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Prcis of Virtues of the Mind Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge by Linda Zagzebski Review by: Linda Zagzebski Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 169-177 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653437 . Accessed: 13/03/2014 19:31
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LX, No. 1, January 2000

Precis of Virtuesof the Mind*

LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

Loyola Marymount University

Part I
The Methodology of Epistemology

Plato told us that to be deprived of knowledge is the only true evil [Protagoras 345b], and philosophers have sought the natureof knowledge ever since. Even skeptics honor it by devoting so much attentionto doubting its existence. Investigationinto knowledge has never been limited to any particularschool or period of philosophy, althoughmany epistemic concepts are limited in these ways, most especially the concept of justification,the central focus of most Americanepistemology in the last half-century.Justificationis an idea that takes center stage in periods of philosophical history dominated by skepticism. That is because we aim to be justified in order to defend our right to be sure. If skepticism is on the decline (and I'm not convinced that it is), justification goes with it. Hence, the so-called Death of Epistemology is really the death of justification. But even if skepticism hasn't died and taken justification with it, the concept of justification is collapsing from internal pressures within contemporary epistemology itself. For one thing, three decades of debateover Gettierproblemshave failed to producea consensus on how a justified belief is connected with knowledge. What is even more serious, some epistemologists have arguedthat the concept of justification is systematically ambiguous,and the dispute between internalistsand externalists has reached an impasse.' Their argumentis over the issue of whetherthe propertythat converts true belief into knowledge (which may or may not be identified with justification) must be consciously accessible to the believer. In brief, internalists say yes and externalists say no. It is illuminating to notice that externalists take as their central cases of knowledge instances of perceptualor memory knowledge. In contrast,internaliststake as their central
Linda Zagzebski, Virtuesof the Mind:An Inquiryinto the Nature of Virtueand the Ethical Foundationsof Knowledge(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996). See William P. Alston, "Epistemic Desiderata," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, #3 (Sept., 1993), 527-51; and Alvin Plantinga, Warrtant:The Current Debate (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 1. BOOK SYMPOSIUM169

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cases those in which conscious reflectivenessis required-usually, where evidence needs to be gathered and weighed. One of the things this difference indicates, I believe, is that epistemologists cannotmake up their minds about the sense in which knowledge is good. Externaliststhink of knowledge as a naturalgood, like good eyesight, whereas internaliststhink of knowledge as similar to a moral good. They say it must be justified, which means that the knower must be in a position to explain and defend it. To be unable to do so is a personal failure akin to a moral failure. Responsible epistemic agents ought to be able to justify their beliefs, so when this responsibility is associated with the normativity of knowledge, it leads to internalism about knowledge. These two ways of looking at the normativityof knowledge, the naturalisticway and the moral way, form the deep backgroundout of which arise the concepts of justificationand the normativeaspect of knowledge. My diagnosis of the internalism!externalismdispute, then, is that it stems from insufficient attention to normative theory and the way the normativity of epistemic states should be handledin such a theory. So the concept of justification is in trouble, and part of the problem is unclarity or indecision about the kind of normativity we associate with since justificationis a propertyof individualbeliefknowledge. Furthermore, the preoccupationwith justification has led to individual persons, states of neglect of the social dimension of epistemic states, as well as neglect of episparticutemic values thatin othereras were consideredmuch more important, and wisdom. larly understanding In Virtuesof the Mind I proposed that these problems might be resolved or bypassed by carefullyattendingto the normativeconcepts and theoriesthat provide the backdropfor normativeepistemology. Knowledge is an evaluatively positive state; that much is indisputable.Knowledge is good, and there are other good and bad epistemic states as well, whetheror not their goodness or badness is identified with being justified or unjustified. If I am even roughly right about this, epistemologists ought to take more than a passing look at ethics. For some time I have been attractedby the many ways in which epistemology parallels ethics, and I am strongly inclined to think that the former can benefit from the latter. The way the concept of a justified belief functions in epistemology is strikinglyparallel to the way the concept of a right act functions in ethics. Once that is seen many things become clearer.A right act makes no sense outside a networkof ethical concepts that constitute its theoreticalbackground.I have arguedthat the same can be said for normative epistemic concepts. A justified belief, like a right act, gets its In so far as thatbackgroundcan be meaning againsta conceptualbackground. articulatedat all, it is almost always the parallel of an ethical theory. That may or may not be noticed-usually not. But it is no accident that the two most popular epistemological theories are the analogues of the two most common ethical theories: deontological epistemology is the parallel of
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deontological ethics, and reliabilism is the parallel of consequentialism. In Virtues of the Mind I argued that reliabilism and epistemic deontologism inherit some of the same problems as the parallel theories in ethics, and that the advantages of a virtue ethics would also be advantages of a virtue epistemology. So one set of motives for modeling epistemology on virtue ethics comes from the side of ethics. I also arguedthat a virtue model is the best hope for addressingthe problems in epistemology I have mentioned: the impasse over the nature of justification, the neglect of the social dimension of epistemic states, and the neglect of the values of understanding and wisdom. The concept of virtue is a social concept. Aristotle used it primarilyas a way of identifying those qualities that human beings need to live well in communities. The same can be said for epistemic communities since acquiringknowledge is almost never a solo enterprise.2 In addition,attentionto understanding and wisdom is much more likely within a virtue framework since both are either virtues themselves or closely connected to virtues. Finally, I propose that the best hope for resolving the variousdisputes over justificationis to set aside the concept of justification while attending to its theoretical background.If I am right that a justified belief is the counterpart of a right act, then since virtue ethics treats a right act as derivative from the deeper concept of a moral virtue, my idea was that an epistemology modeled on virtue ethics might be able to disambiguatejustification and to resolve problems about its normativityby making a justified belief derivativefrom intellectualvirtue. One consequence of a virtue approachis that justification becomes less importantthan it has been in recent epistemology, and I think that is the way it should be. The traits of epistemic agents are of the first importance;nonetheless, virtue epistemology is powerfulenough to handle the evaluationof beliefs. In short, my motives for turningto virtue theory come both from the side of ethics and from the side of epistemology. In addition, there was the fact that no one had triedit before. Part II A Theoryof Virtueand Vice I propose that we make the concept of intellectual virtue the focus of normative epistemology, and that we treatit as a component of a general theory of virtue. Unfortunately, intellectual virtue has fallen into the gap between ethics and epistemology. Neither field has much to say about it. Virtue ethicists discuss phronesis, or practical wisdom, but they are interested in that virtue mostly because Aristotle closely connectedphronesis with the distinctively moral virtues. Such intellectual virtues as open-mindedness and
2

See, for example, Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and C.A.J. Coady, Testimony(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1992).

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intellectual fairness, autonomy, trustworthiness,courage, perseverance, and attentiveness are almost totally ignored. On the side of epistemology, the term "intellectualvirtue"has been in vogue since Ernest Sosa introducedit into the contemporaryliterature,3 but almost no effort has been made, either by Sosa or by others, to connect it to the sense of virtue used in ethics, much less to integrate it into a general theory of virtue. In many cases what an epistemologist calls an intellectual virtue is a virtue only by courtesy. That meant that the concept of intellectual virtue needed some work before its value to epistemologycould be appreciated. My purpose in PartII of Virtuesof the Mind was to outline a pure virtue theory that is rich enough to include an account of intellectual virtues within the same theory as moral virtues,and to show how such a theory can generate a way to handle both epistemic evaluation and moral evaluation. In fact, the two types of evaluation are parallel. When pushed far enough, I believe we find that the fairly vague boundaries of the moral ought to be extended to include the type of normativitywe use in evaluating persons for their intellectual virtues and vices and beliefs for theirjustifiedness and otherepistemically evaluative properties.Intellectual virtues are a subset of moral virtues and justificationis not just a normativeproperty;it is a moral one. In a pure virtue theory the concept of a right act is derivative from the concept of a moral virtue. Similarly, I propose that in a pure virtue epistemology the concept of a justified belief is derivativefrom the concept of an intellectual virtue. A virtue, I claim, is a deep and enduring acquiredexcellence of the humanperson that includes both a motivationalcomponentand a component of reliable success in bringing about the end of the motivational component. A motivation is an emotion-dispositionthat initiates and directs action towards an end. The motivational component is distinctive of the particularvirtue, but a complete taxonomy of the virtues will probablyreveal that the immediate ends of the particularvirtues are not ultimate, but that several virtueshave the same ultimateend. For example, generosity, compassion, kindness, and charity ultimately aim at the well-being of others, even though each of them has a more immediateend-in the case of compassion it is relief of the suffering of others; in the case of generosity it is increasing our neighbors' possession of the goods of life. Intellectualvirtues ultimately aim at the truth,but each also has a more immediateend such as distinguishing reliable from unreliable authority, or gathering a sufficient amount of relevantevidence.4 Intellectualvirtues do not differ from moral virtues in any importantway. Both are acquiredby imitatingvirtuouspersons and developing habits aimed
3 4

Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid,"Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5 (Studies in Epistemology), Notre Dame Press, 1980. There may be a few intellectual virtues such as intellectual creativity and originality that ultimatelyaim at something otherthantruth.
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at controlling emotions and developing the cognitive and perceptualabilities circumstances. necessary to know how to apply the virtues in the appropriate Both differ from skills. Both are sufficiently voluntaryto be within the realm of praise and blame, and there are logical and causal connectionsbetween and among the virtues of both types. Furthermore,if it turns out that the ultimate end of truth and the ultimate ends of the moral virtues are all components of a life of eudaimonia, then the moral and intellectual virtues do not even differ in their ultimateultimateends. Concepts of act and belief evaluationcan be defined in terms of moral and episteintellectualvirtue. Since modernethics is act-basedand contemporary mology is belief-based, it is no surprisethat these concepts have been given more attentionthan I think they deserve. Nonetheless, the evaluation of acts and beliefs is something we want to do, and a virtue theory has the resources to do it. I suggest the following definitionsof these concepts: A right (permissible) act is an act a virtuous person might do in like cirwould not do cumstances.That is, it is not the case that she characteristically not do in would it. A wrong act is an act a virtuousperson characteristically like circumstances.A moral duty is an act a virtuousperson characteristically A justified belief, the counterpartof a right would do in like circumstances.5 act, is what an intellectually virtuous person might believe in like circumstances. It is not the case that she characteristicallywould not believe it. An unjustifiedbelief is a belief an intellectuallyvirtuousperson characteristically would not believe in like circumstances. An epistemic duty is a belief an would believe in like circumintellectually virtuousperson characteristically what a virtuous person might or would believe in stances. In determining given circumstances we need to incorporate any background beliefs the virtuous person would bring to the situationthat affect the descriptionof the circumstances.A belief is to be evaluatedin the circumstancesas they would be taken by the virtuousperson. Vicious persons characteristicallyperformwrong acts, but so do persons who are neithervicious nor virtuous,and virtuouspersons also may perform An act can be right even though it is not wrong acts, but uncharacteristically. virtuously motivated. For example, a person has done the right thing in giving the correct amount in a monetary exchange even when he is not at all motivated by moral concerns. Similarly, there is a sense of justified in which we say a person has a justified belief in believing that the earthis round even if he cares nothingfor the evidence and has not made the reasonsfor believing it his own. Right andjustified are thereforethe weakest concepts of actlbelief evaluation.
5

The definitions of right, wrong, and duty have been slightly modified from the ones I give in Virtues of the Mind. There I define each in terms of what a virtuous person might do, would do, or would not do. Here I have added the word "characteristically."The same and epistemic duty. applies to the definitionsof justified, unjustified,
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We can define stronger concepts as well. An importantway to evaluate beliefs and acts includes the factor of the agent's motivation.An act or belief that is virtuouslymotivateddeserves credit, althoughwe almost always qualify it if it does not also involve doing/believing what virtuous persons characteristically do. I suggest that a person is praiseworthy for performing an act/having a belief just in case the act/belief is what a virtuousperson would characteristically do/have in the circumstancesand it is virtuouslymotivated.6 We may define yet strongerconceptions of a morally good act since an act may be evaluatedpositively on groundsof motive as well as on what is done, and still not have everythingwe want morally in an act. So even when an act is motivated properlyand is what a virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances,it may fail in the aim of the act. When this happens the act lacks something morally desirable. Moral success is evaluated positively even though that is to some extent out of the hands of the agent. It is one of the ways in which we are victims of moral luck. So, for example, a person might be motivated by generosity and act in a way characteristicof generous persons in some particular circumstances, say by giving money to a beggar on the street, but if it turns out that the beggar is really rich and is playing the part of a beggar to win a bet, we would think that there is something morally lacking in the act. I am not, of course, suggesting that we would withhold praise of the agent, but her act would not merit the degree of praise due it if the beggar really were deserving. The same point applies to intellectual acts. A person may be motivatedby intellectualvirtues and act in a way intellectually virtuous persons characteristicallyact in attempting to get knowledge, but if she fails to get the truth,her epistemic state is lacking something praiseworthy.This means there is a kind of epistemic luck analogous to moral luck. In addition,mere success in reachingthe end of the virtuousmotive in the particularcase is not sufficient for the highest praise of an act or belief even if it also has the other praiseworthyfeatures just identified. It is important that success in reaching the end be due to the other praiseworthyfeatures of the act. In the morally best act, the end is reached because of these other features. So we especially value an act when one good aspect explains another.This leads to a way of defining an act thatis good in every respect: An act is an act of virtue A just in case it arises from the motivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A would do in the circumstances,and is successful in bringcharacteristically ing aboutthe end of virtueA because of these featuresof the act.

In Virtues of the Mind I define praiseworthinessfor an act or belief in terms of what the virtuous person would probably do. Here I have substituted "characteristically" for "probably."

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What I mean by the end of virtue A includes the ultimate end of virtue A as well as the proximateend. The term "act of virtue"as I am using it is to some extent a term of art, but only to some extent. I believe that the concept I am trying to pick out is an importantone for ethical theory. It is importantboth for the evaluation of acts and for the evaluation of epistemic states that result from such acts. There are acts of moral virtue and acts of intellectualvirtue. The lattercan be definedas follows: An act is an act of intellectual virtue I just in case it arises from the motivational component of I, is something a person with I would do in the circumstances,and is successful in leadcharacteristically ing to the immediate end of I and to the truth because of these featuresof the act. Ultimately, it is the behavior of persons with phronesis, or practical wisdom, that determinesright acting andjustified believing, as well as one's moral and intellectual duty and the other evaluative properties of acts and beliefs. For the sake of the unity of the self, it is important that there be forms of all these concepts that apply to what a person ought or ought not do/believe all things considered. The virtue of practical wisdom is, among other things, the virtue that permits a person to mediate between and among all the particularconsiderationsof value in any given situation, and to act in a way that gives each its proper weight. Another set of definitions of act/belief evaluation, then, can be given that replaces "a virtuous person" with "personwith phronesis" in each of the above definitions. So, for example, an act is right all things consideredjust in case it is an act a person with phronesis might do in the circumstances.Paralleldefinitionscan be given for a belief that is justified all things considered, and for the definitions of a praiseworthyact. The definition of an act of virtue also can be amended to include what a person with phronesis would characteristicallydo, although I did not propose that in the book. Part III TheNature of Knowledge This project began with a passion to understandknowledge, and that led me to investigate ethics. As I showed in Part II, many of the concepts of epistemic evaluation have ethical counterparts.Ironically, knowledge, the most importantepistemic concept of all, does not. Still, knowledge is importantly groundedin the concept of intellectualvirtue.In the last quarterof the book I proposed a definition of knowledge that not only connects it to the concepts analyzed in Part II,but thathas a numberof desirablefeaturesin a definition,

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and which has assimilated the moral of Gettier problems. It also has a number of advantagesover otherrecenttheories. The definition is as follows: Knowledgeis state of belief arisingfrom acts of intellectualvirtue. An alternativedefinition that does not restrictit to individual states of belief with the presumptionof a propositionalobject, is as follows: Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising from acts of intellectualvirtue. I have argued that Gettierproblems occur for any definition according to which knowledge is true belief + x, where x and truthare closely connected, The recipe for generatingcounterexamplesis as but x does not entail truth.7 follows: Since by hypothesis there is a gap between an x belief and the truth, find a belief in the gap-a false x belief, and then amend the description of the situation so that the belief comes out true after all for reasons that have no bearing on the fact that the belief has propertyx or the degree to which it has x. The result will be a situation in which a belief is true and is x in a degree the theory specifies is sufficient for knowledge, but is not knowledge. To avoid this problem we must close the gap between the component x and truth.Given the fact that the goodness of knowledge exceeds the goodness of getting the truth, component x must be normative. So the moral of Gettier problems is that the normative component of knowledge (other than truth) must entail truth.But it has to do so in a way that is not ad hoc. The concept of an act of intellectual virtue does that. It is normative,it entails truth, and it is not ad hoc as long as I am right that the concept of an act of virtue is something we would want in an ethical theory anyway. The concept of an act of intellectualvirtue is just a special case of that concept. This definition of knowledge is compatible with a much wider range of kinds of knowledge than its competitors since it applies both to the cases of knowledge favored by internalists and to those favored by externalists; it avoids Gettier problems, unlike almost all of its competitors;and it inherits virtuetheory. the theoreticalpower and practicalusefulness of the background It is also very simple. Conclusion Naturalized epistemology is often thought to be in conflict with normative epistemology. But while the varieties of reliabilism are in conflict with evidentialism, that is not because one is naturalisticand the other is normative.
7 This argumentwas first published in "The Inescapabilityof GettierProblems,"Philosophical Quarterly44, #174 (Jan. 1994), 65-73.

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As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, that conflict is between two types of normativity,not between normativityand the lack of it. The theory I have outlined in this book is clearly normative, but it is also naturalisticin the way that virtue ethics is naturalistic.In virtue theory the normativityof human behavior is imbedded in a rich descriptionof human nature.It is not an analysis of normativeconcepts subsequentlyapplied to empirical facts. I the forms of normativityand the relation between believe that understanding normativityof any kind and the world of non-normativefact is not only one of the deepest issues in meta-ethics, it is one of the deepest issues in epistemology. I also suspect that mistakes in answering this question may have serious consequences for the methodology of epistemology. If so, epistemologists ought to benefit from a study of meta-ethics as well as of normative ethics.

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