Rule 77 LEON AND GHEZZI V MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS. CO. (1951) TUAZON, J.

FACTS: Basil Gordon Butler and died and his will was duly probated in New York. Pursuant to a provision in his will giving discretion to his executors to purchase an annuity in favour of his universal heir Mercedes de Leon, , the appointed trustee James Madison Ross bought an annuity from respondent insurance company. After a few months of receiving monthly allowance however, Mercedes presented the will for probate in the CFI of Manila. ISSUE: WON Mercedes has disposition of the funds covered by the contract of annuity. HELD: NO. A. Applicable rule: Sec4, Rule 78, Rules of Court re jurisdiction of probate court all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. In this case, 1. Canada is the situs of the money. The money has been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country. 2. The agencys intervention is limited to delivering the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. 3. The money no longer forms part of Butlers estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. B. The power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88. In this case, The administratrix did not entrust to the respondent the money she wants the latter to account for, nor did the said money come to the repondents possession in trust for the administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the motion and to the respondent.

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Rule 78 OZAETA V PECSON (1953) LABRADOR, J. FACTS: Ramon Ozaeta, who was named executor in the will of Carlos Palanca in case General Manuel Roxas fails to qualify, presented Palancas will for probate upon Palancas death, and Gen. Roxas having died previously. The court rendered an order admitting the will to probate and appointing Ozaeta as administrator. 2 days later, the court appointed the Bank of the Phil Islands upon allowing the previously appointed special administrator Phil Trust Company to resign and reconsidering Sebastian Palancas appointment. ISSUE: Can the court appoint as special administrator any person other than the executor named in the will? Who should be appointed special admin. in this case? HELD: YES, but only if there is no reasonable objection. Ramon Ozaeta. 1. Roxas v Pecson: Despite the silence of the rules regarding who may be appointed as special administrator, the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. 2. Hence, the choice of the person lies within the court's discretion. BUT such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. 3. When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application. Reasons: a) The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. b) The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. (In re Erlanger's Estate) 4. If the new special administrator appointed by the respondent judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration as that imposed by the Phil Trust Company.

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NGO THE HUA V CHUNG KIAT HUA (1963) LABRADOR, J. FACTS: Two oppositors challenge Ngo The Huas petition to be appointed administratrix as surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu: 1) Chung Kiat Hua, et al. claiming to be the children of the deceased and alleging that Ngo The Hua is morally and physically unfit to execute the duties of the trust as administratrix, and that she and the deceased have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan, and 2) Chung Kiat Kang claiming to be the nephew of the deceased. Chung Kiat Kang appealed when Chung Kiat Hua was appointed administrator by arguing that the declaration of heirs shall only take place after all debts, expenses and taxes have been paid" in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 91, RoC. ISSUE: Did the lower court erred in passing upon the validity of the divorce and upon the filiation of Chung Kiat Hua, et al.? HELD: NO.
1.

2.

3.

4.

Nowhere from said section (Sec. 1, Rule 91, RoC) may it be inferred that the court cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of these obligations. The court in making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to make a declaration of heirs. It was deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of the parties, as advanced by petitioner and the oppositors-appellees, to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the order preference established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. What the lower court actual decided and what we also decide is the relationships between the deceased and the parties of claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not who are his heirs who are entitled to share in his estate. The appellant not having any interest in Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as he now prays. An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a certain claim against the estate, such as a creditor.

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TORRES V JAVIER (1916) MORELAND, J. FACTS: Two women were claiming to be the legal wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic Marta Torres and Yu Teng New. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator Juan L. Javier. ISSUES and RULING:
1.

2.

3.

WON the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in the proceeding NO. Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo appeared in those proceedings, apparently representing the interests of Yu Teng New, the alleged Chinese wife of the deceased. Messrs. Crossfield & O'Brien, attorneys for the appellee in this case, appeared for the alleged Chinese wife and acted in conjunction with Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo in protecting her interests. WON the court erred in taking into consideration the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese wife in China. The probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. WON the court erred in not finding that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic. NO. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.

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TORRES AND DE JESUS V SICAT VDA. DE MORALES (1953) BENGZON, J. FACTS: Jose Torres, alleging to be a creditor, commenced this special proceeding in the Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the purpose of settling the estate of the deceased Luis Morales. The respondent widow voiced her opposition, and claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. ISSUE: Who should be appointed as administratrix? Can the respondent widow be appointed despite her hostility to the creditors by consistently refusing to recognize the credits? HELD: Respondent widow. YES. Applicable rule: Section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court 1. The administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical to the interests of the creditors. 2. But by creditors we mean those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully established, they are not "creditors" within the purview of the above principle. So it is not improper it is even proper for the administrator to oppose, or to require competent proof of claims advanced against the estate. 3. The widow practically did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. 4. Under Rule 87, creditors claims may be filed, and considered, only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute. THUS, since her attitude to creditors was not antagonistic and she is fully competent in a high degree to administer the estate, she has the superior right to be appointed as administratrix.
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DE GUZMAN V LIMCOLIOC (1939) AVANCEA, C.J. FACTS: Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased Proceso de Guzman, was contesting the grant of letters of appointment as ad ministratrix to one of the deceaseds children, Nicolasa de Guzman on the ground of her preference as the widow. ISSUE: Should the widow be appointed administrator by virtue of her preference in the Rules? HELD: NO. RULE: The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than surviving spouse. In this case,
1.

2.

3.

Nicolasa de Guzman, in her application for her appointment, alleged that during the marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. When Angela asked for the reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering them when it denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of Nicolasa. If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no betterment.

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Rule 79 DURAN V DURAN (1967) BENGZON, J.P., J. FACTS: Subsequent to Pio Durans death, one of his brothers, Cipriano Duran, executed executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedents estate in favor of Josefina Duran, Pios surviving spouse. However, a year later, Cipriano filed a petition for intestate proceedings and asking to be administrator. When challenged by Josefina as not an interested person, he alleged that the deed of assignment was procured by fraud with gross inadequacy of price and lesion. Miguel Duran filed a petition to be joined as co-petitioner. ISSUE: WON Cipriano Duran is an interested person so as to file the petition for settlement of estate HELD: NO.
1.

2.

3.

The cited In re Irene Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings, properly and validly commenced. In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. In the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective a gainst him, so that he is left without that interest in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings.

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Rule 80 DE GUZMAN V GUADIZ (1980) FERNANDEZ, J. FACTS: When Catalina Bajacan died, petitioner filed for the probate of her will where petitioner was named executor. Private respondents opposed contending that all the real properties of the deceased are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. Petitioners motion for the appointment of special administrator was denied since the properties are in the possession of the oppositors. ISSUE: WON a special administrator should be appointed HELD: YES. 1. Rule 80, Sec 1, RoC: by any cause includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator. 2. Reason for appointing special administrator to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs 3. Facts in this case justifying the appointment of a special administrator: (a) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win. (b) The basis of respondents' claim to the estate and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. (c) The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private respondents is to appoint a special administrator who will have the personality to file an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation. 4. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special administrator. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. The accountability which the court which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the personal possession of private respondents.

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RELUCIO V SAN JOSE (1952) PARAS, C.J. FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as administratrix of the testate estae of Felipe Relucio, Sr. 25 years after however, CFI Manila appointed Rolando Relucio, an heir, as administrator in substitution of petitioner. Rolando moved for immediate execution pending appeal by petitioner, but the court did not pass upon it. The court instead appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator pending appeal. ISSUE: WON it was proper to appoint a special administrator HELD: NO. 1. The present situation is not one of the cases in which a special administrator may be appointed in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court or in section 8 of Rule 87. 2. There is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix:
a.

b.

The motion for immediate execution by Rolando was in effect denied, with the result that the petitioner must be deemed as having the right to continue as administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of. It is noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix but as executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio is not for any cause, but is based solely on the circumstance that Rolando Relucio is an heir.

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HON. ALCASID, ET AL. V SAMSON, ET AL. (1957) REYES, J.B.L., J. FACTS: The CFI granted respondents application for issuance of letters of administration in favour of Jesus V. Samson. Petitioners opposed and asked that Josefina N. Samson be appointed instead. Judge Alcasid appointed Antonio Conda as regular administrator and ordered the special administrator to turn over all properties and funds of the estate. Respondents filed an appeal. ISSUE: WON the order appointing Conda was stayed by the appeal taken against it HELD: NO. 1. Roxas v Pecson: As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. 2. The order appointing the regular administrator and thus superseding the special administrator is in accordance with Rule 81, Sec3, RoC. 3. The conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and the prompt settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed. 4. Even assuming that Cotia v Pecson is applicable considering that it involved a regular, not a special administrator, the present case complied Rule 39, Sec2 (execution pending appeal). The order that required the special administrator to turn over the properties and funds of the estate to the regular administrator, was in effect a special order for the carrying out of the regular administration. The special reasons for immediately carrying the order into effect are given in the order of March 12, as supplemented by that of May 9, 1956. The element that gives validity to an order of immediate execution is the existence of good reasons, if they may be found distinctly somewhere in the record, although not expressly stated in the order of execution itself.

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DE GUZMAN V ANGELES (1988) GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: The lower court appointed Elaine de Guzman, surviving spouse, as special administrator of the estate of Manolito de Guzman and ordered militarymen and/or policemen to assist her in preserving the estate. However, petitioner vehemently resisted when the deputy sheriffs tried to take the subject vehicles alleged to be properties of the deceased on the ground that they were his personal properties. Petitioner filed the instant petition to annul the orders of the lower court. ISSUE: WON a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the decedent even before the probate court causes notices to be served upon all interested parties. HELD: NO. 1. Applicable rule: Sec 3, Rule 79, RoC. Eusebio v Valmores: Where no notice has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. In the instant case, no notice was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions for the appointment of special administratrix, issuance of a writ of possession and assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman. 2. The explanation by the respondent judge that it would be to the best interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third person does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If indeed the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. 3. It is not clear exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records. 4. The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.

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GARCIA V FULE (1976) MARTIN, J. FACTS: Virginia G. Fule filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI Calamba, Laguna for the settlement of the estate of Amado Garcia. She claimed that Amado was a property owner of Calamba, Laguna. This was opposed by Preciosa Garcia on the grounds of absence of jurisdiction and notice upon persons interested, among others. Virginia filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that Amados last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna. This was also opposed by Preciosa. ISSUE: Who should be special administrator? HELD: Preciosa Garcia, the widow of the deceased. 1. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 2. Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 3. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. Documents considered by the Court: a. Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia where he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia b. Certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970 where he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 4. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

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PIJUAN V VDA. DE GURREA (1966) CONCEPCION, C.J. FACTS: Carlos Gurrea left a last will and testament naming Marcelo Pijuan as executor and disinheriting his wife Mrs. Gurea and their son. Pijuans appointment as special administrator was being challenged by Mrs. Gurrea by claiming that she has a right of preference as widow of he deceased under Sec 6, Rule 78, RoC. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in denying Mrs. Gurreas petition for appointment as administratrix HELD: NO 1. Applicable rule: Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate. a. Carlos did not die intestate. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. b. said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof c. it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor d. has also expressly accepted it by applying for his appointment as executor 2. The preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

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CORONA V CA (1982) MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Dolores Vitug died and left two wills disinheriting her husband Romarico and appointing Rowena Corona as executrix. Upon petition by Rowena who was then employed in New York City, Nenita Alonte was appointed as special administrator. Romarico, et al. filed an Opposition claiming that the special administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs, has no interest to be protected, and that the surviving spouse is qualified to administer. The probate court then appointed Romarico as special administrator. ISSUE: Who should be appointed as special administrator? HELD: Nenita Alonte. 1. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest consideration. 2. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. 3. Special Administrators, while they may have respective interests to protect, are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.

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MATIAS V GONZALES (1957) CONCEPCION, J. FACTS: After successfully opposing the probate of the will of her cousin Gabina Raquel, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez as special administrator. The court granted the motion and appointed Basilia Salud, to be assisted by her niece Victorina Salud, and Ramon Plata as co-administrators. Aurea Matias opposed as the universal heiress instituted in the will by alleging that she had a special interest to be protected and hence must be represented in the management, and that the RoC do not permit the appointment of more than one administrator. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Basilia, Victorina, and Ramon as special administrators were proper HELD: NO. 1. Petitioner Aurea Matias was denied due process: a) The motion for removal of Horacio was received only after setting the hearing, b) the notice of order postponing the hearing was not served, c) petitioner had no notice that Basilia and Victorina would be considered for the management of the estate. 2. Aurea Matias has as the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument a special interest to protect during the pendency of said appeal. The order denying probate is not, as yet, final and executor due to the appeal taken by Aurea Matias. 3. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. 4. There are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special co-administrators. Roxas v Pecson is not squarely in point because in that case, there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators.

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ROXAS V PECSON (1948) FERIA, J. FACTS: The petitioner Natividad Vda. De Roxas was appointed special administrator of the estate of her deceased husband Pablo M. Roxas in the probate proceedings, over the objection of Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother of the deceased. However, respondent judge denied probate of the court and appointed petitioner as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas. ISSUE: WON the appointment of 2 special administrators, one for the conjugal properties and the other for the paraphernal properties of the deceased, was proper HELD: NO.
1. 2.

3.

The petitioner widow has the same beneficial interest after the decision disapproving the will because the decision is not yet final and executor as it is on appeal. Even if the will is not probated, petitioners beneficial interest is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof. The petitioner being entitled to onehalf in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in administering the entire estate correctly. The respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two separate special administratices of the estate of the decedent. a. Sec2, Rule 75: administration of community property in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. The estate of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered, liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as determined after the liquidation thereof. b. Art 1422 & 1423, CC: the exclusive property of the husband may only be liquidated after the dowry and paraphernal properties of the wife and the obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid. c. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator.

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ANDERSON V PERKINS (1961) REYES, J.B.L., J. FACTS: The court appointed Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins. 2 years later, Enrile submitted a petition to sell or donate certain personal effects of the deceased allegedly deteriorating physically and in value. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased, opposed on the ground that, among others, most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in approving the proposed sale HELD: NO. 1. Sec 2, Rule 81. The special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only. 2. The function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property. HOWEVER, until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential houses so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

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LIWANAG V REYES (1964) REGALA, J. FACTS: When mortgagor Pio D. Liwanag died, the mortgagee Rotegaan Financing instituted a complaint for foreclosure against the estate of the deceased and prayed for the appointment of a receiver. The special administrator Gliceria Liwanag opposed claiming that she may not be sued as special administrator and property subject of foreclosure proceedings is in custodial egis due to the pending settlement proceedings. ISSUES and RULING: 1. WON petitioner can be sued as special administrator YES a. Respondent has chosen second remedy in Sec 1, Rule 86 for creditors holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage. b. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. c. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. 2. WON the appointment of a receiver is proper YES. It was the will of the deceased himself, as stated in the contract of mortgage, that, in case of foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected by the administratrix of the estate.

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JUNQUERA V BORROMEO, ET AL. BAUTISTA, J. FACTS: Junquera was appointed special administrator of the estate of Vito Borromeo. However, respondents filed a motion for Junqueras removal due to his failure to submit an inventory and deposit all income in the bank or with the clerk of court. Although Junquera alleged that such failure was due to the opposition of the heirs of the deceased, Junquera still submitted an inventory and report. The court decided to remove Junquera. ISSUE: Has Junquera complied with his duty make a true inventory of the estate and truly account four such as received by him pursuant to Sec 4, Rule 82? HELD: NO. 1. Despite 7 months after assuming office, he appears not to have taken any step to determine the property belonging to the estate and to file an inventory with the court. 2. Although Sec 4, Rule 82 does not fix any period, the duty to submit an inventory has to be performed within a reasonable period, if not as soon as practicable, in order to preserve the estate and protect the heirs. 3. His claim that the papers and documents were in the possession of one of the heirs claiming to be the owner of of the conjugal properties is too flimsy. His duty is to inform the court of such opposition on order that the latter may give whatever advice may be necessary. 4. The account submitted at the last hour is unsatisfactory. There is an intimation that the special administrator has never been allowed by the legatees of the will, who are in actual possession of the estate, to take possession thereof or collect rentals. 5. Junqueras designation in the will as executor cannot give him any preference or advantage until after the will is admitted to probate. The appointment and removal of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court.

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Rule 81 COSME DE MEDOZA V PACHECO AND CORDERO (1937) LAUREL, J. FACTS: Due to the previous administrators (Manuel Soriano) failure to turn over a certain sum belonging to the estate of Baldomero Cosme, the new administrator Rosario Cosme filed for the execution of the bond. After a settlement agreement, the remaining indebtedness was P5,000. The administrator moved to levy the property of the sureties and was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. However, upon remand to the lower court, respondents are now challenging for the first time the jurisdiction of the probate court. ISSUE: WON the probate court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the administrators bond HELD: YES. 1. By necessary and logical implication from the probate courts all-embracing power over the administrators bond and over administration proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. 2. Sec 683, Code of Civil Procedure: a surety may be admitted as a party in accounting the account of an executor or administrator and has the right to appeal. From this it could be inferred a surety may be charged with liability upon the bond during the process of accounting within the recognized confines of probate proceedings. 3. There is general tendency, in the absence of express and specific restrictions to the contrary, to uphold the exercise by these courts of incidental powers as are reasonably necessary to enable them to accomplish the objects for which they were invested with jurisdiction and to perfect the same. 4. The tendency in the US has been towards enlargement of the powers of the probate court. 5. Besides, appellants should have raised the question before in the previous proceedings or appealing from the order dated Nov4, 1942.

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WARNER, BARNES & CO., LTD., V LUZON SURETY CO., INC. (1956) PARAS, C.J. FACTS: Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for the recovery of an amount of money as its duly approved claim against the estate of Aguedo Gonzaga. Defendant was the surety of the bond executed by the administratrix who violated the conditions of the bond. The CFI rendered a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff. ISSUES and RULING: 1. WON it is the probate court which has jurisdiction to pass upon a suretys liability under the bond, and not the lower court (citing Mendoza v Pacheco) NO. It was not held therein that the matter may not be litigated in an ordinary civil action before the CFI. 2. WON the administratrix made a return of the war damage payments and that she wasnt authorized to pay the claims of plaintiff Such allegations of failure to file an inventory and pay plaintiffs claim are factual and remained uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which the appellant could have easily filed. 3. Won the bond was executed in favour of the Republic of the Phils and should be enforced in the administration proceedings where it was filed. NO. The bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees, and creditors of the estate of the deceased. There is no reason why a creditor may not directly enforce said bond in his name. 4. Won plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga in conformity with Sec6, Rule 87, RoC NO. a. This defense was not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; hence deemed waived. b. When the present complaint was filed, there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate. Sec6, Rule 87 is not applicable.

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LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. V QUEBRAR (1984) MAKASIAR, J. FACTS: In consideration of plaintiffs suretyship on the administrators bond of defendant Quebrar, defendant and Kilayko executed 2 indemnity agreements where they solidarily agreed to pay premiums to plaintiff. In the administration proceedings, the court approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of defendant. Since defendant ceased paying the premiums and documentary stamp tax in 1955, plaintiff moved for the cancellation of the executors bond. The CFI cancelled the bonds. ISSUE: WON the administrators bond were in force and effect after the approval of the Project of Partition HELD: YES. 1. It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957. Administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. 2. Montemayor v Gutierrez: An estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings. 3. The term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants. 4. The Indemnity Agreements are clear that the agreements were attached to be made an integral part of the special proceedings. To separately consider these two agreements would then be contrary to the intent of the parties in making them integrated as a whole.

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