Sharing the background

Sharing the background

Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt a. M., Germany
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Inaugural ENSO meeting

October 16-17, 2009
Konstanz

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Searle’s argument for the background I

Rejection of the intellectualist model of rule-following.

Phenomenological argument: Most of our rule-following
actions are not guided by representations of rules.
General rule-following argument: Intentional content does
not determine its extension by itself. (Wittgenstein’s
regress)

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Searle’s argument for the background II

Solution: Background as a non-intellectualist alternative.

Background is not a behaviourist solution: Evolution in
response to institutions makes it rule-guided.
Two-stage causal account: evolutionary account of
dispositions, dispositional account of actions.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Problems of a causal background explanation I

The Argument from Normativity:

1 Rule-following is a normative phenomenon.
2 Regularities of behaviour do not provide normative
criteria.
3 Dispositions as part of causal stories are counterfactual
truths about regularities of behaviour.
4 Therefore: A dispositional model does not provide an
interesting explanation for the ability to follow rules.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Problems of a causal background explanation II

An explanation of our ability to follow rules must not only

include a (trivial) causal story, but also an account of how
we come to be justified in our actions.
Causal histories of actions are not good criteria for
judgements about a person’s ability to follow rules.
Searle does not actually provide us with a story about
how a causal history explains the normative aspects of
rule-following.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Problems of a causal background explanation III

“there is a socially created normative component

in the institutional structure [...]

the actual rules that we specify in describing the

institution will determine those aspects under which
the system is normative.”

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Problems of a causal background explanation IV

The evolutionary story requires an account of the

institutional environment (only rule-following behaviour
can provide a suitable environment, but then the ability of
others to follow rules is already presupposed).

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Causal vs. constitutive background explanations I

Ambiguity of the question: “How is a person able to follow a

rule?”
Causal explanation: What are the causal conditions for a
person to produce some token of behaviour which counts
as rule-following?
Constitutive explanation: What must be true such that
some behaviour of a person can count as rule-following?

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Causal vs. constitutive background explanations II

Is this still the question of the background?

Yes, because we must ask not only how an individual can act
in a way such that her behaviour might be rule-following but
also what conditions must obtain for her behaviour to actually
be rule-following.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

The Wittgenstein / Heidegger insight I

Wittgenstein:
We often act without justification, but this does not
mean that we act without right.
Causal account does not solve normative problem.
Importance of the embedding of an action into a context
of public practice.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

The Wittgenstein / Heidegger insight II

Heidegger:
Background as being-in-the-world.
Question of significance of our agency.
Concept of care.
A social pragmatist Heidegger∗ : Being-in-the-world
constitutively depending on interlocking attitudes of care.

∗
Not to be confused with the actual Heidegger
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Sharing the background

The duality of practice

The duality of practice:

First aspect: dispositional guidance (in the normal case).
Second aspect: Embedding in normative discourse.
How do these both aspects go together?

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

A moderate conformist model of rule-following I

Second-order disposition: Orientation towards affirmative

attitudes of others.
But: Not any affirmative attitudes, but only correct ones.
No regress because of defeasible default justification of
normative attitudes.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

A moderate conformist model of rule-following II

Attitudes count as justified only as long as there are no

discursive challenges.
Consequence: Background of rule-following is a network
of mutual attitudes, combined with a readiness to
recognize discursive challenges.
In other word: Attribution of default authority or
recognition.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

Consequences

We have to understand the significance-generating

second-order dispositions as normative expectations
Hegelian model of Sittlichkeit.

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Sharing the background

stahl@em.uni-frankfurt.de

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt