#ute and #urchase Ne& Ge)ico and /alifornia for u# to OC0 *illion &as a'orted &hen Ge)ico refused to recei$e hi*. In res#onse to the snu', Pres. Fa*es Pol( sent troo#s under Pachar" a"lor to occu#" the dis#uted land 'et&een the t&o ri$ers. In 7#ril 16E5 Ge)ican troo#s crossed the Rio @rande and attac(ed a"lorJs troo#s? /on%ress a##ro$ed a declaration of &ar in Ga". Ordered to in$ade Ge)ico, a"lor ca#tured Gonterre" and defeated a lar%e Ge)ican force under 7ntonio Santa 7nna at the !attle of !uena Qista in Fe'ruar" 16EK.

16

+nder the reat" of @uadalu#e Aidal%o, Ge)ico ceded to the +.S. nearl" all of #resent Ne& Ge)ico, +tah, Ne$ada, 7ri1ona, /alifornia, e)as, and /olorado for O1B,000,000 and +.S. assu*#tion of its citi1ensJ clai*s a%ainst Ge)ico. /asualties included a'out 1C,000 7*erican deaths, all 'ut 1,K00 of &hich &ere caused '" disease. he &ar, &hich *ade a national hero of a"lor, reo#ened the sla$er"-e)tension issue su##osedl" settled '" the Gissouri /o*#ro*ise.

8arious Arab-Israeli wars# 1;@B# 1;FC# 1;CE Six "ay 6ar# 1;E< '5om Gippur& 6ar3 he first &ar ;1DE6< 'e%an &hen Israel declared itself an inde#endent state follo&in% the +nited NationsJ #artition of Palestine. Protestin% this *o$e, fi$e 7ra' countries ;E%"#t, Ira., Fordan, Le'anon, and S"ria< attac(ed Israel. he conflict ended &ith Israel %ainin% considera'le territor". he 1DB5 Sue1 /risis 'e%an after E%"#t nationali1ed the Sue1 /anal. 7 French, !ritish, and Israeli coalition attac(ed E%"#t and occu#ied the canal 1one 'ut soon &ithdre& under international #ressure. In the Si)-2a" 0ar of 1D5K, Israel attac(ed E%"#t, Fordan, and S"ria. he &ar ended &ith the Israel occu#"in% su'stantial a*ounts of 7ra' territor". 7n undeclared &ar of attrition ;1D5D< &as fou%ht 'et&een E%"#t and Israel alon% the Sue1 /anal and ended &ith the hel# of international di#lo*ac". E%"#t and S"ria attac(ed Israel in 1DKC ;the No* Hi##ur 0ar<, 'ut, des#ite earl" 7ra' success, the conflict ended inconclusi$el". In 1DKD E%"#t *ade #eace &ith Israel. In 1D62 Israel in$aded Le'anon in order to e)#el Palestinian %uerrillas 'ased there. Israel &ithdre& fro* *ost of Le'anon '" 1D6B 'ut *aintained a narro& 'uffer 1one inside that countr" until 2000. Israel-%alestinian territorial dispute over 9erusalem3 here are differin% le%al and di#lo*atic #ositions on Ferusale* held &ithin the international co**unit". @o$ern*ents and scholars ali(e are di$ided o$er the le%al status of Ferusale* under international la&. Gost countries of the &orld do not reco%ni1e Ferusale* as IsraelJs ca#ital. Gan" do not reco%ni1e it as a cit" that is #ro#erl" IsraelJs. Gan" +N *e*'er states for*all" adhere to the +nited Nations #ro#osal that Ferusale* should ha$e an international status. he chief dis#ute re$ol$es around IsraelJs control of East Ferusale*, &hile 'roader a%ree*ent e)ists re%ardin% the Israeli #resence in 0est Ferusale*. De jure, the *a9orit" of +N *e*'er states and *ost international or%ani1ations do not reco%ni1e IsraelJs control of East Ferusale* &hich occurred after the 1D5K Si) 2a" 0ar, nor its 1D60 Ferusale* La& #rocla*ation, &hich declared a Ico*#lete and unitedI Ferusale* as the ca#ital of Israel. 7s a result, forei%n e*'assies are %enerall" located in el 7$i$ and its su'ur's. Ferusale* is a contentious issue in final status #eace tal(s 'et&een Israel and the Palestinian National 7uthorit", &hich clai*s Ferusale* as 7l Luds, the ca#ital of a future Palestinian state. Israeli Pri*e Ginister !in"a*in Netan"ahu has stated that IFerusale* 'elon%s to the Fe&ish #eo#le and &ill re*ain under Israeli so$erei%nt" for eternit".I Other or%ani1ations and co**unities ad$ocate Ferusale* should 'e an international cit". Israel-Syria dispute over possession o /olan *eights3 !et&een 1DE6 and 1D5K, the stru%%le 'et&een Israel and S"ria o$er their de*ilitari1ed 'order 1one &as a #rinci#al reason 'ehind the Si) 2a" 0ar of 1D5K, &hich ended in Israel ca#turin% the @olan Aei%hts. In 2ece*'er 1D61, the %o$ern*ent of Israel e)tended Israeli la&, 9urisdiction, and ad*inistration to the @olan, an action critici1ed '" the Rea%an ad*inistration and considered Inull and $oidI '" the +nited Nations Securit" /ouncil. In ter*s of *ilitar" si%nificance, the area is of e)ce#tional %eostrate%ic $alue 'ecause it offers a co**andin% #osition o$erloo(in% southern Le'anon, the @olan #lateau, and *uch of southern S"ria and northern Israel. o the east, a ran%e of $olcanic hills offers do&nhill access to @alilee in the &est and to 2a*ascus in the east. o the &est, the @olan #lateau o$erloo(s Israeli *etro#olitan centers. he @olan is also i*#ortant for its re%ional &ater sources. his is #articularl" true of the area of Gount Aer*on, &here the head&aters of the Fordan Ri$er lie. Peacene%otiations, in &hich the @olan Aei%hts &ere a crucial co*#onent, ha$e 'een on%oin% inter*ittentl" 'et&een Israel and S"ria. 7fter the assassination of an Israeli Pri*e Ginister in the *id-D08s, su'se.uent atte*#ts at rene&in% the ne%otiations re*ained futile.

India-%a1istan dispute over possession o Gashmir3 Hash*ir is a dis#uted re%ion, &hose so$erei%nt" is contested '" India and Pa(istan. 0hen the !ritish announced their &ithdra&al fro* India and #artition in 1DEK, the ruler of the State of Fa**u and Hash*ir &as reluctant to 9oin &ith either India or Pa(istan, 'ut in the li%ht of *ilitar" incursions fro* Pa(istan acceded to India. /ontinued fi%htin% lasted until the +nited Nations ne%otiated a ceasefire, and the State &as di$ided '" a line of control. here &as another &ar 'et&een India and Pa(istan o$er Hash*ir in 1D5B, and there ha$e 'een #eriodic *ilitar" flare-u#s since the 1DD0s. he State of Fa**u and Hash*ir is #redo*inantl" Gusli*, 'ut &ith si%nificant areas #o#ulated '" Aindus and !uddhists.

11

In the face of hardenin% reli%ious identities, set a%ainst a 'ac(dro# of a desta'ili1in% and *ilitari1in% conflict in 7f%hanistan, and &ith $alue for 'oth India and Pa(istan as a (e" strate%ic location, the #ros#ects for conflict resolution see* re*ote. Since 'oth India and Pa(istan no& ha$e nuclear &ea#ons, such a source of tension is #otentiall" disastrous. )hina deterrent threat vs- ?S,?+ orces during Gorean 6ar# 1;F=3 In 1DB0 North Horea in$aded South Horea, and +.S. Pres. Aarr" ru*an ordered troo#s to assist South Horea. he +N Securit" /ouncil, *inus the a'sent So$iet dele%ate, #assed a resolution callin% for the assistance of all +N *e*'ers in haltin% the North Horeans. 7t first North Horean troo#s dro$e the South Horean and +.S. forces do&n to the southern ti# of the Horean #eninsula, 'ut a 'rilliant a*#hi'ious landin% at InchJn, concei$ed '" @en. 2ou%las Gac7rthur, turned the tide in fa$or of the +N troo#s, &ho ad$anced near the 'order of North Horea and /hina. /hinese PG /hou En-lai %a$e &arnin% throu%h Indian di#lo*atic channels that Rif the 7*erican authorities decided to cross S /hina &ill 'e forced to act accordin%l"8. he !ritish chiefs of staff too( this to *ean /hinese *ilitar" inter$ention, a res#onse to 'e a$oided at all costs &hile Stalin threatened in Euro#e. he +S and !ritish %o$ern*ents, in close consultation, disa%reed? li(e&ise a *a9orit" in the +N. /hina *i%ht 'e 'luffin% and to hold 'ac( &ould surel" offer Hi* an o##ortunit" to raise ne& forces and stri(e a%ain. he /hinese &ere not 'luffin%. he /hinese then entered the &ar and dro$e the +N forces 'ac( south? the front line sta'ili1ed at the C6th #arallel. 7argaining during wartime# and 7ritish-/erman peace terms in 1;1C# during 6orld 6ar I3

+orth Gorea.s nuclear weapons program & ?S e orts to limit it3 North HoreaJs histor" of re%ional *ilitar" #ro$ocations, #roliferation of *ilitar"-related ite*s, and lon%-ran%e *issile de$elo#*ent are of *a9or concern to the international co**unit". In 2ece*'er 2002, follo&in% re$elations that the 2PRH &as #ursuin% a nuclear &ea#ons #ro%ra* 'ased on enriched uraniu* in $iolation of a 1DDE a%ree*ent &ith the +S to free1e and ulti*atel" dis*antle its e)istin% #lutoniu*-'ased #ro%ra*, North Horea e)#elled *onitors fro* the International 7to*ic Ener%" 7%enc" ;I7E7<. In Fanuar" 200C, it declared its &ithdra&al fro* the international Non-Proliferation reat". In *id-200C P"on%"an% announced it had co*#leted the re#rocessin% of s#ent nuclear fuel rods ;to e)tract &ea#ons-%rade #lutoniu*< and &as de$elo#in% a Inuclear deterrent.I !e%innin% in 7u%ust 200C, North Horea, /hina, Fa#an, Russia, South Horea, and the +S ha$e #artici#ated in the Si)-Part" al(s ai*ed at resol$in% the stale*ate o$er the 2PRHJs nuclear #ro%ra*s. North Horea #ulled out of the tal(s in No$e*'er 200B. It test-fired 'allistic *issiles in Ful" 2005 and conducted a nuclear test in Octo'er 2005. North Horea returned to the Si)-Part" al(s in 2ece*'er 2005 and su'se.uentl" si%ned t&o a%ree*ents on denucleari1ation. he +nited States *aintains $arious sanctions on North Horea due to its hu*an ri%hts record, nuclear &ea#ons #ro%ra*s, &ea#ons #roliferation acti$ities, and other reasons. E)#orts of *ilitar" and sensiti$e dual-use ite*s are #rohi'ited, as are *ost t"#es of +.S. econo*ic assistance. 7t this ti*e, %oods of North Horean ori%in *a" not 'e i*#orted into the +nited States either directl" or indirectl" &ithout #rior notification to and a##ro$al of the +.S. reasur" 2e#art*ent8s Office of Forei%n 7ssets /ontrol ;OF7/<. nuclear weapons inspections & transparency in )old 6ar agreements3 he reat" on the NonProliferation of Nuclear 0ea#ons, co**onl" (no&n as the Non-Proliferation reat" or NP , is a land*ar( international treat" &hose o'9ecti$e is to #re$ent the s#read of nuclear &ea#ons and &ea#ons technolo%", to #ro*ote coo#eration in the #eaceful uses of nuclear ener%" and to further the %oal of achie$in% nuclear disar*a*ent and %eneral and co*#lete disar*a*ent. he NP is often seen to 'e 'ased on a central 'ar%ain: 3the NP non-nuclear-&ea#on states a%ree ne$er to ac.uire nuclear &ea#ons and the NP nuclear-&ea#on states in e)chan%e a%ree to share the 'enefits of #eaceful nuclear technolo%" and to #ursue nuclear disar*a*ent ai*ed at the ulti*ate eli*ination of their nuclear arsenals4. Se$eral *easures ha$e 'een ado#ted to stren%then the NP and the 'roader nuclear non#roliferation re%i*e and *a(e it difficult for states to ac.uire the ca#a'ilit" to #roduce nuclear &ea#ons, includin% the e)#ort controls of the Nuclear Su##liers @rou# and the enhanced $erification *easures of the I7E7 7dditional Protocol. 7fter the NP , the t&o co*#onents of the Strate%ic 7r*s Li*itation reaties ;S7L < re#resented a &illin%ness '" the +nited States and the So$iet +nion to constrain an ar*s race that 'oth reco%ni1ed &as costl" and #otentiall" desta'ili1in%. So$iet nuclear ad$anta%e in the earl" 1DK0s concerned the +nited States, and the So$iets reco%ni1ed that 7*erican fears &ould li(el" translate into a *assi$e &ea#ons #ro%ra* ai*ed at re%ainin% nuclear su#eriorit". hus the So$iet +nion chose to forsa(e short-ter* ad$anta%e in fa$or of %uaranteed #arit" o$er the lon% ter*.

12

!oth sides a%reed that strate%ic #arit" &ould si%nificantl" contri'ute to sta'ilit". he chief #roducts of S7L I &ere the 7nti-!allistic Gissile ;7!G< reat" in 1DK2, and an interi* a%ree*ent &hich set li*its on the total nu*'er of offensi$e *issiles allo&a'le ;further addressed in S7L II<. he 7!G reat" li*ited the nu*'er of defensi$e &ea#ons, indicatin% that 'oth the +nited States and the So$iet +nion acce#ted the idea that *utual $ulnera'ilit" &ould increase sta'ilit" - there'" institutionali1in% *utual assured destruction ;G72<. S7L II li*ited the total nu*'er of all t"#es of strate%ic nuclear &ea#ons. Ao&e$er, althou%h a%reed u#on '" 'oth countries, S7L II &as ne$er ratified 'ecause 7*erican President Fi**" /arter &ithdre& his su##ort after the So$iet in$asion of 7f%hanistan in 2ece*'er 1DKD.

nuclear &ea#ons ins#ections T trans#arenc" in /old 0ar a%ree*ents !oth sides %enerall" (ne& that each had a %reat a*ount of nuclear &ea#ons. Each side &atched carefull" &here the other &as *antlin% *issiles and ca*e to a%ree*ents to dis*antle certain ones. his %eneral trans#arenc" of each side8s &ea#onr" and the threat of 3*utuall" assured destruction4 hel#ed the +.S. and the So$iet +nion a$oid &ar. Russia and the Second /hechen 0ar Isla*ic se#aratist *ilitants in$ade Russian #ro$ince of 2a%estan fro* /hechn"a, and Russian forces roll in. 2irect 'attle a'andoned '" earl" 2000, shift to %uerrilla &ar. 2012 ne%otiations a*on% Euro#ean countries o$er 'an(in% ca#ital standards 0hich banking capital standard to useU Ga" 2012: +H ne%otiates &ith France T @er*an" on standards ;!asel III i*#le*entation<. +H &anted a hi%her safet" 'uffer, ti%hter rules on &hat 'an(s can count as reser$es. It did not &ant the failure to ha$e enou%h cash to 'e a ris( once a%ain. 3/o*#ro*ise4: +H can do &hat it &ants, e$er"one else has a &ea(er standard . 7r%entina8s *ilitar" 9unta, !ritish Pri*e Ginister hatcher, and the Fal(lands 0ar, 1D62 !ritain and 7r%entina fou%ht o$er the in$alua'le Fal(land Islands. he 7r%entina 9unta thou%ht an attac( on the islands &ould sol$e do*estic econo*ic #ro'le*s. heir rule &as re#ressi$e and un#o#ular. Fearin% threat to their rule, the" tried to unite the countr" a%ainst the !ritish control of the islands ;7r%entinians resented !ritish control of the Fal(lands<. On the !ritish side, Pri*e Ginister Gar%aret hatcher &as also #ro'a'l" thin(in% of #olitical sur$i$al. Aer #o#ularit" &as lo& 'ecause of une*#lo"*ent. !ecause of her fir* stance on the islands, her a##ro$al ratin% soared. +S /I7 inter$ention in @uate*ala, 1DBE /I7 su##orted cou# in @uate*ala on 'ehalf of +nited Fruit /o*#an". he /I7 &as ar*in% and trainin% @uate*alan re'els. Political insta'ilit" &ould8$e ne%ati$el" i*#acted the +nited Fruit /o*#an"8s #roduction facilities in @uate*ala. he co*#an" also sou%ht to #rotect its lands fro* the @uate*alan %o$ern*ent. the /arter 2octrine 37n" atte*#t '" an outside force to %ain control of the Persian @ulf re%ion &ill 'e re%arded as an assault on the $ital interests of the +S7, and such an assault &ill 'e re#elled '" an" *eans necessar", includin% *ilitar" force.- President /arter. he +.S. had an interest in ensurin% a stead" su##l" of oil. the Russo-Fa#anese &ar of 1D0E-1D0B Russians ho#ed for a $ictorious &ar 'ut suffered hu*iliatin% defeat at the hands of the Fa#anese. 2efeats on the 'attlefield *i)ed &ith unha##iness of the tsar8s re%i*e 'rou%ht the Re$olution of 1D0B, in &hich the tsar &as forced to *a(e #olitical concessions to his o##onents. his sho&s ho& a failures a'road can affect leaders do*esticall". trends in +S #u'lic o#inion in su##ort of the &ars of the #ast centur" here is an increasin% o##osition to &ar in the +.S. he leader8s infor*ational ad$anta%e hel#s 'uild a rall" earl" in the conflict. Ao&e$er, if casualties increase and $ictor" is not in si%ht, #u'lic o##osition %ro&s. the !oer 0ar 13

!ritish lost *an" li$es in the &ar to defend an e*#ire in 7frica. 7lthou%h !ritain didn8t 'enefit as a &hole, a fe& s*all %rou#s &ithin the countr" did. he" &ere the rich #eo#le &ith the a'ilit" to in$est o$erseas. !" fi%htin% and (ee#in% these colonial #ossessions, rich #eo#le continued to ha$e o##ortunities for #rofita'le in$est*ents. he" e)erted their #o&er and influence to force !ritish %o$ern*ents to #ursue a #olic" that 'enefited the* at the e)#ense of the %reater %ood. +S s#ecial interest lo''" %rou#s and +S #olic" to&ards Israel and /u'a - he *ain lo''"in% %rou# of #ro-Israel is the 7*erica-Israel Political 7ction /o**ittee ;7IP7/<. 7 $er" effecti$e %rou#, the" &ant the +.S. to su##ort and defend Israel. his #uts +.S. in conflict &ith Israel8s ene*ies in the Giddle East. -/u'an 7*ericans are o##osed to the co**unist re%i*e in /u'a, *ost are ones &ho fled /u'a &hen Fidel /astro too( o$er in 1DBD. /u'an 7*ericans lo''ied the +.S. %o$ern*ent to containMunder*ine the /astro re%i*e '" su##ortin% a failed in$asion '" e)iles in 1D51 and i*#osin% e*'ar%os. +S Secretar" of State Se&ard8s 1650 #eace #ro#osal #rior to the +S /i$il 0ar +S Sec. State Se&ard &as a Senator in 2ec 1650. !efore the +.S. /i$il 0ar, southern states 'e%an secedin%, threatenin% &ar. Se&ard &as a founder of the antisla$er" Re#u'lican Part" and a *a9or o##onent of sla$er", he #ro#osed a constitutional a*end*ent 'annin% /on%ress fro* #assin% a la& to re*o$e or alter sla$er".Ae de#arted fro* his 3cherished con$ictions4 'ecause 3#oliticians *ust consider not onl" #ersonal $ie&s 'ut also Rthose &ith &ho* &e *ust necessaril" act84

Luestions 0hat is a 3#u11le4U 0hat is the social scientific a##roach to the stud" of international #oliticsU Pu11les are o'ser$ations a'out the &orld that de*and an e)#lanation. +sin% the scientific a##roach, &e for* a theory, a lo%icall" consistent set of state*ents that e)#lains a #heno*enon of interest. O'ser$in% #olitical e$ents fro* the #ast and a##l"in% the* to the #resent or to #redict future outco*es for* theories. heories ha$e to 'e si*#lified 'ecause the" atte*#t to ans&er onl" certain #heno*enon. 0e *ust cut a&a" so*e of the co*#le)ities. 0hat is our 'asic theoretical fra*e&or( for understandin% international #olitical #heno*ena, 'roadl" s#ea(in%U he three core conce#ts are: Interests: 0hat actors &ant to achie$e throu%h #olitical action. Interactions: he &a"s in &hich the choices of t&o or *ore actors co*'ine to #roduce #olitical outco*es. Institutions: Set of rules (no&n and shared '" the co**unit" that structure #olitical interactions in #articular &a"s. 0e assu*e that actors are #ur#osi$e. In 'road stro(es, &hat ha$e 'een the *a9or #hases of &orld #olitics since 1B00U 0hat &ere the characteristics of those #hases, in ter*s of the nature of the state s"ste*, the actors, interests, and t"#es of interactions do*inant in each #haseU Gercantilist Era ;1B00-161B<: *assi$e coloni1ation '" the Euro#eans in the Ne& 0orld ;then 7frica, 7sia<. E*#ires used resources #roduced '" colonies in the ne& &orld to #roduce %oods, then #roceed to sell these %oods at *ono#olistic #rices to colonies. +sin% *ilitar" #o&er to increase econo*ic %ain, then usin% the econo*ic %ain to enrich the *ilitar"M%o$ern*ent. 14

Pa) !ritannicaM !ritish Peace ;161B-1D1E<: interest in tradeMin$estin% leads to %reat econo*ic %ro&th &orld&ide. 2u''ed the 3Aundred Nears8 Peace4, relations a*on% #o&erful nations &ere far cal*er than 'efore. !ritain8s econo*ic influence contri'uted to o#en trade and relati$e #eace. he hirt" Nears8 /risis ;1D1E-1DEB<: ensions in Euro#e increases as @er*an" rises in #o&er, e$entuall" Euro#e di$ides into t&o hostile sides and 00I 'e%ins. 00I does little to settle tensions in Euro#e ;es#eciall" 'ecause @er*an" &as #unished so harshl" after the &ar<. 00II 'e%ins in 1DE1 and ended &hen the Na1i re%i*e fell and Fa#an &as 'o*'ed t&ice &ith nuclear &ea#ons. he /old 0ar ;1DEB-1DK0s<: &o su#er#o&ers e*er%e: N7 O led '" +.S. and the 0arsa& Pact led '" the So$iets. Econo*icall", +.S. fa$ored ca#italis* &hile So$iet +nion fa$ored socialis*. Each &as afraid of the other %ain in #o&er. 0ar al*ost occurred durin% the 1DED !erlin 7irlift and the 1D52 /u'an Gissile /risis, 'ut ne%otiations &ere reached. 2ecoloni1ation and the rise of third-&orld countries also occurred durin% this #eriod. Post /old 0ar ;1DK0s on&ards<: So$iet +nion falls and +.S. e*er%es as the sole &orld #o&er. @lo'ali1ation is the ne& idea of the 21st centur", as *an" a%ree on the 'enefits of international econo*ic inte%ration. 0h" is coo#eration often so difficult in international #oliticsU 0h" is it #articularl" difficult a*on% lar%e nu*'ers of actorsU 0hat other t"#es of situationsMinteractions *a(e coo#eration #articularl" difficultU /oo#eration is difficult 'ecause of conflicts o$er #u'lic %oods, collecti$e action #ro'le*s, and 'ecause of free riders. It is easier for a s*aller nu*'er of actors to coo#erate 'ecause of the need to *onitor and o'ser$e each other8s actions to *a(e sure e$er"one is a'idin% '" the rules. his is difficult if the %rou# of actors is too lar%e. Lac( of infor*ation and lin(a%e ;&ithholdin% coo#eration on another issue if other actor does not consent to current issue< also *a(e coo#eration *ore difficult. 0hat factors deter*ine &hich side &ins and &hich side loses in a 'ar%ainin% interactionU Po&er: the a'ilit" to %et the other side to *a(e concessions &ithout ha$in% to *a(e concessions oneself. /oercion: usin% threats or i*#osin% %reater costs to chan%e the other actor8s 'eha$ior. Outside o#tions: the *ore outside o#tions a state has outside of reachin% an a%ree*ent, the *ore li(el" that state &ill %et &hat it &ants. 7%enda-settin% #o&er: First *o$er ad$anta%e, settin% the rulesM#olicies 'efore 'ar%ainin% can e$en 'e%in. ;Gicrosoft had this ad$anta%e of other o# s"ste*s<. Ao& *i%ht institutions and rules affect state 'eha$ior in &orld #oliticsU 0h" do states so*eti*es follo& 3the rules4U Institutions #lace rules that reduce the cost of 9oint-decision *a(in%. he" define the decision*a(in% #rocess so states do not &aste ti*e ha%%lin% o$er rules as &ell as &hate$er the" &ant to 'ar%ain for. he" also define standards or 'eha$ior, $erif" that states are follo&in% these standards, and atte*#t to resol$e dis#utes if the" should arise. States 3follo& the rules4 'ecause so*eti*es the" ha$e no incenti$e not to follo& the* ;coordination<. States &ant to re*ain credi'le on the face of international #olitics as &ell. 0h" do states e)#erience conflicts of interestU 7ll states &ant the *ost for the*sel$es, &hether it8s territor", resources, or #o&er ;an"thin% of $alue<. he desire for these scarce %oods often causes conflicts. Policies that 'enefit certain 11

states 'ut har* others also induces conflict. Lastl", states ha$e conflicts o$er re%i*e t"#es ;such as &hen +.S. sou%ht to #re$ent the rise of co**unist re%i*es<. 0hat causes &ar to 'rea( outU 0h" does a &ar not end soonerU 0hat role do inco*#lete infor*ation, co**it*ent #ro'le*s, and indi$isi'ilit" #la" in causin% 'ar%ainin% 'rea(do&n, and &hat are these conce#ts in #racticeU 0ar 'rea(s out 'ecause of #ro#ert" dis#utes, #olic" disa%ree*ents, and conflictin% ideas of &ho should %o$ern. +nfortunatel", dis#utes that lead to &ars can often 'e sol$ed throu%h institutional *echanis*s. 0ars last lon%er than e)#ected 'ecause one or 'oth sides *iscalculate the costs of &ar fro* the other side. his is inco*#lete infor*ation, &hen states cannot accuratel" deter*ine the 'ar%ainin% ran%e 'ecause of lac( of infor*ation re%ardin% interests and ca#a'ilities ;Hu&ait in$asion-Aussein 'luff #%. DB<. here are also ne& sources of uncertaint" and continuation of co**it*ent #ro'le*s. /o**it*ent #ro'le*s occur &hen states ha$e incenti$es not to honor institutional settle*ents that are alread" in #lace? this includes 'ar%ainin% o$er %oods that ha$e future 'ar%ainin% #o&er, &ars in res#onse to chan%in% #o&er, and #ree*#ti$e &ars that start 'ecause of the first-stri(e ad$anta%e. Indi$isi'ilit" can s#ar( &ars 'ecause there are so*e %oods that cannot 'e di$ided, ne%otiation as a settle*ent see*s unli(el". It8s all or nothin% ;e.%. Ferusale*<. 0hat are so*e #redictions of the 'ar%ainin% *odel of &ar for understandin% &hen &ar &ill 'rea( out, ho& lon% it &ill last, and &hether it &ill recur once it la#sesU 0ar 'rea(s out &hen t&o sides fail to *a(e a deal in the 'ar%ainin% ran%e or &hen a state e)#ects to %ain *ore throu%h &ar ;#lus cost of &ar< than it has in the status .uo. 0ar continues as lon% as one side continues to *a(e concessions and ends &hen one side is defeated *ilitaril" and is &illin% to chan%e its ne%otiation ;'ar%ainin% ran%e has chan%ed< stance to acce#t an a%ree*ent. +nder &hat circu*stances *i%ht #ri$ate interests ;of #articularistic lo''" %rou#s, industries, 'ureaucracies, or the nation8s leader< #ush a state into a *ore a%%ressi$e forei%n #olic" and #erha#s into &ar itselfU Interest %rou#s often sha#e the decisions re%ardin% &ar and #eace. 0hile these %rou#s also care for the countr" as a &hole, so*eti*es the" also &ant to %ain so*ethin% ;resources, influence, etc.< for the*sel$es. If a *ore a%%ressi$e forei%n #olic" can %reater ena'le #ersonal #ro*otion, certain interest %rou#s &ill ha$e an incenti$e to su##ort such #olicies. E). Oil %rou#s su##ort the Ira.i &ar 'ecause the" &ere interested in Ira.8s oil. ;7lso, !ush &as once an oil industr" e)ecuti$eS< 2o leaders start &ars to achie$e a 3rall" effect4U 0henU Nes, 'ecause the rall" effect ena'les %reater su##ort fro* a nation8s citi1ens to&ards their countr"8s leadersM %o$ern*ents. he first 'est outco*e is to %et out of fi%htin%, 'ut if conflict a'road i*#ro$es a leader8s chance of sta"in% in #o&erM%ainin% su##ort, heMshe *i%ht #refer &ar to a ne%otiation. Leaders &ant to achie$e the rall" effect &hen there are do*estic #ro'le*s? &hen a countr" is di$ided internall", a &ar can ser$e to unite citi1ens. he incenti$e that a leader has to start crises to %ain su##ort at ho*e is diversionary incentive. 2o leaders continue &ars to 3%a*'le for resurrection4U +nder &hat conditionsU Nes, &hen leaders see that the alternati$e to not startin% a &ar is &orse, e$en if %oin% to &ar is ris(". E). Political leaders &ho are sure the" are %oin% to lose #o&er #refer &ar, 'ecause the" are *ore #rone to %a*'le on the outco*e ;the" are %oin% to lose #o&er an"&a"s, &h" notU<. 2o leaders start &ars to 'enefit a certain s#ecial interest %rou# or industr"U 12

Nes, es#eciall" &hen certain %rou#s e)ert %reater influence a*on% #olitical leaders or &hen certain leaders hold 3o'li%ations4 to 'ac( u# a certain %rou#. E.%. 2efense 2e#art*ent #refers &ar to su##ort the *ilitar"8s $ie&s ;*ilitar" has ideolo%ical and #rofessional interest in #olicies that *a(e &ar *ore li(el"<.

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