RULE 133 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined .

In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1a) Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt . In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an ac uittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. !roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, e"cluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. #oral certainly only is re uired, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unpre$udiced mind. (%a) Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. &n e"tra$udicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (') Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. (ircumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if) (a) There is more than one circumstances* (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven* and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (+) Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or uasi,$udicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade uate to $ustify a conclusion. (n) Section 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably e"pected to be additionally persuasive. -ut this power should be e"ercised with caution. (.) Section 7. Evidence on motion. /hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (0) 1. G.R. No. 113 7! "#$i% 2 & 2 1 ENERG' REGUL"()R' *)"R+& petitioner, vs. ,)UR( )- "..E"LS and .E(R)LEU/ +0S(R0*U()RS "N+ SER10,ES ,)R.)R"(0)N& respondents. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, G.R. No. 114!23 "#$i% 2 & 2 1 .0L0.0N"S S2ELL .E(R)LEU/ ,)R.)R"(0)N& petitioner, vs. ,)UR( )- "..E"LS and .E(R)LEU/ +0S(R0*U()RS "N+ SER10,ES ,)R.)R"(0)N& respondents. 'N"RES3S"N(0"G)& J.: -",(S4 1hell filed with the uondam -ureau of 2nergy 3tili4ation (-23) an application for authority to relocate its 1hell 1ervice 1tation at Tambo, !ara5a ue, #etro #anila, to Imelda #arcos &venue of the same municipality. !rivate respondent opposed the application on the grounds that) 1.6 there are ade uate service stations attending to the motorists' re uirements in the trading area covered by the application* %.6 ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the proposed new service station* and '.6 there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area. !etrophil and (alte", also opposed the application on the ground that 1hell failed to comply with the $urisdictional re uirements. -23 denied the application. 1hell appealed to 7ffice of 2nergy &ffairs (72&). 8enied. 29- (petitioner) was created (27 10%) transferring to it the regulatory and ad$udicatory functions of the -23. #otion for reconsideration by 1hell. &pplication was remanded to 29-. (Imelda #arcos &venue, now -enigno & uino :r. &ve.) 29- approved. !81( motion for reconsideration. 8enied. &ppealed to the (&. (& reversed hence, 1(. /hile the case was on going in the (&, (alte" filed a similar application with 29- likewise opposed by !81(. 29approved (alte" application. !81( appealed to (&. (& dismissed !81('s appeal. (contradicting decisions) 0SSUE4 /hether the findings of facts of those of the 29- were based on substantial evidence. 2EL+4

'ES. The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the 29-, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. ; & long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. <owever, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre,e"isting law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.1. Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the $udicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of $urisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the 29- conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on the matter. In reversing the 29-, the (ourt of &ppeals first avers in sum that there is no substantial evidence to support 29-'s finding of public necessity to warrant approval of 1hell's application. The (ourt disagrees. 7n the contrary, the record discloses that the 29- 8ecision approving 1hell's application in 29- (ase =o. ;>,+0 was based on hard economic data on developmental pro$ects, residential subdivision listings, population count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc.,%+ rather than empirical evidence to support its conclusions. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order. %0 & litany of cases has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. %; It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. %> 1uffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the conte"t of such an evidentiary matri", is strewn with well,nigh overwhelming proof of the necessity to build such a gasoline retail outlet in the vicinity sub$ect of the application. %. G.R. No. 54!66 Nove67e$ 21& 1!!1 RE.U*L0, )- (2E .20L0..0NES& petitioner, vs. (2E ,)UR( )- "..E"LS and "N()N0N" GU0+)& /"UR) ,"S("8E+"& /"RG"R0(" GU0+)& GR",0"N) L. "/"N(E& -EL09" GU0+)& "N()N0) ":U0N)& ,R0S"N(" GU0+)& *UEN"1EN(UR" *. ENR0:UE9& ,"N+0+" GU0+)& ;",)* "SS"+& ES.ER"N9" GU0+)& "NGEL *EN0()& "L-RE+) GU0+)& ,L"R" /0N+" "NSEL/)& EU-R)N0" GU0+)& ;)SE L)REN)& .R0S,0LL" GU0+) 1+". +E ESGUERR"& *ENE+0,() L).E9& .R)-E(09" GU0+)& "0+" +EL ,"R/EN& *UENSU,ES) GU0+)& 2ER/0N0" 10LL"RE"L& ,"RL)S GU0+)& "/"N+" ,. R01ER"& ;)SE ". R);"S and E/0L0"N /. R);"S& the 0N(ER.)R( RES)UR,ES ,)R.)R"(0)N and the REG0S(ER )- +EE+S )- R09"L </o$ong *$anch=& respondents. !hodora "# $orales for %nterport !esources Corp# &ilbert $# 'abella for Executrix Claraminda (nselmo &uido# )uiason, $a*alintal, "arot, +orres, %barra , Sison for "# &uido, (# del Carmen, E# &uido and (# !ui-# /E+0"L+E"& J.:p -",(S4 The 9epublic of the !hilippines filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of 8ecreto =o. .1?+, the owner's duplicate copy of T(T =o. %''0 and all titles derived from said decree* and the declaration of the parcel of land covered by the decree as belonging to the state, e"cept so much thereof as had been validly disposed of to third persons. It alleged 8ecree =o. .1?+ issued on 1eptember 1@, 1>11 and the alleged owner's copy of Transfer (ertificate of Title =o. %''00 issued on #ay 1%, 1>'', both in the name of Arancisco and <ermogenes Buido, and which supposed owner's duplicate was made the basis of the administrative reconstitution of Transfer (ertificate of Title =o. (%''00) 9T,#,@@@% on #arch %>, 1>0., or about ?' years later, are false, spurious and fabricated and were never issued by virtue of $udicial proceedings for registration of land, either under &ct =o. ?>., as amended, otherwise known as the Cand 9egistration &ct, or any other law. The defendants consistently claimed (from the trial court up to this (ourt) that the parcel of land covered by the uestioned document is a portion of the vast <acienda de &ngono owned by their predecessor,in,interest, 8on -uenaventura Buido y 1ta. &na* that 8on -uenaventura Buido left a portion of the hacienda (porcion del plano 11,.%0) to his heirs, Arancisco and <ermogenes Buido* that the sub$ect matter of the petition is only a portion of plano 11,.%0, consisting of an area of ',1;1.0? hectares and covered by 8ecreto =o. .1?+, issued on 1eptember 1, 1>11 in the name of the heirs of -uenaventura Buido y 1ta. &na (Arancisco and <ermogenes Buido)* that on :une 1%, 1>1%, an 7riginal

(ertificate of Title (7(T =o. .'') was issued on the basis of 8ecreto =o. .1?+* that the original title was subse uently cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer (ertificate of Title =o. %''00 was issued on #ay 1%, 1>''* that the heirs of Arancisco and <ermogenes Buido ad$udicated among themselves the estate left by their predecessors and transferred one,half portion thereof to :ose 9o$as sometime in 1>?%, as contained in an 2"tra,$udicial 1ettlement of 2state with Duitclaim dated 8ecember 10, 1>0'. The court rendered $udgment dismissing the complaint and declaring 8ecree =o. .1?+ and T(T =o. %''00, genuine and authentic. The decision of the trial court was appealed by the 1olicitor Beneral to the (ourt of &ppeal which affirmed the trial court's decision. 1olicitor Beneral filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the (ourt of &ppeals. In the same motion, he prayed for an alternative $udgment declaring the decree and its derivative titles authentic e"cept with respect to such portions of the property which were either) 1) possessed and owned by bona fideoccupants who had already ac uired indefeasible titles thereto* %) possessed and owned by bona fide occupants and their families with lengths of possession which amounted to ownership. 82=I28. !rivate respondents submitted a memorandum that they had unanimously agreed to accept the alternative prayer. In this petition, petitioner alleged that respondent appellate court committed serious errors and committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision that petitioner 9! Efailed to satisfy the re uirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory.E 0SSUE4 /hether or not the 9! satisfied the re uirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory. 2EL+4 R. fai%ed to >ati>fy the $e?ui$e6ent> of #$e#onde$ant #$oof. The general rule in civil cases is that a party having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon. -y preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The term Epreponderance of evidenceE means the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the terms Egreater weight of evidenceE or Egreater weight of the credible evidence.E !reponderance of the evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. !reponderance of the evidence means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

!( (rime Caboratory, is a -1-& graduate who had e"amined not less than 1@,@@@ documents. &tty. !agui, on the other hand, is the former (hief of the Duestioned 8ocument 1ection of the =-I, an CC- and -. 1. (riminology graduate, and had e"amined about +@,@@@ uestioned documents. The court a .uo observed, and /e note this fact, that &tty. !agui testified in a straight,forward manner while #r. (ru4 wavered in answering some pertinent uestions. /e also note from the transcript of stenographic notes that !agui's answers to some technical uestions reveal his authority as a document and handwriting witness, which cannot be said of Arancisco (ru4. The petitioner also alleged that 8ecree =o. .1?+, solitary in its hidden isolation and detached from the expedienteof the land registration case, surfaced .? years later under mysterious and bi4arre circumstances. The circumstances surrounding the appearance of 8ecree .1?+ was far from mysterious. 9ac uel #arfori, a witness for the petitioner, who was then (hief of the 7rdinary 8ecree 1ection of the 8ivision of 7riginal 9egistration testified that C9( (ommissioner &ntonio =oble$as issued (ircular =o. ?, instructing all 9egisters of 8eeds to forward all copies of decrees in their possession for custody to the C9( to complete the records of the (ommission. &s appearing in the record book of inventory in the C9(, among the decrees forwarded to their office is 8ecree .1?+ (T1=, 7ctober %., 1>;%, pp. +?,++). 1he likewise categorically stated that in the course of investigation of this case, a copy of 8ecree .1?+ was found in the vault section of the (ommission. &lfredo Buido, 1r., during his lifetime, also testified that the owner's duplicate copy of T(T =o. %''00 was given to him by :oa uin Buido who is the son of :usto Buido, the latter appearing to be a brother of 8on -uenaventura Buido. &((798I=BCF, the decision of the (ourt of &ppeals in (&,B.9. =o. 1%>'' is &AAI9#28 sub$ect to the herein declared superior rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles within the area covered by the uestioned decree and bona fide occupants therein with length of possession which had ripened to ownership, the latter to be determined in an appropriate proceeding. '. @G.R. No. 125356. Nove67e$ 21& 2 1A SU.RE/E (R"NSL0NER 0N,. v>. 2)N. ,)UR( )- "..E"LS

-",(S4 !etitioners 1upreme Transliner Inc. and Aelipe 1ia are the registered owners of a bus driven by co,petitioner =ovencio Alores. 7n 1eptember %?, 1>>@, the bus collided with a passenger $eepney carrying private respondents Bloria and Cotis -ra4al. &t the time of the incident, the $eepney was owned and registered in the name of #arcelino Gillones and driven by 9eynaldo 8ecena. &s a result of the collision, private respondents suffered in$uries. They instituted a civil case for damages against petitioners based on uasi,delict and against Gillones and 8ecena for breach of contract. !etitioners, in turn, filed a third, The matter of determining which party had the preponderant evidence is within the province of the trial court before whom party complaint against (ountry -ankers Insurance (ompany, insurer of the 1upreme Transliner bus. the evidence of both parties are presented. The decision of who to believe and who not to believe goes to the credibility of 8uring the trial, Bloria -ra4al testified that on 1eptember %?, 1>>@, she and her daughter Cotis were on board the a witness which, likewise, is within the province of the trial court. passenger $eepney when the 1upreme Transliner bus hit it, causing them in$uries that re uired medical treatment. 8ecena and Gillones testified on their own behalf and presented Cu4viminda #alabanan and 1gt. =icolas #. &ll the facts and circumstances of the case must properly be considered in determining the weight of evidence. 9o"as as witnesses. 8ecena recounted that on 1eptember %?, 1>>@, at about %)@@ !.#., he was driving a passenger In weighing the evidence of witnesses, the trial court takes into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances $eepney bound for (andelaria, Due4on. 7n board, the $eepney was about fifteen passengers, including private of the case on trial including the means of knowledge of the witnesses, their true intentions, their seeming honesty or lack respondents Bloria and Cotis -ra4al. 3pon reaching 1ampaloc, 1ariaya, Due4on, a 1upreme Transliner bus coming from of it, their respective opportunities for seeing and knowing the things about which they testify, their conduct upon the the opposite direction, suddenly appeared on a curved portion of the road and overtook another $eepney, which it was witness stand, their manner of testifying, etc. then following. Thereafter, the bus collided with 8ecenaHs $eepney. !etitioners presented =ovencio Alores and #oises &lvare4, the #anager of 1upreme Transliner. -oth testified !etitioner's primary witness was Arancisco (ru4, :r., a document e"aminer of the !( (rime Caboratory. The testimony of that the passenger $eepney was running very fast when the accident occurred. 7n the third,party complaint, petitioners Arancisco (ru4 was corroborated by the report dated 8ecember 1+, 1>;@ of 1egundo &. Tabayoyong, =-I (hief showed that they already submitted the re uired documents for insurance claim and that (ountry -ankers Insurance 8ocument 2"aminer and (hief, Duestioned 8ocuments 1tation. <owever, Tabayoyong was not presented in court. (ompany promised to settle the claim, but did not. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs Ihave6 established by preponderance of evidence the allegations of the The private respondents, on the other hand, presented &tty. 8esiderio !agui, former (hief, Duestioned 8ocuments complaint and ordered the defendants Aelipe 1ia, as registered owner of the 1upreme -us, and =ovencio Alores primarily 1ection of the =-I. In 1>0+, even before the complaint for declaration of nullity of 8ecreta .1?+ and T(T. =o. %''00 was liable for the damages of the plaintiffs. filed in court which meant that he was impartial* he was re uested by the Cand 9egistration (ommission to e"amine and !etitioners appealed to the (ourt of &ppeals. The (ourt of &ppeals affirmed the appealed $udgment. The (ourt of verify the authenticity of 8ecree =o. .1?+. &ppeals found that there was competent and preponderant evidence which showed that driver =ovencio AloresH negligence was the pro"imate cause of the mishap and that Aelipe 1ia failed to perform the re uired degree of care in the /e agree with the court a .uo and respondent appellate court in giving more weight to the testimony of &tty. 8esiderio selection and supervision of the bus driver. It also found that the actual damages representing the medical e"penses !agui than to that of #r. Arancisco &. (ru4. Their respective educational and work background speak of the differing incurred by private respondents were properly supported by receipts. levels of their ualifications and competence to testify as e"pert witnesses. Arancisco (ru4, a 8ocument 2"aminer of the !etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. <ence, this petition.

0SSUE4 2EL+4 /hether the evidence presented by 8ecena and Gillones may be considered in determining preponderance of /e find no merit in petitionersH motion for reconsideration. The matters raised in the motion have already been evidence against herein petitioners substantially discussed in the decision. It must be emphasi4ed that in civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by preponderance of evidence is 2EL+4 on the plaintiff who is asserting the affirmative of an issue. <e has the burden of presenting evidence re uired to obtain a -urden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of favorable $udgment, and he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. evidence re uired by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, I'6 Inasmuch as petitioners pray for the K8eclaration of =ullity and =on,2"istence of 8eedMTitle, (ancellation of (ertificates who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable $udgment. Aor the defendant, an of Title and 9ecovery of !ropertyL against the respondent, they had the burden to establish their claims of ownership of affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffHs cause of action, but one which, if the sub$ect property which they failed to do in this case. established, will be a good defense J i.e. an KavoidanceL of the claim. 1ection 1; of &ct =o. 11%@ or the Ariar Cands &ct une uivocally provides) K=o lease or sale made by the (hief of In this case, both private respondents as well as the $eepney driver 9eynaldo 8ecena and its owner #arcelino the -ureau of !ublic Cands (now the 8irector of Cands) under the provisions of this &ct shall be valid until approved by Gillones claim that the bus driver, =ovencio Alores, was liable for negligently operating the bus. Aor private respondents, the 1ecretary of the Interior (now, the 1ecretary of =atural 9esources). Thus, petitionersH claim of ownership must fail in the claim constitutes their cause of action against petitioners which said private respondents must prove by the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the 1ecretary of Interior. &pproval of the 1ecretary of the preponderance of evidence. &t the same time, the same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the part of 8ecena Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is e"plicit in its mandate. This is the settled and Gillones who are impleaded as co,defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both private respondents as well as the said rule as enunciated in Solid State $ulti0Products Corporation vs# Court of (ppeals and reiterated in /iao vs# Court of co,defendants had the burden of proving petitionersH negligence by the uantum of proof re uired to establish the latterHs (ppeals# !etitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would $ustify a deviation from this rule. liability, i.e. by preponderance of evidence. (ontrary to petitionersH protestations, we s uarely resolved the core issues of fraud and want of $urisdiction The evidence presented by the $eepney owner and its driver, Gillones and 8ecena, forms part of the totality of the afflicting the reconstitution of respondentHs title. /hile we held that the issue of the validity of respondentHs title is factual evidence concerning the negligence committed by petitioners as defendants in uasi,delict case. !reponderance of which cannot be reviewed on appeal, nevertheless, we have answered each ground raised by petitioner in assailing evidence is determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless respondentHs title. =eedless to stress, mere allegations of fraud are not enough. Araud is never presumed but must be of who actually presented it. !etitionersH liability were proved by the evidence presented by 8ecena and Gillones at the proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being ade uate. (s we have held trial, taken together with the evidence presented by the victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents Bloria in Saguid vs# Court of (ppeals, contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the and Cotis -ra4al. strength of the party1s own evidence and not upon the wea*ness of the opponent1s defense# !etitioners failed to discharge that burden. #oreover, it cannot be over,accentuated that Tomas &lonso, petitionersH predecessor,in,interest, never asserted ?. any claim of ownership over the disputed property during his lifetime. /hen he was alive, Tomas &lonso did not e"ert any @G.R. No. 13 576. +ece67e$ 5& 2 3A effort to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or seek recovery thereof from the respondent -R"N,0S,) "L)NS) <+ecea>ed=& >u7>tituted 7y /ER,E+ES 1. "L)NS)& ()/"S 1. "L)NS) and "SUN,0)N which was in possession since 1>'1. 1ignificantly, Tomas &lonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on Cot ;1@, 1. "L)NS) vs. ,E*U ,)UN(R' ,LU*& 0N,. which is ad$acent to the disputed property, sometime in 1>?. and yet petitioners failed to show that Tomas &lonso e"erted the same effort to reconstitute his alleged title to the sub$ect property. &s successors,in,interest, petitioners -",(S4 merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas &lonso. They cannot claim a right greater than that of their predecessor. =otably, The 1upreme court rendered a decision declaring that) Tomas &lonso and his son Arancisco &lonso were not ordinary or unschooled men. They were learned men of the law. ... neither Tomas =. &lonso nor his son Arancisco #. &lonso or the latterHs heirs are the lawful owners of Cot =o. 0%0 in They belonged to the landed gentry and, thus, had ade uate financial resources at their disposal. Tomas &lonso was dispute. =either has the respondent (ebu (ountry (lub, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. even a member of (ongress. The length of time that has elapsed, spanning si" decades, before the institution of the suit The reconstitution of a title is simply the re,issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. to recover the property, begs for a valid e"planation, of which none was convincingly offered. !etitionersH silent It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. & reconstituted title, like ac uiescence for several decades and belated invocation of an alleged right speak strongly of the staleness of their the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. claim. Their claims can hardly evoke $udicial compassion. 2igilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt# KIf eternal !etitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a different aspect of the vigilance is the price of safety, one cannot sleep on oneHs right for more than a tenth of a century and e"pect it to be decision. preserved in its pristine purityL. !etitioners, in their #otion for 9econsideration dated #arch ., %@@%, vigorously argue that) (a) the ma$ority /e likewise find no merit in respondentHs motion for reconsideration insofar as the decision declared that Cot 0%0, decision unduly deprives petitioners of their property without due process of law and Kin a manner shocking to good 8,% of the -anilad Ariar Cands 2state legally belongs to the Bovernment of the 9epublic of the !hilippines. conscienceL* (b) in invalidating the sale of Cot 0%0 to the late Tomas &lonso, the ponencia unfairly deviated from established doctrine to favor a mere obiter dictum as misapplied in /iao vs# Court of (ppeals, using as basis factual +. findings either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate courtHs findings of fact* (c) the core issues of @".,. No. 64 3. "ugu>t 31& 2 4A fraud and want of $urisdiction afflicting the reconstitution of respondent (ebu (ountry (lubHs title were not s uarely and RU+E,)N /"N"GE/EN( ,)R.)R"(0)N and "(('. RU+EGEL0) +. (",)R+" v>. "(('. /"NUEL N. frontally met, to the pre$udice and damage of the petitioners* and (d) the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look ,"/",2) as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and $uridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and laches. -",(S) !etitioners filed with the Integrated -ar of the !hilippines (I-!) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension 7n the other hand, respondent (ebu (ountry (lub, Inc., in its #otion for 9econsideration dated #arch +, %@@%, from the practice of law against &tty. (amacho for knowingly committing forum,shopping, in violation of 1( &dministrative staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that KCot 0%0,8,% of the -anilad Ariar Cands 2state legally belongs to (ircular =o. @?,>? in relation to the provisions of 1ection +, 9ule 0, 1>>0 9ules of (ivil !rocedure and the (anons of the the Bovernment of the 9epublic of the !hilippinesL. 9espondent argues that the 7ffice of the 1olicitor Beneral (71B), as (ode of !rofessional 9esponsibility. representative of the Bovernment, has not intervened nor has it been impleaded in the 9egional Trial (ourt (9T() nor during the appeal in the (ourt of &ppeals, and, the Torrens (ertificate of Title, T(T =o. 9T,1'1@ (T,11'+1) of 1isenando 1ingson, represented by herein respondent &tty. (amacho, filed with the 9T( of D( a complaint respondent, covering Cot 0%0, -anilad Ariar Cands 2state, cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar. against herein complainant 9udecon #anagement (orporation for damages and reconveyance. The case was originally $aff%ed to *$anch 7! but was eventually $e3$aff%ed to *$anch 55 of the same court. 1ingson, again represented by &tty. 0SSUE4 (amacho, fi%ed Bith *$anch 75, 9T(, Due4on (ity a K#otion for Intervention (/ith &ttached &nswer in Intervention /ith /hether there is merit in petitionersH motion for reconsideration &ffirmative 8efenses and (ompulsory (ounterclaim)L in a case entitled, K9udecon #anagement (orporation vs. 9amon

#. Gelu4L a case for unlawful detainer on appeal before said court. 9udecon filed a motion before -ranch 0; seeking to cite 1ingson and his counsel, &tty. (amacho, for contempt for having allegedly violated the rule against forum shopping. 9udecon contends that the answer,in,intervention filed before -ranch 0; involves the same issues already raised in the complaint filed with -ranch 0>. -ranch 0;, issued an order against the herein petitioners, hereby reprimanding both of them without pre$udice to any administrative and appropriate action. 1ingson and (amacho did not appeal the order.

/hile waiting for his turn, Bon4ales was asked by Cloyd Ao$as, the check,in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Ao$as wrote something on the tickets which Bon4ales later read as Klate check,in 0)@+L. /hen Bon4alesH turn came, Ao$as gave him the tickets of private respondents :udy, :ane and Bian and told him to proceed to the cashier to make arrangements.

1alvador then went to &tty. &mor and told him about the situation. &tty. &mor pleaded with Ao$as, pointing out that it is only .)?+ &#, but the latter did not even look at him or utter any word. &tty. &mor then tried to plead with 8elfin 7n the basis of the above,cited order, 9udecon and Tacorda filed the instant complaint for disbarment or (anoni4ado and Beorge (arran4a, employees of petitioner, but still to no avail. !rivate respondents were not able to suspension against &tty. (amacho. (omplainants submit that aside from disregarding the rule against forum shopping, board said flight. The plane left at0)'@ &#, twenty minutes behind the original schedule. !rivate respondents went to the respondent is also guilty of violating 9ules 1.@1 and 1.@%, (anon 1 and 9ule 1@.@1, (anon 1@ of the (ode of !rofessional bus terminals hoping to catch a ride for #anila. Ainding none, they went back to the airport and tried to catch an 9esponsibility. afternoon flight. 3nfortunately, the %)'@ p.m.flight, !9 %0;, was cancelled due to Kaircraft situationL. 9espondent filed his &nswer to the instant complaint. <e denies the allegations of complainant and contends that he is not guilty of forum shopping. <e claims that the &nswer in Intervention filed with -ranch 0; and the (omplaint filed with -ranch 0> do not involve the same issues and reliefs prayed for and that he did not resort to the filing of both actions in order to increase the chances of his client obtaining a favorable decision. The I-! -oard of Bovernors recommended that the penalty of warning be meted out against the respondent for violating the prohibition against forum shopping based on its failure to appeal to the order of the court. 0SSUE4 /hat uantum of evidence is needed in a case for disbarment or suspension of a lawyerN 2EL+4 In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the uantum of proof re uired is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. #oreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof. In the present case, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violation of the standards of honesty as provided for by the (ode of !rofessional 9esponsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him. &fter a perusal of the records before us, we agree with respondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing the pendency of (ivil (ase =o. D,>;,'+??? in -ranch 0> when they filed the #otion for Intervention and &nswer in Intervention in (ivil (ase =o. D,>;,'+'%. in -ranch 0;. Indeed, the first paragraph of the said &nswer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called the trial courtHs attention with respect to the pendency of (ivil (ase =o. D,>;,'+???. <erein complainant, which is the plaintiff in (ivil (ase =o. D,>;,'+'%., does not dispute respondentHs allegation that the latter and his client attached to their &nswer in Intervention a copy of their complaint in (ivil (ase =o. D,>;,'+???. /<292A792, 9esolution of the Integrated -ar of the !hilippines is 12T &1I82 and the instant administrative case filed against &tty. #anuel =. (amacho is 8I1#I1128 for lack of merit. .. @G.R. No. 127473. +ece67e$ 5& 2 3A .20L0..0NE "0RL0NES& 0N,. v>. ,)UR( )- "..E"LS& ;U+' "/)R& ;"NE G"/0L& 6ino$> G0"N ,"RL) "/)R $e#$e>ented 7y "(('. )WEN "/)R& and ,"RL) *EN0(E9 $e#$e>ented 7y ;)SE.20NE *EN0(E9 !rivate respondents were told to wait for the +)'@ p.m. flight, !9 1;@. They checked,in their bags and were told to hand in their tickets. Cater, a !&C employee at the check,in counter called out the name of private respondent minor (arlo -enite4. !laintiff :udy approached the counter and was told by the !&C personnel that they cannot be accommodated. Ao$as who was also at the counter then removed the boarding passes inserted in private respondentsH tickets as well as the tags from their luggages. #anuel -alta4ar, a former &cting #anager of petitioner in Cegaspi (ity in #ay 1>;;, testified that based on his investigation, the private respondents, although confirmed passengers, were not able to board !9 10; in the morning of #ay ;, 1>;; because there were Kgo,showL or KwaitlistedL and non,revenue passengers who were accommodated in said flight. <e also noted that there was overbooking for !9 10;. 7n the other hand, petitioner contends that private respondents are not entitled to their claim for damages because they were late in checking,in for !9 10;* and that they were only chance or waitlisted passengers for !9 1;@ and were not accommodated because all confirmed passengers of the flight had checked,in. 7n cross,e"amination, Ao$as testified that he did not know how many waitlisted or non,revenue passengers were accommodated or issued boarding passes in the 0)@@ a. m. and in the afternoon flight of #ay ;, 1>;;. &fter trial, the 9T( rendered $udgment upholding the evidence presented by private respondents. &ggrieved, petitioner appealed to the (& which affirmed the $udgment of the trial court in toto and denied petitionerHs motion for reconsideration. <ence, the present petition of !&C. !etitioner argues, among others, that while ordinarily, the findings of the (& are accepted as conclusive by this (ourt, there are instances when the (ourt may make its own findings such as when the appellate court based its findings on speculation, surmises or con$ectures. The appellate court erroneously gave too much reliance on the testimony of -alta4ar who is a disgruntled former employee and relative of private respondent &mor. <e was not present at the time of the incident. -alta4ar merely interpreted the flight manifest and made a lot of speculations which is undeserving of attention and merit. &s to !9 1;@, private respondents were merely waitlisted in said flight hence it was known to them that their accommodation in said flight was dependent upon the failure of any confirmed passenger to check,in within the regulation check,in time. 3nfortunately for them, all the confirmed passengers on !9 1;@ checked,in on time.

In their (omment, private respondents stress that the fact they were not late in checking,in for !9 10; has been substantially established in the hearing before the trial court and affirmed by the (&. They maintain that, contrary to the -",(S4 !rivate respondents :udy &mor, :ane Bamil, minor Bian (arlo &mor, represented by his father, &tty. 7wen assertion of petitioner, they have established their case not only by a preponderance of evidence but by proof that is more &mor, and, minor (arlo -enite4, represented by his mother, :osephine -enite4, filed with the 9T( of 1orsogon, than what is re uired by law $ustifying the factual findings of the trial court and the (&. !rivate respondents point out that 1orsogon, a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latterHs failure to honor their confirmed tickets. since the issues raised by this petition are factual and do not fall under e"ceptional circumstances, there is nothing left to be reviewed or e"amined by the 1upreme (ourt. In its 9eply, petitioner reiterates its earlier points and uestions !rivate respondent :udy &mor purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Bian (arlo &mor as once more the credibility of private respondentsH witnesses, particularly &tty. 7wen &mor, 1alvador Bon4ales and well as her sister :ane Bamil for the #ay ;, 1>;;, 0)1@ &# flight, !9 10;, bound for #anila from defendantHs branch #anuel-alta4ar who are related to the respondents by blood or affinity. In their 9e$oinder, private respondents aver that office in Cegaspi (ity. :udy &mor, a dentist and a member of the -oard of 8irectors of the 1orsogon 8ental &ssociation, the findings of facts of the courts a uo were based not only on the testimonies of their witnesses but also on petitionerHs was scheduled to attend the =ational (onvention of the !hilippine 8ental &ssociation from #ay ; to 1?, 1>;; at the own employee, Cloyd Ao$as, who testified that there were non,revenue, go,show and waitlisted passengers who were !hilippine International (onvention (enter. :udy with Bian, :ane and minor (arlo -enite4, nephew of :udy and :ane, accommodated in !9 10;. They reiterate their position that where there is a uestion regarding the credibility of arrived at the Cegaspi &irport at .)%@ &# for !9 10;. (arlo -enite4 was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a certain witnesses, the findings of trial courts are generally not disturbed by appellate courts. Ainally, as to the damages awarded, 8ra. 2mily (hua. They were accompanied by &tty. 7wen &mor and the latterHs cousin, 1alvador Bon4ales who fell in line private respondents claim that there was substantial basis in awarding such amounts. 2vidently, in resolving the issues at the check,in counter while plaintiff :udy went to the office of the station manager to re uest that minor plaintiff (arlo raised in the present petition, it is inevitable and most crucial that we first determine the uestion whether or not the (& -enite4 be allowed to use the ticket of 8ra. (hua. erred in upholding the 9T( ruling that private respondents were late in checking,in. -oth issues call for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

I1132) Is the veracity of a witnessH statement automatically affected by his relationship to a partyN <2C8) =7. &lthough petitioner had every opportunity to refute such testimony, it failed to present any countervailing evidence. Instead, petitioner merely focused on assailing the credibility of -alta4ar on the ground that he was a disgruntled employee and a relative of private respondents. &part from the bare allegations in petitionerHs pleadings, no evidence was ever presented in court to substantiate its claim that -alta4ar was a disgruntled employee that impelled him to testify against petitioner. &s to his relationship with private respondents, this (ourt has repeatedly held that a witnessH relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. /hile this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witnessH relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the uantum of evidence re uired is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the uantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. &s aptly observed by the (& which we hereby adopt) Ironically for the defendant, aside from appellantHs assumption that -alta4ar could be a disgruntled former employee of their company and could be biased (which same reason could be attributed to Cloyd Ao$as) due to a distant relationship with the plaintiff, it offered no proof or evidence to rebut, demean and contradict the substance of the testimony of -alta4ar on the crucial point that plaintiffs,appellees were bumped off to accommodate non,revenue, waitlisted or go,show passengers. 7n this fact alone, defendantHs position weakens while credibly establishing that indeed plaintiffs arrived at the airport on time to check,in for Alight !9 10;. Aurther emphasis must be made that Cloyd Ao$as even affirmed in court that he cannot recall how many !9 10; boarding passes he had at the check,in counter because management has authority to accommodate in any flight and correspondingly issue boarding passes to non,revenue passengers. 0. G.R. No. 5553! )cto7e$ 26& 1!!3 CUE ,U0S)N& doing 7u>ine>> unde$ the fi$6 na6e and >ty%eDCUE ,U0S)N .".ER SU..L'&D petitioner, vs. (2E ,)UR( )- "..E"LS& 1"L0"N( 0N1ES(/EN( "SS),0"(ES& respondents. *0+0N& J.: Facts: This petition for review assails the decision of the respondent (ourt of &ppeals ordering petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of !%>0,?;%.'@ with interest. 1aid decision reversed the appealed decision of the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner. The case involves an action for a sum of money filed by respondent against petitioner anchored on the following antecedent facts) !etitioner Oue (uison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap, with places of business at -aesa, Due4on (ity, and 1to. (risto, -inondo, #anila. !rivate respondent Galiant Investment &ssociates, on the other hand, is a partnership duly organi4ed and e"isting under the laws of the !hilippines with business address at Oalookan (ity. Arom 8ecember ?, 1>0> to Aebruary 1+, 1>;@, private respondent delivered various kinds of paper products amounting to !%>0,?;0.'@ to a certain Cilian Tan of CT Trading. The deliveries were made by respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu <uy Tiac who was then employed in the -inondo office of petitioner. It was likewise pursuant to Tiac's instructions that the merchandise was delivered to Cilian Tan. 3pon delivery, Cilian Tan paid for the merchandise by issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific re uest of Tiu <uy Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (>) postdated checks to private respondent as payment for the paper products. 3nfortunately, sad checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank. Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay for the merchandise in uestion, claiming that Tiu <uy Tiac was duly authori4ed by petitioner as the manager of his -inondo office, to enter into the uestioned transactions with private respondent and Cilian Tan. .etitione$ denied any invo%ve6ent in the t$an>action ente$ed into 7y (iu 2uy (iac and $efu>ed to #ay #$ivate $e>#ondent the a6ount co$$e>#onding to the >e%%ing #$ice of the >u7Eect 6e$chandi>e.

Ceft with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against petitioner for the collection of !%>0,?;0.'@ representing the price of the merchandise. &fter due hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. 7n appeal, however, the decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by the (ourt of &ppeals Issue) /hether or not Tiu <uy Tiac possessed the re uired authority from petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction. <eld) This petition ought to have been denied outright, forin the final analysis, it raises a factual issue. It is elementary that in petitions for review under 9ule ?+, this (ourt only passes upon uestions of law. &n e"ception thereto occurs where the findings of fact of the (ourt of &ppeals are at variance with the trial court, in which case the (ourt reviews the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the records. &s to the merits of the case, it is a well,established rule that one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his agent, to the pre$udice of innocent third parties dealing with such person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears to be. Arom the facts and the evidence on record, there is no doubt that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail. It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission, petitioner held out Tiu <uy Tiac to the public as the manager of his store in 1to. (risto, -inondo, #anila. /o$e #a$ticu%a$%y& #etitione$ eF#%icit%y int$oduced (iu 2uy (iac to *e$na$dino 1i%%anueva& $e>#ondentG> 6anage$& a> hi> <#etitione$G>= 7$anch 6anage$ a> te>tified to 7y *e$na$dino 1i%%anueva. 1econdly, Cilian Tan, who has been doing business with petitioner for uite a while, also testified that she knew Tiu <uy Tiac to be the manager of petitioner's 1to. (risto, -inondo branch. This general perception of Tiu <uy Tiac as the manager of petitioner's 1to. (risto store is even made manifest by the fact that Tiu <uy Tiac is known in the community to be the EkinakapatidE (godbrother) of petitioner. In fact, even petitioner admitted his close relationship with Tiu <uy Tiac when he said that they are Elike brothersE There was thus no reason for anybody especially those transacting business with petitioner to even doubt the authority of Tiu <uy Tiac as his manager in the 1to. (risto -inondo branch. In a futile attempt to discredit Gillanueva, petitioner alleges that the former's testimony is clearly self,serving inasmuch as Gillanueva worked for private respondent as its manager. /e disagree, The argument that Gillanueva's testimony is self,serving and therefore inadmissible on the lame e"cuse of his employment with private respondent utterly misconstrues the nature of E'self,serving evidenceE and the specific ground for its e"clusion. 1elf,serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time* it does not include a party3s testimony as a witness in court. It is e"cluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross,e"amination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. 7n theother hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross,e"amination (emphasis supplied) !etitioner cites Gillanueva's failure, despite his commitment to do so on cross,e"amination, to produce the very first invoice of the transaction between petitioner and private respondent as another ground to discredit Gillanueva's testimony. 1uch failure, proves that Gillanueva was not only bluffing when he pretended that he can produce the invoice, but that Gillanueva was likewise prevaricating when he insisted that such prior transactions actually took place. !etitioner is mistaken. In fact, it was petitioner's counsel himself who withdrew the reservation to have Gillanueva produce the document in court In the same manner, petitioner assails the credibility of Cilian Tan by alleging that Tan was part of an intricate plot to defraud him. <owever, petitioner failed to substantiate or prove that the sub$ect transaction was designed to defraud him. Ironically, it was even the testimony of petitioner's daughter and assistant manager Imelda Oue (uison which confirmed the credibility of Tan as a witness. -ut of even greater weight than any of these testimonies, is petitioner's categorical admission on the witness stand that Tiu <uy Tiac was the manager of his store in 1to. (risto, -inondo. <e was such during the mornings while petitioner was still not present. The latter was the manager in the afternoons. 1uch admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is sufficient to negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the capacity of Tiu <uy Tiac to enter into the transaction in uestion. Aurthermore, consistent with and as an obvious indication of the fact that Tiu <uy Tiac was the manager of the 1to. (risto branch, three (') months after Tiu <uy Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent, communications to its customers notifying them that Tiu <uy Tiac is no longer connected with petitioner's business. 1uch undertaking spoke unmistakenly of Tiu <uy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's manager than any uttered disclaimer. #ore than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of petitioner in open court amount to admissions under 9ule 1'@ 1ection %% of the 9ules of (ourt.

#oreover, petitioner's une"plained delay in disowning the transactions entered into by Tiu <uy Tiac despite several attempts made by respondent to collect the amount from him, proved all the more that petitioner was aware of the uestioned commission was tantamount to an admission by silence under 9ule 1'@ 1ection %' of the 9ules of (ourt. &ll of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu <uy Tiac was admittedly the manager of petitioner's store in 1to. (risto, -inondo. (onse uently, the transaction in uestion as well as the concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner. -y his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming liability for the transaction entered by Tiu <uy Tiac on his behalf. ;. G.R. No. 56!3! "ugu>t 2& 1!!3 .E).LE )- (2E .20L0..0NES& plaintiff,appellee, vs. S"N()S +U,"' and E+G"R+) +U,"'& accu>ed. S"N()S +U,"'& accused,appellant. +he Solicitor &eneral for plaintiff0appellee# 2almonte /aw 4ffice for accused0appellant# +"10+E& ;R.& J.: 1antos 8ucay and 2dgardo 8ucay, father and son, were charged with the comple" crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder in an Information 1 filed on 1. 7ctober 1>;. with the 9egional Trial (ourt (9T() of Galen4uela, #etro #anila, allegedly committed as follows) that on or about the 1%th day of 7ctober, 1>;., in the municipality of Galen4uela, #etro #anila, !hilippines, and within the $urisdiction of this <onorable (ourt, the above,named accused, with intent to kill !acita Cabos, #anuel Cabos, Cina Cabos,#o$ica, 2dwin Cabos and #a. (ristina Cabos, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with a .?+ caliber Ipistol6 and shotgun they were then provided the said !acita Cabos, #anuel Cabos* Cina Cabos,#o$ica, 2dwin Cabos and #aria (ristina Cabos, hitting them on their body, thereby causing them serious physical in$uries which directly caused the death of !acita Cabos and #anuel Cabos* thereby, also, with respect to Cina Cabos,#o$ica, 2dwin Cabos and #aria (ristina Cabos, performing all the acts of e"ecution which ordinarily would have produced the crime of murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Cina Cabos,#o$ica, 2dwin Cabos and #aria (ristina Cabos which prevented their death. The case was docketed as (riminal (ase =o. 00>%,G,. before -ranch 10% of the said court. 3pon arraignment, both accused entered a plea not guilty. 2 In due course, the trial on the merits proceeded. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were 2dwin Cabos, Cina Cabos, 1gt. !onciano (asile, 8r. 9odolfo Ci4ondra, 8r. Tahil #indalano and 8r. Ceo &rthur (amagay. 3 7n the other hand, the witnesses presented by the defense were accused 1antos 8ucay and 2dgardo 8ucay, 9uben &mpuan, #ario &bad and (ristino #ariano. !rosecution witness Cina Cabos testified that at about +)@@ o'clock in the morning of 1% 7ctober 1>;., she was sleeping in the sala at the second floor of the house together with her husband, #anuel Cabos, and their si",month old daughter, #a. (ristina Cabos, when she was awakened by the pounding of the door on the first floor leading to the sala. #oments later, 1antos 8ucay and his son, 2dgardo 8ucay, appeared in the sala. 1antos was carrying a long firearm while 2dgardo held a caliber .?+ pistol. The two started firing at #anuel, who was already standing albeit half asleep. Then they shot her mother,in,law, !acita Cabos. -oth #anuel and !acita were killed. The accused also shot her, #a. (ristina, and 2dwin Cabos, her brother,in,law, who was then coming out of the bedroom. 1he was hit in the stomach and gall bladder while #a. (ristina was hit in the right leg, left thigh and abdomen. The accused then turned their backs and one of them uttered 56bos ang lahi.5 1he was able to identify the two accused, who are her former neighbors, because of the fluorescent light in the sala. &fter the accused had left, the police came and brought the wounded to the :ose 9eyes #emorial #edical (enter. 4 2dwin Cabos testified that on %? 8ecember 1>;+ his brother #anuel Cabos and 1antos 8ucay uarreled and stabbed each other* however, 1antos 8ucay did not file any charges against #anuel who gave the former !%@@.@@ for medical e"penses. 5 <e also corroborated the testimony of his sister,in,law. <e heard the banging of the door and several gunshots, then he went out of his room and saw his brother #anuel already sprawled dead on the floor. <e saw both accused shoot his sister,in,law and his niece. 6 2dgardo then fired at him, hitting him in the right thigh, while 1antos shot his mother. 7 <e was later treated at the :ose 9eyes #emorial #edical (enter where he spent !1',%>>.+' (2"hibits EDE

to ED,1.+E). They paid !1',%@@.@@ to !opular #emorial (hapels and !>,@.@.@@ to <oly (ross #emorial (hapel for the interment of his mother and brother. 5 1gt. !onciano (asile, a police investigator of the Galen4uela !olice 1tation, testified that he was ordered to investigate the incident. In the course of his investigation, he learned that the assailants were 1antos 8ucay and a yet unidentified man who, upon Cina 8ucay's sworn statement given two days later, was identified as 1antos 8ucay's son, 2dgardo. ! 8r. 9odolfo Ci4ondra, 1upervising #edico,Cegal 7fficer of the =ational -ureau of Investigation (=-I), testified on the post, mortem e"aminations he conducted on the cadavers of !acita and #anuel Cabos, the results of which are embodied in two autopsy reports (2"hibits EOE and E#E). 1 <e determined the cause of death of !acita as Ehemorrhage, secondary to shotgun wounds of the chest, abdomen and left arm,E and that of #anuel as Ehemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wounds of the head and chest.E 8r. Tahil #indalano testified regarding the in$uries sustained by Cina and #a. (ristina Cabos and the medical assistance rendered to them, 11 while 8r. &rthur Ceo #acasiano (amagay testified about the in$uries sustained by 2dwin Cabos. 12 8rs. #indalano and (amagay declared that without the medical attendance given to Cina, #a. (ristina and 2dwin Cabos, said persons would have died because of the nature of the in$uries sustained by them. 13 !er the #edico,Cegal (ertificates issued, Cina Cabos sustained three gunshot wounds on her Eleft umbilical,E Eleft buttocks,E and Elateral 8M'rd left thigh.E The point of e"it of the last wound was at the Eanterior middle 'rd left thigh,E thereby Epenetrating the liver by 1.+ cm. thru and thru, perforating the duodenum by 1 cm. thru and thru, perforating $e$unom by @.+ cm. lacerating the pancreas by % cm. transecting muscular branch aorta (abdominal)E (2"hibit E&E). 2dwin Cabos sustained a gunshot wound at the Emiddle 'rd anterior surface thigh, rightE with no point of e"it resulting in EBustilo, &nderson type III open fracture comminuted #M'rd femur, right,E (2"hibit EGE) and #a. (ristina Cabos sustained three gunshot wounds located at Elateral aspect 8M'rd thigh right,E Eantero,medial aspect #M'rd thigh, leftE and Eperiumbilcal rightE (2"hibit E-E). -oth accused testified that they were in their house at &rea ?, Galen4uela at the time of the incident in uestion. &t about .)@@ o'clock in the morning, they were roused from their sleep by a friend, #artin Babukan, who informed them that 1antos was a suspect in the shooting of the Cabos family. 14 Babukan told 1antos not to worry because Emany people heard that Ithe accused6 were really not the one.E 15 1antos was arrested on 1? 7ctober 1>;. in -alagtas, -ulacan 16 while he was looking for a lawyer, while 2dgardo was taken into custody by the police while he was attending to his father in the police head uarters. 17 (ristino #arinao, a neighbor of the 8ucays, testified that at about .)@@ o'clock in the morning of 1% 7ctober 1>;., 1antos 8ucay came and said that he (1antos) was a suspect in the shooting incident in uestion. 15 The following day, he brought 1antos to the -arangay (aptain, !io &ngeles, who entered in the barangay blotter (2"hibit E.E) 1antos' profession of innocence of the crime he was suspected of. 7n cross,e"amination, (ristino stated that the distance between &rea ?, where he and the 8ucays are residing, and the house of the Caboses at &rea . (also referred to as &rea 11) is about one kilometer. 1! 9uben &mpuan, a neighbor of the Caboses, testified that at the time of the incident and while he was still lying down, he heard gunshots. <e stood up, opened the window and saw two men leaving the house of the Caboses. <e stated that they were not the accused in this case. 2 #ario &bad &llegado testified that he was at the EtambakanE which is about thirty meters from the scene of the crime when he heard several gunshots. &s he headed for home, he met two persons in front of the lamp post near the house of the 2ugenios heading towards #aysan 9oad. 7ne of them, a tall, thin fellow, with curly hair and mesti4o features, was carrying a firearm, while the other, whose face he did not see, 21 was shorter. <e believed that both persons were the assailants. 22 <e declared that they were not the accused whom he knows very well being his former neighbors. 23 3pon reaching home, he heard a commotion from the house of the Caboses. <e went inside the Caboses' house and saw the wounded family members. <e asked 2dwin and Cina Cabos whether they recogni4ed their assailants and both answered that they did not. 24 (apt. (arlos Ti uia, (hief Investigator of the Galen4uela !olice 1tation, who was presented as the only defense witness during the hearing for the application for bail and whose testimony was adopted in the trial on the merits, declared that he proceeded to the crime scene after receiving a report on the incident from the investigator assigned to the case. /hen he and the investigator returned to the office, his investigator took down the statements of the witnesses, one of whom was 2rwin Cabos and whose statement was taken down at ?)@@ o'clock in the morning of 1? 7ctober 1>;.. <owever, he believed that 2rwin was not telling the truth so that he personally talked to him, and at .)@@ a.m., 2rwin e"ecuted a supplemental statement (2"hibit E?E) in the presence of several people including his brother 9enato Cabos. This time, 2rwin described one of the alleged assailants as tall, with curly hair and mesti4o features. 7n the basis of such a description, Ti uia made a re uest for a cartographic sketch to the !( (rime Caboratory. 25 7n %> &pril 1>;;, the trial court promulgated its $udgment finding 1antos 8ucay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but ac uitting 2dgardo 8ucay on ground of reasonable doubt. 26 The dispositive portion of the decision reads) In view of the foregoing, the (ourt finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt 1antos 8ucay of the comple" crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder as charged.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its ma"imum period to death is e uivalent to 10 years, ? months and 1 day to death, the minimum being 10 years, ? months and 1 day to %@ years, the medium being reclusion perpetua and ma"imum, death. The (ourt, could have meted the death sentence on 1antos 8ucay but is prevented from doing so by the =ew (onstitution. 1antos 8ucay is, therefore, hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life, reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty provided by law, and all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim !acita Cabos in the sum of !'@,@@@.@@ and the heirs of #anuel Cabos !'@,@@@.@@* to indemnify the victims 2dwin Cabos in the sum of !1',%>>.+' as reimbursement of medical e"penses, and the sum of !?,+@@.@@ as lost earnings for the period from 7ctober 1%, 1>;. to :uly 1>;0* to indemnify Cina Cabos and #a. (ristina Cabos in the total sum of !1@,@@@.@@ as reimbursement of medical e"penses* and to pay the costs of suit. The (ourt finds 2dgardo 8ucay not guilty of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby ac uitted. The :ail /arden of Galen4uela, #etro #anila, is hereby ordered to release 2dgardo 8ucay from detention unless held for any other lawful cause. 27 In convicting 1antos 8ucay, the trial court said) The (ourt never doubts the participation of 1antos 8ucay not only on the basis of the positive identification made by surviving victims, Cina and 2dwin Cabos, the motive 1antos 8ucay had to avenge the assault done on him by #anuel Cabos, but also because his positive identification sweeps aside altogether his defense P that of alibi P a very weak defense in the light of the overwhelming evidence against him. """ """ """ Arom the evidence thus adduced the (ourt is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was 1antos 8ucay who was one of the persons who conspired with another in killing the victims, #anuel Cabos, !acita Cabos, and in trying to kill Cina Cabos, #aria (ristina Cabos and 2dwin Cabos, but was frustrated, The evidence of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, were clearly shown by the prosecution when it proved convincingly to the (ourt that considering the time of the attack, +)@@ at dawn, evident premeditation is clear especially if the testimony of 2dwin Cabos will be considered that months previous to this attack, 1antos 8ucay had a uarrel with one of the victims shot to death. There was abuse of superior strength and treachery because the victims were asleep at the time of the attack and were therefore unprepared and unarmed for the attack. They had no chance whatsoever to fight back, the si" months baby #a. (ristina Cabos especially. 25 The trial court e"pressed the view that two murders and three frustrated murders were committed, or that there are as many crimes as there are victims in this case because Ethe trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act. <owever, it did not impose the corresponding penalties therefor Ebecause the information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder.E 2! 7n 1' #ay 1>;;, 1antos 8ucay filed a !artial #otion Aor 9econsideration &ndM7r =ew Trial. 3 <e sought the admission of the alleged result of a paraffin test conducted on him on 1' 7ctober 1>;., or a day after the incident, which shows that he was found negative for powder burns. Aor lack of merit, the trial court denied the motion in its 7rder of %? #ay 1>;;. 31 1antos 8ucay, hereinafter referred to as the &ppellant, then filed on 0 :une 1>;; a =otice of &ppeal. 32 In his E-rief for the 8efenseE filed on %? 1eptember 1>>%, 33 the appellant raises the following assignment of errors) 1. T<2 T9I&C (739T 29928 I= <7C8I=B &1 E!71ITIG2E !9712(3TI7= /IT=21121 28/I= C&-71 &=8 CI=& C&-71' I82=TIAI(&TI7= 7A &((3128* <2=(2, IT 29928 /<2= IT 92:2(T28 &((3128'1 82A2=12 7A &CI-I. %. T<2 T9I&C (739T 29928 I= 82=FI=B &((3128'1 !&9TI&C #7TI7= A79 92(7=1I829&TI7= &=8M79 =2/ T9I&C A79 T<2 &8#I11I7= 7A T<2 !&9&AAI= 2Q&#I=&TI7= 7= &((3128 & 8&F &AT29 T<2 I=(I82=T AI=8I=B <I# =2B&TIG2 7A !7/29 (sic) -39=1. '. T<2 T9I&C (739T 29928 I= (7=GI(TI=B T<2 &((3128. In the first assigned error, the appellant attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Cina and 2dwin Cabos and alleges that their identification of the appellant is vague and highly dubious. To buttress this claim, he refers this (ourt to his testimony that a neighbor by the name of #artin Babukan told him that while the victims were the hospital, he (#artin) overheard 2dwin Cabos say that he did not really see the appellant and 2dgardo 8ucay* that 2dwin only happened to mention the name of the appellant when he has asked by the police about their enemies in their place. The appellant then concludes that the crime was imputed upon him not because he was seen at the scene of the crime but because of the motive alleged, namely, that he and #anuel Cabos had an altercation on %? 8ecember 1>;+. &s to Cina Cabos, the

appellant maintains that she gave her statement only on 1? 7ctober 1>;. or two days after the occurrence of the incident* she thus had sufficient time to concoct a story and implicate the appellant and 2dgardo after she had talked with her brother,in,law, 2dwin, and her father,in,law, :esus Cabos. The appellant further claims that since the trial court did not believe Cina and 2dwin's testimonies that they positively identified 2dgardo 8ucay, then following the ma"im 5falsus et 7sic) uno, falsus et 7sic) omnibus,5 34 it should not have also believed their testimony as regards the appellant. <e also faults the trial court for re$ecting the supplementary statement (2"hibit E?E) of 2rwin Cabos, brother of 2dwin Cabos, and 2rwin's EcontemporaneousE statement to 2dgar 8ucay) EOuya pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, hindi naman ikaw,E allegedly absolving the accused and pointing to a tall, mesti4o and curly,haired man as one of the assailants, which statement was allegedly confirmed by 1gt. (asile and (apt. Ti uia and made as the basis of the cartographic sketch by the !( (rime Caboratory. &ccording to the appellant, these declarations of 2rwin are declarations against interest and are part of the res gestae. Ainally, the appellant asserts that the evidence for the prosecution is weak because no disinterested witness was presented despite the fact that the incident occurred in a thickly populated area. <e also contends that the prosecution suppressed evidence by failing to present 2rwin Cabos as a witness. These claims are without merit. & careful evaluation of the records and the evidence adduced by the prosecution discloses that the appellant had been positively identified by Cina and 2rwin Cabos. In his sworn statement (2"hibit E<E) e"ecuted barely four hours after the incident and while he was still in the emergency room of the hospital, 2dwin e"plicitly declared that the appellant was one of the assailants. This sworn statement was spontaneously given at the time he was hovering between life and death. <e had no opportunity then to contrive or fabricate a story. The appellant is the only one identified therein by 2dwin. Thus) """ """ """ T&=7=B -akit ka narito ngayon sa loob ng 8r. :ose 9eyes <ospital, 2mergency 9oom, #anilaN 1&B7T -inaril po ako. T 1ino and bumaril sa iyoN 1 &ng kasama ni 1antos 8ucay po nakatira sa &rea,?, Aamily (ompound, Oaruhatan, Gal. #.#. T Oilala mo ba ang bumaril sa iyo na kasama ni 1antosN 1 Oong makikita ko muli. """ """ """ T !aano mo nasabi na kasama ni 1antos 8ucay and bumaril sa iyoN 1 8a*ita *o po si Santos 9ucay na ang hawa* niya shotgun at siya ang bumaril sa *uya *o, $anuel, nanay *o, Pacita, (te *o, /ina at bata na si $aria Cristina. T 8ati mo bang kilala si 1antos 8ucayN 1 7po. T !aano mo siya nakilalaN 1 8ati po siyang (1antos) kapitbahay namin at lumipat as &rea,? Aamily (ompound, Oaruhatan, Gal., #.#. 35 In court, 2dwin unhesitatingly pointed to the appellant as one of the assailants. 36 Cina Cabos also identified the appellant as one of the malefactors both in her handwritten sworn statement, 2"hibit E2,E 37 e"ecuted on 1? 7ctober 1>;. or two days after the incident, and in her court testimony. 35 That her statement was e"ecuted two days after the incident does not perforce affect her credibility. /ith the three gunshot wounds she sustained and the thought of the death of her husband and mother,in,law and the serious in$uries of her daughter and brother,in, law, it would be too much to e"pect from her that physical and emotional fortitude to forthwith give her statement as what 2dwin did. 8elay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily e"plained. 3! In any case, the speculation that she could have contrived her testimony after having talked with her father,in,law and brother,in,law is wholly unsupported by evidence. /e agree with the appellee that the alleged statements made by #artin Babukan to the appellant, which the latter related in court, is hearsay and has little, if any, probative value. (ounsel for the appellant knew, or ought to have known, that this was so. Fet, the defense did not present #artin as witness. =or can we subscribed to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to 2dwin and Cina's testimonies that they positively identified 2dgardo, it should, pursuant to the ma"im 5falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,5 likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly ac uit him. In People vs. 9asig, 4 this (ourt stated that the ma"im is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In People vs. Pacada, 41 we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others. &nd in People vs. 4sias, 42 we ruled that)

It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. &nd it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not re uired that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be re$ected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified Ithe accused6 as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged . . . . !rofessor /igmore gives the following enlightening commentary) It may be said, once for all, that the ma"im is in itself worthlessPfirst, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a ma"im of life* and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the $ury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is fre uently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves. 43 The trial court did not err in re$ecting the supplementary statement (2"hibit E?E) of 2rwin Cabos, brother of 2dwin Cabos, and his alleged contemporaneous statement to 2dgardo 8ucay. 2rwin Cabos was not called by the defense as its witness Peven as a hostile one. /hatever declaration he made to any party, either written or oral, is thus hearsay. The prosecution seasonably ob$ected to the admission of 2"hibit E?.E 44 -esides, as noted by the prosecution, this document is not under oath while his first statement implicating the appellant is duly subscribed and sworn to. The defense should have presented 2rwin as a witness if indeed it was convinced that 2"hibit E?E e"presses the truth. There is no showing that this could not have been done because 2rwin was not available. <is brother, 2dwin, testified that 2rwin was staying with his father in 2scolta. 45 This information should have been utili4ed by the defense to have compulsory process issued to bring 2rwin to court. Instead, the defense imputes suppression of evidence upon the prosecution in not presenting 2rwin Cabos as its witness. It is settled that suppression of evidence is inapplicable in a case where the evidence is at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. 46 -esides, the prosecution had no cogent reason for presenting 2rwin since there is no showing that he was in the house when the incident occurred. 7n the other hand, the defense needed his testimony for if, indeed, he should affirm his supplemental statement, he may somehow enhance the theory of the defense. /e do not likewise agree with the appellant that 2rwin's alleged statement to 2dgardo 8ucay) 5:uya pasensiya *a na, naturo *ita noon una, hindi naman i*aw,5 uttered immediately after he made his supplemental statement, is a part of the res gestae and thus an e"ception to the hearsay rule. The rule on spontaneous statements as part of the res gestae is stated in 1ection ?%, 9ule 1'@ of the 9ules of (ourt) Estatements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subse uent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. . . . .E There are three re uisites for the admission of spontaneous statements as evidence of the res gestae) 1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence* %) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise* and ') that the statements must concern the occurrence in uestion and its immediately attending circumstances. 47 The rationale for the e"ception lies in the fact that a statement made under the stress of an e"citing event or condition tends to ensure that the statement is spontaneous and, therefore, trustworthy* and the likely pro"imity in time between the event or condition and the statement minimi4es the possibility of a memory problem. 45 2rwin's alleged statement to 2dgardo 8ucay does not refer to the incident in uestion but rather to his prior statement (not the supplemental statement) implicating 2dgardo 8ucay. Aurthermore, the alleged EcontemporaneousE statement was made two days after the shooting incident. In no way can it be said that 2rwin was under the stress of an e"citing event or condition. =or do we find merit in the appellant's argument that the prosecution's evidence is weak because unlike the defense, it did not present any disinterested witness. <e suggests that since the place where the incident happened is thickly populated, there were many people who saw the gunmen and who could have pointed to the accused if they were the ones who committed the crime considering that they were familiar to the residents of the area. In the first place, it was not shown that at the time the incident occurred, many people were already awake and were able to see the gunmen. In the second place, assuming that it was so shown, the determination of who should be utili4ed as witnesses by the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case. 4! That the prosecutor did not present any disinterested witness does not lessen the strength of the prosecution's case, which is anchored on the testimonies of 2dwin and Cina Cabos, who were themselves eyewitnesses and victims of the crime. In the ultimate analysis, the first assigned error involves the credibility of witnesses. It is settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the uestion, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and

manner of testifying during the trial unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 5 /e find no reason to depart from this rule in this case. In his second assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for denying his motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of (hemistry 9eport =o. 7,1.'@,;. of the !( (rime Caboratory 1ervice, the result of the paraffin test conducted on 1antos 8ucay on 1' 7ctober 1>;. or the day after the incident on uestion, which allegedly shows that Eboth hands of the Iappellant6 gave =2B&TIG2 result to the test for gunpowder residue (nitrates).E 51 7ne of the grounds for a new trial mentioned in 1ection %, 9ules of (ourt is the discovery of new and material evidence. The re uisites therefor which must concur are) (1) that the evidence was discovered after the trial* (%) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the e"ercise of reasonable diligence* and (') that such evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the $udgment. 52 In the present case, the appellant was sub$ected to a paraffin test the day after the crime was committed. (ertainly, he knew that the findings of such test would be forthcoming. <e should have asked for the result of the test to find out if it is e"culpatory, in which case he could have presented it during the hearing of his application for bail or, at the latest, during the trial on the merits. In any event, the chemistry report cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already e"isting even before the trial commenced and could have been easily produced in court by compulsory process. The appellant either did not e"ercise reasonable diligence for its production or simply forgot about it. Aorgotten evidence is, of course, not a ground for a new trial. 53 #oreover, the result of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is not conclusive evidence that he did not fire a gun. 54 It is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates, as when he wore gloves or washed his hands afterwards. 55 The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the motion for new trial. The testimonies of the witnesses and the nature of the wounds suffered by the victims show that there were two different firearms used by two assailants, one of whom is the appellant. The crimes committed were not caused by a single act nor were any of the crimes committed as a necessary means of committing the others. In this case, there are as many crimes committed as there are victims. The trial court correctly ruled that there was no comple" crime Econsidering that the trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act.E It is settled that when various victims e"pire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 56 <owever, the trial court erred when it ruled that E(i)t cannot, however, impose the corresponding penalty of the crime committed against each victim because the information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder.E The information in this case, although denominated as one for a comple" crime, clearly charges the accused with five different criminal acts. It states) Ethe above,named accused, with intent to *ill !acita Cabos, #anuel Cabos, Cina Cabos,#o$ica, 2dwin Cabos, and #a. (ristina Cabos, . . . did then and there . . . attack, assault and shoot with a .?+ caliber Ipistol6 and shotgun they were then provided the said !acita Cabos, #anuel Cabos, Cina Cabos, #o$ica, 2dwin Cabos and #a. (ristina Cabos, . . . .E The appellant and his co,accused did not move to uash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges. &t no other time thereafter did they ob$ect thereto. They therefore waived such defect 57 and the trial court thus validly rendered $udgment against them for as many crimes as were alleged and proven. 55 The crimes committed by the appellant and his companion, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt are) (1) two counts of murder with the ualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack on the victims was so sudden and at a time when the victims were barely awake, thus giving them no chance whatsoever to defend themselves* and (%) three counts of frustrated murder. (onspiracy 5! between the assailants was duly proven. Together they came to the house of the victims, simultaneously attacked them, and then, together again, they fled. -efore fleeing, one of them even e"claimed 56bos ang lahi.5 These acts sufficiently established a common plan or design to commit the crimes charged and a concerted action to effectively pursue it. <ence, the act of one is the act of all. 6 /e do not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation was sufficiently established. &lthough #anuel Cabos stabbed the appellant on %? 8ecember 1>;+, there is paucity of evidence as to when the latter determined to kill the former and any member of his family and as to acts manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination. 61 =evertheless, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which was proved without ob$ection from the defense should be appreciated against the appellant since the victims were attacked and shot inside their own dwelling. The assailants displayed greater perversity in their deliberate invasion of the home of the Caboses. 62 3nder &rticle %?; of the 9evised !enal (ode, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal ma"imum to death. The ma"imum of the penalty should be imposed in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance. <owever, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the (onstitution* 63 hence, the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua. The penalty for the crime of frustrated murder is the penalty ne"t lower in degree that the prescribed for murder, 64 that is, prision mayor medium as ma"imum to reclusion temporal medium. 65 The appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate 1entence Caw in the frustrated murder cases. Thus, he may be sentenced in each of the three frustrated murder cases to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (;) years and

one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (1?) years, eight (;) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as ma"imum. &((798I=BCF, the challenged $udgment of -ranch 10% of the 9egional Trial court of Galen4uela, #etro #anila in (riminal (ase =o. 00>%,G,. is &AAI9#28 sub$ect to the modifications herein indicated. &s modified, appellant 1antos 8ucay is convicted of (a) two crimes of murder for the death of !acita Cabos and #anuel Cabos and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each death, with the indemnity in each crime increased from !'@,@@@.@@ to !+@,@@@.@@ in conformance with the current policy of this (ourt* and (b) three crimes of frustrated murder committed on Cina Cabos, #a. (ristina Cabos and 2dwin Cabos, and is hereby sentenced in each crime to an indeterminate penalty of eight (;) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (1?) years, eight (;) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. (osts against the appellant. 17 7982928. Cru-, &ri;o0(.uino, "ellosillo and )uiason, <<#, concur# >. .E).LE )- (2E .20L0..0NES vs. W0LL0E "/"GU0N& G0L+) "/"GU0N "N+ ,ELS) "/"GU0N& W0LL0E "/"GU0N "N+ G0L+) "/"GU0N G.R. No>. 54344345 . ;anua$y 1 & 1!!4 -",(S The coup de main on the 7ro brood sent two brothers to the mortuary and a third to medical care. The bloodbath resulted in the brothers /illie, Bildo and (elso, all surnamed &maguin, being charged with the murder of the 7ro brothers !acifico and 8iosdado. /illie and Bildo went through trial while (elso to this date remains a fugitive. Witne>>e> fo$ the .$o>ecution @1A 2e$nando )$o , a younger brother of !acifico and 8iosdado <ernando narrated that in the afternoon of %? #ay 1>00, he and his brothers 8iosdado and 8anilo, brother,in,law 9afael (andelaria, and first cousin 1ergio &rgon4ola were invited by their eldest brother !acifico to the latter's house in the interior of 8ivinagracia 1treet, Ca !a4, Iloilo (ity, for a small gathering to celebrate the town fiesta. &t about five o'clock in the afternoon, after partaking of the meager preparations put together by !acifico, he (<ernando) and his companions decided to leave. They were accompanied by their host to the pla4a where they could get a ride. 7n their way, while traversing 8ivinagracia 1treet, !acifico was called by accused (elso &maguin, E!are, come here.E -ut !acifico answered, E!are, not yet because I have to conduct my guests first.E Immediately, (elso, with a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards !acifico. Bildo, (elso's younger brother, with a knife tucked to his waist, followed with a slingshot known as EIndian panaE or EIndian targetE. /hile Bildo aimed the dart from his slingshot at 8anilo, which hit the latter on the chest, (elso hacked !acifico. Bildo then stabbed 8iosdado with a knife. Thereafter, /illie, the eldest of the &maguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers !acifico, 8iosdado and the fleeing 8anilo. 8iosdado, own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was again shot by /illie who ne"t fired anew at !acifico. #eanwhile, Bildo and (elso repeatedly stabbed !acifico who already lying prostrate and defenseless. @2A +ani%o )$o , the youngest of the 7ros <e testified that at around five o'clock in the afternoon of %? #ay 1>00, while walking along 8ivinagracia 1treet on their way to the pla4a for ride home with his three brothers and two others, they were waylaid by (elso, /illie and Bildo, their cousin 8anny, all surnamed &maguin, and several others. (elso placed an arm on the shoulder of !acifico and stabbed him with a knife. Then there was a clash between the two groups. In a split second, he (8anilo) was hit on the left chest by a dart from the slingshot of Bildo whom he saw aiming at him. <e (8anilo) pulled the dart from his chest and ran away but was hit on the lips by a bullet. Then he was pushed by <ernando to seek cover. @3A Rafae% ,ande%a$ia , a brother,in,law of the 7ros <is version was that while he, his brothers,in,law and one 1ergio &rgon4ola were walking along 8ivinagracia 1treet that afternoon, two men approached them. /ithout any provocation, one suddenly stabbed him. &fter being hit on the left arm, he immediately fled to the pla4a where he flagged down a passing cab to take him to the hospital. <e did not see what happened ne"t to his companions. Witne>>e> fo$ the +efen>e The defense maintains that it was the 7ro brothers who started the fight. @1A Gi%do "6aguin <e recounted that on %? #ay 1>00, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, !acifico with five others went to their house in 8ivinagracia 1treet, Ca !a4, Iloilo (ity, and approached his brother (elso, who was waiting for his wife at the foot of the stairs. /hile !acifico was talking to (elso, a companion of !acifico came forward, held (elso by the shoulder and said ) EThis is the bravest man in 8ivinagracia 1treet, the &maguin.E #eanwhile, another companion of !acifico gave (elso a

flying kick that sent him reeling. Bildo then went down the house shouting ) E8on't fight.E <owever, the attackers drew their knives and slingshots. In return, (elso pulled out his knife. 1ince one of the companions of !acifico lunged at him, Bildo retreated to the other side of the road and threw stones at his attackers. #eanwhile, he saw his cousin 8anny hit 8anilo 7ro with a dart from a slingshot. -ut later 8anny himself was stabbed from behind by one of !acifico's companions. Then 2rnie 7rtigas, a guest of (elso, emerged from the &maguin residence holding a revolver. 2rnie initially fired three warning shots, after which he successively shot !acifico and a person who tried to stab the former as well as an identified companion of !acifico. Cater, both 2rnie 7rtigas and (elso &maguin escaped towards the railway tracks. The following day, he was brought by his uncle to the !( authorities in Aort 1an !edro for Esafe,keepingE and turned over to the local police after a week. @2A 1icente *e%icano and Ni%da (agnong , long,time residents of 8ivinagracia 1treet Nenita "6aguin , mother of the accused brothers They affirmed the testimony of Bildo. =enita &maguin even affirmed that her son (elso was indeed troublesome, but added that /illie Enever had any brush with the law.E @3A Wi%%ie "6aguin <e related that he was in the house of his uncle along 8ivinagracia 1treet that afternoon drinking with some friends. <e left the group after hearing some e"plosions coming from the direction of his mother's house and then seeing his cousin 8anny, with a stab wound at the back, being taken by two policemen, and his wounded brother Bildo running towards the pla4a. Thus, he went to his mother's residence to find out what happened. -ut when he got there, the incident had already ended. &s a conse uence, he was told by his mother to look for his two brothers who were wounded in the fight and to take them to the hospital. <e turned himself in after five days, upon learning that law enforcers were looking for him. @4A U%#iano 1ence$& Roge%io de %a .aH and .at ;e$eo> They all confirmed that accused /illie only left their gathering after the e"plosions were heard, and only after seeing his wounded brother Bildo and his cousin 8anny, who was in the company of two policemen, pass by. @5A .e$%a *e%%eHa , a vegetable vendor in the Ca !a4 !ublic #arket 1he testified that after hearing si" e"plosions, she saw an unidentified man with a revolver running away from the scene of the crime, followed by accused (elso who was holding a knife. 1he was certain that the unidentified man was not accused /illie as the latter was very well known to her, she being a former neighbor of the &maguins. @6A +$. (ito +o$o6a% , &sst. #edico,Cegal 7fficer, Iloilo #etropolitan 8istrict (ommand, I=! <e conducted an autopsy on !acifico and 8iosdado. <e declared that out of the 1+ stab wounds and one gunshot wound !acifico sustained, five of the stab wounds were fatal. /ith regard to 8iosdado, four (?) stab wounds, out of the ten (1@), and the lone bullet he had sustained were considered fatal. ($ia% ,ou$tI> Ru%ing &fter a $oint trial, and finding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the then (ourt of Airst Instance of Iloilo, -ranch II, found the accused Bildo &maguin, also known as ETigib,E guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of #urder, and sentenced him to !eclusion Perpetua in both criminal cases. &s regards /illie &maguin alias ETikboy,E the trial court found him guilty Eas accomplice in both criminal cases. 0SSUE /hich of the two conflicting versions of the incident deserves credenceN 2EL+ J !rosecutionHs Their resolution rests upon the credibility of the witnesses who have come forward, a matter addressed to the sound $udgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide them, it having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. (onse uently, the assessment of the trial $udge is usually received with respect, if not conclusiveness, on appeal unless there is a showing of arbitrariness. &lways, this has been the familiar rule. In the instant case, the trial court has accepted as credible the testimonies of <ernando and 8anilo 7ro who positively identified accused (elso and Bildo &maguin as having started the assault on the 7ro brothers with the use of a knife and an EIndian pana,E and accused /illie &maguin as the gunwielder who shot the brothers !acifico, 8iosdado and 8anilo during the fray. /e see no reason to disregard the assessment. /e simply cannot set aside the factual findings of the trial court absent any showing of capriciousness on its part. The defense belittles the testimony of <ernando 7ro pointing to accused /illie &maguin as the gunman as it stands Esingly and alone,E in contrast to the declaration of the defense witnesses e"onerating /illie and Bildo. /hile the defense may have presented a number of witnesses who, as the trial court puts it, Evirtually 'sang' in a chorus that the killers ((elso and 8anny &maguin and a certain 2rnie 7rtigas) not the two accused herein (/illie and Bildo &maguin),E still the trial $udge had the opportunity, as well as the right and responsibility, to assess their credibility P $ust like all other witnesses. &fter all, there is no law which re uires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration e"cept when the law so e"pressly re uires. &s it is often said, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. If credible and positive, the

testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict. Indeed the determination of the credibility of witnesses is the trial court's domain, hence, we respect its factual findings. Aor, even the respective defenses of the accused, i.e., accused /illie &maguin's alibi that he did not participate in the fray and that he was in the nearby house of his uncle drinking with his friends, and accused Bildo &maguin's denial that he was unarmed but later forced to hurl stones to defend himself, are without sound basis. &libi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to especially where there is direct testimony of an eyewitness, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the ease of its fabrication and the difficulty of checking and rebutting it. -esides, alibi to be believed must be supported by the physical impossibility of the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. &nd as in an alibi, a denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self, serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Thus, as between a mere denial of the accused and the positive identification and detailed declarations of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court committed no error in according heavier weight to the latter. <ence, this version of the prosecution prevails) (elso and Bildo, together with others, attacked the 7ros. 8uring the fray, Bildo was armed with a knife and an EIndian target.E &nd $ust as they were about to finish off the 7ro brothers, /illie, the eldest of the &maguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de grace. <owever, it was error to rule that accused /illie was an accomplice to his brothers. There being no sufficient evidence to link him to the conspiracy, he should be liable for the natural and logical conse uence of his own felonious acts. <ence, we take e"ception to the conclusion of the trial court that !acifico and 8iosdado did not die due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by /illie. Bildo &maguin was found guilty of two (%) separate crimes of homicide for the death of 8iosdado and !acifico. /illie &maguin was found guilty of homicide aggravated by abuse of superior strength but offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and of frustrated homicide likewise aggravated by abuse of superior strength but offset by voluntary surrender. 1@. !eople v. 1ara Aacts) &ppellant -ernardo K-erningL 1ara was charged with #urder. &ppellant was earlier charged for the same offense, along with 2fren 9obles,however, &cting #unicipal (ircuit Trial :udge 1imeonito &. 1alarda who conducted the preliminary e"amination, found no probable cause to hale 9obles into court. &ccused pleaded not guilty. while !aterno #orcillo (the victim) and his wife,prosecution witness Girginia #orcillo were sitting at their balcony situated at the left side of their one storey house the victim revealed to her that on account of his accusation against appellant and 2fren 9obles for killing his chicken, the two had threatened to kill him on =ovember 1, 1>;0. &llaying any an"iety of the victim, his wife told him not to be bothered as it was already the second of =ovember, and he should be thankful for being alive #oments later, hearing the incessant barking of dogs, Girginia prodded the victim to transfer their carabao from the back portion of the house to the front.1 <earing that the victim, their father, was going to transfer the carabao, prosecution witnesses Aelipe and -en$amin #orcillo curiously looked out of the window situated at the side of their house to watch the transfer of the carabao. 3nknown to the victim who proceeded to the back of the house, appellant and one whom Aelipe and -en$amin claim to be 2fren 9obles were s uatting beside a nearby coconut tree. /hile the victim was at the right side of the house, before he could reach the carabao, he was shot by appellant. 1oon after hearing the sound of a gunshot, Girginia heard her husband,the victim moaning. &nother shot was soon after fired by 2fren 9obles prompting Girginia to run downstairs where she saw her husband lying on the ground. 1he then lifted him and placed him in her arms, and as their children Aelipe and -en$amin approached her, they told her K=ay, it was Tay -erning who killed Tatay.L /hen she turned her attention back to her husband, he was already dead. &ccused denied the accusation and posed an alibi which was corroborated by her wife. (ourt ruled convicting accused. 7n appeal the accused assailed the decision conteding that the court erred in giving full faith and credence to the patently incredible, fabricated, unreliable, inconsistent if not contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In affirming the conviction of appellant, the appellate court relied, as did the trial court, mainly on the testimony of Aelipe and -en$amin, particularly their positive identification of appellant. AelipeHs testimony during cross,e"amination that he saw appellant and 2fren 9obles in the balcony of the victimHs house, whereas on further cross,e"amination, he declared that he saw appellant and 9obles at the tambi or back porch* AelipeHs testimony that his sister Cianisa was inside the house during the incident but he did not know what she was then doing, whereas in his sworn statement, Aelipe stated that Cianisa was urinating at the tambi or back porch* AelipeHs testimony that a short firearm was used in shooting his father, whereas in his sworn statement he stated that he did not know the kind of firearm was used* AelipeHs testimony that there was a grudge between appellant and his father, whereas in his sworn statement he stated that he did not know

of any reason or motive behind his fatherHs murder* -en$aminHs testimony during crosse"amination that he was lying down, preparing to go to sleep when he heard the dogs barking, whereas on further cross,e"amination, he declared that he and Aelipe were playing and teasing each other* -en$aminHs testimony that he saw appellant at the side of a coconut tree when he shot the victim, hereas in AelipeHs testimony, he declared that he saw appellant and 2fren 9obles in the balcony of their house* -en$aminHs testimony that he did not know of any reason or motive for the killing of his father, whereas in AelipeHs testimony, he stated that there was a grudge between appellant and his deceased father* GirginiaHs testimony that she and the victim were in the balcony talking with each other when the dogs started barking, hereas in AelipeHs and -en$aminHs estimonies they declared that she was inside the house* and GirginiaHs testimony that Aelipe and -en$amin told her that they saw another person aside from appellant but that they could not recogni4e him whereas both Aelipe and -en$amin stated that 2fren 9obles was with appellant during the incident. I1132) whether the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt <2C8)F21. There was thus no possibility for both witnesses to be mistaken in identifying their fatherHs assailant, especially considering that they have known appellant, their neighbor, for a long time. There being no indication that Aelipe and -en$amin were actuated by any improper motive to falsely testify against appellant, their relationship with the victim notwithstanding, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of their testimonies. 9elationship could in fact even strengthen the witnessesH credibility, it being unnatural for aggrieved relatives to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit, for their natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating any other. That appellantHs hands were found positive for gunpowder nitrates corroborates the evidence of his guilt. /ith respect to the then 1@,year old AelipeHs inconsistent testimony on where appellant was at the time of the incident, that could reasonably be attributed to his tender age and his failure to understand the uestions of defense counsel. Aor to young witnesses who, much more than adults, would naturally be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the e"perience of testifying before a court, ample margin of error and understanding must be accorded. In any event, upon clarification by the trial court, it was sufficiently established that Aelipe saw appellant and 9obles outside of his house. /hile, admittedly, there were contradictions between the prosecution witnessesH testimonies in open court and their sworn statements, discrepancies do not necessarily impair their credibility, for affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate or lack of searching in uiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are thus generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. &s for the other alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, they refer to minor and collateral matters, not to an essential element of the crime, and do not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that is, the killing of the victim. #oreover, minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be e"pected in view of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors. In fact, they bolster rather than weaken their credibility as they erase any suspicion that their testimonies have been rehearsed. /hat is important is that both Aelipe and -en$amin were consistent in positively identifying appellant as the person who shot their father.