CRIM II Cases

[No. 17958.
February 27, 1922]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LOL-LO and
SARAW, defendants and appellants.
1.PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154, PENAL CODE; WHETHER IN FORCB. The
provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID.Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy,
notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines.
3.ID. ; ID.; ID.Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows: "The crime of piracy
committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or
the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging f rom cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed
against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall
be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
4.ID. ; DEFINED.Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without
lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
5.ID.; JURISDICTION.Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits.
6.ID. ; ID.It does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U. S. vs, Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
7.ID. ; INSTANT CASE.One Moro who participated in the crime of piracy was
sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.
8.PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF TERRITORY. The
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far
as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force.
9.ID. ; ID. ; ID.Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order
and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by
direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the
word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens of the United States and citizens
of the Philippine Islands."
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Horrilleno, J.
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VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 27, 1922
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the
south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a
horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30,1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a
number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked
for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some
of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be
described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two
women were able to escape.
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Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of
Suhn with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts
did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After
the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was
rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis,
defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which
had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a onehalf part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio.
By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is, robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is
again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the
case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so
may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "f6r those limits, though neutral
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to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision f or the
first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code read as follows:
"ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
"ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical
injuries specified in articles f our hundred and f ourteen and f our hundred and fifteen
and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code,
when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitu24
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tion of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to
the 'effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are wellknown. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal
law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the
main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by
direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U. S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by
the InstructioHs of PresidentMcKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Merritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for
the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to
remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion." (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1,
1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt's Proclamation of August 14, 1898.) ,
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy
were meant to include the
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Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution
of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy
by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal
Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the
public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima, Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations. (U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on
the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U. S. Crim. Code,
sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest
on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating
to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United
States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of
piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs.
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Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as f
ollows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime f alls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to
article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited
article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary f or us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the
accused to lif e imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary f or its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of
the act, must also be taken into consideration
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VOL. 43, MARCH 1, 1922
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L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison
in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime
committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of 'the imposition
of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the accused who raped
one of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant
Saraw, since one member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore,
that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed,
and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime
of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall
be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the eQuivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Judgment modified. [People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19(1922)]
______________________________________________________________________
_
G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
Right to Counsel; Waiver; Waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial
as covered by the due process clauses shall only be valid if made with the full assistance
of a bona fide lawyer.On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit
20, Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante,
Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when
they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if
made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants,
as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said
accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject
manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 364, AUGUST 30, 2001
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People vs. Tulin
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11,
1992, pp. 7-59).
Same; Same; There is a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial where such waiver is unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the
full assistance of a bona fide lawyer.It is true that an accused person shall be entitled
to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not
versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that [r]ights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law. (Article 6,
Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that [u]pon
motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel. By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the
illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were
sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure.
Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made
and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial
of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been
made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).
Same; Same; Miranda Rights; The right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.However, we must
quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel, x x x Such rights originated from
Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing
and made in the presence of counsel.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Tulin
Same; Same; Same; The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called
confessions of the accused make them invalid.Saliently, the absence of counsel during
the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid.
In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at
bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called fruit from the
poisonous tree doctrine, a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this
rule, once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule
is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used
to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in
this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
Witnesses; Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accuseds plain denial of participation in the
commission of the crime.We also agree with the trial courts finding that accusedappellants defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare
testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accuseds plain denial of participation in the
commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accusedappellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they
were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas, to work on board the M/T Tabangao which was then anchored off-shore. And
readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite
period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their
destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long
voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human
experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second
Mate Torralba, and their companion had to leave the vessel at 9:30 oclock in the
evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or
handymen (p. 113, Rollo).
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VOL. 364, AUGUST 30, 2001

13
People vs. Tulin
Alibi; Alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses.Anent accused-appellant Changcos defense of
denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April
10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by
other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to
fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear
and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do
this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates
aforestated.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
executionhe need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.We likewise uphold
the trial courts finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by
the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different
tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and
collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
Same; Piracy; Statutes; Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532piracy under Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor
amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is
no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries. For this reason, piracy
under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
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People vs. Tulin
Same; Same; International Law; Jurisdiction; Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,
suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of M/T Tabangao
(renamed M/T Galilee by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was off loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiongs direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code, and, as such, is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law; It is
likewise well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of
Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case,
were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v.
Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Right to be Informed; One charged as a principal by direct
participation under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 may be validly convicted as
an accomplice under Section 4 of said law; If there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal.However, does
this constitute a violation of accused-appellants constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under Section
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VOL. 364, AUGUST 30, 2001
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People vs. Tulin
2 of said law? x x x The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if
there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and
not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of
lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr.,
125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of Superior; An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if
such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful.It cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was
merely following the orders of his superiors. An individual is justified in performing an
act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful
purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of
Hiongs superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but
of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere
clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself,
and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain.
These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of
the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders
to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not
do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rodrigo, Berenguer & Guno counsel de oficio for Roger Tulin, V.I. Loyola, CO.
Changco and A.C. Infante.
Britanico, Consunji & Sarmiento Law Offices for accused-appellant Cheong San
Hiong.
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People vs. Tulin
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court
for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned
ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600
barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793.87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use
of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter,
accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint,
the name M/T Tabangao on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the
PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name
Galilee, with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to
Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative
results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised
around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The
pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at
Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the M/T Tabangao again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapores shoreline
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People vs. Tulin
where another vessel called Navi Pride anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered
the crew of M/T Tabangao to transfer the vessels cargo to the hold of Navi Pride.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of Navi Pride in receiving
the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was
completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, M/T Tabangao returned to the same area and completed the
transfer of cargo to Navi Pride.
On April 8, 1991, M/T Tabangao arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three
batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a
period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch
was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accusedappellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite
and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at
midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew
members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was
also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of
the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present
at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance,
accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hiway by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade
arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby
of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
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18
People vs. Tulin
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as
follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,
CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine
(9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with
high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products,
together with the complement and crew members, employing violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to
Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines
on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment,
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies
in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of
denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from M/T
Tabangao to the Navi Pride. All of them claimed having their own respective sources of
livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing
by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian
Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if
they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be
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People vs. Tulin
paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period.
They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied
having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival
thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for
nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their
addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at
home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio
Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence
that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the Certificate as Chief Officer, and later
completed the course as a Master of a vessel, working as such for two years on board
a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The
company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker
lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one
of which was Navi Pride.
On March 2, 1991, the day before M/T Tabangao was seized by Emilio Changco and
his cohorts, Hiongs name was listed in the companys letter to the Mercantile Section of
the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator
on board the vessel Ching Ma.
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,
who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore
dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the
latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the
high seas on board Navi Pride but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon
his return on board the vessel Ching Ma, was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship
transfer of diesel oil off
20
20
People vs. Tulin
the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was
ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board Navi Pride sailed toward a vessel called M/T Galilee.
Hiong was told that M/T Galilee would be making the transfer. Although no inspection
of Navi Pride was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration
and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and
did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the
vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, Navi Pride reached the location of M/T Galilee. The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to shipside with M/T Galilee and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of M/T Galilee, called
Captain Bobby (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did
not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latters personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the Navi
Pride and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which
Captain Bobby signed under the name Roberto Castillo. Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of
March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the
firm from M/T Galilee to Navi Pride. The same procedure as in the first transfer was
observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer,
purchased by the company for the crew of M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and
was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship
agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the
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People vs. Tulin
matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with
M/T Polaris as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive
at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas
City, where Hiong checked in under the name SONNY CSH. A person by the name of
KEVIN OCAMPO, who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in
at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the
vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and
Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in
Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the
accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the
said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death
penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio
Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante,
Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation the M/T Tabangao or if the accused can no longer return the
same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said
corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with
interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount
is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return
to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the M/T Tabangao, or if the accused can no
longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned
to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the
amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in
full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported
to Singapore.
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People vs. Tulin
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs
against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may
be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance
as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11,
1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine
Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the
accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio Changco uniformly contend
that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were
forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the
same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in
violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified
piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and
who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude,
could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
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People vs. Tulin
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime
committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio
Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the M/T Tabangao and/or that the cargo
of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court
erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial
court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and
sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on
record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during
trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation
under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove
any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further
argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of M/T Tabangao and
in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and
its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers
to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done
outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act
must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
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24
People vs. Tulin
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants
during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong
be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit 20, Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11,
1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during
the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by
Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were
apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that
they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness
of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present raid to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial.
However, it is also provided by law that [r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with right recognized by law. (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus,
the same section of Rule 115 adds that [u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights
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People vs. Tulin
without the assistance of counsel. By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions
imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of
accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr.
Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules
of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver
of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People,
166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation
may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to
the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he gives may be used as evidence
26
26
People vs. Tulin
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more
stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of
counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the
accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda
rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section
12 sets forth the so-called fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine, a phrase minted by
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308
U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the tree) is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived
from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are
inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as like
wise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient
evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound
deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits IT and UU) and
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to
commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo
of the Court of Appeals
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members
of the crew of the M/T Tabangao no less, who identified and pointed to the said
Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the M/T Tabangao on March 2,
1991, at about 6:30 oclock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo,
and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the
vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
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People vs. Tulin
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which
the cargo was discharged from the M/T Tabangao to the Navi Pride for the price of
about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991 . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the M/T Tabangao were on board
the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or
for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court
that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and
their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa,
Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit B) and
pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March
2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned
out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 108-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial courts finding that accused-appellants defense of denial is
not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to
the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the
accuseds plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay,
284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers
(allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their
companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the
seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the M/T
Tabangao which
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People vs. Tulin
was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as
cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to
their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage,
without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is
incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial
court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion
had to leave the vessel at 9:30 oclock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo).
Anent accused-appellant Changcos defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and
17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in
Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a
weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora,
275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to
disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce deaf and convincing evidence that, at about
midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in
Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to
prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded
the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling
the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need
not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one an29
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People vs. Tulin
other, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal
design.
We affirm the trial courts finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the M/T
Tabangao off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch
the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after
the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of
the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts
had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at
the time of the attack and seizure of M/T Tabangao since he performed his task in view
of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accusedappellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines.
Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six
or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant
Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyolas wife is a relative of
the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding M/T Isla Luzon and its cargo of steel coils and
plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted
of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No.
532 has been rendered superfluous or duplicitous because both Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to recon30
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People vs. Tulin
cile the two laws, the word any person mentioned in Section 1[d] of Presidential Decree
No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to
offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas
Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the
complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the
law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas.The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole
or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas,
or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms.The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy.Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or
part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as
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People vs. Tulin
piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided (italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided
that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its
complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659,
the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed in
Philippine waters. On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in
1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters. Hence, passenger or
not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent
to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532,
piracy is among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries. For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,
suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of M/T Tabangao
(renamed M/T Galilee by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiongs direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
part of the act of
32
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People vs. Tulin
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such,
it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies
even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy
under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which
penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible
crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellants constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he
was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even
though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of M/T
Tabangao and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack
and seizure of M/T Tabangao and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in
the attack on and seizure of M/T Tabangao and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court
found that accused-appellant Hiongs participation was indisputably one which aided or
abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery brigandage.Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such
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People vs. Tulin
pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage,
shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in
accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section
has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of
an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125
SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said
section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly
abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates
and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from M/T Galilee to M/T Navi Pride.
He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd.
(tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the
petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the
General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through,
undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and
other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine
Services personnel in
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People vs. Tulin
the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence,
had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have
resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen
cargo from M/T Galilee to Navi Pride could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accusedappellant Hiongs role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that
on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the Navi Pride, one of
the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the M/T Galilee; that the firm
submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit 8-CSH, Record) to the port authorities,
excluding the name of Hiong; that the General Declaration (for departure) of the Navi
Pride for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits HH and 8-A CSH, Record) falsely
stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 oclock in the evening), that
there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for cargo
operation and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after
the transfer of the fuel from M/T Galilee with Emilio Changco a.k.a. Captain Bobby
a.k.a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the Quantity Certificate
(Exhibit 11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the Navi Pride was
2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he
affixed his signature on the Certificate above the word Master (Exhibit 11-C-2 CSH,
Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount;
that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite General
Declaration upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 oclock in the evening,
(Exhibits JJ and 13-A CSH, Record), it was made to falsely appear that the Navi
Pride unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it
acquired from the M/T Galilee 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer
transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by
accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer
from his end.
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People vs. Tulin
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from M/T Tabangao. Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it
was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase
order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for
and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the M/T Galilee; he did not
even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did
he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles
off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily
do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum
of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a
Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of
the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less
than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time
and money for transportationonly to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate
sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was
purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was merely following the
orders of his superiors. An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an
order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means
used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiongs superior Chua Kim Leng
Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
36
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People vs. Tulin
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the
means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port
and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was
convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances
show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua
Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the
deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not do so, for which
reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in toto.
Notes.Infractions of the so called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigationthe
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course
of custodial investigation. (People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167 [1996])
Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]) [People
vs. Tulin, 364 SCRA 10(2001)]
______________________________________________________________________
__
No. L-57292. February 18, 1986.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder; Credibility of
witnesses; Motive; Absence of motive of a prosecution witness to pervert the truth or
fabricate the heinous crime charged.And Judge Rasul also makes this observation: x
x x, this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone
survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified
against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the
evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should
pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with
triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes is doubt the version of the
defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the
accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the
accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of
the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio
de Guzman, acted consistently with the latters report and placed the accused under
detention for investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but
two persons they have identified is baseless in view of the proven conspiracy among the
accused.That the af-fidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de
Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that
Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were
killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants claim,
therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former.
But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused.
Same; Same; Piracy; Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material;
Piracy, a special complex crime punishable by
___________
* EN BANC.
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People vs. Siyoh
death.That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There
is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a
manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and
when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D.
No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result
or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless
of the number of victims.
Same; Same; Death certificates, not vague as to the nature of the injuries of victim;
Cause of death of victim consistent with testimony of prosecution witnesses.That the
death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims;
were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de
Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot
wounds. (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de
Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with barongs
while In-danan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
CUEVAS, J., concurring:
Criminal Law; Penalties; Appellants deserve the penalty of death.Considering the
gravamen of the offense charged and the manner by which it was committed, I vote to
affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Rasul, J.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM
KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with
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People vs. Siyoh
triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the
information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the
above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with firearms
and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating together,
aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or
intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said
pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo
sets, merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of
P18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime
herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to
jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused
the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is,
said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman, which prevented
his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and
Omarkayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id., p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omarkayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the
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People vs. Siyoh
provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106
of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the
accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so-called
compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id., p.
130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OMARKAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The Peoples version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Lamitan Public
Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979,
Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman
received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and
stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4 6, tsn). The goods were
received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits
for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor
returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by
Antonio de Guzman that his group was heldup near Baluk Baluk Island and that his
companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were
also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan,
to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them
had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp. 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p. m. of
July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of
Omarkayam Kiram at Pilas
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People vs. Siyoh
Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzmans group, together with Kiram and Julaide
Siyoh, started selling their goods. They were able to sell goods worth P3,500.00. On July
12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at
another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and again slept at Kirams house.
However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day
when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of
Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a
place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46,
tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47,
tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 tsn). They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh
were at that time armed with barongs. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00
oclock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the
group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was
selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with
two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After
selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared
to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the
front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman
saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their
pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after, Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp.
57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with
armalites. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram
conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them,
Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzmans pumpboat towards
Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions
were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram
and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the
pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said, It
was good to kill all of you. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen
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People vs. Siyoh

while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he
was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him,
injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed
till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and
brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment.
Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province
(pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de
Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were
arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took
from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get
back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral,
tangenital (Exh. C, prosecution), (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of
witnesses. Who should be believedAntonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution
eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also
the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and
an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would
justify a reversal of the trial courts determination. Additionally, the following claims of the
appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram
house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say
that robbing the victims at Kirams house would make Kiram and his family immediately
suspect and robbing the victims before
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People vs. Siyoh
they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the
victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided
safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not
support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: It is of important consequence to
mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends
of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but
no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the
prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has
been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army
detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating
the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge
Rasul also makes this observation: x x x, this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of
the defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been
allegedly helped by the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was
presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented
showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or
manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and frustrated
murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by
the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement
agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing in the
version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently
with the latters report and placed the accused under detention for investigation.
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de
Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that
Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were
killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram.
363
363
People vs. Siyoh
The thrust of the appellants claim, therefore, is that Namli In-danan and Andaw Jamahali
were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven
conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this
case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly
conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two
(2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was
chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to
be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk-Baluk
Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two
armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors banca; D) That Tony de
Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and
undressed while the two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted
actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime
(People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. Indic, 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of
the will of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id.,
pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de
Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no
reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the
trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But
the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on
the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the
number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the
victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for
364
364
People vs. Siyoh
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible
gunshot wounds. (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio
de Guz-man that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with
barongs while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and
the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the
penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in
solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutier-rez, Jr., De la Fuente,
Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.
Cuevas, J., considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it
was committed, I vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.
Decision affirmed with modifications.
Notes.Trial courts conclusion on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal. (People vs. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22.)
The declaration of complainant that he saw accused running away with a gun tucked in
his waist is more credible than the defense witness who alleged that he saw another
person inasmuch as the former had an unobstructed view and was nearer the scene of
the shooting. (People vs. Manimtim, 120 SCRA 324.)
Identification of malefactor by a witness should be accepted when conditions of visibility
are favorable and witness is not biased. (People vs. Bemat, 120 SCRA 918.)
The mere facts that the lone prosecution witness saw the
365
365
Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
victim carried off by the two appellants and others in a case, he heard gunshot in the
direction where the car went and the car came back with all its occupants without the
deceased, do not definitely establish that the two appellants participated in the killing of
the victim. (People vs. Bautista, 121 SCRA 688.)
Witness who testify in categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remained consistent on cross-examination are credible witnesses. (People vs. Barros,
122 SCRA 34.) [People vs. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356(1986)]
______________________________________________________________________
__
G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y
TAYONG, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Piracy; Grave Coercion; There is piracy, not grave coercion, where, as
part of the act of seizing their boat, the occupants of the vessel were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination.Under the definition of piracy in PD No.
532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and
Juan, Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene,
one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation.
Same; Same; Same; To sustain the defense and convert the instant case of piracy into
one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons.To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one
of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine
waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and
boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered
_________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
762
762
People vs. Catantan
complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to dapa or lie down with face downwards, and then
struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which,
Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; P.D. No. 532; The issuance of PD No. 532 was designed
to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
waters.The incident happened at 3:00 oclock in the morning. The sudden appearance
of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of
his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence
the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To impede the livelihood of small fishermen would be
to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview
of P.D. No. 532 are the obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people.The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of
livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the
unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small
fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood
would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within
the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people. Had it not been for the chance passing of another
pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering,
meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could
not be ascertained.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the revolver used by the accused to seize the boat
was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate them from the crime.The fact that the
revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot
exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and
his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils
while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
763
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997
763
People vs. Catantan
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 14.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias Bimbo were charged with
violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law
of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a fire-arm and a bladed weapon,
acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan
Pilapil, Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their
fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y
Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias Bimbo guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 oclock in the morning of 27 June 1993,
the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan, Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3
kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up
with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck
Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and
__________________
1 Rollo, p. 1.
2 Decision penned by Judge Renato C. Dacudao, RTC-Br. 14, Cebu, 26 May 1994.
764
764
People vs. Catantan
Juan, Jr. to dapa.3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the
Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat,
covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan, Jr. to
ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused
had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they
were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later,
the engine conked out and Juan, Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be
set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm
instead.
Meanwhile Juan, Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the
open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother.
Eugenes hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres
cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose
boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that
its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to
approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the new pumpboat. Once
aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu.
When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his
catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, You choose between the two, or I will kill
you.5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the
other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
_________________
3 To lie down.
4 A 3-bladed knife.
5 Rollo, p. 14.
765
765
People vs. Catantan
But, as Ursal was transferring to the new pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part
of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw
Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan, Jr. then untied his
brothers legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another
pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof,
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed
by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided. And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par.
(b), of the same decree as any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers
and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds
and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that
there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did
not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation
but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they
used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists
that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving
complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they
ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils
behind in their boat. Accordingly,
766
766
People vs. Catantan
appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion
as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the
purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of
the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony
of Eugene is significant and enlightening
Q:
Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at
that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A:
Yes.
Q:
Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A:
While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that
pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q:
Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that
pumpboat?
A:
Four.
Q:
When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they
do that?
A:
They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (italics supplied).
Q:
How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A:
Only one.
Q:
What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A:
When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (italics supplied).
Q:
By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxxx
A:
He said, dapa, which means lie down (italics supplied).
COURT:
Q:
To whom did he aim that revolver?

A:
He aimed the revolver on me.
767
767
People vs. Catantan
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q:
What else did he do?
A:
Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q:
What did he do with his revolver?
A:
He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q:
Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A:
We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q:
To what place did he order you to go?
A:
To Daan Tabogon.6
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would
be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the
accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil
testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and
Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
to dapa or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver,
hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point
to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 oclock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the
Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of
his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence
the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding
whereas clauses of the decree
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredations upon the
_________________
6 TSN, 13 January 1994, pp. 5-6.
768
768
People vs. Catantan
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating
such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in
view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea
waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea
to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople
depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their
very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the
obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil
brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow
and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back
to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their new pumpboat ran out of gas so they
were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local
authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again,
that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and
769
769
Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio
intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction
of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized
under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed. [People vs. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761(1997)]
______________________________________________________________________
__
G.R. No. 178552.October 5, 2010.*
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the SouthSouth Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M.
SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 178554.October 5, 2010.*
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer Labog,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez and Sec_______________
* EN BANC.
147
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 5, 2010
147
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
retary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, petitioners, vs. HON.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES,
in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity
as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity
as PNP Chief of Staff, respondents.
G.R. No. 178581.October 5, 2010.*
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING
WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION
(GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF
CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN,
PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE
OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO
LUMBERA, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB,
DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.),
CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO
REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO
CASAMBRE, petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in148
148
Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE
OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME,
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE
PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, respondents.
G.R. No. 178890.October 5, 2010.*
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLES RIGHTS,
represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following
organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own
behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her own
behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf,
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by
Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLES
RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief,
EXECU149
149
TIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, respondents.
G.R. No. 179157.October 5, 2010.*
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M.
Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA
CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEA III and
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), respondents.
G.R. No. 179461.October 5, 2010.*
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST),
GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS
150
150
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST,
PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISAT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA
MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA
REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK),
STARTER, LOSOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY,
CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO,
JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P.
ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE BELTRAN, petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
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CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, respondents.
Certiorari; Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who
do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is clear: Section1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Judicial Review; Requisites.In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.
Same; Locus Standi; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal standing has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged; A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interestit must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid,
but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake
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in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The
Executive Secretary, 531 SCRA 583 (2007), summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [A] party who
assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or
is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that
it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it
must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Same; Same; While transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigationcompelling State and societal interests in the
proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
While Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA
744 (1998), holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in
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the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic Act No. 9372); Judicial Notice; A
court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence
or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge; The Court
cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the National
Peoples Army.BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,
LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitionerorganizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et
al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. The Court cannot take judicial notice
of the alleged tagging of petitioners. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice
have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. Things of
common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may
be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
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be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence
of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist
organization, the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) have both
classified the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), National Peoples Army (NPA)
and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations; There is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and
National Peoples Army (NPA) organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under Republic Act (RA) No. 9372.While in our jurisdiction there is still
no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America (US) and the
European Union (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts
an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or
outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three
years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted
their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.
Same; Same; Same; The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does
not suffice to clothe the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or any of its members with
standing.Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus
standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of
RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to
clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to suffi155
155
ciently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Same; Same; Same; Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held
sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr.
in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching
implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they
have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has
nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show
an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws
enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi,
as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Same; Same; Same; A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and
personal interest in the proceeding; Republic Act (RA) No. 9372 is a penal statute and
does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and
citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
interest in the proceeding. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual
petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of
the law.
Same; Same; Generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public
right, do not establish locus standi.It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of
a direct and personal interest is key.
Same; Actual Case or Controversy; By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only
when there is an actual case or controversy;
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An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only
when there is an actual case or controversy. Section 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied.) As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
(1936), the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Same; Same; While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to
any constitutional interest may suffice to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional
challenge, this is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to
enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.The Court is not unaware that a
reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.
Same; Same; Legal Research; Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication
on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition
forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
justiciable controversy; Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and
supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat
of prosecution.Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
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Project, 561 U.S. [unpaginated] (2010), allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of
prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as
the sole means of seeking relief. The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal
court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a)
(1), proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to
provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or
activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that
they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and
existing one. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly
being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinion, which is not its function.
Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; Jurisdiction; Without any justiciable controversy, the
petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no
original jurisdiction.Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are
merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
Same; Same; Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail
to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may
be abused. Allegations
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of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Facial Challenges; Criminal Law; Words and Phrases; The
doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane; A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application; The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.The confusion apparently stems from
the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a
facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due
process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of
speech and cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness
doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation
to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
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existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities; A litigant cannot successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.A facial challenge is
likewise different from an as-applied challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied
challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis
of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities. Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring
opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge,
are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The allowance of a facial challenge in free
speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.The allowance of a facial
challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. As reflected
earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in
terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains
from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Same; Same; Same; By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation.It is settled, on the other hand, that the application
of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are
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impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness
challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the
specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statutes facial validity; In
this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause
has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes.American
jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not
with regard to the statutes facial validity. For more than 125 years, the US Supreme
Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty
under law. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due
process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In
at least three cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy
provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in
these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372);
Terrorism; What Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech;
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand, thus, given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling
out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize
the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.From the definition of the crime of
terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled:
(1) the offender commits an act
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punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of
the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law
seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed
under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of
the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing
of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against
a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction; Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech.Petitioners notion on the
transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle
of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of
words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a
victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign
reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one
regulating speech rather than conduct. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental
to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds
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true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
PETITIONS Challenging the Constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372 An Act to Secure the
State and Protect Our People from Terrorism, Otherwise Known as the Human Security
Act of 2007.
Soliman M. Santos and Vicente Dante P. Adan for petitioners in G.R. No. 178552.
Remegio D. Saladero, Jr. and Nenita C. Mahinay for Kilusang Mayo Uno, etc., et al.
Edre U. Olalia for Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan).
Rex J.M.A. Fernandez and Alfonso Cinco IV for petitioners in G.R. No. 178890.
Pacifico Agabin, Rodolfo Urbiztondo and Neri Javier Colmenares for petitioners in G.R.
No. 179157.
Ryan A. Matibag for petitioner in G.R. No. 179461.
CARPIO-MORALES,J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc., a
_______________
1 A consolidation of House Bill No. 4839 and Senate Bill No. 2137.
2 Republic Act No. 9372, Sec. 62.
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non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen,
taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007
docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for
Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who
are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity,
Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan
ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of
Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for
Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,4 and joined
_______________
3 KMU Chairperson Elmer Labog, NAFLU-KMU National President Joselito V. Ustarez
and NAFLU-KMU Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CTUHR Executive
Director Daisy Arago.
4 BAYAN Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, GABRIELA Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, KMP Secretary General Danilo Ramos, MCCCL Convenor
Amado G. Inciong, COURAGE National President Ferdinand Gaite, KADAMAY Vice
Chairperson Gloria G. Arellano, SCW Chairperson Merly Grafe, LFS National
Chairperson Vencer Crisostomo, Anakbayan Secretary General Eleanor de Guzman,
PAMALAKAYA Chairperson Fernando Hicap, ACT Chairperson Antonio Tinio, Migrante
Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, HEAD Deputy Secretary General Dr.
Geneve Rivera, and Agham Chairperson Dr. Giovanni Tapang. Grafe and Tapang,
however, failed to verify the petition.
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by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera,
Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty.
Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua
and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea
III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog
(BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern
Tagalog Region,7 and individu_______________
5 Dr. Edelina P. De La Paz for Karapatan, Evangeline Hernandez for Hustisya, Mary Guy
Portajada for Desaparecidos, Donato Continente for SELDA, Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon
for EMJP and Fr. Gilbert Sabado for PCPR.
6 IBP is represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, national president, while CODAL is
represented by Atty. Noel Neri, convenor/
member.
7 BAYAN-ST is represented by Secretary General Arman Albarillo; Katipunan ng mga
Magsasaka sa Timog Katagulagan (KASAMA-TK) by Secretary General Orly
Marcellana; Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalugan (PAMANTIK-KMU)
by Regional Secretary General Luz Baculo; GABRIELA-Southern Taga165
165
als8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition
in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9
composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and
Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that
of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
_______________
log by Secretary General Helen Asdolo; Organized Labor Association in Line Industries
and Agriculture (OLALIA) by Chairperson Romeo Legaspi; Southern Tagalog Region
Transport Organization (STARTER) by Regional Chairperson Rolando Mingo; Bayan
Muna Partylist-ST by Regional Coordinator Bayani Cambronero; Anakbayan-ST by
Regional Chairperson Pedro Santos, Jr.; LFS-ST by Spokesperson Mark Velasco;
PAMALAKAYA-ST by Vice Chairperson Peter Gonzales, Bigkis at Lakas ng mga
Katutubo sa Timog Katagalugan (BALATIK) by Regional Auditor Aynong Abnay;
Kongreso ng mga Magbubukid para sa Repormang Agraryo (Kompra) represented by
member Leng Jucutan; Martir ng Bayan with no representation; Pagkakaisa at Ugnayan
ng mga Magbubukid sa Laguna (PUMALAG) represented by Provincial Secretary
General Darwin Liwag; and Los Baos Rural Poor Organization for Progress and
Equality represented by Teodoro Reyes.
8 Francesca Tolentino, Jannette Barrientos, Arnel Segune Beltran, Edgardo Bitara Yap,
Oscar Lapida, Delfin de Claro, Sally Astera, Christian Nio Lajara, Mario Anicete, and
Emmanuel Capulong.
9 Republic Act No. 9372, Sec. 53.
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166
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of

Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money
Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence
and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners resort to
certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section1.Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus
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167
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on
locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal
interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also
that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
show that it has been
_______________
10 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415
SCRA 44, 133 (2003).
11 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633; 338 SCRA 81, 100
(2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12 G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583, 591-592.
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168
or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist
fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with
the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal
interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No.
178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state
security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark
windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim
that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.14
_______________
13 360 Phil. 133; 299 SCRA 744 (1998).
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 178890), pp. 11-12.
169
169
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No.
178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads
the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts
may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may
be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 178581), p. 17.
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170
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of
particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But
a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice.
Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge
or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the
so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who
merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in
direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified
the CPP,
_______________
16 Vide Genesis Transport Service, Inc. v. Unyon ng Malayang Manggagawa ng

Genesis Transport, G.R. No. 182114, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 352.
17 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (last visited August 13, 2010).
18 <http://eurex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf> and its
recent update <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:01:EN:HTM> on the Council Common Position (last visited
August 13, 2010).
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171
NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of
the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the
CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet
to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda
Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by
removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the
CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the
policy statement of the Aquino Administration21 of resuming
_______________
19 Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 11, 2007, Page A-1. Visit also
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/2007071175951/Reds_target_of_terror_law>(last visited August 16, 2010).
20 House Resolution No. 641.
21 In his State of the Nation Address, President Benigno Aquino III said: x x x x.
Tungkol naman po sa CPP-NPA-NDF: handa na ba kayong maglaan ng kongkretong
mungkahi, sa halip na pawang batikos lamang?
Kung kapayapaan din ang hangad ninyo, handa po kami sa malawakang tigil-putukan.
Mag-usap tayo.
Mahirap magsimula ang usapan habang mayroon pang amoy ng pulbura sa hangin.
Nananawagan ako: huwag po natin hayaang masayang ang napakagandang
pagkakataong ito upang magtipon sa ilalim ng iisang adhikain.
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172
peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the
judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific
interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first
case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice
before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitionerorganizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
_______________
Kapayapaan at katahimikan po ang pundasyon ng kaunlaran. Habang nagpapatuloy ang
barilan, patuloy din ang pagkakagapos natin sa kahirapan. x x x x. See:
<http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/26/
state-of-the-nation-address-2010> (last visited August 25, 2010).
22 In Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899; 415 SCRA 44, 139
(2003), the Court followed the determinants cited by Mr, Justice Florentino Feliciano in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona for using the transcendental importance doctrine, to wit: (a) the
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (b) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (c) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.
23 SEC.17.Proscription of Terrorist Organization, Association, or Group of Persons.
Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses
acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread
fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a
competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the
organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
24 <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=607149&publicationSubCategoryId=63> (last visited: September 1, 2010).
173
173
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under
RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006
against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners
Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia
de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the
Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one,
those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by
this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA
9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion,
its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to
prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after
the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their
sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
_______________
25 G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318.
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 178581), pp. 111-125.
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174
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to
clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently
demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single
arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of
political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone
legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown
even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus
standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite
their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA
9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been
pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in
G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental
importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or
may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held
sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or
immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule
otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause
is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and
citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing
_______________
27 Supra note 22 at p. 896.
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175
power of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest
in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is
key.
Petitioners fail to present an
actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Section1.The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.30
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
_______________
28 Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518, 525; 337 SCRA 733, 742 (2000), citing
Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83, 20 L Ed 2d 947, 88 S Ct 1942.
29 Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337.
30 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
31 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
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176
argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more
emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain,
contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the
authorities does not
_______________
32 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, G.R. No. 140338, August 7,

2007, 529 SCRA 232, 243.
33 499 Phil. 281, 304-305; 460 SCRA 291, 312-313 (2005).
34 Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil. 259; 242 SCRA 211 (1995).
177
177
present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a
hypothetical problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on
Elections36 for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based
merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and
those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds
goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed
the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds,
since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution
_______________
35 Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990, 190
SCRA 782.
36 314 Phil. 131; 244 SCRA 272 (1995).
37 G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989, 179 SCRA 287.
38 De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA
666, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976) and Regional Rail
Reoganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974).
39 561 U.S. [unpaginated] (2010). Volume 561 is still pending completion.
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178
as the sole means of seeking relief.40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a
federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared
by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they
intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such
organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or
activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that
they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and
existing one.
_______________
40 Id. citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers, supra.
41 2339B. Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist
organizations.
(a)Prohibited Activities.
(1) Unlawful conduct.Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to
a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization
(as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in
terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section
140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).
42 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-189 (1973).
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179
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged
as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From
these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its
function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is
not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step
in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
_______________
43 Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005,
449 SCRA 1, 10, citing Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500,
October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 782.
44 Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Vol. I, p. 332 (3rd ed. 2000), citing
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) and Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
45 Vide Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993, 227
SCRA 100, 117, stating that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere possibility of
abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power[.]
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180
A facial invalidation of a statute is
allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism46 under
_______________
46 RA 9372 defines the crime of terrorism as follows:
SEC.3.Terrorism.Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a.Article 222 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine
Waters);
b.Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c.Article 134-a (Coup detat), including acts committed by private persons;
d.Article 248 (Murder);
e.Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f.Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction); or under
1.Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2.Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act of 1990);
3.Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4.Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5.Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974);
and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal
and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
181
181
RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to
free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline
the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are
equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the
application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v.
Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48

The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section
549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vague_______________
imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
47 479 Phil. 265; 435 SCRA 371 (2004).
48 421 Phil. 290; 369 SCRA 394 (2001).
49 Republic Act No. 3019, Sec.5.Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful
for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree,
of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of
the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
182
182
ness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.50 It added that, at any rate, the
challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court
stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless
proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense53 under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein
petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act
No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically
postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that
[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests
_______________
50 Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 281.
51 Id., at p. 288.
52 G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 370.
53 Punishable under Section 45(j) in relation to Section 10(g) or (j) of Republic Act No.
8189.
54 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at p. 284.
55 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at pp. 421-450.
183
183
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing
attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, we have not recognized
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and, again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. For this reason, it has been held that a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others.
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what
is involved is a criminal statute. With
184
184
respect to such statute, the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional. As has been pointed out, vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant. Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioners claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, on its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed
out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as
manifestly strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, and is
generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the
light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
_______________
56 Id., at pp. 353-356.
185
185
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal
statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a
claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on
the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.59
A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
_______________
57 People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.
58 Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992,
207 SCRA 712, 719-720.
59 Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,

Revisited, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279 (2003), note 39, citing Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 261-262 (1994).
186
186
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert
the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful,
so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be
challenged and under_______________
60 Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160,
239; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at p. 418, note 35.
61 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 429.
62 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 4.
63 The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative
in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an
aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged. (People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476, 485).
187
187
scored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed.64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States
ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as
applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the
law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited
to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
_______________
64 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at p. 643.
65 Id., at pp. 645-646.
188
188
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to
raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute on its face, not merely as applied
for so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the chilling; deterrent effect of the overbroad
statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad laws very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression. An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the
original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if
ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
_______________
66 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra at p. 238.
67 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra; David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.

69 Id.
70 539 U.S. 113, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003).
189
189
statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression.71
Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis
of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372
is legally impermissible absent an actual
or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of
the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding,
however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety.72 It
stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
only as applied to a particular defendant.73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the
First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and
not with regard to the statutes facial validity.
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that
criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among
the most important guarantees of liberty under law.75
_______________
71 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 31 L. Ed 2d 408 (1972).
73 Id.
74 United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564 (11th Circ. 1995) cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119,
134 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1996); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 114 L. Ed 2d 524
(1991); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1975); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 42 L. Ed 2d 706 (1975).
75 Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279 (2003).
190
190
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least
three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy
provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in
these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA

9372 regulates speech so as to permit
a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any
of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated
special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism77
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.
_______________
76 People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 186; People v. Dela
Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 163; People v. Siton, G.R. No.
169364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476.
77 Republic Act No. 9372, Sec. 3, supra.
191
191
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out
or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly
focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a
crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78
illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race
will require an employer to take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly
means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct
alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of
the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case
where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of
coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances
brought about through speaking or writ_______________
78 Rumsfield v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 164 L.Ed
2d 156 (2006).
192
192
ing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such
an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would
make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely
evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot
heed the call for a facial analysis.
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the
therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were
actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court
in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face
and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review
of a criminal statute, chal_______________
79 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 93 L. Ed. 834, 843-844 (1949);
Cf Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 71 L. Ed 2d 732, 742 (1982) that acknowledges: x x x
The fact that such an agreement [to engage in illegal conduct] necessarily takes the form
of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional
immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech. Finally, while a solicitation to
enter into an agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing
conduct from pure speech, such a solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the
political arena, remains in essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for
private profit, and may properly be prohibited.
80 Vide Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, Situation-Altering Utterances, and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev.
1277, 1315 (2005).
193
193
lenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a credible threat of
prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as
the sole means of seeking relief.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that
judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and
Sereno, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., On Official Leave.
Abad, J. I certify that J. Abad who is on official business submitted a concurring opinion.
(Sgd.) Corona, C.J.
CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD,J.:
I concur with the majority opinion in dismissing the various petitions filed before this
Court challenging the validity of Republic Act (R.A.) 9372. I feel a need to emphasize,
however, that as the grounds for dismissal are more procedural than substantive, our
decision in these consolidated cases does not definitively uphold the validity of the
questioned law. The specific questions raised by the petitioners against R.A. 9372 may
be raised in the proper forum if and when an actual controversy arises and becomes ripe
for adjudication.
194
194
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which
holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, and like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes
employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of
clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. (People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168
[2006])
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
(Romualdez vs. Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 [2008])
The time has come to reconsider the statement in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435
SCRA 371 (2004), that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases and that they are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutesrooted in unyielding formalism and deprived of guidance from
basic constitutional tenets, that dicta disenchants the rights of free people, diminishing
as it does, the basic right to due process. (Tinga, J., dissenting in Romualdez vs.
Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 [2008]) [Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146(2010)]
______________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 120670. October 23, 2003.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HEDISHI SUZUKI, appellant.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Whenever the right against unreasonable
search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure.
Same; Same; A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of each case.It is axiomatic that a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several
marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto,
justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid search
are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; Court find the trial courts reliance on the plain view
doctrine misplaced; The doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of
the object is in the plain view of the police officer.Nonetheless, we find the trial
courts reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine finds application only
when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain view of the police officer.
Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport
authorities.
Same; Same; To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there must be a lawful arrest before the search can be made.Neither was the
search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time of the
search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that
there must be a lawful arrest before the search can be made.
_______________
* EN BANC.
44
44
People vs. Suzuki
Criminal law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Mere possession of the prohibited
substance is a crime per se and the burdened of proof is upon appellant to show that he
has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.At this point, it
bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se and
the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit under the
law to possess the prohibited drug. Here, appellant failed to prove that he has a license
to possess the marijuana. In People vs. Bongcarawan, we held that such possession
constitutes prima facie evidence of animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in
the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Same; Same; Same; Frame-up; Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the
defense of frame-up; Allegations of frame-up are easily fabricated, making it the
common and standard line of defense in prosecutions involving the Dangerous Drugs
Law.It is noteworthy that aside from appellants testimony, not a shred of evidence was
presented by the defense to prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who
allegedly gave him the box of piaya containing marijuana was presented as a witness to
confirm his story. We have ruled that clear and convincing evidence is required to prove
the defense of frame-up because in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of
the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against appellant, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty stands. Also, allegations of frame-up are
easily fabricated, making it the common and standard line of defense in prosecutions
involving the Dangerous Drugs Law.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Br. 45.
Jesus N. Borromeo and Carlito Cudiamat for accused-appellant H. Suzuki.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod
City in Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi Suzuki, appellant, of illegal
possession of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 8, Article II of
_______________
1 Records at p. 219.
45
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
45
People vs. Suzuki
R.A. No. 6525, as amended,2 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to
pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
The Information3 against appellant reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess, prepare, administer or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control 1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or less, of marijuana which is a
prohibited drug, in violation of the aforementioned laws.
Acts contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial followed.
The prosecution presented P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of
the Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM), PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the
PASCOM, and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), all of
Bacolod City. Their testimonies, woven together, established the following facts:
Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all
Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within
their respective areas of responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent
in domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport authorities and the PASCOM.
In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the prosecution witnesses were in their respective
stations, appellant and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the predeparture area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Appellant was bound for Manila via flight
No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box
marked Bongbongs piaya.4 At the
_______________
2 The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, An Act to Impose
the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes.
3 Records at p. 1.
4 A delicacy in Bacolod City.
46
46
People vs. Suzuki
pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the
PASCOM, appellant proceeded to the walk-through metal detector, a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or
object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the
presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This
prompted PO3 Poyugao to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3
Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it through the machine. Again, the
machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered appellant to go to the hand-carried
luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were
present. SPO1 Casugod requested appellant to open the box. He appeared tense and
reluctant and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented,
saying in faltering English, open, open. SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found
therein eighteen (18) small packs, seventeen (17) of which were wrapped in aluminum
foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which looked like
marijuana. Upon seeing this, appellant ran outside the pre-departure area but he was
chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.
They apprehended appellant near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the
PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the
office, being suspects as conspirators with appellant in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked
permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised appellant
of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same.
The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900
grams. He then drafted a confiscation receipt which appellant, upon the advice of Atty.
Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over appellant to SPO1 Linda
for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions were brought to the prosecutors office for
inquest and placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM
office. The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Inspector
Villavicencio conducted three tests on the specimen samples which proved positive for
marijuana.
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VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
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People vs. Suzuki
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony is as follows: On
April 9, 1994, he and Takeshi Koketsu arrived in Manila from Osaka, Japan. The purpose
of his trip was to collect from Takeshi 2.5 million or P500,000.00 which the latter owed
him. Waiting for them at the airport was Takeshis wife, Lourdes. On the same day, the
three flew to Bacolod City. Appellant stayed at the house of Takeshi.

Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay. When Takeshi admitted he had no
money, appellant got angry and went to the Casino Filipino where he stayed until 10:30
in the evening. Upon leaving the casino, he met Pinky who enticed him to have sex with
her. They then proceeded to the Moonlight Motel. Moments later, Pinky left while
appellant stayed there for the night. He told her he was leaving the following morning.
The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant went to the airport. Pinky, who was
there waiting, gave him a box of Bong-bongs piayaas pasalubong from Bacolod City.
He did not ascertain the contents of the box since he trusted Pinky although he just met
her the previous night.
Appellant found and joined Takeshi and Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi apologized
for his failure to pay his debt, assuring him that he would settle his obligation next month.
When it was time to leave, appellant, accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the predeparture area. When he passed through the metal detector, a policeman frisked him,
got the box and placed it inside the metal detector. The machine produced a red light,
hence, the policeman brought the box to the inspection table, with appellant following
him. Thereafter, the policeman, whom he later knew as SPO1 Arturo Casugod, pointed
to the box uttering something appellant did not understand. Appellant said, wait a
minute, (in Japanese) and went outside to ask Takeshi and Lourdes to interpret for him,
but they did not respond. When PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called him back to the predeparture area, he found Takeshi near the table and the box containing something
wrapped in aluminum foil already opened. Takeshi told him that he was carrying
marijuana. He replied it was given to him by a woman that morning. Then he and SPO1
Casugod went to the PASCOM office where the latter weighed the contents of the box.
He did not sign the Confiscation Receipt presented to him. They then proceeded to the
NARCOM office with C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1
48
48
People vs. Suzuki
Linda, PO3 Poyugao, and three other officers. From the NARCOM office, appellant was
brought to the Bacolod Police Station.
Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya Restaurant owned by Takeshi where
appellant saw C/Inspector Alcantara and Lourdes talking. When he inquired from Takeshi
what was going on, he was told they needed money in dealing with the police. Appellant
was then brought to the prosecutors office. There Takeshi told him to keep silent as he
would make a deal with the prosecutor. Then they went to Takeshis house where
appellant stayed for two days.
On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and SPO1 Linda brought appellant to the
Bacolod City Jail. Takeshi visited him twice, advising him to ask someone from Japan to
send him money and be discreet, otherwise he would be killed; and to admit he has in
his possession less than 750 grams of marijuana so he could post bail. However, he
refused.
Five days later, appellant, escorted by the police, went to Takeshis house to retrieve his
money (120,000 equivalent to P30,000.00), but Takeshi told him that it was already
spent for the food and drinks of the NARCOM agents and the airport policemen.
On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death,
to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17
of Republic Act No. 7659, let the 1,547.07 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject
matter of this case, be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government and be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed according to
law. SO ORDERED.
Hence the instant mandatory review.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
49
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
49
People vs. Suzuki
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT
AGENTS HAD THE LEGAL AUTHORITY WHEN THEY OPENED AND SEARCHED
THE SMALL CARTON IN QUESTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE OPENING AND SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND
IN DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE SEIZURE OF SAID CARTON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
MARIJUANA CONTENTS OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
CARTON IN QUESTION WAS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
SUBJECT CARTON WAS MADE UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF
EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE
APPELLANT WAS VALID AS HE WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
UNQUALIFIED, VOLUNTARY AND AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT GIVEN BY THE
APPELLANT TO THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
VIII
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
CAUGHT IN POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSE50

50
People vs. Suzuki
CUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
IX
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE CARTON IN QUESTION (CONTAINING
MARIJUANA), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT
INTENDED TO POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA.
X
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS PETITION
TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY
ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM FROM QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT,
CONSIDERATION AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AND IN
DECLARING THE SAME SELF-SERVING AND NOT AMPLY PROVEN.
XII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT.
XIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING
APPELLANT.
XIV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE
MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH AND IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.
XV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM.
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51
People vs. Suzuki
Considering that the above assigned errors are interrelated, they will be discussed
jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure,
contending that: (1) the authority to open and investigate suspicious packages and
cargoes under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 62355 does not apply to PASCOM and
NARCOM agents but is limited only to aircraft companies or operators of aircraft for hire;
(2) he did not consent to be searched by the authorities; (3) the prohibited substances
confiscated by the authorities were not actually in their plain view; and (4) the search
they conducted was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads:
SECTION 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft
which are for hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and
cargoes in the presence of the owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if
present, in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act:
Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative refuses to have the same
opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the loading
thereof.
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court correctly upheld the PASCOMs authority to
open packages and cargoes, thus:
This Court does not subscribe to the contention of the accused. The Police Aviation
Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action
Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 399, dated April 28, 1976.
On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of
National Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication,
the Secretary of Justice, the Director General, National Intelligence and Security
Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed. The purpose was to establish a
working arrangement among cognizant agencies, set up guidelines and procedures for
the security of the airport complex throughout the Philippines particularly handling,
coordination and disposition of hijacking and other criminal incidents that may occur
thereat (PAFM 3-9, page 1-3).
______________
5 An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation and For Other Purposes.
52
52
People vs. Suzuki
Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM)
shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
1. Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;
2. Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;
3. Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport
security operations;
4. Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and provide
other pertinent public safety services within the airports;
xxx
One of its guidelines before the passenger can enter the sanitized area (pre-departure
area) is to check the hand-carried luggage and personal effects of passengers (PAFM 39, page 2-3). Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attach case with the
following limitation:
a. x x x
xxx
b. x x x
xxx
c.It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2-4).
Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in

relation to R.A. 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport,
Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags.
Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, particularly paragraph 3.6.4 when x-ray inspection is not possible
or when the x-ray image of a bag gives rise to suspicion, x x x, a manual search must be
carried out (Memorandum of the Prosecution, pp. 15-16; italics supplied).
The prosecution correctly argued that the PASCOM established a system of checkpoint
at the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport to quickly inspect or screen persons or
hand-carried baggages for illegal items pursuant to said Memorandum of Agreement,
which in turn derived its life from LOI 399. In short, the setting up of checkpoint at the
Bacolod Airport on April 12, 1994 does not have only jurisprudential basis (Val-monte vs.
De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83288, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211, more popularly
known as the checkpoints cases) but also statutory basis.
Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting the authority to open
and search suspicious luggages would result to
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VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
53
People vs. Suzuki
absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their authority to perform their duty of
maintaining order, preserving peace, protecting life and property and other police works
such as crime detection, while within the airport premises. The construction given by the
accused conveniently omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235
which reads in order to help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this
Act. The word authorities evidently refers to police officers and other law enforcers such
as the PASCOM officers. It follows that in allowing or authorizing aircraft companies
which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for hire, to open and
investigate suspicious packages and seizures, the authors of the law does not disallow
or prohibit law enforcement agencies of the government from assisting or conducting the
opening and investigation of suspicious packages and cargoes. Otherwise, they will be
remiss in their sworn duty of protecting the public in general and more particularly those
in the aviation industry. x x x. It becomes crystal-clear that the PASCOM officers and
personnel had the legal authority when they opened and investigated the box in the
presence of the accused and his counsel.
This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport
security procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In
People vs. Canton,6 and People vs. Johnson,7 we validated the search conducted on
the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their
persons, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
_______________
6 G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 478.
7 G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 526.
54
54
People vs. Suzuki
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. (Italics ours)
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of
prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected
illegal items to enter the pre-departure area, as claimed by appellant, is to deprive the
authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of
the law enforcers, to the detriment of society.8
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure.9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM
agents. The testimony of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is quite revealing, thus:
Q
And when the said carton box was passed for the second time thru the walk-through
machine it indicated this metallic element by flashing a red light, is that correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And because of that, what did you do?
A
Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the inspection table.
Q
What happened then?
A
And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr. Donato Barnezo, asked the passenger Mr.
Hedishi Suzuki, saying, kindly open your box for inspection.
Q
What happened after he asked the accused to open the box?
A
Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He signaled no, no.
Q
What happened then?
A
At that juncture, sir. I advised the said passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: Very sorry, sir, we
need to open your luggage because it indicated a red light.
Q
When you say open the luggage you are referring to the box?
A
Referring to the small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.
_______________
8 People vs. Canton, supra, citing People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991).
9 People vs. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 525.
55
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
55
People vs. Suzuki
Q
What happened then?
A
Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the pre-departure area instead of opening the
box.
Q
Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?
A
Before he could get out of the door of the pre-departure area I called his attention to
come back.
Q
Did he come back?
A
He came back and I explained to him again, sir, that we are very sorry but we need to
open your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya. I told him, I am very sorry, sir, but we
need to open your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.
Q
And what did Mr. Suzuki do?
A
Mr. Suzuki answered me, open.
Q
What did you do?
A
I said kindly open your carton and he repeated, open.
Q
For the second time?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What did you do then because he said open?
A
I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again, sir, I am going to open this and he told me
you open.
Q
Then, what did you do?
A
I got hold of the carton and opened it by means of cutting the masking tape that bound
both ends of the carton.
Q
And what did you find inside the said box?
A
When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it contained suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops wrapped in an aluminum foil, sir, and transparent cellophane. x x x.10
That appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked him to open the box was
confirmed by SPO1 Linda and PO3 Poyugao.11 As succinctly found by the trial court,
appellant cannot deny that he consented by feigning ignorance of the English language,
thus:
Accused through counsel would want this Court to believe that the opening of the carton
containing marijuana fruiting tops was without the consent of the accused. The defense
relied on the alleged inability of the accused to understand nor speak the English
language because he is a
_______________
10 TSN dated August 11, 1994 at pp. 14-16.
11 TSN dated August 12, 1994 at p. 34; August 16, 1994 at p. 17.
56
56
People vs. Suzuki
Japanese national. It made capital on the presence of Japanese interpreters, Tsuyushi
Tsuchida and Hideo Agarie, who assisted during the trial.
The Court has no doubt in the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
their categorical declaration that accused Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent not only
nodding his head but also by saying Open. Open. Open. There was even a third-party
consent given by his Japanese companion Takeshi Koketsu.
The allegation of the accused that he does not understand English is indeed incredible
to believe. As aptly observed by Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael Guanco, the trial
prosecutor, the accused might not be able to speak straight English yet he might
understand English (Memorandum of the Prosecution, page 21). The prosecution
witnesses categorically declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki was speaking English
during the airport encounter with the PASCOM and NARCOM operatives and while
being investigated at the PASCOM Office. While it may be true that Lourdes Linsangan
participated on some occasions, her participation merely facilitated the conversation.
The Court cannot believe accuseds protestation of ignorance of the English language.
There are several indications that accused understand the English language. It may be
noted that in filing a motion to terminate the legal services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it
appeared that accused caused its preparation or filing without the assistance of a lawyer
(Motion To Terminate Services of Counsel, page 53, expediente). The accused testified
that his wife is proficient in English. Accused was able to play games in the casino, the
night before the airport incident. He was able to give direction to the driver from the
motel to the airport. He has traveled to the Philippines about ten (10) times. He claims to
be an owner and manager of a company where some clients or customers are nonJapanese such as Germans and Americans. During the trial accused appeared to be an
intelligent witness and this Court has keenly observed that accused had shown
eagerness and readiness to answer the questions propounded in the English language
even before the Japanese translation. Above all, accused answered in the affirmative
when queried by the Court whether he was able to attend English classes while in
college. In short, the Court was literally taken for a ride when initially made to believe
that the accused could not read, speak and understand the English language.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.12 Given the circumstances

obtaining here, we find the
_______________
12 Valmonte vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211,
reiterated in People vs. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA 432.
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VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
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People vs. Suzuki
search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several
marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto,
justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.13 The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid
search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.14
Nonetheless, we find the trial courts reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such
doctrine finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain
view of the police officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from
appellant is contained in the box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately
apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested
at the time of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there must be a lawful arrest before the search can be made.16
At this point, it bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a
crime per se and the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or
permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug.17 Here, appellant failed to prove
that he has a license to possess the marijuana. In People vs. Bongcarawan,18 we held
that such possession constitutes prima facie evidence of animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
_______________
13 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
x x x
14 People vs. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 138929, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 471; Go vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123943, March 14, 2001, 354 SCRA 338.
15 People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 597.
16 People vs. Cuizon, G.R. No. 109287, April 18, 1996, 256 SCRA 325; People vs.
Canton, supra, citing People vs. Chua Ho San, supra.
17 People vs. Johnson, supra.
18 Supra.
58
58
People vs. Suzuki
Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court should have sustained his unrebutted
testimony that he was a victim of frame-up contrived by Takeshi in connivance with the
arresting officers, especially C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, accused in several criminal
charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellants testimony, not a shred of evidence was
presented by the defense to prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who
allegedly gave him the box of piaya containing marijuana was presented as a witness to
confirm his story. We have ruled that clear and convincing evidence is required to prove
the defense of frame-up because in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of
the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against appellant, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty stands.19 Also, allegations of frame-up are
easily fabricated, making it the common and standard line of defense in prosecutions
involving the Dangerous Drugs Law.20
We are not swayed by appellants reference to C/Inspector Alcantaras criminal records.
Suffice it to state that he is neither an accused in this case or a prosecution witness.
We have carefully reviewed the records and found no cogent reason to overthrow the
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. That this is a matter exclusively
within its competence, since it had the unique opportunity of observing the witnesses
and their manner of testifying during trial, had long been established. Hence, its findings
are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, except when there is a clear
showing that facts of weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the case
have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.21 This exception is not present
here.
_______________
19 People vs. Sy, G.R. No. 147348, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 594; People vs.
Bongalon, G.R. No. 125025,January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 289; People vs. JulianFernandez, supra; People vs. Lacap, G.R. No. 139114, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA
124; People vs. Mustapa, G.R. No. 141244, February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 252; People
vs. Uy, G.R. No. 129019, August 16, 2000, 338 SCRA 232.
20 People vs. So, G.R. No. 133861, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 252; People vs.
Tan, G.R. No. 133001, December 4, 2000, 348 SCRA 116.
21 People vs. Remerata, G.R. No. 147230, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 753; People vs.
Almendras, G.R. No. 145915, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA
59
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 23, 2003
59
People vs. Suzuki
However, the trial court imposed the wrong penalty.
Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00
shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or
more.22 Section 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied in the
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.23
In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, appellants
possession of 1,547.70 grams24 of marijuana does not merit the supreme penalty of
death but only reclusion perpetua.
While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal
drugs,25 we, however, reduce the fine imposed by the trial court to P1,000,000.00,
considering that courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 94-16100 finding appellant Hedishi Suzuki guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and fined One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
Costs de oficio.
_______________
555, citing People vs. Chen Tiz Chang, G.R. Nos. 131872-73, February 17, 2000, 325
SCRA 776; People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 143805, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 689;
People vs. Mustapa, supra, citing People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20,
1993, 225 SCRA 499.
22 People vs. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 419.
23 People vs. Remerata, supra, citing People vs. Gonzales, supra; People vs. Lacap,
supra; People vs. Paredes, G.R. No. 136105, October 23, 2001, 368 SCRA 102; People
vs. Sy, supra.
24 The total weight of marijuana after re-weighing in open court.
25 People vs. Tee, supra.
26 People vs. Canton, supra; People vs. Johnson, supra.
60
60
People vs. Satioquia
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA 668 [1999]) [People vs. Suzuki, 414 SCRA 43(2003)]
______________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 176944.March 6, 2013.*
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y.
LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Special Civil Actions; Even assuming that a petition for
certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of their petition shows that the issues
they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability
of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the
Court of Appeals, which fall outside the Supreme Courts limited jurisdiction when
resolving certiorari petitions.Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly
provides the remedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA: Section
57. Appeal.Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless
the Supreme Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied] From this provision, it is apparent
that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition
for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the
freeze order over their properties. Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available
to the petitioners, a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e.,
existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month
limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall
outside the Courts limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions.
Same; Moot and Academic; A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
510
510
Ligot vs. Republic
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness. However, the moot and academic principle is not an iron-clad
rule and is subject to four settled exceptions, two of which are present in this case,
namely: when the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and when the case is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
Freeze Orders; Republic Act No. 9160; Money Laundering; Based on Section 10 of R.A.
No. 9160, as amended by R.A. No. 9194, there are only two requisites for the issuance
of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, and
(2) the determination of probable cause by the Court of Appeals.The legal basis for the
issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended by RA No. 9194,
which states: Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.The Court of
Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable
cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall
be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days
unless extended by the court. [italics supplied] The Ligots claim that the CA erred in
extending the effectivity period of the freeze order against them, given that they have not
yet been convicted of committing any of the offenses enumerated under RA No. 9160
that would support the AMLCs accusation of money-laundering activity. We do not see
any merit in this claim. The Ligots argument is founded on a flawed understanding of
probable cause in the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding or freeze order application.
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the issuance of a
freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of
probable cause by the CA. The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze
order differs from the probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and
the latter was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
511
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
511
Ligot vs. Republic
Same; Same; Same; As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance
of a freeze order refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money
laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account
or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.As defined in the
law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to
believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is
being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offense. In other words, in resolving the issue of whether
probable cause exists, the CAs statutorily-guided determinations focus is not on the
probable commission of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the
Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets,
or other monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the
illegal activities enumerated under RA No. 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated,
probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and
the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended.
Same; Same; Same; A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the
Court of Appeals to prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are
suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended. The primary objective of a freeze order is to
temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way related to an
unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing them during
the duration of the freeze order.A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief
issued by the CA to prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are
suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended. The primary objective of a freeze order is to
temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way
512
512
Ligot vs. Republic
related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from
utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is pre-emptive in
character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the
States effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or
prosecuting the owner.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the
Court of Appeals for a period not exceeding six months; However, should it become
completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order,
it should file the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and
explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the
period of extension sought.As a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended
by the CA for a period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period,
ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the
property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation
order or it should have filed the necessary information. Otherwise, the property owner
should already be able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it.
However, should it become completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the
duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary motion before the expiration of
the six-month period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file an
appropriate case and justify the period of extension sought. The freeze order should
remain effective prior to the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this
kind of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Zulueta, Puno and Associates for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
513
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
513
Ligot vs. Republic
BRION,J.:
In this petition for certiorari,1 retired Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Jacinto C. Ligot,
Erlinda Y. Ligot (Mrs. Ligot), Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot, and Miguel Y. Ligot (petitioners)
claim that the Court of Appeals (CA) acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its January 12, 2007 resolution2 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90238. This assailed resolution affirmed in toto the CAs earlier January 4, 2006
resolution3 extending the freeze order issued against the Ligots properties for an
indefinite period of time.
Background Facts
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the AntiMoney Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance
of a freeze order with the CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of the
petitioners, pursuant to Section 104 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as amended
(otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). This application was
based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of the Ombudsman to the AMLC,
recommending that the
_______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Rollo, pp. 3-22.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador; id., at pp.
28-30.
3 Id., at pp. 32-41.
4 Section10.Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.The Court of Appeals,
upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause
exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful
activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be
effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless
extended by the court. [italics supplied].
514
514
Ligot vs. Republic
latter conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of
RA No. 9160.5
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the complaint6 it filed
against the Ligots for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violations of Section 87 of RA No. 67138 and RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
The Ombudsmans Complaint
a.Lt. Gen. Ligot and immediate family
The Ombudsmans complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years and 2 months, from April 1, 1966 as a cadet until his
retirement on August 17, 2004.9 He and Mrs. Ligot have four
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 70.
6 Id., at pp. 71-86.
7Section8.Statements and Disclosure.Public officials and employees have an
obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the
right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests
including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of
age living in their households. [italics supplied]
8 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
9 Based on the Ombudsmans complaint, Lt. Gen. Ligot held various
positions/designations as per records of the last five years of his stay with the AFP, to
wit:
Commander of the Central Command, AFP from April 13, 2002 date of retirement;
Officer-in-Charge of the Southern Luzon Command, AFP from December 5-20, 2001
and October 2-16, 2001;
Commanding General of the 2nd Infantry Division, PA from March 28, 2001 to April
13, 2002;
Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of OJ6, GHQ, AFP from November 6,
1999 to March 28, 2001;
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VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
515
Ligot vs. Republic
children, namely: Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot, George Y. Ligot and Miguel Y. Ligot, who
have all reached the age of majority at the time of the filing of the complaint.10
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that
as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight
Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos (P3,848,003.00).11 In contrast, his
declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(P105,000.00).12
Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsmans investigation revealed that Lt. Gen.
Ligot and his family had other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN,
amounting to at least Fifty Four Million One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos
(P54,001,217.00). These undeclared assets consisted of the following:
_______________
Brigade Commander of the 403rd Infantry Brigade, 41D, PA from June 10, 1966 to
October 1, 1999.
(Rollo, pp. 71-72).
10 Id., at p. 72.
11 Lt. Gen. Ligots assets as of December 31, 2003 consist of the following:
Assets Year of
Acquisition Amount in
Pesos
Cash-on-hand
P 550,000.00
Investments/Bus and Stocks
700,000.00
Appliances
251,003.00
Jewelries and Books
430,000.00
House and lot (TARLAC) 1980
10,000.00
House and lot (MUNTINLUPA)
1983
337,000.00
Lot (MARIKINA) 1986
110,000.00
Agri lands (NUEVA ECIJA)
1995
60,000.00
Agri lands (SAN JOSE BATS.)
1999
200,000.00
Motor vehicle
199 4600,000.00
2000
600,000.00
TOTAL
P3,848,003.00
(Id., at p. 75).
12 Id.
516
516
Ligot vs. Republic
Undeclared Assets Amount
Jacinto Ligots undeclared assets P41,185,583.5313
Jacinto Ligots childrens assets 1,744,035.6014
_______________
13 Based on the Ombudsmans estimation, the Ligot spouses have the following
undeclared assets:
Assets Year of
Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Registered
Owner
Raw land in Masalat, Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal (72,738 sqm.)
2002
(June 28, 2002)
P2,000,000.00 Jacinto Ligot
Proceeds of sale of 19A, Essensa East Forbes Condominium, Lawton Tower, Taguig
2003
(August 19, 2003)
P25,000,000.00 Erlinda Ligot
Poultry building 2002
P 6,715,783.02 Jacinto Ligot
AFPSLAI (highest accumulated balance of the four accounts of the spouses) 2002
P
7,469,800.51
Spouses Jacinto and Erlinda Ligot
TOTAL
P41,185,583.53
(Ombudsmans complaint, id., at p. 80.)
14 The following properties are registered in the names of the Ligot children:
Year of
Acquisition
Registered
owner/Age at
time of
acquisition
Description Acquisition Cost
2001
Paulo (22) Agricultural land in Bgy. Imbayao, Malaybalay City
P 195,000.00
2001
Paulo (22) Toyota Hi-lux
P1,078,000.00
2002
Riza (22)
Isuzu Mini-dump P305,000.00
2003
Riza (23)
Bgy. Kalatugonan, Patpat, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon (4 hectares)
Market value P72,000.00
2003
Miguel (18) Bgy. Kalasungay, Malaybalay City (5,2242 has.)
Market Value
P94,035.60
Total
P1,744,035.60
(Ombudsmans complaint, id., at p. 81.)
517
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
517
Ligot vs. Republic
Tuition fees and travel expenses P 2,308,047.8715
_______________
15 Based on the Ombudsmans complaint, the Ligot family had, from 1986 to 2004,
substantial funds used to cover the tuition fees of the children and their travel expenses.
While Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his SALN family expenses, the amounts declared were
considered to only cover necessary and basic expenses, being considered too small to
cover the expensive tuition fees of the children and their frequent travels abroad.
Year
Nature of Expenses Amount Estimated Total Travel and Tuition Fee Expenses
Declared Family Expenses (SALN)
1986 Travel Tuition fee
No data
P8,480.70
P 8,480.70
P 60,000.00
1987
Travel Tuition fee
No data
P9,815.40
P 9,815.40
P 60,000.00
1988
Travel Tuition fee
No data
P12,477.76
P 12,477.76 P 103,000.00
1989
Travel Tuition fee
No data
P13,732.00
P 13,732.00 P 96,000.00
1990
Travel Tuition fee
No data
P16,153.10
P 16,153.10 P 78,462.00
1991
No SALN
No SALN
No SALN
No SALN
1992
Travel Tuition fee
No data
P41,085.46
P 41,085.46 P 102,000.00
1993
Travel Tuition fee
P56,700.00
Data
unavailable
P 56,700.00 P 140,000.00
1994
Travel Tuition fee
P 36,400.00
P 59,408.00
P 95,808.00 P 150,000.00
1995
Travel Tuition fee
P 25,000.00
P 64,318.00
P 89,318.00 P 170,000.00
1996
Travel Tuition fee
P 62,400.00
P 84,743.30
P 147,143.30
P 143,873.00
1997
Travel Tuition fee
P39,150.00
P 114,086.65
P 156,236.65
P 136,535.50
518
518
Ligot vs. Republic
Edgardo Yambaos assets relative to
the real properties
P 8,763,550.0016
_______________
1998
Travel Tuition fee
P 34,000.00
P132,987.00P166,987.00P140,000.00
1999
Travel Tuition fee
P 115,050.00
P 111,639.00
P226,689.00P160,500.00
2000
Travel Tuition fee
P 371,800.00
P 100,259.50
P472,059.50P216,520.00
2001
Travel Tuition fee
P 50,000.00
P 50,214.00
P100,214.00P239,908.00
2002
Travel Tuition fee
P 86,700.00
P 54,547.00
P141,247.00P309,000.00
2003
Travel Tuition fee
P 185,500.00
P 38,954.00
P224,454.00P335,258.00
2004
Travel Tuition fee
P 304,750.00
P 27,697.00
P332,447.00No SALN
Total Expenses from 1986 to 2004
P2,308,047.87 P2,641,056.50
Total Expenses
(Declared Family Expenses plus estimated travel and tuition fee expenses)
P 4,949,104.37
(Id., at p. 82.)
16 According to the Ombudsmans complaint, Yambao acted as the Ligot spouses
dummy. Mrs. Ligot transferred her condominium unit in Essensa in favor of her brother,
allegedly for the amount of P25,000,000.00. This amount, however, was never declared
in Lt. Gen. Ligots SALN, nor was any increase in his cash asset registered. Moreover,
Yambao has not filed any Individual Tax Returns since 1999, thereby discounting his
probable financial capacity to acquire the Essensa property and any of his other assets.
The Ombudsman also took into account the fact that Yambao used three addresses
used by the Ligots as his address. From these circumstances, the Ombudsman
concluded that the assets registered in Yambaos name are actually assets belonging to
the Ligots. These assets include:
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VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
519
Ligot vs. Republic
Total
P54,001,217.00
Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligots main source of income was his salary as an officer
of the AFP,17 and given his wife and childrens lack of any other substantial sources of
income,18 the Ombudsman declared the assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligots name, as
well as those in his wifes and childrens names, to be illegally obtained and unexplained
wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor
of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer
or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor).
_______________
Year of
Acquisition Description Acquisition Cost
1993 Residential lot/Susana Heights Subdivision Village VI, Muntinlupa City (904
sqm.) P1,050,000.00
1994
Mabelline Foods, Inc. P 156,250.00 Amount paid as incorporator
1996 1996 Honda Accord 4 Drive Sedan (brand new)
P 878,000.00
1999 Condominium Unit/ Burgundy Plaza, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights,
Diliman Quezon City (54.05 sqm.) P1,405,300.00
2001
2001 Toyota Hilander
P 2,800,000.00
2002 Subaru Forester P 1,174,000.00
2003
Total
Subaru Forester P 1,300,000.00

P 8,763,550.00
(Id., at p. 83-84.)
17 Id., at p. 76.
18 Id., at p. 72.
520
520
Ligot vs. Republic
b.Edgardo Tecson Yambao
The Ombudsmans investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligots younger brother, Edgardo
Tecson Yambao. The records of the Social Security System (SSS) revealed that Yambao
had been employed in the private sector from 1977 to 1994. Based on his contributions
to the SSS, Yambao did not have a substantial salary during his employment. While
Yambao had an investment with Mabelline Foods, Inc., the Ombudsman noted that this
company only had a net income of P5,062.96 in 2002 and P693.67 in 2003.19 Moreover,
the certification from the Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that Yambao had no record
of any annual Individual Income Tax Return filed for the calendar year 1999 up to the
date of the investigation.
Despite Yambaos lack of substantial income, the records show that he has real
properties and vehicles registered in his name, amounting to Eight Million Seven
Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P8,763,550.00), which he
acquired from 1993 onwards. The Office of the Ombudsman further observed that in the
documents it examined, Yambao declared three of the Ligots addresses as his own.
From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy
and/or nominee of the Ligot spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambaos name
actually belong to the Ligot family.
Urgent Ex-Parte Freeze Order Application
As a result of the Ombudsmans complaint, the Compliance and Investigation staff (CIS)
of the AMLC conducted a financial investigation, which revealed the existence of the
Ligots various bank accounts with several financial institutions.20 On
_______________
19 Based on the corporations income statements with the SEC.
20 The CIS discovered that the Ligots had the following bank accounts in their names:
521
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
521
Ligot vs. Republic
April 5, 2005, the Ombudsman for the Military and Other LawA Enforcement Officers
issued a resolution holding that
_______________
Lank Bank of the Philippines
Account Name Type of Account Account Number
Col. Jacinto C. Ligot Peso SA-ATM 0962-0055-35
Jacinto C. Ligot Peso Demand Deposit 0057-0575-72
Equitable PCIBank (EPCIB)
Jacinto C. Ligot Peso Demand Deposit 0057-575-02
Erlinda Y. Ligot US Dollar Account 4466000391

Erlinda Y. Ligot US Dollar Account 4466000405
Erlinda Y. Ligot US Dollar Account 04008E00043CTF-K
Erlinda Y. Ligot US Dollar Account 03009B00069CTF-K
Erlinda Y. Ligot Peso Account
3763-00267-4
3763-00267-3
3763-00282-8
Equitable Savings Bank
Emelda T. Yambao Savings Deposit Private (Special), 90-day ESB Speedsaver Peso
3763-00318-2
3763-00356-5
3763-00357-3
3763-00287-9
Citibank
Jacinto C. Ligot US Dollar Account 8143020917
Jacinto C. Ligot Peso Account
8132063827
Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI)
Jacinto C. Ligot
013093075
Jacinto C. Ligot
8132063827
522
522
Ligot vs. Republic
probable cause exists that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated Section 8, in relation to Section 11, of
RA No. 6713, as well
_______________
Erlinda Y. Ligot
013624151
Erlinda Y. Ligot CCA
630-001-0524885-7
Erlinda Y. Ligot SA 630-002-0009922-2
Erlinda Y. Ligot CCA
630-001-0524885-7
Riza Y. Ligot
014606319
Paulo Yambao Ligot
01460327
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
1215319969
Erlinda Y. Ligot USD Common Trust Fund contribution/
placement/investment
2150000014*
Erlinda Y. Ligot USD Common Trust Fund contribution/
placement/investment
2150000016*
Philippine Savings Bank
01000762
Bank of the Philippine Islands
Parmil Farms, Inc. Peso Account

0200120600002061013388
Parmil Farms, Inc. Current Account
Elpidio V. Yambao
Peso Account
00583037225
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank)
Edgardo T. Yambao US Dollar Common Trust/Fund contribution/placement/investment
Peso account
00012407
United Overseas Bank Phils.
Edgardo T. Yambao ITF
Frances Isabelle Yambao
021072002773
Edgardo T. Yambao
002072001829
853
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
853
Ligot vs. Republic
as Article 18321 of the Revised Penal Code.
_______________
Keppel Bank Phils.
Edgardo T. Yambao
3035000914
Citicorp Financial Services & Insurance Brokerage Phils., Inc.
Erlinda Ligot USD Account
002369932
Erlinda Ligot/Riza Ligot USD Account
007906196
Paulo Ligot/Riza Ligot
USD Account
007906165
Emelda Yambao USD Account
007064904
Edgardo T. Yambao USD Account
000117966
Edgardo T. Yambao USD Account
006911804
Philippine Axa Life Insurance Corporation
Insured Policy Owner
Kind of Insurance
Policy Number
Miguel Y. Ligot Erlinda Y. Ligot Sure Dollar in the amount of USD25,000.00 with
maturity of ten (10) years 501-1093597
This Policy was cancelled upon the request of Erlinda Y. Ligot on December 8, 2004. On
January 7, 2005, a certain Janah G. Evangelista received the check in the amount of
P1,004,016.87 (USD17,876.52 @ P56.164) in behalf of Erlinda Ligot upon her authority.
(Rollo, p. 59.)
21 Article183.False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements
and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under
oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit
any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section,
shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein. [italics supplied]
524
524

Ligot vs. Republic
On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005, directing the
Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order
against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and the members of his family with the CA.22
Subsequently, on June 27, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with
the appellate court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the
Ligots and Yambao.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that
probable cause existed that an unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense had
been committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family, including Yambao, and that the
properties sought to be frozen are related to the unlawful activity or money laundering
offense. Accordingly, the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots and Yambaos
various bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the
date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of
Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not
continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement
authorities and the governments efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots unlawful
activities would be frustrated. In support of its motion, it informed the CA that the
Ombudsman was presently investigating the following cases involving the Ligots:
Case Number Complainant(s) Nature
OMB-P-C-05-0523 Wilfredo Garrido Plunder
OMB-P-C-05-0003 AGIO Gina Villamor, et al.Perjury
OMB-P-C-05-0184 Field Investigation Violation of RA No.
_______________
22 Rollo, pp. 88-95.
525
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525
Ligot vs. Republic
Office 3019, Section 3(b); Perjury under Article 183, Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 11 of RA No. 6713; Forfeiture Proceedings in Relation to RA No. 1379
OMB-P-C-05-0352 David OdilaoMalicious Mischief; Violation of Section 20, RA No.
7856
Finding merit in the Republics arguments, the CA granted the motion in its September
20, 2005 resolution, extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings
and/or investigations have been terminated.
On September 28, 2005, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order,
principally arguing that there was no evidence to support the extension of the freeze
order. They further argued that the extension not only deprived them of their property
without due process; it also punished them before their guilt could be proven. The
appellate court subsequently denied this motion in its January 4, 2006 resolution.
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds
Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering
Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended23 (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases)
took effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of
six months.
On January 31, 2006, the Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs January 4,
2006 resolution, insisting that the freeze order should be lifted considering: (a) no predi_______________
23 A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
526
526
Ligot vs. Republic
cate crime has been proven to support the freeze orders issuance; (b) the freeze order
expired six months after it was issued on July 5, 2005; and (c) the freeze order is
provisional in character and not intended to supplant a case for money laundering. When
the CA denied this motion in its resolution dated January 12, 2007, the Ligots filed the
present petition.
The Petitioners Arguments
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued
against him and his family even though no predicate crime had been duly proven or
established to support the allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the
freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension
limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The CA, in
extending the freeze order, not only unduly deprived him and his family of their property,
in violation of due process, but also penalized them before they had been convicted of
the crimes they stand accused of.
The Republics Arguments
In opposition, the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order upon a
determination that probable cause exists, showing that the monetary instruments or
properties subject of the freeze order are related to the unlawful activity enumerated in
RA No. 9160. Contrary to the petitioners claims, it is not necessary that a formal criminal
charge must have been previously filed against them before the freeze order can be
issued.
The Republic further claims that the CAs September 20, 2005 resolution, granting the
Republics motion to extend the effectivity of the freeze order, had already become final
and executory, and could no longer be challenged. The Republic notes that the Ligots
erred when they filed what is effectively
527
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
527
Ligot vs. Republic
a second motion for reconsideration in response to the CAs January 4, 2006 resolution,
instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari via Rule 45 with this Court. Under these
circumstances, the assailed January 4, 2006 resolution granting the freeze order had
already attained finality when the Ligots filed the present petition before this Court.
The Courts Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
I.Procedural aspect
a.Certiorari not proper remedy to
assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available
in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section57.Appeal.Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may
appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final
order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which
extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of their
petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the
freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders
embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of
judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Courts lim528
528
Ligot vs. Republic
ited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As held in People v. Court of
Appeals:24
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to
resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or
issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial
court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a
petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct
errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors
of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.25 (citations omitted; italics supplied)
Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not what is
effectively a second motion for reconsideration (nor an original action of certiorari after
this second motion was denied), within fifteen days from receipt of the CAs January 4,
2006 resolution. To recall, this resolution denied the petitioners motion to lift the
extended freeze order which is effectively a motion for reconsideration of the CA ruling
extending the freeze order indefinitely.26
However, considering the issue of due process squarely brought before us in the face of
an apparent conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section
53(b) of
_______________
24 G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
25 Id., at p. 617.
26 Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
529
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
529
Ligot vs. Republic

the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this Court finds it imperative to relax the application of
the rules of procedure and resolve this case on the merits in the interest of justice.27
b.Applicability of 6-month
extension period under the
Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the Republic
nonetheless asserts that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does not apply to the present
case because the CA had already resolved the issues regarding the extension of the
freeze order before the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect.
This reasoning fails to convince us.
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005.
Section 59 provides that it shall apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for
freeze order at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20, 2005 resolution
extending the freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order on
September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA only acted upon this motion on January 4,
2006, when it issued a resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion was actually
a motion for reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the assailed CA resolution.
Since the Ligots motion for reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the
Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
_______________
27 See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182, 188-189; 256 SCRA 171, 177
(1996); Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA
633, 643; and Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, 439 Phil. 793, 805-806; 391 SCRA 192,
202 (2002).
530
530
Ligot vs. Republic
came into effect on December 15, 2005, the Rule unquestionably applies to the present
case.
c.Subsequent events
During the pendency of this case, the Republic manifested that on September 26, 2011,
it filed a Petition for Civil Forfeiture with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On
September 28, 2011, the RTC, Branch 22, Manila, issued a Provisional Asset
Preservation Order and on October 5, 2011, after due hearing, it issued an Asset
Preservation Order.
On the other hand, the petitioners manifested that as of October 29, 2012, the only case
filed in connection with the frozen bank accounts is Civil Case No. 0197, for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under RA No. 1379 (entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot, et al.), pending before the Sandiganbayan.
These subsequent developments and their dates are significant in our consideration of
the present case, particularly the procedural aspect. Under Section 56 of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases which provides that after the post-issuance hearing on whether to
modify, lift or extend the freeze order, the CA shall remand the case and transmit the
records to the RTC for consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding. This
provision gives the impression that the filing of the appropriate cases in courts in 2011
and 2012 rendered this case moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.28 However, the moot and academic principle is not an iron-clad
rule and is subject
_______________
28 Deutsche Bank AG v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 193065, February 27, 2012, 667
SCRA 82, 91.
531
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
531
Ligot vs. Republic
to four settled exceptions,29 two of which are present in this case, namely: when the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and when the case is capable of repetition, yet evading
review.
The apparent conflict presented by the limiting provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases, on one hand, and the very broad judicial discretion under RA No. 9160, as
amended, on the other hand, and the uncertainty it casts on an individuals guaranteed
right to due process indubitably call for the Courts exercise of its discretion to decide the
case, otherwise moot and academic, under those two exceptions, for the future guidance
of those affected and involved in the implementation of RA No. 9160, as amended.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the governments failure to file an
appropriate case until only after six years (despite the clear provision of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss the petition because of the filing of the forfeiture
case during the pendency of the case before the Court. The sheer length of time and the
constitutional violation involved, as will be discussed below, strongly dissuade us from
dismissing the petition on the basis of the moot and academic principle. The Court
should not allow the seeds of future violations to sprout by hiding under this principle
even when directly confronted with the glaring issue of the respondents violation of the
petitioners due process right30an issue that the respondent itself chooses to ignore.
We shall discuss the substantive relevance of the subsequent developments and their
dates at length below.
_______________
29 Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 754; 489 SCRA 160, 214
(2006).
30 See SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 505-506; 421 SCRA
656, 664 (2004).
532
532
Ligot vs. Republic
II.Substantive aspect
a.Probable cause exists to support
the issuance of a freeze order
The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as
amended by RA No. 9194, which states:
Section10.Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.The Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that
any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as

defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective
immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended
by the court. [italics supplied]
The Ligots claim that the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of the freeze order
against them, given that they have not yet been convicted of committing any of the
offenses enumerated under RA No. 9160 that would support the AMLCs accusation of
money-laundering activity.
We do not see any merit in this claim. The Ligots argument is founded on a flawed
understanding of probable cause in the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding31 or
freeze order application.32
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the issuance of a
freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of
probable cause by the CA.33 The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze
order differs from the probable cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and
the latter was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
_______________
31 Section 11 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
32 Section 51, paragraph 2 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
33 Major General Carlos Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165800, November 27,
2007.
533
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
533
Ligot vs. Republic
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order
refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent
or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is
about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.34
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CAs
statutorily-guided determinations focus is not on the probable commission of an unlawful
activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined
to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments
sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated
under RA No. 9160, as amended.35 Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the
sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary
instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. To
differentiate this from any criminal case that may thereafter be instituted against the
same re_______________
34 Rule 10.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, RA No. 9160, as
amended by RA No. 9194.
35 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, RA No. 9160, as amended by RA No.
9194.
Rule10.1.When the AMLC may apply for the freezing of any monetary instrument or
property.
(a) After an investigation conducted by the AMLC and upon determination that
probable cause exists that a monetary instrument or property is in any way related to
any unlawful activity as defined under Section 3(i), the AMLC may file an ex-parte
application before the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a freeze order on any
monetary instrument or property subject thereof prior to the institution or in the course of,
the criminal proceedings involving the unlawful activity to which said monetary
instrument or property is any way related.
534
534
Ligot vs. Republic
spondent, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases expressly provides
SEC.28.Precedence of proceedings.Any criminal case relating to an unlawful
activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense or violation under
Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, without prejudice to the filing of a separate petition
for civil forfeiture or the issuance of an asset preservation order or a freeze order. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. [italics supplied;
emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and Section 28
(allowing a separate petition for the issuance of a freeze order to proceed independently)
of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are only consistent with the very purpose of the
freeze order, which specifically is to give the government the necessary time to prepare
its case and to file the appropriate charges without having to worry about the possible
dissipation of the assets that are in any way related to the suspected illegal activity.
Thus, contrary to the Ligots claim, a freeze order is not dependent on a separate
criminal charge, much less does it depend on a conviction.
That a freeze order can be issued upon the AMLCs ex parte application further
emphasizes the laws consideration of how critical time is in these proceedings. As we
previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,36 [t]o make such freeze order anteceded
by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the
dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.
It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would justify the
issuance and the extension of the freeze order has likewise been established in this
case.
From the ex parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, we glean that Lt. Gen.
Ligot himself admitted that his
_______________
36 G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008, 545 SCRA 384.
535
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
535
Ligot vs. Republic
income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsmans
investigation revealed that the bank accounts, investments and properties in the name of
Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than Fifty-Four Million Pesos
(P54,000,000.00). Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligots
income, as well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots have other sources of
income, the CA properly found that probable cause exists that these funds have been
illegally acquired. On the other hand, the AMLCs verified allegations in its ex parte
application, based on the complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family
for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the CAs finding
that probable cause exists that the monetary instruments subject of the freeze order are
related to, or are the product of, an unlawful activity.
b.A freeze order, however, cannot be
issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots now assert that
its effectiveness ceased after January 25, 2006 (or six months after July 25, 2005 when
the original freeze order first expired), pursuant to Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC). This section states:
Section53.Freeze order.
xxxx
(b)Extension.On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days
from issuance of a freeze order, the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a
period not exceeding six months. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
We find merit in this claim.
536
536
Ligot vs. Republic
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief37 issued by the CA to prevent the
dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds of,
or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as
amended.38 The primary objective of a freeze
_______________
37 Ibid.
38 Section 3(i) provides:
(i) Unlawful activity refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof
involving or having relation to the following:
(1)Kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(2) Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article Two of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972;
(3) Section 3, paragraphs B, C, E, G, H and I of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
(4)Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended;
(5)Robbery and extortion under Articles 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301 and 302 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(6)Jueteng and Masiao punished as illegal gambling under Presidential Decree No.
1602;
(7)Piracy on the high seas under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532;
(8)Qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(9)Swindling under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(10)Smuggling under Republic Act Nos. 455 and 1937;
(11)Violations under Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000;
(12) Hijacking and other violations under Republic Act No. 6235; destructive arson and
murder, as defined under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, including those
perpetrated by terrorists against non-combatant persons and similar targets;
(13)Fraudulent practices and other violations under Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise
known as the Securities Regulation Code of 2000;
537
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
537
Ligot vs. Republic
order is to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way
related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from
utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order.39 The relief is pre-emptive in
character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the
States effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or
prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point
of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the maximum
period of time that the freeze order can be extended by the CA. The final sentence of
Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 provides, [t]he freeze order shall
be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. In contrast, Section 55
of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension for a period not
exceeding six months for good cause shown.
We observe on this point that nothing in the law grants the owner of the frozen property
any substantive right to demand that the freeze order be lifted, except by implication, i.e.,
if he can show that no probable cause exists or if the 20-day period has already lapsed
without any extension being requested from and granted by the CA. Notably, the Senate
deliberations on RA No. 9160 even suggest the intent on the part of our legislators to
make the freeze order effective until the termination of the case, when necessary.40
_______________
(14)Felonies or offenses of a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws
of other countries.
39 Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 33.
40 See Transcripts of Session Proceedings, 12th Congress, September 27, 2001, pp.
18-19.
Senator Osmea (S).Why would it be necessary to remove Provisional Remedies
Pending Criminal Proceedings? We have a 20-day freeze. One may go to court for an ex
parte motion to investigate
538
538
Ligot vs. Republic
The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Courts own power under
the Constitution to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights xxx and procedure in all courts.41 Pursuant to this power, the Court
issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six
monthsto otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA,
which may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of
timecarries serious implications on an individuals substantive right to due process.42
This right demands that no person be denied his right to property or be subjected to any
governmental action that
_______________
the account, inquire into the account. What happens after that if we remove this
provision, Mr. President?
Senator Cayetano.Mr. President, the moment the court orders the freezing of the
account that will remain until the case is terminated. That is the reason. And when an
order to freeze exists, the defendant cannot move any property already frozen. The
availment of provisional remedy is to ensure that the property being sought will not be
removed. But since it is already frozen, there is no way by which the property can be
removed or concealed. That is the reason why I proposed the deletion of this. (Emphasis
ours.)
41 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5(5).
42 This implication was made express by Section 53 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. The
failure of the petitioners to move for the modification or the lifting of the freeze order
within the twenty-day period, as provided in Section 53(a), cannot prejudice them. To
begin with, A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC itself only took effect on November 15, 2005 while the
freeze order was issued a few months earlier, or on July 5, 2005; neither can we
reasonably expect the petitioners to comply with the provisions of R.A. No. 10167
(granting the property owner the remedy of filing a motion to lift the freeze order within
the original 20-day period) since this law only took effect sometime in 2012. In short,
even from this simple temporal point of view, coupled with their lone procedural error in
resorting to certiorari, and the due process consideration involved, the Court is justified
in proceeding with the petitions merits.
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VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
539
Ligot vs. Republic
amounts to a denial.43 The right to due process, under these terms, requires a limitation
or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the governmental action.44
In this case, the law has left to the CA the authority to resolve the issue of extending the
freeze order it issued. Without doubt, the CA followed the law to the letter, but it did so by
avoiding the fundamental laws command under its Section 1, Article III. This command,
the Courtunder its constitutional rule-making powersought to implement through
Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which the CA erroneously assumed
does not apply.
The Ligots case perfectly illustrates the inequity that would result from giving the CA the
power to extend freeze orders without limitations. As narrated above, the CA, via its
September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the freeze order over the Ligots various bank
accounts and personal properties until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations being conducted are terminated.45 By its very terms, the CA resolution
effectively bars the Ligots from using any of the property covered by the freeze order
until after an eventual civil forfeiture proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they
shall have been adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of committing.
These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order
which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and criminal trial courts can very
well handle the disposition of properties related to a forfeiture case or to a crime charged
and need not rely on the interim relief that the appellate court issued as a guarantee
against loss of property while the government is preparing its full case. The term of the
CAs
_______________
43 Hon. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Asso. of the Phil., 347 Phil. 333, 340, 342; 283
SCRA 31, 40 (1997).
44 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311; 455 SCRA 308, 330-331 (2005).
45 Rollo, p. 154.
540
540
Ligot vs. Republic
extension, too, borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots, in violation of their
constitutionally protected right to be presumed innocent, because the unreasonable
denial of their property comes before final conviction.
In more concrete terms, the freeze order over the Ligots properties has been in effect
since 2005, while the civil forfeiture caseper the Republics manifestationwas filed
only in 2011 and the forfeiture case under RA No. 1379per the petitioners
manifestationwas filed only in 2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to
access the properties subject of the freeze order for six years or so simply on the basis
of the existence of probable cause to issue a freeze order, which was intended mainly as
an interim preemptive remedy.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary effect;
it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the
provisional remedywhich means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the
main actionof asking for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court
where the petition is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a
preservatory and preemptive remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the laws silence on the freeze orders period of
effectivity46 compelled this Court to issue the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. Specifically,
the Court fixed the maximum allowable extension on the freeze orders effectivity at six
months. In doing so, the Court sought to balance the States interest in going after
suspected money launderers with an individuals constitutionally-protected right not to be
_______________
46 Vitug, Pardo & Herrera, A Summary of Notes and Views on the Rule of Procedure in
Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or
Money Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended, 2006, p. 90.
541
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
541
Ligot vs. Republic
deprived of his property without due process of law, as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
To our mind, the six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the government to
act against the suspected money launderer and to file the appropriate forfeiture case
against him, and is a reasonable period as well that recognizes the property owners
right to due process. In this case, the period of inaction of six years, under the
circumstances, already far exceeded what is reasonable.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a due process
concern, we do not say that the six-month period is an inflexible rule that would result in
the automatic lifting of the freeze order upon its expiration in all instances. An inflexible
rule may lend itself to abuseto the prejudice of the States legitimate interestswhere
the property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the freeze order during
the six-month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of a money laundering or civil
forfeiture case within this period. With the limited resources that our government
prosecutors and investigators have at their disposal, the end-result of an inflexible rule is
not difficult to see.
We observe, too, that the factual complexities and intricacies of the case and other
matters that may be beyond the governments prosecutory agencies control may
contribute to their inability to file the corresponding civil forfeiture case before the lapse
of six months. Given these considerations, it is only proper to strike a balance between
the individuals right to due process and the governments interest in curbing criminality,
particularly money laundering and the predicate crimes underlying it.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period
not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic
should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property owner with the
proper courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed
the neces542
542
Ligot vs. Republic
sary information.47 Otherwise, the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy
his property without any legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely
necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file
the necessary motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the period of
extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to the resolution by the
CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind of motion for extension with reasonable
dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it
took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was
filed in court, despite the clear tenor of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the
extension of a freeze order for only a period of six months. All the Republic could proffer
is its temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases; in
effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these
circumstances, we cannot but conclude that the continued extension of the freeze order
beyond the six-month period violated the Ligots right to due process; thus, the CA
decision be reversed.
_______________
47 Note that for instance, if the unlawful activity involved is plunder, Section 2 of RA No.
7080 requires that upon conviction, the court shall declare any and all ill gotten wealth
and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the state;
likewise if the unlawful activity involved is violation of RA 3019, the law orders the
confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to the convicted accused salary and
other lawful income. In these cases, the state may avail of the provisional remedy under
Rule 127 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to secure the preservation of these
unexplained wealth and income should no petition for civil forfeiture or freeze order be
filed.
543
VOL. 692, MARCH 6, 2013
543
Ligot vs. Republic
We clarify that our conclusion applies only to the CA ruling and does not affect the
proceedings and whatever order or resolution the RTC may have issued in the presently
pending civil cases for forfeiture. We make this clarification to ensure that we can now
fully conclude and terminate this CA aspect of the case.
As our last point, we commend the fervor of the CA in assisting the States efforts to
prosecute corrupt public officials. We remind the appellate court though that the
governments anti-corruption drive cannot be done at the expense of cherished
fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. So long as we continue to be guided by
the Constitution and the rule of the law, the Court cannot allow the justification of
governmental action on the basis of the noblest objectives alone. As so oft-repeated, the
end does not justify the means. Of primordial importance is that the means employed
must be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will certainly not excuse
constitutional shortcuts.48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and LIFT the freeze order
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 90238. This lifting is without prejudice
to, and shall not affect, the preservation orders that the lower courts have ordered on the
same properties in the cases pending before them. Pursuant to Section 56 of A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC, the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand the case and to transmit
the records to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, where the civil forfeiture
proceeding is for consolidation therewith as may be appropriate.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
_______________
48 256 Phil. 777, 809; 175 SCRA 343, 375 (1989).
544
544
Ligot vs. Republic
Note.Like the remedies of freeze order and provisional takeover with which the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has been equipped,
sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to
his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any other
person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by
law. (Republic vs. Estate of Hans Menzi, 685 SCRA 291 [2012]) [Ligot vs. Republic, 692
SCRA 509(2013)]

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[No. 17958.

February 27, 1922]

Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:

G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001.*

VOL. 364, AUGUST 30, 2001

has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

caused the death of his companions.

People vs. Siyoh

To whom did he aim that revolver?

INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE

MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council

prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of

16 Vide Genesis Transport Service, Inc. v. Unyon ng Malayang Manggagawa ng

32 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, G.R. No. 140338, August 7,

Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48

59 Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,

68 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 354.

There is no merit in the claim that RA

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

three flew to Bacolod City. Appellant stayed at the house of Takeshi.

IN CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSE50

Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in

is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.12 Given the circumstances

Subaru Forester P 1,300,000.00

Erlinda Y. Ligot US Dollar Account 4466000391

Parmil Farms, Inc. Peso Account

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ligot vs. Republic

A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable

any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as

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