Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No.

L-363 July 31, 1962

strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted." It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said: We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191. And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States." The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent. Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint. Nestor M. Andrada for respondent. MAKALINTAL, J.: Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429. The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to

degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers. Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1174 February 27, 1976 LUZON MAHOGANY TIMBER INDUSTRIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTORNEY MANUEL REYES CASTRO, respondent. RESOLUTION

Resolved: (a) to require respondent Castro to [explain] such failure; and (b) to [file] said comment with warning that disciplinary action will be taken against him should be fail to do so, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof. 1 His explanation was duly filed on January 9, 1975. He alleged that while he was desirous to comply with his obligation to file such comment, he was unable to do so "because of some tragedy in the family. 2 Reference was then made to the following: "Respondent's sister, Mrs. Lourdes Castro-Soriano, suffered a nervous breakdown (bordering on insanity) and respondent had to go to Pangasinan to fetch her for hospitalization in the city. Added to this was the fact that his aged parents, Mr. and Mrs. Claudio Castro, Sr. and Marciana Reyes-Castro, also suffered from several ailments which required the personal attention of the respondent as he alone, among his parents' children, could be of help due to his residence being here in Quezon City where hospital facilities are available. 3 He would stress, however, that it was his intention "to file such comment to show his innocence. 4There was likewise the submission that "he met the officials and counsel of the complainant, and it appears that complainant is inclined to withdraw or cause the dismissal of the instant complaint after respondent had a change [sic] of views with them regarding the circumstances of the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q17383 in the CFI of Quezon City. 5 1. This Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of the explanation. It does not suffice, however, for exculpation. As far as the effort to help his sister, who suffered a nervous breakdown, is concerned, his omission is excusable. Nor can fault be attributed to him if he took time to attend to the needs of his aged parents, likewise the victims of "Several ailments, Insofar however as he would predicate his neglect because of alleged professional problems consisting of court attendance and preparation of motions, respondent ought to have been aware that such a manifestation does not help his cause at all. This is not the first time a member of the bar has been told in no uncertain terms that in view of the hierarchy in the judicial system in the Philippines, it is, to say the least, a deplorable lack of common sense on the part of a member of the bar taken to task if this Court is to be given the least attention. He should be aware likewise that what is involved is his own standing in the legal profession, presumably, until this incident, one as yet unblemished. Nor could he expect approbation when instead of doing what is required of him by this Court, he would readily assume that just because complainant "was inclined to withdraw or cause the dismissal of the instant complaint," he was free to disregard a duty that ought to have been fulfilled. He has the temerity to speak of professional obligations. He must be reminded that as an officer of the Court, he is likewise called upon to discharge certain responsibilities. When therefore he would assert with all confidence that "he is not guilty of any act or omission as will justify the imposition of disciplinary action," he is very much mistaken. It is this Court, not his deficient sense of what duty requires, that is controlling. Accordingly, punishment should be imposed. It is only

FERNANDO, J.: It was the dismissal of an administrative complaint for disbarment on the ground of its being premature against respondent Manuel Reyes Castro, a member of the Philippine Bar charged with malpractice and gross misconduct for allegedly assisting a third party in a dishonest and illegal ,,scheme, and his failure to file a comment on a motion for reconsideration that led to the resolution of this Court of December 18, 1974. It is of the following tenor: "For failure of respondent Castro to file comment on the motion of complainant for reconsideration of the resolution of April 5, 1973 which dismissed the herein complaint for disbarment, the Court

the realization that his negligence could also be attributed to the commendable concern for the welfare of his aged parents and his ailing sister that has led this Court to limit the penalty to reprimand. 2. As far as the motion for reconsideration for complainant is concerned, there is nothing therein that would in any way militate against the conclusion reached by this Court in dismissing it "without prejudice to its being filed after the termination of the pending civil case," reference being made-to Civil Case Q-17383 of Quezon City. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of complainant is denied. Respondent Manuel Reyes Castro is reprimanded, his explanation of the failure to submit the comment required of him being only partially satisfactory. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record. Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Resolution dated December 18, 1974. 2 Explanation, par. III. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, par. IV. 5 Ibid, par. V.

order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below. Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no accompanying copy of the petition has been attached thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be able to prepare the comments of the respondents as directed in said resolution without said copy." filed his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from receipt of such petition within which to submit respondents' comment. The Court granted such first extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972. Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion for extension of ten days from December 15, 1972 within which to submit respondents' comment on the ground "2. That Atty. L.C. Delante, counsel of record, got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to work as yet" as per verified medical certificate attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has just recovered from his ailment, and has requested the undersigned to specially make this motion for another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents." Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972. The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12, 1973, the Court as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required comment. Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez." Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan. 15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December 12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and subsequently operated on for

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-35766 July 12, 1973 LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, BR. 1, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN CO., INC., respondents. Ortile Law Office for petitioners. Delante, Orellan and Associates for private respondents. R E S O L U T I O N TEEHANKEE, J.: The Court imposes a three-months suspension from the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful disregard of his solemn duty to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining

sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Caeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R. No. L35766 from me." Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called "affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Caeda, president and general manager of respondent Grecan Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez "to prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-called "affidavit" is however not sworn to before any official authorized to administer oaths but merely carries the statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are true and correct as what actually transpired" under the signature of one Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-Treasurer)." Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and without blinking an eye notwithstanding that the required comment has long been overdue for almost four months at the time that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the respondents." Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents' comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court. In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court took action on the petition and dismissed the same for insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due course from any adverse decision on the merits being the merits being the proper and adequate remedy. The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's explanation which the Court finds to be unsatisfactory. Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his clients at his instance because of his pressing professional commitments "to do so, because of a surgical operation," is unworthy of credence because it is contrary to the facts of record: In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated allegation now that another lawyer had been retained to file the required comment, and no other lawyer, much less Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein on behalf of respondents; In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;" In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and cited "pressure

of work in his office" and the Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this Court; His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline on January 12, 1973; Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records of the case had been given to the former, for Atty. Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Caeda of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital (sometime between December 23-26, 1972) he advised Caeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and Caeda got back the records of the case from him; He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his "final draft of the desired comments" was "already prepared" since year-end of 1972 and only had to be "finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six months and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7, 1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12, 1973; and He likewise submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that the required comment was filed within the last extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured by him from the Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready and did nothing for three months until after he received the Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation. The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove. Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is

good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients. The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3 The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4 Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part." Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank. Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359; to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538360; and to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. SO ORDERED. 1 On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accusedappellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. xxx xxx xxx The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5 ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result. Footnotes 1 Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 7; Rollo p. 14; italics supplied. 2 146 SCRA 323 (1986). 3 146 SCRA at 338 and 340. 4 Administrative Case No. 2104, promulgated 24 August 1989. 5 Id., slip op., p. 16; italics supplied. FIRST DIVISION [A C. No. 3919. January 28, 1998] SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a businesswoman, against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law. Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was

following up the documents for her shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs such as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division, and OIC of the Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to give her some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a month after, or in November of the same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from complainantP120,000.00 with the promise to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that he could use his influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation, respondent issued to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December 1989 for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4 December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January 1990 for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C," "D," respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No. 051946 dated 9 January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks covering the total amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account. Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car.[1] As complainant agreed respondent handed her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of the deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the same car to another. Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade complainant altogether so that she was constrained to write him a final demand letter dated 22 September 1992[2]preceding the filing of several criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22.[3] Complainant also filed a letter- complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman.[4] It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil cases against respondent similarly involving money transactions.[5] Ms. Ortiz claimed that respondent had volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the holidays. However, despite her successive payments to respondent totalling P410,000.00, the latter failed to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's personal check for P410,000.00 representing reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was returned dishonored for insufficiency of funds. By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by way of rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her. He brushed aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague, confusing, misleading and full of biases and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated a special relationship with the two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings with them. On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this

administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings 1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of the subject checks has been paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the complainant; 2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject bouncing checks and wherein he was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation but rather that 'private complainant knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank; and 3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated 26 August 1995 x x x and the release of real estate mortgage x x x x If it is true that he had already paid his obligation with five (5) cellular phones, why pay again? The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his nonprofessional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]). The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.[6] While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. Thus we held in Lizaso v. Amante[7] where Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of 10% profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof (P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes

which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x x The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him x x x x[8] Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo[9] where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him x x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."[10] Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly deserves. His propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier attitude towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them is reprehensible. This disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of

law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. [1] Exh. "F", complainant's Offer of Exhibits, p. 32 [2] Exh. "I," id., pp. 35-36. [3] Crim. Cases Nos. 99914-99918, Exhs. "M" to "Q," id., pp. 62-71. [4] Exh. "W," id., pp. 77-80. [5] Annex "J," IBP Records, Vol. III, pp. 3738. [6] Report and Recommendation, Adm. Case No. 3919. [7] Adm. Case No. 2019, 3 June 1991, 198 SCRA 1. [8] Id., pp. 9-11. [9] 58 Phil. 350 (1933). [10] Id., pp. 351352. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 126 October 24, 1952

Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as lawyer. Moral turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.) Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private person, but the Government. Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and he is hereby directed to surrender to this Court his lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this resolution shall have become final. So ordered. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 516 June 27, 1967

In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero. Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf. PARAS, C.J.: The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment against Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31, 1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been found in a final decision rendered by then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated the customs law by fraudulently concealing a dutiable importation, was fined in an amount equal to three times the customs duty due on a piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was subsequently found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October 28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R. No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent practice against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code." The respondents admits the existence of the of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and his conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession.

TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner, vs. ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent. Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,. Ramirez for investigators. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo1 upon a verified letter- complaint of the petitioner, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the former with "having committed false statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan. On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent, because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which

reason the investigating fiscal considered the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross misconduct. No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or admitted: On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose Malimit of the same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances, educational attainment, civil service eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads: Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the details of case and the final outcome.)" to which respondent answered, "None." Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied for. However, on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646) for illegal possession of explosive powder.2 Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as a member of the Philippine bar. In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was made in good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal or police record.1wph1.t The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and devoid of legalism hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it asked for records "which did not reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to the question as referring to final judgments or convictions. Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained of was committed on 17 January 1959. Without explaining

how and upon what authority, respondent invokes the defense of prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434). Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground for disbarment in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399). Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information sheet is not required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the point. The issue is whether or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence against him of any criminal or police record, including those that did not reach the court. In this, he did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own favor. He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to a member of the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one higher than that of the market place. The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from his Court. For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur. Footnotes *The "Resolution of the Court on the " Motion for Reconsideration" was promulgated on August 30, 1967 and is printed in this volume. 1Admitted to the Bar on 7 February 1965.

2The information bears data of 3 July 1958 (Exh. "B-1"). **16 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 623. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 289 November 29, 1962

MERCEDES AGDOMA, EUGENIA AGDOMA and PEDRO AGDOMA, petitioners, vs. ATTY. ISAIAS A. CELESTINO, respondent. PADILLA, J.: This is a disbarment proceeding against Isaias A. Celestino for malpractice and misconduct as a lawyer and notary public. The complainants Mercedes Agdoma, Eugenia Agdoma and Pedro Agdoma are aunts and uncle of respondent Isaias A. Celestino, his deceased mother Eulogia Agdoma being the sister of the former. Both the complainant and the respondent, in representation of his late mother Eulogia, are the heirs of the late Julian Agdoma, the complainants' father and the respondent's grandfather. Julian Agdoma left a parcel of land situated in barrio San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, registered in his name under original certificate of title No. 62507. On 23 July 19 Julian Agdoma died in Lambayong, Cotabato (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). On 9 March 1956 Anastasia Cabatic, Julian's wife, died in Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit C). On or after 16 August 1955 Isaias A. Celestino filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an ex-partepetition in behalf of the late Julian Agdoma. In said petition he represented that his late grandfather was alive and that the latter's copy of original certificate of title No. 62507 had been burned by fire that razed to the ground his (Julian's) house in San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan and prayed that the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan be directed to issue another duplicate copy thereof. (Exhibit E-1). The respondent supported the petition by an affidavit purportedly subscribed and sworn to by the deceased Julian Agdoma on 16 August 1955 before him (the respondent) as notary public (Exhibit E-2). On 17 August 1955 Judge Jesus P. Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan entered an order granting the petition and directing the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan to issue another owner's duplicate of certificate of title No. 62507 (Exhibit F). Two days before the respondent filed the ex parte petition asking for a new copy of original certificate of title No. 62507, it was made to appear that for and in consideration of P1,000 Julian Agdoma had sold the lot described in the original

certificate of title No. 62507 to the respondent in a deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) purportedly acknowledged before notary public Julio B. Pequet who, however, turned out to be a fictitious or nonexistent notary public in and for the province of Pangasinan (Exhibits I and J). By virtue of said sale, on 17 August 1955 the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan cancelled original certificate of title No. 62507 in the name of Julian Agdoma and in lieu thereof issued transfer certificate of title No. 18925 in the name of respondent Isaias A. Celestino (Exhibit H). Afterwards, the respondent mortgaged the parcel of land for P425 to the Dagupan City branch of the Philippine National Bank. Until now the loan still is unpaid. On 14 February 1957 the complainants filed in this Court a complaint praying for the disbarment of Isaias A. Celestino. On 19 February 1957 this Court ordered the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from notice. On 15 March the respondent in his behalf filed an answer denying all the material averments of the complaint. On 18 March this Court passed a resolution referring the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 30 April, the Solicitor General forwarded the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan for investigation, report and recommendation. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan set the hearing of the case for 26 April 1957, which was postponed to 9 May 1957. At the hearing held on 9 May, the respondent did not appear. The officer serving summons and notices certified that the respondent refused to sign the notice. The fiscal considered such refusal as a waiver by the respondent of his right to be present at the investigation. When the fiscal was preparing a report on case based on the evidence presented by the complainants, Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on 10 June 1957 formally entered his appearance for the respondent and requested that the case be immediately set for hearing. The respondent expressed in writing his consent to the appearance of and motion by Attorney Abenojar to set the case for hearing. The fiscal granted request and set the hearing for 26 July 1957 with a warning that no further postponement would be granted. At the hearing held on 26 July, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared. Instead, the latter filed a motion for postponement, alleging that the respondent and the complainants, being blood relatives, might settle amicably. This last motion was granted and the fiscal set the investigation for 20 August 1957 with a warning of no further postponement. Again, the respondent or lawyer did not appear at the hearing on 20 August. Forthwith, the fiscal rendered a report finding the respondent Isaias A. Celestino guilty of malpractice an commending to the Solicitor General that the corresponding charges for disbarment be filed against him (respondent Celestino). On 22 June 1959, the Solicitor General filed in Court a formal complaint against Isaias A. Celestino malpractice and breach of professional ethics. Letters and

communications sent by this Court to the respondent directing him to answer the complaint filed by the Solicitor General were all returned undelivered or unserved, because the respondent could not be located at his given address at San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record in the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan also required to answer, but instead of answering, he requested that he be relieved as counsel for the respondent. At the oral argument of the case before this Court on 14 December, Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar appeared the respondent. The Court ordered the respondent self to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argumentation. The oral and documentary evidence points unerringly to the guilt of respondent Isaias A. Celestino as charged. The ex-parte petition wherein he sought another owner's duplicate of original certificate of title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma, his grandfather, whom he knew had been dead since 23 July 1945, and the affidavit which he (the respondent) represented to have been subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma before him (the respondent) as notary public, thus making it appear that his late grandfather was alive, and which he used to support the ex-parte petition, are clear evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a wanton falsehood in court. And this wanton disregard for truth and honesty is aggravated by his forging or simulating a deed of sale of the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 62507 executed in his favor by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when he (the respondent) knew that his grandfather had been dead ten years before and therefore could not have executed the deed of sale. To lend to this concoction a semblance of legality, the respondent made it appear that Julian Agdoma, appeared and acknowledged the sale before one Julio B. Pequet supposedly a notary public. But it clearly has been shown that said Julio B. Pequet was a non-existent or fictitious notary public. The residence certificate No. A- 3609899 issued at Alcala, Pangasinan, on 14 February 1955, which the respondent attributed to pertain to and to have been exhibited by the late Julian Agdoma in swearing before him (the respondent) supporting affidavit to the ex-parte petition seeking an owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title No. 62507 and in acknowledging the deed of sale before the fictitious notary public Julio B. Pequet is another evidence showing the respondent's propensity to commit falsehood, because the said residence certificate does not belong to Julian Agdoma but to one Mrs. Angela Eslava of Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit A). The clinching evidence of the respondent's guilt is the fact that after the ownership to the parcel of land had been transferred to him, he mortgaged it for P425 to the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City branch. The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could not be located at his known address without making his whereabouts known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense.

THEREFORE, the respondent Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the practice of the legal profession. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC December 7, 1928 In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf. City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.: The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario, has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report has been permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the report and to direct the setting aside of the suspension to practice law by the respondent, heretofore ordered by the court. Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence. The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the

members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.)1awphi1.net The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court. Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 195 January 31, 1958

It appears that sometime in January 1949 Manuel Quiambao, an agent of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company offered for sale to Pedro R. Peralta a parcel of land located in barrio Moriones, Tarlac, Tarlac containing an area of 44 hectares for P15,000. Peralta accepted the offer, and on 7 February 1949 he opened a checking account with the Tarlac branch of the Philippines National Bank by depositing therewith the sum of P11,000. With a cheek of P11,000 drawn upon the bank in Manila, Peralta and Manuel Quiambao proceeded to Manila and contacted Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao, brother of Manuel, at his house to seek his help in the purchase of the parcel of land. On 9 February Peralta and the two brothers cashed the check at the bank in Escolta and repaired to the law office of Honesto K. Bausa, attorney for the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company, at the Regina building, where upon reaching the door Peralta handed to Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao the sum of P11,000. Attorney Quiambao went inside the office of Attorney Bausa, where he stayed for about an hour, leaving Peralta at the door waiting for him. As he emerged from the law office, Attorney Quiambao told Peralta to wait for a while because "they will place your name in the title," and later on executed a document (Exhibit A), acknowledging receipt from Peralta of the sum of P12,000 to kept by the former as attorney-in-fact of the latter pending issuance of the title to the parcel of land. The receipt acknowledges the sum of P12,000, because Peralta had given Attorney Quiambao the sum of P1,000 as earnest money. Days passed and as Peralta d not receive the title to the period of land, he went to the office of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company to inquire to the parcel of land had already been issued in his name and there he learned from the bookkeeper of the company that the title had not yet been issued in his name. He then demanded the return of the sum of P12,000 from Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao b the later failed to return it to him. Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao does not deny having received the sum of P12,000 from Peralta, but claims that the same had been returned to him be installments through his brother Manuel Quiambao, who was Peralta's friend, and in whose house Peralta and his family lived; that he gave Attorney Bausa the sum of P500 as earnest money when they went to see hi that the balance of P12,000 was left in his custody; that Peralta was authorized to take possession of the property and make improvements on it pending actual transfer to him; that the balance of P11,500 in his (Attorney Quiambao's) custody was withdrawn from him by brother Manuel by authority of Peralta; that the first withdrawal in the sum of P3,000 was made sometime in the first week of March 1949, the second in the sum of P4,000 in April 1949, the third in the sum of P3,000 or P2,000 on or about the 24th of May, 1949, and the last for the balance of the sum, paid by his wife, sometime in June 1949; that he and his wife did not ask any receipt for all the withdrawals; that all these sums were spent to build an earth dam in the parcel of land, to hire a bulldozer, to buy seedlings, and to construct houses for 28 tenants, except the sum of P4,000, withdrawn by Manuel Quiambao by way of loan from Peralta, which the former promised to pay to the

In re: Attorney JESUS T. QUIAMBAO, respondent. Jose G. Gatchalian and Santiago F. Alidio for respondent. PADILLA, J.: On 17 May 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. No. 11104-R, Pedro R. Peralta, plaintiff appellee vs. Jesus T. Quiambao, defendant-appellant, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (case No. 1783) and transmitted the record of the case to this Court for whatever action it may deem proper, to take against Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao for having committed acts unbecoming a member of the Ba.

latter as soon as he would secure a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; that on 10 March 1950, a document (Exhibit 1) was signed by Jesus T. Quiambao, Pedro R. Peralta and Manuel Quiambao reciting, among others, that the sum of P12,000 in the custody of Attorney Quiambao was periodically withdrawn from him by Manuel Quiambao at the behest and/or with the knowledge and consent of Pedro R. Peralta; and that on that same day Pedro R. Peralta executed another document (Exhibit 2) releasing Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao from liability for the sum of P12,00 entrusted to him. It recites TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that I should collect the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS, (P12,000.00) from Mr. Manuel Quiambao, from the proceeds of the sale of his property, as satisfaction of the money receipted by Mr. Jesus T. Quiambao and withdrawn from him with my knowledge and consent. This is made in order to secure the realization of said sum from Mr. Manuel Quiambao exclusively. Manila, March 10, 1950 (Sgd.) PEDRO PERALTA The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao engineered the whole scheme to induce, through his brother Manuel, Pedro R. Peralta to purchase the parcel of land in question, knowing fully well that it was not for sale because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way succeeded in taking from Peralta the sum of P12,000 which he appropriated for his own use and benefit; that he fraudulently and maliciously induced Peralta to sign the document marked Exhibit 1, thereby relieving him from the obligation of paying the said sum to Peralta and at the same time caused the latter to execute another document marked Exhibit 2 where Peralta undertook to collect from Manuel Quiambao the whole sum of P12,00. The respondent attorney was required by this Court to answer the charges against him. In his answer he set up the same defenses he had set up in case No. 17837 of Court of First Instance of Rizal and CA-G.R. No. 11104-R of the Court of Appeals which were overruled by the two Court. By his acts the respondent has shown that he is unworthy to continue as a member of the Bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law. Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants, vs. ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent. Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez. Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital. Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM: This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's. Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338). Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).

Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him. The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are Judge Bernad's findings: The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild preeclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family. However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child. Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong. On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles. On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves. While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office. Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at

the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of them Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office. In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man. After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness. In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police. A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia. He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID." PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID". The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles,

was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V. On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia. At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse. Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record was actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation. He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established. He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never seen him before. He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber. In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).

That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent. While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical chart. Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was fruitless for he was never seen again. Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present. His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain his identity. In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross- examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript. When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk of court. His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.

On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that: Canon 1. . . . Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be illsuited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice." The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly. . . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.) . . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.) . . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR. Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.) WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., took no part. Padilla, J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 1037 December 14, 1998 VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, respondent. vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON,

PER CURIAM: To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, 1 it is

imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession. In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurreccion charged Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence case, in which Complaint Resurreccion was the defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complaint alleged that, pursuant to the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the Complaint for Disbarment. The records show that the Office of the Solicitor Genaral (OSG) conducted several hearings on the matter, during which the complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such hearings. He eventually appeared through his new counsel, Atty. Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973 Order, 2 deemed the investigation of the case terminated. But upon the motion of the respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set aside its earlier Order and once again set the case for a hearing of the former's evidence. Since, then, however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to submit its report and recommendation on the case. In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of the case, 3 and tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the investigation, of which both the complainant and the respondent were duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the pursuit of the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not be found. 4 In his Report, Commissioner Manalo presented the following facts. Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was accused of having converted and appropriated [for] his own personal benefit the amount P2,500.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the complainant to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence. xxx xxx xxx

settled on 8 August 1970 and respondent received from the complainant the amount of P2,500.00. Respondent allegedlly assured complainant that the sum [would] be delivered to his client Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in writing having received the amount of P2,500.00. Contrary however, to the assurances of the respondent, he had not delivered the said amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for which reason complainant was compelled to pay anew the heirs of the victim the amount P2,500.00. Demands were made for the respondent to return the said amount of P2,500.00 but the latter failed. By reason thereof, complaint filed a complaint for estafa against the respondent before the City Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ciriaco C. Sayson". In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant Victoriano P. Resurrection appeared assisted by his counsel. There was however, no appearance for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The investigator declared his failure to appear as a waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto Sr. was presented as witness. He testified that he [was] the father of Armando Basto Jr. who was ran over by a motor vehicle then driven by the respondent. By reason of such death a case was filed in court and he was represented by Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A settlement arrangement was arrived at and complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00 to the respondent for the latter to turn over the same to his client. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, however, failed to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00 to his client for which reason the case was not immediately dismissed. To effect dismissal of the case, complainant was forced to pay anew the sum of P2,500.00 Complainant was next presented as witness and the testified that on 30 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one armando Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence [,] and to effect settlement of that case he agreed to pay the amount of P2,500.00. On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his counsel conferred with [the] respondent in the latter's office at may Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila and in a conference, a settlement was arrived at whereby complainant [would] pay the amount of P2,500.00. This was done and payment was delivered to the respondent who acknowledged having received the said amount. Subsequently, complaint learned that the said amount of P2,500,00 was not delivered by respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father of the victim for which reason he was compelled to pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs of the victim. Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said amount of P2,500.00 from the respondent. Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times, Atty. Ciriaco C.

Complainat alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which occured at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City which involved a boy [named] the name of Armando Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By reason of the said incident, complainant was accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In the preliminary investigation, the father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto Sr., was represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was amicably

Sayson still failed to return the money. Thus, complainant filed a complaint for estafa which was elevated in Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 49358. A Decision finding respondent guilty of [the] crime of estafa was promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City.5 Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and recommendation in this wise: Complainant was able to establish by more than convincing that the misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent. This fact [is] eloquently poroven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of which were not controverted by the respondent. xxx xxx xxx

The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings and conclusion, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be disbarred. Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on September 20, 1973. 8 Such conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals 9 and upheld by this Court. 10 In In re Vinzon, 11 the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa and held that "moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals. In a more recent case, 12 the Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents, because the was "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In adopting, the recommendation, we held that "good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. 13 Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 14 However, in the present case, the Court notes that even if respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

In view of the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that the above-entitled case be endorsed by the Honorable Board Governors to the Supreme Court with the recommendation that the complain[ant be] disbarred and his name be stricken off . . . the roll of attorneys. xxx xxx xxx6

On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28, 1998, is worded as follows: RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202 Adm. Case No. 1037 Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs. Atty. Ciriaco C. sayson RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson is DISBARRED and . . . his name . . . stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been found guilty of Estafa promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City and [which] complainant was able to establish by more convincing evidences that misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent, all of which were not controverted by the respondent. 7

Davide, Jr. C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265; cited in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 214. 2 Issued by the investigating officer, Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo. 3 Largely due to Complainant Resurreccion's steadfast determination to pursue the case. He had written letters bewailing the delay in the resolution of the disbarment case and had submitted documents which he thought were necessary for the proper disposition of the case, which were either lost or misplaced at the Office of the Solicitor General. 4 All letters to Sayson were returned to the IBP. 5 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 36-38. 6 Ibid., p. 39. 7 Rollo, vol. I, p. 35. 8 The decretal part of the trial court's Decision, penned by Judge Pacifico I. Punzalan, reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the finds the accused Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa as charged in the information, defined and penalized under Article 315, sub-division three sub. par. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon him as penalty to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional as maximum to indemnify the offended party Victoriano Resurreccion in the sum of P2,500.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, together with all the accessory penaties of law, and to pay the costs (CA Decision , p. 1). 9 In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson, CA-GR. No. 15299-CR, the Court of Appeals (First Division, composed of Justice Roseller T. Lim, ponente; and Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Sixto A. Domondon, concurring) disposed of the case as follows: The failure, therefore, of appellant to produce the money when confronted at the Fiscal's Office or even when the present action was filed, is a clear indication of converting or misappropriating for his own use and benefit the money he received for his client. We agree with the conclusion of the lower court as follows:

From the facts of the above-entitled case, brought out during the trial by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence this court is of the view that when the accused received the amount of P2,500.00 in Manila from the offended party Resurreccion pursuant to the agreement reached by parties in Quezon City accused imposed upon himself the obligation and duty to deliver the said amount to his client Basto, Sr. in Quezon City. and should he fall to do so to return the said amount to Resurreccion, as borne out [by] the testimonies of Resurreccion and Atty. Umali. The failure of the accused to deliver the amount of P2,500.00 to Basto and the subsequent failure of the accused to return the said amount to Resurreccion coupled with his failure to give any reason for such failure despite demands, clearly show misappropriation or conversion of the money. This misappropriation or conversion or at least part thereof, as an essential ingredient of the offense of estafa occured in Quezon City. The fact that Resurreccion was constrained to pay Basto against the amount of P2,500.00 in order that the case against him would be dropped as it was indeed dropped, sufficiently prove[s] prejudice and damage on the part of the complainant Resurreccion. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgement appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the cost against appellant. (CA Decision, pp. 9-10). 10 Rollo, vol. I, p. 15. The Court's March 18, 1977 Resolution is worded thus: L-43834 (Atty. Ciriaco Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). Considering the grounds of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 20, 1976 which denied the petition for review oncertiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Solicitor General's comment thereon the Court Resolved to DENY the motion for lack of merit and this denial is FINAL. The Court of Appeals is directed to remand the records of this case to the trial court for prompt execution of judgment to the trial court and to submit to this Court proof of such remand, both within five (5) days from notice hereof. 11 19 SCRA 815, April 27, 1967. See also Medina v. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, September 26, 1964, and In Re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182, January 17, 1958. 12 Villanueva v. Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707, July 11, 1995. 13 Tapucar v. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998. 14 For example, in Castillo v. Taguines, 254 SCRA 554, March 11, 1996, the respondent who was accused of estafa by his client, was suspended for one year from the practice of law. Likewise, in Igual v. Javier (254 SCRA 416, March 7, 1996), suspended from the practice of law for one year was the respondent, who was accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated complainant's money in the amount of P7,000.00, allegedly paid as acceptance fee for a matter on which respondent never performed any work.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959). The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2). The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). xxx xxx xxx

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. BARRERA, J.: In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959). She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles

FINDINGS AND COMMENT There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor .... But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was

accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. xxx xxx xxx

removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys." In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed. On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows: ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles- Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her

RECOMMENDATION Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent

legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28- 29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:. ... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962). After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on

her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed. It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rulemaking power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair

private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and

dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735). The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.

SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days. The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation.. The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963

PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent. PADILLA, J.: This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court. On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint.3 The respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children is not true because her very informant, whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding. Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D.

Almonte and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which the complainant presented her evidence both oral and documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but reserved the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September 1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared and was given a period of 15 days within which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in reply. Section 6, Rule 128, provides: The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same. (Emphasis supplied)

The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer. Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in this Court. The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until about three or four months before his graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically mentioned that three days before the last examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they became actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either. Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to

call the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as operatormechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo." The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p. 14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying. Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge against

him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure, because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not. Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant. The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence. Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid, scant in education, and understands little English. She did not even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp and incisive questions propounded to her by the investigating Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her failure to understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a thorough examination by three lawyers and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted. The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in evidence during the investigation.

The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar.6 THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Bengzon, C.J., took no part. Footnotes 1He took and passed the bar examinations given by this Court in August 1949 (46 Off. Gaz. 4948, 4951) and was admitted to the practice of law on 16 May 1950 (47 Off. Gaz. 1221, 1226). 2In a letter dated 17 July 1956, she informed the Court that the respondent is employed in the Bureau of Lands and not in the Bureau of Mines. 3According to the respondent, he received notice of the order requiring him to answer the complaint on 18 September 1956. 4The complainant's letter dated 25 June 1956 was received in the Docket Section of this Court on 2 July 1956. It was returned to her because it was not duly sworn to before a person authorized to administer oath. On 9 July 1956 the complainant again filed in this Court the same letter duly sworn to before a notary public. 5Later on he transferred to the MLQ school of Law where he finished the law course. 6Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 December 1956 andSarmiento vs. Cui, Adm. Case No. 141, 29 March 1957. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant case. 3 On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4 In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy. The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992 DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum. On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner: Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she

likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 2829). 7 There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant. Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character. That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent

had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital. Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9 In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio- Herrera: It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11 In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13 We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Resolution, 16 June 1992. Rollo, p. 6. 2 Three (3) attempts were made by registered mail: the first two (2), at respondent's address at Abelardo Street, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, and the third, at respondent's employment address at Commission on Audit, Cadiz City. Another attempt was made at respondent's address at Bliss Project Daga, Cadig City, through the assistance of the P.C. Command at Bacolod City; and another at Lumbunao Calinog Sugar Mill, Iloilo (Court's Resolution dated 24 April 1985, Rollo, p. 47). 3 Resolution, 24 April 1985. Rollo, p. 52. 4 Rollo, p. 53. 5 Id., p. 70. 6 In his Answer with Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order, respondent Jordan Terre stated his address as "c/o 4th Floor, PAIC Building, 105 Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila." Court papers sent to him at that address were, however, returned unserved with the notation "not known at given address" (Rollo, p. 63). It thus appears that Jordan Terre once more submerged to evade service of legal papers on him. 7 Rollo, p. 73. 8 Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615 (1970); Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 37 SCRA 316 (1971); Wiegel v. Hon. Alicia Sempio-Diy, etc., et al, 143 SCRA 499 (1986). This rule has been cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209, dated 6 July 1987). 9 Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, 19 November 1991. 10 133 SCRA 309 (1984). 11 133 SCRA at 316. See also Cordova v. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680 (1989) and Laguitan v. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837 (1989). 12 16 SCRA 623 (1966). 13 16 SCRA 630. Search

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967 FLORA QUINGWA complainant, vs.

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child. That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent. A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed. This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents. Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant. Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent. REGALA, J.: On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, crossexamined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child. After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites: That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M. Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1wph1.t Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant. The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony. In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter

to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.) Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) . One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.

567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice. Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956

3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and respondent continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent, who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy her. On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of her complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her marriage to respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever". Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal profession 1, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer. On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his son Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said she knew all the time he was a married man. On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case. Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953. However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that she had asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable settlement with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as husband and wife, from April to November, 1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as a result she was on the family way. She also charged the respondent with having ordered his son, Cesar, to live with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living together". On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover up his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January 14, 1953; and,

JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner, vs. ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner. Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.: On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F. Aspiras, alleging substantially that: 1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and eventually won her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after December 31, 1952 upon being assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her husband; 4. on January

what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having sexual relations with the spouse of his own son. On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the Government prosecutor. He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he asked for, and was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any. At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a memorandum--which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is not sufficient ground for disbarment. In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable doubt the following facts: In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who represented himself as single, although he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with whom he had seven children. A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because without much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4 a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly promising marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the benefit of marriage she gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to have the marriage celebrated the following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching until the end of the school term. She stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City. Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the first time, she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two of them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband- to-be.

In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent to enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras. Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the ceremony, the two contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife. However, the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy on January 24, 1954. Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net . . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.) Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to you. (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.) And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953 Exhibits A-19 and A-21. Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to cover up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by turning him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities. But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with each other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited with the wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed. It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault in pari delicto, respondent suggests -- because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently ask for dismissal, the matter

may not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete defense 4 Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules which an attorney may be disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may removed from office on grounds other than those enumerated by the statutes. re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that principle in Balinon vs. Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583. for be (In De

1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of attorney by the Supreme Court on its own motion. (Section 1, Rule 128.). 1 Proceeding may be taken for removal of attorney by the Supreme Court on its own motion. (Section 1, Rule 128.). 2 Went through the motions of a marriage ceremony. 3 That is why Solicitor General intervenes. 4 Cf. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209. 5 Concubinage is not considered now, because his wife has not complained, and no criminal conviction has been obtained. 6 See People vs. Smith, 9 A.L.R. 183 (Ill.) and note at page 202. 7 See 7 C.J.S. p. 735 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989 ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent. Federico A. Blay for complainant. Luciano Babiera for respondent. RESOLUTION

In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . . and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.) As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to admission to the bar, and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of this court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a showing that he lacked the necessary qualification, so is its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R. 1361.) Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and on this we do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of the latter's honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the bar. 7 Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered. Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.lawphil.net

PER CURIAM: This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.

Footnotes

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality. On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows: EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that: 1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975); 2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975); 3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975); 4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ; 5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K- 1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975); 6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975); 7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975); 8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...; 10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ; 11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975); 12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975); 13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40) Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41). Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42). The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows: Edilberto Caban testified that: 1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977); 2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43). Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that: 1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43). The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him. In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit: From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him. It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 5559, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx xxx xxx On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years. On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69). On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75). After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself. While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced. It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court: When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]). The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47). On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic. We disagree. Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows: A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused. WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio- Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan (C.J.), took no part. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989 IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates." Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

PER CURIAM: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: NAME POSITION Atty. Violeta Drilon President Atty. Bella Tiro Executive VicePresident Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & VicePresident for Southern Luzon Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Courten banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oathtaking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x." Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments. II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP. In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to

conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify. The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus: "SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material; (b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal- size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections; (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof; (d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof; (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice- president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the

invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents. Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read: "Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating RAMON M. NISCE as National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________ Chapter Signature" Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.

Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person. Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04). (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2- Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates. Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118). Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549). Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon,

Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69). (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989. Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice- President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit MNisce). The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce). Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon. Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica). In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161). (5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates. (a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast. Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon. Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms. (b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract

that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta." Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza. Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment: (a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000 (b) Antonio Carpio 20,000 (c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000 (d) Jay Castro 10,000 (e) Danny Deen 20,000 (f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000 (g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000 (h) Cosme Rossel 15,300 (t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4) Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too. Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989). The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil

Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta. Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan. Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34). Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39). (c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE. Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45. Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo). As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy. The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By- Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho." He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May. Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room. Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves. (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28). She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non- election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws). On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and biodata. The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws). Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39). Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145). (10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vicechairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149). Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54). Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted

Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew. Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111) Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106). Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101- 104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce. Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce. He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101). SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers. He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group;

the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned

unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP ByLaws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive VicePresident to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew. 5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.' 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary- Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region. 10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph: No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities

attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION June 30, 1961 G.R. No. L-14066 VENANCIO CASTAEDA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. PASTOR D. AGO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Quijano and Azores and J.P. Arroyo for plaintiffs-appellees. Jose M. Luison for defendants-appellants. Dizon, J.: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May 30, 1957, and its order of March 7, 1958 (R.A. pp. 4658 & 156-157). The former sentenced appellant Pastor D. Ago as follows: . . . to return to the plaintiffs the three pieces of machinery described in the complaint or to pay them jointly and severally the sum of P30,000. Said defendants are also hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P1,750.00 for the month of August 3 to September 3, 1954 and from September 4, 1954 and until the three pieces of machinery are returned to the plaintiffs or paid them the sum of P30,000, the sum of P1,312.50 monthly, deducting therefrom the sum of P3,000.00 admitted by the plaintiffs to have been paid to them by the defendants, plus the sum of P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, with legal interest on all those amounts from the date the complaint was filed and until they are fully paid. Said defendants are also sentenced to pay the costs of these proceedings. The order appealed from denied appellants original and amended motion for reconsideration and new trial.

Appellees commenced this action to recover from appellant the three pieces of machinery described in their complaint, the sum of P18,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint, the additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit. The complaint alleged that appellee delivered to appellant the machineries described therein together with one D-7 Caterpillar Tractor with a Bulldozer, as their share in the capital of the logging business they had agreed to engage in with him for a period of one year from August 3, 1954; that their written contract provided that appellant and appellees would divide equally the profits that may be realized in the business in excess of the sum of P7,750.00, this amount having been agreed to be the least share of appellees in said profits, to which they would be entitled even if the profits realized were less than said sum; that the tractor was returned to appellees after one month use; that appellant had paid to appellees, on account of their share in the profits, only the sum of P3,000.00; that upon expiration of the period of one year agreed upon, appellees demanded from defendant the return of the three pieces of machinery, and the payment of their share in the profits of their business, but appellant refused to comply with such demand and instead asked that their agreement be renewed. Appellant filed his answer alleging that appellees had not complied with their obligation to furnish him with the spare parts and accessories necessary to place the machineries in working condition, to obtain which appellant had to spend the sum of P19,640.00; that the D-7 Caterpillar was not returned by him but was seized from him by virtue of a writ of replevin issued in another case. By way of counterclaim, appellant sought to recover damages resulting from the taking away from him of the D-7 Caterpillar Tractor and appellees failure to comply with other stipulations of their agreement. Because neither appellant nor his counsel appeared when the case was called for trial on August 14, 1956, appellees were allowed to present their evidence, and on May 30, 1957 the court rendered the decision appealed from. On July 1, 1957, appellant filed his original verified motion for reconsideration, the principal ground relied upon therein being that the notice of trial was sent to the Manila address of Atty. Mariano Yap who was no longer his attorney at that time; that in the latter part of December, 1955, appellant requested a clerk in the law office of his attorney Francisco Cupin to tell the latter to file his appearance in a substitution of Atty. Yap, but due to the fact that Atty. Francisco Cupin was busy at hat time with his election protest in connection with the 1955 mayoralty fight in Butuan City where Atty. Cupin was a candidate, as found out later by the defendant Mr. Ago, said clerk was unable to tell Atty. Cupin of this request and as a result no such change of counsels and addresses was duly made; that when the office of Atty. Yap received the notice of trial, his clerk sent the same by ordinary mail to appellant in Butuan City, which notice, however, was never received by him; that these circumstances caused his failure to appear at the trial.

The above-mentioned motion for reconsideration, however was not accompanied by any affidavit of merits. Appellees, on July 19, 1957, opposed it precisely on this particular ground, and further contended that the negligence or mistake committed by appellant and counsel was not excusable. On January 31, 1958 appellees filed supplemental opposition alleging that appellants attorneys of record were Attys. Calo, Cupin and Yap; that was only after 15 months from the date of the trial and 5 months after appellant learned of the decision that said law firm withdrew its appearance from the case. In this connection it is worthy of notice that the original motion for reconsideration (R.A. pp. 64-68) was signed by Atty. Francisco R. Cupin a member of said law firm. On February 1, 1958, that is, seven months after the filing of the original motion for reconsideration, appellant filed a verified amended motion for reconsideration and new trial, supported by the affidavits of appellant Pastor D. Ago, in one of which he claimed that he had a good and valid defense showing contrary to the allegations made in his answer to the complaint to the effect that their agreement was renewed for one year that the written agreement attached to the complaint as Annex A and on which appellees based their cause of action had been cancelled prior to the filing of the complaint and upon the seizure by replevin of the D-7 Caterpillar Tractor with bulldozer mentioned therein which seizure took place only a month after the contract was entered into on August 3, 1954; that appellees had committed a breach of the aforesaid agreement by not furnishing appellant with the required spare parts and accessories to put the remaining machineries in running condition; that said breach on the part of appellees entitled appellant to withdraw from the agreement; that after the cancellation of the agreement on September 12, 1954, the parties thereto agreed that appellant would simply rent the remaining machineries at the rate of P750.00 per month, which rent appellant had been paying until the present action was commenced. Appellees objected to the consideration of the amended motion claiming that the same was filed without leave of court and not in accordance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 17; that the affidavit of merits did not state facts but mere conclusions; that it was filed too late, that is, more than 7 months after appellant had received notice of the decision. After appellant had filed a reply to this opposition, the lower court issued its order of March 7, 1958, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: The original motion was patently defective; and to admit, and give due course to, the amended motion would in effect allow a motion for reconsideration or call it a petition for relief beyond the period or periods fixed by the Rules of Court. Indeed, the Court cannot accept defendants theory that they were not legally notified of the trial or that they have filed appropriate motion or petition with the necessary affidavits of merit within the reglementary period.

WHEREFORE the motion for reconsideration as well as the amended motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. The issue decisive of this appeal, therefore, is whether or not the lower court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration and the amended motion for reconsideration and new trial mentioned heretofore. In the light of the facts already stated above, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not commit this error. The record discloses that the attorneys of record of appellant who filed his answer to the complaint were Attys. Calo, Cupin and Yap. On the other hand, appellant admits that the notice of the trial was sent to and was received by Atty. Mariano Yap, a member of said law firm. At that time no withdrawal of appearance had been filed neither by the aforesaid law firm itself nor by Atty. Yap alone. Consequently, appellants own allegations show that the service of the notice of the trial was proper and in accordance with the rules. Moreover, appellants original motion, as the lower court held, was fatally defective, firstly, because it did not sufficiently prove by affidavit or otherwise the alleged accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and secondly, the same was not supported by an affidavit of merit showing that appellant had a good and valid defense. This latter defect appellant obviously sought to cure more than seven months later when he filed his amended motion for reconsideration and new trial. It must be adverted to that when appellees, on July 19, 1957, filed a written opposition to appellants original motion for reconsideration, they pointed out as first groun d in support thereof precisely the lack of affidavit of merits to support the aforesaid motion. Although appellant had notice of this defect of his motion since then, it was only on February 1, 1958, that is, almost seven months thereafter that he made a desperate attempt to cure it by filing an amended motion. Now, as far as appellants appeal from the decision of the lower court is concerned, little need be said. The evidence presented by appellees was uncontradicted and sufficiently supports the findings of fact made and conclusions of law drawn therefrom by the trial court. We agree, therefore, with the lower court that appellees are entitled to the return of the three pieces of machinery described in their complaint or to the payment of their value in the sum of P30,000.00, and that in accordance with the contract Exhibit A, they are further entitled to the sums of money specified in the dispositive part of the decision appealed from. WHEREFORE, the decision and the order appealed from are affirmed, with costs. Bengzon, C.J. Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo. On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CAG.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that . . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied). On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988. In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality. Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690. On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995 RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law. I Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22). The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986. On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment. On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the

On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA. On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution. From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040). II We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]). Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules: Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]). The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud." As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993): A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534). Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution. This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled: . . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430). (See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]). Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra; (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra; (3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals; (4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court; (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and, (6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra. Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that: Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275). By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of

substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2). WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991 ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent. PER CURIAM: This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties. The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the Supreme Court, states: xxx xxx xxx The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620. On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L23662, affirming the decision of the Lower Court; That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for

annulment of will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno. Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs; That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971; That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972; That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo, for specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending before said court. In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on may part. The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court. In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate action. xxx xxx xxx 1 In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice.2

In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were done. xxx xxx xxx at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3 In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4 As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had been decided by the Court. 5 Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata. xxx xxx xxx But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final judgment. 6 In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.

xxx xxx xxx Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7 This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases. On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution of disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8 It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No. 1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes. In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action: 1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate but was subsequently appealed. 2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision was affirmed. 3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court, upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant. 4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed. 5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed. 6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed. 8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes. Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment. This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court.9 Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs. A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less

significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT. WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. SO ORDERED. Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. # Footnotes 1 Rollo, 1-2. 2 Rollo, 3. 3 Rollo, 6. 4 Id. 5 Rollo, 7. 6 Rollo, 8. 7 Ibid. 8 Rollo, 12. 9 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71. Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) day or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by fine n exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)d or both, if it be an inferior court.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944 vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT,

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant. Francisco Claravall for respondent. OZAETA, J.: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows: Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Legal assistance service 12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105 Tel. 2-41-60. Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof. Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision. It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young

lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent. Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC March 23, 1929 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA, Duran & Lim for respondent. Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government. MALCOLM, J.: The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows: LUIS B. TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Province of Isabela (NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows: ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration. Yours respectfully, (Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the

end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to

reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929, Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., reserves his vote. Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting: I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment. EN BANC

Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay. Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees. Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws. Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance. In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeos. Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioners flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations. Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment. On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service. Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions. Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make him a better person. Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character: 1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222 x --------------------------------------- x ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, Present: Puno, C.J., Quisumbing,* Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin, JJ. Promulgated: April 24, 2009 x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x RESOLUTION YNARESSANTIAGO, J.: This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.[1] To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which reads in part: WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to (1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION; x x x x The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder: Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his fathers childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents. Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang

2) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparati ng sa Kataas- Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig; 3) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas- Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig; 4) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas - Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag- susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig; 5) An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar dated 8 June 2007of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices; 6) Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne; 7) Testimonial Letter dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU); 8) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas- Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA); 9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes dated 11 July 2008 of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB); 10) A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San

Sebastian College Recoletos; 11) An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City; 12) Testimonial Letter dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City; 13) Testimonial Letter dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and 14) Testimonial Letter dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say: Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. x x x x When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined. Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds. There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition. In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said: After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. xxxx Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F.

Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated: The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license. Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and society. Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioners strength of character and positive moral fiber. However, still, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court. We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioners five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law. The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.[2] While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.[3] In cases where we have

deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer[4] and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.[5] For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held: However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.[6] And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,[7] we noted: Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x x x Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003. Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning: Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bo und to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.[8] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN

from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004. SO ORDERED. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice * On official leave. [1] Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion (hereinafter, Petition), p. 26. [2] Bernardo v. Mejia, A.C. No. 2984, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 639. [3] Id. [4] See Adez Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 201. [5] A.C. No. 1302, 1391, 1543, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 503. [6] Id. at 515. [7] Supra note 2 at 643. [8] Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 341.