THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

BY

W.

R.
LECTURER

BOYCE
IN PHILOSOPHY

GIBSON,
AT THE

M.A.
OF

(OxoN.)
LONDON

UNIVERSITY

WITH

THE

CO-OPERATION

OF

AUGUSTA

KLEIN

r*/

LONDON ADAM AND

CHARLES

BLACK

1908

PREFACE.

THE

present
wish his

volume

has

grown

up

and

taken No

shape
teacher

under of
he

the

chastening
would from

influences
to

of

College
the my
my

teaching.
value education claim
to

Logic
been

underestimate
;

of

the has have

education for learnt nine

receives

students

and

since

years

advancing teaching
most at

along
it may

these be

lines,

Logic
A

through
first

accepted

in

sincerest

good
my

faith.
many
at

and

is due to grateful acknowledgment the New Hampstead College Centre, (at

fellow-workers Westfield

and

College)
have

who
had But

by
so

their much there

doubts,
to

difficulties,
the

criticisms,
of this
sense

and book.

suggestions
the when
a

do
a

with
more

shaping
intimate

is

still

in the

which
time

book
it
to
was

is

the first

work decided

of many
to

rather
reconstruct

than
the
to

of

one.

From lectures

College
the

with

view

publica
assist

tion,
ance

was

privileged
G. F.

enjoy

invaluable Stout returned

volume

sympathy
most

and

of Professor read

Stout,

Professor and

kindly
to
me

consented

to

through

these

lectures,

them

shortly
It

afterwards
be

accompanied
to

by
the Laws

small

of criticisms.
criticisms. the

would funda

hard

exaggerate
as

value

of these

On

such of and

mental

heads

the

of

Thought,
and

interrelation

Cate the

gorical,
essential the
will

Disjunctive,
meaning
of
of the

and

Hypothetical
Stout's

Propositions,

Disjunctive
all who from

Hypothetical
was

Judgments
and

substance be

Professor

contentions
are

adopted,
the will be

easily recognized
views.

by

familiar
these

with

Professor's found
me

logical
in

Many
volume.
a me

extracts

criticisms
has also

the

present through

Professor of
his ways,
own

Stout Class
not

allowed
in

to

look
has

large part
in many
we

lectures

Logic,
certain

and
con

helped

other
have

least
over

through
fundamental

versations

which

had

together
dates from

logical
,

principles.
.

Miss work"
the been

Klein's
from the

collaboration

the that

first

revision

of

the
in

spring
and
to

of

1905.

Since

date,

every

change
drastic"

treatment"

the the

reconstructions friendliest
between into
a

have
most

been

has

subjected point
of

but
us

unsparing
has been

criticism.

No

divergence
transmuted

but

thoroughly
agreement.

discussed,

and

point

of

common

viii

PREFACE
to

If, in addition
the tions

the

reading of
may

the

of proofs,the verifying of the scientific illustra

quotations and
and I allusions,

the has

elaboration been

singleout two respects in which Miss particularlyvaluable, I would co-operation in the interest of consistency, of the work mention her revision it in the interest of clear expression. To of and her revision the importance of these revisions,it would be necessary show draft side by side with the final product ; to publishthe original I can is not practicable, the reader but as this course only assure
Klein's the defects of the present treatise, but for these revisions, would have been incalculably his sufferings,

that, however

he may

suffer from

worse.

work
one

It has, indeed, become proceeded,that it could man's work.

to

evident to me, as the increasingly be no longer honestlyregarded as

was

The
the

originaldraft
of three. derived
'

the

work

of

one

; the

reconstruction With

is the work

regard

help

from

published treatises
of Mill and

on

Logic, my Sigwart, to Professor

'

heaviest
to

has been obligation

to the works

of

Introduction

Bosanquet's Logic,' and to Mr. Joseph's Logic.' My indebtedness to Mr. Joseph is in

direct,our
been unable elements I have

direct rather than But

or

points of
which

view

being quite different.

either the Aristotelian

though I
the

have

to assimilate

Baconian

figureso
reason

Joseph'streatment, every work appeared early enough to allow

in

to

revisingmy useful ticularly

'

own.

Among
I would

other

of my works which
'

prominently in Mr. that his grateful making full use of it

be have been Professor par Minto's

to me,

mention specially Deductive

treatise,

Logic,Inductive
'

and

tion to Book have

also

II.,dealingwith books, notably The Use of Words Sidgwick's

much profited

(notablythe Introduc the Logic of Science), and Mr. Alfred

in

Reasoning ';but

by

the treatises of Dr.

Keynes, Dr. Mellone,

Professor Professor
the

Carveth Welton.
me

help given

Read, Mr. St. George Stock, Dr. Venn, and I would, in addition, gratefully acknowledge the Miss of Goldsmiths' Strudwick, College, by

New

Cross,in connexion with the scientificillustrations on pp. 59-62. In conclusion, I would add that if I have appeared to ignore the it is not work of such writers as Professor Dewey or Dr. Schiller,

through any lack of sympathy or appreciation. I am, indeed, persuaded that the drift of the present work is convergent with that of the Pragmatic Reformation, and that the stress laid on and the ourselves between relevancy is a vital bond of union the central contentions of Pragmatism concern Pragmatists. But
the
or

and cannot, therefore, be appropriately Logic of Experience, adequately treated in the pages that follow. We hope to them
in
a

consider

later work.

The
treatise

present
on

volume

aspiresto be the first part of

the second
in its
more

'

complete
to

'

with

the

Logic,of which LogicalProblem

will

deal, or attempt

deal,
Some

philosophical aspect.

PREFACE brief indication

duction. Idealism
to

ix

as

to

Here in which

it

this programme be enough may author's for

a own

will
to

be

found that

in the

the

Intro

state

Religious
seems

the

conviction

culminates

him

to call

imperatively
Idealism

frank

and

fruitful
on

co-operation
the
one

between

the

of the

Hegelian

School

hand,

Psychologism of the Pragmatic and Genetic movements far as it is In attempting this reconciliation, so the other. on the to relevant requirements of a logical treatise, the author be found working in the service of to hope that he may ventures in Philosophy which, in his own mind, that liberatingmovement with the work of Professor and personality is centrally associated
and the Eucken. shield for convenient a promise of a sequel is no doubt though, indeed, only temporarily from any shelteringan author this claim I would charge of incompleteness in his treatment. The
" "

shelter
in their in the I
am

as

regards the

discussion
I

of the
to deal

of principles
this

Mathematics

bearing. logical sequel.

much
more

hope

with

important problem

doubtful

with

regard

to

the

generalproblem

of

Symbolic

of this in postponing the discussion Logic. Whether, consideration not am or shelving its department of Logic, I am I would In no case not now prepared to say. altogether, I am the interest and importance of Symbolic Logic ; but whether contest the limitations render of my its discussion programme irrelevant
"

or or

of my

own

powers
"

"

may

not

"

impracticable is, perhaps, a

present
volume
to

pardonable question.
The be distinctive
in the feature

of

the

will, I think,
the idea

found

dominating
the

position assigned
concepts of Truth
this

of

relevancy. The
been
denned in

fundamental

and
the

Reality

have

light of

category,

and

principleof

Fidelityto Relevant Fact has been adopted as the master-key to all Formal the main positions, including the central problem of a of Logic. I treatment to a material and its relation treatment,
would also draw
attention
to to the

distinction
will be

between

the

functions

respectivelyassigned
cluded nected Middle. with that This

the

Laws

of Non-Contradiction found
a

and

Ex

distinction
a

to

be

directlycon
treatment of

between

Formal

and

material

the

logical problem.
I would

In conclusion, Miss
and

acknowledge gratefully
of the
it.
W. R.

the Index

work

done

by

Klein
she

in

the is

framing

Index.

The

is her

work,

alone

for responsible

BOYCE

GIBSON.

CHAKDONNE

SVR

VEVEY,

May

10, 1908.

ERRATA.

Page

337,

line

30,

instead

of

'

Neptune's

irregularities,'

read

'The

irregularities

of

Uranus.'

Page

404,

line

27,

instead

of

'

Agreement,'

read

'

Difference.'

CONTENTS.

SECTION

PAGE

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

LOGIC

IN

ITS

RELATION
their and of and function the

TO and

LANGUAGE

(i.) Words, (ii.) Definition (iii.) The

Definition

right

use

(Ch. II.)

I.)
-

Predicables

(Ch.

Testing

Definitions Division:

(Ch. III.) Logical

Division

(iv.)

(Ch.

IV.)

(v.) Classification (vi.) Scientific (vii.) Connotation

(Ch. V.) Terminology

and Abstract

and

Nomenclature

(Ch. VI.)

Denotation
Terms

(Ch. (Ch.

VII.) VIII.)
-

(viii.) Concrete
III. THE

and

LOGICAL

PROPOSITION

(i.) The (ii.)The

Judgment
IX.)
of Laws

or

Proposition (Ch. X.)

Introductory

Statement

(Ch.

Thought
of

(a) The
The

Logical Proposition
Laws Middle of Non-

Law

Identity

in

its

relation

to

the

(6) (c)
IV

Contradiction

and

Excluded

The

Inviolability
THE OF

of

the

Laws

of

Thought
AS

ANALYSIS

OF MENT

LOGICAL MEANING

PROPOSITION
:

STATE

(i.) Kinds (iii.) The

of

Proposition
of

(Ch.

XI.)

(ii.) Analysis

the of

Categorical Possibility Proposition

Proposition (Ch. XIII.) (Ch. XIV.) (Ch. XV.)

THE

(Ch.
-

XII.)

110

Meaning

l^j
-

(iv.)

The

Disjunctive

(v.) The
THE

Hypothetical
TREATMENT
:

Proposition
OF

FORMAL POSITION (i ) Transition (ii)

The Formal

LOGICAL

PRO

to

the

Formal

Treatment of the

of

Logic

(Ch. XVI.) Proposition

to

145
-

Import
of

Categorical
Propositions
-

(Ch.
(iii.) The (iv.) The
IMMEDIATE

XVII.)
Reduction
Form

Categorical
Propositions (Ch.
XX.)

Strict

Logical

(Ch. XVIII.)
of

Opposition
INFERENCE

(Ch.

A1A.)

VI.

187

xii

CONTENTS

VII.

THE

SIMPLE
Formal (i.)

CATEGORICAL

SYLLOGISM

(ii. ) The

Rules

Preliminary(Ch. XXI.) of the SyUogism : the

-

213 216

Valid Forms

(Ch. XXII.
-

the Structure Exercises of the S.C.D. on (iii.) Syllogism (Ch.XXIII.) and the Reduction The Analysisof Syllogisms, of Argu (iv.) Form into Syllogistic ments (Ch. XXIV.) (v.)Uses and Characteristics of the Four Figures: the SpecialRules (Ch. XXV.) The Dicta (Ch. XXVI.) (vi.) The Problem of Reduction (Ch. XXVII.) (vii.) Unorthodox (Ch. XXVIII.) (viii.) Syllogisms
-

227
230 235 239 247 250

VIII.

OTHER

FORMS

OF

SYLLOGISM

(i.) Complex
The (ii.) The (iii.) (iv.)The IX. X.

cheirema

Sorites : Categorical Syllogisms (Ch. XXIX.) (Ch. XXX.) DisjunctiveSyllogism (Ch. XXXI.) Hypothetical Syllogism Dilemma (Ch. XXXII.)
-

and
-

Epi-

255 262 263 271 281

FALLACIES
THE PROBLEM

(Ch. XXXIII.)
OF
INFERENCE of the and

Mill's Estimate (i.) The (ii.) Function

SyUogism (Ch. XXXIV.)

Value and of real
a

299 304 306

Formal

Discipline
-

(Ch. XXXV.)
Truth-Inference, formal (iii.)
XL

(Ch. XXXVI.)
:

INDUCTION

AND

THE

INDUCTIVE

PRINCIPLE

Theory of Induction (Ch. XXXVII.) (a) The Pure Inductive Method (6) The Essentials of Induction (c) Induction and Inductive Inference (ii.) Hypothesis (Ch. XXXVIII.) Generalization (iii.) (Ch. XXXIX.)
' '
-

(i.)General

:
-

313 316 326 328 339

XII.

APPLICATION
'

OF INDUCTIONS
'

THE

INDUCTIVE
IMPROPERLY

PRINCIPLE

TO AND

SO-CALLED,'
'

TO

IMPERFECT

INDUCTIONS

Inductive Inferences improperly so-called (Ch. XL.) (i.) The (ii.) 'Imperfect Inductions': Induction (a) Enumerative (Ch. XLI.)

347 351 358

(6) Argument
XIII. THE

from

Analogy (Ch. XLII.)

:

GOAL

OF

INDUCTION

CAUSAL

EXPLANATION
-

Cause and Causal Law (i.) (Ch. XLIII.) The Process of Scientific Observation (ii.) (Ch. XLIV.) The Method of Causal Explanation (Ch. XLV.) (iii.) Illustrations of (iv.) (Ch. XLVI.) XIV. THE INDUCTIVE the
-

367 389 395 422 447 463

'

Application of

Inductive

Method
-

POSTULATE and

(Ch. XLVII.)
-

Index, Verbal

Analytic

I.

INTRODUCTION.

Looic
and
"

is the

the

mind's

systematic
of ?'
we

attempt
after

to

understand
To the the

the

nature

conditions
is

the

search
answer

Truth.

question,

What

Truth

would
:

by

suggesting

following-

provisional
Truth

definition

is the the

Unity

of

ideas

as

systematically
relevant fact.

organized

through

control

exercised

by
Or"

Truth

is

the

Unity
the

of

Thought
exercised
to

as

systematically by
that of the

organized
of

through
which is

control

aspect
thinker.

Reality

relevant

the

purpose the that

With
we

view
state

to

bringing
the first

out

meaning
we

of
not

these

definitions,
Truth
as a

must

in
a

place
The

do seek

regard
cannot at

datum,
which sufficient
we

but

as

problem.
for
were

truth

we

be
the

that

from
no

start,
reason

truth be of
its

already
for

attained

outset, further

could
We

assigned
course,

proceeding
the Truth

any
as

with and

the devote

quest.
our

might,
to
we

regard

given,

energies
case,

systematic
have

exposition
to

and
alter
our

application.
definition after its

But,
of
but

in

that

should
no

radically
deal
the with

Logic.
would

Logic
be

would busied

longer
with
mean

the

Search
of

Truth,

solely
would

question

consistent and

presentation.
be
nature

Logic
as

just

Consistency-Logic,
attempt
to

might
the Truth. value in its

defined and valuable

the

mind's

systematic
of
a

understand of
its the

the
as

conditions
such its
a

correct

presentation
would of

But,
would

Consistency-Logic
to
a

be,

logical
but

He,

not

in

relation
of

system
laws the that

given

truth,

analysis
We Truth
to

and would
is

development
draw
as

the in

of second
to

consistent

thinking.
to

attention,
a

place,
define We

the
as a

fact

that is

defined

Unity,
on a

and

Truth

Unity
of
course,

ground

logical inquiry
faith

monistic

basis.

cannot,

justify

monistic

by

merely

asserting

it,

nor,

by

asserting

it,

THE

PROBLEM
'

OF
'

LOGIC
is

[I.
as

make
that

our

meaning
of
that

clear.

Monism

catchword

dear

to

the Rationalism much

Hegel

as

it is to that

It is indeed
at

To
our

making. bluntly, a the outset of our inquiry,not as a dogma but as a problem. faith we than justify monistic need here do no more our justify the of for to thought as complete unity struggle right accept
calls itself Pluralism is but
we

of Haeckel, and we in the Monism

introduce it thus

suspect

much-abused

word, and

the fundamental the

nature

mark

of the

and the attempt truth-seeker, of such

a as struggle

to define

and of

conditions

the

distinctive

Logic. of this rightby presenting it as a necessity might justify that it is meaningless to suppose and contend our logical reason, that Unity of Thought and Purpose can be ultimatelysatisfied by Or we might defend anything short of the Unity of the Universe. faith as a postulatelimiting monistic the scope of our our inquiry, with than with content and proceed confidently our venture, more self-limitation. conferred upon the perfectfreedom us by our own would We prefer,however, to point quite simply to a certain for our of logicalappetite as the best justification insatiability For if we Monism. forgo or evade the struggle after Unity, we We reallydo limit ourselves in quite a literal and painful sense. the hope of a logical renounce conquest that shall leave us nothing abdicate We unsubdued mock with its alien nature. to or us foreign live in perpetual dread of border of our empire, and must a fraction troubles,of disturbances emanating from those shadowy entities the dim And hosts of the ununifiable. can one imagine thought such self-limited domain its chaos from the of a own surveying edge Is it not ? and still deliberately a redemptive mission disclaiming ifc rather like nature to weep no sees Alexander, because, thought's for further worlds to ? Our sufficient then, apology, conquer regardingthe Truth-problem as a search after Unity is that logical endure be satisfied with ambition can nothing less, and cannot the sightof chaos battening for lack of its two-edged sword. that relevant We contention turn, in the third place, to our our fact is the agency which controls the process through which the function of becomes The thinking systematized. precise expression relevant fact is to indicate that truth impliesat once and a reference to reality a reference to purpose ; and the second of the two definitions of Truth that we have given explicitly bringsout this implication. Thought submits itselfto fact as the experimenter submits himself to the object experimented on. As the experimenter determines the conditions under which the experiment shall take place, so thought selects and determines the aspect under which the facts shall be thought. The of the inquiry,be it that of the purpose the the biologist, the artist, the mystic, determines physicist, or of fact within which the student of Nature recognizesan range
function We
"

'

'

INTRO.]

INTRODUCTION
It
must

objective control. obey her ; but we

to

is true know

Nature conquer what it is that we clearly

to

that

we

muafc

obey, and
that
we

this

end

must to

first select

and

mark

out

the The his

own

domain

have Nature

then

conquer
at
once

through by
the

submission.

of investigator purpose,
'

is thus

self-controlled
facts in
so

by
far

and

outwardly
that fact which We
'
"

controlled
In
a

purpose.

word,

he is controlled

to they are germane relevant throughout by

as

i.e., by the
is relevant thus
we

to his

of that aspect nature objective interest. subjective that the the

of the

universe

reach the conclusion

set out
our

conception

of Truth
must

from

which
nate

itself determines
whole

which principle If the of relevant

domi
of
our

and inform
is to be

attempt

to realize it.

Unity

thought to fidelity
which standard
attainment. the
not

shaped through
fact must is

the

pressure and

fact,then

relevant

be the

fundamental
it must

growth
or

in Truth

determined,
any it as

principle through also figure the as

its of

criterion of
So
we

take We

inquiry into the conditions of our guiding clue through the mazes
and

problem.* logical in only the problemsof

and
"

shall realize its determinative definition

division, where

it

influence, operates

what non-ambiguity,but even in fixing which these serve mean we meaning by meaning the processes which the principle to develop. Again, the reference implies to will be found to enter into to reality, and through purpose purpose, the very conception of a complete logicaljudgment ; whilst, in this principle methodology and the problem of scientificexplanation, sustained as the funda to relevant fact will be explicitly of fidelity mental principleand standard of Induction, and rendered deter of the Inductive Postulate. in the light minate considerations to the special Let us now case apply these general Truth in so far of the present inquiry. The truth we have in view is for Ideal it a pre-philosophical an serve as Logic. can as relevantly truthfor difficult for When a more journey flights-e.gr., preparing down the abysmal depths of personality"Logic might reasonably desire to equip itself with a more conception of Truth penetrating If Truth than is required for its more is,in preliminarylabours. aim at progressively all cases, the Ideal which realizing through we which that conceived can adequately satisfy as Knowledge, and is in the interests of Order
'
'

the thinker's will to know, view

we

then

the Truth-Ideal

Knowledge, and also with know. By Knowledge we may understand Self-Knowledge, and depth of the truth-interest will then be measured by the depth of
take

of

will vary with the of this the depth will to the the

be stated in the of Thought may the Laws to of this Principle Hut it is only in the latter. the that the former simplest way by saying presupposes with the problem ot of the logical problem, in connexion purely Formal treatment understand them, can be acceptedas an of Thought, as we that the Laws Inference a concreter the truth-interest is present, Where principle adequate logical standaid. of to give Laws is required the with Thought" in conformity "operating, of
*

The

relation

direction positive

course, to our

thinking.
o

THE
is

PROBLEM

OP

LOGIC

[I.

seeking for truth-satisfaction ; we should then be con cerned with the profoundest questions with Freedom, Personality, Perfection, Immortality, God questions which spring from the and dissatisfaction of our deepest self. But if by Knowledge unrest understand, not Self -Knowledge, but Knowledge about Things, we we apprehend through the senses, we Knowledge of that which with a less intimate well be content of the meaning specification may reach this more We restricted conception of Truth of Truth. the realm fact which take to be relevant of we through marking out in to the limited requirements of a pre-philosophical treatment what here mean we a word, by defining by Reality. Under Reality we shall include two main aspects of Fact :
self that
"

"

"

'

'

1. The

world

as

common

sense

understands

it

(or some

con

2. In

restricted fragment of it). ventionally the subject-matter of Science. as Nature, understood

Sense thus closely bringingthe worlds of Science and Common together,we are making an assumption which it is important to notice. We to are sense assuming that the attitude of common
the
more or

less

fragmentary world
own

within

which

its interest

is

restricted is, on Science towards

reason

its

humbler
It may,

Nature. thus

level,similar to the attitude of however, be objected with good

common-sense

that

in

towards external

reality as
to

characterizingthe are we pre-scientific,

over a

attitude the The world

doing injusticeto
its interest in social
a

ordinaryconsciousness,which,
it, has
interests

and above

of

personal and

kind.

objectionin itself is perfectly legitimate.The ordinary conscious well as practical, is religious and has inward well as ness as as outward views of truth. to nature the If sense-ex as looking its I have the beliefs of the rests intuitionism on an seen,' perience I have moral and consciousness rests its beliefs on an religious felt.' In the one is the truth truth taken to be about an case object,
' '

the

truth

about

conception of the meaning advanced of truth are of fundamental importance, and, at a more inquiry,their discussion becomes imperative. But stage of logical of a pre-philosophical for our present purpose for the purposes i.e., this inward of to Logic we propose personal, interpretation ignore would the truth-problem, and the deeper view of Reality which that the time we remember must correspond to it. At the same full definition we have do not laid down does provisionally justice it is presented to common It imposes a to the truth sense. as
more
" "

the truth subject, of The implications

fact ; in the for a person. the

other, it
inward

is taken

as

the truth

for

restriction

which

reduces
common

common sense

sense

to

an

infra-scientific stand

point. Only
be
have

when
its
as

is thus

restricted
truth

can

Science
when
we

regarded as
eliminated

completion and
irrelevant

rectification.

Only
to

the

relation of

personal

INTRO.]

INTRODUCTION describe fairly Science

experience can
Sense.
The tion

we

as

organized Common

deliberate exclusion
of truth

the definition

may appear is given solely from The

of the personal element from the defini when to some to be unjustifiable even
the scientific and

infra-scientific

objection that,since the reference may which is implied in all truth-seeking, scientific whether to reality be characterized and defined only through can infra-scientific, or relation to logical cannot we study Reality at any stage purpose, the element. It is quite true that the without introducing personal truth-definition which have includes a refer we adopted explicitly
ence

points of view.

be raised

commits

to purpose. to us

But
a

this

mere

referenceto
of truth
to
or

view personalistic
so

in no purpose way of reality. On the

contrary, it may irrelevant view a

been have truth

defined, in

to render such as reality has this reality-reference and impossible. How the interest of a pre-philosophical treatment, we

define

the reference

already
about

seen.

The
not

limitation the truth

ensures

that

Truth

shall

be

To personal realization. Fact in must truth, we study the lightof a philosophical truth-interest,and adopt a correspond inglyphilosophical conception of reality. It is true that reference to purpose impliesreference to a deeper than that reality of nature the conception of which it serves reality the scientific point of that in this important sense to define, and the philosophic view impliesand presupposes ; but the implication remains conceptionsof latent, and the scientific and pre-scientific truth and reality correspondingly impersonal and objective. There stages in the life of Logic. In are, we may say, three main its first, formal, or common-sense stage, Logic presents itself as a it and the truth-ideal which or propaedeutic, preliminarydiscipline, of the relation then presents to thought is truth as involving thought of or but more a of the Natural to not to the reality a reality Order, less restricted and kind. The conventional point of view, in a is There conventional. of formal in the sense word, is essentially

fact, and

of

reach the

philosophical conception of

no

reference to
to

permanent

order like that

by Science, but
it
as answer

only to such the requirements of

which

conceived of Nature as conventionallyrestricted aspects of

some

purpose. particular

In grasp

the
on

second, real, or

Reality

scientific stage, the casual, disconnected restrictions involve is these conventional

abandoned. definitely

Thought

interests of discussion,or with the Armed course.

to face the

play with Reality in the inter of other requirements of practical idea of natural law, it now disposesitself
ceases

to

full force

of that

great
not

realm

of fact which itself.

has

no

limit

but that
And

of the

of applicability

the idea

a relation It presupposes broken of externality fact and idea, and is through when between itself as the this externality is done away with, and Truth shows

yet

this second

stage is

final.

C intimate

THE

PROBLEM fact.

OF
The

LOGIC

[I.

complete settingforth of of a philosophicalLogic. Briefly, it this unity is the function the the of fact of ideas within and amounts to realizing idealizing is possible to Science a, conception of experienced fact largerthan In this third stage, or appropriateto its restricted point of view. with itself, finds itself home freed at would Thought, as Hegel say, from all fettering abstraction,and at the very heart of the reality remains is then justthe sys it is its mission What to understand. this tematic articulation of the structure of experienced fact, at the Logic of spiritual most real and most ideal once experience. This Personalistic Logic,as already stated, lies beyond the scope of the present treatise ; the followingcourse covers only the first
oneness

of idea with

"

essential to the proper of the third and last. For the lessons of each earlier stage grasp taken up into the succeeding one in a form determined are by the what is conditions of the latter. richer,concreter Thus, gained at and redeemed. the one level is not lost at the next, but transcended
two

stages. The earlier stages,however,

are

assimilated the Under have Philosophy must distinctness and of the for Science, standing precision, passion
of
'

The

'

Reason

'

'

which
to

is characteristic

of the
to

relevant

fact.

Loyalty

scientific attitude, and its loyalty bestead Philosophy but ideals can

little if it does not, in its own appropriateway, include reverence for fact as an integral of all true spiritual experience. requisite

foregoing attempt to define the point of view adopted in the following formal deserves treatise,the meaning of the word the For it is more particularconsideration. customary to identify
' '

In the

term ment

'

Formal

in

Logic with which is implied

'

'

a a

Logic merely
'

of
'

Validity than
'

with
to

treat

formal

reference with the

reality.
so-called

In

particular,the word
or

formal

is associated

Forms

Formal

consistent

which Thought as the principles upon thinking ultimately depends. Thus, in using this

Laws

of

ambiguous term,
meanings.
We

it is essential

that

we

should
the

not

confuse
of

the

two

propose,

therefore,in
When
'

interests
'

clearness,to

adopt
F

the

device. following
sense

Formal of
'

fundamental
; when

of

'

we valid,' abstractly

being used in its shall employ a capital

is

it is

being used
with
a

in the
'

sense

conventional,' we
open

shall

write the word

and

small

f.'

Should

the word

the

we capitalletter be indispensable,

the sentence, shall leave it to the is

context

being used.* is The distinction between treatment and a real logical a formal distinction within a unity. Both methods equallyimply a fundato decide in which

of its two

senses

the word

Perhaps the strongest reason designate meanings apparentlyso

as
'

they

appear
'

to

be.
'

case limiting

of

A formal

'

similar words such closely to for retainingtwo different is that the meanings are not so unrelated Formal of Logic might be considered treatment as a
' '

treatment

conventional
an

restriction put upon

status essentially hypothetical

subject the case, namely, where meaning of Realityis such as to reduce (vide p. 145).
of the
"

the it to

the

THE
cannot

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
in
so. as

[I.
our use

We

maintain, without
all
men are our

variation illegitimate that

one

of

words,
The

that

rational, and

is not
as

of Interconsistency

statements

is

important

their

Self -Consistency. The pages

strue

diligentreader
treatise
statements statements

of
as a

connected

discover on different may which no charitycan con

may

interconsistent. hundred
a

The
but

be

separatedby

more

than

pages,

the

of requisite

will still Interconsistency

logical readjustment of the passages such as will make them maintainable thinker in one and togetherby one and the same The the same discourse. coherency of our thinking is essentially faithful observance of the requisite of intera dependent upon consistency. from Logical Consistency should be carefullydistinguished compel
Material

Compatibility.Whether

the

assertion
with

that
'

my

friend
'

the statement that he regularexercise is compatible to enjoy robust health, and is in that sense consistent with it,is a question that concerns A treatment material truth. which all considerations of truth and falsity* cannot ignores possibly relevant the matter. say anything upon from logical should be distinguished LogicalConsistency Validity. The meaning of the former is at once wider and more negativethan that of the latter. Consistency implies mere from freedom selfconnexion contradiction ; Validity, close that the severingof a so it would If we involve a contradiction. Some people are say it is consistent add to Some reasonable,' quite people are not shall see (vide reasonable ';but, as we could not validly we p. 174), infer that some that people are not reasonable from the statement An is said to be valid when some the con people are. argument clusion drawn from the premissesis such that we must accept it, the premisseshave been accepted. A conclusion drawn in this once its said drawn from them with from to be premissesis logical way is valid the a nd known conclusion. as a necessity, So, again, pro is a valid mortals are men are mortals, some position If all men if since the acceptance of the clause necessitates proposition, its If all men The our statement are accepting consequent.
no

takes

continues

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

mortals, all mortals are men,' is invalid if taken logical connexion, though it is not inconsistent.
We should
also note

as

asserting a
character

the

distinctively negative

of
to

Logical Consistency.Logical Consistency does not amount systematiccoherency. The coherency of a scientific system means
much
more

than

mere

freedom

from

self-contradiction. with the brief following

We
resume

conclude

this

Chapter Introductory points :

of its main

Logic is
To think

the Science of
we rightly

must
*

Right Thinking. think both consistently and truly.

Vide

note, p. 9.

INTRO.]
To think think

INTRODUCTION
is to avoid all self-contradiction. If consistently as our logical necessity thought is said requires, not
we

to

be valid.
not inconsistent. involvingcontradiction Valid involvinglogical necessity. Inconsistent involvingself-contradiction, /nvalid not involvinglogical necessity ^ To think truly is to think under the control exercised by that of our aspect of Reality which is relevant to the purpose thinking. Under Reality,as relevant to the truth-interest of a pre-philoinclude the world of Common Sense sophicaldiscipline, we the world in relation to our various practical interests and Nature understood as by Science. In either case, this reality is conceived as having a nature suffi about it. stable tentative control to our ciently thought the reality When have in view is limited by some we practical the logical ideal is satisfied in proportion as our interest, ide?s adjust themselves exercised by this to the control be limited reality. Ideas so adjusted may conventionally said to be formallyor conventionally true, true in relation
= = = = =
" "

Consistent

to

our

restricted

practical purpose.
by Science, the con is said to give us real through reality
as

When

the

is Nature reality
our

conceived

of trolling
or

ideas

scientific truth.

think when of our sole interest is in the validity our Finally, the reference of our thought to ing, the question whether relevant is formal or real ceases to be are reality ; for we shall true, be that our here no longer concerned thought but only that it shall be valid. The treatment of rightthinkingwhich is thus exclusively regu Formal lated by the Ideal of Validityis known as Logic. in Formal Whatever there is to truth or falsity reference Logic is wholly hypothetical. dis The Formal of right treatment thinkingshould be carefully Formal a tinguished from a formal reference to reality, Formal treatment being a treatment in accordance with the Laws of Thought, the laws of logical Validity. Ideal of Validity. the Formal dominated mean we By by conventional.' mean we By formal
* ' ' ' '

NOTE.
ment

"

There
'

is

certain which
to

misconception with
our very foster. We

regard to
a

our

use

of the term
may
treatment

Formal,'

definition of
have
so

Formal
that
a

treat

have
can

served

stated
as we

logical
in the these

be called Formal
or

only in

far

abstract from

all reference to truth

interest of
a

reality ; and

if the definitions
we

which,

treatment, pre-philosophical

have

given of

10

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[I.

same

terms

are

not

borne

carefully
as

in
status

mind,
of

the

reader

may

be Formal abstract

left

with

very

poor
seem

opinion
to

to

the

Formal
with

Logic.
some

Logic

will

be

concerned

essentially

department
If
we

of turn,

Non-Being.
however,
1,
to

the

definitions

of

truth

and shall is

reality, readily
intended
as we

as

given
that
no

on

pp.

4,

or

in

the of
from

resume,
a

p.

9,
treatment to

we

see

such
In

disparagement abstracting
do the
is
not

Formal reference
all

or

implied. defined
is have

all

reality
to

have It

it,
when

we

abstract

from

reference

all

reality.
which
we

only

pre-philosophical
mistaken of
to for

definition

of

reality
of
in

adopted
treatment

the

ultimate

meaning
unreal,
mere

reality
its

that

Formal

Thought degenerate
on

appears into

and,
mechanical

detailed

application,
on

tends

drudgery, explorations

the
a

one

hand,

or,

the

other,

into

irresponsible

within The still

purely

artificial from
with

world.
all reference
to

abstraction leaves

material
to

reality
itself
;

and
when

truth

us

the

reference

of

thought
with the the

and of

this

self-reference
which it

of

thought,
is studied

together
under

problem

Validity
of

involves,

redeeming
gains
a

conditions
a

philosophical
vital

insight,

Formal

Thinking
a
'

vital,

spiritually
of in

significance.
understand
an

Assuming
the in
term

philosophical
'
"

definition the
interest

Truth
"

as

we

philosophical

Validity

is

itself

interest

Truth.

II.

LOGIC

IN

ITS

RELATION

TO

LANGUAGE.

(i.)

Words,

their

function

and

right
use

(ch.

i.).

(ii.)

Definition

and

the

Predicates

(ch.

ii.).

(iii.)

The

Testing

of

Definitions

(ch.

iii.).

(iv.)

Definition

and

Division
:

Logical

Division

(ch.

iv.).

(v.)

Classification

(ch.
v.

).

(vi.)

Scientific

Terminology

and

Nomenclature

(ch.

vi.).

(vii.)

Connotation

and

Denotation

(ch.

vii.).

(viii.)

Concrete

and

Abstract

Terms

(ch.

viii.).

CHAPTER

I.

II.

(i.) WORDS,

THEIR

FUNCTION

AND

RIGHT

USE.

The

Function
start

of
the

Words. and
most

PROPOSING
way
we

as our

we

do

to

in the

humblest and
we

methodical of

in look

investigation
to

of
or

nature

conditions shall
be

Truth,
on

first
"

the

tool

instrument

dependent
written

all

through Logic,

namely,
every its

Language.
other

like
as

science,

depends
and in

on

language,
In

or

spoken,
considers

only
in

suitable themselves

instrument.

Grammar,
to
as

which other.
:

words is the
not
so

relation
as

each

Language
but
as

subject-matter
in

treated
is

of

well

the

instrument

it
an

is

Logic.
of it

Logic
and

concerned
its aim
not
a

with is
so

language
to

only
the

instrument
as

thought,
a can

handle
to

instrument

to

make

help
be directed

and
handled

hindrance in upon verbal

correct

thinking. regulative
is

Since function

thought
of

only
well.

form,

the

Logic,
upon it.

primarily
as

thought
must

itself.
reveal

inevitably pressed
and
not

language
with aims Rhetoric The
at

Language
and
use

thought
words. view with
to
a

falsify
is

Rhetoric,
But

too,

concerned

language
the aims purpose

the of

right
words
use

use

of
a

whereas

Logic

right
at

with

correct

thinking,
to

the of

right
made
to

of
to

words
prove whole As
a

view

persuasion.
and and its

Rhetoric

is
to
reason.

practically effective,
man, to

appeal

is therefore
as

the

his
at

emotions any with

humours is

well with As
an

as

his

science,
rather aim
to at

rate, Logic

concerned

theoretical
art

soundness

than

practical efficiency. efficiency,

but its

it may made

be

said

to

practical
reason.

appeal

is

still

exclusively

the

Over

this

instrument,
But the
use

Speech,
nature

Logic
what
we

proposes
to

to

exercise
must

appro be in
we

priate

supervision.
with the

supervision,
of

be

logical,

accordance
consider natural The in
our

is
must

supervised.
learn

Before
of

right
in function minds I

of

words,
to

something

their

function main
own

relation of in

thought.
is
to
our

words
those it into of

fix

meanings
If of of I vision.

or

ideas
to
see

both
an

and

of

fellows. focus number

wish

object

clearly,

bring
the

the
a

This
eye

I
move-

do

instinctively through

help

delicate

13

14

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC of the
two

[II.i.
eyes,

merits.

There

are

movements
near or

of convergence
far

of

accommodation
These

to

vision, and

focusing movements.

to fixate the us eye-muscles fixate smells look at. we Similarly, objects we by setting our nasal muscles in action, and so inhalingor sniffing upwards. We of the palate in action, and fixate a taste by settingthe muscles in pressing the food on to the palate. So with the ear-muscles It is in a to fix a sound. hearing. A horse will prick its ears that the utilize muscles of lips, we perfectly analogous sense breath into sounds our tongue, larynx, for toning and articulating that bring our Thus, we control the meaning fixedlybefore us. of of certain utterance our a thought by means special set of the in breath to the muscles involved so as muscles, controlling produce articulate sounds.

contractions

of

the

enable

'

'

The For
not

function

of words

is to fix
to

ideas,and

this in

twofold

sense.

who impress meanings on think ; they also serve to express our meanings to others, and are then known as expressivesigns. should be distinguishedfrom substitute signs. An These ex is whereas substitute meant to a meaning, pressivesign express be manipulated without which can our knowing sign is a counter what it stands idea for (cf. Stout, Analytic Psychology,'p. 193). substitute signs. I may used as are Thus, algebraical symbols of cows start a by positing that x shall stand for the number but I certain farmer to solve the equation bought ; go on may the I xz + 3x + 2 20 without about cows. more thinking any laws according to which I concerned with the algebraical am solely the value the sign. It is only when profitably operate upon may of x is found that I think about the cows again. If I say All S is P,' or Such substitute signs are not words. words S is P,' S and P are not words. only if They would be the the letters attention of intended fixate to on alphabet they were indicated. They are mere symbols, and do not call attention to A word,' it has been well said, is an instrument their meaning. it expresses for thinking about the meaning which ; a substitute it the meaning which of not thinking about sign is a means symbolizes (ibid., p. 194). which But of expressivesigns, to return to the natural function is to fix meanings with view to rendering them a unambiguous and stable. Meanings are naturallyvolatile ; in Hegel'sexpressive phrase,they have hands and feet. It is indeed no easy task for the of thought. While words with the march to keep even pace meaning runs through a succession of changes, the word has a way of remaining unchanged. The change in the meaning of a word tends to take place in one of two become or more generalized, opposite directions : it may it may become more specialized.

only do

they

serve

ourselves

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

16

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.i.

animals, trees, picture is full of detail figures, and a curving river-bed. Experts tell us that the organicunity of the parts of that picture is such to cut out the that, if we were smallest of all this the whole effect detail, of appreciable fragment the picture would be destroyed. Now consider this patch of colour which will has been If seen cut out. we on a pieceof paper suppose it might be devoid of all significance into by itself, ; but put it back its proper in the whole place, and it shares at once beauty and takes its in of the life. So a the picture's meaning picture, part itself word in its usual when seen (colourless enough by meaning conventionalized when as by definition), placed in an appropriate the glow of the context. takes on at once setting,
The
"

on-Thames.

The The

Right

Use

of Words

Aspect). (Logical
fix

essential function

of words
over

being to
them
must

meanings, the
in

Logic it the this intrinsic tendency of language so as to make rectifying The essential fact best possible medium for expressingthe truth. of the function cf language have to reckon with in this regulation we the expressionof ideas is that ideas show an intrinsic plasticity as that meanings grow and vary with the context. and indefiniteness, to stereotype the meaning Hence, any policywhich tends ruthlessly counter to the proper fulfilling of the of words would obviouslyrun is to express thought. If such essential function of language,which the use of a word, it will be for special definite fixity is imposed upon of the elaborate technology of Science, as when, in the case purposes, is subordinated to the paramount of expression every other requisite of desideratum precision. This natural tendency of words to fix the meanings they express receives its true logical guidance from the Principleof Non-Am the This is the Principleof Identity not to be same as biguity.
discussed
correct

vision which

exercises

consist

super guidingand

further

on,

and

if

we

venture

to call it the

first law

of

it is firstnot for thought itself, but thinking, towards the for us who inward more are making our way gradually of nature that most the our truly thinking. It principles express in the is essentially a limitingor negative principle. It insists, the natural and that indefiniteness interests of rightthinking, fluency reach the of shall of our never ambiguity. But it point meaning indefiniteness in the use of words, with an appropriate has no quarrel i.e., provided this indefiniteness is definite enough for the purpose the truth of to ambiguity. In this sense see does not amount we It is only when the saying that Logic is the medicine of the mind. its remedy of definition. ambiguity is felt that Logic presses upon us the tendency in language to render and regulating In interpreting our thinking determinate, Logic has not infrequentlyto unfix in It unfixes the casual non-purposiveassociations order to fix better.

and

consistent

"

CHAP.

II.]
have

DEFINITION

AND

THE

PREDICABLES

17

by reference to any up at random, undisciplined held ideal,practical theoretical. or Language, if self-consciously

that grown
our thinking. We may unthinkingly used, plays the tyrant over become the slaves of words. We allow a word to gather easily may insist on about it a cluster of subjective associations with which we it whenever it is used, never to inquirewhether investing troubling the word in the new context, or as used by the author we are study does not mean ing, something quitedifferent from such meaning as have come to attach to it. In the interests of rightthinking, we

words
any

should

stand

loose the

from

such

associations, so
or

as

to

take
mean

on

desired
not

meaning,
involve

ideal logical

only that requiring

unreasoned

the

ing shall

any

ambiguity

inconsistency.

CHAPTER
II. DEFINITION (ii.) AND THE

II.
PREDICABLES.

Definition 'per ordinary talk provided we can

purposes. If
a

Genus

et

Differentiam.

IN

we

are

not

over-careful of the
to
means

make

ourselves

rightuse of words, for practical sufficiently intelligible

use a

friend

happens

word

with

which

we

are

not

ask him what he we familiar, with his satisfied answer quite

us

if it be
are

by it ; but we are, as a rule, definite to show sufficiently

us

what

he is

to. referring

We

satisfied if he describes to
Mr. He

the

meaning
name

of the

unfamiliar

word.

Alfred

S'dgwick has given a

'

to this kind
'

of information.

calls it

translation.'

'

De

term. satisfactory simpler and more of a consists in giving a general account Descriptionin this sense Mr. word's meaning. It givesus the rough meaning of the word. Sidgwick is anxious, and rightlyso, that we should not confuse description(or unelaborated definition)with definition proper. definition means Etymologically, marking out the limits or boun

scription

seems,

however,

daries of the do in
amount at their

use

ordinarydiscourse.
of useful

of words, and We

this,
are

as

rule, we
to
we use

never

trouble to
a

content

speak
are

with

certain

certain of their

misty edges. Indeed, apart inherent indefiniteness of contour, they would cease

vagueness. centre, but they have

The

words

clear

enough
from
to
a

be

useful ; for it is the very indefiniteness of words which permits really taking on different shades of meaning accordingto context. But, as Mr. Sidgwick points out, indefiniteness does not mean definite of it. If a word were ambiguity, though it is a precondition through and through, with clear-cut edges in addition to a wellbecome niarked be ambiguous. Words centre, it could never 2

18

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.ii.

ambiguous when their inherent indefiniteness has become such that it perplexesthe meaning of what Take the word Liberal.' we say. The Mr. which latent in the indefmiteness,' was Sidgwick,* says few months name a up to the beginning of April, 1886, became afterwards so ambiguity ; within what used to patent as to cause be called the Liberal party there had come to light two sub-classes, each of which denied to the other the rightto the name.' The single had no longer one in two ; the word well-marked meaning had split and but two not told,on being spoken so centre, ; long as we were to about C or was Liberals,whether being referred to, ambiguity C1
'
'

'

would We

arise.

conclude, then, that if we would use our words rightly, we must be able the which to at definition becomes (1) recognize point and to set about discovering know how to the defini (2) ; necessary
"

required. have to recognizethat, even when we up as regards (1), there is doubt to the meaning of a term in an assertion, a defini as tion is not necessarily called for. To define a word formally is to mark the encroachments off its edges from of other words, and there is no point in being preciseabout the edges if there is uncer A definition, in fact, is rarely wanted tainty about the centre. unless the rough meaning of a word If the is already known. in grasping the meaning of a sentence arises from undifficulty with any word, description is called for,not definition ; familiarity but if an actual difficulty is felt in applying a familiar word correctly in a given case that is,whenever the latent indefiniteness natural to the word is actuallycausing ambiguity then definition is called
To
sum
" "

tion when

for.f
If it is called The natural

for,how
is
:

are

we

to
a

set about

answer

Through
in contact

at their outer

edges are

process with other be To

most

defining? of Comparison. Words

work of

the

words,
out
a

and

the respec
com

tive

can sphere the meanings. paring and adjusting

of influence of each such words

us

marked define

only by
word,
we

must

compare

it with

as

are

closelyrelated
Differentia.
The
common

to

it in genus
rest
;

meaning.

This

gives

the
the

Genus word

and has in

includes the

marks

which

with

the

the differentia those which

it from them. distinguish this We may result in Defini different form. a slightly express tion,we may say, is the process whereby we assignto a word (1)its and to difference which serves class-designation, (2) the specific
"

it distinguish

from

all other

words

that

share

the

same

class-

designation. Experience shows that, though nothing is in all respects like any other thing, yet thingscan be separated out into groups, each group comprising all those different objectswhich resemble each other in
*

A.

Sidgwick,
49.

'

The

Use

of Words

in

Reasoning,' p.

196.

t Ibid., p.

CHAP.

IT.]

DEFINITION

AND

THE

PRKDICABLES
then
common common

19

certain

points P15 P0, P3,P4.

"

classed,and

the

class-name

objects are defined, by these

these called

The

said to
marks marks

be
"

Pj, P2, P3, P4. Anything possesses then designatedby the class-name, also
Further, the
tions between

that

is

class-name,
a

as

such,
or

cannot

general name. possiblyspecifydistinc

'

the

the included

sub-classes.
a

The

name

horse

'

cannot

inform
I other

me

whether

cart-horse

race-horse

is in

question.

If

of a wish, specifya from the genus, words, to differentiate a species mark, or differentia. Thus, if I wish to define the qualifying kind or species of vehicle known as omnibus,' I ask myself : What which this species is the genus or class under and what is the falls, from or differentia, mark, whereby it is distinguishable specific whatever fall under the same other species ? Now, practi genus have seen, we this question by bringingtogether as we answer cally,

therefore,to

section particular

class,or, in I must add a

'

and com possible, tram.' Let us compare omnibus,' for example, with paringthem. The terms four-wheeled public vehicles ; they agree in designating in this : that, whereas differ essentially the one designatessuch vehicles of this kind as are the other designates confined to rails,
as

many

words

with

related meanings closely

'

as

'

such

as

are

not

confined to rails.
(r'enus
:

Four-wheeled

publicvehicle.

Species: Omnibus. Differentia:Not confined if we have had

Tram.
to rails.
'

Confined

to

rails.

compared the
some

two
as

terms

omnibus

'

and

'

cab,'we

should

had

such
:

result

this

Four-wheeled

not publicvehicle,

confined

to rails.

Species: Omnibus.
: Keeping to Differentia

(Jab. wellNot

keeping to
defined

well-

defined

routes.
'
'

routes.

If

we

had

compared
some

omnibus,'
as

"

cab,'
:

tram

'

we together,

should

have had

such

result
:

this

Four-wheeled

publicvehicle.

: Omnibus. Species

Differentia: Keeping
well-defined
not

to

Keeping to
to rails.

Tram. well-defined confined

routes, and
to

routes, and

confined

rails.

Cab. Not keeping to welldefined routes, and not conlined to rails.

This

by assigninggenus and for practical : purposes for it is of the essence of practical that it should requirement adap: itselfto the exigencies of the specific occasion. The definition found
comparison,
most

defining by

direct

and

is by differentia,

far the

convenient

2"2

20

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II. ii.
it will make with

is likely to have this defect : that a dictionary by consulting in which The only way suit the occasion. to not precisely

defirition relevant is to select for ourselves the kindred which

to

terms

the term

in

question is in risk of

being confused,

and

then

note, from the point of view that happens to be interesting us, its use from that of all these the differentia whicli distinguishes kindred
terms.

The
Taken

Relation

of Genus

to

Differentia.

to the

Genus and Differentia state the marks essential together, definition. They include justthose features which are logically of our f or the indispensable unambiguous statement meaning. The
"

however, between relation,

"

the two be

types

of definition-mark

adequatelyrepresented generic and the specific cannot side them side of co-ordinate as by though they were by placing the specific The and as differentia, mark, specifies, significance. the mark therefore it is a or : generic logically presupposes, genus the the of of And, though specification comparison process genus. definitions are occasional framed does not our through which this connexion is the less none connexion, the bring out explicitly It is concealed the implied. only by logical definitely incomplete this process of the comparison process as we conduct it. Were ness marks of agreement between the two terms would thorough-going, include not only determinate, but also indeterminate marks, so far
the
as

these latter would other

were

relevant
reveal

to

our

purpose

in

defining ;
a

and

the

differentia

then

itself quitenaturally as marks

'

specification

of

one
'

or

of these

indeterminate

define

view,

it with compare The two say, of public transit.

tram,'

we

of agreement. To omnibus,' from the point of

terms agree in determinately

four-wheeled signifying

public vehicles,but

they
'

also agree

inde

in requiring distinctive method of proceeding from some terminately The differentia confined to rails to destination. starting-point what this method must of a distinctive be in the case justspecifies It is thus only in relation to the indeterminate elements of tram. that the the genus that we could endorse Mr. Joseph's contention the differentia the the is specific general type or plan, genus that is realized or developed.'* mode in which The Let us take an illustration suggestedby Mr. Joseph himself. and N of be taken rectilinear three-sided A as plane might genus specifiable construction,possessingsome arrangement of the three sides.' The differentia of the term triangle namely, enclosing be of the above indeterminate then would a specification a space of a triangularconstruction,the sides are mark ; in the case so arranged as to enclose a space. |
' ' " " ' ' '
'
"

'

"

t Mr.
the
'

Cf. p. 70. Joseph, 'An Introduction to Logic,' p. 68. of the of that out species as the specification Joseph points conception smaller class forbids the a our as a larger including describing genus genus
' ' '

CHAP.

II.]

DEFINITION

AND

THE

PREDICABLES
the admission

21

If further determinate

be required for justification mark into the

structure

of the

in

of

we definition,

in the fact that

it is necessitated

by the

zation

process

through
"

which

our

very nature definition is reached.

find it may of the generali The

"

of Generalization

or

of its main

and species the stultify understand by it a process whereby vitallytogether. We may differences are ruthlesslyeliminated, and points of agreement all relation identities identities disengaged from reduced to mere of genus from But if the abstraction to difference. species implies of of agreement from the marks this logical isolation of the marks consider the it is manifestly impossible to species as difference, of If in the mounting, through generalization, specifications genus. the lower the vital bond between from speciesto genus, we sever and the higher class,we cannot, when descending,through differ behave as entiation,from genus to species, though this bond were

understood

as

to

feature, Abstraction attempt to connect genus

may

process be so

"

still unsevered. that generalization (or surely gratuitous to suppose of this It kind. of is, a devitalizing course, process and the after this Formal conceive it to fashion, Logician possible embrace But justin so far as we has almost invariably done so. a the old static view of it and abandon true conception of identity, A is A,' we in the formula are as compelled to entertain typified But it is

abstraction)is

'

new

ideas about
we

Abstraction.

To

abstract
one

ence,

find,is not
a new

to isolate them

from

agreement from differ another, but to connect

"

itself through the Abstraction process the that the difference becomes of the agreement a specification does not Abstraction of the difference. agreement a generalization them in way. It is take that
us are

from
out to

differences that have

no

identical element
:

to identities

of all relation to differences

the still points back
'

it takes But

us

from

the deter
it has

minate
so

reached

indeterminate. relatively from to the specifications Colour

'

the

indeterminate
which is neither
'

been

abstracted.

does

not

mean

that

which

nor violet, red, nor kind,' and, to signify violet, seen or some
'

colour of blue, nor any other ; it means when its meaning is pressed a little further, it is colour

red, or blue,

or

some

other colour.'
to

As

abstracted
classes

from

these

differences, it still stands

them

in what

within or it,and consequentlyrenders the attempt to represent the species relation by means of two within the other, entirely misleading. The one circles, word the genus of svhereas a "class,"' he says (ibid., collection, p. 69), 'suggests which it realizes.' but a scheme anything is not a collection to which it belongs, (vide Now, in so far as we are reading the class in intension or conno-denotation above described, to consider it 'as p. 72), it is undoubtedly necessary, in the sense ' in a particular (ibid., something realized in its various members way p. 71) ; but from the point of view of extension (videp. 158) it is at least reasonable,and may be
'

to depict the objects indicated purposive, by the class-term as included But to admit number class-term. of indicated second larger objects by a admit that the one class (extensively included within the be can denned) (alsoextensively denned).

\v

ithin

the

this is to other class

22

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.ii.

abstracted relation. The genus, as pre-disjunctive from the species, still points back to the species it has from which A of is been abstracted. rational (animal some man a kind) ; an animal is a sentient of We some then, conclude, kind). (organism that Generalization when properly interpreted, (or Abstraction), works of in the service of the logical evolution meaning. The genus, of which is abstract the rudiment or vestige, potentially qua germ the speciesare It requiresbut the interest in the specifications. the logical development of meaning to transform it actuallyfrom
is at

least

the

one

to the

other.*

The
The

Predicates.

outlined in the foregoing as theory of practicaldefinition, with is connected the Aristotelian doctrine of discussion, closely the Predicables.
lands make The

Predicables, for Aristotle,were

'

the various

might be predicated of a subject. If I P may statement (where S is a class-concept), stand to S in any be its of five possiblerelations. It may one it may definitioni.e., give the genus and differentia of S. Or it be the genus alone or the differentia alone. Finally,it may may of else heads accident. These an S, or give a property or proprium to of predicables,' as called, have passed,' they are sometimes quote Mr. Joseph again, into the language of science and of ordinary
of attribute
which the

S is P

'

"

'

'

'

conversation.

We say

ask

how

to

triangle ; monarchy
different the

we a

that

the

define virtue, momentum, air,or a limited is of a Viola, species pansy

; that
one

speciesof
man

constitution

genus

contains
are

more

species than another

; that

; that

the crab and

the

lobster the
in

generically
animals
with of

is differentiated

from

lower

by
acci

possessionof reason ; that quinine is a that valuable properties the jury brought ; dental death ; and so forth (ibid., p. 54).
'

medicine
a

many

verdict with

There
of

is

later scheme

of Predicables

connected

the

name

six hundred some Porphyry, a logicianwho wrote years after t he between sole difference Porphyry's Superficially, scheme and the older of Predicables, as given in his ^la-ajwjrj,

Aristotle. scheme

of Aristotle himself, appears to be the substitution of the of predicable species for the predicable of definition.' The
' ' '

differentia, proprium. species, and But accidens. the substitution in question conceals a more In the case fundamental disagreement between the two schemes. of Aristotle the subject-term meant a common nature, a kind, species, or universal, and not the individual object as such. The predi and cables were, therefore, and one all,predicated about a species,
are

for Porphyry, predicables,

genus,

Cf. with
'

between in

the above the abstraction

'

the discussion in Chapter VIII. and the implied in generalization be noted.

The distinction p. 88. results which abstraction

abstract terms

should

24

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC their
the

[II.ii.

do
'

not, of

course,

define words
'

apart from
animal
'

is defined

by

the term

rational

is not

meaning. What mere sound-sign

soundthe mere man,' but its meaning. If by words we mean to signsin themselves, we cannot be said to define words, nor even as describe supports for them, but only to utilize them sensory meanings which can be defined. is it that The define,things, we meanings, or question What
"

'

'

words have
it is

?' has

been

the

theme

of immemorial

controversy.
maintained

There that

been

three

rival

parties. The

realists have

that we define define ; the conceptualists, things that we The meanings ; the nominalists,that we define words and names. The realists controversyhinged on the meaning of the universal.' held that things had, in all those relations in which they resembled
'

each
common

other, a

common we were

or

universal

nature, and

this that,in defining

at least as genuine and what was defining nature the individual of reality constituent was as a indispensable the universal that held element of objects. The conceptualists themselves, but only in the thought which existed,not in the objects

nature,

conceived the

them

the

true

universal

was

the

concept.
same was name

Finally,
had
a mere

nominalists
common

held

that
the

things
name.

called The

by

the

nothingin
convenience
or

but

universal

thus
in

of

language. The only true

whether existent,

reality

thought, was by the nominalist

universal

in

conceived and the individual was the individual, within it in a sense which excluded the presence
nature.

of any

The

conflict between

these rival views

was

conflict between

ab

hostile to each other, being intrinsically and in reality, indispensable. mutually complementary were, of meaning is that definition have the We already suggested time the definition of an object,and to thio always at the same extent the definition is realistic : definition is always definition of On the other hand, such objective content, we objectivecontent. hold, is definable only in relation to subjectiveintent, so that, in defining it as conceived in the light the object, we are defining of this or that specific To this extent interest. our point of view it is not abstract, Still, might be characterized as conceptualistic. but, shall we say, concrete conceptualism. The conceptualism we have adopted is simply realism tempered by the requisite of reference

stractions which, far from

to purpose.

According to

the interest bear any

to

or

purpose

ceptualism may of a mere conceptualism

is term

shade
an

of

engaged, this plasticcon case meaning, from the limiting

the realistic element

idealism in which

a completely transfigured.If what is essential to me in defining is primarilyand predominantly this, that my meaning shall be of the object clearlyand unambiguously understood, the nature and my meaning has but a vanish counts in the definition, for little ing reference to objective conceptualismin a reality. This is logical

CHAP.

II.]

DEFINITION

AND

THE

PREDICABLES

25

strict but the

still intelligible sense.

It is

governed by

an

interest

in

If, on the other hand, my logical purityof meanings as such. of the interest that it has for me, an meaning object the subject lies primarilyin discovering what that object means, tends to mean, within the spiritual or unity of the universe, the is transformed into idealism, and my definition will conceptualism to the logical answer requirements of idealistic conviction. have We that the true logical to add nominalism, in its finally relation to the problem of definition, is indistinguishable from con ceptualism. To define a word is to define its meaning : we do not define as a mere sound-complex the aggregate of vowels and con
interest in the
" "

sonants

which
are

make
not

up

word.

When
mere

animal,' we
sented

by

definition vice in
versa.

sign repre the three letters m, a, n, arranged in a certain order. All of meaning is at the same verbal time and definition,
or

definingthe

' Man say verbal label

we

is

rational

The

distinction between
a

nominalism
a

and

conceptualism,

is definition, The
statement

distinction without
that do
not

difference.

we mere sound-complexes as be It be taken to mean that misunderstood. easily may may do not even define the meanings of symbols qua symbols. But we this is by no means implied in the statement. Any and every true meaning, as we hope eventuallyto show, is definable in some of the word. The sense meanings of symbols as such are indeed I define the conventional I say : when definable. symbol man Man is a conventional verbal symbol representing the concept rational animal." Every symbol has, in fact, a twofold mean the of the ing : meaning symbol qua symbol, and the meaning of the idea which is symbolized by the symbol. The meaning, in a word, may be the meaning either of the sign or of the signification. When I say rational man means animal, I am a definingthe is a rational animal, I am man meaning of the sign ; when I say the meaning of the significate.* defining We doctrine of meaning and of now proceed to apply the logical have just been formulatingit, to the non-defining as definition, we

define

such

'

'

"

"

"

'

'

'

'

predicables, property and accident. A property or proprium is an attribute which, though not neces interest. is still relevant to the defining sary to the definition itself, It is thus already present by implication in the meaning which an
interest. lightof a specified is Thus, in the geometricalproposition The equilateral triangle the equiangular,' predicate states a proprium of the subject. is the Triangle equal-sided the differentia, equiangular genus, the proprium. The triangleis equiangularityof an equilateral an implied in the system of spatial relations, apart from which and has our equilateral no geometrical triangle meaning, geometrical interest no real object. The geometricalinterest in an equilateral
us
; '

objecthas

for

in the

'

'

'

'

'

For

further

development of

this

point,cf.pp. 115,

121.

26

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.ii.

of Space, and the this reference to the nature triangle presupposes is conceived as constructed in Space as Geometry equilateral triangle
treats trace

of it.
out
"

The

enclosing plane equal sides, with three equal sides. But when come a space a triangle we i.e., the the thus to examine constructed, of triangleas properties discover that one of these is equiangularity.'As a further we have the fact we property of an equilateral triangle, qua triangle, that the three internal angles are to two right collectively equal angles. Let us look a littlemore at the relation between proprium closely
a
' ' '

furnishes very construction with three rectilinear figure

the

definition.

We

and

definition.
It

as definition,

we some

have

seen,

is the definition interest

or

of

an

objectivenature
view.

qua

related

to

definite
to

point cf
the of

would,
does not

however,
was

be

irrelevant

include

within

definition whatever Definition

relevant

to the interest

; for the function

beyond the removal of ambiguity, and there may relevant that is perfectly to the interest, but be much which, so far as mere non-ambiguity is concerned, need not bo stated. The explicitly propria,therefore,develop, from the point that at which nature Definition stops, the meaning of the objective fraction is being defined. What the definition states is only that of nonof the essence which its own logical principle the principle ambiguity requiresit to state. The residue is developed in the
extend
" "

form We

of propria.
must
"

at two distinguishbetween types of propria two least,for we eventually find it convenient to add a third. may characteristic.' They are Propertiesmay be either implied or from the with when implied logical necessity they are deducible fixed by the definition in strict nature we are as interpreting, Thus relevance to the defining interest. equiangular is a be deduced for it can implied property of equilateral triangle,' with logical necessity from the geometrical space-construction defined by three-sided plane rectilinear figureenclosinga space and by the differentia of equal-sidedness.' A property is when characteristic it predicatesof the nature attribute which, without we are an being implied,' interpreting of be shown can by observation or experience to be both typical interest. that nature and relevant to our Thus, from interpreting con the point of view of biological science, such attributes as food,' reproducing itselfafter its tractile,'irritable,' assimilating of an kind,' would be characteristic properties organism.'
' ' ' ' ' ' '

""

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

The

Meaning of Essence.''
'

'

By
contact

What

meaning we aim at expressingthe and a subjectiveinterest. between an objective nature is this interplay is indispensable of to the conception essence
' ' '

essence

or

essential

'

'

CHAP.

II.]

DEFINITION and
'

AND
intent.

THE

PREDICABLES be

27

between

content

It will thus of view of

seen

that,
'

from

the
'

right-thinking,essence All meaning is essential terms. of meaning are more intimately From the point of view have essential than others. we adopted, that which accidental the non-essential or implies no interplay is logically and intent between content meaningless. It is meaning and therefore meaningless for rightless for the interest in question, the to be unable which to assimilate is so constructed as thinking,
'
" "

logical point of view, the point and are meaning synonymous some types meaning, though

irrelevant Some

as

such. of

types

meaning,
In

we so

have far
as

just said, are

the intent

more

intimately
interest in

essential than

others.

is

an

the definingthe content up to the point required for satisfying of our of non-ambiguity, the essence meaning is given by principle the intent takes us beyond genus In so far as genus and differentia. and differentia
to

other

marks

which the
essence
'

are

still relevant of
our
'

to

it and is

characteristic
more

of the

content,

meaning
'

given
'

inclusively by propriaas well, by implied or characteristic of interplay between there is yet a third form But properties. of our still more The essence content and intent. meaning becomes
inclusive if
we

reckon
this

among

the

marks

which

are

relevant

to

our

intent, and relevant,

are

in

sense

essential to
Thus
a

it, features

which, though
be

a building may palace, a problematic. the point of view of a palace may be the palace of a king. From for social uses, the possi general interest in buildingsas edifices relevant mark of a building, of being a palace is a perfectly bility and the possibility of a palace being a royal palace a perfectly relevant mark of a palace. Such as we problematic properties, in realized call need in concrete be not them, actually may any in question. Any type of building stances of the meaning or nature which the architect could imagine, plan, and realize if need be. would be a problematic property of building.' It might be con venient to such to give a specialname problematic propertiesas but actually realized in at least not only capable of realization, were occasion. We instance concrete one or might refer to these as occasional properties. Thus, from the architect's point of view, it would be an occasional property of a buildingto be a palace or a occasional not country-house. Problematic propertieswhich were in this sense might be referred to as purelyproblematic.' It mighl be possible to build a house which should have the preciseshape of an elephantor of an icosahedron ; but, until such houses are actually the device in questionremains built, a purelyproblematic property. Problematic propertiesshould not be identified with accident-' '
'

'

'

'

marks, from genuine accidents,

or

accidental

as

we

have

defined

them view
we

above. have
so a

The

the
are

generalpoint of
irrelevant and
to
our

must

be

marks

which

intent, and
Thus,
in

adopted, entirely

outside the

of interplay

intent

content.

flower,the

28

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
the
so

[II.ii.
botanist

is to colour, which to the artist is essential, accidental, whilst the microscopic characters

relatively

important to the botanist are, from the artist's point of view, entirelynegligible. Again, if my interest lies in the assuaging of my thirst,tumbler, and other appropriate vessels are all alike to me : the hand]e mug,
mug
not

of the

and
in

its absence

in the

tumbler

are

mere

accidents, for
interest.

of my they fulfilling way any again,despitethe fact that the burning of wood and
iron
are

do

affect

the

So.

both processes of oxidation, are still essentially different for the person
such
an one

and

rustingof so akin, they chemically who is seeking warmth.

interest

the

To

the

resemblances

which

the

chemist
'

are

and in this sense accidental. purely irrelevant, It may be objected that accidents irrelevants not as are pure predicablesat all,for no one can logically predicate of a subject what is irrelevant to it. Subject and predicate are united in the interest which the the of making statement, and, as so prompts This may united, are relevant to each other. very well be granted,
'

in which with

case
'

the

'

accidents

'

of Aristotle's scheme
'

become

identical

that have we problematic properties of the scheme the in the of realizable a adopted, accident, guise possibility, the into of The essence our enters, in an intelligible meaning. way, then reducible to four definition, are predicables genus, differentia, and property ; a property being either implied,' characteristic,' and a problematic property being either pure or problematic,'

the

and

"

'

'

'

'

'

'

or

occasional.' word
more on

One

the

problem of Essence.
and the
content

Once

the indent
is

or

defining purpose

is

relevant to strictly But in clear. ordinaryirreflective thought

determined, the intent, the meaning of Essence

we

limited to what

is

logically

are,
we

as

rule,neither

self-conscious of
it to the

nor defining purpose, of a given content. deciphering our

suggestion and habit. thingstogether,we come,

mental each

of

When

we

apply consistently largelythe slaves habituallyexperience certain

We
are

do

in accordance them
as

with

well-known

laws

of

association,to other. Indeed, we

we cease

conceive show the

inherentlybelonging to independence of mind justin propor

association. and
I

tion
'

as

to be

slaves of such
'

quote the
and

from following A
court

Dr.

Watts's
and

Logic
bred

'

lady, born

amongst

pomp

equipage

notions of birth and quality, constantlyjoins and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines these to be essential to her nature, and, as it were, she is to her being. Thence necessary

the vain

tempted
kind
as

to look

upon has

menial of

servants

and

the lowest rank from

of

man

another

species
never

beings,quitedistinct

herself.

ploughboy that
seen

travelled

led to and

nothing but thatched imagine that thatch

that
must

and has beyond his own village, houses and his parishchurch, is naturally of a house, belongs to the very nature

that

be

church

which

is built

of stone, and

es-

CHAP.

II.]

DEFINITION

AND

THE

PREDICABLES

29

uncle has it. A child,again, whose if it has a spireupon pecially been excessively fond, and his schoolmaster very severe, easilybe is lieves that fondness always belongs to uncles, and that severity

essential to masters red coats, and

can or

or

instructors. with these

He

has

seen

also soldiers with

ministers that
a

persuades himself
that he be he
a

long black garbs are

who
has

and therefore he gowns, essential to the character,

not
a

is not

minister is not

long
an

black

gown, from

nor

soldier who ended

I

dressed in red.
I
a can

It would

be well if all my

such mistakes
own

in childhood.'
was

add
to
see

instance the

From

experience. that day onwards believed that a palace was

Palace

taken

as on

child
to

right
not
a

advanced
was

palaceunless it
that would

CrystalPalace. boyhood I firmly made of crystal.

mind in my shocks to this old super until my further reading gave the necessary reflective the and of stition, thought at length slowly dis power

and

stone

were

two

ideas

not

blend

solved

it.

Real

or

Scientific Definition.

have in view in framing definitions, we special purposes that of meeting the stands out pre-eminentlyabove all others" one function of Definition is here The logical requirementsof Science. of to the ideal of Nature, and a systematized knowledge adjusted which arise in the pursuit consists in the removal of all ambiguities Of all the
of this ideal. which that the definitions are readily understood the within net for our vastlycomplex required ordering meanings of Science cannot work of relations which subserve the organization the be reached in quite so simple a manner occasional defini as can interests. varied practical tions which subserve our Thus, the mere concept with another will process of comparing one not in any way define fundamental suffice to a physicalconcept such that of inertia, as weight, mass, or gravitation.In each of these expressionof great scientific dis concepts we have the condensed the of highly elaborated embodiment coveries, theory ; hence the path to definition here lies not in a process of simple comparison, but in a searchinganalysis and interrelations of the of the interactions It will

be

facts of Nature.

help of construction, and it is by ideally constructing its concepts e.g., those of straight Here line and circle that the definitions of Geometry are reached. the specifying mark mark is genetic, a embodying a rule of con struction. of a circle is a line traced by Thus, The circumference which a in one point moves plane at a constant distance from a fixed point in that plane.' Cf. also the definition of a circle as a

In

Geometry
"

such

proceeds by analysis

the
"

'

section

of

cone

drawn

Outside

Geometry

square to its axis. the genetic definition

is not

usual, though

it

30

THE

PROBLEM

OF wish
main

LOGIC
to

[II.ii.
define
with

is

common

in up

Chemistry, when
elements. it
uses

we

compounds
Science
the

as

made in

of their

The

interest which

has

defining the

terms

is in connexion

problem of

Classification.
definition

Order

is here

is therefore

dominatingneed, and the work of dominated by this general requirement of

the

order.

relatively simple and schematic requirements of formal of Science : the definition are quite inadequate for the purposes
Thus the distinction but the

between value

formal of
a

and

scientific definition of this kind

to

main

distinction

would

is inevitable ; be lost if, by

on we were it, insisting the definingprocess

in any way at whatever

obscure

the

essential
we

unity of
to

stage of thought
alike
a we

choose

consider it.
In formal and in scientific definition in reference
to

have

define
In

and by relations, than

purpose
to
a

to necessarily stated or implied.

formal

definition the the

the

reference subjective
to

purpose

is

more

conspicuous meanings. But

very less

objectiverelatedness
a

system of kindred

connexion

of the defined
of interrelated

with definition,

system
so

meaning, through its the meanings is none

the
'

present for not

purpose, have we
we

being

obvious.

If, in

interest
' '

of

some

restricted

find it sufficient to define

Man

as
"

rational

animal,'
the

still three

humanity,

and rationality,
Thus

definition.

meanings those of involved in animality systematically formal definition is essentially relational in

"

closely related

character, though in some apparent than in others.

reference explicit
to

cases
'

the
'

relational reference

is

more

King

can

the

relations in which
ruled
; and
'

hardly Kingship stands

a

be

defined

without
to
"

the
tLand

government
"

of the

country

in

whole
and

class of

cases

:so-called class of correlatives

(e.g., Whole
scientific

part/

'

Genus

') the definition species

its relation
are

of either term In

involves

the statement

of

the is
a

where definition, meanings the relatedness of so more interconnected, systematically defined meaning, as defined, to a system of kindred meanings much more patent characteristic of the definition than is the much
to

to the

other.

which purpose, It is true objectivecontrol.

reference

here that

comes

more

under definitely
have

different sciences
to purpose

different
the

points of view, but

in

the

reference

which

this distinction

view-pointinvolves is
to enter

implied rather than

to be defined
more

whereas expressed,
a

relatedness of the

meaning

to

whole

system

of other the very

meanings tends
structure

and

more

into explicitly

of the definition itself.

formal or definingprocess, whether is perhaps brought out most real,practicalor scientific, clearly by which the consideration that the process of comparison through our practicalor occasional definitions are obtained is only a special, and synthesis, simple case of the more generalprocedure of analysis essential unity of the
' '

The

which

we

utilize in all definition processes

of

scientific character.

32

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
to
even

[II. iii.

Joseph's masterly
and

treatment

iv.)cannot

be too

('An Introduction stronglyrecommended,

Logic,'ch. iii. by those who

those

venture two

to differ from
are

the Aristotelian

standpointfrom which

chapters

written.]

CHAPTER
II. THE (iii.) TESTING OF

III.
DEFINITIONS.

Rules
I. WE
must

towards

securingSoundness

in

Definition.

definitions from translations and derivations. distinguish have two equivalentsymbols for one and the same we idea, define other for not it. do the the one we symbol by substituting To that a laundress is a or dyspepsia is indigestion, say that is not to state what washerwoman, dyspepsia or laundress means. sometimes called Such statements circular definitions ; but why are call them definitions at all ? They have as little title to be called

E.g.,if

'

'

definitions mother.' shewer

'

as

have

the statements,
such
statements
mere mean

'

Anima
'

is the

soul,' Mere
means answer

'

is

So, again, (av/cov"f"aiva") suggest did the word question, What

'

as

derivations.
once

Sycophant They
?' not,
'

figthe

What
term.
more

does it Still
a

mean

now

?' is in than
an

They
a a sense mere

derive
a

but

do

not

define the
so

derivation the
to
name

fossil

and definition, It The

has

rightto

translation.
'

it

as

etymological definition.
is
an
'

close to one's work sitting close is concerned. sitting

'

might be reasonable to refer statement Assiduity is far as so etymologicaldefinition,

'

2. We
narrow nor

must
too

see

that that
we

the
it

definition
In with

s fit
"

that

it is neither

too

wide,
the

exactlyexpresses
other
each

the

meaning

we

wish and
can

to

convey definition

by
must

term

use.

be commensurate

words, definiendum whatever other i.e.,

"

be

relevantlypredicated of the
definition rule

object defined
versa.

must

be

predicable
most

of the

important
the natural
or

also, and and of all,

of

vice
can

This

is, perhaps, the

best be observed

method

which defining,
This

consists in
natural in
some

by always adopting comparing the

or

word

class to be defined with

those other words

classes which of

in sense. approach it most closely allied what is most of by simple comparison proximate genus being reached instead of chosen

method

defining
a

meaning
remoter

ensures

genus
most

as and, further, the differentia can be so and all the exclude the one species, sister-species,

to

cover

just the

class-terms

liable to be confused definition

is

with

it. too

If the

genus

is not I

proximate, the
wish
to

likely to be

wide.

Suppose

define

CHAP.

III.]

THE

TESTING
'

OF

DEFINITIONS

33

it with rhombus,' and find at once, as genus, square.' I compare I and as differentia, rectangular ; or equilateralquadrilateral, find with and at it as oblong,' once, genus, rectangular compare But if I reach and differentia, as equilateral. quadrilateral, my less closely allied in terms definition through comparison with if I compare Thus to fit well. meaning, the definition is less likely the obvious with is circle,' plane figure.'The genus square the circle by from is then distinguished quite sufficiently square rectilinear.' But the of the differentia definition, means resulting A square is a rectilinear plane figure,' is very much too wide. rule we have the As an important corollaryfrom this second that contain should definition a nothing superfluous. requirement Thus, the following attempt at defininga tip obviously needs pruning : A tip is an extra gratuitypaid out of goodwillover and Here above what be demanded extra,' can by contract.' the idea. and all involve When above same over gratuity,' and reduced to the more economical fitting form, A tip is a gift the out of though still faulty,is much paid goodwill,' definition,
' ' ' '
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

improved.

profitablyguide practically applying this rule, we may testby the following questions: Do all the kinds of objectsdenoted (i.) by the term possess the differentia given ? If not, the definition is, to this extent, too animal. Are all kinds of A is domestic narrow. a Example : dog Therefore, the definition dogs domestic ? No ; dingoes are wild. fails to include all kinds of dogs, and is consequentlytoo narrow. (ii.) Having ascertained that the definition is not too narrow, we ask, Is it too wide ?' This test- questionwe may state in two equivalent forms : (a) Are there no other terms that satisfythe definition ? same (b) Is the definition simply convertible ? i.e., given that A is B, is it equally true that B is A ? Example : The Is it equally true to house-dogis a domestic animal that barks. that barks is domestic animal that a house-dog ? a say
When
ourselves
' ' '
"

3. The
term

terms

of
'

definition
must not
a

must

be

of the

same

order
the

as

the
A

defined.
is*

They
the
use

be in

or figurative a

metaphorical.
sense,

metaphor
ference

of

word
'

transferred
it
' '

trans
some

being from

the

order to which
faith

properly belongs to
the
'

other order.'
am

Thus, if I define

as

eye

of the of the

soul,'I

order to the spiritual transferring

the word
means an

which eye,' organ

to the
' '

physicalorder, and
a

primarily
'

belongs body.
term The term

the ship of the desert,' the order. is to transferred from the inorganic ship organic in fact,must be homogeneous throughout with the definition,
camel
as

So in the definition of

the

defined.

Example. Logic is the medicine of the mind. This is metaphorical. Logic and medicine
"

are

not

of the

same

Father

'p. 222. Clarke,'Logic,

34 order. One
is

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.iii.

to be assimilated by the mind, the other discipline by the body. a drug to be absorbed consist of terms more 4. The definition must elementary than the be such that no one can defined reasonably term i.e.,it must
a
"

expect

to

understand

the term

to

be

defined

without

first under

rule must themselves mean. terms standing what the defining of the reference to be applied with given interest e.g., that Geometry. I may be quite right in defininga circle as follows : contained by a line of which all the points A circle is a plane figure mark since the specific from a fixed point within it,' are equidistant all of line,' point,' equidistant,' as contains only such terms that than the of ideas which express more elementary geometrical
This
"

'

'

'

'

circle.

Hence

definition less

is not

invalidated

because

the untrained
'

mind much these

finds its terms

is to most

people,no

simple than the term doubt, a much simplerand

than its definition
'

it defines.
more

Man

'

easier to understand,

definingwords are more to define. term they serve Example. A fine is a pecuniary mulct. is any for mulct as a correct definition, This is, scientifically, a point of view it feiture or penalty. But from the purely practical
"

term, rational animal,' but obvious elementarythan the more

familiar

would
'

be

breach
per

of this fourth
not

rule, or,

in technical

language,
which

an

ignotum
term

ignotius.'
be defined

5. A cannot

should be
To

by

the

aid of terms without commit

a
'

themselves
' '

defined appropriately break

this rule is to
:

first defining circulus in

term. the original

definiendo
'

or

vicious

circle.' E.g.

Man The

is
sun

human

being.'
of the solar

'

is the centre is
a

'

Network
An

'

reticulated ecclesiastical is an archdeacon

system.' system of cordage.'

whose dignitary, business

it is to

perform archidiaconal functions.'

is
a
'

Example.
'

"

Cheese
wish out

Here

caseous

means

'

cheesy.'

We

to

preparationof milk. the definition of want and we still cheesy,' know by what kind of preparation cheese
caseous
'

can

be obtained
A vicious

of milk.

The

differentia should

indicate

the

recipefor transformingmilk destroysnot

The
at
'

into cheese.

It blemish. than mere a circle in definition is more only the value of the definition,but the definition itself.
'

statement

that

all.

It does not
is to
'

concept which
further than non-existent. We
must

cheesy is, in fact, no statement predicateanything of cheese, but stops at the Cheese is cheesy takes us no be defined.
'

cheese is

'

'

'

cheese.'

The

definition is,therefore,to this extent

not to be too

be careful,however,
of

hasty

in

accusing a

definition

involvinga

vicious

circle.

CHAP.

III.]
"

THE

TESTING

OF

DEFINITIONS
inhabitant

35 of
the

Example.
Lilliput.

Lilliputianis
'

an

island

of

Taking
is
a

'

Lilliputian in
'

its

primary
should
land the

sense

(in its derived

to meet

sense

it

objection then to Lilliputians, inhabitant of shut oneself to is define the Lilliputian an as Lilliput if But in such a is denned vicious circle. within Lilliput a up that its definition does not introduce the Lilliputian e.g., by way and its geographical position then there is no vicious circle at all, A sovereignis a gold Such definitions as the definition is correct. A day is a period of coin equal in value to twenty shillings and liable under similar time are consistingof twenty-four hours the former if a shilling is of vicious circle, limitations to the fallacy the latter if an hour defined as the twentieth part of a sovereign, is defined as the twenty-fourthpart of a day. have of circular definition, the attempt As a particular we case In the case of its correlative. of corre to define a term by means
as

for dwarf synonym is defined that if Lilliput

'),we

have

the

of the

'

'

"

"

'

'

'

'

latives
'

"

in the
'

case,

that
'

is,of
'

such

terms
'

'

as
'

whole
'

'

and

'

genus the two

and
terms

'

species,' first
must

and

second,'
We

cause

and define

'

part,' effect,'

be defined
cannot
'

the other. if by parts,' tion here

to

A
'

whole
a

be

together. defined logically

'

cannot
'

one

by
of

as

an

aggregate
The
'

is,in
'

part we fact,the
of with

mean

fraction

of

whole.' define
some a

defini
'

definiendum It is
a

itself.

To

whole

is

define

whole

parts.'
the form of

unity of

kind, of
whole and

which

the nature In

varies

of relation

between

part.

specifyingthis
we

form

relation, whether
have may

the
'

spiritual, general
whole
' '

define the type of unity we whole.' We meaning of

'

in

spatial, organic, or mind, and specify

therefore
'

define
'

or

whole

of parts
'

indeterminate

differentia

of the genus by means kind and some possessing

'

unity
some

and

the

degree of

self-coherence.'

" 7),clearly points out why it is Logic (Bk. I.,ch. ii., in the case of the instances men that certain words as go in pairs, tioned above. It is because the meaning of both terms is derived from fact or set of facts. the same Thus, taking the relation of father of B are to not son,'he writes : The paternityof A and the filiety fact.' The two terms facts,but two modes of expressingthe same correlatives and the father as are son,'however, are not strictly child.' Father terms They are semi-correlatives. parent and hood does not necessarily imply sonship,though sonship implies fatherhood. and shepherd are semi-correlatives in a Sheep be no shepherd unless there are There similar can sense. precisely be sheep without a sheep to be herded and tended, but there can and these a second, but shepherd. So, again,a third impliesa first do not imply a third. circle is committed Hence no by defininga for we may shepherd as a person who looks after sheep,' very well define a sheep without introducingits relation to a shepherd. But
Mill,in his
' ' '
' '

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

36

THE

PROBLEM define circle,

not

OF

LOGIC
'

[II.iii.
the kind of animal if

we

cannot, without
a

sheep
in

as

which 6. A

shepherd looks after.'

definition would should
not

be

given

negative form
reminds
us,
a

idea positive historian

is intended.

As
a

Professor lion

Read

natural

not a by saying that it was be would of it Geometry, vegetarian. So, line that is always changing its better to define a curve as a On the than to define it as direction a line in no part straight.' stands for defined to be a distinctly other hand, where the word is definition of definition this form i.e., negative negative idea, other. to any to be preferred E.g.,'An alien is a person who is

define

in the

interests positive
' '

'

"

"

not

citizen,' A bachelor

'

is

man

who

is not

married.'

Examples
I. A circle is
a

on

the Testing which all the To

of Definitions. points are give

a

of figure
the

from equidistant

its centre.

Purpose of
of
a

definition

definition geometrical

circle.
as

Criticism of the definition

given.
'

(a)

The than

word the

'

centre
'

is

not

more

elementary
should
which be

term

circle,'therefore
a

avoided.
Correction
:

circle is

figureof

all

points are equidistantfrom a certain fixed point within the figure. is not true that all points of a circular area It are (b) equidistantfrom the centre ; one point of the
area

is,in fact,the centre

:

itself.
a

Correction
one

circle is

figureenclosed

by
all

line, the
' '

circumference, of which
we

If

points,etc. line by
line,'
this

understand should

'

continuous

correction

suspicionthat

quiet the the circumference might be

discontinuous

punctiform,a
points. (c)The
'

aggregate of
stillmeander all

one

line

'

freelyover

of this definition may any surface of which

a

points are

the point phrase,its locus may figure. In mathematical be the surface of a sphere. circle is a plane figure, A en Reconstruction : Final of which all line (the circumference), closed by one within certain fixed from a point points are equidistant the figure.

from equidistant

certain

within

CHAP.

III.]

THE

TESTING

OF

DEFINITIONS

37

II. Work

is the salt of life.

Verbal Division
an or activity

work By its product.

:*
as

'

'

we

The

may former

understand
sense

either

is

evidently
to

intended

here. To

Purpose
moral Criticism

define Work

an

having relation activity

We must

life.
:

The

definition is Work (i.)

is

metaphorical.
a

get

rid of the Reconstruction

metaphor.
:

type of purposiveactivity

and sustains the life (genus)which stimulates, purifies, (differentia). here work distinguished sufficiently Query : Is ? from play Work is which, when regarded a purposiveactivity (ii.) of a moral obligation, stimulates, purifies in the light
' ' ' '

and

sustains

the life. with the

III. A chair is

an : :

article of furniture
To

four
use

legsand
to which

back.

Purpose
Criticism

define

chair

by

it is

put.

(a)

Proximate
:

Correction

genus chair is

not
a

given.

seat.

(b) The

differentia

is not If
we as
'

satisfactorily given.
compare
'

Correction
we

chair

with

stool,
as a

obtain

genus
a

moveable
back.' If

seat,' and
we

differentia

having

compare is
'

chair with
to seat
' '

sofa, the differentia

' '

intended

one

person.'

accident or problematical (c) Four legs is a mere occasional the of type. property Reconstruction : Proximate (of chair, sofa, stool)" genus
'

Moveable
at

seat.'
'

: Differentia

Intended

to

accommodate
a

one

person

time, and having

cow

back.'

IV. A

cow

is a ruminant
: :

with cloven feet and

a

Purpose
Criticism
'

To

define
'

breath. sweet-smelling zoologically.

(a) Proximate
'

Comparing
'

cow

genus with
'

wanted.

bull,'we

obtain

as

genus

ox

(in the

ordinary genericsense
'

of that

term),

and
' '

as

differentia
feet
'

(b) With cloven breath Sweet-smelling

the

is

female.' a characteristic property.

'

is

problematic property
may
or

of

occasional type. A sweet-smelling breath.

teriorate Reconstruction
* By Verbal meaninged word
'
'

cow

may

not

have de

The

breath

might
be
a

without
:

the is
a

creature

ceasingto
ox.

cow.

cow

female

box
'

'

into would

'

or understand the division of an equivocal manywe of the division Thus into its various alternative signiiications. driTer's the or with blow s hrub, list, in a theatre, covered case, partition

Division

'

seat

be

verbal division.

38
V. A

THE candle is

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.iii.
was

a : use

kind of
To
as

lightused before
a

gas

invented.

Purpose
its that

define
a

candle
the

from

the

point of
which

view

of

lightand

structure

subserves kind
but

use. :

Criticism
a means

(a) Genus
of

inexact ;

candle the

is not

(6) The
were

light. specifyingmark
too

leaves
other

definition in into candles

'

one

respect
another

wide, for

things besides
gas
came

candles
use. are

used

for

lightingbefore
'

In still
'

respect it is too

narrow,

for

used, though
k

impliesthat
into fashion.

invented.' gas has been candles ceased to be used

not
'

Used

before
gas
came

when
'

(c)Further, gas
The flat and Reconstruction of VI. The
a

was

invented

'

but

manufactured.'
as

mark specific

must, therefore,be cancelled

a

irrelevant,and
candle is
that
a means

radical reconstruction
of

is called for.
:

stick of
To

fatty matter
shines
sun

traversed

consisting lighting, by a wick. point of

view

Sun

is the star
:

by day.
from the of its

Purpose
Criticism the

define the Can

'

appearance
:

(Ptolemaicpoint of view).

day

'

be
'

defined

without time

involving

vicious circle ?
sun

Is not

day
the

'

that

during which
and

is above
:

the horizon

?*
sun no

Reconstruction which obtain The VII.

'

Comparing
in

with

moon

stars,
we

agree
: sun

giving

forth

heat, perceptible
warms

is

celestial luminary which who

is

the earth.

A soldier is

a man ready country. from the Purpose : To define a soldier as such i.e., point of view of his militaryoffice. the essential kind : (a) Brave as Objection superfluous, of bravery that a soldier requires is implied in ready to die.' A soldier is a man Correction : (i.) who is ready to die
"

brave

to die for his

'

'

'

for his country.

: (b) Objection Cf. Amazons
'

Man

'

makes

the definition too who

is

narrow.

and
A (ii.)

drummer-boys.
soldier is
a

Correction

person

ready to
It

die for his country. definition : Objection (c) The excludes Correction
die
* This criticism, as himself.

is still too

narrow.

etc. mercenaries, organized revolutionists,

:

A soldier is a person who is ready to (iii.) for country, cause, or material reward.

Mr.

Joseph points out

(ibid., p. 100), is given by Aristotle

40

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.iv.

Logical Division.
The
term
'

Division,'which

is the

established

of designation

the

We to examine, is not happily chosen. procedure we have now of the of cannot a dividinga word, or appropriately speak meaning differentiated rather than divided. The word, for meanings are Division (as also such other metaphorical expressions very term almost to imply a physicaldivision, as parts,' joints,' etc.)seems individual a division of some thing into its component parts.* The has the further of the word use disadvantage of prejudicingthe the in its logicalaspect. be to interpretation put upon process For this process essentially the relation between concerns a genus and its species, Division in this connexion and the term naturally Division consists in the splitting suggests that logical up of a genus into its constituent species. If this is the way in which to we are
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

conceive genus

the process,

then

the true
=

formula
and S]^
'

for the relation between

S2 and S3. Plane triangles, and should have to say, are divided into equilateral, we isosceles, scalene. These are the parts of which plane triangle is the whole. But I I certainly is a plane triangle, when do not say that ABC and isosceles to say that it is an equilateral mean an triangle triangle and a scalene triangle, that it is Sx and S2 and S3 ; I mean that it is Sx or S2 or S3. It is this disjunctive formulation which alone truly
G and

species Sx, S2, S3is G

'

represents the nature

of

Division. logical

a splitting Logical Division is in no sense up of things into their parts. For the thing is not a genus, nor are its parts species. The division of an animal (mentally,of course) into head, trunk, and limbs, or of a book into parts or chapters,is a purely physical

division. of

The part here does not stand to the whole cannot We speciesto genus. say that the head
an

in the relation of
or

trunk

or

limb the

animal

is itself a sort be
'

of animal.

But

in

Division logical
'

of each of the species into which it predicable human divide or being into man woman,' into which human each of the two the species being is genus divided is itself a sort or kind of human being. of non-logical There is another Division referred to species usually This is of Division.' the mental division as an Metaphysical object into its several attributes,as when I analyze organism into its and various properties. These not are differentia, parts of genus, the in in which the concept sense head, trunk, and organism limbs are parts of an animal, for the qualities could not reallybe separatedfrom each other as head or limb could be separated from the trunk, nor are they collectively equivalent to the object
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

divided must genus is divided. If we

divided.
*

not

hack

that Cf. Plato's admonition anywhere like a clumsy

cut

'

the
'

philosophermust
;

divide

by
a

the

and joints,
'

cook

and

Seneca's

remark

that

genus

should

Le divided, not

into shreds.'

CHAP.

IV.]
true

DEFINITION

AND

DIVISION

41

of logical Division can best be gauged by significance with in connexion the relation of Division to Definition considering call the To this what we logical development of meaning. may and we development, as we have seen, both processes are essential, functions within this development by define their respective may that to render Division serves determinate those elements saying of meaning in the definition which stillleft indeterminate, and are therefore capable of further specification. Division, in a word, is just the further differentiation of the definition in so far as it elements. Given the definition of a plane contains indeterminate the relations between as a three-sided rectilinear plane figure, triangle The the three

sides
the

are

not

determined

except
of is otherwise

to
'

this extent

"

that the

we

know,
in the

from

geometrical definition
an area

that figure,'
an

three

sides must determinate

include

; there

indeterminateness which into is

an side-relations,

indeterminateness
or

rendered

by

the

division

differentiation

equilateral,

scalene. or isosceles,

Illustration

of

the

Logical Development of Meaning

and Definition Division. the

through
in

government
in every

may

be
some

defined the

as

ruling power
character

society
of rule

consolidated

through
case

dominating interest,the form

structural

varying
wherein The

with

of the

body

the ultimate

authorityis vested.

be either political interest may or consolidating non-political. If non-political, it may be either ecclesiastical (Church-government) non-ecclesiastical. We restrict ourselves to developing,through or division,the meaning of a State-government. In the case of a State-government, the structural character of the of three forms consist of an take : it may rulingbody may any one consist of a privileged individual,*or it may class,or of the com be either an munity itself. A State-government, that is, may If it is autocratic,the Autocracy,an Oligarchy,or a Democracy. form of government will vary the rule by one is as according limited or unlimited. An be either a Autocracy, that is, may Limited or a Constitutional Monarchy, or else an Absolute Monarchy or Despotism, passing,when degenerate,into a Tyranny. If the government will vary is a class-government,the form If this is rank, according to the nature of the rulingqualification. the government will be an if wealth, a Plutocracy. Aristocracy; If the government is a government by the people,its form will with the method of self-government. This may be direct, vary
' '

as

in the
case

Citizen-Rule of modern
two
or

the
*

Athens, or representative,as in Democracies, the form of representativegovernas

of ancient

Perhaps

three,

in the

case

of the

two

Kings

of

Sparta, or

of the

Roman

Triumvirates.

42

THE

PROBLEM.
the

OF

LOGIC of the franchise

[II.iv.
and the

merit

varying again with

and
we

conditions

number
Thus

nature
see

of the
a

representativebodies.
is not exhausted necessarily

that

division logical
a

by

singledivision of
which

interest

prompts
to

into its alternative species. The genus the division may requirefor its fulfilment
and into sub-species, species

the further division of the may and genus.

these,again,
of

require sub-specieswould conception or

summum
"

be

divided.
at

These
same

further time

divisions

species
of the

the

be

subdivisions

The
as

genus

with

which

the division starts

; the

is known

the

genus its
'

of the division

ultimate
to

subdivisions purpose

of

this

genus
"

ultimate, that
infimse called subaltern the infima

is, in respect
The
"

the

of the
are

division

are

species.
'

intermediate because

classes

sometimes divided.
genus,
so

genera
a

except the infima speciesis

Just the
as summum

genus

every species it is to the classes into which genera,

a

is species

which species

is not

also

Every
genus.

subaltern

is not also a species. genus is a genus which and class in a continued division is at once species which It is
' '

The when when

interest logical
or

prompts
formal
' '

and

guidesa

division may
'

be

either formal
it is
'

real.

(with a small
'

'

; vide p.

16)
'

practical
are

and

occasional
in

in character.
S(

It is

'

real

the

divisions

drafted

the

le interest and

of scientific

research.

This distinction between There

formal

to the divisions themselves.

as a

A real division
' '

be applied real may be then regarded might

a
'

Scientific Classification.
two

is,however,
and
'

reason

for not
Division.'
'

the identifying
Real

terms

Classification

Real
'

Division

proceedsalways downwards

from

genus

to

species/
move

In the process of Classification, the other hand, we on may ' either of two directions : we may move from the ' species
or

in

upwards,

from

the

'

'

genus

downwards.

Every
a summum
'

summum separate classification has its own genus, so that denote anything absolute, as cannot profitably genus
'

the
Thus

being
the

of
'

Porphyry's tree
genus
not
even
'

summum

of the classification be extended

the

kingdom
as

Plants
trust

Animal,' and well, and might

recent

unusually supposed to do. in Zoology is scheme which would include Living Being,'
is not
to

Metals, if
a

we

may

certain
'

scientific research.
no means

The
in any

infima

species,' again,is by

fixed distinction

but is relative to the limit of given system of classification, in class African distinctions. The the making of purposiveness Lion, which is classed as a variety in Animal Classification, may be regarded as an infima species, useful to distin but if it became the in their turn become these latter would guish sub-varieties, infimae species. from Enumera LogicalDivision must be carefully distinguished tion. Enumeration is a summing of the individuals which up
' '

CHAP.

IV.]
to
a

DEFINITION

AND

DIVISION

43

whether that class be a summum given class-designation, genus, subaltern genus, or infima species. It is therefore a process which to the development of meaning through logical runs parallel At any stage of that development it may Division. be purposive to turn from the conceptual ordering of fact to the counting up of
answer

the

individual When
or

units
we

which

the
facts

concepts
from is
an

serve

to

include

under of their the

classes. number

consider the

the

point

of view
centres

quantity, the
of view in
see,

logical point
as we

process interest

Enumeration.
its

From

in Enumeration

shall

questions relatingto

mainly, completeness or its

incompleteness.

Basis

of Division, or

Fundamentum

Divisionis.
a

and Every division is based upon divisionis character of i.e., by some

"

guided by
the group and
or

fundamentum

source

of difference
of

amongst
into

its members.

Thus,
number

which is genus in the botanical

division

Angiosperms

Monocotyledons
F.D.,
is the

fundamentum

or divisionis,

possessed by the plant-embryo. It will fundamenta divisionis are simply indeterminate

genus.
'

Dicotyledons,the primary leaves that the readily be seen

of attributes
'

of the

If

'

Man
'

'

is divided

into
'

'

White

man,'
is

Black
'

man,'
rational

Yellow
the

man,'
genus

Brown
'

man,'
'

Red

man,' the F.D.

of
some

skin-colour.'
'

But

Man

is here

relevantly defined
kind the
as

as

animal F.D.

(det.)possessinga skin-colour
cannot

The (indet.).'

be

determinate

attribute

of

minate, for the simple reason

ceases

that, in

so

far

deter qua genus, it is determinate, it

to

be

minate

attributes

At the same so-called deter time, most specifiable. are determinate, and, in so far as only partially
serve as

they are indeterminate, may

of division. From
the

fundamenta

divisionis

or

bases

point of view of the interest we have in dividingor the meaning of a concept these fundamenta divisionis differentiating
are

essential

characteristics of the
the

included within its definition.

statistical unit from purposes
to

concept, and Thus, suppose we

of
a a

must

therefore

be

desire to define the

point of view
of

statistical

inquirywhich
means as

class the

citizens

country according to
take
some

and
this
:

occupation. The
The
tion when
'

definition would
'

such
means

form and

statistical man
; and
we

is

'

citizen

of

certain
can

occupa

'

meaning specifythe divisions

the
has
an
'

the full

of this unit
we man

be draw

made under

clear

only

intend
'

to

these two
as

heads.

Thus

statistical
that
'

citizen who

income
amount

be may is either under

as a

regarded
"50
a

(1) 'a

"500,
or

or

over

that in

and

(2)

'

year or under citizen who is an artisan falls outside these

is

engaged

business,or

is in

or profession,

three

classes.'

44

THE

PROBLEM
Rules
one

OF

LOGIC

[II.iv.

The
I. There

of Logical Division.
fundamentum
into

should

be

and divisionis, which

one

only,

for each
must

II. The

complete act of division. species or alternatives be mutually exclusive.

more

genus

is divided

III. If the division involves

than

one

step,it should proceed

the infimse

gradually
Divisio IV.
ne

from

the

sunimum

genus

towards of

species.
be

fiat per saltum.

division,
within

The

the

limits

relevancy,must
and divisionis,

exhaustive. disjunctively
Rule I.
"

There of

should

be

one

fundamentum

one

only,for each
The

complete
a

act

of division.*
is

division

genus

complete

when

and differentiated, tinued until the division

has

of successive process of distinction requiredby the purpose of the degree In this process each subbeen preciselyattained. and yet of which
must

the

has been the genus differentiation con

or differentiation, subdivision,should help to develop,more indeterminate that more one distinctly, aspect of the genus

the differentiation The mark

We and
case

was

the
that

aim original aim

at

in

dividing.
the F.D. be
a

of the
may
to carry
our

which principle meaning

out
'

is here involved
we

is that

find it convenient
the
'

to

developing through change the F.D. after a first division,

'

division.

subdivisions
'

upon

fresh bases.

But

in this

division is no

a longera single process,but

chain of divisions,

and
a

the term

subdivision

becomes
a

misnomer.

For,
A

in

assuming

of the genus. a subdivision necessarily the function of the F.D. in misinterpret yet that it is itself incapable of any development. Division by insisting between basis and another one implies,indeed, a Discontinuity the interest of which correspondingchange givesunity and direction to the dividingprocess, and so implies also a corresponding break in the division. But there is an important via media dis between The be static and F.D. a continuity continuity. legitimately may changed, provided the change is a change within its own original male or being into meaning. Thus, after dividing human this abandon female,' the F.D. being sex,'we do not necessarily F.D. when into male we man or proceed to subdivide boy,' female and into for the age-basis be here woman or girl,' may in its is forward differences. essential What brought bearingon sex
And
we

have fresh basis,we is species therefore not

must

started

fresh division.

division of the

not

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

is that the

sex

interest

should

dominate that

the

division into its most

in divisional basis

detailed differentiations, and

*

all variations

to

more

We of age and sex, old,'and into '

It is,of course, to divide a genus (as in the last illustration) possible according than one of that division, we principle provided keep the divisions distinct. then have what is called co-division. Thus, again,adopting the fundamenta
we man

may
or

co-divide woman.'

'

human

being

'

into

'

young,

middle-aged,or

CHAP.

IV.]

DEFINITION

AND

DIVISION
It is in this that

45

should
F.D.

be variations be
one

on

the sex-theme.
constant

sense

the

must

given division.
themselves In
so

throughout the development of any be sub-f undamenta, but these must may many of the original fundamentum. be developed in the service
There
as

and

far

the

'

sub-f undamenta
new are

'

are

developed
as

on

their

own

account, each
into component nallyconnected
is lost. supreme

a initiating

interest, the
The

parts, which
with each

and, only loosely

certain

other.

up it were, exter organicunity of the division

to ensue,

division is broken

Moreover,

overlapping is almost

for the

preventiveagainstthe overlapping of the various parts of that the parts stand for the various division lies in making sure a modes in which of a human a singlegeneralmeaning e.g., the sex be differentiated can or being developed. bases of division ewe simultaneously two or more When adopted and cross-division. The as developed,the resulting overlappingis known
" "

different divisions bears witness

"

cross

each

other, and

the

confusion

which

ensues

Division. importance of the first rule of logical Rule II. The second rule of logical Division follows naturally the first the which result It is rule. directed errors against upon in overlapping,whether The of the cross-division kind or not. speciesor alternatives into which a genus is divided must be mutually to the exclusive
"

no i.e.,

under lies in

any
'

other

overlap or be included part of the division must part. The only securityfor observing this rule
a or

holding to
into
'

singlefundamentum.
female
or

If
or

we

divide

'

human simul

being

male
two

young

old,'employing

taneously the
this rule.

fundamenta

of

sex

and

It is possible, however, to break

age, we obviously break Rule II. without breaking

statement
means a

Rule

I.

"

namely, through
Thus
I may

carelessness
' '

in the

of alter
'

natives.

divide define
'

man
' '

(F.D.

'

') into
as

rich.
it

easy, or poor,'but may to overlap with ' rich '

or

in such easy poor,'or both.

more

way

to

cause

Rule
Divisio In

III.

"

If the

division involves
the

than

one

step, it should

from proceedgradually
ne

highestgenus

towards

the lowest

species.
same

fiat per
of

saltum.

each
or

step of the

division the
Let

speciesmust
G be divided

stand
into

in the

order

S1; S2,S3 ; and generality. we S2 again into S'l5 S3, S'3. Were we to divide G into S1;S'2, S'2, should have two ranks of generality and under the one same genus. The would division would since account be no clearly inadequate, have been taken of S\ or S'3. Consider the old-fashioned division of Digitigrade into weasel, civet,hyaena,the cat-kind, fox, wolf, dog.' Here the speciesare not in the same and fox wolf order of generality. Thus are of the Canis (the dog kind), just as species lion,' tiger,' genus etc. are Had the cat of Felis kind). we species (the given genus the genus order of generality Canis, and thereby kept in the same
rank
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

the

members

of

one

step

in

the

division, we

should

have

been

46

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC would have been

[II iv.
included be

secure as

which againstomitting the jackal, being under that genus.

Rule

IV.

"

The

division,within

the

limits of

relevancy,must

exhaustive. disjunctively have dis We already had occasion to point out the essentially character of into Division. divide G When we S1}S2,S3, junctive that G may be developed either into Sj or into S2 or into mean we be developed into Si and S2 and S3. that G may S3 ; we do not mean when that be disjunctively the division must ex we Hence, say that Sl5S2, S3 must within the limits of rele haustive, we mean
"

vancy

"

exhaust

the alternatives.
the the

The

meaning of
in relation to

word

'

exhaustive

'

can,

in

fact, be defined

we requirement of relevancy. When say that a division of a genus be exhaustive, we into its speciesmust that it must mean give all the differentiations of the genus which are and relevant. The limit of relevance will be given at once possible

only

In the case of the division. of the divisions which purpose within the classification of the natural sciences,the exhaustivefigure

by
ness

the

cannot
new

reveal

carried out.
are

for further investigations provisional, may call for the revision of divisions as previously or species, would be relevant that Moreover, only those species

be other than

with also actual,for scientific classifications are not concerned the laying out of possibilities as such, but only with the orderingof such Nature has realized. Thus as possibilities to which included blue man skin-colour, according would
not
mere a

division

of Man,

include irrelevant

items, since

green man, studies science anthropological be

more

and

but facts. possibilities,

man or

It would

than exhaustive,
much
as a

and
into

break
'

this fourth rule of Division black

'

just as
would

division

white

man

which

be under-exhaustive. will be
seen

by Dichotomy (vide p. 47) the division be implicitly, exhaustive. though not determinately,
In Mr. connexion with this

In Division

to

rule

of
'

exhaustiveness

in

Division

Joseph (ibid., p. 103) gives an take the liberty of quoting in full

what forms that ; it is necessary of wealth to be are
rent

instructive
:

illustration

which

is introduced

accordingly. The
income,
if the and

of land

Suppose that an imposing it should state regarded as income, and taxed of and houses is clearlya form
the Act

income-tax

would
of
a

be included

in the

division of that
of

genus

; but

he receives no it, letting rent. Nevertheless, he enjoys an income, in the shape of the annual value of the house he lives in, just as truly as if he had let that
owner

house

lives in it instead

house, and received for

another
much
as

sufficient to hire himself of money house as he ought to be taxed if he lives in his own ; and if he lets it. But if the income-tax Act omitted to include it
a sum

the species of income the annual value of houses occupied among by their owners, he would escape payment on that head altogether. Such is the practical importance of making a division exhaustive.

48

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.iv

at each of the indefinite term step of the division rejection abscissio infiniti,' known the infinitum is technically an as or the here indefinite term. indeterminate being

This

'

'

'

'

'

The
are

definite and

indefinite terms
to
as

in

their relation to each

other

sometimes

referred

Contradictory Opposites, Contra

'

Thus dictoryRelatives,or Contradictories. be said to are contradictory opposites. But and

are

cold
name

'

and

'

not-cold

the

is unfortunate

apt
not

to mislead.

definite term
the
can sense

and

its counter-indeterminate

in contradictory statements that

of

each contradicting
or

other.

It

is

only

contradict
are

be

contradicted.

It is

predicated of the same subject in the same relation the assertions within which they thus function as it is the each other contradict the respectivepredicates ; but oppositionof the two statements, and not that of the two predicates
true

that

when

such

terms

as

such, which constitutes the contradiction. to consider come We shall,in fact, see, when we
an

what

we

mean

by
are

contradictoryopposites complementary rather than antithetic. They should therefore from be carefullydistinguished contrary opposites or contrary which terms defined be as markedly opposed under relatives, may the same head. We most,' since under markedly and not say have we more given head may e.g., that of temperature any Thus cold and contraries. hot than of are con one pair It will and be traries ; but so also are seen broiling.'* freezing is itself a positive term that each of a given pair of contrary terms Black is reference. with well-defined positive just as positive in meaning as as as white,' miserable happy,' hard positive soft.' as as positive not per se, A term is,of course, a contradictory or a contrary,' the indefinite but only in relation to its opposite. In particular term.' It is contra term not-a; is not in itself a contradictory x,* dictory only in relation to the complementary definite term indicated. in that derivative and the sense already only
indefinite

term, that

these

so-called

'

'

'

"

"

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

The The

Meaning of

the

Term. Indefinite

of Dichotomy depends primarily on the significance logical We indefinite term. the to must, therefore, meaning we assign this be. what consider meaning carefully may
An

indefinite term
what

is

term
a:

of the form
in
a sense

'

not-a;
we

'

'

or

non-a:.'

It

indicates
to

is other than

that

must

now

proceed
character^

determine.

Some

insist that logicians

it must

be,

in

and inimitablyindefinite. perfectly

take
*

Not-a;, they
Out

up
This
'

all that

is excluded
does
not

from
extend between

x.

surely say, must of the sum-total of thinkthe

op
" '

indefmiteness S is P.'

to
'

contrary propositions.There
'

positionexists unambiguously
and No

all

and

none,' between

'

All

S is P

CHAP.

IV.]
we

DEFINITION subtract

AND

DIVISION
be not-a;.

49

able existence
"

:
=

all that is left must

Not-a;

Thus if x everything x. Europeans, not-a; stands for 'the of entities which unlimited myriads people the heterogeneous that not-a; domain of everything European.' It is in this sense has been called an Infinite Term. This,however, is a useless logical worth and mentionino; as a warning concerning what figment, only
' '
"

not-a; should

not

be made

to mean.*

It

seems

clear that

in the interests

be indefinite in this illimitable

may
term

call the
not-a;.

or disjunctive,

the

science not-a; cannot logical This brings us to what we sense. of the indefinite use suppositional,

of

The

ordinaryuse
is not
'

of terms
or

is limited

by

'

some

'7 some Suppositio,

so

Topic, some
interest take is the form

Universe
that

of pure
within

Subject of Discourse. negation in which

"

In
case

far

as

man's
will

the denial
'
"

S is not

P,' and
some

not

the form

'

S is not-P

his mind the

always moving suppositio.

is,moreover,

and assignablesuppositio,

sig
to

nificance

of the indefinite terms

he

uses

is limited

by

reference

this
It

important to realize to be disjunctively differentiated. Let division : tion,the following

Colour.

that
us

the term

not-a;

requires

take, by

way

of illustra

I !
Red.

I
Not-red.

Here colour

'

not-red

'

has
red

the
'
"

implicitly disjunctive meaning of

i.e., either
'

'

some

other than stand

Were

blue

or

It does not

red.

this its
or

for the sum conjunctively would not-red meaning, abbreviative

that the

green of colours be
'

or

etc. yellow,'

other

than

term
'

a fulfilling
'

merely epitomic taken together would

colour.
is also It is true

function,and
of colour in
a

red the into

and

not-red

'

exhaust conjunctively division it is exhaustive

suppositio of
red
or

not-red
not

exhaustive, but conjunctive sense.

This view

and disjunctive

in

disjunctivemeaning of not-a; in implicitly Dichotomy supports the more generalview that we have taken of differentiation Division the progressive of the meaning as logical of a concept. view the division of colour On this disjunctive that colour is either red into red and not-red means precisely
of the
' '

'

'

'

'

Aristotle long ago pointed out that oux-dvdpuTros not properly a name was all ; and he perhaps extended too much to it when he said his countenance call it "name indeterminate" it that, if we call to must a were anything,we
at

'

because, being the {ovofj.0. dbpiffTov)

it had
a

purely
'

indeterminate
is

in particular, of nothing positive and name signification (Joseph, ibid.,pp. 29, 30 ; c/. also
'

footnote, p. 30).

Suppositio revived by Venn

about which
we

an

earlier

name

for

'

the universe
It
means

Carveth Read. to ourselves consider

term
'

and

be

name recently matter subject range speaking.' Mr. Joseph, followingDe

'

of discourse,' a
of

the

the Morgan,prefers

limited

universe.'

50

THE not-red.
'

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
to

[II. iv.
'

or

Hence, when
or

we

proceed

differentiate

not-red

'

into very

blue

green

or

same

of principle

we are yellow,etc.,' simply carrying on the which differentiation we disjunctive applied

'

to the division of the concept colour.' is understood When the indefinite term have

in the

sense

which

we

attempted

to

define, the

main

objectionswhich

have

been

of division fall entirely levelled against Dichotomy as a process Thus Mr. Joseph (ibid., away. p. 106, sq.)maintains, in the first

instance,that in the subdivision of the the essential nature of division as tion,'

membra

'

negative
a

'

class

'

or

process

which

concep exhibits its

developments of a common notion Mr. Joseph holds is violated. (ibid., consistently p. 107) this objection to be fatal and decisive (ibid., p. 109). But it depends for its force on what conceive to be a misinterpretation we entirely Mr. Joseph takes of the meaning of the land negative term. the meaning or conception to be divided. He divides it by as land not used for building.' dichotomy into building-landand
as
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

dividentia

'

alternative

Each

of these
'

conceptions he
into
'

subdivides.
'

Thus
'

'

land

not

used for
so a a

building
on.

is divided

farm-land

and
that

non-farm-land,' and
'

He

then
'

points out

(ibid., p. 109)
is

to

farm the

land

is not

way
'

of not

buildingon

that it,'and, generally,

division
"

division of
which

necessarily a negative conception is of the genus no a division,there a species longer specification relation between fore,which fails to respect the true logical genus
and differentia. it is undeniable the
a
'

in

the

Now

that

'

to
'

farm
'

land

is not

way

of not
*

but on it,' building

has, as

we

have

seen,

land not used for building negative term certain positive meaning of an indeterminate for
'

kind. predisjunctive other than that of

It stands

land

used

for
'

some

purpose
'

and the farming of land is precisely a building,' A of this indeterminate negative con specification genericidea.

ception affords,therefore,as sound

a

basis

for subdivision
to
'

as
'

does
land
'

definite conception. or positive

other than purpose it is to specify' land used for
some

It is just as sound that

specify
'

used
as

for

The

objectionmay
the
'

divide used
what

genus

building by building as urban or suburban. perhaps be raised that if we are proposing to land alternative into the two species land
of
' ' ' ' '

farm-land

or buildingpurposes not do we reallycarry building,' we are so

for

land
out

used
what

for purposes
we

other than
to do.
'

propose
'

For

it dividing,

a subserving

human
human

subserves
it is
as

no

land as said,is not land,'but the that land waste-land,' purpose.' is excluded from the division, though purpose, may be Hence
'

of land as building-land farm-land. or genuine a species which has certain a challenges objection point and directness admit the justice of the plea that close consideration. must We This
'

it is not
'

land

as

such
some

'

which

can

be divided

into

'

building-land,'
division

or

land

used

for

purpose

other than

building.' This

CHAP.

IV.]
a

DEFINITION
division of
'

AND

DIVISION

5] human
a

is

undoubtedly
our

land
'

as as

subservinga
such
'

purpose.'
genus of
an

But, from
for for
a

point
can

of view,

land

is not

suitable

division. logical and subject, the

Meaning
be made

is necessarily the

unambiguous
which could goes
to

or

subjective interest specified.Indeed, we clearly

when that the

meaning object definite only logically the objectis first meet

object which we propose definable and divisible object through the as a logically of a subjective interest. The object selective,abstracting activity divided is always a to be logically and, as such, its meaning genus,' will be variously differentiated accordingas the dividing-interest is variouslyspecified.
stituted
'

go a step further,and maintain to define and divide is first con

We of in
'

admit, then, that

land far
as as
'

'

waste-land human
'

'

is not

included
hasten

in

our

division
add

subserving a
waste-land
be
'

purpose,'but
'

to

that,
human

so

means

land

that

subserves

no

it would purpose,'
to include it.*

and therefore logically irrelevant, meaningless,

The
mean

negative
'

'

term

'

not

used for

there building,'

fore, does
or

not

else not words

used
'

the

or

other than some purpose for any purpose at all '; for the addendum else ' introduce is irrelevant to the genus therefore
'

used

for

building,
which
we are

and dividing, the

as
'

cannot
'

be included for

within
'

the

meaning

of

building negative other than building.' alreadystated, used for some purpose By first defining the objectto be divided, through the limiting activity of a definite subjective interest, we cut off from the outset, at one stroke,all differentiations of the object's logical meaning which do not positively subserve the development of that interest. Negating
term.
'

Not

used

must

therefore mean,

addenda raison Mr.

of the d'etre.

type of that
whole
race a

just

considered

have

no

longerany
proceed

The

of them

is excluded division

ab initio.

ing on
says

Joseph further accuses fundamentum. a single

dichotomic
'

of not

the division of land (i.e., of communication, pleasure-ground, means waste), the basis taken the use to which land is put, and that was was retained throughout ; but in the division by dichotomy, the basis taken was, first, the use
'

In the proper division of land,'he into building-land, farm-land, forest,

of land

for

building, by
the rest

which

it

was on

divided
a

into

and building-land
"

the rest
of land

; and

was

divided
'

different

basis
But

the viz.,
once

u^e

for

farming, and
is understood to say of land that

so

on

(ibid., p. 109).
sense we

the

in

definite term
true longer
'

in the

have

the for

first F.D.

in the

adopted, it is no process by dichotomy

'

divide land into we building.' When or building-land land,'we are dividingit into build not-building land used for other than building.' Our F.D. or ing-land purposes is therefore the use land is put,'just as in the case to which of
was
'

the

use

'

* In a division of ' land that of the geologist, there

'

from would

the point of view be no waste-land,

of

just as

scientific intent, such as to the botanist there-

is

no

such

speciesas

'

weed.'

52

THE

PROBLEM of land.'

OF

LOGIC

[II.iv.
we
'

the

proper
'

division

So, again, when

proceed
'

to

divide

other than building into farm-land land used for purposes not do non-farm land,'we or adopt a different basis of division. The basis stillremains, as before, the use to which land is put.' When
'

is used for purposes farming purposes or for land We

a

other than

it may building,

be used either for

would

point out, in

other than farming. non-building purposes conclusion,that Dichotomy is by no means

of purely Formal process, which can be carried out independently As Mr. insists material knowledge. Joseph convincingly (ibid., p. 1 10, have the to divide into and not-a no x a we right species footnote),* know of fact,a is a species of x. unless we Thus, that, as a matter
it is absurd
to divide circle into rectilinear circle and
we

non-rectilinear

circle, though
every

are, of course,

in perfectlyjustified

saying that

AnalyticalGeometry, identified with its cir We cannot develop cumference) must be either rectilinear or not. it its circle of to of as one the meaning by assigning speciesthe rectilinear circle. In dividingG into S or not-S, S must be a possible
circle
as (here,

in

'

'

and

relevant differentiation of the genus

G.

The
In

Testing of Given
we

Divisions. have
first to decide

the

testingof given divisions

whether
it is

the division is

or and, non-logical, logical

if the

whether latter,

metaphysical,or verbal. physical, in form, If the division is logical

four rules.
This
: we

we

must

test its observance

of the

may

do conveniently

by
?

means

of the

following

test-questions
I.

(a) Is

there

more

than

one

F.D.

chosen ? (6) If only one, is it appropriately II. (a) Is there overlapping of the classes ? is it due to a confusion of funda(6) If so, to what cause to careless definition, menta (giving cross-division), of the ranks of generality to a confusion ? or
"

III. If due
are

to not

the
'

latter

cause
'
"

"

if the i.e., is the

membra

dividentia
?

cognate

what

remedy
?

Answer

Subdivision.
IV.

Is the division
"

adequately exhaustive followingdivisions

'

Examples.
'

Test

the
'

(i.) Living being

We must
'

into

moral
'

or

immoral.'
If
we mean

begin by defining moral.'

then
'

genuinely,

moral, actively
If under

the
we

class of indifferents in
mean

moral
are case

to

include
the

all creatures

morality is left out. capable of

in

morality
But
*

that

not
we

immoral, then positively

have
'An

the division is sound.

in any

omitted

non-moral
of

the

sense

of

Cf. also Mellone,

IntroductoryText-Book

ch. vi.," Logic,'

10.

CHAP.

IV.]

DEFINITION
'

AND
and

DIVISION

53

'

moral

incapables plants
"

animals,

human The

cases pathological

of adult human

beings.

infants, and division, therefore,

the
men

is not

exhaustive
'

(breach of Rule
'

IV.). Moreover,
as

division
are some
'

as

applied to
times

livingbeing
sometimes
'

is

unsatisfactory,
It would
or

most

moral,
'

immoral.

better

apply

to

act.'

(ii.) Man
The haviour F.D.'s with

into

"

(a)

'

timid

rash
or

';

(b)
are

'

avaricious

prodigal.'
to be

specified.They may be taken and to regard (b} behaviour danger,'

not
'

(a)

'

be

with

regardto
case

money.' Again, these divisions

a

are

not
"

exhaustive.

There

is in each

twofold

mean

to be introduced

(a)

'

cautious
economical

or

valiant';
or

(b)
So
'

'

liberal.'

cut well at the joints,' the more distinctions we can long as we the better. it is well avoid the habit of to make, Indeed, relevantly In there can fancyingthat between two extremes only be one mean. the case of (a) the objection be raised that the division much must the than to act to the man more naturallyapplies people ; for most timid in certain respects and in others, much not are depending

suffi their emotions Further, the timid may, when are become maternal the brave roused, rash, or even ciently really (cf. instinct of protection in ordinarilytimid the moral or women, but naturally timid reformer, or the courage courage of the convinced of the martyr for faith's sake).
on

habit.

(iii.)Students
"

'

'

into

'

and diligent.' idle,athletic,

'

The

Criticism (1). The dividendum is not students necessitates pluralterm

'

tion.

In

so

far

as

Division

is

form. expressed in logical extensive an interpreta differentiation of meaning, we must

' ' '

adopt the singular form, and restate our dividendum A correspondingalteration must be made in the form itself. We must substitute the disjunctive or for
' ' '

as

student.'

of the division
the

conjunctive

'

to discuss is that of division, then, which we have now into student idle,athletic, or diligent.' Criticism (2). The F.I), is twofold and games: work-status
'
'
"

and.'

The

status.

co-division
I. and

is

here

required
to
ensure

(Breach of Rules (Rule IV.). The

as briefly

and II.),

division
:

accordingto
Student.

remedy overlapping adequate exhaustiveness work-status be given may

to

follows

Idle.

Xot-idle.

J
I

Perfunctory.

Diligent.

54

THE

PROBLEM
'

OF
'

LOGIC

[II.iv.

attempt to divide however, a fundamental cannot be included, even

of
some
'

The

raises, according to play-status For the F.D. play-status difficulty.

' '

student

as

an

indeterminate

mark,
as one

in the definition who

student.'
form

student
or

cannot
some

be defined
form

patronizes
Problematic

of

play

takes

of recreation.

be trans at the call of the dividing-interest, cannot, even properties into differentiae. There is certainly a difficulty here, but the figured logical remedy is simple and direct. The genus or dividendum be altered so as to answer appropriatelyto the requirements may of the case. We cannot accept play-status as an F.D. of student,'
' ' '

but

we

can

accept

it

as

an

F.D.

of
be We

'

student

who that

is interested this

in

games.'
is
a mere

supposed procedure asked to not infrequently subterfuge dodge. perform operationson inappropriateobjects. We might be asked, for instance, to multiply 8 cows by 15 sheep, or to divide 15 sheep by 5 sheep. We might be asked to decide upon the specific spiritual qualityof a ghost'sbody or a comet's tail. We may even asked be to convert 0 proposition. Against all such questions an as these we safeguardourselves by pointingout that the requirement cannot be met, and that the nature of the objectresents the subjec tive demand it. A number be made can inconsiderately upon divided by another number, but not a sheep by a sheep,nor so many horses. A comet's tail cannot cows by so many by spiritual grow the simpleprocess of becoming sufficiently thin. a student Similarly the cannot suit in order to capricesof a put on a games-interest itself be Division. A question in Logic may question in logical When student we are illogical. asked, then, to divide according to play-status, that it the is we answer play-studentthat has only and that, from the point of view of play, the student a play-status, who does not play must be cancelled,not, indeed, as a skulk,' a
not, however,
or are
' ' '
'

It should

or shirker,'

'

book-

worm

controlled by feelings We
some

for these pretty labels do not express but as an irrelevance interests an logical
" " "

'

irrelevance to the limited

may such

interests
as our

of the

adopt, then,

division

play-topic. according to play-status,

classification as

the

following:

Playing student.

Athletic.

Non-athletic.

Shaping badly.

Shaping well.
'

(iv.j Quadrilateral figure

gram,
or

'

'

into

square,

parallelo rectangle,

rhomboid.'
' ' '

quadrilateral figure to mean rilateral figure.' The classes overlap,with breach of

We

take

plane rectilinear quad

III. The correction

Rule

56

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.iv.

given, involves two fundamenta, which, still different are specifically though not generically, namely, siderelation of relative magnitude and it is a And angle-relation.' III. (though not necessarily breach of Rule of Rule I.) to utilize that are specifi simultaneouslyat any given stage two fundamenta different. to be the cally Proper subdivision, then, might seem natural and the corrected division we as remedy, might present
the
'
"

But

division, as

'

'

follows

Triangle.

Acute-angled.

Right-angled.

Obtuse-angled.

Equilateral.

Non-equilateral.

Isosceles.

Scalene.

to requireto be completed by the division,so framed, seems the subdivision of the two remaining members of the first division,

But

and

the total result is

case

complex. unnecessarily
a

It would

in this
run as

to institute
:

co-division which, when

simpler completed, would

be

scalene (F.D. isosceles, Triangle into equilateral, relative side-length), and into acute-angled, obtuseright-angled, angled (F.D. side-inclination).

follows

(vi.) Yorkshire
This is
'

'

'

into

'

North, East, and West

Ridings.'

physicaldivision.
'

(vii.) Lemonade
This is
an

into

'

fluid, acid,sweet,'etc.

incomplete metaphysical division.

'

''Accident (viii.)

into

'

misadventure

or

irrelevant

predicable.'

the discrimination This is verbal division, of

an

of the

possible meanings

ambiguous

term.

CHAPTER

V.

II. (v.) CLASSIFICATION.*

THE

first main

object of Classification
in order ; and the

by marshallingthem
*

facts keep control over which principle general guides

is to
'
'

Classification already indicated in the last chapter (vide p. 42),the term Real Division it comprehensive than the term ; for, in the first place, not only the downward from summum movement genus to infimae species to which from restricted in Real Division, but also the upward movement we are the lowest speciesto the highest genus. In the treatment of Classification here is more includes
' '

As

CHAP.

V.]
such
are

CLASSIFICATION endeavour
most

57

every which

is that and the

alike
to take

bringing together those things separatingthose things which are most

of

of

unlike. and

Thus,

case

animals, we

have

here

an

immense

bewilderingvariety of individual beings. A sufficient know of life certain ledgeof Anatomy enables us to detect within this maze aid structure the of of which we form relatively by permanent types these are will zoological species. When compared together,some characters in common be seen to have by which they resemble differ from all other These another and one we species. group into what is here called From a technically together genus. genera similar to and to we families,orders, classes, by finally steps pass sub-kingdoms. The words class,' genus,' species have here acquiredmeanings quite different from those involved in statingthat the definition of is given by statinggenus and differentia. In this a class or species all the terms From latter statement the are general and relative. the word class is used generally point of view of the predicables, for any group of objects resembling each other in certain character istics.* Thus, a sub-kingdom, or an order, or a class proper, or a is a class in this sense of the word. So, again, genus, or a species
'

'

'

'

'

'

if we

take

any

two

successive

groups
as
'

in the scheme
to

of

classification,
'

the first will stand

sense

to the second
'

of these
'

terms.

Class

the species. But

'

in these fixed

predicable genus of which is the genus Order ' is ' ' classifications the words class,' genus,"
A
' '

in the species

species
a

have

specializedmeanings.
and
'

class

'

corner a

between
and

sub-kingdom a species, species between

a an
'

order, a
a

'

genus genus and

between

family

variety.

TYPES

OF

CLASSIFICATION*. kinds
:

Classifications

are

of

two

they
are

may

be

either

real

or

formal.
When
mount
we

state

that

classifications
to

governed by

consideration
arise in for order.

of order, our
a

tions need

response But there

tive purpose divided given we

be

realizes itself the nature

primary meaning the dominating subjectivepurpose, which this in main two are subjec ways in either whole-hearted it : develop may
material

para is that classifica

the

to conformity

of the

studied, or

it may

show

adherence, conforming partly to the requirements

have used

of the

it cannot almost in which the term in that sense exclusively the up-building of a considered lieal Division have i.e.,we classification rather than its explication from the most generalconcepts downwards. But even where the direction of Classification coincides with that of Real Division, the two processes remain distinct. For Classification includes processes of Definition as well as of Division; whereas have defined them, Division and Definition, as we

mistaken

for

"

are
*

our

mutually exclusive. The extension-import of (fide p. 14("). purpose

class is here

assumed,

as

the

more

convenient

for

58

THE

PROBLEM
to

OF

LOGIC

[II. v.

material, but partly also

for order which life and
culture. the

one

or

other of the
in the

subjectmakes
In the former In

demands specialized interests of his own practical

be called is the
as one

case

the classification may

case

real ; in the latter, formal. the subjectiveinterest in interest is fixed may the

each and But

dominating factor
well
case as

order,

here,
in the
own
"

there,

the

be

'

disinterested.'

this interest

on

discoveryof the material's

order

whether nature by the laws of its own ; in the other it material is the in or bent on arranging necessity by the help of such of its characters as happen to be classifier's specific requirements.
"

imposed upon it through choice a selective spirit

relevant to the

All the classification-schemes

of the Natural
of

Sciences

are

real in

the

sense

above
are as

defined.
main and

There known
same

two

types

Real

Classification, respectively

natural the

diagnostic.But
natural.

they
As the

do

not

stand

on

the

for level,

diagnostic type of Classification

of the
it at

has its sole raison

"Titre in the these two

service

distinction

between

types

of Real

Classification is
some

particularly important, we

proceed

to consider

length.

Natural In

Classification.
scientists have
may
"

classifying accordingto Nature,

true

been

guided
as

by

the

followingimportant clue, which

Natural

be
to

regarded
wit,
that

the
it is

guiding-thread of

Classification

characteristic of the ways of Nature a fundamental in any single ence particular e.g., possessionor lack she correlates with this difference a largenumber of a spinalcord
" "

that, when

she makes

differ

of other view

differences.

In

the

case

of the Genetic

Sciences, which

standpoint of its development, this characteristic admits two of a ready explanation. Given of with the rudiment and the other without a one spinal species, cord, it is obvious, from the point of view of Evolution, that they will develop in very different ways, and acquire very different pro perties. Such classes as are formed of things which agree among
their

object-matterfrom

the

themselves called
in
so

and

differ from
'

others in

multitude

of characters

were

A classification is natural by J. S. Mill natural kinds.' far as it keeps to natural kinds throughout.

only

natural

classification, then,
divisions
one

may
so

be defined constituted

as

one

in

which,

roughly speaking,the
included
in any

are

that the

objects
all

of them

resemble

each other and

differ from

others in many In Natural those

thus which
"

respects. significant
Classification the
are

differences

are

i.e., important characters of correlated accompanied by largernumber selected for determining the higher groups, and
more
"

the

the kinds

classified will,on

the

from whole, be arranged, the of principle

'

thX
sub-

primary divisions downwards,

accordingto

CHAP.

V.]

CLASSIFICATION of characters.'
In this

59

ordination
which the

any class holds which characters

arrangement, the higherthe place the more in the classification, important are constitute it. This arrangement will prevent
from being brought together in the groups and the frogwill be held apart in the classi ox

any lower

widely dissimilar
divisions. The

fication,as in Nature.
we

Thus, if we
another

are

notice

that

plantsin which
one

the ovules

considering plants, flowering in enclosed are a protective

structure
are

resemble

not unprotected)

only in
as

(and differ from those whose ovules this particular, but in a largenumber
the structure
of their vascular

of other

pointsas well,such
of the

tissue,

the form
the

and stamens, the germination of the pollen-grain, development of the endosperm. In classifyingflowering
therefore

as (according they have protectedor unprotected ovules) into Angiospermse or GymnoIn subdividingthe Angiospermse,we choose the character spermse. of two primary leaves,or of only one, and thus form of the presence alternative the two sub-classes, Dicotyledons and Monocotyledons. of After this we in descending order to other characters go on we plants,

divide them

first of all

importance,

and

so

form
of

our

Orders, Sub-orders, Genera,

and

Species.
The

characterization

dicotyledonousor untechnical relatively

Angiosperms, according as they are monocotyledonous, admits of being stated in a

way. the has Thus
:

(i.) Dicotyledons have (1) The (2) The (3) (4) The
The

characters following
two

embryo
first
or

seed-leaves
root

primary
the seed.

of the

or cotyledons. embryo branches after

it leaves
stem

branches when

stem,
tinuous
stem

repeatedly. perennial,has
and in thickness

distinct

pith, con
The

rings of wood,
of wood outside
The

separable bark.
the formation

increases

by

of fresh
and

rings
(5)
The
outer

those

already formed
wood is inside.
most

inside the bark.

hardest
are

fives

"

parts of the flower have five members i.e.,

are

commonly

in

in each whorl.

(6) The

leaves

net-veined.
the

(ii.) Monocotyledons
(1) The

have

followingcharacters

(2) The (3) The

embryo has only one seed-leaf. branches before primary root

seed.

it

leaves

the

stem,

as

rule, shows

little

branching,and

in the

monocotyledonous
apex, the buds

trees (such as Palms) unbranched, growing only from a quite

it may be bud at its leaves

produced remaining undeveloped.

in the

axils of the

60

THE

PROBLEM
is without
or

OF

LOGIC

[II. v.

(4) The

stem

any

distinct

pith,continuous
The

ringsof

of

wood,

separablebark.
in cellular tissue.

wood
are

consists

bundles embedded
are

of fibres and

which vessels,

separately
bundles,

The

hardest

outside.

(5) The (6) With

outer

parts of the flower

are

in threes.
are

few

the leaves exceptions,

straight-veined.
are

It is to be noticed
means

that the most

most

important characters
Our

by

no

the (usually)

obvious.

natural

groups

seem,

at

To an extremely heterogeneous kinds. mind, the yellow cowslip,the scarlet pimpernel, and the purple cyclamen would be ; unlike as flowers could seem as yet these three species are closelyrelated, and we class them all in the Natural Order Primulaceae. So also the daisy, the goldenrod, and the thistle belong to one Natural the Order, Compositse ; and two flowers so unlike as the blue cornflower and the purple knap weed to the same belong,not only to the same family, but even do in (Centaurea). We Classification, not, genus give the preference to the most and the least vari obvious, but to the most significant able characters. and Botanical Classifica Thus, in both Zoological tion, Analogy (resemblance arising from adaptation to similar is of far less importance than Homology or morphological functions) of Classi for purposes identity. Hence the paramount necessity, of the study of Development. In classingany organism, fication, of must consider not only its characters moment we at any one observation, but also those exhibited by its past history; for thus alone is it possibleto ascertain the homologies of structure upon which Comparative Morphology is founded. The importance to Classification of a close study of Development has been tenfold increased by the discovery of the connexion between and ontogeny phylogeny,the establishment of the theory that each individual animal forms) organism (at least among If recapitulates in its development the whole historyof its race. bo for the to meet, first time, a full-grownhen, we we were might uncertain but of her exact place in the Animal when we Kingdom ; have watched day by day the development of the chick, in the egg, from the single cell which protozoan ancestor, represents some the fish-like which exhibits a through stage swimming tail and con and form with its again through the reptilian spicuous gill-slits, each with four limbs and hands, its five digitsdistinctly shown by

first

sight, to

include

unbotanical

'

'

the microscope, on to the first emergence in like form, then we have no difficulty
her proper
an

of the characteristic birdour relegating

adult fowl to

in position

our

classification. zoological classification of animals

or

Thus, represent, not

ideal natural

plants would
ancestral

historyof the

but the whole only the present affinities, organisms dealt with. It would indicate no

mechan-

CHAP.

V.]

CLASSIFICATION

61

ical arrangement of isolated types, but an organized continuum of the missing links would in which some be suppliedby palseontowould be and others research, ideallyreconstructed with logical
Our scheme of classification probable exactness. would thus become a genealogical tree, showing the vital relation of each kind to all the others, and thus making evident the organized unity of the whole.* with Natural in Connexion The Problem Definition Classification. involves the of Classification the which of names necessity defining
more or

less of

"

constitute Definition

the Nomenclature. takes of the the form

In the

case

of Natural
"

of Characterization

Classification, of giving an in i.e.,

to

ventory
members
theses

known

characteristics

common

all the
"

typical
a

of the class indicated

which

by

the

term

to

be denned

result

only through those thorough-going analysesand syn for when called are we study Nature, with reconstruc tive intention,as a complex and developing system of which all the parts and aspects are intimatelyinterrelated. In a natural classi have from the primary divisions as wre fication, seen, every group,
will possess downwards, a Thus, the definition of the somewhat
The
term
as
'

to be obtained

number
term
'

of

common
'

characteristics.

Dicotyledon
a

might be stated

follows

:
'

the distin plant possessing of the Angiospermae (genus), and further guishing characters characterized by the following marks : with two Embryo cotyledons. Stem, when perennial,having a distinct pith,continuous ringsof wood, and separablebark, and branching repeatedly. Leaves
Parts net-veined. of the flower

Dicotyledon

stands

for

usuallyin fives.
of the
:

So, again, the definition

would The

term

Vertebrate

'

in

Zoology (genus)

be somewhat
term
'

as

follows
'

Vertebrate

stands

for

a :

multicellular

animal

characterized
1. The

marks by the following

possession (at some stage of the animal's development) of smooth, elastic, dorsally placed rod (the Notochord) lying ventral
*

of Natural Classification mention the classification of the chemical may elements Periodic Law. This same according to Mendeleeff's instance is also ' excellent example of Classification by Series (vide Professor an Duncan's The New and Knowledge,'ch. iii.; Hodder As another, perhaps Stoughton, 1906). still more this time in the realm important, instance of Natural Classification
"

As a particularly important and in the realm of inorganic Nature, we

impressiveinstance

values spiritual Virtues,'by H. W.

of

"

we

would

refer

to

an

article

'

on

The

Classification

of

the

and Scientific of Philosophy,Psychology, Methods, vol. iv.,No. 6, March 14, 1907). However, Mr. Wright does not so much furnish the classification itself as the for making it. As the species principles classifiedaccording to the part they play in the are of organic evolution, process so the virtues are classified accordingto the office they discharge in the organization of conduct. Thus ideal of a principle of classification organic to the field of our its application is realized (ibid., p. 160).
'
'

Wright (The

Journal

62

THE

PROBLEM be

OF

LOGIC

[II. v.
a

to

the

nerve-cord.
or

This
a

may

replacedby
'

rod, gristly)
may

by

column

of distinct round

either remain

or cartilaginous

cartilaginous (i.e., These, again, be replaced later by vertebrae

vertebrae.' and

of bone.
2. The

(These vertebrae grow

at possession,
some

protect the nerve-cord.)

in stage of development, of gill-slits which is

the anterior

part

of the

alimentary canal.
nerve-cord,
the

3. An

unpaired

dorsal

tubular, having
or

central canal, and is In the more advanced

protected by
forms

notochord
sense

the vertebrae.
are

the brain and

The

organs

highly
ventral

developed, the latter

4. A
to

being paired. highly organized circulation. the alimentary canal. 5. Symmetrical segmentation.
Definition

heart

is

always

mental

develop by Type, a type the species defined class for of as an instance, being example any the character which of a genus is considered as eminentlypossessing Mitchell says that of the class (Whewell). Thus, Dr. P. Chalmers such conception as that Morphologists are slowly coming to some of which central point around a a speciesis the abstract group of variations oscillate, and that the peripheral oscillations one Enc. allied those of an Brit.,' even species (' speciesmay overlap by
characterization take
case

tends, in the
"

of the

sciences,to
'
"

the

form

of Definition

'

'

'

10th

article edn., vol. xxviii.,

'

on

Evolution,' p. 343).
"

Definition

it does defective by Type is no doubt to this extent logically not provide ideallyagainstambiguity ; and, in its insistence on a central as distinguished from definiteness of character a peripheral that

ization, it resembles
but it is none

Description rather
natural

than
to

the less the Definition

reason

; proper Science. classificatory

Definition

classification, why, in Botanical and Zoological the reference to organizedreality should call for definition by type. structures Typical possessinga complete fitness for existence sur vive, and the intermediate forms tend to disappear,though there be many deviations from type that are not important enough may which the persistence to interfere with that fitness to survive upon of the type depends. Hence, in the developmental sciences, Real
There
is good

Definition the

"

the definition of

class

or

concept

that is framed
"

to bear

which searchlight

Science

throws

central in character. the definition ; but tions which show

The
in its

central

upon and qualities

Nature

is

essentially
determine

tendencies

the definition takes in all varia application marked more a approximation to the central requirements in question than to those of any other definition. This Definition by Type, we add, forms a transitional link may between a rigidperipheraldefinition, or definition by boundaries, In this and the more inward and vital definition by ends or ideals. latter kind of Definition,the definingmarks, far from being pos be the sessed in common class of defined, may by all the members

64

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II. v.

himself claimed

Besides his nothing higherfor it. index, of arrangement he also promulgatedfragments of a natural method
... . . .

'

9th edn., vol. iv., ('Enc. Brit.,' p. 80).

This distinction
a

between

Natural

and

Diagnostic Classification
' '

puts

in

clear

Definition.
structural
we

lightthe relative character of what is essential for classification shows that for The need for a diagnostic
the salient mark is often If
we more

scientific purposes
or

essential than
to

the

the functional
a

mark.

don't, as

rule,need
true

to examine
some

order to class the

mark

specimen by
to

It is,therefore,not

say

identifya plant, microscopiccharacters in minute of structure. peculiarity that in Diagnostic Definition the
its

wish

non-essential. For the of specifying may purposes is is and of Definition its what Diagnosis saliency just Diagnostic with DiagnosticClassification is essential. Definition in connexion Definition with the purpose it naturally of identification. Hence takes the form of diagnosticcharacterization. It is a definition Thus be Iodine giving the salient,easily tested marks. may defined as substance that colours starch blue. a diagnostically Where the absence forms the most of a mark of strikingmeans identification,the a diagnostic definition includes negative
' '

be

characteristic
Manx
cats

: are

cats

that is
a

have

no

tails. in

An

apetalous plant

ant flowering -pi

which

the corolla is

absent.

Formal
As
we

Classification.

already stated,formal classifications are characterized require by the intimate relation in which they stand to the specific
have
ments

of the

individual

classifier. There
we

are

two

main

types of
names

formal

Classification to which

may

convenientlygive the

of Conventional

the latter Index-Classification, solelyfor the sake of, and in the service of, the former. existing Conventional Classification, again, may be either Appropriately

Classification and

Conventional

or

not.

suitably be called carried appropriately

the
nature

latter case, the Classification may classification is conventional Artificial. A

In the
out

when

there the The

is

of what

is classified and

maladjustment between of the purpose nature specific

no

which

directs the

classification.

kinds

here

classified must

be those proper to any natural science, for in that case conventional orderingof them would not be proper to a subjective, art from be drawn their nature. products of human They must therefore not and
the

thought, such
case

as no or

statues

or

books. would

Here,
be

of books,
the

valuable

end

in especially gained by attempting

more

to group

of

Natural

characteristic complete manner types of the in which the full resemblances Classification, kinds after the
taken

types classified are

into account.

It is here

more

purposive,

CHAP.

V.]
therefore
more

CLASSIFICATION

65

of attri to fix on attribute or group an logical, butes which happens to be of importance for the purpose, and to the types in strict relation to it. On the and construct classify of plants other hand, where the types are natural kinds e.g., species and yet are not classified accordingto their nature, but according of selection and arrangement to a specifically subjectiveprinciple chosen without regard to the real nature of the material in question, Artificial.' This the classification may conveniently be termed of the word, though it gives a to be a rightand proper use appears that implied in the ordinary contrast restricted than more sense and
" "

'

between kinds
some

Natural

and

Artificial Classification.
and

Thus

the

various

arranged in the lightof garden plantsmight be formed which the decorative interest, subjectiveinterest (e.g., may
of
and essential), such
an

find colour-distinctions contrasted with

the true, in

geneticorder
to

in which

arrangement, when the various species

then be
a

of
'

plants stand

relation

each

other, might suitablybe called

would
not kind

Artificial.'

Artificial Classification
but Classification,

of
with

Conventional Conventional

would

be

identified

Classification in

general.

Conventional,like Natural, Classification needs the co-operation of a key-classification subordinated to its own requirements. special
will not, of course, key-classification character and intention of the analytical keys

But

this

Classification. As
as

it rule,

will be found and

to be

objective Diagnostic proper alphabetical, strictly

to
a

share

the

in the

case

of all indexes

catalogues. Thus,

in librarian,

and classifying types of books, will do so according to constructing rather than the convenience some subjective plan for which his own But the librarian's nature of the objectis the dominating standard. classification of the books is one thing,the cataloguingof the same for the convenience of readers is another thing. The latter classifi cation is a mere finder to the former as that is representedby the

arrangement
tion
natural

of the books
to

on

the

shelves,and stands
in which
a are

to it in

rela
to
a a

closely analogous
classification.

that

diagnosticstands
differences.

And

yet there

Thus,

classification diagnostic

yieldsin itself a

certain

know superficial

and can be translated into ledgeof the nature of what is classified, other languages, the arrangement not being alphabetical ; but a catalogue,qua alphabeticalarrangement, yields no knowledge of

what have books

such
a

it classifies. To
a

be

aware

that

Punch

and
a

the

'

Principia
the involve

'

common

initial letter and any

hardly constitutes
attempt

knowledge of
would

in

question,

at translation

original arrangement as to be catalogue. would draw attention to the fact that spatial we Finally, grouping, such as that of the books on the shelves of a library, the arrange or complete transformation of the equivalent to the construction of a new
ment

of

collection of butterflies in
an

classification. It is logical

cabinet, is in no sense arrangement of specimens,and

a

not

66

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.vi.

species. Again, the assigningof individuals to their respective is not a classes, though in itself a logical operation, but of species, of objects. We may class classification only a classing but them. cannot we classify specimens,
a

classification of

Classification.

Real.

Formal.

Natural.

Diagnostic (Analytical key).

Conventional.

Index-Classification

| I
I
Artificial.
.

(Alphabetical key).

Appropriate.

CHAPTER
II.

VI.
AND

SCIENTIFIC (vi.)

TERMINOLOGY

NOMENCLATURE.

Technology.
LET
as we us

first say

few

words

about

Technical

Terms. of

Words,

through a process growth. nucleus of meaning, original the usual meaning making it extremely hard to define sharply even Now in its the dangers to of the word. Science, anxiety escape arisingfrom these clingingassociations, often takes the extreme be current, never step of inventing symbols which, since they can Hence associative a great advantage never can meaning. gain an must face the in clearness and precision. On the other hand, we cut fact that, by using technical Science off from terms, we this objection Political Economy has, on ordinary life. To meet the whole, adopted the plan of using popular words e.g., rent,' for its own accurate wages,' etc. But it defines these strictly and is therefore misleading to the uninitiated reader. purposes, And this plan has the great advantage of keeping the student in yet
have Various
'
"

and pass sensitive, seen, are the associations cluster round

'

close touch To

with

fact. the

The

use

of technical

terms

is, of

course,

justifiable only on
be technical in
oneself is to make

distinctions are needed. ground that accurate in one's thought one's language and inaccurate The
two

ridiculous.

essentials of the

technical

language of Science are (a) a good descriptive Terminology, (b) a good Nomenclature. a collec (a) Terminology. By descriptive Terminology we mean
"

tion

of words

which

will enable

us

to

describe

natural

kinds.

Of

all the

sciences, perhaps Botany has

thebest

terminology. descriptive

CHAP.

VI.]

TERMINOLOGY

AND

NOMENCLATURE

67

Every part of a plant and every varietyof plant structure has been in that the plant can, so to speak, be drawn named so exhaustively of its has its corolla of flower The calyx,consisting sepals, words. with its stamens, with their filaments and anthers, its pistil petals, and stigma,etc. its carpels, style, all the various forms of the leaves of plants there Again, among be accuratelydescribed. which cannot is not one Thus, when a be it said is to linear the length when and leaf is long ; very narrow, times as great as the breadth, and the broadest is three or more is tapering, the leaf is part is below the middle, while the summit
described
' ' '

as

lanceolate

'

; when

the

broadest
the

part is above
with
a

the

middle, and

the

blade

tapers towards
'

base, the leaf

is called

when the blade is broadly cuneate cuneate ; and top we say that it is flabelliform.' A leaf that
form of
a

rounded

approaches the
' '

spathulate ; and other forms of leaves are as oval,' oblong,' ovate,' obovate,' orbicular,' and falcate.' oblate,' rhomboidal,' elliptical,' A descriptive be carefullv must (b) Nomenclature. terminology
spoon known
'

or

ladle is called
' ' '

'

'

'

'

'

"

of any The nomenclature. nomenclature for the groups kinds which or classification consists of the names the words which these the classification systematizes ; by groups

from distinguished

are

characterized

constitute like
names

its

terminology.
to

Nomenclature,
view from which
"

Definition,tends
are

vary

with

the

point of

considered.
in

The

being steady
Classification
"

that
we

of

naming

accordance

purpose with of principles of

of Science

have,

nomenclature.
'

With

of course, a corresponding steadiness of interest comes variety of nomen variety

'

from the following extract Watts's as clature, Logic (quoted by Dr. Gilbart, Logic for the Million,'pp. 66, 67) clearlyshows :
'

'

Most

of all

plantsagree [flowering]
and

in this seeds
as

stalk,leaves,buds, blossoms,
very different kinds of service
to

; but

them

under

different names,

they have a root, a the gardener ranges really though they were
"

that

merely beings,

because

of the

different

use

and

they plantswhose roots are to themselves, such as carrots, turnips,radishes, etc.

are

which

are appliedby men" as, for shall appropriate the eaten

those instance,
name

of roots

If the leaves

herbs, sage, mint, thyme ; termed are salad, as lettuce, they raw, if boiled,they become pot-herbs as spinach, coleworts ; purslain; and some of those plantswhich are pot-herbs in one familyare salad in another. If the buds are made food they are called heads or our
of chief
use

to us, then eaten

we

call them

as

if the

leaves

are

"

heads tops,so cabbage-heads,

blossom

be of most

of asparagus, and artichokes. importance we call it a flower,such as

are

If the

daisies,

and tulips,

carnations,which
or

the

mere are

blossoms
called

of those
the

plants'

If the husks

seeds

are

eaten, they

fruits of the

ground,

as

be of known

peas, and

If any part of the plant etc. beans, strawberries, in to us use medicine, we call it a physical common
o
"

68

THE

PROBLEM

OF but if

LOGIC
count

[II.vi.
no

herb,
call it
next

as a

carduus, scurvy-grass weed, and throw it out

some neighbour knows his and it in garden, givesit the title of an herb or a flower. plants it appears how ridiculous Now, when thingsare set in this clear light

part useful we of the garden ; and yet, perhaps,our valuable property and use of it ; he
;
we

it would

be it be

to
a

contend

whether
or a

dandelion

be

an

herb

or or

weed,

whether
different

pot-herb
one

salad,when, by
the value each
name

the custom

this families,
uses

plant obtains

to the several

of it and

that

all these names, is put upon it.' would

fancy of according
the

In

an

ideal nomenclature

indicate
This

place
be

in occupied by the class named the class-names done by relating

the

classification.

would

to each

other, instead of allowing

rest.

each

group

to

name

itself independentlyof the

Definition

is thus represented, in a very simple form, per genus et differentiam In in the systems of scientificnomenclature. Botany and Zoology, characteristic some giving, usually, of the Rabbit is Lepus salient mark. name or Thus, the zoological The Red Deer of the Common that timidus. cuniculus; Hare, Lepus The Brown the Wapiti Deer Cervus canadensis. is Cervus elaphus, Bear Ursus ferox. So also Botanists the Grizzly Bear is Ursus arctos, Rosa the Field Rose call arvensis, the Dog Rose R. canina, the the Sweetbriar R. rubiginosa. The Marsh Violet is Viola palustris, the Sand Violet Sweet Violet V. odorata,the Hairy Violet V. hirta, and The the Common V. arenaria. CreepingButtercup, the Hairy Goldilocks,'and the Lesser Celandine all belong to Ranunculus, the genus Ranunculus, and are distinguished respectively by the names acris, auricomus, and Ficaria. specific repens, hirsutus, secured In view of the great efficiency itself by making the name feel considerable sympathy sort of condensed we definition, a may with Mr. Garden's protest against what he calls the evil fashion, so once prevalent amongst naturalists,of paying compliments What I the am by naming genera and speciesafter each other. called Hedwigia hornmoss better,'he asks, for hearing a rare led infer to that schuchiana, beyond being Germany has, or had, ? two On botanists, one called Hedwig and the other Hornschuch
' ' '

for instance, each kind takes the and adds to it a differentia species,

name

of the genus

of which

it is

the other
mum

hand, when
I

am

told that

such

moss

is called Trichosto-

of

on am, previous knowledge a presented with definition, lanuginosum (" woolly ") expressing the differentia of this speciesin the genus

lanuginosum,

supposition of

Trichostomum,
even

Trichostomum,
viewed
as

as

Trichostomum

does

that of the genus

when

higher genus which contains it.' species is peculiarly Chemical Nomenclature efficient. The names of the for the most been Elements, indeed, have, part, chosen, arbitrarily
and
names are

of the

of historic interest rather of compound substances are

of

than

of scientific value ; but

the

Those

assignedon systematic principles. substances simple binary compounds (i.e., composed of

CHAP.

VI.]

TERMINOLOGY

AND formed
as

NOMENCLATURE

69

two

elements

only) are

by combining the
cases

names

of their elements

component
combine
duced
are

elements, and

in many

the

same

two

the different compounds so pro proportions, of the addition of terminal means distinguishedby the compounds of prefixes. Thus, among or (more usually) syllables and of Sulphur Oxygen we have Sulphur dioxide, Sulphur trioxide. and monoxide Sulphur sesquioxide. So, too, we have Potassium Potassium Simi dioxide, Lead tetroxide,Arsenic pentoxide, etc. acids the names of indicate their placesin the classification by larly of significant and suffixes. Thus means prefixes Sulphur,in com bination with Oxygen and Hydrogen, forms a whole series of acids known as respectively hyposulphurous acid, sulphurous acid, sul and anhydro-sulphuric acid,pyrosulphuric, phuricacid, thiosulphuric acid. In combination with other elements Sulphur forms a series and the termination of sulplurfes, sulphz'^es, sulphates, showing in each the in series of the the case position compound indicated. of Chemistry is even more Further, the symbolic nomenclature efficient and element is precise than the verbal system. Each the initial letter the letters) symbolically representedby (or two of and the symbolic names of its Latin name, of compounds are made elements with the addition up of the symbols of their component of numbers which indicate the proportionsin which these elements combined. Thus H is the symbol of Hydrogen, S of Sulphur, are and 0 of Oxygen ; and, in the series of acids cited above, hyposulphurous acid is symbolicallyrepresentedas H2S02, sulphurous acid as H2S03, and the others in order as H2S04, H2S203, HS207,
in different

H2S207. In Astronomy, also, we

The
verbal
name

find both

verbal
the
our

and
'

symbolic
of

names.
'

principle.The persons by a family name is represented by that

a a

framed, as a rule,on system is analogous to

of
or

is

letter of the

Greek

designating and a Christian name. The family name the constellation, Christian the name by number. Roman Thus, or a alphabet,

genus method

et differentia

Lyrae, j3Pegasi,Z Herculis,T Corona?, 113 Herculis. of the star in some Frequentlythe number given catalogue is
as

used

designation"e.g., Lac(aille)7215, Brad(ley) 3077. As the constellations, hemi those in the southern especially have been sphere, variouslymapped out by different astronomers, and as different astronomers, again, different catalogues, there is use stilla good deal of uncertaintyas to the naming of stars. The same
star may thus

its

belong

to

more

than

one

constellation,and

be

numbered differently Hence

name.

the great

The
a

position of

catalogues. advantage in star-naming of using the symbolic rule for finding the is a formula or symbolic name it. The formula consists in star, and so identifying
"

in different

what called the co-ordinates of the star its latitude and giving are longitude, to ascension its right and declinaso speak (technically

70

THE

PROBLEM of

OF

LOGIC
18

[II. vii.

tion). Thus,
+

the

symbolic name

Lyraeis :

hours, 33',6"
of

R. A. ;
star

38" 41' Declination.

It would
seem,

then, that, since

and since a star can it by means identify nothing always be identified by its rightascension and declination, The the is this statement star's but of position reallynecessary. should be completely sufficient. Unfortunately, symbolic name the position constantly changes through the precession of the equinoxes and other causes, so that this designation of a star of a star is, is a variable quantity.'* The true symbolic name therefore, given by the formula noting its R.A. and declination + all of the rectifications required for precession,refraction, errors instrument, personalequation,etc.
to be able to
'

purpose of its name,

the

naming

is

CHAPTER
II.

VII.
AND

CONNOTATION (vii.)

DENOTATION.

DEFINITION
of these two

and

Division have
'

are

the

two

fundamental of
term.

methods The
;
"

for

or making developing

the explicit

processes
'

a meaning special given to names

results

them
a

Definition

gives the connotation,Division

we we

the denotation

of

word.

Thus,
are

if If

define divide The

Man Man

'

as
'

rational
'

'

into

animal,' Aryan, Semitic, or Turanian,' we

term, then, consists
the

this is its connotation.

giving

its denotation. connotation

of

of the

definingmarks
class-

which

the

name

implies;
the

of the denotation,

alternative

distinctions into which divided.

of
a

be can relevantly meaning of the name two consider more us closelyeach of these aspects word's meaning. Let
may be either formal the
name or

1. Connotation
a name

real.

The

connotation service of

of
an

will be is

formal when
more or

is used

in the

interest that
real when
case

less

subjectiveand
of
a

occasional

it is the is

connotation

scientific term.

; it will be But in either

connotation And

tion.

just in
name.

definite, being the product of defini essentially far as an so object possesses the attributes or
in the connotation

the characteristics formulated

does it merit

and

obtain the From formal

'

the two
and

connotation above referred to, the types of logical the real,we must distingusha type of noncarefully
' '

connotation intension.' logical subjective usuallyreferred to as The marks class includes such intension of as a subjective only
*

Simon

Newcomb,

'

The

Stars,'pp. 36, 37.

72 It is for this

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II.vii.

comprehensive office that Professor Keynes has sug extension.' extension of a general gested the term By the
' '
. . .

name

.,'he writes,
or

'

we

shall understand
to

the

whole
can

range

of

correctly imaginary, applied,the only limitation being that of logicalconceivability.' But if the term is adopted in the sense extension here denned by that in so far as its Professor Keynes, it should not be overlooked range is not limited by a corresponding connotation, either in the rank as a logical formal or in the scientific sense, it cannot type of
name
' '

real objects,

which

the

be

reference apart from any be the connotation, there would, for logical purposes,
to the
'

extension.

Considered
'

to
same

definite

objection

term
'

extension

'

as

there is to the so-called infinite term

It is

essential that extension logically should in all cases be determined by connotation. We must between the specification of mean carefully distinguish ing, through Division, and the applicationof meaning, through
not-x

(videpp. 48-52).

Enumeration. sion.'

We

propose
use we

to

stamp
terms
as

this distinction
'

by
and

a
'

corre

spondingly distinct
Denotation

of the two define

denotation

'

exten

meaning, to be interpreted disjunctively through '0=8! or S2 or S3, etc.' of meaning to individual Extension define as application we of the formula to be interpretedconjunctivelyby means objects, and the G appliesto (or indicates) individuals ^ etc.' I2 and I3,
the

differentiation of formula

'

Correspondingto
suggest the
relevant Definition have
term
'

this

use

of the term Let

'

'

Extension
'

'

we

would

Intension.' of the The

Intension of of
a a

stand

for the full

development
and Division.

meaning
intension

concept
term

through
then and be
we

will

equivalent to its
the formula
:

connotation

and

denotation

combined,

Intension Our
use

Connotation
'

Denotation.

of the term
sense

'

Intension

in the

sequel will always be

in

the inclusive

here indicated.

The

'

Inverse

Relation

'

of Connotation

and

Denotation. Connota

It has been tion and

customary

to formulate

the relation between

by pointingout that,as we pass from summum at each step increasing the in a classification, genus to infima species determinate connotation tend at least to one differentia, we by diminish the number of kinds denoted by the concept. Thus, if we specify ship as steam-ship,'the word no longer denotes the If we mere further qualifyit as sailing-vessel. screw-steamship,' the speciespaddle-steamer is ruled out. correct as is this view of the relation in question, But, substantially it is none and the less superficial misleading in its emphasis. It
' ' ' '

Denotation

obscures the fact that the fundamental

relation

between

connotation

CHAP.

VII.]

CONNOTATION
is not
'

AND
'

DENOTATION
'

73

and denotation
tation factors and in

that conno but inverse,' complementary denotation are, in fact, complementary stages and
"

co-

relation

meaning. Moreover, by meaning or intension is poorer than that of a subordinated of a genus species. This for remains an given genus, question. Let G stand open any let stand for the deter its for species (F.D. /) ; d" dz d3 S1?S2, S3 connotation minate of G, and let /ls /2,/3 stand for those specifica of differentiae of tions / which give the Sl5S2,S3 respectively.Then the full meaning or intension of G, as relevant to the present com is given by parisonbetween G and its species,
the
no

logicalarticulation implies that

of

the

means

the total

fi and The
what

f*

f,

the

correspondingintension of Sx is given by di+ d2+ d3 + f1. or or /., questionbefore us, then, is whether (/x /3) for this is
"

amounts

to

"

is richer

which
and

besets the

in meaning than /r The difficulty poorer solution of this conundrum suggests that genus
or

studied as mutually indispensable speciesare more profitably for links in the development of meaning than rival claimants as at the some monopoly of meaning which shall enrich the one
expense

of the other.

Connotative

and

Denotative and

Names

"

The

Limits

of Definition
'

Division. called
' '

name

may
a

be appropriately
'

connotative in
as so

in

so

far

as

it
a

possesses to the

denotation.

connotation, denotative The expressions are useful

far

as

it possesses

important
consider

inquiry concerning the

a

limits of

helpingto give precision and definability

such clear
as a

divisibility.
given conceptual system, classification of animals or plants,it is at once
we

If

natural all the and

are,

that

subaltern genera, the classes between the summum infimse species, and both connotative denotative are

genus
;

the
we

they

But it is not so clear that either the may say, conno-denotative. the infima summum The or species is conno-denotative. genus summum Animal Plant in the case of the zoological, genus in the case of the botanical classification to the cannot, relevantly
' ' '
"
"

'

system
The

which

it

represents, be

summum

genus,

being the

'

genus be cannot highest,'

defined

per

et

the

differentiam. speciesof a

74

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II. vii.
summa

genus

higher than itself. It might seem, then, that that the indefinable. were So, again,it would seem ranks lowest in the of a division, were being
' '

genera

infimse not

species,

relevantly

subdivisible.
There
are,

moreover,

associated with
infima

the
a

difficulties those, namely, which are of the If the term infima ambiguity species.'
other
"

'

is species similar precisely

it should class-concept, that in which

a

be

definable in
genus

sense

to

subaltern
or

is definable.

If,on

the other

hand,
a a new

the proper
set

name,

the its

to be identified with

the infima

species as

singular meaning, is li mi ting form, we are

centre

confronted

by
'

of difficulties which be defined ?'

round

the

question :

Can

proper

name

Having
how

thus

stated the difficulties, we briefly

pass

on

to consider

they can

best be met.

Is the Summum (i.) It is

*

Genus
the
case

? Definable

manifestly true
'

that

in

of

the

summum

genus

there is, within the classification, no highergenus by the it But this which could be defined. of help simply pointsthe moral
Animal

develop the full meaning of his leading concept, Animal,' without connectingit with the leadingconcepts
that the
cannot zoologist
'

of other

sciences

"

e.g., the botanical

'

concept

'Plant'

"

and

recog

nizing

superordinategenus,
alike.
At

-which Organism,'

dominates
limits genus

both of the
must

interests

the

same

classification which specific

admit

it

within the time, even represents, a summum

attribute, partialdefinition through an indeterminate all subsequent fundamenta the primary F.D., of which divisionis of the one are Thus, taking as our summum specifications. genus the two primary groups into which the Animal Kingdom is divided, is definable the Sub-Kingdom Metazoon,'* this summum genus anatomical animal structure an an as of some organism possessing indeterminate kind.' This last-named or characteristic, though the less,a perfectly none indefinite, unambiguous mark, supplies,
of
a
' '

and,

as

we

have
is
no

seen,

an

indefiniteness which
the

does not
of

amount

to

ambiguity
*

for disqualification

purposes

Definition.

If
seem

we

But so-called
'

anatomical structure. cannot Protozoa unambiguously be said to possess scientists do not yet have shirked the definition of ' Animal,' it is because ' ' animal and ' plant.' discovered differentia between to have a satisfactory would be to absorb be obtainable, the logical the if this should not course
'

Organic species.

the singleClassification of might thus be defined as of cellular structure of some kind," or, better still, a protoplasmic structure a be kind.' The essential point is that no classificatory can some developed system this primary F.D. suppliesan without a primary F.D., and adequate differentia it unambiguously from all other Summa of the Summum Genus, distinguishing Animal
'

and

'

Plant

'

Classifications Genus
'

within

The

Summum

Organism

'

'

"
"

Jenera.
'

The
' '

reader

animal plant and .Bergson'sL'Evolution

who is interested in the attempt to fix the distinction between ' excellent treatment of the problem in Prof. will find an Creatrice'

(deuxieme edition, pp. 115-130).

CHAP.

VII.]

CONNOTATION

AND

DENOTATION

75

The

of this dominating fundamentum disjunctivespecification givesthe division of Vertebrate or Invertebrate' ; and all the subse
' '
"

quent fundamenta
of this
some

e.g.,

Dentition
summum

'
"

are

attribute original of anatomical

fresh
a

of the

modifications many of the possession genus

so
"

kind But

structure.

of conceive the process arises when we difficulty are reached, carried to its abstraction, whereby summa genera Existence.' Being or limit, and culminating in a concept like have more no general concept Such a concept or meaning can for ultimate our is since it thinking. We posited as beyond it, cannot, therefore,bring it under any superordinategenus, nor can function a co-ordinate it with connect speciesfulfilling we any Animal with connect similar can to its own, we as logically
' ' '
'

'

'

Plant.'

The

ultimate

summum

differentiam.We cannot therefore ; we any co-species and so distinguisha genus

et

be defined per genus genus cannot with this unique definiendum compare
cannot

sift
a

agreement

from We

difference,
must

from

differentia.

look

elsewhere It

for

solution

of the
that

problem.
arch-concept
is But self-defining.
sense

might

be

urged
?
are

this

if so, in what

sense

It cannot

in the be self -defining

'

in which

connotations
tell
us
'

its the

own

not ultimate The concept self-defining. meaning as do the expressions rational animal

does

'

and

mother

of the two

Gracchi
form

'

(videp. 80).

But

if not it not

self-

in defining

still of self-definition, may be self-evident,and therefore in last resort self-definable ? The ultimate for supposing this. There is no logical justification
this determinate

abstraction
fore

can

make

no

appeal to

immediate

experience; it

there

and vague meaning, in however proclaim its own undeveloped a form, by the easy way of unreasoned intuition. It sense. But it might conceivably be self-evident in another might proclaim its meaning indisputablyto the trained insightof the logical though it failed to impress the exoteric conscious reason, does
not
ness.

In order to ? self-evident in this esoteric sense criterion of intuitive test this point we apply the well-known logical to deny the self-evidence it is impossible ask whether certainty ; we into self-contradiction.* of Pure Being without falling selfof the logical Let us first consider the argument in favour

Can

it be

evidence

Something, qua pure being, is.' of the indubitable We take as our model Dr. McTaggart's defence the Category of Pure of Hegel'sdialectical starting-point, certainty Something is.' Hegel'sPure Being differs Being stated in the form here considering, in some are we genus respects from the summum the affect but the differences do not present argument, and our proof of the non-self-evidence of the Being which gives the summum tells equallywell, in our opinion,against Dr. McTaggart's genus
of the statement that
'

'

'

'

The
sense,

'

self-affirmation
a

'

of

Being

"

namely,

the

affirmation

that it exists

"

is,

in

statement

of what

it is, and

to this extent

impliesits definability.

76 defence

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
'

[II.vii.
which Something is,' the argument
'

of the self-evident character

'

of the
'

givesthe leadingcategory of the Dialectic. To deny the self-evidence of so Being to deny the self-evidence of the assertion
"

runs

"

is

that

Something
the
same

is.'* time

But

this assertion

cannot

be denied
'

without is.' And

being at

reaffirmed.
is
as

For the denial at least

in its favour
not.
as

to doubt

conclusive

either
we

genuine or
;
we

doubt

hold that

is not
'

genuine, then we while we Something is,'

Now
if this

deny it. For our If it is genuine,then we do not doubt that is something namely, our doubt : and if it all the while admitting the truth that are pretend to doubt it.
to
"

the assertion be doubt must

argument

were

sound
But

we

should

have

to

admit

the

the argument is surelyfallacious. Suppose I deny the self-evident character of Pure Being. I assert but not in the sense of pure being.' I assert denial,certainly, my self-evidence of Pure

Being.

'

it in

much

less abstract

sense.

I may,
'

therefore,without
qua pure
'

any
'

deny inconsistency, logical

the qua assertion pure

that

Something
'

of my denial being, but that

In the two

is the assertion
' '

not

that
'

for being is,' Something is

an

experience.
different We either
It

Something is for me as propositions Pure Being is

immediate
'

and

of the existence

of Pure

Being

is

'

the word

'

is

'

has

two

My denial quite
is genus it be can

meanings.
admit that the ultimate
as we summum

therefore cannot
et

self-evident ; nor, or self-defining

have

seen,

defined per genus

differentiam.
convenient
'

would,

no

doubt, be
the short

the knot with

sharp word
it would
a

point we could cut The stroke would, indefinable.'

if at this

for however, be suicidal,

cut at the root of the whole is

'

logical
sense

theory of Definition.
of the word, it must should ambiguity Definition
'

If

term

indefinable
to

'

in the strict

remain
ever come

permanently
to

infected with
it ;

cleave

for, the

ambiguity, remedy of
to tease

being unavailable, the ambiguity

of time.
' '

must

remain

to the end logicians

But

no

one

will

pretend that
summum

the term genus, is

Pure
the

Being,' that
summum

which

is the if an
root

ultimate incurable

free from
to

ambiguity. Moreover,
genus,

ambiguity attaches
in any classi-

there is
on

no

of soundness
et

ficatory system developed

For
'

the
no

in such
rest

system there

is

differentia principle. class-term of which the meaning

genus
'

does not
is
a

rational animal the

last resort which

summum

Man,' we say, but in both are animality ; of the wholly indeterminate specifications concept from

ultimatelyupon
'

the

summum

genus. and rationality

development
never

of

all

meaning

flows. initially
mean.
'

If the
Our

genus
we can

is indefinable, our

and

definitions are, one and ultimatelyknow what we reallydo

all, illusory,

definitions will all be more less remote of that we or specifications know not what.' If xn be the ultimate concept, and xn-1 a penulti*

Vide

McTaggart,

'

Studies

in the

Hegelian Dialectic,'" 18,

p. 21.

CHAP.

VII.]

CONNOTATION

AND

DENOTATION

77

of xn with differentia Btl we species say that xn_" is xn qualified by SH. But what is xn ? Similarly xn_2 is xn_^ quali of the vice fied by Sn_!. Thus, xn_2 inherits xn_l which originated in xn ; and so we might go on to the limit of the infima species. with the impatient reply that the be met At this point we may and that the ultimate is surelygratuitous, whole difficulty concept call When but in we definable not is only definable, ways. many Or we it ? may genus,'are we not defining Being the summum the wholly define Being as the ultimate category or concept, be will it these And not indeterminate are meanings, meaning. be con the wholly indeterminate added, unidetermining ? Can fused with any other meaning ? the is that, from the sufficient response To these plausibilities they all involve point of view of Definition per genus et differentiam, must and indeterminate circulus in definiendo. Wholly a of the wholly indeterminate be specifications themselves concept the ultimate for to hypothesis, is, by concept define, they profess whence proceed all the determinate ultimate,the ultimate generality definition pre of every forms of conceptual being. Every term
mate

concept

"

"

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

supposes

this ultimate

summum us

We
if any,

have, then,
the the
summum

still before genus

genus. the task of

showing
genus

in what

sense,

is definable.
name

Our firststep must From

' 4 '

be to

the

summum

more

precisely.
' '

of standpoint of a merely objectiveview of the nature or for retaining Being meaning there might be good reason the ultimate Pure Being as concept. But we have already re pudiated this abstractly realistic conception of meaning,' and which claims thathave adopted an inclusively idealistic conception, else it is, must always be the meaning of an meaning, whatever has conviction, which object for a subject. This fundamental been stated rather than only through its defended, or defended to reconcile views, calls for a correspondingly conflicting power
' '

idealistic framing of the ultimate Knowable Being ? If it were

' '

concept.

Shall
this

urged
we

that

then, call it concept suggests

we,

further-lying concept, Being as

or our

'

such,' which
should

either knowable

unknowable,

be specified as may ' unknowaWe reply that

point of view, meaningless. We might, indeed, Ferrier's simple argument Professor here with that ignorance is relative to knowledge, and that where no know there can be no possible ledgeis possible ignorance. If there be an unknowable, it is out of all relation to Consciousness, and we cannot are it.' We cannot refer to it as ignorant of logically say that we be nothing for our what it is. It must it,or that we don't know ignoranceas well as for our knowledge. Adopting 'Knowable Being as our ultimate concept,we abandon,

being is,from

'

content

ourselves

'

'

as

intrinsically unreasonable,

the

attempt

to

define the

ultimate

concept except in relation

to the

interest through logical

which

we

78 know
sources

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC the search

[II.vii.
for the hidden

it, and
of

we

begin to
must

realize that
take
us

ceptual tree
' '

beyond the limits of any con involve not, throughout its ramifications, this reference to interest and to knowledge. Nor is the appeal from object to object of interest an appeal to the deus ex machind, For the reference to logical interest is involved in the very notion of a concept. A concept is a concept-in-relation-to-logical-interes meaning
which

does

'

'

If the

addendum

be torn

away,

the

concept itself vanishes.

Hence

the

appeal from

the demand

is simply the concept per se to the concept as known what to have is alreadyimplied. But to made explicit that deus which
ex

fluous all ultimate have

it all, such This
as

is precisely to do bring out implications assistance from a unintelligible somewhat The a problem now presents

renders super The

machind.

different aspect.

the genus that has no is seen to superordinate,* genus, its correlative a thorough-goinglogical It there interest.

fore cannot
must
an

get
be

meaning from itself. If it is definable it stands definable through the relation in which
relation. is, in brief, the subject-object

its whole

at to

interest. relation

bereft of all determinate

the

content, the

summum

genus

is stillan

Though object,

interest. Hence the problem of its definition logical the problem of deciding what in generalby an becomes we mean object of logical inquiry. The attempt to cope with this problem would bringus to the fundamental questionof Kant's whole critical the conditions of a possibleobject of ex are inquiry : What for us to reconsider this problem, perience ?' It is not necessary

objectof

'

or

to gauge
our

the aim

value of Kant's
is not
some

solution of it.
to

It is not
'

because

to
sense

give

the definition of
answer,

necessary Object,'but to

question as to its ourselves with We, therefore, content definability. noting the ambiguous or following points : (1) That there is no meaning more in need of careful definition than the term more object of ex the question perience ; (2) that the problem of its definition i.e., of its function and significance within the unity of experience is a fundamental problem of the Theory of Knowledge ; (3) that the ultimate logical postulatewhich this defining-process presupposes is the postulate of the radical intelligibility of experience. We have think only to add that this postulateis not optional. We cannot all at without making it. For to think is the same thing as to think what is not self-contradictory X. (vide Chapter c) ; the self-contra there is nothing ultimately be thought. But dictory cannot the 103, 104). (vide pp. self-contradictory meaningless save Hence, to think at all is to think what has meaning and is pro tanto be This ultimate radically intelligible. postulate, then, may it that if the universe true to say Not only is accepted as a TTOV arw.
'

consider,

and

in

the

'

"

"

we

It makes difference to the generalargument if,\vith no hold that there are as many ultimate genera as there are

Porphyry and Aristotle, categories.

80

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[II. vii.

Bannerman.'

Similarlywe
subaltern

might

pass

by successive subdivisions
etc. Philosopher,

through the
to the

Socrates

and

Greek, Athenian, genera of Plato Porphyry's tree. So

the
same

long as the single

considered
the many ' Man
as

individual is
'

by represented
in the

proper

name

is not way
as are

he
'

but forhimself,

external

indi

viduals

indicated of the

by
seems

any
to

Athenian,' there

or ordinaryclass-name such as be no ground for differentiating between

and that of the proper name in regard generalname The latter becomes to the problem of the development of meaning. the of former. case simply a limiting the above-mentioned in to be justified With proviso,we seem includingindividual elements in a conceptual tree and in regarding them as intrinsically generalor conceptual in character, though sharpened intensively to such a point of conceptual fineness and extensively a unique reference. determinacy as to have the function of a singular from names, They are then singular name, the point of view of Extension, being to refer us unambiguously individual object or person. to some single the singular name or meaning belongs, by Regarded in this light, to the organized system of logicalconcepts. natural birthright, between the class-concept and the singular There is no opposition individual concept, nor is the phrase singular or concept a contra The is individual diction in terms. meaning simply the concept in Where the only relevant element in this meaning its limiting form. the name of its reference, which represents it is is the individuality the status
" " "

"

'

'

known The

as

proper

name.

singular concept
division is

is that

form limiting
to

which

the infima

species
this

of

tends

in

last resort

take, though whether

the answer on actuallyreached or not depends entirely it relevant is whether or to logically advantageous question the which to reach it. The singular or name concept, proper repre hold to be definable by means of a significant sents it,we singular is singular. name a name which, by virtue of its very significance, terminus
the
"

This

and the
'

connexion between the proper name to be the natural appears ' Rational animal,' which defines term. the significant singular

general concept
mother of the two

'

The

Man,' is a significant general expression; Gracchi,'which defines the singular concept

'

is a significant Cornelia,' singular expression.* Significant singular

'

alike in this to significant precisely generalexpressions, expressions, The mountain at the Earth on T hus, are self-defining. highest this present stage of our planet'sgeological history defines itself.
'

singularexpressionsare Significant
Thus Mr.
'

tions.'
as a

phrase

which

Joseph by a

('An

than by a name longer one superfluous. A singular symbol may either designateor signify. it may It may or a signify meaning (inten designatean individual (Extension), sion). otherwise the

sometimes called ' designa more briefly Introduction to Logic,'p. 21) defines a designation what individual not to indicate an or serves pronoun This briefer title,however, does not render of its own.'

CHAP.

VII.]

CONNOTATION
in the

AND

DENOTATION
marks

81

Its the

consists significance
term.

meaning of the
tells
us

that make

up

singleobject very and in the is mountain to our referred a planet, highestof all at the As other instances of the significant singularterm present time. of The The centre the Earth,' first Emperor of mention we may
The

expression

that

the

'

'

Rome,'
Our

'

The

town to

at

present situated
the

at the

mouth

of the Dart.' individual

may

attempt

maintain

of the definability

be met

by

certain

: objections

be urged that 1. It may do not imply, attributes.

do indeed names proper The distinction between

suggest, but

suggestion,

accordingto

and logical laws of association, implica psychological tion is, indeed, fundamental, and there is a great difference between
' ' ' '

But connotation. unregulated subjective meaning and logical we once implication is relative to purpose recognizethat such is that that it is only through knowing what our defining purpose the objection loses its be relevantlyfixed the implicationcan natures, no less than individual natures, suggest point. Common
"
"

'

'

great deal

more

than

is relevant
to

definition may
once

chance

be

to the purpose required. But the

or

for which

their

stated,those attributes clearly

direct and economical reference

marks

can

interest defining be selected which,

our

in the most and

way, The

suffice to render
marks

meaning
are

unambiguous.

unselected

that

not

of

the status for the fixation of our meaning will then assume required and remain interest will so our propria long as defining propria, It may be sufficient, from a given point of view, remains the same. British with Mr. Balfour Minister in the Prime the to identify The Foundations the philosopher who wrote year 1900,'or with of Belief." These identifications will give just such meaning as and therefore logically, the name impliesin respect to relevantly, the interest which dominates the definition. They will be definitions of a proper like general names, name. requireas Proper names, which view from of definitions there as are they can points many be used. serviceably 2. An objection of quite another kind may be raised against the
' ' "

definition of the proper

a

name.
'

It may

be contended
of
; and

that

it is

just

meaninglessmark.
Mill,
connect
'

The

only

names

objectswhich

connote

writes nothing,' mark

in

are

no speaking, signification.
...

which

we

proper names A proper name in our minds with the idea of the
meets
our

these have, strictly is but an unmeaning

object,
to
our

order that whenever

the mark

eyes

or

occurs

we thoughts,

In the does not

use

think of that individual object.'* may ' it is evident that Mill of the phrase ' unmeaning mark
us

intend
of sounds

to

understand
It
must at

that least

the

name a

is bereft of all

meaning whatsoever.
complex
this
or

retain

meaning
were

as

meaning
*

it could

for if the proper name letters, at all. not function as a mark

'

bereft of

By the phrase
6

J. S. Mill,

System

of

Book Logic,'

I, ch. ii., " 5.

82
'

THE
mark
'

PROBLEM
to

OP

LOGIC

[II.vii.

sign which stands for the it indicates. and that what of the object which not for the Is is this ? But the that intelligible possible apart from its A case ? might conceivably be made development into a what unmeaning
'

he

seems
'

mean

'

'

'

'

'

'

out
name.

for the pure

Mill

thatness

of

summum

genus,

but

not

of

proper

marking
But the

compares of Ali Baba's chalk-mark

to the imposition of a proper name house by the robber in the Arabian Nights.'* it affixed to the house in order to distinguish
'

the

from It
was

the other houses

a

in the meant
'

row

did not house

sign which

The

represent a mere of Ali Baba,' and

the
'

'

that.'
this

to

extent
was

it stood

for and

what signified cannot

attached.
3. The

It therefore

object to which it be regarded as an unmeaning

was

mark.' in our still opinion, unconvincing)defence for (though, is based upon the conviction of the proper name indefinability

best

the
that

an

individual's
is for
an

principium
outside

individuationis
"

is not
"

what
what

the
it is

individual

spectator

or

logician

but

the contention for itself, being that the individual, qua inwardly indefinable. But is this so? individual qua experient is strictly
" "

we differentiam, may the point of view have of the not Experience-definition reflecting in himself 1 definitions would Such systematic experient present immediate form the meaning of our own experiencesstamped with them. the impress of our relevant reflection upon own Concepts Thou mark and immediate like I,'concepts which experiences tired of feeling such or as blue,' hot,' sensation, angry,' (con sidered not as concepts of Physics or Physiology, but as genuine meanings grounded in immediate experience) may psychological not all these gain a definite meaning through a reflective reconstruc As is primarilyself-evident ? tion of what experience-concepts they could not belong to any conceptual tree which, in its arrange ment, failed to recognizeeither that meaning is for a subject or that the subjectis also an experient. Now,' here,' ultramarine,' neither to Porphyry's I,'and all proper names, belong qua personal, branch scientific Classification. They tree nor to any of strictly or belong, as perhaps all concepts ultimatelydo, whether directly which is rooted in immediate to the tree of self-knowledge indirectly, experience. we

If

cannot

here have

Definition per genus

et

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

"

'

'

'

'

'

'

The

difficulties which
from

beset

the

attempt
to the

to

define experience-

concepts apart
are

their relation

experience which

they
an

signify article by Professor

'

illustrated excellently
Stout,

by

the

following passage

from
him I
as

When

I refer to the

f present Lord

Chancellor,I determine
the time
at

as am

the

Lord particular

Chancellor

at existing

which

speaking ; when
*

I refer to this

table,I determine

the

table

that

Book I., ch. ii., System of Logic,' " 5. N.S., vol. vi., pp. f Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society,

J. S. Mill, ' A

360-362.

CHAP.

VII.]
is
near

CONNOTATION
me or

AND
I

DENOTATION

83

that of which I or as pointing, of proper is deter have just been talking. The names application occasions which have the been uttered on mined by they particular And service. the in w e can never baptismal quitegenerally, so, e.g., existence mark off in language the particular we mean except by other particularexistence its relation to some presupposed as But this process obviouslyinvolves a vicious already known. direct apprehensionof particu some circle unless there is ultimately lar existence which a supplies point of departure for thought. If we attempt to reach this ultimate basis by a regressive process, we and nearer find ourselves approaching nearer to our own psychical life as the final centre of reference through which all other particular limit of this regress is marked The is determined. existence by

which

at which

am

"

such

words

"

"

as

now

and

"

I."

In

such

words

we

indicate

existence particular

which other

is not

determined

by

the

thought of

particularexistence, but by the direct existence particular just as it is actuallyexisting. it is impossiblewithout For this reason circle to define a logical what is in it refer to when we we now adequately language say because I." This is impossible or we can only express in language the relatively complex cognitionof which immediate apprehension is an element. What is immediately apprehended cannot be so detached as to become by itself a distinct objectof knowledge. It is not nameable except as being an element of a relatively complex if I when the of am words to object. Thus, right, application determined existents is directly particular by immediate experience. it ought to be impossible is meant without to explainwhat a vicious
relation to
some

apprehensionof

"

"

"

circle. And,

as

explainwhat time is not enough to say

is

of fact, this is so. it is which he refers to when

matter

Let

anyone
"

try

to

that

"

"

now

means

the time

he says It now." at which a person

speak at different times, constituting a but in the reference is to only one nows great many ; saying "now," time. is this time How from particular particular distinguished the others ? It is circular to say that by "now" I mean the I am Yet time at which of this now speaking." anything short i? inadequate.Again, define the time meant cannot we by assigning
"

speaking,for persons

its relation to past

mate

or

future time.
which
we

For the

"

"

now

forms

the ulti

from starting-point

determine

temporal position in

the past or future. The future is what follows the " now," and the past is what precedesit. Thus, any attempt to determine the mean ing of the now merely by its relation to the past or the future

involves
is this say that
are

vicious circle. The

own
"

"

"

now

must

be

stamped by
to to

peculiar
What
it

signatureof its sayingthat the

not
"

peculiarcharacter
? We

intrinsic

it.

peculiarcharacter
"

now

is the moment in which but

may of actual

attempt

express

by

it is the moment

merely being thought

experience. We may sensations, pleasures, pains,etc. actuallyexisting. But, again,

6"2

84

THE

PROBLEM
the old

OF

LOGIC
"

[II. vii.

we

have

to press

home
?

moment

of

actual

question. The which experience. But

there
us are an

now,"
moment

it is

said,is

of

actual
;

experienceis it
the mental incessant

For

indefinite

of these multiplicity

lifeof each of succession

which

from

of moments
we

the cradle to the grave includes an of actual experience. How is the

" "

saying now singledout from the others ? of actual no Evidently generalconception experience., and no mere instances of actual thought of there being particular will help us in the least. Mere thought leaves us moving experience,
one particular

refer to in

round

in the

old circle.
moment

The

moment
"

to is the

present

; the

of actual experience referred is the time of that actual now"

If there is any way out of this I should be exceedinglyglad to

experience which is now impasse except the one

know what
it is.

existing.
I propose,

only escape that I can discover lies in frankly existence admitting that there is a direct apprehension of particular the is The of it is word as now actuallyexisting. application determined, not by any mere thought of it,but by our immediate imagery, pleasure, experiences in the way of sensation, sensuous the in their existence as moment of cognized pain, etc., directly be cognized at any other moment.' they cannot
The
" "

With

the

fundamental
But

contention I would

of this passage
in
a

I should

be in

cordial agreement. that certain ultimate

says the
'

put
are

meanings a writer, without logicalcircle

is ?
we

indefinable.
to
"

pleaagainstthe suggestion It is impossible,'

'

define
"

adequatelyin
"

us just quoted passage circle to define in a logical impossible without now adequate language what it is we refer to by such terms as of used immediate and I when as symbols they are personal But is to definition ? of we a it, ask, justifiable experience attempt ? if we And the self-evident qua immediately self-evident do not the task still live uncalled for,may we not attempt this,deeming when in the hope that the self-evident, reflected on, so sufficiently in the end to inner spiritual to reveal an structure, may as prove ? be self -defining The adequate definition of these experience-concepts no is, doubt, a philosophical ideal, but, as such, it is surelya problem of supreme and importance. With and con interest regard to the nature than do more throw cannot out one ditions of such a problem, we central suggestion. Is not the essential condition this that the be grasped only in proportion as the experiences are definitions can ? must and Just as the definitions of here be now experienced be no of actual formulations experience,so there can genuine such definitions of religious as concepts except genuine express definitions of experience; no genuine art-concepts which religious do not express genuine artistic experience. The definer who would in such case, be compelled to exhis definitions will, understand

language what it this strictly true

rather that

refer to when Has

not

we

say

now

or

I." shown
'

Is

the

it is

'

'

'

"

'

'

'

'

CHAP.

VIII.]

CONCRETE
in

AND

ABSTRACT

TERMS

sympatheticallyto live out what his definitions may subsequently attempt to formulate and express. relive in conceptualform, other Experience must, in his definitions, the definitions are wise mere deceptive formulae which cannot what they say. An adequate definition of the selfpossiblymean perienceand,
some

sense,

evident
how but

'

'

now

of immediate
nature

experience will,at
has realized in its
not
own

any

rate, not

be

given till our

human

past, present, and

future

stand which

related in
some

time-experience only to each other,

transcends them.

also to the eternal Present

way

CHAPTER
II. CONCRETE (viii.) AND

VIII.
ABSTRACT TERMS.

TERM

may

be said to be concrete
when
or

when
to
an

it refers

us

to

concrete

abstract objects,
a

it refers abstract

us

abstract
on

object. Whether
the nature of its

term

is concrete

depends, then,
when
'

reference. objective

Now,

an

object is
either for
is

concrete
sense or

immediacy
space, and

regarded as possessingan in time or for feeling, or individuality

' '

it is

thus immediate individual.' as or thought Abstract objectsare derivative. They are derived from concrete objects through a process (1) of discrimination,(2) of analysis. alone cannot Discrimination give us an abstract object. It can only differentiate the concrete object. In a yellow orange we may discriminate the yellownessand the roundness. But the yellowness of the orange is not an abstract dis it is a a yellowness; quality, criminated quality, of the concrete orange. Whether the adjectival the substantival form makes use we or
no

of

difference in the nature difference in regard to the

discrimination,and therefore question of abstract and concrete.

'

of the

no
'

are yellownessof an orange equally con both concrete terms. accordinglyare But if,after having discriminated the yellownessas a quality or featureof the orange, we proceed to analyze it out of its concrete context, so that it can no longer be said to be an inherent feature of the of thought by the abstracting orange, but is withdrawn power and brought under the conditions of thought-existence, have we yellownessas an abstract object an object which has immediacy for thought, but no longer any relevant sense-immediacy,nor yet in the ordinary acceptance of that term. any immediacy for feeling An abstract conception or meaning is thus a common qualityas detached from all reference to individual objects, such, a universal, and considered solely qua universal.

yellow orange
crete

'

and

'

the

in their

and reference,

"

86 Terms these the

which

THE indicate

PROBLEM
otherwise

OF

LOGIC

[II.viii.

or

refer to these abstract called abstract.

products

of mental

are analysis,

objects, They are

and The
se.

names

of detached

attributes and attribute

of attributes relations,
per is not

relations
severed
we

of attributes and relations mentally isolated,

or

merely discriminated
from
saw,

relation which
it

mentally

the concrete

object which

still concrete

in its reference.

relates is,as or qualifies b (See 1, below.)

:

We
1. A

distinctions obtain, then, the following

term

is concrete
it
serves

"

(a) When

to

indicate*

individual

existents

(things,

; persons, events, etc.) to indicate an attribute presentedas actually (6) When it serves individual existents,or a relation considered qualifying

in connexion

with the individuals related.

"

2. A

term

is abstract
it
serves

(a) When
from

to indicate

an

attribute

considered

the

individuals from

(things, persons,
; or
a

apart events, etc.) of

in

which
severance

it is the

attribute indicate

relation considered

the individuals
an

(6) When

it

serves an

to

related ; attribute or other

qualifica

tion of
As Terms
us

abstract

object.
Abstract and Concrete

illustrations of the distinction between

let regarded from the point of view of objectivereference, consider the subject-terms of the following : propositions A

kate is a thing we need not fear.' tyrant's is concrete Here the subject-term (1, b). The hate of my fellows is a force I dare not face.' Concrete (1,6). Hate is old wrathe (Chaucer). Abstract (2,a). Abstract The hate of hate is the Poet's dower.' (2,a). Abstract fact.' sin is an eternal The hatefulness (2,b). of Concrete horror.' is The hatefulness Mr. a of Hyde haunting (1,6). is a crime.' A hateful Abstract (2, a). thought That hateful is (1,b). a disgrace.' Concrete thought of yours Abstract (2,a). All the Virtues are personified qualities.' Abstract (2,a). Virtue is a selfre warding activity.' A man's virtue is to be trulya man.' Concrete (1,b). Some virtuous peopleare not pious people.' Concrete (1,a). All virtuous activities are forms of happiness. Abstract (2,a). of sympathy. Abstract The virtue of suffering is the fostering
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

'

(2,6).
'

This

man's

is an thoroughness

characteristic. acquired

Concrete

(1,6).
*

Thus
' '

'

Being

'

'

or

Person

'

is, from

this

point of view,

as

concrete

'

as

Welsh

man

or

John

Jones.'

88
'

THE
8. This

PROBLEM
that

OF

LOGIC

[II. viii.

square

Here

both
is

meaning
without
with

square.' subject and predicate that the given square ABCD,

is not square
'

terms
as

are

concrete.
or

The

drawn square, if the

constructed,
identical
'

reference to the ideal mathematical

is not
'

the
are

given
of the

EFGH.

Of
'

course,

cated
terms

TrafalgarSquare
obvious.
is
a

is stillmore
'

Concrete

kind, (1,a).

squares the concrete nature

indi

of the

9.

The the

Square

rectangle.'
not

reference is to the ideal square, representationof it. Abstract (2,a). Since whether
it is the nature

Here

to any

particular

of the

objectivereference which

decides

term to follow a or seem concrete, it would which such may that the degree of generality a class-term as possess, though it involves a certain kind of abstraction namely, ' generali

is abstract

"

zation
or

'
"

has

nothing to

do

with

its

being ranked

as

an

abstract

concrete

term.

be raised that classindeed, legitimately objection may, that class meaning is more one meanings are as such abstract,and abstract
than

The

another.

'

Animal,'
sense
'

'

mammal,'

'

lion,'it

may

be and

urged, are
not
'

abstract
'

in the

that

they
than

are
'

general classes
more

individual from

things; and, again, animal

'

is the

abstract
'

than As

mammal,'
pass

mammal

more

abstract

typical

lion.'

we

mammal

lion to carnivore, from carnivore to mammal, from of to vertebrate, each higher class higher in the sense
"

being more
summum

general
"

is at

the

same

time

more

and abstract,

the
most

in any system of genus generaland most abstract of all. That

classification will be
to

the

the

distinctions here The

referred

are

real

enough
'

cannot

be denied.
is

of degreesof generality presence among essential to the existence of a classification. But the word

concepts

is
'

general

surelygood enough
'

to

enable There

us

to

in dispense,
a

this

connexion,

with the word word

upon

abstract.'
'

is,moreover,
This

more

appropriate
'

still
"

namely,

indeterminate.'
we

word
'

is,in fact,forced

us

by the
from What

construction

have

put

on

meaning

and

its
or

logicalevolution
involution

from

the

indeterminate
to

to

the

determinate,
From

the determinate

the

indeterminate.
a

this

point of view, every concept

has its

placewithin

certain

conceptual

is depends on the interest this system precisely system. which controls our use of the concept in question. This system we call the logical universe of discourse,and in so far as or topic, may in the direction deter it is allowed to develop itself logically i.e.,
"

mined
start

by the growth of
from
a summum an

the
as

logicalinterest

itself
"

it takes

its

genus

its indeterminate

fountain-head,

and
'

orderlyconceptualway, tillit reaches the limit of determinacy in the infimse species. The concept in the logical Carnivore from this standpoint, a stage represents,
differentiates itselfin
'

CHAP.

VIII]

CONCRETE

AND

ABSTRACT

TERMS

80

development
of
Definition

of

the

Topic

of the
as

Animal combined

Kingdom,
in
nature

and

it is the process

aim of this

and
to

Division,
indicate
to

the
and

single

Classification, stage
the
to

precisely the Topic.

are

position
the
It is

of

in

relation class
'

the

whole

Where
term

distinctions
'

understood
and of

in uncalled

this

way,

use

of

abstract there

is unnecessary
are

for.
or

simpler
above

say

that

degrees
to

among

concepts,

and

determinacy interpret this statement

indeterminacy
the
way

in

suggested.

Logicians
abstract but
tive should
or

are are

accustomed
connotative

to
or

raise
not.

the
The

question question
terms

as

to

whether

terms

is

legitimate,
are

include

the

question

whether

abstract

denota

not.
seems

There
with

to and
concerns

be

no

reason

for

dealing differently
terms.

in

this

matter
or

concrete

with the

abstract

For

the

concreteness and in
no

abstractness the these

objective
of any

reference

only,
of
is that If
et

way

conceptual
be abstract

interrelations
or

system
it

meanings,
with the

whether these
of
'

concrete,
a

whereas

precisely by
'

interrelations
connotation
we mean

within and

conceptual
are

system
concerned.
per
summum

distinctions
connotation in

denotation
of

the

product
be

definition the

genus

differentiam, then relatively

"

system system,
matical

of

abstract

concepts

genus,

to

the

will

non-connotative
"

the

infimse
;

species
all

e.g.,

mathe

equality
will

will

be

non-denotative
and have
or a

the

other
Thus
'

abstract the
term

concepts

be

both

connotative

denotative.
connotation
or

'Insanity,'abstractly used, might

state,' and
a or

morbid

mental
or

denotation
amentia.'

'

mania,
So the

monomonia,
of
a

melancholia, Roundness,'
surface

dementia,
outline,'
the kinds To the the
and

connotation

'

ab
or

stractly used, ordinary

of

might
this
manner :

be

'

spatial form
admits

having
of
There

curved

connotation of

being
are

differentiated
at

after
main

denotation. of

least

two

roundness

roundness

line
the the

and

roundness
of

of

surface.

former

type
the

belong circularity,
catenary,
roundness
"

roundness latter

the

oval,

of

cycloid, of

etc.

; to

all the of the

varieties

of
the

three-dimensional

the

roundness

sphere,

ellipsoid, etc.

III.

THE

LOGICAL

PROPOSITION.

( i.) The

Judgment
Laws of The The The Law Laws

or

Proposition. (ch. Logical

x.).

Introductory

Statement

(ch.

ix.).

(ii.)

The

Thought
of of

(a) (6) (c)

Identity

in

its

relation Excluded

to

the

Proposition.

Non-contradiction of the Laws of

and

Middle.

Inviolability

Thought.

CHAPTER
III. THE (i.)

IX.
OR

JUDGMENT

PROPOSITION.

JUDGMENT,

in the

which
as

admits

sense simplestlogical of being characterized as

of the
true
or

word, is a meaning false,or at least

is out

self-consistent.
cannot

Where rank

such
a

characterization

of

place,

as judgment. Thus, optatives, im expression and ejaculations as such, outside the sphere of logical fall, peratives, cannot a wish, and we judgments. An optative expresses say of that wishes mere they are either true or false ; they are merely unreasonable. reasonable or Similarly imperatives call, not for but do not commands, belief,but for obedience ; they announce

the

communicate The relation

truths.

be Proposition to Judgment or Assertion may in the denned a judgment by saying that the proposition is purpowhich that in in form it It the fixed form. is judgment sively The firstbecomes available for logical propositionis not purposes. to be understood mere as a drapery of words which the judgment, as a put on or put off as it pleases. synthetic act of thought, can words. It is not It is quite true that we without think at all can essential that assistance the sensory so indispensable to thought verbal sign. But whatever should take the form of a conventional the sensory symbolism may be, it is only as a purposive fixation of significance.The grammatical, or, meaning that it has any logical and to speak more the philological phonetic interest in correctly, interested verbal structure such is non-logical. In Logic we are as in words only as the visible or audible forms in which thought fixes and controls its own proposition, qua logically meaning. The the judgment. As from serviceable,is therefore indistinguishable in Definition the distinction verbal and conceptual defini between tion was raison d'etre, to have no logical found, on closer inspection, between the distinction of assertion generally, so, in the matter pro is concerned, is a position and judgment, so far as logicalinterest distinction without difference. The terms proposition and a judgment are logically interchangeable. On the other hand, we must proposition and distinguishbetween but not every sentence sentence. a Every propositionis a sentence, of the unit the is For proposition. sentence speech generally. Any of
' '
'

'

93

94

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[III.i.

syntactical expressionis
or a a mere

sentence, whether
or
"

wish, a command
kind

it expresses truth a is only supposition. A proposition in which

an

certain

of sentence

sentence

affirmation
an

or

denial is
or

appropriately expressed. sentence. declaratory have We referred to the judgment

The
reason
we

It has

been

called

indicative

unit. form

for this is that

can
'

in which
' '

state
' '

our
'

the verdict
'
"

true

or
'

valid
"

propositionas the logical propositionis the simplest form to which meaning, the simplest be applied. Ideas in themselves can
or

the

false ; nor neither true nor are horse,' leaf,' man can we combinations of mere of ideas. We predicate truth and falsity can no more as high horse,' lingering say that such expressions than true can we leaf,' miserly man,' are hexagonal say that false. They are are horse,' league-long leaf,' microscopicman
' ' ' ' ' '

'

not
can

judgments,and
such
'

therefore do not admit ideas be

' '

of truth

or

Nor falsity.
'

Human or complex self-contradictory contradict themselves, cannot horse,' limpingleaf,'mineral man because they express no assertions they can proceed to deny. Before I can maintain I must to be either true or false, anything
express
'

invalid.

it

as

an are

affirmation of

or
'

denial.
man

'

This

horse is not

high,'

These The

leaves

This lingering,'

is

miser.'
'

as meaning which we find in every proposition such impliesan objective reference to fact. For as we meaning,' objectfor a subject. But it is by saw, is always the meaning of an essential that we should take this implied objective no means reference explicitly Whether do so or not will into account. we depend on the nature of our interest. Where the interest in putting forward a proposition lies in ascertaining whether the interpretation of fact, as stated in the proposition, does or does not tallywith the more authoritative interpretations based upon experimental analysisof sensible fact, the propositionhas a truth-import and calls for proof or disproof. The reference to fact is here of the of the proposition. The discussion of such propositions essence

statement

will occupy

us

at

later stage,when

we

come

to treat

of Inductive of

Method. The We
science of logical preliminary inquiries presuppose
a more

into the nature

Judgment
of statement

abstract view

of

not only,as require

in inductive

to consider inquiry,

prepositional import. the bearing

itself,
the it may im

fact ; we must also consider the statement the interrelations of its elements, and the relations in which upon stand
to

other statements.
a

We
or

have

also to

consider

how
"

of plications tions of

implica reference quite another kind from that of objective may be made have to consider,not clear and explicit.In a word, we but also,and from the various of a proposition, only the truth-import its statement-import, its import as a points of view above specified, statement of meaning.
statement,
"

combination

of statements

96

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[III.ii.

problem, a desire,hope, or aim ; and the intellectual movements and evanescent of our life, however fleeting they may be, gain their relation such interest, to some or unity through organized identity kind of ending or and through working the interest out to some the answering of a question,the solution of the consummation : reasoned fulfilment of the end we had in view. problem, the
a

We

do not

propose

at

present

to discuss in its full

the bearings

of LogicalIdentity. Its relation to Inference is as close Principle its We shall see later on in what sense relation to Judgment. as an Inference is an Identity. We restrict ourselves here to considering of LogicalIdentityin its relation to the unit of all our the principle thinking: the judgment or proposition. It has been customary, in this connexion, to state the Principle A is A,' or in the unpromising form A is not non-A.' This is the natural to a view of the significance of meaning form of statement account of development. It is the Principleof which takes no affirm the separate Statical Identity. As such it can only endlessly of logical self concepts. It circles about the concept as -identity a beyond it. It cannot starting-point, impotent to move regulate the development of a concept, or take us from the concept, through and a system of inferences. For to to inference the proposition, A If A is to is we are equivalent precisely saying 'A.' say that still hold the undifferentiated concept told that Logic is Logic,we minds ; Logic is Logic means but we of Logic before our Logic,' about This of have so-called principle said nothing at all Logic. is all. The not itself at f orm a judgment judgment propositional itselfcontradicts it : for a proposition always promises a distinction while the present one does not fulfil between subjectand predicate, The tr. what its form requires (' of Wallace, p. 213). Logic Hegel,' If we this so-called should never we were principle, guided by really We should be continually make any assertions whatsoever. positing and and them then never developing ; proposing topics, concepts, idea of them. around the mere involvinghelplessly To state a proposition, we must, to put the matter quitegenerally, wish If make definite statement of to a we specifyour meaning. that the of total which must first we fact,we specify topic aspect wish to speak about give us the subject ; this will particularly have then to specifythis subjectby predi statement. of our We cating something about it that is other than itself. This whole of meaning will have taken place within a topicwhose specification will unity dominates the whole procedure,so that the specifications within the topic; and the Principle of Identity be all specifications will be a Principle of Identityin relation to Differences, a Principle of Identityin Difference. understood be fruitfully then, can Identity, only in the lightof is conceived out of all relation to difference. Hence, when identity it is barren, and A has no difference, logicalvalue whatsoever.
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

CHAP.

X.]
'

THE

LAWS

OF

THOUGHT
is

97
of Tautology. principle that
'

'

so principleof Identity

conceived that
'

mere

Thus, the empty insistence

is
worse

is who

A,' or

Whatever
in

is,is,'

meaningless. Many ordinary to think that in Logic they are very suitably housed, kind of function there which must mysterious anyhow fulfilling some to the initiated. be very satisfying Moreover, the greatest truths, of all this holds are told,are the simplest. But the very reverse we A is in than truism worse Logic anywhere else,for it is good. truth of fact,but as a truth of the there paraded, not as a mere
than
seem

despisetruisms

discourse

very reason. The inanityof the distinctions

'

old formula
statement

'

Whatever here
'

or is,is,'

'

is A
"

'
"

of formal

are

of

no
'

by Hegel Logic.' with is thought, not to confuse the true Iden urges, with an abstract identity, of bare form. All the identity tity of which often are so hardness, nieaninglessness, charges narrowness, and immediate directed againstthought from the quarter of feeling the perverse rest on assumption that thought acts only perception of abstract identification The a as faculty (' Logic of Hegel,'tr.
in connexion
.

first clearly exposed

in his

was consequence The main he thing,'

'

It is asserted,' he writes on a Wallace, p. 215). previous page that be the maxim of Identity, (ibid., though it cannot p. 214), the procedure of every proved, regulates consciousness,and that its terms as are experience shows it to be accepted as soon appre To this alleged experience of the logic-booksmay hended. be opposed the universal experience that no mind thinks or forms conceptions or speaks in accordance with this law, and that no
'

'

conforms existence of any kind whatever after to it. Utterances the fashion of this pretended law (A planetis a planet; Magnetism is magnetism ; Mind is mind) are, as they deserve to be, reputed
"

"

"

of general experience. The matter logic certainly which seriously propounds such laws, and the scholastic world in which alone they are valid, have long been discredited with practical of reason.' common sense, as well as with the pliilosophy It is extremely important, however, that this lawful contempt for the impotent tautology A is A limited to should be precisely its lawful object. What is an is logically inane identitythat is out of relation to all differences. Identityin relation to difference stillremains Science. the basic and the guidingconceptionof logical The logical the Statement unit or Proposition is an identity

silly.That

is

'

'

"

"

in difference.

statement movement

is

movement
"

of mind

"

purposive,
is
a

directed ideally
*

of mind*

and

this movement

de-

statement

is implied in its being a of all assertion whatsoever meaning,'as we have conceived it, tells us what an interest object is in relation to a specified or (vide p. 23). Meaning, purpose in so far as it has is always intended meaning. The teleological significance, any logicalcharacter of Judgment can, however, be adequately grasped only in relation to the problem of Experience, and the further discussion of this centra! point is therefore postponed.

The

purposive character
of

meaning;

for

'

'

'

98

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[III.ii.

velopment through which different elements are evolved within the unity of a singletotal meaning. Nor, as we have already said, is of the Law the scope of Identity limited to a singlestatement. think be knit together through the Whatever we together must constitutive activity of the Identity otherwise it is illusory Principle, that our cohere. to suppose thoughts really The now question suggests itself : Does the Law of Identityindi condition of sound cate, not only a necessary, but also the sufficient If this the ? Law of Identitywould be the Law were thinking so, for maintainingthat this is really of Thought. There is good reason the case, and into a that, in guarding itself against degenerating formula of without difference the Principle meaningless identity, would take the the rather form or naturally limiting, self-limiting, of a Law If ^ and ^' are accepted as con of Self-Consistency. and the the same idea or topic. tributingto development of one affirm what ]" cannot ^' denies. There is,however, at this point for pressing thus far the claims of a logical Monism. no reason the For convenientlyregard the Law of Identity present we may as limited in its application by a second law, which insists that differ cannot be carried to the point of inconsistency ence intelligibly ; is broken, our statements of our thinking for,in so far as the integrity must to mean cease anything at all.

(6) THE
The

LAWS

OF

NON-CONTRADICTION

AND

EXCLUDED

MIDDLE.

of Non-Contradiction, which Principle suppliesthe criterion test of LogicalConsistency, which states the conditions under or a held statement be with the primary requisite can given consistently of Intelligibility. This involves the relating of a propositionS, is called its contradictory S is P,' to what specifically, or, more
'

3, or
The

'

SlsT.'*

Principle may
statement

be formulated
'

as

follows

If the

S is P

understood
must

statement

accepted (i.e., accepted of meaning), the statement S

is
'

'

as

an
'

is P

be

rejected(a).
'

And"
If the statement
must
*

S is P

'

is

the rejected,

statement

'

S is P

'

be

accepted (/3).f
symbolic designationfor the denial of S the affirmation device is a recognizedlogical
The thus
' '

A
"

convenient

is P." for

The

'

bar

'

placed over correspondingdenial.

bar
a

device
:

is
,

little lower

down,

S-ia-P

natural one, for we and ' S is P ' is then

'

in the
more

We shall, therefore, use the ordinary way. awkward expression Not (S is P) whenever
a reject

expressingthe only to place the cancelled appropriately symbol S is P in place of the

have the substitution
proves
con

venient.

To

statement

is to

accept its contradictory.

CHAP.

X.]

THE

LAWS
will

OF be

THOUGHT

99

These

enunciations, it

observed, include

an

explicit

reference to the thinker's attitude of acceptance or rejection.This If it were would reference is essential. cease dropped, the Principle To insist simply that If S is P to be a Consistency-principle.
' " " " " is true, S is P must of Reality bility ; but

bearingon
or

to postulatethe Intelligi be false is, indeed, the principle direct has no so enunciated the of is which exercised the Consistency Thought upon,

'

within, Reality. If 2
not

and

could

be true
is
no

together, Reality
our

would

be

; but intelligible
we

there

in inconsistency statements
our

until thinking

attempt

to
as

think these two

true

together.

and

must

be entertained be supposed, be false

'

before together
that

thoughtcan
'

be said to be inconsistent and It must

not

to

run

into contradiction.

however,
some

the

true, jj must
The

is not, in

sense,

principle If 2 be of Thought. Law a

under
of

which Principles

express

the
not

we necessity

are

holding
our

are Reality as intelligible concern Still, t hey thinking.

of fundamental
statement
as

for significance

such, but

statement

only in relation
not position,

of the Pro the truth-import They concern statement-import. to explainthe omission of the Law This consideration will serve list of principles the of Excluded which Middle from the upon of and Law The statements our depend. consistency intelligibility
to fact.

its

of Excluded

Middle
no

impliesthat
possible.*

be formulated The statement below. as may third alternative, is middle no no course mean,

Either S is false Either ^ is true

or

or

S is false (a). S is true (ft).

are Here, as before, (a) and (ft) mutually complementary. It is plain, that the a reference attempt to interpolate moreover, to the thinker would destroy the self-evidence of the principle.It

is

by

no

means
'

that or true,' suspend our judgment, which

true
or case

necessary Either 2 be

that
or

'

Either 2
be
a

or

must

be

accepted

as

2
may

must

rejectedas false.' We
unverified
to

may

%
an

be

mere

in hypothesis,

it would

affront to

Realityeither

is

it as false. It is, then, only on the reject true that we are bound, in actually accepted_as
to
as

accept it as suppositionthat
the interests of

to reject^ consistency,

false.
not
concern no

The Law
until

of Excluded

Middle,then,does
we can

the statementto

and import of the Proposition,

we

have

occasion the

apply it
of

come

to deal with

propositionsfrom
is,however,
a an

point

of view

their truth-import. There

to which

the law
; and

itself is liable"

important misconception its very misconceptionaffecting

and

statement
at once.
*

this it will be convenient

suitable to consider

For

criticism of the pseudo-form

'

S is either P

or

non-P,' vide p

191

7"2

100

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[III.ii.

The

Relation

of the

Law

of Excluded

Middle

to

Time. of Excluded
so,

It is frequently stated that the formulation Middle should include Middle

a

of the Law If this

were

reference to time.
run as

the Lav/

of Excluded
'

should
"

follows
" "

:
"

and S is-not P cannot both propositions S is P be true (or false) simultaneously.'' The is to appeal to its important, but it is not necessa^ point importance to justifythe followingdiscussion of it,which I owe

The

two

to the
'

kindness

of Professor

Stout.
if
a

We

sometimes both
be

speak
true
"

as

propositionand
at

its

contradictory
time,
but
was
. .
.

could

not, indeed,
we

the
was

same

at

different times.
a

Thus the

may
now

bachelor, but

truth

say, It is that that truth

true isn't
a

that

Jones
in

he and

bachelor.
no

But

closer examination

shows

are falsity

way

Whatever be reference there may by the flux of time. in the meaning of the propositions to time is alreadyincluded which These false. true are or temporal conditions cannot, therefore, be used over The again to qualifythe proposition as a whole. in A.D." 1815 is Battle of Waterloo was a fought proposition and its event truth date. But of the a temporal concerning the propositionis not an The truth event, and has not a date. which of the proposition is not in 1815. occurred something affected
"

The

occurrence

of the
if
as

battle in
a

1815

will be

fact

thousand
some one

hence ; and years had assigned 1815

a

thousand
date

the

before 1815 years of the battle,he would

have

been

stating with the analogous To bring this out clearly, we may compare The which of spatial relation. be used to same case argument may also be used to show that truth is subjectto time conditions may But conditions. in the case of show that it is subject to spatial obvious. three is A the and B Suppose fallacy more persons, space
'

fact.

and

C.

is
"

on

one

side of the street is C ?" B

answers we

; B

and
"

C
two
are

are

on

the other. A

calls to B
"

Where

C is here."
statements true.

rejoins:
"

C is not

here, but
"

there."

Thus

have

C is

here," and
to say

C isn't here," and both of these

is

Are

we,

then,

variable ? Are we to say that a proposi locally it false whereas is and its contradictory be in tion may true one place, true in another only a few yards off ? If this were so, the topo study which has been graphy of truth would be a most interesting the whole Of supposition is nonsense, strangelyneglected. course, removed. The is easily and the apparent difficulty word here," sound in the mouth of A and in the mouth although it has the same of B, has a different meaning. In the mouth of A it indicates the neighbourhood ; in place where A is at the time, and its immediate B is at the time, and the mouth of B it indicates the place where that truth
"

its immediate

neighbourhood. Thus

the statements

"

C isn't here

"

CHAP.

X.]
"

THE
"

LAWS
the
we

OF

THOUGHT
in the mouths B says A when
"

101 of A and

and B

C is here

are

not

same

statements

Hence respectively.
a affirming

may

admit

that when also that

C is here,"
"

he is not

true

proposition ; and

says

C is

here," he
both
be

this without may

a true proposition can, I say, admit ; we affirming admitting either that two contradictorystatements positionin true, or that truth and falsehood have

is

space. ' The

are

relation
true
one

of truth
time and

to

time

is

quite

similar.

not at
were

at

one

false at another

true

place and
not
same

false at another. appearance is may attaches

"

any more If it sometimes

than

Propositions they are

looks
to
as

if

this that

so,

the

and illusory,
on

is due

the

fact

the

verbal
"

formula
there
" "

different the the

occasions

different

propositions. The
here
"

in variability

meaning
tenses
"

express of the
"

words and

"

and
as
"

"

also to

of verbs,

to such

terms

now
"

and

morrow,"
when

past
;'

and

future
never

"

example, that
it does
"

to-morrow
we no

to yesterday and We and present." say, for that comes," but this only means

"

then,"
"

"

longercall it to-morrow," we call it to the very same day day ; but when we call it to-day we mean On the other hand, called to-morrow." had previously which we instead of said if we to-morrow to-day," we should not be another. Thus, if a man to the same day, but to say on referring the does he contradict not to-morrow," I shall play golf Monday I shall not play golf to-morrow." statement by saying on Tuesday that he will play golfon Wednesday ; He contradicts the proposition that he will play golf on statement the he does not contradict the present especially Tuesday. The tenses of verbs, and more which the occasion in meaning with on tense, fluctuate similarly Jones is now a they are used. In the year 1900 the words 1905 the true proposition bachelor a ; in the year express may for Jones has false proposition, words a express very same may of what do not give a rightaccount interval. But we married in the true in has taken place if we say that the propositionwhich was
come
''

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

1900 this What in the verb.

has

ceased

to

be

true

in 1905.

On

the

proposition is absolutely unaffected

looks like
a

contrary, the truth of by the lapse of time. present

"

change from
"

truth
"

to

is really only a change falsity of the

tense

meaning
The
"

of the word

now

and

of the is
a

truth
as

expressed by
in 1900 cannot

the be

verbal

formula the

Jones

bachelor
not

used

in 1905, and
now a

it cannot

be contradicted If
';

bachelor." say
"

tradict

it,he must

a person Jones was

expressedby by saying in speaking in 1905

not
a

same
''

formula Jones
to
con

1905

is

wishes

bachelor

in 1900."

Simi

in 1908," we if we Jones will be a widower now larly, express say be which would one expressedby some exactlythe same proposition In widower." is Jones in 1908 in the form a general, speaking
"

what true.

is true

does

not

become

false,and what
appear
to

is false does
so,

not

become
is
an

Wherever

this may

be

the

appearance

102 illusion. What which

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC form of

[III. ii.

has

reallyhappened
because of
a

is that

changed its meaning

we

determine

of the shifting time-relations.'

speech has of view from point

to that of Principleof Non-Contradiction Ambiguitymay be briefly expressedas follows : of Nonthat of Ambiguity logically ^The Principle presupposes the Non-Contradiction, of the latter though practical application principle the former. For what is Ambiguity ? Not presupposes all variation in the meaning of terms, but only such as may lead to Inconsistency. And Ambiguity is to be avoided just for this reason. Without reference to the Principleof Non-Contradiction

relation of the

Non-

hardly distinguish Ambiguity term.* meaning of the same

we can

from

other
the

variation

in the

of NonPrinciple Non-Ambiguity is presupposed. This may be shown follows : If there is not between as disputants complete agreement as to the meaning of statements and expressions, it is impossible for the one, with any certainty, to accuse the other of contradicting if himself. is there not Similarly, perfectcorre and what I say, two of my spondence between what I mean state be ments in form apparentlycontradictorycontradictory may and yet my be not The existence so. of meaning may a genuine be clearly can thought-contradiction pointed out only after we have firstseen that the Principle of Non-Ambiguity is adequately satisfied.

We

have

said

that

in the

of application

Contradiction

the

Principle of

"

"

Meanings can
other

be criticized
so

as

consistent

or

inconsistent

with

each
'

they have been adequately defined. Thus, to borrow Father Clarke' sf illustrations, the two propositions This is wise,' This man is not wise man be accepted together, in may if by the firstwe mean that spiteof their beingverbal contradictions, the man is prudent and canny in business matters, and by the second that he holds many foolish opinions on speculative questions. So, again,an event may be said to be impossibleor not impossible ac moral or absolute impossibility cordingas we use the word to signify ; and similarly, in reference to an unwelcome I may visitor, say with
as
' '

only

in

far

out

self-contradiction
we can

"

am

at

home, and yet

two to their

am

not

at home."

contra are propositions In this sense or not, we the dictory meaning. agree as observance of the Law of Non- Ambiguity is presupposed in all dis cussions as to whether is or is not consistent with one proposition But another. not in itself imply a does necessarily ambiguity and the same contradiction. of one Two interpretations statement be inconsistent, and therefore contradictory. not or may may A priori, and complementary to they are as likely prove adjustable as they are to prove mutually inconsistent. must
*

Before

decide,then, whether

For
'

this whole i)7.

observation

am

indebted

to

Professor Stout.

Logic,' p.

104

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[III.ii.

is puzzle lies in the consideration that the given proposition have What we self-contradictory. just proved, then, is not that but that if a proposition is contradictories may be true together, it is possible self-contradictory, implicitly by a little reasoningto its self-contradictory make character explicit. conclude our treatment We of the Laws of Thought by the dis of a certain fundamental cussion characteristic shared by all the Laws alike in virtue of their common of Intel function as Principles A s a nd the Laws of now we ligibility. such, Thought are inviolable, this to discuss the of striking property precisesignificance propose

of this

of

inviolability.
(c) THE
The
Laws it is

INVIOLABILITY of
are so

OF

THE

LAWS

OF

THOUGHT.*
our

that

Thought impossibleto
in say is

constitutive them. The in

a no

of

rational
failure to

faculty
at

violate

deliberate attempt blank

violation results not What

we

falsehood,but
and of Principle to treat
an

think.

unthinkable, attempt

attempt

to override the

meaning. Thus, the in its relation to the Identity,

has assertion
as

is the proposition,

beingvoid

of any

that principle Predicate

assertion inward And
are

has

together. Subject and whereas the treated as mutually independent entities, their no dependence. Hence, an meaning apart from
holds
its various

elements

contradiction reduces
status

which,
'

qua

contradiction, is unthinkable.
of

if,further, the hypotheticalviolation

the
of
a
'

the

Law

of the

Con viola
at

tradiction
tion to

the

mere

proposition attempts the attempt formula, meaningless

Middle leads to similar results. of fact. intelligibility

that

the violating

Law

of Excluded

The If

Law

of Excluded

Middle

safeguardsthe

fact is not

it cannot be intelligibly thought of. In so intelligible, is far as the objectof our (would-be) thought e.g., a round square the meaningless, thought is simply non-existent. the Laws In this fundamental of Thought respect of inviolability,
"

"

'

'

are

unlike

such

other kinds of laws

as

laws
and

of the land, and

Laws

laws

of the means. regulatethe relation between land are presumably violated by every criminal who finds his way of health, and all other laws into prison or reformatory. Laws the which the conditions of success in attainment of ends, prescribe But all of cannot we so are us. constantly infringed by speak of the If we Laws of Thought : a violation of these can are never occur. it is found accepting two apparently contradictorystatements, either that they are contradictory in form only and not in substance, else that, in acceptingthem, we or accept them without thinking, rate, without recognizingthat they are contradictory. or, at any
which

ends

Let

us

consider different classes of

cases

in which

the

Law

of Con

tradiction is thus
*

apparently violated.
owes

The

section following

much

to the

help and inspirationof Professor Stout.

CHAP.

X.]
most
common

THE

LAWS
instance

OF

THOUGHT

105

supposed violation of a law of thought is the case in which we are deceived by the ambiguitiesof make of" ambiguities which the language we themselves reveal use in our own a lack of precision thinking. Thus, to take up an illus 'This tration already cited, we accept the two statements may
The

of

is not strong ' as is strong ' and ' This man whereas reflection will show us that a little further
man

contradictories,
we are

using the

word
not

strong ambiguously. Until we have made the distinction have between we strong muscularly and strong constitutionally,'
' ' '

'

'

said what

we

intended

to

say

; but

so

soon

as

our

intention is

expressed in appropriatelanguage, the contradiction disappears. Distinction is the first remedy to apply to that state of mental
disease which It is
a we

may

call the illusion of Contradiction.

fact that of

well-known

when
our
"

we

set ourselves

to think

over

the fundamental the World

"

problems
soon

life

God, Freedom, Immortality, form,

Kant these

we

find ourselves In their

most

reachingapparently contradic
conclu their
most,

tory
sions

conclusions.
are

fundamental
Antinomies. Pure

known

in

in his significance familiar of these

Philosophy as Critiqueof
'

discusses the

Reason.' between

Antinomies
on we

is that the
are

Perhaps Necessity and

to
are

Freetwo

Will.

Sincere

reflection
that

problem
free,and
a

oppositeconclusions But an Antinomy of

this,it would
actual
not

lead may that we yet

the
not

free.
were

this kind
so

is not

Contradiction.

If it

mentally stimulatingas it is. It is not what that stimulates is meaningless cannot Contradiction is fail to be depressing but the necessity our thinking nature Kant under to get beyond the illusion of Contradiction. solves the differ the we Antinomy by making a distinction. He qualifies As members of a phenomenal world, he ently in the two cases. of an concludes, we are not free ; we can be free only as members world. or intelligible spiritual
be
" "

'

'

'

'

In

another

class

of

cases

we

run

into Thus

apparent contradiction
it is conceivable
'

through very
student
not
were

failure to think

at

all.
two
are

that
are

by thinking out the premisses. well mere or an suggestion may ill-digested very without relieve the tension of our thought at the critical moment, have in this case not our what has happened. But we realizing that a violated a law of thought, but simply the salutary maxim have beeu must result for which the reason is to be held responsible
A association reached under the sole direction fail to entirely
a
'

of

might conclude from the Europeans and All Parisians not Europeans. But it cannot an argument is always reached
' '

statements

No
some

French

French

'

that

Parisians

be assumed

that the conclusion

of the

reason.

people live mentally in

Most

their thinking. They systematize

number

of isolated compartments,
be
'

and

are

quite
own

indifferent if an A is B,' which can abstract sphere, is irreconcileable with

within justified A is not

its

an

B/ which

in its

106

THE

PROBLEM
be

OF

LOGIC

[III.ii.

But there is no similarly justified. For contradiction spheresin questionare labelled and then is and is S2, S2 (A not B) are not contradictories. Sx Sx (A B) subjectas S2A,nor is SXB the same SjA is not the same predicateas S2B. There is only the Illusion of Contradiction.
own

context, again, can

here.

if the two

look at this matter, the Law to be inviolable. When we imagine that

we

However

of Contradiction
we

is

seen

have

violated
no

it,we

have
cannot

simply ceased
think

to

think

; and

where

there is

thought, we

violate its laws.

then, is strictly inconsistently, impossible. It would necessitate our thinking the gaps in our thinking. We cannot go think on to on thinking through a contradiction,though we can
the very the

To

edge
the

of the

gap

and

then

allow

ourselves

to

be

borne

the unthinkable itself. over wings of forgetfulness is that the unthinkable metaphor misleading. It implies is something, whereas it is nothing. The is that unthinkable only which breaks a constitutive law of our thinking; but if these laws

asleepon
But

are

Contradiction

the unthinkable It is not cannot exist in any form. inviolable, that exists, but the baffled thought that realizes the
of that which

restraining pressure

makes

Contradiction

impossible
"

Where inconsistently. the inconsistency there will be a bare blank of thought, occurs of our showing up not, indeed, the inconsistency thought, but its violated the Prin fragmentariness.We shall thus appear to have which insists on the meaninglessness of logically cipleof Identity discontinuous. The connecting two judgments that are logically Illusion of Identity and here consists in the assumed unity continuity of the reasoning. In treatingwhat is fragmentary as though it have not, however, violated the Principleof were coherent, we

the very Reason itself. It is, then, impossible, we

repeat,to

think

for Identity,
The

we

have

not been

able to think it as
the

one

and

continuous. Laws hard of

to

which difficulty
are

besets

conclusion

that

the

Thought
account
can mean

inviolable is that, on this doctrine, it seems for the fact of Inconsistency. Inconsistencyof
no more

Thought

than

Discontinuityof
must

the Formal
not

we fallacy, as

have

ceased

Thought ; in committing But if we to think. are

inconsistent
that

sistent ?

in what thinkers, capacityis it that we are incon if Moreover, even we replacethe conception of Inconsis

tency by
as mere one

and Discontinuity, breaches of Continuity, we

of

are

content

to label

our

fallacies

have

only shifted the difficulty

Laws of

from

word

to another. the

We

have

stillto reconcile the fact of

Thought. If a breach of continuity is not a violation of a law of thought, of what is it a violation ? To hold that nothing is violated is to deny the and value of logical reduce the distinction between distinctions, to a and Inconsistency, Consistency Continuity and Discontinuity, difference that is purelypsychological. But if we hold, as we must
with discontinuity

of the inviolability

CHAP.

X.]

THE

LAWS

OF

THOUGHT

107

if Logic is to have
are, in
some

confronted
violations

inconsistencies any distinctive meaning, that our of rational obligation, more once are we sense, breaches How with the old persistent can : they be difficulty

requirement if they are not violations of the logical laws of our thinking? to this really the simplest answer perplexingquestionis Perhaps It may be enough to say that the fallacieswhich appear the best. of Thought are, in truth, infringe of the Laws to be infringements of the moral (or religious) of the duty to think, we ments obligation think whenever to faithfully under to think faithfullyi.e., we are be to thinking. profess It may, violate a law, indeed, be argued that though we cannot we yet break a rule,and that fallacies in Logic are no more may than breaches of logical This would rules. doubt be a happy no solution did not the breach of the rule imply the violation of the law. of But strictly rules embody the requirementsof the Laws logical for the guidance be qualified could they otherwise Thought. How be a violation of therefore of our thinking? A fallacycannot of the Syllogism Rules the rules as such. Again, though logical satisfactoriness of our doubt be used to test the logical no may its validity that in thus testing it would we seem are, at reasoning, have if For to thought. we bottom, testing our own really fidelity thus been thinking, have been thinkingvalidly. We must are we logical fallacies are breaches of broughtback to the view that of the Intellect, violations of intellectual moralityor of the religion the duty to think whenever are we pledged to think. faithfully to be rooted in Moralityand Religion. Logic would thus seem of this kind there It may seem strange that in a crucial difficulty should have been no appeal to the insightof Hegel. The whole arises from the conviction that Contradiction is meaning perplexity whereas Hegel is insistent that Contradiction is not meaning less, less. read (' Contradiction,' we Logic,'tr. Wallace, p. 223), is the very moving principle of the world : and it is ridiculous to say I am, that Contradiction is unthinkable.' however, obliged to that I have found confess though the fault may very well be mine irrelevant to of Contradiction Hegel's conception and treatment In so far consideration. the solution of the precisedifficulty under movement. that a certain Negativity, as Hegelis insisting or negative that is essential to the vitality such Nega and of spiritual experience,
of
"

'

'

'

'

"

"

under tivity, that he is

one

aspect or another,is
in its most

permanent element
its abstract form

of such
the most

experience,even

harmonious

developments, I believe
I do not

and establishing in indicating

What distinctiveconviction of all genuine Idealism. see is that he is in any way unintellithe redeeming or transcending of a contradiction.* gibility
*

For

treatment profound and suggestive

'

of

Professor Bosanquet's article

1906. January,

on

Contradiction

vide the problem of Negativity, and Reality,' Mind, N.S., No. 57,

IV.

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

LOGICAL
OF

PROPOSITION
MEANING.

AS

STATEMENT

(i ) (ii.) (iii.) (iv.) (v.)

Kinds

of

Proposition
of the of

(ch.

xi.).

Analysis
The
The

Categorical
Possibility Proposition Proposition

Proposition (ch.
(ch. siii.). xiv.). xv.).

(ch.

xu.).

Meaning Disjunctive

The

Hypothetical

(oh.

112

THE

PROBLEM
not

OF

LOGIC
service within

[IV.
a

i.

to it.

Though
must

tion, it
earth

2. In the
moves

clauses,not
alternatives
cate.
"

proposi belong to the reserve. of the DisjunctiveProposition e.g., Either the case mistaken the main elements are or Copernicus was terms ; and they stand to each other in the relation of relation a very different from that of Subject to Predi
at least
'
"

it need

be

doing actual

'

"

3. In the that the

we

case

of the
'

HypotheticalProposition, again,it is evident

elements
is
'

cannot

call its main

two

terms.'

Take,

for

instance,

proposition
we as

If the weather
main

Here other

have

elements
Antecedent
'

shall go for a picnic.' to each ; but these do not stand

fine,we

Subject to

Predicate,nor
as

are

and stand to each other

they terms. They are clauses, to Consequent,the antecedent

are

being representedby
We conclude
:

the

if ' clause.

that

elements propositional
Predicate in

of three kinds

Terms Clauses

1.

Subject and
Antecedent
tions.

(2. Alternative
:

-! 3.

Categorical propositions. in Disjunctive propositions. possibilities and Consequent in Hypothetical proposi-

[
The

be considering may connected togetheras different stages in the process through which mind the human Every passes on its way from questionto answer. which is reflective however guided, activity vaguely,by process of ideal of clear and consistent is the logical a thinking process of is to give a more determinate form to what, at the which the essence The i ndeterminate. action of thought,' it has is outset, relatively when been said, is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases belief is attained.'* So, we might add, an act of judgment is excited do not at once the foresee discomfort of a questionto which we by into the form of a proposition the answer, and it crystallizes only has been definitely however when formulated. some partial, answer, which As Belief is to Doubt, so is the Answer a judgment expresses
we
'
'

that types of proposition

have

been

to the

Question
a

out

of which

it arises.

if it is to be more than a vague question, unprogressive is fact of its being the state of wonder or by curiosity, already, very It takes its start from a more determinate. or a question, partially

Now,

less vague conception, and the motive which is the pressure minate answer exercises necessarily interest upon

which the

prompts
idea whenever

more

deter

of the determinate
the

the undetermined

logical
a a

This pressure is in any exerts itself most degree awake. the of possibility naturallyin the work of transforming vague
solution of

set
*

implied If definite alternative possibilities.

'

which

is

in the

existence

of the
I
am

question
a

into

told that
Science

happy
Monthly,

C. S. Peirce,

Illustrations

of the

Logic of Science,'Popular

xii.,p. 289.

CHAP.

XL]
has

KINDS

OF
the

PROPOSITION

113

event

raised
the

me

to

dignityof
determine
'

an

uncle, but

am

not

further

informed,
a

knowledge

I have

is,in its indeterminateness, itself

itself forthwith it is
a

question which tends to : of the disjunctive proposition

niece.'
A further
as

in the
or

form
a

Either

nephew
when

it is

stage of
to the
on

determination and

is reached

I make

an

assumption
law

sex,

proceed to define my
'

mental

attitude,
brother-in-

prospectively, will perhaps be sorry ; but my sister,I know, will be pleased. of its being called after there is no reasonable possibility If it is a girl, The forth. second stage is thus that of the Hypo rne.' And so thetical Proposition.
a

that

assumption.

If it is

boy, my

The

third

that my The me. process

a

when the process is reached and that the infant is to be sister is pleased,

stage

in the

news

arrives after

called

question What
now

'

sex

'?'with the

which

the
answer

whole
'

thoughtchild is

started
The

receives

definite

The

boy.'

propositionpasses disjunctive
asserts

into
to

categorical pro
exclusion
of the

position which
other. It must

the

one

alternative

the

supposed that the Disjunctive Proposi is logically is logically tion, which prior prior to the Hypothetical, the deter It to is well. to the Categorical more as prior certainly alterna which out of many minate asserts form of categorical one indefinite categorical to the more tive possibilities ; but it is posterior and the the question out of which Thus, the disjunction sprang. child is the necessary preface propositionthat the being is a human the ?' and to all that follows between to the question What sex child is The a categorical answer, question and the determinate boy.'*
not, however, be
' '

in statement no indeed, a categorical possesses and therefore no hence suggests no question, determinateness at all, determinate towards the first answer. more a as disjunction step have in which cate a we Moreover, there is another class of cases been have gorical propositionwhich, though determinate, cannot In many
cases,

reached
cannot

through
The

the

of cancelling
'

alternatives is not

in

disjunctive pro
'

position.

greater than the whole part have been preceded by a disjunctive propositionstatingan
statement

The

alternative to

the

assertion in
case

evident, and in goricalstatement

all.

the

of be

cannot
can

propositionis selfthe cate all self-evident propositions of at answer considered in the light an question.
The

Where therefore no
*

there
answer.

be

no

doubt

there

can

be

no

question, and

The Categorical Propositionis, in fact, implied all through. It mediates the transitions from the question to the disjunctive, and from the disjunctive to the

hypothetical. Thus the statement the categorical A baby is supposes If it is a boy sister will my "sisterhas a preference foi boys.'
'
'
. . . . . .

'

Either either be

it is
'

a or

a boy pleased presupposes

nephew 1 a gi)

or
'

it is a niece ' pre the statement and ; ' the categorical My

114

THE

PROBLEM
that the

OF

LOGIC
the

[IV.

i.

We forms

conclude, then,
is
:

logicalorder of

prepositional

1. 2. 3. and
we

Categorical ;
Disjunctive; Hypothetical ;

discussions on adopt this order in the following and Inference. the nature of Proposition But before we proceed to the detailed discussion of the Categorical it is essential that we should emphasize a distinction of Proposition, out of the relation in which fundamental a ques importance arising in reference to which the answer is sought. tion stands to the reality The be either logicalinterest that inspiresa question may be conventionally restricted occasional or systematic. It may within the limits of some it may definite topic, aim at an answer or that shall respect systematicconnexion of facts apart from any such
propose to

conventional
'

restriction.

In

the

former
a

case
'

the
'

answer

has Where

formal

'

only expressedmay
'

has

it has value ; in the latter case a formal value,the judgment or

real

value.

it it is.

in which proposition
;

be

designatedas
'

'

formal

'

where

it has

real value,

as

real.'
if I

inquire Is my friend in a good temper this morning ?' express the merely occasional interest of ascertain my questionmay On the whether our ing meeting is likelyto be pleasant or not. be scientifically other hand, if I should chance to be a doctor, I may interested in the effects on his nervous of some organization special In the former condition such as neuralgia a sleepless case or night. and expects a formal answer the questionrefers to formal reality, ; in the latter both question and have a real or systematic answer
Thus,
character.*
interest may logical be aptly illustrated by the difference in meaning acquired by the which has for its subject a Singular Proposition(the proposition singularterm) accordingas it is considered in the lightof the one The

distinction between

formal

and

real

interest

or

of the other.

In the service in the service

of

our

unorganizedeveryday experienceas
an

well

as

of Science the
our as

part.
events,

In all
as

talk about

important proposition plays singular be they persons, tilings or individuals,

and
our verifications,

well

in scientific observations

reference is to the individual direct,explicit

from all its significance

fact.

In

the

case

of

of observed Science, however, the sense-individuality

the scientist'sbelief in natural
a

fact derives law.

A fact,
is
so

for natural

Science
a common

is

fact under
nature.

law,

and

instance, or species,
for fact which

example of
*

The

reverence

of Spiritual The reality of Nature, as interpreted by Science, is not the reality interest Experience. The same question might express a spiritual e.g., in my in difficult circumstances. The discussion, friend's power to be cheerful logical of this more however, to a Philosophical Logic. personalpoint of view belongs,
"

CHAP.

XL]
of

KINDS
the

OF

PROPOSITION
attitude is This

115

characteristic
reverence

scientific

ultimately rooted
attitude towards

in the

for

this

common

nature.

facts of observation

gives to
the
'

the real
'

by

Science

"

i.e.,to

proposition as singular singularproposition

"

understood
a

peculiar
qua

import. The reference individual, but to the

common

to individual

fact is not
as

to the individual

individual
case common

nature.

In

the
to
a

of the

though
the

this reference

a or symbolic singularproposition, nature must always be implied

of

universal

formal

"

isolated

individual
same

being having
'

at

bottom The
has

unthinkable

"

it is not
as a

impliedin the
fact under certain the

systematic sense.
as an

fact is not conceived

law, but topic. If I

uses

individual

say
a

This

chair my avoid

possible
choose

of

chair,and
I must

I may

to sit on,

importance relative to a only three legs,' topicis my chair meaning is that, whatever the chair in question.
formal and

propositions verbal proposition. The Verbal Proposition states strictly verbal the meaning of a word word. Man or means sign qua and Man stands is a verbal symbol which rational animal for
to

It is convenient

from distinguish

real

alike the

'

'

'

"

rational

animal be

"

'

illustrate the

two

forms
case

in which

verbal

propositionmay
is that

expressed. In either
as

the

of the word

such, and

not

that

of the

meaning we define objectsignified by

the word.

Thus, the proposition which states a definition is not usuallyverbal, since what we wish to define is, as a rule,not the meaning of the word qua purposive combination of letters or sounds,
but the word is but the of which meaning of that significate is a rational animal is a defini verbal sign. The proposition Man tion of the common nature symbolized by the sign conventionally Man,' and not a definition of the sign itself. It is therefore mate the
'

'

'

rial

and (formal or real),

not

verbal.

CHAPTER
IV. ANALYSIS (ii.) OF THE

XII.
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION.

1.

Subject and
"

Predicate
or,

in

the

Categorical Proposition.
"

WE tion

have defined
as one

rather, distinguished the Categorical Proposi

states

which

something about
for existents
what is called
or

as proposition, therefore, a subject including

*

well

something else, as a as a predicate term.*

Whether

these

two

terms

stand
concern

are

further questionswhich

not, and if so, in what sense, the Theory of the Existential

Import

of propositions. Prof. Keynes, in particular, has discussion of this problem in his 'Studies and Exercises 4th edition, Part ii., ch. viii. But on this point see p. 189.

given
in

an

elaborate

Formal

Loo-ic.'

116 There

THE certain

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

ii.

embryonic forms of the Categorical Judgment in which the Exclamatory and the Impersonal Judgments the viz., is still not Subject-Predicaterelation,though present, obviously such we mean ejaculations expressed. By Exclamatory Judgments !' where Fire !' is equivalent to Fire !' Man overboard as
are
" "

'

'

'

'

There
'

is

or fire,'

'

fire has

broken
'

out

'

; Man

overboard fallen
over

!'

to

There

is

man

overboard,'

or

man

has

board.'

Impersonal Judgments are, from this point of view, abbreviations instanced cate of a more as They are sometimes perplexingkind. but without there to be seems a no subject, goricalpropositions In this such is It view. too for It cases as bad,' reason adequate it is quite properly regarded as an indeterminate isn't fair,' the its indeterminateness which through subject-concept, truly very
' ' '

'

represents
total

some

unnameable

and

unlabellable
'

some subject-thing,

and indeterminacy. Such impressionin its natural vagueness to be true It snows,' It is foggy hardly seem propositionsas have indefinite an impersonals. Grammatically, indeed, they soon as as provisional subject (cf.Fr. Il-y-a) they are ; but is falling,' of logicalpropositions Snow to the form reduced that the see Fog is prevailing we subject-terms are really
' ' ' ' '
"

'

'

"

definite.
of course, we By the subject of a categorical proposition mean, the subject.' The questionwhich term is subjectand which logical predicatemust be decided, not by grammatical structure or by the of the words, but by the meaning of the sentence. positions respective At the same time, the subjectis usuallythe less emphatic, the predi that is asserted which cate usually and naturally the more Hence in have the help we emphatic term. ordinary conversation and in written of the speaker'svoice and intonation work, where ; the rightstress can be given through our knowledge of the meaning in which of the whole context the propositionoccurs, we fre may in ancient be the helped out by emphasis. Thus, reading quently is safety,'* the In multitude of counsellors there feel we proverb that the emphatic part of the propositionis in the multitude of in the about counsellors.' Safety is not what we are asserting
'
" "

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

multitude is what
we

safety.' But if the sentence occurs quite alone, and we have not the requisitedata for unambiguously specifyingthe logicalsubject, reduced which the to we are stating the various alternatives assume. Take, for instance, the isolated logicalsubject may
sentence
'

but of counsellors,' about are asserting

'

in

the

multitude

of

counsellors

'

'

The

Novum

Organum
of Aristotle.'
*

of Bacon

was

not

intended

to

supersede

the

Organon

Proverbs

xxiv.

6.

CHAP.

XIL]
the

THE

CATEGORICAL be

PROPOSITION

117

Here

meaning
Novum

may

"

1. The

Organum

of Bacon

was

not

intended intended
"

to

supersede supersede

the I.e.

Organon (The work the Organon

of Aristotle. of Bacon of which

"

was

to

Aristotle) Subject
"

is-not Predicate. Organum) The Novum Organum of Bacon was not intended the Organon of Aristotle. intended I.e. (The Novum Organum that was the Organon of Aristotle) Subject"

(hisNovum

2.

to

supersede supersede

to

"

is-not

(Bacon's work
3. The

Novum
the

Predicate. of that name) Bacon not intended of was Organum

"

to

super

sede I.e.

Organon
to

of Aristotle. that the Novum the

(The

statement

intended

supersede

Organum of Bacon was Organon of Aristotle)

"

Subject
"

is-not

(true)
"

Predicate.

4. The

Organum of Bacon was not intended to supersede the Organon of Aristotle. I.e. (The superseding of Aristotle's Organon by Bacon's Novum Subject Organum)
Novum
" "

is-not

(a result that
5. The Novum

was

intended

by Bacon)

"

Predicate.

Organum of Bacon was not intended to supersede the Organon of Aristotle. I.e. (The relation which Bacon intended his Novum Organum to bear to the Organon of Aristotle) Subject
" "

is-not

(the relation of superseding) Predicate.

"

6. The

Novum

Organum

of Bacon

was

not

intended intended
"

to

super his

the Organon of Aristotle. I.e. (The work of Aristotle which

own

sede

Bacon

that
"

Novum

Organum
"

should

supersede) Subject

is-not

7. The

(theOrganon) Predicate. Novum Organum of Bacon was not intended to super sede the Organon of Aristotle. I.e. (The Organon which to supersede by Bacon intended his own Novum Subject Organum)
" "

is-not

(thework
The
main

of

Aristotle) Predicate.
"

conclusion
a

to

which

we

are as

driven much

by the foregoing
on

is that analysis

proposition depends

context

for its

118

THE

PROBLEM which

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

ii.

true
we

Everywhere pointingbeyond itself. Now, it is of fundamental importance that we should not interpret this reference of part to whole in abstraction from the limiting or interest ; for, apart from this or defining reference to purpose fulfil the cannot reference,we defining logical hope to requirement A logical defined and, of relevance. whole is objectivereality as it were, individualized of some as through the selective agency interest. What as a specific Logic here demands requirement of is Art in of as canon a right thinking recognized right feeling. If, for instance,in lookingat a picture we are to feel aesthetically, the must be able to feel the full appeal of the picturewithin we itself. As Professor Stout has somewhere frame of the picture said,* meaning
as are

do the terms

its elements.

find the

part incomplete and

'

Whatever

content
as

enters
never

into the work

of art must from

be

so

connected
:

with
or

the whole
must

to divert attention
as a

the whole

picture

apprehended poem within it ; hence being gratified whilst looking at its pictureis to slipaway from the artistic unity and the enjoyment is no of the picture, longer aesthetic.' So it is with a a whole, the object that can logical satisfy given logical Its interest. natural framework is defined by the limitations of the in respect of that interest is extra- marginal is interest. What
irrelevant logically the It follows
:

be

world in itself, the whole interest of the real landscape to think

it cannot

enter

into the

whole

within

which

definite interest finds its definite satisfaction.

that its true, or say of a proposition is given to it by its logicalcontext,
'

that, when we ultimate, meaning logically

we

understand
'

by
within

'

context logical

that limited
its

topic or

'

universe

of discourse
in

which
moves

the interest which

and has

the statement inspires

being. The of a proposition stands to the relation in which the subject relevant universe of discourse may, perhaps,be made clearer by the help of an illustration. Let the subject(or universe ')of discourse (^) be the wanderings of Odysseus, and the propositionin question the Here Ulysses (S) bends the bow that no other could bend.' ultimate subject true and logically of the sentence is 8 as interpreted but S as qualified in the light by %. We are of %. It is not ^ itself, adventures already speaking of Ulysses, the hero of a hundred in Ithaca once detailed,but now again,and just about to reassert
' '

questionlives and

himself
mate

as

lord of his

own

house

and

country.
'

The

true
'
"

and

ulti

is therefore Ulysses Ulysses as subject of the proposition him through the story of his past adventures, have come to know we not the bare Ulysses severed from all reference to a past which alone givesto the present action,the bending of the bow, its critical As for the predication bends the bow that no other significance. its be defined by could bend,' relation to the subject Ulysses may
' ' ' ' '

* I quote from Stout's point.

notes, but

the

statement

substantially reproduces Professor

120

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

ii.

adopted
context

in the present work, reference to context, whether limited be formal or real, is always conceived as reference
to

that

by
con

an

involved

purpose

or

interest ; and

that

we

take

siderations of The based

be relevancy^to

ultimate. logically
to

Predicate' relation""ofj.

Subject

Judgment
on

suggests, on
a

confusion

closer view, a of thought, is

unity of the distinction which, though sufficiently widespread and

within

the

notice. popular to requirespecial When is compared with the information suppliedby the predicate the definition of the subject-term, the result so the ordinary state ment will either that show the predicate runs givesno information not suppliedby that definition, that it takes us beyond the con or tent of the definition. In the former the judgment is said case to be analytic or or case synthetic ampliaexplicative ; in the second tive. The words and analytic synthetic are usually adopted to express the distinction in question; but Kant, who is responsible for giving to the distinction between Analytic and SyntheticJudg its great historical importance, himself suggested as alterna ment tive expressions the words explicative and augmentative or ampliative.' in Kant's An of the sense Explicative Judgment ('analytic,' then, a judgment which, on reference to the definition of the word) is, turns out to be a mere verbal truism, telling us subject-term, nothing about the subject in its that was definition. Thus, not alreadygiven
" "

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

if

'

'

man or

be

defined
is

'

as

rational
that
to
'

animal,'
All
men

it is
are

mere

verbal
no

truism

tautology to
which

assert

for rational,' the

information of the terms An

thereby given

anyone

who

knows

meaning

are being in Kant's sense) is a judg ', Ampliative Judgment (' synthetic ment which predicates of the subjectsomething which is not already is stated in the definition of the subject-term. Thus, if man defined as a rational animal, it is an amplification of this original has adopted the habit of wearing clothes. meaning to say that man Man if is man is take the proposition Man we So, again, (i.e., in the sense that the of being master of his fate), we see trulyhuman the meaning of the subject-term. The meaning predicateamplifies of the statement to be this : Man, a natural seems being,is also a free agent.' The proposition, introduces through its subject-term, natural man as a being, and the predicate informs us that this natural is also being spiritual.' This distinction between and ampliative judgments explicative is often stated in a more form by reference to the system of precise It is that S is P,' P is if,in the judgment predicables. argued the genus to which both S belongs or the differentia of S, or at once the genus and the differentia, it simply repeats,in whole or in part, the meaning which the speciesS bears in virtue of its definition,
' ' ' ' ' ' '
'

used.

'

CHAP.

XII.]
the
'

THE

CATEGORICAL

PROPOSITION

121

and thus
'

judgment is explicative.But if P gives a property or of S, the judgment is ampliative; for these predicables accident be assigned only after the meaning has been unambiguously can that The statement an triangle fixed through definition. equilateral defined a as plane is equiangular an equilateral trianglebeing truism nor a rectilinear figure having three equal sides is neither a tautology. Having stated this familiar distinction in its usual form, we now value. proceed to consider the questionof its logical It distinction is illogical. the have As we already pointed out, is,indeed, open to a fatal objectionwhich deprivesit of all value. that the explicative maintain this objection when We state we is above defined, no as propositionat all. If, in the proposition, is already understood Man is a rational animal,' man statement the tautology have fallen back upon rational animal,' we to mean
" "

'

'

'

'

'

Rational

animal
the
at

further than
statement

animal,'which, as we saw, takes us bare concept rational animal,' and is therefore

is rational
'

no no

rule the

is to principleof Identity-in-Difference not repeat the logicalProposition,the predicate must all. If the
or

subjectin whole ponendo. Every

If I define the
' '

in

part.

Otherwise

we

have

circulus

in pro-

man
'

ampliative. proposition is therefore essentially rational Man is a animal,' through the statement
' '

I undertake which to define is the as yet meaning of man nature which, when analysed and reconstructed, common unspecified states a defini which A proposition is specified rational animal.' as tion involves as genuine a development of meaning as does any other the meaning growing in clearness as we pass from the proposition, determinate the to as yet indeterminate meaning of the subject-term The meaning of the predicatewhich suppliesthe definingmarks. term to be defined,the subject-term definiendum, is a term which or threatens to give ambiguity, and calls for the remedy of definition : which it therefore cannot be identical in meaning with the predicate the definition. supplies alone, or differentia alone, of an as to predicategenus Similarly,
'

yet
The

undefined

concept

is in
a

no

sense

to

repeat a part of

that

concept.
which further

subject-termis here

indeterminate relatively

meaning

of genus or of differentia some gainsthrough the predication though partialdevelopment. We conclude, then, that whatever the predica be predicatedof the undefined subject-term, predicable is fixed the meaning of the term tion is ampliative. When once become through definition, the term, qua defined,may, of course, the subject of further we predicate predication. Hence, when propriaof a given term, we are amplifyingthat meaning of the term But until the definition which it has secured through its definition. be treated as cannot of a term is fixed,the term, qua definiendum, alreadydefined. is intrinsically With that the Proposition the recognition amplia-

122

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

ii.

the distinction between ampliativeand explicative tive in character, and with it the synonjonous distinction between analyticand
"

is necessarily abandoned. syntheticpropositions" The distinction between Analytic and Synthetic has been re Mr. Joseph) so as to correspond (e.g., interpreted by some logicians
to

the

distinction between
'

the differentiation of S from

'

and

the
-

Judgment considered as an Identity Every judgement,' writes Mr. Joseph, is at once holds dif analyticand synthetic ; for the act of judgement at once ferent elements apart and recognizesthem elements in a single as act of synthesis whole. As held apart,it requires to see that they an make whole : as recognizedto make one one whole, it requiresan and them act of analysis to find hold apart.'* If we do not endorse this application of the words analytic and it is partlybecause we require the word synthetic,' synthetic
in-Difference.
' ' ' ' '

identification of S and

P in the

for another tion and

officein connexion

with

the distinction between

Affirma

partly because the function of holding S apart from P, so that their identitydoes not degenerate into a with the other, appears and to be more fusion of one specifically differentiation than accuratelyreferred to as a differencingor the use of the term as as an analysis. We reserve synthesis,' for the purposes of Explanation contradistinguished from analysis,' Negation, and
' ' ' ' ' '

and

Inductive

Method,

2. The

Qualityof a Categorical Proposition.

a

The

analysisof psychological
it, shows (1) that
whether

completeact of judgment,
an

as

we

understand intended

it is

assertion

or

statement

of

or meaning, negative; (2) that, qua an identity-in-difference developingits meaning ac of logical Identity; (3) that it involves an cording to the principle attitude belief. of accompanying Assertion and make distinction between Some no psychologists I the distinction is surely necessary. assert Belief. But a may all I I what at and to not what statement mean as stating say, All believe to be true or hold to be false. Such a proposition as taken in this state sense as a mere donkeys are daffodils may be of meaning.J Moreover, in so far as we are studyingproposiment

affirmative

it is assertion,

'

'

ch. viii., to Logic,' t Vide Chapter XXXIX. p. 187. of this kind are meaningless formulas, urged that propositions A reductio is this reallythe case ? and therefore no at all. But propositions in the well conclude with statement whereas, ad absurdum question, might very statement at all, the reductio ad absurdum if this statement in reality no were of defender be vitiated. a would at once or Further, the writer of a fairy-tale, all absolute of believer the in a being might very or identity transmigration, daffodils in posse, or that, in so far as donkeys well maintain that donkeys were identical with daffodils, and that the had any reality at all, they were essentially illusion. The proposition, a mere was apparent difference between the two species statements and only self-contradictory in fact, is not necessarily self-contradictory, are meaningless.
*
'

An

Introduction been

It has

CHAP.

XII.]

THE

CATEGORICAL

PROPOSITION
with interest other

123

tions in themselves, their

or

relations logical
we cease

propositions,
The

their

reference

logical implications, for knowledge. to reality or their significance

to
we

ourselves in their

question
purpose

whether
we

believe

or

disbelieve

them

is irrelevant to the

thus abstractly Judgments, when disbelieved. studied, are asserted without being either believed or Some perhaps, be felt in accepting Affirmation difficulty may, A consideration forms of Assertion. and Negation as co-ordinate belief and disbelief may relation between help to of the parallel it. It is a psychological commonplace that the true oppo remove have in

consideringthem.

site of belief is not

disbelief,but

doubt.

Disbelief is
are

form of
con

of

belief ; or, at any rate, belief and viction. Again, the real opposite of

disbelief alike
a

forms

given
them. their

extreme

is not
men

the
are

counter-extreme,

but qua

the

mean

between

If two
common

fighting, they
man

are,

akin, and fighters,

and

foil is the

who

stands

by

watches.

These

illustrations and in

suggest

corresponding relation between

suggest that, just as
Affirmation belief and and

Affirmation

disbelief agree

viction, so Negation agree in tion ; and, further, that justas belief and disbelief agree in
to doubt, opposition
so

Negation. They being forms of con being forms of Asser

a common

Negation felt in of judgment. difficulty a suspense and Negation alike are apprehending the view that Affirmation the forms of Assertion,or if it be set down as a scholastic subtlety, to word in ordinary use is probably this : that there is no reason affirmative the term set off against synthesis (with its distinctively But the denial. in involved to represent the operation implication) and is which separation,' term means a sundering or dialysis,' word, might very well be adopted, and we a respectable dictionary should then be left free to define a negation or denial as the assertion of a dialysis, and an affirmation or position as the assertion of a synthesis.* differentiations of the more Affirmation and Negation, then, are All Judgment or Proposition fundamental activityof Assertion. is Assertion, or statement of intended meaning, and the quality and Negation is not ultimate : they Affirmation difference between
the true

oppositeof Affirmation
If there is still a

and

alike is

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

are

differentiations of affirmative
or

common

nature,

the

act

of Assertion.

assertive are propositions negativein quality, be must an assertion, it in character. Hence, though a negation involve any affirmative synthesis. Pure nega cannot, qua negation, intention. tion is denial pure from all affirmative or synthetic Whether
' ' of the term synthesis should be of the principle is frequentlyused to signifythat application The term noted. to this such. as According constitutes which fust a of logical judgment Identity (which is that of Mr. Joseph, referred to above) every judgment is synthetic use It seems better, however, to in difference. in virtue of its expressingan identity ' and to use the relation, fundamental this denote to the term reserve identity

The

restriction

here

put upon

the

use

'

term

'

synthesis in that restricted

'

sense

in which

it is

opposed

to

'

dialysis.'

124

THE subordination

PROBLEM of the

OF

LOGIC between

[IV.
affirmative

ii.

Our

distinction

and

assertive character to all negative qualityto the common proper in its does affect not propositions genuineness. This any way distinction has, however, been dis genuineness of the qualitative have in puted. Some logicians attempted to state all propositions affirmative form, insisting that form of the S is-not P,' the typical is logically negative proposition, equivalentto S is not-P.' The of negation in attempt, however, ignores the primary significance the act of judgment. We often requireto negate simply,to give to a statement a bare, blank denial,without any positive implication that is in the background. If we not we a white, merely thing say that the 'white' is it. We contradict term to not applicable mean just that in the the statement quite barely thing question is white. without We destroythe predication white making the slightest mental it effort to replace by another. denial can, Genuine logical in fact, do nothing more than fulfils itself in it negating. deny : have We conclude,then, that S is not-P,' the meaning of which we in is with our not discussed connexion treatment of negative terms, with is-not and that the two S be can P,' equatedonly synonymous by weakening the natural distinction between the affirmative and the negative.
' ' ' ' ' '

3. The The

Copula.

defined as the identity-principle* as Copula may be briefly operative within a categorical judgment. This principleis the itself ideal. Present in subjectand reason as inspiredby a logical as specifi predicatealike,it claims both, in their interrelatedness, cations of its own meaning. It is in virtue of the unity and con of interest that our tinuity the logical meaning developes all of a and interest means oneness piece. Oneness and identityof logical identity of the judgment, or the system of judgments, through which
that very nature tative factor in all What itself. We have here to do with the expresses the fundamental interest itself, and authori of the logical interest

logicalinquiry,and
an

we

cannot

get behind

it.
a

makes

an

of identity
The

affirmation to that

reasoned

interest

and specifies,

extent

(or a itself fulfils,

denial)is that

in the

general form in which such an interest fulfils meaning of a subjectthrough a predicate. The copula is, strictly speaking, the judgment-activityitself in -fulfilment in the form of a judgment : this active of self process of the identity-in-differenc interest in constitutive fact, is, logical which pervades and characterizes the Judgment.
assertion of it.
itself is in the specifying
*

The
two
'

takes
not
'

copula should typicalforms

the assertion the

not
'

be confused is
'

when

when
'

is-not

is negative. dialytic copula-mark.

with the copula-mar". The copula-mark the assertion is affirmative in character, ' is' Is ' may conveniently be called the synthetic,

CHAP.

XIL]

THE

CATEGORICAL
is

PROPOSITION
It cannot whatever

125 be

The

Copula,then,

any outside could have had

no

identified with
share

omnipresent in the Judgment. part or aspect of it,for in that case no part or lot in the judgment. An
which unifies
a

lay
that be
an

element
not

in that

propositioncould

of that proposition. This point is important, and we pro ceed to amplify and to emphasize it. The copula is frequently called a coupling-link between the subject and the predicate. This metaphor is misleadingif it be interpreted as meaning that the terms of a judgment can be given independently im them. of things, This is,in the nature of the relation between independently of possible. For the words or concepts, set down
element
the
terms

relation
out

between

them,

are

not act

'

terms

in the

judgment,'but

which or dialysis synthesis defines the relation between S and P first brings S and P into the But there act. a judgment. They are not prior to the relating first be cannot considered coupling-link as constituting railwaythe same before remain These carriagesinto railway-carriages. and after the coupling. It is true that the car first becomes part of a train by being thus coupled with another ; and if this is insisted on, the couplingmetaphor might serve the purpose, though stillrather essential The however, is that the term lamely. point to recognize, exists only in the proposition itself as organically of a proposition with it, cannot be identi one so that the Copula, as activity, relating with element fied with any single in the Judgment a relation, partial be the activity It must for instance, that is outside the terms. which brings terms and relation, content and form, not together for this implies a previousseparate existence in mutual isolation" but into-birth-tog ether. much We illustrate this important point by what is really may that than stated It sometimes is more a mere a poet analogy. works upon certain content, moulding it into poetic form ; and a left with the impressionthat what is intrinsically we are poeticis certain the form. But the truth is that the poet works a upon of his the content not subject-matter, which, as such, is certainly In bringingpoeticunity into this subject-matter,he brings poem. into birth, in intimate and form together. With unison, content of the

judgment.

The

of

"

"

the content
content

comes

the

form,

and

with

the

form

the

content.

The

formed ; the form is the subject-matter poetically form form of the content. The poetic end is not to superinduce transform to content, but subject-matter into a formed upon
is the content.*

Categorical Judgment. The matter of the judgment, that about which we judge,exists prior to the judgment. But the act of judgment consists not in superinducing a relation upon given terms, but in transformingthe given matter, through the selective and unifyingagency of a dominating interest,into terms-in-relation
the
*

So with

Cf. Professor

A. C.

Bradley, Poetry for Poetry'sSake.'

'

126

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

ii.

subject to predicate),or into that formed content which call a proposition. we The systematic intimacy of subject and predicate within a proposi tion is customarily indicated through the use of copula-marks of the expressions is and The is-not.' function of the word is in the judgment is not that of serving as a coupling-link S is P between the identitysubject and predicate,but that of indicating
"

(the relation

of

'

'

'

'

'

'

relation

between

the

two.

It tells

us

that
as

the

term
"

'

'

which

it

must be used precedes and introduces predicate of the subject-term S.*

predicate
Dr.

i.e.,as

the

The

discussion foregoing
'

will

serve

to meet

Sigwart's objection

has by its very negative copula.' copula, argues, Hence that divides is a selfa synthetic function. copula is no such There contradictory absurdity. thing,'he writes, as but a negative, only a negated copula. 'f If the function of the in that of were in which the word copula sense it is synthetic this argument would be pertinent enough. opposed to dialytic,' But, as we interpret the copula, its function is to operate as the which the assertion whether that assertion identity take expresses, the form of a synthesis or that of a dialysis. Concepts do not cease
a

against

he

nature

'

'

'

'

to

be

related
to

to
an

each

other

because

the

relation

between

them

happens
dence
assert world

We show opposition or a severance. our depen it has been society most energetically, upon said, when we it. The our ascetic who independence against the renounces has been made ascetic the evil an which he by shuns. very lecturer from who lectures
in direct

be

The
he the

young

opposition

to

the

tenets

has

imbibed

his late

University teachers
have

thereby proclaims
upon

potent effect which

assertion expresses
'

the lectures relation

produced
S and
P of that

his mind. the

The mark if

of

between^

which

copulaHence,

is independent of the nature

'

relation.
'

the dialytic relation between negative copula we mean S and is reasonable. The expression perfectly negated copula/ the other hand, as we understand on the term copula,'is a logical It means fiction. nothing. It indicates an operation that cannot

by

P, the

'

be

carried

out.

We denial

cannot

deny
as we

an

assertion
seen,
a
"

without form
a

ourselves
assertion.

asserting.
Hence the conclusion

For

is,

have
a

of

negated copula
which
we

is itself
never

copula
reached

self-contradictory
not

could

have

had

conception
*

itself been

and self-contradictory
'

therefore

original meaningless.

the

Christoph Sigwart, Logic,' vol. i., cli. ii., " 17, English translation by Helen Dendy (Mrs. Bosanquet),p. 94. t Ibid., ch. iv., " 20, Eng. tr., p. 122. word between be understood must not t The in the coupling-link sense. What the copula-mark expresses is the S and P relation, a relation which cannot
'

Of.

Dr.

'

'

be

understood

as

distinct

from

the

terms

related.

128

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
these
as

[IV.

iii.

The

Scheme

or necessity

Opposition* proper to be set down possibility may

of

relations of intrinsic
:

follows

Assertion

: S mustf be P. of Intrinsic Necessity be an identity-in-difference ; (E.g., A proposition must be it such that must is of a proposition an the nature i.e., identity-in-difference. ) not be P. : S need Contradictory need not be affirmative.') (E.g., A proposition P. be S cannot Contrary : (E.g., A propositioncannot be self-contradictory.') Subalternate (Contradictory of Contrary): S can be P. be indesignate.') can (E.g., A proposition
' ' ' ' '

Where

the

necessity
"

or

possibilityis explicitlyteleological,
"

and end, the Scheme bearing on Opposition needs a certain readjustment,giving what we may the Teleological Scheme : the

relation between

means

of
call

Assertion

: If of Teleological Necessity then Q must J be accepted as means

is
; or

accepted as end, : Teleologically,

P.

S must

be P.
If X is

: Contradictory Contrary : If X

Subalternate

If X

accepted as end, then S need not be accepted as end, then S must not be P. is accepted as end, then S may" be P.
is

Opposition. Example of Teleological man's is to keep aim Assertion of Teleological : If a necessity well, he must take regularexercise. is to keep well, he need not aim man's : If a Contradictory exercise (i.e., take regular the failure to take regularexer of his end). cise will not be fatal to the attaining not take Contrary : If a man's aim is to keep well, he must regularexercise. aim Subalternate : If a man's is to keep well, he may" take regularexercise. (I.e., taking regular exercise will not be fatal to the attainment of his end.)
The
various
uses

of

'

we possibility

'

have

so

far discussed

have

pointed to a positive capacity in the subject considered, whether that subject be a personal agent, a spatialobject,a proposition,
means

to
This

an

end,

or

what

not.

Thus, when

I say

'

This

acorn

can

section
'

must t Note that possible. $ Here, again, must

'

an acquaintance with ch. xix. presupposes is here not exclusive of ' c'
'

'

is not

exclusive

of

'

may.'
means

" The

'

'

may

is here

and permissive,

by

no

implieslimitation

of know

ledge(videinfra).

CHAP.

XI1LJ

THE

MEANING
v

OF

POSSIBILITY
and
or evaporate,'
;

129

become

an

oak,' or

Water

can

freeze

The

as

I am pirant after health may forgo regularexercise,' abstractly which the lies it in the nature of these subjects considering changes to undergo. real dis potentialities, capacities, real are as possibilities. They in each nature the which of some are positive case, they presuppose, We or dispositions. might refer to them as DISPOSIcapacities and in TIONAL POSSIBILITIES, designatingthem we would propose, can.' far as possible, To say that S can be to adopt the word as P that is to say P. It is only in S is potentially or dispositionally the case that it seems connexions of teleological to sub necessary stitute in order to express this dispositional for can may But the the in instance teleological may,' as quality. already allied to the potential can.' It presupposes, in cited, is closely nature a positive particular, (theagent inspired by an end or motive), in the form of a permissive it adds a qualification and pur to which posivepossibility.
are

Possibilities of this kind

and positions,

referred to frequently

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Modal
The of

Possibility.
we reserve

distinctive
MODAL

use

for which
POSSIBILITY.
a

the term

'

'

may the

is that

expressing
A

problematic character on a potentiality part object expresses, is made, but imperfectionof predication concerning which some knowledge on the part of the predicatingsubject. The may
not

modal

is possibility

of possibility

which the

of the

'

'

which
'

expresses

modal

is possibility of

known

as

the

PROBLEMATIC

may.'
Let
us

consider the

case

particular objectwhose

development

from
as

within is circumscribed by its environment. Here, in so far the objectcontains in itselfonly the partial ground of its future of its reaching certain subsequent states possibility
but also of external influences The

evolution, the
is not
our

only a questionof time,

beyond

foresee. to determine or plant-embryo in the seed power the child When tree become a man. a full-grown ; may become may is thoroughly understood, as also the the nature of the environment connexion between it and is be
no

the

object, the possibility gains a real,

case

value, and objective

'

say,
"

The

moon

can

In that longermodal. we no '), eclipsed longeruse

'

(as when

we

the

problematic to-night.' very partial

may.'
statement Consider, again,the specific It may freeze
on a

In

making this statement, I ground my judgment knowledge of the conditions which occasion frost.
I
can

The

consequence I

is that with

draw

no

decisive

But possibility. predicating

a

is simply rj

confession of

myself predicate of inadequate knowledge. ignorance" i.e.,

content

conclusion, and
this

must

which possibility

130

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

iii.

to be busy with the frost, treats My judgment, while it appears of the scant of conditions. own knowledge frost-bearing really my it happen that I am conscious of none of the conditions Should on the event whose depends, the judgment,' as Dr. Sigwart agency the of conjecture, and thus into subjectivepossibility passes says, into the expression of uncertainty.'* It is in this purely subjective with becomes conceivamere sphere that possibility synonymous absence of contradiction.' or bility
' '
'

The
The

Modal

Square of Opposition.^

the suggestion of a contradictorily opposes certain knowledge on a point may be said to find suitable expression in the proposition S is assuredly P.' The contradictoryof this is S is-not assuredly P '; the contrary, S is assuredly not P '; and the subaltern (or the contradictory of the construe these propo contrary) S is-not assuredly not P.' If we sitions into equivalentsexpressiveof the subjectiveattitude toward the evidence which obtain the we conceivably adopt, we may Modal following Square :

attitude

which

limitation

of one's

'

'

'

'

S is P is decisive. for the statement S is P is not decisive. M0 : The evidence for the statement S is P is decisive. Me : The evidence againstthe statement S is P is not decisive. MJ : The evidence againstthe statement E.g.,The evidence in support of a whale being a fish is decisive. The evidence in support of a whale being a fish is not decisive. The evidence against a whale being a fish is decisive. The evidence against a whale being a fish is not decisive.

Ma

The

evidence

The

So-called

Inferential Possibility.

Inference, the reference to knowledge is Where, as in Formal with it and the modal of may,' the idea of a possi use excluded,
'

mean we possibility meaning. If by a logical there can such thing as a logical be no inferential an possibility, All If All S Inference is the premiss is possibility. necessary. is P,' then all we can inferentially say concerning the proposition All P is S is that our accepted premiss affords no ground either for accepting it or for rejecting it. But when there is no ground for have an inferential cannot we inference, possibility. ceases bility
'

to have
'

'

'

'

the

The analysis given Logic,' vol. i., English translation, p. 204. of the term much to Dr. Sigwart's treatment, possibility owes t This section presupposes an acquaintance with Chapter XIX.
' '

'

above

of

uses

CHAP.

XIV.]

THE

DISJUNCTIVE

PROPOSITION

131

CHAPTER
IV.

XIV.
PROPOSITION.

(iv.)THE

DISJUNCTIVE

is to develop Disjunctive Proposition less general and indeter or basis, of a more a given categorical the alternative which minate character,by specifying possibilities* of the given categorical the predicate presents. Thus, the Disjunc aid of the Categorical All plane to the tive Propositioncomes rectilinear triangles are plane rectilinear figures by three-angled plane rectilinear figurehas either adding that every three-angled obtuse angle,or one one rightangle,or three acute angles. The stands the Disjunctive to the Cate relation in which Proposition is analogous to that in which Division stands to Definition gorical THE essential
' '

function of the

exclusiveness (videp. 41). In so far as weins ist on the mutual is complete. the correspondence of the alternatives, the relation of possibilities to their The disjunctive expresses
'

basis categorical which

"

ultimatelyto
them
and
a

the

nature

of actual

existence
is
no

"

determines

existence which
actual instance is of
seen

has not

limits their range. which nature common constitutes the it

a

There
of

actual

it shares with
a

other
"

and existences,
or

which

member

class

an

to be

common nature, when scrutinized, example. But of certain alternative and not determinations, capable

others.

To

enumerate

series of

such
a

determinations which

omits
. . .

alternative is to state no possible determinations Among the specific

disjunctive proposition.
which
not
a

common

nature

admits

of, there
have the kind

may

be many

which

are

and actualized,

per

nor Nevertheless, they call which The we common being possibility. possess which nature we are capable of them. dealingwith is intrinsically viscous or a perfect fluid." A partially Thus, a fluid is either colour is either red, green, blue, yellow,white, black, or of some etc. Here blueintermediate quality e.g., blue-green, blue-yellow,

haps

never

been

will be

actualized.

of

"

"

yellow is not,
rence.

as

matter

of fact, an human
cannot

actual
seem

colour
"

; and

the actual its

"

conditions of physiological None the less, we

vision say than

"

to exclude
a

occur

that

a impossible, trinsically any more of nature sider only the intrinsic colour-mixture and of blue and of of a blue-yellow. yellow,there is nothing to exclude the possibility "is an impossibility. It four-sided triangle On the other hand, a such is not a specific of determination (Professor triangle as Stout). if it is to have of a disjunctive The essential requisite proposition, shall value, is that the alternatives which it enumerates any logical
" " " '

blue-yellow is in blue-green."If we con

with which possibilities clispositional They possibilities. The

the
are

is concerned disjunctive proposition not modal possibilities.

are

real,

9"2

132

THE

PROBLEM
that is

OF

LOGIC

[IV.
or

iv.

be exhaustive.

If I say
statement

men

are

either white-skinned the

black

skinned, the
is

as positively misleading,

assumption
that if
a

made always tacitly skin is not

or

that

the alternatives of would

are disjunction

exhaustive, and
man's white-skinned
tive. We

the conclusion

naturallybe drawn

But if I say that men white, it must be black. are their skins otherwise black-skinned, or have is sound white
case

coloured,the statement
learn that
of skin-colour in the hausts

enough, and
black
are

is in

and

two

of human

and beings,

exhaus principle definite possibilities the disjunction ex

possibilities. that the sake, we have in the foregoingassumed brevity's takes A is either B or C.' the form typical disjunctive proposition No doubt the meaning of this formula This, however, is not the case. and the proposition is genuinely be expressedin the disjunctive, may A form B A is is Either C ';but the form as it or genuinedisjunctive stands is categorical, A being the subject-term, and 'either B or C the is trulydisjunctive that cannot be predicate-term. No proposition in P Either or Q,' where P and Q expressed the form appropriately
For
'

the

'

'

'

are

statements.

Thus,
The

the

proposition
it may B
'

'

All A's

are sense

either B
'

or an

C
A
'

'

is

only because disjunctive

or

be read in the
A

Either
B B
or

is B

it is C.'
'

proposition No
nor

is either
'

is is

equivalentto
not

is neither

'
"

to i.e.,

is not

and
Some

compound categorical proposition. With A's either B or C are particular propositions Some
"

'

regard to
and
'

the A's

'

'

are

neither

nor

C,' it
of

seems

difficultto consider
'

them

in any
'

other

lightthan
nor

that their

'

as

with either B categoricals predicate-terms. respective

or

'

and

neither B

problems connected with the import of the Disjunc interest as the question has excited so much tive Proposition none should be treated as mutu whether the alternatives of a disjunction Does the or expression Either ally exclusive or not. include or exclude the possibility of both alternatives being true ?
Of the many
' '
...

When

'

we

imply
other may

say that he ? In
a
'

Either may be is

this

man or
...

is

fool
he
'

or

he

is

a one

knave,' do
and
not
'

we

both,
'

that
or

must to

be
'

the
'

word,
?*

either

imply
uses

not

both

or

it

be both
we

Before
of the
one. or
*

pledge ourselves
is it
even

to either of these

to the exclusion

other, it would

be well to ask

whether

the

option is
either in

a one

forced
way

Is it necessary, the other ?

The

relevant,to decide

"

alternative uses two perhaps be expressed may and not assuredly (or knowedly) not both The truth-view of import is here presupposed. From the stand statementview of import the distinction would be best expressed and that between not statedlyboth as statedlynot both (c/. pp. 148, 157). Either is exactlyparallel of of This interpretation to the interpretation or of the non-exclusive dis in the In the case some particular c ategorical. adopted junctive Either P or Q,' Both P and Q is an unstated possibility (vide pp. 156, 157).

clearlyas assuredlyboth.' pointof the mere

more

these distinction between ' that between

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

...

'

'

'

'

CHAT-.

XIV.]
query

THE

DISJUNCTIVE
not
'

PROPOSITION

133

This
to the

does

imply
.

any
.

expression Ambiguity, it is essential that we should know what we mean the* when use so we expression, far as such knowledge is relevant to have the logical form. in using the disjunctive But, purpose we the only meaning which in ordinary cases, it is relevant to give to is that of not neither.' This either or meaning satisfies the requirement of exhaust! veness, and it enables us to waive alto either not is to imply or gether the issue as to whether
.

either

dislike of giving a fixed meaning or.' In the interests of the Principle

of Non-

'

'

'

'

'

'

...

both
Let

'

'

or us

it may

be both.'
we are naturally disjunctive proposition Either P or Q.' number: (1) The hypothetical proposition 'If

consider
two

the

types of inference

that

inclined to draw

from in

the

'

They
not

are

"

not'P, then
Q.'
The of the

Q ';and

If P, (2) the hypothetical proposition"' is the inference is the from the the

then

first of these

exhaustiveness
the
two two
;

disjunction ;
as

second
'

inference
are more or

from
than

mutual
alter infer

exclusiveness

of the alternatives.
in the

If there P
or

natives,
ences

proposition
:

Either
not

will take

the forms

(1) If

P,

then

either

R,' the Q or R

and

(2)if
alone
the
'-

P. then neither

nor as

R. first of these in the

are

Now,
concerns

in

so

far

it is the

two

inferences of
a

that

our

logical purpose
to

framing
We
for

the disjunction,
or
'

question as
that is

whether is
'

we

to

side with
'

the
are

exclusivists
'

non-exclusivists

wholly
Either
...

irrelevant.
or means

exhaustivists
not

enough. nothing further.

In
an

us

neither,'and
has

able article in
to

Mind, October, 1903,

'

Mr.

G. R. T. Ross

endeavoured
ment

show

that in

the

function

of the

judg disjunctive
as a

both in science
not

and

reasonings is to be exhaustive practical

The

primary sound. When contention, at any rate, to be essentially we develop indeterminate* basis an our categorical disjunctively, primary aim
appears, is attained if we
can

and

exclusive.' necessarily

contention

substitute for the

indeterminate comparatively

which collectively statement categorical a list of specific possibilities which the the cover same precisely they generality vaguer range as both in covered is disjunctively specify. For, since the same range the choice between is a fresh of specific a number cases, possibilities those offered and above advantage that the disjunctiveoffers over without This particularization by the indeterminate categorical. loss of scope is in itself something to the good. But once have we the specific the b efore possibilities exhaustively question as to us, whether they mutually exclude each other may remain a matter of complete indifference to us.
Let is X
us

suppose knave is
or

that the assertion the

that X

is an

objectionable person
'

adequatelyrepresented by
is
a

knavery

that Either statement disjunctive he is a fool.' Without or inquiringwhether X's infer at is not compatible with his foolishness,we can

134 from

THE

PROBLEM that if X
a

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

iv.

once,

fool,and

this statement, that if he is not

is not
must

fool,he

knave, he must be a be a knave, and thereby

a
'

contention that X our emphasize in a fresh and specific original way is an objectionable character. If X is a knave, The inference that he is not a fool would be beside the point. It would not emphasize his objectionableness, but qualifyand limit it. that X is in a perilous situation at the edge of a Suppose, again, action chasm, and that the categorical requirement of immediate is presented in the disjunctiveform : Either jump or starve.' Here the essential inference is that If X does not jump, he will starve,'for it is this consideration that suppliesthe incentive to action. Little can If X be gained by inferring that does jump,
' ' ' '

he
I

will

not

starve,' and

that

'

If

starves, the

he

will

not

have

jumped.'
in

followingillustrations that, under ordinary cir cumstances, an exhaustivist need not pledge himself either to the exclusivist or to the non-exclusivist theory. 1. Planetary orbits* fall either wholly inside or wholly outside
further
'

quote from the article by Mr. Ross support of the contention

the Earth's Here the

we

orbit,' admits of being read exclusively. We disjunction that like, Jupiter'sorbit,lying without that of
'

can

infer,if Earth,
futile. in its with

the

cannot

lie

wholly nearer

to

the

sun

than Mr.

it.'

But

this is

The

real force of the

exhaustiveness,in the
orbits

lies, as disjunction denial that implied

that of the Earth. It intersecting of the inference that if a planetary orbit does the Earth's orbit,then it must lie wholly outside it. 2.
'

pointsout, are any planets lies in the possibilitjr not fall wholly inside
there and in the the

Ross

Planets

whose

orbits lie between

seen

the Earth
or

Sun

arc,

when Here

to be visible,
we

either in the which

morning
we

have

statement

may

very

evening.' utilize profitably

visible possessing any proof that Venus, for instance, when in the evenings, in the morning rise after the Sun, and so be must lost in his light. The force of the disjunction lies, again,in its ex that it professesto give us haustiveness, in the certaintywhich to be seen planetsof the kind specified are never during the middle of the night. It assures that if us we a starry objectof peculiar see be brilliance at midnight, though it may be Jupiter, it cannot without

Venus.
We
a

have

so

far been
that

from the DisjunctiveProposition considering contro

on as

compels no reference to the Exclusivist But a point is necessarily reached where a decision versy. becomes The reached soon question so imperative. point is
distinction of the alternatives from interest. logical
*

point

of view

this the

each

other becomes
to
among

matter

of
an

It may

become
the Earth

important
is not included

decide
the

whether

In this statement

planets.

136

THE

PROBLEM
the

OF
interest

LOGIC
in exclusiveness

[IV.

iv.

itself with

ally may ideal of disjunction. Assuming logical is desirable that this distinction of alternative possibilities it is, as for instance, in the classification of species under a genus have we the logical demands ideal of disjunction of the disjunc to ask what in view of this requirement. tive proposition would to speak wholly in favour of the The natural answer seem the disjunctive For surely it is only when Exclusivists. proposition that we is read exclusively obtain this desired distinctness between
a

real value

for Science, and interest in

a

the

"

"

the various alternatives.

assumption which we must clear. It is this : We are assuming that the way in try to make which the disjunctiveproposition can always best further the is by being itself ideally idea of precision logical precise. But this is a fundamental ideals misconception. In the service of logical the various forms of judgment must In some cases co-operate. that of precise characterization, will be the ideal for instance reached by means of a categorical proposition. As an example of
in this view
an
" "

But

there is involved

this,we

may

cite the record

of

some

delicate

scientificobservation.

In other cases, as in the development of a supposition into its con that must proposition embody the sequences, it is the hypothetical

ideal logical

"

in this

case

that

of necessary

connexion

between
as

the

parts of the

proposition.

In other

circumstances,again,

in scien
a a

the ideal,that of the mutual tific Classification, exclusiveness of number of co-ordinate possibilities, requiresfor its embodiment

disjunctive proposition.
Now,
where
the

function

of

embodying

the

ideal falls to logical

there can be no doubt that disjunctive proposition, which it must be mutually enumerates possibilities exclusive as well as exhaustive. Here the function of the disjunctive that its form shall be perfect. Hence, when scien logically requires tificresults are tabulated in disjunctive the should form, disjunctive be of the exclusive type, or should approximate as closely as possible these perfect to that type. In Mathematics are disjunctions always

the lot of the

the alternative

obtainable,but type
'

in the

more

concrete

sciences this is not

the

the

case.
'

In that classification of
will often

in which species

species
two

are

defined

(vide p. 62) the boundaries

be
somewhat

between

co-ordinate
various

by species
as

uncertain, though the

distinct and of

types,

mutually ideal falls, shall embodying the logical the of lot the categorical and the disjunc we proposition, say, to tive proposition its service as a mere fulfils towards ensuring means of statement, that service the maximum to the categorical precision when the disjunctiveis non frequently be best fulfilled may exclusive. The ideal functioningof the disjunctive requireshere of its form. the imperfection from a given Suppose that, starting basis,we are able to state our alternatives exhaustively categorical
But

defined,are centrally
where

exclusive.

the function

CHAP.

XIV.]
'

THE

DISJUNCTIVE
P
a

PROPOSITION
R.' A methodical in

137

in the form may

cannot

Either P
as

or

Q
we

or

scientific inquiry
circumstances
'

cancel

which possibility
are

the
is

given

be actualized,and
R.' The

left with
'

the

conclusion

Either

Q
we

or

the

Q, we suppose, possibility cancelled,and similarly left with the categorical are R.' of this kind assertion In a case non-exclusive type of disjunction service is the most imperfect,
for that
one reason

able,and

the most

ideal.

Where

our

aim

is to reach

by the elimination of the others, it is otiose to insist on the various alternatives being ab initio mutually The successive cancelling exclusive. of P and Q is a process that is quiteindependent of the questionof exclusiveness or non-exclusiveness. is given in exclusive form. We Suppose that the disjunction
are

the truth of

alternative

then told that either PQR

is true,
are we

or

QPR

is true, or

RPQ
we

is true.

P and the with

same

Q
the

are

and cancelled,
as

we

left with
reached

result

that

which

RPQ. above,
'

But when

this is

really

started

disjunctive Either P or Q or R.' For the result R there obtained might equally well have been exclusive of P and Q. expressed RPQ,' since it was certainly The inconvenience of refusing to utilize a disjunctive proposition at all except when expressed in its most perfectform may best be than brought out by a comparison which is much more mere a to use analogy. It would be like refusing a hypothetical proposition until it had been rendered so precise in both its parts that not only
'

non-exclusive imperfect,

should

the

affirmation of the antecedent

of the

involve

that

of the

conse

quent, but also the affirmation that of the antecedent.

We

consequent
the

should
service

involve
of

conclude, then,

that

the

in disjunctive,

the
that

categorical, form, and may this imperfect, non-exclusive form is the form required in the in terests of Scientific Explanation. Formal Classification, on the other and the of out alternative in the mathe hand, laying possibilities matical sciences, requirethe service of the disjunctive judgment in its perfect and exclusive form. A disjunctive to then, may be defined as a statement proposition, the effect that, of a closed number of alternative one possibilities, is taken to be actualized. The one rule of disjunction obligatory Rule I. is that the alternatives shall exhaust the possibilities. Where it falls to the lot of the disjunctive to uphold the ideal of
be left in non-exclusive profitably
"
"

scientific

we precision,

have

further

to

observe

Rule

II.,that

the

alternatives

be reciprocallyexclusive. In mathematical where scientific precisionis as imperative at the beginning inquiry, of the inquiry as it is at its close, both rules must hold necessarily for all good disjunctive propositions. the Criticize Example." : followingdisjunction
'

shall

Either
are

or are triangles equilateral, they right-angled.'

are

isosceles,or

they

138

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC be

[IV.

v.

This breaks Rule Whether

It also it
can

for II.,

an

isosceles triangle may

on

right-angled.
of

be

depends equilateral
I. There
are

the

precise definition

the isosceles

triangle.
Rule
"

which neither are triangles the tri nor scalene isosceles, equilateral, namely, right-angled angleswhich are not right-angled.

breaks

CHAPTER
IV.

XV.
PROPOSITION.

(v.) THE

HYPOTHETICAL

THE

Categorical Proposition is
a

propositionwhich
the
a

purports

to

be
need

statement
not

of fact.
'

The
'

fact to which
fact

statement

refers Causal

be

real

'

fact, or
formal
certain

of Nature,
fact that

fact under
can

Law.

only
as

It may be a in reference to

'

fact, a
on

have

actuality

limited universe

of discourse.

The the
contains

Hypothetical Proposition,
statement two

of
the

connexion

be defined the other hand, may It two between possibilities.

clauses, of which
states
a

the first is called the Antecedent,

The

DisjunctivePropositionalso, between but in possibilities, seen, that case the possibilities are regarded as alternative possibilities. The connexion between the Hypothetical Proposition and the Disjunctiveis,from the point of view of the logical development of The HypotheticalProposition, as we thought,a very close one. have alreadyseen the which takes of one possibilities (vide p. 113), the DisjunctivePropositionspecifies, and develops by connecting it with the hypotheticalselects for its another possibility. Thus antecedent of possibilities of a number one disjunctively presented. The drawn from also be been as regarded having consequent may the the alternatives of another both disjunctive series. Thus with which the is concerned possibilities Hypothetical Proposition of the disjunctive are type, and therefore real, and not modal, possibilities. have before us the disjunctiveproposition Suppose that we it has Either a triangle is obtuse-angled, it is right-angled, or or three acute alternative of these angles.' Selecting one possi If be is right-angled, semicircle may bilities, we a a triangle say circumscribed to it having its hypotenuse as diameter.' As the Hypothetical Propositionis concerned with possibilities, and with what the Categorical with actualities, or purport to be formal it is whether actualities, or real, impossible to logically a hypotheticalproposition as a genuine categorical, though express it may Consider form. be equivalentlyexpressed in categorical

and

the second have

Consequent.

as

we

connexion

'

'

CHAP.

XV.]
statement

THE

HYPOTHETICAL

PROPOSITION

130

the

'

prosecuted.' We cannot give it a categoricalmeaning.

'

If anyone trespasses on this property, he will be this into categorical transvert form, but we may We

it in the state may form : All trespassers will be prosecuted.' But this is not a propo It does not imply of fact. sition which purports to be a statement anyone will anyone that has do has

trespassed in
so

the

past,

nor

even, not to

indeed,
that

that

in

the

future
or
'

prosecution the other hand,

taken the
a

place,

; it does is certain

statement

All

those

imply any place. On trespassers are being

take
to
as a

prosecuted
actual

'

is

fact, and

categorical proposition. It claims be equivalently it cannot expressed

since it is
a

state

an

genuine

hypothetical.
We

conclude, then, that,

fundamental
not

of requisite

logical thinking to be guided by meaning and since the meaning of a hypotheticalstatement from the meaning of a categorical statement,

is

by form, and different entirely

two

types of the one irreducible to the other. statement Further, since are are form, frequentlygiven in categorical hypotheticalpropositions and propositions in hypotheticalform, it is essential, categorical
when

the

shape, to look reducing a propositionto strict logical meaning and adjust the form accordingly. : Consider, for instance, the proposition
'

to

the

If air is is
a

it liquefied,

is in that state

dangerousto
'

handle.'

This

lent to
to

pseudo-hypothetical. Its meaning is preciselyequiva that of the genuine categorical Liquefied air is dangerous
On
the is

handle.'

other

hand,

the

proposition
'

'

If this

fluid is

liquefied air,it
cannot

It is a true hypothetical. dangerous to handle be reduced to a genuinelycategorical equivalent. of the

of Hypothetical Propositionas a connexion the in one be using the word connexion or we possibilities may assertorial" other of two senses either an i.e., an : (1) as indicating intended an connexion or as apodeictic (2) indicating assertorially ; The connexion is intended connexion. an i.e., apodeictically and is assertorial so far as it is merely asserted implied nothing It is apodeictic when to with regard to its nature. it is intended be that cannot be a logically connexion, a connexion necessary without either denied or own our rendering Nature unintelligible In

speaking

'

'

"

thoughtinconsistent.
As instances of assertorial
connexion
we

may

cite the

following
will

propositions:
'

If you
home

go

out

without

an

umbrella

to-day, you
on

come

wet.' this

'

If sun-spots are magnetic storms numerous, will be correspondingly numerous.'

planet

140

THE

PROBLEM of

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

v.

The

are following

instances
a

connexion apodeictic

1. 'If there is

way

up,

follows that) there (itlogically

must

be
2.
'

If

way all men

down.'
are are are

follows that) mortals, (itlogically

some

mortals
3.
'

men.' follows that)all mortals mortals, (it logically

statement

If all men
are

men.'

4.

'

If you you
are

accept the

compelled logically
second
the

all persons that you to admit

that

are are

selfish,

yourself

selfish.' In the first and of the

In the

of these last would

examples

we

see

that denial

of the connexion validity

render Nature

unintelligible.

In apodeicticintention has miscarried. example the fourth, denial of the validityof the connexion would render thought inconsistent. When of possibilities will the connexion depends on the human and the reference to Reality is still as a synthetic principle, either c onceived formal or as real,'the free con restrictedly the statement nexion which as impliesmust be interpreted equiva

third

'

'

'

lent to

material connexion

in this essential scientific

respect
"

that it

can

be

justified through observation or ranks as an assertorial hypothetical. Let us statement the preted, If anyone consider the proposition from this point of view : he this will be prosecuted.' Here the property, trespasses on be to must not supposed depend on the capriceof the prosecution It must owner. depend on such facts as the apparatus of the law be re trespassingand the policing of the property, which can the actual facts can be investigated. Otherwise as investigated validityof the propositiondoes not admit of being scientifically
'

investigation.So inter

tested. We
two

have, then, two

main

Assertorial
main Law

(formal or

types of Hypothetical proposition the real) and the Apodeictic. There are also
"

varieties

of the

regulatedby the Apodeictic, respectively

and
the

of Non-Contradiction
two

Law

of Excluded

Middle.

The

first of these
The

varieties

Hypothetical, the second three types of HypotheticalProposition may

as

be called the Formal Apodeictic may the Material Apodeictic Hypothetical. be symbo suitably

lized

follows

Assertorial

Hypothetical. If P,
f If P
tion
it
"
T"

then
is

Q. ascertainably*

accepted,then
must
*

by implica"

Apodeictic Hypothetical.^

"

"-

TT

4-1

i-

Q
"

is

true,

be accepted (Formal). " T j_then

by implication

^
*

Q
with

is true

(Material).
a

and

of Q is, of The ascertainability the form of verification may vary

course,

only
the

claim

made

by

the

judger,

Universe

of Discourse.

CHU-.

XV.]

THE

HYPOTHETICAL

PROPOSITION

141

Illustrations If water

is heated

at

standard

pressure,

it will boil at

100" C.
the

assertorial). (real
If Black
mates

White

in three moves,

Black

will have

won

tournament If the
moon

(formal assertorial).
at

is made

it must

of green cheese, least be subject to of green

follows that) (itlogically

the law

of

gravitation
that)

apodeictic). (material
If the
moon

is made

follows cheese, (itlogically

are

some

heavenly bodies apodeictic).

statement that the

not

incorruptible(material
of green
we

If the

moon

is made

cheese

is the

follows accepted, (it logically further

are-not statement

that)
not

must

accept

that all bodies

made

of green

cheese

the

moon

If the

statements
moon

that is made

the

(Formal apodeictic). and that all green cheese is corruptible cheese of green are accepted, (it is

that some that) the further statement logically necessary also be accepted must heavenly bodies are not incorruptible (Formal apodeictic).

Should
then

the

Hypothetical be presented in
'

the

generalform
more

'

If P,

specific of the will on meaning depend hypothetical given that in If then then.' as a word means the connectingcase, if assertorial is the of ascertainable matter fact,' ; proposition it follows with logical then that,'the proposi necessity means kind or the other. of one tion is an apodeictic hypothetical assertorial and apodeictichypobetween With this distinction able to give more theticals before us, we are preciseexpression to of forms and hypothetical the categorical the distinction between admit of being pre A statement. proposition must categorical
Q,' or
in the form If P is true, then
'

the Q is true,'

nature

of the

'

'

"

'

'

sented, whether
'

in

formal

or

in

real
be
'

sense,
or

as

true

or

false. It
an can

The be

apodeictichypotheticalcan
validated
'

only

valid

invalid.
'

as

sound

inference,

or

invalidated

as

unsound

the other An assertorial hypothetical, on inference. illegitimate correct either be justified as a prediction or be dis hand, may credited as an incorrect prediction. Moreover, it is only categorical When be verified. that can statements we verifythe truth of the and antecedent between are consequent, we alleged connexion with P.' connected is proposition Q verifying the categorical to Induction, to verify shall see, when come we as we Similarly, but its not proposition, a hypothetical a hypothesis is to verif}^ antecedent. (categorical) asserted by the Apodeictic of possibilities connexion The logical and therefore,in first or last resort, when not invalid, Hypothetical, valid. be either conditionally or unconditionally meaningless, may
or
'

142

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IV.

v.

It

is

unconditionally necessarily
:

valid

when

the the

antecedent

cannot

be the

affirmed
propo

without sitions

implying

consequent.

Thus

'

If

all

men

are

mortal,

then

some

mortals

'

are

men

(material),

and
'

If

it

be

granted
that

that
some

all mortals

men

are

mortal,
'

then

it

must

be

granted unconditionally
'

are

men

(Formal)
the

are

valid

hypotheticals.
then Socrates

But

propositions
'

If

all

men

are

mortal,

is

mortal

(material),

and
'

If

it

be

granted
that

that

all

men

are

mortal,
'

then

it

must

be

granted
are

Socrates

is

mortal

(Formal) They
can

conditionally
because in

valid each
in
case

hypotheticals.
the

are

conditionally
from the

valid

consequent
a

be

inferred
"

antecedent

only
that

virtue is

of
a

further
or

assumption granted
would
to

namely,
a man.

the
The

assumption strictly
'

Socrates forms of

man,

is

be
:

logical
all
is

these

propositions
and Socrates

be

If

men

are
'

mortal,

is

man,

then

Socrates

mortal

(material),

and
'

If

it
a

be
man,

granted
then

that it
must

all

men

are

mortal,
that

and

that

Socrates is mortal

is
'

also

be

granted

Socrates

(Formal).
All in strict

hypothetical
logical
form,

validity-connexions,
are

in

fact,

when
valid

expressed
type.
as

of

the

unconditionally
itself inference.
Inference.

The
were,

hypothetical
elongating point
of

assertion into
an

cannot

justify logical
of

except
We

by,
have

it

explicit
for
the

here

the

departure

study

CHAPTER
V. TRANSITION (i.) TO
THE

XVI.
FORMAL TREATMENT

OF

LOGIC.

THE

of the connexion between and Inference significance of statement the apodeictichypothetical form is concentrated in If the meaning of the word if.' Whether P is then we true, say If P is accepted, then be accepted,' if Q is true,' or Q must If the word than is understood means no more assuming that.' must as mean equivalent to given that,' then by given we If the therefore plays given as an assumption.' important truth and relations of in a falsity part introducing purely hypo
w "

essential

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

thetical

way.

P, then
He
is not of truth

Q,'
P.

no

person call is made on

even

When

states

an

inference

in the the the

form

'

If

him
an

to

substantiate
as

truth truth
or

of P.
un

expected
When of
of

to

have

opinion

to

cedent
and with word

and

in the form of ante respectivelyintroduced the premisses consequent of a hypotheticalproposition,

an

conclusion the
'

argument

are

shielded of

from

all direct The shelter

contact

world
'

if

Knowledge completely protects preciselyin

we

and them

Reality.
from the

of the per

fortunes
the

and

plexitiesof the truth-interest.

Now
of it is
can

this

abstract

aspect that
to

Inference
our

best be studied.
must
;

In order

understand

problem of the object hypothetical

study
of

isolate in the the

it, after present

the

fashion

of all successful
the This

experimentation
form
statement

and is

instance

isolating apparatus.
of Truth has

isolation from
such

the

larger interests
us,
more

very

provisional great advan

tages. It enables

to present particularly,

our

object in

and devised our serve as artificially purpose, thus makes and precision which would possible a degree of accuracy be possible were not the object studied in the vast, uncontrolled context of its natural surroundings. We then, to study Inference Inference, to substitute as propose, for the more a comprehensive truth-interest, pure validity-interest and as an important provisional step to adapt the statementof the import proposition in such wise as to facilitate still further our Moreover, of the study of the conditions of valid Inference. model two take tileas our types of apodeictic hypothetical we Formal the purport is to uphold the necessityfor type, of which consistent statement of Identity in the name of the Formal principles forms
" "

will best

145

10

146

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V.

i.

and

to do, the Adopting, as we propose of the Proposition, the material statement-import type If P is true, with its ultimate appeal to the Law of Material true,' Q is implicitly the of and Law Excluded Middle Identity (videp. 99), would be a wholly incongruous model. The study of the Inference problem under the restrictions above and perhaps the exclusive, set forth is the central, topic of a Formal' Propositionand Inference are studied not only as Logic. Where less of meaning, but also on the more or complicated statements basis of an artificialmodification of statement-import,the treat
' '

Non-contradiction.

ment

is at very

once

abstract of

and

conventional,
; and

and
we

therefore have

Formal

in
a

genuine sense
treatment

of the word

what

here called

as usually more Logic. It is with this Formal aspect of Logic that we shall until we be exclusively the problem of concerned now pass from Inference to the wider and deeper problem of Scientific Explanation.

Formal

Logic is

referred to briefly

Formal

CHAPTER
V. THE (ii.)

XVII.
THE

FORMAL

IMPORT

OF

CATEGORICAL

PROPOSITION.

THE

of a proposition depends import, or structural significance,

on

the

character

of the
: as

relation which identity the

this
most

it affirms.

Identity
import
which,

determines

Import

is identity is identity

conceived, so
conceived
of

will the

be conceived.

Where

in the form

being the
the

simplestand
have what

manageable, is
treatment
as

therefore, regarded from

point of view of the Formal

we

vant,
The that

is known

the Formal
the

most

of simple interpretation

Logic, the most rele import of a proposition. meaning of identityis

lions
are

of numerical
am

coincidence.

When

lions and considering simply as count and able objects. Qua countable the objects they are identical, difference of quantity : the lions as countable difference is a mere number of carni objectsare numerically coincident with the same

vores,'I

I say ' All carnivores alike

carni

vores.

Each form

of all the lions is a carnivore.

of

prepositional import and reads sition in this simple way, in extension, may terms suitablybe of a proposition. The extension of a
The
to

which both

interprets the

subject and
as or we

called the

Propo predicate Extensive Import

have
seen,

term,

is not

be

confused

with

its conno-denotation

intension, the joint

of Definition and Division through product of those processes which includes the meaning of a term is developed. The extension the meaning of the term the objects to which applies. But in of a term need not refer to the whole to the extension we referring

CHAP.

XVII.]
:
'

THE

FORMAL
be
term
on a

CATEGORICAL

147 total.
the

of it

the

reference may
'

either

partialor
from

Hence

term

read

extensively

is

considered whether

its extent, but

dependent

point of view of defining quantity-mark (or its logical

this reference
to

to make equivalent) total. or partial

clear

extension

is

The

'

extensive

'

or interpretation

customarily called
involves
of these
are
'

its

'

denotative
who

'

reading of reading.
and
we

proposition
this

is

But

usage

confusion avoided

between

extension

be carefully

by those
as

hold, as

words

should
taken

be differentiated.
to equivalent
"

The

denotation, and must do, that the meanings proposition All men
'

mortal,'when

the true
"

objectsindicated by the term indicated by the incident with objects

said to have is substituted of the its terms for
' '

The

man

term

';

meaning, numerically co mortal," is commonly

are
'

extensive

read in denotation, and

The
occurs same
'

the word

'

denoted
hold

'

indicated.' denoted

misuse the

(as we

it to is

be)

word

in

enunciation

of what

called

the predicative view of Import. Here the subject-termis said to be read in denotation,the predicate-term in connotation, and
the

proposition All men 'The objectsdenoted by

'

are

mortal

'

is then

rendered

as

follows

"man"

possess

the attributes connoted in this

case

by

"

mortal."

We
read

should in

prefer to
extension

subject-term is
intension.*

say that and the

the

predicate-term in
the various ways

We
of

are

not, however,

concerned directly

with

a interpreting proposition,but rather with explainingand that one form of prepositional developing import which we have selected as most the adequately meeting requirementsof a Formal treatment. logical

The extensive is most proposition convenientlystated in one of four ultimate forms, which known the A, E, I. are as traditionally and 0 propositions.The scheme is as follows :

fUniversal Affirmative symbolized by SaP.

Particular
Affirmative SiP.
:

'

All

S's
S's

are

P's,5 P's,'
Afill'mo')

'

Some

are

symbolized by

"{"Universal Negative : E symbolizedby SeP. Particular Negative : O : by SoP. symbolized

*

'

All

S's are-not S's are-not

P's,' P's,'

'

Some

here conveniently be variety in the rendering of a proposition may On this view It is called the attributive, view. both terms read in are ' connotation. All men mortal ' would Thus, the proposition run as follows : are ' " " The attributes connoted man are by the term accompanied by the attributes ' " " ' connoted the mortal else The attributes term connoted or by by the ; noticed.
term
" "

third

man

are

t A
and

distinction the ' general'

accompanied by the is commonly drawn

or

attribute

"

mortal."

'

enumerative

between the generic universal judgment universal judgment. The A and the E pro-

10"2

148 Illustrations A I E
: : : :

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V.

ii.

: are are

All dukes

members members

of the House of the House

of Lords. of Commons.
of Commons.

Some Some

lords

All dukes

are-not

members members

of the House
of the House there

0
The

lords are-not

of Commons.
are a

fact that

according to
follows A
case so

this scheme

tions, and

only four,
conceived. in either
or

from

the

nature

of

proposi as proposition
affirmative
or

four

Formally
not
; and

propositionmust
its used.* and

be

either either

subject-termmust
Moreover,

be used
of the

in its two

whole

extent

not

the

choice which

fundamenta division

Quantity, upon Quality depends, is necessitated by the adoption of view view of Import. The adoption of this specific perative to accept the basis of Quantity or extensive
fundamentum
a

of

this fourfold
the extensive it im
as

makes

reference

one

and
is

the fact

that

the
to

distinction in

is

distinction

which

whatsoever identity-import
as a

logically prior any include to us obliges

quality of specification the quality-basis

second

fundamentum.

On In
ence a

the Distribution
we

of

Terms

in

Proposition.
fact that
our

previousparagraph
of
a

pointed out the

refer
use or

to the extent
more

the
form

technical

be either total or partial, or, to may Logic,either universal language of Formal

term
to to

preciser particular. We have now give which is at abstract the validity-interest present requiredby this restricted standpoint whole inquiry. From dominating our is with unambiguous statements of meaning, and sole concern our It is with statements. of these same inquiryinto the implications of standpoint that, the aim of clearlyexpressing this limitation the words shall the extension when of use speaking of terms, we and defined below, in the place distributed as undistributed,' of the words universal and particular.' when it is A term is said to be distributed (withina proposition) there is either an explicitly used in its whole extent that is,when stated or a logically implied reference to all the individuals con
'

this distinction the

'

'

'

'

'

"

tained A

in the class for which

it stands. when it is not used in its whole

extent

term
"

is said to be undistributed that

extent

is,when

no

reference to the whole

or

of the class

is either

stated explicitly

Let

us

consider A, E, I, 0 from
are,

implied. logically this point of view.

universals.
to

positions
'

in
' '

our

view,
'

enumerative

The the the

generic

'

'

intensive * For further

and ' and

enumerative extensive.'

corresponds,in fact,
the discussion
on

difference distinction

between between

substantiation, see

QuantifiedPredicate,

pp. 159-161.

CHAP.

XVIL]

THE

FORMAL

CATEGORICAL

149

i. Distribution

of S
0

A, I,
With

and

present

no

difficulty. S
0.

is distributed

in

A,

undistributed

in I and

regard to E a difficulty may form familiar,though misleading,

statement

from present itself, arising No S is P.' E In

the be

'

objectionto the
it may

that

S is distributed
the
no

in

the

proposition
no

urged that,
with

since

proposition
individuals

states

that

S's

are

identical
are

P's,therefore Now,

belongingto
that
no

the class S individual But

'

referred to.
are

it is
to
as

quite

true

such

beingobjects
'

being referred
an a

being identical

with P's.

No
'

S is P
extent.

is not It is

proposition with a subject of zero negativeproposition. It is therefore equivalentto

P's.' Thus

affirmative

All the

S's are-not
sition is the P's,'

E,

the

universal

distributes its

subject. that, so consistently presented in the stricter misapprehension cannot arise.

of P
:
'

It is obvious

negative proposition, long as the E propo

form
'

All S's are-not

ii. Distribution

A. Does
'

the statement
are

All S's

are

P's

'

imply

the

statement

All S's

all P's' ?*

that all the S's For the statement Obviously it does not. with number identical the same of P's does are severally not imply that the two classes S and P are coextensive, the given statement coincidingpoint for point. What necessitates is simply the identification of each of all the S's with each of some It is equivalentto the of the P's.
statement

that

'

All S's
'

are

some

P's.'
P's P's
'

Therefore
E. Does the

is undistributed. the
statement
'

All S's are-not

imply necessarily
?

statement

If it did not the

It must be so. any would its not preclude imply this, acceptance ' of the P's statement Some S's,' are acceptance if

All S's are-not

'

which,
'

accepted, would
are

necessitate if
'

the

acceptance
P's
are
'

of
not

Some

S's

P's.'

But

All S's are-not

'

does
'

preclude
Therefore
I. Does
'

the

acceptance

of

Some

S's

P's

it is

meaningless, f
P is distributed.
'

the statement

Some

S's

are

P's

'

imply
are
'

the statement

Some

S's
not

are

all P's'? The assertion

'

not. No, certainly

Some

cats

black
some

objects
cats
'

'

does
ferred
no

imply that, when

identified

each with
over. a

of the black

re" are

to has been

there object,

black
'

objectsremaining
cats
'

It does not

imply

that

the

some

are

numerous

enough

to

account

for all

the individuals contained

*

in the class Black

p. 159.

object.
104.

On

the

see quantified predicate,

| Cf. pp. 98,

150

THE
P

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. ii.

Therefore 0. Does

is undistributed.

the

statement
'

'

Some

S's are-not
any P's '?

P's

'

imply the

statement

Some
its

S's are-not

Yes, for if not,

ance

of the
'

acceptance would not preclude the accept identical with that Some P's are statement
some

these
are

same

S's

'

of which

we

are we

statingthat they
were

not
are are

identical with identical with identical with Now

an

P's.

But

if

to

state

that

P's

they

that them, we should also be stating the which is to P's, given contrary

statement.

accepted
of
a

statement

which

does

not

preclude the acceptance

itself is

statement

inconsistent

with

and therefore self-contradictory,

meaningless.

Therefore From

is distributed.

the consideration
as such, sitions,

of E and have

we

must

their

negativepropo distributed. predicates

see

that

We
terms

rules for the distribution have, then, the four following

:

of

1. All universal 2. 3. 4.

distribute their subjects. propositions No particular distribute their subjects. propositions All negativepropositions distribute their predicates. No affirmative propositions distribute their predicates. No.
3 in is particular is worth

Rule An
sition and A

remembering.
;

defined as a logical technically propo and its undistributed its distributed predicate subject having

proposition,then,
are

E, I, and 0
in
a

definable. similarly
treatment

These of them

definitions
it is

are

funda

mental

Formal

of

Logic, and
think

important, when

to thinkingof these propositions,

in this way.

The
'

of A, E, /, 0. Diagrammatic Representation
'

to make intended are Diagrams,' as Professor Welton says, the terms obvious at a glance the relations between expressedin a thus expressed are proposition.'*The relations diagrammatically the extensive it is that when so extensity-relations, only necessarily view of Import is adopted, and both subject and predicateterms read in extension, that we can are diagrammatically the express

relations which Each

sented
terms

we

state
as

to
a

exist between class-term and

the

two

classes S and between

the

P.

term

is treated
a

diagrammatically repre
to

by

circle.

The

relation stated

hold

two

representeddiagrammatically by a mutual coinci dence or non-coincidence,partial or total,of two circles. of to We proceed diagrammatic equivalents point out the precise the A, E, I, and 0 propositions. In the following diagrams the shaded part of a circle stands in
is thus
*
'

Manual

of

vol. i.,ch. iii., Logic,' p.

215.

152

THE

PROBLEM
that

OF A

LOGIC
I

[V. ii.

invari must proposition even though ably be taken as possessing an undistributed predicate, made we by the proposition happen to know that the statement still be true taken reference involve to would to all a though the individuals included in the extension of the predicate term. Thus the predicateof the proposition All equilateral are triangles equiangular triangles is undistributed, and so is the predicateof
an or
' '

It follows from

the above

the

proposition Some

'

animals

are

horses.'
"

If

our

intention

is to

distribute both

subject and predicate if we wish, for instance, to assert that all the objectscontained in the class Equilateral triangle class with those in all the identical contained are Equi severally and must two make of we use angular triangle, propositions, say and All equilateral All equi are triangles,' triangles equiangular are angular triangles equilateral triangles.' It is most in connexion with logical diagrams, not important, to confuse the diagrammatic representation of statements con cerning the relations of classes to each other with the repre sentation, in diagrammatic form, of the possible class-relations
'

'

themselves.

Thus,

as

Dr.

Venn

and

Professor

Welton

there insist,

are

only

in which two classes can five ways or wholly coincide with partially the five diagrams : another one namely, those representedby
"

For, as Mr. Stock points out either classes,S and P, must

"

2nd ('Logic,'

edit., p.

85),

two

coincide Entirely

or

not

coincide partially

or

not

inclusion by^total

CHAP.

XVII.]
this does

THE

FORMAL in

CATEGORICAL

153

But view

not

us justify are

of import, there

and five, P
:

concluding that, on the extensive : only five, elementarypropositions

1. S coincides with

2. S is 3.
4. 5.

in P : wholly P : S wholly includes S partially excludes includes and partially excludes P : S entirely of

included

Qua

statement

elementary type. conjointly. More generallywe

can

It

meaning, the first of these is, in fact, not an the third is equivalent to the second and
that classes admit may say that, whilst we other (in respect of mutual coincidence and and ways in which

be related to each

non-coincidence) in five
there
are

five
such
seen,

only,we
reduce without

do

not

hold
can

that be
or

only five
We

ways

relations of classes them

to

stated.
we

may

have as we may, extend them, though

it is
not

just

four ;

to
we

eight. And
are

perhaps to be noted particularly

with

sufficient reason,* that in Formal Logic

the

concerned
of

the relations

of classes, but with

statement

statements

Logical diagrams represent only, sc that two ways of saying the same thing may appropriately be represented by different diagrams. Thus the is represented by the proposition All the S's are all the P's
'

their relations.

should

'

diagram

|i; 3

m
p

which ;;:i

directlyexpresses

the

coextensiveness

of the classes S and

P.
are

But

when

our

statement
are

takes

the

com

pound

form

'

All S's

P's and

all P's

the corresponding S's,'

diagrammatic rendering will

be

jjjgjj^ "f*

Air

and

'Some.' the

The
'

meanings
'

which

we

ascribe to

words
to
'

'

universal

'

and and

particular
discussion

as
'

'

undistributed
of

and applied to propositions, as applied to terms, need to the precise meanings of the
*

distributed words
'

'

be
two

further

defined
All
'

by
and

Vide

p. 159.

154
'

THE
'

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V.

ii.

Some
The

as

used

to

the universal and introduce, respectively,

a

the

particular proposition.
extension

of
'

term,
'

interpreted(the
the
etc.

intension Man
'

conjunctively being disjunctively interpreted).Thus,

as we

have

seen,

must

be

extension
'

of
and

is

'

this

man

and
must

that

man

and
are

the

other,'
con

All

'

Some,' then,
use

in

Formal
not

Logic

used
' '

junctively. This
collective use
'

conjunctive
words.

be identified with
'

the
'

Some

'

we
'

may All the

'

All and ordinary discourse In all be used collectively. the men speaking of may in the to them be referring statement as a single as group,

of these

In

men

in
'

the

room
'

were

but

tithe of
'

those

who

were as

invited
'

; and

Some

is

used collectively

in such

statements

are needs,' Some coppers will make days these children happy.' But the two words also be dismay understood, and this is the case in their conjunctiveuse. tributively

Some

of rest

all that he

The
means
'

expression A
'

'

and also

A, also B,
B

and

and

'

is

conjunctivelyunderstood, whatever is predicatedof predicated of each individually. This is the

C,' and
are

and

C,' when

in this

case

case

when

All and

Some

used

to introduce

the universal have that

and

particular propositions respectively. 1. On the Logical Meaning of All."1 We

'
"

seen

in is is

ordinary discourse

the

word
two

'All'

(as also the word

'Some')
one

ambiguous. accepted as appropriate to the

when
that I

It bears

distinct

meanings

of which

only

purposes

of Formal may

Logic. Thus,
mean

I say

'

All

these articles cost

' '

I sixpence,'

either

lot. Both
In

that I gave or paid sixpencefor each article, All is the universal In the former case, it and

sixpencefor the quantity-mark.

distributive
'

the

statement

that
an

it introduces

are

in

meaning.

The

sentence

is

propositionin strict
the
to

form. logical
All
'

the latter case,

quantity-mark in Formal Logic the

form,
and will

and meaning is collective, For the strictly logicalsense.

the
statement

is not

needs
as a

to

be reduced

of purposes strict logical

'

Singular Proposition: This collection of articles is a lot that costs sixpence.' the distributive and between The simple test for discriminating
then
appear

the

collective the

'

all

'

is to

substitute statement

'

each
is

of

'

for

'

and all,'

see

whether
if it

sense

of the

thereby affected.

If the

substitution

does, we
hide

is distributive ; does not alter the sense, the proposition which is not in are dealingwith a collective statement

strict

form. logical
the

For
'

instance, in the
cannot

sentence

'

All these
'

trees

here
is

view
sense.

we

read the
'

'

each

of

'

for

all

'

without
It

destroyingthe
a

Therefore

statement

is collective.

SingularPropositionin disguise. the Logical Meaning of Some' 2. On and the Import of the Particular Proposition qua The Particular. distinction between the and universal the particular proposition coincides, as we have with the distinction between a proposition with a seen,
"

CHAP.

XVII.]

THE

FORMAL

CATEGORICAL

155

distributed

undistributed an subject and a proposition with bears in the par Some subject. The logicalmeaning which which I and 0 must, therefore, be that ticular propositions appro As we undistributedness. of the characteristic priatelyexpresses
' '

have

seen,

term

is undistributed

when whole
an

there
extent

is

no

reference,
class for
term

either
which

expressed or
it stands.

implied, to
This

the

of the

definition of

undistributed

is not

arbitrary. It
Inference.
so

is the
term

meaning

dictated

by

the

true

interests

of
in its

is of interest

for purposes

of inference

just
take

state or else logically imply what we definitely The primary essential here is to to be. extensity-reference with in any certainty between given case, to distinguish

far

as

we

be able, what the is

use

stated and
of the words

what
'

is not, and

distributed

'

it is this very distinction which ' above and as undistributed,' of

'

defined,
'

enables
The

us

to express.

true

logicalmeaning
we

Some

'

in its relation

to

All.' a

meaning
As

which

may

call the

undistributed

is therefore

correctlyexpressed in
inferior

regards the
If
we are

limit, the
Socrates
But
we are

meaning of the word, not the phrase statedly all.' at appropriate phrase is one
' '

least.'
citizen Athenian with

told that
we was

was

wise, and
conclude
is that

that
at

he

was one

of Athens, citizen

entitled to
this do
to
'

least

wise.

a proposition essentially

undistributed
were
'

subject,for
Hence,
not

not

state

that

all Athenian
cases we as see

citizens
'

wise. be

in order for
'

include

such

this,
that

Some
one

must

able to stand

one

and at least,' proper Some is

' '

'

at

least,but
'

statedlyall

is the

logical equivalent
we

of the word

Some.'

From

this

meaning logical strictly

that of
'

of

'

must

other meanings distinguish is the popular use There (i.) less any rate, yet considerably of this thus
use

the word

capable of
sense

carefully bearing :
'

Some
all.'

in the The

of

few

at

than

of the

word

is that, if the
are

there interpreted,
'

many

disadvantage logical quantity-mark is particular be then which can propositions

'

neither

One S at universal. Thus, nor particular not would P's and Very nearly all the S's are were propositionsif this popular meaning of Some they certainlyare not universal. This, of course, If it wishes consciousness. to the practical difficulty
' ' '
'

least be

is

P,'

particular adopted, and

presents
no

to

talk about
'

one

at

it says 'least,'
'

'

one

at least

'

; if it desires

to refer to to

nearly

it all,'
to

says

nearly all.'

It is

and making them that we aim at regulate to the interests, for instance, of relevant to our strictly purpose inference. logical which That (ii.) Secondly, there is the exclusive use of 'Some.' is open, in have called the strictly we meaning of Some logical the opinion of a certain school, to a fundamental objection. It the defect of not allowing our other interpretations shares with
"

only when we wish minimizing distinctions

and generalize

'

'

156

THE
to be

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. ii.

be sufficiently explicit.A man reasonably" may he does not to point out what challengedto explainwhy he prefers and exclusively what he does intend state instead of statingclearly to say. as Granting that a proposition, Formally used, expresses of meaning, would it not be better to nothing beyond a statement
statements

render
that there
one

'

Some

S's

are a

P's

'

as

follows
that
not

'

What

mean are

to

state

is

S at least is
no

P, but
as

all of the S's

P's.'
is not
'

Here

is
not

no reticence,
'

inscrutable reference to what exclusive

'

stated.

Why
of
'

define
'

Some'

of

and 'All,'
'

'All

as

exclusive
'

Some
'

the is known of Some ex as proposed interpretation at is clusive Some here taken as equivalentto one meaning. to the least,but not all,' prefer to keep more explicitly or, if we statement-view of Import, one at least,but statedlynot all.' The essential objection of Some to this exclusive interpretation is that it reduces the distinction between the I and 0 propositions difference of emphasis. If we state that one S is a P, but to a mere that not all S's are P's,we that some S's are-not P's. also stating are The fourfold scheme reduces to a threefold scheme, includingthree the confuse c"". This would types of proposition A, E, and whole scheme of logical opposition(videChapter XIX.). is also the further objection that There of Some this use
' ' ' ' ' '
"

This

'

'

cannot

cover as a

all

cases.

not,
What

rule, wish

to

If I say ' Some imply that some

cats cats

are

fond

are-not
one are

I do of fish,' fond of fish.

cat at

the statement of fish.

is made.

does

is fond
no

As to the

invariablyimply questionwhether

is that all cats

least

fond

of fish

statement

of the There is,further, an indefinite or semi-indefinite use (iii.) word still suggested as the correct in many use logicaltreatises. is defined as meaning According to this interpretation Some Some at least, it may be all.' at least, one or one possiblyall,' S's are P could then be paraphrased thus : I state the predicate P of at least one S's it holds good : S, but I do not state of how many it may hold good of all of them.'' Thus, when of your I say I saw some include friends at the gatheringyesterday,' the to I may mean possi I am of all the whom friends of the to seen bility my having person speaking. But This interpretationof has a plausible some appearance. this plausibility is reallyderived from a confusion of the positive not be all with the negative limitation expression it may the inconvenience statedlyall ; and it shares with other renderings of leaving certain types of proposition not accounted for either as human universal. Some as particular or Thus, beings are human children cannot be interpreted as beings, meaning Some incom is it children.' be all Some possibly all,are may
' ' ' '
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

...

patible with
.
.

'

Some

but not

statedlyall

'

Some the other hand, all.' but not is compatible with Some but
not all.'

On

'

'

CHAP.

XVII.]
'

THE

FORMAL
that all human

CATEGORICAL

157

it is open beings are children,' statement else to complete my by saying : But I do one to some human that some state beings are not children.' The rendering it may be all lacks the comprehensivenessof the at least one but not statedly all.' rendering one at least The kind. fundamental of a more But there are other objections reading possibly all does not truly interpret the meaning of term. the undistributed By unduly emphasizing the indefinite character it fails to grasp the true logical some import of the word is indefinite of the particular proposition. It is quite true that than is the word label for the I and 0 propositions par a better definiteness ticular.' For as popularly used, implies a particular,' individual.' when we of a positive speak of this particular kind, as when to particulars, So, again,we talk of reasoning from particulars instance to from one that in each case we given mean we argue need a stillbetter label which should convey But we really another. universal makes definite idea that the proposition no the negatively indefinitevalue in For there is certainly no statement. logical P's the S's all that of the are ness.' possibility Merely to suggest If I say I don't state
'

'

'

...

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

is to There

make is
no

statement

that

lias

no

inferential

value

whatsoever.

in a mere possibility. vitality logical decisive against The reasons given above are perhaps sufficiently But the crucial objection in its indefinite sense. Some the use of of the word arises out of the implications possibly.' The phrase limitation of subjective either indicate a Some, possiblyall may One at least, all for aught I it means in which case certainty, of knowledge, its meaning definite limitation know,' or else a more But both these read all.'* not assuredly then being One at least, inadmissible on the view we Some are entirely ings of the word term, have adopted as to the import not only of the undistributed be too emphatically but of a Formal Logic generally. It cannot of Logic treatment Formal in stated that in Formal Logic i.e., a with not questions of truth or we are directlyconcerned any with the limitations of opinion, or or even knowledge or ignorance, aim of Logic is to analyse intimate of any of these. No doubt a more with is concerned knowledge and the scientific reasoning which which is abstractly with truth ; but Formal Logic is a propaedeutic reference to with consistencyof reasoning without concerned any to the of the accepted premisses, or the truth the falsehood or In Formal Logic we knowledge or the ignorance of the reasoner.
'

'

'

"

'

'

'

'

'

"

"

are

concerned
is stated

not

with

what

is, or

with

what

is known,

but

with

what

business is
statement.

or by logicalimplication. Our explicitly to develop not knowledge or opinion, but significant the Formal Doubtless logicianmay have to deal with

either

The

word

iieaningmore
well.

knowedly than directly

'

'

or

the

would perhaps knownly but might word assuredly,'

' '

'

have not

expressed
have sounded

the
so

158

THE

PROBLEM also with

OF

LOGIC

[V. ii.

statements

about

truth,as

statements

concerning know

with the truth of statements possibility ; but from the knowledge, ignorance,certainty, or or possibility which those statements spring he has nothing at all to do. He develops the meaning of statements, and notes their limitations of not known, or meaning. His business is not with what is known is stated. as but simply with what Thus, for him the particular the state opposed to the universal quantity-mark indicates never limitation statement. but ment of a of a limitation, always the and ledge, certainty, with

of the Justification
Mr.

'

Extensive

'

View

of Import.

Joseph has
the crucial
one

import
sion

brought against the conception of extensive that cannot we predicateof the exten objection
'

of

term

the extension

of another.'*
we

But

what

does

this

It is true that ? mean precisely that taken S's, distributively, they if the word
'

cannot

predicate of all the

all

'

'

'

or

some

of them, all the P's, or some are in the predicateis used collectively.

Nor (coll.).' if can we (distr.) by this say is meant P's).' But we can Every S is every P (or each of some be Every S is a P,' and the predicateof this proposition may say The term. undistributed meaning is regarded as a genuinely each of all the S's is a P.' Evidently the Sx and S2 and S3 the S's,but whether P's must be at least as numerous as they out that If to wish state number them or not we do not state. we they of the compound propo do, we may do so unambiguously by means We
cannot
' All S's (distr.) are all,or some, say ' All S's (distr.) are all,or some, P's

P's

'

'

'

'

'

'

"

"

sition
we

'

Every
to
can

S is

P,

and the

each of
two
a

some

wish

state

that

point,we say employ the simple form

each of all the P's with
nor statedly

''EveryS is
'

P,

groups and

P's is-not any S.' And if exactly coincide point for

P is
we are an

Every
S.
of

every S is a P '

S.'
not

When

we

identifying

an

The

to implicitly

each
we see

reference,therefore,is neither all the P's, and hence the predicate

' '

is undistributed.
'

Every S is a P predicaterepresent the undistributedness logically may in the particular It may term. do so with equal appropriateness S's is a P.' Here again the proposition proposition Each of some does not imply that each of all the P's is an S. If we desire to dis tribute the predicateterm, we the compound proposition use can
Thus that the mark
a

in

'

of the

'

'

Each

of

P, and each negative propositions,for E we

of
some a

S's is

of all P's is

an

S.'
P.'
no

In

the any Here

case

have

'

Every

S is-not

P,'
the

and
'

0 is
'

equivalentto
a

'

Each

of

some

any

is

mark

of distributedness.

S's is-not any state that We

one

of the

S's referred to is any single of all the P's. one It follows from the above that there is a sense
*
'

in which
202.

we

can

An

Introduction

to

Logic,'ch. ix., p.

160 words
and
'

THE

PROBLEM
'

OF

LOGIC between

[V.

ii.

All

'

and

'

Some

and

the confusion

the distributive for

collective
and the

uses

of these

marks

supply ample opportunity

criticism Into

reconstruction.

to complexitiesof this discussion we do not propose We enter. content ourselves with connecting the doctrine of a with the fourfold scheme as we have adopted it, quantified predicate and considering the logical and importance of the eight significance fold scheme from this single point of view. In the firstplace, the conception of a quantified predicateappears be to to reasonable. The us predicate is perfectly quantified indeed already present in the fourfold scheme under the guise of the distributed and undistributed predicate-term. Hence, assuming do the undistributed as we Some,' and reading meaning of the word both subject and predicateterms in extension, we hold that there is obviously no difference between the A, I, E, and 0 of the quanti fied scheme and the corresponding propositionsof the fourfold
'

scheme. Our sole criticism

is that

of the

Hamiltonian

scheme

when

interpreted
77,
o"

in this way

the four additional have

U, Y, propositions,
is is

are

superfluous.
proposition,as compound proposition
elements
"

The

we
'

already seen,
and
All P

equivalentto
S,' of which
A

the

All

S is P
is

the

are

A Y

propositions.
proposition
be

Again, the
All P is S.'

equivalent to

the

proposition
We
some

disposed of in a similar way. diagrammatically represent the rj proposition No S is

TI proposition may
'
"

The

may P '
"

as

follows

But

if

we

exchange the S and

the

in these

diagrams, we

obtain

the

diagrams of

0 proposition :

'

No

S is

some
o"

P
if

'

in fact,identical is, intend

with

'

Some the

P is

no we

S.' intend
of the

As
to

for the

it cannot proposition,
we

be denied
that

whatever

state.

Even

to

state

extension

CHAP.

XVIII.]

REDUCTION
with
a

OF
that

CATEGORICALS
of

161

class S

exactly coincides
that certain other

P,

still we

evidentlycannot
are

deny
with

the statement
a

certain

number

of S's

not

coincident

number

of P's.
rj, w,

Thus, of the four propositions U, Y,

U Y is reducible is reducible
to two to
an

A A

propositions,
proposition,

rj is reducible to and is truistic, ""

0,
therefore useless.*

CHAPTER
V. THE (iii.) REDUCTION STRICT OF

XVIII
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS TO

LOGICAL

FORM.

to strict logical form, our first care must reducing a proposition extensive statement the an as interpret proposition. given the predicative is naturallyread on view, to the Thus, if S is P effect that the objects indicated by S possess the attribute P, it be indicated to read must so as as follows : 'The objects reinterpreted, by S are objects which possess the attribute P.' In the case of abstract propositions(statements, that is, with an abstract term will be abstract, the objectindicated by the subject-term as subject)

IN

be to

'

'

'

and

the

correct

interpretationwill

be

somewhat
'

as

follows

'

The

objectindicated

objectindicated by the term S is identified with an abstract by the term P.' Thus, Mercy is twice blest may be interpreted as Mercy is a twice-blest virtue.' It will then rank undis universal distributed subject and affirmative with as a tributed predicate. The from the point no difficulty singularpropositionneed cause of view we have seen, it is but the here considering. For, as we are form of the universal means limiting proposition. This S is P All objects this S indicated indicated by the term are objects by
abstract
' '
'

'

'

"

"

the

term

P.'

As

matter to
one

of fact,

'

this

S,' like
while The

restricts the is

extension

object, so that,
distributed.

name, proper the proposition

its subject-termis singular,

singularproposi
not

ranks, therefore, as a universal. ticular proposition for another reason. at least,' the and least is not at one
'

tion

It could For
same as
'

rank
'

as

a
'

par
one
'

'

some
'

means

'

one.' S's

Hence
are

This

S is P
*

'

could
one

not

be

brought

under

the form

Some

P's,'for

In

the S and

where

vidual)the use -.such coincidence

in which it might seem case possiblenot to accept w (namely, indi and the same coincide, and both refer to one extensionally wished to state be inappropriate. If we of the proposition would should employ a singularproposition. we

162

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. iii.

the latter form

impliesthat one S at least is P, and this rendering proposition. goes beyond the meaning of the singular is understood Once a proposition the main rules for extensively, form may be briefly reduction to strict logical formulated. into strict logical form means, Putting a categorical proposition it in four the of we one forms, A, E, I, 0. typical may say, expressing
This involves
1.
:

2.

Finding which is the true logical subjectand which the logical predicate. the Giving subject its correct quantity-mark,either
'

true

'

All

'

or

Some.'
the

3.

Giving
'

its proposition

correct

quality-mark,either
is

'

is

'

or

is-not.' of these
We

The

second

however, requisites,
seen

subjectto
purposes
as a

an

important
a

modification. treatment, the

have
'

that, for the

'

of

Formal Con

Singular Proposition ranks

A
'

universal.

sequentlywe have a singular form of the typically representedby This S is a P.'

We
sition
"

the form proposition,

of the A propo

have, then,

as

the two

forms recognized

1. 2. A

'

All the S's S

are

where P's,'

'All

'

is understood

distributively.

'

is a P.' (singular)

difficulty frequently arises from the fact that propositions in collective meaning are presented in the ordinary distributive form. All the S's are Thus, a sentence given to us in the form be incorrectly P's we know, is expressed. A proposition, may find distributive if,on putting each of in the place of we all,'
' ' ' ' '

that

the

sense

remains

unaffected.

The

distributive
'

use

of

'

all

'

being accepted as its correct Formal use, the word whenever retained, in the logically stated proposition,
tution the

all

'

should

be

this substi

changes and must not therefore collectively, sense, when this is stated in logical form. be retained in the proposition must In its place we collective expressionwith a singular use a import,* so that the elaborated proposition will take the form is a P S (singular) instead of All the S's are P's '; the essential defect of the latter expressionin such a case being that it has
not
sense.

does

alter all
'

the

But

if the

substitution

then

'

is used

'

'

'

regiment,'which refer to a collection of This objectsqua aggregate,may be either singularor general. Such terms as is a The Light Brigade are singular collectives. Regiment regiment or are always used generalcollective. Collective terms, whether singularor general, with regard to the individuals of the group or kind of group specified. collectively kinds But general collectives are used with regard to the various disjunctively classes which constitute their denotation. or Family indicates the members but it denotes the various kinds of family disjunctively.A family collectively, be predicated is large or small, rich or poor. The term family may correctly of each of these types taken apart from the rest.
*

Collective
'

terms,

like

'

family

'

'

or

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

CHAP.

XVIIL]

REDUCTION but collective

collective when
so

OF

CATEGORICALS

163

distributive form
also to may
some

propositionswhich
in
a

be

used of

meaning. This distinction applies are apparentlyparticular. Some as meaning, for instance, a sense,
' ' '

handful

';and,
the
a

quantity supersededby
'

in

used, it should not appear proposition logically expressed, but collective expression. Thus,
choke
into is
a mass

as

mark

of
be

should

All these weeds

the flower-bed

'

should
'

be transformed
This
'

mass

of weeds

that

chokes

the flower-bed.'
'

So also
an

to

is only apparently soothingwords appeased him I proposition, the is here used for Reduced some collectively. the would run : form, proposition proper logical
' '
'

Some

of soothingwords string

is

thing that appeased him.'

is caused refer to a difficulty by propositions which but that and not do therefore individual, single individual, specify not are singularin the sense required to justifythe use of the form. are : singular Examples of such propositions
'

Further

A A An

friend of mine

has

gone occurred

abroad.'
in Jamaica.' of this

'

ship was

on

fire.'

'

earthquake had
of

method legitimate

to utilizex, the usual

'

reducing sentences symbol for the unknown

I call X is
a

type

would

be
:

as quantity,

follows

The

friend whom

'

The
The

'

ship X is a ship that was as earthquake specified

in Jamaica.'

person who fire.' on is

an

has gone that had

abroad.' occurred

event

In arguments this substitution would perhaps be convenient. The third of the requisites also needs of strict reduction
words of comment. If
' '

some

The

quality-markmay
' ' ' '

take

any
'

one

of several
'

forms.

it may be affirmative, am,' or negative, am-not,' art-not,' is-not,' Thou art We a a man,' are woman,'
'

are.' art,' is,'or I are-not.' Thus,

'

If
am

'

human

beings,' may

be

regardedas reduced propositions. They are all universal affirmatives. It is important that the quality-mark should be confused not with the tense-mark. The the is quality-mark copula-mark, and has a strictly Distinctions between logical significance. present, and Thus and future to the were past, were belong predicate. and will not not be not,' will be are as strictly permissible
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

copula-marks.

Example.
"

'

The

Drake

was

in harbour.

She

is

splendid vessel,
11"2

and

will be the Admiral's

flagship.'

164

THE
'

PROBLEM
The in

OF

LOGIC
vessel which The

[V. iii.
at the time
we

are

Form Strict Logical speaking about

: was

Drake

is

harbour.

Drake

is

vessel. Where of these

from

The the

Drake

is

vessel destined
is

to be the Admiral's

splendid flagship.'

argument presupposes
so

the future tense, the

that there

no

throughout either the past or danger of confusion, disregard

to
owes

requirements is apt logical

flintiest may

pass

without
to

protest, even
the

logician. Logic
waive its claims

much

genius of

language,and
but
or

without lead up

inconsistency,so long
to any

upon the as

form not only graciously, yieldingdoes not involve

ambiguity

or

contradiction.

On

the Reduction

of Certain Ambiguous Expressions.

characteristic

are Any is an ambiguous expression. The following meanings :

Any Affirmatively
'

'

'
=
=

'

every.'
that
'

Any

man are
'

will tell you

persons any
. .

to reduces,therefore, to
'

'

All
'

men

NegativelyNot
'
=

'=
.

'

competent no ';or else,

tell you
not

that.'
'=
'

any

not

every

some

not.'
'

Thus
'

I have
no

not

any

money

reduces

to

'

am

person

with

money.'
' '

And
'

Any

will not suffice reduces to excuses will suffice i.e., Some

excuse
' '
"

Not

every

excuse

are-not

adequate

excuses.' N.B.
"

In
'

questions, Any
you
' '
=

'

'=

'

Some.' about
you ?'

E.g.,
'

Have
are are

any

coppers

A A

few few few

Some
'
= '

are.' Some
'

'

not

are-not.'
to
'

Thus

'

were

present reduces
'

Some

persons

are

persons

who
'

were

present.'
...

All

are
'

not

is
. .

ambiguous.
are-not.'
.

It may The all

...

mean

either 'All

...

are-not

'

or

Some
...

latter
are

gives
'
=

the
.

natural
. .

meaning ; for 'All not.' It is with the

we

are

not

'
=

'

Not

'

Some

are-

have

used P's.'
'

the

that express object of avoiding this ambiguity ' All S's E the of proposition, hyphen in the case

are-not

E.g.,
= =

All Not

men

are men

not
are

honest honest say

who
who
are
'

say say

that that

'

all
men

they are.' they are.'

honest puns

'

Some
'

who pun

they
a

honest

are-not

men.'
are-

So
not

again, Every

is not

joke reduces

to

'

Some

jokes.'

CHAP.

XVIIL]

REDUCTION

OF

CATEGORICALS

165

In many
is kind

cases we

the

where quantity-mark is lacking altogether have then

to

it

needed, and
are

and
rules

in
:

Propositions of this known as Indesignate or Pre-indesignate Propositions; we guide ourselves by the followingreducing them may
insert it.

it is read Indesignate Proposition is universal if, when according to the predicative view, the predicate is found to be else a property of the connotation, element or furnishing some implied in the definition of the subject ; for then P belongs to S as 1. An

such.*

Examples : Angles in
' '

right angles.' ruminants.' is here Cows of cow are (The connotation mark assumed the to include, explicitlyor implicitly, ruminant.' )f
a are
' ' '

semicircle

2. If P is

is obviously problematic property of S, the proposition

particular. Examples
' '

: are are

Frenchmen
Italians
to

vivacious.'

musical.'
will be
:

Reduced
'

logicalform, these
are are

Some Some the

Frenchmen
Italians
'

vivacious

individuals.'

'

musical

individuals.'
'

Here

Some

'

is, of

course,

be indesignate form would is a mark of particularity. 3. If P is

a

most '; otherwise the equal to positively misleading. Still, most

'

'

characteristic
as

property,
There have is

the
no

naturally treated our supposing that

our

universal.
all ruminants the

proposition is most logicalnecessity for

feet ; but, so is invariably far
accom as

divided
the

experience goes,
the

chewing of
Hence feet
'

cud

panied by
'

divided
have

foot. divided

the

proposition

Ruminants

would
'

appropriately reduce
All ruminants
are

into

creatures

with

divided

feet.'

term

Of. Welton, 'A Manual indefinite judgement

'

t
the

The

connotation it

meaning which tively indeterminate

serves

to render

more

the Mr. Joseph, uses of Logic,' vol. i., pp. 169-171. to Logic,'ch. viii.,p. 156). ('An Introduction of the subject-term in this proposition is, of course, not actually bears in the proposition. This meaning is a rela the predication of the term ruminant meaning which determinate (videp. 121).
'

'

'

166

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. iii.

Exclusive

and

ExceptivePropositions.
a

An of
a

denies proposition class. specified exclusive

'
"

of all save predicate

the members

Example.
Thus
with
a

None

but

the free
persons

can

obey.'
persons

'
=

All not-free

are-not

who
an

can

obey.'

the

equivalentof logical
as

the exclusive is

proposition

subject. affirms the predicateof the members of exceptive proposition whole class with the exceptionof those constituting a certain part negative term
An

of it.

Example

'

:
'
=

All is lost but honour All

'

'

possessionsother than honour A proposition with sions an i.e., as subject.

"

are a

lost posses

negative term
strict

With

regard
we
'

to the may

reduction

of exclusive
the

form, logical

provisionally adopt
are

to propositions rule : following

are

Express
as or

Only S's
'

P's

'

'

or

S's alone
P's
'

P's

'

E
as
'
"

All not-S's are-not

'

(preferably),
'

A:

All P's

are

S's.'

Example.

Only drakes
All
'

'
=

or

All

curly-tailed tailed creatures,' not-drakes are-not curlycreatures drakes.' are curly-tailed

are

E. A.
'

important to does not imply that

are wear wearers

It is

note
'

that
are

the

statement

'

all S's

P's.'

Granted

Only S's are P's that only heroes

'

of the Victoria Cross,'it does not

' '

follow that

all heroes

it. in which Some is used in its exclusive particular proposition is not strictly exclusive accordingto the definition given above, is different from that

The
sense

and
to

its reduction which the

of the exclusive

universal

resolves itself, in fact, into two for instance,the proposition :

'

given definition alone, in strictness,applies. It independent propositions. Take, promise keep their word.'
' ' ' ' '

Some
the

only who

function of the word coincides logical only precisely with that of the expression not all not.' The i.e., some their Some who word, propositiontherefore means promise keep
"

Here

'

but

some
'

do not Some Some

'
"

i.e.: of
of

/I.
12.

makers makers

'

promises are breakers of promises.' I. 0. promises are-not breakers of promises.'

inde Propositionswhich are thus analysableinto two or more called Exponible Propositions. pendent propositions are technically

168
'

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
!'
'

[V. iii.
To
be
a

an

I were Optative. Would objectof my desire.' the Imperative. Beware

"

cassowary

cassowary

is

'

"

Jabberwock

!'
"

'

The

Jabberwock

is

creature

to be avoided.'
"

Question. 'Is thy servant (Rhetorical) is-not a dog.'

'

dog ?'='Thy
I
am

servant

Am

not

I thine

ass

?'

'

thine ass.'

with indicative implicationshave negative force Interrogatives force if in negativeform. if they are in positive form, positive Exclamation.
'
"

Just

place for a Snark !' This place is a promising spot for snarks.' To the Bell the crew man's exclamation might have re plied: We don't believe it !' In that case taken the remark have as a they would
the
=

'

'

statement

that
have

had

no

sufficient
it
as a

ground.

This would

stamped

Proposition.

On

the Reduction Hints

on

of Given
what
is

Sentences

to Strict
'

LogicalForm.
'

Practical

implied by
'

strict

form logical

(a) As regards quantity and quality. and not Use all,' every,' each
' '

Use Use

'all 'no
'

are-not
...

'

for the all

...

any.' negative universal,and

or

'

'

not

'
...

'

are

or

are
'

not.'
'

some,' and

not

'

several

or

(b) As

regards the
terms.

constitution

of

many,' etc. subject and

predicate

These

that have a meaning in them expressions selves,and they should also admit naturallyof being of some (except in the case by all or qualified things,' Singular Propositions) e.g., all glittering not all that glitters.'

should

be

'

'

'

'

'

"

'

in such Examples. Express each of the following sentences form as reproduces most nearly the natural meaning (strict) logical
"

of the sentence 1. Not

=

all who Some

The

are

called

are

chosen.
persons him.
a

persons sum-total him.

called are-not
can save

chosen. force that

0.

2. Not
=

all your
save

efforts

of your

efforts is-not

can

E.

3. All
=

4.

kings are not wise. Some kings are-not Every bullet does not
=

wise kill.

persons.

0. 0.

Some

bullets are-not

fatal missiles.

CHAP.

XVIIL]
5. Few
=

REDUCTION succeed number

OF
in life.

CATEGORICALS

169

men

The

of

men

who

succeed in lifeis-not
correct. I

large

number.*
6. All my
"

guesses number The

but

two

were

of guesses which diminished the total number

is Diana of the of the man's

correctlymade
two.

is A.

by

7. Great
=

Diana

Ephesians. Ephesians is a great goddess.

the noblest work is the

A.

8. An
=

honest Honest
envies
=

manhood

of God. of God. noblest work

has
are none

A.

9. He

others' wealth

who

himself.
envious of A.

A11

non-wealthy

persons this

persons

others' wealth.
10.

Only
=

doctors

understand
this

subject.
persons able to

A11

non-doctors

are-not

under

stand
11. The
=

subject.
are

more,

the merrier. mirth-increasers. A.

A11 has

new-comers no

12. He
=

home

but

Athens.
are-not
vast

All few

13. A
=

placesoutside of Athens Greeks vanquished the

mere

homes

for him.

E.

handful
vast

of Greeks
army

of Darius. army is the force that

van

quishedthe
14. A
=

of Darius.

A.
A.

little knowledge is A

smatteringof
Romans
Roman

15.

The
=

dangerous thing. knowledge is a dangerous tiling. conquered the Carthaginians.

a

The

power

is

power

that

conquered the
A.

16.

Carthaginians. The angles of a triangleare equivalent to two right angles. is a quantum The of the angles of a triangle sum equal to two rightangles.
=

A.

17. Two
=

blacks All

won't

make

white.

combinations possible

of two

blacks are-not

com

18.

19.

20.

producing whiteness. My friend plays golf. My friend is a golfer. availed any Not all the gallantefforts of the veterans thing. is-not fighting of the veterans The gallantfighting that availed anything. sticks. Few dogs are not fond of fetching (Force Affirmative) All dogs not fond of fetchingsticks are exceptional dogs.
binations
=
=

E.

A.

A.
be

* is negative in meaning, As the original proposition sympathetically negative.

the

form logical

must

170
21. A few

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. iii.

22.

dogs are fond of cats. Some dogs are fond of cats. statesmen. are Only a few politicians (Exponible) and statesmen Some politicians are
t=
"

I.

some

politicians
3".

are-not

statesmen.

23.

Only ignorantpersons hold such opinions. (Exclusive) are-not A11 non-ignorant persons persons such opinions.
=

holding
E.

Or"
=

A11

persons
not

holding

such

opinions

are

ignorant
A.

persons. 24.

Some

falsehoods. incapableof telling (Force Affirmative) Some are quite capable of telling persons persons
men are

falsehoods.
25.

I.

Scotchmen Is
' '

are

level-headed.
'

level-headed Scotchman
'

part of the
?
'

connotation

of

Obviously not, unless by Scotchman mean we typical Scotch be It to man.' a problematic pro appears
' '

perty.
"

We
: are

therefore

have

as

the

strict

form logical Some be

=

Scotchmen
not
to

level-headed
is the

persons.

I.

26. To

or

be, that

Whether
I must

life is worth
answer.

question. livingor not is the question

A.

27.

Scarcely anyone
=

got through.
of persons who

The

number
not

passed is

very

small
A.

number.
28.

Men
=

are

what

The

manhood

they were. of to-day is-not manhood

a

as

it used E.

to be.

29.

The

side and able. The

an

diagonalof

square

are

incommensur

ratio

of the side of

square

to its

diagonal is
A. and
ex

incommensurable

ratio.
are

30. The

only interested
aminers.
A11

persons

candidates either

interested brother's

persons

are

candidates

or

examiners. 31. Am
I my

A.

keeper ? (Rhetorical question implying negative ment. The logical subject here is guardianship of my brother.')
my

state
'

The

Looking after

brother is-not my

business.

E.

CHAP.

XVIII.]
32. Fain
=

REDUCTION

OF
that
a

CATEGORICALS
I fear to fall. checked

171

would

climb, but
is

yiy wish to climb of falling.

(N.B."
'

wish

only by
of
'

my

fear
A.

only.') renderingsare : All my impulses to climb are impulses inhibited fear of falling. by the single
But has the force

'

Other

alternative

A.

Or"
=

33.

All

is the only thing which prevents My fear of falling from me climbing. not travellers were the provided with pass

A.

ports.
"

Some

travellers who

in
were

the

company

are-not specified

travellers 34. All but

=

Noah

All persons hold are

are

provided with passports. drowned. and his family were who not of his house of Noah's were day
persons who
were

O.

drowned.

A.

35. Afflictions
=

often

salutary.
of affliction
are

Some
ences.

visitations

salutary experi
I.

36. All these

=

claims upon time overpower me. my is time multitude of claims This upon my that overwhelms me.

burden
A

CHAPTER
V.

XIX.
OF

(iv.)THE
to

OPPOSITION

PROPOSITIONS.

are logically opposed propositions differ in they predicate, when, having quan From this point and in both in or quality. quantity quality, tity, A, E, I, and of view the relation between any two of the propositions 0 is treated as an Opposition. and arbitrary, The definition, though convenient, is superficial in the an term and it necessitates entirely Opposition using

IT is

customary

say

that two

the

same

subject and

'

'

technical
and
'

sense,
men

for the
are

relation
'

between

'

All

men

are

mortals

'

Some
an

mortals

is,according to

the definition

given

above,
A
to

opposition.
sounder method
is to and guide ourselves by principle,

much

in oppositiononly when they violate are propositions this Where the requirement of non-contradiction. requirement and subcontraries the so-called subalterns,' is respected, in as of opposition, and the relation ceases we to be one suitably may but of not Suband Subalternation, speak of Subcontrariety

hold that

'

'

'

172

THE

PROBLEM
of Subaltern

OF

LOGIC

contrary Opposition or
forms of

Opposition.* The

only

two

as genuine opposition between propositions are known and Contradictory Opposition Contrary Opposition respectively. They are relations between genuine opposites,because in each have cannot case we a pair of propositions juxtaposed which If b e them is entertained of one logically accepted,the together. other must be rejected. We to the more minute consideration of the four proceed now

propositions,A, E, I, 0,
them
we

in

respect of those
as

relations between
relations

which

are

customarilyknown
are

have

to deal with

the

Oppositions. The : following

Fs.
P's.

(a) Contradictory Opposition: A. All S's are Fs. )(f 0. Some S's are-not E. All S's are-not P's. )( I. Some S's are
: (6)Subcontrariety

I. Some

S's

are

P's. )( 0. Some

S's are-not
are-not P's.

Fs.

: (c) Contrary Opposition A. All S's are P's. )( E. All S's

(d) Subalternation
A. E. All S's
are

Fs.

All S's are-not

)( I. Some S's P's. )( 0. Some

known
and
as

are

P's.
Fs. A is

S's are-not

These

last two

pairs are
of

Subalterns.

called the Subalternans

E is the subalternans

of I, and

I the subalternate 0 the subalternate be

of

of A. of E.

usually Similarly,

0,

The
in what

above-named
is known
as

relations may the

Square

diagrammaticallyrepresented Opposition:

?'

S?i

/
Sub-contraries
"

Logic,'chap, ix., p. 207, footnote)draws this point : For some is only verbally are to Pri. At the Mr. Joseph not time B., 636, some are xv. same 27). (Anal. opposed holds that if subcontraries not are opposed,they are anyhow contrasted, and that may their continued inclusion forms of opposition.' justify among We the t adopt grammatical sign )( as signifyingany kind of so-called Opposition.
to

Mr.

Joseph ('An

Introduction
own
'

attention

to Aristotle's

statement
'

'

on

'

'

CHAP.

XIX.]

OPPOSITION

OF

PROPOSITIONS

173

Contradictory Opposition.
The
the

Rules

or

formulse
:

of ContradictoryOppositionare identical with already given (p. 98) for the Principleof Non-Con
Laws

tradiction
Rule

1. Contradictories

cannot

both

be be

Rule 2. Contradictories cannot

These ultimate

both

accepted. rejected.
of
'

be rules cannot themselves. than

lies in
its

proved by
But
sense

means

more principles

they
of the

admit
term

of the

most

cogent

in another proof possible,

proof.'

If the

proof

of Contra then the Rules indispensableness, a hilt, if For they do not dictory Opposition may be proved to the it becomes and such there is hold good, no thing as consistency,

of

law

unreasonable
these be laws

to think

at all.

Moreover,
The the

the

very
'

attempt

to

deny
can

refutes

itself.
'

statement

Contradictories

accepted together
may

impliesthat

contradictory of

this very

accepted. Finally,as we have already of Thought, the Principle of Non-contradiction being a Law seen, to violate it is absolutely impossible. To have succeeded in doing would be to have thought the unthinkable. so form S is P,' its contra If a proposition is stated in the general Not (S is P).' Some S is P be stated in the form or dictory may contradiction-formula. tins the o f in is needed interpretation care the denial is directed for instance, whenever It is misinterpreted, takes for some assumption which the proposition S is P upon itself. instead of being directed upon the proposition granted, that Japan's President is Thus, the denial of the statement revered' with the assertion that identified be by his people cannot For this simply denies The ruler of Japan is not its president,' the implicit ; by a president assumption that Japan is represented it does not deny the given proposition. So, again, The Mikado the Japanese Republic is not is tlie^PresTdent"of expressed by that the realm of Japan is not a presidency. This denies, asserting but an not the proposition assumption which the statement itself,
statement

itself be

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

has taken The

for

granted.
'

denial of
'

S is P
'

'

must not

then

itselfbe
But

statement

the relation the

not

of S to P, and
S is P

the denial of

some

assumption
on
'

concerning which

assertion

presupposes.
that the

insistence

this should S is P
'

be carried to the
'

that point of asserting

to

the denial of
'

is

simply
of the Those

S is-not P,' and

the clumsier form

'

Not the

(S is

P)

'

may

therefore

give
who

way
'

form

S is-not

P,' as
to

typicalform
the

denial of

S is P.'
this

support

as proposition
'

equivalence appear of all the rest. representative

'

take

singular
that is

The

statement
'

Socrates is-not wise

may

be

taken

as

the

denial of

Socrates

174

THE therefore

PROBLEM the

OF

LOGIC
'

[V. iv.

wise,' and
But

as

equivalentof
are

Not

(Socratesis wise).'
or

when

relations quantitative

involved,
can

when

the propo

* sition is indesignate, nothing but

'

confusion
'

result from

equating

Not
Let

(S is
us

P)

'

to

'

S is-not P.'
case

consider the

where

S is P
'

'

is

and take, indesignate,

vivacious.' are proposition way ' French It is surely to assert forthwith that the denial of misleading

by
men

the of illustration,

Frenchmen

are

vivacious

'

is

'

Frenchmen

are-not
' '

vivacious.'

For in

if the

then, deny indesignateproposition is here taken as particular, Frenchmen are-not Some Frenchmen Some vivacious are by ing is a mere should be mistaking what vivacious,'we subcontrary denial. oppositionfor logical S is P,' and not the Not (S is P) or We conclude, then, that is-not is declaration S the only general form which the denial P,' this denial is specified of S is P take ; and that when can logically in definite propositional form, it is a statement having the same which it denies. subjectand predicateas the proposition of the laws of Contra As regards the more specialapplication and also dictory Opposition, since A and 0 are contradictories,
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

and

I, we

see

that, in

the

case

of the first of the two

is proposition

laws, it

con

sists in

arguing that if a certain

accepted,then

another

but differing and predicate, from it proposition, having the same subject and quantity, in quality be accepted; and so, mutatis mutandis, cannot for the application of the second law of ContradictoryOpposition.

: Subcontrariety

The

Rules

: of Subcontrariety

Rule

1. Of

two

Subcontraries, if
other.

one

is

accepted,there
or

is

no

logicalground of the rejection

Rule 2. Of two be

either for the

is

acceptance

for the
must

Subcontraries,if one

the other rejected,

accepted.
1.
"

Proof of
one

Rule

To

accept the

propositionis
statement

to state all the

that S's.

S at least is

P,
'

while

In
'

acceptingI
S's
are

we

do not
P's must of I does

All the

making no state or imply either that be rejected, or

not

about that the

The

acceptance acceptance of A.
But

involve the

proposition be accepted. it must the either the rejection or

of I

Consequently

acceptance

does

not

involve
of A.

either the acceptance or the rejection of the contradictory the contradictory Therefore the acceptance of A is 0. of I does not involve of 0. either the acceptance or the rejection

Similarlyit

may

be

shown

that
or

the

acceptance

of 0

does

not

involve either the acceptance

*

the

of I. rejection

Vide

p. 165.

176

THE limited if I know of

PROBLEM
that

OF

LOGIC
But
are

[V. iv.
it is

not

one

at least will fail.

this limitation

knowledge

which

the

reading we

precisely considering

There is,therefore,a contradiction involved, to express. professes this reading, in accepting the I and 0 propositionsas true on I must the two exchange statement of together. To harmonize I must limitation (ofknowledge) for limitation of statement. adopt will and at One least of the undistributed : us reading, pass, say the question of our than that I don't say ; about all but more passing / make no statement.'
'

Contrary Opposition.
The

Rules

of Contrary Oppositionare
if contraries,
one

the

: following

Rule

1. Of two

is

accepted the other

there rejected,
or

must

be

rejected.
Rule 2. Of two

if one contraries,

is

is

no

logical

ground either for the acceptance of the other.

These rules may
this As
now

for the

rejection

be

follows as justified
be

1. Contraries

cannot

accepted together; for, supposing

then possible,

be accepted (Principle of accepted, I must Identity: vide infraon Subalternation). And, as E is accepted,0 must be accepted (ibid,}. .-.A and 0 are accepted together, also are E and I. as But this is impossible,by the Principleof Non-Contra A
is

diction.
2. It may

rejectboth contraries ; for their contradictories (which are subcontraries) may Rule 1. both be accepted. See Subcontrariety,
be

quite

consistent

to

The
to

question may
the than

be asked
of

why,
a

in

controversy, it

is

preferable

by proving its contra by proving contrary. The simple answer than its is that the contrary of a propositionis harder to prove of contradictory. But this is not all. The additional element the the strengthenedoppositionsuperinducesupon assertion which part in the refutation of the pure contradiction not only plays no statement, but may give the adversary an opening for counter he would attack which not have possessedhad the refutation taken place through contradiction simply.
attempt
refutation
statement

dictory rather

its

Subalternation.
The

followingare

the Rules

of Subalternation

Rule 1. If the universal

is accepted,the particular proposition be accepted. propositionmust also

CHAP.

XIX.]
If

OPPOSITION
A is

OF

PROPOSITIONS

If Rule

of be accepted (Principle accepted,I must Identity). E is accepted, be accepted (ibid.). 0 must

2. If the

there is no propositionis rejected, ground either for acceptingor for rejecting logical the particular proposition.
universal 2
:

Proof of Rule
The

.-.

logical ground either for the 1). acceptance or for the rejection of I (Subcontrariety, the acceptance of 0 is logically But equivalent to the of A (Contradiction). rejection the rejectionof A affords no logical ground either for the
acceptance
of 0

affords

no

acceptance
Rule 3. If the

or

for the rejectionof I.

propositionis accepted, there is no particular ground either for acceptingor for rejecting logical the universal proposition.
see

of this Rule, justification First Rule of Subcontrariety).

For
a

above,

p.

174

(Proof
universal

of the

Rule

4. If the

then is rejected, particular also be rejected. If I is

the

must

Proof
.-.

must

If
.-.

must

be accepted (Contra rejected,E must diction). be rejected(Contrariety). be accepted (Contradiction). A must 0 is rejected, be rejected(Contrariety). of

The

followingTable

Opposition will
:

serve

to

summarize

the

results of the

previous discussion

N.B. there is
"

'

Some

' =

'

One

at

all.' By least, but not statedly either for the

logical ground in question. proposition

no

acceptance or

neither for the

'

'

we

mean

of rejection

thp.t the

12

178

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. iv.

The The

Propositions. Opposition of Disjunctive

the

contradictoryof
'
...

disjunctiveproposition Either
is
'

'

or

Q
'

'

in its non-exclusive
or

form
P

Neither

nor

Q.'

When
'

tV Either Eithe:

Either

is read

its contradictoryis exclusively

nor

both
one

P and
or

Q,

or

else neither
'

Q.'

In this second Either

'

case

the

other

is contradicted

by
' '

'

both

or
'

else neither,'

According to the exclusive view, Neither P nor Q could not bf accepted as the contradictoryof Either P or Q,' since both pro the accepted statement being Boti positions could be rejected,
'

and
'

Q.'
the may
'

Again, according to
and
and have Both P and

exclusive both
be P

reading, Neither
as
'

'

nor

Q Q
w(

"

Q
nor

'

considered
or

contraries of the Either

P
or as

disjunctiveproposition
'

Either
cannot

Q.'
be

For

Neither
'

Q
'

'

both

accepted, and
to
'

yet.

already seen, larly, Either P or Q and Both P and Q cannot both be accepted, both but it may be quite consistent to reject them namely, when P is Neither the accepted statement nor Q.'
'
"

it may

be quite consistent

rejectboth.

Sim:-

'

The The

Opposition of Hypothetical^.

Scheme

of

ing

to the different

Opposition here takes different forms correspond types of Hypothetical Proposition.

(Formal).
P is necessary. of P is necessary. rejection

1.

(a)

The

ApodeicticScheme
If P If P

Hj.

If P If P

H0.
Example.
"

accepted,the is accepted,the is accepted,the is accepted,the

is If of
'

acceptance of

of Q rejection

is not

necessary. necessary.

acceptance of Q is not
P's P's P's P's
' ' '

Ha.
He. Hj.

All S's
'

are are

is
'

accepted,the acceptance
of rejection

All S's

If
'

'

All S's

are

is necessary. is accepted,the

All S's
'

are are

If
'

All S's
are

P's P's
'

is necessary. ' is accepted,the is not P's necessary.

'

of rejection

All S's
'

Either (I.e., for

All

S's
is
no

are

must

be
for

accepted, or
accepting
or

else there

ground
P's P's
are
'

either

it.) rejecting
All S's
'

H0.

If of

'

are are

is
'

accepted,the acceptance
necessary.
must
'

All S's
'

is not P's

Either (I.e.,

All

S's
no

be
for

else there is

ground

either

or rejected, acceptingor

for

it.) rejecting

CHAP.

XIX.]

OPPOSITION
Scheme Apodeiclic

OF

PROPOSITIONS

179

1.

(b) The

(Material).

Q is true. Ha. If P is true, then implicitly is false). Q is not true (i.e., He. If P is true, then implicitly If P is then it is not that true, Hj. Q is false. implied Either it is implied that Q is true, or else there is no (I.e., of Q.) implication as to the truth or falsity If P is then it is that not true, H0. implied Q is true.
Either (I.e., it is

implied
to

that

is
or

or false,

else there

is

no

as implication

the

truth

of Q.) falsity

2. The

Assertoric

Scheme. universal
:

Affirmative

If P, then
matter

in (i.e.,

that

case

it is

of ascertainable
cases we

fact

that)
in all

in all

have If

Or,

more

: briefly

Q. P, then Q.

cases

Q.
in in
no some case cases

Negative
Affirmative

universal

If P, then If P, then
some

: particular

In Q (i.e., of be

of the
presence

P's

possible instances will also Q

cases

present).
: Negative particular

If

P,

then

in

some

not

Q.

Opposition of Hypotheticals, Dr. Keynes contends hypotheticalis assertorial* (the truth of Q followingupon the truth of P, but not necessarily from it),the of If P, then Q is P, and not Q.'f He true contradictory argues if the is antecedent not that, posited in the contra categorically and the contradictory of If P, then Q is stated in the dictory,
that, where
the
l

In

discussingthe

'

'

'

'

form
other of P

'

If

P,

then

not

Q,' we
to

are

not

in let

a us

of these

must

be false.
not
can

For

positionto say that that, as a suppose

no

one

or

matter

fact,P happens
as

be true.

Then

consequent
as

which When

has
once

its antecedent

be

labelled definitely the

'

false. is

the

assumption representedby

if ' clause

discredited, we
the Dr.
to

may say antecedent

anything we
which
own

like
'

on

the

imaginativesupposition that
is true.
' '

the

if ' introduces the

two

Thus,

take

Keynes'

example,!

cross-nibbed,it is corroded cannot cross-nibbed, it is not corroded by the ink of fact,the pen happens matter dictories, as a since,if, either nibbed, we cannot proposition as false. regard
'

propositions by the ink,' and

If this pen If this pen be

to be

is not is not
contra
cross-

The
so soon
*

difficulties which
as we

beset

insist

"

(1) on
in

foregoing argument disappear contradictories testing by the principle

'

the

Dr.
'

Keyiiesmakes
and

use

of the word

assertorie.'

t
pp.

Studios

Exercises

Formal

Logic,'fourth

edition, Part

II., ch. ix

202, 203. I Ibid., p. 207, footnote.

12"2

1 80

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[V. iv.

Logical Consistency instead of by an appeal to the Law of Ex of the Hypo cluded Middle,* and (2) on respecting the true nature connexion of thetical Proposition as a possibilities. maintains when the in the antecedent if Dr. that, Keynes clause is not credible in the light of actual facts, we cannot say of
of
' '

the the

two

statements must

'

If

P, then
But
on

Q,'
the

'

If

P,

then

not

'

that

one

or

other

be
not

false.

the

interconsistency of
of actual
statement
once

the

two

statements

does
whether

depend

testimony

fact.

The

question is
with

the

the acceptance, of the one When acceptance of the other.

is consistent connexion
'

the
then

of

asserted possibilities the

'

P, Q proposition accepted, asserted possibilities by the proposition the point of view If P, then must be rejected.f From of not Q the relation the in which stand consistent possibilities thinking may irrelevant. to realities is entirely is that Dr. second to our And this brings us criticism, which the of Hypothetical Proposition Keynes fails to respect the nature For main of connexion a as a possibilities. objectionthat he brings contradictory is that we can conceive cases against the hypothetical
further
connexion
'

by

the

'

If

is

of

in which be
'

the

antecedent
as

clause
an

in both

the
at

contradictories all. when

cannot

seriouslyintended

If this

the pen
not

Thus, assumption all is time the not cross-nibbed,' though aware pen I am is cross-nibbed, what reallysaying is If this
'

I say that pen is

cross-nibbed,

as

I know

a longer proposition,so the It of deserves title no more hypothetical possibilities. S's are P's than the proposition Some ('some being taken to the title of at least,possibly all ') deserves mean one particular all is all when the replaced by actually (videp. 156). possibly If Mr. that Oliver Twist' When ever Grimwig in boy says

thetical

is, then understood, no

it

.,'etc.

But

the

hypo
'

asserts

connexion

of

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

returns

to

this
"

house, sir, I'll

the the

eat

my
to

head,' he does
be taken
not to

not

"

Dr. he in

intend Keynes is that means really

this
case
"

antecedent

seriously ; for
return.

argues what But

parallel Dr. Keynes adduces instances proposition is hypothetical in It is function. rhetorical in form not a hypothetical, of only, is the categoricalstatement That which the form true : boy's is an head.' return event as impossible as my eating my own We conclude, then, that the objection to the hypothetical con justified. tradictory has not been sufficiently
"

and

the

boy is quite certain reasoning holds good

the
'

for

all the

'

'

of two that contradictory propositions one must disjunctivestatement Middle bejfalse is, in our view, an expression of the Law of Excluded (videp. 99). of hypothetical propositions as true and 'false f Dr. Keynes' qualification of this problem. In the proposition lf_P, in his treatment is a further difficulty not only P and then Q Q that can be either true or false ? is_it
*

.The

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

CHAP.

XIX.]

OPPOSITION

OF

PROPOSITIONS

181

EXAMPLES.

Example
'

1.

"

Give
'

all the

logical opposites of the proposition,

'

'

'

All officers are

citizens.'
are

By

its

logical opposites
are

meant

the

correspondingproposi

tions, in the forms

and predicate, and tradictory,

E, 0, and I, which have the same subject and related to it respectively its contrary, con as
:

subaltern

Contrary, E : All officers are-not officers O : Some Contradictory,

Subaltern, I
:

citizens.
are-not
.

citizens.

Some
the

officers are
'

citizens.
'

Example
is too

2.

"

Give

logical opposites

of the

proposition, It

'

late to mend.'

in the case of singular Opposition presents a certain difficulty first is it whether not obvious at Thus, propositions. sight quite the counter-assertion the
'

It is-not
or as

too

late

to

mend

'

should

be

re

contradictoryof the given pro whereas the given proposition an proposition, A proposition, is an Formal constitutes a ground for reckoning it the contrary. But this merely technical argument has no weight as that the pro as principle, against the contention, based on logical be be both contradictories, since they cannot positions must is, there rejected. The contradictoryof It is too late to mend
contrary
it is the That E
' '

garded as position.

fore,

'

It is-not the

too

late to mend.'
'

There
soon

is
to

no

though
natural

proposition

It is too is
no

mend

technical contrary, would be the

' '

Keynes has called secondary the then, though quantification,' propositionswill no longer be in the sense opposites already defined,we may apply the Square of modified form. Opposition in a slightly We have the attribution of a whenever secondary quantification predicate to a subject is limited with reference to times or condi tions. The the opening of from Thus, in the followingsentence 'Pied Piper of Hamelin
Professor
' '

contrary. There If,however, there is what

subaltern.

When

begins my

ditty
"

Almost
To
see

five hundred the townsfolk vermin

"

years ago suffer so

a

"

From

'twas

pity '"

the first two

lines express
have
'

cate, and
Here
mend.' The

we

of the predi secondary quantification also in the singular secondary quantification

a

proposition,
the

It is

never

too

late to mend.' is
'

Contradictory
'

It

is

sometimes

too

late

to

Contrary is

It is is

always
'

too

late to mend.' is-not too

And

the Subalternate

It sometimes

late to mend.'

182

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
the S's U
are

[V. iv.

Example 3.*
The
are or

"

Give

the

of contradictory
the

proposition.
P's and all P's

proposition
The

takes

form,
'

'

All

S's.'
some

of this is contradictory S's.'

be

Either

some

S's are-not

P's,

P's are-not

If either of these

alternatives is
on

accepted,

must original proposition if the latter is rejected, one, accepted.

the

the other hand, of these alternatives must at least, be

cannot
are

rejected ; and,

We is
a

may

observe
to

that
'

we

of contradictory P's are-not is true

All the S's

say that all the

'

Some

S's are-not

P's

'

consistent
'

and rejectboth propositions,

be quite for it may P's,' to accept the proposition,

Some What

S's.'

propositionholds good of all compound propositions. A compound propositioncan have only one contra than one and affirm a must the contradictory dictory not more number of which other be must of alternatives, one or accepted if the original is rejected. proposition
" "

of the U

Example
Cretans
says
are

4."

: following Epimenides says Cretan. is and Therefore a liars, Epimenides

Test

the

'

that what

the he

is not

true.

Therefore
a

the

Cretans
he

are

not

liars.
"

Therefore

Epimenides
Mentions.
This

is not

liar,and

what

says

is true.'

Fallacyof

is for a proposition obviously involves a fallacy, here deduced from its own contradictory. What Epimenides says is true from is deduced What Epimenides says is not true.' We most follows : as clearly point out the fallacy may The following are the different propositions involved in the

argument

'

'

'

argument

(a) Epimenides

(6)Epimenides
(c) Therefore

says that the is a Cretan. he says

Cretans
true.

are

liars.

what the

is not
are

(d) Therefore
(e) Therefore

Cretans

not
a

liars. liar. is true.

(/) Therefore
Let
us

Epimenides what Epimenides

attention show
so on

is not

says

concentrate If
we can

the

(c)and
when
ment

(d).
(c)and
from

that

this

connexion between logical invalid connexion is logically

(d) are

of the invalidity

we fallacy, given argument. The logicalconnexion in question depends that what Epimenides says in (a) finds its in (d). Can we, then, find out without ambiguity
"

to free the rest of the argu as interpreted shall have proved the logical sufficiently

on

the

true

assumption contradictory

(1) What (2) What

Epimenides ? (d)means
*

does

say

in

(a);

After

Dr.

Revues.

VI.

IMMEDIATE
INFERENCE.

CHAPTER
IM .MEDIATE

XX.
INFERENCE.

Formal FORMAL misses

to

and Inference, is

its

Logical Principle.

Inference

Inference formulated

or reasoning from accepted statements pre in The them. of Formal conclusions Principle implied Formal It may be the be called Law of Validity. may as

follows

is accepted, then the // a given proposition or set of propositions further propositions which are implied in what is thus admitted, also be accepted ; and the furtherpro'posithese,and these only, must with any one in contradiction tions which are of the admitted proposi and these only,must these, or with tions, of their implications, any one be rejected. addition of to the Laws Law of Formal The Validity is no new

Thought.

It

the simply interprets

as

Laws

of Formal
to

Identity and
of

Non-contradiction

formulated
to

in relation
a

Inference.

Implication. belong to one one This systematic intimacy between identical system. and the same Law them their constitutes of Formal logical Identity. The be formulated Inference to as Identity in its relation may Identity,in
its relation is

Inference, is

matter

If

statement

implied in another, the

two

must

follows

If a given proposition or furtherpropositionswhich are

and these the

set

is accepted, then the of propositions implied in what is thus admitted, these, in its relation
to Inference

only,must
Law thus

also be

accepted.
may

So

of Non-contradiction
:

be formulated

is accepted, then the set of propositions or // a given proposition of the further propositions which are in contradiction with any one admitted with propositionsimplied by them, propositions,or any be these and must rejected. these, only,

The
of the

Law

of Formal

Inference

is sometimes
'

stated

in the

form

though negative precept Not to go beyond the Law the this injunction with of connect premisses.' We may the in that Formal beyond going premisses Validity by showing certain propositions implied by these necessarily contradict we
concise
187

188

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
'

[VI.
r

All S's are P's premisses. Thus, from the accepted statement that All P's S's.' In drawing this we are might conclude the conclusion should be we going beyond accepted premiss, it. But should be not we though contradicting though we docontradict not the premiss All S's are P's when we accept the
' ' '

conclusion
we

'

All

P's

are

S's

'

as

if this

were

an

inference from
that

it,

thereby premiss. P's 'we i.e.,All S's are some posit All S's are P's we expresslydon't state anything about all the P's. Hence no with all the P's is implied in the original statement state dealing ment. Consequently, no statement dealing with all the P's can be disimplicated But the incorrectly from the original statement. drawn conclusion tells us that at least one statement dealingwith all the P's can Thus be disimplicated statement. from the original that the proposition "All P's are S's" is impliedin the we see "All statement S's P's" contradicts of are an original implication the accepted premiss,and must be rejected inconsistent with it. as (Itis not, of course, the proposition All P's are S's which contra dicts an implication of the accepted premiss. Were this the case, should be compelled, after accepting All S's are P's,'to reject we
certain

do

contradict
'

implicationsof
'
"

Thus, when

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

All P's We

are

S's

'

as

inconsistent with
in

it.)

see,

then, that,

regarded the Law of into meaninglessself-contradiction.

The
most

going beyond the premiss, we have dis at one Validity,and fallen, point at least,

of Formal simple expressionof the Principle Identity considered as a principle but one of Inference,an expression degree removed from the blank formula If A is accepted, of Tautology then A is accepted is provided by the First Law of Subalternation, the law which states that if the universal is accepted, proposition the particular be accepted propositionof the same quality must
'
"

'

"

also.
The
out

attempt
of the
us

to prove

this law

is instructive, as Formal

it

serves

to

bring

the fact that the

means

of Principle in

Identitycannot

be

proved

by

of Principle that

Non-contradiction.

acceptingA we do not thereby logically suppose bind ourselves to accept I. On this supposition, when we accept A disable the contradictoryof I. But we ourselves from rejecting this disability involves in a logical and A s ince us inconsistency,
E
are

Let

contraries.

This
sition

proof, however,
prove which
can

a Contrary Oppo proved only by the help of the very law of Subalternation which therefore have we are considering. We committed the fallacy of reasoningin a circle. Hence the Principle of Identity, in this its simplestform, cannot be proved by means

endeavouringto

presupposes ; for it assumes

the

truth
law of

of the

law

it is

be

of the

of Principle

Non-contradiction.

CHAP.

XX.]
may

IMMEDIATE be mediate

INFERENCE
immediate. With in

189

Inference
ence,
or

or

Mediate
course.

Infer We

propose An Immediate

shall be concerned Syllogism, we make the study of to a beginningwith Inference

or

due

Immediate

Inference. the

may

be
a

defined

as

the inference from

acceptance
the

the

rejection of
further

of a rejection and Thus that the relations Non-Contradiction. we see Identity of Opposition between the four propositionsA, E, I, 0 are estab lished through processes of Immediate Inference. There is at least of
' '

propositionto the acceptance or the sole basis of the Laws on proposition

one we

other

form

of immediate
to

inference, as
the
name

above

defined, which
two

shall
It is

presentlyconsider.
include, under
of which
one

customary

of Eductions,
we as

processes

of inference

alone,
the

as

shall

see,

is

an

immediate
These
two

inference
processes Of these

according to
are

definition
as

above

stated.
and
an
" -

known respectively alone

can

Obversion called

Conversion.
immediate e.g.,

Conversion All other

be strictly involve

inference.

so-called immediate
"

inferences

Contraposition and of Conversion repetitions

fore, refer
Educts Eduction
one
" "

Inversion and

simply
We
an as

alternating
not, there
The
two

Obversion. Conversion.

should eduction.

to

Inversion, for instance,

are

sole eductions

Obversion
be either
'

and

i.e., the

propositions inferred
' '

through
A
taken be

which,

in

meaning
'

strong or may for purposes of Inference, may from which to the proposition
'

weak.'

processes strong educt

as

of
is

equivalent
In order the

it is inferred.
as quantity

to be

strong

an

educt
is

must

be of the

same

original original
substi

proposition.
A weak educt
a one

which

propositionin
tuted

weakened

presents form, and

the

meaning

of the be

therefore

cannot

for the

Whenever is weak.
not

without weakening the content. original proposition and its educt differ in quantity,the educt a proposition be All candidates areThus, if the original proposition
'

examiners,' strong educt, and

We shall view

then
'

'

All

examiners

are-not
are

candidates
'

'

is weak

Some

non-candidates

examiners

is

educt. the

point of important.
The

the strong educts, as, from stress on lay especial the more serviceable and of Inference,they are of Immediate Inference and
a

processes

Eduction

have,

from

our

Formal present strictly

are

point of view,
what discerning

purely Foimal
are

interest.

We

interested solely
a

in

the

tions

singleproposition. The whole attention of the propo on validityof the reasoning, the matter sition ceases the to interest us, and, as an important consequence, whole in question of the existential import of the propositions It volved in the inference is appropriately is, ignored(vide p. 145). of course, always possible interest on the premiss or to concentrate
trated

of

logical implica being concen

the

premisses of

an

inference

as

material

evidence.

But

in that

case,

190

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VI.

as

less systematic, or alreadyappealedto knowledge,more the subjectsof our inform us whether such knowledge must propo in what sitions exist or not, and, if existent, sense they exist. There of to be no seems ground for perplexinga purely Formal treatment the kind we are at present undertaking with a theory of existential implication. is with Formally stated propositions Our sole concern and the drawn inferences that can be necessarily there from these. We
we

have

fore assume,

in

our

treatment

Import and the fourfold quantity and qualitywhich

of Eduction, the extensive view of division of propositionsaccording to

is based upon it.

EDUCTIONS. 1. Obversion.* It has

been said that Obversion

'

propositionits any affirmative the meaning of a the of else expressing process ' A is B affirmative as an ; thus the obverse of
and the obverse of
'

is the process of substituting for ' equivalent in negative form, or

negativeproposition
'

is
'

'

is-not may
to

not-B,'
this it
as

is-not B

'

is

'

is not-B

We But

take

account of the process as a correct describing a process of Immediate

as

eductive.
Immediate

accept

Inferenceimplies a
Inference
if it

miscon which it

ception of the
is

genuine meaning of
notice.
seen,
an

important to
As
we a

have

inference is immediate

can

be drawn

of singlepropositionon the sole ground of the principles But Formal when, for instance, Identityand Non-contradiction. All the is the obverse that are-not S's not-P's we proposition say be supported of All S's are P's,'we are maintaining what cannot The alone. of the term notuse by reference to these principles discourse coloured of G P's universe us (let object,' impliesa say and the proposition which the P being blue-coloured object'), on Either an S (in respect of G) is : reasoningrests is the following this the statement else combine it is a not-P.'f With we a P, or

from

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

All

S's

are

P's,'and
is known

thence
as a

infer that

'

All

S's are-not

not-P's.'

This

inference,and the process disjunctive in the ordinary Theory of of Obversion, as we presented inference at all. Immediate Inference, is reallynot an immediate but an inference based on a given disjunction. In this criticism the essential points are (1) that the statement
is what find it
More Immediate
'

Permutation,' ^Equipollence,' equivalents are Inference by Privative Conception.' expressed in the form : All S's are either P's or notf This is not infrequently have P's seen we expressed (p. 132), the meaning of this categorically ; but, as be appropriatelystated and therefore is can only in disjunctive, proposition form. disjunctive
*

or

less

obsolete

'

'

'

'

192 not-P's have

[VI.
are

mutually exclusive, and, taken together,exhaustive of Thus alternatives of some discourse. we given universe
:

Either
A. But
.-.

an

S is
are

P,

or

else it is

not-P.

all S's

P's. not-P's.
or

All S's are-not

an

Either E.
But
.-.

S is

P,

else it is a not-P.

all S's are-not All S's

are

P's.

not-P's.

And

so

also for I and

0.
not

Obversions, therefore, are

ferences.
The

immediate,

but

mediate

in

rule

whereby
the

these

disjunctiveobverses
is

may

at

once

be

obtained thus
:

from

obvertends corresponding

usually enunciated

and change the quality of the proposition, Negative the predicate, but leave the quantity unchanged.

The
that If

fact that in Obversion

the

quantity is left unchanged shows

to the four obverses

all obverses
we

apply

are strong educts. the rule of Obversion

of A, E, I,

and
"

0, we find that the obverse of the obverse of each proposition is the propositionitself. Generally, obverse its obverted i.e., if Y is the obverse of X, then X is the obverse of Y. Obversion is
"

reciprocal process.
EXAMPLES
OP

OBVERSION.

Exercise.* forms
:

"

in propositions Express the following 1. Not 2. Not 3. Not 4. Not all S's

their

simplest

are

not-P's. not-P's. not-P's. not-P's.

all S's are-not

some some

S's

are

S's are-not

placedbefore the sign of quantity contradicts the whole Thus of All S's (1)is equivalentto the contradictory proposition.
A
'

not

'

'

Borrowed

from

Minto's

'

Logic,' pp. 149, 150,

footnote.

CHAP.

XX.]
'
"

IMMEDIATE
to the i.e.,

INFERENCE
this

193

are
'

not-P's

of contradictory

obverse, proposition's P's,' the

the I propo E

All

S's are-not

P's

'
"

i.e.,to

'

Some

S's

are

sition.

2, 3, Similarly, propositions.

are

equivalentto respectively

0, A, and

2. Conversion.

Pure

Conversion,
a

as

is propositions, appliedto categorical

the

educing from

form, and on expressedin strict logical proposition Law of another the of the sole ground proposition LogicalValidity, in which the original form in strict logical subject and predicate
terms
are

transposed.
of Conversion
converse :

The

Rules

Rule

1. The

must

be

of

the

same

quality as
converse

the

convertend. Rule
2. No
term must

be

distributed

in the

if not

distributed in the convertend.

We and have the
now

to

see

what

is the

connexion

between

these

rules

fundamental

of LogicalValidity ; principle
can

for the

logical

of rules justification

lie

only

in their

being rooted

in rational

principles.
The than
an

first of these

rules appears,

to be at first sight,

convention. But, if so, it has arbitrary Immediate of Inference, which in the Theory Prof. Welton Non-contradiction. of Identityand the Principles the converse that the difficulty as by saying attempts to meet assertion as the convertend, looked at, as simply makes the same of the two that the quality it were, from the other side, it is clear ? clear Is it this, But is will be the same.* then, so propositions
' '

nothing more obviouslyno place is based solelyon

quite obvious,
converse

of

'

Some for instance, that Some S's are-not P's '?

'

P's

are

S's

'

may

not

be

of the first rule of Conversion depends on the justification view of negation as bare nega (based on the privative recognition tion,blank denial)that affirmation and negationdo not imply each is of an affirmative proposition other. The fact that the obverse negative (and vice versa] does not show that an affirmative can imply a negative. If the inference ef All S's are-not not-P's of Thought, then the Laws All S's are P's from rested solely on the statement that the inference of a negativefrom an affirmative is contraryto the Laws of Thought would obviouslybe untenable. is therefore To accept the validity of the first rule of Conversion Laws the of to admit on that Ob version does not rest exclusively indeed, we have Thought. And this we have already admitted The
'

'

'

"

J. Weltoii, 'A

Manual

of

Bk. III., eh. Hi., vol. i.,p. Logic,'

250.

13

194

THE

PROBLEM therefore

OF

LOGIC
to

[VI.
admit the necessary

insisted
character

on

it. of the but

We

are

prepared

convention,
that
a

first rule of Conversion, and to regard it not as a fact as an expressionof the fundamental logical be

immediately inferred from an affirmation. is clearlyfundamental, for it The second rule of Conversion essential simply expresses the requirement of the guiding principle negation cannot
of Inference.
or

It is characteristic that the This

of all Formal
must not

Inference, mediate
go

immediate,
or

conclusion
in

beyond
to

the pre
we

miss

premisses.
any in the term

requirement would
the
the

be

ignored were
appear

to

allow

undistributed
converse.

convertend

dis
is

tributed

Hence

second

rule of Conversion
ex Identity

logically justified, being, in fact, the Law in of distribution. terms pressed

The Conversion

of Formal

the proposition Proposition. That P's are is a converse S's of the proposition All S's are Some of Logical Identity P's in its from the Principle follows at once If the statement All S's form. are we P's,'we accept simplest But Some S's P's must cannot are we (Subalternation). accept accept Some S's are P's without accepting Some P's are S's (Identity).
"

of the

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

Moreover,
breaks
the

it is the

only possible converse,

'

for

'

All P's

are

S's

'

distribution-rule, Some
'

P's are-not
'

S's
is
'

'

breaks P's
'

the

and quality-rule, Thus the only S's.' This

'

All P's are-not

converse

S's
All

breaks
are

both.

of

'

S's

P's

'

Some
a

are

is
'

weak
;

educt.
converse

It is per

called technically
'*: it would

converse

by limitation
to call it
a

or

accidens

be P's

simpler
are

weak of
'

converse.'

The
is
a

Conversion

of
Some

the

Proposition. That
"

'

Some
as

S's
That

'

converse

S's

are

Thus

preciselyas only converse may the is of Some S's are P's converse only proposition P's are S's.' the strong equivalent Some the E The Conversion of of All S's areProposition. The converse is the E proposition All P's are-not S's.' For if we P's not
it is the the
' ' ' '
"

may again be

P's

'

be shown shown

above.

above.

'

'

accept the
ment
'

statement

'

All S's are-not

P's,' we
also P's Some

must

rejectthe
the

state

Some

S's

are

P's,' and
statement
'

therefore
'

(by
are

of Principle
But the if
we con

Identity)the rejectthe

converse

S's.'

statement

Some

P's

are

S's,'we
S's.'

must

accept

statement tradictory

'

All P's are-not S's

' '

Moreover,
exclude
the

'

All P's are-not

converse

is the P's
'

only converse
are-not

if we possible

weak
'

Some P's

S's.'
the

acceptance of
*

All S's are-not

necessitates

For, since the acceptance of

of this expression, H. W. B. Joseph, ' An Introduction the justification see to ch. The 212. however, does not extend to Logic,' x., justification, pp. 211, and of the word (vide supra, the use of ' accidental ' in our we sense 27), p. ' instead of therefore adopt the phrase ' weak converse converse per accidens.' For
'

CHAP.

XX.]

IMMEDIATE

INFERENCE also the

'

195

'

All P's are-riot the

'

S's,'it
P's be
are

necessitates
' '

of rejection S's
are
'
"

the

con

trary and

of contradictory S's
converses

All P's are-not of

'

jectionof they are

of their
The called
"

All

and of

Some

P's

S's.'
out

the re i.e., These,

cannot therefore,

All S's are-not therefore

P's.'

Moreover,

affirmative

and propositions, of E is thus

ruled

by

virtue

quality.
converse a

true
as

strong educt.
"

It is

technically
It

the

converse

of I also is called

simple converse.
Given

would

be better

to call them
"

both strong converses.

inconvertible. unable shall
to infer see,

Converse

of
'

0.

The

is proposition
we P's,' are as

the

propositionSome
about

S's are-not
P's.
'

Formally
an

anything ference concerning the

but the this is not
a

the

We

can,
'
"

we

draw

in

not-P's
"

of predicate
two

pure converse the convertend. may

not-P's are viz., 'Some S's'; its is not the i.e., same as subject
shown

That the

0 is inconvertible

be

rules of Conversion, for of the and negativesbreak the distribution-rule,

the

of by a direct application the possibleconverses

the

affirmatives break
to

It may, however, be useful quality-rule. of proving the inconvertibility of 0. methods

point out
we

other pro
"

Thus

may

ceed

as

follows

Writing down

the various

converses possible

(1) Some P's are-not S's. (2) Some P's are S's, (3) All P's are-not S's,
(4) All P's
we
'

are

S's,
or illegitimate

see

at

once
'

that if we
converses,

non-illative

can prove (1) and (2) to be it will follow, that a fortiori,

(3)and

(4)are

illegitimate. (1) Is the proposition Some

'
'

P's

are-not

S's

'

inferible from
of

Some
two

S's are-not that this is

P's

'

The

distribution-rule

Conversion
:

shows The

we impossible ; but may vary the proof thus not inconsistent. For instance are propositions
"

'

Some
with

men

are-not

swimmers

'
. . .

(i.)

is not

inconsistent

'Some
But

swimmers

are-not

men.'
is not
on

(ii.)

the second
if

of

these
with

statements

first. For
would

followed (ii.)

be inconsistent
'

necessarily the two (i.) i.e.,

"

from (he inferible i ts (i.), contradictory

"

statements

All swimmers

'

are

men

and
'

Some

men

are-not

swimmers But the that

'

could

not

be

entertained

be

accepted together is

together. shown by

can they obviously accompanying diagram,

'

13"2

196

THE

PROBLEM
the

OF

LOGIC
in

[VI.

which

represents,not, indeed,

statements

question,but

fact about which single

they might both be trulymade.

(2) kSome P's

not

'

are

S's
be

'

cannot

be

converse or

of

'

Some

S's

are-

P's.'

This

may
'

proved as above,
;
are can or we
'

by
be

direct

application
:

of the
'

of Conversion quality-rule
statement

may
can

argue

thus
'

If the

Some P's
'

P's
so

S's
'

inferred from validly P's

; for

Some
'

S's are-not Some P's

are

then P's,'
are
'

Some

S's

are

the state

ment
'

S's

must

be

accepted whenever
'

the statement
'

Some

tion does not is not

a

accepted. But we know that the 0 proposi imply its subcontraryI. Therefore, Some P's are S's
S's
is
'

valid inference from

Some

S's are-not

P's.'
of

We
here
'

now

proceed to give
from of
as a

some

examples
Bowen's
:
'

Conversion.
'

The will

following extract
serve

Professor

Logic

(p. 157)

useful

introduction

that Judgments, the learner must remember the whole Predicate must change places with the whole Subject that is,whatever belongs to the Predicate must be transferred to whatever the Subject'splace, and relates to the Subject to the Predicate's place. For example, Some temple is in the cityis not the Some is in into converted temple,but into Something in the city has been a cityis a temple. Again, the Predicate of Every old man boy is not boy,but has been a boy ; therefore it is not converted into Some boy has been an old man, but into Some one who has been a boy old man. of this sort, every proposition is an To avoid mistakes it is subjectedto any logical before Conversion or, indeed, before be whatever form should reduced to its simplestlogical treatment In

Conversion

"

"

"

"

that

is,to the
we

formula

is

B,

or

is not B.

Then

no

error

can or

if arise,
not

remember

that that

all* which all* which

precedes the Copula

follows the

is

is

is the

Subject,and

Copula is

Predi

cate.'

Examples of Conversion
1. All

organicsubstances
substances
stances.

contain

carbon. carbon
are

Some

which

contain

organic sub

The

'

all

'

here

must

not

be taken

as

includingthe quantity-mark.

CHAF.

XX.]
2. The poor

IMMEDIATE
have few friends. have
more

INFERENCE

107

Some
3. A wise Some
are

persons who makes man persons wise men. who

poor people. than he finds. opportunities few friends

are more

make

than they find opportunities

4. Warm-blooded

animals
are

are

without

exceptionair-breathers.
animals.
to appear
as

Some
5. Some

air-breathers
have

warm-blooded
the courage

good men they are.

persons
are as

not

good
as

as

Some

who
are

have

not
men.

the courage

to appear

good

0. Some

they are-not symmetrical. crystals

converse.

good

No
7. All

men

have

not

faith.

No No
9. Mrs.

converse.

8. All mathematical
converse.

works

are

not

difficult.

Brown

was was

Miss Miss

Smith. Smith
is Mrs. Brown.

One
10. An

who

11.

of three is a plane rectilinear figure triangle equilateral equal sides. This is a logical definition,which should apply only to the is in the Therefore class defined. simple transposition of definitions not only admissible, but logically case that requisite.If our purpose is definition,we stultify There if we attempt to convert by limitation. purpose is : of the given proposition fore the converse three of A plane rectilineal figure equal sides is an triangle. equilateral A is followed by B. Something that is followed by B is A.

12. P struck

Q.
who

Somebodv

struck Q

is P.

Converse,* or Contrapositive
The

Converse

by Negation.

Converse, of a given pro or Contrapositive contrapositive, of the obverse, or as tho be defined as the converse position may definition is genetic,informing us how The converted obverse. the following have Thus be obtained. the contrapositive we may
table
*

The

nomenclature
'

here

varies

Joseph ('An Negation to

the
'

Introduction to the converted obverse, and ' Obverted Contrapositive of our own

greatly in Logic,'ch. x., pp.

reserves

Mr. different logicaltreatises. ' Converse 215, 216) restricts by ' ' the term Contrapositive for

scheme

(vide infra, p. 201).

198

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VI

The rule

ofContraposition may
'

be

stated succinctly

thus

First

obvert, then convert.'

E and I have

We
we

have

seen

that

only

strong

converses.

But

if

first substitute
we

for A

and

their obverse

and equivalents,

then

find that these indirect converses, which called are these, the do render contrapositive originalpropositionsin converses,
convert

unweakened
verses

forms.
I
are

On
not

of E and

con hand, the contrapositive the is other One weak, strong converses.

the

other

non-existent.
TABLE STRONG WEAK CONVERSES.

OF

AND

in Relation Exponible Propositions An into

to Eduction.

(AfterDr. Keynes.)

which is a proposition be resolved can exponible proposition which two or more are independentof one simplerpropositions

another.
an

For

instance, the

proposition All
'

'

S's

are

all P's

'

is

exponible,since it may be resolved into the two mutually independentpropositions, All S's are P's
are

simpler and
'

and

'

All P's

S's.'

Now,
1. Can
'

we

ask, is
we

the

Exclusive
it is
'

Proposition Only
the

'

S's

are

P's

'

an

? exponibleproposition say
are-not

that P's

equivalent to
'

two
'

propositions
Yes,
argues

All not-S's

and

Some

S's

are

P's

Dr.

Keynes,

but

the two

are propositions

not

mutually independent.

200
4. The writer
a

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC A.B. both

terms

[VI.

of the document

was

This is

with singular proposition

an

distributed.
most
a

It is therefore not

A proposition. Our ordinary it into

will be to convert course straightforward the into of same type i.e., position
" "

pro

Converse Obverse

A.B.

is the person who shall then have We person

wrote
as

the document. is-not

E.

the document

The
a

who

wrote

the

person other than A.B. other than A.B. are-not : All Contrapositive persons the person who wrote the document. 5. More

E
.

haste, less speed.

as

Tin's might be treated Given

follows

proposition All
=

cases

of increased
tend
to

haste

are

cases

that tend

to diminish

Converse Obverse

Some
are

cases cases

that

speed. diminish speed

are-not
cases

A.

of increased haste. of increased

not

I.

All
not

cases

haste

tendingto
cases

diminish

: All Contrapositive

speed. tendingto diminish speed

of increased haste.

E.

are-not

cases

E.

It seems, Thus: Given

however,

more

given propositionas
=

to regard the satisfactory having an abstract subject.

proposition Greater haste is a circumstance tending to produce correspond inglyless speed. Converse : A circumstance tendingto produce corre less speed is greater haste. spondingly
so on.

A.

I.

And 6. Some

of portraits

some
=

celebrated brated

men

are

rare.

Given

proposition Some
:

portraits
men are are

of

certain

cele I. certain I.

rarities.

Converse Obverse

Some

rarities
men.

portraits of
certain

celebrated
:

Some

portraitsof

celebrated

men

are-not

non-rarities,

0.

: (None). Contrapositive

Systematic Eduction.
be stated as follows : systematic eduction may A, E, I, and 0, plot down all the Having taken the propositions educts, strong or weak, which can be obtained by succes legitimate The

problem

of

sive processes

of conversion

and

obversion.

CHAP.

XX.]
the

IMMEDIATE

INFERENCE
this

201

For

convenient

carrying out of
is
are

symbolic nomenclature
as

used

by

Dr.

Keynes,
A. E.

requirement,a suitable essential. The followingsubstitutions, now recognized: generally

P's=SeP. P's=SiP. P's=SoP.
x.

All S's areP's=SaP. All S's are-not

I. Some 0. Some
The term
'

S's

are

S's are-riot
'

not-x

'

'

or

non-x

is

represented by the symbol

EductionA. E. SeP

Scheme. I. SiP

0.
SoP

SaP

7\
/ \
SeP
I

/\
/

\
SoP

(PiS) (PoS)

PeS

SaP

PiS

SiP PiS PoS

PeS

PaS

(PiS) (PoS)

PoS

PVS (SiP) (SoP)

N.B.
"

(SiP)

(SoP)

The process

in every

case

is checked
a

by

the

inconvertibility

of the 0

proposition. (
:

) indicates

weak

educt.

Nomenclature S-P P-S P-S S-P

P-S
: : : : : : : :

the convertend Original proposition,

or

obvertend.

Converse. Obverted Obverse. Converted or (Converse), Contrapositive

Obverse. Converse.

P-S
S-P S-P

Contrapositive. of Contrapositive, or Contrapositive

Inverse. from

Obverted

Obverted

Inverse.

accepted premiss,we are able to infer both PoS and SoP, so that, given SaP, the proposition PoS and SoP both be accepted. But this does not (itspseudo-converse)must For PoS and SoP are is convertible. prove that the 0 proposition the condition that SaP but only on accepted,not unconditionally, is firstaccepted. The point to notice is that when two propositions
Note
that

SaP,

as

202

THE of the

PROBLEM

OF
third

LOGIC

[VI.

by
to

means

be

be shown can proposition, necessarily accepted together,it does not therefore follow
a

acceptance of

the acceptance of one of the two, without the acceptance of the third proposition, necessitates the acceptance of the other.

that

Examples
1. Examine

in
:

SystematicEduction.

the inference
All
.-.

men non-men

are

mortals.
are

All

non-mortals.
its

The
serve

inference
to

is

obviously faulty, but

general method
of

examination

will

illustrate the

solving problems of

this kind. SaP as the : Given problem is equivalent to the following of the relation between S (subject) and P accepted statement find the inferible statement of the relation between S (predicate), and P (predicate). (subject)
The

The

educt

here

the having posited and then, by sion,

obversion,
has

we

start with obveran of of alternate conversion and means processes forward to which the inferible statement push

required is the obverted SaP, we given proposition

inverse.

Therefore,

S for

subject and

P for

predicate.
SaP

SeP

I
PeS

J
PaS

L
SiP of stated relation between S

Thus,
that

since

SiP is the strongest form

P that (predicate)
can

and (subject)

be inferred from be inferred.

SaP,

it follows

the subalternans

SaP

cannot

2.

'

All that

love the

success

love work.' the three

Arrange

in following propositions which

can

(1) Those (2) Those

be
not

inferred
inconsistent

from
with

groups : the proposition

given above.
which
are

it,but

cannot

be inferred from

it.

CHAP.

XX.]

IMMEDIATE

INFERENCE inconsistent with loves not

not
success

203

(3) Those which (a) None

are

it.

that

loves work. love

(b) All that

(c) All that

love work do

love

success. success.

love
not

work

(d) None
(e) Some

that that that that that

does

love work

loves
love

success.

do not do not do not

do
not

love love
love

success success

work. love work.

(/)Some
(g) Some

do not
love
success.

love work
work

(h) Some
Condensed

do not

love

success.

solution

Symbolic Dictionary. (i.)

Lovers
Lovers

of

success

S. P.

of work

(ii.) Symbolic equivalents of the propositions given above.

(a) SeP.

(e) SiP.

(b) PaS.
'c) PaS.

(/)SoP.
(g) PiS.

(d) PeS.
Scheme (iii.) SaP. SaP

(h) PoS. from

the

of Eductions

originalproposition

PiS

SeP

PoS

PeS"

PoS

PaS

L
SiP

I
SoP
as Classification of the given propositions, (iv.) per problem,on the basis of the Rules of Opposition.

RESULT

(d),(/), (k) can

SaP.

be

inferred

from

(a),(b), (e) are

neither SaP

inconsistent
nor

with

inferwith

ible from

it.

(c), (g) are

SaP.

inconsistent

204

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VI.

to show whether so as or Arrange the followingpropositions of one be inferred either not the acceptance* or the rejection* can the of another : from the acceptance* from or rejection*

3.

(a) No

intelligent persons

are

prejudiced.
are are

(6) All
(c) Some

unprejudiced persons
unintelligent persons
every

intelligent.

unprejudiced.
unintelligent.

(d) Not

prejudiced person

is

Arts Examination, London, 1902.) (Intermediate

Symbolic Dictionary. (i.) Intelligent person =ES. P. Prejudiced person

=
'

This
is
'

assumes

that

'

un

equivalent to
'

the

Unintelligent person

=
=

S. P.

contradictorypar
of prefix
a

Unprejudiced person

ticle 'non,'and is not

the

'con

trary term.'
Scheme (ii.)

of Strong Eductions, drawn out for the pur those strong educts from the given pose of selecting are SeP, PaS, SiP, PoS, which propositions, for solution of the a straightforward requisite

problem.
SeP
PaS SiP

PoS

7\
PeS SaP PeS PiS SoP PiS

I
PaS

J
SeP

I
PoS

I
SiP

I
SaP The

L
SoP
are :

purposive selections

(a) SaP.

(6) PaS.
(c) PoS.

(d) SoP.
Solution. (iii.)

Arranging these educts

r

in the two

groups

/SaP (a)
I)
the words

n
'

(PaS (6)

jPoS (c),
the

*
*

We
'

have and
'

substituted

'acceptance' and

for 'rejection'

original

truth

falsity.'

CHAP.

XX.]

IMMEDIATE
that

INFERENCE
there
or

205

we

see

can

be

no

inference from
in proposition

the the

acceptance
first group

of rejection

any

to the

in the proposition

of any acceptance or rejection vice This and versa. second,

the Rules

follows at
of

once

from

of Conversion

and of
re

Subcontrariety.

Hence, with the additional help of the Law tabulate at once Contradiction, we can our
sults thus
:

M.B.

"

By

'

neither
or

'

we

mean

that

there

the acceptance

for the rejection of the

is no logical ground in question. proposition

either

for

relation logical following given below propositions

4. What

is the

between ?

the

first and

each

of the

(a) Only the sensitive are sympathetic. (") Some sensitive people are-not unsympathetic. (c) All unsympatheticpeople are sensitive.

sympathetic. unsympathetic people are insensitive. (/)All sympathetic people are insensitive. (g) Some unsympathetic people are-not insensitive. insensitive people are (h) Some sympathetic. (i)No insensitive people are unsympathetic. (k) Some sympathetic peopleare sensitive.
(e) No

(d} No

sensitive

peopleare

Logical Dictionary: (a) (people). Sympathetic

=

All

sjonpathetic peopleare
=

sensitive

person
=

S.

Sensitive

person
~

P.

Unsympathetic
Insensitive
=

non-sympathetic.

non-sensitive.

206

THE Eduction-Scheme.

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VI.

SaP

Weak Obverted

converse.

PiS

SeP

Obverse.

i
converse.

I
PeS PaS

PoS

Contrapositive.
Obverted

contrapositive.

of contraposi/ Contrapositive
I

tive,or obverted
Inverse.

inverse.

I
.

SoP

of given propositions, and results Symbolic equivalents -SaP. (a)

(b) PoS
=

"

obverted

converse

of (a). Inferible SoP"

with

from

(a).

(c) SaP
=

of contradictory
of contradictory

contradictoryof inverse
(a).
of

of (a). Inconsistent

(d) PeS
=

converse

(a).

Inconsistent

with

(a).
of obverted contradictory inverse of (a). Incon

(e) SeP
"

sistent.

(/) SaP=
= =

contrary of obverse of (a). Inconsistent.

inverse of (a). Neither
inconsistent.

("7) SoP=subcontrary of obverted

inferible
nor

(h) PiS
=

of contrapositiveof (a). contradictory

Incon

sistent.

(i) PeS
=

contrary of obverted

of (a). In contrapositive

consistent.

(")=SiP=Subalternate of (a). Inferible.

5. What statements the statement

about
'

candidates
'

who
who

pass

in

Logic can
pass in

you

infer from
are-not

All candidates ?

do not

Logic

successful candidates

: LogicalDictionary

Candidates

who

pass

in
=

Logic
P.

S.

Successful candidates Problem Solution

: :

Given
The

SeP,

what

can

we

infer about
is the

S ?

Eduction-Scheme

: following

208 The
the

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VI.

character of these conclusions is, of course, due to startling character of the data. This is concealed by self-contradictory
we

the fact that when

we

reallymean
"

to

the unknowable is-not unthinkable say that that the unknowable is not necessarily un say

'

'

that, for instance, the pure subjectwhich, it might be argued,is unknowable, since only objects can be known, is still something of which we can think. We can think the Self,it might cannot be urged,though we know it. But in saying this, do not we
thinkable
wish
to

intimate is-not

"

as

we

do logically
"

when

we

knowable thinkable. statement,

unthinkable

that

whatever

urge that is unknowable

the

un

is still

This

able itself must

For the unthink is,in fact, self-contradictory. be unknowable, and therefore, according to our

stillthinkable.
'

the inference 7. Examine small St. Bernard is a small

This is a fallacious instance the

St. Bernard
is known

is

dog.

Therefore

dog.'
of what
as

Inference the

Determinants,
"

added

determinant
are

small.'
as we

These

inferences

but,

shall

presentlysee,
runs

being customarily classed as immediate mediate inferences. they are really

:

here

by added epithet
;

The

given argument
'

thus

A's
'

are

B's.

Therefore

small A's
to

are

small B's,'
extension

"

small

A's

being the objectscommon

of the class
an
'

the

of class A

and

the extension

small

class S. or things,'
the

Now,
would

if this class had

absolute, fixed extension, the reasoning

The

be

correct. perfectly

accompanying diagram shows

facts

as

the

premiss
B's.
are

and

conclusion
may be shown

would

represent them.
:

The

of the argument validity

All A's
are

thus analytically

Certain S's Therefore

A's.
same

these

S's

are

B's;
"

the small A's i.e.,

are

also

small B's.
But the if the class S is
or

class A

extension

the class B, there of ASj should coincide

it concerns ambiguously Sx or S2,according as is no reason why any part of with any

the

part of the

extension

of

BS2.

CHAP.

XX.]

IMMEDIATE

INFERENCE

209

(Dog).

S-|(Small -for

dog generally).

A
(St Bernard

(Jog)

[This diagram exhibits

which the statements
an

not

of the

but the /acts itself, argument argument might collectively represent.]

added

the

Hence, if
determinant both
of the minant
cases.

inference
must

by

determinant

is to be valid, the

added
Its it

term

same in application with must not the application vary significance The followinginference by added deter qualifies. :

have

the precisely

is

valid perfectly

St. Bernard
a

is

dog.
is
a

Therefore
8. Examine
'

hungry St. Bernard

:

hungry dog.

the inference

All

judges are lawyers. Therefore a majority of judges is

a

majority of lawyers.'
of inference

This

is

fallacious

instance
as

of

kind

(miscalled

immediate)
Here the

usually known

Inference

by Complex Conception.

determinants of a third subject and predicateare made the the Here of inference depends on validity again expression. in the application of this third expression. the unambiguous fixity inference The following by complex conception is valid :
' '

Oranges
Therefore But
'

are a

fruit.

barrel of oranges

is

barrel of fruit.
'

the expression arises so soon the word as (like fallacy majo adjustivesense, rity in the given example) is used in a relative, varyingin its import with the words that determine it.

14

VII.
THE SIMPLE

CATEGORICAL

SYLLOGISM.

(i.)Formal Preliminary (ch. xxi.). of the Syllogism The Valid Forms The Rules (ch. xxii.). (ii.) the Structure of the Syllogism (ch. xxiii.). Exercises on (iii.) into the Reduction of Arguments (iv.) The Analysis of Syllogisms, and Form (ch.xxiv.). Syllogistic the Four of and Characteristics Special Rule? Figures The (v.) Uses (ch. xxv.). (vi.) The Dicta (ch.xxvi.). of Reduction (vii.)The Problem (ch.xxvii.). Unorthodox Syllogisms (ch.xxviii.). (viii.)
" "

14-2

CHAPTER
VII.

XXI.
PRELIMINARY.

FORMAL (i.)

INSTEAD

consideringthe valid inferences which, with the help of of Consistency and Identity,or an assumed the Principles disjunc let make from us now some one can given proposition, tion, we
of
take
two

and propositions,

see

what

can

be inferred from

these

taken

together.
from It is not, of course, to draw a conclusion possible pair of propositions. Thus, from the two propositions All bullfinches All flounders
no
'

any

given

are are

birds, fishes,

conclusion All flounders

the

can

be drawn.

are-not

is not further

case.

To

premiss would
birds.'

might suppose that the conclusion bullfinches followed, but this legitimately that conclusion render logicallysound, a All be required namely, the statement
We
' '
"

fishes are-not
To the

put the matter

more

nothing generally,

can

be
are

inferred from

premisses 'All Si's are another premiss is given which

Pi's' and
states
some

'All

S2's

connexion

P2's'unless between Px's

in

and

P2's.

This

is the the

central

postulateinvolved
his

Aristotle's

con discovery essentially be drawn sisted in finding out logically that, if a conclusion is to include these must a common of from a pair given propositions, term. Thus, from the element, i.e., they must contain a common

great discovery of

Syllogism,for

two

statements All birds

are

vertebrates,
are

All bullfinches

birds,
and
'

where
'

the two

ideas

'

vertebrates
link
'

'

bullfinches
once

'

are

connected conclusion from

term.

through the mediating

All bullfinches
are

birds,'we
a

at

infer the

vertebrates.'
that the

We

may
term

say,

then,

conclusion
Term. the

can a

be
common

drawn

two

premisses,* only when

common

premisses have
The
as

The

is called the Middle

are

terms

related
the Minor

through
Term

the Middle

Term

known

Major

and

respectively.
* as

propositionsfrom which the premisses, propositiones prcemissx.

The

conclusion
213

is drawn

are

known technically

214

THE Conclusion
the in

PROBLEM

OF
the

LOGIC
statement

[VII.i.
of
term
a

The between
the

Syllogism is
minor
terms.

relation
is

major

and

The

minor

always

the predicate, and the major term of the conclusion. subject, called the is one premisses, major and the other the contains minor the premiss. The major premiss is that which major term (P),and the minor premiss is that which contains the minor term in both. The major (S). The middle term, M, occurs premiss, then, states a relation between P and M, the minor a

Of the two

relation between
and (subject) In P

S and

M, and

the

conclusion
in

relation between

(predicate).
syllogismmust follow it must be premisses i.e.,
a
"

be valid, the conclusion and exclusively from the necessarily

to

order

implied in the premissesthemselves.

All Roses
are

Consider

the argument

All Sweetbriars
.-.

Flowering-plants. are Flowering-plants.

are

All Sweetbriars

Roses.
the truth
a

This

is

no

valid

though syllogism,
the conclusion

of the

conclusion

is

indisputable ; for

is not
sources

misses,but from other extraneous Again, take the argument

All bats
are

from of knowledge.

conclusion

the pre

birds.
are are

All bantams
.-.

bats. birds. the

All bantams

This is

sound perfectly
If
we
'

though both syllogism,

the statement
are
'

premisses are
are

false. entirely

accept
'

All bats
are

also the statement

the further statement We
must

All bantams All bantams

bats,'we
are

and birds,' bound to accept

birds.'
in which the to

note the relation carefully of the reasoning Syllogism stands to

For
truth tions

where

the

nature

of the
"

reference

purely Formal question of Definition. it as Reality becomes

this
"

does in the Formal

or

of the falsity

and the Syllogism an irrelevant consideration, a ll of matter indifference, distinc premissesa

of
terms
"

in and

the

definition
"

e.g., the

distinction
The

between

formal Formal

real

become

irrelevant. correspondingly

purely
that

the sense : merely words take on any desired meaning, providedthat the meaning may is so given as not in any way to endanger the interests of Nonambiguityand logical Consistency. treatment is also the

verbal in this

The The
thus
:

Form most

of

the

Syllogism.
form,
may

Syllogism,in its

schematic
M_p

be

represented

S~M
S" P

216

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. ii.

CHAPTER
VII. THE (ii.) RULES OF THE

XXII.
SYLLOGISM" THE VALID FORMS.

FROM

these 256
in
one

conceivable
or

forms

we

have

now

to eliminate

those

which,
We
cussion
we

way

another, violate the

at

requirementsof Syllogistic
into any detailed' disit is essential that with

Inference. do not
propose

this stage to enter

of the theory of Syllogistic Inference,but

to provide ourselves develop it sufficiently criteria for discriminating the valid requisite practical

should

the the

from

syllogistic reasoning. have seen of all Inference we to "be principle in the injunction embodied not to go beyond the premisses. To infer in the widest sense of the process, is to disimplicate syllogistically, certain conclusions as the said pre interrelated such from premisses misses collectively necessitate.
The fundamental
But for We
our

invalid

forms

of

present purpose

more

restricted definition is called

restricted type of Syllogism, for. are a the Simple Categorical Syllogism,and the definition must, accord

dealing with
the

certain

ingly,include

further

marks
'

which

stamp
'

the

Syllogismas

the Syllogism must contain simple and categorical.Qua simple,' its three propositions, and three only ; and qua categorical,' proposi but terms. tions must consist of elements which not clauses, are in the Simple Categorical Distributional Syllogism these Finally,

elements,
as

or

terms,
or as

are

read

in

extension, and
definition
'

may

be referred to
here

distributed
The

undistributed.
we
"

then, with whose Syllogism,

be labelled
'

are
'

concerned

may
'

as
'

the

S.C.D.

Syllogism
LV

S.'

standing for

Simple,'
From the

C.' for

and Categorical,'

for

'

Distributional.'*

the definition point of view of Inference, and accepting in define the Simple we of propositions terms of distribution, may to which from Categorical Syllogismas A form of reasoningaccording called premisses, which contain a common two acceptedpropositions link between them, we, infer term constituting a common or disimplicate called the conclusion. a third proposition, This definition embodies of Infer not only the general Principle
ence

but

also the
"

Postulate
the
are

of Mediation

or :

Mediate
the
two

Inference
terms

in

its

simplestform
third
or

of Aristotle postulate

of the

conclusion,S and P,
the
common

Reasoning
*

of this
'

brought togetherthrough the mediation of term to which they are severallyrelated. known kind is accordingly Mediate Inference. as
used abbreviation
in Division

The
'

term

as Syllogism,'
as an

VII., should, from this pointonward*

word Formal
'

be

understood
'

for

gistic should
ence,

be

understood. similarly
'

Syllogism

will be used

in the

and the Syllogism," of Throughout the treatment of Formal sense Syllogism.'

'

'

S.C.D.

Syllo
Infer

CHAP.

XXIL] definition

RULES

OF

THE
have

SYLLOGISM

217 unravel
its

import in order to obtain, in explicit form, the so-called Rules of the Syllogism, of sifting by the aid of which we propose to undertake the logical forms of syllogistic the 256 abstractly possible reasoning.
The

we posited,

simply to

THE

RULES

OF

THE

S.C.D.

SYLLOGISM.

Structural Rules. (i.) Rule Rule I.

:

Every S.C.D.
and three
:

II.

syllogism contains three propositions, only. S.C.D. three different syllogism contains Every terms, and three only.
Rules of Distribution. (ii.)

Rule Rule

III. IV.

: :

The
If
a

middle
term

term

must

be distributed in the

once

at least. must

is distributed

conclusion, it
in
one

have

been

distributed previously

of the

premisses.
Quality Rules. (iii.)
Rule V.
:

If both any,

are premisses

affirmative, the conclusion, if

one

is affirmative.

Rule Rule Rule Rule

VI.

If

one

premiss,and

only, is negative,the
can

con

VII. VIII.
IX.

clusion, if any, is negative. From two negative premisses nothing

ferred.
:

be in

If the conclusion is

is

one negative,

of the

premisses

negative.
conclusion is

If the

both premisses are affirmative,

affirmative.

(iv.)Quantity Rules.
Rule X. XI.
:

Two
:

Rule

If

premissesprove nothing. particular the conclusion one premiss be particular, particular.

Structural Rules. (i.)

is

The with

requirement that
the firstrule. I.

the

Syllogismshall

be

simple providesus
three

Rule

Every

S.C.D.

Syllogism contains

propositions,

and three The second

only.
to Rule

rule is similar in character

I.

218 Rule, II.

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. ii.

Every 8.C.D. Syllogismcontains three different terms, and three only.

contain
terms
as

the Syllogismmust Qua categorical, elements

to the term to ;
nor can

its structural

it contain

more

than

four terms, since, according

can

of Formal Principle those

contained

the conclusion Validity, in the

add

no

new

premisses.
so as

But

(given that
between

the

the Postulate Syllogismis distributional*)

two

of Mediation

that requires the two three

that

of these terms There

shall coalesce

to mediate

extremes.

must, therefore,be three terms, and

rule it is

only,
the

in the S.C.D.

For middle

the
term

Syllogism. keeping of this

be not

obviouslynecessary

ambiguous ; for if it is ambiguous, it is not one in all. four terms term, but two, so that the syllogism contains The fallacy is in caused four terms a syllogism technically by using called quaternioterminorum, or the fallacy terms. of four
Rules (ii.)
A

of Distribution. (as expressed in

as

third rule
"

"

the Rule

of Mediation

terms

of

and distribution)is ordinarily

RULE
OF

convenientlyknown
be distributed

the FIRST

DISTRIBUTION.
:

Rule III.
The the

The

middle in

term

must

once

at least.
as technically

involved fallacy
we

breakingthis
term

rule is known has not been

fallacy of Undistributed Middle.

say

When either

that the middle

distributed

in

of to this : that some premiss,our statement, in brief,comes have been term the objectsextensivelyindicated by the middle of identified with, or distinguished from, objectsindicated by one the extremes, and some, again,identified with objectsindicated by the other ; but the statement does not imply that objectsindicated indicated objects by the two extremes have been referred to the same has been there that the in term middle does fact,imply by not,
"

any

mediation
the
'

at all.

Consider

following premisses:
All swallows
are

fond of insects.' fond of insects.' fond

there

'

All

hedgehogsare
'

Here
in both

the

predicate
so are
'

creatures
are

of insects
is

'

is undistributed

premisses.
'

Swallows
the
two
'

stated to be
no

some

of these

crea

tures, and
that

hedgehogs;
in
are

but
cases
'

ground for supposing

the
'

the
'

some

refers to
are

same

creatures.
no

Between connexion

All P's

M^s possible.To insist

and
*

and

All S's there

M^'s

there is

logical

that

is would the

be to violate the

Postulate

of Mediation
See

to go
'

beyond
Unorthodox

accepteddata.
Syllogisms.'

Chapter XXVIII.,

CHAP.

XXII.]

RULES

OF

THE

SYLLOGISM other rules, is customarily called the

all the

The finds

of Inference, though implied in Principle

its

embodiment explicit
OF

in what

SECOND Rule

RULE

DISTRIBUTION.
a

IV.

If

term

is distributed in

the

conclusion,it
in
one

must

have

previouslydistributed premisses.
been
term must
one

of

the

To
was

say
not

that

no

be

distributed

in the

conclusion

that

distributed in
we

of the

is only another premisses

saying that
about have duce all the

not, in the conclusion, make any indicated objects by a term when in the premisseswe
must to
some a

of way statement

only referred
in the
no

of them reference We

"

that i.e.,

we

must

not

intro the the

conclusion

to

make premisses data. accepted The

statement.

objects concerningwhich must not trespass beyond

is called that
an

process then its partial, minor when

are

fallacyinvolved of the major when

in its

in

it is the

breaking this rule major term

an

illicit

is used

first in

total,extension, and
term

illicit process in this way.

of

the

it is the minor

that
name

is treated

Both

fallacies

included

under

the

of Illicit Process.

(iii.) Quality Rules.

for brevity's these five rules we sake, to discussing propose, of the expressions a class,' two classes,' use etc., in the sense in two the objects contained in a class,' the objects contained such expressionsas classes respectively,' state etc. ; and where of nonof relation,' statement ment of identity,' statement to be we inconveniently cumbersome, identity would propose words the substitute for them relation,' identity,' nonetc. identity,' We may the QualityRules of the Syllogismby the following justify In
' '
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

considerations
There
are

but

two

possible ways
of two classes of relation
must

in
to

which,
one

from the

statements
same

regarding the
class,we
those
two
can

relations infer
a

and

third

classes.

We

identity or non-identitybetween from identityof relation to a argue

relations
to
a

relation

or of identity,

from

non-identity of
to

relation

of non-identity.
Either the relations be
so

of P

M
as

and

S to M,

as

stated in the pre

the inference that

misses, must
or

far identical
are

to necessitate

the classes S and those the

same

or wholly) identical, (partly

relations must
that the

be

so

far non-identical S and P

are

as

to necessi

tate

inference

classes

or (partly wholly)

non-identical.

An

inference
as

from

identity
as

of
an

relations inference

to

relation

of

non-

is identity

inconceivable

from

non-identityof

220

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
statements

[VII. ii. which

it is

relations to the
and it is

relation of
the infer

identity. From
to

identityof
from

relations of P
a

and

S to M

imply evidently

to impossible

statements

non-identitybetween S and P ; implying the non-identityof those relations

relation

of

to infer that S and P stand to one-another evidentlyimpossible in a relation of identity. Thus, if premisses of the same quality give any conclusion, it must be affirmative qualitygive any ; and if premisses of differing vice be negative. And, affirmative conclusion, it must versa, an and conclusion can be inferred only from premisses of like quality, of unlike quality. This a negative conclusion only from premisses Rules V., VI., and VIII. justifies that if two negativepremisses With regard to Rule VII., we see that can give any conclusion,that conclusion must be affirmative between state an S and P. Now, such is, it must identity-relation be inferred from can an only premisses which identity-relation imply the identityof the relations between P and M and between in this But S and M. two negative premisses imply no more,
"

respect,than

that

these relations

so

far resemble

one

another

that

non-identity. And the relation of nonthat so being purelynegative,admits of infinite variety, identity, they
the
are

both

relations of

this involves no resemblance of such as implied statement P and M and between S and M that the relations between implication have with one another any positive Thus, two identitywhatever.

of relations from which negativepremissesdo not imply an identity relation of identity can be inferred. An identity-relation any that the between S and P can be inferred only from statements and the -relations with one classes S and P both stand in identity furnished M ; and not these statements are same by third-class, affirma two from no Thus, negativepremisses. negativepremisses tive conclusion And since the premisses are of like be drawn. can quality,and therefore,as we have seen, a negative conclusion is
it impossible,

follows that

no

conclusion
have

can

be drawn
that

at all. This

they mustquality i.e., in discussing be either both affirmative or both negative. But be negative. that both have Rule VII. we shown they cannot Hence they must both be affirmative, and Rule IX. is justified. Rule VIII. Of the five quality-rules, the two last are derivative.
be of like
"

Rule VII. justifies With regard to Rule IX., we affirmative the premisses must

seen

if the conclusion

is

is

impliedin

Rule

according to they so, the conclusion would be affirmative. Again, Rule IX. is impliedin Rule VI., for if the conclusion is not negative,then, according to Rule VI., there can be no negative be would there such a premiss,the conclusion premiss ; were negative.

then, V., for if the conclusion is not affirmative, be affirmative ; were Rule V., both premisses cannot

CHAP.

XXIL]
Rule that

RULES

OF

THE

SYLLOGISM

221

nothing can be inferred from two negative pre misses is apt to cause difficulty. Arguments can be framed which, at first sightto be syllogistically though they violate this rule,seem
The

sound" What E.g.,

is not M. P. is not
'

is not

P.

S is not
.-.

Sis not

Here, however,
that have the
a

the

middle

term

M,'

but

'

Not-M,'
we

so

minor

premissis
case
"

reallyaffirmative.
;

Otherwise

should
no

terminorum quaternio
in this
one

and
the
not

though
two

the

argument
terms

would,

doubt,
an

be

valid"

middle

being

here

reducible to S.C.D.
The

yet

it would

be stated in the correct

form

of

syllogism.
in fact, applies only deal with three
to hold.
so

Rule,

form, and gistic

long as we keep terms only. If we

birds. unable
to

to strict

syllo looselyallow

four terms, the rule

ceases

All E.g., Some

bats

are-not are-not

All bats
,".

creatures
use
'

that

can

fly. flyare-not
'

birds.
'
'

This
tures

argument

makes

of four

terms
can

"

birds,' bats,'

crea

unable to

and fly,'

creatures

that

not is,therefore,

amenable

to rules which

in strict expressed and

form. syllogistic
obtain
, ,
.

also the

conclusion, we
All bats All bats
are are

fly.' And the reasoning apply only to arguments Obverting both the premisses valid the followingstrict and

syllogism :

not-birds.
not-

(unableto fly)
that
can can

are (i.e.,
.-.

creatures

fly).
not-birds.

Some

creatures
no

that

flyare

But

now

the

are premisses

longernegative.

(iv.)Quantity Rules.
Rule X.
:

Two

particular premissesprove nothing.

of two

The
are

combinations abstractly possible

breaks the rule of

premisses particular

00, II, 10/01.

00
10 II breaks

Negative Premisses (Rule VII.). (Rule III.). and 01, containing, as they do, only one distributed term apiece,leave no term to be distributed in the conclusion
the first rule of Distribution if the first rule of Distribution Hence the conclusion inferred
must

be
a

is to be observed. (Rule III.) I (Rule IV.) an affirmative

"

conclusion

from

negative premiss
"

which

is

impossible(Rule IX.).

222

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
two

[VII.ii.

Though nothing can

in the usual
'

be inferred from
word
' '

sense

of the M's
are
'

particular propositions particular,' yet from the two

' '
"

P's,' Most M's are S's,' the conclusion most be drawn, Some P's S's are can being equivalent to than half.' The conclusion, however, is reallydrawn, in more universal last resort, from two propositions. For let C represent the M's that the premisses assert S's and P's,* and to be both

pluratives Most
' '

which

have

thus been
Then

stated implicitly

to

belong

to

the

extensions
"

of both classes.

the

above-given argument is equivalentto

are are

All C's All C's

.-.

P's. S's.
are

Some

S's

P's

(Fig.3, Darapti).

Example
Most

dogs Most dogs

.-.

are are

Some

creatures

worrying cats. sticks. fond of fetching fond of fetching sticks

fond of

are

creatures

fond

of

worrying

cats.

Let C represent the dogs that of both the misses to be members

are

asserted implicitly
: following

in the pre

in question. Then majorities

the

argument

is

equivalentto the virtually

are are

All the
All
.-.

dogs C the dogs C

fond of

worrying cats. sticks. fond of fetching

etc.

Again, in

the

syllogism
"

Some Some
.-.

M's
M's

are are

P's. S's.
P's.

Some

S's

are

if the
to

'

Some
same

M's

'

in the
as

one
'

premiss
Some M's
'

are

intended

be the
'

M's

the

in the other

by the arguer premiss,then

'

the M's

Some argument, though incorrectlyexpressed, is valid. all the objectswhich this class represents a definite class,and
are

contains

stated
Middle which
runs

to

be

both
not

P's
occur.

and

S's.

Thus
'

the

fallacyof

Undistributed
middle the
'

does

term

has
'

been
All

Let C represent the common labelled Some M's.' Then incorrectly

are

argument
S's
are

:
'
"

C's

P's,'

'

All

C's

are

S's '; therefore

Some
*

P's

in Fig. 3 (Darapti). syllogism

one

If two

within majorities would of the

we

and
sum

extension

be less than M's have

the been

fore

some

the whole did not overlap, extension same of its parts, and this is impossible. There S's and P's, and asserted to be both implicitly the

these M's

call C's.

224

THE

PROBLEM the

OF

LOGIC

[VII.ii.
the criteria of

We

proceed now

to

of practical application

which we validity logical possess in the Rules of the S.C.D. Syllo forms of Syllogism. of the 256 possible sifting gism to the logical of If any one of these forms of reasoningis such as to break none the rules of the S.C.D. Syllogism,the form is valid ; if it breaks
any
one

of them, it is invalid.

The I.

Discovery of

the

Valid

Forms.

first plot down the sixtywe Disregardingvarieties of figure, with view to eliminatingthose a moods, abstractlypossible in every figure.* which are illogical four
AAA IAA

E^A
EAI EAE

OAA OAI OAE OAO OIA Oil OIE 010 OEA

OEI

AAI
AAE

IAI
IAE

AAO
AIA

IAO
IIA III HE

EAO
EIA EII EIE

All
AIE

AIO
AEA AEI

110
IEA IEI IEE

EIO EEA
EEI EEE

AEE AEO AOA AOI AOE AOO We

now :

OEE OEO OOA OOI OOE 000

IEO
IOA

EEO EOA EOI

EOE

101 IOE 100 cancel

EOO
all moods

proceed to

guiltyof

the

following

fallacies

(1) Two negativepremisses. (2) Two particular premisses. (3) One negativepremiss,affirmative conclusion. (4) Negative conclusion,two affirmative premisses. (5) One particular premiss,universal conclusion.
As the result of these So far
the
reason we eliminations, are

left with

twelve

moods

still to be tested in each of the four

we

figures.
to the two

have

not that

had

recourse are

rules of

distribution,

unless the generallyapplicable of the But in the single is known well as the mood. case as figure have which mood be rejectedfor breaking a mood IEO we a may rule of distribution figure. apart from any reference to a particular

being

they

not

For

a
'

much A

Welton,

neater, but, from Manual of Logic,' Bk.

our point of view, less appropriatemethod, vol. i.,pp. 319-322. IV., ch. iii.,

see

CHAP.

XXIL]
the
as

RULES 0
I

OP

THE

SYLLOGISM
its the major predicate,

225

For
but

conclusion
is

distributes in any

term

this term

cannot
an

which premiss, of the Major.

figurebe distributed in the major Illicit Process there is invariably proposition,

are

Eliminating IEO,
moods
:

we

left with

the

eleven unrejected following

AAA,

AAI, AEE, IAI; OAO.

have
now

AEO,

All,

AGO

EAE,

EAO,

EIO

II. We

to find out
'

in which
'

of the

four
"

these figures
we i.e.,

eleven

unrejectedor
how many the

to find out

are legitimate of Syllogism are forms

moods

valid

have

valid

in any

given

figure. Plottingdown

we figure-schemes,

have

"

We

now

take

each

of the

eleven

moods

in turn,

and

put

it in

distributive form.
du dd
;

Thus, AAA

EE

du du

EIO

uu?
ud

etc.

Comparing

the

distribution-scheme
we

of

AAA

with

each

of

the

in turn, figure-schemes

cancel

this mood

it is guilty either of undistributed

middle

or

in any figure in which of illicitprocess of the

major

or

the minor

term.

du

M" with S" S"

P M P

Thus, comparing

du du

we

see

that

none

of

these

rules

is broken.

AAA

is therefore

valid in

Fig. I.
du P" M ^

Again, comparing

du du

with

S-P

we

see

that in

there

is

undistributed

middle.

AAA

is

therefore
15

invalid

Fig. II.

226

THE

PROBLEM du

OF
M"

LOGIC
P

[VII.ii.

Again, comparing

du du

with

M"

and

with

S"

P"

P" M
"

S
P

we

see

that

there

is in each

case

the

of fallacy

S"

minor. illicit

III. and IV. is therefore invalid in Figs. six of the Proceeding in this way, we find that in each figure that in all have moods we valid,so are twenty-fourvalid legitimate AAA of

forms
from This

Syllogism. Of
forms
"

these, five
which

are

known
that

as

subaltern

or

weakened

i.e., forms
which
warrant

draw

conclusions particular
are

premisses
can,

conclusions

universal.

conclusion is a universal of course, be realized only when of Syllogism that has a universal con legitimate ; and to every form weakened clusion there will correspond a form, with conclusion of the
same

quality.
AAA
EAE

Thus,

EAE AEE
AEE

gives AAI gives EAO gives EAO gives AEO gives AEO
in

in in in in in

Fig. I. Fig. I. Fig. II. Fig. II. Fig. IV.

are

no

Since all conclusions form. weakened

The nineteen forms

Fig. III.

Fig. III. particular,

can

have

which

are

found convenientlytabulated the Traditional Logic :

in

only valid but the followingmnemonic

not

strong
verses

are

of

; Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioqueprioris Baroco secundai ; Cesare, Camestres, Festmo, Tertia Darapti, Disarms, Datisi,Felapton, addit Bocardo, Ferison habet ; Quarta Instiper Fresison. Bramantlp, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo,

Each which
form
or

of
inform

these

time-honoured

names

contains three

three

vowels
"

us, concerning each to the of Syllogism that answers

of the

of propositions
it is

the

name,
us

whether

A, E, I,

0.
a

Thus, the mnemonic

form
in

is

Ferison,for instance, Fig. III.,having major premiss E, minor premiss I,

verses

tell

that

and Of
or

conclusion
these

O. forms
four

nineteen

are

known

as

forms, strengthened
is
a

syllogisms.A strengthened

form strengthened^

strong

or

CHAP.

XXII.]
weakened

EULES
form

OF
which

THE

SYLLOGISM
iwo

227

non-

premisses to when a particularconclusion Darapt; only one, is needed. prove and Felapton in Fig. III.,Fesapo and Bramantip in Fig. IV. are forms. If these excluded from the list we are left are strengthened
with fifteen
nor
'

employs

universal

fundamental

'

forms,

valid

forms

that

are

neither

weakened
each
same

the

strengthened. The followingcomparison between of the forms strengthened forms and the fundamental conclusion will serve to bring out figurethat have the same character of the former. superfluous
of the

MaP

Thus, Darapti, MaS

SiP

is
,

obviouslynot

so

adequate

or

economical

MiP
a

MaP
}

form

as

Disamis, MaS
SiP

or

Datisi, MiS
SiP

MeP

MoP
;

Again, Felapton, MaS

SoP

is less effective than

Bocardo, MaS,
SoP

or

MeP

Ferison, MiS_.

SoP"
PeM PeM

So,

in

Fig. IV., Fesapo, MaS

SoP

is less effective
,

than

Fresison,

PeM

PaM
; and

PiM

MiS SoP

Bramantip,

MaS
,

less effective than

Dimaris, MaS.
SiP

SiP

CHAPTER
VII.

XXIII.
STRUCTURE OF THE S.C.D. SYLLOGISM.

EXERCISES (iii.)

ON

THE

Exercise

1.

"

Show

that

there cannot

be

more

than

four

syllogistic
in which

figures.
The the M

number
be

of

is figures

limited
can

to the

number

of position may

the middle

term

be varied

of ways in the two

premisses.

four subject or predicatein either premiss,thus offering in

variations possible

position.

228
Exercise 2.

THE
Prove
one

PROBLEM
that

OF

LOGIC

[VII.iii.
in the

"

there must

always be
more

premisses
term

distributed term
in the

than

in the conclusion.
one
"

If Middle
or

no
"

term must

is distributed be
term

conclusion, yet

the

distributed

in the

premisses.
as

And

if the
must

major
be dis

the

minor

is distributed

in the

conclusion, it
the middle

tributed also in the

Exercise 3.
"

premisses,as well

term.

If

major premiss in Fig. I. were particular what ? would be committed affirmative, fallacy
in the

the

P,
the

being undistributed
The
must

major,
must

must

be undistributed

in

conclusion.

conclusion also be
in both

therefore the minor

of undistributed

therefore be affirmative, and The is affirmative. middle term

the

therefore undistributed middle.

If the what

premisses,and

fallacyis

that

Exercise

4.

"

major premiss in Fig. II. would be committed fallacy

in the

were

particular,
also

P, being undistributed
in the
are

major, must
have

be undistributed Both

conclusion,which

is therefore
we

affirmative. the

premisses

and therefore affirmative,

of undistributed fallacy

middle. Exercise
5.

"

Why

is it that four

the

moods

EAO,

EIO

are

valid in

all the The

? figures

question is equivalent to the following: Given that the be utilized conclusion is 0, why is it that the premissesEA, El can all the it in ? four to prove figures The conclusion P is distributed in the major, but, as 0, being be either subjector predicatethere. the major is E, P may Again, need in the not be distributed M, being already distributed major,
in the either minor. Therefore the minor may be in the and either A
or

I ; and

be

MS

or

SM,

as

S is undistributed
may

conclusion. the minor MS

or

Hence

the

major

be MP

or

PM,

SM.

Therefore,
Exercise

etc.

6.-" Detect

the

problem :
find out

fallacyin the followingsolution of the the Given major premiss particular,

the minor is

whether

A, E, I, or 0.
must

Since the

major
the

is

the given particular, is the particular, in the

must

minor

be universal. is

Again,

since

major

conclusion

particular.
also

Therefore

S is undistributed
Therefore

conclusion,and
be
an

therefore

in the minor. since minor This The the the

the minor

affirmative universal,
Therefore the

negative universal

distributes both terms.

is A.

conclusion, though correct, has been incorrectlydrawn. in inferring that, because S is undistributed in fallacyoccurs in the minor therefore be undistributed conclusion, it must

CHAP.

XX1IL]

EXERCISES This inference

not to

ON

THE

SYLLOGISM

229"

premiss.*
were

would, however,
weakened the

be valid if the conclusion It is true that in

known
case

be

conclusion.

the

of

Bramantip regarded
as

major
in the

term,
form

which

is undistributed But
:

in the conclusion, is distributed

major premiss.
in this conclusion

Braman that
can

tip may
drawn in

be

weakened

sense

its be

conclusion

is the

weak the

converse same

of the

which

Fig. I. from
with

premisses.
out

In

connexion

the

working
S.C.D.

structure

in relation to

the

syllogistic Syllogism,the followinghints

of exercises
on

may

be found In (i.) the take

to be of service.

these What (ii.)

working out for granted only,

of

of these the Rules

to exercises,it is permissible

of the S.C.D.

Syllogism,and

is not to be taken the

as

given :
in each
to

(a) Knowledge
mnemonic

valid forms
are

verses

be used

only as

figure. The a reference,

or answers.

for purposes of identification and the correctness in testing as a check Hence the
a

nomenclature,
of one's
mere

result

based moods value from

on solely

reference

to

list of the
no

which
at

are

figureis of
be reasoned

all.

valid in any Results must

out

the rules of the

given always S.C.D. Syllo

gism.
called the Special Figures,sometimes should not be used Rules of the Syllogism. These the for direct reasoning based substitute on as a generalRules of the Syllogism. The solution of a problem in Formal Logic should not (iii) It should be regarded as an experimental process. the implications of the given data proceedby developing till the required solution actually unfolds itself. The of discussion a problem should always take syllogistic

(6) The

Rules

of the

the

form

of

direct in

series

of necessary

inferences, and
number of

should not
moods.

consist

a testing experimentally

Thus
certain

if,in

an

exercise

on

the

S.C.D.
do

quite general data, which then the or figure, fulfilled the conditions in which are or figure figures the middle from the given data the respective of positions
reference to mood
'

given involve not specific any the best way of discovering Syllogism,we
are

is to
term

infer
in the

Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, An Beginners imagine sometimes

term

'

which
course,

is distributed
not

that in the

This

is, of

the
no

case.

to Logic,'ch. xii.,p. 252, footnote: Introduction if of illicit process is committed the fallacy in the conclusion. undistributed is premiss information than is not on more I must presume

given me,

but there is

reason

why

I should

not

xise

less.'

230

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. iii.

the figurefrom premisses. This is equivalent to discovering surest first principles.It is invariablythe shortest,neatest, and at and whenever aimed be of should method always procedure, possible.
two

The

two

exercises following

may

serve

to illustrate this

important figure

point :
1. If the minor and the is

premiss of
?

syllogismbe 0, what
the conclusion in the is

is the

mood 0.
must

The
the

minor
term

Therefore be

0.

Therefore

major premiss. But the major must be since the minor premiss is negativeand particular, Thus the major is A ; and, since P is affirmative and universal. major
distributed
the order of distributed, its terms is PM. in the

Again, M
in the

being undistributed
and is
must
an

major,
the

must

be distributed
in

minor,
minor is

therefore

be

predicatein the minor,

the order of terms
in

since the the minor

0
the
a

SM,

and

proposition. Hence is Baroco syllogism

affirmative

Fig. II.
form

2. Prove

that

universal
in

propositioncan

the conclusion Both

Fig. I. only.

and premissesmust be universal affirmative, consequently their distribute only subjects. in the conclusion,must be distributed Now S, being distributed the minor premiss. in this case, be the subjectof in i.e., the in This to be distributed leaves M major, of which it is therefore the subject.
"

"

We

therefore get MaP Barbara SaM, i.e.,

SaP in

Fig.I.

CHAPTER
VrII. THE (iv.)

XXIV.
AND THE FORM.

ANALYSIS ARGUMENTS

OF

SYLLOGISMS, INTO
SYLLOGISTIC

REDUCTION

OF

handling, may presented for logical form or requirereducing syllogistic indis is an form into such form. Reduction to strict syllogistic to the application of the Rules of the S.C.D. pensable preliminary of tests Syllogism as logical validity. An important form of unsyllogized argument goes by the name of Enihymeme.
A

CATEGORICAL
be

argument,

as

either

already expressed in

232

THE
that

PROBLEM

OF
the

LOGIC

[VII. iv.

is a defective Enthymeme and its logical correction consists in supplyingthe omitted syllogism, in proposition such a way that the argument becomes syllogistically valid. This is, of course, not always possible.If a particular premiss is given, for instance, with a universal conclusion, the possibly be expanded into a valid pseudo-enthymeme cannot syllogism. If a negative premiss is given with an affirmative interest
save

of

validity
"

conclusion,there is not are non-combatants, for

sion may

the
no

same

E.g., hopelessness.
are

'

All children the conclu

com

children the

soldiers.'
'

Here

be obverted

into

form
'

All

children

are-not
are

batants,' and the omitted major is All combatants the argument being in Camestres (Fig.II.).
As transitional between
we

soldiers,'

may
'

note

Enthymeme and the Syllogism proper such arguments as the following :

the

Some

plantsare
'

parasites for example,Mistletoe.'

"

expression for example implies both that Mistletoe is a plant and also that it is a parasite. Hence there is no premiss actuallyomitted ; the argument is abbreviative rather than defec tive. It may be fullystated thus :
the Mistletoe
Mistletoe
.-.

Here

'

is is

a a

parasite.

plant.
parasites(Darapti).
the
sentence following
some : are

Some

plants are
is

similar

argument

suppliedby

The
not

example
the

of Demosthenes

shows

that

orators

made,

born. Where
valid.

or defective,it may given argument is not logically to reduced not be syllogismsare necesEnthymemes may valid for made are through the very process of sarityvalid, they it is, of course, otherwise But remedying their defectiveness.

where
case

the argument is from the outset the first step must be to reduce

stated. completely the

In

this

argument

into

strict

care form, particular being taken to place the three syllogistic relative places. in their proper propositions is for no No experience painless Example,. patience pleasant, is patience, and no are pleasant. experiences painful for the proposition No painful experiences are Substituting All pleasantex its obverted pleasant (experiences) converse, obtain the argument : we periencesare non-painful experiences,'
"

'

'

'

All
All
.".

experiencesare pleasant
of

experiences. non-painful
instances of

are-not painless experiences

patience.

All instances

patienceare-not

experiences. pleasant

If

we a

this is hibits

' that ' painless is equivalentto ' non-painful,' assume may valid argument in Camenes (Fig.IV.). Otherwise it ex

terminorum. quaternio

CHAP.

XXIV.]

THE

ANALYSTS
is

OF

SYLLOGISMS
what

When

an

argument
not

in presented that

form,
is

we

must

suppose

to be appears the first, in order, of the

the major premiss. The necessarily the major term. that contains Example : ^11 fungi are plants. Some
.-.

syllogistic; premisses major premiss is the premiss

fungi are

Some

plantsare

microscopicorganisms. microscopicorganisms.
of this

By considering the conclusion

to state

argument
the

we

are

able at term,
"

once

which
is
'

is the

major and
the

which

minor

for

the
case

major
the

term

always
the

of the predicate Thus

must
:

conclusion
the

in this

term

microscopic organisms.'
major term,
thus

second

premiss,
The

since it contains
true

be the

major premiss.

then, stands syllogism,

Some All
.-.

fungi

Some

microscopicorganisms. plants. plants are microscopicorganisms (Disamis,Fig. III.). fungiare

are

The

order of the

of the
vided

argument
nor

cannot, of course, premisses of the the applicability or

it
even

affect the rules of the

validity
S.C.D.

Syllogism;
that

does
take

we

the

labellingof the mood, pro of deciding,as above, precaution preliminary

affect the and which
to

which
In

premiss is the
the

major
of

the minor. strict

reduction

arguments

form, syllogistic;
is

th"" the

mood

should figure and Formal mood, figure, and

be stated if the

argument

valid,and

if it is invalid. fallacy

EXAMPLES.

Example
and that
no

1.
"

Since

we

must

admit

that

all

are plants

not

least

poodles are are poodles. This argument may be

All

petunias,it follows
written thus
:

that

some

petunias, plants at

poodlesare-not
plants are-not plantsare

Some
.-.

petunias. petunias.
in

Some the

poodles.
Fig.II.,the fallacybeing

Here

we

have

that of two

KOI pseudo-syllogism negativepremisses.

"

Example 2. No sopheras well. Xow

It

one we

can

be

great logicianwithout
that Aristotle
was

being a philo
a

must

admit

philosopher.
runs

follows, then, that Aristotle is a great logician. in strict logical This argument, when form, expressed
All
are great logicians was was a a

thus

philosophers.

Aristotle
.-.

philosopher.
great logician.
:

Aristotle in

This is AAA

Fig. II.

Fallacy

Undistributed

middle.

234

THE

PROBLEM
stars.

OF

LOGIC Therefore

[VII.iv.

Example
mitted

3.
a

"

Only
sun,
:

suns a

are

Sirius,being

ad

to be

is also

star.

Logical form

(a) All
.-.

stars

are a a

suns. sun.

Sirius is Sirius is
in

star.

This, again,is AAA

Or"

Fig. II.

Fallacy:

Undistributed

middle.

(6) All
.-.

not-suns

are-not
a

stars.

Sirius is-not Sirius is

a

not-sun.

star.

This is EEA

in

Fig.I.
Since

Fallacy: TAVO negativepremisses.

seaweeds,
it follows that
some

Example, 4.
plants
Here
'

"

only plantsare

are

not

the

green, for all seaweeds are not green. conclusion of the argument must be
'

the

introduced
green not are

by

it follows

that.' the

Therefore

the

proposition is major term

' '

Therefore (things).'

which, in green things,' seaweeds are-not green things' ;

Some Some seaweeds
are

major premiss is All seaweeds strict logicalform, reads Some and we obtain as our syllogism:
green

are-not

things.

All seaweeds
.-.

plants.
green

are-not plants

things.

This is a valid argument

in Bocardo

(Fig. III.).

The A
what

Fallacyof Four

Terms. the be

given argument
we

is not

invalid because necessarily

it has It may

form

in which

that four terms. to express is incorrect is not the argument, but our pseudo-distributional

happen

syllogism.
does not
found
case

If so, the syllogism must involve the fallacy. Thus an contain

be

recast

into will

form

that

to the
'

the

four

terms

argument S, P, M, and

frequentlybe
In

not-M.

this

frequentlybe transferred to the copula by obversion, leavinga three-term sjdlogism. Again, a not infrequent mistake that it not is that of stating, with regard to a syllogism, only has four terms, but also breaks such and such rules. But if S.C.D. Syllogism,*then, when we once an by syllogismwe mean iiave convicted so-called of a a quaternioterminorum, syllogism it is sufficiently then be and it must stamped as non-syllogistic, futile to convict it of breaking any other rule of the Syllogism.
not

'

may

'

'

Vide

supra,

p. 216.

CHAP.

XXIV.]
:

THE

ANALYSIS

OF

SYLLOGISMS

235

Example
No

one

is

contemptible but
are are

Some
.-.

cowards cowards

not

contemptuous. contemptuous.

the

Some

not

contemptible.

All Some
.-.

non-contemptuous
cowards cowards have
'

persons

are-not

contemptible persons.
persons.

are-not are-not terms

contemptuous

Some
we

contemptible persons.
;

Here
'

four

but

the that

inference
we

is not
not

that
a

the

syllogism
all. We
an

is

invalid,but simply
recast

have

yet

syllogism
correct

at

must

this

seeming

syllogisminto

the

form

of
All

S.C.D.

: S}rllogism

non-contemptuous persons are-not Some cowards are non-contemptuous

cowards
are-not

contemptible persons.
persons.

.-.

Some

contemptible persons

(Fig.I.,Ferio).

Or"
All

contemptible persons
cowards cowards
are-not are-not

Some Some

contemptuous persons. contemptuous persons. contemptible persons (Fig.II.,Baroco).

are

CHAPTER
VII.

XXV.
OF RULES. THE FOUR

(v.) USES

AND

CHARACTERISTICS
THE SPECIAL

FIGURES"

FIGURE
A
GLANCE

I. will show that

serves are

at

the

mnemonic

verses

Fig.

I.

gives

conclusions

in all the four forms, and

or or denial, partial

therefore total. We

of affirmation in
to

every purpose therefore able,

or

Fig. I.,to
support

make them
or

universal
;
we are

statements,
also
to

affirmative contradict
our

and negative,

able

to

affirmative

negative, and
is the
are

support

statement, any denial in this same

figure.
Further, Fig. I.
cate

in only figure

which

the

subjectand predi
the

of the

conclusion
which
course

in subjectand predicate respectively

premisses in puts it, the

'

they occur, so that, as Professor Carveth Read an of argument has, in its mere easy expression,

and

natural

236

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. v.

FIGURE In

II.

Fig. II. only negative conclusions can be proved, so that its is greatly restricted as use compared with, that of Fig. I. Still, where suggestedassertions about a given subject have to be rejected, the use of the Second Figure is more natural than that of the First.
Thus the question may
is
a we

be

'

Can

we

accept
'

the

statement
we

that this

plant
for
not

have

Dicotyledon?' and the alreadyaccepted the

a

answer

No,

must

rejectit

statement

that

this

plant does

possess

character

common

to all

Dicotyledons.'

All

two primary leaves,and are Dicotyledons plantspossessing only two. This plant is-not a plant possessingtwo primary leaves and

.-.

only two. This plant is-not

Dicotyledon(Camestres).

Thus
we can

of it the figure of denial. Fig.II. is essentially By means go on denying a succession of disjunctively acceptedpredi

cations until,by a process of exclusion, we enabled to accept are the one that remains. Thus Fig. II. may predication play an im

portant part

in the service of the

DisjunctiveSyllogism.

FIGURE In this undoubted for it is both

III.

be proved. Its one conclusions can figure only particular with singular advantage is seen in dealing propositions ; the only figure in which in the singular be name can subject

premisses.
:

Example

Socrates Socrates
.-.

is is

a a

warrior.

One

philosopher. at least is a philosopher

warrior

(Darapti).

FIGURE
The

IV.

Fourth

Figure
no

inclusion is necessary theory. It formed

was

by logiciansonly because its for the structural completeness of syllogistic part in the logical system of Aristotle,but
is tolerated centuries later.

added

by

Galen

some

fectlyvalid form

reasoning,and, as exclude it from the Syllogism. Thus, Mr. Joseph, who starts by of the fourth the is forms introduce to rejecting figure, compelled them of Fig. I.'* indirect moods as It is easy to show that in no case can Fig.IV. improve on Fig. I.
'

of

It is,however, a per such, resists the effort to

See

'An

Introduction

to

Logic,'ch. xii.,pp. 246, 258,

261 ; ch. xiv., p. 301.

CHAP.

XXV.]

THE

FOUR

FIGURES

237

of Bramantip, Camenes, and Dimaris, the pre For, in the case at once misses, when transposed, give conclusions in Fig. I. in the and the reasoning forms Barbara, Celarent, and Darii respectively,
in these latter forms has that easy flow which is

entirely lacking in

Fig. IV., where Subject and Predicate in the conclusion are respec tively Predicate and Subject in the premisses. Moreover, in the than the conclusion of Bramantip, the conclusion is weaker case the same in Fig. I. from drawn premisses. Thus, given precisely All grasses are the statements, All mono monocotyledons,' and the conclusion in flowering-plants,' cotyledons are Fig. IV. is the weak Some of the con are converse flowering-plants grasses,' clusion in Fig.I., All grasses are flowering-plants.' As regardsFesapo and Fresison, the former, as a strengthened
' ' '
'

'

'

form, is inferior in effectiveness to Fresison

Ferio Ferio
over

; and

Fresison

itself is it is

again

with

the

premisses simply converted

and

; but

with
to

inferior

its easy flow rendered to that extent is awkward, IV. all forms is its in less it. Hence effective a Fig. than

instrument

Fig. I.
Rules Special has figures of the

The
Each the
more

of the
own

Four

Figures.
from the

of the four
of the

its

deducible rules, special

in

generalrules

Syllogism

conjunction with

form specific

figure.

FIGURE Rule
1. The

I. be

minor If

premiss must
it be

affirmative.
be

Proof :

let possible, Then the and

negative.
must

major
the

affirmative
must

VII.), (Rule VI.).

conclusion

be

(Rule negative

Jr
IS
"

,;

Therefore buted in

the the

major

term

will

be

undistri
in

premiss
have

and

distributed

the

conclusion, and we major (Rule IV.).

cannot

the the

fallacy of
minor
must

illicit

Hence

premiss
therefore

be

negativein Fig. I.,and

be

affirmative.

Rule

2. The

major premiss must

The minor is there

be universal.

Proof :

premiss being affirmative, the

undistributed,and
this
must

middle

term

therefore

be distributed in the
But it is

major premiss(Rule III.).

subject in

premiss.

Hence

the

major

premiss must

be universal.

238

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII.

v.

FIGURE Rule
1. One

II.

premiss

must

be

negative.
will

g~M

Otherwise Hence the

there

be
in

undistributed

middle.

conclusion

Fig. II.

must

always be

negative (Rule VI.).

Rule

2.

The
:

major premiss
The conclusion

must

be universal. P
is

Proof

being negative,

distributed

there, as, therefore, also in the major premiss (Rule IV.). Hence, since P is subject there,that

premiss

is universal.

FIGURE Rule
1. The minor

III. be

premiss
were

must

affirmative.

Proof
M
"

If

"

would be negative, the conclusion the major premiss affirmative. negative, and But illicit major (Rule 4). Hence involves tms be affirmative. *ke mmor premiss must it

Rule

2.

The
:

conclusion As the

must

be

particular.
is

Proof

affirmative,S is undis tributed there, being predicate, and is therefore in the conclusion also (Rule IV.). undistributed therefore be particular. must which
minor

premiss

FIGURE Rule Rule

Rule 1. If the 2. 3.

IV.

If the If

Rule The

4. If

affirmative,the minor is universal. minor affirmative,the conclusion is particular is negative, both premisses are the minor universal. either premiss is negative, the major is universal. major
is is may

proof of these rules

suitablybe

taken

as

an

exercise.

240

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. vi.
S and

relations between the possible exhaustivelyrepresenting

a

P,

fivefold scheme

of

propositions
:

1. S

wholly includes

P.

2. S is whollyincluded

by

P.

3. S coincides with P.

4. S

includes and partially excludes partially

P.

5. S

excludes P. entirely

THE

SO-CALLED

'

PRINCIPLES

'

or

THE

SYLLOGISTIC

FIGURES. View

1. Formal

Enunciations

of the Dicta, on the Class-inclusion of Statement-import.

has
as

The

of Fig. I. principle may

can

been

called
:

the Dictum

de Omni

et

Nullo, and //
we

be enunciated
assert

follows

excluded

of the whole of a class from, a second class,we can

whole class. has

that it is included in,

assert

or

the

same

of any

part of that
The ;md may

of Fig. II. principle be enunciated

can as

been
:

called

the

Dictum

de Diverso,

follows

// we

assert

of

one

class that it is included

in, and
may

of another
the

that it is excluded mutual exclusion

from,

third

we class,

also assert

of the

two

classes.

CHAP.XXVL]
The
et de

THE has

DICTA
been
as

241

of Fig. III. principle

may

called the Dictum follows

:

de

Exemplo

and Excepto,

be enunciated

// we

of two classes tJiat theyboth include one and the include also assert that theypartially third class, we can same the one that classes each other ; and if we assert of two can also can we includes a third class which the other excludes, assert that part of one of these classes is excluded from the
can

assert

other.

The
Its

of Fig.IV. has been called principle cumbrous formulation is necessarily so dicta have been

the Dictum that it

de
seems

Eeciproco.
idle to

present it.
These

formulations varying with the view given above the class-inclusion view of statement-importhas been adopted, both subject and predicatebeing treated as classes,and It follows from this way of interpreting both referred to collectively. is the class as indicated by the that the subject-class the Dicta in the premiss. Thus, in the premiss, subject-termas quantified
'

enunciated, the very variously of import adopted. In the

enunciations

All S is included class and

'

in
'

P,'
'

'

All S
'

'

is the

one

class,and
in
as

'

P
'

'

the other.

So, again,in the premiss, Some

the the the that
one

S is included

P,'
two

Some in

'

is

the other.

Where,

sometimes the

M subject-term
'

is

in quantified differently M.'

Fig.III., premisses,
to

third class
indicated

referred to in the Dictum

'

must

be

taken

be

by

Some

2. The A
must

Logical Status
that

of

the Dicta. be

in order logical principle, conditions : two satisfy

it may

efficiently regulative,

lead to unambiguous results, must Its application (i.) admit of being used as a criterion to test the It must (ii.)
ness

sound

of all relevant

cases.

Of these two
the Dicta. That (i.) results may, follows : as

requirementsit
the

is the firstalone which furnishes

et

is satisfied by

of application
case

the

Dicta

unambiguous
set forth

in the

of the Dictum

de Omni

Nullo, be (AllM)
is the
must

The All M Barbara

:

whole

class
in

is statedly

is P is M
P
=

included
.-.

the

class P.

All
All

S
^

Since

(All S)
in
we

statedlyconwhole admit class that

tained

(AllM),

it is included

in the class P. 16

242

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. vi.

M) is statedly The whole class (All excluded from the class P.

All M Celarent
:

is-not P is M
=

Since

(All S)
in
we

is

statedly con
whole admit the
class that

Al^S
AUS

tained

the
must

.-.

is-not P

(AllM),
P.

it is excluded

from

class

M) is statedly The whole class (All

All M Darii Some Some is S jsr S is P included Since tained
in the class P. is

(Some S)
in
we

statedlycon
whole admit class
that

the
must

(All M),

it is included

in the class P.

The All M is-not P

.

whole

class (All M) is statedly

from the class P. is

excluded Since Ferio Some Some S is M S is-not P tained

(Some S)
in
we

statedlycon
whole admit
the class that class

the
must

(AllM),
P.

it is excluded

from

Thus
forms

the Dictum of
; it

de Omni
to

Syllogismin
enables moods
us

to Nullo, when applied Fig. I.,leads in each case to an et

the

four

valid

unambiguous
correct
con

result
clusion in
'

draw

from

the

the premisses
' '

in

regardto

both
is
'

all four

qualityand quantity. The whole The All M.' part is either 'All S
'

class
'

'

or

be included in that in all four moods, in strict accordance And we see All M.' be asserted in All M is asserted of may with the Dictum, what Some S.' of the part All S or the same sense to fulfilthe first be shown de Diverso similarly The Dictum Some

S,' and

is stated

in each

minor

premiss to
'

'

'

'

'

'

may

requirement of
All S

Thus, if the class All P

logical principle. is statedlycontained

from,
each
a

in, and
must

the

class
that from

statedlyexcluded
are

third class M, other"

we

admit

they

excluded

from

i.e.,All S is excluded

All'P, or All

This is the reasoning of the form Camestres. S is-not P. to yield be shown similarly of the Dictum The may application in the of the remaining forms unambiguous results in the case of Baroco, the conclusion is that Second Figure. Thus, in the case All P and The

Some

S exclude
the

each other"

Some i.e.,

S is-not P.
as

part of de Exemplo, concerns Third Figure. We Darapti :

first We
assert

of Fig. III.,known principle of

illustrate its

the Dictum the

the three affirmative forms

may

in Syllogism in the case application that

of

of the two

classes S and

each includes

third

CHAP.

XXVI.]

THE Hence S and

P

DICTA
must

243 each

class

(AllM).

include partially

other

"

Some i.e.,
The
concerns

S is P. the Dictum de Excepto, known as principle, three negative forms of the Third Figure. We may in the case of Bocardo : application of the which
two

second part of the

the

illustrate its

We
class

assert

S classes,
excludes.
"

and

P,

that
we

S includes
can

third that

(Some M)

Hence

also assert

part of S is excluded
We (ii.)
even

from P
to

that Some i.e., that

tests
own

S is-not P.

have the

now narrow no

pointout
limits

as

or

within

of their

regulative principles, appropriateprovinces,

the Dicta the

have

value

whatsoever.

pseudo-forms of
forms. of of the

Syllogism in their They

are,

valid logically
ments

at

They cannot be used to sift from the figures respective state best, mere descriptive
of the valid forms in these

type

argument characteristic
are

their rules

several

for them.
us

figures.They In a word, they are

the Dictum de

Let

take

must we principle, expect it valid or invalid,that are of the form characteristic of syllogisms, I. for is it forward the not of Fig.I.' ? as Fig. ; principle put But the pseudo-syllogism AEE, Fig. I., expressed as suppose
'

from forms, not but figure-heads. principles Omni If it be a logical et Nullo. to be regulative with regard to all
not

abstracts

follows
to

'

All M

is

P,

All S is-not

M,

therefore Dictum

All S is-not

P,' desires

can by only reply that AEE, Fig. I., having, unfortunately, a negative minor, does not the for the conditions requisite Dictum's satisfy applicabilit}'. I not in Fig. I., and But,' says AEE, Fig. I., am are you not of Fig. I. ?' the Dictum, the principle I am No,' answers not the principle of Fig. I. altogether, but only a principle of the valid these moods after forms in Fig. I. I was only put in office over they had been sifted from the others. You therefore do not come under my jurisdiction.' This is perfectly just. AEE, Fig. I.,should have appliedto the SpecialRules,' Fig. I.,to have its inference tested. The Special Rules of any figure, far as they serve so any useful function other than that of the General Rules of the Syllogism,constitute the test of admission in question. No mood to the figure be ad can mitted among the valid forms of Fig.I. unless (1) its major premiss is universal, and (2)its minor premiss is affirmative. similar Precisely reasoning would show that the Dicta of the Second and Third Figures are but principles of the valid forms in their respective a nd therefore be employed to cannot figures,
' ' ' ' ' ' '

be

tested

this

principle.The

sift the valid forms Our is to draw

run fully

from

the invalid. that

is conclusion,therefore,

the sole function of

the Dicta

the proper conclusions from whatever premissessuccess the gauntletof the Rules of the Syllogismand the Special

Rules of the

Figures.
16"2

244

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VII. vi.

The

: then, is the following rightorder ofprecedence,

1. The

the Postulate Principle of Logical Validity and of Mediate in the definition of the Inferenceas embodied S.C.D. Syllogism. These are the true principles of syllo gistic reasoning.
General Rules

2. The 3. The

deduced

from

these. from the General

SpecialRules
Dicta. Dictum be claimed

deduced of the figures,

Rules. 4. The

N.B. Rules

"

The

de Omni
as

et Nullo
source

cumstances

the

any cir of the authorityof the special

not

should

under

impossibleto infer the latter from (as customary to do) without putting the cart The before the horse. Special Rules can be justified only by the taken General Rales i.e.,by the system of general collectively Figure.
the former
it is
"

of the First

It is

rules.

3. The The

Dictum

de Omni

et Nullo

in its relation

to Deduction.

function
or a

of this Dictum Deductive Method.

or

has

been

identified with
is defined

that
'

of
the

Deduction

Deduction

as

applying of

generallaw
this is

rule to

and cases,' particular of the Dictum. this

it is then It is,

pointedout
can

that

the function precisely

us

therefore, important for

be

to

examine

whether

contention

reasonably supported. Is it, we ask, the function of the ? to apply generallaws to particular cases Dictum that it is the moment for logically permissible to Assuming of Inference as that of apply characterize the function of a principle have still to ask whether the uni we ing a universal to particulars, is universal Dictum the versal which or applies any only a special
of universal.
This

kind

question can
is enunciated
or

be
on

unambiguously answered.
the class-inclusion it
can

In

so

far

as

the the

dictum

view, it is clear that

made
to

apply expressed in class-inclusion form. be adequately represented, Where can a law diagrammatically, by of one circle in another, or by the exclusion, the total inclusion to particular and total,of both, its application mutual cases may the Dictum. then be guaranteed by still based on the scholastic metaphysics of Now, if Science were the Middle Ages, it might be possibleto apply its laws uniformly But as Science stands to-daythe sugges in this very simple way. Laws that could be effectively tion is ridiculous. applied on the have to be sought, if anywhere, in those would Dictum principle still subsumed classification-tables in which under species are
are

only

universals
laws

laws

which be

possibly be

the

which

can

CHAP.

XXVI.]

THE

DICTA
has

245

the Dictum they are ' connotation-tables,' ; but as genera here no natural,direct applicability.
But makes there it is
a

even

further

and

more

limitation deep-reaching the

Dictum
can

which
an on

impossible to
view

allow
even

that the

apply, in
to

effective scientific way,

any

given

group of prepositional import be

"

small

of laws
it the

which,

Class-inclusion
is restricted.

view, the
We
ance

Identity view,

or

any

other

"

its function

in accord we express this limitation when say that a law, applied the with the Dictum, cannot account for the differences among which
it

particularsto

apply. The distinction between the ways in which the application of Law is understood and by Science respectively is in this respectradical. by the Dictum Let us imagine that the Law of Gravitation had been applied of Jupiter and Saturn in the way to the movements by prescribed It could have been appliedto these movements the Dictum. only
is intended
to
'
'

so

far

as

whatsoever

of the

they resembled each other. It could have given no account been a law It would have of the points of difference. but of no heavenly bodies in general, heavenly body in par
It would
as same.

ticular.

have it

enabled Can

astronomers

to

conclude

that that

Jupiter,moving
Saturn
nomy of the did the

did, moved
we

like

heavenly body, and

that the science of

could

have

suppose much from profited

of Astro

theory

so gravitation

as applied

to be unable

to explain the differences

in the movements

surely be obvious th'at the planets ? It must Dictum has no power of giving effect to the explanatory function of the laws which it pretends to apply. law to If we ask for the reason of a general why the application and is understood particularcases so differently by the Dictum the the the of function and of Science, by principles why it is that Dictum be styled deductive cannot in the sense alreadyindicated, the answer is to be found in the fundamental importance which the impossi arises Deductive Science Hence attaches to System. with the Principle of Deduction of identifying bility any principle
different
' '

which

represents the
be laws

process

as

an

inference the the

from proceeding

some

isolated single,

generality.Thus,
deduced
of motion from

movements sole

of Saturn
of

and

of

Jupiter cannot
apart from
could taken
not

theory

gravitation,
which Euclid
it is I. 47

the

and

of

equilibriumwith
theorem

involved. inextricably
be

So, again, the

from
any

of

deduced

other

theorem singlegeometrical fact way

in isolation from

the rest.
a

It is true that
we

that,in reasoningfrom
not

of theories, the plurality

of them of them in isolation in
no

do

precludes our
G. F. Stout

any one reasoning from each said

'

reason

from

singly.

As

Professor

of the theories interconnexion logical lies precisely conditions for in the fact that each supplies specifying the application of the others. Consider the theory of gravitation. Here laws of motion and of equilibrium, etc.,are alreadyrecognized has
:

The

246
in

THE

PROBLEM this
But

OF

LOGIC
far
as

[VII. vi.
as

understandingwhat
system

case,
a

So theory means. the singletheory of gravitationis treated of theories.

so

this is the
itself

being in
the
case,

far

as

this

is not

the

specialapplications, supply determining conditions which logically specify the mode in which that in this or the law of gravitation must work instance. its define conditions Doubt the of They application.
less it also defines
may
start

laws of motion,

etc., with equilibrium,

their

the

conditions

of their

application.But

we

from
as

the

others

merely

the others, and condition.' So far

we

and regard these singletheory of gravitation, specifyingconditions,just as we may start from regard the theory of gravitationas a specifying

proceeding on the assumption that the func tion of a logicalprinciplemight be adequately characterized as that of applying universals to particulars. The assumption, how involves an ever, important ambiguity, and tends to misleading The of Logical Inference. work of conceptions as to the nature
have been
'

and applicationinvolves,in fact,imaginative

which cannot be reckoned
as

'

constructive of

activi

ties of mind

infer logical so ence, long as Inference is defined as a process of disimplication, distinguish pledged not to trespass beyond the data. We must between and Method Inference, between Deduction-process and processes

Deductive
a

Inference.
can

If,dissatisfied with
not to

the Dictum,

we

seek for
Law
to

conception that
we

of the systematicapplication inspire

any the
mere

Fact,
ence,

must

turn,
defined

of principle

Deductive
the aim

Infer
may

but

to that

largerprocess
'

of Deduction valid

of which

correctly be
'

as

of application of Deduction.

systematized
As

knowledge to unsystematized fact.' then, is a function Application,'

not

such,

it is

of Logical Inference. Through Deduc Principle tion we bring laws to bear at the rightpoints,and so combine in fruitful co-operationthe premisses from which then draw we our deductive inferences. The application of System to Fact demands not only inference from given evidence, but also the purposive

limited

by

the

arrangement of the evidence itself. Thus, the proof of Euclid I. 47, or of any geometrical theorem, cannot be reduced, without It includes con remainder, to a chain of deductive inferences. structions and combinations, apart from which the purely inferen
tial process would be directionless That the definition of Deduction

and

ineffective.
we

which also

have

given
as

does

not
:

apply
other

to

Deductive
may be

Premisses
in

Inference may given which cannot premisses

with in
so
'

be

shown
to

follows
to

be

said
to
a we

stand

each
'

the

relation of statement
The

of law
Nile is
'

statement

of fact.

Thus, from
and sary the
'

the two
; but

blessingto Egypt
may

The

Nile is infested
to have

crocodiles

infer

neces

conclusion

words,

doing we cannot be said,in any sense fact. applieda generallaw to a particular

of

So,

248
later
'

THE

PROBLEM be
ad

OF

LOGIC
it under We the

[VII.vii.
name

chapter.

We
or

shall then
Reductio the

meeting
Absurdum.

of add

Indirect

Proof,'

need
'

only

that

the fact that

in their

Scholastic

Logiciansresorted to Indirect
the
not

Re
'

duction
forms that

attempt

to confirm

of two validity
so

imperfect
evidence

Syllogism, Baroco and their treatment of Logic was

as

of

Bocardo,

is sufficient

and consistently strictly

Formal

has

sometimes

been

supposed.
Reduction.

Direct We

or

Ostensive

illustrate the operation of direct Reduction may Baroco and Bocardo to the First Figure. Baroco thus be

by reducing
PaM

may

representedin symbolic
M" P

form

SoM. SoP

We

wish

to

reduce

this

to

the

form

S" -M S"
P

Conversion
.

'

per

accidens

'

of

the

reduction,did

major premiss would readilygive the desired it not leave us with two particular premisses.ReducM" P M P

tion, however,

to

the

form

S" S"

would,

if

possible, logically

answer

the
and

requirement just as well.

SoM
are we

From

the eduction-schemes
that

of PaM form.

select those the

inferences

suit the

above

of PaM, and SiM, the contrapositive obverse of SoM ; and since from our new premisses we are able the old conclusion have a syllogismin Ferio, to draw SoP, we I. Fig.

They

MeP,

MoP

Bocardo

may

be

representedthus

in

symbolic form
M"

MaS
.

SoP P
M
.

We

wish

to

reduce

this

to

the

form

"

But

as

in

S"

be universal, and Fig. I. the major premiss must reduce the given particular major into a universal, our
must

we

cannot

first step
In
.

be
to

to

transpose the premisses. This gives

"

^p -j

order

place the middle

term

in the

in positionof predicate

the

CHAP.XXVIL]
minor

THE

PROBLEM
must convert

OF
this

REDUCTION

249

premiss, we
take, then,

we proposition,

cannot

We
obtain the

the

premiss ; but, as it is an do this without obvertingit first. of our minor premiss,and contrapositive premissesin Fig.I. we
the
are

we

a^
.

From

these which

able is the

to draw

IPiM conclusion SoP. MaS

PiS, of

obverted

converse

original

conclusion

Thus, the valid syllogism

FiM

is the

of Bocardo, equivalent

PiS_
been has therefore Figure (Darii). Bocardo reduced to the First Figure,as desired. that of is simpler than reduction of the remaining forms The be obtained by reasoning either Baroco or Bocardo, and may readily It seems the steps as above. out ungracious,however, to pass remark the without over ingeniouskey to these reductions which the Verses. for us in the Mnemonic traditional Logic has preserved and
it is in the

First

Each

of the curious

names

preservedin
which

these

Latin

hexameters letters

contains,in addition
for significant
case

to the vowels

give the mood, other

Thus,
to take

the purpose of reduction. the initial letter C of CAmEstrEs,

the

typical

indicates

the initial letter

of that
to

form

of Syllogism in the form

can

First

Figure" namely, Celarent"

The

which

this

be reduced.

small

letters
must to

and handle

refer to the vowels

the desired

justbefore them, and tell us how we by these vowels in order propositions represented
reduction.
: s

effect the

Thus

indicates simple conversion of the E simpliciter) in premiss and conclusion. proposition to be the that premisses have ( muta) indicates i.e., transposed. changed

'

'

"

PaM

Following out
MeS reduces
to

these

indications, we

see

at

once

that

SeM
SeP

PaM
"

?;.e. to Celarent

in

Fig. I.

PeS_
Of the other of significance
It will have

letters in the mnemonic

p, which been noticed
as
'

verses,

we

should

note

the

signifiesconversion
that Baroco and

per accidens.'* Bocardo do not reduce

to Barbara, directly
*

the initial letter B

would
the

lead

us

to

expect.

For

scheme form

ingenious revision of the mnemonic all meaningless letters, shows at Carveth Read, belongs, see Professor
an

verses,
once
'

which,

while which and

from

figureto
Deductive

freeingthe any given

Inductive,'

Logic

third edition, pp. 126, 127.

250 As
matter

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC of these two

[VII.vii.

into their indirect the necessity of indicates The c ( per contradictionem) reduction. to this indirect reduction. resorting the soundness of to admit The refusal of the ancient logicians refers to
enters
"

of fact,the initial B, in the Barbara the syllogism which

names

forms,

the direct reduction the reduction

of Baroco

and

Bocardo

due to their distrust of the

as

negativeterm.
use

appears It is true
cannot

to

have be

been
so

that, in

far

involves the

of

obversion, it
the

justified

and Identity by the sole,unconditional appeal that the and we are therefore bound to recognize Non-contradiction, further than the adequacy of these reductions extends no validity
to

of principles

of the formula

'

Either

an

S is

or

else it is

not-P.'

CHAPTER
VII.

XXVIII.
SYLLOGISMS.

UNORTHODOX (viii.)

ACCORDING which J. S. from above

Archbishop Whately,* the Syllogism is the form to be reduced. So, also, reasoning may ultimately Mill writes : All valid ratiocination, all reasoning by which, general propositions previously admitted, other propositions
to all correct
'

equallyor less generalare

forms
"

inferred, may

be exhibited

in

some

of the

the valid forms of the traditional Syllogism. 'f i.e., Inference what all Formal Now, if Whately and Mill were right, would soever ultimatelybe reducible to three-term syllogisms. Dr. Keynes, that so long as we retain J however, shows quiteclearly the orthodox copula-mark,many types of argument are irreducibly

four-termed.

Consider, for instance, the argumentum

B A
.-.

: fortiori

is

greater than C. greater than B. is greater than C.

is

The

of this argument irreducibility

shown ciently

by the fact
to

that to

syllogisticform it cannot, through reduction

to

'

'

is suffi
or

other

wise, be made
Dictum

conform
one

the Dictum
must

de Omni

et

Nullo.
a

and is required, in subordination

'

which

be

placed on

old,not
in the than
*

form,

may is greater than a second thingwhich third thingis itself '" greater than that third thing.
new

to it.

The

Dictum

A new the with par be expressed

is

Whatever

greater

f
+

'Logic,' Book I., "2. A System of Logic,' Book

' '

II., ch. ii., " 1.

Studies

and

Exercises number

in Formal Dicta

Logic,"fourth
that would
is in

edition, part iii.,ch. vii.,

pp. 384-388. " The endless

of such

justice to

all the

possibleforms

of argument

be necessary in order to do itself sufficient proof of their

as futility principles.

CHAP.

XXVIII.]

UNORTHODOX

SYLLOGISMS

251

'

There

are
'

an

indefinite
for

number
reasons

of other
cannot

arguments,'
be reduced

continues
to

Dr.

Keynes,
form.
;

which

similar
:

syllo
A is
a

gistic equals C
fore of A

For
X is
a

example
; A

equals B,
of

B Y B is

equals C,
of
a

therefore X

contemporary
is
a

Y,
of the

and

Z, therefore
brother
of

contemporary
is
a

of Z brother A

brother
is to

B,

C,
the

there

of C
is to A

; A

right
; A

of

B,
tune

is to with

right
and B

C, therefore C, therefore nullo,

the

right of C
with be
are

is in

B,

with upon omni

is in may

tune

C.
on

All
a

these
par

arguments
with the

depend
dictum de

principles which
et

placed
'

in the equally axiomatic particular The Dr. adds which to claims,' belong.'* Keynes they systems of the been that behalf have in conclusion, on syllo put forward and which
'

gism
If which

as

the

exclusive

form

of

all deductive

reasoning
consider
to

must

accord

ingly be rejected.'
we

endeavour

to

go

step further, arguments

than follow

and

the

relation

in

these
we

unorthodox do better

stand the

the

traditional

syllo
to

gism,
fessor

cannot

indication

given by Pro
the

S.C.D.

of opposing these Keynes, f and, instead Syllogism as irreducibly four-termed

'

arguments
"

'

the the

S.C.D.
vital

Syllo copula.
of the is there
a

gism
between All

being
the

three-termed
two

"

admit

at

once

that
a

difference
of

forms

of

argument
are a

lies in

difference

simple Categorical Syllogisms of Mediation. Postulate J For if

valid
are

three-termed
'

by
'

virtue

four-termed

syllogism
? If

mediate
two two

inference,
terms,
terms

how

is the is the
'

mediation
common

effected link
'

middle

where
must

In last resort,

the

middle

themselves

be if the

mediated
various

by
types
in of the

third,

syllogism. But through a three-term differ Categorical Syllogism do not

terms,
the it must
terms

of

Simple
of

from

each different

other forms
in

number

be

allowed
are

that

in

these
related.

syllogism
a

differently syllogism the .symbol for the copula is the S.C.D. Syllogism the corresponding symbol
three The each in
a conception other distinctions by

Thus,
is the

fortiori

of

number

of

in the sign ^", whereas sign syllogistic types, differentiated

=
.

from
ment
'

of
as

copula, finds
'

its fruitful of
can

develop
'

what

is

now

known Such the

a

the

calculus

relations be

or

the

logic of

relatives.'

calculus, however,
of

satisfactorily

elaborated
*
'

only by
and

methods
in

Symbolic Logic.
fourth

Studies 887.
PP-

Exercises

Formal

Logic,' J

edition, above,

part
213,

iii., ch.
216.

vii

pp.
^

386,

f H"M-"

387,

388.

Vide

pp.

VIII.

OTHER

FORMS

OF

SYLLOGISM.

(i.) (ii.) (iii.) (i\.)

Complex
The The The

Categorical

Syllogisms (ch.

Sorites

and

Epicheirema

(ch.

xxix.).

Disjunctive Hypothetical
Dilemma

Syllogism Syllogism (ch.

xxxii.).

xxx.). xxxi.).

(ch.

256

THE
fact
no

PROBLEM have

OF

LOGIC

[VIII. i.

The

that

sorites may

all its
the

figureby

means

impliesthat

premisses in the fourth be actually argument can

As a matter of fact, the analysed out arguments in Fig. IV. of the less than those no ProgressiveSorites, component syllogisms in Fig. I. of the RegressiveSorites, are, as theystand, syllogisms there are four, and only four, possible Hence forms of the Aristo Goclenian of the to as Sorites, corresponding respectively telian, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio. Assuming four premisses,
into

the forms
1. Forms

may

be

as specified

follows

of the Aristotelian Sorites

are are are are

(1) All S's

All X's All Y's

X's.
Y's.

(2) All S's

All X's All Y's

are are are

X's. Y's. Z's.

P's. P's.

Z's. P's. P's.

.-.

All Z's
.-.

All Z's are-not All S's are-not

All S's

are

(3) Some

S's

are

X's.
Y's.

(4) Some

S's

are

X's. Y's. Z's. P's. P's.

All X's All Y's

AH
.-.

are are

All X's All Y's

are
are

Z's.

Z's

are_P's^_
are

All Z's are-not

Some

S's

P's.

Some

S's are-not

2. Forms

of the Goclenian
are are are

Sorites

(1) All Z's

All Y's AU All
.-.

P's. Z's. Y's.

(2) All Z's

All Y's

are-not
are are are

P's.

Z's.

X's

All X's
All S's
.-.

Y's. X's. P's.

X's. S's_are
are

AllS's

P's!"
P's. Z's. Y's. X's. P's.

All S's are-not

(3) All Z's

AU
AU

are are are

(4) All Z's

All Y's
All X's

are-not
are are are

P's.

Y's X's

Z's. Y's. X's. P's.

Some
.-.

S's S's

are

Some
.-.

S's

Some

are

Some

S's are-not

Analysis of
The

the Sorites.

analysisof the Sorites takes place as foUows : The Sorites must be broken up into as many syllogismsin Fig.I. as there are the firstand the last. between In the analysed Aristo propositions telian Sorites, S, the subjectof the conclusion,is the subjectin the conclusion of each of the component syllogisms. In the analysed

CHAP.

XXIX.]

SORITES
the

AND

EPICHEIREMA
the conclusion is the

257

Goclenian
It is

P, Sorites,

of predicate

predicate

syllogisms. the major and the in minor premisses. In the Aristotelian Sorites the first syllogism, not have as major the second premiss, order to be in Fig.I., must of Aristotelian Sorites the first. Thus, analysing the first form given above, we have as the firstsyllogism: important in these analysesnot
to confuse

in the conclusion

of each

of the component

All X's All S's

.-.

are are

Y's. X's.

All S's

are~Y's.
must

this conclusion Then, similarly,

be

the

minor

and

not

the

major premiss of

the next

syllogism:
All Y's
are

Z's.

All S's areY's.

.-.

AllSVare'Z's.
All Z's
All P's.

So, again :
are

Z's. gps_are
are

.-.

All S's

P's

(conclusion).

Episyllogisms. In analysing a complex Prosyllogisms and that we see syllogismlike a Sorites into its component syllogisms, with respect to each component (except the last)is a prosyllogism the syllogism which succeeds it, and that each component (except with respect to the syllogismthat pre is an episyllogism the first)
"

cedes it.
A

of is a syllogism prosyllogism with which syllogism

a

which

the conclusion of the

is

premiss

in another

it is connected.

An

is episyllogism of

the conclusion

syllogismof which one with which another syllogism

:

premisses is

it is connected.

SpecialRules of the Aristotelian Sorites

1. No 2.

premiss but the first can No premiss but the last can
Rule minor 1." The in
one

be be

particular.
negative.

Proof of
which Each is
a

others is, in premiss in the Sorites, save

to
a

of the

only premiss in an Aristotelian Sorites is the first. of the component syllogisms its turn, a major premiss. Hence, if any
the first, were the it would particular, A of the lead

particularmajor
in middle.

in

First

Figure.

particularmajor
major
17
or

premiss

Fig. I., however,

gives

illicit process

undistributed

258

THE
2.

PROBLEM take

OF

LOGIC

[VIII.i.

Proof of Rule premisses,say,

This will
Thus
: serve

of four Aristotelian Sorites, typical and analyse it out into its component syllogisms. to steady the subsequent reasoning.
"

Let

us

All A's
All B's All C's All D's
.-.

are are are are

B's. C's. D's. E's.

E's.

All A's

are

This

reduces to the
are are

in Fig.I. series of syllogisms following All C's

are

All B's
All A's
.-.

C's. B's. C's.

.-.

D's.

All D's All A's

.-.

are are

E's. D's. E's.

All

A's^r^C's.
D^ lire

All A's

are

All A's

All A's

are

require premiss of the given Sorites would, if negative, it enters as a premiss to into which the conclusion of the syllogism be negative.* in the case of all illicit major in the episyllogism But this means is not followed the component syllogism where but the final premiss, each the of For conclusion syllogism by any episyllogism. minor the becomes last the of premiss of the epi except, course, the con I.,if the minor premiss be negative, syllogism ; and in Fig. the major premiss affirmative,illicit clusion being negative and major follows. it is only that premiss which enters into the final syllogism Hence that can be negative last Sorites the of the i.e., premiss only without fallacy.
Now,
any
" " "

"

The
as

rules special
:

of the Goclenian

Sorites may

be formulated

follows

1. No 2. No

premiss but the last can premiss but the firstcan

be be

particular. negative.
of the

We

leave the

proofof

these two

rules to the consideration

reader.
It will be
seen

this Sorites into first-figure syllo that,in resolving

not
as

gisms, the
conclusion

two

leadingpremisses must of each prosyllogism serves

be

and transposed,
not
as

the

major,

minor,

of the premiss
A

episyllogism.
be
"

framed in Figs. II. and III. A Sorites differs middle it has many in this respect from a simple syllogism : that terms.' Now, any two consecutive premissesof a Sorites in a given
Sorites cannot
'

If the all.

premiss were first

attempt
to

at

The

draw

could this negativeconclusion negative, involve illicitmajor (or else it would

not two

be drawn

negative

premisses).

CHAP.

XXIX.]

SORITES

AND

EPICHEIREMA
if we
start with

259

show the form of that figure. Thus, must figure in Fig. III. premisses say, e.g.,
"

two

All S's All S's the third

are are

X's, Y's,
form
'

premiss must
the

take

the

All S's

are

Z's

'

for it is

only on
arrange the data

condition that in

that 8 is

second
But

and

Fig.III.

againsubjectof the premiss that we can third premissestogether shall supply the premisses
"

All S's All S's All S's

are are are

X's, Y's,
Z's,
'

involve,after the firststage,a quaternioterminorum.

For from the obtain the conclusion first two premisseswe Y's are X's,' Some with the third premiss,so that and this has no point of contact be said to belong to the same the third premiss cannot train of The the that two first breaks is, premisses. reasoning, argument as and we have consequently off after the firstsyllogism, no polysyllo-

gism and

similar argument would show precisely that a Sorites could not be framed in the Second Figure. to frame a Sorites in the Second or But though it is not possible the Third Figure,it is quitepossible, to by the aid of Conversion, resolve those forms of the Aristotelian Sorites which have particular and those forms of the conclusions into Third Figure Syllogisms,
no

Sorites.

Goclenian Second

Figure Syllogisms. The

out,
we

have negative conclusions into Second resolution of the Aristotelian Sorites into is not possible ; for,in order to carry it Figure Syllogisms Sorites which should have
to convert

premiss,and this would the fallacy of give in every case component syllogisms exhibiting it is undistributed middle. Similarly, impossibleto resolve any of the Third Figure. Goclenian Sorites into syllogisms back to the four forms of the Aristotelian Sorites given Referring the first premiss of (3), that if we convert see on we page 256, we of the Sorites somewhat, without shall change the form affecting the nature of the argument, for the I. proposition in any way is simply convertible. But when to analysethe Sorites whose premisshas been we come thus converted, we shall find that the component are syllogisms but is in below in shown as no : Fig.III., clearly longer Fig.I.,
Some
X's
are are

the second

S's.

All X's
.-.

Y's.
are

Some

Y's
are

S's.

All Y's
.-.

Z's.
are

Some

Z's
are

S's.

All Z's

P's.
are

Some

P's

S's.

.-.

Some

S's

are

P's. 17"2

260 Form
manner.

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
be

[VIII.i.
treated in the
same

(4) of the Aristotelian Sorites

may

So, again,the resolution of

the Goclenian

Sorites

All Z's are-not

Fs.

All Y's
All X's All S's
.-.

are are are

Z's. Y's. X's.

All S's are-not

Fs,

into its

in Fig.II., givesa series of syllogisms component syllogisms and all the convert if we start by converting the leadingpremiss, negative conclusions as they occur. All P's are-not All Y's
.-. are

Z's.

Z's. P's.
:

All Y's are-not have

Converting this conclusion,we

All X's
.-.

All P's are-not

are

Y's.

Y's. P's.
:

All X's are-not

Converting this conclusion,we

All S's
.-.

have

All P's are-not

are

X's.

X's. P's.

All S's are-not

The be We

Goclenian

Sorites with
that

negative conclusion particular

resolve
some

may

resolved. similarly
see,

then,

we

can

forms

of Sorites into

of Fig. III. We may of Fig.II., and others into syllogisms syllogisms final the Celarent type of the of also (e.g., premiss by converting Aristotelian Sorites) resolve a Sorites into syllogisms which are partly Fig.I. partlyof the first and partlyof another Figure (e.g., and partlyFig. II.).

THE

EPICHBIREMA.
an

The

Epicheirema
kind.

is

chain of
in the

centrated

Chains

reasoningof be of reasoning may

of the

abridgedand
progressive

con or

either

case of regressive. When, as becomes t he each component syllogism a premiss in an episyllogism, the movement of thought takes place chain is progressive ; when in the contrary direction namely, from syllogismto prosyllogism
" "

Sorites,the conclusion

CHAP.

XXIX.]
chain is

SORITES

AND

EPICHEIREMA

261

the

in character.

regressive essentially ordinary syllogism. argument but the premisses in the argument both of them, brought or are, one forward from conclusions other as premisses. Thus, the Epi of the premisses, cheirema is a syllogismof which each premiss, one or the premiss of a prosyllogism (as when is stated as the conclusion All All S's are P's M's are P's, is given thus : All S's are P's, for regressive. The
The
main

Epicheirema
consists

is

of

an

'

'

and

All

S's
of

are an

M's

'),or,

as

is

more

usual,
there
'

is stated
two
'

as

the

con

clusion
'

enthyrneme.

When

are

double enthymemes, the Epicheirema is called it is single.' The followingillustrates a singleEpicheirema :

'

prosyllogismsor only one, ; when

All

rational
as

beings
are

are

to

be

treated

with

respect, inasmuch

they
are

made

in the

image

of God.

Slaves

rational

beings.
be treated
with

Therefore

slaves should

respect.' (Father Clarke.)

:

The
'

followingillustrates

double

Epicheirema

All

All the

Malays are cruel,because inhabitants aboriginal

all the natives of that natives all the of

all savages are. of Singapore are of Asia

are. are

Malays, because

part

Therefore

Singapore

cruel.'

(Welton.)
The what

he refers to

followingscheme, given by Professor as a Complex Epicheirema :

Every
M is

Welton,

illustrates

P, because

it is

X,

and

every

is Y.

Every
.-.

S is M.

Every S~isP.
into its three
com

analyse this Complex Epicheirema ponent syllogisms. These are :

may

We

(1) Every

X M M

is Y. is X. is

Every
Every (.-.
It should

(2) (Every Every

.-.

Y M M

is

P.)

(3) Every

is P. is M. is P.

is Y. is P.
.-.

Every S Every S

Y.)

Every

miss,
added

that

of the major pre with the form be noted, in connexion X is Y is not another and the addition reason every
' ' '

to the first reason

because

it is

X,'

but
as

rather

which,

in combination

with in

it,yieldsa

reason

conclusion.
a

proposition Every
a

Complex Epicheirema,
Epicheirema.
from both
It
cannot

fact, must
be

be

either into
a

singleor
fresh form

double distinct

construed

of these two

forms.

262

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VIII.ii.

CHAPTER
VIII. THE (ii.)

XXX.
SYLLOGISM.

DISJUNCTIVE

THE

alternatives only, where there are two DisjunctiveSyllogism, be developed from basis of the Disjunctive Proposition, as may in two ways, giving two distinct moods. inference,
1. THE

MODUS
one

TOLLENDO

PONENS

"

the mood i.e.,

which

posits

the

alternative
P
or

by

the other. rejecting

Either P
or

Either Not
.-.

Q.

Q.

P.

Not
.-.

Q.
P. which sublates

Q.
PONENDO
one

2. THE
or

MODUS

TOLLENS
alternative

"

the mood i.e.,

the rejects

by acceptingor
Either P
or

positingthe

other. Either P
or

else Q.

else Q.
P.
is is of

P.
.-.

Q.
.-.

NotQ.

Not

[NOTE.
more

by no of meaning. a thinking,is essentially develo'jmient in the major premiss may receive clearer definition
clusion. It should

alternative in a form which The minor an premiss may positor reject definite than that in which it is presented in the major premiss. This means an arbitrary provision,for a syllogism, like any other form
"

What

is

in the minor

indefinite relatively premiss and con

element be noticed in that the DisjunctivePropositionas an integral view of state of be read from the to mere Disjunctive Syllogismrequires point Either P or read: would Q, but not ment-import. Thus, 'Either P or Q So read : Either P or Q, but statedly Either P or else Q would statedlyboth.' not both.'] the
' ' ' ' '

disjunctive syllogismin which there are two, and only two, the minor the cate alternatives, major is always disjunctive, than and the conclusion gorical, categorical.Where there are more two alternatives in the major, either the minor premissor the con clusion may be disjunctive. Thus :
In
a
'

'

'

'

Either P

or

Q
P.

or

R.
R.

Not
.-.

Either Q
or

or

Either P

else

Q
P.
or

or

else R.

Not
.-.

Either
or

Q Q
or

else R.
R.

Either P Neither

P R.

nor

Q (compound categorical).

.-.

264 This
removes

THE
is the Modus
or

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
which in the minor

[VIII.iii.

Tollens, the mood sublates the consequent of

the modus

premiss

the

major.
need
not

The

Categorical premiss in
in the modus

ponens

be affirma

tive,nor,
Thus:

need fallens,

it be

negative.

If not A, then C
not A

(modus ponens).
So

again :
If not

A, then
C
.-.

not

(modus fallens).

The When
1.
once

Rules the
at

of the

Mixed

Hypothetical Syllogism.
"

then premiss is accepted, hypothetical

is the Consequent must accepted,
once

//

the Antecedent

be

accepted.
the which

This
the

follows

from

the consideration the

that

to

disallow

accept reasoningstarts. the Antecedent 2. // the Consequent is rejected, be rejected. must then our Granted that the Consequent is rejected, data are to seen For the acceptance necessitate the rejectionof the Antecedent. the lead the to would contradiction of acceptingthe of Antecedent have been which we just rejecting. And what it is Consequent to accept, we are compelled to reject. contradictory logically

rule is to

refuse to

hypothetical premiss from

Fallacies
1.

of the Mixed
"

Syllogism. Hypothetical

Rejectionof the Antecedent does be rejected. not entitle us to the inference that the Consequent must with the of identical the a For, being rejection proposition that its of that from to assert we see contradictory, acceptance infer the rejection of the Antecedent of the the rejection we can that if is C be to inferred from a proposition can Consequent say another proposition B, then from the contradictoryof B we can of C. But this is manifestly not the case. infer the contradictory For instance,from an A proposition infer the we can corresponding cannot I ; but from infer E, the 0, the contradictoryof A, we of I. Therefore, from the rejection of the Antecedent contradictory the of cannot the infer we Consequent. rejection 2. Acceptanceof the Consequent. Acceptance of the Consequent
"

of the Antecedent. Rejection

does

not

entitle

us

to

the inference

that

the Antecedent

must

be

accepted.

CHAP.

XXXI.]
to

THE

HYPOTHETICAL
from
the

SYLLOGISM
the

265

For
can

assert

that

acceptance of

Consequent
a

we

is to say that if infer the acceptance of the Antecedent B, then another proposition be inferred from C can position

pro from

we

can

infer

B.

But

this

is

manifestly not
the

the

case.

For

can instance, the Subalternate from Subalternans the but not

be inferred from
the Subalternate.

Subaltern ans,

that, while acceptance of the Antecedent see Summing up, we of the Conse involves acceptance of the Consequent, and rejection be logically of the Antecedent, nothing can quent involves rejection
inferred either from

acceptance of

the

of rejection Consequent.
the

the

Antecedent

or

from

the

The

So-called Immediate

from Hypothetical. Inferences

the

We

may,

perhaps, venture
'

with regard followingsuggestions

'

to the so-called

Immediate be
no

Inferences
'

from
'

Hypothetical.
proposition If A,
k

1. There then

can

logical

converse no

of the

C,' for there can the of consequent.

2. Nor
'

be

inference

from

the

acceptance

can

there then

be

any

logical
there
can

'

inverse be
no

'

of the
inference

proposition
from the

If

A,
can

C,' for
no

of rejection 3. There then

'

the antecedent.

be

C,' not
we

logical obverse of the proposition If A, the proposition If A, then not C even

' ' ' '

'

i.e., If

accept

the

antecedent,

we

must

of the consequent.' For, as the contradictory identical is precisely of any proposition the contradictory
with
no

reject the of rejection

has

the

acceptance of
be
'

that

this proposition,
'

obverse

value. logical
can no

4. There
'

of logical contrapositive
where there

the

proposition
converse
nor

If

A,

then

C,' for
can

is neither
no
'

obverse, there
The

manifestlybe

converted
then

obverse.^

If A, C, /. if C, drawing of the inference of contrathen A,' which usually goes by the name is just another form of the hypothetical inference, positive syllogism If

A,

then

NotC
.-.

not

A,

and
'

is therefore

not
an
'

immediate.
inference from
'

For If

If

C,

then

A,' as

proposition A, then C,' simply

the
if we

states
we

that

must

granted If A, then C,' then, necessarily grant A.

also grant C,

266

THE
It remains,
'

PROBLEM of course,
A

OF

LOGIC

[VIIL

iii.

proposition If C, then

legitimateto posit the perfectly of If A, the contrapositive as

' '

is not here taken then C,' provided that the contrapositive immediate an as inference, found by converting the

obverse borne

of
in

If A, then C.' This reservation should be in connexion with mind the problem which

'

immediate]y follows.
Give the of the following : contrapositive proposition
no

If either P and

is R

or

no

is

R, then nothing

that

is both

is Pv
'

(Keynes).
If A
'

This the
P P

takes the form is contrapositive of C rejection

is

then accepted, A is rejected, the

C is
'

of accepted,'

which

If C is
means

The
and and

Q is R,' and Q are R.'

of rejection
A

is

rejected.' Nothing that is both therefore equivalent to Some things both

of rejection
'

The
no

means

the

of rejection

'

Either
'

no

is R

or

Q is R.'
This
and
'

Either X or Y,' disjunctivepropositionis of the form of which the contradictory, the exclusive on view, is : Either both
X

Y,
or

or

neither X P's and

nor

Y.'
A is

Hence
are

the
some

of rejection
some

given by
are

'

Either

no

(P's and

Q's)

R,
The
'

Q's

R.'

is then the requiredContrapositive

If
some

following:
Q
P's
are are

thingsthat
is R and
no

are

both

P and
some

R, then either
R

no

P
are

is

R,

or

and

some

Q's

R.'

On
'

the non-exclusive
If
some are

view it takes the

form simpler P's

are

PQ's
R.'

are

R, then

some

R, and

some

Q's

EXAMPLES.
1. Which

of the

following arguments

are

correct logically

is B if it is C ; it is not C, therefore it is not B. (") A is not B, unless it is C ; as it is not C, it is not B. (c) If A is not B, C is not D ; but as A is B, it follows that

(a) A

CisD.

(d) A is not

B if C is D

C, then, is not D,

for A

is B.

(Jevons.)

CHAP.

XXXL]

THE

HYPOTHETICAL

SYLLOGISM
run :

267

Put

into strict logical form, these is

(a) If A
A

C,

is B

A is not
.-.

C
B

is not

Fallacy of Rejection of Antecedent A is not C '= (Assuming that

'

is

C, or

not

(A

is
'

C), and
is not

simi

larlyas regards (b) If A

is not A
.-.

B.')

C,

is not

is not A is not

C
B

Valid.

Modus

Ponens.

(c) If

is not A

B, C is
is B is P

not

'.'" C
""

Fallacy of Rejectionof Antecedent

(Assuming
A
is

that

'A

is

'

rioFTB, and
'

similarlyas

regards
(d) If C is
D,
A is not B

C is D.')

AisB
.-.

C is not

Valid.

Modus
that
'

Tollens.
A is B
'

(Assum
not B

ing
and
2.

^Us

'CisnotD'EEClsD.)
form, logical
and
test their

Arrange
(a) It

the

following

in proper

validity :
were unless the weather turned fine,we has not turned to postpone the match ; so, as the weather be postponed. must fine, the match meals are not served P^ctuallj; i f their Men not pleased are (b) was

agreedthat

'

thus, as Mr. X. is never

kept waiting
mice
are are

for his meals, he must

be pleased. necessarily

(c) If the
then

cat's away,
be

the

everywhere;
nowhere.

the

cat

mu

about, for the mice

form, the
does
not

Reduced

to proper

given arguments read

turn

as

follows

(a) If

the weather

fine,the match
tine.

is to be pos

poned.
The
.-.

weather
The

has not

turned

match

is to be

postponed.
(Modus Ponens.)

268

THE

PROBLEM served be

OF

LOGIC

[VIII.iii.
are

(6) If

men

are

not X.

Mr.
.-.

is served
must

punctually,they punctually.

displeased.

He

pleased.
(Rejectionof Antecedent.) everywhere. anywhere.
are

(c) If the

cat

But
.-.

is away, the mice

cat

the mice
are

not

The

must

be about.
is sound

Here

the argument
in of

minor,
instead
necessary

'aliens), though the rejectingthe consequent through its contrary than is states more through its contradictory, (Modus
1

for

drawing the

conclusion.

The

mood

is there

fore
3. Annex

'

strengthenedmood.'
: premisses (if any) to the following

the proper conclusion

did
not

(a) If the earth

rotate

day and actuallyoccur (Welton). (Modus Tollens.) Ergo : The

axis.

alternation of

its axis, there would be no whereas this alternation does night,

on

Earth

does

rotate

on

its

(6) If

no

men

were

mad, asylums would

men

be useless ; but
are

they
con

are (Welton). (Modus Tollens.} Ergo: 'Some of the antecedent. tradictory

not

useless

mad,' the
; but

(c)If all men

are

were

reasonable,all would

be contented

some

unreasonable. involves
'

This
'

rejection of the
'

antecedent still be Thus

no

; for

even reason

if

unreasonable those who

be taken
'

as

the term

contrary to
included

able, the
'

unreasonable
are

would

under
can

not

reasonable.'

conclusion

be drawn.

The Transversion The Modus

case

Form. of the Hypothetical Syllogisminto Categorical

can

Ponens of A

be trans verted

as

follows :*

The

.-.

(beingaccepted)is the case of C (beingaccepted). This is the case of A (beingaccepted). This is the case of C (being accepted). (Barbara,Fig. I.)
"

It should not be forgotten that these transversions do not give us, in the with a place of the given hypotheticals, genuine categoricals i.e.,propositions in categorical meaning. What they give us are simply hypotheticalpropositions form. If taken to be a genuine bridge from one of to categorical type proposition the other, the clumsy artifice through which the transversion is effected is no more than of must be taken to mean a transparent pieceof self-deception. The case "the of." for "in case" case Thus, it is simplv a synonvm i.e.,for possible if (Professor Stout).
' " "
"

"

"

'

CHAP.

XXXI.]
in
so

THE
far

HYPOTHETICAL the

SYLLOGISM
statement is taken

269

Again,
takes the The

as

rejectionof

as

to equivalent

its

non-acceptance, the
:

transverse

of the Modus

Tollen*

form following
case

.-.

(beingaccepted)is the case of 0 (beingaccepted). of C (beingaccepted). This is-not the case of A (beingaccepted). This is-not the case (Camestres,Fig. II.)
of A
are

These

transversions mediate

useful, if only
of

because

they

serve

to

em

phasizethe

inference (which has, hypothetical for they afford justification ; and enough, been disputed) curiously of referring to the hypothetical premiss as the convenient practice character

the

as the minor, since,in the transversioii, categorical the propositioncontaining the the hypothetical premiss becomes premiss, the premiss containing major term, and the categorical

major,and

the

the minor

term.

Again, by these transversions we are able to show that the fallacy the is analogous to illicit major, and the antecedent of rejecting fallacyof accepting the consequent correspondsto undistributed
middle. Thus
The

of the antecedent,in (a),the rejection

(caseof
A

the transverse,

gives:

is a (caseof C being accepted). being accepted) This is-not a (case of A being accepted). This is-not a (case of C being accepted). .-. involving illicitmajor. a I.e., categorical pseudo-syllogism, the

again (b),the acceptance of gives:

So The

consequent

in the

transverse

(case of
.-.

I.e., a

is a (case of C being accepted). being accepted) This is a (caseof C being accepted). This is a (case of A being accepted). involving undistributed categoricalpseudo-syllogism, A

middle.

The This takes the form

Pure
:

Syllogism. Hypothetical

If If
.-.

A,

then then

G!

d,

C2_
C2
be

If A, then

The follows

Law
:

of Inference

here

exemplified may
is the

expressedas
the

'The

consequent of

the

consequent

consequent of

ground.'
It is
a

direct embodiment

of the

of Identity. principle

270 This
this

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VIII.iii.

same

of reasoningappliesequally to syllogisms of principle

we

form, however
:

may If

increase

the number

of the

premisses.

Thus

Ct Ct,then C2 If Ca, then a

If

A,

then

If
.-.

On,!,then Cn
A,
then

If

Cn
the Standard Sorites

We
If

may

conveniently refer
alter the order of the
to the

to

this form

as

(Hypothetical).
we

proceedinggradually
which reasoning,
we

with the last and premisses,starting the we first, following form of get

may

call the Inverted

If If

Sorites.

Cn_ltthen Cn Cn_2, then Cu_j C15 then C2 A, then C\

A, thenCn

If If
.-.

If

Example.

"

If humble-bees humble-bees
If field-mice If cats
.-.

are

abundant,

the

red

clover which

alone
are

is pollinate

also abundant.

are

If cats

abundant. are few, humble-bees abundant, field-mice are few. abound, red clover is also abundant.

(Darwin, Origin of Species,' p. 53.)

The

'

analysisof

Sorites of this inverted

the

form
as

presents
follows
:

no

diffi

culty. When

analysedout,

argument

runs

(1) Transposing the first two

If If
"'"

premises,we

have

Cn_9, then Cn_1

Cn_i,then Ca

then C7 If~C"-2'

(2) Combining

this conclusion If If

with

the third

we premiss,

get

Cn_3,then Cn_2 Cn_2,then Cn

and

so

on.

272

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[VIII.iv.

1. The

Constructive, Dilemma.

If

But
.-.
'
"

P15 then Qx ; and if P2, then Q2. either Pj or P2. Either Q1 or Q2.
cross

Example.

If I

'

go up I shall Either

I shall meet the bull ; and the field, the lane I shall meet the farmer.
cross

if I the the

the field the bull

or

I shall go I

up

lane.
'

.-.

Either

I shall meet

or

shall meet

farmer.'

(Stock.)
Destructive
;

2. The

Dilemma.
if

If

PI} then Qj
either not

and
or

P2, then Q2.

But
.".
'

Qx
or

not

Q2

Either not
If he
were were

Px

not

P2.
; and

Example.
"

he
'

clever,he would see his mistake candid, he would acknowledgeit.

does
not it.
see

if

Either Either

he

his mistake he is not

or

he

will not

acknowledge
'

.-.

he is not

clever

or

candid.'

(Stock.)
The
two

fundamental
"

forms

of Dilemma

"

the Constructive which

are

and suffi

the Destructive

may

take certain

forms limiting

consideration. important to call for special ciently

Thus, in the case quents QJ and Q2

of the Constructive
may

Dilemma,

the two then

conse

coincide,and
:

the Dilemma

takes

the

form followingsimplified

If either
Bu But

Px or P2, then Q. either Px or P2

acts

Q.

Example.

'
"

Whether

man or

in

accordance
the

with

his

own

judgment
'

is

guided by

opinions of others,
with

his action will be criticized.

But

either he acts
or

in accordance the

his

own

judg

ment
'

he is

guided by
the

opinionsof others.
'

.".

In any

case,

his action

will be criticized.'
...

It. should

be

noticed

that

'either

or

of the

major

premiss does not stand for a genuine disjunction. That the dis junction is merely verbal is shown by the fact that we have but of the major premiss to get rid of to modify the statement slightly the disjunction altogether. Thus, instead of saying If either Pt or P2, then Q,' we may say If P1?then Q ; and if P2, then Q.'
' '

CHAP.

XXXIL]
case

THE of the Destructive

DILEMMA
Dilemma the two
;

2/3 antecedents

In the

may

coincide.
then

The

major

premiss then
takes

reads,
the

If P, then

Qx

and if P,
:

Q2.'and

the Dilemma If

form simplified following

But
.-.

P, then both Qx and Q2. either not Ql or not Q9.

XotP.

Example.
"

'

If

'

to be trusted,the departedare are table-rappers and they also exert mechanical energy. spirits, not spirits or But either the departed are they do not exert

mechanical
are

'

."

Table- rappers

not

energy. to be trusted.'

(CarvethRead. )
of Dilemma
are

These

forms simplified referred to

as

of the two
the

standard

types

and Simple Constructive Dilemma of contrast and by way respectively ; Simple Destructive Dilemma the Complex to referred as forms the standard are respectively It Dilemma. and the Complex Destructive Constructive Dilemma sometimes
the

used, these titles are is, however, essential to bear in mind, when the complex forms, of Dilemma forms are that the fundamental from these, owing their derivatives forms the simpler being mere to the coincidence either of the two consequents or of the simplicity
two

antecedents.

As the of

mark diagnostic

for

between distinguishing may

the
ence

complex
in the

and form

we varieties, simplified

mention

the differ
case

the

conclusion.

The

conclusion, in the
of the

of the

; in the case Complex Dilemma, is disjunctive Dilemma, categorical. have We spoken of the Simple Destructive Dilemma from the corresponding complex form by making the

Simple
derived
ante

as

two

cedents coincide.
\ve

If,in

addition

to this coincidence

of

antecedents,
Destructive

substitute for
takes

Qx

'

Either

and Rj or R.,,'
:

cancel

Q2, the

Dilemma

form the following If

P,

then

either

Rx

or

R2.

But
.-.

neither P.

Hx

nor

R0.

Xot

of dilemma of this form peculiarity the minor in instead of being presented The the

is that

the

disjunction,

premiss, is
either

presentedin
it is,or it

major.
-;
"

Example.

If

body
a

moves,

it must

move

where

where
"

it is not.

But
move

body

cannot

move

where

it is ; neither

can

where
move

it is not.
at all.'

"

.-.

It cannot

is impossible.) Motion, being unintelligible, (I.e.,

[Zeno'sDilemma]/11
*

Vide

Chapter XXXIII.,

p. 290; and

Joseph, ibid.,pp. cf.

332-334.

18

274

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC have
minor
to

[VIII.iv
we

In mind

testingthe Formal
argument

of dilemmas, validity
:

bear

in

three essential criteria

1. The

must,

either in have
an

major

or

in

premiss,
the
Thus
:

present genuine

alternatives.

Otherwise, argument,
a

however
is not

correct

we reasoningmay be in itself, valid the following, as though

'

only a pseudo-dilemma.
a

dilemma

Whether
a

Geometry
may

be be

regarded as regarded
as

mental both

or discipline

as

science, it deserves practical

to be studied.
a

'

But

Geometry
and
a

mental

discipline

science. practical
to be studied.'

'

.-.

It deserves this

(Dr. Fowler, quoted by Mellone.)

that it is
'

Of
one or

reasoningwe
alone there

cannot

say

an

argument

in which

other of two

semblance is any of but only a compound genuinely disjunctive,

in tion of the
'

which

antecedent
to
'

major premiss, is not disjunction, hypotheticalproposi If P.' then form The disjunctive form of the St or S2, is quiteillusory, the whole proposition being equivalent
a

alternatives is offered.'

For the

If

Slsthen

natives

P ; and if S2,then P.' offered as in the case of a

Here

there is no

choice of alter

disjunctive consequent ('If S,

must

then either
2. The

Px

or

P2).
be

principlesof hypothetical reasoning

these
are we infringed

strictly

applied. Where
dilemma.
3. The

have

Formally invalid

structure logical

of the
or

import, whether
in view.

exclusive

and its disjunctiveproposition, be steadily non-exclusive, must kept

The

'

Rebuttal

'

of

Dilemma.

The

metaphors used
from who
on

to describe dilemmatic

been taken
sary
'

the old
to
a

pastime
dilemma.'

of

to have argument seem adver the Thus, bull-fighting.

a

is unable

escape

the force of He
with which

dilemma

is said to be

fixed

the horns of oppose

to the

is said to rebut the dilemma he is assailed

a

if he and We

can

argument

relevant such

equallyconvincingcounterpart.
must

attempt

to show
us

in what
start

sense

and

to what

extent
we can

rebuttal is

possible.Let
by
that

by
a

what considering

logi

callyunderstand
"

the rebuttal of

Constructive typical
:

Dilemma,

dilemma,

form is,of the following If

P15then Qj
either

; and
or

if

P2,then Q2.

But
.-.

Px
or

P,.

Either

Qt

Q2.
that

Now,

if

we

were

rebut this dilemma

brought forward

in

objectorwho endeavours to is restricted, as regards data, to the statements of the the premisses dilemma, the only premisses
to suppose

the

CHAP.

XXXIL]
he

THE

DILEMMA
for

275

which would

could

relevantlyutilize
a

the purposes

of rebuttal-

that is,in such utilize,

"

assent to them way as to win his opponent's if it be inferences from the original premisses. But even

were

to possible

draw
;

objector's purpose
the very
same

such inferences, they would be useless for the for starting, then be doing, from he would as

and expressed
any The
common

his opponent, though perhapsdifferently as premisses he could not possibly these extract from arranged, that

conclusion

would

contrast

with

the

conclusion

of the
the data in the

dilemma. original of possibility to the

two
a

cogent rebuttal depends,then,

The

on

disputants not being exhaustivelystated

dilemma. original
must

the

of the premisses and

its

of both premisses

dilemma

counterpart

be drawn
them

from
the

the

same

set

of

facts, each

from disputant selecting treatment

must
a

data

that

suit his

purpose. A merely Formal

of rebuttal is therefore

necessarily
fund
than

inadequate.

We

material evidence"

certain common a presuppose But more certain given situation.

for the

of
this

is necessary to account takes. argument If

osus we

peculiarform

which
such

dilemmatic
the

consider

classical example of Rebuttal

as

Litigi-

derives its that the Counter-dilemma see (vide pp. 293-295),we the determina from standards two adroit with an juggling cogency tions of which
are

in every
as

instance

bolize these
wherever Dilemma

standards
to

Sx

and
is

reference

them

opposed. If we precisely refer to S2, and explicitly formulate implied,we may

as

sym them the

and (Constructive) Dilemma

:

its Counter-Dilemma

follows

If But

Pv

then

S1Q1 ;
Pt
or or

and if P2; then

S2Q2.

either

P2.

.-.

Either
:

SjQj
If

S2Q2.
if P2, then

Counter-Dilemma

.-.

I\, then S2Q2 ; and But either P1 or P2. Either S^i or S2Q2.

S^.

Example"Dilemma
c

myself,then (to judge by neglecting standards)* I shall make myselfunhappy ; and if I egoistic live for myself,neglecting others, then (tojudge by altruistic standards) others will make me unhappy. But either I shall live for others or I shall live for myself. standards) I shall make Either .-. (to judge by egoistic myself unhappy, or (to judge by altruistic standards) others
If I live for others,
'
'

will make
*

me

unhappy.'
parentheses would
nor even

The

additions

in

not,

of

course,

appear

in

the

actual

of presentation

the Dilemma,

in its Retort.

18

"

"

276
Counter
'

THE -Dilemma

PROBLEM

OP

LOGIC

[VIII.iv.

If I live for

altruistic if I

others, neglectingmyself, then (to judge by standards) others will not make me unhappy ; and live for myself, neglecting others, then (to judge by
shall not

standards)I egoistic
'

make

myself unhappy.
or

But

either I shall live for others

I shall live for

myself.
I

'

.-.

Either
me

(to judge by

altruistic

standards)others will not

make

shall not

standards) unhappy, or (to judge by egoistic make myself unhappy.'

to

We

seem,

then,

be

in concluding that, so justified

far
two

as

the
stan

Constructive dards
are

Dilemma

is

concerned,

it is

where possible,
that

alternately appealed to according to the

Counter-Dilemma

convenience

of

its own ground by playing game. The Retort, then, serves the useful purpose of equalizing matters, left to the and the onus of taking any further steps is appropriately there is no such shifting dilemma. Where propounder of the original of the point of view, no retort is required, and no relevant counter-

the reasoner, to devise a relevant the original argument upon its own

shall meet

dilemma
It is the

is

possible.A Rebuttal, so understood, is not

for

refutation.

means logical

the Standard
If

of Shifting exposing the dilemmatic fallacy of a com of Reference, by making a counter-move results the

plementary kind.
we

these simplify
the formula for
:

by making Q1 and
Constructive

Q2 coincide, we
Dilemma

obtain

Simple

and

its

Counterpart or Retort
Dilemma
:

.-.

PI} then SXQ ; and But either Px or P2 Either SjQ or S2Q ;

.

If

if

P2, then S2Q.

Q.

.-.

Counter-

Dilemma

If But

Pv

then

S2Q

; and

if

P2, then S1Q.

Q.

either

Px
or

or

P2.
;
.-.

.-.

Either

SXQ

S2Q

Example
'

"

Dilemma
am

If I

then altruistic, not

(to judge by egoistic standards)I

am

unhappy and other people's,

'

(because whatever

happiness I bring about

altruistic
own

is

If I

am

mine). then (to judge by egoistic,

standards)

am

unhappy
the But
.-.

(because to

seek after one's

way
or

happiness,

says
' '

is the surest Altruist,

of

missing it). egoistic.

either I shall be altruistic

I
am

I shall be

bound

to be

unhappy.'

CHAP.

XXXII.]

THE

DILEMMA

277

Counter-Dilemma
'

No

I if

am

bound
am sure

to

be

happy.
then
own

'

For,

I I
am

altruistic,
to

(to

judge

by

altruistic

standards)
seek
'

find

my

happiness

(since I don't

after And
sure

it).
am

if I
to

egoistic, then
be

(to judge by egoistic standards)

whatever

am

happy
be be

(because
altruistic

happiness
be

bring

about
'

is my either I
am

own).
I shall
or

But
.-.

I shall

egoistic.

'

bound

to

happy.'

The

Rebuttal the follows

of

the

Destructive

Dilemma.
Dilemma and its

We

may

formulate
as

Complex
:

Destructive

Counter-Dilemma

Dilemma

If But

l\,

then

either

S^ S^
or

;
or

andjf
S2Q2.

P2,

then

SoQ.,.*

.-.

Either

P1
:

P2.
then

Counter-Dilemma

If But

PI}

S2Q., S2Q2
or

;
or

and

if LV

then

S^.

either

Sj^Qj.

.-.

Either

Pt

P,.

The tive

corresponding
Dilemma and

formulations

in

the

case

of then

the be

Simple
:

Destruc

its Counter-Dilemma

will

Dilemma

If But

P1;

then

S^

and
or

S2Q2.*
S,Qo.

either

S^

Counter-Dilemma

If But

P1?

then

S2Q2 and

S1Q1.

either

S2Q2

or

S^.

.-.

Pr
Sj
and

The

reference in the

to

the

Standards of the

S2

would
or

not, that

of

course,

be

explicit!!/

made

either

presentation

Dilemma

in

of the

Counter-Dilemma.

CHAPTER

XXXIII.

FALLACIES.

LOGICAL

Fallacies

are

and principle, infringements of logical

upon this definition would
as

classification of fallacies based

priate. But what are we to accept delityto which spells fallacy? Here
inevitable.
But
we

the

any be appro infi principles, logical in

differences

arrangement

are

would

most as logical principles the fundamentals in with which, dealing

suggest the following classification of with the distinctions upon in harmony

of

Logic, we

would

lay the

greatest stress

1. The 2. The 3. The 4. The

Principleof Definition. Principleof Inference.

of Principle of Principle
these
we

Proof.
Inductive have

Method.
four main
sources

Corresponding to
: fallacy

should

of

1.
2.

Ambiguity. Invalidity.
of Method. four main

3. Inconclusiveness. 4. Breach

Fallacies Formal consider

or

are,

then, of

kinds.

Inferential,Demonstrational,

be Verbal, They may Methodological. Let us

the

these types in turn,

begining with

Verbal.

1. VERBAL
;i

FALLACIES.

already seen, is not to be confused with All indefiniteness of words. in our an use appropriateindefiniteness does not call for definition, but only such indefiniteness as is not intercourse it In practical definite for our sufficiently purpose.

Ambiguity,"aswe"

have

would

be

pedantic to
In
a

insist

on

refinement purposeless
indefinite" title to in the its main

of

our

meaning.
tiveness But of

literature, the
word
or

infinite" i.e.,the
is often

sugges-

phrase

excellence. enunciation

in scientific terminology and

nomenclature,

281

282

THE

PROBLEM
in all

OF

LOGIC
at

[IX.

of all fundamental

proof, absolutely Here to be indefinite is to be ambiguous and to indispensable. that reasoned to the labours to supply superstructure, complete itself on the security of undefined meanings, the sandy foundation
in the meanings precision
we

laws, and

reasoning that aims

terms
we use

give to the

is

of the

Gospelparable.
:

As

an

illustration we

may

take the

following

argument

If A

is true, I is true. If I is true, 0 may be true. is true, O may

.-.

If A

be true.

self-contradictory, though valid. The premisses reasoning appearance of contradiction vanishes,however, when once the premissesand the conclusion are rid of their ambiguities. The argument then takes the followingform :
the
are

Here

the conclusion

is,to all appearance,

and
the

sound

If A is true, I is true. If I is true, then (on the

ground of I being true) we are unable to state anything certain concerning the truth or falsity of 0.
(on the ground of I being true)we
to state
or are

.-.

If A

is true, then

unable

anything
of 0. falsity

certain

concerning the

truth

phrase is used repeatedly (twice than twice) in the same essential or more argument, it is particularly that such indefiniteness as it may not should legitimately possess result in any such variation to its of its meaning as would amount in the various contexts. being used in different senses in different parts of an argument the same When word or phrase
one same or

When

and

the

word

is used
senses

in different senses,
were as

the same,

we

while the argument proceedsas if these have the important type of ambiguity
may with

known

Equivocation.
we fallacy

In illustration of this
'

cite the

following example

All able

men

are

consistent

themselves.

'

He

who who

'.-. He

changes his opinionsis not consistent with himself. changes his opinionsis not an able man.' (Father Clarke.)

Here
and
at

'

in the major, refers to opinions held together consistent,' the same time, whilst in the minor premiss it refers to opinions different times.
'

held

dictum that foolish a Cf. Emerson's is the of littleminds.' consistency hobgoblin Where the Equivocation arises through a confusion of grammatical and feminine gender,active and passive form, as between masculine
at

CHAP.

XXXIII.]

FALLACIES
a

283

voice, etc., the fallacyis called

of participle from
that
a

verb

may

have

the Thus fallacyof Flexion. acquired a meaning quite distinct

are presuming men for he presumes contemptible,
'

of other
his

the verb" parts"of

man,

e.g.,

All

contemptible ; this
to believe

therefore, is
correct
we
'

opinionsare
instance,

As
J. S.
'

further

may

take

(Jevons). the followingargument

of

Mill: The

only proofcapableof being given that an objectis visible is that peopleactually it, The only proofthat a sound see
is audible
sources

is that
our

people hear
In it is

it. like

And
manner,

so

of the I

other

of

experience.

apprehend,
'

the

sole evidence
is that

is desirable

to produce that anything possible Utili people do actuallydesire it ('

tarianism,'chap, iv.," 2).

In the this passage Mill is

endeavouring
must

Summum
sense

Bonum. of
'

He
to

prove that therefore understand

to

happinessis
'

desirable'
as

in the

worthy is to argument requires,

'

be

desired.'

But

if the

word,
to

Mill's

words

visible

'

and

'

of the a meaning analogous able to be desired.' mean audible,'it must

have that
'

given to it, the argument can in no way happiness is a Moral End or Good. Where the Equivocation arises through a confusion of the dis tributive and collective uses is known of a term, the fallacy as a Com Division. of There is fallacy of Composition or of fallacy used disof term when, a position having predicatedsomething we tributively, proceedas if the term had been used collectively. The following will serve illustrations of this fallacy : as
Now,
if this

meaning
that

is

help Mill to show

1. All

drops of
The

The
.-.

Pacific Ocean

objects. (nothingbut) drops of Pacific Ocean is a small object.

water
are

small

is

water.

2. All atoms

are

invisible.

All material
.-.

All material human

objectsare (composed of) atoms. objectsare invisible.

200 is
race

3. No The
.-.

are beings (singly) race

British
The

(an aggregate
is not 200 of
to

years old. of) human

beings.

British

years

old.

There Smith's
Dean and

was,

doubtless, a

latent

Fallacy
as

Composition in Sidney
whether blocks it would
'

remark
pave

during

the

discussion
'

be The

to possible

St. Paul's would

be

Churchyard with
need done.'
But

of wood.

only put their heads together, thing though to infer from those that therefore blockheads dignitaries' collectively being individually
the their heads

and

he said, Chapter,'

would

serve

the

useful purposes

of

wood-pavement

284 doubtless

THE

PROBLEM
of this

OF

LOGIC another
kind

[IX.
of

was

an

instance

fallacy, yet

Equivocation also contributed to the argument. There is fallacyof Division when, having predicatedsomething of a term used we collectively, proceed as if the term had been
used
The

distributively. serve following may

men are an

as

: examples of this fallacy

1. All

Hence carbon
3.

at

aggregate including many least one such aggregate is a

atoms coals.
not

millions of persons.
man. some

2. All coals

are are

of carbon.

Therefore

atoms

of

English people are

are

cowardly.

Therefore

no

cowards

4. The

Englishpeople. are anglesof a triangle equal to two right (collectively) the are angles. A, B, C (distributively) angles of a Therefore A, B, C (distributively) triangle (distributively). two to are rightangles. equal
commonest
'

Perhaps the
in such
manner,

form
It must
one

of the

is that which fallacy

it takes in

arguments
because
We

as

be wrong
did
so,

for you

to

act

this be

if every
start

the

disastrous.'
to

junctive) acted
the

in

some

by urging that manner specified

"

consequences if A and B and

"

would C
. .
.

(con

e.g., all studied

Logic
be
conse

neglect
must

of business
we

the
on

welfare

of

the
no

world

would

affected,and fatally
quences
manner
"

go A

follow when

or

to argue B or C
so

that
...

less fatal

specifiede.g., become

enamoured

act in the (disjunctive) of Logic as to allow

' '

study of it to lead to the neglectof the interests of business. A good illustration of this fallacy in the Imitatio Christi occurs attributed to Thomas a Kempis (Lib.I.,cap. xx., " 8). Here the to seek no earthly writer, who is exhorting the good monk him thus : with but to remain alone in his cell,reasons delight,
the
' '
'

What

canst

thou
and

see

elsewhere

which all the

here

thou

seest

not

Behold
all
we

the

sky
are

the earth, and

'

elements
'

; for of these

things
see

made.'

Expressing this argument

division

syllogistically,
Term
:

that

the

lies in the fallacy

of the Middle

The The

elementarysubstances
whole
material

(in organizedcombination) are

cell
are

the

world.
in

objects included

.-.

elementary The objectsincluded

whole
material

the prospect from your substances (not so combined).

in the

the
the

prospect from

your

cell

are

world.

A is

important illustration of the fallacyof Equivocation of suppliedby the fallacyof Accident and the Converse fallacy
more

Accident.

fallacyof Accident consists in first employing a unconditioned indeterminate or propositionin a relatively

The

term

or

sense,

CHAP.

XXXIIL]
then

FALLACIES

285

and

proceedingas

though

it had

been
'

used

in

sense

rela

The conditioned. or tivelydeterminate described its Latin by sufficiently name, ad dictum secundum quid simpliciter transition
to

nature

of this

fallacyis
a

Argumentum
is, Thus,
men an

dicto
form

'
"

that
or

equivocal discussing

from

statement
'

in its
a

general

indeterminate
in
nature

the

same

statement
some

with

modification.'
insist that all

seek by questions, may acts sub specie after the good, meaning that each man boni, and is kind of good, even when he is pursuing therefore seekingafter some his own in the use pleasure. But, continuing argument, he may of the the term good in a differentiated sense e.g., in the sense and come common thereby, good,' or the good of humanity o f the conclusion that all to men bynature through a fallacy accident, seek the generalgood. The be easilyexposed, once the ambiguity in the fallacycan the the the equivocationthus is and term of remedied, use good In the light of a Formal eliminated. criticism, the fallacy of is seen, like all the other fallacies Accident, when used in Syllogism, reduce As a further of equivocation, to to a quaternio terminorum. cite the following instance of this fallacy, we : may ethical
one
' '
"

'

"

'

'

is sometimes creatures of living killing Murder is the killing of living creatures. The
.-.

necessary.

Murder

is sometimes

necessary. Accident
we or a

In

the

Converse

Fallacyof
it had

first employ conditioned

sense
'

term

or

propositionin a then proceed as though

indeterminate
or

determinate relatively

sense,

and

been used in
We

which
a

is relatively secundum

unconditioned.

argue

dicto

quid

ad

dictum To

simpliciter.'
drink since wine in
excess

Example.

"

is

to injurious

health.

Hence,
see

to injureour it is wrong to drink wine is wrong.

health, we

that

Ambiguity
is but

may

lie not

only in
the
'

the

use

to which

word

or

phrase

in the very put, fallacyis then known

structure
as

of

sentence.

The

corresponding

Structure,a

sentence

of Amphibole, or Ambiguous fallacy being amphibolic when it admits of a double

'

interpretation. Example.
'
"

The

wolf the Here

we are

shepherd slew.'
left uncertain that
was

whether killed.

it

was

the wolf

or

the

shepherd
of this
'

As the
'

another oracle
to

example Pyrrhus
Romans

we fallacy

may

take

the response
vincere in

of

Aio

te, JE"cida,, Romanes

posse.'

It was, I say, subdue.' can, business of the oracle to devise plausible Amphiboles.

Pyrrhus

the

fact, the

280

THE

PROBLEM
is

OP

LOGIC

[IX.

The

of False, Parenthesis fallacy

I will go e.g., ' I will (go and
'

an

important form of AmphiThis may

'

bole
mean

"

and

return

to-morrow.'
or

either
I will

return) to-morrow,'

it may

mean
'

go

I ruined the : (and return to-morrow).' Cf. also the following Cause and injuredmy own prospects,which I deeply regret.' advertisements The following of accuratelyillustrate the fallacy
:

Amphibole

(a) Wanted
of mind.

: a

groom

to look after two

horses of
eat

pious turn
"

(b) For
(c) Lost
with

sale

Newfoundland

dog

; will

anything
a

very

fond of children.
: a a

valuable

silk umbrella head

curiouslycarved
OR

belonging to (Welton).
FALLACIES.

gentleman

2. FORMAL The main

INFERENTIAL

of Formal Inference,not to Principle have To we alreadyconsidered. acceptedpremisses, go beyond break any rule of the Syllogism is to commit a Formal fallacy. As and illustrated these breaches of rule have already been discussed and their application, the rules themselves there in dealing with
the
can

breaches

of the

be We

no

call here for their further consideration.

onlyallude to one important point,and that is the relation of Formal to verbal fallacy. To apprehend that relation logically, consider it in the lightof the followingrule : Never must see we Formal whether an fallacyor not, until it argument presents a has been adequately cleared of all its verbal ambiguities.' All
need
'

verbal
can

be

fallacies must, in fact, be rectified before the argument convicted of any Formal fallacy. In other words, logically

of Logical Consistency Principle depends for its correct appli of Noncation upon a due preliminaryobservance of the Principle if wish the of the to discuss validity following Ambiguity. Thus, we the

argument,
some we mean men

'Some
are

men

are

selfish;therefore
must
'

it may

be

true

that

not

we selfish,'
'

firstof all know

'

what precisely

further

first is form.
lacies We
"

some may.' why the verbal fallacies must be disposed of that this is part of the process of reducing to strict logical Fal Until this is done, it is irrelevant to speak of Formal to detect them. or, at least,it is quite impossible

by

the words
reason

and

Fallacies in argument would, if written reduce to Quaternio the argument were syllogistically, Terminorum, except Amphibole, which would simply vanish.
may

add

that

all Verbal

3. DEMONSTRATIONAL

FALLACIES.

Demonstrational heads
:

fallacies may

be

divided

under

two

main

^ panacies of lrrational Evidence. (2) Fallacies of Illicit Proof.

288

THE

PROBLEM
to

OF

LOGIC
is

[IX.

Occasionallythis appeal
if a
we man

to

Thus, justifiable. in a largeincome, in urging his interestedness against his right are quite justified to refusing the to discuss subject. But this simply comes speak on
is zealous in
some cause

the individual
which

bringshim

the the

matter

with

him.
a

It should, moreover,
retort
as a

be borne

in mind and

that

rejoinderis

mere

and

not

an

argument,
as an

should
it

.therefore be advanced exhibits the The

an

retort.

If advanced

argument,

of irrational fallacy

evidence.

the argumentum ad populum, is or argumentum ad passiones, with irrelevant the type of argumentum ad argument similarly
we

hominem
ment

have
is
a

just been considering. Here

but

it is not

the

judg

that

convinced,
statement

the inclinations
second the
'

As (ii.)
mentum

of the
I borrow

ad himself

hominem,
refers to

passions. of the argu interpretation from Dr. Gilbart,* following

and

who

Dr.

Watts'

Improvement

of the

Mind

'

that it differs essen (cf.Part I.,ch. x., " xii.). It will be seen already considered in that it does tiallyfrom the interpretation the It cannot, therefore, to be classed as a reason. imply an appeal If we call it a fallacy of irrelevant fallacyof irrational evidence. evidence, it is because its reasoningis not ad rem, but ad hominem. this defect, though it prevents the evidence from having any But does not precludeits possessing relevance for scientific a purposes, As a certain formal relevance. strictlyformal argument, the be perfectly valid. argumentum ad hominem, thus interpreted, may
'

Sometimes
person argue
were

we

labours

make of the very prejudices under which use may him of some in order to convince truth, particular him

and

they
Jew but

another

his own as professed principles though upon ad is called true. hominem, and is argumentum of men. of dealing with the prejudices Suppose a way

with

This

lies sick of

fever, and

is forbidden

flesh

desired because
that that him

hearing that rabbits were to eat of them earnestly

his
did physician
not

providedfor the dinner

; and

suppose

by his physician, of the family, he became impatient

it could

do him
that

fancy
that

and

permit him, and he insisted upon it hurt : surely, in rather than let him persist no I would tell to the of his life, desire, danger
were

these

animals

which strangled,
I

sort

of food

was

forbidden
is
now
'

by

the Jewish

law, though
same means

myself may

believe that
when maintain

law

abolished. used
drink

Encrates

the
wine

of conviction and
:

he
him

saw

Mahometan
fulness his
own

to excess,

heard

him

the law that

to

and

pleasureof
the

drunkenness

Encrates

reminded

prophet

Mahomet

had
man no

utterly forbidden
his vicious convince
excess

all wine

his
his

followers,and
ness was

good
nor

restrained
otherwise him

appetiteby
that drunken

when superstition

he could

him !'

unlawful

withhold
*
'

from

Logic for

the Million,' p. 125.

CHAP.

XXX1IL]
ad

FALLACIES Verecundiam.
in the

289

(2) Argumentum

"

This is

an

appeal to

man's

modesty. It consists proof,the opinion of

of more as weight than a reasoned alleging, the wisdom of the aged,or the majority,
'

tradition of the elders.

When
'

men

are

it is thought writes Locke,* dignity,' from it, and question the authority of others to derogate any way of it. This is apt to be censured, as carry who are in possession men when does not readilyyield of pride, man a ing with it too much
to

established in any kind of breach of modesty for a

the

determination
with

of
and
man

approved authors,
submission
to set up

which

is wont

to

be

received
upon
as

respect
a

by others
and adhere
to

; and to his

it is looked
own

insolence for

opinion

againstthe current againstthat of some

Whoever
backs his

stream

of

learned
tenets

or antiquity, put doctor, or otherwise approved writer. thinks with he ought such authorities,

it in the balance

thereby to

in anyone be called argumentum

carry the cause, who shall stand

and
out

ready to styleit "impudence" This, I think, may againstthem.

is
"

ad verecundiam.' ad

Ignorantiam,or Address to our Ignorance. to drive others, and force Another that men use ordinarily way them to submit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, what they allegeas a proof, is to require the adversary to admit I this And call better. to f Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.' or assigna (3) Argumentum
'

(2) Fallacies of Illicit Proof.

The of
a

two

main

fallacies to which

we

are

truth-interest, we
are

seek

to

prove
to

liable when, in the light conclusions from material

evidence
The

the Fallacies

of Petitio
liable
treat

Elenchi. Principiiand Ignoratio

Dilemma, however, is kind, and we shall therefore

Petitio Principii. (i.)
"

of

of a peculiar proof-fallacies these separately.

Petitio
are

Principiias
the

'

SidgwickJ has aptly defined the surreptitious assumption of a truth you

Mr.

Alfred

pretendingto prove.'
'

The

procedure is popularlyknown
terms
'

as

Reasoning Question. Begging reserved to indicate an argument Arguing in a Circle are sometimes be proved except by means that cannot in which a premiss is used that it is to assist in proving. Such reason of the very conclusion the same fallacy as a Petitio ing, however, involves precisely Principii, though in a form that is less direct and less easy to detect, Petitio Principii in the larger and we to therefore propose use
The
'

Circular

'

and

of the term, which includes both forms of begging the questionat issue.
sense

the

direct

and

the

indirect

That

the
we
*

fallacyis Material
what
we mean

and

not

Formal

will be

apparent
we mean

when

consider

by Formal

Proof, what
19.

'Essay concerning Human

'

Understanding,'ch. xvii., "

131.

t Locke, ibid., ch. xvii., " 20.

The

Use

of Words

in

Reasoning,'p.

290

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC be valid
the

[IX.
on as

when

we

sumption only to
ever,

say that the conclusion is that certain premisses are

proved to

pretence of

proving
it
as

the

conclusion

prove in the

a,

conclusion

accepted. There is here no matter as a of fact; we profess validly inferred. We cannot, how

until

the
a

the conclusion qua conclusion,for premisses assume And premisses are given no conclusion can be drawn.

yet, in

Formal
that

argument, the
the

conclusion which

cannot

be conceived
"

out

of relation to

premisses from

it is inferred that

cannot

be

conceived,
from the

is,in any
meant

relation other than

of

conclusion
in

premissesin
in

What,
endeavour

fact, is
to

question. is that, by a petitio principii

the
material

our

establish

truth

of

we proposition,

actuallyutilize for this proof,at one stage of it or another, the the The attempt to prove propositionwe wish to prove. very Non-Contra of of the of Principle Identityby means Principle diction* is a case in point. Another instance is suppliedby the
famous
thinker

dilemma undertook

of Zeno to prove
:

the

Eleatic, in which

that

paradoxical

the

of motion. impossiblity

Zend's Dilemma
'

If But

body
a

moves,

it must

move

either where

it is

or

where

it is not.
'

body

cannot

move

where

it is ; neither

can

it

move

where
'

it is not.
move
'

.-.

It cannot

at all.

Motion I.e., be

is

impossible.'

we gainsaid if once grant the major, it. The truth, however, seeing that the major covertly assumes is that bodies move where neither they are nor where they are not, where but where Motion consists in to are from they they are not. that the place is unchanged change of place; the major assumes that is,that there is no motion Minto, Logic,' (cf. pp. 224, 225). the The argument is really to : equivalent following

The

conclusion

cannot

'

"

'

'

'

If

body
motion
a

moves,

it must

move

under
under

conditions which conditions which

render render

impossible.
cannot
move

'

But

body

motion
'

impossible.
move

.-.

It cannot

at

all.'

Here Let
means
'

the
us

is manifest. petitio principii

take

as

further

illustration

the

of which The
The
.-.

Father

Clarke illustrates this

followingargument, by : fallacy
its

Catholic

Church

is infallible. Therefore

sayings are

true. infallibly
'

Catholic Church Therefore

maintains

the

of the Bible. inspiration

'

the Bible is
*

inspired.
p. 188.

Vide

supra,

CHAP.

XXXIIL]
'

FALLACIES
all being inspired,
states

291

Xow,
But
.-.

the Bible the Bible

its statements

are

infallible.

"

that is

the Catholic Church

is infallible.

'

The

Catholic Church
as a

infallible.''
inference, there is
futile form the of
no

If this be taken

merely Formal
course,

Petitio

Principii. There
consists in the Catholic Church
it is so,
on

is,of

that

tautologywhich

of the infallibility saying that, as respondent's the conclusion that is acceptedby the questioner,

The conclusion is assumption, follows irresistibly. irresistibleas it is tautological. as is anxious to discover a cogent proofof the But if the questioner real evidence, the of the Catholic Church, based on infallibility unveiled in its most attempt in questioninvolves Petitio Principii is The real ground for supposing that the Catholic Church form. that is that it is infallible. it says in effect, infallible, mental for and As
we as
"

This

is the funda

of mistaking assertion the fallacy fallacyof Dogmatism in its blankest of Petitio Principii proof and this is the fallacy
"

absurdest
an

form. of
a

instance the
case

Petitio

only one Principii

an one

degree less glaring,

argument intended
of the

have
a

the conclusion, in with is real proof, exactly synonymous in which

a

Thus,
words

of Saxon

bring Sophist may and give as origin,

in words every To allow
must
man an

forward
a

premisses. expressedin proposition

for it the very
same

reason

stated proposition

of classical origin.

E.g. :

'

unbounded

freedom

of

speech
to

the always be, on the whole, advantageous State, for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community that each individual should enjoy a liberty

perfectlyunlimited
(Whately).
Elenchi. (ii.) Ignoratio
an
"

of

expressinghis

sentiments

'

evasion

of the

point at

Elenchi may be described as Ignoratio In a long argument, for instance, issue. The reached
may

the
thus

ground
be

requires. Where the issue is deliberately evaded, the IgnoratioElenchi conclusion.' becomes of surreptitious a fallacy Elenchi does not exactly reproduce This view of the Ignoratio of which it is a modernized the original of the fallacy, interpretation the technical name elenchus The modification. given to the was of the oppo the contrary or contradictory in which final syllogism, shown to be true, and the thesis therebydisproved. nent's thesis was the ignorance of the syllogism Hence Ignoratio Elenchi is literally required for clinching a point in this special way. invented and the Achilles Tortoise, The famous of by paradox Elenchi. illustration of Ignoratio Zeno the Eleatic,may an serve as Achilles and a tortoise run race a together. The details of the
' ' ' ' '

and the actual conclusion be shifted, may the issue the conclusion which different from

race

are

not

stated,but

we

may

suppose,

for clearness'

sake, that

19"2

292

THE
ten
a

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[IX.

Achilles

runs

consequence, says when

and accepts, ia quicker than the tortoise, handicap of 100 yards. Under these conditions, times

the argument, Achilles will never overtake the tortoise ; for the tortoise has gone 10 yards, Achilles will still be 10 yards him. When
1

caught up, the tortoise will of a yard by yard. When yard is caught up, -j^ will still separate the two, the advantage resting with the tor toise. When this ~$ yard is covered, the lead dwindles to T^j yard ; and yet, though it thus decreases continuously from yard to T^-gyard, and then to T^OT^ yard, it still finds the tortoise in front T^OIF and Achilles behind. Achilles,then, though he will be continually to the tortoise,will never drawing nearer actuallyovertake him. The main gist of Aristotle's criticism of this paradox is that it involves a confusion of infinite length with infinite divisibility of The length. argument aims at proving that the space which Achilles must before overtaking the tortoise is an infinite magnitude ; cover but what it does prove is not this, but simply that the space in question is divisible ad infinitum. It is in this failure to lead the Elenchi consists. reasoning to its rightterminus that the Ignoratio
these 10

behind

yards

are

still be ahead

this

in the Dilemma. (iii.) Proof-Fallacies

a

"

When

choice choose of

between the
one

two

alternatives,and
alternative
or

points

out

presents B with that, whether

conse

he

the

other, disastrous

quences

horns
quences
not

will follow, B is threatened with being fixed on the If dilemma. he a can show, however, that the conse which
attach
to

the

acceptance of the alternatives

there
are

are

disastrous,or really
the two
an

that

alternatives other legitimate

will have

than from

to which

he is

he restricted, In
'

freed himself will

embarrassing situation.
in his
'

technical
to

he phraseology, the

have horns

succeeded
'

attempt either

take

dilemma He of its

by the
takes it

or

to escape

between he

the horns of the dilemma.'

truth

by
that

the horns

when

successfully disputes the

hypo

thetical

between propositions ; he escapes the disjunctive premiss is false.

B that if he that

the horns takes wine

when

he shows

instance,if A informs ally become a drunkard, and

For

he will wine

gradu
he will

if he refrains

from

become dull and anaemic, B may necessarily justly deny the truth of that he both the propositions. He may stilltake wine insist may and not lose his self-control, and that he may also cease taking wine and full of life. Or, again,A may and yet remain spirited urge that that whether and out either fools or knaves, men are they point the for the outlook class the to one or other, belong humanity is a
dark
one.

In

this rather

case

may

attack
refuse
to

A's

division of

men

into
not to

cheaters and

cheated, and
men

protest that
who
a

the non-cheated

need

be be

cheaters, but
cheated

allow of the

themselves

because

they have
a common

nature, and believe in

right sense good.

dignityof

human

CHAP.

XXXIIL]
further
illustration its

FALLACIES of dilemma which be defeated

293

In

can

only

by escapingbetween as commonly known

The

horns, we may the Ignava Ratio.

cite the Fatalistic

Dilemma,

Fatalistic Dilemma
'

(Ignava Ratio] :
you call in you die, you will die whether not ; and if it is fated that you recover, you whether you call in a doctor or not.

If it is fated that
a

doctor
recover

or

will
'

But
.-.

it must

be fated either that you

or

die

or

that you

recover.

'

You

will either die you

tion whether The The the the that

of the ques independently recover, will call in a doctor or not.'

this dilemma is
as

disjunctive premiss in
of
an

constructed. faultily

action

inexorable
'

fate is assumed

the When disjunction is built up. fated that you Either it is correct form, recover,' it is clear that a third you
"

which the basis upon stated in alternatives are

die, or

it is fated is pos
an

alternative

sible

namely,

'

or

men's
But the

destinies

are

not

predeterminedby
this

inexorable
The tion

fate.'

the

admission

of
have

third

alternative
refuta the

breaks entirely
mere

up rebuttal of It
serves,

force of the dilemma. logical

a

dilemma,
however,

as as

we an

seen,

is not check

of

it.

effective if the

upon

pretensionsof
up to meet result will be a
set

the the

argument

rebutted, and
is
as

counter-dilemma
as

dilemma original dead-lock. logical the dead-lock,

we

cogent
the

its

rival,the

To
or

transcend

must

weigh
are

claims respective

values the two

more

of the two
dilemmas.

standards
If
we can

which

at

once

used

and

abused

by
to

decide which

of the two

standards

is the the

Double If the

duty will be to apply it rigorously logical of a Single for a at issue, and case so, by the substitution clear up the situation. Standard of Reference, effectively should turn out to be equally obligatoryin two standards
our obligatory,

relation to the issue with confronted

with
to
a

which

the dilemmas in its

are

concerned, we

are

analogous
drama in the and

the

which, perplexity from perplexities

in real life.

lightof our clearer dead-lock. Many dilemmas, however, lead to no such tragical There are comedy-dilemmas as well as tragedy-dilemmas. As an instructive example of the Comedy-dilemma, we may cite the famous
and ancient
"

logical abstractly way, is which tragediesarise, both in revise but deepen the issue, and We can insight.

dilemma

known

as

Litigiosus.

Litigiosus.Protagoras the
his

Sophist is said
half remain due

to have

engaged with
should
be

pupil Euathlus
at once,

that the

half the

fee for instruction

paid
advo
court.

down
win
cate

and

other

till Euathlus
as an

should

his first cause.

Euathlus

till Protagoras became

his appearance impatient and brought him

deferred

into

The

sophist then

addressed

his

pupil

as

follows

'

Most

foolish

294

THE whatever

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
must

[IX.
pay your money
;

young if the

man,

be the decision,you
in my

judges decide
;

favour,
'

of the Court rebutted

sapientmaster, whatever be the lose your fee ; if the judges decide in my favour, decision, you must it lose the decision of the Court ; if in yours, by our bargain, by you for I shall not have gained my cause.' Putting the dilemma presentedby Protagoras into strict logical the form, we get following: by
'

if in yours, by our the following: Most

fee by the decision my This dilemma Euathlus bargain.'

gain

If the And

judgesdecide

in favour

of

Protagoras,then Protagoras

'

'

'

Court ; by in decide favour of Euathlus, Protagoras judges gains his fee by the terms of the Agreement. But either the judges will decide in favour of the one disputant, or they will decide in favour of the other. Hence, whether through the decision of the Court or the terms of the Agreement, Protagoras will gain his fee.'
if the Retort

gains his fee

the decision of the

The
'

presented by

Euathlus

will then

run

as

follows

'

'

'

judges decide in favour of Protagoras,Protagoras will of the Agreement ; not gain his fee by the terms And if the judges decide in favour of Euathlus, Protagoraswill not gain his fee by decision of the Court. But either the judges will decide in favour of the one disputant, or they will decide in favour of the other. Hence, whether through the terms of the Agreement or the decision of the Court, Protagoraswill not gain his fee.'
If the
a

With values
The

view

to

of meeting the perplexities

the

situation, as
the
at to

ex

pressedthrough

these two

dilemmas, let
relative
to

us

consider

respective
The

of the two

standards

the
or

point
is not

issue.

question at issue is whether

standards With
are

is Protagoras

gain

his fee.

Court. obvious
it is

of agreement, (2) the verdict of the regardto the claims of these two standards, it seems

(1)the deed

that the deed

on

of agreement
the

has the
terms

prior claim.
of the deed

In

fact,
been

only that the recourse be to law can ignored or violated by Euathlus But is and defendant it justified. quiteplain that, whilst plaintiff
are

the

suppositionthat

have

pleadingtheir
unviolated. done
so,

claims

before

the

remains he has
The when

Euathlus
verdict
no

has

the

of the

law, the deed of agreement not yet won a case, and, until Court, whether favourable or

unfavourable, can

have

legalvalue.

root-error, which consists in the appealto a second standard all the requirements the first is stillfullycompetent to meet

of the
structure
are

situation, may
of the

be

detected

in

another

form

in

the

very

minor premiss from which both dilemmas disjunctive to decide For the judges not obliged not only were developed.

X.

THE

PROBLEM

OF

INFERENCE.

(i.) (ii.)

Mill's The

Estimate Function and

of

the Value formal

Syllogism
of and
a

(ch.
Formal real

xxxiv.).

Discipline (ch.
xxxvi.).

(ch.

xxxv.

(iii.)

Truth-Inference,

CHAPTER
X. MILL'S (i.)

XXXIV.
OF THE

ESTIMATE to

SYLLOGISM. to

AN
must

Inference, according
lead
the
us

Mill, if it is
must

be
from

an

inference the known

at to

all,
the

to

new

truth,
Now

bring
we

us

hitherto
are

unknown.
between
; and

since what

do

know, according to Mill,

the

of particulars

sense-observation
these

and the
we :

observed

resem

blances

them,
the

constitute
Mill
a

natural

starting-point
on

of Inference

procedurewhereby
by
as

improve

such initial

knowledge
'

is formulated

follows

Certain
An

individuals
or

have

given attribute.
resemble the former
in certain

'

individual

individuals
them

other attributes.
'

.-.

They resemble

also in the
'

given attribute.'
type of the reasoning
individuals
to indi

This, says Mill,may

be taken

as

an

universal

process.'*
All inference, then,

according to Mill, is

from

viduals, from
have
once

child whose The fingers to particulars. particulars this particular makes experience his reason been burnt
'

for not

of any consulted
on

again,and has no thought touching the grate with his fingers matron, So the village Fire burns.' such as general maxim
as

to how

to treat

her

sick child, neighbour's

on

'

pronounces

the evil and

its

remedy simply
the similar

the

recollection and

authority

of what
After

she accounts

case

of her

statingthat all Inference inference. with inductive inference Mill goes on to identify such All inference, according to Mill, is inductive, and always consists the usual view Now to particulars. in reasoning from particulars particulars is that it consists in arguing from inference of inductive it to universals.J Mill quite accepts this usual view, harmonizing with his own peculiarview of the meaning of through his own generalization.
*

is from

Lucy.'f to particulars, particulars

J.

S.

Mill, 'A

System

of

Logic Ratiocinative

and

Inductive,'

Book

II.,

ch. iii., " 7, init. I This, of course,

t Id., ib., " 3. the same as is not arguing from the particularproposition would instance naturally A particular I or 0 to the universal propositionA or E. be expressed in the form of a singularproposition.
299

300 If

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[X.

i.

practicalconvenience, to argue of known first from a number such as Socrates died,' particulars, Plato to which includes these died,' etc., a general proposition All statements -and then to argue mortal men are particular from this general propositionto the particular syllogistically pro The Duke of Wellington [thenliving] is mortal,' we position, may do so, even with advantage, but we must not fancy that the validity of the inference is in any way increased by taking this circuitous via route the universal proposition. For we do not reason from this universal have but when even we proposition, only got it, from do reason the particular facts we are accordingto it. What from which the generalproposition firstdrawn. The universal was in two elements : to a premiss Mill, contains syllogism, according a proved part and an unproved part. The proved part is that which our cases registers previous observations of particular ; the instructions adds the inferences from these, and for unproved part The in innumerable inferences unforeseen cases.'* un making proved part is bound up in one formula with the proved part in and memorandum of the mere of the nature as a anticipation, conclusions which to we are prepared prove.'f With the assertion of the general proposition the inference, on Mill's view, is complete. Hence, when we conclude, according to that is mortal, or that the the major All men Socrates are mortal,' Duke of Wellington must eventually die, we make no inference, is finished but simply interpreta memorandum. The inference
we a
' ' ' '
" "

prefer, argues

Mill, as

'

'

'

'

'

when be

we

have

asserted that all

men

are

mortal.

What

remains

to

notes. 'J our own performed afterwards is merely deciphering in a word, is not to infer, but to decipher To syllogize, and interpret.

Mill clinches this statement

of his,that
as

is not Inference, Syllogism

an

by showing that,
the

if it be considered the

argument

to

prove

the takes

conclusion,it involves

of fallacy
men are

Petitio

Principii. He

example

:
'

All

mortal,
a

Socrates
.-.

is is

man,

Socrates
cannot

mortal;'

and
men,

points out
unless
we

that
are

'

we

be assured

already certain

mortality of all of the mortality of every indi

of the

man.'" accusing the Syllogism (qua proof process)of a Petitio that the conclusion Mill does not go so far as to assert Principii, to be proved must have formed of the particular cases one through the major premiss was first inferred. the observation of which He expresslyguards himself, in fact, against this misinterpretation
In

vidual

thus

J.

S.

Mill, 'A

System

of

Logic

Ratiocinative

ch. iii., " 3.

I Id., ib., "3.

and Inductive,' Book footnote. last ib., 8, Id-, " t " Id., ib., " 2, init.

II.,

CHAP.

XXXIV.]

MILL

ON

THE

SYLLOGISM
the

301

of his
he may

meaning.
'

'

Whoever
'

mortal,"
known
"

he

writes,
have
so '* or

pronounces that has affirmed of Socrates

a

words
is

"

All

men

are

Socrates

never

heard

; for since

mortal, though Socrates, whether

in the words

to be

is not, really in

man,

he is included
men

All

men."

Hence,

all asserting

assertingSocrates to be implicitly to do had nothing whatever general proposition. Its establishment is an inductive inference and the observations, My father father's father from my and mortal have been quite and other persons were ';f may independent of Socrates.
have
'
. .
. . .

be mortal, we are mortal, though Socrates may with of the the establishment
to

CRITICISM.
If
we

could
be
no

agree

with
to

Mill's

use

of the his views

term
on

'

Inference,'there
of the

would

reason

quarrelwith

the function

Syllogism. For Mill admits that, as a process of the disimplication of a memorandum, of premisses(thedecipheringor interpreting as he puts it),the Syllogism is a perfectlyvalid form of reasoning. the Syllogism, his view, unless There is nothing fallacious about on of Inference ; for Inference, in Mill's it be regarded as a process of reasoning from the known to the unknown. sense, is a process In his clear insistence on the point that Syllogism is one thing and Mill of all Induction who deserves the another, gratitude profit
from his labours. It would

be

no possible,

doubt,

to

maintain

that

Mill

goes

too

far in pressinghis

charge Syllogism that the conclusion is for, granted ; implied in qua proof-process in its support, there is surely some the premisses adduced novelty the from transition the to in the implicit explicit. Yet, as Mill mortal the are covers justlyinsists,the major premiss All men heard of that particular of Socrates, even case though we never has and stated and may been not yet though the minor premiss case, In asserting the major premiss,we to be true. not yet be known do in fact (whether consciouslyor not) assert Socrates to be a
' '

of Petitio

Principiiagainst the

mortal

; for whether

we we

have know

ever

heard

of him he is
a

or man we
'

not,
or

having
a

heard

of him,

whether

whether, not, still, as

or

matter

that
case,

of fact,he is a man. there is a distinction and

that
us

Hence, though
between
'

stated

may and

justlyclaim
'

covered should

'

Mill fails to do
to

to justice

the

this distinction,

not
a

blind material

the
or

fact

that

the

proof

inference if the

attempt to treat a syllogismas (in Mill's sense) is fundamentally

a

and fallacious, while

*

that

it is a fallacy so so-called,
to differentiate
S.

is not fallacy related closely

Petitio

to it that

Principiistrictly it is barelyworth
Book

the two.
of

J.

Mill, 'A

System

Logic

Ratiocinative

and

Inductive,'
6.

II.,

ch. iii., " 8, last footnote.

f Id., ib., "

302

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[X.

i.

MiWs

View

of

the Nature

of Inference.

But to particulars. at particulars time the same he recognizesthe possibility of making inferences facts observation of to laws ; from particular or generalpropositions indeed, his whole theory of Induction is a setting forth of the

Inference, says

Mill, is from

methods from

of such

inference.

Induction
summaries

is for he

Mill

an

inference

to particulars

because particulars,
as mere

regards

the universal
"

arrived at propositions

of

facts particular

not,

however, of the
be inferred from Mill

observed

facts

only, but also of

all others that may

these.
:

two kinds of inference clearly recognizes

1. Inference

from

facts particular died

and
'

others, have

') to

(e.g., A, B, C, particularconclusion (e.g.,

observed

'

2.

'); and Inference from particularfacts observed to a general or mortal universal proposition(e.g., All men are which, '), is of a though general, particulars. summary
is mortal
'

Socrates

The
as

second

kind

of inference is for Mill

that

quite as trulyinference
the second
is not

the

first. All

he

contends

for is that
route utmost

indispensably necessary

(as

an

intermediate
"

step)
via

to

the and

first,
"

though he admits that the circuitous conclusion is of the to the particular

vantage
the
We in many
cases,

the universal

importance

ad

and

that

it is

to absolutely indispensable

of the validity of testing

contention

the inference.

may is given in the and ticulars,

take it, then, that the substance

that
move

of Mill's view

of Inference

may

always

to par proceedsfrom particulars data to a particular from particular

it

conclusion
It is criticism without

without the intervention

must

of a general proposition.
these

againstthe idea
be
such intervention

expressedin
there

italicized words

that

our

directed.

that It is necessary to maintain be no can logicalreasoning from

that an indispensable to particulars, particulars part of the logical is the disengaging of some universal from the particulars, process of instances. of particular a number through the help The Mill chooses for justifying the process instances which of inference from particulars to particulars, without the intervention universal of any almost exclusively selected from are proposition, the reasonings of children, dogs, savages, and ignorant people. This is no that the oversighton Mill's part. He is quite aware which is necessarily inference of a proceeds without generalization and to the rudest his use own primitivetype, or, expression, of mental most spontaneous form operation.* Generalization,he
' '

* J. S. Mill, 'A ch. iii., " 3.

System

of

Logic

Ratiocinative

and

Inductive,' Book

II.,

304

THE of

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[X.

i.

Thought
seen,

"

Identityand of Non-Contradiction.
the

Mill,as
is not

we

have

persuaded that
that

conclusion
at

so

reached all. But

radically
re

novel, denies

this is Inference

the essential
is not

word) novelty, we reallynovel and fruitful, must should we forgetthat the inability of an inferred conclusion to trespass beyond the accepted data does not render it superfluous or tautological.Mill himself admits that the conclusion brings out explicitly what is only implied in the premisses.
our sense

quirement

of Inference

(in

of the

but

For irresistibility. logical turn to Explanation. Nor

the

of the universal from disengaging in particular which issues instances,the disengaging expression
We

hold, then,

that

the

its

in

is not Inference, or a generalization hypothesis, in scientific but only the first Explanation of facts. It is stage in which we not Inference in the strictly have sense certainly logical the is Its term. to defined in fact, principle, go beyond the evi

the formulation

of

dence, from

the
can

known
it be

to

the

unknown.

It

is, therefore, not

for it includes no verification. Explanation, tentative It is simply generalization, as generalization, yet unde and untested. veloped

Inference.Nor

CHAPTER ;X. (ii.) THEIFUNCTION

FORMAL
AND VALUE

XXXV.
OF A

FORMAL

DISCIPLINE.

Logic

is the

Logic of Validity as
concern

from distinguished

the

Logic
and

of Truth, and

its central

is the proper

correct

in application, in

Opposition, Eduction, and

interpretation Syllogism,

of the fundamental As
a

of thought. principles

Formal Logic has definite positive Validity, than a study in correct thinking. It is the value. But it is more for the study of scientific Method. propaedeutic indispensable For the deductive reasoning which enters so vitallyinto the at tempt to interpretFact through Hypothesis,though it is there

study

mere

exercised effective
A

in the

service

of material

truth, can

render

this service

Validity. only through respecting the requirements its little unless is to Science of can use hypothesis consequences be such precision can be inferred with logicalprecision. And of domain that the in school of Validity, adequately learnt only Formal Logic. the Logic of Further, though framed in the interests of Validity, the least toward at Form our sets us on Logic of Science. way Thus Syllogism,properlyunderstood, introduces us, in the simplest
of
and
most

instructive

way,

to

the fundamental

ideas

of scientific

theory and system.

CHAP.

XXXV.]

VALUE

OP

FORMAL

LOGIC
' '

305

science in Syllogism,for instance, form a of miniature. Dependent as they are on the single principle which in of forms, they a Validity, they express variety logical the principles of Science and the coherent foreshadow to the student be developed. They can systems of laws into which these principles the in solution of difficulties, collectively are, moreover, applied and in this way bring home the important truth that in solvingany science all the systematicresources of the in difficulty any special and may for the solution. be requisite, science are available, be too stronglyurged that the dis At the same time it cannot the procedure of Formal tinction between Logic (ofSyllogism in and that of the Logic of Science or Methodology is particular) The

rules of the

radical.

Enthymeme treatment. of the two systems of logical point of departure it is A man poisonous.' says 'This plant has milky juice; therefore in with their interest centred Formal Validity, solely logicians, complete the reasoningas follows :
This the
we a

will be clear if

consider

for

moment

the

as

'

'

'

'

'

are poisonousplants. plantswith milky juice This plant is a plant with milky juice. .-. This plant is a poisonousplant.'

All

Logic of Science, or Methodology, completesthe reasoningby the observation Has been analysing the data of the situation. of the juiceof a And made is the milky appearance ? correctly In a word, character ? plant a trustworthy index to its poisonous seeks to express the general conditions whilst a Formal treatment the which the validity of the reasoning depends, whatever upon the treatment scientific circumstances be, analyses particular may conditions upon which depends the truth of the conclusion. since It has sometimes been stated that Formal Logic is useless, consider the Let without its us briefly reason help. people can of the statement. justice As It is,of course, true that Logic does not teach us to reason.
The Prof. Carveth
and from Read

puts it,

'

We

assistance some growth he be to adds, few of frank,' neighbours. But, us walk, talk, or reason remarkably well.'* It is the business of Logic to train us into reasoningwell. and indeed any study But be said that Mathematics, it may that depends on in close reasoningfor its evidence, is a discipline these but sciences in of none good reasoning. This is true enough ; which sound reasoning the are we principles explicitly taught upon depends. Apart from logical theory we can give no final or con fall back, as in clusive justification of our reasoning. We may

talk, by the natural

friends and

learn to reason, as of our powers, with

we

learn to walk
'

'

Logic Deductive

and

Inductive,' third edition, ch. L, p. 6.

20

306

THE Axioms
concerns

PROBLEM
and

OF

LOGIC
and

[X. iii.
it is value

Mathematics,

on

Postulates

Definitions ; but
nature

only Logic
of these W.

that

itself with

studying the
to

and

first

principles.
Preface

S. Jevons, in the
on

(p.x)
'

his

'

Studies

in Deductive

laysstress Logic,'
to

the fact that

mathematical

education

requires
The

be corrected of
the

and

completed
is

...

by
to

education.' logical these with the

conditions and
ditions
a

quantitative reasoningare,
mathematician

after confuse

conditions, all, special

con

pure

apt

of

argumentationin general. Thus, having proved that, if

have two sides equal to one another, the oppositeangles triangle will also be equal, a mathematician might be tempted to give a separate proof of the proposition If a trianglehas two unequal angles,the sides subtended by these angles will also be unequal,' inference is an immediate that the second statement not recognizing from the first (cf. ibid., p. ix).
'

CHAPTER
X.

XXXVI.
FORMAL
AND REAL.*

TRUTH-INFERENCE, (Hi.)

WHERE
both

the process of Inference is associated,as it habituallyis in ordinary life, with in Science and interest in knowing an the

validly drawn the new which is essentially interest Is itselftrue or false, an interest, radica] at to and tends introduce in verification proof, once a change
whether
a

evidence

from

which

conclusion

is

into

the character

of the inference. which

is thus

It is not,

however, the form

essentially changed. So long as the in the meaning of simply disimplicating logical process the process of inference remains the structurally given premisses, not interested in our whether we are or are premisses as same, In either case the start is made with given items of knowledge. the the drawn with is conclusion and goal logical necessity premisses, is changed is the function. these from same premisses. What to the truth-interest, With the expansion from the validity-interest in Inference be end and becomes to an ceases itself, an episode seek the truth of material in the inquiry through which we
of the argument
consists fact.

stages in the to these, two truth-interest, and, corresponding

There
are

two

well-marked

evolution
main

of

the

varieties of

The

reader

will find the

an

and interesting Traditional

connexion

between

so-called

' to Logic,'ch. Mr. Joseph's Introduction to also Prof. Minto's important Introduction

suggestiveestimate of the historical Logic and the Logic of Induction in xvii., particularly Cf. pp. 344-349. the second book of his Logic.

CHAP.

XXXVL] The

TRUTH-IXFERENCE interest in Fact

and in the truth

307 of it may

truth-inference.
be either The

formal or of a given range of fact may be con potential significance limited in the service of some definite human ventionally interest, it in the be various of Natural or regarded,as departments may
limit except its respect a disinterestedness that has no law. In the of former case, the Truth-inference will be a reign real. formal ; in the latter,

real.

Science,with
for

Of of

the

formal

we types of truth-inference,

special importance.
is restricted may

The

world be
a

may of fact within of

specifythree
which the

as

the truthmake-

interest believe
romance.

world

make-believe,
is real for

world

of

child,or

the

world

which

legend or
which The of this

be a world Again, it may authoritysuppliesthe facts and the

truth-interest kind. of the scholastic it
was

of closed

in beliefs, inference.
a

premisses of
within found.

Truth,

held, had

Logic moved already been

the wisdom unravel the

world It

lay bound
All that

up in the creed of the Church and needed to was was consistently fundamental of life. the truth-interest Finally, may

of Aristotle.

of these implications them

to

dogmas and systematically apply

be
and

the

needs

limited strictly this

case

in the interest

of discussion. indeed. Minto

The

hold

on

Reality in

Logic,*the dominating interest seems still to have been the interest in Validity. Here the in to entangle the respondent in selfquestioner, his endeavour limited contradiction, was by this one consideration, that he could not go beyond the admissions of the respondent. His data consisted simply in the respondent'sexplicit admissions. These admissions it was function the questioner's but to not to criticize,

In the game associates the

of Question Answer of the Aristotelian origin

be very feeble may with which Professor

disimplicate.
The interests up with in of discussion those the

bound

may, of truth than

however,
was

be
case

far

more

the

in this

closely playful

dialectic, or

formalities of the scholastic

discussion-class.

allied with that impartialpursuit of integrally procedureof the Natural Sciences. Scientists thrash a matter with Nature out in the laboratory, herself as may and such discussions would be essentiallyreal.' But it is referee, and that the requirementsof discussion, held customarily naturally as compared with those of investigation, are relatively subjective .and conventional. Disputants must be ready to accept each the other's point of view, and argue ad hominem (videp. 288) rather may
even

They

be

truth

which

marks

the

'

than The

ad

rem.

distinction between a formal and a real reference to Reality, between formal and real types of evidence, is,within certain limits, relative distinction. In playing with A Reality" and whenever
*

W.

Minto,

'

Logic,' pp.

3 et seq.

20"2

308
content

THE

PROBLEM formal

OF evidence
"

LOGIC
contact
' '

[X.
with
'

iii.

we

ourselves with

our

Reality

be termed playful one form of unjustly play may be with r eal another. Within the domain as compared relatively of Chess, Chess Problems Games while are are formal, (relatively) real. relatively In the problems, we start with isolated positions arbitrarily
may not
'

constructed, and considered without any rence as stages in the development of a

them
'

reference
game.

to

their

occur

Indeed,
rules of

many

of

could not
a

occur we

in

game.

In

Game

to proceedaccording
we

the

same

as

in

Problems, but
involves
and

start

with

that

initial arrangement of
"

operation pieces

which of

the whole system chess combinations possible this The subsequent development is within chess-reality. is
'

all

Stout). throughout controlled by it (Professor of the dis There is, however, a point at which the relativity tinction gives way, and that is where from we Reality as pass regulatedby conventional rules to Reality as governed by natural law. The appeal to Fact as an embodiment of natural law sharply discriminates between a real and a formal attitude towards Reality. Where the reference to Reality stops short of a reference to Realityas-under-natural-law i.e.,to a general system of Reality the is reference The of the word. formal in the logical sense definitely first logical conversion from a formal to a real grasp of Reality takes place when material evidence is handled in the interest of system,
"

"

the scientificbelief in natural and

A

law.

'

To

return

to

Chess, both
of

games

problems are
Game
"

datum but
any

movements
as

Logic. processes formal process, because its total a logically of their the arrangement of the pieces and the nature is not regarded of as a general a part or system, phase ultimate assumption, neither requiring nor an admitting
formal
is

from

the

point of view

at

Chess

"

further

explanation. And
are

the series of inferences

involved
;
'

in

playinga
do not fessor
We

game

quiteisolated
a

; they lead to nothing further

supply Stout).
even

point of
the

departurefor the next

game

they (Pro

see,

then, that
upon

essential characteristic
it is active in Real it

of the

truththat

interest,in the form

the evidence

in which

Inference, is

ultimately relies is the potentially unlimited evidence of Fact unfettered by any convention that would nature as displayingits own peculiar prevent the fact from fully natural law. fact under The a appeal in scientific reasoning is and The facts of Nature, as natural law. always back to Nature facts under of evidence ; and law, are here the ultimate repositories
which
the of

conviction

that

this evidence
the fund

remains

fresh perennially

and is

full

and that surprises, cally inexhaustible, is the characteristic belief of Sciences. Real from Evidence, then, differs essentially

of reality to be drawn

practi upon all the Natural

evidence

formal

by

CHAP.

XXXVL]

TRUTH-INFERENCE
to

309

its Fact
ness

perpetualback-reference
as

still undiscovered based

or

unexhausted

its ultimate

source

of

supply.

It is essential to the effective

on

of

disputatiorial argument
should
process

evidence deductive
that

be
is

accepted by

both
;

the facts, as putants, should confirm

to

abruptly checked they exist outside

the

that the formal evidence the otherwise disputants, but it is quite unessential
statements

the the

of these

dis

disputants are prepared the condi talkingwith Nature accept. when is a silent respondent, and even tions are changed. Nature it her a provisional Science, the questioner,wrings from answer, be revisable the condition that the enforced disclosure is only on be subsequentlyelicited. in the light of what may
evidence
in

On

the other

hand,

This is the Real

back-reference

to

an

inexhaustible from
so

source

of further of Inference Evidence

can

evidence based
can never on

and distinguishing Evidence. The

feature controlling

conclusions
in

Real
as one sense

be considered control
the
over

closed, except
the
source

far

of

supply, in the
and Science

of

complete understanding all

of their effective
we
'

claim

elements disturbing possible In

a

the conditions alone and do

appearance. real evidence

mathematical control
formal of this

conclusions.
referred
to

In

kind, evidence, on the

limited
as

over possess ' closed consequently

other

hand,

the

reality
in

evitable.

may Thus

be

so

to

make

closed conclusions

every

conclusion

that

necessarilyfollows

from

premissesaccepted by
argument
to these

all the interested

is considered
same

closed,so long as
not

disputantsas true bases of the consent originally given

or

premissesis

withdrawn. real. But in either

case

Evidence, then, may

the

be either formal

meaning of the terms in which the evidence is presented must There be unambiguously understood. is, however, a difference ; fall back in formal fix this in evidence order to we for, meaning,
formal
or

upon real
a

whereas definitions,

in real evidence

we

fall back

upon
to

scientificdefinitions.
reference that
to to

Again, formal
and

definition itself
a

implies

formal
; so

Fact,

real definition

real reference in the between is

Fact

references

it is always the difference ultimately Realitythat is the essential difference In the

one case

respective
the two

types
and

fragmentary conventional ; in the other, it is systematized, subjectively and methodical. objective, in its relation the question of evidence leave cannot to We the reader's attention to the important Inference without recalling made been in the Introduction fact to which reference has already to the elsewhere fact, namely, that in drawing an (p. 7) and transferred from the nature be entirely inference the interest may the The of the evidence interest of nature to the logical reasoning. in the distinction between truth and falsity entirely disappear, may and the strictly take its place. Formal or abstract interest in Validity In such event, the reference to Reality is no longer even playful;
of evidence.
"

the

reference

310

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[X.

iii.

for has

the

interest

in

the

material
There

truth
is

or

falsity
further
as

of

our

statements*
or

completely

vanished.

no

make-believe,
true.

conventional Formal

acceptance
treatment

of of

stated the be
true

premisses
treatment

In

the

strictly
ideal
but is

Logic,
may

whose
may

sole

Validity,
truth
or

the

premisses
is

or

they

be

false,

their

falsity

logically
*

irrelevant.

Vide

Note,

pp.

9,

10.

CHAPTER
XI. GENERAL (i.)

XXXVII.
THEORY
OF

INDUCTION.

A.
THE

THE

PURE

INDUCTIVE

METHOD. Bacon the

history of Logic, from the time of wards, has been mainly determined by
from found
the

and
to

Galileo
divert

down

desire

Logic
to

word-chopping

tendencies

of

formal

discussion

the

in which this desire requirements of natural fact. The movement the In is known a as systematized expression commonly ductive It aimed movement. consistent at substituting for the elaboration of dogma the true explanation of Nature. Its funda mental embodied in the general requirement was working principle

of

to Fidelity

Fact.

to tendency of the so-called Inductive logicianswas and to uphold of investigation, keep to the letter this new principle the necessity of allowing the facts to speak for themselves, the mind maintaining with regard to them a purely receptiveattitude. Hence
sense arose

The

first

the
term
"

pure that

Inductive

Method,
aims

in the
at

stricter, clearer

of the

the method
to

which make

simple reason the strict evidence beyond go method No hypotheses or guesses to be made must are we ; but wait till our tabulations of the particularphenomena reveal the "form" them' w hich to or general (Prof.Creighton, principle belongs Logic,'p. 29). The natural this radicallyempirical goal of Science based on method is to become Science of Statistics so compiled and arranged a
' *

for the

avoiding Hypothesis, to a hypothesis is,temporarily, of the facts. According to this

force upon the methodical collector of observations the laws which the facts require to explain them. In this way, laborious method takes the place of the scientific imagination and the happy idea.
as

to

primitive conception of the Principle. The tendency to avoid the use of Hypothesis in the beginningsof Inductive Science is, as a matter of fact,justified of the conditions under by the very nature which alone Hypothesis be usefully can employed. To be fruitful and not barren, a hypothesis
may

Much

be said

in favour

of this

Inductive

must

be rooted
we

in

scientific system

; where

there is

as

yet

no

scien

tificsystem,

cannot

expect any

fruitful
313

of application

Hypothesis.

314

THE bound
much

PROBLEM
to

OF

LOGIC
that

[XL i.

Moreover,
and

we

are

the great value of recognize of facts

And upon yet it is which

unprejudicedcollection
so

this

impartial early em

piricismlaid

imperative to add that collect facts methodically unless it also selects the mind cannot them. Not only is there a natural tendency to observe in the lightand under the selective guidance of a thought,but, further, it
stress.

is essential to

the

should
the

go to meet

that of scientific progress It the facts armed with ideas. is not

interests

the

mind
to to

enough
facts,
as

be faithful to fact.
facts

Science
own a

must

be faithful What

to its

own

relevant to its Fact.*

ideas.
vague

Induction
but

needs

its

is not guiding principle

Fidelityto Fact,

Fidelityto

Relevant

of a developed Science, it follows Speaking from the standpoint towards the mind should know (1) that, prior to any collecting,
what

end

and

for what

purpose

the collection is to be made

material in it must

; and

(2) that during the collection of

on

be

ready

to seize make
a

any

indication

of

law
test

embodied
it either

the

material, to

hypothesis of it,and

by experiment, or, if experi is impossible, ment by further collection of material. would thus method In illustration of the form which the Baconian
to

Autobiography : to England, it appeared to me After my return that, by following all facts which and the example of Lyellin Geology, by collecting and the variation of animals bore in any on plants under way and nature, some domestication light might perhaps be thrown true Baconian the whole subject. I worked on on principles, and without any theory collected facts on a wholesale scale,more with by printed productions, respect to domesticated especially and with skilful breeders and gardeners, by conversation enquiries, the I soon that selection was perceived by extensive reading. and of animals in making useful races keystone of man's success plants. But how selection could be applied to organisms living
assume,
'

we

quote the followingfrom

Darwin's

'

'

...

...

in

state

of nature
1838
"

remained
I

for

some

time

mystery

to

me.

In sys

October,
tematic

that
"

is,fifteen months

after I had

begun

on happened to read for amusement enquiry for Population,and being well preparedto appreciatethe struggle observa existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued that, struck animals it and plants, at once me tion of the habits of

my Malthus

under

these circumstances, favourable variations would tend to be result of to be destroyed. The ones preserved,and unfavourable of new this would be the formation species. Here, then, I had at
last

got
Vide

theory by

which the
pp

to

work.'f
method
seems

This
*

adoption of
Introduction,
Darwin

Baconian
also the

to
on

have
the

come

.1-8 ;

concluding chapter

Inductive

Postulate. ' "f Charles Selected

Series

Life : his of his Published

told

in Letters.

an

Edited

AutobiographicalChapter, and in a by his son, Francis Darwin,'

ch. ii., pp. 39, 40.

CHAP.

XXXVIL]

THEORY

OF

INDUCTION
'

315

witness as naturallyto Darwin through his beinga born collector,' the following extracts : At eight years of age for natural taste history,and more my out for collecting, was well-developed. I tried to make especially and collected all sorts of things shells, the names of plants, seals, which and minerals. The for collecting franks, coins, passion leads a man to be a systematic naturalist, a virtuoso, or a miser of my sisters innate, as none was clearly very strong in me, and was
'
"

or

brother
'

ever

had

this taste.'*
was

nearly so much much or me so beetles.'! pleasure,as collecting eagerness, gave During the voyage of the Beagle another of my occupationswas animals of all classses,brieflydescribing and roughly collecting of the marine ones.'f dissecting many It is therefore not surprising to read the following : My mind become to have seems [at seventy-two years of age] a kind of machine for grindinggenerallaws out of largecollections of facts.'
No

pursuit at Cambridge

followed

with

'

'

On
the he

the

other

hand,
'

this Baconian Newtonian.'

'

method
I have
as

was

not

adopted

to

exclusion
'

of the

says, however

to

keep
as

1113-mind

free,so
I cannot

much
soon no

beloved
facts

(and
are

endeavoured,' steadily to give up any hypothesis, resist forming one on every

subject) as
have tion had of

shown

to be

opposed
a

to

it.

Indeed,
the excep

choice but
had this

to act

the Coral

Reefs,
not
we

in this manner, I cannot remember after

may
a

for,with
be

hypothesis which modified. 'J With

'

time

to

singlefirst-formed given up or greatly

son's
:

Reminiscences.'
'

Speaking
no one

from his a passage compare of his father,the writer remarks

could be
me a

He
an

often active

said that
theorizer. for

good

observer

unless he
he

was

This

brings

back

to what
as

I said about
were

his

instinct with

on charged any avoid could that however the slightest small, so no disturbance, fact, of theory,and thus the fact became a stream magnified releasing into importance. '" We stress we conclude, then, that, whatever lay on the value of the facts speak for with open mind instances and letting collecting cannot themselves, we dispense with Hypothesis. Hypothesis is needed to give meaning to Fact. The attitude taken by the radical empiricists of the earlyInductive a reaction as period may be explained, though not, indeed, justified, against the apotheosis of dogma in the days of Scholasticism. to fact, but The not here was fidelity principleof investigation

arrestingexceptions; it was ready to flow theorizing power

though

into

channel

Charles Darwin Life : his Selected Series of his Published ch. ii., p. G.

'

told

in

an

Letters.

Edited

Autobiographical Chapter, and in a by his son, Francis Darwin,' % Ibid., p. 52. by his son,

t Ibid., p. 20.
"
'

Life

and

Letters

of

Charles

Darwin,

edited

Francis

Darwin,'

vol. i.,ch. iii., p. 149.

316

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

i.

loyaltyto dogma. The dicta of Aristotle and of Church Theology of treated as beyond the reach of criticism,and the aim were with Nature that of reconciling construed Science was as Dogma, of Philosophy and and of proving herself the dutiful handmaid Theology. Thus the discovery of Copernicus was opposed by reasoning such the following: as
'

Theology teaches
earth.

that

the

sun

was

made

to

give lightto the

not
we move move

'

Now,

when

we

wish the

to

lightour
On

house
torch
'

about about about

torch.

houses, we do the contrary,

about
the

the the the

the house.
sun

Therefore
earth

it is the

that

moves

earth, not

the sun.' when professor,

An

old scholastic Galileo's

his notice
'

discovery
:

of

day brought to the following sun-spots, made

his

pupil one

characteristic remark

My

friend, I have
that

read

Aristotle twice

from

and

I know

there cannot
in your

a little more glasses itself, they must be

be spots on the sun. carefully.If the spots are not

own

beginning to end, Just wipe your

in the

telescope

eyes.'

B.

THE

ESSENTIALS

OF

INDUCTION.

(1) Principleand Method.

the early empiricism proceeded which principle upon sound at heart, and, as was namely, that of Fidelity to Fact contained implicitlythe tendencies applied by the empiricists, with correction. Busied fact, as they were requisiteto its own to fact they were equally concerned about Method ; and fidelity to the method, instrument, implied, as its precondition,fidelity facts be approached and which to the were or through organon, to fact to fact really meant studied. For them, fidelity fidelity Relevancy to scientific along the lines of pure inductive method. still unquestionably was recognized, purpose, though not explicitly The
" "

Vide More
or

Ernest real.

Naville, La Logique de 1'Hypothese,' p. 17.

'

f
which the

correctly

formal

dominated
a

guessingof

Scientific Induction,' for inductive procedure may be either restricted interests as that in the service of such of finding method definitions, or that which prompts In the chaptersthat It is real in the service of Science. riddle.
'

It is formal the Socratic

follow, however,
synonymous
as

we

shall treat We should

'

Induction add that

we

'

and

'

Real

or

Scientific Induction of Definition

'

as

terms.

Division, whether
Inductive

formal

processes

not naturallyregulative, to it.

regard the processes to Induction, rather than or real, as operationssubsidiary is Fact of to Relevant The Fidelity Principle proper. only of Induction itself,but of all operationssubsidiary

and

CHAP.

XXXVIL]
in their

THEORY whole

OF

INDUCTION towards
been that

317
Thus

implied
of the

attitude
has
not

Nature. of

the

task

fresh a substituting and a fresh method, both. of reconstructing Fidelity principle for be Fact to Relevant an as adequate principle accepted may of the modern inductive research, but it is simply a specification is of the specification of Fidelityto Fact. Still, principle vaguer the the first importance. In explicitly use introducing,through but

later

Induction

of the
is

term

'

relevant,'a
that
to

reference

attention

to the

fundamental
it is

it draws scientific purpose, truth that fact out of relation to idea

to
so

meaningless,and
can

only in

jar as factis

relevant

to idea

that idea

be true

fact.

Closely connected with this fundamental improvement in the have the of we an equallyradical improvement conception principle, method in the method of its application. The was improved by whilst giving Hypothesis a central place in inductive procedure, insistence the empirical ideal was on adequately guaranteed by Verification.Through the Verification-test subjective prejudices warded been off quite as effectively as are though they had never the is chance and Science allowed a of expressing themselves, gainer the scientific the assistance of Imagination. powerful by enlisting that the limitations The due recognition characteristic of the earlier not were only uncalled for in the interests of empirical method
fact,
clear but
to prejudicial

such
we

interests, coincides

with
'

the

first

perception of
Fact
'

what

really mean

Relevant Nor

which

is the fundamental

Fidelity to by that of Scientific guiding idea

Explanation.
jealouscare for Fact implies oppositionto the interests of System. On the contrary, it is any of Science the organization the loyalty to Fact that explains precisely to be lessoned by fact is, into System. A perpetualwillingness
must

it be

supposed that

this

indeed, the characteristic of

itself. systematizing
the fact which that it And

all Science

that

has

ever

succeeded

in

Science
the

that this is very significant ; for it shows calls Nature struc is itself systematically

tured, and forced

upon

systematic character
nature
can

of successful Science
facts it endeavours

is
to

by
"

interpret. And
means

very that the facts

the

of the

just

this

understood
tematize The

in the them.

systematically only be interpreted that Nature, being itself systematic,can only be is facts To to sys of interpret light a system.

in any be understood Principleof Induction, then, cannot be controlled To of that by sense System. impliesdisparagement be facts to facts the the relevant shaped into just means systematic coherency through the essential coherency of fact itself. In refusingto go beyond the evidence, the scientific spirit the principles of an is assimilating objectiveorder, making them and approximating more and more to the ideal of syste its own,
" "

matic

unity

in

interpretation.

31S And
own

THE

PROBLEM be

OF

LOGIC that Science

aims

[XL

i.

yet

it would

misleading to

say

at its

systematization. For the true lesson of Science is that systematiccoherency can be gained only indirectly.To aim directly at being systematically coherent is to forfeit the true objective which Fact is the one and only key, and to win a partial system to that is that and doomed on systematization hopelessly subjective,
account to eventual

barrenness.
for

Hence
true

the

supremacy,

Science, of Fact

System systematiccoherency to the determination to be at all costs faithful in its true nature, to the facts. Fact dominates System because it is,
itself the ideal and

interest

of

is secured

System.* The by subordinatingthe desire for

over

standard

system.

(2) Hypothesis.
We

have

seen

that,

in
a

the

applicationof the
and between
the

new

Inductive
It is

Method,
the which is

Hypothesis is

central

factor. indispensable

essential medium
it is

scientific system, beingappliedto the explanationof facts,and the facts to

of contact

which
has

being applied. As
the

consistent
a

with

the system of which

a

it

been

enrolled provisionally
to to

corporate member,

hypothesis

belongs
facts
are

system.
the

As

the

be

explained,it
one

direct agency through which the the facts. to is belongs Consistency

view
; truth

required of
from The

it from

point of

is

requiredof

it

the other.

artificially grafted on to the scientific it. The system in question,but is its product, and presupposes law of gravitation, conceived by physicalScience, presupposes as a whole theory of dynamics, and in the formulation of it the require all along kept rigidly of this theory of dynamics were ments in view Newton's of Descartes' treatment (cf. Theory of Vortices '). It is the scientificsystem which givesto the hypothesisits explanatory its deductive vitality. Consider how forlorn and resourceresources, is when less a theological or graftedon to philosophical hypothesis
not
'

hypothesisis

scientific system, and

vice

versa.

(3) Deductive
We may three distinguish main

Inference.
functions of deductive inference
:

1. The 2. The 3. The

*

development of a hypothesis. of a hypothesis. application of from axiomatic premisses. a proof proposition^

'

We

do

not

say

of Fact

over

Idea,' for Fact

is

nothing out
idea.

of relation to Idea.
to
own

point is simply that Science attaches primary in so far as Nature Nature is relevant to its inductive Science is a subsidiary matter. as

Our

importance
Its

being

true

to

organization

320

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
'

[XI. i.
If cats

Thus clover form

wish to test the may is also abundant.' The

we

suggestion

abound,
take

red

development will
is also

then

the

of the
If
cats

Sorites following

abound, red
clover

clover

abundant

(undeveloped

hypothesis).
If red

abounds, humble-bees

this clover) must also abound. pollinate If humble-bees abound, then their inveterate the field-mice, must be few in number.
.-.

(which alone^j I
, .

foes, j

J
the

If cats
one can

abound, field-mice

are

few

hypothesis). (developed hypothesis,

No the

deny that,through the development of

of verification has

So considerably simplified. far we with have dealt only that form of development which of a categorical proceeds by analysingthe predicate-concept pro the consequent of a hypotheticalproposition. The or position, a different form equally development though it here assumes may well take place of the subjectof the categorical, through the analysis the antecedent the of the hypothetical, or proposition. Thus to be tested may of S may be S is P,' and analysis proposition

problem

been

"

"

'

show
not

us

that S is M.

We

then substitute for the

hypothesis, original

M. is P. M, but a new hypothesis, For if we show that M is P, then, since S is M, we shall have can shown that S is P. To recur to the illustration just cited,we may If wish to justifythe statement red clover cats that, abound,

the developed hypothesisS is

'

also abounds.'

We

may

then argue

as

follows

If cats

If field-mice
.-.

If cats
we can

abound, field-mice are few. abound. are few, humble-bees humble-bees abound. abound,
'

the proposition, If humble-bees abound, justify red clover also abounds,' we shall also have justified the hypothesis

Now,

if

we

started with, for

If cats

we

can

then

reason

as

follows

If humble-bees
.-.

If cats

abound. abound, humble-bees red clover also abounds. abound, abound, red clover also abounds.

the Process throughwhich an Hypothesis as Inference applied. When once the hypothesishas been suitably developed, the the application to particular at follows soon as so cases once, be brought under the hypothesis case can through the discoveryof the suitable middle term. Thus we a apply hypothesisthat No to the case micro-organismsarise by spontaneous generation of Bacillus subtilis by bringing under the more this species general of micro-organism : concept
2. Deductive
"

is

'

"

"

'

'

'

No

Bacillus
.-.

micro-organismsare produced by abiogenesis. subtilisis a micro-organism.

subtilis is not

Bacillus

producedby abiogenesis.

C'HAP.XXXVIL]

THEORY

OF

INDUCTION

321

might have occasion to apply the cecological hypo Whortleberry belongs to the Heather Association of plants. Formulating our hypothesis in the proposition, All districts in which Heather is plentiful districts in which the are is it the Whortleberry found,'we might apply by helpof an inference such as the following :
So, again,we
thesis that
the
'

All heather

districts
is is
a a

are

whortleberry districts.
district.

Dartmoor
.-.

heather

Dartmoor

whortleberrydistrict.
in the transition

Syllogistic Inference, logical the drawing of conclusions with logical from stated pre necessity of its importance. It is, in fact, only when misses, loses none inductive Inference transportedinto this new settingthat logical is seen in its true light the process through which the implications as of Knowledge are unfolded. In its Formal Inference did setting, had been or was not develop what but only to be adequatelyverified, what had been accepted as data in the interests of the Implication aims Inference problem. Formal only at validly developing at developing acceptedpremisses; scientific Inference aims primarily the truth. Validityis here a secondary,though still an essential requirement. Formal Inference gives way, to an then, in Scientific Method ideal of Deductive valid inference real to Inference, from grounds inference as logically Formal but differ as was Inference, necessary from the latter in its function,which, in last resort, ing essentially is that of furthering the work of scientificexplanation. It is through of logical is brought Deductive Inference that the principle necessity into relation with fact whilst the investigation of : a retaining becomes Inference factor now an character, strictly logical integral in the progress of Science Truthon (vide Chapter XXXVI.
see,
a

We

then,

that

from

Formal

to

Scientific Explanation,the central

function

of

"

'

Inference, formal
Deductive

and

real

').
not

Inference
is the wider in the

should
term.

be

confused
not

with

Deduction.
strict infer for instance,

Deduction
ence,

It includes

only the

theorems, proof and those ingenious constructions, imaginative which of the parts of a whole treatment combinations provide the the novel and element in whole strictly procedure.The progressive of complex trains of reasoning involves, systematic construction Mill's phrases, a great deal of scientific dexterity and to use artful combination.'* of Deduction, in the large sense The use of the word, is always likely this vital, creative element, to involve this native tact or ingenuity, this inventive which is imagination, rather than guided by glimpses, analogies, by method. suspicions,
also, as
the and spatial other
' '

but

of Euclid's

'

'A

System

of

Logic/

Bk.

II., ch. iv.,"

4.

21

322

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

i.

In

includes Deductive elements. brief,Deduction extra-logical It can Inference, on the other hand, is a strictly logical process.

only

make

the

The impliedexplicit.

inexhaustible
up with

fruitfulness of
its

mathematical

reasoning, though bound

deductive

deductive inference. a product of mere character, is in no sense in Let us consider, this connexion, the part played by construction
in the deductions

Ostensibly whereby Euclid proves his theorems. the proofs rest upon and the security of definitions, postulates, But these in their turn refer us back to Euclidean axioms. Space
"

to i.e.,

an

intuitive

basis which

is

as

rich

storehouse

of

geometrical

living organism is fruitful of data for the biologist.Thus the properties its of a circle cannot be deductively inferred from definition, excepting so far as the definition is that of a circle in To Euclidean Space,'and is supported by actual constructions. in a semicircle is a right must construct we angle, prove that the angle
fact
as

the

'

Space (as idealized to meet the lines within geometry), and draw special
a

circle in

purpose

of

our

traditional
thus avail

the circle.

We

of intuited space when fertility ideas. To realize of by geometrical penetrated the continuityand of space, and its intuitively tridimensionality into forms through inclosure of of being determined susceptibility its parts, is to be master that admit of properties of endless com bination and development through the medium of construction. in This is concealed ultimate reference to a space-intuition has Professor Euclid's Geometry. Latta Thus, as pointed out,* and this definitions the (1) postulatespresuppose system of space ourselves of the inexhaustible the invisible network
'

without the

showing
right
to

how

the
'

described figures

in

the

definitions,
the
as

or

demand itself

these
; and

postulates,follow from
(2) the
these
each

very

nature

they

of the space deduced were whereas

" '

proofsare

stated

though
"

axioms,
struction
or

solely from the proof of

kind
to be

and definitions, postulates

con as

propositionrequiresa
such

of

some

made,
...

the

producingof lines

If you produce two sides of a of figures. superposition in order to prove something about its angles, triangle you implicitly that is the not a self-complete triangle recognize system, the proper

the

ties of which it is
an

may

be
in
a

deduced directly

from

its

but definition,

that

element

surface,and
its external with

that

its internal

are properties

logically dependent on
most intimate connexion

relations, or, at

least,are

in the

them.'

3. Deductive is
a

Inferenceas
aim
must

the Process
to

throughwhich
or

Proposition

PROVED.

"

In the endeavour
in need

prove

demonstrate
a

the proposition,
not

be to discover of

the truth of basis of proof whicli which

the

does

itself stand

proof,and
of

from

pro

positionmay
*
'

be inferred with
Relation between the

logical necessity.
Philosophy Spinoza
and that of Leibniz,'"

On New

the

Mind,

Series, vol. viii., 1899, p. 335.

CHAP.

XXXVIL]
are

THEORY
three main into

OF

INDUCTION thus transform

inference themselves

323

There

demonstrandum
which the
as

in which we ways the conclusion of either axiomatic

or

may
a can

our

deductive

of

premissesare
necessary inference

be demon

strated be

conclusions

from

axiomatic

premisses.* The
effected

deductive
may Thus
as

through which or or disjunctive categorical hypothetical.

the

the proofis in last resort

demonstrandum

'

All

S's
'

are

P's

'

All S's are proved, providedwe can accept M's or as propositions are as axiomatic alreadyproved. propositions form : The proofwill then take the categorical
All M's

may P's

be
'

accepted
'

and

'

'

All M's All S's All S's

are are are

P's M's
P's
'

'

is true. is true. is also true.

a or

'

'

'

.-.

Where

Method Proof
'

the proof proceeds by inference is disjunctive, be called Proof by Exclusion! of Exclusion, and may the Exhaustion.
are

by

J
a

and Sj is PI}'

in
or

Suppose to position
'

we

set down

the proposition wisli to prove the proposition Either

'

"! is Pj or S2 is P2
axiomatic
'

S3 is P3
We have

as

axiomatic

or

as

demonstrable
that
'

from

grounds.
'

then

only to show
the Mr.

S2 is P2' and
'

S3

is

P3
to

are

true

in order to demonstrate the

truth of

St is Pt.'
our

Thus,
thesis

borrow
that

example cited by
'

Milnes,

suppose

to be

of Euclid
than the

angles be greater

of two one I, 19 : If, in any triangle, the the side subtending other, greater

angle
prove

is

greater

than

that
:

subtending

the

less.

This

we

may

by arguing as follows
Either the

side AC
the
cannot

less than But

greater than the side AB, or else it is side AB, or else it is equal to it (axiomatic).
is be less than is

AC

AB,
"

nor

can

it be

Therefore
the less.
*

greater than AB greater angleis greater than

AC
that

the i.e., that

equal to it. side subtending

subtends
the

which

In the discussion

follows,

we

assume

that

such

axiomatic

or

self-evident

this of brief consideration For point, see a propositionsare obtainable. the made in There no present volume is, however, attempt Chapter XLV. the theory of Mathematical Knowledge, or with the to deal adequately with self-evidence. of problem vol. ii., ch. iii., English Transla " 81, 10. t See Dr. ChristophSigwart, Logik,' 201. tion by Helen Dendy, p. second edition, p. 85. I Cf. Alfred Milnes, Elementary Xotions of Logic,'
' '

21"2

324

THE exclusions

PKOBLEM

OF
in the

LOGIC of application
this

[XL

i.

The the

through which,

method,

alternative is effected are frequently proof of the non-excluded Indirect form of Proof. The justified by a proof usuallyknown as proposition S2 is P2 is assumed to be true, and it is then shown also be that on must this assumption the proposition Sn is Pn if contradicts true. is the proposition Sn Hence, Pn accepted as if to be follows a true, propositionalreadyproved by the Modus
' ' ' ' ' '

Tollens that

'

S2 is P2
runs as

'

cannot

be true.
:

Thus

the main

argument

in

Indirect Proof

follows If
But

S2 is P2, then Sa is Pn.

Sn
is

Pn.

.-.

S2 isP2V
which
an

The known
ment

argument
as a

through
ad

indirect

proof

is effected

is

reductio
us

absurdum, the absurdity to

of self-contradiction. has

which

the argu
name

reduces
Reductio

being that
ad

The

Absurdum
or

been

under utilized,
'

the

of

to test the correct impossibile, of inferences drawn in the of the Syllogism ness imperfect figures drawn and the that inferences II.,III., (Figs. IV.),on assumption in the first or perfect figure, according to the Dictum de Omni et Nullo, could be accepted as The process, however, is correct. to applicable syllogistic reasoning only so far as this is treated conclusion can as a truth-inference,so that the premisses and be characterized as true or false. Indirect Reduction, legitimately be defined as a proof,effected by means of a sjdlogism then, may in the first figure,that the truth of certain conclusions drawn in the follows with logical imperfect figures necessityupon the truth of their premisses,because, if those premisses are true, the contradictories of those conclusions are necessarily false. The traditional Logic, who in Direct Reduc Aristotle,* following tion made and did of Conversion only not recognize Ob version, use f Baroco and out Bocardo the most suitable forms of as singled We this process of Indirect Reduction. Syllogism for illustrating

Indirect Reduction

Reductio

per

'

'

'

'

'

may

therefore take

one

of these

"

Baroco

"

and

use

it for the

illus

tration of the method.

If it is
so

suggested that
argues
"

the inference in Baroco

in that
case,

is not
we
'

correct

"

the
'

method
to

then

though

assume

the

premisses
P's

be

true, the truth

are

of the conclusion
That
'

Some

S's are-not
of
'

will not
'

follow. necessarily
M's
'

is,granted the truth

S's are-not
its
'

the

premisses
S's are-not
is

All P's P's

'

and

Some

M's,' still Some

of
a

may

be false.
'

But

since the denial

proposition
true.

logically equivalent to the affirmation of that follows the proposition All S's are P's
us, for the sake
*

it contradictory, be Let

may

of the argument,
c.

assume

that it is true. | cf- above,

Taking

Vide An., Pr., A.,

45, p. 516, 1, 2.

pp. 189-192.

CHAP.

XXXVIL]
'

THEORY

OF

INDUCTION

325

proposition, All S's are gism, and combining it with

this
are

P's,'as
our

premiss of major premiss, original

the minor conclusion
'

a
'

syllo
P'.s
'

All

M's,' we

can

at
'

once

draw
'

the

All

S's

are

M's

perfect figure. But this conclusion contra Now M's.' dicts our S's are-not originalminor premiss Some the premisses of the original true. syllogismare both, ex hypothesi,
in the standard
or
'

The

statement

'

All

S's

are

M's

'

is therefore

least reasoning in Fig. I. is be two must premisses which necessitated this conclusion the false ; for,if both were of Identity, true, then, by the Principle

the form
of the

of

Hence, admittedlyvalid, one at

false.

since

conclusion

'

All S's

are

M's

'

would

also be true.
statement
'

But

of these

two

premisses, All P's are M's,' being our the assumed true. Hence ex hypothesi,
must

'

major premiss, is, original

'

All S's

are

P's

'

and be false,
true.

its

Some contradictory, conclusion

in of
our

S's are-not

P's,'must

originalsyllogism in see we Baroco, granted the truth of the premisses, the truth of the conclusion necessarilyfollows. We have thus shown that Baroco is a valid form of Syllogism. other of the valid in a precisely forms may be justified Any
But this is the

be

Baroco.

Thus

that

similar way. The Method

of

Proof

assumes

peculiar form

whenever

the

the demonstrandum is deducible are reversible premissesfrom In convertible. this these or case simply premisses may requisite be discovered of a process of regressive analysis based by means the assumption that the demonstrandum We is true. upon may show this certain that, on necessarily assumption, consequences
which

follow which

are

alreadyknown
form, from
let D
some

to

be

true.

We truths

may
to

then the

reason

back,

in

Sorites

these

known

demon

strandum.

Thus,

be

the
such

demonstrandum. form
as

The

regressive

will then take analysis

this

If D

is true, C is true.

If C is true, B is true. If B is true, A is true. But A

a

is true.

Now,
from
if the

if the the

premisses

are

of such

character

as

permits us

to argue

of the consequent to that of the antecedent" i.e., of the sorites reversible are we can premisses present the
truth
"

proof as follows,in the form

in the Modus

of

series of

hypotheticalsyllogisms

Ponens

is true. is true, B is true. is true.

But
But

if A
.-.

if B
.-.

is true, C is true. C is true. is true.

But

if C is true, D is true. .". D

326

THE

PROBLEM

OP

LOGIC

[XI.

i.

C. INDUCTION

AND

'

INDUCTIVE

INFERENCE.'

(1) The
It is essential to note
to
use

Meaning of Induction*
the wide
sense

in which unusual process

we

are

the

term

'

Induction.'

It is not

to

proposing identify In

duction

with

the

first stage

in the whole

of Scientific Ex

the stage which starts with the observation of facts and planation, in the of terminates some formulation hypothesis. Were this

nomenclature be the But

if three
we

adopted, Induction, Deduction, Verification would successive stages in a complete scientific explanation.

to talk of cease adopt this nomenclature, we must Inductive Logic, and must speak,instead, of the Logic of Scientific Explanation. For it is Scientific Explanation, qua completed

do

process,

which

alone is

governed by
So far
as

the fundamental the

of principle

to Relevant Fidelity

reasoning-process undeveloped, unverified hypothesis, that it aims at not transgressing it is surelyunreasonable to contend Does it not embody a tendency to go bej^ond the evidence of fact. the facts rather than not to go beyond them ? as Assuming, then, that we accept Fidelity to Relevant Fact Induction t he in its of the word the Inductive Principle, narrower use to universals of a tentative passage from particulars is,strictly sense be faithful to fact by reposing We cannot illegitimate. speaking, with the and dispensing untested generalizations from experience on and In the wider of the test of Verification. legitimate sense the whole process of Scientific Explana Induction covers term,
a

Fact.

goal of

is the

mere

formulation

of

an

'

'

'

'

tion, the
which
sure

formulation

and

verification of
its various
not

Hypothesis, a
methods,
go

ends

that its tentative

only when, through explanationdoes

it has

process made

beyond the evidence

of the facts.

(2) The So-called

No
can

'

Inductive

Inference.''
character,
'

account

with dispense We is

of Induction, however introductory in the allusion to much-abused term an

Inductive
that

Inference.' there

hold, for
one

our

only
which

fundamental

part, to the simple conviction type of logicalInference

is the

"

that,
a

namely,
system
of

consists in

what rendering explicit

impliedin
'

given premisses,through logicalValidity. We consequently

'

of

sole
view

help
the

of the

principle
Inductive
;

term
or

Inference

as

misnomer.

Inference

may from

be Formal

Deductive
a

be drawn, that is, from Formal may else abstract validity-interest, or

premissesin the
material
in either But

of light it is

strictly
in the

grounds
a

lightof

genuine

truth-interest.
*

case

strictly

See also footnote, p. 316.

328

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

ii.

CHAPTER
XI.

XXXVIII.

HYPOTHESIS. (ii.)

J. S. MILL evidence
from

defines

a we

Hypothesisas
make

follows

'

An

is hypothesis

any

which supposition

actual without evidence, or on (either to in order to deduce endeavour avowedly insufficient) in accordance with facts which rank
are as a a

it conclusions

known

to be

real.'* Not A It is

every Hypothesis is
a

therefore,can supposition,
a

Hypothesis.

suppositionmade

in

view

of

truth-interest.
"

suppositionwhich
and

consequences, Mill What thesis. To

(1) admits of and admits (2) requires is,in fact,the

thus defines be

being developed into its of verification,. "1" Scientific Hypo legitimate

essential condition a Hypothesis has one legitimate be verifiable.J But to be verifiable it must be to satisfy : it must adequately developable. A legitimate hypothesis, again,is identical with a working hypo thesis in the widest of that term. For a working hypothesis sense behaves fluid ; Vegetable as a though it were (e.g., Electricity
' ' '

mould works"
A

is due

to

the action

of earthworms

') is

hypothesisthat
facts.

works,

that

is, by attempting to

explainthe

is a hypothesis that works well. working hypothesis must be both resourceful and fruitful. To work well, a hypothesis it must be rooted directly To be resourceful, (or indirectly through in a reasoned of a generalworkingidea] the medium science. or system it must be capableof continually To be fruitful, extending its sphere and of bringingmore and more of verification, facts under scientific

successful

control. A
may
out

is, as working hypothesis

rule, closelyallied
This
is the

with

what

we

working germinal conception working hypothesisis shaped. The working is developed out of the working idea not by beingdeduced hypothesis from it with logical necessity(the idea would in that case be fundamental but working hypothesis), only a more by processes of a purely tentative kind. The work of imaginative construction the to idea stands thus working hypothesis ing developedfrom it in a relation somewhat analogous to that in which the subject of discourse stands to the particular propositionthrough which it is at any moment being developed. " It stands for the ..relatively
a

suitablycall
the

idea.

of which

true

'

'

'

System
term
a
' '

of
'

Book Logic,'
'

here, as Ordinarily, result in disproving the hypothesis. In its may ' stricter use, ' Verification is the process which tanto confirms the truth of pro a of the term, of admit hypotheses would, in this sense hypothesis. Only some being verified. Similar remarks apply to the use of the term ' verifiable.' it
means

The

Verification
"

III.,ch. xiv., " 4. is,in its current use, ambiguous.

test

test

that

f
on

For a more the Inductive

radical criterion of the Postulate.

legitimacyof

see hypothesis,

the

chapter

" Cf. pp. 118, 119.

CHAP.

XXXVI1I.J

HYPOTHESIS

329

indeterminate,

guidingconception which
successive been of constructed
failures
a

may

subsist

unchallenged

through
out

the

theses which

have

working hypo great many along the generallines marked

by

it.

ILLUSTRATION
WORKING IDEA
:

or

THE

IMPORTANCE
THE

AND OF

SIGNIFICANCE
ASTRONOMICAL that shall

OF

THE

FROM

HISTORY
a

SCIENCE.

Problem

To formulate
account

theory or system

for all the varied movements

of the

exhaustively heavenly

bodies.
1. In the

Ptolemy'sSystem.
our

second

century of
into
one

era,

the

Alexandrian
feature

astronomer

Claudius
is that
sun,

Ptolemseus

brought

all the The

observed
main

movements

of the

heavenly bodies
the Earth
moon,

system.
as

of this system
it.

at rest is taken stars

the centre

of the universe, while

and planets,

revolve in various
were :

circles around

The

main

working
Earth,
as

ideas* the

of this system
one

1. The

fixed centre

of the

universe, is
we see are

cer

tainlyat rest, and

real movements. terized
2. The

the The
'

celestial movements
the

the

by Ptolemy heavenly bodies

move as

as are

charac opposite suggestion was of height absurdity.'

divine

and

and incorruptible,

must

therefore
the On Now
were

in circles the most

ancients

being considered by figure). geometrical perfect

(the
circle ideas the

the it had

basis

of these

working
A

system

was

built

up.

long been noticed anything but simple.

be
seen

that the

would
then

first to
to

move

from

apparent paths of the planets night after night planet watched west to east with a varyingvelocity,

then to stop movement, adopt a retrograde then forward and to on. so again, again, go "The problem was to analyse these movements into a system of ultimate of the centre the Earth at rest being circular movements,
to

stop, then

the whole From

system.
of these observed
movements it
was

the nature

plainthat

the simpledevice of making each planetgo in a circle round the Earth to invent do. therefore necessary would It was not centre a as an being a smaller circle whose centre system of epicycles, epicycle

along the circumference of a greater. Each planetwas then uniformlyalong the circumference of the epicycle, supposedto move whilst the centre of the epicycle itselfmoved uniformlyin a circular
moves

orbit round
to
*

the Earth. movements

Thus

the

explainthe
That

of the
have
'

was an attempt system of epicycles the but not was attempt ; planets

their true

Ptolemy himself character logical

should
as

treated ideas.'

these

as

axiomatic

does

not

affect

working

330

THE

PROBLEM
It
a

OF found

LOGIC
to

[XL ii.

altogethersuccessful. with system of epicycles

This
'

was

system

necessary of excentrics.

supplement the

excentric

'

device

consisted

in allowing the essentially

about a planet'scycle (not its epicycle)to move point outside the Earth, this point itself being supposed to revolve about the Earth as centre, so that in last resort the sanctityof the first idea should not be violated. The sanctityof the second was preserved inviolate through the care all the orbits circular. taken to make Such a Ptolemy's. Now, as observations became system was more found continually to modify this accurate, it was necessary New circles had continuallyto system of wheels within wheels. be added (for instance, an epi-epicycle revolvingon an epicycle), until in Copernicus's of found day seventy-nine these circles were with the roughest approxima necessary in order to represent,even tion to accuracy, the movements of the heavenly bodies.

2. The

System of Copernicus.

by the system of Copernicus on the the point of view system of Ptolemy lay in its completely shifting and It showed the first of Ptolemy's dogmatic Ideas. shattering clear mathematical treatment a took by (which thirty years to movements of the planets were develop)that the observed ap
parent,
not

The

main

advance

made

real; that
that

the

Sun
was

was

the

centre

of the

system of
could

planets;

and

the Earth that

no

only

one mere

planetlike the others.

modification

Copernicusshowed

amount

of

the Ptolemaic justify conception of things; that its fundamental be given up in favour must assumption, being entirelyincorrect, of the Heliocentric Theory. The of this the shattering then, was great work of Copernicus,

firstIdea. that
the

But

he

was

still himself

slave

to the second

"

the idea

the only perfectfigure, could alone be worthy as circle, to represent the path of a planet. The fundamental change which of motion transferred the centre the of the solar system from

perfectly easy the explanation of the of the stationary points and retrograde (apparent) movements which still but certain there minor were planets; irregularities of a new Copernicustried to solve by means system of epicycles
to

Earth

the Sun

had

made

and

excentrics. had
not

Moreover, he
firstIdea.
centre

The

Sun

completely emancipated himself from took the place of the Earth, not only as
as

the the

of the solar system, but

"

the centre

the Ideas of
"

which Copernicus propositions

that of the universe, so him axiomatic to were

were

"

1. There 2. The

is

centre

circle is
move

bodies

the Sun. things, the only perfectfigure ; therefore all heavenly in circles. or directly indirectly

of all

CHAP.

XXXVIIL]
stars
were

HYPOTHESIS conceived

331

by Copernicusas absolutelyfixed in all-embracing sphere. They did not shine by their own great not themselves suns but, like the moon, light i.e.,they were of all the lightas well as reflected the lightof the Sun, the source
The
a
" "

the centre

of all the movement

of the universe.

3. It
was

Kepler.
once

of the
that made least time

Kepler to remove Copernican System ; and

left for of the first. This itself is Sun

and

for all the second

a

Idea

he

also made

great step towards

he showed
are suns

the removal the

latter

step

he

took when
the the
stars stars

only

star-like

by distance.
as as

star, and He showed

that that

must at

be

at

2,000
was

times

regarded
same

far away as the outside warder the stars from the

were

Saturn, the
all of
a

planet which
on a one

that
But

of the solar system.

all piece,
was

he still imagined that

at

sphere
time

the

distance

Sun.

Further, it

long

involved in Idea No. 2. Kepler removed the hoary prejudice Idea the fundamental he himself which It was on only because that worked its he was seen was suppression eventuallyto require of 2,000 years. able at length to lay aside the prejudice have that the Creator been must one leading Idea was Kepler's It The idea is Pythagorean. was a geometer. adopted by Plato, It and borrowed Plato from was no longer 'The by Kepler. Creator must have arranged the orbits of the heavenly bodies on a but He must have arranged them on a geometrical circular pattern,' time Kepler was at first quite unconscious pattern.'At the same directed mainly towards of this distinction, and all his first efforts, Mars basis of Tycho-Brahe's the of the movements on explaining observations, were spent on making hypotheses of the old circular kind. But try as he would, there still remained a large unexplained about of about of minutes of error one-eighth a degree,as eight arc, compared with Tycho's observations. He then said boldly that it was impossiblethat so good an observer as Tycho could be wrong by eight minutes, and added : will construct Out of these eight minutes a we new theory that He then proceeded will explain the motions of all the planets.' For he had at length in ellipses. to work out the theory of motion
before
"

'

"

found
at

to

his

great satisfaction
of the
move

that
at

when

the

sun

was

placed not
planet was in equal
exten

the centre
to

but ellipse,
a

its focus, and

to describe

the

supposed
sion

in such

way

times, all the irregularities were

of this

as equal adequately explained. The areas

planets discovery to the movements instead the old cumbrous of system of ; and, very easily and excentrics, Kepler produced a system of the greatest epicycles which had the paramount merit of explainingto a close simplicity, the various movements of all the planets. degree of approximation
followed

of all the

other

332

THE

PROBLEM
main

OP laws of

LOGIC

[XL

ii.

We

have, then,

two
are

planetary motion
second

already
Laws of

established.

They

known

as

Kepler'sfirst and
the
in

Planetary Motion.
1.

Every planet revolves around

the
sun

sun

an

path. elliptic
a

beingat

one

of the foci. round

the
sun

2.

Every planet moves

every passes

with

such from

at velocity
sun

point that a straightline drawn in equal times. over equal areas

a

it to the

To

these
3. The

Kepler added
squares

third

to the proportional cubes of the mean distances from the sun (the periodic time the time which the being planet requires for the of its orbit) completion

of the

periodictimes

are

"

^2

I.e.,
~~-

is constant

for all the

planets.

D3

of the great move ripeexpression ment had its root in the Working Ideas of scientific thought which of the Ptolemaic But the culminating point is reached system. when Newton principle passes beyond these three laws to the single
we

In these three laws

have

the

of Gravitation,which

at

once

and explains

transcends

them.

4. Newton.

Newton System of the World explainshis own position the in lightof a historical retrospect. The ancients very clearly satisfied the instinctive desire they felt for a causal explanationof the planetarymovements orbs or spheres. by their theory of crystal These and held them orbs served to keep the planetsin their places, it were as still material. was by a support which, though invisible, It was the comets that first broke up this old theory.* Above all things, the phenomena of comets with consist can by no means the notion of solid orbs,' the unavoidable for,he adds,f as it was of the hypothesisof solid orbs, while it prevailed, that consequence
' '

In

'

The

'

the comets

should

be thrust down

below

the later observations

ancient
at
once

of astronomers incumbrance

had the moon, so no sooner to their restored the comets

placesin the higher heavens,

cleared of the
were

observations
But with

broke

these celestial placeswere of solid orbs, which by these and discarded for ever.' into pieces
the unsustained
movements

but

these orbs

also disappeared

explainedthe

apparently Other forces had to through the heavens. in his vortex cartes, theory, made a distinction between
*

supporting forces that of the planets take their place. Des

at

least
512.

Newton's

'

Works,'

American

edition, p. 511.

f Ibid., p.

CHAP.

XXXV1IL]
kinds of matter,
one

HYPOTHESIS

333

two

very

tenuous, the other heavier, the

was

matter

of the

the
sun

planets.
in
a

This

heavy planetary matter

matter.

whirled

round
a

vortex

of the tenuous

This

tenuous

matter,

mid-way
whole its

form

between
and
was

ether
the

of space, round. Cartesian

endowed

rotatory

movements

ponderable forming by great velocity, the which eddies in planets were

matter,
with very

and

filled the

borne This

vortex

theory was

popular.
It
a

It

was

adopted
sane

was by Ferrnat, Huygens, Bernoulli,Leibniz. It in vortices. All idea. storms move ingenious

very

and

great disturbances on the face of the sun LordKelvin's storms of fiery gas (cf. sun-spots and faculae are cyclonic
that the
'

is very probable with in connexion

Vortex

Theory of Matter
Newton,
at

Now
astronomers
see

force

mathematically. justifyingthe instinct that compelled Force, and to to adopt the working idea of Mechanical that the of movement, stated very clearly the root
). But
it will not while of any the laws from is
use or

'

work

only essential property of this force that was law. its mathematical to astronomers was
Thus,
most
some on

interest

the

one

hand

we

read

'

From

of motion the action

to

it is

certain

that

these

effects must

proceed
our a

of

force
the
as

or

other,'and
all

then,

'

but

purpose

only

trace

out
so

quantity and

of this force in properties

its nature
'

mathematical

way,

quality.' Compare in the : also the following Principia,' p. 506 (conclusion) passage and of Hitherto we have explainedthe phenomena of the heavens but have not yet assignedthe causes sea our by the powrer of gravity,
to avoid

questionsabout

or

"

of this power. of these cause

But
. . .

hitherto

I have

not

been

able to discover the

of gravity from phenomena, and I frame properties And to us it is enough that non fingo). no hypotheses (hypotheses gravity does reallyexist, and act according to the laws which we for all the and to account have abundantly serves explained,
. .

motions The

of the celestial bodies, and

force Newton he called
'

of

our

sea.'

by which of the heavenly bodies

law, with
all bodies varies which tend he
to
was

sought

to

explain the

movements

and its mathematical attraction,' That the following : concerned, was solely
'

attract

each

other

mutually
masses

with

force

that the

the product as directly

of their

and

as inversely

of the distance between them.'t square In his attempt, then, to explaincausallythe

movements

of the

heavenly bodies, Newton adopts as his Working Idea not the notion but rather that of the law accordingto which of mere gravitaforce, Force has of the idea In modern Science tive force is operative. given way to that of Energy or Capacity for Work, and its funda mental Working Idea is the Law of the Conservation of Energy. It is essential not to forget that this great law is after all only a Working Idea.'
"

Newton's

'

Works,'

American

Edition, p. 512.

f Ibid., p.

385.

334

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

ii.

The
1.
"

Problem

of Verification.

Negative Aspect. If the Working Idea has only a relative the working hypothesisis emphaticallyand essentially permanency, if it failsto account to be laid aside at once a provisional explanation, facts If it to for the for. account fact absolutely professes any before must refutes it,the hypothesis the fact. But we give way that the opposing fact is genuine. Thus it is a must be quite sure natural primitiveobjection to the Law of Gravitation that some
bodies"
But

balloons, for instance

a

"

tend

to

move

away

from

the earth.

this is not
If

but is thwarted to fall,

since the balloon reallytends genuine objection, by the upward pressure due to the gravitation
were

of the air.
vacuo,

we

to
a

remove

the

air,and

leave the balloon in

it would
even

fall like

stone.

But
or

if compelledto admit

the

modify discrepancy. In discussingthe character of the successful of W. S. Jevons experimentalist, shrewdlypoints out ('Principles that vol. Readiness false to Science,' ii., rejecta theory p. 232) with combined in be and main a peculiar pertinacity may courage is not actually as long as its falsity tainingan hypothesis apparent ;' and he quotes Leslie's remark his own concerning experimental nature the of heat of investiga i nto In the course : investigations tion I have found myself compelledto relinquish some preconceived notions ; but I have not abandoned them hastily, after a nor till, and obstinate defence, I was driven from every post (ibid., warm
extent

the

hypothesis to

the

need only correct we objection, required for the removal

of the

'

'

p.

234). There
a

are

circumstances

which

will

a justify

scientist

in

theory through everything. investigator may say : Given A, B will follow ; and if B is not observed to follow under the conditions symbolized by A, the result is said to be negative. But this negativeresult need not be accepted
An
as

to clinging

conclusive,and this for

three

reasons

:
"

(1) The result,though genuine, may disprovenot the working the specific idea,but only a certain determinate form of it,

working hypothesis under investigation. the working hypothesis. (2) The result may not disprove even that It may the conditions of the actual ex only show have not were satisfactory.The effect may periment been produced, but in too slighta form to be detected, been have the arrangements of an experiment may not or suitable; justas CErsted could not detect electro-magnetism to the plane of motion so long as his wire was perpendicular of his needle (ibid., p. 239). fact itself has not been properly ob It be that the (3) may
served.
nor

The

fault in this

case

not lies,

with

the

hypothesis,

with

the apparatus,

but with

the observation.

336

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

ii.

in general,must take place under certain conditions ; or eclipses, if it differs, it differs only as regardsprecision of statement. It is sometimes that to supposed predict is an infallible power truth This is the of of a a hypothesis. proof perfectly ungrounded A successful is only an statement. prediction interesting, striking form A

of verification.

hypothesisthat
is

may

afterwards
one

prove with

to

be

erroneous

may

furnish verified

predictions. The
continued
or more

generaltest of the
fact. There
each

truth may

of

hypothesis

conformity

be

developed two

theories of which

accounts sufficiently

for all the fundamental, perhaps all the known, facts. It is the facts stilluntested or still to be discovered agreement with further
which
must

then

decide
crucis
" "

between
the A

the

two

hypotheses.
"

Sooner

or

later the instantia

the

the crucial instance

and presents itself,

"

experimentum crucis

decides experiment of the finger-post crucial instance is

a

between

the rival claims.

circumstance

that

hypotheses,admittingof one explanation only ; a crucial experiment is a test so arranged that the result is bound to one hypothesis, and disprove the other. approve Professor Minto Logic,' pp. 347, 348) gives the followingcrucial (' instance as proving decisive against the Cartesian Theory of
Vortices
the any
'

is decisive between

rival

The

fact that be

comets

pass
to

into and

vortices must
instance

assumed
an

be

out of spaces where in action without exhibiting

perturbationis
an

instantia

crucis crucis

against the hypothesis.'

cite Foucault's we experimentum may in of two different media, the velocity light experiment and the lighterair.* Foucault that denser water showed light travel took longer to certain distance through glass or water a than it did to pass through the same distance in air or through This confirmed the Undulatory Theory of Light, and vacuum. a the demolished effectively Corpuscular Theory, which requiredthat should move more rapidlythrough the denser medium. light It should be noticed that the crucial instance,though it negatives the defeated theory,does not absolutely that is success prove the one ful. to the It only serves increase of its being greatly possibility the true one. No inductive hypothesiscan be regarded as the ever perfected, unimprovable expressionof the truth. Verification in a is not word the hypo Completed Proof. We must distinguish from the hypothesisas proved. thesis as verified f that the hypothesis A is B Let us suppose is to be tested,and P is Q with that the consequence derived from is, logical necessity,
on

As

of the the

'

'

'

'

it and

from

the

scientific system
'

in

which
'

it is rooted.

Let

us

This
"

further suppose verification of

A is B.'
*

that the verification of P is

P is

'

'

does

not, of course,
so

has been conclusive. the truth of prove

the

To

suppose
'A

that it did
Manual of

would

be to commit
v.,

fallacy

Cf. Prof. Welton,

For
a

Logic,'vol. ii.,bk.
proper,
see

eh. iv., p. 103.

discussion

of the process

of Proof

above, pp. 322-325.

CHAP.

XXXVIIL]

HYPOTHESIS

337

the consequent.' We have shown that the hypothesis, affirming properly enunciated, enables us to explainthe facts without trans have still to To prove the hypothesis, we gressingthe evidence. for the other hypothesis will adequately account show that no be facts. The evidence afforded by the verification must adequate the that if in to be to prove this, we are hypothesis justified saying is proved. Let us consider from this point of view the status of a typically and fruitful hypothesis, that of gravitation. fundamental Newton reasoning that, proved clearlyby exact mathematical there was the idea of attraction or gravitation,' given working only one admissible form of that idea" the law that the attraction the the square of the distance, and directly varied inversely as as He proved the of the bodies concerned. product of the masses working hypothesis on the assumption that the working idea was into which sound. and for all the only form He discovered once the working idea of gravitation could be developed so as to explain But the working idea itself still remains the facts. subject to the Thus of revision. affinitybetween Faraday's conception if justified, would involve a revision of and electricity, gravitation the working idea of gravitation. from Barren is a supposition Hypothesis."A. barren hypothesis which, or from the functional substitute for which (videp. 320), It is the oppositeof what verifiable conclusion be drawn. no can is usuallyknown as a permissible or legitimate hypothesis" because it of a hypothesis which is workable, and workable i.e., of operation which extent, is, at least to some suggests a mode A analogous to operationswith which we are already familiar. such as This havoc has been wrought by a ghost,' or, supposition be would frolic of the demon,' a are again, Neptune'sirregularities barren a hypothesis. How can we aspireto verifyeither of these ? definite about We know ghosts suggestions nothing sufficiently of
'
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

or

demons
'

to enable

us

to deduce

from
facts.

the

hypothesis consequences
'

catas Referring to the convulsion trophic or theory in Geology, Professor Creighton points out that, in assuming its truth as a basis of investigation, we are assuming the operation of incalculable forces,the positing of which leads and can Instead of these mys lead to nothing. terious agencies, similar to those with that causes Lyell assumed which we are now acquainted had been acting uniformly for long The nature of the causes at work being known, it became ages. to and thus to reduce the possible calculate the nature of the effects, facts of Geology to order and system.'* A hypothesis, however, may be barren at one stage of scientific

which

could

be

compared
'

with

'

'

"culture and

yet

prove

fruitful later the

on.

When

we

know
cease

more

about

ghostsand

their ways,

ghost-hypothesis may
*
'

to be barren,

Logic,' p.

243.

22

338

THE thousand
have

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC Read

[XI.

ii.

Three the

years ago, as Professor Carveth hypothesis that the Sun is the centre of our

would

been of

barren perfectly Greek and

and

points out,* planetary system hypothesis. It needed the

astronomers,
to

observations discoveries False verifiable and

of the

Alexandrian Newton

and
it

the

Galileo, Kepler,
fruitful.
"

make

really

be carefully dis Hypothesis. A barren hypothesis must tinguishedfrom a false or erroneous hypothesis. A barren hypo is the under thesis one that, given conditions of scientificknowledge,! in this sense be verified,and cannot is illegitimate (vide above hypothesis p. 337), a hypothesisimproperly so-called ; an erroneous but unsuc Theory of Light is a legitimate e.g., the Corpuscular which cessful hypothesis, and be a supposition tested, can developed but does not happen to fit all the facts. It is an attempt at ex of some crucial instance planationshown to be inadequate by means At is not the time same or an erroneous experiment. hypothesis that than worthless. Its inadequacy means no more necessarily the hypothesis breaks down at a certain point, and before breaking
"
"

down
that its

it may have done considerable service to Science. And not qua yet it is essential to note that it is certainly the

erroneous

with hypothesisis serviceable. The Ptolemaic hypothesis, of all and its that the movements geocentric principle assumption

uniform in speed and circular in direction, were planets gave a But the service science. definite steadying-point for astronomical the
here

rendered
was

was

due
in

to the
not

systematic way

in which
was

the

hypo

thesis

developed, and
so

theory. Moreover,
was

in any way to what far as it merely assumed

false in the

that

the Earth
observations

the be been the

fixed

centre

from

which
what in.
was

all astronomical all other

must

made,
made

it assumed
to

astronomical the influenced

theories

have

obliged
at

observations

acquiesce that period

Hence
not

quality of the
in any way

by

character specific

of the Ptolemaic

theory.

Whatever
our

the

astronomical

theory may

be, the Earth

remains, for
was

perception,

the apparent centre of the universe. But in so far as the hypothesisthat the Earth of the universe of the
was

the real centre movements

brought into play,and

the

apparent

of this the only utility planets treated as real movements, error lay in its eventuallyrefutingitself through the bewildering in it gave rise. to which complexities Except as an object-lesson the truth that the path of error is a path of growing complexity, it had no intrinsic utility. A theory cannot be said to have been
and Inductive,' third edition, ch. xviii.,pp. 250, 251. Logic,Deductive ' is limitation which It this the concession of the title ' hypothesis to justifies f these barren suppositions. Were unverifiable, they would not be they intrinsically
*
'

be intrinsically, and not hypotheses at all. They would merely provisionally, scientific The intrinsically from the strictly illegitimate illegitimate. supposition, Inductive of is which defies of the a the view, supposition point requirements Postulate Chapter XLVIL). (c/.

CHAP.

XXXVI1L]
so

HYPOTHESIS
it has stood in the

j
way

339

usefulin
truer

far

as

of the

of application
itself to be

far
one

theories whose

work,

since it

began, has
of

shown

of

and progressivesimplification it made it

progressivefruit-fulness.

So, again,the Corpuscular Theory

as

Light was

useful

in

so

far

and

refraction of

advance

possibleto explain the phenomena of the reflection and so provided a rallying-centre for the light, it had Newton's of opticaltheory. But, unfortunately,
it,so
that it received
a

brain behind

developmentout

tion to its intrinsic lease of life and and The that

merits,and

others,from

prevented the its due effect on the mind of the time" exercising of a false hypothesis is thus evidenced by the fact now-utility the more it perfectly is elaborated, the more surely does it
of Aberra
course

which gave prestige wave-theory,as developedby Young

a

of all propor it an artificial

prove a hindrance to the developmentof Science. It is true that Bradley's of the phenomenon explanation

tion,according to which
year,
on

each

fixed star

to describe

small

orbit about

appears, its true position, was and

in the

of

developed
that

the basis of the

not

Theory, Corpuscular

experts
had the

aver

the

could discovery

wave theory an erroneous adopted, so theory led to an time it is hard to convince important discovery.*At the same oneself that what was in the theorycould have erroneous positively

been

have so readily that in this case

been made

led to the

in question. discovery

CHAPTER
XI.

XXXIX.

GENERALIZATIOX. (iii.)
so

GENERALIZATION
*

of distinctive of the very activity a fact or thought that it is not easy to define it. To be observing is idea universal of in the or alreadyto be light an particular breaking through its sense-isolation and winning it for thought. is
a

process

'

'

'

meaninglessexcept in so far as it is relevant to some and rests upon some background, however indeterminate, interest, of a of questioningmental activity. We start the generalization first when it first realize we fact when a as we fact, question its and so transform the sense-datum meaning for us and our interests, when the into a thought problem. We complete the generalization in all its relevant relations, fact is, adequatelysystematized. If the
A fact is indeed
notions correct modern be drawn that, if the more The curious inference may in Bradley's of light time, it must have been much more of the nature had prevailed for him to have thought of his explanationof the if not impracticable, difficult, stellar motions which he was theory led to a most studying ; and thus an erroneous ' important discovery (Arthur Berry, A Short History of Astronomy,' p. 265).
'
'

22"2

340

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
in the

[XI. iii.

of process idealization ordered

generalization may
of fact, in
the

be said to consist continuous

progressive
as an

the

revelation

of fact

of that process may be defined as guiding-idea system, the systematizing of fact in the simplestand most economical way,
so as

to

thoughts to bear bring the simplest

fundamental form
which

upon

the widest

range

of facts.
The

fixing the flux of facts, as steadying and permanent form of a concept. This process is com of factsunder concepts or monly referred to as the generalization notions. It consists in startingfrom the observation of concrete of to and thence classes. This is a knowledge objects, proceeding the attributes peculiar to this object done by progressively omitting those which are attributes of all the to that, and by retaining or Generalization considered. So involves more viewed, or objects less complex processes of Comparison and Abstraction,and cul
minates In in Definition.

takes is that of generalization within the immediately experienced,

those
to

discussions

on

the

nature
'

of the

virtues

with

which

Socrates
Avas

began the firstEuropean Philosophy of Morals,'his method proceedby critical comparison of a number of instances,to
the
a

abstract
these
'

common

or

essential features,and of

then

to formulate
'

in

definition.
were a

If you
to

in need ?

dinner,' asked
but
to
a a

Socrates, would

you
were

apply

shoemaker board
?

No,
Not

cook.
the

Again,

if you

bestormed, and wished

the soldiers
on

to make

for

harbour, would
to

you

resort

to

pilot.' After a batch a positionto see that and the rest shared a common cook, pilot, quality in virtue of made to them was occasions, application which, on the respective the than to others of rather namely, quality being technically
of such

so, but

questions the

learner would

be in

"

qualified.
The main

process of
'

facts under generalizing Dr. Venn

concepts

is beset
'

by

two

to which difficulties,
:

calls attention

in his

Empirical
common

Logic

1. There

the difficulty of clearly is,first, detectingthe

a

qualityin

number

of

given
'

instances

of

certain

class.

Thus,

to

take Dr. Venn's instance, let A, B, C be Sheffield grinders, a familiar It had class. that they were well-marked and long been known

sickly and
disease task
to
'
"

short-lived
character sort of

people, but
of their
'
"

the

person
so

who
as

first
to

recognizedthe
a

symptoms,
under be
have
one

clearly bring the

no

lung disease

concept, had

easy

perform.'*
quality in question
in which may

2. The

individuals A, B, C, been classed together. We have

one
*

the

qualityis
for
our

enough, but the never recognized, may then to bring them under
purpose. This will often
347.

obvious

the right one class-concept,

J)r. Venn,
'

The

of Empirical or Principles

Inductive

Logic,'ch. xiv., p.

CHAP.

XXXIX.]
matter

GENERALIZATION

341

be

to be

the detection of the property of great difficulty. Briefly, a nd class the which this property is to be of over generalized often the
of
most

is generalized

difficult and

facts under concepts connects generalizing itself with the problem of Definition, that of generalizing concepts under a problem conceptsgives rise to the problem of Classification, with
name

operationsinvolved If the problem

in the

establishment

important of the many of a complete induction.

which

the

name

of Aristotle is
that

as

closelyassociated
In

as

the

of Socrates

with

of Definition.

Classification

(vide

general Chapter V.) we have the natural development of the same Definition. which find i n their first resting-place izing tendencies But the of is far more com Scientific Classification problem than it was in Aristotle's day. Aristotle worked on plicatednow the basis of certain simplifyingassumptions,such as that of the of species, which theories of causation and develop modern fixity have than rendered ment more problematic. As a consequence, the nature of the involved in Scientific generalizingprocesses
Classification and
times. The

Definition

has

been

greatlymodified

in modern

simplerprocesses of comparing attributes and abstract and more to the more points of agreement have given way more of relations and complex processes gathering variations analysing around defined types. And diagnostically pari passu with this find that the of the process itself we complication in the nature whole ever problem of bringing concepts under concepts becomes more intimatelyconnected with a further aspect of the generaliza lawsthe bringing of facts under tion-problem.This concerns laws and laws of development. The of causal interaction very of objects forces us beyond the statement of a fixed variability characteristics, and obligesus to include complex of perceptible causal relations or laws of development in our of the enumeration all attributes from class of things is distinguished by which one others. of to admit of a simple statement Quicksilver seems which characteristics by means in a its attributes are of expressed combination which belongs to no other object; but it is only at an ordinary temperature that it is such an easily object: recognizable
'
.

it

evaporates
metals
not
we

in heat

and

becomes

other

to form
we

amalgams,
included

with solid in cold, it combines and with sulphur to form cinnabar, transformations
'

and
can

until claim

have

these

in

our
'

concept

to have

stated what

is quicksilver

(Sigwart, Logik,'

vol. ii., ch. ii., part iii., " 77, 6 ; English Translation, II.,p. 163). In the generalization of factsunder laws, the firststep is the formu

lation of what

are

commonly
which

called
must

'

empirical laws.
in the

'

There

are

three essential marks

an

be included

definition of

been In the first place,it must have Empirical Law. gained direct In the second place,it must observation of facts. through not have been case or already explained as a particular specifica tion of
some

law

more

fundamental

than

itself ; it is

law, in fact,

342

THE has
not

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL

iii.

systematized. Thus Kepler'sLaws of until Newton showed Planetary Motion were empiricalin this sense that his deductions from own they were principleof necessary universal or gravitation. They then became specifications expres sions of the Law In the third place,the Empirical of Gravitation. It is a law descriptive is not an Law explanatory law. of the be haviour time at the same without of facts, being explanatory,or
of descriptive
no

which

itself been

the
as

mode Science
which

of

behaviour

of

cause. mean a no

For
more a

an

ex

planatory law, than a less)

force, energy,
the nature
it works. We

understands

it,can

(and

implies cause, necessarily tendency,though it makes no attempt to explain of that cause beyond denning the law accordingto which
or

law

to reference

illustrate the may certain instances which we

of Empirical Law by means E. borrow from Dr. Sigwart (ibid., T., " 93 ; which take law states We the of bodies, falling pp. 362-366). may that, whenever a body falls freelyfrom rest, it describes spaces which This is a law are proportionalto the squares of the times. in the sense that it describes the motion of a falling body by means of a formula but it is not a law in the causal or explan (2 s gt2), the : it states how,' but not the why.' So, again, atory sense that in first about the law tells us Kepler's ellipses planetsmove Sun as focus, tells us how and not why they move as they do ; states in a formula whilst his second law the law of equal areas and the its distance from the relation between of a planet velocity law and the sun, and is similarlydescriptive empirical. The which states the connexion between changes in the height of the with respect to tide and and the changing positionsof sun moon law the Earth each other and con is,again, only a descriptive cerning the regular accompaniment of one change by the other, and it is essentially different from the causal explanation which

meaning of

an

'

'

"

"

'

deduces

this connexion of the earth

are

from
'

the attraction

of

moon

and

sun

upon

the waters

E. (ibid.,

T., II.,p. 365). These

descrip

tive statements

History.
of sequence
A

Thus
and

the

particularly frequent and important in Natural laws mere uniformities, followingare empirical
: sown

coexistence

Dicotyledonous seed, when

conditions
The

in suitable soil under

favour

able
This
root

of

moisture, temperature,
which it contains

etc., will

commonly

germinate.

embryo

will

protrudeits radicle.

will grow downward, and from it will be developed the primary This root which fixes the developingseedlingin the soil.

may

branch

and repeatedly,
two

ultimately form
leaves. The

complex
from

root-

The seed-coat and

system.
If
an

cotyledonswill (in many

cases) emerge

the

will grow upward. stem developinto green embryonic plumule is present,this will develop its rudimentary

leaves into the first foliage-leaves of the like the root, may branch

growing plant. The stem, and will give rise to more repeatedly,

344

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XL
in

iii.

immediately complete programme

will may

The

preceding paragraphs
of Inductive of the

contain
a

themselves which

Method,

programme to

it It

be
not

the be
or

main
out

business of of

following chapters
in

develop.

tration

two

generalized, explained.
Let
what
us

and,

to add, conclusion, an place, however, the facts are general process through which further and as a systematized consequence,

illus

take of

as

our

complex
We

fact

door
to

with

its framework

some

out

order.

proceed

analyse

the

obstruction

by
the We
its

resolving the vague complex idea of a door out of order into ideas of of order. out more latch, a hinge, or fitting a simple find eventually that that the hinge is to blame, and upper
looseness has the
is
now now

caused

the

door
so

to

lean

against problem
we

floor, and
reduced

scrapes
a

graze against it

and

the when

floor

it presses

moved.

The

to

may

proceed
the laws about.
came

to

and friction,and question of pressure explain the difficulty by showing how.

pressure and

according
necessarily
ized. It is

to

of

friction, the
fact

obstruction
is

By
as a

this

simplification the
of the

general

operation of the and It is also systematized, or at friction. general laws of pressure with least potentially correlated host facts ; for, by of other a with all other of pressure connecting the phenomenon phenomena and have it out of friction, we taken of its mere particularity and generalized

particular case

isolation.
if we illustration to take an are Again given by Dr. Venn* at once attempting to explain the slipperiness of ice, we simplify and before us generalize the problem by displaying the fact of backward and of the forward slipperiness as a specific variety reactions feet and that always take the surface our place between be of the ground We against which they press. slip,'we say,
" "

'

'

cause

the
a

horizontal
minimal if
we

reaction

to

the

impulse
the

of

the

feet

has

fallen

below Once

certain
more,

amount.'
to the

desire

explain
fact
'

succulent

habit

of

some

desert-plant,we
be
a

generalize
of
'

of succulence

specific form again

as a

xerophilous
of that

adaptation,

and

by showing it to by regarding

adaptive modification, in response to the influence of environment, which, gradually perfected through the process of natural selection, ultimately fits each species of of its own particular habitat. plant to the conditions
*

this

specialkind

'The

Principles

of

Empirical

or

Inductive

Logic,'

ch.

xxi., p. 498.

XII.

APPLICATION
'

OF

THE

INDUCTIVE SO-CALLED INDUCTIONS.'

PRINCIPLE
'

TO

INDUCTIONS

IMPROPERLY
'IMPERFECT

AND

TO

(i.)

Inductive The
'

Inferences,

improperly
'

so-called

(ch.

xl.).

(ii.)

Imperfect
Enumerative

Inductions Induction from

(A) (B)

(ch. (ch.

xli.).
xlii.

Argument

Analogy

).

CHAPTER
XII.

XL.
IMPROPERLY SO-CALLED.

(i.)INDUCTIVE

INFERENCES,

THE

popular and scientific explana tion has been expressedin the familiar saying that Science is just This sense. organized common organizationimplies two things and the method method, principle being determined by the principle. And in the the principlewhereby Science organizes common sense of the explanation of facts is just that of steadfast matter loyalty relevant to its scientific purpose. to the facts in so far as they are scientific ultimate This principle standard to an investigation gives ultimate since the scientific aspiration and criterion or purpose does not extend beyond that of an adequate explanation of the facts of the sense-world. Hence, in inquiring whether any pro with the is facts method of scientifically adequate or dealing posed shall have to ask : In what does it provide an adequate sense not, we
essential distinction between
" "

Verification-test
which For the

This

is the

touchstone
this

of Scientific

Method,

to

all else is subordinate. purpose

of
in

carrying out
detail,we

inductive

standard
may

Scheme, which

conveniently be
'

propose laid out

principleand applying tin's to adopt Mill's* Inductive

as

follows

Inductions.'

Improperly

so-called.

Properly
I I
I
i

so-called.

J_
'

Perfect

Induction.'

Parity

of

Reasoning.

of Colligation

Facts.

Imperfect

Inductions.

Scientific Induction.

Imperfect Under
three

Enumeration.

Analogy. of Inductions
'

the
:

head
1.

improperly so-called

Mill

reckons

types

Perfect

Induct'on.'
of

2. 3.
*

by Parity Colligation.
J. S. Mill,
'

'

Induction

Reasoning.'

Vide

System
347

of

Logic,'Book

III.

348

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII.

i.

1.

'

PerfectInduction.''

Suppose that we have certain knowledge that all the instancesbelonging to a given class have been considered by us ; then, if we find that a certain attribute is possessedby each of these instances, it is an act of summarize to universalize perfectinduction i.e., the discovery of that class possess by statingthat all the members the attribute in question.
' '
"

"

Thus

:
'

'

January, February days or more. January, February

in

December December have

have

each

twenty-eight
months in

are

all the

'

.-.

the year. All the months more.'

the

year

days twenty-eight
could allow Induction
?

or

Now,
There

is there
as a

anything
form

in this

reasoningwhich

us

to

consider it

of Scientific

Explanationor

Explanation, as we have seen, only where a. elements hypotheticalconjecture is adequately verified. Two here indispensable are : the conjecture (going tentativelybeyond the evidence),and the verification or of the con the justifying jecture. Here, we might say, we have at least verification : the general to admit of complete, final verification. But proposition seems this confidence is illusory for there has really been no conjecturing ; at all, and there is therefore nothing to verify. There has been no tentative supposition made, no uncertainty at any point of the to the unknown, no reasoning, temporary passage from the known
which,
facts to
not when
a

is Scientific

understood

to

mean

tentative

passage

from

known
In

hypothesis,is essential
a

to all inductive

procedure.

order that

scientificmethod

adequate, but it must involve verifiable conjecture. The a legitimatehypothesis is the precon verification. dition of Perfect Induction lacks the legitimate the element indeed, lacks, altogether. hypothesis hypothetical of If it is something more than short-hand a mere registration self-contained Mill it is still facts known,'* as a essentially puts it, deductive inference,and of the very simplesttype. As such, it is only
must
' '
"

may its verification-tests be

the criterion of Induction, satisfy

'

no

episodein
in any
*

ductive

total process of Induction, and of the word.'f sense

therefore

not

in

J. S. Mill,'.' A System of Logic,'Book III., ch. ii.," 1. ' of Perfect For Jevons' defence Induction, see Elementary Lessons in Logic/ t he is only forcibly He appears to himself to be criticizing Mill, whereas p. 214. ' words. (Cf. 'A System of Logic,'ibid. : The operationmay repeatingMill's own be very useful, as most forms of abridged notation are part of the in ; but it is no of the often in truth, an preparationof bearing vestigation though important,part the materials for that

investigation.')

CHAP.

XL.]

'

INDUCTIVE

INFERENCES

'

349

2.

Parity of Reasoning.
that
a

When,

after

having
that

shown of

certain because
us

fact

is true

of A,

we

.argue that it must the same reason as

we are

be true

B,

not

it is true of its truth

of A, but
in A's
'

for

which

convinced

case,

said to
that the

proceed by Parity
three

of

shown

equal to two not triangle,

which But

angles of the conclude that we rightangles,

because it is true of

having Reasoning. Thus, ABC are together triangle

this is true but for the

of every
same

other
reason

ABC,

proved it to be true

of ABC.'*

than surelyParity of Reasoning is no more is to take 110 And to reason identically that have not further step in the reasoning at all,so we only no whatever. but no induction, logical process Mill brings to bear upon the essence But of the criticism which Parity of Reasoning, considered as an Induction, is that the con drawn clusion by it is not believed on the evidence of particular and instances,'' consequently that the process lacks the charac teristic qualityof Induction. inference is inductive that Mill Instead of saying with an if this is the case, Identity of Reasoning.
'

grounded
the

in the

instances

whose

sole function

has

been

to

suggest

be can should rather say that an we generalization, exercised verification of progressive grounded only through a process Nor observed instances. the as yet unobserved or on uncritically Mill repeatedly, is the difference a mere matter of words. though believed the were not as generalization though invariably, argues the evidence that verifies not on it,but on the evidence of the par
induction ticular instances which have

suggested it.
oo

3. The of
term

of Colligation
and
'

Facts.

f
of

is

Whewell's,

means

the act

bringinga number

when as actually observed under a general description,' the suc of observations on a Kepler, having made large number them cessive positions of Mars at different pointsof its orbit,brought all togetherunder the one collective conception of an ellipse.Mill facts and

Whewell

They
denies

the term Colligation.' agree as to this definition of calls it Induction,'Mill in this : that, whilst Whewell disagree
'

'

that it is says

an

induction

at all.
mere

Whewell,
observed tion is
*

Mill, is confounding a

of description The

set of

an

phenomena with an induction from them. to Induction, not itself an operationsubsidiary

descrip
induction.

III., eh. ii., J. S. Mill, ' A System of Logic,' Book " ~2. t Ibid., Book III., ch. ii., " 3 ft.; Book III., ch. xvi. ; Book IV., ch. i., ii. Whewell, 'Of Induction,' pp. 1-45. Of. also G. F. Stout, 'Analytic Psychology,' ii., pp. 49-52; and J. Venn, 'The Logic,' Principlesof Empirical or Inductive "-h.

xiv., pp. 353 ff.

350

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII.

i.

It is in

essentiallya
case

mere

act
was

of

the

considered
in But

to

circumstance

which

all

Thus, what comparison. Kepler did discover careful by comparisons the the observed positions of the planet
is
common

is

agreed. only
in any

to discover
a

what

to

series

of observations
:

to

give
an

general

character from them.

to

these

observations

it is not

way

induction

Whewell,
character
to
a

in

defence,

contends

that, besides
as

the

facts, Colligation introduces,

mind
not

giving a general a principle of con

The
"

nexion,
inductive

conception of the
act

consists

in

existing in the facts. superinduction of a conception

the The
sum

conception
statement

of about

the

ellipse in

Kepler's

case

"

upon
'

the
was

facts.
not

the

orbit, he elliptical

argues,

the

of

the sum of the observations merely ; it was under seen a new point of view, which point of view Kepler's mind That the the elliptical about motion statement not supplied.' was of the different observations is plain from merely the sum this, Whewell and other persons, : that Kepler himself before his argues did find it not by adding together the observations.* discovery, We must further remember a point not pressed by Whewell that himself the orbit of Mars that is not an actual if so ellipse, had actual been the facts, he could not simply Kepler summarizing have arrived at the idea of the ellipse. What Kepler did was, from finite number of observed rule for a a positions to frame all the intermediate unobserved inferring positions,as well as those at any future time.'f Notwithstanding Mill's attempt to past or show that no III., generalization is involved ('Logic,' Book
" "

the

observations

'

ch. ii.," 5), the

we

must

agree

with

Dr.

Venn

in

this

statement true

of

case. a it, was Kepler's procedure, we is justified hold that Whewell we generalization. To this extent as does, indeed, take us a first step beyond against Mill. Colligation the observed facts by suggesting a tentative, descriptive generaliza tion of them such observation could possibly have as no mere sup well as to observed as plied,seeing that it refers to the unobserved It certainly is not, that Mill it is, a maintained instances. as facts themselves. of the facts thrust the mere one by summary upon have criterion which But, from the point of view of the inductive we

take

tentative

is adopted, Colligation tion.

not

Induction.

It is
a

an

unverified

Generaliza
true to

It

has

not

been

justified as

generalization

the

evidence
*

of the
'

facts.
p. 33. of

Cf.

Of

Induction,'
'The

J. Venn, ad

Principles

Empirical

or

Inductive

Logic,'

ch.

xiv.,

p. 354,

footnote,

fin.

352

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII. ii.

III. Deductive
If

Development.
of this kind
.

all instances

a',b', c',d', e'

must

the mark x, possess all the marks (which possess

x.

then
p,

q)

also possess

the mark

IV.

ProgressiveVerification.
a',b', c',d', e'
marks
. . .

which [test-instances],

all possess
x.

the

p, q, do (or do not) possess

the property

Illustration

I. These

various disease.
all

individuals

are

from suffering class defined

this

specific
mark

lung
II.
'

(a) They

belong

to

the

by the

Sheffield

grinders.'

II. (/^) .-. perhaps all the individuals belonging to the class of Sheffield grinders, to which the observed individuals

belong,also
III. But
if all are

suffer from

this disease.

etc., who afflicted in this way. IV.

then Smith, Jones, Robinson, thus afflicted, also Sheffield grinders, to be should prove are

Attempt
"

at

progressiveverification by further

observa

tion of Smith, Jones, Robinson, etc.

characteristic of Induction [NOTE. In the generalization by Simple Enumeration, the two essential aspects of Generalization, the singling and out of the class-marks the universalizing and the and, since element, take place separately successively ; is taken for granted,it comes of these to pass that the second class-generalization
two

aspects is identified
Generalization
were

as

rule

with with

the

whole

process

of

as generalization,

though We
upon

identical

Universalization.]
as

must

admit

that this

conceptionof Inductive Method

does answer,
it. The in outline at essentials of inductive

based

enumeration Idea
: as

of instances
we

to the least,

Inductive
are

conceive

procedure

Generalization PreliminaryObservation of instances, of experience, deductive of Development hypothesis, attempt at progressiveVerification through further observation of instances. It is therefore at least possible to attempt to solve the problem of Induction by the use of the Method of Simple Enumeration. Our discussion of this
with
two

all present

be concerned
1. What 2. What

simplestform of the Inductive main questions:

of Enumeration
? in Inductive

Process

will

is the value
are

inquiry ?
as an

the

limitations of Enumerative

Induction

Inductive

Method

1. The It is

Value of Enumeration

in Inductive

Inquiry.

valuable in those more complex Sciences,such particularly which the data from as Meteorology and Sociology,in which be drawn often can are adequately given only in generalizations

CHAP.

XLL] form of
the

ENUMERATIVE

INDUCTION
The

353

the

aggregates and
an

averages.

Method

of Statistics,
on

though
tion, or
In

it includes

element

of

is founded Analysis,

Enumera

counting of instances.
statistical
to

every

investigationthere
be

are

certain
as,

definitely
e.g.,

stated
census,

phenomena
the number and
tenements

counted
men

and
or

tabulated"

in

of married
the with

of bachelors, the number

those
to

of in

widows
habit
tenements

widowers,
with

proportion of
than five
rooms

families those and that

so

that

more or

inhabit The

five

less

than

five

rooms,

on.

method
;

of

counting such
the Method

agreements
statistical
be is
a

and

comparing
:

the

results

constitutes The

of Statistics.
a

first rule
to be

of

investigationis
fact that

the
serve

phe
as

nomenon
a

counted

must

countable

can

unit.'*
in

Thus,
a

supposing it
What And of

houses human that

a

town.

beings ?
house
to

of required to count the number inhabited ? is a house by Any place size ? out Professor Scripturepoints any
in

census

taken

India
of
so
'

respect
Instead somewhat
number the the

this

indefiniteness

the greatest trouble in gave therefore the unit. We must

as

qualifythe
of

object to be counted counting

artificial up the instance
'
"

to

render

it

suitable
"

unit.

of cold

days, we
it
was

to take a days in the year the and contrasting these with all which count in should days up, say,

hot

highestshade days
in which

temperature exceeded
less than
a
'

70" P., and

contrast

with

40" P.

The from

second main

rule of

follows statisticalinvestigation
all

naturally
shall

the first. It is that

thingswhich

are

to

be counted

correspond completely and exactly to the stated definition of the counted object,and that nothing that does so correspond shall be of the thing counted This requires that all the properties omitted. shall be accuratelydetermined before the count begins,and that 'f they shall not be changed during the counting. the ancient Logic and Science dis It is interesting to notice how of these statistical, merely numerical, regarded the serviceability Aristotle relations. The knowledge of the concept, so argued, can realized. But in often it is how gain nothing by our knowing modern Science,where the desire to apprehend the Given fullyand an as preface to understanding its laws, accurately, indispensable attained has has been predominant, number characteristically definite scientific value. Who can why explain,' says Darwin, another and why one speciesranges widely and is very numerous, Yet these relations allied species and is ? has a narrow rare range the present of the highest importance, for they determine are
c
'

welfare, and,

as

believe, the

future
. .

success
'

and

modification

of

of this world. "every inhabitant useful or pleasingto man appear

*

.'J As variations manifestly the chance of only occasionally,

t Mid.,
p. 4.
p. 18.

E. W.

Scripture, The New Psychology,'p. 16. Introduction, \ The Originof Species,'

'

'

354

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII.

ii.

of indi largenumber highestimportance for Marshall this On success. formerly remarked, with principle As they generally respect to the sheep of parts of Yorkshire, and are can mostly in small lots, they never belong to poor people,
a
"

will be much increased by their appearance is of the viduals being kept. Hence number

be

improved."
amateurs

On

the
same

other and

hand,

nurserymen,

from
more

keeping
successful

large stocks of the

than

plant, are
new

generallyfar

in raising

valuable

varieties.'*

Illustration of the (From Romanes' Statistics of the

'

Value

of Statistics.

Darwin, and after Darwin.')

speciesof fauna found on islands (1) that have long been separated by great distances of sea from the mainland ; from the mainland. (2) that have only recentlybeen separated As typicalinstances take the Sandwich of (1) we Islands, the We GalapagosIslands,and St. Helena. get the followingresults :

Peculiar

Species.

Non-peculiarSpecies.

Thus,
with

out

of

total of 658
a

the

exception of
on

of terrestrial fauna, all are peculiar, species singleland bird found in the Galapagos Continent
take
as

Islands and
As
a

the American

well.
Britain.

instance of (2) we typical

the Island of Great

Peculiar

Species.
'

Non-peculiarSpecies.
of Species,' ch. Origin

The

i.,p. 28.

CHAP.

XLL]

ENUMERATIVE

INDUCTION
tabular
are analysis
'

355

The

statistics furnished

by this

and eloquent,

the towards point irresistibly evidence of land-areas having other

conclusion been

that

wherever
less

there

is

for
a

long
more

time

from separated

land-areas,there

we

meet

with

or

profusion of unique

unique

or

peculiarspecies,often

extraordinary running up into

hitherto genera ; and, in fact, so far as naturalists have been able to ascertain, there is no exceptionto this generallaw in of the globe. Moreover, there is everywhere a constant any region correlation between the part of the degree of the peculiarity on the fauna isolated.'*
to scientific complete subordination of statistical numeration is the fact made clear laws are explanation as that, as soon by established,statistical numeration to be of interest. actually ceases As Dr. Sigwart points out, the interest in counting how many of sun and moon occurred annually has completelyvanished eclipses since the rule has been found accordingto which they occur, and be calculated can for centuries past and to come ('Logic,' English
'

and

flora and

the

time

during

which

they

have

been

The

'

vol. ii., translation, " 101, p. 483). ask in conclusion, is What, then, we

the

value

of

number that

of

the safely say the to proportional necessarily number of instances cited. The that lead to the generalizations most not the on trustworthyhypotheses are based, counting of the number of instances, but on the weighing of their quality and
may

instances

in

inductive

inquiry?
is not

We

strength of

an

induction

character.

One

crucial

instance

may

be

worth

hundred

others.

be based on the com Again, strong analogicalarguments can the most in parisonof two instances only, whilst finally stringent ductions of all are those carried out by the Method of Difference,in which only one instance in two forms or, at most, two instances are

needed.
We
must

add, however, that

the work

of true

scientific analysis

of instances of greatlyassisted by the fact that the number of of an event is large; for the larger a phenomenon the repetition or the number of varied instances, the more the unessential can easily elements be detected,together with the form of the generallaw.

is often

2. Enumerative We have
seen

Induction that the

in the

Light of the

Inductive

Criterion.

scientific value vation. We have

now

counting of instances may have definite during the preliminarystages of scientific obser
to

consider to what
can

by

the

further

counting counting of

of instances instances.
*
'

be

This

uniformitysuggested verified by the satisfactorily which amounts to the inquiry,

extent
a

The

Originof Species,' p.

235.

23"2

356

THE
Enumeration

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC Criterion
to

[XII. of

ii.

testingof
Relevant
as an

by the Inductive
to define the extent

Fact, will
see

serve

Fidelityto which it is adequate

facts
to

Inductive

Method. that insistence

on

We
as

shall

the

relevant) must
direction the
are

have

their nature

principlethat respected serves

(so far
in

deepen
in

every

of the significance

germinalform,
open out

present

a which, processes and in Enumerative Induction itself,

crude
to

How,

the way to true Scientific Induction. then, does this Method stand in relation to the of Enumerative
P

requirement
the process the justify indi

of Verification ?
It is characteristic

Induction
we

that
to

Verification of Progressive suggestionthat all S's are vidual

instance may

through which
in
be
a

attempt
is P

that S by verifying
such
as

in each

culminate
may

verification that
to

is final and of
a

complete.
enumeration

The

conditions

admit

complete

indi of instances, and on testing these instances viduallyit may be shown that they all possess the requiredmark. This Complete Enumeration, as a genuine inductive process,
not

should

be

confused The
run as

with

the

so-called
in
an

'

Perfect

Induction

'

already considered.
Enumeration

argument
follows
"

Induction

by Complete

would

I.

PreliminaryObservation. the mark x. sessing

"

a,

b, c, d,

are

all instances

pos

II. Generalization.

(1) p,

the marks q are instances.

common

to all these

(2) Perhaps all

III.

instances

of this class (pq) the

Deductive mark

x. possess the mark If all instances these Development.

"

possess
so.

x, then
"

any

individual

instance

must

do

IV.

All the possibleinstances having been ex Verification. either that all to assert able are amined, we categorically instances of the class pq are accompanied by x, or that some lack the mark in question. instances
in

Thus
may Have

be
we

the Verification by Complete Enumeration then naturally suggests itself: question complete. ideal in Induction not an by Complete Enumeration
an

Induction

The

form indeed
the

of

Induction
an

To

this

our

answer

must

be

that

it does
; but

realize

ideal, the ideal of Enumerative

:

Induction

further

question remains
of Induction do
no more

What

are

the

intrinsic

limitations

of this kind
It (i.)
'

? than

can

verifya
induction

'

that.'
are

It cannot
a can

verifya
number

how.'

Given

the observed

fact that

p, q
at

in

certain

of

cases

accompanied by suggestedfact that p,

x.

x, the

best

only

verifythe
the
con

by

But

this is not

q in any
x.

are

in all way How

a

instances possible

accompanied
connected
can

verified

explanationof
x are

nexion

between

(p,q) and

(p, q)

and

CHAP.

XLL]

ENUMERATIVE

INDUCTION

357

never

be though it may, of course, then known before the process begins. Complete Enumeration (when the results are wholly favourable)is just a verified conjecture from fact (Some S's are P). one P) to another fact (All S's are Enumerative Induction cannot, therefore, be used for establishing

be ascertained

by

this process,

laws
in

of connexion,

whether

of sequence

cannot particular,
are

establish
uniformities To
a

laws
which that

of coexistence, and For of causal connexion.

or

so,

all
con

scientific laws
nected with with

state
one

how
is

one

fact

is

another. is to law
state

state

fact

always

connected
not the

another

fact

of uniform

connexion, but

explanatory
This A (ii.)

of that

connexion.

limitation
second

is fundamental. is

It quite,as fundamental. Induction is impossiblethrough an by Simple Enumeration, unsup call we ported by analysis, to deal with what apparent may found not exceptions.' If an object possessing the marks p, q is limitation

almost, if

not

'

to

possess

the

mark
as an

x.

it must,

so

far

as

this method
one

is

concerned,

exception the enumerative universal All pq is x can no longer be completely verified. The this method most obvious suggestion which suppliestowards its own is its indication of Analysis as the method reconstruction required for meeting the difficulties with which it is itself unable to itself contains Enumeration of Analysis. Closer a cope. germ that that, apart from analysis which inspection, indeed, shows possiblethe generalization, suppliesthe class-distinction and makes that I know enumeration into play at all. Unless could not come I have to count instances characterized as pq, counting is im possible. Analysis,again,is the natural remedy for the deficiencies of mere Enumeration. To Enumeration Nature necessarilypre
put down
' '

be

exception, and

with

sents

itself

as

mere

aggregate

of

instances.

The

systematic

given is by this method completelyand inevitably is the main to that systematic character to do justice ignored. function of the analytic method Enumeration to which by its own be to that limitations points. Thus needs Enumeration we see of Analysis. completed and transcended by the deeper method A study of the Method's defects that for the clear has made it true need an interpretationof fact we experimental analysis of the systematic connexions of Nature. therefore It would seem to the consideration of that com appropriate to proceed at once the of Scientific which Method actually plete Method, Induction,
character of the
But

works

on

the and

lines thus value of

a

indicated.
Method

But

we

must

first consider

the

import
and but is still

which, though non-experimental, of real fact, dimly foreshadowing the systematic character of Analysis, and, as full stage Method takes us a such,

beyond

the

unanalytic Method

of

Simple

Enumeration.

358

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII. ii.

CHAPTER
XII. THE (ii.)

XLII.
INDUCTIONS.'

'IMPERFECT
FROM

B. THE

ARGUMENT

ANALOGY.
upon
as

Argument

from

Analogy
may

is based

resemblance. follows each

:

The

form Two
B

of the argument

be

roughly stated
B, resemble
.

A and things(or classes), more properties, R1; R2.

.

other in

one

or

other property, P. possesses We therefore conclude that A will resemble

a

certain

in possessing

this

property also.
In

arguing from Analogy

we

we

no we

in Enumerative tive Induction

Induction, but

longer count instances,as we do weigh properties.* In Enumera-

instances

"

on

the number of corroborative on lay stress solely the fact that, though the number of instances con

sidered is great, no contrary instance has yet been met with. This is its essential weak unanalytic character of Simple Enumeration The ness. gives way to an argument argument by Enumeration from

Analogy

so

soon

as

attention
an

is turned

from

an

enumeration

of observed

instances

to

of their analysis from he had

treated

character.

Mill's view
enumeration

of the of

Argument

Analogy
it

has
as

sometimes
on a a

been
mere

criticized, as severely though

criticism
ated
;

founded
is

resemblances.

for Mill's process

can

hardly of Analogy undoubtedly begins with

all those

This, however,

fair
an

analyticinquiry through which

which
in

resemblances
with the

are

elimin

be shown

to

be unconnected

ch. xx., III., of the over, analogical argument about the habitability fact that how Moon, he shows difference the one single (the Moon apparentlyhas no atmosphere) outweighs a large number of resemblances. in the light Indeed, he shows that, viewed

A question (' his

System of Logic,'Book

property in " 2). More

of

this

one

difference,

'

all the

resemblances

which

exist

become

habited

presumptions against, not in favour of, the moon's being in And all through his discussion of False Analogies (ibid.). insists on the importance of (Book V., ch. v., " 6) he implicitly weighing rather than counting resemblances, showing that the important resemblances are those on which the suggested property depends.
'

The

Argument

from

Analogy, then,

as

opposed to

Enumerative

But if the analysis Induction, proceeds by analysisof content. could be sufficiently causal invariable to disclose an thoroughgoing the property P and the properties connexion between Rx, R2
. . "

Cf. Professor

vol. Bosanquet, Logic,'

'

ch. iii., ii., p. 83.

360

THE of
the

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII. ii.
"

its method

is like that of the shark respiration

that i.e.,
no

it be

breathes
But have

oxygen

dissolved in the water, and The

has

need

to

suppliedwith

atmospheric air. points that

with the
we

this argument is unsound. observed the characters are

presence
a

connected

the

ought to functionof
that

respiration.The
in

in the shark of gill-slits

so

and their absence

the

whale
the

is

difference
at
once

essential

to

inquiry
our

its

observation
fall to

would

have
among

been

sufficient to make still more which also should The

analogy
external
out

ground.
a

And

the

obvious

differences there is

singlecharacter

alone

weigh
the

all the

above-mentioned

resemblances.

extremity of

the flukes of expanded vertically ; in the whale From are placed horizontally. points of view this many difference might be regarded as unimportant ; but from the point of view of our analogical argument it is very important indeed, for it is intimately connected with the problematicpoint of resemblance that we are which, endeavouring to establish. For sea-creatures like the whale and the shark, spend their life in swimming freely is chiefly determined through the water, the direction of movement habit. Those crea by the presence or absence of the air-breathing air move tures that have no need of atmospheric usuallyin straight and lateral and forward for effecting such movements a directions, caudal is But fin fitted. creatures vertically admirably expanded that need to rise frequentlyto the surface of the water for the pur and downward. are constantlymoving upward pose of respiration of this kind a tail with horizontally To movements expanded flukes is precisely adapted. Thus the whale's horizontally expanded tail affords a strong presumption in favour of the presence of the airhabit and difference this between the apparently trifling breathing ; be regarded as two creatures must fatal to the cogency of the analogical argument. We see, then, that it is the importantdifference which invalidates an argument from Analogy, this importance being purely relative the argument seeks to to the problematic property (P) which that are in this same establish. So also it is only by resemblances sense important that arguments from Analogy can be justified. of the Earth to that Thus, if we are arguing from the habitability the and conditions the surface of Mars, on atmospheric temperature of Mars are the all-important points. Since these constitute marks the tail of resemblance
to

shark's tail is

the Earth
is

rather

than

marks

the of difference,

analogical argument proportionately strong. It is frequentlystated that, in estimatingresemblances, a group If of causallyconnected resemblances should only count as one. number the strengthof an analogy depended on the of independent this would be reasonable of resemblance, a precaution to points But in proportion as we insist on. to lay stress on number, cease its loses this precaution When meaning. points are weighed

CHAP.

XLIL]

ANALOGY

361

instead of
herent
more

being counted,
such relevant
it that

then

the

more

complex and causallyco

2 (Rx)may
be, the
will

any the

likelyis
same

group the property P

nexus.

of resemblances

ultimatelybe brought

within

causal

The
The

Logical Character of AnalogicalArgument.

AnalogicalArgument finds its natural place as a stage in a complete inductive inquiry. It has genuine inductive value as a of suggesting hypothesesand of sifting an un means out, from and soundest tested heap of mere guesses at truth, such as are the the most arduous work of to development and likely repay verification : the true function of analogical reasoning cannot be the trouble other than that of recommending a hypothesis as worth
' '

of verification. To

have
must

analogical argument
verification
may the
concern

value, the conclusion of an any inductive be verifiable. It is not essential that the
The immediately practicable.
on

should
state

be

the conditions

present
the
a

of life of astronomical
to

Mars

or

on

the Moon,

argument and, in
be In pos this

knowledge,
conclusion
as a

sible for astronomers

case as

put
be the

the

it may not to the test.

conclusion

should

treated

suspendedhypothesis"
The

of which hypothesis

verification is deferred sine die.

analogical stage in an inductive argument stands as a preliminary that is not as inquiry yet completed. The true place of Analogy is in the service of Scientific Induction. In relation to a complete scientific inquiry,its logical function is heuristic. It plays an important part in the Logic of Discovery, but has no placein the Logic of Verification. 2
The
As

Value

of Analogy

in

Scientific Hypotheses. suggesting

'

Mill has said,it is when Analogy is used which direction in the more pointing out should
be that prosecuted,' it has
'

as

mere

guide-post,

rigorousinvestigations highest scientific value.'* This point of view is,however, lightly passed over by Mill himself, the it of does, Discovery rather than the concerning, as Logic Jevons, on the other hand, in his chapter on Logic of Evidence. Analogyf in his Principlesof Science,'emphasizesit almost ex clusively. Quoting from Jeremy Bentham's Essay on Logic,' Discovery,' he asserts, is most frequently accomplished by followingup hints received from analogy.' Thus, if a chemist is
the
' '
'

'

testing
any
an one

'

what

he

believes to be

new

element,' and

sees

that

'

in

the substance qualities displays a resemblance tto will he alkaline metal naturallyproceed to try whether it

of its

...

possesses other
*

common properties
'

to
of

the alkaline metals.'

III., ch.
xx.,

J. S. Mill,

System

Book Logic,'

" 3.

| Vol. ii.,pp.

283-305.

362 Jevons draws

THE

PROBLEM

OF
to the

LOGIC

[XII. ii.
of

attention especial

example perfect

Analogy

presented by the analogy between Geometry and Algebra. So this and the two sciences de not analogy was suspected, long as did up to Descartes' veloped independently, as they practically Descartes, in his system day, they made but slow progress. When had of Algebraic Geometry, that the straight lines or shown the positionof a point and the co-ordinates required for fixing algebraicalsymbols x, y were fundamentally analogous, in such wise that a geometrical figure could always be repre curve or sented by an algebraical equation, the two sciences rapidlyde discovered by solvingequations, of curves were veloped. Properties and of curves. equations established by geometricalinvestigations and The analogy between when understood, symbol, properly thing is the most perfectand fruitful of analogies. Another fruitful Analogy, interestinginstance of historically cited by Jevons the is ii., (ibid'., analogy between Jupiter p. 298), and its moons the one on hand, and the Sun and its planets on the other. in opinion divided While the scientific world was
' ' '

between

the

Copernican and
use

Ptolemaic
new

systems,

Galileo dis
the
a were
'

covered, by the
satellites which

of

his

four telescope,'

of

small

circulate These
to

round

Jupiter, and
Stars, as
round

make

miniature

planetaryworld.
were

four Medicean

they

called,

plainly

seen

revolve
one

Jupiter in

various

periods,

but

approximatelyin
true

ferred that

found

Jupiterand
the

in irresistibly plane, and astronomers also be what might happen on the smaller scale might of the greater planetary system. The relation between its satellites is in many important respects analogous

to the relation between

the Sun

and

its

satellites

move

round

the Jupiter,

planets. Therefore, since planetsshould also move

round

the Sun.'
f

The From the

so-called

False

Analogy.'
Standard which
we

point of

view

of the Inductive
conclusion drawn

have

adopted the
argument
may

tentative

be called true

subsequent process by the process.

Let the two

through an analogical only when adequately verified by a when of scientific Experiment ; false disproved

instances A, B be
. . .

analysed as follows symbolically

P.
.

AEER-L,R2, R3, B RX, R2, R3,

=

dx,da,d3, S2,83, Sj,

.

(P ?).

Here

R1? R2, R3 dl5dg,d3 "i""2""3

.
"

points of resemblance ; points possessedby A, but not by B ; points possessedby B, but not by A ; a mark possessedby A ; the analogicalargument in that B also possesses P. sisting concluding
.

are

the

'

'

'

'

'

'

"

"

"

con

CHAP.

XLIL]
true

ANALOGY from

363

conclusion
P
an

nexion

between

sustained Induction.
A

by

Analogy, then, would consist in a con founded resemblance, and R1; R2, R3 upon analogical argument, and established by Scientific
.

conclusion false under

the

from

Analogy would
a
. . .

be

one

that

should

break

down
But the

criticism of
it is not

connexion
so

between

scientific verification,the suggested P and R1; R2, R3 proving to be unwarranted.

to practicable
' '

and
tween

proceedto this verification, than probable. True be regardedas more conclusion cannot and the as false,' epithets, appliedto it, are inappropriate
long as
'

place of
'

this distinction is

naturallytaken
between A

by

the

distinction be
un

sound

'

and
'

'

unsound,'
'

well-groundedand
sound of
or

grounded analogical
analogy through
"

conclusions.
in the
"

well-grounded

drawn sense a using analogy be one then in which would an analogicalargument the resemblances essential in relation to P, and were R15 R2, R3 A and B (againin relation to P) were the differences between un
. . .

conclusion

essential. On
as

the other
or

hand,
are

an

argument from Analogy should

it
can

be

stamped
; or,

unsound
other from

when illegitimate

be shown

that

the differences

in relation
in

to P

essential and
we can

the

resemblances
the

unessential

words, when

show the

that

suggested property
is rooted

P,
in

far

being

rooted

in

known and

resemblances,

certain

differences

between

obtain in A, but not in B. Such an called be ungrounded.' appropriately

'

B, in certain conditions which argument from Analogy could

Illustrations

Analogy of Illegitimate

1. States must In the

case

decay, as individuals
individual

do.* results

of the

body, decay

from

'

the

natural

very progress earlier stages, constitute its growth to conditions of old age, d1? d2,dg" whereas these which

of those

changes of structure
in the

which, in their maturity,' i.e.,from the

"

case

of the

State

conditions
its
an

are

not

for the present,

at

healthy
is

existence

any

stage

properties S1582,83,upon depends, are such as

The

point to
of

indefinite

continuance
to
'

of

healthy growth.
old age, but
to
'

decay
which it is of

States
be

due,

not

inevitable

disease but

may disease

warded
or

off.

Bodies

violent and B

death ; resemble

die,'says Mill, politic they have no old age.'

each both
a

2. A

other make view

in

a possessing

certain

kind

of skill.
to

They picking them

to
'

can

locks.
to

is further

given
B is

with

robber}^. Therefore
a

also addicted
*

with lock-picking

view

to

robbery. f
is clever

t
at

A System of Logic,' Book V., ch. v., " 6. is clever a man Cf.Plato, Republic,' p. 334, A : What too.' stealing
' '

J. S. Mill,

at

keeping he

364

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XII.

ii.

Here

==

skill
will

to
to to

make

locks them

implying (dj). implying

tendencies,

skill

to

pick
to

them

the

pick
make

skill
will

locks whose

skill
one

pick
or

them the

-f

about

way

other,

nothing
The
too

is known

(Sj).
A

argument
the

is

that,

as

actually picks locks,

the

therefore

does

; and

question
addiction
as

is whether to is not

argument
is

is sound. in

Now locks.
is
no

P,

the

robbery,
known
P with to

rooted
a

dlt

A's

will of

to

pick
there

Hence,

d"

be

characteristic

B,

ground

for the
as

connecting analogy

B.

Therefore So called
in

is unsound.

long
true.

an

analogical
it may

conclusion

is

not

verified

it

cannot

be

But,
sense

be

urged,
"

an

Unsound
case,

Analogy namely,
with in

may

surely
P
can

the

strictest
on

be

false
data

in to

the

which
certain

be

proved

the

given

be
but

incompatible
not

differ the the

to

ences,

Sj, 82, B3, possessed

from would

by

by A.
?

In

this

case

is not
;

argument

Analogy
entail
a

strictly disproved
Scientific
as

Certainly
It
or

but

disproof
prove connexion.

Induction.
is to prove

is

as

difficult
a

such

incompatibility
Is human life

it

disprove
of
water

causal

Thus,
answer

'

incompatible
we

with
must

absence

?' the

To pro

this of

question

satisfactorily
as a

analyse
etc.)
the
;
we

out
must

perties

Water

(considered
the

solvent,
and

physio
a

logically analyse
of

meaning
consider Not
on

of
in

thirst,
detail

necessity question
of

of of

supply possible
are
'

liquid

we

must

the

whole
processes
use

substitutes

for
can we

water.

till
a

these

analysis
term

completed patible.'

venture

downright
not to

of

the

incom

Incompatibility Analogy.
with fact
as

would deals

thus
with

seem

be

matter

that

concerns
as

Analogy
of difference
to

points
But
so

of
soon

difference,
as we can

certainly, deepen
seem

points
of

resemblance.
into

the

the
gone

fact

of

incompatibility, Analogy
into
as we

we

almost
when
we

certainly

have the

beyond
of resemblance

have of

have
nexion.

deepened

fact

fact

causal

con

XIII.

THE

GOAL

OF

INDUCTION

CAUSAL

EXPLANATION.

(i.) (ii.)

Cause The The

and
Process

Causal of of of

Law

(ch.

xliii.).
Observation

Scientific
Causal the

(ch. (ch.
of Inductive

xliv.).

(iii.)

Method

Explanation Application

xlv.).
Method

Illustrations

(ch.

xlvi.)-

368

THE
to

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
its

[XIII. i.
own

presupposes for it is these alone principles,

submission

Fact

to fidelity the
not

fundamental Science
It has

which

determine fundamental

how

shall

study

Fact.

On

the other

its root arbitrary. in the protest of the scientificspirit againstthe anthropomorphisms animisms of pre-scientific and (vide Chapter XLVII.), and ages

Science, the Inductive

hand, Postulate, is

assumption of

testifiesto the laws

of Nature

deep conviction
Law.
that

of modern

Science that Nature

is the

expressionof Natural

It is out of this belief in the immanent

the ideal laws

of Science have

at Nature gradually taken shape, bringing intrinsic orderliness. of its own self-conscious possession

and tentatively into last,through man,

Is all Inductive
We may
:

ExplanationCausal
to

divide

our

answer

this

question under
is

two

main

heads

1. All
'

Explanation complete Scientific

causal be
'

in the

sense

which

this word

or directly properlybears

indirectly
in Science.

how an simply inquiring the elements are or simple object or it is constructed, the explanationis substantial, factors out of which But this mere causal. not analysisof a fact into its factors is no The is fact explained only when we can show how explanation.
It may
we are

argued that, so long as

fact is

constituted, asking what

it is the

product of
all

these factors.

Indeed, Science, in

last resort,

in a questionsconcerning the coexistence of properties causal to connexion. So long as questions of thing or substance of the what to connexions take be we are we studying systematic in nature, we are studying causal connexions, whether these con

reduces

nexions

be coexistences

most of Uniformities Nature. so Every natural classification,

or sequences. coexistence are the

obvious
far
as

uniformities

in
a

it is

natural, is
of
co

record
the
'

of Nature's The
name

correlated of
a

facts

"

i.e.,of uniformities
which

we sign by recognize For instance, properties. by understand of high specific Gold a metal we gravity, high meltingyellow colour, etc. great ductility, point, low chemical affinities, In the case of the higher divisions of a natural classification we are furnished with a similar clue to coexistent properties. For in is a signwhereby we are stance, Monocotyledon apprisedof the whole list of the coexistences expressedin its definition. Again, the

existence.

class is the of

coexistence
'

of

multitude

'

'

inferencesthat
Correlations the

can

be

drawn

expressiveof the coexistence

or

from a natural classification of correlated properties.

"

are

all

coexistences habit and

ruminating

e.g., that of two divided feet in most

"

such
cases

as properties can only be

formulated. empirically

CHAP.

XLIIL]
the
case particular

CAUSATION of

369

Geometry, however, we have a science of rationalized coexistences, the correlated propertiesbeing here all deducible from the essential propertiesof Space and Figure. All the properties of a circle are coexistent ; and not only so, but have We be given to explain their coexistence. exact can reasons causal explanationpasses into in which here a type of coexistence is deduction. mathematical Explanation in Mathematics pure it reference to In abstracting from any substance, non-causal. all from causal considerations. abstracts eo ipso the properties But when, as in all systems of Natural Classification, that the con the scientificbelief in not correlated reason only, are of being but must not nexions eventually admit are arbitrary, reasoned out, leaves the scientist with the problem of discovering the for all these coexistent effects. Precisely cause common some same reasoningtakes place where uniformities are sequence-unifor and winter, etc. summer mities, as in the sequences of day and night, causal explanation, driven to seek for some Here again we are co-effects though, of which the sequences are cause to find some else to deepen the relation effects or simultaneous not of course,
In
" "

If in Explanation is, therefore, causal. where the and Induction Analogy, complete, as in Enumerative but not the that is investigated, how,' the explanationcan at to true Causal Explanation. else subsidiary, best be preliminary, or is called the explanation In what of laws we have a process of causal ; but, though it does not which is not directly systematization
'

one of sequence All completeScientific

itself into

of causation.

'

'

deal

with

the

relation of Cause

and

Effect, it does

deal

with

the

be regarded themselves must interrelations of uniformities which that the procedureis still so from the point of view of Causality,

referable indirectly

to Causal

Explanation.
in
an

2.

be used causal // the word Explanation is causal.

'

'

ultimate sense,

no

Scientific

In

the

of causal explanation scientifically

as an

that fact Here

ment

effect

consequent
on

on

look upon certain ascertainable conditions.

a we

fact

the

first

step

in causal

explanationconsists
the

in the

ascertain, the main

of the the

conditions

which

effect

depends,and

discoveryand verification of the laws accordingto which these conditions operate in bringingabout the effect. In Scientific Explanation we are in the habit of contentingourselves with the tracingof effects to the operationof conditions accordingto ascer
step is
tained laws.

Against Scientific Explanation as thus conceived it has been no description. explanationat all,but mere urged that it is really and these antecedent be is a cause said,can ; Only a free agent, it be themselves free agents, but must not conditions are certainly
24

370

THE

PROBLEM antecedent

OF

LOGIC A
It is

[XIII. i.
cause

by previous explicable
not
a

conditions.
name.

that

is

first

cause

is

cause

only

in the

deter entirely

mined

effect. So by its antecedents, and is, therefore, a mere that The mechanical asserts inquires philosopher Berkeley and the and modes of rules alone, operation concerning properly not as is, nothing mechanical concerning the cause ; forasmuch cause.'* can or be, a really it does, that, far from is fundamental, implying, The objection as is causal. being causal, none every complete scientific explanation The objection is valid and useful,providedits bearing be properly in which understood ; for it simply emphasizes the restricted sense
'
. . .

the term
laws

'

'

cause

is used

be

as

of connexion, it is,and not

Science elucidates for scientific purposes. connexion the should but does not explainwhy otherwise. As Causal
in Science, Explanation,

is not final them. from the

causal in the true

causes

(which
causes

are

teleological sense, as it does not deal with it does not the concern of Philosophy), so
to obliged

deal with

qua It deals with the

to

efficient forces, though it is

causes

presuppose

which

It remains

as conditions,as conditions apart solely event effect in question would not take place, or f to these remarks follow up by an attempt analyse

meaning

of

'

Cause

'

as

in interpreted

Inductive

Science.

The A
cause

Meaning of
the realized,

'

Cause
as

'

for Inductive Science.

sum

is defined

by Mill

which
Let

being
us

total of the conditions, and unconditionally consequent invariably

two

the

follows. J consider the separately

by aspects of Cause suggested

this definition.

Cause
'

as

the

sum

total of the conditions.

'

the sum only mean im of all the relevant are sufficiently from this Venn should as limitation, portant. Apart pointsout, we

By

the

sum

total of the conditions that both

Mill

can

conditions

and

Dr.

George Berkeley, Siris,' " 249,

'

Fraser's

edition, vol. ii.,p. 457

'

Selec

tions,' fifth edition, p. 293. | The Cause, or Causal Antecedent,

should be carefully from the distinguished it occurs antecedent in a hypotheticaljudgment. The latter is as merely logical the logical ground of a stated consequent, whereas the former is the existential ground of an effect, the ground apart from which the effect would not exist at all. Of course,
as

logical ground
will be wet besides
'

the consequent may stand for the consequent is stated

to

for
may

an

effect,and
stand

it

rains, the grass will be wet.'

those furnished

grass
reasons

Here the reason be the presence

the antecedent which serves ' for the cause, If when as we say, for our being able to infer that the other of the cause. But there are
soon

by

causes.

Any sign may

I may say : not the cause. I See 'A

If the barometer of

falls,the grass will III., ch.

v.,

furnish a reason. be wet.' Here the

Thus
reason

i"

System

Logic,'Book

"" 3,

6.

CHAP.

XLIIL]
unable
'

CAUSATION
to

371 which
in the

be
to

quite
some

secure

that

of repetition
we

occurrence

we

require in order
new

to

apply the

instance

sequence in the future.'*

have
a

noticed

past
is to

If

causal
;

connexion

be tested,the antecedents must be limited in number, and must

such individual characteristics
as

be under
not

control

must, therefore,
from

be dealt with
are

in abstraction

be all negative conditions,'he says, may summed head one namely, the absence of preventing up under one or invariably counteracting causes negative condition all and the in of the absence instances (namely, same understood, of the along with the sum counteractingcauses) being sufficient, on conditions,to make positive up the whole set of circumstances which the phenomenon is dependent.'! which two conditions we may classes, distinguish Among positive and Exciting or Initiating be called respectively Predisposing may Causes. Causes the are relatively Predisposing permanent con the effect ditions whose for length of precede presence may any lack the of time, but which, for ExcitingCause, remain inoperative. The Exciting Cause is an instantaneous change, a something which, into effective action by coming into play,bringsall the conditions and precipitates the effect. When that small we causes say may have mind in the causes w e effects, produce great initiating spark and the speech that brings about a war. that burns a city, Here is a fictitious instance given by Boscovich, and quoted by Tyndall
The
"

these Among the negative.

conditions
'

Mill

repeatable. the positive from distinguishes

'

"

('Heat
'

Mode
.

of Motion,' ninth
. .

Lecture edition, mountain

III., pp. 66-68) :

out of the sea, rising to rest upon able so are just steep them such blocks, diminishing He supposes without rolling down. the mountain over gradually in size,to be strewn large below, and dwindling to sand-grains at the moderate at the middle height, ; it top. A small bird touches with its foot a grain on the summit motion let the these next loose sets largergrainsin moves, ; again the pebbles, these the largerstones, these the blocks ; until finally the whole mountain-side rolls violentlyinto the sea, there pro Here the foot of the little bird unlocked ducing mighty waves. the energy, the rest of the work being done by gravitation.' a Similarly spark acts like the foot of the bird ; it starts a pro which and is continued cess vastly augmented by the molecular .' Tyndall further pointsout that The action forces of the fuel. the in the muscles of also falls in nerves unlocking the power of the here described.' admirably with conception of Boscovich of conditions combine to keep a body in a Again, when a number of unstable to equilibrium e.g., keep an egg balanced on position is all that is needed infinitesimal determining cause end to an one

Boscovich sides

picturesa high
that

with

blocks of stone

"

'

'

"

"

Dr. John
'

Venn,
of

System

The Principles of Empirical or Book III., ch. v., " 3. Logic,'

'

Inductive

ch. ii., Logic,' p.

57.

24"2

372 decide

THE the fate of the

PROBLEM

OP Hence

LOGIC the

[XIII. i.
de

system.

importance of the
in

even when, considered termining or excitingcause nature. to be of a very trifling might seem

it isolation,

The

causes predisposing

constitute
causes

what of
a

Professor
summer

Bain

calls

Collocation.
we

In

the considering
presence

thunderstorm
the

may

regardthe

ture

of the

earth's surface, and The downward

of aqueous the
difference rush

vapour,

high tempera
of air
as

ascending
of

currents

constituting, together with

Collocation.

electric

the potential,

of cold sudden

dry air, which

of
warm

(in con
air

junctionwith
from In the of quantities

the ascensional

movements
a

moist

rising

heated

ground)
the of

causes

condensation

of great deter

aqueous

vapour,

would

be here the
If

determining cause.
the investigating

Pathology marked. is often clearly mining causes

causes

distinction

between

and predisposing
we we are

of

'

case

nervous

break-down,'
an

may

have

to reckon

among late

conditions predisposing
or

inherited

neuropathic tendency,

insufficient while the

improper nourishment, bad air,insufficient exercise, hours, over-excitement, over-work, long-continued anxiety ;
cause exciting

may

be

sudden

shock

or

single sleepless

night. might have re of the excitingcause temperature as garded a sudden heat thunderstorm,' and all the other conditions as constituting of cold dry air any had the descending masses the Collocation ; nor moist of warm air to be better right than the ascending columns So again a long-continued suc called the determining cause.
But

these

distinctions

are

not

absolute.

We

rise of

the

'

cession

of

nervous

shocks

and

an

established

habit

of insomnia
'

break of a neurasthenic causes might be regarded as predisposing be while the a cause down,' day's fastingor an might exciting The important point is that a change through which hour's worry. total cause a produces its effect can take place only when all the essential conditions
causes predisposing are

conditions,then, if any
a,s

present. If n (n 1) of these
"

be the number
are

of essential
are

present, they

present
camel's

until matters

are

by precipitated
that
are

the arrival
the

of the nth.

It is

always

the

last straw

breaks

back,
We

no

matter

in what

order

they

successively placed in
im

position.
have

said
not

to emphasize the enough,perhaps,sufficiently

portance of
criminated
between

taking the heap. Clearlywe

or

antecedent
must

conditions
on

in

an

undis

at least insist

the distinction

the collateral other

and predisposing which

the

or initiating exciting

conditions.
There
are

distinctions be

may

at

any

time

assume

importance, and
agency

require to beings
is

emphasized. Thus,
the

wherever

the

of human

presupposed,there
Take the
case

is the

practically
and

important
those

distinction human

between

controllable
of
a

conditions

beyond

control.

hung carelessly

CHAP.

XLIIL]
on :

CAUSATION
the

373

picturewhich,
conditions
are

of clapping

door, suddenlyfalls. Here

the

(1) Weight of picture. (2) Rotten cord or loose nail. (3) Slamming of door (the precipitating cause).
Here and sound
the

important distinction
(3) on
In
the the

lies between the

see

on (2),

the

one

hand,
are re

(1)and
and

other, (2) being

we

eminently
to it that cannot
so

controllable
cords

condition.

hanging pictures
nails well
driven

may in. We of doors

the

sponsiblefor the pictures.

When
we are

non-slamming

or

for the

easilybe weight of

the

char consideringcausal influences of a persistent that between acter, a commonly recognizeddistinction is periodic and With this in somewhat is causes. associated, non-periodic cumulative and noncomplex relations,the distinction between cumulative A

effects.

periodiccause
or

might

be

defined
in
a

as

identical
Thus
cause

similar

conditions
and systole

of rhythmic recurrence regular order of succession. the

are a

the with

successive

diastole of the heart

periodic

rhythmic expand alternately and diminish the thoracic cavity is a periodic of respiration. cause A non-periodiccause is the continuous (or irregular persistence and the of similar in identical conditions one or recurrence) tending causal direction. Whatever action there is is non-rhythmic. same Thus the gravitation of bodies at the surface of the earth is a nonlike that and so is any steadily maintained periodic cause, pressure exerted by the mainspring of a watch or by the steady pullof the hand in drawing out a cork with a corkscrew. and if But modern Science tends to multiply periodic causes, include it them all vibratory and we undulatory motions among be that the Science of the future will regard the action of every may in some force as sense physical periodic. effect is said to be cumulative An when it persistently increases and the same in one be produced either by Such effects may sense. of which at least is periodic. c auses or one by causes non-periodic
to

of muscular

and the the circulation, regard and relaxations which contractions

succession

(a) Cumulative

effects produced by

Periodic

Causes.

result in growth, and Rhythmic circulation of the blood may exercise in daily continuallyincreasingstrength. The beat of a bird's wings results in continuous and the alternate move flight, of the legs may result in locomotion ments to an ever-increasing distance from the starting-point. instance effect pro of a cumulative Tyndall gives the following of which duced by a total cause main factor was one periodic. A of the sheet lead, covering slopingchoir-roof of Bristol Cathedral

374
in two

THE moved

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. i.

through a space of eighteeninches. The lead was varying temperature, higher exposed to a periodically the action in the day-time, lower at night. Under of gravity it than freely downwards upwards, and, in con expanded more drawn than more easilydownwards tracting, its upper edge was that its lower edge upwards. Its motion was therefore of a common the it its earth-worm lower forward edge during day, and pushed ; drew its upper edge after it during the night,and thus by degrees it crawled through a space of eighteeninches in two years.'* We take another typicalexample from Sir Robert Ball's Time and Tide,' p. 101. You see,' he says, a heavy weight hanging by and in my hand I hold a little slip of wood no heavier than a string, I common a speaking, might strike that heavy pencil ; ordinarily effect is pro weight with this slipof wood, and no [perceptible] duced ; but if I take care to time the little blows that I give so that with the vibrations which the weight is they shall harmonize small blows will naturally disposedto make, then the effect of many that after a short time the weight begins be cumulative, so much so a nd to respond to my now efforts, you see it has acquired a swing of considerable amplitude.' very Mr. Edmund Catchpool gives similar instances : The regular tramp of soldiers crossing a bridge will break the bridge down if its period of oscillation agrees with the interval between the steps ; and the vibrations of the air caused by an organ (itis said even by if the pane the voice)will break a pane is of of glassin a window with a frequency correspondingto the such a size that it vibrates successive impacts of the sound-waves, f cumulative of the tides have a Again, the periodicmovements
years
' ' ' ' ' '

bodily down

effect in the retardation

of the

Earth's

rotation

on

its axis.
moon

Con

sequently the
and there
seems

day

is
to

always
be
no

lengthening and

the

counteracting agency

retreating, anywhere dis

cernible.

(b) Cumulative
As
an

effects produced by Non-periodicCauses.

an

example of
of heat

effect of this kind

we

have
to

the results of the

its

conduction loss thence

from

the Earth's

interior This

surface,and
is

its

by radiation into space. extremely process in and the same direction, always tardy ; but, going on incessantly the changes pro it produces giganticeffects. Other examples are duced in rocks through the age-longpressure of the superincumbent in the biological to a sphere the gradual adaptation, strata, and new habitat, of a race of animals or plants.
" "

The

effects

produced by
'

both

types of
as a

cause

may

tiallynon-cumulative.
*

Thus,
a

non-cumulative

be at least par effect due to

IV., p. 95.

John
'

Tyndall,
Text-book

Heat

Mode

of Sound,'

second

of Motion,' ninth edition, Lecture edition, ch. v., p. 76.

376
individual
name

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
'

[XIII. i.

effects is called

by Mill

Composition.
'

is

Compositionof Causes,'he says, to in all cases in which the joint effect exemplified
of the

give the the principle which

of several
causes
'

I shall

is identical with

of their separate effects (ibid.). In illustration of the Intermixture of Effects due to Composition
sum we

the

of Causes
to

may

cite the movement

of the Earth
causes

in space

relatively

the Sun.

The

distinguishable

which

contribute

in number. ducing this singletotal effect are many action and of the Sun of the Moon and of gravitative each of these bodies items definite planets, contributing

in pro There is the the

various

to the total

effect

; and

there is also the Earth's

own

momentum

in the direction

of the tangent to its orbit. A more general illustration is that duced

of the resultant

effect pro

by the composition of any forces acting according to dynamical laws. For instance,two forces, P, Q, actingon a particle, and in and direction, by the adjacent represented, magnitude sides AB, AC will cause of a parallelogramABDC, that particle in the direction of the diagonal AD to move ; and the positionto is which the particle eventually transported through the simul action of these two forces, taneous operatingduring a given time T,
will be

the precisely
had it been the

same

as

that

to

which

it would

have

been force

brought
and

then

by

in succession first by the one acted upon them each of other, actingduring a time T.

The

mutual

interference
amount to

of

homogeneous

effects

complete Counteraction. in opposite P, Q are magnitude, but act upon a particle will remain the particle at rest. Mill gives the following directions, illustration : A stream running into a reservoir at one end tends to fill it higher and higher,while a drain at the other extremity limiting case,
forces

as a may, Thus, if the two

equal in

'

which if the two causes tends to empty it '; and he adds that even in jointaction exactly annul one are another, stillthe laws of both effect is if the drain had been open for fulfilled the the same are : as half an had flowed in for as long after hour first, and the stream wards In the
causes
'

'

(Book III.,ch. vi.," 1).

to

reference

this

phenomenon
that

important
whose

remark

laws

are

of Counteraction, Mill makes when the not broken even

operationthey attempt to explain,through counteraction of their natural effects, apparentlyfail to act in accord with that refers these laws. He to the popular prejudice ance all general truths have exceptions,' and to the fallacyunderlying There this prejudice when it is made to bear on laws of Causation. law not that law and in to the are a an law, exception acting ninetynine cases, and There the exception in one. two are laws, each possiblyacting in the whole hundred cases.' And again : What is thought to be an is always some exception to a principle other and distinct principle (Book III., cutting into the former
' ' '
...

mode

of

'

ch. x.,

" 5).

CHAP.

XLIIL]

CAUSATION

377

Mill proposes to remedy the confusion caused by this misinterpre of the tation of the meaning of scientific law by an appropriateuse

of expression tendency.' All laws of causation, in consequence their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in words Thus, affirmative of tendencies only,and not of actual results. that all heavy bodies fall if it were stated to be a law of Nature to the ground, it would probablybe said that the resistance of the the constitutes atmosphere, which prevents a balloon from falling, the But balloon an exception to that pretended law of Nature. real law is that all heavy bodies tend to fall ; and to this there is no and the sun moon they, as every ; for even exception,not even astronomer knows, tend towards the earth, with a force exactly (Book III., equal to that with which the earth tends towards them
' '
. . .

'

ch. x.,

" 5).
as

2. Cause
'

the

'

concurrence

of antecedents

'

on

which

an

is effect

and unconditionally consequent.'' invariably firm in

on insisting

Mill

is very

the

point
'

that

the

theory of
'

requiresno other notion of Cause than such as can be sensegained from experience; and by experience Mill means conviction of the invariability He considers that our experience.'* from obtained is experience by Induction of causal consequences invariable that notice to It is understood. by so important Mill does not mean merely invariable so far as our experiencehas unvaried within the limits of human experience.' gone,' or even sufficient is this not in that sense He saw invariability quiteclearly
Induction
'
'

'

'

'

to constitute
'

The

any causal connexion. of day and night,' succession says

as

is Mill,

as

much

an

in the
one

variable sequence earth to the sun.

another.
our

the alternate exposure Yet day and night are their sequence,
so unconditionally

of

oppositesides of
the
causes

not

of

Why ? is experience,
other
either
two

Because
not

though
facts absence

invariable
of
we

in

; those

only succeed
the
sun

each

provided that
day
or

the

presence

and
were one

succeed
have thus the

each other, and

kinds

if this alternation

to cease,

might
are

night
on on

unfollowed
the

by

another.
one

There

of uniformities
those

of succession, the
first : laws

unconditional,

other

conditional

successions commit
the

dependent
'

laws.'f

of causation, and other To confuse these two is to

is

of Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.' fallacy of Mill's causal consequence the invariability Thus ditional invariability.
In
*
'

uncon

another

passage

Mill

connects

the idea of unconditionalness

in itself, and truth both obvious a as therefore, safelybe laid down It may, of that into take consideration, to it is at whom admitted present necessary by all and can know, absolutely know, nothing,except the sensa world we the outward ' " 7). tions which we experiencefrom it (Book I., ch. iii., ' and Positivism,' second edition, Part I., pp. 57, 58. Comte

Auguste

378
with

THE that of
which
'

PROBLEM

OP

LOGIC

[XIII. i.
'

necessity. If there be any meaning,' we read, which it is unconditionalness. confessedly belongsto the term "necessity,"
is necessary, that which
must

That

be, means

that which

will

be, whatever
The
sense.

make in regard to all other things. we supposition may succession of day and night evidentlyis not necessary in this
It is conditional which
some on

the
a

occurrence

of other

antecedents.

That

will be followed third

when,

by given consequent when, and also exists,is not the cause, circumstance
have
the

only
even

though no case should ever took place without it.'*

It

occurred

in which

the

phenomenon

follows

at

once

from
an

antecedent
sense

upon

which

passages effect follows

'

'

of the word, must be the total will always be dependent for its effectiveness antecedent conditions
that
'

'

quoted above that the in Mill's unconditionally,' antecedent. The partial

on
'
"

the
and

on a lacking i.e., a cause according to Mill's definition of the the two requisites term. Hence and unconditionalness of totality and the are akin, essentially questionforcibly suggestsitselfwhether that have been the two Cause we considering aspects of are
"

third

circumstance

therefore cannot

be

'

'

'

'

"

(1) Cause
concurrence

as

total of the conditions,and (2) Cause as the and which of antecedents effect is invariably on an the
sum
"

not unconditionally eventuallyprove consequent may two renderingsof one and the same conception. view With between to determining the relation a

to

be

but
two

these

aspects,let

us

once

more

consider what

it is that

Mill understands

In the firstplace, of the conditions. totality having respect is only that he is to Mill's explicit the cause statement considering the physical and not the efficient cause, we must not press the scientific beyond its relevance for strictly meaning of the expression understood to Again, the total antecedent might be purposes.

by

the

'

'

'

'

'

'

include cedent
so

an

endless chain
ad

of causes,
a

for the

immediate

total ante

is itself dependenton

and of conditions, totality preceding

backward

never

be

would cause ; for a firstand unconditional infinitum A completely sufficient reason, reached. indeed, cannot

given by Inductive Science for any of the effects that arise within But it is essential to add that Mill, the endless chain of phenomena. in his causal theory, makes no pretence of exhausting the signifi it in the way of the term Cause.' His sole aim is to interpret cance most purposive for the true interests of inductive inquiry. I make into the ultimate or ontological he says, cause no research,' of anything (Book III.,ch. v., " 2). We when turn to trace Mill's real meaning most can we clearly the sections in his Logic (Book III.,ch. v., "" 2 and 3) in which he idea which The first states and develops his definitions of Cause. Mill initially with the law of Causation is that of invariable connects reached as This conception, Mill's view, is inductively on sequence.
be
'
'

'

'

'

System

of

Book Logic,'

III.,ch.

v.,

" 6.

CHAP.

XLIIL]

CAUSATION

379

a
'

from generalization The only notion of a

'

he he main

says, adds

is such
'

The

Law

experience from observed facts of Nature. which the theory of induction cause requires,' be from notion can as gained experience;'and of which is the of Causation, the recognition
"

of inductive pillar of succession variability fact in nature

v.,

science, is but
is found
some

the familiar
to

truth

that

in

by observation
other
fact which

obtain

between
'

every with At

and

has in Law
a

(Book III.,ch.
the

" 2).

We

shall be concerned of this view

to

preceded it later chapter

of Causation.
the notion

critical discussion
we are

of the
notice

present

only

concerned

that
to

of

invariable

sequence is the idea which to the idea of the causal relation.

Mill holds

be most
to

essential
connect

From
total

this

point Mill proceeds by

an

easy

transition

the idea of invariable antecedent.

and is
a

with the conception of Cause as sequence 'It is seldom, if ever,' he writes, 'between that
a

the
a

consequent
subsists.
several section total

singleantecedent
between
'

this invariable
and the

sequence
sum same sum

It

usually
him

consequent
towards

of

antecedents
we

(ibid., " 3) ;

and

the end
Cause taken

of this
'

find

definingthe specifically positiveand

as

the

of the

conditions

whole

of every contingencies if a person the consequent invariablyfollows.' eats of Thus, and take in dies to Mill's a particular dish, consequence there illustration the circumstances own certainlyis, among other on which death is which took place, some combination or for the of of act the instance, invariablyconsequent : as, eating with a a constitution, dish, combined bodily particular particular

of the

negative which description,

'

together; the being realized,

"

'

"

of present health, and then, atmosphere.3 We see,

state

perhaps even
that

a sum

certain total
sum

state

of

the
con

by

the

of the

ditions

which

make
with

by an But an beyond meaning of doctrine. causal which of Mill's connexion forms no explicit part seek to establish The causal connexions which inductive inquirymust reversible the antecedent Not connexions. be in are only must but the followed the be must variably by consequent consequent, antecedent. Mill's belief in what invariably preceded by this same he calls (vide p. 383), according to which pluralityof causes
consequent
this
can

antecedents invariable

up which

the Cause the

Mill

means

the be

of just those

connected

law.

there

is

ideal

'

'

doctrine
sequences mechanical
vents

'

one
'

fact

may

be
'

the

(Book III.,ch. motion,' and

from

x.,

consequent " 1),for many

'

in

several may

invariable

causes

produce
'

him

many introducingthe

causes

may

produce death,' pre

'

idea

of

reversible Mill's

connexion
own

into sions

his definition of

the

causal

though, as this deeper conception of the

sometimes,

expres it seems, unintentionally, point us to causal relation. Thus, in the passage he is

on insisting by the same

relation.

But

(Book III.,ch.
cause

v.,

" 2)

in which

the

fact

that

must

be

invariablyfollowed

consequent,

he

380 writes
what
'

THE The

PROBLEM antecedent
to

OF

LOGIC the
'

[XIII. i.
cause

invariable the
if it has

is termed adds
:

the

invariable

consequent

effect '; and

Let

the

fact be

fact was begun preceded by some which it is invariably connected.' or Mill's language here seems his meaning quite not to express it Were the literal meaning not to accurately. misleading press of the words, we might say that if a consequent is invariably
it may, facts with

exist,it

connected

with

an

antecedent

which

is itself invariable

"

i.e., pre

sumably,
nexion the

the

invariable

antecedent

and reversible, consequent, just as invariablyas

must

be

the con the consequent the causal antecedent must precede

"

of

the consequent
is held total
'

follows the

antecedent. But when

once

the

causal

connexion
'

to
'

be

ideallyre
'

versible,the
is

meaning of the words

The
'

and
'

unconditional
con

modified. correspondingly
mean

totality of the relevant

is relevant
to

ditions must
reversible

that

which totality And after it

the

ideal of
must

connexion. as

All other elements

in the antecedent very

sun,

be

eliminated
that

accidental.

is,in fact,in this

that the

direction

when, feeling chemical action may electricity, percussion, he adds that we If, on further analysis,
'

Mill is

pointing out
can

friction,

all be from

of heat, detect in these any

causes

common cause

element,
which
now

we

may

be able to ascend

them

to

some

one

it is

all. Thus in them reallyoperativecircumstance thought that in the production of heat by friction, per is the
source

cussion, chemical action, etc. the ultimate same (Book III.,ch. x., " 3). Again, in
'

is

one

and

the

the
to

lightof the ideal of

the
term
'

we reversibility

ditional.' connexion

For

may since
to

give
each

new

meaning
and
as

uncon

antecedent other

consequent

in

reversible

belong
we

closely

as

themselves,

may

and connexion uncon a reversibility valid It it is be borne when reversible. should, however, ditionally is not absolute, but relative to that this unconditionality in mind The discussion in Chapter XLVI. the inductive point of view. make this clear. should (below) see more we clearly Again, in the lightof the reversibility-ideal, Science the importance of that requirement of immediacy which is accustomed Effect. to

appropriately equate the and account unconditionality,

two

they belong to conceptions of

attach

to

the

connexion the

between

Cause
the

and

One

main

distinction
'

between

popular and

scientific

popular usage to The of immediacy. this requisite ordinary man, looking forward in reversibility of causal rather than backward, is not interested view For he often connexion. practicalpurposes requires some ahead, and he is then opposed to any attempt to bring Cause and Effect near so together that this view ahead is lost. To screw Dr. Venn's and Effect into close juxtaposition(to use up Cause

conceptionsof

Cause

'

lies in the indifference of

CHAP.

XLIIL]

CAUSATION

381

and reversibility certainty expressivephrase*)would be to secure Thus death is conceived at the price of usefulness. of connexion the effect of intemper health ruined the effect of takingpoison, as as and effect cause despitethe long uncertain interval between ance, is quite right in sup We may in each case. grant that Dr. Venn is ready to allow perfectly posing that the popular consciousness and desired interval to elapse between cause effect, provided any this implies practical adapts his phrase gain. The ordinary man furthered But his interests are just as frequently by to his needs. that effect immediate as the more by emphasizing nearly noticing is causallycon the lighted match Thus which is more remote. and tobacco the with the nected in the popular mind smoking the touching of hot iron with that speedily ensues, pleasantfeeling indiffer The man of pain, and so forth. seems practical a feeling such after-effect or ently to emphasize either the most conspicuous to interest him. after-effect as happens at the moment specially It stillremains plain true, as Dr. Venn pointsout, that the perfectly in order to and effect tightlytogether will not screw cause man which is useless to him. ensure a degree of scientific certainty
' '

But
costs

the

main

interest

of Science in the matter

where entails the of

is to

secure

at

all

and regularity connexion. in the into

and, certainty,
This
a

of causal
nents

possible, reversibility of the two bringing compo

antecedent
with each and its
as con

causal such

sequence,

causal
ideal

sequent,
suffice

closeness

contact

other

will

for

this

purpose

Now,
so

certainty,and regularity,
as

cannot reversibility

be attained
link in the

long
that

the

mind

and

control

consequent.
a

every If we

chain

leads from
we links,

cannot grasp antecedent to

ignorethese intermediate
to that

labour under

disability very
Mr.

similar

which
sum

look
As

essential elements A.

in the

Sidgwick
'

well

observes

experiencewhen we over of the conditions. or totality ('The Process of Argument,'

we a

ch. xi., p. many

153), Intermediate

links in

chain in the

of causation

are

so

same as way opportunitiesfor counteraction, accident. for an of of a piece opportunities railway provides length will fire The conditions. intermediate pull on the trigger are They the the the the catch, hammer, the shot if, and only if, spring, cap, Therefore our forgetfuland so on, all act in the expected manner. links takes effect just in the same of intermediate as our ness way false it of conditions generally security.' give us a ; forgetfulness may it is essential to aim at bring In the interests of vigorousinduction and effect sufficiently close to exclude all intermediate ing cause It is in this render account. which links of cannot an we intelligible that the inductive interest calls for something approaching sense Thus and effect. it would be unsatis between cause to continuity the the of Chlorine as cause bleachingof vegetable factoryto assign to dyes. It is true that, popularly speaking, Chlorine, added
*
'

the

The

of Empirical or Principles

Inductive

ch. ii., Logic,' p.

56.

382

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII.

i.

vegetable dyes, bleaches them ; but it is not the Chlorine that is the bleachingagent. The Chlorine, by unitingwith the Hydrogen liberates of the water, Oxygen ; and it is this nascent Oxygen which, of the dye, forms a colourless reactingupon the colouringmatter compound, and so effects the bleaching. The requirement of immediacy can be pressed only in so far as it is called for in the interests of ensuring the unconditionality and of the causal sequence. In a chain of necessary con reversibility link may with any nexions be held to be causallyconnected any intermediate links may other link,though many intervene between the two. for means If, instead of being considered as a mere and the reversibility, requisiteof ensuring unconditionalness in the terminus treated end as an itself, only logical immediacy were of such a view would be an insistence on the absolute simultaneity and effect ; and indeed, as Mill points out, or identityof cause Cessante causd cessat et effectus has been a dogma of the schools ch. (Book III., v., " 7). would point out that, if it were With regard to this maxim, we be any chain of causation at all ; true, there would never strictly and that, though it is undoubtedly true that every cause expresses which is partly itself in producing an effect, the direct effect, still,
' '

contemporaneous
effect relevant element
in the if
to

with

the

action

of the

cause,

need

not

be and
'

the

the scientific interest. between

All
a

that

Science
cause

requires
an cer

is that the connexion

the action of

certain

succession

of after-effects shall be

regular and

tain,and, that effect,'

sense

reversible. possible,
so

Any element,
the
cause

in the total

after

is

connected
an

with

can

in the truest
a

scientific

be called
the
to

effect of the
to the
cause

cause.

As

matter

of fact it is
it is

usuallyvery close
Where

itself.
action

direct causal

lasts

an

time, appreciable

customary

in the distinguish

causal

process three

defined clearly

: time-stages

(a) The

prior to the causal action (antecedent) ; is actuallyproducing an effect (6) The time when the cause (synchronous); time following The the direct causal action (subsequent). on (c)
time
"

Example.
so

When

A
to

stabs

B, the direct causal

in which the

action, strictly
is

called,is limited
which

the time
tissues. that

dagger
be

penetrating wounding
:

the that the

one

the body and tearing

From

this should

distinguished

precedesand
the
;

which

follows the actual

seizingof
hand

of the arm, dagger, the movement etc., on the the opening of the bloodvessels,the loss of blood, and death itself, on effects, possibly
'

stillremoter
*

the other.*
:

Dr.

tion

ch. i., " 73 part iii., ChristophSigwart, Logik,'vol. ii., by Helen Dendy, vol. ii., p. 106.

English Transla

384

THE

PROBLEM
it is this

OF

LOGIC
that

[XIII. i.
which
'

symptoms,
many
causes are

according as

cause

or

has

been

the symptom operative, there

of death,'as kinds of death.'* many Minto

in
or

There are being just part of the effect. Dr. Mellone concisely puts it,'onlybecause
'

Professor is found
cated
stances

dead

by drowning
and

gives the followingillustration : A man's body It may water. be a questionwhether death came violence. He may have been suffo by previous
thrown
into

afterwards
If

the

water.

But

the

circum

will tell the true

story. Death
was

by drowning
water

has

distinctive
in the

symptoms.
stomach We sible
and

drowning

the cause,
certain very

will be found

and

froth in the

trachea.'f

see,

then, that,given a

further,it
causes

generaleffect and nothing is impossible to tell to which of a given number of pos it is due ; but that, if we the effect more study closely,
its
cause more

observe

specific symptoms

or

marks,

we

are

able to

point out the

We

Minto, ibid., (c/. p. 343). if conclude, then, that, only the effect is given in
never

all its

detail,
for it.

there will
The
or

be Each
one

more

than

one

possible

cause

to

account

relation

between

Cause

and

reversible. strike out the whole

are are

additional
or more

Effect is thus, ideally, reciprocal line in the delineation of an effect conceivable

causes,

may when
one causes

of the various

effect is
It

eliminated. thus

causes analysed out, all possible happen that all known may

until, except

possible
remains

eliminated.

In

that

case

the

cause

unknown.
But

however

effect be analysed and its an exhaustively

remotest to
non-

ascertainable
essential

symptoms
a

studied, it cannot
If these
were

be traced

back

antecedents. of

to be reckoned

antecedent

longer be
sist.

causal sequence, then the causal and the plurality of causes reciprocal,

as part of the relation would no

would

still sub

ex regarded as consisting that it is possibleto by diagnosisof the effect. E.g.,a nail is driven specifythe cause inch into a piece of wood one by a blow from a blue-coloured hammer made of steel. Now, it will be driven in just as far and in made of iron, by a red-coloured hammer exactly the same way the is the same, hammers two and each provided the weight of cause

It is

only

when

the total

is

of essential clusively

or

effective conditions

offers the coloured

a

same

surface-resistance
strikes
a

to the nail.
a

Whenever
momentum

the
a

blue-

steel hammer
kind

with

certain

nail of

certain inch

placed in

certain

the nail position,

will be driven

restricted one ; but the colour, and, in a more degree, the material, are non-effective conditions, and, as such, connexion with the effect. enter into any reciprocal cannot into the wood
*

Dr.
'

Sydney

Herbert

Mallone,

'

An

Introductory Text-Book

of

Logic,'first
Read,

edition, ch. viii., p. 260.

*

Cf. also Professor f Logic Inductive and Deductive,' p. 342. and Inductive,' third edition, ch. xiv., pp. 179, Logic Deductive

Carveth 180.

CHAP.

XLIIL]

CAUSATION

385

has an im of Causes preceding discussion on the Plurality the theory of Deductive Inference in its hypo portant bearing on For it shows that in proportion thetical form. as our knowledge of and comprehensive,the less do the accurate Reality becomes more the fallacies of affirming consequent and denying the antecedent both We that when are, indeed, led to see imply any real error. defined" i.e., defined with are precisely Consequent and Antecedent ideal" that is a relevantly they mutually imply each precision affirm the conse we or other, so that when deny the antecedent Thus, to quote from Professor fallacyis committed. quent no i nfer "If a closed I from the proposition Stout : can legitimately it has angles that if anything has not angles, is three-sided, figure with three sides. The denial of the con it is not a closed figure The
' "

sequent involves denial

of the antecedent.

But

I cannot

infer that has

not

anything is not angles." I cannot

the But

"'

If

closed
so

figurewith
I have this in the

three
not

sides, it
"

defined precisely If a closed proposition consequent. has three sides, it has three angles," the fallacy of denying the figure antecedent is no longera fallacy. Take If all vegetableswere different example. a cabbages, the vegetable I am Even if some would be a eating cabbage." vegetablesare not cabbages, the one I am eating may still be a this because I is have included but in the more cabbage ; only of the assigned antecedent than is necessary for it qua antecedent consequent. It is presupposed in the unity and identityof the universe that the fact of the vegetableI am eatingbeing a cabbage has some If vegetables precise antecedent statable in the form with certain specific characters are cabbages." Given this precise
when I do
' "
"

do

because

antecedent, I
the

can

argue

from

the denial of the antecedent

to that

of

consequent.'
QuantitativeAspect of
the Causal Relation.

of the such as the principles comprehensive generalizations, of Energy and Conservation of Mass, Science has the greatest of scientific procedure is not that it respect. But what is typical bears towards breadth of generalization so, alas ! does ignorance but that it consistently refuses to reach comprehensiveness at the cost of accuracy. the achieved reconciliation of the Hence general and the which constitutes the essential triumph of accurate Science. As Science has become more comprehensive both in the of data and its in the of its generalizations, it has array scope and But it in is its advanced not pari passu precision. accuracy that has ensured the precision. On the comprehensivenessof spirit the and that slowness which of advance "contrary, precision, pre cision demands, have the and fruitful alone made vast possible comprehensiveness.
" "

For

'

'

'

'

25

386 Precision

THE
is doubtless

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC of requisite

[XIII. i.
all scientific

fundamental

of the biologist or investigation.It is as essential to the success it is the mathematician. the archaeologist to that of as or the physicist But it is only within the strictly sciences and mathematical physical that the numerical precisionrequired for the quantitativetreat be said to be obligatory. This is frequently ment of Causation can Thus Sir forgotten by the votaries of these abstracter sciences. John

Herschel, the
...

astronomer,

writes

as

follows

'

Numerical

is the very soul of science ; and its attainment affords precision the truth at the only criterion, least the of of or theories, and best, the correctness of experiments. Indeed, it is a character of all the higher laws of nature the form of precisequantitative to assume
. . .

statement.'*

This

statement

is

true

of

the such

physical sciences

only.
The his
'

need
'

for numerical
'

brought out by excellently cannot he says, we Logic : If we are to speak accurately,' for a mouthful or a thirst, say that eating stillshunger and drinking sip is no good ; nor can we say that arsenic kills or quinine reduces fever, for it depends upon the dose ; it is inaccurate, again, to say
'

is obtainable, is Dr. Sigwartin the following of passage

accuracy,

where

that

common

salt is dissolved

by water,

for it is not

true

that

any

quantity of salt is dissolved by any quantity of water. 'f The quantitative aspect of Causation is regulated by certain PRINCIPLE CON of Conservation, notablyby THE THE OF Principles ENERGY. has been denned This principle SERVATION OF by ClerkMaxwell
'

in the

terms following

of any material neither be increased nor diminished

of the

The

total energy

system

is

quantity which
between
the

can

by

any

action

parts

system, though

it may

be transformed

into any

of the forms

of which

is susceptible.' | energy It is often stated as an axiom that universe is constant. This

the amount
statement

material

of energy is far from

in the

being

the record

of

an

ascertained established
at any

has physicist

ever

of the Universe heaven and

that nosafelyaver may between whole the an equation energy of all the stars of time, includingthe energies

fact.

We

all the moment

cells of all

subsequent

of time.

livingbodies, and its energy at a of the The equation of constancy

"

constancy, that is,of the energy of the Universe as in indefinitum extension of fact,a most unjustifiable
established The

whole

"

is,in

the

empirically

equation of equivalencein
in
'

limited and
is

closed system.
this

fallacyinvolved
Dr.

this extension Those who be constant

expressed picturesquely
the

by

James

Ward

insist that
seem

quantity of
says Dr.
Professor

energy
*
'

in the universe
on

must

to

me,'

Ward,
Welton,.

Discourse Manual of

Natural

Philosophy, "" 115, 116, quoted by

second vol. ii., ch. vi., p. 161. Logic,' impression, ' ch. v., " 95 : English Translation, pp. 346, 347. t Logik,'Part III., vol. ii., J Dr. J. Clerk-Maxwell, ' Matter and Motion,' ch. v., p. 60.

CHAP.

XLIIL]
same as position a one

CAUSATION who should maintain

that the

387

'

in the

quantity
fathom

of water
was

in

vast

lake must

be constant
never

merely because
reach its shores
the

the surface
nor

though always level, its depth.'*

Moreover,
Universe
has
not

he could

this so-called

of principle
even

constancy of the energy

of the

the

limited

regulativeprincipleof Physics. What forming his energy- equations is not the idea of
energy any within the universe, but that

necessityof a guides the physicistin

relative the

constancy

of

The given change as fulcrum. in the other words, the energy distributed within same stantly ; or, the given system must con remain, through all its redistributions, Idea of The a working as stant in amount. constancy of energy,' than this : Given a finite, indeed, to nothing more Physics,comes, after known quantity of energy, then, if that energy be measured in amount to be precisely equivalent any transformation, it must the original quantity. In other words, lost energy can always be There is amount lost is known. found again,providedthe precise
'

of energy about remain must con energy-level

of the balance

no

attempt
any
'

to deal with
a

at

time,
than

of energy in the universe incalculable Just as indefinite, quantum. perfectly the whole amount of the

the
more

postulate

change, so
than within the
a

is really of matter nothing indestructibility after a chemical the balance of weights before and is nothing more of energy that of the indestructibility between balance the capacity for work mathematical
'

of actual closed system, before a certain amount the same closed work is done, and the capacityfor work within taken has transformation place. | system after the and Cause Effect required between The numerical equivalency certain of the Conservation by the principle of each causal the when amount only

of

Energy
and unit.

can

be ascertained
can

agency
same

the total effect

be measured

in terms such the

of
a

one

and has

the

In the
It has

case

of the found

physicalsciences possibleto state

in
an

unit

been

found.

been

act

of causation

expressed in terms gravity,from the height. specified

Let E be
a

physical agent equivalent work in done of of the amount lifting against certain to certain a a weight sea-level, specified
amount

contributed
form

by

each

in the

of its mechanical

certain
us

effect measured

in terms

of the unit U, and

be the
.
. .

let represented,
or

say,
to

by 47 U.
each 20

Let

C1? C2,C3
as

causes

agents

known

be involved

in producingE.

Let

the

amount

of work
Let
+

contributed
+

by
-

be measured,
U
;

before,in
Then of the

terms

of U.
=

Cx=

8 U

C2

C8=
the
have

15

U.

Cx + C2 + C3
of principle all the
causes

43 U.

We

on infer, therefore,

ground
not

the
; ii.,

Conservation
*

of

Energy,
and

that

we

yet found

'Naturalism
'

Agnosticism' (Gifford Lectures,

:

1896-1898), vol.

Lecture

XIII., pp. 76, 77.

Personal Idealism edited by Essays,' Philosophical H. Sturt, pp. 151-155.

| Cf.

25"2

388

THE
that

PROBLEM combined

OF

LOGIC
is

[XIII.

i.

but
+

causes

whose
to

capacityfor work

equivalentto

4 U

stillremain

to be discovered.

of the Transformation and Conser principles regard to Causal Explanation, vation of Energy in their application we may considerations : the following note is not lost, but transformed 1. Our knowledge that energy or With

the

redistributed,helps us the as or effect, cause

Newton,
for instance Now
as
"

in
case

the discovering
may energy

factors
to

that

make
"

up

be.

It used

be heat

thought
was

by

that
to

lost in

friction
into

lost for and sound.

good.
will

it is known the

be

transformed

Moreover,

following examples will show, a causal explanation often consist in noting what transformations actuallydo take

place.
EXAMPLES
:

Question. Why (i.)

"

can

a a

man

endure

the heat
?

of

an

oven

in

which Answer.
"

beefsteak

is cooked

Because

he

and perspires freely,

enters

thus

largepart

of the heat which

body is used in the performance of a certain saving me chanical work, while only a fraction of the is effective in raising the total amount
temperature.
'

his

The

excess

of heat, instead

being applied to increase the temperature to change its aggrega body, is applied tion ; the heat prepares forces perspiration, it through the pores, and vaporizesit. Heat
of the
is thus

of

consumed
a

in

work.'*
bath

This

is the

fact that makes

Turkish

endurable.
in coal-mines

Question. Why (ii.)

"

does

the

Safety-lampused

Answer.

"

? prevent explosions the Because, though explosivegas may ignite within the lamp, yet, when the combustion

reaches

the
the

close-knit

wire

gauze,

large
is

part of

transformed

of the burning gas energy into the vibrational energy

of

and thence into the vibrational the gauze, of the lamp. The energy of the heavy metal of the lowers the conducting power gauze

temperature
the progress

of
of

the

gas, the with

thereby stopping
Hence the

combustion.
the

flame is
come

kept

within

lamp, and

does not

into

contact

explosive gas

outside,
*

f
IX., p. 243.

Tyndall, Heat a Mode of Motion,' ninth edition, Lecture I John Tyndall, ibid.,Lecture IX., pp. 261-263.
John

'

CHAP.

XLIIL]
once

CAUSATION
the factors in

389 discovered
in accordance

2. When

an

effect are

knowledge of the transformation of energy, the quantum be estimated in accordance of effect contributed by each factor can mechanical with the theory of equivalence. In this way all the
with
our

various 3.

quota

are

measured

in terms

of

one

and

the

same

unit.

of the Conservation of Finally,by applying the principle The the able of test to our adequacy explanations. Energy we are effect the contained work in must be the same the for as capacity capacityfor work contained in the cause, the work done consisting in every
case

of

some

transformation

or

redistribution of energy.

Transition
In the

to the

Method

of Causal
on
'

Explanation.
have that

mainly presentchapter,relying
to

Mill's guidance, we
'

attempted
secure

reach

concept

of

Cause

would

basis

for the

of methods application
is that is to reach

of Causal

provide a Explanation.
we

The aim

outstandingconclusion in Causal Explanation

and Effect. the

the ideal after which

should
that the

reversible relations between

seem

Cause method
that since

It would, interest

therefore,

to

follow

which
the ideal

in Causal

will

adequately fulfilthis fundamental

of
"

Explanation requiresis one requirement. Further,

Unideterminism,
as

Reversibility or
"

of
so

it is

sometimes
of plurality

called
causes

remains

unrealized

long
be its the

as

the

defect
aim

of of

a a

still subsists, it must

primary

Causal

Method

of through the precision

procedureto

eliminate

this radical defect.

CHAPTER
THE XITI.'Jii.)

XLIV.
SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION.

PROCESS

OF

THE law. tion

goal of Observation, we may say, is to see a fact as a fact-underof what is involved in such Observa Now, a closer analysis experimentalcharacter, and brings into relief its essentially
us

convinces
upon the

that, if the facts

must

are

to exercise their full natural

effect

subjectedto an analysisof an essen kind. Through the very pressure of its own experimental tially Observation interest of experimental develops into a process rest satisfied only when its experimental tests Analysis that can the fact. have brought out the law which interprets be cannot Observation, therefore, adequately conceived as a mere inductive in procedure preliminary stage principle of ; for the and inspires all scientific to Relevant Fact, which actuates Fidelity whole that the to last, observation, requires induction, from first
mind, they

be

390 shall be under is conceived

as

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC facts. When

[XIII.

ii.

the control of the relevant

Induction

dominated explicitly by this Inductive Idea, we see interest predominant all through. Observation and its interest 'permanent becomes a factorin inductive inquiry, with fact the interest in dealingfaithfully the controlling interest the observational
"
"

in the whole

process. This view, of course, impliesa deepened view of the meaning of It impliesthat Observation is the expressionof the Observation. observational of the
mind
senses,

Interest and

but,
a

as

Purpose. Thus it Descartes clearlysaw,

are

is
an

no

inspection inspectionof the

mere

of mere process service in whose posiveperception,

; it is not

but sensation,

powers
We
we

of scientific Thought and

are

engaged Imagination.
conviction is

of pur a process all the constructive form when

the only expressing

that
a mere

same

in another

add

Scientific Observation

an essentially

It is not
active

passivesubmission

of the mind

to its

active process. but an object,

attempt to see that object in the light of some and to bring it into touch with the body of our interest,

dominant

acquiredknowledge.
itself in upon The
our

Were

we

content
as a

minds,
out.

we,

previously objectto stamp writer has tersely put it,should

to allow the
are

simply be stamped
(1) its

of Scientific Observation activity character. and (2) its experimental purposiveness, characteristics of this

(1) True
For
aim
or

Observation Scientific
to
our

is

essentially Purposive.
first know
must

Observation

be effective, we

must
we

what

is the

purport of
'

observation, and

adhere steadfastly
no use

to the lines marked

'

out

by

this purpose.
We
must
'

It is of

to observe to

in

general
interest.

or

at
a

random. book of the

select what

is relevant

our

In has
an

entitled
meteor

Chapter of
'

Science

'

(p. 19)

point. Many says, 13, 1866. display on November the important point, and Some thought that their colour was could Others thought that the colour of each noted the see. they at was the important point,and noted rate they seemed to move the that. Others thought that the points they disappeared at was and that. that noted Others the to note, thought important point most direction of their motion was important, and noted that ; and these the best informed and others thought that the most the which at they made their points important thing to note was
Mr.
'

Stuart

illustration in

he people,'

took

observations

"

"

appearance,

and

noted

that.'

The

writer

then

goes

on

to remark

of greatest that,though the observations of the radiant point were fix served the that to scientific value, seeing they positionof the the result most desired swarm especially yet all the other sets to some of observation, restricted as each was one aspect of the
" "

whole

phenomenon,

were

serviceable

in

subordinate

way.

On

392
It need not

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
to

[XIII. ii.
us

neglectthese instances. Our non-observation of them be due simply to may the psychological law according to which we tend to perceive only mind. such objectsas fit in with the idea that is filling The our which we only things,' commonly see are says Professor James, and it is those which we well-known fact that to a ;'* pre-perceive have an idea of the objectwe wish to observe is the surest guarantee of our seeingit.
causes
' '
"

be deliberate bias which

Example.

"

(1) Think

and

then look at the

lamp-shade viewed accompanying figure.

a

of

square

from

above,

(2) Think
and

of

lookingdown
the found

then look from

again at

or ball-room, long picture-gallery given figure. a

having idea (1) in mind prevents and that us of (2), regarding the figureas a representation (1). havingidea (2)in mind prevents our regardingit as representing be appropriately and adequately Purposive observation must The analytic. observer,' merely sees says Mill, is not he who

It will

probably be

that

'

'

the
not

thingwhich

is before his eyes, but

he who

sees

what

parts that

thing is composed of.'f So Lord Avebury reminds us that we have mountain until we seen have seen a really through it. How observed fact is thus mentally split an up into parts or aspects will depend on the purpose of the investigation. Observation includes not only perceptions, but also the interpre tation of perceptions. But the observer must guard very carefully if the inter these two elements, more againstconfusing especially is pretation merely conjectural. An appeal to the testimony of the senses has logical value in state between mere we proportion as, in observation, distinguish of fact as observed and conjectures ment from the observed drawn facts i.e., in proportion as we accuratelyand pointedly describe what and avoiding any actually Tappeared, keeping to essentials, mental confusion between what did happen, on the one hand, and what we feel ought to have happened, or what we should like to have happened, on the other. In reportingan experiencewe tend to relate not what have actuallyseen we or heard, but rather the We have made us. impressionwhich the events experienced upon confuse fact,not with opiniononly,but also with feeling.
"

'The of Psychology,'vol. i.,ch. xi., p. 444. Principles J. S. Mill, ' A System of Logic,' Book III., ch. vii., " 1.

CHAP.

XLIV.]
the

OBSERVATION

393

When the what

is false, takes the fallacy conjectureor interpretation form of Mai-observation, the fallacyof wrongly interpreting immediately perceivethrough our senses. we it is not the
one senses

In Mai- observation
suppose into very The
one we

that
into

are

wrong. the is that

Thus,
other

plunge
hot

our

hands,
and then

into

ice-cold water,
water

water,
is

dip both

tepid.

hand
There
come

will feel
no

cold. would
ment

of heat, the other a sensation of a sensation mistaking the sensations. Mai-observation

to

in

were

we

that

the water
its

must
our

be

interpretthese sensations by the at the one warmer spot than

seem

state
at

the

other. passes
seem

Again, when
to to
assure us

eyes

to

tell

us

that

the

sun

rises,
a

highestpoint, and
that

motor-sensations sets, while our make the earth is at rest beneath us, we sensations
it

mal-observation from
is at

if
at

we

interpret our
the
sun

by saying :
it does the
not

'

The

earth is at rest, and

our

goes

round
the

;' for

follow itself

being

rest

to relatively

earth that

earth

motion not are no we by the fact that we feel It be either at in recordingthat the earth is at rest. justified may In order rest or in motion, for aught that observation can tell us. must in this particularinstance, we avoid mal-observation to follows I is at observations record our as : feelthat the earth in daily movement the sun from East to West see rest, and I can ; but whether these perceptionsare illusions or not only systematic must decide.' For interpretation Science can of our perceptions we appeal from Sense to Reason.* rest.

Hence

'

(2) True
To
see a

Observation Scientific fact

is to scientifically

is
see

essentially Experimental.
it in the

lightof

an

idea.

Observation

expresses

satisfied only when

which be of scientific endeavour can a form The law. the fact is observed as fulfilling some fact is

merely passiveassimilation of plete process of Observation.

data
new

only the first stage in the com Through such absorption of senseenable it to observe
say,
are seen

the mind interest We The

which develops suggestions

with
new

and
now

light.
fact.

aim

efficacy.The facts, we at ascertaining whether

of observational

in

centre

fits the the suggestion interest is transferred from

and the observation inevitably passivewatching to active testing, takes an experimentalform. Observation, we repeat, as animated by scientific purpose, is a whose natural end remains unattained so long as the fact process law. Hence is not clearly the seen as obeying experiments to which we subject facts enter as an integral part into every purposive It is,of course, observation. not mere manipulation of the object
* On Mal-observation, Philonous,' pp. 455, 456

fessor

Hylas and cf. Berkeley, the 'Third Dialogue between for a good illustration of the same Pro see fallacy, Royce's Psychology,'p. 27.
;

and

'

394

THE

PROBLEM

OP

LOGIC

[XIII.

ii.

that

marks

the

difference We
our

between
may eyes
or

the

passive and

exerimpental
our

stages in Observation.
as fingers so we as can

observe
ears.

just as
But
once

passively with
is

with

Observation the

long

it is

purely assimilative.
of
as an

passive just manipulation

passes

into such

the

service

under

conditions observation

the
no

our itself, A definite,purposive

is

proceed to put our object for and verifying requires testing but experimental. longer merely passive,
we

idea, and
idea

interference

of

some

sort

with

the

production

is the desideratum of the experi to be noted phenomenon or testing stage. unable is impossible where this interference Where i.e., we are that answer to the requirements of to place our object in contexts difficult conditions. idea our experimenting takes place under till Nature We have to wait object under the desired presents us our

of the
mental

"

"

conditions.

But

even

then

it is almost

certain

that

Nature

will

have to requirements, and we roughly satisfy our may wait Nature, again, may a present the right kind of long time. For delicate electric investiga in too strong a degree. instance, but be Or it may will not do. in a thunder-cloud tions the electricity in the production of heat by gentle friction, in too weak a degree, as is required. when furnace-heat a the object shall which under CONTROL CONDITIONS THE OVER

only

very

present

itself for

study

is the

experimental

observation
the

great desideratum, and the factor which most influences the precision
Such the control enables
as us

in and

certainty of
the

results and

obtained.
to

to
as

vary
we

circumstances,

repeat

observation

often

please by simply reproducing the concurrence for bringing into play the desired effect. In certain sciences, as in Astronomy,
question.
'

of conditions

requisite
of the
the

such his

control

is out

The in

Astronomer
or

must

test

theories

concerning

canals

'

Mars be

the

belts

of

happen
fine. tions
'

favourable, the Occasionally, however,

to

the conditions Jupiter whenever planet in opposition, the weather contrives

Nature

the

have We a requires for its verification. of this, we illustration As excellent Natural an Experiment.' * the observation Fowler take that noticed by Dr. Thomas may normal of prominences during a total solar eclipse. Here, under and the of light, is dazzled by the excess conditions, the observer be answered of the prominences cannot ; question as to the nature have but when the moon appropriately obscures the sun's disc, we that

the

idea

very then

condi

"

'

experimental
*
'

'

conditions

under

which

the

answer

is obtainable.
50, 51.

The

Elements

of Inductive

Logic,' sixth

edition, pp.

CHAP.

XLV.]

CAUSAL

METHOD

395

CHAPTER
XIII. THE (iii.) METHOD OF

XLV.
CAUSAL

EXPLANATION.

effect, explanation is causal,fact, as we have seen, means the in con and the problem lies (1) or probable causes discovering ditions upon and the laws according to which the effect depends, the actual efficiency of these which they are operative; (2)in testing
WHERE
causes or

conditions.

We

must

be able to trace

effects back

to their nature

surmises as to the our determining conditions,and justify of these conditions by working back with explanatorypower
causes

from

to effects.

Explanation is, in its general outline, The dictated in advance by its inevitablyinductive character. in of Fact our ex requiresthat, Principle Fidelity to Relevant that fact back from fact shall to we we again planation, ; pass but that shall not be content to trace effects to causes, tentatively back from also effects. shall to causes we Preliminary argue its inductive observation of effects requires as complement experi mentation causes. Hence, though it is customary to speak upon of Methods of of Causal Enquiry, and to divide these into Methods Observation and Methods of Experiment, yet, when we look at the inductive in the lightof our matter we see principle, synthetically, in that the Methods in questioncannot be other than co-operative the task of a complete Explanation,and that the so-called Obser than preliminaryto the Methods vational Methods be more cannot these Our observations. which built test the hypotheses upon main endeavour, therefore, will be to bring out the unity of the of its Method of Causal Explanation and the interdependence one
The

procedure

in Causal

'

'

various A
cerns

component
the

stages.
or

Method

of PURE

SIMPLE

OBSERVATION,

in

so

far

as

it

con

problem of Causal Explanation, may be diagnostically which method as a proceeds from effects to causes ; and a which denned as a method Method of EXPERIMENT be similarly may to effects. proceeds from causes
defined

I. PURELY The known

OBSERVATIONAL of
as

METHODS.

typicalform
since Mill's day
two

has been Method Purely Observational the Method of Agreement. He enunciates

:

it somewhat

follows as formally,
or one more

// have only
nomenon.'1*

'

instances

of
in

the

phenomenon
the
cause

under

investigation
in

circumstance agree
of

common,

circumstance the

which

alone all the instances

*

is the

of (or effect]
III., ch. viii.," 1.

given phe

'A

System

Logic,'Book

396 In

THE

PROBLEM
term

OF
'

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.

the practicalapplication, of the Canon be

circumstance,' occurring in
of
'

this enunciation

of the Method the

Agreement,as given
important

by

Mill,must

replacedby

expression

relevant and

circumstance.' The
and

requirement that the important circumstance

that

instances in
common

shall have makes of

only one relevant it imperative to

are

ascertain

all the

other

relevant

circumstances

different.

Hence
tion

the method

has been

called the Method

A method elimination

of
a as

only ;

mere agreement could be founded on method of Single Agreement must

SingleAgreement. simple enumera

be founded
on

is established only through well, for the singleness

to all the that are not common eliminatingall the circumstances in question. instances this purely Observational Method, it may By way of illustrating be sufficient to quote the following example from Professor Read,

who
'

has

it from
me

Professor Bain

Let

begin by borrowing an
III.,ch. vi.). The

example from
North-East

Professor
is

Bain

("Logic," Book

wind

generally

detested in this country : as long as it blows, few Occasional best. well-known of a wind causes heat violence, excessive electrical condition, the Let the wind's unwholesome
or

people feel at their

are being injurious

cold, excessive
with
cause

dryness
dust
or

or

moisture,

being laden

exhalations.

be that the last is the hypothesis

of the North-East

quality; since we know it is a ground current setting from the pole toward the equator and bent westward thousands by the rotation of the earth ; so that, reaching us over well be fraught with dust, effluvia, and of miles of land, it may microbes. of North-East cases wind, we Now, examining many in which all the instances find that this is the only circumstance hot ; generallydry, but cold, sometimes agree : for it is sometimes sometimes wet ; sometimes violent, and of all light,sometimes
electrical conditions. be omitted but
its
one

Each
is

of the other wind

"

circumstances, then,
to

can

without
That

the North-East
never

circumstance

absent

ceasing namely, that

be noxious
it is
a

ground
of

current.

circumstance, therefore, is probably the Cause

this method
that is

injuriousness.'*
fact that

The

method a essentially

of elimination

the force of the method depends on the explains the fact and variety of the instances ; for the greater the number number of successfully of varied instances, the greater will be the chance to all instances the circumstances that are not common eliminating of the phenomenon under investigation.Thus Dr. Mellone (follow ing the lead of Professor Henry Laurie,f) states Mill's First Canon
as

follows
*

Carveth

Read,

'Logic

Deductive

and

Inductive,'
New

third

edition, ch.

xvi.,

p. 198. ' ")"Methods

of Inductive

Inquiry,'Mind,

Series, vol. ii. (1893), p. 321.

CHAP.

XLV.] observation

CAUSAL shows

METHOD
events

397

'

When

simultaneouslyor (either causallyconnected ; and and varietyof the instances.'*

Now,
as

another one accompany it is probable that they are in succession), increases with the number the probability
that two has

through this that the of analysis) elimination (with its accompanying processes which itselfproceeds by enumeration of SingleAgreement Method limitations of the unthe transcends of instances essentially But this is not the only analyticMethod of Simple Enumeration. methods the two we as regard them. essential difference between Method of Agreement is frankly and confessedlya merely The effects to causes, heuristic method, proceeding tentativelyfrom
Dr. Thomas

Fowler

pointedout,f it

is

"

"

and

complete a Complete Enumeration.

The

of the Method whereas of Verification, Induction Enumerative (as we have formulated it) claims to be a which aims at the verification-ideal of Method Inductive is in
no sense a

Method

essential limitation

of the
is

himself has of Causes.

shown, J clearly
We

Agreement, as Mill the uncertaintydue to the Plurality

Method of
not
a

call it

limitation, and
'

defect, since

the

than claim a more being purely observational, cannot of reconnoitring,' It is frankly a mode sug heuristic function. for experimental inquiry, starting-points well-grounded gesting but making no pretence at causal explanation. that we in question,let us suppose To illustrate the limitation but somewhat which artificially, still we instances have two may symbolize as follows : conveniently,

method,

Antecedents, As
Mill

S ^ -ff
'

'

'

*'

1Consequents. % *'"
z
,

(A,

rs
,

x, y

.j circumstance

points out,
the
"

it is not

certain

that

A, the
of the

in which
x.

antecedents

For

so
"

long
all

as

agree, is the cause due to the limitation

on

phenomenon

holds
same

good
cause

is not
; for

produced necessarily
we can

each

Pluralityof Causes occasion by the

to

say,

it may

be due
were

B
to

in the

first

instance, and

give to each of half a dozen persons a glass of water to drink, having poured into each glassa different poison, it could hardly be said to be the of which caused the death element common namely, the water
to B' in the

second.

Thus, if we

"

"

those

due to this limitation of the method uncertainty and variety of the is greatly reduced by increasing the number the is intrinsic to method, being rooted instances ; but the limitation in its merely observational and heuristic character. of Causes If it is objected that the difficulties due to Plurality
*

six persons. It is true that the

S. H.
'

Mellone,

The
A

'

Elements System of

of Logic,'ch. ix., p. 271. Introductory Text-Book sixth edition, ch. iv., p. 222. of Inductive Logic,' Logic,'Book III., ch. x., " 2. 'An

398 be met

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC less enumerative

[XIII. iii. and

more

may

by making

the observations

analyticin character, with a view to describingthe nature of an effect with the greatest possibleprecision(videp. 384), the reply be that the results of such preciseanalysiscan be utilized must for the purpose of eliminatingplurality of causes an only when connexions been of causal has adequate knowledge already gained of Experimental Methods. Suppose through preciseapplications that E is the effect in question,and that it is described with all is then made that E may desirable precision. be the The suggestion
effect either of Cause

C15or

of Cause
a

C2,or

of

some

other

cause.

This

suggestionthat
in
so

E
are a cause

far

as

we

because
cannot

Cx

has

be the

be met only of causes can plurality that Cj cannot be the cause of E, constant known effect, Ex ; and, again, that C2 of E, because C2 has a known constant effect,
may

have

able to show

But these accurate assertions presuppose an so E2, knowledge of the causal action of C19C2,etc. It may be perfectly of Agreement in conjunctionwith Experimental true that a Method Methods precise delineation of the effects by a sufficiently may, it starts, get beyond any from from which practicalannoyance of SingleAgreement, by itself, of causes plurality ; but the Method Method of Pure as a Observation, remains permanently at the For the overcoming of of a possibleplurality of causes. mercy this limitation we look to the experimental stage of the must Causal Inquiry. complete

and

forth.

But tinctive

before

we

pass of

on

to

the

consideration notice
an

of the methods

dis

of this later
not

stage, we

must

tion of the Method

Agreement, which, while

important modifica it strengthensthe

deprive it of its purely observational character. in questionhas had various names The Method given to it,but the its real nature most Method of Double Agreement expresses simply and aptly ; for,as Mill himself points out, its use involves a of Agreement. double employment of the Method We start,in this
Method, does
' '

method, from
the
instances

two

sets

of instances be
same

(1) from

instances

in which

phenomenon
in which

E,

to

the

causallyexplained,is present ; (2) from Applying the phenomenon is absent.

the first set of

Method
that instances

of

Agreement
start

to

relevant
we

circumstance,
from
; and

C,

which

instances,we look alone is present in

Method
once

out

for

all the

then,
cases

applyingthe
in

again
we

to the instances examine

in which

the

phenomenon

questionis absent,

whether, in all these

and is the

of the absence
circumstance

of E, C also is
the first

absent,
If
we

only
so,

relevant

invariablyabsent.

find that it is of the

the that

suggestionfurnished by
C is the
cause

applica

tion

Method,

of E, is very

consider

ably strengthened.
In illustration

of the Method

of Double Read's
'

from Professor Carveth following

*

Agreement, Logic :*
'

we

adapt the

Third

edition, ch. xvi., pp. 204, 205.

400

THE for is

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.

accounted

unpreciselyconceived in the second application in the first. Nothing can obviate this defect,in our as supposed the of of inquiry,except an adequate specification variety indiges tion suffered on each successive evening a specification sufficiently detailed to cancel all suggested causes But this analytic save one. have for its success, the already seen, presupposes, process, as we of strictly methods. use experimental
as
"

II. THE

EXPERIMENTAL A.

STAGE
and

nsr

CAUSAL

INQUIRY.

Positive
an

Negative Instances.

explanation of which a cause, C, let us say, is found to be is suggested. On inquiry,the suggestion, of C's operationcan be shown adequately justified.The supposition
Let to account its effect.

stand

for

effect for the

for E.
But
\ve

We
have

have, then, shown

not

that,
that may

given C,
E

will be

yet
cause.

shown

when

is the

given
other be
a

effect,C must
causes
'

have

been E

the
as

There

possiblybe
There may

which

also have causes.'

their natural

effect.

of plurality
But

the interests that third

a

of scientific precision cannot fourth

so cause. as

be satisfied
cause or

by

the

conclusion
or

given effect is due

or

either to this

to

that,
C and find

to

some

The the

ideal of Causal

Explanation
We
must

remains
E
a

unrealized

long

causal connexion

between

is not
cause

proved
which

to

be

unideterminate. reciprocally conditions

:

satisfies the two

Whenever Whenever

C, then E ; E, then C.
condition
not

Expressingthe
form

latter

in the

equivalent contrapositive E,
two

'

'

Whenever
we

C,

then

not

have

the

requirement that C
(1) Whenever (2) Whenever

shall

the satisfy

conditions

C, then E ; not C, then

which

not

E.

Experimental
instances.

instances

illustrate

(1)

are

named

positive

of might effect. and cause Experimental instances which illustrate (2) are These we named negativeinstances. might call instances of the and effect. of the adequate verification of For cause co-absence We
also call them instances

of the co-presence

causal

instances hypothesis should Negative Instances

of both
not

types

are

essential. with
a

be

confused

The

former

are

instances

which

corroborate

Exceptions. suggested causal

CHAP.

XLV.]
; the

CAUSAL
latter
a

METHOD
which may

40) The

connexion

are

instances

disprove it.
be stated
as

form
:

of argument from
Here
.-., so

negativeinstance
so

follows

C is absent, and far

as

also is E. goes,

this evidence

(Negativeinstance.) be causallyconnected C may

with The take

E. of

form
the

argument
:

in which

an

exception is being urged

may

form following C is
so

Here
.-.,

present,but
as

E is absent.

far

this

evidence

goes, C is not

(Exception.) causallyconnected

with

E.
or

exceptions we merely negative (vide such are as positively incompatible with the pp. 334, 335) from to are Negative results,in par seeking hypothesis we prove. from n" gativeinstances. ticular,should be carefully distinguished form state in a more In the light of the foregoing, we specific may the Observational Methods between distinction the on one Purely Again,
under

should

exceptions such distinguish

"

what

appear
are

to

be

"

results

as

hand,
from
from

and
a

Experimental Methods

on

the

other. Method
as one

On

described

effects to
causes

as a Purely Observational Method Method causes ; an Experimental

p. 395 we that proceeds that

proceeds
more

to

effects.

We

may

now

state

the

distinction

: precisely

Where viewed

the in the

start

is made
a

from

effects
"

"

from i.e.,
and causal

facts

or

events

are explanations them formulated, without by attempt to verify tentatively any method is the and to instances, Purely negative positive appeal

of light

causal interest

Observational.
and negative instances Where, on the other hand, both positive used, with a view to the verification of suggested causal con are the control is Experimental. Where over nexions, the method instances is and adequately exhaustive, the negative positive and effect can, by this method, be shown between connexion cause
to be

and reciprocal,

the ideal of Causal

Explanation is realized.

B. The the

The

Method
a

of Scientific Experiment.
are

differentiae of
there is

method strictly experimental

are

(1) that
control
;

conditions

of observation
a

under

the

observer's with the

or

(2) that

well-controlled interference
mere

object to be

observed.
the that

Thus,
or

dissection
our

of
is

an

animal

plant

is not

experiment.
nerve,
we

In dissection the member

to

aim
a

not precisely
or so

to interfere

with

of
"

desire

examine

flower-whorl, except, indeed,

any far

other
as

structure

interference
26

402

THE

PROBLEM aid to
In

OF

LOGIC Absolute
the

[XIII. iii.
non-inter

is necessary

as

mere

observation.
to

ference would

of preclude the possibility order

make and

all but

ficial observation.

simple observation
with it.
must

We

must

our object interfere study, we must often in one sense innate collapsible structures, or injectwith some

most super accessible to

highly coloured
or we

stain

the

finer ramifications the microtome

of
and

vascular make

system

cut

sections

with

microscopic

preparations, renderingdifferences of tissue conspicuousby means these are aids to of careful staining. But all such interferences as this further than observation we when, for only. When go instance, instead of merely layinga nerve bare, and perhaps treating it with acetic acid to make it more conspicuous and easy to trace, and watch the effect nerve we apply an electric stimulus to a living then we have at once a genuine experiment. In vivisection we have the For of method. constant a application experimental example, localized cortical point in the brain of an anaesthetized a carefully animal the ensuing movements is stimulated, and are accurately
"

"

observed. the

In both

dissection and
the

vivisection there
is also
a

is control
or

over con

conditions former

structive in the

; but in the interference with

latter there

modifying

phenomenon
much

to be

observed,

while

as to only so it exists. as object already Further, in a scientific experiment, properly so called, there is made deliberate a unambiguous attempt to obtain precise and results. This impliesthat, before experimentation,the conditions been have of Scientific carefullyanalysed. Thus, the Method in strict the be the method of sense a term, must Experiment, which control over conditions, implies a directly presupposes modifying or constructive interference with the phenomenon to be both in procedure and in result. observed, and aims at precision of Scientific Experiment, so understood, is The typicalMethod discussed of Difference.' by Mill under the title of the Method and Its essential import is very simply conciselypresented by words Dr. H. S. Mellone in the following : the addition of an When or agent is followed by the appearance, certain other its subtraction by the disappearance, circum of a event, that agent is the cause stances remaining the same, of the event.' the suspected agent is present,' continues Dr. Mellone, we When it is absent, the negativeinstance. have the positive instance ; when be eliminated without cannot What doing away with the event is. causallyconnected with it.'* It will be gathered from this passage, taken togetherwith the rest that his definitions of of Dr. Mellone's exposition, positiveand The different from ours. are instance,' positive negativeinstances the the of have not defined as we it,implies only suggested presence

there

is

interference

is necessary

aid observation

of the

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

cause,

but also the co-presence

*

of the effect.
of

It is an

instance
274.

which

'An

Introductory Text-Book

ch. ix., p. Logic,'

CHAP.

XLV.]

CAUSAL

METHOD

403

is

always corroborative of a suggested causal connexion. Similarly understand it,impliesnot only the negative instance,' as we absence of the effect, of the suggestedcause, but also the co-absence and, like the positive instance, is always corroborative. According to Dr. Hellene's definitions,the positive and negative instances do not, as such, necessarily : confirmsome suggested causal connexion instances of a causal they simply test it. They are not necessarily but instances of which claim the of a sug are means law, by they to the title of causal law is challengedand sifted. gested connexion In order these to distinguish positiveand negative instances of the words) from the positive and negative (inDr. Mellone's sense
the
'

'

'

instances and
serve

of

our

own

definition

(which
propose

are

all instances
to

of the law,
'

to

establish when

it),we
the

call the

former

test-

instances.'

suspected agent is present, we have the positivetest-instance it is absent, the negative test; when effect whether the is present or not. instance, expected
of the Following Dr. Mellone, we may illustrate the application of Difference familiar by the experiment of the coin and feather.' The questionto be decided is,Why is it that, when a coin and feather are a simultaneously let fall from the same height, the feather does not reach the ground so soon the coin ? as will suppose We that Analytic Observation suggests that the re tardation of the motion of the feather (the phenomenon or effect is caused to be explained) by the resistance of the air (the suspected agent). We proceed to test this hypothesisby a systematicapplication of
Method
'

Thus,

the Method

of Difference.
Test-instance
"

(a) Positive
The
an

i.e., the

instance

in

which, under
receiver of

conditions,the experimental
two
'

objects are air-pump, the air being left

'
"

suspected agent is present : dropped simultaneouslyin the

in.' flutters to the
"

Result.

The

feather

ground

after the

coin.' under

in i.e., the instance (b) Negative Test-instance the suspected conditions, experimental agent is absent. The the
as

which,

air is,as and

far

as

coin before.

feather

practicable, pumped out of the receiver, and are simultaneouslydropped in the receiver
the

Result.
instant.

"

They

reach

bottom

approximately

at

the

same

For
that

the the

ideal

success

of the Method

of Difference

it is essential

and negative test-instances should differ only in positive and circumstance. the As in coin and important feather of the Method, the experiment, so in other applications of this requisiteis, as a rule, over difficulty adequately ensuring what in is and the same both come cases one by using practically one instance, modified, in the second case, in some singlepoint.
one

relevant

26"2

404

THE
is is

PROBLEM
'

OF
'

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.

This

and

explainedby Mill in the Logic (Book III.,ch. viii., " 3), of emphasized by Dr. Mellone's above-quoted restatement
Canon.

Mill's Second

Precautions
The

to

be Observed

in

Applying

the Method

of Difference.

fundamental
time.

the Method
at
a

requirement for the successful applicationof condition shall be varied of Difference is that only one Upon the observance of this rule depends the scientific
method.

precisionof the ing it :

If (i.)
we we

There
conditions

are

two

main

reasons

for observ

cannot

two vary tell whether

at

time,

and
or

find

some

this effect is due

cannot

to one,

to the

effect, other, or
either of

to both. jointly

If (ii.) the
two

no

effect ensues,
was

we

safelyconclude
effect of

that
one

changes

ineffective ; for the

may

have

neutralized
Mill

the effect of the other.

accordingly pointsout that, in using this method, the change and the whole process be introduced must as rapidlyas possible, whenever the introduced time. last not must For, a long change time itself felt,and opportunity is takes a considerable to make and thereby given for its effect to be fused with other unintended be c onclusion from drawn unobserved can changes, no satisfactory beware of Intermixture must of Effects. the experiment. We of complying with this requirement in the case The impossibility of investigations belonging to the province of such a science as why in a science of this kind, which Geology is the main reason itself with slow and age-long processes, the Method of concerns In the investigationof geological Agreement is inapplicable.
causation
to

it is inconceivable

that

we

should
if
we

ever

have and

control

over

all the relevant

conditions

among called C, there previously causal

introduce

; and even those conditions

had,
the

could
which

proceed
we

that

change

have

would initiated

still remain

that the difficulty

change thereby
any effect

produce
there when
at

centuries to might take many of geologicalsignificance. During this time countless the

would

creep

in

other

agencies, and
a

the

'

effect,' C,

length perceivedby
in

of geologists
due
not
our

later
our own

generation,
cause,

would
but

probably be

great

measure

to

to those other

agenciesat work of

without

sanction.

Limitations 1. Mill* with the

can

the Method

of Difference.
of Difference
"

points out that the Method of permanent causes difficulty

never

cannot

causes,

that

is,

cope whose

agency lies in its

be excluded

;
"

producing an
*
'

instance
of

for the very essence the cause in which

III.,ch. viii.," 6.

of the method
in

question is

System

Logic,'Book

CHAP.

XLV.]
But

CAUSAL

METHOD

405

absent.
can never

he goes on to show that, though the permanent cause ' be prevented be other than a coexisting fact,'it may
'

from

operating as

an

influencing agent.'

In

illustration of this,

find that with a pendulum, we he supposes that, in experimenting Now, its oscillation is affected by the vicinity of a mountain.

though
to such

we

cannot

remove possibly

the
we

mountain,
can

so

as

to

apply

the method
a

of Difference
distance becomes from

directly, yet

remove

the

pendulum

the mountain

that the

attractive disturbing

influence

this amounts, inappreciable ; and practically Method of Difference. the of to a genuine application indirectly, the effect But, again,suppose we wish to estimate experimentally the of of the attractive power of the earth on the motion pendulum.
cannot we Here, as Mill says, dulum, nor the pendulum from
'

take

away

the earth
The All

from

the earth.'

Method

the pen of Differ

ence,

Mill expresses it, to tion of a condition

do is, as we can so called,is here unavailable. strictly modifica what the cannot exclude, we modify meaning change in it not amounting to its
'

total removal.'
constitutes

It is

methodical

modification

of this kind which

the take most

Variations ; and of Concomitant of this method, as Mill points out, striking applications
the Method in the
"

place

cases

in which

the Method

of Difference

is

quiteinapplicable

here friction. We laws of heat, gravitation, e.g., in establishing make series of partial a experiments, in which we proceed by a

modification gradual quantitative

be

of the constituent
an

which

cannot

wholly

withdrawn.

The

following is
whenever

abbreviation
:

of Mill's

Canon
menon

of the Method varies in any

of Concomitant
manner

Variations another

Whatever

pheno

manner particular Thus, if in a tropical country, as the rainfall of each year is more the is observed to be greater or less, or to fail, less, or rice-crop connected together, the two phenomena are at once correspondingly, law and we according to what quantitative proceed to determine some

in

phenomenon varies connected with that phenomenon. is causally

the

one

varies

with

the the

other.
use

In

the

Read
method.

points out,*
The with the

of the and

way, thermometer

same

as

Mr.

Carveth
this the

illustrates

rise and

fall of the

observer per
unit

increase in the

is connected mercury of the amount decrease air in contact

by

of volume,

atmospheric

of heat, with the

and at once comparison of these two glass, suggests a quantitative varying facts. As a simple and typical example of this Method of Concomitant Variations, let us suppose that an electric bell is placed ringing under the receiver of an gradually air-pump. The air is now exhausted, and it is noticed that, pari passu with the exhaustion of the

air, the sound

reached
at to pass

of the

point is
now
*
'

which back
and

fainter and fainter, until a bell grows it is no longer heard at all. The air is the receiver, and,
as

allowed

into gradually

it does

Logic Deductive

Inductive,' third edition, ch. xvi., p. 216.

406

THE

PEOBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.
more

so, the

sound

of the bell is the clearness

then heard, at firstfaintly, of the

note original

and

more

loudly,until
2. The

is

reproduced.*
cause

Method

of Difference

cannot

establish between Method

and

effect any precisequantitative relation. Here again, in order to supplement the

we

must

have

recourse

to

the

Method

of Difference, of Concomitant Variations. first been

ascertained

When,
that
a

by

the

Method
cause

of Difference, it has

the Method of Con produces a certain effect, be called in to determine Variations may accord usefully what to law the effect the follows cause. ing quantitative the application of the Method But of Concomitant Variations is not without its dangers. When, within of varia a limited range tion, a continuous change of a phenomenon, C, in one direction is found to be always accompanied by a continuous change of another phenomenon, E, also in one direction,there is a tendency to take for granted that this correspondence will always hold even beyond the limits within which has been and our conducted, investigation comitant
we are

certain

inclined forthwith is such

a a

to

frame
as

universal

law

to that

effect.

But

thing produced by varying cause critical points,of which two

law level
creases

there

discontinuous is often each marks

variation.

Change
between in the
sea-

continuous
a

only
at

sudden

change

of variation.
between

Thus,
the
this

as

the

temperature of
0"

water

the

continuously increases
it decreases. the

from
In

C. to 100"
0"

C., its
4" the

density in
but after

temperatures of

C. and
to meet

C.,

4" C. is reached of such

variations Another
cases as

order

requirements
of

experiments by
extend
over

which
a

concomitance range.

is established

should

wide

affects danger which peculiarly, though not exclusively, method is that whenever the applicationof this of supposing, we find two series of phenomena of that one concomitantly, varying the series is causallyresponsiblefor the other. But this by no It is quiteas likely that the two series are co-effects follows. means and the same of one Method of Concomitant Varia the cause. By in fact,never of the two to ascertain which tions alone it is, possible is true. suppositions 3. A single is not, as a of Difference applicationof the Method relation between a suggested rule,sufficient to verifythe reciprocal and its supposed effect. To reach this ideal of Causal Ex cause exhausted the series of the relevant must have planationwe repre in sentative established each and case test-instances, negative f afresh the truth of the proposition

If not
*

C, then not

E.

Dr. W. Stanley Jevons, ' Elemen illustration of this method, see Lesson xxix., pp. 249-251. tary Lessons in Logic,' than a series of typical or representa t We could not attempt to deal with more but not be exhaustivelyrepresentative, tive instances, and even that series would For further would be constituted

by

relevant

selection.

408

THE
is needed

PROBLEM
to carry

OF
out

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.
final
'

Methods

in order

these satisfactorily

of Inter Referringto this very difficulty processes of Verification. with the applicationof his mixture of Effects, in connexion four

ExperimentalMethods,'
alone
source

Mill writes
the have
a

'

The

instrument

of Deduction
than
'

is

adequate
the

to unravel

complexities proceedingfrom this

little
more

; and

four methods

in their power

to

supplv premissesfor, and

x.,

verification

of,

our

deductions elaborate

(Book III.,ch.
In the

" 3).

light of this conviction, Mill

of Causal
the to deal with

proceeds
a

to

Method strengthened devised Effects Book The

;

Explanation,
of the

Method

especially
of Method

difficulties arisingfrom
name

Intermixture

and

he

gives it the
;

Deductive

(see

III., ch. xi.

Deductive

also Book
as

Method,

III.,ch. xiv., " 4). Mill conceives it,is

Method

in three

Induction.*" (i.)
we

with Starting
first at

aim

periment, the operation it is due,

these

given complex phenomenon, discovering, through Analysisand Ex to whose combined simple antecedents
the and the laws

accordingto

which

antecedents

act. severally
"

Ratiocination (or Deduction). We calculate what would be (ii.) the joint effect of the operation of these antecedents, law. each acting according to its own reliance the on (iii.) Verification. To warrant general con clusions arrived at by deduction, these conclusions be found, on must careful comparison, to accord with
'
"

the

results of direct observation

'

wherever

it

can

be

had
In

(Book III.,ch. xi.," 3).

can
'

Method, we applicationof this Deductive instance the Mill himself" given by quote the deduction,' namely, which proves the identity of gravity

illustration of the

hardly do better than

the central

'

with
'

force of the solar

system.'
moon's motions that
the earth

First,

it is

proved
a

from

the

varying as the inverse square of the dis This (though partlydependent on priordeductions) corre tance. of to the first or purely inductive step, the ascertainment sponds the law of the cause. Secondly, from this law, and from the know distance from the obtained of the moon's mean ledge previously and the actual deflection the of from amount of her earth, tangent,
attracts her

with

force

it is ascertained
cause

with
to

what

the rapidity
were no

earth's

attraction
no more

would
acted is the

the

moon

if she fall,

farther

off and
are.

upon

by
'In

extraneous the

forces than ratiocination.

terrestrial bodies

That

second
*

step,
many

Finally, this

calculated

velocity

place
of this

of the

induction

particular investigations,' says Mill (Book III., ch. xi., " 1), 'the be supplied by a prior deduction ; but the premises may
must

priordeduction

have

been

derived, from

induction.'

CHAP.

XLV.]
with

CAUSAL
the observed

METHOD

409

being compared
bodies

velocitywith

which

all

heavy

the surface of the earth fall,by mere gravity, towards in the second, and first so second, forty-eight (sixteen feet in the the two quantities forth,in the ratio of the odd numbers, 1, 3, 5, etc.), found to agree are (Book III., ch. xiv., " 4). To the Deductive Method, with its three stages of Induction, Ratiocination, and Verification, Mill attaches the greatest import he writes, for its most is indebted to it,' The human mind ance.
' ' '

it we To conspicuous triumphs in the investigationof nature. and all the theories by which vast owe complicated phenomena the few simple laws, which, considered under embraced as are a been have detected laws of those great phenomena, could never It of ch. their direct is, xi.," 3). moreover, by study (Book III., value in Sociological inquiry. It is, indeed, only when supreme Mill comes Sciences that he of the Logic of the Moral to treat In first place, a the Method. full the of resources develops the and abstract between concrete distinction is drawn a an applica the simple procedure of Geometry is tion of the Method. Where the require taken as the model, the application so far,at least, as is abstract ; wrhere the deduc of Sociology are concerned ments of the more are tions, and the inductions which they presuppose, complex kind proper to Astronomy, the applicationis concrete. Abstract In the former Mill speaks of the Geometrical or case Method. Method, in the latter of the Physical or Concrete Deductive The Social Science, therefore barbarism, (which, by a convenient
'
" "

'

has after

been
the

termed
model

is Sociology), It infers that the

deductive after law that

science

not, indeed,

of geometry, but which

effect
as

of the

more

complex
the laws the

physical sciences.
of causation
on

of each

effect from

merely of one considering all the and compounding

short, is the Concrete
furnishes
the
most

law

cause,
causes

in

which laws

depends ; the geometrical method, conjunctly influence the

one

not, however, from

but

by

their

with

another. that

effect, in Its method,

Deductive

Method"

of which
a

astronomy
less

perfect,natural

philosophy

somewhat

perfectexample, and the employment of which, with the adapta tions and precautions required by the subject, is beginning to regenerate physiology (Book VI., ch. ix., " 1). abstract between But not an only is there a distinction drawn the and a concrete method concrete the of application application ;
'

itself may be laws of human

either

direct

or

inverse.

Thus,

we

nature, deduce

conclusions

from

of ratiocination, and process facts. with observed

This is
a

then

verifythese
as

through by comparing them

'

may these

start

with
a

is the

kind

there Mill goes on to add, their of sociological to which, from prodigious inquiries Direct Method.

But,

complication,the method plicable (ibid.}. Resort

'

of direct
must

deduction be had

is

altogetherinap
Inverse

then

to the

Method.

410

THE
start

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.

Here

by direct consideration of the facts of social life and and of history, obtain thence empirical laws or generalizations which then proceed to verify, not we by comparison with further It is an facts, but by deduction from the laws of human nature. to introduce never imperative rule of the Historical Method any from the science unless sufficient social generalization history into nature grounds can be pointed out for it in human (Book VI.,
we
' ' ' '

ch.

form of successful " 4). Verification here takes the new and have deduction, we a strikinginversion of the ordinarypro
x.,

cedure. pare the

'

Whereas

in the

"

method with

of direct observed

deduction"

we

com

results

of deduction

facts,we

here

begin
facts from

by provisionally formulatingempirical laws gathered from of observation, and then verify these laws by deducing them '* the principles nature." of human
"

In the Deductive to reach

can

Method, with
the The march

its inverse concretest

development,we
form which
the

seem

what

is, perhaps,
Book onwards the

Scientific

Method of the
abstract

take.

of Mill's be

third

development from
views

may abstract to

of the universe, and

opening progressive the concrete. Beginning with that with the partialmethods
described
as a

from exposition

and more elements correspond to them, he graduallytakes in more of Reality,and shows in the partial at each step how methods are themselves with these to inadequate newly recognizedaspects cope of the world. towards view of the world concreter a Every step is shown to necessitate a development of Method, until he has welded all his partialMethods out facing a together,and comes concrete fitted at length to deal (material) universe with weapons with its

complexity.f
is a
sense

But

there

in which

even

the Deductive
'

Method
'

is not

his

for in his final standpoint,

up method.

further and
He
to

most

paragraphson Hypotheses thread into the tissue important

conception of Method
in it

Mill

of

enriches the part

the
'

by

an

gathers logical explicit

reference

played
:

ch. xiv.," 5, he writes which be reckoned must Without

such
state.
. .

III., by Hypothesis. of hypothesesis one in science. absolutelyindispensable

In Book The function
... . . .

assumptions,
.

science

could

never

have

attained

its
was

present
once

Nearly everything
to
use

which

is

now

theory

hypothesis.'
'

This

HypotheticalMethod,'
as a

Mill's

own

is expression,

regarded by Mill
differs from
the
are

modification
in
one

of the Deductive

Method.

It
or

latter

important particular.The
are, in the

law,

laws,
the

but
*

of case developed through ratiocination HypotheticalMethod, not proved by experimentalmethods, assumed. The Hypothetical it, is Method, as Mill conceives
which
this to be
a

I believe

quotation,but
Mill's
'

cannot

trace
'

it to its

source.

For a comparison between of Scientific Method and our own

expository development of of Induction, vide pp. 419, exposition

the 420.

Theory

CHAP.

XLV.]
a

CAUSAL
of the simplification
"

METHOD Deductive
or

411 Method. the It consists

therefore
two

of

stages only
of This

that

of Ratiocination, that

deductive

develop

ment

Hypothesis, and

of Verification.

abridgment, however, does not imply any loss of inductive soundness. For, as Mill expresslypoints out, this abridged method is legitimate on one supposition only namely, if the nature of
' '
'
"

the and

case

be such that

the final

fulfil the

conditions

chap, xiv., " 4). The though not here present

shall amount to step, the verification, of a complete induction (Book III., testing through experimental methods,
'

inquiry,is in the third stage reinforced and applied with additional vigour. The Method of Difference exercises its verificatory function in its most conclusive form. it in an earlier chapter of his As Mill expresses The work, begin as Hypotheses must great generalizationswhich end by being proved, and are in reality (as will be shown hereafter) the ch. Four Methods (Book III., ix.," 6). proved, by The thus concretely conceived, is Hypothetical Method, when have interpreted from the Inductive Method, as we distinguishable it, only in its exclusion of the preliminarystages of Observation and of Hypothesis. As Mill understands Formulation Induction, these but operationssubsidiaryto it. not parts of Induction are itself, It is in connexion with the application of the Deductive Method that Mill's Method finds its natural of Residues place. But, as formulated under the at first appears by Mill himself, the method head of Induction, and and Deduction Verifica as preliminary to
'

in the

first stage of the

'

tion.
'

Mill's enunciation from any

to

runs

as

follows

: as

Subduct

phenomenon
is the effect

such part
of the

is known and

by previous
the residue

inductions
of the The
we are

be

the

effect of certain

antecedents,
different
uses

phenomenon
to Professor

remaining antecedents.'*
of this method
the method
we

distinction
owe

between

two

quite
In
one

Laurie, f
all the Dr.

of application

acquainted
Mill is in

with

antecedents believes is

concerned.

Professor

Laurie which and

(followed by
has direct

Mellone)
But
to

this to be the

in mind.

this the

opposition

surely a following statement

application misinterpretation,
of the

method
'

by Mill himself : Subducting from any given phenomenon all the portionswhich, of preceding inductions, can virtue be assignedto known by causes,
remainder will be of which the effect of
was

made

the

the antecedents
as

ivhich had

been

or overlooked,

the effect have

'

yet
'

an

unknown
to

quantity.'
that

The Method lone

we expressions

underlined

seem

show

Mill's thus

of Residues
as

is not

characterizes
:

that which different from really regulatedby a distinct rule,'which

'

Dr. Melhe

formulates
'

When
'

any

part of

complex phenomenon

is still

unexplained

Book SysteirfofjjLogic,' of Inductive

'

Methods

Mind, Inquiry,'

III., ch. viii.," 5. New Series, vol. ii.(1893),pp. 335, 336.

412

THE
the which

PROBLEM have been

not

OF

LOGIC
cause

[XIII. iii.
for this of them This
two.

by

causes

assigned,a further
all
'

remainder

must

be

sought.'*
are

Here

the antecedents

known

causes.'

Some

(one

or

more)

are

causes

that

have

hitherto been overlooked.

is the form Dr. Mellone

of the Method
the total

of Residues
as

contemplated by Mill, and

important
of the

rightlyregards it
cause

the

more

given instance to contain the any the total effect to be known conditions, A, B, C ; and suppose the 8. known out causes A, B, C, representedby a, ft, Singling j, of operation the effect that deduce from their known modes we can

Suppose

in

they
with
cause

will

produce

Suppose
a x.

this effect to be

residual

actingtogetherunder the given conditions. then left are represented by a, /3, 7 ; we phenomenon 8,to which we must assignthe unknown
when

Example.

"

The

Perturbation

of the Planet
1846
:

Uranus.

discoveryof Neptune in might have been roughly stated thus

Cause ABC
.

Before the

this astronomical

problem

gives af3j8as
(B)
of known

effect.
at
a

I.e., Tangential momentum

+
+ 4-

of Uranus

given

moment

(A)

Attraction

of the Sun

Perturbinginfluence

planets(C)
cause

Perturbing influence of unknown

orbit of Uranus gives,as the observed effect,the known (a{3y8). were A, B, C, astronomers able,by mathe Taking the known causes
matical due
to

deduction,
these
causes

to

ascertain

the

effect in the

motion

of Uranus
was

acting in combination. sented by aBy, and the investigators were

residual effect 8, which observed effect a/3y8and
a

This effect
left with the

problem

repre of the
the

the discrepancy between represented from the effect aflyalready deduced

laws

of all the known J. J. Leverrier

then

causes.

John

Couch

Adams

in

England and
to the per

Urbain
one

in France

(working quite independentlyof

effect 8 must

another)

argued that this

be due

unknown turbing influence of some planet,which we may call #.f In this way an application of the Method of Residues pointedto the fact of the planet Neptune's existence. From
tion. the

foregoingit
of Residues

will be
ensure

seen

that

the

essential function

of

the Method

is to

The

ascribed

cause
"

for the When

on
*

observed
the Method

effect
cause

adequacy of a causal explana be qualitatively must adequate to account be conditions must i.e.,all the requisite
established reach
as a

the

considered, and the

total

cause.

of Residues

is further
a

refined

through insistence

quantitative adequacy, we
'

conception of Causal ExplanaNeptune.

An
a

IntroductoryText-Book

f "/.Simon

For

of Logic,' first edition, ch. ix., p. 287. brief authoritative account of the historyof the discoveryof ' Newcomb's Astronomy for Everybody,' pp. 232-235.

CHAP.

XLV.]
can

CAUSAL
be

METHOD

413

realized only through the application satisfactorily It was methods. through precisequantitativein of quantitative that James Bradley discovered the vestigationof residual errors and that of light, of the earth's axis and the aberration nutation ascertained not only the existence of Neptune, and Adams Leverrier and the orbit of the yet unseen planet. It was but also the mass that Argon, Helium, and other con method also through this same stituents of our recentlybrought to light. atmosphere were
tion which

As
The
serve

characteristic
we

of these
the

more

exact

modes of Error
on

cedure,

note may extract following

Elimination
a

of scientific pro in Observation.

from

popular treatise
'

Astronomy*
with instrument is made it turns

to illustrate the method

Observations for
errors

made

may the transit

circle must The

be
...

corrected
see

in the

itself.
and is

astronomer
as

will

to

it that

his instrument which

must pivots on and east west, point exactly exactly at rightangles to the These of the instrument. lines joiningthe pivots in all positions conditions never are absolutelyfulfilled. Day by day, therefore, much his instrument is in has to ascertain just how the astronomer his instrument Were absolutely in each of these three matters. error it that remain would he so. not could assume without error to-day, set up

as possible.The perfectly

level ; they must be exactly on same be must and the axis of the telescope the

The

astronomer

finds that his

...

own

presence

near

the instrument

is

sufficient to disturb it.

circle work with the result

The

after is this striving

great interest ever greater and

fresh

attachingto transit
greater precision, which, at
under Then further
comes

of

bringing out

little discordances,

purely accidental, but sight, appear to be subjectto themselves show scrutiny,

first
the hunt for

which,
some

law.

It discovery follows. the observations explainsmuch, but when it is allowed for, though deviations still remain to little much closer together, come now form the subjectof a fresh inquiry.' be individually eliminated,we have to resort cannot Where errors to the best argument whereby we can temper our ignorance the

this

new

unknown

law.

Its

"

argument
reduction allowance

from of

probability.Our
to

reasoning

is here

based

on

the due

errors

average

and

probable errors,

for which

is made.

III. THE

ESSENCE

OF

INDUCTIVE CAUSAL

METHOD

AS

AN

INSTRUMENT

OF

INQUIRY.
his methods involve

Mill maintains
two

" 1) that (Book III.,ch. viii., : simple principles (1) That of the Method the Method (2) That^of
*

of

Agreement

of Difference.
more

I regret that

am

unable

to state the reference

precisely.

414 1. The different 2. The

THE

PROBLEM

OF
consists

LOGIC
in

[XIII. iii.

Method
instances Method

of

Agreement
a

comparing together
in

in which

phenomenon
consists in

occurs.

of Difference

comparing instances
in other

which
Both

phenomenon

does

occur

with

instances

respects

similar in which methods

'

it does not.
to

methods, according
of Elimination.
on

Mill, agree
Method
can

in this

"

that

they
he

are

'The that

of

Agreement,'
Method

says,
con

stands
has

the the

ground

whatever any

be eliminated

is not

nected
ence

with

phenomenon by
the

law.

The
cannot
'

of Differ is

for its foundation

with

that whatever

be eliminated

connected

(Book III.,ch. viii., " 3). phenomenon by a law the that Mill It would from Inductive foregoing regards appear of Elimination. Whether Method we as fundamentally a weapon of Agreement or of the Method of Difference, make use of the Method But by Elimina we proceed,according to Mill, by Elimination. tion Mill means, not a logicalprocess, but a physical exclusion. he well suited to express the operation The is term, says,
'
. .

which
tion the
nomenon

has been understood of

circumstances
a

since the time

"

of Bacon
the
to

to be the founda

experimental inquiry namely,

which
are

successive

exclusion
a are

of

various
in

found
to

given instance, in order

can

accompany ascertain what

phe
those

them which among the phenomenon '

be absent

with consistently

the existence

of

In thus
to that

(ibid.). reducing his Inductive

Mill here

Methods

to

Methods

of so-called of

Elimination,
To Bacon

attaches explicitly

his view

Induction

adopted by
the

Francis

Bacon.

as com presented themselves of e ach its some as essence having properties, plex groups property he called forms; These singlecauses corresponding simple cause. and the aim of Induction, in his opinion,is the discovery of these which of Induction The Method Bacon forms. adopted he called

data

of observation

the Method
certain

of Exclusion.
"

In

order to discover

the

form
"

or

cause

of a for instance, that of heat we must, phenomenon three this take to method, according preliminarysteps : the phenomenon collect all the known in which 1. We must cases of heat
2. We
to

is

present.
must

These
a

constitute

tabula essentice et prcesentice.

similar
a

make

the

former,
must

in which

collection of instances, cognate or heat is absent. These constitute

tabula

to the firsttable. proximo parallel tabula graduum, in which the varying in compile a tensitywith which the phenomenon appears may be compared with the varying intensities of other phenomena that accompany it. the discover of heat seek to form We then by applying the be nothing but that which that this form can is always principle

absentice in 3. We

present
increases

where

heat
which

is

found, which

is not

present
as

where

heat

is

lacking,and
as

decreases perpetually

heat

decreases, and

heat

increases.

416

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
of

[XIII. iii.

SingleAgreement, of the agreement could be established onlythrough singleness of logical elimination ; but the singleness of the difference a process between two instances is established,not by any such elimination, but by making a single We do change in a certain given instance. the not pass from the positive to in experi negative test-instance, in eliminate this that sense elimination, we ment, by a except circumstance in the positive instance in order to secure the negative But this, instance. of course, is not a logical process of elimination, but a physicalprocess of subtraction. It would therefore have been
we

" 2). Now,

that the

saw,

in the

case

of the Method

'

'

"

better if Mill had

statement

avoided

the

use

of the term Method

more

'

eliminated

'

in his He if he

of the
'

foundation
own

of the
absent

of

Difference.

would
had

have
said
:

expressed his
What is
cannot

meaning

be

without

unambiguously with doing away

the

phenomenon
The
or

H.

causallyconnected with it.' is essentially Induction of Elimination a Method Exclusion has recently received the powerful support of Mr. W. B. Joseph. Mr. Joseph is convinced, not only that the
view that

Method
and

Bacon's Method, but that it was he has uncompromisingly adopted it as his own.
was
'

of Exclusion

also Mill's ;
'

Inductive

by disjunctively inductive proof of disproofof alternatives.'* And again : rests on excludingalternative a conclusion explanations. 'f It will be useful to consider Mr. Joseph's closely. positionmore He has formulated four grounds of elimination, each of which to some points particularrequirement of the causal relation, which failure to satisfy disprovesthat relation as between two given phenomena. '{ enumerated These grounds of Elimination follows : " are as
are

conclusions,'he roundly asserts,

established
'

the

The

'

'

"

'

1.

Nothing
which

is the

cause

of of of

phenomenon
phenomenon
occur.

in the absence

of of
it in

it nevertheless is the
cause

occurs. a

'

2.

Nothing
which

in the presence varies when varies

it nevertheless
cause or a

fails to

'

3. Nothing is the is constant,

no

phenomenon
when

which

is constant

it

varies, or

'

4.

proportionatemanner of one Nothing is the cause

be the
cause

with it.

phenomenon which

is known

to

of

different
canons

phenomenon.'
of Elimination successive the

The pass

of application
to
a

these four
of the
cause

enables

us non-

to

knowledge
and

causes,

inductive the Modus takes

care

by a reasoning takes
Tollendo Ponens.
to

exclusion

of all

form

of

disjunctive

argument of
Mr.

Joseph
'

reasoning is unaffected
*

point out that the character of the either by the completeness of the eliminaxx.,

'

An

Introduction

to

ch. Logic,' 403.

p. 408.

t Ibid., p.

415.

% Ibid., p.

" Ibid., pp. 403, 404.

CHAP.

XLV.]
or

CAUSAL

METHOD

417

fails by the ground of elimination used.'* Whatever be of these grounds cannot a cause. to satisfy one Again, any single basis exhaustively, if I am unable to state my disjunctive or to elimi
tion
...

nate

all alternatives the character

save

one,

this failure The

am

on

my

part
of

in

no

way the

alters remains
cause
or some

of my
same

argument.
whether the
cause
'

method
must

reasoning
that
or

the precisely

able to conclude of E

of E is C,
cause

or

only that
inductive

be

Cj or C2
a

C3,
con

hitherto
not

undetected.

The

gettingof
of the

positive

clusion,but
on

the

character

argument,

depends

completenessof the elimination.'f these grounds of elimination a footnote J Mr. Joseph connects On these grounds of elimination,' with Mill's Inductive Canons. Mill's Methods Inductive lie writes, severallyrepose. The of Agreement," the second of of his Method firstis the foundation Method his of Difference," the first and second jointlyof his of Agreement and Method Joint Difference," the third of his
the
In
' ' " " " " " %'

Method Method

of

Concomitant Difference

Variations,"
Mill's statement
are

and

the

fourth
the

of

his

"

of Residues."
and

that
of

Methods

of

Agreement
tion is thus

both Methods

Elimina (physical)
'

that Inductive developedinto the surprising consequence It would be of LogicalElimination. is a Method Method generally four (or five) but one that Mill has not formulated well to recognize indeed Bacon Method of Experimental Inquiry as might
" "
"

have

shown

him

"

of which

the

essence

is that you
a

establish
and of the

par

ticular

hypothesis about
not

the

cause

of

phenomenon
cause as

by showing
effect,

with that, consistently the else facts do

the nature
to

of the relation of the

permit you
mutandis

regard it
are

effect

anything
effect of

(and '" anything).

Now,

mutatis

if you

inquiringinto

it is true that Mill has laid himself open to this interpretation of Agree that not only the Method of his position by his statement

of Elimina also,is a Method does not refer tion.' But, as we have already said,that statement of it such an interpretation would Elimination at all, to logical nor ment,
but the Method of Difference

tallywith Mill's actual handling of

is there
treatment

the Method

of Difference.

Nor
and Mr. varies in
no

any

hint of the
'

of the Methodus

Exclusiva of

in his formulation

Method

of Concomitant
cause a

Variations.

Where
which varies

Joseph says,
when
varies in
some

Nothing
or

is the

phenomenon
it varies, or

it is constant, in

is constant with

when

manner proportionate

any

manner

Mill says : ' Whatever it,' phenomenon varies whenever another phenomenon effect of that fact of the
causa

is either a cause an or particular manner, is with connected it or phenomenon, through some tion. '|| It is impossible not to be struck at once by the negativecharacter of the third ground between
*

opposition
417.

of Elimination

'An

Introduction
404.

to

ch. Logic,'

xx.,

p. 396.

f Ibid., p.
IIBook

% Ibid., p.

" Ibid., p. 399.

III., ch. viii., " f".

27

418

THE
the

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC Nor

[XIII. iii.
is there any former, in the sense

and

character of Mill's positive

that

fifth Canon.
on

the latter reposes thing to suggest that the application of the former paves

the

of the latter. Method

If

we

the way for the statement consider,for instance, Mill's illustration of the of the first law of motion

corroboration experimental of Concomitant

through the

viii., (Book " 7), we is perfectly and direct. find that the application Nor can I positive find any evidence that fourth for supposing the ground of Elimina
tion is the foundation

Variations

III.,ch.

As

the gist of
that

our

which the Method of Residues rests. upon criticism of Mr. Joseph'sview consists in the

contention

the Method it may

of Difference
Mr.

is not

Elimination, logical by reference to a particular example.

in which

be useful to make

our

of a Method really clearer meaning

inductive

conclusions

are

by by chameleons and frogsof changing colour according to the colour he says, of their surroundings. in the absence of any Granting,' that it depends on the colour as such, we may other alternative, ask in the differently coloured rays affect the animal. what Lord way the Lister showed that they affected it through eyes ; for a specimen whose had been of Rana removed was no temporaria longer eyes affected by any change in the colour of the surroundings in which it was otherwise not unreasonable, is placed ; thus the alternative, reaction is that the somehow determined excluded, through the circumstance in the skin, the principleapplied being that no which the is its cause.'* phenomenon fails to occur presence of did the not Mr. we ask, But, experiment, on Joseph'sown explicit ? showing,prove the eye-theoryrather than disprovethe skin-theory Did Lister's experiment show that the rays affected the not Lord the And not the principle was frogthrough appliedjustthis eyes ?
' '
"

of alternatives

reference to the

Josephillustrates the way established through the disproof problem as to the power possessed

that the circumstance

occur

in the

absence
to that

of which

the ?

phenomenon
of the
that
to

fails to The

related is causally upon which Mr. appears

phenomenon
is the

pivot

Joseph'sargument
to turn

in favour

Method

of Elimination

conviction

is a far easier and surer of elimination a ground of to than verification. Referring a ground prove through process to Bacon's Methodus Exdusiva, he writes : We must proceed,then,

disprovethrough

'

by

exclusions.

Where

hundred

instances

will not

prove
stress

an

uni

versal connexion, one will disprove it.'f This is,no doubt, true of causal methods
on

in which

is laid

the number

instances of positive The

Method
the

of Difference

; but the verification is as

in the easy

of the application
as

and

convincing

as

of Mill is in no sense verification-method positive of weaker or more unwieldy than the negative elimination-method connected Mr. Joseph. Even when the verification of C as causally with E does not give the total cause which the phenomenon E on

disproof.

'An

Introduction

to

ch. Logic,'

xx.,

p. 409.

f Ibid., ch. xviii.,p.

365.

CHAP.

XLV.]

CAUSAL

METHOD
have

419

at the very least,we depends, still, the force of the Method in discussing

ascertained

(as Mill puts

'

it

of

Agreement)

one

invariable
. .

antecedent
may and

however
. .

still remain
as

many unascertained.'*

other invariable This result is

antecedents

surelyas definite

valuable

of the causal But there Mr.

for the purposes of causal elaboration as the disproof connexion in questionfor those of causal elimination.

for the discrepancy deeper reason and than any which the our own Joseph'sstandpoint precedingargument has yet suggested. It appears to me that there and methodological in the issue a conflict between logical is involved The the ideal ; ideals. is to logical tendency strictly presuppose the methodologicaltendency is to aim at progressively it. realizing the ideal is presupposed,we tend to frame rules of Where our pro cedure the assumption that it is realized. on Thus, in Mill's case, from the actual conditions the start is made, not methodologically, but from and idealized conception of sense-experience, a simplified of such experience. Mill, as his own words and the testimony of the basis for the his own artificialsymbolism assure assumes us, as causal which there is neither situation in of his canons a application of causes of effects. nor f On this any intermixture any plurality basis a conception of Induction is developed which can simplified the aid without of we add, as Deduction, and, might perhaps proceed the aid of Hypothesis, of Verification. without or even Unfortunately the enuncia these presuppositions in embodied not explicitly are which that the latter wear air of unreality tions of the canons, an so between haunts the student
even

is, I believe, a

when in

he fails to

suspect the
It is
of

abstract

formal

character limitations

of the methods
are

question.

only when

these formal

abandoned,
of

when

the Method

to be at the

mercy
a

the level of
ence,

and

the of

and of causes, plurality mere preliminaryor adjunct to the Method to be unable to cope latter,again,shown into that

Agreement is shown forthwith depressedto

of Differ with inter

mixture
to

effects, and,
we

Deduction,

in its turn, transformed a preliminary the true conception of a working approach Deduc stages of Observation, Hypothesis,

Inductive tive

Method. and

The

Veri Applicationof Hypothesis,Progressive development which, from the strictly methodologicalpoint of fication"stages the outset the first essentials of from as view, impose themselves thus and made inductive are more more gradually procedure,
familiar
*

to

the

reader, until,in

the

concrete

development of

the

Book
'

III., ch. viii., "3.

the

of the four methods of observation and experi precedingexposition of co-existent contrive to distinguish a mass ment, by which we phenomena among the particular effect due to a given cause, which gave birth cause the particular or in the first instance, for the to suppose, to a given effect, it has been necessary that this analytical sake of simplification, by no other operation is encumbered

In

difficulties than

what

are

inherent essentially

in

its nature
as

; and

to

represent
confounded

to

ourselves, therefore, every

a

effect, on
'

the

single cause,
any

and

on

with

other

co-existent

the other hand as effect (Book III., ch. x.,

connected incapableof being mixed

one

hand,

with exclusively and

" 1). 27"2

420
'

THE and
'

PROBLEM
'

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.
reach at last
a

'

Deductive

Hypothetical Methods,

we

true

methodologicalconception of Inductive Inquiry. Mr. Joseph has not been It is an interesting question whether developing his Methodology on a similar plan. We would readily
admit
is
common

that the ideal of alike to the

'

reversible
'

or

causal reciprocal
'

connexion
'

methodological pointsof logical to view ; but the presupposing of the ideal as already realized seems of the logician the energies from the task have the effect of diverting and realize to of seeking how progressively it, concentratingthem fails to satisfy certain methods for the elimination of whatever on The logical standard rules or canons. supplements presupposition and the methodologicalgoal,though presupposition goal embody,
each in its of Means
very way, the rather than of
own same

and

the

inductive

ideal.

The

difference is

one

Ends, though
terminus
a

it is a difference which

touches for

on closely

fundamental between
"

principles.
quo and terminus

The both

balance
are

ad quern

"

might, perhaps, be adjusted by a purposive For the logical Presupposition change in the character of the former. substitute the Postulate we methodological might ; or, in less tech nical language,we might place at the forefront of Inductive Inquiry
essential
not
an

ideal assumed

to

be realized,but
Inductive

condition would

which
indeed the

must

be but

satisfied in order

to render

Inquiry,not

ideal,
con

possible.The
on

methodological Postulate
"

state

dition

which

scientific explanation legitimate depends,and the

the ideal

Unideterminate
connexions
"

Ideal would

of
the

system of reversible causal

then

become

methodological guiding idea.

presses forward
to

It is in the
terminus
to

of light

this ideal that

Science
"

the

fact,in
If
we

ad quern of all Inductive Inquiry namely, complete fidelity relevant of the Inductive is to the demands far fact so as

Postulate.
are

asked

to define the method

which
can

tute

for the
to

Method
the

point

Professor
as

of Elimination, we Bosanquet's Method

'

propose to substi hardly do better than

we

of

Analysis,to

his view
'

of

progressive moulding of Hypothesis ('Logic,' he elsewhere ch. v., pp. 166, 167) through a process which vol. ii., describes as a purifying by exceptionsand a limitingby negations ch. iv.,p. 117). In this process we have central importance ii., (vol. the attached to positive, progressiveelaboration of causal con with clear of the part played by negation, and, a nexions, recognition
Induction
in view of Induction (ch. iv.). The by elimination particular, the been influenced by Professor largely adopted in present work has

Bosanquet's
volume

treatment
'

of the

Inductive the

Problem of the

in

this

second
'

of his

though Logic,'

has inspiration

been
'

author by pragmatic have little sympathy. In Professor Bosanquet's view, the primary and inductive of an is not to attack investigator

leaningsfor which

the

tempered Logic might

business

essential

all rival theories,

CHAP.

XLV.]

CAUSAL

METHOD

421 other
be
to

supporting the truth of his

can

own :

theory by showing that

his main

no

explainthe

facts
own

so

well

endeavour

should

theory in a positiveand constructive spirit. This he must do by showing that all objectionsadvanced against if not it are still, limiting b y wholly ungrounded, ungrounded, or, the theory in determinate support rather than refute it. A ways, meeting all relevant theory can establish itself only by successfully will be brought forward as exceptions objections. These objections which to the truth of the statement expresses the theory. If the the theory must be correspondingly exception proves to be genuine, modified by the introduction of a limiting condition ; if only ap confirmatory of the parent, it is refuted by a negative instance rule its by restricting theory. A genuine exception modifies the universality apparent exceptionis but a mistaken interpretation ; an of the facts which the negativeinstance interprets rightly. form of inductive procedure, we this typical As exemplifying may who also is discussed Professor cite an Welton,* by investigation indebted to Professor Bosanquet for his general line of confessedly strengthen his
treatment. inductive

Professor
interest
"

Welton"

from

the

point

of

view

of

the

into the formation

worms,

analysinga part of Charles Darwin's inquiry mould of vegetable through the action of earth
is

f
number
that

A
ment

of careful observations
the
'

formation
The

gone to support the state mould is due to the action of of vegetable

had

of vegetable signby which the fresh production the ground, strewed of the mould tested was on was sinking objects and the process through which these objectswere graduallyburied deeper and deeper in the soil. But met here the investigator was by an apparent exception to

earth-worms.'

the universal

activityof earthworms, which

he desired to establish.

that this Large boulders do not sink. Darwin, however, showed furnished but it that fact was confirmatory no genuine exception, he such If dimensions,' is of boulder instances. a huge negative writes, that the earth beneath is kept dry, such earth will not be and the boulder will not sink into the ground.' inhabited by worms, J there is there Thus Where worms the positive are statement, vege and defined by the establishment, corroborated table mould,' was Where through negative instances, of the negative statement,
'
'

'

'

there This in

are

no same a

worms

there

is

no

mould.' vegetable also

a

example
of

furnishes

simple instance
a

which

genuine exception

necessitates
"

modification

of the way of the

statement original It

might
and
A
*
'

be

moles

urged other burrowing

of

restriction of its universality. a hypothesis the surface by that soil is brought from beneath
a

creatures

no

less than

by

worms.

The

Manual
'

Formation The ch. ii., pp. 131-177.

Vide,

vol. ii., Book V., ch. v., pp. 124-127. Logic,' of Vegetable Mould through the
*

Action

of

Worms,

Ibid., p. 152.

422

THE

PROBLEM
; but

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iii.

fact cannot
to

be denied

it

can

be shown less than

that their contribution

that

the

surface
'

layer of

soil is far

of
the

worms.

The forma

statement original

of the word
tion of A

should, then, be modified mainly,'and should be enunciated

by

introduction
'

thus

The

series of accurate
on

vegetablemould is mainly due to the comparative measurements

the
'

action

of earthworms.' of the

earthworms, etc., on the other,would

one

hand, and

of the
causal

soil thrown value

complete the

castingsof up by moles, of the proposition

by giving mainly
before exact
ment

'

form) for different soils and

results
must
can

its proper fractional values (expressed in average climates. This illustrates the fact that, be
a

is based

be of

obtained, the data upon which the judg kind,and that corresponding quantitative
into
as our we

numerical

limits must

be introduced

general statement.
conceive Method of the of

In conclusion, we
the is

would

add

that,
in the
case

matter,

part played by Elimination in the as heuristic, essentially

Elimination
has
a

complete
to

of the Method function

Analysis SingleAgree

ment.

further

fulfil in connexion

Avith the necessary though secondary work of meeting and refuting rival hypotheses, and in the devisingof crucial instances especially

experiments which
rivals. theories But into
even

shall approve
here it
seems

one

hypothesisby disproving its

these

gratuitous to bring

rival

preliminaryrelation with each other as co-alternatives a disjunctive proposition. The disjunctionhas force only in so far as the verification of the theory we are defending rests upon the But the verification rests essentially of the rival theories. disproof the value the for systematically of on positive theory as a means the relevant and the of a facts, explaining disproof rival theories be almost in an which, if undertaken disproof impartialspirit, may of the theory itself arduous a piece of work as the justification as is an operation and subsidiary supplementary to this.
of
"

"

CHAPTER
XIII. ILLUSTRATIONS (iv.) OF THE

XLVI.
APPLICATION OF INDUCTIVE

METHOD.

As may

examples of
take the

the ways

in which

Inductive

Method

is

we applied,

: following

1. The 2. The

Problem Case of

of Fermentation.*

Algol,the Demon

Star.

3. The
*

of the Earth. Rigidity

illustration is given by Dr. Mellone of as an example of the application ' ' of Single Agreement and the ' Double Method of Difference ( An of Logic,'first edition, ch. ix., pp. 272, 273, 282, 283). Introductory Text-Book Our of this investigation account is mainly an own adaptation of Professor W. the Method Dittmar's article
on

This

'Fermentation'

in the

'Encyclopaedia Britannica,'

ninth

edition, vol. ix.

424

THE
an apparently

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC of vinous
:

[XIII. iv.
fermenta

yeast
tion.

was

invariable concomitant

was Accordingly,a causal hypothesis

formulated

First

as Hypothesis: The substance known yeast is a causal antecedent of the alcoholic fermentation of grape-juice.

This earliest form

or

of the

could hypothesis

microscopicresearch was the microscope itself hardly yet worthy of thesis was of necessity But about the year comparatively barren. 1840 it was and Cagniard-Latour that the discovered by Schwann consists of millions yeast which is found in fermenting grape-juice the of globules characteristics of vegetable possessing morphological
cells.

applied. While

be developed easily in its infancy, still and its name, such a hypo
not

This, coupled with

is

the fact that

these cells

multiplyas

the

fermentation

of the fact that proceeds,convinced the investigators led to put forward a plant. Thus, they were an yeast important the original modification of hypothesis. Second

Hypothesis: The chemical changesknown as the alcoholic caused are of grape-juice fermentation by the physiological yeast-cell. activity of the living
we

advancing knowledge, due to a deeper and more analysisof the data, results in the moulding of hypo precise the hypothesis, theses. thus modified, was consider Historically, the ably strengthened by the close analogiesobserved between processes of putrefactionand alcoholic fermentation, tending to is involved. show that in both processes livingagency Moreover, notice that in its second form the hypothesisis no longer barren. we Firmly rooted in the systems of morphological and physiological Science, it can be logically developedinto forms which are capable of experimental verification. The recognition of the yeast-cell as cells in the of a vegetable micro-organism possessing properties general enables us to draw upon botanical Science for premisses with which to combine our hypothesis. Such premisses are the following: live at very cannot Vegetable cells, (i.) includingthe yeast-plant, high or at very low temperatures. (ii.) They are immediately killed by being treated with certain substances known as antiseptics e.g., corrosive sublimate, sul
Thus,
see

how

'

'

"

phuric acid, carbolic

acid.
'

Micro-organisms cannot (iii.) (so far as we know) arise taneously.' Thus, a liquid which by prolonged boilingor
means
so

spon other

has been

freed

from

all

livingmicro-organisms will remain

air atmospheric

if

kept from

all contact

with free
turn

and

otherwise

uninfected.

we

Combining these statements in obtain, as developed forms

' '

with
same

our

of that

hypothesis, the state hypothesis,

modified
-

CHAP.

XLVL]

ILLUSTRATIONS
we are

425

ments
cause

that, in the process which

of the chemical

the exciting investigating,

change (and therefore in this instance the exist at ex is (i.)something that cannot chemical change itself) low something that temperatures ; (ii.) tremely high or extremely of certain exist in the immediate cannot antiseptics ; presence arise something that, if not antecedently present, cannot (iii.) conditions. under substance in aseptic kept spontaneously any were These, and other developed forms of the hypothesis, duly of a long series of experiments, of and tested by means applied,
which these
are

some

of the results within

any liquidis
recommence

: a

Grape-juiceferments (i.) only.

60" C.
It does If the
; not

ferment

at

of range much temperature

certain
on

temperature

higher than
invari after

fermenting
nor

boiled,the fermentation

ably ceases liquidhas

The (ii.)

does left for

it

cooling unless
with

the

been

some

time

in contact be

atmosphericair.
by treating the

fermentation

may

always

arrested

of carbon, carbolic acid,or any with sulphuric acid, bisulphide liquid of other of a number antiseptics.By an experiment in antiseptic treatment which
as

Schwann

verified

that

part

of the

modified
an

hypothesis
organism
the
same

from as distinguished a vegetable assigned

animal
and
at

the

exciting cause

in alcoholic fermentation, the

one

time

discovered experimentally
of fermentation,
'

limit

of the and

analogy

between the

this kind

on

the

hand, and

on putrefaction

other.

He

found

that

white

arsenic

corrosive

sublimate,

animals, stop both putrefaction of nux and fermentation, while extract vomica, being destructive but does of but animal not of vegetablelife, prevents putrefaction,

being poisonous to both

plantsand

not

interfere with
'

vinous

fermentation.'*

not ferment, unless the grape- juice does with ordinary has been least started contact at by temporary process This cardinal fact was air. observed by Gay-Lussac in a now

(iii.)Perfectlypure

experiments. He caused clean grapes to ascend of a large barometer into the Torricellian through mercury where he crushed them of the mercurial column. by means vacuum, thus and The juice produced preservedremained unchanged, but
classical series of
the the addition
to

it of

ever

so once

small

fermentation, which, when

care

air-bell (as a rule) induced started,was always found to take

an

of itself. 'f

Such
were

experiments (and
means
"

others

of which

we

have

still to

speak)
the

the

of
an

and prolonged in application cases prior to from

varied
which the

of application

the Method that

of Difference
is positive the

it is noticeable

in many of introducing the

negative instance.
so

Instead

suspectedcausal
the

antecedent, and

positiveinstance
from the

negative, the

often subtracted the

instance
*
'

suggested agent, and so positive though, in the

"

obtaining more investigators obtained the negative

of the air-bubble
94.

case

Britaimica,' Encyclopaedia

loc. cit., p. 95.

t Ibid-tP-

426 admitted
in contact
was

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iv.

to the with

and the atmospheric Torricellian vacuum, air left the boiled and coolingmust, the positive instance

re-obtained
The

from

the

negative.
case was

obvious

danger

in each
was

that from

of
the

For instance,when
it not
not

air

excluded

too much. subtracting was germlessliquid,

were

possiblethat only
?

the

micro-organisms in

atmosphericair

the

relevant

tracted air
means

Might not
some a

important the exciting of cause

of it ?

and

circumstance

thereby sub
be the
decided

the fermentation

or itself,

constituent

This

point was
He

by

of

crucial instance

devised

by

Schwann.

all organiclife, and then juice,thus subtracting but only through a red-hot glass tube, which, while allowing the of the air, must destroy any livinggerms that it might passage contain. The grape-juice treated did not ferment, and so thus, the it of Method of by a striking application SingleDifference, was

boiled grapeadmitted air to it,

of for the fermentation proved that air, qua air, is not responsible grape-juice. the rapid advance Meanwhile of Science was a making possible fuller analysis of the data and a further development of the hypo thesis. of Rooted
now

in the

system

of chemical

as

well

as

in that

Science, that biological

"

could be combined hypothesis

as

with

such

premissesas
substance

(iv.)Living vegetablecells cannot,

; while

such,
of
"

constitute

soluble
and

their movements

advancing knowledge micro-organisms had furnished the premiss

thickness of cotton-wool
is
an

(v.) A
to

certain

impassablebarrier
cannot

micro-organisms [which become

Combined
in turn with

enmeshed

in it,and

slip

through].
each
into the statements develops
we are

of these premisses,the that the causal antecedent

hypothesis
for

which

the not soluble,and (v.)something of which seekingis (iv.) be prevented by the interposition of cotton-wool. passage may From the statement that the requiredagent is not soluble Helmholz deduced the still further developedhypothesisthat it is unable to pass through the wall of a bladder. able to This form he was bladder sealed containing verifyexperimentally by suspending a contained in a quantity of fermenting The liquid must. grape-juice in the bladder remained unchanged. after this Hoffmann took a test-tube full of sugarMany years water, and by a plug of cotton- wool inserted within it divided the liquidinto two parts. To the upper part he added yeast, which, of course, there ; but the change did not induced fermentation to the lower portion.'* propagate itself through the cotton-wool form the of Thus, again, a developed conclusively hypothesis was
'

verified. All these taken investigations,

*
'

to together,pointed irresistibly
loc. cit., p. 95.

EncyclopaediaBritannica,'

CHAP.

XLVL]
truth of the

ILLUSTRATIONS
Second

427

the original hypothesis Hypothesis" i.e., chemical the That as by Cagniard-Latour. of grape-juice the alcoholic fermentation are as changes known could caused by the physiological activityof the living yeast-cell established be It had been doubted. as a 110 triumphantly longer the

modified

Schwann

and

causal

law.

The
never

ideal

of

'

indeed, reversibility,'
in

had view

not

been, and
facts be

will possibly

be, reached

this

case.

In

of the
to

(1) that

number of

of fermentations

have

been

proved
that
seems even

inde

pendent
to have cannot

activity, and physiological

of minute without
to

(2)
of

alcoholic
some cases

fermentation

quantitiesof
the
assert

sugar

in

occurred

intervention
that

micro-organisms,we

yet

venture

quantitiesof grape-juicehas never ordinaryprocess of vinous fermentation plantshas long been an established fact.
But several the

of minute asepticfermentation taken place. But that the

is in all
cases

due

to

yeastIn

Second
'

Hypothesis could
'

not

be

regardedas
be

final. is meant
an

points it is
or

lacking in scientific precision. What

? Is the
to yeast-cell

by

the word

caused

regarded as

im

Is the presence ? causal antecedent only as a remote cell all it is in cases or living only a separable necessary, the of cell that ? What is indispensable product living precisely mediate of the is meant that the

by

the

use

of the

word

'

? physiological is meant

'

Does

it
a

imply

process
reaction

of fermentation
?

is in itself anything but

purely
yeast-

chemical cell '?

what And, finally,

by

'

the

different species If there are ? speciesor many differences there in the fer of the yeast-plant, are corresponding mentations which they severally induce ?

Is it

one

We

have

not

space in which
these

to follow

out

in detail the

investiga
the

tions to which

questions have

given

rise.

With of the

regard to

botanical researches into the interesting we can only say that they have resulted
fact that be vinous

nature

yeast-plant,
of the

in the establishment
an

fermentation

results from

of the genus regarded as pathological) of species, charomyces. This genus includes a considerable number Each S. cerevisice. the most is of which important plant of this cell of globularform is a single measuring about Tg-"y milli species
metre

to activity (probably Sacof fungus known as

in diameter. the

From

logical point of view,

or
"

the

most

is that of remote suggested

immediate

causation.

rise to two rival hypotheses that gave in two moulded different investigators, its

is,the

interesting question This problem by hypothesis was,

;

(apparently) opposite ways

modification progressive
Third

advanced

along divergentlines.

Hypothesis: The changes known as the alcoholic fermenta The tion of grape-juice are of a purely chemical character. livingorganism is a remote causal antecedent.
call this the

We

may

Hypothesisof Liebig.

428 Fourth

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII.

iv.

Hypothesis: The changes known as the alcoholic fer mentation of grape-juice represent a physiological process. take the within and place organism of the yeast-plant, They caused thereby in this sense that the products are immediately to be regardedas actual productsof are of the fermentation
"

the metabolism This is the The

to have

of the cell.
Pasteur.

Hypothesisof

question between these rival hypothesescannot yet be said been finally decided. In forms modified by recent research But for a time Pasteur's theory they still confront one another. was completely triumphant,and until the year 1897 that of Liebig discredited. Both was regarded as finally duly hypotheses were and tested. The of the history developed,applied, (temporary) establishment the more of Pasteur's theory is logically interesting. of and critical at first Pasteur's work was a purely revisionary
kind. his
mental
'

He

did

the whole

of the work

of Schwann

and

the rest of

the experi again, modifying and perfecting methods, so as to silence any objectionor doubt that might be raised, repeatingand multiplyinghis experiments until possibly was firmlyestablished.'* every proposition the Pasteur's positivework consisted essentially in generalizing fermentation connexion of the of alcoholic with theory organic

predecessorsover

agency.

He

supported his hypothesisnot

a

as

an

isolated thesis,

largertheoretical system. To express the matter he supportedhis a way adequate but more logically precise, hypothesis by strong analogical arguments which his extended
as

but
in

part of
less

researches of

had

made

possible.
that

It is well
one a

known

alcoholic

'

or

vinous
to

fermentation

is

only

number

of fermentative
" "

changes
which,

which

sugar

is liable. certain

The

samef substance
up

conditions,breaks
into

sugar into alcohol and

when

placed under
acid, under

carbonic

certain

other sets of conditions

ferments
gum

into lactic

acid,and throughlactic
. . .

Pasteur What plus mannite. of a function of these changes is the exclusive the yeastcertain species(or at least genus) of organism. What a third for plant is for vinous a certain other organism is for lactic, No of these two mannitic, a fourth for butyric fermentation. if they belong to the same even species, genus, will ever pass into each other. Pasteur arrived at this great generalization by means of for of his invention an cultivating ingeniousmethod pure growths of the several species, could be examined that each of them so functions. for its chemical separately J More recentlythis method and chemist has been superseded by that of Hansen, a Danish

butyricacid, or
is that each

into

showed

'

'

t J

This
'

EncyclopaediaBritannica,' is not quite accurate. Encyclopaedia Britannica,'

loc. cit.,p. 95. Different sugars loc. cit.,p. 95.

are

variouslyconstituted.

CHAP.

XLVL] showed

ILLUSTRATIONS
that

429

botanist, who
not

Pasteur's

and deserve the name, really to begin with and strictly that is certainly a pure, it is necessary be still must regarded as having done single cell ; but Pasteur of yeast-fermenta inestimable service to Science in the investigation

did so-called pure cultures that, in order to obtain a culture

tion, however

researches were sively established

some imperfect acceptedby

of his methods
the that

may scientific world

have
as

been.

His

having
a

conclu
'

the

theory

is yeast-fermentation the

vital

phenomenon
But
not
was

'

taking placewithin

living cell.
1897

the Chemical been

yet
made

opposed to disproved. finally

as

the In

by

Buchner.

By
'

means

Physiological Hypothesishad an important discovery which Professor Ray Lankester

mechanical
he

has

truly characterized
in

as

heroic

methods,'

he

suc

regards as an un the is able, quite apart from certainly alcoholic fermentation. to induce By prolonged living yeast-cell, then and subjecting the mass by grinding with quartz sand, cells to high pressure, he at length produced the of disintegrated that by a purely he regards as an which liquid zymase enzyme
ceeded

obtaining

from

brewing-yeastwhat

substance, which organized

'

'

chemical appears

process effects alcoholic fermentation. at least, the liquidmay to be soluble

"

This be made

substance
to

pass

losingits property of Thus, the Chemical Hypothesis of Liebig, exciting fermentation. been be said to have revived, though in so long discredited, may The modified form, in the Enzyme a Hypothesis of Buchner. Hypothesis of Pasteur can no longer stand as he Physiological its life by sub to save formulated it. At present it is struggling The fermentation mitting to an important modification. (says the faction)induced by Buchner's wrongly termed physiological enzyme through
a

filter of porous

without porcelain

is due
to

not

to

ferment

from separable

the substance
are

of the cell, but

minute

of living protoplasm,which particles

are

not, indeed,
able
to

soluble, but

miscible with sufficiently and

the

water

to

be

pass

through
Thus,
modified devise

the

filter. porcelain

the Chemical

Physiological hypotheses both

Will
some

(in
final

forms)
last

still survive.

investigatorof
will lead ?
a

the future the

at

some

crucial instance them be

which

to
some

triumph
ciliation

of one,
between

the final defeat

of the other about

Or will

recon

brought
so

by
which be

the meaning

of that
we

difference between
which

chemical
the

deeper analysisof and physiological

yet is
the
not

speak process that suspicionof vagueness need of preciser definition ?

forms and of the

of which

but readily, may

without

indication
two to converge

of the

Is it
be

that possible modified

so as hypothesis may As Organic Chemistry advances, to coincide ? finally

divergent again,
may
'

it

that distinction between and our physiological prove distinction in after this chemical case all, a process was,
'

purely

without

difference ?

430

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iv.

2. The

Case
star

of Algol, the
in

Demon

Star.* Perseus.
the

Algol through
eye,

is
a

variable

the

constellation that
are

regularcycle
have

of

changes
known

visible to

It goes naked

Algol is the stars which, instead of varying con remain maximum their at tinuously, constantly brightnessduring the greater part of their period, and then temporarily lose a part of their light, to regain their usual brilliancy.Stars which soon in this peculiarway are relatively being vary very few, only twelve brightestof those
variable
as

and

therefore

been

for centuries.

yet known
The

to

us.

is of

of Algol causallyaccounting for the variability and the earlier of crude some long standing, hypotheses were

problem

of

and

fanciful.

The

star

was

at

one

demon.

The

development and

the eye of a of this attractive hypo application time

believed

to be

thesis may safelybe left to the ingenuity of the reader, who will in combining it with such premisses concerning find no difficulty
as blinking of demons Mythology or Folk-lore may supply. We need hardly say that, considered from the Astronomical stand this is barren. point, prescientific hypothesis unfortunately From the later stages of this long-continuedinquiry we select a few salient points, without order. aiming at strictly chronological

the

First

Hypothesis: explosions.

The

variability of Algol is

due

to

series

of

This

hypothesisdid
Too

not

prove

sense. satisfactory of Astronomy, system

vague it

itself fruitful in any to take firm root in any

precise or
scientific
of indeter

put forth

only

feeble

shoots

its vitality the hypothesis as probability.Yet, slight was, be quite sufficiently disproved. Into developed far enough to the it f orms whatever ramified, feebly swaying branches specific from the facts. Explosive action is sudden, all pointed away minate of short likelyto result in a maximum brilliancy regular, The and long intervals of diminished variation light. of Algol is steady and regularlyrecurring,and consists in the short interval of diminished of a relatively occurrence brilliancy much times maximum of between longer brightness. Even the demon idea of a venerable indulging every three days in one

seldom

duration

solemn than

and the

deliberate

wink

was

in

some

respects less incredible

a

Explosion Hypothesis.
even

Such

strength enough
carded. The
next

to

bear

modification. select

suggestion had It was simply

on an

not

dis

hypothesisthat
from

we

was

based

ingenious

argument
*

Analogy.
of this
is partly based investigation upon entitled In the High Heavens,' pp.
'

Our

account

that

given by

Sir

Robert

Ball in the volume

179-190.

432

THE be much

PROBLEM
to

OP
that

LOGIC

[XIII. iv.
lustre than is

to

more
case.

nearly equal
If the
to
a

of diminished
to be

actuallythe
it must

is not hypothesis

discarded, entirely

at least submit

radical reconstruction.
to
re

Fourth

Hypothesis: The apparent variation of Algol is due its being periodically eclipsed by a darker companion round it. volving

the

the latest,but it was not chronologically hypothesiswas that conclusive verification could be so a developed attempted. Even our present telescopesenable us to see Algol

This

last to be

only
the

as

and pin-point of light,

us. was

the star barren. much

is at

an

immeasurable modern
than tele the

distance

from

When

first suggested, and

so

for

long afterwards,
the

hypothesis

comparatively
its films

Even
more

scopic camera,
human

with

sensitive

eye, could

alone

give no

clue for its

It could, indeed, be combined and the Laws of Gravitation wide observed prove thesis

with of

profitable development. furnished by the Law premisses Motion, and so developed into a
the dis

of possible of which results, some agreed with range data ; but such a test as this, though it sufficed to the
an

did not rotation-hypothesis,

afford for the

adequate verification.

To

disprovean
one

erroneous

eclipse-hypo hypo
difficult. It
was

thesis is often easy ; to establish a true But at length the spectroscopegave

is usually very

the

required clue.
dark

observed

that

during that
star

half of

Algol'speriod which
the brilliancy

follows the
lines in the

first half of the time

of minimum shifted

spectrum
that red end

of the the

during
let

towards the violet end, and slightly the other half of the period they shifted towards
our

Now
it
can

of the spectrum. us again consider

Fourth

to Hypothesis,

see

whether

used For What

in any way be developed, so for its verification.

that this observed

fact may

be

brevity'ssake,
the Law

we

formulated

our

of Gravitation his dark

it to requires

hypothesis inaccurately. is not that Algol mean

companion revolves round him, but that is luminous) the Algol system consists of two bodies (ofwhich one centre their of about common revolving gravity. Now, a little will show that if that be reallythe case, then the consideration will time after luminous body always be approachingus for some and retreating from us for an equal time before it,these the eclipse, two times, togetherwith the time of the eclipse itself, constituting the whole the time of not period. As the luminous body moves the of in a straightline, but in an the orbit, elliptical velocity luminous body in the line of sight will,of course, not be uniform. Now, it can be deductivelyshown that, assuming the truth of the well-established Undulatory Theory of Light, the dark lines now is moving towards of lightwhich the in the spectrum of a source the towards violet end ; and that if the observer will shift slightly
stands stilland

CHAP.

XLVL]
of

ILLUSTRATIONS

433

source

lightbe moving
see

towards slightly Thus

we

from the observer, they will shift away the red end of the spectrum.
our

that, by combining

Fourth

Hypothesis

with

by the Law of Gravitation and the Laws of Motion, it has been possibleto develop it into a form in which it be applied by means of deductions from an accepted theory can the eclipse-hypothesis of physical Science. Thus at length was ob accurate established by a convincing verification. Further the exact servation of the photographic spectrum of Algol showed towards length of the times during which the dark lines moved and it was the violet and the red end respectively, shown that during just one-half of its period Algol must be moving towards us with of twenty-sixmiles per second in the line of maximum a velocity that and sight, during the other half it must be receding from us with the same maximum speed of twenty-six miles per second. observations confirmed the hypothesisnot only These spectroscopic in regard to the motion that the of Algol,but also in the statement both to Algol,since, were companion-star must be dark relatively have appeared instead of two lines would sets of dark stars bright, with pre from these one. Moreover, observations,combined only misses furnished by the Law of Gravitation and the Laws of Motion, for Algol which, of motion it was found possible to deduce a form while perfectlyagreeing with the undeveloped hypothesis,could be more Of the dark now companion and its preciselystated. the movements could, of course, say nothing. spectrum analysis premisses furnished
of Algol could variability and established hypothesis, now of the analysis of the results of deduction, themselves based upon detail of the original the spectral Each observations phenomena. the in established be of terms newlv now can theory. interpreted
The be

previouslyobserved facts as in the lightof interpreted

to the

the

Thus

(a) The

period of Algol's revolution in its orbit. Therefore, the time of this period is two minutes, fifty-two days, twenty hours, forty-eight seconds (approximately). the in Algol means (6) The periodicfall and rise of brilliancy dark of Algol by its regularly eclipse recurring companion. The diminish to as begins Algol begins to pass brilliancy behind the dark body ; it begins to increase as the dark body begins to pass from the disc of Algol. The whole time of eclipse about eleven hours. is,therefore, the time during which means (c) The time of minimum brilliancy the whole of the dark body is eclipsing Algol. Therefore this time of the transit of the dark Algol is body over period of Algol'svariation
means

the

twenty

minutes. 28

434

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIILrm
time

during this (d) Algol's losingthree-fifths of its brightness that the dark companion greatest eclipsemeans three-fifths of its disc. covering
All these
are

of

is then

not

deductions
set of

in the true
terms

sense

of one interpretations We
come
now

symbols in
in the

of the word, but of another.

to

stage
we are

that of

deduction. quantitative know

Given

conjunction with what nearly circular orbit,we

(1) The (2) The

which we call investigation may (a),(6), (c),(d) (as above) in about the velocityof Algol in its the results following
common :

able to deduce

magnitude of Algol'sorbit about gravity.

distance between
masses
are

the

centre

of

the two what

"

globes.
we

(3) The

of the two
to
assume

and globes,

allowed
more or

also their dimensions, if we have reason for believing bodies its

to
are

is

less true

that the two

of the

same

density. (4) The

nature

of the dark
well

body's orbit,and
we are

velocityin that
that this

orbit, provided that

dark tion
mass
"

allowed

assume

body, as

Algol itself, obeys the Law of Gravita a i.e., varying directlywith the of two attracting the squarebodies, and inversely as
as

law

of attraction

of their distance.

of the results thus obtained : followingare some than Algol is twice as largeas our sun, having a diameter of more million miles. its Its weight is only one-half that of our a sun, little density being less than that of water, a greater than average The that of cork.

Algol'sdark companion

is of the

same

size

as

our

sun,

and

has

Its orbit, like that of Algol,is sun's mass. one-quarter of our and in that orbit almost uniform its nearly circular, velocity
"

about The

miles fifty distance

per second. the two between

globesis about three million miles..

The have

So ends for the present the story of Algol,the Demon Star. be regarded as perfectly results may trustworthy,providedwe been

rightin assuming
The (i.) and
its

"

truth of the Law

of Gravitation of Motion,
stars.

as

to Algol applicable

companion, Undulatory Theory of Light,

of the two certain

The (ii.) The (iii.)

truth of the Laws truth of the

(iv.)The

equal densities

as

and (iii.) Of these, (i.), are fundamental, and about (ii.), and (i.) any fact of knowledge whatsoever, especially

as

The(ii.).

CHAP.

XLVL]
of real
be

ILLUSTRATIONS

435

only element
would
remain

uncertainty lies
not to

densities should be
the
a

found

(iv.). But be equal, the only

in

even

if the

comparativelysmall
account

modification
of the

of

consequence the numerical

results.
If the

our Substantially same.

Algol system

would

moral, we would story of Algol is to close with a logical point out that the great lesson it teaches is that of the importance and careful analysis of the spectroof Analysis. But for the minute

scopicdata
or

the causal

hypothesiscould
made. The

never

have

been established

the

quantitativedeductions

We

must

not, indeed, confuse

"

with logical

physicalanalysis. spectrum analysis of Algol into its elements the spreadingout of the light not a was The after logical logicalbut a physical process. analysiscame the careful distinction between It was wards. those spectroscopic of the light phenomena which concerned the qualitative properties the and those which of itself. of light source pointed to movements It is noticeable that this analysiswas exercised the results upon
"

so-called

not

but of what of direct, of far the

we

may

call indirect

the direct observation

as as case

luminous Algol's

When had been carried changes

observation.

admitted, it gave place to the observation of the phenomena of Algol's spectrum. Thus, it often happens in scientific
that investigation

phenomenon enables later to discover some hitherto uninterpreted indica us sooner or tions which, though not obviously or directlybearing upon the enable its to to before elucidation us some problem us, yet apply of is that our knowledge. Analysis acquired previously part scientific essential process it is in whereby investigation possible is yet that which to bring old knowledge to bear effectively on
some

the

of analysis

obscure

unknown.

3. The The whole thin

Rigidityof
the

the Earth.* of the

high temperature of the bulk of our planet with

crust
"

interior

Earth

"

of i.e.,

the

is
as

phenomena
rock

exception of a relatively very From well-established fact. such times early those of hot springsand the lava-streams of molten
a

ejectedby volcanoes had attracted attention and called for the fact that the temperature in the explanation. More recently, lower parts of deep mines is higher than that at the earth's surface and experimental was direction, recognizedas pointingin the same established the fact that, from a point investigations have now
about
100 feet beneath
at the rate

the

surface,the temperature
66 feet of

of the Earth
"

increases

of 1" F. for every

descent

80" i.e., to the

Ball's ch. iii.

for the firstmile.

The
*

causal
account

of such phenomena investigation

of this
'

as

pointed

Our

discussions

in

'

The

Earth's

is based mainly upon Sir Robert investigation ch. ix.,and In the High Heavens,' Beginning,'

28"2

436 existence of
when

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iv.

of the
ance,
as

extremely high temperatures beneath the Earth's crust, from the standpoint suggested by the initial stages viewed Nebular Theory, gained immensely in interest and import
necessitated
in which

and

the formulation
upon the

of

some

definite

to

the conditions

which

these

phenomena

hypothesis depend. The

earlier forms
a

consideration

of the the
'

interior,while

took shape were founded on hypothesis the Earth's conditions of high-temperature are conditions, which quite as high-pressure

important, were
'

comparatively ignored. If we may be allowed to fluid the word in that popularly acceptedsense in which it is use formulate the initial hypothesis we briefly opposed to rigid,' may
'

thus

First
We

Hypothesis :
not

The

interior

of the Earth
out

is

fluid.
processes

have

space

in which
was

to follow

the various
than

whereby

hypothesis and Speaking quite briefly,

logical arrangement,
thesis
was we

this

and developed,applied,

disproved.
chrono

aiming

at

may say in main two developed

that

rather logical this early form

:

of the

hypo

directions

Combined (i.)
it
was

with
with

premisses furnished
facts
'

by the Laws
which
Ball

of

Motion,
be
com

developed into
to
as

pared
nected Combined (ii.) known

consequences which Sir Robert astronomical

could

somewhat
con on

vaguely refers
with its axis.'

certain

phenomena
turns

the

way

in which

the earth

round

with
laws

the of

Law

of Gravitation

and

certain

well-

sequences

which

Hydrostatics,it was developed into con could be compared with established facts
and

regardingthe ebb
It broke
was

flow of the tides.

found

that in both the test of

these

developedforms

the

hypothesis

down

under

attempted
been been

verification.

Meanwhile,

Astronomers which

had
have

their theories and

investigations upon
we

o building many implicitly an hypothesisdirectlyop

posed
but it

to

that

considering. It

is true

tha

absolute

not was rigidity supposed to have any actual existence, taken for granted that the rigidit; in was investigations many the is so great that without of the Earth practicalrisk of error be considered Earth may as behaving like an absolutelyrigidbody.

We

must

now

consider

the fortunes

of this form

of

hypothesis.
as

Second
an

Hypothesis: The Earth absolutely rigid body.

may

be taken

behaving like

and

Passing over interesting developments of this hypothesis, many the partialverifications which its use in many cases justified

CHAP.

XLVL]

ILLUSTRATIONS

437

in no practical must simplification resulting give some error, we account of one interest, since development which is of very special led to the disproof it ultimately of the hypothesisitself. Moreover, it is specially as being an unintentional development in interesting
as a

this
or

sense

"

that it was

not

carried

out

with any
the form

intention

verifying the
The

hypothesisof which
took
the of the

truth

assumed.

development respectinga supposed movement

relative
to the Earth's

of

an

testing was implicitly investigation

of the

of

North

Pole

Earth

surface.

Observa identifythe Pole Star in the heavens. tion shows that its apparent positionremains the same practically all through the night,while the other stars appear to revolve round it. As a matter of fact,it does every twenty-four hours apparently describe a small circle about another point in the heavens. This which is entirely to the diurnal apparent point, relatively stationary
us can

Most

of

motion

of the stars,is called the Celestial Pole. Let the reader imagine that his eye is placed at the centre and

of the

Earth,
from

that
centre

surface.
the celestial
out

If this tube

long,slender tube passes from that centre to the be so placed that, when looking through it of the Earth, the eye is directed exactly to the
of the

pole, then that spot at which the end through the surface of the Earth is the North
have
now

tube

passes
or

Pole.

We

to

consider

whether

this

imaginary tube

axis,

daily rotates, always cuts the surface of the (north Equator) at exactly the same point of that We surface. that it is only an imaginary axis, or must remember shall tend to think that this must be the case. If we necessarily I make that pierces an spin round a steel knitting-needle orange its centre, that will it however needle, always cut the moves, surface of the orange at the same point of the peel. But there is such axis as this to exert a physical compulsion on the Earth ; no and the question arises : Assuming that the Celestial and North Poles remain the Earth in fixed positions, does at all in move make such a way to it necessary to identifyin succession as different points of its surface with the North Pole ?' Or, to put it differently, is there a movement of the poleover the surface of the
Earth
of the
'

about

which

the Earth

Earth

? the

Euler, assuming the absolute great mathematician of the Earth, and combining that assumption with wellrigidity that a established laws of Astronomical able to show Science, was and Pole of the North is physicallypossible, rotatory movement be completed in ten that, if it takes place, the period must
months.
This
statement

Now,

about
the

ten

months' of

deduced
may

from
as

assumed
call it so,

absolute form
or

period, having been rigidityof the Earth, we

our

regard
Euler

developed

Second
as a means

Hypothesis.
of testing

That

did

not

regard

it

438 that

THE

PROBLEM
not

OF

LOGIC We
at

[XIII. iv.
are

hypothesis,need
the

disturb

us.

regarding the
the

from investigation view. of point Euler's

and logical,

not

all from

historical than

calculation At

remained
it occurred

unchallenged for
to
a

more

century.

length

certain

Mr.

Chandler

that
the the
to

Euler's deductive
movement

result should made Pole.

to

be tested

by comparison with
past century
as

results of observations of the North enabled take observations does than

in ten him

during
A

the

careful

scrutinyof these recorded

discover

indeed
a

place,that the

that the rotatory movement pole describes a circle not more

the
not periodis completed,

dozen

yards in radius,but

that

months, but in fourteen. the absolute rigidity not consciouslytesting Now, Chandler was
any
true
more

assumption
it,and
the

than

Euler the

import of

consciouslydeveloping discrepancy between the results of

was

had

been

deduction

and

the results of observation Chandler's

the

not
were

at first perceived

by
was

anyone.

observational

results

received

with

incredulity by
faultless.

who theorists,
outcome
was

maintained
a

that

Euler's

reasoning
between

The

veritable

dead-lock

theory and observation. At length Simon Newcomb reasoned thus within himself : Euler, in making his calculations, that the Earth is a perfectly assumed for the rotatory His of months' ten rigidbody. assigning a period movement that assumption. It is possible on depend entirely may there may that, if the Earth is not taken as beingperfectly rigid, still be deducible but that this the movement of a pole, rotatory
movement

may

be

shown

to

have
were

period of

fourteen

months

instead

of ten.

These

ideas

worked

out, and

theory and

Thus reconciled. observation, after many finally hitches, were Newcomb the true meaning of the discrepancy discovered showed He of the to a disproof showed that it amounted by Chandler.

absolute-rigidity assumption,
that the Earth is far from
have

to

the

establishment More
have

of the
recent

theory
measure

beingideally rigid.

researches which

confirmed

this conclusion, and

shown

that the

of the Earth's Chandler We

out

is exactlygiven by plasticity

the observations

adduced.

see,

then, how, by
of which

long and
different

intermittent

process, carried

at different
a

periodsby
the

of

method

and investigators, to a great applicationwas

we

by

means
un

extent

conscious, the assumption

thesis This
was

which

have

called the Second

Hypo

and developed, applied,

in the end

disproved.
of the Earth of the

Second
as a

considered

Hypothesis concerned the and whole. Its disproof

Earth
as

behaviour

the establishment

by Chandler's results bear the original on only indirectly question as to the conditions of the We crust. interior of the Earth from its outer as distinguished
of the plasticity measured

440 These
to

THE well-known

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII. iv.

facts of
two

be

developed into
:

PhysicalScience enable the hypothesis forms capable of being experimentally

the
interior

tested

Tremors (i.)

propagated through
as

of the

Earth

travel with at least

great a speed as those propagated

the interior of the than
crust.

through the outer

Tremors (ii.)
cause
no

crust.

propagated through
more,

Earth

and

possibly less, displacementof the

traversed
outer

of the substances particles

do

tremors

propagatedthrough the
The

Earth's

in these two directions was no development of the hypothesis difficult matter. But what of the experimental verification which its establishment ? for What fabled giant of the was necessary wildest wield could make or a fairy-tale sledge-hammer heavy the Earth as might result in the pro enough to give such a blow to of the tremors throughout globe ? The developedforms pagation of the hypothesis might have waited long for their experimental and supplied to the rescue testinghad not the Earth itself come it had countless of phe series suppliedduring (as,indeed, ages) a which for the first time recognized as natural were nomena now experiments of the very kind that the hypothesisneeded for its convincing verification.

We
exists

have
but

spoken

above
of the

of the Earth.

enormous

amount

of heat
is very

that It is

in the interior

Now

this heat from

slowly

indeed,

stillunceasingly, passing away

the Earth.

continuallyrisingby conduction to the surface, and thence is lost Professor J. D. Everett has estimated by radiation into space. whole the that,were globe covered with a shell of ice one-fifth of an inch in thickness,that shell could be entirely melted by the amount of heat which thus escapes annually from the Earth.
As
a

consequence

of this continual
the Earth-crust

tracts.

Further,
reveal

has to accommodate
causes

loss of heat, the Earth con itself to this violent

perpetualshrinkage, and
which
the
tons

this

adjustment

shocks,
of earth

themselves
an

at the Earth's

surface

in the form
to take

quakes. Suppose
rocks at
on a

adjustment
ten

of this kind

place among
is

depth of
inch.

miles, where
such

the pressure
as

the square
must

Under

pressure

this

thirty-five even a slight

adjustment produce an exceedinglyviolent shock, of which the effect is propagated in the form of undulatory tremors throughout the globe. If the shock is sufficiently intense, the surface of the
Earth above
the
centre

of disturbance
wave-commotion

will shake

and

rend

as

the

vibrations reach it.

in violence decreasing until it is increases, of miles away

The
as no

spreadsin
the centre

all directions, of disturbance thousands

not

the distance from

Yet longerdirectly perceptible.

area,

from

the disturbed
can.

though

we

may
set

feel the
at

tremor, delicate instruments

seismometer,

up

any

CHAP.

XLVL]
the Earth's become
all the

ILLUSTRATIONS surface, will be sensitive

far too faint
on

441

point on
which
senses,

to

earthquaketremors

have

to

be

and

records faithfully These

its that

of particulars
distant which
a

earthquakes

directlyperceived by our drum the revolving paper take place even in the most
Those have

countries.

seismograms

representEarth-tremors family resemblance.

Thus, Professor
has accurate
news

vary in character. in any specific area originating

Milne, in his laboratory at Shide, in the Isle of

of every

Wight,
after the

earthquake
the
a

very

short

time

its occurrence.

He

looks

at

seismogram,
certain

and
a-l"

observes
he is able

nature
'

of the tracing.
This is the

If it is of

kind

"

to say

Japanese group of earth quakes. Therefore an earthquake has been taking place in Japan during the last half-hour, and the tracingtells me the magnitude of
:

tracing proper

to the

the shock.'
'

This
an

is the

seismogram tracing proper to

If the

is of another the West

kind

Indian
has

he will say earthquakes ; I see

"

cr2
"

that

violent earthquake exceptionally

just now

taken

place

region.' of very frequent earthquakes ; about a Japan is the scene Let that thousand take place there every us a year. suppose vigorous earthquake has occurred in the neighbourhood of Tokio.
in that The

earth-tremors

are

propagated

thence

over

the

surface

and

Speaking through the interior of the globe in all directions. in the simplest way we possible, roughly, and putting the matter three main routes : may say that they reach the Isle of Wight by
(1) (2)
The The direct
route

through the

interior

of the Earth
the Earth's

shorter

route superficial

(3) The

route longer superficial

through through the Earth's

crust crust.

Shide

(Isle of

Wight)

442

THE
tremors

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC different routes

[XIII. iv. reach Shide

The

propagated along these

: a

at different

times

(1) About
been

quarter of

an

hour

after

an

earthquake-shock has

felt in

Japan

the

begins to record

the tremors

at Shide pencilof the seismometer arrivingby the direct route

through the interior of the Earth. (2) Three-quarters of an hour after this the pencil makes the same another record of precisely form, but on a much scale. This the tremors by the larger arriving represents
shorter
route. superficial
an a

(3) About
made

half
on

hour

later still a

similar precisely
the

record is
a

largerscale than
the second. in two

but first,

on

smaller

scale than

We from been

are

interested chiefly
:

deductions and

that have

been

made

these observations shown that

(i.) By comparing times of

the tremors
Earth

arrival

distances

it has travelled,

propagated through the interior of the propagatedby way of the that the velocityvaries with the square the the surface. When root of the depth beneath the Earth's of tremors the centre are velocity propagation traversing
travel at greater speed than do those Earth's crust. Indeed, it has been shown
is
more

than

ten

miles

per second

near

the

surface it is not

two

amplitudes of the tremors, as repre by respective seismograms, show that the tremors which have travelled by the direct route smaller amplitudes have much which than those have travelled by either of the superficial routes. Hence is deduced the fact that the particles which the materials of in the Earth's interior are less are displacedby composed any given shock than are those of the Earth's crust. earthquakesented their Thus
the
two

miles per second. Measurements (ii.)

of the

developed forms

of

our

hypothesishave

been

experimentally tested and established ; and so precise are the results obtained that they not only verify the hypothesisitself, but enable us to state it in a far preciser form than that in which it was first proposed. It is now established fact of knowledge an
that the materials
are more

of which

the interior
as we

of the Earth
it at
at

are

composed
surface.

rigidthan
and
under

solid steel

know
of the

ordinary tempera
Earth's of the Earth's

tures

atmospheric pressure
the solution

the

Thus

we

have

reached

problem

rigidity.
The

investigation of

this

problem, when

studied

from

methodologicalstandpoint,offers several
instruction. In the the

points
the

of interest
ultimate

the and

first place,the
we

long acceptance and

have called the Second

fate of

assumption which

Hypothesisteaches

CHAP.

XLVL]

ILLUSTRATIONS
lesson

443

us

the

important

that, when
upon

deductive
on

theory
come
as

on

the
to
: a

one

hand, and must lock, we

the results of observation fall back

the other,

dead the

such

questions

these

Are

sake really trust assumptions adopted by Theory for simplicity's have element worthy ? May not these simplifications ignoredsome which"if taken into account, might bring about a reconciliation
between the

results of Deduction

and

the

data

of Observation the dis

the results of Observation, may not Instead of discrediting to the disproof of some as pointing crepancy be interpreted thetical assumption ? A in the

hypo

tact that, is the important feature of the investigation the testing of the Second and the Third Hypotheses respectively,

second

problem

was

approachedfrom
have here
two

two

different

and

independent
facts
:

standpoints. We
(1) Observations
tions

separategroups
of the

of observed

the movements respecting

deduced
The

From each earth-tremors. respecting the of the Earth. conclusions certain rigidity respecting the first set of observations tends to emphasize its plasticity,
set its

pole; (2) observa of these groups are

happens that one simply serve to from drawn those the other definiteness to standpoint, give greater of rigidity In the presentcase that the amount it is possible required be be found the observations to seismic incompatible by may observations the with the amount of plasticity regarding by required the movements of the pole. If this is so, the whole argument will rigidity. In such
drawn from the
a case

second

it sometimes

the conclusions

point of view

of observa both sides until the two groups If such complete harmony be shown tions can to be concordant. of a narrowly restricted be reached, it will involve the assigning can have
to

be

revised

on

degreeof rigidity.The interior of the Earth must be shown to be enough to just ri^id enough to pleaseMr. Milne, and just plastic The Mr. Chandler. content hope of an accurate solution of the increased thus is by the fact that the investi problem greatly gation has been carried on from two points of view which are apparently antagonisticin their requirements. If solutions of
a

problem

offered from

two

oppositesides

of the the

question
common

can

be shown is true

to be

coincident, the

that probability

result
is
no

is very

great indeed.

there Generallyspeaking,

more

fact than convincing vindication of the truth of a questioned proof that various independent lines of evidence all converge

the
in

maintainingit. A third point which

this

complexitywith
consider and
the
ocean

which

illustrates is the intricate investigation Whether we phenomena cohere in Nature. the

tides, or

rotatory movements

of the

Earth

of its

or poles,

rigidityis seen important conclusion

that, whenever
we

its internal tremors, the to be equally involved.

question of the Earth's The methodologically

instances
as

that

we

draw any

from group

such

this is

reason

from

of observed

facts, we

444

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIII.

iv.

are

drawing by
be any

conclusions
means

to

which

the Our

remaining
conclusions based
on

facts
are

of

Nature

are

not to

indifferent.
account

always
groups
of

liable facts but har

called

to

by
remote

reasonings
from those

other
we

perhaps
really
monious

apparently together
system.
with

on

which
one

reasoned

them

belonging

to

and

the

same

XIV.

POSTULATE. INDUCTIVE THE

448

THE

PROBLEM
the

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.

idea, in
between modified
must

close relation to which the

ing steady throughout

calculated
or

inquiry.
and

results

hypothesesare framed, remain If any occurs discrepancy first be must facts,the hypothesis
only
in last resort

the

fit the facts,and changed so as Idea be brought in question.

to

Postulate
The
term
'

and

Working Idea.
in
one an a or

postulate
main

'

may

conveniently be used
It may
'

the

priori methodologicalguiding principle.' The Principle of Logical Consistencywould be an a prioripostulate that is, a postulate which, if denied, would leave the Reason irrational. An a priori to have postulateis the Reason's demand its own intrinsic nature respectedas an indispensable precondition to its functioningat all. be denied Such a postulatecannot with
senses.

other

of two

stand

either for

of necessity

the reason,

or

for

"

out

self-contradiction. of the
denial

For

what

is

to

guarantee
from

the

rational

character not

if the requirement of
is to hinder the denial

logical consistencybe

respected ?
as a

What

beingexplained

disguise? away Under the second of the two headings we have the Inductive Postulate of Determinism. This deterministic postulate is not in the sense in which this term has just been defined. a priori It is not a law of Thought. The Reason and this fundamental stipu do not stand and fall together. The lation of Inductive Method the postulate is the principle, does Method, however, of which and it is on this account stand or fall with the postulate, that the called is postulate methodological.' A methodologicalpostulate lies at the root of rational inquiry in this sense that it defines the reach after,and the type of explanationthat such inquiry must method type of appropriate to such explanation. Inductive Prin Inductive Postulate,' Inductive Method,' Inductive Ideal ciple,'
'
"

corroborative

affirmation in

'

'

'

'

of

Explanation,' Inductive

'

Conceptionof Fact,' are

but different

and the the same : expressions of one dominating determinant the view observer. the external scientific pointof view, pointof of We of the to term use then, postulate in the sense propose, methodological postulate. Hence we shall be free to discuss the limits of the Inductive Postulate, for these will not necessarily coincide with the limits of the human understanding. In a certain sense, a methodologicalpostulatemay be described idea. idea of the is It as a working a working Reason, all Reason's methods being working methods to be appraised by their explana But it is not a working idea of the scientific point of tory power.
' '

view, for

its limitations

coincide with

the

scientific horizon.

It is

of the scientific outlook, and not tentatively regulative of it. Relative to the scientific Postulate point of view, the Inductive
constitutive is
an a a priori postulate,

vital

requirement which

cannot

be severed

CHAP.

XLVIL]
the method

THE

INDUCTIVE which
it informs and

POSTULATE without
be

449

from

leaving that

method

of development incapable The deterministic wmdeterministic

condemned

to barrenness.

postulate should

distinguishedfrom
If the former

the the

ideal of Natural
a

Science.

defines

the

of legitimacy

hypotheticalexplanation,the latter defines

on

depends. An ex planation may be said to be conclusive when accompanied by the other is possible. Thus, the proof that a that no demonstration reciprocal a proof, in other given causal relation is necessarily of a plurality of causes words, which eliminates the possibility ideal of unideterministic Scientific the would satisfy Explanation.
essential condition
" "

which

its conclusiveness

The The

Inductive

Postulate

and

the Inductive

Principle.

be fully of Fidelity Fact can to Relevant Principle For it is Postulate. understood only in the lightof the Inductive perceive the meaning only through the latter that we can clearly inductive Fact is relevant to relevant.' of the word inquiry only the expressionof Natural Law in so far as it is conceived as only Inductive
'
"

in

so

far,that is,as
Postulate.
of the the

it is studied Inductive Inductive

under

the limitations

of the Induc

tive

The

Postulate

enunciation under

Principle ;

an

the simply specifies inquiry carried out its direction former.

of the latter has generalinspiration the by meaning put upon the callydetermined

specifi

Postulate Dr. tion Whewell defined is not

a

and

Necessary
truth
as

Truth.
a

necessary

the proposition
and

nega

;* only Whewell's. the same as practically He and Mill denies that this is an objects, adequate account. of thingsby our human to measuring the possibility capacity rightly, when have He explains that often seen of conceiving them. we in any one and thought of two things together,and have never there of them is either seen instance or by the separately, thought which in may primary law of association an increasing difficulty, the the end become two of conceiving things apart.' insuperable, when he eminent urged (at the Thus, even e.g., Comte, persons of Spectroscopy were the principles when time being dis very
of which definition is Spencer's
'
"

false,but

inconceivable

Herbert

covered)
what what the
was

that
stars

it

was

inconceivable
made

that

we

should unable

ever

discover conceive

were

of
to

"

have be not

seemed

to

afterwards
done and

found
service

only quite conceivable, but

the is

quite true.
Mill has

good
the

between distinguishing by clearly

inconceivable
*

unbelievable

;|

but

further
II., ch.

distinction
v.,

Vide J. S. Mill, ' A System of Ibid., Book II., ch. vii.,"3.

Book Logic,'

" 6. 29

450

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.

the inconceivable and the imperatively called for that between to regard as identical unimaginable. These two words Mill seems that the in meaning. For our only genuine incon part, we hold the mean ceivable is the strictly irrational, the self-contradictory, ingless. Where it is stillconceivable that greater knowledge may be termed shed light a mystery, that logically mystery cannot upon feel very sceptical about it, but that is inconceivable.' We may
"

'

another Mill's holds

matter.
own

view
we

of necessary

truth

is far from
are

satisfactory.He straight

that what

call necessary

truths
'

experimentaltruths,
from
to

from generalizations lines cannot enclose

a

observation. space
argues
.

The

Two proposition,

is

an

induction that

the evidence

of

our

senses.'* truths
an

He

that it is unreasonable
is

attribute to
rest

these

origin different from

of all the

of

our

knowledge of Nature when their existence for by supposing their originto be the same.
axiom,
' '

Two

straightlines
one

cannot

Experimentalproof crowds
without
an

in upon

accounted perfectly Speaking still of the he writes : enclose a space,' in such endless profusion, us
can

and of

instance

in which
we

there

be
soon

even

suspicion

exception to the rule, that ground for believing the axiom,

than
we

should
as an

even

stronger experimentaltruth,
which
we con

have

have

for almost

fessedlylearn from the We shall presentlydiscuss

"

any evidence

of the of

general truths
our

senses.' of this
truth
a mere

the
a

weakness
necessary
as

positionof Mill's
axiom

of i.e.,

the
or

attempt
the

to

treat

an (e.g.,

of
is

Geometry
more

Law

of Causation)
to

hypothesisthat
we

than which

usually well grounded.

ourselves the
the is conviction

Meanwhile that

have
or

already
postu
of its of two

committed
lates

the demands
as a

Reason
are

obliged to make
truths, and

condition these
are

effective exercise kinds

:

necessary

that

(a)

prioripostulates the absolutelynecessary

"

truths (e.g.,

the

Law

of Non-Contradiction).
"

(6) Methodological postulates truths the for reason generally,but

limited
to
some

not, necessary, the for reason

or

indeed,
as

self-

universe particular

aspect of Reality.

The

Inductive

Postulate

as

the Postulate

of

Mechanical

or

Deterministic
The may
so

Explanation of
"

Nature.

Inductive be enunciated

Postulate
as

the Postulate
:

of Causal

Explanation
"

far as
be

may

inductively explainedonly in This it has been determinately broughtunder Causal Law. Postulate. named the Deterministic more expressively
follows
Fact is
*

Vide

J. S. Mill, 'A

System

of

Logic,'Book

II., ch.

v.,

" 4.

CHAP.

XLVIL]
demand

THE
that

INDUCTIVE the

POSTULATE

451

explanation of Nature shall be given in abstract formula, of is far from being a mere of Causal Law terms the It hardest- won interest to logicians victory only. represents
The

of Science, and
are

is

demand of Nature

over

which It

the

keenest

controversies

waged

even

at the

present day.
over

represents the

victory of

magical. Indeed, the true, livingvalue of the deterministic conception of Explanation is seen with the magical, anthropomorphic conception only in contrast
the mechanical view which To it the

the

supplanted.
have

all things appear to savage inanimate of the movements interprets their

source as

in

motives. psychological
to

psychicallife,and he objectsas though they had He thinks of plants and

determine their

animals

and seeks quasi-persons,

etc. sacrifices,

behaviour

by prayers, Again, the

either

savage

sees

anthropomorphism. between objects sympathetic connexion

one

This

is his

because have

they are
a

like

another

they
of
to
as

been previously
man,

connected

(resemblance),or because together(association). Thus

the cut
so

hair of

his shadow, that If

a

related to him closely

man

image, or pictureare conceived it is possible by injuringthem

image
of
a man

injure the
sun
'

himself.
man

waxen

be

set

in

the

to

melt, the

himself will waste

Hence the custom

setti's

Sister Helen

').

D. G. Ros(cf. away of burying hair or nail-

parings,the
care

dislike of
savages

with

which

being sketched or often keep their

:

photographed, and
names,
or

the of

the

names

their

gods, a profound secret.

are

Here order
when chew with.
a

other instances
it may

savage

will

wear

ring of
to

iron

in
or

that

impart
a

its

quality of hardness
a woman

his

body,

bargaining for

asking cow, pieceof wood to soften the heart of the in the So, again, having discovered
or

for

wife, he

will

person he is dealing lion the quality of

or courage, become may

in the deer

that

eat

enemy virtues from

an

bold, and to acquire

he eats the former that he of swiftness, he well. the latter that So he will run may his

boldness, or

kinsman

to

prevent his

going out of the family. These instances multiplied. Whether might be indefinitely anthropomorphicor magical,the explanationsare all equallynonis the protest of Science The postulateof Induction mechanical. It and requires that natural Magic. against Anthropomorphism
follow from shall natural

effects shall natural

conditions, and
natural

vice

versa

that
now

conditions the

give

rise to

effects.

It is

recognized as that is,which sciences a principle,

"

principleof all the regulative specific

determines the

natural

generalmethod
be

or

direction ideas

of

inquiry, however
middle of the

hypothesesmay

modified

or

working

displaced.
nineteenth

Towards
There

the

were irregularities were

observed

in the movements ways

two

conceivable

puzzling planetUranus. of hypothetically explaining

of the 29"2

century, certain

452

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC been
in

[XIV.
modi motion

The orbit of Uranus have must irregularities. fied either mechanically, by the influence of matter elsewhere, or else by the immediate operation of some these
not

volitional
was

agency in itselfinconceivable.
was an

of

more

than

human

power.

This that

second

alternative
as a

It

was

inadmissible

only

scientific
not

explanation. It
possiblyhave
its
own

alternative

Astronomy

could

admitted
"

limitations

without i.e.,

posing,now,
sible for the found
it out

that
?

some

transgressed ceasing to be Astronomy. Sup incalculable demon had really been respon
we

without

admitting that it had

could Astronomy, perturbations,

ask,

ever

have

puzzlingits mighty intellect for a mechanical solution, and meanwhile blaming its the of ^reflective nature of the surface the or disturbing telescopes, body, or its extraordinary density that resulted in its being too small for visibility, etc. ; and so it would for ever, go puzzling on and its readjusting hypotheses working conceptions even, perhaps, the phenomenon that of gravitation itself in order to render It would, in fact, simply repeat over mechanically intelligible. in its those processes of adjusting again, improved modern way, and the which forced excentrics were same epicycles by respect for regulativeIdeas upon the bewildered observers of the Middle Ages. The postulate or Supreme Idea is a principlefor working with, and not for discussing. The same great regulative principle the principleof Deter minism is sometimes in Psychology, and assumed even by the
no means.
"

By

It would

stillbe

"

"

"

most

modern

writers.
'

'

Psychology, like
"

writes

be deterministic Hoffding, must the assumption that the causal law holds good even the will,just as this law is assumed to be valid for
conscious life and for material will
nature.

other science,' every it must start from i.e.,

in the the life of

remaining
to

If there

are

limits

this

assumption, they
Professor James would-be

coincide
a

with

the

limits
manner

to

Psychology.'*
'

Psychology, as a Science, must, Science, postulate determinism in its and abstract facts, complete consequently from the effects of free-will even if such a force exists. 'f
:

speaksin

similar precisely
like every

other

The

identification of the Inductive

with

the Deterministic

Postu

late may and to involve a gratuitous to be arbitrary, appear to some restriction of the Inductive Method. This, however, is not the case. There
a

is inherent which

in the very

attitude of Science the identification

is that
to

towards
in

its facts An

restriction

compels
a

question.
the facts

intrinsic

requirement of scientific method

his facts from this external Method
of

the theorist shall

them

approach
selves,and
Inductive
*
'

standpointexternal
is There
are

attitude

for the form responsible

two

which
ways in

takes. necessarily

main

Outlines

f
sonal

'

Text-book

Psychology,'English translation, by Mary Lowndes, p. 345. Per Psychology,'p. 456. For a criticism of these views, see edited by Henry Sturt, pp. 166 et seq. Idealism, Philosophical Essays,'
of
'

CHAP.

XLVIL]
we can

THE

INDUCTIVE
facts. We

POSTULATE

453

which
to
are a

study
to
a

scientific or concerned
each

study them in relation either may In the former interest. case, we philosophic
relations
case we

solelywith the
In the

in which
are

the

facts with

stand
their

to

other.
to us, who

second
them

concerned
The

relation
as

know

and

observe

them, with

their function ques

factors here

in is
:

a
'

concrete How do

experience. spiritual
the facts

dominant

we are studying express spiritual however, is possible i nvestigation, teleological purpose only when the inner standpoint of personalexperienceis adopted. a of the case, the object is approached from When, by the nature standpoint external to it,it is only the external, sense-perceivable of being studied. Thus, in of the object that admits behaviour ask about we can the only question which legitimately this case our objectis : How does this objectembody natural law ?' Now, of Nature are the Sciences obliged to approach their object from

tion

?'

Such

'

the

outside.

'

Whatever

life

or

mind
the

may

constitute

the

inner

being
in such

of so-called inanimate
a

Nature,

scientist cannot

share it
a

way

as a

agent poseful
we

any knowledge of its procedureas But just in so his basis for investigations.'*
to make

pur far as

regard an objectfrom the inner pointof view of the end be tending to realize, a procedureof that object may or purpose of behaviour tentative imperative. Laws explanation becomes and be left the object, be hypothetically must superinduced upon acceptance. dependent on verification for their objective entirely make to do need be we If the questionshould postu asked, Why is needed lates at all ?' the reply is simply this : that the postulate mean we to define what explanation. It is of no by a legitimate to which shall enable us to begin an use inquiry without a test not is legitimate whether, or decide whether an alleged explanation be accepted as a possible in fact,it can explanation. The postulate If a suggestedexplana kind. this is a test of of scientific method
fail to
'
"

tion

violates

the

postulateof
none

mechanical
true
or

connexion,
"

Inductive
neces

Science will have

sities
"

of it. Science

The
demand

interests

indeed, the
no

of Inductive
a

that postulate

explana
be enter

tion

of

magical
a

or

otherwise
even as a
'

indeterministic
'

character

tained In
a

for

moment,
to

explanation. possible Logic (Book III.,ch. xxi.) Mill has

famous

chapter of
of

his

endeavoured
'

the Ground

Postulate, or, as he calls it, present the Inductive and from experience, Induction,'as a generalization
same

standing on preciselythe established hypothesis or law

as

inductive He

footing as
enunciates
:

well-

of Nature.
as

this Law

of Causation,
'

or

Ground
or

of Induction,

follows

Every event,
cause,
some

the

beginning of
on

some

antecedent,

have every phenomenon, must it is in of which the existence

consequent. 'f variablyand unconditionally

to Ethics,' Introduction A Philosophical Book III., ch. xxi., " 1. "j- A System of Logic,'
*

From
'

'

p. 54.

454

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.
that

be This law, he maintains, can of Simple Enumeration. process have

"

inductivelyproved, and
In certain based
which
on our

by
we

cases,

may instances is
so

the

completest proof namely, in those cases in

as

simple
survey
met

he says, enumeration
over

of

instances been any

extensive

to

leave

us we

convinced should
truth
to

that, had
have
an

there it.

instance

contrary
to

to the law,
sure

with

In

order

be

of the

of

Induction
able
to to the to the

by Simple
affirm two

Enumeration, we things: (1)that

and
we
'

must,
'

according
never

Mill, be
an

we

have

known

instance instances
cases

in Nature (2) that if there were have should of them.'* known the

any

contrary '; contrary,

of second.

In most

of this kind
the

Induction But
Mill the

firstaffirmation
it
'

has to be made

without

of Induction peculiarity
the

is that ingeniously, in extent.

proportion as
limited

by Simple Enumeration, argues and insufficient exactly in subject-matterof the observation is specialand
is delusive

As

the

spherewidens,
; and

this unscientific
the most the

method class

becomes of truths

less and
"

less liable to mislead

universal

of principles and number of geometry are satisfactorily duly proved by of other that method are alone, nor they susceptible a,ny proof. 'f Mill sustains this point' by the followingargument : An Induc be affirmed as true only within tion by Simple Enumeration can for not certain limits of time, place,and circumstance,' the reason beyond those limits being that the fact extending its application be a consequence of colloca of its holding true within them may in exist which be to concluded cannot one place because tions, be dependent on the accidental they exist in another ; or may which of time or absence of counteractingagencies, any variation the smallest change of circumstances possibly bring into may play.' the subject-matter of any Now, argues Mill, if we suppose there is no time, no generalization to be so widely diffused that afford of but must and combination an no circumstances, place, and be truth it found if its either its of of never or falsity, example be contingent on any colloca otherwise than true, its truth cannot and it must all times such exist at i.e., as tions, unless places it be frustrated by any hold good for all collocations ;J nor can It unless by such as never actuallyoccur. counteractingagencies,
the law
"

of causation, for instance, and and

'

'

'

'

"

'

'

System
'

of

Logic,'Book
'

III.,ch. iii., " 2.

from
in

t Ibid., ch. xxi., " 3.

I By
the

collocation of

(an expression borrowed

or

Dr.

coexistence relations. For and succeeds

causes

causal

tendencies

certain

chain. The have caused

by a example, a lady is troubled, in cycling, between interference this result to an tracing gear-case and loose but this of itself could not to be slightly displaced, gear-case is seen would the rattle provided the chain had been sufficiently taut, nor
in
"

Chalmers) Mill means and relative positions constant rattle, noisy

the mere had been in order. looseness of the chain have caused it if the gear-case ' The fact of the two circumstances being present together their collocation,'as Mill would for the production of the effect. put it is indispensable
"

456

THE
into
to

PROBLEM
which

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.
and
are accus

divided tomed

one

in sphere,

we

feel at

home,

expect results
which
Law
are

phenomena
The (ii.)

and another composed of certainty, changing, variable,and fortuitous.'*

with

of Causation, as the Ground of Induction, cannot be have a methodological a mere generalization from experience ; it must significance. is aban Let us, then, suppose that this proof by Enumeration
to prove the Law that the attempt is made of Causation the will view We that surfaceby a suppose of fact,inseparable the Method of Simple Enumeration, is from

doned,

and

scientific induction.
and

given up,
has
never

that

will further

suppose failed to

thorough-goinganalysistakes its place. We Nature that, as the result of such analysis, reveal the uniformity which the hypothesis
There
are,

requires for
some

its verification.

such

procedure as
he says

this is what

indeed, indications that Mill reallyhas in mind, and

'

that
to

his Enumeration
'

implies: for
us

process is not so unanalytic as its name that it is as phenomena become better known found
to

that

they
it is
'

are
'

obey

the law

of

uniformity of
when able to
we

succes a

sion ; that

after due

examination,'
we

and

know

phenomenon
obedience
if the

well,' that sufficiently

are

perceive its

might be thought that, were granted, Mill's main con tention that the Law is a generalization of Causation from experi would be justified, ence though we might be dissatisfied with his of method supporting his thesis. Let us consider this point.
In any suggested above suppositions
to causal case,

law.f

it

We

must
as

admit
a

that, if Mill

were

prepared to accept

the

Law

of

the same simple hypothesis of precisely standing as the hypothesisof gravitationor any other well-grounded hypo

Causation

thesis,and
duction
on

did not
which

attempt
'

to

erect

the

law

into

Ground

of

In

Methods validity of all the Inductive depends,'! the proof might be accepted as amounting to a very verification. And, indeed, Mill does not regard the satisfactory than the most Uniformity of Nature as anything more general and the most extensively verified of causal laws, as witness the following famous
'

the

passage

The

uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise

called

the

Law of

be received not as a law of the universe, of Causation, must but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means
sure

observation, with

reasonable
is itself

degree of
an

extension

to

adjacent cases.
But if the
same as

'"
Law

of Causation
the

induction, it
The

cannot

be at the

time

Criterion

of Induction.

Ground

of

Induction,
*
'

Mill understands

it,cannot

be the Standard
p. 306.

of Induc-

'

ch. v., " 93, 12. Logik,'vol. ii., English translation, A System of Logic,' Book III.,ch. xxi., "4.

J Ibid., "

1.

" Ibid., " 4.

CHAP.

XLVIL]
It cannot

THE

INDUCTIVE
what

POSTULATE
to understand

457

tion.

tell us

we

are

by

an

inductive

an us explana so that is inductively inductivelylegitimateand one of In so far, then, as the methodological illegitimate. significance criterion Induction its to of ability supply a depends on a ground of Inductive of for the legitimateapplication Method, the Law be said to possess any Causation, as interpreted by Mill, cannot methodologicalsignificance. other than this The significance question then remains : What Induction can a methodological significance ground of possess ? which the alone form is rele in the narrower question Or, to state other than this vant to the present criticism : What significance Mill's of Induction Ground can methodological significance lay the of of function Ground The claim ? Induction, to according the ultimate to Mill, is to serve as major premiss for every specific induction, not contributing at all to prove it,but being a necessary condition of its being proved (Book III., ch. iii., " 1). Thus, the

explanation,and
tion that is

enable

to

between distinguish

'

'

statement,
for had
not

'

The
the

coarse

of

Nature
heat the

is uniform is
a

'
"

Mill's favourite

for expression warrant

Ground

of Induction"
causes

necessary of Nature,

condition
For
we

proving,for instance, that

no

evaporation.

if we should

for

assuming

uniformity

concluding from our observations on heat that it the evaporation of tends to cause" i.e., uniformly tends to cause" liquids. Now, our sole guarantee, according to Mill, for assuming with that Nature is uniform is that Experience shows convincing that for law there that is law is it a a everything consistency The ch. is am word h owever, 1). III., Experience,' (Book v., "
feel safe in
'
' '

biguouslyvague.
argument,
interest.'
interest
'

So

far

as
'

the

term

has

it should

mean
'

It is, then,

Experience as Experience as relevant

on a

any relevancy to Mill's relevant to the inductive

to

the

inductive

which

establishes
since

firm inductive

basis the

uniformity
the
are

of Nature. very

Hence,

the

inductive this

interest

itself defines

experience which
The

establishes

uniformity,we
us

driven
ever

to ask

whether, apart from

query, We

that interest, the

so

uniformity could
at
once

be established.
crux

formulated, leads
see

to the

of the indictment.
the inductive

shall

that
our

this inevitable

reference uni
on on

to

interest
as

requiresthat
Ground
that in the is uniform. the
sense

confidence

in the

formity
the this

of Nature

the

of Induction It is

shall itself rest

that postulate

Nature

only

as

depending

methodological demand
inductions specific Law

Ground

guarantee

of Induction indicated by Mill.

can

Mill's proofof the (iii.)

or a Petitio indirectly,

of Causation
'

either directly involves,

'

Principii.

ultimate of Causation, the major premise (as scientific induction, should itself have been Mill calls it) of every That the Law

obtained

by

'

Induction

'

does

not,

from

Mill's

point of view,

458

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.

that the major maintains principii ; for he petitio any ' the proof of the conclusion, but is itself proved, premiss is never involve

along with

But we hold evidence.'* conclusion,from the same that the fallacyof petitioprincipiivitiates the very process by ultimate which, according to Mill, the major premise has been within obtained. A successful proof of the Law of Causation, even the
' '

the

be experience,must necessarily based on the assumption that there is more uniformity in Nature than at first meets the eye. As we have already seen, the facts do

limits of

restricted

range

of

not

thrust the idea of Causal

gator.
met

Apparent
But

investi the impressionable upon exceptionsto the reign of law will inevitablybe

Law

with.

if the

scientist

is not

assuming
he

that

fact

must

not why exemplify law, there is no reason the exceptions he that should final. Why exceptions as suspect but disguisedexemplifications of law ? are in treating The justified simple truth is that we are logically of it apparent exceptions to order as merely disguisedinstances make it a postulate of the only on condition that we deliberately where search after knowledge that we shall look for order even mind The must in the facts. order is not palpably manifested find make its own for Causal Uniformity, or it will never demand

should

accept these

it realized.

So far
he

as

Mill finds order

so

beneath

the surface of natural

assuming the fundamental by implicitly that the intelligi postulate of all inductive inquiry ; he assumes of fact for Science depends on its being conceived in the light bility

phenomena,

does

of

law.

Limits Provided
as a

of the Inductive
Postulate
is

or

Deterministic

Postulate.^
be treated

that the

of Determinism
"

guiding principle methodological

Inductive Method
to be

as

limitingthe
"

simply sphere in
relevance

which

to facts that refuse

and as having no applicable, explained on the ground of it than that

this
it

cipleneeds
From under
our

no

other limitation

imposed
may be

upon

prin by the

facts themselves.

present point of
heads
:

view

facts

roughly classed

three

(1) Inorganic. (2) Organic. (3) Self-conscious.

In reference to this works postulate
*
'

rough division of facts,we

the first two
III., ch. xxi., " 4.

may

say

that

the

well within

realms

of fact

(though the
'

System

of

Logic,'Book
I
am

section indebted much to Dr. Sigwart's Explanation on ' in the fifth chapter of his alreadyclassical Method by the Nature of Substances Dendy, ology ('Logik,' vol. ii., ch. v., " 100. English translation by Helen

t In what

follows

pp.

460-480).

CHAP.

XLVIL]

THE

INDUCTIVE
has what be

POSTULATE
to

459

nature two

of the determinism with

understood

in differently

the

whereas cases),

is central and

essential in the third not, and

movements

of facts it is entirely inadequate to deal. group Determinism is an effective postulate Whether or

when
on

how,
or or

adequate and
the
ultimate

it is fruitful, of the

exactlyto be
substance

interpreted, depends
require Ideas
between

nature

whose

activities

it is concerned
as

with

We interpreting. of the substances

well
as

working concepts
causal
nature

to the nature

which
the

interaction

takes

place, as

Ideas

concerning

of that causal interaction itself.

Thus, in dealing with inorganicphenomena, Science has adopted and In the electron. the concepts of the molecule, the atom,

attempting to deal with organic phenomena on the basis of the of substance, it lias found itselc to the nature same as suppositions of the facts, and it has been unable to give complete explanation and develop obligedto adopt the further concepts of individuality mental ment. in to activity,the con Finally, attempting explain for giving any cept of freedom,which has been found indispensable action, has sprung meaning to human up in direct antagonism to the deterministic postulate. Let us consider these points more : closely
1. The
seems

concept of
take for

the its

atom.

The

atom

(or the electron, which

ultimate
an

likelyto

the place as representing

nature

of substance

Science) is physical

conceived

as

indivisible,
of of
as

invariable

certain fundamental force-centre, inherentlypossessing

of the ultimate this view nature upon the conception of a mechanism is based
'

force-attributes; and
substance (material)
the universe which

attempts
atoms

to representall

events perceptible

the motion
The universe of what

of invariable of the

according to invariable

laws.'*

mechanism

of the heavens, of which this mechanism best the is the imaginative extension, furnishes example
a

It is needless to say that the conception involves. extended (atomistic) conception of a thorough-going mechanical that as justification explanation of the universe has not the same of the mechanical explanationof the planetary system. That such

could be the
course

case

only
are

were as

this

to interpretthe explanation

whole

of the

universe

and

their satellites In the

one

as intelligibly interpreted by the

the

motions laws

of

planets and gravitation

the it is far indeed

of the

inertia.

case

the Given

is

on explained completely

ground from admitting of

Thus,
the

of the mechanical any

hypothesis ; in the
such

other

complete explanation. explain the facts of development by the interactions of atoms that mutually attract or repeleach other is far from need other concepts or here being satisfactory. We than those of atom inherent force.' The thoroughand categories
attempt
to
' '
"

Dr.

by

Helen

vol. ii., ch. ChristophSigwart, Logik.' Dendy, p. 409.

'

v.,

" 100,

11.

English translation

460

THE

PROBLEM that each

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.

going

is only a collective individuality which interact by virtue of their inherent forces, aggregate of atoms and that the development of these individualities, their disposition to pass through successive is in the stages, already pre-established relative to one It another. originalconfigurationof the atoms need hardly be pointed out that upon life and this view mind the world's are course by-products, being already mechanically predetermined. Thus, consistent atomists regard Consciousness as
us
' ' ' '

atomist

tells

epiphenomenal, as
changes.
2. Truer

mere

spectator of

its

own

predetermined

are individuality when we to deal with organic life. Let us come the meaning of first consider this meaning has as development,' itself gradually developed. In the meaning of the term organic or development we can, as Dr. Sigwart says, distinguish process several stages of growth. unfold First,we have the original meaning of the word, a mere scroll or the expansion of a ing, as in the opening of a rolled-up bud into the full-blown flower. This conception is then enlarged, to take in at the same time the idea of growth, a growth not so as only in volume, but also in differentiation. This meaning also is illustrated by the development of a flower-bud. Not only do its parts unfold, but they also change in size and shape, and their tissues become continually less and less homogeneous. A still fuller meaning is gained when all the particular stages of the process referred are to one explicitly developingindividual, and an anti thesis is drawn the beginning from which between and the end towards which the subject develops. The end of the development is then conceived as revealingwhat the beginningcontained, as the oak reveals the true nature of the acorn. Finally,when the of to extend concept development is made beyond particular individuals to the whole the of organic universe,' it has range find a reached its deepest meaning ; but in establishing this we which the lies in our to fix definitely difficulty inability upon which to universal be ascribed.' this is to subject development Now, from the point of view of our logicalinquiry, the main adhere to our thingto note is that, though we may still profitably of deterministic postulatein the investigation in that of organic as inorganic forms, we have to introduce into the former investigation a new conception of causal explanation. The earlier stages of the be said to account for the later growth of an organism cannot

conceptions of development and

'

of

obviously needed

'

'

'

'

'

'

stages in
the
'

the

development in
atoms

the

same

sense
can

as

that

in which

the for

distribution of original
later

in space
atoms.

be

said to account
the

distribution
'

of these

For

well as always qualitative atomistic explanation practically ignoresall in the of Thus, case organicdevelopment,we

development

is

change we call and as quantitative, changes. qualitative

cannot

account

for

CHAP.

XLVIL]
one

THE

INDUCTIVE

POSTULATE

^461

any All
are

phase by merely pointing out the phases antecedent to it. we can trulysay is that the phenomena of the beginning of a life which is more completely manifestations of a principle imperfect
in the later

study of antecedents gives us the least distinct clue to this inner principle. The forestramifying root, its massively towering tree, with its deep-striking,
manifested

stages. Hence,

the

trunk,

and

its

system far-spreading

of branches,

more

truly

ex

of its speciesthan did the embryonic infantpresses the nature The strongly plant contained in the seed from which it sprang. the withstand that is able to mighty strain developed root-system

by the feeblyrepresented radicle ; the giant branches and unbranched upholding their minute than more are dense cloud of luxuriant significant explicitly foliage tissues of the tiny and delicate plumule ; the fullydifferentiated but dimly were leaf and twig, of pith and bast and woody fibre, white the small features of in the soft,rudimentary foreshadowed tree in its of all is the mature Most folded embryo. significant for an organism is never so truly or seasons, flowering and fruiting which is the that itself as in so process of reproduction explicitly culminating-pointof its development. In the physical,no less than in the moral, world does the saying hold good : By their
and

leverage

of the

storm-wind

was

but

'

fruits ye shall know 3. That

them.'

explains the beginning in a profounder and completer sense than that in which the beginning explainsthe end that appliesto all developing life as such, whether is a principle of its own like that of a tree, is unconscious development, the life,
the
end
or

is conscious,

or

at

least This

conscious, partially

of it,as

in the

case

of the

life of Mind.

is indeed teleological, stand conscious experience. Just as a finished essay explainsa writer's idea far more truly than do the first rough, incoherent though they do explain something, jottings as these jottings, though they tell us how the thoughts struggled into being, and give us the early history of the idea, yet do not give us its true Man is explained, indeed, both by his past and by his so meaning by his destiny" than by future, but more truly by his future his past. The explanation reaches deeper than the teleological genetic. The attempt, when dealingwith mental development, to explain of its antecedents inevitably the subsequent completelyby means if we were to grant that the religious issues in fallacy. Thus, even could belief in ghosts,we other than a at first no sentiment was sentiment of not reasonablygo on to argue that, since the religious of primitive sentiment to-day is but a development of the religious belief therefore still be essentially a mere transfigured it must man, in ghosts. We might just as profitably argue that, since the first
" " "

as type of explanation,which is known characteristic of all our attempts to under

462

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

[XIV.

efforts fore
But

of Science
it

Science
must

produced
be
we

nothing
a mere

but

fanciful collection
the

conjecture,
of fancies.

there

at
come

bottom
to most

is

when

deal

with

self-conscious
the

activities

of

moral

beings
"

that all
on

we

clearly
"

realize

limits For
any

of

all

deter
to

ministic

i.e., of

inductive
the
to

explanation.
of determinism Where there
to

attempt
stultifies there for
"

explain
that is
no

morality
it

basis

completely
is striven
so no

which

seeks

explain. duty,
the
no

freedom,
after

responsibility,
we

no

ideal inevitable
or even

be
?
"

why
is
a

should

strive
no

against
of

that

morality
but of

question
customary
to

longer
behaviour

character and ; ethics and

of

conduct,
no

merely
what

of

science

longer

ought

be,
With

but the

of

what

has

been

must

be.
and still
more so

conception
of

of

Freedom,
and
rooted

with

the
we

further

concepts
for
the

Immortality
the

God
"

concepts
our

needed,
difficulties

believe,
we

explaining
deterministic
causation there when may

deepest postulate

of

moral

"

leave

far

behind. What
it
"

The

category

of of
ques

mechanical

must

be which

transcended.
can

categories
this
main is
a

explanation
tion

be

transcend

which,
a

systematically Logic.

conceived,

forms

the

problem

of

Philosophical

464

THE
See All.'

PROBLEM
'All'
'

OF
And

LOGIC
'/in'r Division

All:

(ftn.),152-160, 162, 164, 168, 241-243 (see'Categorical Collective Judgment,' Meaning,' Distribu .,' Conjunctive use tive Meaning '). All A's are either
' ' '
. .

'Possibly Quantity-mark: 48

as

49, 53."' In

Ex

tension-formula : 72, 154, 158. Animal: 22, 40, 42, 47, 52, 57, 60, 73-75,

88, 89, 152, 314, 359, 360, 374, 401, See 'Zoology.' 402, 418, 425, 451.
Animism Answer
: :

'

368.

' All P is S ' : 130, 132. ' 160. All S is all P ' : 159 (see 'U 'All S is-not P' : 242. ...'). ' ' All S is P ' : 130, 160. All S is ' All (the) S's are P ' : 159. some all (the)P's ' : 149, 153, 158, 182, 198

or

'

96, 112-114. Antecedent: 112, 137, 138, 141, 142, 145, 263-274, 320, 325, 369-372, 377-385, 397, 408, 411, 412, 419, 'Ac See 424-427, 453, 458, 461. ceptance of the A.,' Hypothetical
'

(see 'U
P's
are
'

.').

'All
'

S's

are-not

Proposition.'

All (the)S's 147, 149, 164. P's 147, 149, 153, 159, 162, :
:
'

Anthropology:
'

46.

166, 239. 149, 158.

Alternative minations 324

All

'

S's

are

some

P's

'

Alphabetical Key

65, 66.
:

Anthropomorphism, 368, 451. Antinomy : 105. 149, 150, 158, 159, 164, 168. : Any ApodeicticHypothetical : 139-142. Its
"

Clauses

112

(see
A.

'

Dis

junctive Judgment ').

Deter

with Inference connexion Its Opposition : 178, 179.

145, 146.

Possibilities : 112, 113, or 131-138, 236, 262, 271, 274, 292, 293,

Apparatus (of Experiment or Obser vation): 145, 334, 335. See 'Transit
Circle.' 282. : 100-106, Apparent Contradiction A. Exception : 357, 401, 421, 458. Method : Applicability of Inductive 458-462. See
'

Disjunctive .'). A. 452 422, Explanations : 416-418, A. (see 'Rival Hypotheses'). Species: 21 (see Disjunctive Di vision '). A. Subjects: 116, 117. Ambiguity : 14, 16-18, 26, 29, 56, 62,
(see
. .

'

'

Application of
396,

74, 76, 78, 102, 105, 121, 135, 154, 159, 164, 208, 246, 281, 282, 285, 286, 327 (ftn.),457 (see 'Non-

389, : 454. Of 399-413, 418-426, Hypothesis : 313, 318, 320-322, 327, 419, 424, 425, 428, 430, 431, 433,
Of Inductive Method
:

Causal

In. Postulate.' Methods

Ambiguity ').
Term
:

A.

of

the

Middle

436, 438.
444.

422-

218. Ambiguous Structure

Of

285, 286.
or

Amphibole : 285, 286. Ampliative Judgment

120-122.

Proposition:
'

18, 21 Of 209 (see 'Indication ...'). to Particulars Universal : 244-247. A.' Apprehension : See ' Immediate

Meanings, Terms, Words : 71, 72, 83, 84, 124, 146, (ftn.),
a

Analogical Argument
'

See

Analogy.'

A.

Inference

'

327.

Approximation : 62, 63, Archeology : 386.

'

331.
'

: 60. Analogy (Biological) : 321, 327, 347, 355, Analogy (Logical)

Are,'
See
'

'

Are

not,'

'

Are-not 289.

163, 164.
See
'

358-364,
431.

A.,'

'

See Sound

369, 424, 425, 428, 430, '"False A."' 'Illegitimate

A.'

Copula-mark.' Arguing in a Circle :

titio ..."

PeAn

Analysis : 29-31, 40, 47, 61, 85, 86,

117, 121, 122, 157, 329, 341, 343, 344, 358, 362, 364, 368, 389, 397-400, 402, 422, 424, 426, 429,
456
'

303, 305, 325, 353, 355, 357, 380, 383, 384, 407, 408, 419431, 433, 435,

Argument alogy.' Arguments

Form
etc.
:

from

Analogy
to

See

'

reduced

Syllogistic
. . .

230-235.
a

Argumentum
:
.

284,
.

285.
.,

dicto secundum quid A. a dicto simplietc.

:

citer

284,
ad ad A.

(see Experimental A.'). A. of Categorical Proposition: 115-126. Of Complex Epicheirema : 261. Of Of Exponibles : 166. Judgment : Of Logical Proposition: 109122.
142.

: fortiori

250. ad

A. A.

A. 285. Hominem

a :

287, 288, 307.

289. A. Passiones 288. : ad Hem

Ignorantiam :
:

Judicium

287.

A. A.

ad
:

ad

Populum
ad

Of
'

Sorites

255-260,

270, 271.

'

Syllogisms: 130-135. Analytic Judgment or Proposition: A. Method 120-122. or Inquiry : See Observation Analysis.' A. :
Of
'

288. A. Verecundiam Aristotelian

288, 307.
:

: 289. Evolution

447.

A.
'

Logic

viii, 307,

353
:

(see
A.

Aris

totle '). A. Sorites Aristotle : 79, 233, Classification

:

255-260,
316.

319. and

392, 403.

-341. A.

Analytical Key : Anatomy, 57, 74,

63-66. 75.

meration

3oU. A"

Figure :

236.

and Enu A. and the Fourth and the Postulate

INDEX,

VERBAL
A. and and the and

AND
Barbara

ANALYTIC

465

216. of Mediation : 213, A. Scholastic Logic : 307. Sorites : 255. Tortoise the
tion
:

215, 226, 230, 237, 241, 247,

:

A.
:

on

292.

38
49
:

(ftn.). On
(ftn.). On
324.

A. the

Achilles Defini on Indirect

250, 256. Bare Denial Baroco

:

See

'

Pure

Negation.'

226, 230,

Term: duction

Indefinite Re
:

On

Subalternation

Its Indirect Its Ostensive Barren Hypothesis

235, 242, 248, 250. Reduction 324, 325. : Reduction : 248-250.

:

313, 337, 338, 424,

289. See
'

172 (ftn.). Aristotle's Categories: 31, 32, 47 (ftn.), A.'s A.'s Organon : 116, 117. 78. of Predicables : 22, 23, 28, 32. Scheme ' Spatialgrouping,' Arrangement : See
'

430, 432.

Begging

the

Question :

Pe-

titio ..."

Being: 31, 42, 47, 122 (ftn.), 131.

Belief:

75-77,

79, 86 (ftn.),

Classification.'
369.

93, 112, 122, 123.

Artificial Classification : 63-66.

140, 141, : Ascertainability

Assertion

93, 94, 96, 97, 104, 113, : 116, 119, 122-128, 133-139, 141, 142,
character of
: Propositions

Jeremy : 361. Bergson, Prof. : 74 (ftn.). Berkeley, George (Bishop): 370,

(ftn.).
Bernoulli
:

Bentham,

393

149-152, 166, 167, 291.

Assertive

333. 447.

123, 124. Assertorial Hypothetical : 139-141.

Its

Berry, Arthur : 339 (ftn.). Biology : 2, 26, 374, 386, 426, See Botany,' Zoology.'
' '

Opposition :
Association
:

179.

16, 17, 28, 29, 66, 81, 105, 303, 449, 451. Assumption: 113, 142, 145, 289, 290292, 308, 324, 325, 330, 337, 338, 341, 410, 419, 432, 434-438, 442, 443, 447, 457, 458 (see Presuppo sition '). A. of Science : 368, 452. 157, 175, Assuredly : 130, 132 (ftn.),
' ' '

Bocardo : 226, 227, 234, 243, 248, 250. Its Its Indirect Reduction : 324. Ostensive Reduction : 248-250. viii, 15, : Bosanquet, Bernard (Prof.)

420, 421. 119, 358 (ftn.), (ftn.), 126 : Bosanquet (Mrs.) (ftn.). See Sigwart.' Boscovich, Roger Joseph : 371. Botany : 28, 43, 51 (ftn.),59-68, 73107
'

176.

Astronomical

See

'

Astronomy.'

: 38, 69, 70, 129, 134, 245, 329-333, 338, 339, 361, 362, 377, 386, 394, 409, 412, 413, 430-438, 452. See 'Aberration .,' 'Copernicus,' Pto Planet,' Eclipse,' Moon,' lemaic A.,' 'Star,' 'Sun,' 'Transit Circle.' Atom 460. : 423, 459, Atomism : 459, 460. Attribute : 22, 25, 26, 40, 43, 65, 70, 75, 81, 86, 147, 159, 161, 299, 340, Con Character,' 348. See 341, Indeterminate Ele notation,'

Astronomy

75, 87, 129, 236, 237, 342, 343, 368. F. (Prof.) Bowen, 196. : Bradley,James (The Rev. Dr.) : 339, 413. Bramantip : 226, 227, 229, 237.
Breach

Buchner,

of Method : 281, 295. Prof. : 429.

'

'

'

'

Cagniard-Latour,Charles (Baron): 424,

427.

Caird, Edward
Calculus

: 63 (ftn.). of Relations : 251.

'

'

'

Camenes : 226, 232, 237. Camestres : 226, 232, 236, 242, 249, 269. ' Can ' : 127-129. of Causal Methods Canons 395-397, :

ments

...,'' Property,' Quality.'

'

Attributive view

Augmentative tion : 120-122. Avebury, Lord : 392.

Import Judgment

of

147

or

(ftn.). Proposi

402, 404, 405, 407, 411, Causation 417-420. Of Elimination : 416-418.

'

412,
:

415,
Of

415.

Average : 352, 422,

434.

A. Error

413.

Axiom 306, 322, 386, 450. : 251, Ideas or Propositions Axiomatic : 329 A. Premisses 330. : 318, 322. (ftn.), Bacon, Francis, Lord Verulam
:

Capability: See Capacity.' Capacity : 128, 129, 131 (see Potenti ality'). C. for Work : 387-389 (see Energy ). Cartesian Vortex Theory : 332, 333,
' '
'

336.

116,
414-

117, 313, 351, 391, 414-418. Method Baconian : viii, 313-317,

418.

Catalogue : 63, 65, 69. : 374. Catchpool, Edmund Assertion, Judgment, Pro Categorical viii, 111-126, : position,Statement
131-133,

136-139,
:

: 372, 396. (Prof.) Bain, Alexander Balfour, the Rt. Hon. Arthur J. : 81. Ball, Sir Robert : 374, 375, 430 (ftn.), 436, 439. 435 (ftn.),

Import

146-161.

strict Logical to the Relation

Its Formal 239. Its Reduction to Form Its 161-171. :

: Hypothetical

138,
of

139,

141,

268

(ftn.). C.

Basis

30

466

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
of the Four

Disjunction: 113, 114, 131, 133, 136. C. Equivalents of Hypotheticals : 138, 139, 268 (ftn.). C. Form : 138, of 139, 141, 268 (ftn.). C. Form
' '

Characteristics

Syllogistic

Figures :

235-238.

Sorites C. C.

255-260, 319.

C. Inference,

269, 323. Syllogism : 111-261, Meaning : 139, 268 (ftn.). 63 (ftn.), Category : ix, 31, 32, 47 (ftn.), 75-78, 459, 462.
Causal Antecedent: 370

Characterization : 59-64, 67, 93, 136, 167, 357. Chemistry: 28, 30, 61 (ftn.), 68, 69, 119, 361, 368, 380-382, 387, 423-429.
447. Choice Circle
:
.

See See
.

'

Free
'

Choice.'
. .

Circular

.,'

'

Cir-

383, 424-427 Con 382. C. 378, 381, : nexion : 357-361, 364, 368, 371, 377C. 384, 397-407, 414-420, 428, 452. Consequence, C. Sequence : 377, 381, 382, 384, 455 (see Causation,' 'Con 381,
Chain
'

(ftn.),380, (see 'A.'). C.

culus. .' Circles : See ' Diagrams.' Circular Reasoning : 289. titio. Circulus
. .

See

'

Pe-

.' in

77, 83, 84.

121 Circumstance
'

Definiendo: 32, 34-36, 38, C. in Proponendo : 103, (see Tautology ').

419'). C. Elaboration : sequence ' 421. C. Elimination : 419 (see E '). C. Explanation, C. Inquiry, C. In

333, 342, : vestigation 'E'). C. Hypothesis:

C. 401. Interaction C. Law
: :

365-462

(see
'

(see
C.

H.').
:

459.

Interest

138, 303, 341, 342, 357, 367-389, 403, 407-409, 412, 427, C. Method 450, 451, 455. : (see
of M. Methods C. Nexus
'

402, 403, 414: 394-398, 416, 418, 426, 454. Clarke, R. F. (Father): 33, 102, 261, 282, 290. Class, Class-term, etc. : 18-24, 32, 33, 39, 42, 43, 52, 54, 55, 70-72, 80, 88, 89, 131, 148-155, 159-162, 166, 219, 220, 239-242, 327, 340, 341, 348, See 351, 352, 356-359, 368, 454.
'

C.
: :

Explanation').
'

C.

Classification,"

'

Nomenclature,'
'

(see

Inductive

M's

').

'

Species.'

Action] :
lation

361. C. Process [or ' (see Causation '). C. Re

See Class.' : 22. Class-concept : 18, 43. Class-designation

: :

Class-distinction : 341, 379, 384-389, 406, 416C. Tendency: 454 (ftn.). Class-extension 418, 449. 378. 'T.'). C. Theory: See U.' Uniformity : 458. See Causal Causality: 369.

357. 151. See

'

E.,'

'

Ex See

(see

C.

tensive.
'

..."

'

'

.,'

: 352 Class-generalization G. proper.'

(Note).

'

Causation,'
:

'

Cause.'

Classification

Causation

309, 341, 367-389, 398, 399, 403-409, 415, 417, 419, 422, 427-458, See Canons 462. of C.,' 'Causal .,'
'
. .

30, 42, 46, 54, 56-74, : 76-79, 88, 89, 95, 136, 137, 244, 245, C. distinguished from 341, 368, 369.
Division 61 Series:

Law Cause : C.
as

: 56-57 (ftn.). C. by (ftn.). C. of Fallacies: 281. Of Logical Principles 35, 333, 337, 342, 367-389, : 281. 159 (ftn.), 395-426, 430, 449, 453, 454 (ftn.). Class-inclusion : 20-21 (ftn.),
'

Real

of C.'

the
:

Sum

Total

of the

Condi

239-245.

tions Celarent 260. Central

370-378.
:

Classing: 18, 19, 42, 43, 57, 58, 60,

64, 66, 340.
Class-mark
:

226, 237, 242, 247, 249, 256,

:

352.

See

'

Definition-

Definition

See

'

D.

by Type.'

Certainty : 75, 134, 139, 155, 157, 158,

381-383,
Cesare
'

mark.' Class-relations Clause: native

394, 397, 456.

226.
. .

: 152, 153. See 112, 138, 216. C.'s,' Antecedent,'

'

'Alter
'

Con

Cessante causd etc. : 382. .,' Chain of Causation C. : 378, 381, 382. of Divisions C. of Reasoning : : 44.

sequent.'
Clearness:
Closed

66, 112, 121.

Clerk-Maxwell, James
Conclusion
:

(Dr.) : 335,
Effect
'

386.

255,
'

260,

261

(see

'

Epicheirema,'
:

Sorites

'). (Dr.)
454

Co-absence

309. of Cause and 422.

44

400,
.'

Chalmers, Thomas
Chandler
:

(ftn.).

438, 443. Character, Characteristic Attribute : 43, 57-64, 68, 70, 74, 75, 83, 87, 236, 341, 359, 360, 364, 371, 383, 385, 386, 424. See 'Common 'Pro A.,'

403. Co-alternative Co-division Co-effect Coexistence

: :

See

A.

43, 53, 55, 56. (ftn.), 369, 406. 342, 357, 368, 369, 419 :

perty.'
Characteristic

454 (ftn.), (ftn.). Coexisting Fact : 405.

Property

Character.' 26, 27, 37, 165.

:

See

'

C.

Coextensiveness

149, 151, 153, 455.

Dividentia
:

Cognate

Membra

52.

INDEX,
Coherence of Natural

VERBAL
443

AND

ANALYTIC

467

Phenomena
.

:
.

.'). Systematic Conception C. of Thought : 7, 8, 98, 106 (see 'Consistency,' T. and Identity,' Validity'). Coherency : 343. (see
' '

'

Comprehensiveness : 157, 385. Compulsion : 127. See Necessity.' Comte, I. Auguste M.F.X. : 449. : 72, 130, 449, 450. Conceivability Concept, Conception, etc. : ix, 22, 24 25, 29, 31, 34, 40-43, 49, 50, 57 (ftn)'
'

Coincidence

146,

153, 158, 159,

147, 149, 150, 152, C. of 161, 240, 391.

Di

Antecedents or Consequents in lemma : 272, 273.

159 (ftn.). : Coincidence-import Coincident Explanations : 443.

Collateral
'

Condition of Facts
349.

372,

375.

See

..." Predisposing.
:

Collection Collective

313-315.
460.

Aggregate :
C.

C.

Con
or

ception :
Term 158,
:

Expression

C. Meaning : 154, 102, 163. 160, 162, 163, 171, 239, 241, 284.
:

62, 63, 71-85, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97 112 116, 121, 125-127, 329, 335, 340 34l' 349, 353, 449, 459-462 (see Abstract C.,' 'Fundamental C.,' 'General C.,' Idea,' Individual C.,' Logical C.,' 'Singular C.,' Subject-c.'). C. in relation to LogicalInterest : 78. Conception of Fact : 448, 449. Conceptual Being : 77. C. Definition C. Determinacy : 80" 24, 25, 93. C. Ordering of Fact, C. System etc 43, 73, 78-80, 82, 88, 89, 95 (see 'Classification,' 'Division,' 'Por
' ' ' ' '
" "

283,
sition

C.

Statement 349-351.
'

or

Propo

154.

phyry's Tree '). Definition Conceptualistic

Conclusion
:

: 347, Colligation

Collocation Command
:

372, 454. See 93, 94.

:

Imperative.'

Terms Commensurate Common Attribute, etc.

:

55.

Mark, Property, 18-21, 38, 57, 61, 62, 65, 236, 340, 350, 356, 358, 359, 361, 383 (see

: 24, 25. 8, 105, 129, 137 145 194 208, 213-238, 242, 243, 246-249' 255-263, 268, 270, 273, 275 282* 289-291, 300-306, 309, 319-328 337' 349, 355, 359-364, 389, 391, 400 404' 408, 409, 416-418, 438, 443 444' 454, 457, 458.
'

'Agreement,' 'Resemblance').
Circumstance or C. Nature 415. Element
: :

C.

Conclusive Concomitance

Explanation :
:

449. 414 415 417

395-398,

165, 342, 397

:

22,

24,
:

114, 115, 121, 123, 131. C. Term 4, 5, 9, 97, 347.

222

81, 85, C. Sense:

423, 424.
Concomitant
418.

Variations

405-407

213, 217,

(see 'Middle
:

T.').

Concrete Context C. form C.

Comparison

18-20, 29-33, 37-39, 57, 75, 340, 341, 350, 353, 355, 408410, 414, 422, 431, 436, 438, 442. Inc.' See Compatibility: 8, 133, 156.
'

Conceptualism : 24, 25. C. 85. C. Experience : 453. :

of Scientific Method
:

410.

(Deductive) Method : 409 410 C. Object : 85, 86, 340*. 419, 420.
C. Science : 136. C. Terms C. Thought : 6. of Antecedents Concurrence or 375-383. Condition C. of Conditions
: :

: 48. Complementary Terms Complete Act of Judgment

85-89

122.
:

C.

Definition ' Continued

39.

C. Division C.

44

(see
:

Causes

"

D.').

Elimination

C. Enumeration : 416, 417. : 43, 356, 334, 336, 344, 360-363, 369-381 C. 397. 357, Explanation : 368394-404, 407, 411-413, 419-421, 42s' C. Induction, 370, 395, 459, 461. 428, 436, 439, 448-451, 457, 458. C. Causal Inquiry : 326, 327 (ftn.), Uniformities 377 : 341, 361, 398, 411 378 Ind.'). Conditional (see C. Validity: 141, 142. Method C. Inductive 397. C. :
'

394. 130, 246, 305, 306, 309 319

'

Method
cess

of

Analysis :
:

422.

of Observation

393.

C. Pro C. Proof
255-

Conduct.
:

See

'

Morality.'
460.

: Configuration

454.

Conic

Complex
261.

CategoricalSyllogism : C. Conception : 209. C.

Dilemma Dilemma
: :

Con C. C. C.
:

Sections (or Analytical Geo metry) : 29, 52, 362. Conjecture : 130, 327, 348, 351 357 359, 392, 393, 399, 415, 431, 462.

structive Destructive

272-277. 272, 273. 284. Forces

Epicheirema : 261. : 283, Composition (Fallacy)

of 376. 271
tion

Conjunctive Division : 49, interpretation of Extension

284. C. 154, ' ' 154. Some : Connexion See :
use

53.
"

of

'

All

'

C. 72 and

Causes : 375-377. Of Laws : 409.

'

Of

Compound
:

Hypothetical Syllogism : '). C. Proposi (see Dilemma

132, 153, 158, 160, 274 182, 262.
;

tion,'
bilities

Causal 'Necessary C.'

:

'

C.,'
C. of

'

Rela

Possi See

138-141, 180.
:

its

Contradictory:

Conno -denotation ' Intension.'

21

146. (ftn.),

30"2

468

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
197-202,

Terms Conno-denotative 73, 89. : Connotation : 70-85, 89, 147, 165, 170,
245

Contrapositive (Converse):
206, 248, 249, 400.

(see Connotative
or

'

...').
To

C. Exten

as

Contrariety (or Contrary Opposition) :

128, 172, 176.

formal
to

real

: :

70, 71.
71-73. Term

Its relation

Denotation
:

Contrary
268, 291
Terms Control
'

Propositions:
:

128,

130,
'

71, 72. Name Connotative

sion 89. Consciousness
:

(see 'Contrariety ').

48. Conditions
:

C.

or

73, 74,

of

371-373,

394,

77, 97, 155, 381, 383,

401,
'

Immediate Ap .,' 'Psy prehension,''Psychical chology '). C. of a Limit : 79. Consequence : 136, 304, 319, 325, 328,

452, 460, 461

(see

'

404. C., or Limitation, to Purpose : See through Relevance

402,

Purpose.'
: :

Conventional sification C.
'

See

'

formal.'
C.

C. Clas
:

64-66.
'

Meaning

335-337,
451-454.

377-383,

435,

436,

440,

Signs or Symbols : 25, 93, (see Sign,' Words ').

16. 115

Consequent: 112, 137, 138, 141, 142,

145, 264, 265, 269-274, 320, 325, 337, See 369, 370, 378-385, 397, 439.

Convergence of
Converse 249 Accident Conversion
:

Evidence

443.

193-201, 206, 229, 232, 237,

'

(see Weak
:

C.').

C.

Fallacy

of

Acceptance of the C.,' Rejection of the C..' Hypothetical Judgment.' of Energy : 333, 385-389. Conservation
' '

'

C. of Mass
:

385.

284, 285. : 189, 193-198, 200, 202, 260, 265, 324, 325. C. by Limitation or : 194, 197, 248, 249. per accidens
C.
' ' '

Consistency 1-9, 16, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 112, 145, 157, 172, 180, 214, 282, 286, 448, 457. Distinguished Material from Compatibility: 8.
From thesis

by Negation : 197 (see Contra position,' Contrapositive'). C. of C. of 0 : 54. Hypothetical : 265.

'

Convertend
version.' Conviction
:

193-195, 201. 123, 377.

:

See

'

Con

Validity
:

8.

C.

in

Hypo

318. P. of Non-Contra See

'

Consistency-Logic: 1. : 99. Consistency-principle of P. C.,' (Logical)

'

Causes Co-operating See

'

375, 376.

diction.' Consistent Statement

:

145.

Con

sistency.' Constancy of Energy

Constant Cause
:

136 : (see Disjunctive .'). C. Species (or : 32, 33, 39, 75, 136 Co-species) (see Division '). Copernicus, Copernican System : 316,
'
. .

Co-ordinate

Possibilities

'

386, 387.
C. Effect
:

330, 331, 362.

398.

399.

Co-presence of
402.

Cause

and

Effect

400,

Construction : 26, 29, 65, 246, 321, 322, 328, 390, 402, 421. Dilemma 271-277. C. Constructive : : 263, 264. Syllogism Hypothetical Content : 23, 24, 27, 28, 78, 118, 120, 125, 126, 358. Context 106, 116-120, 282, : 15-17, 85, See formal C.,' 394. Logical C.,' Real C.,' Ultimate C.' See Possi Contingence : 379, 454.
' ' ' ' '

Copula : 124-126, 251. 126, 163, 168, Copula-mark : 124 (ftn.),

250, 251.

CorpuscularTheory
339. Correct

of See

Light : 336, 338,

'

Thinking
:

Right
:

T.'

Correction Correlate

of Observations 159. Differences 369.

413. 59. C.

Correlated Correlation

58,

bility.'
Continued
'

Properties: 368,
:

Division

41-52, 72-80.
'

344, 368.

Correlative Terms : 30, 35. Continuity : 106, 124 (see Coherence,' Corroborative Instance 403. See : Unity '). C. of Cause and Effect : Con 381 (see Immediacy in Causal Negative I.,' Positive I.' Co-ordinate S.' nexion '). C. in Division : 44-46. : See Co-species Contradiction (or ContradictoryOppo Countable Objects : 146. 48, 94, 98-107, 122 : : 371, 374-377, 381, 399, sition) (ftn.), Counteraction
' ' ' '

124, 128, 130, 150, 164, 172-174, 188, 208, 264, 324, 325, 448, 450. See Apparent C.,' Non-C.,' Self' ' '

404, 454. Counter-dilemma

Counter-extreme Counting : See
'

: :

275-277,
123. Edwin

293, 294.

C.'

Enumeration.'

Contradictory
sitions
:

Statements
'

or

Propo
'

Creighton,James
337. Criteria 328. of

(Prof.):313,

98-106, 128, 130, 264-266, C. Terms 268, 291, 324, 325. : 48. 198. C. of : 189, 197, Contraposition
'

Of

Legitimate Hypothesis : Validity in Dilemma:

Hypothetical

'

265, 266.

274.

INDEX,
Criterion of Consistency
of Induction 386.
119
: :

VERBAL
98,
:

AND
C. C. C.' Of
:

ANALYTIC
Answer D D.
:

469
D. of Interest 132 D. D.
Sub
,

99. 453. 75.

Definite
118

113.

: :

(or Test) of Explanation

See
'

Limitation
Term
:

Knowledge

Inductive

157.

112, Possibility: 47-52.

116.

C. of Truth

Intuitive
:

Certainty:
Valid

Of

Syllogism

Species or ject-term:
Definiteness:

241, 243.

Criticism:

(ftn.). C. of a Dis Of Definitions : 137, 138. 50-52. Of Dichotomy 31, 36-39. : Of the distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgment : 120-122. Scheme of Cate Of the Hamiltonian junction:

' 157. See Determinacy. Definition : ix, 3, 16-39, 66, 67, 71-81, 93, 102, 115, 118, 120, 121, 125, 138,

146, 309,
'

147, 165,
316 368, 383,

214, 385,

281,

282,

306, 353,

322, (ftn.),

159-161. Of of Induction Mr. Joseph's view : 416-420. Of Mill : 81, 82, 301-304, 455-458.

: goricalPropositions

(sec 362, Complete Circulus in Definiendo,' D.,' 'Defin D.,' Conceptualistic Diagnostic ability,'Dofiniendum,' D.,' 'Dictionary-definition,' Etymolocncal D.,' Fitting D.,' formal
' ' ' ' ' ' "
"

340, 341, 421, 429

'

Cross-division : 45, 52, 53, 55. Crucial Experiment : 336, 338, 422. C. Instance 422, 426, : 336, 338, 355,
429.

D.,' D.,' D.,'

'

'Genetic
'

D.,'

'Homogeneous
'

Metaphoric D.,' Nominalistic 'Object of D.,' 'Partial D.() 'Peripheral D.,' 'Pragmatic D.,(
'

Cumulative

Effect

373, 374.

Realistic D.,' Verbal D.'). D.

D.

'

Relational D-, as Progressive

Darapti
"

222, 226, 227, 231, 232, 236,

Classification : 41, 43, 45, 52, 70, : 3, 39, D. of Correlatives : 30, 35. 71, 89. Of De Morgan, Augustus (Prof.) Of Semi-correlatives : 35, 36. : 49 (ftn.). D. per Death Words: Effect : 379, 381-384, 397. an 17-20, 23-25, 115. as et differentiam : 17-22, 25, 3^Declaratory Sentence : 94. genus in Denotation Decrease 73-77, 39, 82, 89. 57, 68, 69, : 72. Deducible Property : 26, 369. Definition-mark: 62-64, 70, 81, 121, Differentia, Deduction: See 246, 321, 322, 326, 327 165, 351, 352. Genus,' 337, 342, 343, 407-412, 419, Negative Def.-m.' (ftn.), Definition-rules : 32-36. 426, 432-438, 442, 443 (see De ductive ...,'' Quantitative D.'). Definitions as Simply Convertible : 33,
to

242, 243. Darii 226, 237, 242, 247, 249, 256. Charles : 270, 314, 315, 353, Darwin, 354, 391, 421, 447. Darwin, Francis : 314 (ftn.), 315. Datisi: 226, 227.

by By Ends : (CentralD.) : 62, 63, Formal Logic : 214.

Division

63

79 61-63.

: Characterization 62, 63. By Type

D. in 71, 136. D. in relation 57 (ftn.). To

'

'

'

'

'

'

Its relation 244-247. Deductive

to the

Dictum of

de Omni

197.

Ds.

tested

Development
411,

: Hypothesis

Degree of Determinacy 88. : 45, erality

Demand : See Demonstrandum Demonstration
'

32-39. : 89.

Of Gen

352,
'

356,
of

419,

426,

Dev.

H.').

Ded.

438 (see Inference: D. 420.

246, 247, 318-328, Method 244, 246, :

D.
Process
:

385. 348, 408-411,

Reasoning
Science
443.
:

Deduction.' D. 304, 309. D. 251, 409. D. 245, Theory :

See
'

Vi D. Synthesis: 407. : 318, 430, 431 (see Fruitful tality Hypothesis '). Defective Argument : 230-232. of Experi D. Definability 25, 73. : D.
'

Postulate.' : 323, 325. Proof.' : See Demonstrational Fallacies : 286-295. Denial : 94, 98, 123, 124, 126, 134, 139, 140 166, 173, 174, 193, 235, 236, Of D. of Being : 75, 76. 324, 422. Of the Antecedent Postulate : 448. :
'

See

'

Rejection of
'
.

the A.'
'

82-85. Of the In : dividual : 81. Of Infima Species : Of Particular 74. Existences 83. : Of Proper Names Of 74, 79-85. : Subaltern Genus Of Summum : 74. Genus Of Symbols : 25. : 73-79. Definiendum 121. See Defi : 23-25,
'

ence-concepts

147 (see Denota Denotation : 70-73, tive .,' formal Denotation,' Real D.'). D. in relation to Connotation : Extension : 71, 72, To 71-73, 89. Collectives : of General D. 147.
.

162
89.

(ftn.).
Names
or
' '

Denotative
D. Derivative Descartes, 390

Reading Objects :
Rene:

Terms 147.

16,

/4,

85. 318, 332,

333, 362, 349,

nition.'

Defining

Terms

33.

34.

See

'

Defi

Description:

nition-mark.'

17, 18, 24, 62, 342, 350, 369, 392, 398.

470
Law Descriptive 342

THE
'

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
:

(see Empirica

Diagrams
195,

20-21

150-153, (ftn.),

160 323

Terminology : 66, 67. 80 (ftn.). D. by Class : Designation L.').

names

D.

196, 208, 209, 240, 244

392, 441. D. of Hegel : 75, 76 : 307. Dialysis: 123, 125, 126. DialyticCopula or C.-mark : 124 (ftn ) 126.

18, 19.
Dilemma
:

Dialectic

Destructive
D. 264. 113.

271-273, 277
263,

Hypothetical Syllogism :

Determinacy :
See
'

Determinant

16, 17, 80, 88, 89, 112 .' Determinate : 208, 209, 448.
. .

Dichotomy:
Dicta
:

46-52, 79.
20. D.

239-247, 250.
de Diverso
:

19, : Dictionary-definition Dictum

Determinate
Answer:

Agreement

20.

240, 242, 243.

de Exemplo et de Excepto : 241-243. D. Categorical: 112, 113. D. de Omni et Nullo : 240-247, 250, D. D. Connotation 113. 72, 73. : 251 ; its relation to D. Deduction Content : 78. Exhaustiveness D. de D. Form 46. D. Mark 113. 244-247, 324. : 112, Eeciproco: 241. or Meaning : 18-22, 41, 43, 88, 95 146 Difference : 43, 57-59, 75, 122-124 121, 165 (ftn.), 285. 245, 358-360, 362-364, 396, 402-40?' Determination : See Definition,' De 422 425, 426 413-419, (see (ftn.), terminacy.' D. of Import by Iden
" "

'

'

D. of Meaning through tity : 146. Disjunction : 131 (see Disjunc tive .'). Through Division: 41, 127. Through Interest or Purpose :
'
. .

of Method Differentia,' Double of D.'). D.,' Essential D.,' Method

' '

'

'

D.

in

relation

to

Identity : 96-98,
See
'

121-124.
122. : Differencing tion.'

of Possibilities: 131. ' Exciting Determining Cause : See C.' D. Condition : 395 (see ' C.').
51.

D.

Differentia

Determinism

458-462. 'Law of Causation,'

367, 448, 449, 450-455, See Inductive Postulate,'

:
' '

Uniformity.'
D. Postu

Deterministic
late
:

Explanation,
'

Determinism.' Development: 58-63, 129, 341, 447, 459462. 74 Of D. of

a

See

Differentia : 17-22, 25-29, 32-40, 54, 57, 68, 69, 72-77, 82, 89, 120, 121, Its relation to the Genus 159. : 50. D. 461. Differentiation : 460, (or of Meanings : 96, 123, Specification) 124, 131 (see 'Differentia,' 'Dis crimination '). D. of M. in Classifi
: See ; in Division Diff. of S from P : 122. 271-277, 289, 290, 292-295. 292Fallacies : 276, 289 Dilemmatic :

cation System : Classificatory 76 (ftn.), (see 'Classification'). D.' Dilemma: a Possibility Of a Topic : : 138.
'

See

'

C.

'

of Hypothesis : D. 88, 89, 119. 136, 318-320, 326-328, 335-339, 352, 356, 361, 411, 419, 424-433, 436442. Of Implications: 229. Of Laws Interest : 51, 88. Of : 343, D. of Meaning, etc. : 3, 367, 368. 22, 26, 41, 43-45, 50, 70, 71, 73, 74 76, 80, 88, 89, 95-98, 146, 148, 262 (Note), 321 (see 'Variation in M.'). D. of M. in Proposition: 119, 121 D. of M. through Classi 122, 124. C.' fication : See Through Defi
'

295. Dimaris Direct See Action 409.

'

226, 227, 237.

Apprehension, D.
Immediate
:

Cognition :
D. Causal
:

A.'

Method 382. D. Deductive ' D. Effect : 382 (see Imme in Causal

:

diacy
'

Observation

Connexion '). D. 435 (see 341, 408, O.'). D. Perception : 440, 441 247-250, (see 'P.'). D. Reduction:
:
:

324. Disamis

nition tion
:

See

'

Def.'
'

112-114, 131,
See 449.

Through Disjunc 133. Through

Dev. of

226, 227, 233.

123.
:

Disbelief

Division:
Method Of the

Div.'

Of Purpose : 57, 58. : Category of Substance : 47 (ftn.). Of the F. D. : See Unity of

'

in Division Discontinuity of Thought : 106.

44, 45.

D.

F. D.' Of the ' That

the
'

Genus Of
'

20-22.
:

Of 31

82.

Thought

112-114, 138.

Developmental : See Genetic.' : viii. Dewey, John (Prof.) D. of Effect 64. 63, : Diagnosis
Diagnostic Classification
). Definition
: :

384.

Variation Discontinuous : 406. Discourse (or Conversation): 17, 22, See 'Subject of 97, 116, 154, 155. D.,' Universe of D.' Discovery: 331, 336, 338, 339, 348, 350, 359, 361, 362, 369, 383, 388, 389, 391, 395, 407, 408, 412-414, 424, D. of a 425, 429, 435, 438, 449.
'

58,

63-66 A E

Middle misses
:

Term 325.

320.

D.

of

Pre Of

63, 64, 341, 395.

Diagrammatic Representation of
"n,

Discrimination

I, O

150-153, 160.

of Meanings : 56. Relations, etc. : 85, 86. Qualities,

472
'

THE
'
. . .

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

Either 272. tive

.

or
'

132-135, 137, 262, 263,

'

See
.

Disjunction,' Disjunc
168.

.' 343.

Ejaculation: 93, 116,

Elaboration
:

Essential Characteristic or Property : 43, 369. E. Concepts : 63A- E. Condition : 372, 384. E. Difference : 28, 360, 363. E. Identity : 122 (ftn.).
E.
'

Marks

64.

E.

Electricity:335, 337, 372, 380, 394,

402, 407.

Meaning

See

Electro-magneticTheory
ooo. : Electro-magnetism

of

Light :

Essence.' E. Resemblance : 28, 359, 360, 362. Essentials of Induction : 316-325, 352
419.

334. 153. E.

Electron Terms

459.

Morality.' EtymologicalDefinition : 32.

:

Ethics

See

'

Elementary Propositions:
:

34, 36.

of Spiritual Experience : 107. ' E. of the Proposition P.al E.' : See Elenchus : 291.

Elements

Elimination : 137, 343, 358, 384, 396398, 400, 402, 414-418, 420, 422, 449.
E. of Error
'

Rudolf (Prof.) : ix. 245, 246, 321-323. Euler, Leonard (Prof.) : 437, 438. Event: 86, 114, 119 (ftn.), 130, 370, 392, 397, 401, 402, 453, 457, 459.
Euclid
:

Eucken,

Everett, J. D. (Prof.) : 440.

'

Every

413.
:

Evidence See
'

Elimination-method
Else
'

M.

of E.'

See

'

Or

else.'

Ralph Waldo : 282. Emphasis : 116, 134, 156, 157. Emphatic Term : 116. Empirical Law, E. Rule : 341-343,
410, 455.

Emerson,

158, 164, 168. 130, 189, 246, 275, 286289, 291, 303-309, 313, 317, 326, 328, 337, 348, 350, 367, 401, 443, 458 (see Fallacies of Irrational E.,' formal E.,' Real E.,' Self-E.').
: :
' ' ' '

'

E. of the Senses 368

450.

Evolution Exactitude

See
:

'

Development.'
'

See

Precision.'

Empiricism
End
:

313-317.
' '

96, 128, 129, 283, 314, 429, 453,

461. See Purpose,' Tele ology.' Energy : 87, 333, 335, 342, 371, 385-389. Enthymeme : 230-232, 261, 305.

460,

Examples : See under subjectsexem plified. Exception : 103, 315, 351, 357, 376
377,
458.

400,
See
'

401,

420,

421, 450, 455,

167.

Apparent E.' Exceptive Proposition: 166,

Enumeration 351-361,
'

42, 43, 71, 72, 327, 347 See' 396-398, 454-456.

:

Exciting(or Determiningor Initiating or Precipitating) Cause or Condition

"

Countable

..."

Enumerative
meration.'

Argument
Universal 357. (ftn.), Induction

See

'

Enu
"

371-373, 423, 425, 426. Exclamation See : 168. Ejaculation,'

'

Enumerative
147-148

(Judgment)
(or Method

.' Exclamatory Exclamatory Judgment

. .

'

:
'

116. Law of E.

Excluded
of M.' Exclusion

Middle

See

Enumerative

Simple Enumeration) : 347, 351-358 369, 397, 454-456 (see 'Enumera tion '). E. I. in the light of the In
ductive Criterion
:

355-357.

Epicheirema : 260, 261. Epimenides : 103, 182, 183.

323, 324, 414-418. : E. of Classes : 153, 339-244. E. of Pos sibilities 113, 236. : Exclusive Proposition: 166, 167, 170, 198, 199. E. Reading of the Dis

junctive: 131-137,
274. ' Some E. Universal
:

178,

263,

Epiphenomenon : 460. : 257, 258, Episyliogism

160,

266,

260. 153-

Equivalence : 124, 147, 149, 150,

E. use 166. of ' : 155, 156, 175. Exclusiveness of Alternatives in Dis

166, 177, 189, 190, 198, 199 249, 324, 386-389, 400, 408, 409.

junction :
'

131,

133,
:

135-137
E.

(see
of 54,

Exclusive

Equivalents of Modals : 130. Equivocal Words : 37. See guity.' Equivocation : 282-285. Erroneous Hypothesis : See
H.' Error:

Reading ...').
Dividentia 44,
See 323.
'

Membra
'

45,

Ambi

55.

Exclusivist

Exclusive

Read

ing
' "

.'
:

False

"

Exhaustion Exhaustive
vision
:

Disjunction: 417.
44, 46, 49, 52-55.

295, 303, 331, 338, 385, 413 See 'False 436, 437. .,' 'Resi
. .

E. Di E. Read

dual E.' Essence (or Essential

Meaning)
of

26-29, Method

38,
:

414.

E.

23 Inductive
"

the Disjunctive: 132-134, 136, 137, 263. Exhaustiveness .' Exhaustive : See Exhaustivist : See Read Exhaustive
'
. .

ing of

'

413-422.

ing

.'

INDEX,
Existence E. in Existent
:

VERBAL
'

AND

ANALYTIC

473

75,

97, 131
See

(see

Being ').

Extensive

Thought.
:

'T.-e.'

24, 86, 115

Existential

Ground

Import : 115 Experience : viii,5, 6, 28, 29,

(ftn.). 370 (ftn.). E. 190. 1 89, (ftn.),

:

75, 76, 78, 82-85, 97, 107, 114, 165, 303, 326, 340, 351, 352, 377, 379, 392, 419, 439, Immediate See 453, 455-458, 461. Personal E.,' Apprehension,' E.,' Time-e.,' Sense-e.,' Spiritual
' ' ' ' ' '

Definition 21 : (ftn.). E. Extension-i.' E. in Import : See Dividendum 53. of : terpretation 161. E. Proposition: 147, 148 (ftn.), Extension-im E. Reading : See port.' E. Reference : 146-152, 155,
' '

158, 239, 241. ' Extension.' Extent : See External Observation 452, 453. : 448, Externality of the Pre-philosophical See ' External Attitude 5, 80. : 4,

UnorganizedE.'
:

Observation.'
82-85. Elements Extra-logical
in

Experience-concept : 82, 84, 85. Experience-definition Experient : 82. Experiment, Experimentation : 2, 145,
334-336,
401-408,
425,

Deduction

321, 322.
Extreme Extremes Fact
:

123. in Division 115,

:

53.

375, 414,

386,

393-395,

397,
:

416,

of E.,'

426, 428, 435, ' Natural E.' character

:

418, 419 (ftn.), ' Method 440. See 94,

ix, 114, 313-322,

140,

141, 246, 303-

Experimental Analysis :
E. 389. servation ditions :
400

343, 357,

328, 334-344, 326, 377-380, 367-369, 347-353, 356-358, 417, 401, 405, 409-412, 386, 389-395, 309,

389, 403. 394,

of Scientific Ob E. Con 390, 394. E.

'

420-427,
:

430-444,
:

447-459.

F.

as

intelligible104
of See

(see

'

Instance

(sec 'Negative I.,' Positive

I.').
'

E.
'

See : Inquiry, E. Investigation Experiment.' E. Method : See M. E. of Experiment.' E. Proof : 450. Stage in Causal Inquiry : 398-408. E. Test, E. Testing,E. Verification :

Experience '). F. as 'S. Conception relation to Analysis : 29

.

Intelligibility Systematic :
.'
.

; to

F. in Classi
:

fication : 57 to Division
43
; to ;

;
:

to

Dichotomy
: or

52 ;
: :

43 ; to

Enumeration
Inference
:

Experience
to
'

6 ; to
'

290
453 35
;

Interest

Purpose
or

1-6,
: :

389, 424-420,
450.

440, Crucis

442.

E.

Truth

(see Relevant
to 135

F.

) ; to Meaning
Statement
as

Proposition
(see
Truth
:
'

Experimenlum Explanation :
303,
328,

344,
462.

336, 338, 422. 3, 122, 137, 146, 245, 304, 313, 317, 318, 321, 326, 330-334, 336, 338, 339, 341347, 348, 351, 355, 356, 365:

94, 96,

S.
: :

bearing
; to

on
:

F.') ;
100-102

to

Thought
; to

1-6

Time

Observation
308,

114,

1-5, 97. 115. F.

:

F. of under

(or expressing)Law
'

114,

115,

138,
in

E.

of Laws

369.

Explanatory Law : 342, Explication of Meaning

94,
'

357.
:

367, 389, 393, 449, 453, 458. Faithfulness : See Fidelity.' F. 70, (ftn.),
See
'

57

Thought
Fallacies tional
:

107.

95,

304,
'

322,

326.
'

Dis-

implication,' Implication.' E.' Propo Explicative Judgment,

'

sition

120-122. 166, 198, 170.

199.
:

Exponible Proposition:
relation
to

In
16.

Demonstra295. ' I. P.' See F. of Illicit Process : Of Ir Of I. Proof : 286, 289-295. Of the 286-289. rational Evidence : 279-295 F.'). F.

(sec

'

in

Method:

Eduction
in

Mixed Of 265. Fallacious

Hypothetical Svllogism : 264,

Inference
:

Language Expression E. of Meaning in Words : 14-17. Truth in Language : 16. Expressive Signs : 14.
of Ideas

by

Added I.

De

Extension,

Extensity,

Extent

21

by Complex Fallacy : 106, 107, 228, 233, 376, 386,

terminant F. 209. Conception : 209. 208,
'

158-161, 208, 219, to Connota Its relation 222, 239. tion : 71, 72. 161 Coincidence Extensional : (ftn.) (see 'Coincidence'). E. Correlate: Fourfold of the form 159. E. 80, 146-155, (ftn.),
159. E. : Import : See Extension-import.' 146-148, Extension-import : 57 (ftn.),

F. of Acci 391, 4G1 (see Converse F.'). F. dent,' 'Fallacies,' 'Formal Of Accept 285. of Accident : 284, See

Scheme
'

Affirming the Consequent : Acceptance of the C.' Of Am or Amphibole : biguous Structure Of Composition : 283, 285, 286. Of Denying or Rejecting the 284. Antecedent : See Rejection of the ing
or
' '

150, 153, 158-160, 162, 190, 216, 239.

A.'

Of

Division
:

283,

284.

Of

Extensity

See

'

Extension.'

Dogmatism
282-285.

150. : Extensity-relations

Of Equivocation : 291. Of False Parenthesis : 285

.

474
Of
Flexion : See
:

THE
283. 7. E.' Of Of

PROBLEM Ignoratio
Irrelevant

OF
Final First 378.
'

LOGIC
Cause Cause
'

:
'

370.

Elenchi tion

(or Ultimate
:

C.) :

370,

Evidence
:

183. Affirmative clusion

Mai-observa Of Mzntiens 393. : 103, 182, Of Negative Conclusion, Two

288. Premisses
:

Of

Fitting

Definition Scheme

Fivefold Fixation F. of

of

32, 33, 36-39. Class-relations

224.

gative Premiss,
:

Affirmative Particular Of

Of Ne Con
:

152, 240.
of Attention

by

Words

14.

224.

Of Non-observation
Petitio Prin-

' Of hoc Post ' hoc Of 377. : Quaternio ergo propter ' Terminorum Of Two : See Q. T.' Negative Premisses : 224, 233, 234, 258 (ftn.). Of Two Particular Pre Undistributed misses : 224. Of ' Middle See U. M.' Of Vicious :

392. 391, Of One Universal C. : 224. See 'P.P.' : cipii

Pr.,

Meaning by 16, : 17 (see 'A.'); by Context: 15, 16, 93, 116-118; by Definition: 16-39, 81, 121, 309 (see D.') ; by Usage : 15 ; by Words : 13-16, 23, 93.
Association
'

Flexion Force
:

283.

332, 333, 335, 337, 342, 343, 367, 370, 373, 375-377, 408, 409, 452, 459, 460. Form 125 Distributive : F.,' (see
'

Circle:
False
. . .

32, 34, 35. ' Falsehood : See

'

'

Logical F.').
:

'

F.' in Baconian F.

..."
'

'

F.
or

duction Formal

Analogy
Erroneous

358,

362-364.
:

F.'

313, 414, 415. 215. : 214, Syllogism 142, 145, 146.

In of the

Hypothesis

334,

336,

F. Parenthesis 338, 339, 432. : 285. Falsehood, Falsity: 7, 93, 94, 99, 103, 104, 122, 141, 145, 306, 310, 393, 449, 454. Ignored by Formal Logic : F. in relation to 7-9, 157, 309, 310. Hypotheticals : 179, 180. To Time : 100-102. of Conclusion F. 324, : 325. Of Premisses 292, 295, : 214, 325. Michael Fatalistic Dilemma 324,

Apodeictic Hypothetical : 140F. Argument: 290. F. Discipline F. Fallacy : : 304-306. 106, 233, 286, 289 (see Fallacies .,' Fallacy ...'). F. Import of the Categorical Proposition: 146-161.
'
.

'

Inference : 130, 135, 136, 187191, 194, 216 (ftn.), 250, 291, 321, 326, 327 (ftn.) (see 'Inference'). F. Premisses
146
:

F.

326.
'

F. of

Faraday,
Favourable

335, 337.
:

145,
'

293.
:

Law 'P. P. of Identity,'

(see

: Principle Validity,'

Condition

394.
:

F. Fact,

diction'). F.
289. F.
'

Process

of Non-Contra F. Proof : 52.

F. Event, F. 118.

F. Instance

391. 393. See

'

: Syllogism

214, 216
of

(ftn.)
Defi
:

Feeling : 4, 82-85, 87, 392,

: : Feeling-immediacy

Right
Imme

(see
nition

S.'). F.
:

treatment

214.

F.

(t. of) Logic

ix,

85.

diate Experience.' Felapton : 226, 227. Ferio 256. Ferison

:

3 (ftn.), 6-10, 21, 143-306, 309, 310, 321. F. t. of the Logical Propo
sition
:

143-183.
'

F.

Validity: 187,

226,

235,

237,

242,

247,

248,

191, 218, 223 (see V.'). Formal Actuality, f. Fact

226,

227.

Fermat,

Pierre de : 333. Fermentation : 422-429. Frederick Ferrier, James Fesapo : 226, 227, 237. Festino ' ' Few
: : : (Prof.)

Argument : : pothetical
77. f. Connotation

288.

138. f. : f. Assertorial Hy f. 140-142, 145, 146.

:

Classification

226. 169. Fact Fact See

: :
'

58, 64-66, 137. f. Context 70-72. : f. Definition 120. 17-23, 29-31, : 34, 71, 214, 309, 316 (ftn.). f. De

57,

f.' 390. F. to

Fidelityto
Relevant

313-318,

3, 16, 314, 316

(ftn.),
395,

f. Discussion notation 71. 313. : : f. Division 316 (ftn.). f. Evi : 42, dence f. Induction : 307-309. : 316

F. to Thought : 107. in Definition : 33. Figurative Terms ' F.' Figure : See Fig. I. Syllogistic

317, 347, 420, 449.

356,

367,

389-391,

(ftn.). f.

Inference: f.

306-310.
:

f.

Judgment, Proposition 114, 115, f. Method: f. Process: 119. 419.

:

308.

f. Reference

to

215, 225, 226, 228-230, 234-237, 242-244, 246-249, 255-260, 324, Fig. II. : 215, 225, 226, 228, 232-236, 238, 242, 243, 246, 260, 269, 324. Fig. III. : 215, 225-227, 233, 234, 236, 238, 243, 246, 258-260, 324. Fig. 215, 225-227, 232, 236-238, 246, 256, 324.

240,
325.

1), 114,

119,
288.

140,
L

307-309.

levance :
sition
:

230,
258-

114,
:

115.

Realty: 4-7. J.ITeSingular Propo f. Subject of

and

Discourse

119.

f. Truth

Fal

222,
241IV. :

sity:
Formed Forms

141.

Content of

125, 126.

Syllogism : 215-217, 224-227,

255,

236, 237, 242, 243, 247-251, 253-277, 324, 325.

INDEX,
Formula tension
98.

VERBAL
Of
:

AND
Ex
Laws

ANALYTIC
under Laws 343.

475
Of
the G. D.'
: :

of Division
:

40, 72. 72. Of

72. 132. of
:
'

Of

Identity
:

21, 96the Dis F. of

Of

Intension

junctive:
Formulation

14, 15. : Meaning of a Word Proper : 351, 352 (Note). Generic F. D. : See Unity of F.
'

Experience :
304,

85.

Hypothesis

439 (see H.'). Middle cluded : Principleof Non-Contradiction

326, 411, 432, 436, of Ex Of the Law the 100. Of 99,

:

Genus.' G. Idea : See Universal 18-22. G.

147-148 (ftn.). Definition Genetic
:

'

G.

Mark

Judgment
30, 34. G. 58,
'

29,
G.

G.
:

98.

Explanation
ix. G.
'

461.
:

Movement

Foucault,
Foundation Four

Jean
:

Leon Bernard See ' Ground.'

:

336. Ter-

Order

Developmental)
(see
Genuine Genus
'

60, 61, 65. Sciences : See

'

(or
62

Terms

See of

'

Quaternio

Science

').
E.'

minorum.' Fourfold Scheme

: positions

Pro Categorical

Exception : 421. See : (Biological)

'

Animal,'

Four-termed

147, 156, 159, 160, 190. Arguments : 250, 251.

Fowler,
399.

Thomas

(Dr.) : 274,

394, 397,

Fragmentary Aspect of Reality : 4, 5, F. Thought : 106. 23, 309. Fraser : 370 (ftn.).
Free Choice dom.' Freedom
: :

G. Classification,' Plant.' (Log 32, 33, 25, 28, 27, 17-22, : ical) 35-40, 57, 61, 68, 79, 82, 89, 95, (see 120, 121, 127, 136, 159, 245 Summum G.'). Its 'Division,'
'

Definition Geocentric

30, 35. 374,

127,

140.

See

'

Free

Geology:
404.

51

Theory : 329, 330, 338. 80, 314, 337, (ftn.),

4, 105, 120, 127, 140, 369,

See 105, 452. 226, 227, 237.
'

Geometrical

459,
Fresison Fruitful

462.
: :

Geometry
Freedom.' F.

Free-will

Analogy

362.

Hypo

thesis 439.
'

328, 337-339, : 313, F. Postulate : 459.

' '

430, 431,

Method : 409. 20, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 36, 87-89, 120, 127, 40, 41, 52, 54-56, 131, 137, 138, 152, 169, 170, 197, 245, 246, 274, 284, 306, 321-323, 329, 331, 349, 362, 369, 409, 447,
:

450,
'

454. William See

'

Fundamental Freedom,'
timate 227. F.

Concept : ix, 462 (-see Gilbart, John 145. Given : Reality,' Truth,' Ul Statement.' F. Forms : of Syllogism C.').
Problems
:

67, 231, 288. of of

Acceptance
365-444. G.

105.

Goal

of

Induction

Fundamentum

Divisionis

(or F.

D.)

43-46, 51-56, 73-75, 148. Galen, Claudius : 236. Galileo, G. G. : 213, 313, 316, 338, 362. Garden, H. (the Rev.) : 68.

Observation : 389. Goclenian Sorites : 255-260.

Goclenius, Rudolphus : 255. Continued in Division Grades : See

'

D.'

Granted
ment.' Grammar:

Sec

'

Acceptance
See
:
'

of

State

Gay-Lussac, Joseph Col G. 131. General : Categorical lective : 162 (ftn.). G. Class, Con Term cept, Idea, Meaning, Name,
Louis
:

425.

13,93.
Form
:

Grammatical.' 382,
383. G. G. Sub

Grammatical
:

Structure

116, 285, 286.

72, 75, 80, 81, 88, 127 19, 57 (ftn.), G. Effect: (see 'Class,' 'Genus').
384. 383, thetical : G. Maxim,
ment
:

ject:

116.

G.
141.

Form G.

of Law

the
:

Hypo
'

See

L.'

G.

G. Proposition,

State

250, 299-303, 348, 422 'Universal P.'). G. Truth:

450. G. Universal 147

(see
351,
:

376,

Judgment

Gravitation, Gravity : 29, 141, 246, 318, 332-334, 337, 342, 343, 373-377, 387, 405, 408, 409, 434, 436, 452, 456, 459. 168, 269, 291, Ground : 127-130, 363, 349, 323, 327, 321, 387, 410, 450, 456. 370 (ftn.),
of

245, 371,
432-

303,
364, G. Ex

(ftn.).
See
'

Elimination
or

416-418.

Of

Generality: 45, 52, 77, 88, 133, 385,

455.

General

...,''

Generali 299, 355,

zation.'

Generalization : 21, 22, 88, 155, 302-304, 326, 339-344, 349-352, 357, 379, 385, 410, 411, 428,
453-456.

Induction : 453, 456planation Method 417. the Joint : Of 459. Of the M. of Agreement : 414, 417. Varia of Concomitant the M. Of
tions
:

417, 418.
: :

Of
418.

the

Concepts

450, G. of G. Instances : 351. Of under Concepts : 341.

ference Residues
tion
: :

414-417.

Of

M. the

of Dif M. of Verifica
'

417,
158,

Of See

418.

under Facts Of F.'s under

Concepts
Laws
:

340,

341-343.

341. Of

Group
'

154,

162.

Class,'

Continued

Division.'

476
Growth of Guess
'

THE
460
'

PROBLEM

OF
and H.

LOGIC
Truth
treatment

(see Development '}. G.

:

in

Formal

Meanings
:

313,

14-17. 327 (ftn.), 361.

of Truth

and

Logic : 6-9. Falsity:

See Prin

145, 146.
'I': 82-84.
'

Conjecture.'
'I

Guiding Conception, G. Idea, G. : 329, 340, 420, 448, 458. ciple

Ha: 178, 179. Sir William Hamilton,
Hamiltonian Hansen 428. Scheme

can,' 'I
'

cannot,1 'I
'

ought,' I will : 127. I Proposition: 147-152, 155, 157, 159,

must,' 160, 162, Conversion
gram
'

159, 160. of Categorical

163, 169-172, 195. 194,

Its relation
'

282. Its
to

Its Dia
:

151.

O
'

156

Propositions:
:

159-161.

178, 179. Heat 334, 374, 380, 388, 393, 394, : 396, 405, 407, 414, 415, 440, 457. Hegel, G. W. F. : 2, 6, 14, 31, 75, 76, 96, 97, 107.

He:

(see Subcontrariety '). Idea : 94, 393, 394 (see Class,' Con cept,' 'Guiding I.,' 'Ideas,' In
'

Hegelian
Helmholz,
'

School Hermann

ix.
:

Heliocentric Here
'

Theory

330, 331, 338.

von
:

L. F. F. W.

426.

82, 84, 100, 101.

Sir John
:

ductive I.,' 'Principle,' 'Regulative I.,' Supreme I.,' Working I.'). I. and Fact : 6, 9, 313, 314, 317, 318 (ftn.), 339, 343, 393. Ideal : 62, 63, 84, 127, 419, 420, 462 Inductive I.,' (see Logical I.,' Unideterminism I. Construc '). tion : 26, 29, 61, 87, 88, 321, 322. I.
' ' ' ' '

Herschel,

386.

of

Heterogeneous

Effect,
of
:

Heteropathic Analysis :
H. 361.
:

Consistency: planation : 448.

See

'

C.'

I. of Ex

E. : 375. Heuristic function Of 397. Elimination H.

422.

Method

: Supposition

327.
G.'

Idealism : ix, 6, 24, 25, 77, 107. Idealization of Experience or of Fact 6, 340, 419. Ideas : See Meanings.' I. as more
'

or

Hi:

178, 179.
:

HighestGenus
Ho

See
:

'

Summum

Historical Method

410. 438. 452.

History: 119, 410,

178, 179. Hoffding,Harald
: : :

I. expressed elementary : 34. in Language : 16-18, 23-25, 32. Fixed by Words : 13-16, 93. Not true false : 94. or Suggested by less Their Association : 71. Their Indefiniteness : 16. Identification : 64, 69, 70, 97, 29.

Words

28,

Hoffmann Effect

Homogeneous
:

426. Definition

33, 34.

H.

375, 376.
: 274, 292, 293. 342, 356, 357, 368, 369.

Homology
Horns
'

of
'

60. Dilemma
:

How

Huygens, Christian : 333. Hydrostatics : 436. Hypothesis : 99, 136, 204, 304,

149, I. of S and P : 122. 158, 161, 218. Identity: 16, 21, 60, 95-98, 104, 106, 122-124, 126, 145, 146, 149, 150, 152, 187, 188, 194, 219, 220, 223, 250, 290, 304, 325, 327 (see Agree I.,' ment,' 'Essential I.,' 'Material
'

313-

Principleof I.').I. as determining I. Difference : in Import : 146.

96-98,
and 349.

'

315, 317, 321, 326-339, 348, 351, 352, 355, 356, 361, 367, 395, 396, 400, 403, 410, 411, 417, 419-443, 447-453, 456, 459 (see Develop ment of H.,' Modification of H.,' 'Rival H.es,' 'Verification').H. of Causal H. of Law: 455, 456.
' '

121-124,
:

128.

I.

of

Cause
:

Effect Of the

382. Of Reasoning Universe : 385.

'

239,245. 148, 159 (ftn.), Identity-import: P. See : 124, 223. Identity-principle

of I.' between Identity-relation S and P
:

126,
'

Gravitation

See

'

G.'
'

146, 219, 220.

If

H. Hypothetical Assumption : 443. Explanation : See Hypothesis.' H. Inference, H. Syllogism : 263-271, H. 323-325, 385 (see 'Dilemma'). etc. H. : Proposition, Judgment, vii, 111-114, 133, 136-142, 370 (ftn.) Its Opposition: (see 'Dilemma').
'

Hypotheticals : 145 (see HI Judgment '). If P is true, then Q is

'

in

'

true':

141, 145.
:

'

If P, then
'

Q ': 141.

If-clause

112.

See

Antecedent.'

Ignava Ratio : 293. Ignorance : 77, 79, 129, 157, 158, 385,413.
Ignoratio Elenchi
:

289, 291, 292.

178-180. 145, 146.

Its relation to Inference : To the Categorical : 138,

139, 141, 268 (ftn.). To the Dis junctive:113, 114, 138. H. Method: Sorites : 270, 271, 410, 411, 420.f|jH. of Reality H. status 319, 320, 325.

: 34. Ignotum per ignotius Illegitimate (or Unsound) Analogy : I. Explanation : 359, 360, 363, 364. I. Hypothesis : 338 (see Bar 457.
'

ren
'

H.').
. .

I.
'
.

Inference:

141.

See

Invalid

'

INDEX,
IllicitProcess
:

VERBAL

AND
'

ANALYTIC
Statement-i.,'
157
'

477 Truth-i.').I. S.'). I. of

'

219, 229 (ftn.). I. (P. of the) Major : 219, 225, 237, 238, 257, 258, 269. (Of the) Minor : 219, Fallacies I. Proof : See 225, 226.
'

'Some':

(see

of the the the Of

Illusion

of I. P.' of
'

Contradiction

105,

106

146-161. : Categorical Disjunctive: 132-137, Hypothetical : 138-142. ticular Proposition:

I. 274.

of

Of

Of the Par
154-158.
:

(see Apparent C.').

106. Illustrations
:

I. of

Identity:

the
'

Undistributed

Term

157

(see

Some.'

See

under

illus subjects

Important Attribute,

trated.

Imagination : 71, 72, 246, 313, 317, 321,

328, I. in

390, 459.
' ...'). 85 (see Immediate Connexion 378, 381Causal :

I. Character, I. I. Resemblance 58-60, Difference, : I. Circum 62, 65, 327, 358-360. I. Condition : stance : 396, 403, 426. 370.

Immediacy

131. : Impossibility

383, 427, 428. Immediate Antecedent,

Effect
:

I.

Cause,
in

I. I.

See

'

Immediacy
I.

Causal

Inaccuracy : 66, 295, 386, 432. Inadequate (or Incomplete) Division : I. Knowledge : 129, 45, 46, 52-56.
of K.'). 130 (see Limitation Class-i.' I. Inclusion of Classes : See in Classes : 43, 152 of Individuals (see 'Class,' 'Individual').
'
'

Connexion.'

Apprehension,
Perception :

4, 75, I. Inference : 76, 82, 85, 340, 393. ' I. I. by Privative 185-209, 306. Conception': 190 (ftn.). 'I. Is'

Experience,

I.

Inclusive See
'

Idealism

77.

Hypothetical : 265, 266. I. Self-evidence : 84. Object : 85. 462. : Immortality Imperative : 93, 94, 127, 168. Imperfect Disjunction: 137 (see Non exclusive .'). I. Enumeration
from
'
. .

I.

Incompatibility :

156,

364, 401, 443.

Compatibility.'
'

Incomplete Dichotomy : 47. I. Di D.' See vision : Inadequate I. Explanation : I. Enumeration : 43.
:

369.
: 449, 450, Inconceivability

' 347 (see Enumerative ' I.' Figures : 247,

Induction

').
(see

452.

248,

324

Inconclusiveness

281.

'Fig. II.,' 'Fig. III.,' 'Fig. IV.')

I.
'

Inconsistency:

8,

9, 17, 76, 98,

99,
:

Inductions
'

Analogy,' tion'). Impersonal conceptions of Truth and Reality : 4, 5. I. Judgment : 116. Implication : 35. 70, 71, 81, 94, 95, 112,
155-158, 113, 123, 124, 148-151, 165, 167, 168, 187-190, 229, 301, 304, 307, 321, 322, 326, 327 (see Im
'

(see 347, 351-364 : Induc Enumerative

102, 106, 107, 139, 140, 150, 164. Connotation of Determinate Increase 72. 74, : Indefinability Definability.'
'

76,

82,

84.

See

I. Char Indefinite Categorical : 113. Ele acteristic : See ' Indeterminate .' I. Judgment : 165 (ftn.). ments I. Species,I. I. Proposition: 156.
. .

port ...'). I. in Apodeictic Hypo

thetical theticals
: :

(or Negative) Term

190-192,
250.

47-52,
:
'

124,
I.
'

140, 142, 385. : 139-142,

146.

I. in I. in

Hypo Syllo
See 458. SelfI. Pro

Its

Symbol
of

Subject :

116.

I. Use

201. Some

gism Implications of Disjunctives: Import of the Disjunctive.' Implicit Assumption : 436-438,

'

214, 223.

175. 156-158, Indefiniteness : See

'

16-18,

74,

157,

281.

Indeterminacy.' Independent Propositions: 166, 198,

199.

46. Exhaustiveness : I. 104. contradiction : Nature Implied Common

I.

115. I.

Objective perty : 26, Import : See

Reference 27.
'

94.
'

IndesignateProposition: 128, 165, : 387. Indestructibility Indeterminacy : 89, 112, 113, 116.
'

147. See

Indeterminate

.' 'Indefinite
. .

Meaning,' Singular I.' I. of Determined by Identity: 146. 115, 99, 114, 94, 95, : Propositions 145-148, 150, 119, 123, 132 (ftn.),
244, 245 189, 190, 239-241, 155-159, of view 'Attributive I.', (see ' ' Coincidence-im Class-inclusion,'

Indeterminate: I.

Agreement

131, 133. I. Meaning : 76-78, 88, 95, 121, 284, in Definition : I. Elements 285, 329. 20-22, 35, 41, 43, 44, 54, 71, 74, 75. I. SubjectI.' Knowledge : 113.

.' I. Categorical : I. Concept, I. Conception,

:

See

20.

port,'
'

'

"Denotative
'

Reading,"
'

istential I.,' Extension-i.,' 'Intensive I.,' Identity-i.,'

' ' Ex Formal

Read of

concept : 116, 121, 165 (ftn.). See Non-me 453. Indeterminism : .' chanical
'
. .

ing,'

'

Predicative

view

I.,'

Index

63-65.

478
Index-Classification Indication of

THE
64-66.

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
449.

: Principle

I.

: ix, 3, Principle

Objects by

Terms

21

311-364,
'

367,
to

395,
Relevant

448,

80, (ftn.), 218,

Indicative Indirect 435. I.

81, 86, 147, 161, 162 (ftn.), ' See 219. Application of
'

Fidelity

449 (see Fact '). I.

Meanings,' Objective Reference.'

Sentence : 94, 167. Moods I. Observation : 236. : I. Proof : 237, 238, 324, 325.
:

Proof : 416, 454. I. Scheme : 347. I. Science : 313, 378, 379, 453. See ' Induction,' ' Science.' Inertia : 459. Inference

Reduction

See

'

Reductio

per

Impossibile.'
Individual

40, 42, 43, 57, 63, : 22-24, 64, 66, 71, 72, 80-82, 85-88, 114, 115, 148, 149, 152, 157, 161-163, 165, 288, 299, 340, 352, 354, 356, 363, 460 .,' 455, (see Objects
'
. .

7, 8, 114, 130, 141, : 3 (ftn.), 142, 146, 155, 167, 185-310, 318-327, 348, 349, 362, 368, 370 (ftn.),385, 387, 409 (see 'Deductive I.,' 'For mal Induc I.,' Immediate I.,' tive I.",' Invalid ...,'' Syllogism,'
' ' " '

'

Term Singular
'

'). Its Definability :

See

Names.' I. I. Concept : 80 (see 'Singular C.'). I. Elements I. (or Sub in Division : 47, 79, 80. jective)Intension : 70, 71. I. Na I. Meaning : 81. 80 ture : (see

D.

of

Proper
371.

Characteristic

I. as an Identity : 96. Added Determinants : 208, 209. I. from Disjunctives: 133, 134 (see ' D. Par Syllogism '). I. from ticulars to P. : 299, 300, 302. I. in relation to Hypothetical Form : 145, 146. I. of Consequent from Ante I.

'

'). Validity by

cedent Inferential

142

Fallacies

(see Apodeictic .'). : 286 (see Formal

. .

'

'

Singular Meaning '). I. : 82, 85, 459, 460. Individuality See Reference : 80. SingularMean ing.'
'

'

of

Fallacy'). 'I. Possibility':130. Infima Specie : 42-44, 72-74, 77, 80, 88, 89 (see Continued Division ').
'

118. See : 79. Indivisibility Inductive Induction,

:

Individualization

Its Divisibility : 79, 89. Infinite Regress : 103, 378.

'

I. Term

'

'

Divisibility.'

48, 49, 72 (see Indefinite

'

Species').
4, 5.

ductive
'

In Method, Procedure, etc. : 3, 94, 122, 311-462 295, 301-303, 306 (ftn.), (see Prin Explanation,' Inductions,' Scientific I.'). ciple of Induction,' Inductive Inference I. and : 326, I. and the Inductive Principle 327. :
' ' ' ' '

InfluencingAgent : 405. Infra-scientific Viewpoint

Inherent
'

Force

459, 460.

311-344.

I.

tion : 356, Enumeration: Inductions

'

by Complete Enumera 357. I. by Simple

347, 351-357, 454-456.
'

Initiating Cause, I. Condition : See Exciting Cause.' Inner Standpoint : 453. 458, Inorganic Fact, I. Phenomenon 459. I. Nature I. Order : : 61 (ftn.).
33.

Inspection:
Instance
:

390.

See

'

Observation.'

improperly so-called : 344350 (see Colligation,' Parity of Perfect Induc Reasoning,' tion '). I. properlyso-called : 347 (see Imperfect I.,' Scientific I.').
' " " ' '

114, 131, 157, 302-304, 327, 340, 348-362, 371, 383, 391-408, 412418, 421, 422, 425, 426, 439, 443, 454-458. See 449-451, 'Negative I.,' Positive I.'
'

Inductive Methods.'
448.

Canons I.

See

'

C.

Conception

of Causal of Fact

Instantia stance.'

Crucis

See

'

Crucial
'

In

I. I. Conclusion : 416, 418. Criterion, I. Standard : 347, 348, I. Ex 350, 355-357, 362, 456, 457. (see E.,' planation : 343, 368-370
'

Con Integrityof Thought : 98. See sistency." I. 98, 104, 191, 452. : Intelligibility of Experience, of Fact, of Reality,
: 78, 79, 99, 104, 139, 140, 458. I. of Statement : 99. World 105. : Intelligible Intended Meaning : 97 (ftn.).

'). (see 'H.'). I.

Induction

'

I.

Hypothesis
318
:

336
'

etc.

Idea:

(ftn.),

352, 390.
Inference
'

I. Ideal
:

I. 420, 448. 299, 301, 303, 326, 327,

I. Inquiry, I. Method, 347-350. ' Induc I. Procedure, I. Process : See I. In 'I. Instinct': 303. tion.'
terest
:

Intension 147,

21

154.
.

See
.

velopment
:

70-73, 80, 146, (ftn.), Disjunctive De .,' D. Interpretation

' '
. .

381,
'

421,

457.

326

(see

Induction

').

I. Logic I. Methods

of I.,'' Intensive Intensive Reading

.'

: :

455, 456 (see : 313. .'). I. Movement I. Postulate : 3, 338 (ftn.), 367, 368,
326, 356, ' Method

395-422,

Intent,

Intention

147, 148 (ftn.). 23, 24, 27, 28, 51

'

97 (ftn.) (ftn.), Interaction

:

See

Purpose.'
'

420,
minism

445-462.
:

I.

450-455.

P. I.

and P.

Deter and I.

29, 341, 459, 460. See : 7, 8, 9. Interconsistency

Con

sistency.'

480
65. To
:

THE
Definition 52. To 63.

PROBLEM
To
:

OF

LOGIC
'

Dicho

Leading Category:
L. Concept Genus.'
:

76

(see
See
'

Being ').

tomy
To

Ignorance

77, 79.
: :

74.

Summum Saltus in

Truth K. of Classes : 3, 4. Of Meaning : 76. Of Nature Of Self : 3, 4, 82. Known 416.

340. 29.

Leaps

in Division Divisione.'

See

'

Cause, K. Condition

411, 412,

Legitimate Explanation : 420, 449, 453, 457. L. Hypothesis : 328, 337, 338
348.

Lamarck,

J. B. P. A. de Monet Lancaster, Ray (Prof.) : 429.

447.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: Leslie, Sir John : 334.

333.

Language
Ideas As 84
:

(or Speech)
16, 17.
'

as

expressing
Truth
: :

Leverrier, Urbain

J. J.

412, 413.

As

ex.

16.

the Instrument
'

of Definition

53,

Library-Classification : 64, 65. Liebig,Justus (Prof.) : 427-429.

Life
'

(see D.'). L. in relation to Logic : See under Logic.' In r. to 13-17, 24 Thought: (see 'Tech nology '). Its Ambiguity : 105 (see 'A.'). L. regulatedby Rhetoric : 13. Latta, Robert : 322. (Prof.) Laurie, Henry (Prof.) : 396, 407, 411.
Law of Association of
:

57, 425, 426, 453, 460, 461.

'

See

Psychical L.,' Vitality.' Light: 335, 336, 338, 339, 394, 413,
430, 432-435. Likeness : See
Limit tion
:
'

Resemblance.'
or

of Abstraction 75. L. of

of Generaliza 88.

Determinacy :

28, 81, 449.

L. of
:

Causation, L.

Uniformity
'

378,

L. of Knowledge : 79. Limitation by Negations

379, 450, 452-458

See
'

(see Causal L.'). L. of Contradiction, L. of Non-C. :

by Suppositio
curse
:

See of

'

Principleof
Middle
:

Non-C.'

L. of Ex

cluded

ix, 98-100, 104, 146,

157. L. Extension
of

L. : 420-422. Universe of DisS.' L. of Certainty : Content 28. L. of :

or
:

180 ; its relation to Obversion : 191 ; to Time its 100-102 Violation : : ; 104. L. of Falling Bodies : 342, 409.
'

by Connotation Knowledge : 128-130,

L. of

72.

L.

175, 176.
L. of
ment
:

Meaning
L.

157, 158, 17, 158. :

: 131. Possibility

L. of State

L.

of

Formal F.

Inference

See

156,
'

158, 176.

Principle of Validity: See

Gravitation
:
'

I.' L. of Formal ' P. of F. V.' L. of See ' G.' L. of Iden

trol) through Relevance pose) : See P.'

(or Con (to Pur

tity:
Inertia See
'

See
:

Principle of I.' L. of 459. L. of LogicalValidity:

of L. V.' L.
146.

P.

Identity:

L. of Material of Nature, etc.

Limitations of Enumerative Induc tion : 356, 357, 454, 455. L. (or Limits) of the Inductive Postulate : 448, 449, 458. L. 452, of the
Method Limited of Difference Universe
'

404-407. 138. 376. of the

5, 58, 114, 115, 138, 144-147, 295, 302, 303, 305, 307, 308, 313-315, 333, 341-344, 353-357, 367-389, 393, 395, 405-415, 437, 439, 449-459 (see

49

118, (ftn.),

See

Suppositio.'

Limiting

Empirical L.,' Mathematical L.'). of Non-Ambiguity : See Prin L. of Perception : ciple of N.-A.' 392. L. of Self-Consistency 98, : 99 (see Principle of Non-C.'). L. of the Conservation of Energy : 333.
L.
' '

'

'

Case of Interference : Condition L. 421. L. Form : Infima Species : 74, 80. Of 98. 161. Of

Principle of Identity: Universal Proposition:

Limits of 73-85.

the

L. of the Land Peri : 104, 140, 367. odic L. : 61 (ftn.). of Causal Laws Interaction 341 (see : C. Law). L. of ContradictoryOppo sition
ment
: :

Definition and Division : L. of Human Understand L. of the Inductive Pos ing : 448. tulate : See ' Limitations of the I. P.'

Links

173,
341.

L. of Develop 174. of L. Hydrostatics :

:

in Causation : 381, 382. Linnaeus, Carolus (Prof.):63, 64. Lister, Lord : 418.
: 275, 293-295. Litigiosus Living Being : 42.

436. diction

L.

of Motion

333, 335, 418,

Non-Contra Middle ix, : L. of Planetary Motion 98-104. : L. of Science: See 332, 342, 343. ' L. of Thought : Scientific Law.'

431-434,

of 436. L. and Excluded

Locke,

Logic

John : 287, 289. and Truisms L. as a Con : 97. cept : 96. As a Science : 8, 13, 49, As As Art : 13. 94, 97, 111. an the Reason
: :

vii, 3 (ftn.), 6, 7, 9, 16, 95-107, 187, 203, 204, 448 ; their Inviolability : Teleo104-107, 173, 191, 193, 327.
L. logical
:

to appealingexclusively As 13. dependent on

Language
. . .

104.

' As Formal 13. F. : See formal : See ' f. Reference ' Material See M. L.' :

L.'
.

As

.' Philo-

As As

INDEX,
sophical: See : philosophical
'P.
3-5.

VERBAL
L.'
As

AND

ANALYTIC

481

As

Pre-

Lotze, Rudolph Hermann

Lowest
'

(Dr.) : 407.
392.

Scientific : See ' R. lative of Language : R. of Thought : 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 27, of the Mind As the Medicine : 107.
16. In L.

or Real As L.' Regu As 13, 16, 17.

Species: See Infima S.' John Lubbock, (Lord Avebury) : Lyell,Sir Charles : 314, 337.
Ma:
130.

Defined
to
to

1, 8, 33,

34.

L.

in relation
r.

Language : 11-89, 164. Morality and Religion :

In r. to Words 107. 13, 16, 17, : Its Theo 93. Its Function : 1, 2. L. of Ab 13. retical Character : L. of Common stract Identity: 97. Sense
L.
ence
:

McTaggart, J. M. Ellis (Dr.): 75, Magic : 451, 453. Magnetism : 97, 334, 335. Major Premiss : 214, 215, 225, 226,

76.

228-

5.

L.
:

of

of Evidence
:

361.
'

L. L.
'

of

viii (see ' Form : See

Discovery : 361. L. of Experi PhilosophicalL.').

Formal
. . .

231, 233, 234, 237, 238, 243, 257, 258, 261-264, 269, 271-274, 290, 300, M. 301, 324, 457, 458 (see Ultimate 213, 214, 219, 225, P.'). M. Term: 233, 234, 237, 269 228-230, (see
' ' Illicit Process Mai-observation

of the
:

M.').
Robert
:

L.'

393.

of Personality : 3-6, 114 (ftn.) (see L.'). L. of Relatives : Philosophical

Malthus,
'

the Rev.
'

Thomas

314.

Many

168.

L. of the Moral 251. Sciences : 409. L. of Validity: L. of Truth : 304. 304 (see 'Formal L.'). L. of
. . .

Mark
'

Logical
435

Verification : 361. Ambition :

'

(see A.'). (see 'A.'). L. Concept: 95,

L. Analysis : L. Antecedent : 370

96. L.
:
'

2.

: 18-21, 27, 70, 81, 82, 327, 351, See 352, 356, 357, 360, 362, 384. Character,' Copula -m.,' Defini Ele Indeterminate tion m.,' ments ...,'' MeaninglessM.,' Qual' ' '
-

'

ity-m.,' Quantity-m.,'
'

'

Tense-m.'

Mars

327, 331, 349, 350, 360, 361, 394.

:

Consistency:
118-120. grams
56
:

L. See
'

C.' Criterion:
'

See

L. Context 3. L. Division
'

Marshall
Mass
:

354. See
'

Dia
:

385, 434.
:

D.'

L.

40-

Material

Object-matter.' M.

(see ').
324

D.'). L.
:

Exclusion
tion

414-418
'

Elimination, L. (see Elimina

Form Reduction of
of

L.

Equivalence: 124, 147,

(see
:

166,

E.'). L.
'

Arguments
A. ..."
L.

See

F. of Propositions : 116, L. 117, 139, 142, 154, 161-171, 193. Ground: 370 (ftn.)(see ' G.'). L. Ideal
420.
:

9, 124, 136,
L.

137, 303, 419,

'

Identity: See 'I.' L. See : plication

See
'

I.' L. Im Inference

140-142, : Apodeictic Hypothetical M. Evi 146. M. Compatibility : 8. dence : 189, 275, 289, 308 (see E.'). M. Fact M. 306. : Fallacy : 289. M. Ground M. : 326. Falsity: 310. 142. M. 140 M. Hypothetical: Identity: 146. M. Knowledge : 52. M. (treatment of) Logic : ix, 7. M. M. Proposition: 115. Nature: 452. M. Truth M. Reality, : 8, 9, 10, 290,
'
-

304, 310.

M.

I.'

L.

Interest

77-79, 88, 93,

System
387.

386.

M. Substance 459. : Universe M. 386, :

112, 114, 124, 134, 135

pose 78.

(see 'Pur

'); its relation

L.

to
:

Judgment
of
L.
'

the See
;

Concept
' '

Meaning
154-158.

All

': 154
:

of

J.' Some
L.

Method

410.

L. ': Ne

: 8, 9, 26, 139, 141, 165, 306, cessity 309, 321, 322, 324, 327 (ftn.), 328, 336 (see Apodeictic .,' Neces 0.' sity'). L. Opposition: See Priority of Prepositional L. Order or L. Possibility Forms : 112-114. : 130. L. 162 Predicate : (see 'P.'). L. L. Prin : 419, 420. Presupposition : 281 (see P. .'). L. Pro ciple 91 183 : (see position P.'). L. Purpose : 93, 133 (see P.'). L. Science : See Logic as a S.'
' '
. .

Deduction 369, : Science : M. 333. M. Law : Mathematics.' See Mathematics ix, 89, 136, 305, : 330, 333, 309, 322, 323 (ftn.), See 337, 369, 386, 387, 447. gebra,' 'Astronomy,' 'Conic

Mathematical
'

412.
386.

306, 336,
'Al Sec

'

Dynamics,' Euclid,' Geo metry,' Hydrostatics,' Number,' Physics.' M. of a Judgment Matter : 333, 387.
tions,'
'

'

'

'

'

'

125.

'

Maxim 97.
'

105,

382.

M.

of

Identity:

'

'

May
:

'

128-130, 286.
M.
in Division
:

'

Me
Mean

130.
:

L. L. L.

Status

of

the

Dicta
L.

241-244.

99, 123.
:

53.
'

Subject: 116 Theory

:

(see'SubjectTerm').
Unit
:

305.

94, 96,
L.
118.

23-25, 51, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, Meaning 139, 461 (see Col 88, 94, 97 (ftn.),
lective Abstract M.,' See :

97, 111.

L.

Validity: See
L. Whole
:

'V.'

'Concept').
'

M.

as

Vitality: 157.

A.

Concent.'

As

31

482

THE
See
16.
'

PROBLEM
As
:

OF

LOGIC
Herbert

Associative Conventional: See

' '

Association.' As Determinate

Mellone, Sydney

(Dr.) : viii,

D. sence.'
.

.' As Disjunctive: See As Essential See ' Es : As Indeterminate See ' I. : ' .' As In Concept,' I. Elements
D.
. .

.'

52, 274, 384, 396, 397, 402-404, 411, 412, 422 (ftn.). Members of a Class : 43, 61-63, 131, 166

(see 'C.'). Of
'

Genus: 45.

20-22 See
'

(see
Di

Species').
Dividentia
'

dividual As

or

Singular:
:

See 70.

'

S.

Occasional

15,
or

As

M.' Self-

Membra Mendeleeff Mental

. .

vision,' Species.'
:
.

consistent, True,

'Judgment').
'

As As

False : 93 Stated: the

(see
See of

61
:

See

(ftn.). Psychical
'

.'

M.

Statement.'
:

Object
'

Development
Mentiens Mere
:

461.

Definition vision
ment tion
: : : :

17-23
'

(see

D.') ; of Di
Its
to
:

103, 182, 183.

(see

D.').

Develop
Relevant

See 88. 3.

' D. of M.' Its relation

Its Involu

Fact 168. sition

M. of

Sentence
or

116, 117,
:

Subjective
:

70, 71, 81.

118.

M. Ultimate

Intension of
a

M.

Propo

: 46, 157. -Possibility Metaphoric Definition : 33, 37. Metaphysical Division : 40, 52, 56. See Metaphysics : 244. Philosophy,' Philosophical Logic.' Meteorology : 352, 391.
' '

Method
'

Meaning-identity: 95. Meaningless Mark : 81, 82. Meaninglessness: 27, 51, 77-79,

316, 321, 347, : 246, 281, 295, 348, 351, 353, 357 (see Induction,' Methods ...,'' Scientific Method,'
' '

97,

Unscientific
:

M.').
395-399,
of

M.

of

(Single)
419,

98, 103-107, 122 (ftn.), 126, 141, 149, 150, 188, 191, 317, 339, 450. Inconsis or Meanings as Consistent ' See tent : Consistency,' ' Incon

Agreement
422, 423.
M.

413-417,

of

M. Causal

Analysis : 420-422. C. Explanation or

'

sistency.' As
15, 19, 20. 35, 89, 126
As M.

given
'

in Dictionaries
:

Inquiry : 389, tion '). M. of

tions
:

395-422 (see Concomitant

Induc Varia M. of M.'

Interrelated

30, 31,

405-407,
:

417,
'

418.

(see Conceptual Order

ing ...').

expressed by Signs :
M. of Immediate Of 81. Marks :

Deduction See : M. of Definition of

Deductive

14-17, 24, 25, 32.

(Single) Difference
411,
M.
:

Experiences : 82. Of Sound-complexes : 25, 81. Of Symbols : 25. Of Terms, of Words, of Verbal Signs: 115, 214, 282 (see Term,' Words,' V. Sign '). Their A. of M.' Their Application: See
' ' ' '

407,
'

M. 18-20, 29-33. 355, 402: 413-419, 425, 426 (see of

Double

D.').

M.

of Double

Classification

:
'

See C.'
'

'

C.'

parison :
See
'

See
'

Their

Their Com Definition De

'

of 417. M. Elimination, M. of Exclusion : 396, ' Methodus 420 414-418, Ex(see clusiva '). M. of Enumerative In ' duction E. I.' M. of (Scien : See

Agreement

398-400,

D.,'

Their Definability.' See

'

413,

: scription

tomy ': See

tiation,
See Their Their
tion
:
'

D.' D.'

Their Their of
' '

Dicho

tific) Experiment : 395, 398, 401of 428. M. 417, 419 (ftn.), of Ob M. mere Agreement : 396.
:

Differen M.' Their

servation M. dues ative See

See
:

'

Observational
'

M.1

Distinction,
:

Specification : Divisibility.' F. of Meaning.' and Specializa

of Proof
:

See

P.'

M.

of Resi

Differentiation See
'

411-413,
Enumeration Induction.' M. of

417,
:

Division

D.,'

Simple
'

Fixation : See Generalization

S.'

M. Verification
to

of 418. M. See ' Enumer of Statistics :

:

397,
309. M.

Their Indefiniteness 14, 15. : Their Vari 16-18, 74, 281, 282. : 14-18, 37 (ftn.), 66, 101, 102. ability M. : 82-85. ' See 104, Teleo128, 420. logical .' Mechanical Causation, M. Connexion : M. Equivalent : 387, 370, 453, 462. Means
:
. .

418 (see 'V'). Methodical Reference See

'

Reality:
295.

Real 420.

Reference M. M.
'

Ultimate

Methodological
Goal
448,
:

..." Fallacies : Postulate Inductive

: Guiding Principle :

458.

420, 448,

450,

457

(see

P.').

M.
:

of Significance

the Law

of Causation

M. Explanation : 450-455, 459, 389. M. Force: 460. 375. M. 333, Method M. Work : 429. : 388. Inference Mediate : 189, 192, 194, 209,

456, 457.

Methodology
443. See
'

3, 305,

419,
:

420,
'

442,

Induction.' See the Induc

:

Methods
tive 448. Methodus

216,
'

223,

244, 213,

247, 216,

251,

269.

See

of Induction M.'s.' M.'s of Exclusiva

Reason

Syllogism.'
218, 223, 244,

Mediation: 251.

414-418.

M1:

130.

INDEX,
Middle

VERBAL

AND
M.

ANALYTIC
Tollendo Ponens

483

Term 221, 227-229, : 213-218, 248, 251, 258, 284, 320 (see 'Cate

262, 263, 416.

324. Postu

gorical Syllogism').
tion

Its

222, 223, : 217, 218, 237, 238, 269. Stuart : viii, 58, 321, 348, Mill, John
of the Syllogism: Canons His Inductive : 250, 299-304. His In See ' C. of Causal Methods.' 407. His Estimate ductive
the

Distribu 228, 230,

M. Tollens : 263, 264, 267-269, Molecule : 459. Monism late Mood Moon
: : : :

1, 2, 98.
'

M.

as

2.

See

M.' Syllogistic

342, 394, 408.

Moons Moral

38, 129, 141, 329, 331, 355, 358, 361, 375-377,

332, 391,

His Proof of Scheme : 347. His of Causatian Law : 453-458. of Inference : View of the Nature M. on 302-304. Analogy : 358, 361, and Causation On 363. Cause : On 370, 371, 375-380, 382, 389. On Con 350. 349, : Colligation On comitant Variations : 417, 418. Elimination Correlatives On : : 35. Enumerative 414-417. On On tion : 351. Hypothesis : 328. Methods Inductive On 413, 414, : On 418. Necessary Truth : 449, Names Non-connotative 450. On : Induc-

of Jupiter : 362. Science : 409. 61

Morality :
361, 462.

107, 283, 285, 340, (ftn.), 60, 62, 424.

'

Morphology :
tany,'
Most Motion
' '

See

'

Bo

Structure.'
'

Zoology.'
of M.' See
'

': 165, 222. See : 447.

of

Laws

Moulding
cation
'

Hypothesis :
128,

Modifi See

of H.'
'

Must
'

127,

378,

462.

Necessity.'

Mutual

81, 82.
On the 420.

On

Observation

: :

392, 419.
349.

Coincidence, M. Exclusion, M. Exclusiveness, M. Inclusion, M. Noncoincideiice : See C.,' Exclusion,'

' ' '

Parity
On

of Deductive the

Reasoning
Method
420.

On

Exclusive

...,''
'

Exclusiveness,'

-.

408,

419,
M.
:

'

Inclusion,'
:

Non-c.'

Hypothetical

Mysticism
Name:
tative
'

2.
' '

the Joint On On the M. of Agreement : M. : 398. On the 395, 397, 413, 415, 417, 419. M. of Difference : 402, 404, 405, 414, On the M. of Residues : 417, 419.

410,

411, 419,

See

Connotative N.,' Deno N.,' 'Nomenclature,' 'Proper

N.'s,' Term.'
Names

411.

On

the Summum

Bonum

283.

Milne, Prof. : 441, 443. Milnes, Alfred : 323. Mind 112, 390, 392, 393, : 95, 97, 453, 458-461. Minor Premiss : 214, 215, 221, 228-231, 233, 237, 238, 242, 243, 249, 257, 258, 262-264, 268-274, M. Term 301, 324. : 213, 214,
228, 233, 269 of the M').

409, 226, 248,

294,

24, 25 (see ' Defini : N. of Classes Kinds. See '). or ' ' Class,' General Concept.' Of Indi viduals: See ' SingularMeaning.' Natural Classification : 57-66, 73, 368,
tion 451.

denned

219,

N. Condition N. Effect : : 451. N. Experiment : 394, 440. N. Fact, N. Phenomenon : 455, 458 (see ' F.,' ' Nature,' 'P.'). N. Groups, N. Kinds : 58, 60, 61, 63-65 (see' Kind ') ; 369.

(see

'

Illicit process

their Phylogenetic Relations : 60, 61. ' N. History : 342. N. Law L. of : See Nature.' N. Method of Definition : N. Order : 60. 32. N. Philosophy : N. Science : See ' S.' N. Selec 409. Nature:

Minto,
306

William 307, (ftn.)

287, 290, : viii, (Prof.)

336, 384. Mitchell, P. Chalmers (Dr.): 62.

Mixed
: Hypothetical Syllogism

263-

269. Mnemonic 250. 130. M": Modal

Verses

226,

229, 235, 249,

62, 314, 344. 138, 307-309, 313, 314, 316318, 357, 368, 377, 379, 386, 394, 409, 443, 444, 450-458 (see Common N.,' of N.,' Law Science '). N. as
tion
:
' ' '

: 129, 130. May : 129-131, 138. sibility of Opposition : 130.

'

'

Modal
M.

Pos

: See Intelligible

Square
'

perience.' As
'

of Ex Intelligibility Systematic : 119 (see

'

Modes
of F.

of Differentiation D.

See
:

D.' M. M.

Modification
:

of See

Condition
'

Unity
:

of F.

405. D.'
of

Conception ...'). N. in relation Analysis: 29 ; to Knowledge : 29 ; N. of the to Thought : 2-5, 9, 23. Object : 54, 57, 58, 64, 65.
to

S.

(or Moulding
thesis
or

or

Revision)
432,

Hypo
448,

Naville, Ernest
Nebular
in

: :

316. 436.
:

Theory
M.

334, 335, 420-422,

Theory

424, 425, 451, 452.

Modus M.

427-430,

447,

Necessary Conclusion

See

'

Necessity

of Statement : 285. Tollens : 262, Ponendo 263. Ponens : 263, 264, 267, 268, 325.

N. Inference.' Condition 457 : ' between (see C.'). N. Connexion and Antecedent Consequent : 136,

31"2

484
'

THE
142
'

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

139,

(see

Apodeictic Hypo
Cause Effect : 319, 335, 336. and

thetical

) ; between

449, 450. Necessity: 105, 127, 128, 378, 387, 448

:
' ' N.'). (see Intrinsic N.,' Teleological of Possibilities : 139, N. in Connexion In Deduction In Infer 141. : 26.

N. Consequence : 382. N. N. Deduction : 342. 149 (see 'I.'). N. Truth

Non-cause : 415, 416. Non-coincidence : 150, 153. Non-connotative Names Terms or

89.

81,

Implication:

Non-Contradiction N.-C.'
Noncumulative

See

'

Principle of

Effect Predicables Non-defining

373-375.
:

22, 25, 26.

See
'

Non-denotative

Terms

89.

In-

ence

8, 9, 130, 149, 190, 214, 216, 328 (see 306, 309, 321-325, 327 (ftn.),
:
'

fima Species.'
Non-effective Condition Non-essential Antecedents
Mark
: :

LogicalN.').
'

384. : 384.

N.-e.

'

Need

128.

64.

N.-e.

Non-exclusive Negated Copula : 126. tive : 132-137, 178, 266, Negation: 49, 122-124, 193, 194, 420, See 421, 449 (see Negative Proposition,' Non-exclusivist : sive .' of N.,' Pure N.'). Privative View
' ' '
. .

Meaning : 27-29. Reading of the Disjunc

274. ' Non-exclu

Its relation to Affirmation 123, 124. : Negative aspect of Verification : 334, Assertion : 122 (see Nega tion '). N. Conclusion : 217, 220, 223, N. Con 224, 236-238, 257, 259, 260. N. Copula: 126. dition : 371, 379. 335. N. Definiteness
: :

220. : 219, Non-identity Non-logical Division : D.'

See

N.

'

physicalD.,' 'Physical D.,'

Non-mechanical
Non-observation

Meta 'Verbal 452.

'

Explanation : 451,
:

157.

N.

Definition-

391, 392. Non-periodic Causes : 373, 375.

N. Evidence, N. 36, 64. N. Form and : 334, 335, 401. N. Idea: 36 N. Meaning: 169 (ftn.). mark Result

Non-propositional Sentences
167, 168. Non-x : See Indefinite finite Term."
' ' '

93,
' "

94,
In

Species,'
'

(see 'Indefinite
stance
:

Species').

N.

In

400-403, 407, 416, 421, 425,

Not

N. 426. Interrogative: 168. N. Method 156. Limitation : : 418. N. Premiss N. 107. Movement : :

N.

any '"A."'
'

98 See Notion
'

assuredly : See 'N.neither': 133. Not(SisP): N. statedly ': 173, 174. (ftn.),
:
'

'

164.

'

N.

217, 220, 221, 223, 224, 230, 237, 238, 243, 264. N. P. in N. Principle : 16. 257, 258. 124, 147, 123, 149, : position

232-234,
Sorites N. Pro
:

S.' See

'

Concept,'

'

Idea.'

150, 158
'

Not-P, Not-x : See ' Indefinite " ' Infinite Term." ' ' Now : 82-85, 101.
Number

Species,'

'77P./ Nega Proposition,' tion,' 'O P.,' 'w P.'). N. Quality: 123, 124 (see Q.'). N. Quality-mark :
(see E
'

'

N. of Differences, : 447, 454. N. of Instances, N. of Resemblances :

Statement 122, 170 (see : ' Negation '). N. Subject-term: 166. N. Test-instance : 403, 406, 407, 414' N. N.' 416. Universal : See U. 163. N. N.
use

43, 327, 353-355, 358-360, 396, 397, 418, 455 (see Enumeration '). N.
'

of Kinds

denoted
:

Numeration
Numerical N.

See

'

: 72. En.'

Accuracy

or

Precision

386. N. 435.

of

'

Any

'

164.

Coincidence:

146,
N. N.

147.

Negativity: 107. 147. N"gO: Neo-Hegelians : 31. Neptune: 412, 413.

438. Simon Newcomb, : 70, 412 (ftn.), Newton, Sir Isaac : 318, 332, 333, 337339, 342, 343, 388. Method Newtonian : 315. No A is No 164, 168. : 48 (ftn.),
' ' '

Equivalency : 387. : 167. (Proposition)

O

Exceptive
:

Result

Proposition: 147-151, 155, 157-161,

Its Con 172, 182, etc. Its 54, 195, 196, 201. Diagrams : 151, 160. Its relation to version 1
156
: :

168,

171,

(see Subcontrariety ').

451

'

either B ' P : 159. P is some

or
'

C ' : 132. No S is P

'

No

'

S is any ' 149. No S

159-161. : Proposition Object : 78, 129, 341, 357, 359, 368,

(see 'Abstract
' '

'

' 159, 160 (see rj

...').
282.

Nomenclature:
Nominalistic

SymbolicN.

61, 66-70, 281, 69, 70. Definition : 24, 25.

:

'

0.,' O.,' 'Concrete Countable O.,' O's.,' Immediate Individual,' Objective Reference,' Relation '). SpatialO.,' Subject-O.
' ' '

O. of Definition Division
tion
: :

: 269. Non-acceptance of Statement Non- Ambiguity : 3, 16, 20, 26, 27, 39,

O. of : 23-26, 32, 51. 51, 53, 54. O. of Enumera O. of O. of

353.

102, 103, 133, 135, 214. Non-causal Explanation :

O. of 369. 453.

Experiment,

Experience : 78. Study : 145,

O. of

O. of Interest: 78, 118.

INDEX,
'

VERBAL

AND

ANALYTIC

485

0. of ObservaO. ;" tion : 340, 390, 393, 394, 401-403. O. of Thought : of Perception: 392.

"Knowledge
'

83, 208.

Optative : 93, 94, 167, 168. Optics : See Light.' : in Disjunctives Or else
' '
'

3-6, 9, 23, 104, 208.

in

Division
'

See

'

Or D. Disjunctive 135.
'

Objectiveaspect of Meaning : 23-26, 30, 51, 77 ; of Reality or of Truth : 4, 5,

23, 309
O. O.

' Or or.'

in

: See Disjunctives

Either

(sec Real
:

'

Classification Content:

Reference 65 (see 'Real O.

.'). C.').
of

23, 24.

Control

Conceptual Thought : 3, 5. O. Nature : 23, 26. Order,' System,' Systematization,' 'Real P.'). 129 O. Possibility: (see '). Order (or Degree) of Refer Uniformity O. 119. 118, 24, O. Reality: O. of Prepo Generality: 45, 88. 115. 161 (ftn.), : 85-89, 94, 103, ence 112-114. sitional Forms : 162 (ftn.). O. System : 318. Order.' : See Ordered Connexion Object-matter: 57, 58, 65. 34. 33, of : Orders Meaning Classing.' O. Objects classed : See O. Evolution : classified: 63 (see Classification '). Organic Development,
' ' ' ' ' ' ' Class.' O. contained in Classes : See ' Definition '). denned 23-25 O. (see : ' O. O. ' denoted by Terms : 147. ' Indica indicated by Terms : See 80-82. named tion .' 0. :
. .

Order, Ordering, Orderliness : 3, 5, 2.3, 337, 340, 29, 30, 43, 57, 58, 119 (ftn.), Classification.' 458 (see 368, 455, Ordering ...,'' Natural
' '

Obligation: 107, 127,

Observation:

293.

114, 115, 136,

140, 166,

295, 299-303, 305, 313-315, 326, 327, 349-352, 355-360, 338-341, 330-335,

O. Fact, O. Life, O. Pheno O. O. Order : 33. menon : O. 447. Unity of a Relations : Classification : 60 ; of Term Natural Division and Proposition : 125 ; of the Universe : 460. 45. O. Process : 44, ' Order See Conceptual : Organization O. of ...,'' See
'

D.'

458-461.

379, 389-398, 401-405, 408-414, 419, 421, 424, 425, 431-438, 441-443, 448457.

Systematization.' ing Thought: 96. Sense : 5, 347. Organized Common

Ostensive Otherness Reduction
:

See
in

'

: 247-250. Difference.' :

Observational
O. Method
:

Interest: 395-401, 390-393.

389-391,
419

393. (ftn.).O.

Over-exhaustive

Division

46.

Overlapping
Division P as Pairs
:

Classification : 62.

In

Purpose:
Obverse: Obversion

45, 52-55.

190-193,

197-202,206,248,265.
a

232,

221, : 189-193, 198, 200, 202, of O. 234, 249, 250, 324.

' '

Substitute of Terms
'

Sign
:

"

14.
"

See

'

Contradictory
"

Hypothetical
Obvertend
versioii.'
:

265.

T.,"
See
'

'"Contrary
61.
.

T.

'Correla

191, See
'

192, 201.
formal.'
:

Ob-

tive T.'
: Palaeontology
' .' Zeno Paradox : See of ' Either Parallel interpretation ' 132 (ftn.). and ' Some : or and Enumera of Division Parallelism
. .

Occasional
114. O.

Meaning

15, 70.

O. Interest O. Pro

'

perty : 27, 28, 37. Odysseus: 118, 119.

321. CErsted, Hans Christian : 334. ' in Division : See Inadequate Omissions
: (Ecology

tion

43.
:

Parity of Reasoning
Partial Antecedent,

347, 349, 359.

: :

P. Cause

378, 383.

D.' ' 155-157, 161, 162. One at least : ' See Oneness Unity.' : ' Only : 166, 167, 169-171, 198. See ' First C.' Cause : 378. Ontological Induction to : Operations Subsidiary See ' Col 349, 411, 422. 316 (ftn.),
'
'

P. Coincidence, P. Non-c. P. Definition : 74. 159.

150, 152,
P. DeterP.
P. In

minacy
clusion

: :

112. 405.

P.

Exclusion,

153, 240, 241, 243. 148,

Ex

periment :
ence
:

147,
. .

tributed

ligation,' Definition,'
' ' '

Division/ Hypothesis,'Observation.'
'

'

Knowledge : K.'). P. Method

tion
:

P. Extension-refer ' 219 (see Undis 129. P. .'). P. Ground: ' of 129 (see Limitation
:
'

410.

P.

Verifica

Opinion : 145, 157, 392. Opposite : 123. See Opposition.' Opposition: 48, 123, 126, 304. O. of 128, 130, : CategoricalPropositions
156, 171-177, 181-183, 189, 203 (see 'Modal Square of O.,' Teleological
'

436.

See

V.' Progressive

Particular:

83, 84, 87, 88, 129, 157, 244-247, 299, 300, 302, 303, 320, 326, 339, 349, 441, 460 (see Individual,'
'

'

Inference

from

Ps

...').
147
:

mative
P

: (Proposition)

P. Affir ' (see I

Scheme 178. O. of

: of O.'). O. of Disjunctives O. of Hypothetical: 178-180. : SingularPropositions

'). P. Conclusion

217,

181.

228, 236, 238, 259, sion-reference : 148

260.

223, 226P. Exten

'

(see

Undistri-

486
buted
'

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
ix, 97, 105, 316, 370
: :

...'). P. Individual : 157 (see : I.'). P. Judgment, P. Proposition

: Philosophy
'

(see

Natural

P.'). P. of Morals
387.
:

340.

132, 147, 150, 153-158, 161, 163, 165,

166 (see' I P." OP.'). P. Law : 455. P. Negative (Proposition) 147 (see :

PhysicalAgent
P. Cause

'0 P.'). P. Premiss: 217, 221-224, 228, 230, 232, 248 ; P. P. in Sorites : 257. P. Quantity-mark: 155, 158

P. Analysis : 435. P. Division : 40, 52, 56. P. Elimination, P. Exclusion, P. Subtraction P. Fact : 455. : 414-417. 378. P. P. Force
: :

373. 33. P.

P.

Method
'

409.

(see Some').
165, Particularity :
ticular.' Particularization tion.' Particularized
' '

'

344. See

See
'

'

Par

437. : Possibility P. Science : 386 (see Astronomy,' 'Chemistry,' 'Geology,' 'Physics'). P. World
:

Order

461.

133.

Specifica

Physics : 2, 29, 82, 318, 374, 385-389,

409, 433, 439,
'

440,
'

447,

459.
' '

See

383, 384. in Division Parts Parts of : 40, 45. the Proposition : See Prepositional
:
'

Effect

'

'

Dynamics,' Electricity,' Heat,' Hydrostatics,' Light,' Magne

'

tism,"

Sound.'

Elements.' Passive Past: Observation 31.

:

Physiology : 82,
390, 393, 394.

131,

364,
See

409,
'

424,

Passivity:

427-429. Place : 31, 87, 100, 454.

. . .

Space.'

83, 85, 101, 139, 163, 164, 371, 461. Pasteur, Louis (Prof.) : 428, 429. Pathology : 372, 427. 112. Peirce, C. S. : 63 (ftn.), Perception: 97, 338, 390, 392, 393, 440, Immediate See 441, 453, 459. Ap Sense-ex prehension,' Sensation,'
' ' '

Perfect

perience.' Disjunction: 136, 137 (see Ex clusive Reading ...'). "P. Figure"': 257, 324, 325 (see Fig. I.'). P. In
' ' '
'

Planet, Planetary : 80, 81, 97, 119, 134, 139, 236, 237, 245, 329-333, 338, See 375, 376, 435, 439. Earth,' Mars,' Neptune,' Jupiter,' Uranus.' Saturn,' Plant : 42, 53, 59, 60, 64-68, 73-75, 87, 129, 231-234, 305, 314, 315, 320, 321, 342-344, 354, 355, 374, 401, 424-428, 451, 461. Plato : 40 (ftn.), 47, 79, 80, 300, 331,
' ' ' ' ' '

duction Periodic

'

347, 348, 356.

:

363 Plural

(ftn.).

Cause

373-375.

P. Law

61

(ftn.). PeripheralDefinition : 17, 18, 62. Permanent Cause: 404, (or Persistent)
405. P. Conditions : 372, 373. Permissible Hypothesis : 337. See

Dividendum Term : 53. as Pluralism : 2. Pluralityof Causes : 379, 383-385, 397-400, 419, 449. Plurative Proposition: 222.
Political
'

389,

Legitimate H.' 128, : Possibility Permutation 190 (ftn.). :

Permissive Persistent
'

'

Economy : 66. Polysyllogism: 255,259. See Sorites.' Popular Conception of Causation : 380,
381, 383.

129.

See Cause, P. Conditions : Permanent C.' Person : 86, 87, 114, 128, 451. ' Personal P. Ex Agent : See Person.' ' perience: 84, 453 (see Immediate
: See E.'). P. Name Proper 114 63 (ftn.), 3-6, : Personality
'

Porphyry : Porphyry's Tree

Position
'

P. Use of ' Some 78 22, 23, 47 (ftn.),

'

155.

(ftn.).

: 42, 47, 79, 80, 82. 14, 96, 123, 262, 263, 266 (see

'Affirmation'). P. (see Place '). P. in

'T.' Positive

in

Space:
:

101 See

Time

83.

N.'s.'

(ftn.),

127.
Personification Petitio
:

87.

: Principii

289-291,

300, 301.
Law of

Aspect of Verification : 335P. Con P. Conclusion 338. : 417. dition : 371, 379. P. Definiteness : P. Implication: 157. P. Error : 339. 124 Species'). P. (see 'Indefinite
: Incompatibility

P. P. in Mill's Proof Causation 458. : 457,

of the

401.

P.

400-403,
P. S.'

* Proposition: 156, 169. Phenomenal World 105. : Phenomenon 339, 344, 349, 353, : 313,

416, 418, 425, 426. 168. P. Method : terrogative

Instance P. In
:

418.

355, 371, 375, 376, 378, 390, 394-411, 414-419, 423, 429, 433-436, 440, 443,
452-461.

' Definite : See Species, P. Term 421 P. Statement: (see 'Affir 403, mation'). P. Test-instance:

414-416.

Possibility:112, 113,
Definition 453. 318.
114
:

122

127(ftn.),

Philosophic
Interest
:

62,

63.

P. P.

Philosophical Hypothesis : Logic: viii, ix, 3-6, 10,

462.

(ftn.),

437, 449, 454 156-158, Determinations,' Alternative of Intrinsic nexion Ps,' P.,' Modal P.,' 'Permissive Purposive P.,' sibly all," 141,
' ' ' ' ' '

(see
'

Con

P.,'
" '

Pos Real

488 (or Law)

THE
of

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC

P.

Non-Contradiction

ix, 95, 98, 99, 102-104, 140, 145, 171, 172, 187-190, 193, 205, 250, 286, 290, Its Violation (see 304, 327, 450;
'

P. Inviolability ...'). of Pure Induction

:

of Proof

281.

321-325, 364, 399-401, 408, 411, 416, 418, 443, 449, 450, 454, 457, 458 (see 'Experimental P.,' 'Indirect P.'). P. by Exclusion, P. by Exhaustion: P. of a Proposition from 323, 324.
Axiomatic Premisses 337.
:

P.

313, 316

(see

'Fidelityto Fact'). P. of Statical Identity: 96, 97. P. of Synthesis: P. of Tautology: 97. P. of the 140. Conservation of Energy : See C. of
'

Hypothesis : 336,

P. of 318. P. of the Law

E.' M.'

P. of the C. of Mass : See C. of P. of the Constancy of Energy :

'

of Causation : 453-458. Proof- Fallacies : See ' Demonstrational F.' P.-F. in Dilemma : 292-295. Character of Formal Propaedeutic Logic: Of formal Logic : 5. 157, 204. 161. Their Defina : 69, Proper Names : 74, 79-83. bility Property (or Proprium) : 22, 25-29, 37,

See

'

C.

of E.'

P.

' : 451 (see P. of the Transformation See ' T. of E.' 367. P. of Conscience : Principles

Sciences

of the Natural Inductive Postu of of

late'). Energy:

40, 54, 81, 121, 159, 165, 170, 341,

Consistent

Thinking :
P. of of
:

6,

16

(see
of

351-353, 358, 359, 361-364, 368, 369, See Characteristic 414, 424, 447.
'

'Principleof Consistency'). P. P. of Human Geometry : 454.

Nature 410. 104 (see 'Laws of Mathematics Mill's Inductive
:

Property,'
'

'

Essential P.'
'

Characteristic,'

Problematic

: Proposition (or Judgment) : 91-183, Intelligibility 449 A 422, (see Thought'). P. Proposition,' P. of ix, 306. Affirmation,' Ampliative Judg
' '

Methods
'

Agreement,' Difference'). P. of Number:

of P. of Reason : 367. of 305 (see 'Laws Science: P. of

'Method

413 Method

(see
of
454.
:

ment,' tion,'
'

'

'

Analytic J.," Augmentative J.,'

' '

"

'

'

'

Asser Cate

Reasoning Thought'). P. of
'P.' of the
'

Collective gorical Assertion,' Disjunctive J.,' Distributive

P.,' P.,'
Uni
'

63, 305, 368.

P./ versal,'

'

'

t]
' "

P.,'

'

Enumerative
' "

P. of Figures : 240-247. Syllogistic Thought : 304 (see Laws of T.'). Priority of PropositionalForms : See
'

P.,'

'

Exceptive P.,' Exclusive ExJ.,' Explicative

'

ponible P.,'
treatment
'

Extensive

P.,'

'

Formal

Order

of P. F.7
'

Privative View of 443. Probable clusion

Conception : 190 (ftn.). P. Negation : 193 (see PureN.'). Probability: 359, 397, 407, 413, 430,
Cause
: :

of the Logical P./ ' formal Universal J.,' General J.,' ' Generic ' Universal J.,' Hypothetical J.,' 'I P.,' 'Import of Ps.,' 'Indefinite P.,' Indesignate P.,' Negative P.,' 'OP.,' 'wP.,' 'Particular J.,' '*P.,' Plurative P.,' Pre-indesignate P.,' Real J.,' Propositional Forms,' Singular P./ Statement,' Syn thetic J.," Universal U P.,' J.,' Y P.'). P. as the Logical Unit : 94, P. distinguished from Sen 97, 111. tence P. in relation to Judg : 93, 94.
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' '

363.

395, 396. P. Con P. Condition : 395.

P. Inference P. Error : 413. 327. : of Inference : 297-310. Problem P. of Reduction : 247-250. 129. Problematic P. Pro : May perty : 27, 28, 37, 54, 165, 170, 359, 360. Problems
' '

ment

93.

Philosophy : 105. in Proposition: 96. Procedure Analysis and Synthesis: 30,

of of Consciousness tion : See ' I.' Products Division Division
:

Elements Propositional P. of
'

97.

P.

31. P. of Induc and

98, 104, 111, : 112, 118, 122, 125, 136, 137, 160, 216 Clauses,' Antece (see Alternative
'

"Con dent,' 'Compound Proposition,

(or Results)of Definition

:

70, 146.
Definition : 63, 79. P. P. Modification 79. (or of Hypothesis : 420-422,

Progressive
:

Moulding)

sequent/ 'Term'). P. Form : 167, 168 (see Proposition'). P. Forms : 109-115, 136, 139 (see Proposition'). P. Import : See I. of Propositions.' Interrelated : 122, 123. as Propositions As See under : Self-contradictory
' ' '

' of H.'). P. 427 (see Modification of an Ideal : 419, 420. Realization P. Reasoning: 260 (see 'Sorites').

P. Simplification : 339. P. Verification 255-260.

P.
:

Sorites

349, 352,

Self-evident : 99, Statement.' As As Valid or Invalid : 113, 323 (ftn.). 8, 94, 140 (see Apodeictic .'). Their Meaning: 102, 104, 117, 118, 135, 169 (ftn.).See Import of P.').
'
. .

'

'

356, 419. Proof (or Demonstration) : 94, 235, 236, 246-248, 282, 286-291, 300, 301, 306,

Property.' Proprium : Prosyllogism: 257, 258, 260, 261. Protagoras : See Litigiosus.'
'

See

'

INDEX,
Provisional
sion
:

VERBAL

AND

ANALYTIC
Mark

489

4G.

Isolation P.

63. P. Divi : P. P. Explanation : 334. 145. from Truth-interest :

Definition

Qualifying
'

18,

19,

86.

See

Quality.' Qualitative Adequacy :

Mark,'
460.
'

'

Subject :

116.
: :

Proximate Genus Pseudo-Dilemma 139.

32, 33, 37.

274.

412. Q. Change: (see Q. Distinction : 124 Quality '). Q. Property : 435.

Quality : 31, 85, 87,

355, 361, 451
acter
'

Pseudo-hypotheticalProposition: 138, Pseudo-Syllogism: 369. Psychical(or Mental) Life

451, 459, 461, 462. ness,' Mind.'
'

(see Attribute,'

168, 174, 333, 340, ' Char

:
'

83, 84, 105,

Conscious

'). Q. of CategoricalProposi 122-124, 148 (see 'Affirma tion,' 'Negation'). Q. Rules of the
tions

See

PsychologicalAnalysis of Judgment P. Law : 392. 122. P. Meanings

82.

: :

Syllogism : 217, 219-221. 123, 124. : Quality-difference Quality-mark : 162-164, 168.

Quantification
149 (ftn.),
of the

Predicate

148

159-161. (ftn.),
:

Psychologism,ix. Psychology : 71, 81,

Quantitative Adequacy
106, 112, 113,

122,

Aspect
422.

of Causal

Relation
: :

412, 413. Q. : 385-389,

123, 451, 452. Claudius: Ptolemams,

Ptolemaic Pure

405, 406.
Method
:

Q. Change
413.
:

460.

Q. Data
:

329, 330. Astronomy : 38, 329, 330,

Q. Deduction
386.

434, 435.

Q.
306.

Q. Reasoning

332, 338, 362. Denial, P.

75-77 (see 'Being'). P. Negation : 49, 123, 124, 193. P. Hypothetical Syllogism: 363, 369-371 (see H. Sorites').P.

Q. Statement

Being:

Quantity: 31,
386,

43, 146, 168, 174, 333, 387, 389, 409, 447. Q. of Cate

'

Inductive

Method

313-317.

P. P. O.

: 148. Q. Rules goricalPropositions of the Syllogism: 217, 221-224. Quantity-mark: 147, 154, 155, 158-160.

Thatness : 82. Observational Purely

Method,

'

162-164. Some.'

See
'

'"All"

as

Q.-m.,'

'

Inquiry: 395-401, 407. P. Problematic : 27, 28. Properties Purifying by Exceptions : 420-422. See Exception.' : 138, 139, 145, Purport of Propositions
'

Stage in

Causal

Quantum : See Quantity.' 218, 221, 232. : Quaternio Terminorum Question:

234, 235, 259, 285, 286. 95, 96, 112, 113, 164, 168, 170, 339, 340 (see Begging the Q.').
'

'

146.

Its relation

to

Reality:

114.

Purpose
vancy

(or Aim to I. or

or

Interest

or

Rele

to

P.) : viii,ix, 77-80,

Range
Rank

of
of

93, 95, 96, 115, 118-120, 132, 133, 137, 145, 146, 154, 155, 162, 295, 339, 340, 343, 347, 361, 370, 377, 380-382, 390, 392 P.,' (see Observational 'Scientific P.,' 'Logical P.,'
' '

131, 133. : Possibility Generality: 45, 52.

Ratiocination : 250, 408-411. Rational Faculty: 104 (see 'Reason').

R. Inquiry : 448. R. Obligation : : 30, 47, 76, 79, 448. Rationality 106.

Spiritual P.'). P. (or Relevancy) in

Rationalization

369.
429.

Classification : See 'C.' In Collection of Facts : 314. In Definition : See

'

Ray,
Read,
:

Lankester

: (Prof.)

D.,'

'

In Dichotomy Definability.' In

See

' Division: See D.,' In Induction: 316-318 'Divisibility.' ' Fact '). In Nomen (see Relevant clature : See ' N.' In Proposition :

'D.'

Carveth, M.A. : viii,36, (Prof.) 49 (ftn.), 273, 305, 337, 235, 249 (ftn.), 384 (ftn.), 396, 398, 399, 405.
'

Reading : See Import.' R. Fact : 138, 367. Real Actuality, Assertorial Hypothetical: 140,
R.

R. 141.

' Interest '). In (see under relation to Differentia : 20 ; to Mean ingsof Words : 16, 17 ; to Realityand Truth : 1-3,5, 9. In Thought : 1-3,5,

97, 123

(or Scientific)Classification : 57' 64, 66, 82, 136, 341 (see C.'). R. (or R. Context : 70-72. : S.) Connotation 120. R. (or S.) Definition : 23, 29-31,
R. 341. 34, 61-64, 214, 309, 316 (ftn.), Denotation R. Discussion : 71. :
R. 129. R. 307. : (or Disposition Scientific)Division : 30, 42, 56-57 R. Evidence: 316 (ftn.). 291, (ftn.), R. Ground R. 303, 307-309. : 321. 316 (ftn.), Induction: (see 'I.'). R. (or Scientific) Inference : 306-310,

9, 95, 96.

Purposive Interference : 394. P. Per P. Possibility 128, : ception: 390.

129.

Purposiveness
tion
:

of

Scientific
331.

Observa

390-393.
:

Pythagoreanism

86, Qualification: Quality."

'

87,

134,

168.

See

321. ment,

R. R.

R. Interest: 114. Judg : 114, 115, 119, Proposition

490
140, 141.
R.

THE

PROBLEM

OF
Reduction

LOGIC
of
:

R. Logic : 5-7, 9, 157, 304, : Objects : 72. R. Possibility 138. R. Proof: 127-129, 131 (ftn.), 291. R. Reference to Reality : 140, R. 307-309. Singular Proposition: 305. 114,
'

Arguments

into

Syllo

Form gistic
to positions

230-235, 250, 251, 267,

268, 284, 286.

171. and 167. R.

R. of Categorical Pro Strict LogicalForm : 161of Certain Ambiguous Ex

165.

115.

R.

World

119

(see

: 164, pressions

Reality').
:

Exclusive R. of Given
:

R. of Exceptive 166, : Propositions Sentences

to Strict

Realism Realistic

6, 77. Definition
122

Reality : ix,
385, 410.
conceived
as
'

24, 25. 145, 307, 308, (ftn.),

:

R.

as

Whole

R.

by 99, 191 : Intelligible (see of Experience '). R. Intelligibility Conventionally (or formally) Con
ceived
:

Common

R. as : 119. Sense : 4, 5, 9.

HypoCategoricalForm, and vice versa R. of Non-propo: 138, 139. sitional Sentences to Strictly Logical Form R. of Propositions : 167, 168.
theticals
to to

LogicalForm

168-171.

R. of

L. F.

116, 117, 139, 154.

247-250.
'

R. Mean

of

Syllogisms:
Reference
:
'

See

'

formal

Reference
. .

.'

See

Application of
R.,'
'

R.
to
1

in relation to Definition : 23-25 ; Formal Logic : 6-10, 214 (see

ings,'
309.

Extensive
to
:

Indication

...,'' ObjectiveR.'
R. Reflection Refutation
'

Hypothesis : 99 ; to Interest P.' ; to or Purpose : See : 4, 5 ; to Personality : Propositions 123 (see Import ...'); to Question : 114; to SpiritualExperience: 114 T.' ; (ftn.) ; to Thought : See under
' ' '

F.

L.') ;

to

Reality :

R. to Fact : 94, See Reality.'

'

29, 82, 84, 105, 112. 276, 293, 399, 421, :

422

(see Disproof '). R. of Hypothesis:

334.

to

Truth

1, 2,

4,

5,

9.

R.

of

Nature:

Philosophi cally conceived : 5, 114 (ftn.).R. Really, Scientifically, Systemati Real Refer cally conceived : See
'

114

(ftn.). R.

Regress, RegressiveProcess : See Infi nite Regress.' Regressive Analysis: 325. R. Reason ing : 260, 261 (see Epicheirema ').
'

'

R.

Sorites

255-260.
' '

ence

ception
tion

.,' Science,' Scientific Con .,' 'Systematic Concep

. .

'

'

..." See
453.
'

191. : Reality-Principle

Law

of

Regularity: See Order,' Uniformity.' of Logic : 13, 16, Regulative Function 17, 155. Of the Maxim of Identity: 97. Of the Principle of Non-Ambi : guity : 39. R. Idea, R. Principle
387, 451, 452.
Exclusion.' R. Rejection : See (of 172-178, 98, 130, 99, : Statement)
'

Excluded Realization
:

Middle.' of an End R.

cept : 46, Possibility

419,
Reason 420. R. 28.
: 27, perties :

353.

R. of Con of Contingency, R. of
:

R. 379. of of Problematic

Ideal Pro

287,
See
'

6, 13, 75, 97, 104-106, 124, 127, 288, 367, 369, 393, 448, 450.
Sufficient R.'

180, 182, 187, 188, 194, 195, 204, 205, 236, 262, 264-266, 269. R. of Hypo thesis : 334, 430-432. R. of the Ante cedent : 264, 265, 267-269, 271, 285. R. of the Consequent : 264, 265, 268, R. of the Indefinite Term : 271, 385.
48.

Reasoning

: 7, 96, 133, 157, 250, 287289, 299-309, 322-327, 337, 347-349, 359, 361, 369, 413, 416, 417, 438, 443,

Relating Act, Copula.'

'

R.

Activity:

125.

See
R.

444
' '

(see Inference,' Parity of R.,'

R.,'
'

'

'

Relation: between

31, 86, 125, 340, 341.

R.'). R. as Continuous : 106. R. from Particulars to P. : 157. R. Tested by Rules : 107. Rebuttal of Dilemma 274-277, 293, :
294. of Reciprocity(or Reversibility) Connexion
:
'

Practical Scientific

Ratiocination,'

335, 337.
ism R. R.
:

: Electricity Gravity and R. b. Light and Magnet

335.

R.

of 124

Affirmation

and
'

Negation: 123,

(see 'A.,'

N.').

Causal

379-384, 389, 400, 401, See 406, 420, 427, 449. Unideterminism.' Reconstruction 432 (see thesis ').
'

40. of Attribute to Substance : R. of Belief and Disbelief : 123. of Cause and Effect : See ' Causal R.,1 ' of Causation.' R. Concept to

LogicalInterest
tion to

78.
:

R. of Connota 71-73.
R.

Denotation

of

61, 82, 119, 121, 343,

: vii, 112Disjunctiveto Categorical

R.

Modification of of Definitions

Hypo
:

31,

36-39. Eeductio ad Absurdum

247, : 122 (ftn.), H. per Impossible : 248, 324, 325. 247, 248, 250, 324, 325.

to Defi R. of Division 114, 131. ' Division." R. of nition : See under Ends and R. of Means 104, 128. : Extension to Connotation 71, 72. :

R. of Formal R. of Genus

to Verbal

Fallacy:
:

286. R.

and

Differentia

50.

INDEX,
of Genus

VERBAL

AND

ANALYTIC
: 391. Test-instance

491

and Species: 40-56. B. of : vii, 138, Hypotheticalto Categorical 139, 141, 268 (ftn.). R. of Hypo thetical to Disjunctive: vii, 113, 114, 138.
'

R. Instance R.

R.
:

Objection:
407.
462.

421.

406,

Religion: 84, 107, 461, ReligiousIdealism : ix.

Remote
'

R.

of I and

156

(see Sub-

'

Causal

Antecedent
in
'

427

'). R. of Identity: See contrariety I.'R; of Identityto Difference : 9698 (see I. in D.'). R. of Ignorance to Knowledge : 77, 79. R. of Inference R. 146. to Hypothetical Form : 145, of Logic to Language : See under 40. 'Logic.' R. of Part to Whole:
'

Immediacy
: :

C. Connexion

(see '). R.

Effect

381, 382.
See

Rendering

Import.'
'

Representation by Diagrams : See Test-instances : Representative

407.

D.'

406,
Rele

Requirement
vance.' Resemblance

of Relevance

See

'

R.
R.

of

Past, Present, and

:

Future

85.

of Possibilities to their 131. R.

Basis

of
R.

Categorical Proposition to
Question
'

(or Likeness) : 18, 19, 24, 28, 57-60, 64, 245, 299, 327, 358-364,
441, 451. sential R.' See
'

Judgment : 93. Reality : 1 14. R.

155-158. ' (see S.
as

of
'

to

Agreement,'
Residues 328.
:

'

Es
411-

of

Some

to

'

All':
:

R. of Statement

to Fact

99

Residual

Phenomena,

bearingon
'

F.'). R.

of Sub

ject
'

to

Predicate: S.-P.
to

Subject,'
to

See 'Predicate,' R. of Relation.'

R.

413, 417, 418. Resourceful Hypothesis

Retort
:

Subject
of Term of the
ments
'

Suppositio: 118-120. Proposition: 111, 112.

'See Rebuttal : See Reversibility Reciprocity ..."

288.
' '

R.

Reversible
Revision tion of

Premisses

325.
:

to Dictum de Omni et Nullo R. of the Ele Deduction : 244-247.

of

Hypothesis
R.

See

'

H.'
13.

of

Working

Modifica Idea

(or Terms) Statement): 94,

the Law

of

Proposition(or

111, 112, 150 (see Elements '). R. of Prepositional Middle

to Time
:

337. Rhetoric Rhetorical

Hypothetical :
:

180.

R.

of Excluded 100-102. R. of the Inference

: :

Question

168, 170.
R.

tity to
or

of Iden Principle 96 ; to Jiidgment

R,

Right Feeling: 118. Thinking: 8, 9, 13,

204. R.

(or Correct)
118,

16, 17, 27,

Proposition 96, 104.

of the

to Principle of Non-Contradiction that of Xon-Ambiguity : 102, 103. R. of Thought to Interest -. 95, 96 (see Purpose in T.'). R. of Truth to Space : 100, 101 ; to Time : 100-102. R. of Working Idea to W. Hypo
'

16-18. Use of Words : Rigidityof the Earth : 422, 435-444. Rival Hypotheses, R. Theories : 336,

420-422, 427-429. Romanes, George John : 354. Ross, G. R. T. : 133, 134. Gabriel : 451. Rossetti, Dante

thesis Relational 83. Relations R.

of

328. Definition

Royce, Josiah,
:

Ph.D. R.

393

(ftn.).
:

30, 31,

35, 37,

Rule
R.

103, 107.
for

for Inference

350.

of Classes : 152, 153, 239, 240. R. of Class-names 68, 69. : of R. 30, 35, 31, : Concepts, Meanings

tions

89, 126 (see Conceptual Ordering 453. ...,'' Opposition'). R. of Facts: R. of Natural Kinds : 60, 61. R. of

'

R. of of Terms 150. : for Distribution Rules R. for reducing CategoricalPropo 162. : sitions to strict Logical Form R. of R. for r. IndesignateP. : 165.
'

Proposi reducing Exclusive strict to Logical Form : 166. : 198. Contraposition

Opposition: 48 (see O.'). R. of Pro R. of Statements : 94, 95, positions, R. of 123 (see Opposition ...').
'

'

Aristotelian

'

Sorites

257, 258.

R.

of

Contradictory Opposition:

173,
of of

Uniformities
Relative Relatives
:

369.

R. R. of Contrary O. : 176. 174. R. Conversion 193-196, 205. : Definition 137, 138.

:

Necessity :
251.
to

387. See
'

32-36. R.

R.

of

: Disjunction

of Goclenian

Sorites
:

Relativity
Relevance ' Relevant
'

Purpose : (to Purpose):

..."
R. to

P.' See

258.

R.

of
R.

Logical Division of' Mixed

R. 264.

44-46,

'P.,'
:

52-56.
203.

to Interest

See 28.

Syllogism:
R.
R, R.

I.' R.

of Predicate

Subject :

Relevant 426. 404.

Circumstance R. Condition:
R.

: 396, 398, 403, 370, 380, 383,

353. 188.
205.

of of Subalternation

Hypothetical Opposition : : Statistical Investigation

of
:

176, 177,

Context
455

118-120.
R.

R.

Ex

of Subcontrariety : 174, 175, R. of (S. C. D.) Syllogism: 107,

perience:

ix, 326, 347, 356, 1-6, 9, 314, 316-318, 367, 389-391, 395, 420, 422, 449.

(ftn.).

Fact:

216-225, 244,

230, 233, 234, 237, 238, 243, ' 247, 286, 305 (see Distribution

...,'' Quality R

...,'' Quantity

492
R

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
316

...,'' Structural R ...').R. of the (Syllogistic) Figures : 229, 235, 237, 238, 243, 244.

356, 357, 359, (ftn.), (see I.').S. S. Knowledge, S. Pro Investigation,

:

Induction

361-364, 367, 456, 457

'

as

Substitute See

Syllogism :
Distributional
'

Sign : 14. S. C. D. Simple Categorical

' '

S. Law Nature 119

'

cedure, S. Research Science.' : See : 357, 367, 368, 377 (see L. of

'

'

S.'

S can

129. ' S cannot be P,' ' ' ' S must be P,' S must need not be P ' : 128. ' S is a P : ' 162. ' ' S is assuredly P,' etc. : 130. S is either P or non-P ': 99 (ftn.). 'Sis ' not P ' : 49, etc. S is not-P ' : 49, ' S is P ' : 14, 22, 98-100, 124, etc.

128, S may be P,' not be P,' S

:

be P

'

').S. Logic : 5, 6. S. Method : 137, 304, 321, 347, 348, (ftn.),

S. Nomenclature 410,451,453. : See N.' S. Observation 114, 136, 355, :

as essentially Experimental : 389, 390, 393, 394 ; as S. Pre e. Purposive : 390-393.

389-394

(see O.').S. O.

'

126, 130, 161, 173, 174, 320. S is-not 98, 99, 173, 174. PJ : 100, 111, 124, 173, 174. S, S : 98, 99. Saltus in Divisions, : 44, 45, 52, 54-56. SaP : 147, 201-203, 206, 207. Saturn: 245, 331.
'

111, 120,
S is P
'

cision : 16, 66, 135, 137, 386, 400, 404, 427 (see ' P.'). S. Principle : 63, 347. S. Reasoning : 157, 287, 307-309. S.

'

System
70.

328, 336, : 7, 8, 304, 317-320, 424, 426, 430. S. Technology : 16, 66T.' S. Terminology: See Testing: 140 (see 'Verification'). S. Theory: 304, 447 (see T.'). S. Thought : 390 (see Science '). S. Value of Analogy : 361, 362. S. View
' '

S.

'

Savage

Customs

451.

of Enumerative Scheme Induction : S. of Extensive 351, 352. Proposi tions : 147, 148. S. of Inductions :
' '

of Causation

383.

See

'

C.'

347.

Schemes
See
' '

of

: Categorical Propositions

E. W. (Prof.) : 253. Scripture, Secondary Quantification : 181. Seismometry : 440-443. Selection : 314, 406 (ftn.). Natural See
'

Eightfold...,''
. .

Fourfold

S.,' Selective.
Selective Function
:

'

.'
. .

Threefold

.'

S. of

Opposition :

128, 130, 156, 178, 179. Schiller, F. C. S. (Dr.): viii. Scholasticism 248, 307, : 97, 123, 244, 315, 316, 382. Schwann : 424-428. Science : 2-6, 9, 16, 23, 29-31, 46, 62-67, 79, 114, 115, 119, 133, 136, 244, 274, 287, 288, 295, 304-309, 313-318, 321, 328, 331, 333, 334, 337-339, 342, 347, 352, 353, 355, 361, 362, 367-387, 393, 394, 404, 409, 410, 413, 420, 424, 426, 429, 433-440, 447-455, 458, 459, 462 (see Abstract S.,' Anatomy,' An
' ' '

S. Interest

Thought : 2, 3. 51, 58, 65, 81, 118, 125,

'

of

390, 391.
Self:

See

I.' 75. See

'

208. Self-affirmation dence.' Self consciousness

-

Self-evi

28, 368,
8,

458, 459,
98. See

461, 462.

7, : Self-consistency Consistency').
'

93,

Self-contradiction 102-104,
122

126, 128, 150, (ftn.),

208, 282, 307, ' Contradiction.'

7-9, 75, 76, 78, 94, 188, See 324, 448, 450.

logy,'
'

Bio : 75. Self-definability Classification,' Self-definition : 75, 76, 80, 81, 84. Botany,' Self-evidence: Economics,' 75, 76, 82, 84, 85, 99, Logic as a S.,' Mathe 113, 323 (ftn.). matics,' Meteorology,' Moral S.,' Morphology,' (Ecology,' Palaeon : 96. Self-identity : 3, 4, 82. tology,' Pathology,' Physical S.' Self-knowledge ', Scientific Self -limitation : 98, 450. Physiology of Thought or Meaning : Self-reference Seismometry,' Sociology,' Zoo 10. logy '). S. and the Predi cables : 22.

thropology,' Archaeology,'
' ' ' ' ' '

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

S. in relation to Common 347 ; to

Sense 4-6.

4, 5,

Semi-correlative
Seneca on Sensation Sense
450.
:

Terms
:

35, 36.

Philosophy :
. . .

Division

40

Scientific

Real ..." S. 355, 431 (see 'A.'). S. Attitude, S. Intent, S. Interest, S. ' Purpose, S. Standpoint : See Rele vant S. Certainty: Fact,' ' Science.'
:

See

'

Analysis:

393. : 82-84, 377 85, 335, 339, 390, 392, 393, 441, See ' Common S.,' ' Meaning.'
:

(ftn.). 390, (ftn.),

Sense-data
419.

393. 4,

: Sense-experience

82-84,
'

87,

377,

381 (see C.'). S. Conception of Truth S. Experiment : : 3-6, 9, 141. See

'

'

Explanation : S. Hypothesis: 328, 361, H.'). S. Imagination : See

'

E.1

S.

See
362
'

'

E.'

(see
S.

Sense-immediacy : 85. See Experience.' 114. Sense-individuality:

Sense-observation
:

Immediate

I.'

299.

INDEX,
: Sense-perception

VERBAL
See
'

AND

ANALYTIC

493

453.

P.'

Sense- world : 347. Sensible Fact : 94. Sensory Support for

'

Meaning

24,

93

173, 174, : 47, 79, 80, 142, 155, 236, 247, 300-302, 340, 341. Socratic Method (ftn.). : 316 152-166, 168, 175'Some' : 132 (ftn.), Socrates 177,
'

'). S. Symbolism : 93. (see Words 116, 118, 154, 162, 163, 167, Sentence: from Pro S. distinguished 168, 285.
93, 94. SeP : 147, 201, 204. Sequence : 342, 357,
: position

241-243,
'

286

(see

'

Meaning,'
. .

Distributive .,' 'Particular use

'

Conjunctive Meaning,'

use
'

Collective ""' Exclusive

. .

Judgment').
'
'

379, Series:
'

382, 384, 455.

61
'

368, 369, 371, 377See ' Cons.'

:

369. Sequence-uniformities
69. (ftn.),

Several : 168. Shaded Diagrams

' S : 132. S. A's are either B or C C A's are neither B nor : 132. 155-158. in relation to ' All : ' ' Exclusive use 166 : (see only ' ' S. S is all P ' : 159 (see Y Pro ' ' P : 159. '). S. S is not any position
' .

Sidgwick,Alfred : Sign: 370 (ftn.).See 'Signs,''Sym bol,' Verbal Sign.' Import,' Meaning.' : See Significance General Expression: 80. S. Significant Term : SingularExpression, Name, 157. : 80/81. S. Statement
'
'
'

150, 151, 153. viii, 17, 18, 289, 381.

'

S. S

is not

some
'

'

159

(see
P
' '
'

'

'). S. S Proposition
S. S is-not all P's are
'

is

some

159.

P
'

'

242, 243.
151
are
'

:
'

'). position
'

149, S. S's

(see
P's
'

S. S's Pro

147, 149, 156,

156, 159, 161

'

'). (see I Proposition

S. S's are-riot P's : 147, 150, See O Proposition.' 159. is

'

'

25, 115. 115. (ftn.), : 80 Signification Si^nincate

:
'

Something
:

75, 76. 270, 271, 319, ' Aristotelian "

'

See

'

Im

SoP

port,' Meaning.' Signs as Substitutes for Meanings : 14. S. Expressiveof Meaning : 14, 23-25, S. Indicating 32, 93 (see 'Words'). 'Indication .'). 82 (see Objects: : 25. Their Definability Sigwart, Christoph(Dr.): viii,126, 323 341, 342, 355, 382, 386, 455, (ftn.), 459, 460. 458 456, (ftn.), S. Categorical Antecedent : 408. Simple Distributional Syllogism: 216-238, S. C. Syllogism: 211-251, 324, 251.
. .

147, 201. 253-260, Sorites: See 325.

'

320, S.,'

Goclenian S.'
:

S.,' Inverted
388.

S.,' Stan-

dard Sound Sound

374,

nition

S. Defi: 360^ 364. S. 52. S. Division: 32-36. Hypothesis : 361. S. Inference : 141, See ' Validity.' 191, 213, 214.

Analogy
:

Sound-complex : 21, 81, 115. Sounds as Meaning : 14. expressing 322, Space: 25, 26, 85, 87, 119 (ftn.),
333, 369, 374, 376, 440, 460. 100, 101. relation to Truth : S. in

: 195, S. Converse, S. Conversion of S. Conversion 198, 237, 249, 259. S. Dilemma : 272, Premisses : 325. S. Enumeration : See 273, 276, 277.

325.

'

E.'
'

S. Law

409.

S.

Negation :
341, 343,

124

Pure N.'). : 23, 339, Simplification

(see

344,
:

: 322. Space-intuition Spatial Conditions, S. Relations : 100 (see Space '). S. Construction : 321, S. Grouping : 65. 322. S. Form : 89. 66. S. Object : 128.
'

419, 437, 441, 443. Simultaneity of Cause Simultaneous F. D.'s

SpecialRules
Effect 382. telian
"

See
'

'

R.

of

"

Aristo

and
:

Sorites,'
'

45.

Sorites,'

R.

of

of Goclenian R. the (Syllogistic)

413-417, Single Agreement: S. Difference : 407, 416, 426. 422. S. Object: 81 S. Epicheirema : 261. 395-399,

Figures.'
of a Specialization
15.
: Species (Biological)
'

Word's

Meaning
'

14,

(see Individual
'

').
See
'

of F. D. : Singleness Singular Collective

Unity of
:

F. D.'

Term

162.
of
:

Concept
dendum

: :

80, 81.
53.

S. Form

S. DiviS.

S.
'

Import
S. Term

162.
:

Meaning, S. Name,
82, 114, 236

74, 79-

Animal,' See S. Plant,' Selection,' Natural 68, 66, 39-57, 30, 32, 19-23, : (Logical) 72-75, 77, 79, 88, 89, 114, 120, 122 (ftn.),136, 159, 244 (see Infima S.'); its Definition : 30, 35.
' '

(see Proper N.'s'). S.

Character Specific mark

:

385.
'

S. Definition-

Proposition: 114, 115, 154, 161-163, 168, 173 ; its Opposition: 181, 200,
S. Symbol 236, 299 (ftn.). SiP: 147, 201, 204, 207.
:

80

(ftn.).

20, 29, 34 (see Differentia 131 (see D.). : S. Determination Differentia.' See Difference :
'

').
S. S.

Emphasis
of F. D.' Induction

134.

Situation : 31. Smith, Sydney (Canon) : 283.

See Unity S. S. Hypothesis: 447. S. S. Names 457. : 68. S. F. D.

:

'

Sociology:

409,

410.

: 133, 138. Possibility (or Specified)

494

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
Consistent
as

96, 121, 124, 133, 400 Specification: of Meanings,' (see Differentiation Disjunctive S.'). S. of Cause : 384. S. of 'interest: 124. See Mark Differentia.' : 64. Specifying Specimen : 64-66. Spectroscopy : 432, 433, 435, 449.
' ' '

Statements
'

as

See

'

Con 'In
:

sistency.' S.
C. S.' S.
'

: See Contradictory

as

Inconsistent:
as

See

consistency.'S.

Interconsistent

7, 8 (see Consistency').
Static Continuity: 44. Statical Identity: 21, 96, 97. Statistical Unit : 43. Statistics : 43, 313, 353-355. Status

Speech:

13, 14, 97, 116.

'

See

'Lan

guage,' Words.' Spencer,Herbert : 449. Spiritual Being : 120. 453. 107, 114 (ftn.),
127. S. Interest 33. 84. S. S.
:

114

Experience : S. Imperative: S. Order : (ftn.).

S.

Steps :

of the Dicta : 241-244. See ' Stages.'

:

Stock, St. George, M.A.

152, 272.

viii,47 (ftn.),

Purpose : 453. S. Structure : Unity : 6, 25. S. Values : 61 S. World : 105. (ftn.). Squares of Opposition: 128, 130, 172.
'

S's alone in

are

P's

'

166.

Stout, G. F. (Prof.) : vii, 14, 15, 82, 100, 102-104, 118, 131, 245, 268 (ftn.), 385. 295, 308, 349 (ftn.), Strengthened Forms of Syllogism: 226, 227, 237, 268.

Stages

Answering a Question : 112, 113. S. in Causal Inquiry, C. Method, Pro Complete Induction, Inductive cedure, Scientific Explanation : 326,
327, 361, 395, 398, 400, 407, 411. S. in Development of Meaning : 71, 88,
89 (see ' D. of M.'). S. (or Steps) in Division : See ' Continued D.' S. in S. in 24, 5-7, 9, 25, Logic, Thought : 30. S. (or Steps)in Mill's Deductive Method 409, 419 ; in M.'s Hypo : thetical Method:

Emphasis.' Logical Form : See Strong Converse : 195, 198.

Stress Strict
:
'

See

'

L. F.' S. Educt

of S. Forms 189, 192, 195, 200, 204. 247. 226, Syllogism: Structural Rules of the Syllogism: 217, ' S. Significance 146 (see Im 218. :

port ').
Structure: 57, 59-64, 67, 74, 75, 363, ' See 401, 402. Ambiguous S.,'

'Grammatical
'

S.,'

'Spiritual S.,'

411,

419.
'

S.

in

Verbal

S.'

Standard
'

: 460, 461. 103, 347, 362 (see Inductive Criterion '). S.' Figure : 257, 325 (see Fig. I.').S. Sorites: 270, 271, 319, 320, 325. Standards in Dilemma 293, : 275-277, :
'

Organic Development

Strudwick, Miss Florence : viii. Stuart: 390, 391. Study of Nature : See Science.'
'

Sturt, Henry : Subaltern: 128,

'

387.

130,

171,
of

S.ation S.
'

'). S. Forms
Genus:

172 (see Syllogism:

294. Star : 38, 69, 70, 234, 329-333, 339, 362, 386, 430-435, 437, 449. State : 31, 379.
'

226.

42, 43, 73, 74, 80

Division

(see Continued
Subalternans Subalternate
: :

').

Statedly
263.

'

132

155-158, 262, (ftn.),

Statement:

94, 97-99, 102, 109, 113, 117-124, 129-137, 140, 141, 146, 148158, 160-162, 166-168, 170, 239, 301, 386 (see Accep 310, 321, 370 (ftn.), tance of S.,' 'Affirmation,' 'Asser tion,' Circulus .,' 'Falsehood,'
' '
. .

Subalternation 177, 188. Sub-class : 39,

Division.'

172, 265. 128, 172, 265. : 128, 130, 171, 172, 176,
59. See
'

Continued

Subcontrariety: 171,
Sub-differentiation, See 55, 56.
sion.' Subduction
:
'

172, 174-176. 52, Subdivision : Divi Continued

Negation,' Proposition,' Rejec tion (ofS.),' Tautology,' Truth in relation to State Judgment,' ments '). S. as bearingon Fact : 94,
' ' '

'

'

'

411.
:

Sub-fundamentum
'

45.

Subject: 129, 208, 460 (see 'Gram matical S.,' LogicalS.'). S. and
Predicate
in

96, 99, 138, 139, 309, 392, 439. S. as Invalid : 8 (see Invalidity '). S. as Self-consistent : 7, 8. S. (or Pro : 103, position as Self- contradictory 104, 122 (ftn.). S. as Valid : 8 (see Validity'). S. of Hypothesis : 421, of H.'). 422, 442 (see Formulation
' ' '

the

Categorical Pro
(see S. -Predicate
'

See S. of Discourse: ' S. S. of D.,' Suppositio.' 104, 103, 22, 23, 28, 31, 96, Term: 106, 111, 112, 114-122, 124-126, 128, 'formal

: position Relation').

115-122

S. of Limitation

158.

132, 146-152, 154, 159-162, 165, 166, to the 168, 170, 320 ; its Relation

Statement-import: 7, 94, 95, 99, 123, 132 (ftn.), 145, 146, 156-158, 240, 241, 262 (Note).

Suppositio: 118-120. 116. : Subject-concept

Term.'

See

'

Subject

496
tion,' 'Continued
Interest:

THE

PROBLEM

OF

LOGIC
66, 67, 281, 282.
'

jectand
393

S. 114. Predicate
'

Division'). S. Intimacy of Sub

:

Terminology:
Terminus
Terms
as
:

See
:

Goal.' 48. T. of
a

126.

S. Science

Complementary :
33, 34,
77.

(see Science').

Definition

T., their
'

61 (ftn.). Meaning : 31. Their Opposition: 48. Systematizationof Conduct: Terms-in-relation : 125. See S. of Experience : 6, 82. S. of Fact : SubjectPredicate Relation.' 340, 344 (see Systematic Concep Test : See Ex tion Criterion,' Experimental .'). S. of Immediate Kinds Verification.' 82. S. of 67 T.,' T. of Reasoning : : : (see periences S. of Knowledge: 107. 'Classification'). S. of Laws S. of 29, 246. : 342, 369. Testing : 393-395, 403, 421 (see Veri fication '). T. of Definitions : 32-39. S. of the Cate Science : 317, 318. T. of Divisions : 52-56. S. (or Organization)of : 31. gories
' ' '
. .

'

'

Thought:
Table
of Tabulation 304. Technical See

1, 2.

Test-instance
416.
'

352, 403, 406, 407, 415,

Opposition : 177.
:

That Then

'

353-355.
'

Thatness:
' '

75 (ftn.), 82, 356, 357, 369. 82.

in

Tautology : 23,
Terms

97, 120, 121, 188, 291, Circidus .'

. .

Hypothetical Proposition :
'

See

'

Technology.'

Technology : 16, 66-70. Definition : 62, 63. T. ExTeleological T. Investigation : planation: 461. T. T. Law 453. : 104. : 128, May Cause T. Meaning of 129. : 370. T. Possibility T. Necessity: 128. : of Opposition : 128, 129. T. Scheme
' ' ' '

See 141. H. Judgment.' Theoretical Character of Logic : 13. System : 428.

T.

Theory

128 Teleo Teleology: 96, 97 (ftn.).See .' logical Temporal Conditions : 100. See Time.' Tendency : 62, 342, 373, 377, 399, 453, 457. 454 (ftn.),
. .

'

: 29, 314, 315, 319, 329-339, 341, 378, 386, 391, 394, 409, 410, 418, 420422, 428-439, 443, 447, 452 (see Causal T.,' Corpuscular T. .,' Geocentric Heliocentric T.,' T.,' T.,' 'Scien 'Hypothesis,' Nebular tific T.,' UndulatoryT. .'). T. of T. of Deductive : 31, 32. Categories
' '
. .

'

'

'

'

Inference:

385 318.

(see D. I.'). T. of
T. Existential Induction
'

'

'

of Dynamics : T. of Import : 115 (ftn.).

295, 313-327, 377, 379

of

(see I.').T.

Tense: 101, 163, 164. 163. Tense-mark : Tentative Analysis: 343.

326, 327.

T.

T. Conclusion T.

Argument
:

362.

T.

T. Hypothesis : 348, Conjecture,

(see
328.

'

C.,' 'H.').
T.

367. Construction: 453. T.

Knowledge : 78. T. of Mechanical T. of ProEquivalence : 387, 389. positional Import : 119, 134 (see I.'). T. of Recapitulation T. of Scien : 60. tific Method : 410 (ftn.).T. of the 95 (see 'P.'). T. of : Proposition
'

Explanation :

Vortices

Generalization : 350. 125, 150, 216, Term : 31, 111, 112, 118,
447 Concept,' guity,' Application of Meanings,'
'

Thing
47

: 318, 332, 333, 336. 86-88, 114, 341, 353, 357, 362, T.' as Summum Genus : 392, 449. :
'

(see Abstract
'

'

Ambi

(ftn.). Things classed

Definition Thinker:
'

See

'

Their Classing.' Division

:

Collective Assertion,' Categorical ConConcrete Terms,' Expression,'

' ' ' ' ' '

'

24.
'

Their

40.

99, 106.

Conno-denotative This S is (a) P no-denotation,' : 161, 162. Connotation,' a Kempis : 284. Definability,' Thomas Ts,' Definite Species,' Definition,' De Thought: 112, 113, 139, 208, 390, 391, notation,' 449, 461 (see Scientific T.'). T. and Description,' Distribu Ele of Terms,' Division,' tion Identity: 97, 98. T. and Intelligi T. and Self-contra General : 78, 79. bility mentary Ts,' Extension,' 'Indica diction : 78, 79. T. as a Generalizing Concept, Indefinite Species,' 'Inten T.," Process : 339. T. as Consistent : 1, 7tion .,' '"Infinite 'Predi 9, 16, 99, 112 (see Consistency').T. sion,' 'Negative Subject-t.,' Continuous 106 (see Coherence : cate T.,' as Singular Ex Significant of T.'). T. as Correct, T. as Right : pression,' Singular Collective T.,' See R. Thinking.' T. as Discon SingularMeaning,' Subject T.'). tinuous, T. as Fragmentary : 106. T. Scientific T. : 70 (see Technology '). Derivative: Inconsistent: 99, 106, 139, 140 111, or as T. as Abstract T. in Syllogism: 217, 218 (see '). T. aslrreflec112. (see Inconsistency T.,' Middle tive 29. T. 28, as S., : Major Obligatory: 107. 'Categorical
'
'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

T.,'

'

Minor

T.").

T.

as

Reflective

29. T.

as

True

1-5,

INDEX,
8, 9.
'

VERBAL
(see

AND

ANALYTIC

497 Prepositional

T.

as

Valid

6-10, 107

Validity ').T. as Vital : 15. T. Con Fact: trolled by Relevant 1, 2, 39 T. in Judgment : 93. T. (see R. F.'). in relation to Argument : 7 ; to In terest : 95, 96 (see I.') ; to Language : 13-17, 66, 93 ; to Reality: 1-7, 9, 10,
' '

Transitions between Forms : 112, 113. Translation : 17, 32.

Premisses : 237, 248, 249, 257, 258, 270, 271. Transversion of the Hypothetical Pro 138, 139. : T. of the H. position Syllogism: 268, 269. Tree of Concepts,T. of Porphyry : 42 47, 82 78-80, (see 'Conceptual T. of Self-knowledge Ordering ...'). : 82. True
. . .

Transpositionof

23, 24, 31, 99 (see formal Real Reference R.,' to

' '

'

Reference
to

R.,'

Systematic Conception
:

Statement Its

7 ;

to

of R.') ; to Universals : 24.

'

AbstractingPower : 85. Its De velopment : 31, 112-114, 138 (see D. of Meaning ). Its Laws or Principles : See L. of T.'). Its Point of Depar
' '

:
'

Its Selective Function : 83, 84. : 2, 3. Its Unit : 94, 96. T. Regulated
ture

: Hypothetical 139 (see H. Judgment '). T. Iden tity: 97. T. LogicalPredicate : See L. P.' T. L. Subject: See L. S.' :
' ' '

Analogy

See under 362-364. T.

'

Truth.'

'

T.

by Logic :
matized
:

tinder L.' 1, 2. T. Unified

See

'

T.
:

Syste

Truism:
'

97,

120,

121,

161.

See

1-3.

102, 106. : Thought-contradiction : 85. Thought-existence Thought-immediacy : 85. 113. See : Thought-process Thought.' Threefold Scheme of CategoricalPro 156. : positions Three-term Syllogism: 250, 251. See S.' Categorical Time : 31, 82-85, 87, 119 (ftn.), 127, 129,
' '

,| Truth : ix, 304, 321, 348 (ftn.), 351, 361, 386, 449, 450, 454, 455. 458, 461 (see Xecessary T.,' Universal T.'). T.
' '

Tautology.'

as

Problem 1-4. T. as a Unity : a : T. 1-3. Conventionally Conceived, T. formally Conceived 5-7, 9, 141. :
T. T.

Treated Hypothetically

145, 146.

Ignoredby

Formal

Logic: 3 (ftn.),

371, 376, 382, 386, 387, 394, 404, 431-

434,
'

441,

442,

454

(see 'Past,'

7-10, 145, 146, 157, 158, 309, 310, 321. T. in relation to Common Sense : 4, 5 ; to Hypothetical : 179, 180 ; to Judg
Statement ment, : 7, 8, Proposition, 93, 94, 99-104, 122, 123, 132, 137, 140, 141, 145, 146, 152, 157, 158, 322-325, 406 (see ' Truth-import'); to Know ledge: 3-5 ; to Language, 16 ; to

Present ').T. in relation to the Law of Excluded Middle : 100-102. Time-element in Prediction : 335.
: Time-experience

85.

Time-relations

102. Time-stagesin Causal

:

Process

382.

Topic: 88, 89,

Total

95,
'

96, 98,

114,

115,

118, 119. See Suppositio.' Antecedent, T. Cause : 372, 373, 375, 378-380, 383, 384, 412, 418 (see 'Sum T. .'). T. Coincidence, T. Non-c. : 150, 152, 240. T. Eclipse : 394. T. Effect : 375, 376, 382, 387, 412. T. Exclusion: 153, 240, 242, 244. T. Extension-reference : 147, 148, 151, 152, 155, 219 (see Dis
. .

Logic : 1-5, 7-10, 13, 304, 307 ; to : 3-5 ; to Purpose : 1-3, 5, Personality 9 ; to Reality: 1, 2, 4-6, 9 ; to Space :
100,
101 ;
to

Time

100-102.

T. T. of
: :

Conceived : 7, 8, 290. Materially ObjectivelyConceived : 4, 5. T. Assumption : 434. T. of Conclusion

214, 247, 305, 324, 325.

97, 443.
T.

T.

of Fact

of

Hypothesis, T.

of

'

tributed Term T. Inclusion T.

').T. Impression: 116.

:

152, 153, 240-242, 244. Interest, T. Topic: 95, 96. T.

:

336, 337, Theory: 318, 328 (ftn.), 386, 421, 427, 432, 434, 437, 443. T. of Premisses : 214, 247, 310, 324, 325. T. of the Antecedent, T. of the Conse

quent
T.

325.

T. of the Reason

97.

98. ' Sum : See Totality Traditional Logic : 306 Train

Meaning

Total

.'

324. (ftn.), of Argument,

147, 226, 249-251, See ' Aristotelian L.' T.

'

Conceived 3-5, : Philosophically Defined : 1. T. 10. T. Provisionally Really Conceived, T. Scientifically

of 85,

Reasoning :
107,

255, 259, 321. Transcendence :

462.

See

Sorites.'

3-6, 9, 141 (see Real Refer .,' Systematic Concep ence Conceived tion ...'). T. Subjectively
C.
:
'
. .

'

79,

397,

4,5. Truth-Ideal:

3-5.
:

Transference of Meaning : 33. Transformation of Energy : 386-389.

Transit Circle : 413. Transition to the Formal Treatment T. to the Method 389. of of

Truth-import
Truth-Inference Truth- Interest Twofold F. D.

94, 99, 132

: :

(ftn.).

247, 306-310, 324. 3-10, 145, 247, 289,

'

306-310, 326, 328.

:

Logic :
Causal

143-146.

See

Unity

of F. D.1

Explanation :

Tycho-Brahe:

331.

32

498

THE

PROBLEM

OF
U.

LOGIC
of Co-existence U. of Suc : 368. Their Interrelations 377. : 455-458.

: 371, 373, 374, 388. Tyndall,John (Dr.) Type : 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 136, 341. See Definition by T.' A of Proposition : See Typical Forms 'E P.,' 'I P.,' 'O P.' Proposition,' T. Definition : See D. by T.' T. Dis junctive: 132.
' ' '

cession 369. See

'

Uniformity (of Nature) : 367,

' '

Inductive Pos Determinism,' tulate,' Law of Causation.' Unifying Agency of Interest : 125.

153, 159-161, 182. : Contradictory U. Cause

:

Proposition :

198.

Its

Unimaginability: 450. of a Unintelligibility

Contradiction

Ultimate

Category,U. Concept
See
of
"

First

Cause.'
:

75-79. U. U.

107. U. of Nature : 139, 140. Unit : 43, 94, 97, 111, 353, 387, 389 (see ' ' Logical U.,' Statistical U.'). U. of

Character

Concept,
'

U. Fundamental U.

Relevancy Meaning :
C.').

120.

82-85 (see Context U. :

118-120. 84.
'

U. Basis of Thought: 83, Forms of Being : 31 (see of Extensive

(see 'A. P.,' 'E U. Logical P.,' 'I P.,' 'O P.' Postulate: U. Major Pre 78, 79. miss : 457, 458. U. Meaning of a Proposition: 118. U. Subject : 118120.

Category '). U. Forms Proposition: 147, 148

Speech : 93. U. of Thought : 96. Unity : 35 (see Identity'). U. of a U. of a Conceptual System : 95. U. of a of 124. System Judgments : of Total Meaning : 98. U. of a Work Art : 118, 125. U. of Defining Pro of Experience : 78. 30. U. cess : of F. D. : 43Unity (or Singleness)
'

45, 51-53, 55, 56, 74, 75.

with U. of Fact
:

6.
:

U. 2.

U. of Idea of Interest : 124.

Purpose
: :

Unambiguous
209. U. Mark

Application of Terms : U. Meaning : 14, : 74.

Process Method

223. 395.

U. of Syllogistic Causal of the U. U. of the Judgment,

16, 17, 20, 24, 51, 52, 81, 121, 309, U. Reference U. Result : 80, 81. :
402.
ment
'

U.
:

: 116. Specification

U. State See

122, 124, 125. U. of the Universe : 2, 25, 385. U. of Thought: 1-3, 96, 106 (see'Co herence of T.'). U. of Topic: 96, 98.

U. of the

Proposition: 120,

148, 158. Unanalytic Method Enumeration.'

Universal
:

397, 455, 456.

299,
'

302,

22, 24, 85, 115, 244, 246, 304, 326, 339, 351 (see

: 449. Unbelievability Uncertainty : 130, 435.

Unconditional 378, 383.

quence
:

Antecedent,
U.

U.

Cause U. Se U.

Consequence,

370, 377-383, Validity: 141, 142.

453.

Undefined Under-

Subject-term:
Division 448. See :

121.
:

exhaustive

46. Indetermi

Understanding : 6,
Undetermined
. .

'

nate

.' U. See

Common Nature '). U. Affirmative 161, 163, 230 (see : 147, (Proposition) 'A 224, 226, P.'). U. Conclusion: 230, 232, 235. U. Development : 460. U. Extension-reference 148 : (see Distributed Term '). U. Judgment, U. Proposition, U. Statement 147, : 148 (ftn.), 150, 153-156, 161, 162, 165167, 299, 300, 302, 303, 357 (see 'A P.,' 'E P.,' 'General Maxim'). U. Law U. Negative (Pro : 406, 455. 149, 168 (see E P.'). : 147, position)
' '

Undeveloped
326, 433.

tiated M. : ' Differentiation

nate

Hypothesis : Meaning, UndifferenDevelopment of M.,'

319, 320,
' '

U.

Premiss

227, 228, 230, 237, 238,

' "

243, 248, 300.

154, 158

(see

U. All

"

Quantity-mark: as Q.-m.'). U. (see

'

Concept,' Undistributed Meaning

of M.'s,' ' Indetermi I. Elements ..." of Some : Middle : 218,

' '

Truth

454, 455.
455 Uni

421, : Universality versal .').

. .

155, 160, 175, 176. U. 222, 225, 228, 233, 234, 238, 257, 259, 269. U. Term: 148-153, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 193, 194, 216, 228-230, 237, 238. Undistributedness : 155, 158. Undulatory Theory of Light : 87, 335, 336, 339, 432, 434. Unfavourable Event, U. Instance : 391.

Universalization Universe
:

348, 351, 352.

2, 25, 78, 79, 105, 127, 385387, 410, 455, 456, 459, 460 (see ' Identity of the U.,' ' Intelligibility

of U.

Experience,' Unity of the U.'). of Discourse : See Suppositio.'

'

'

Unknowable
Unknown

77-79, 207, 208.

:

Cause
:

412.

Unlikeness

Unidetermining Definition

77.

Unideterminism 389, 400, : See ' Reciprocity ..." Unification Uniformities

:

420,

449.

: 81, 82. Unmeaning Unorganized Experience : 114. Unorthodox Syllogisms: 250, 251.

57. Mark

See
:

'

Unity.'

Unscientific
'

Method

454,

455.

See

342, 355, 357, 367-369.

Enumeration.'

INDEX,
Unsound
A.' U.

VERBAL
'

AND

ANALYTIC
V.

499

Analogy

See
:

Illegitimate
(see
' '

Proposition:115.
bol
:

Sign,V. Sym

Inference

141 See

Inva

25,

'). lidity Unspecified

nate

'Words').
. . .

32, 93, 115 (see 'Sign.' V. 93. 'V. Structure:

Indetermi

.'
. .

132 (ftn.). : Possibility 246. Fact : Unsystematized Unstated Unthinkable: 207, 208. 104, 106, 107, 115, U.

120 (see'Tautology'). Hypothesis : 328. See : 319. Hypothesis.' Verificandum Verification (or Testing): 114, 140, 141. Truism Verifiable
:
'

173,

204, 306, 314, 317-321,

326, 328, 334-

Unverified
thesis Uranus
:

Generalization,

Hypo

Untruth':
Uses 235-238.

99, 326, 350. See ' Falsehood.' 145.

339, 343, 347-352, 355-364, 369, 371. 394, 397, 400, 401, 406-411, 418, 419. 422-428, 431-433, 436-443, 453, 456. of Verification-method See ' Method : Vicious Verification.' Circle : See
'

412, 451, 452. : 337, of the Four (Syllogistic) Figures :

Circulus See
:
'

.'
. .

of Laws Violation : .' V. of Rules

. .

Inviolability
V.'). V.
107. V. of

107.

Vagueness
Valid of
. . .

See
'

'

Indeterminacy.'
:

V.

in the Use
:

of Words

See

17. Valid Validity.'

Forms

: 119 (see Deductive Vitality of Spiritual Experience : Thought : 15.

'

Syllogism: 216, 224-229,

242, 243,

Vivisection Vortex

247, 249, 250, 324, 325. 141. Validation : Validity: 6-10, 107, 141, 142, 145, 187189, 193, 208, 209, 213, 223, 244, 250, 286, 288, 290, 300, 302-306, 309, 310,
321, 326,
'

Theory

402. of Descartes

: :

318, 332,
333.

333, 336. Ward,

Watts, Weak James

V. T. of Matter

(Dr.):
:
'

Isaac, D.D.
See Converse: W.

386, 387. 28, 67, 288. T. .'

. .

327, 456
of
'

(see Conditional
'

WTave-theory:
237.

Undulatory
198,

V.,'

Law

Formal

V.,'

'

L.

of

LogicalV.,' Unconditional V.'). V. from Consistency : 8, 9. distinguished V. in Syllogism: V. in Dilemma : 274.

214, 218, 221, 222, 224, 225, 230, 232234, 236, 242, 243, 247, 248, 251, 263, 267, 268, 301, 324, 325, 327 of S.'). V. (see 'Valid Forms (ftn.), V. of of Hypothetical : 140, 141. ' Im V. of the : 8, 94. Propositions

194, Educt 194, 200, 201. : 189, W. Forms Conclusion Weakened : 229. of Syllogism: 226, 227, 229. W. Resemblances Weighing Properties,

206,

229,

358, 360, 361. J. (Prof.) Welton, : viii, 150, 152, 159, 193, 261, 268, 286, 336 165 (ftn.), 386 (ftn.), 421. (ftn.),
'

perfect Figures: connexion : Validity: 6-10, Validity-interest

'

247. 142. 145,

Whately,
148, 132.

306, 307, 309, 310, 326. of See 'P. 191. Validity-Principle: ' Identity,' P. of Non-Contradiction.' in Inductive Value of Enumeration

82. 75 (ftn.), R. (Archbishop): 250, 291. ' Whatever is, is ' : 97. W. Whewell, (Dr.): 62, 349, 350, 449. ' ' in Division : 40. Parts Whole ' and ' ExtensionTotal W. Extent : See What'
:
'

reference.'
'

Why
: :

'

Inquiry : : Variability

352-355.

Will Wish Word-

140.

342, 370. See ' Free-w.'

'

341, 456. 314, 341, 353, 354 (see Variation : 62, 'Concomitant Variations'). 'Algol,' V. in F. D. : 44, 45. V. in Meaning of 66, 101, Words Terms or : 8, 14-17,

102, 281, 282.

394.

V. of Circumstances

V. of Conditions : 404. Variety : 42, 57, 79, 89, 354, 400. 399, 407. Instances : 396, 397, 422. Mould : 328, 421, Vegetable Venn,

V. of

F.R.S. : viii, 49 John, Sc.D., 349 (ftn.), 350, 340, 344, 152, (ftn.), 370, 371, 380, 381. V. 100-103. Contradiction Verbal : V. Disjunc Definition : 24, 25, 93. tion 56.
:

272.

V.

Division

37,

Expression of Meaning (see 'Language,' 'Words'). V.

V. lacies
:

52, 93 Fal V.

Optative.' complex : 111. Words : See Ambiguity,' Application of Meanings,' Definition,' Descrip of Division,' tion,' Meanings Nomenclature,' Significa Terms,' Terminology,' Ver tion,' Term,' bal Sign.' W. as Expressive Signs : W. as Fixing Atten 14, 23-25, 32. 14 F. tion : Meanings : 13-16, 23. ; as W. 93. as Sensory Supports for Meaning : 24, 93. W. as Sound-com plexes: 24, 25, 81. W. in a Sentence : 116. W. in relation to Judgment : 93 ; to Logic : 13, 16, 17 ; to Rhetoric : Their 13 ; to Thought : 13-17. Their 13-18. Right Use : Function : Their 13, 16-18. Subjective Inten
See
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

281-286.

V. Name:

69.

sion

70, 71.

Their

Variation

in

500 Meaning
282

THE

PEOBLEM

OF
52.

LOGIC
As

8, 14-17, 66, 101, 102, 281,

W. Idea:

representingan
163. As Ultimate 76.

Unspecified
Summum

Subject :
328-335,
Its 328. 335, Y
x:

Working Concept,
relation W. 337. W.
:

Qerius
201.

337, 387, 447-449, 451, 452, 459.

to

the

W.

Hypothesis :
:

Hypothesis : 328, 329, 334,

Method
'

448.

Proposition: 159-161. Young, Charles Augustus

Zeno Zero the Eleatic Extent
: :

339.

World

See
H.

Real
:

W.'
61

Wright,
a; as or a

W.

(ftn.).
As Definite As Genus
:

273, 290, 291.

149.

Substitute Sign : 14.

Term
:

Zoology: 37, 42, 57, 60-62, 68, 71,

73-75.

Positive

47-49.

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