1971war Final

Introduction
The documents below were declassified by the US Department of State around June 2005.
They cover a crucial period in Indias relations with the US; the years 1969-1972 which are generally considered as the low points in Indo-American relations.
These declassified documents are important because they provide glimpses into the minds of important decision makers on both sides. The surprising revelation in these documents is that emotions and personal equations play a significant role even among people who should know better.
These are must read documents for students of Indian history, and for those who wish to learn from the past.
- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 1/390
Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

Released by the Office of the Historian
Persons
Abbas, M. M., Director General for Americas and Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan Abshire, David M., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from April 1970 Agha Khan, Prince Sadruddin, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States, January 1969 October 1973 Ahmad, Khondkar Mushtaq, Vice President of the Awami League and Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April December 1971 Ahmad, M. M., Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission in Pakistan, Economic Adviser to President Yahya Ahmed, Aziz, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Ahmed, Tajuddin, General Secretary of the Awami League and Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April 1971 January 12, 1972; thereafter Minister of Finance of Bangladesh Ahsan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad, Deputy Martial Law Administrator and Commander-inChief of the Pakistan Navy until August 1969; Governor of East Pakistan, August 1969 February 1971 Ali, Iftikar, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan from April 1972 Ali, M. Hossain, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States from December 1972 Ali, Mahmud (Mahood), Head of Pakistan s delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, October 1971 Alvie, Momtaz A., Additional Foreign Secretary of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry Annenberg, Walter H., United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969 Ayub Khan, Mohammad, President of Pakistan until March 1969 Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, March 1969 January 1973 Bhashani, Maulana Abdul Hamid, Leader of the National Awami Party in East Pakistan Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, Chairman of the Pakistan People s Party; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, December 7 December 19, 1971; thereafter President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense of Pakistan Blee, David H., Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency Blood, Archer K., Consul General in Dacca until June 1971 Bowles, Chester, Ambassador to India until April 1969 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bush, George H. W., Republican Congressman from Texas until January 1971; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, February 1971 January 1973 Cargo, William I., Director of the Policy and Coordination Staff, Department of State Cargill, Peter, Director, South Asia Department, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps until December 1971 Chaudhry, Air Marshal Zafer, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force from March 1972 Chavan, Yashwantrao B., Indian Minister of the Interior until June 1970; thereafter, Indian Minister of Finance Chowdhry, Abu Ayed, President of Bangladesh from January 12, 1972 Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 1969
Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971 May 1972 Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, May 1969 December 1971 Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970 1971 DePalma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Desai, Morarji Ranchhodji, Indian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister until July 1969 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Durrani, S.U., Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Bangladesh from September 1972 Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1969 Etemadi, Nur Ahmed, Prime Minister of Afghanistan until May 1971 Farhadi, Rawan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Farland, Joseph S., Ambassador to Pakistan, September 1969 April 1972 Farooqi, Zahir M., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of Pakistan Firyubin, Nikolai Pavlovich, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India Giri, Varahagiri Venkata, Vice President of India until May 3, 1969; Acting President, May 3 July 29, 1969; President from August 20, 1969 Gordon, Herbert, Consul General in Calcutta Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969; also, Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970 Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gross, Nelson, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State, and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters Guyer, Roberto, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Haig, General Alexander M., Jr., Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969 June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 1970 January 1973 Haksar, Parmeshwar Narain, Secretary to Prime Minister Gandhi Haldeman, H. R., Assistant to the President Hamed, Samad, Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Turkey, May 1969 April 1973 Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development, April 1969 October 1973 Haq, Major General Inam-ul, Director General, Defense Procurement, Pakistan Ministry of Defense Hassan, Lt. General Gul, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, from December 1971 March 1972 Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973 Henry, Paul-Marc, Assistant Administrator and Associate Director, Bureau of Operations and Programming, UNDP; Coordinator, UN Relief Operations in Dacca (UNROD), 1971 Hilaly, Agha, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States until September 1971 Holdridge, John H., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970 1972 Hoskinson, Samuel M., member of the National Security Council staff, 1970 1972 Hussain, Zakir, President of India until his death, May 3, 1969 Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 1969
Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970 July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State Islam, Syed Nazrul, Acting President of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, April December 1971 Jha, Lakshmi Kant, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India until May 1970; thereafter, Indian Ambassador to the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969 Jung, Nawab Ali Yavar, Indian Ambassador to the United States until May 1970 Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency Karim, Muhammad Enayet, Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States, May August 1972; thereafter Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Karim, S. A., Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh until August 1972 Kaul, Triloki Nath, Foreign Secretary of Indian Ministry of External Affairs from February 1969 Keating, Kenneth B., Ambassador to India, May 1969 July 1972 Kellogg, Francis L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs from January 1971; also Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Pakistani Refugee Relief Kennedy, Richard T., member of the National Security Council staff, January 1970 January 1972 Khan, General Abdul Hamid, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army and Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Khan, Abdul Monem, Governor of East Pakistan until March 1969 Khan, Lieutenant General Tikka, Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan, February September 1971; Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army from March 1972 Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah, Leader, Democratic Action Committee of Pakistan Khan, Air Marshal Nur, Deputy Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kittani, Ismat, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs; also Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Assistance to East Pakistan Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Laingen, L. Bruce, Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan until July 1971; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense, January 1969 January 1973 Lall, K. B., Indian Defense Secretary Lewis, Samuel W., Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan MacDonald, Donald G., Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development Mace, Charles, Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Macomber, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 1969; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) October 1969 April 1973 Malik, A. M., Special Assistant to President Yahya for Displaced Persons and Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in East Pakistan, July September 1971; thereafter Governor of East Pakistan Malik, H. R., Chairman of the East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation, 1971 Malikyar, Abdullah, Afghan Ambassador to the United States Manekshaw, General Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969 McNamara, Robert S., President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Meyer, Armin H., Special Consultant in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from April 1972
Mitchell, John, Attorney General, January 1969 February 1972 Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nalle, David, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency Nass, Charles, Political Counselor at the Embassy in Afghanistan Narayan, J. P., elder statesman, Indian Congress Party Niazi, Lt. General Amir Abdullah Khan, Martial Law Administrator for East Pakistan from September 1971 Neumann, Robert G., Ambassador to Afghanistan Newberry, Daniel O., Deputy Chief of Mission in Afghanistan from October 1972 Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States, January 10, 1969 August 9, 1974 Noyes, James H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., Ambassador to Pakistan until July 1969 Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1971 Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971 January 1972; Secretary of Commerce, January 1972 January 1973 Patel, I. G., Special Secretary, Indian Ministry of Finance Pickard, Sir Cyril, British High Commissioner in Pakistan Popper, David H., Ambassador to Cyprus Qaiyum Qazi Zahirul, member of the Pakistan National Assembly, Awami League representative Quainton, Anthony C .E., Political and Economic Affairs Officer, New Delhi, 1969; thereafter member of the Office of Nepal, India, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, (Mujib), President of the Awami League; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Bangladesh from January 1972 Ram Jagjivan, Indian Minister of Defense from June 1970 Rasgotra, Maharajakrishna, Minister for Political Affairs of the Indian Embassy in the United States Raza, Major General Nawabzada Agha Mohammad, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, November 1971 April 1972 Rees, C. Herbert, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969 June 1970 Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rogers, William P., Secretary of State, January 1969 September 1973 Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 1969 February 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 1972 January 1973 Ryan, General John D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Sathe, R. D., Joint Secretary, Indian Ministry of External Affairs Samad, Abdus, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Sarabi, Abdul Wahed, Afghan Minister of Planning Saunders, Harold H., member of the National Security Council staff Scali, John, Special Consultant to the President, January 1971 January 1973 Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969; Acting Deputy Director, 1969 1970; Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970 1971; thereafter, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
Schneider, David T., Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969 Selden, Armistead I., Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Seraj, Dr. Majid, Afghan Minister of Public Health Sethi P. B., Indian Minister of State for Finance Shafiq, Mohammad Moussa, Afghan Foreign Minister, July 1971 December 1972; thereafter also Prime Minister Shahi, Agha, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations Shakespeare, Frank, Director, United States Information Agency, February 1969 February 1973 Sher Ali Mohammad, Pakistani Minister of Information and National Affairs Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 1969 July 1970; Director, Office of Management and the Budget, July 1970 May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury, and also Assistant to the President, May 1972 May 1974; also head of the Council on Economic Policy from December 1972 Singh, Dinesh, Minister of External Affairs of India, February 1969 June 1970 Singh, Kewal, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of India from November 1972 Singh, Swaran, Indian Minister of Defense until June 1970; thereafter Minister of External Affairs Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; also Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia Sober, Sidney, Director of the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State until November 1969, thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member of the National Security Council staff, 1969 1972 Sorabi, Abdul Wahid, Minister of Planning of Afghanistan Spain, James W., Director of the Office of Pakistan and Afghanistan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, January July 1969; Chargi d Affaires in Pakistan, July November 1969; thereafter Country Director for Pakistan Spengler, William F., Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, July 1970 July 1971 Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, September 1969 August 1973 Spivack, Herbert D., Consul General in Dacca, June 1971 September 1972 Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969 January 1972 Stone, Galen L., Chargi d Affaires in India from August 1969 Sultan Khan, Mohammad, Foreign Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan until April 1972, thereafter Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Timmons, William, Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, January 1969 February 1970; thereafter, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971 Van Hollen, Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, May 1969 September 1972; thereafter, Ambassador to Sri Lanka Volcker, Paul A., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Vorontsov, Yuli M., Minister of the Soviet Embassy in the United States Waldheim, Kurt, Austrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 31, 1971; thereafter, Secretary-General Weinberger, Caspar W., Deputy Director, Office of Management and the Budget, July 1970 May 1972; Director, May 1972 January 1973; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Westmoreland, General William C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until June 30, 1972
Williams, Maurice J., Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development; Chairman of Interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief Winspeare-Guicciardi, Vittorio, Under Secretary General of the UN and head of the UN s Geneva office, appointed at the end of December 1971 as Special Representative of the Secretary General to deal with the humanitarian problems growing out of the conflict in South Asia Yahya Khan, General Agha Mohammad, Chief Martial Law Administrator, President, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, March 1969 December 1971 Yost, Charles W., United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 1969 February 1971 Yung, Ali Yavar, Indian Ambassador to the United States until May 1970 Zahir, Abdul, Afghan Prime Minister, June 1971 December 1972 Zahir, Mohammad, King of Afghanistan Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President, January 1969 January 1973 Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., Chief of Naval Operations
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIO N SUBJECT : Discussion with Ambassador Joseph S . Farlan d Participants : Department of Defens e Secretary of Defense - Melvin R . Lair d Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - G . Warren Nutte r ISA Assistant for South Asia - Colonel Seymour kravit z Department of Stat e U .S . Ambassador to Pakistan - Mr . Joseph S . Farlan d Country Director for Pakistan - William Spengle r Time : Place : I . 1430 - 1500 hrs, 21 May 197 0
Office of the Secretary of Defens e
US/Pakistani Relation s
Ambassador Farland gave a brief resume of US/Pak relations . He summe d up by stating that the lack of decision on the U .S . military supply polic y has caused the Paks to turn increasingly to the Chinese and Russians . H e stated that the Paks considered that President Johnson had made a commitmen t to get them tanks and that President Nixon had indicated sympathy toward tha t commitment . The Ambassador estimated that US/Pak relations had taken a marked . turn for the worse since the end of Februar y 2. Military SupplyPolic y
Ambassador Farland recounted a recent meeting during which the Chief of the Pak Army Staff said that they had to be prepared to defend Pakistan and would secure the necessary equipment where they could, despite highe r cost . The Chief of Staff said his main worry was not-the added costs o f purchasing from "other" sources, but the commitment that goes with the purchase . Following a discussion of how much equipment the Chinese hav e already provided to Pakistan, Mr . Laird questioned whether Pakistan wa s not already committed to China . Mr . Farland opined ; there is still som e leeway but that time is growing short and the Pak feeling of disenchantmen t with the U .S . is growing . As an example, he cited his attempts since
March to get an appointment to present to President Yahya Khan fro m President Nixon, the moon rock and Pak flag which had been carried t o the moon by U .S . astronauts . He has been denied an audience and at th e same time has been politely informed of the need for the U .S . to sel l lethal end items to Pakistan . The Ambassador also told how much bette r reception in the Pak press the Chinese enjoy as contrasted to the U .S . Their small moves are given greater and more favorable play than muc h larger U .S . activities in Pakistan . Mr . Laird stated that the Ambassador' s report was so pessimistic that perhaps it was too late to do anything . The Ambassador assured him we still have time but that our options ar e being reduced rapidly . 3. Pak Commitments to the USSR and Communist Chin a
Mr . Laird asked Mr . Farland what the Chinese Communists and Soviet Unio n hoped to get for their favors to Pakistan . The Ambassador said that possibly China is seeking increased Communist control of the states betwee n China and the Bay of Bengal . If Burma, Assam and East Pakistan were unde r Communist control, China would effectively outflank Southeast Asia and i f communists gained control of Pakistan, China could outflank India as well . He added that the Russians are probably seeking more influence in th e Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and looked for help from Pakistan in thi s regard . 4. Tanks for Pakista n
Ambassador Farland stressed the need to provide some tanks for Pakistan . A discussion ensued as to whether the third country route remains feasible . There was general agreement that it will not be as easy to do now as i t would have been some months ago . The question of proposed Congressiona l amendments to the Foreign Military Sales bill was considered and Congressiona l attitudes discussed . The Ambassador said that he has talked to many peopl e on the Hill and has a feeling that a change is in the wind . The Secretar y expressed a hope that the Ambassador is right and he and Mr . Nutter assure d Mr . Farland that DOD is working along the same lines-as he is . 5. Conclusio n After an exchange of courtesies, the meeting ended .
Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by : Colonel Seymour Kravitz OASD(ISA)NESA Regio n
Approved by : The Assistant Secretar y of Defense (ISA ) Date : 26 May 197 0
Distribution :
SecDe f DepSecDe f OSD Files
ISA RF DASD(ISA)NESA
NESA RF
SD-IYR
Chron
STATE : NEA/PAF

MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUS E
WASHiNGTON
ACTION 1085 3 June 11, 197 0
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDEN T FROM : Henry A . Kissing er
SUBJECT : Arms Supply Policy for South Asi a
When our Cambodian decision-making was at its height, you mad e a decision on the South Asian arms supply question but asked us t o hold it . Then during your meeting with the CENTO foreign minister s you asked Assistant Secretary Sisco to take another look at what w e might do for Pakistan . His memo is attached, and this will give you an opportunity for making a final decision . (Tab A) To refresh your memory, the present policy bans the sale of letha l equipment but does allow sale of spare parts and non-lethal equipment as well as the sale of U .S . -made equipment now in the hands of thir d countries like Turkey . On this last point, you should be aware tha t one of the restrictions being proposed for inclusion in the Foreig n Military Sales Act would prohibit third-country sales of this kind . You will recall that the most realistic choice is between : relaxing the ban to permit sale of equipment to replac e worn out equipment formerly provided by the U .S . and --not changing policy, keeping it under review but making a one-time sale to provide Pakistan with some equipment i t most urgently needs . In your earlier consideration of this problem, you approved th e second--the one-time exception--but asked that the decision be held . The two sides of the case are well known to you : 1 . Ambassador Farland--like Ambassador Hilaly at your meeting with the CENTO ministers--argues strongly tha t Pakistan is at a political crossroads, that President Yahy a needs support in his effort to keep Pakistan from going radical
and that re-opening of regular U .S . military supply can hel p him in his argument with his officers that Pakistan must kee p its lines open to the U .S . He points out that Yahya is going o n long-delayed trip to Moscow June 22 and that a U .S . answe r before then is necessary so that Yahya will know what he ca n expect from the U.S . Farland concludes by describing th e potential effects for U .S . interests if Yahya fails in his effort s to keep Pakistan out of radical hands--much greater Chines e influence in East Pakistan and even the commitment of Pakistan i troops beside Arab forces against Israel . 2 . Ambassador Keating argues the desirability of not reinsertin g ourselves in the middle of the India-Pakistan rivalry by going bac k into the regular military aid business . He also argues that th e sharp Indian reaction is not worth what must be the margina l U.S . influence on the Pakistani political scene . Secretary Rogers concurs in your earlier judgment not to remove th e .arms embargo altogether . That leaves us, he feels, with only th e choice of making a one-time exception to that embargo to permit on e direct sale to Pakistan. While this has the obvious advantages of doin g something for Pakistan, he points out that it will not meet Pakistan' s desire for a basic change in policy . He feels that even a one-time sal e would create "major" problems with those in the Congress who feel tha t we should not after almost five years re-involve ourselves in a disput e where we do not have direct security interests . If you wish to go ahead, the Secretary recommends a package consistin g of: --6 replacement F-104 fighter-interceptors or 12 F-5's o r F-104's of a different model ; --300 armored personnel ; carriers --4 anti-submarine patrol . aircraft Other possibilities for a package include : - -7 B-57 bomber s - -100 M-48 tanks
- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

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The Secretary would exclude these because of adverse Congressional and Indian reaction . He feels that the controversy on the Hill ove r the Turkish tank deal alone could end the prospect of doing anythin g significant for Pakistan at this time . He rules out the B-57s becaus e they are a more obviously offensive weapon . If you decide to proceed with the arms offer to Pakistan a s recommended by Secretary Rogers, he suggests the followin g scenario ; 1. Z. Early consultations with Congress . A letter from you to President Yahya containing ou r arms offer . Informing the Indian Government simultaneousl y through our embassy in New Delhi. Asking both the Indians and the Pakistanis to treat ou r decision as confidential, but when leaks almost inevitabl y occur emphasize that the arms offer to Pakistan is a special exception .
3. 4.
That you approve Secretary Rogers' recommendaRecommendation : tion for carrying out your decision to make a one-time exception fo r Pakistan and that you approve transmittal of the decision to Presiden t Yahya before hq goes to Moscow June 22 . Approv e Add tank s Add B-57's Add tanks and B-57' s Other


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DEPARTMENT OF STAT E
Washington, D .C . 2052 0
OCT 19 1970
TO : THROUGH : FROM : SUBJECT : The Secretar y S/ J - Joseph J . Sisc o U . S . Sale of Military Equipment to Pakistan INFORMATION MEMORANDU M -
The Indians have now protested our decision to sell a limited quantity of military equipment to Pakistan, both i n New Delhi and in Washington . They have also issued a ver y starchy public statement indicating their dissatisfaction wit h our explanations for the sale, The Pakistanis are please d that we have brought this matter to a conclusion and ar e cooperating with us closely and discreetly in handling it . President Yahya has publicly announced his plans to dine a t the White House October 24 and have a bilateral meeting wit h the President in Washington . In formal oral presentations in New Delhi and Washingto n October 7 and 8, the Indians conveyed their "strong protes t and serious misgivings about our decision ." They were carefu l to say, however, that they meant this in a "friendly spirit . " The Indian spokesmen (Acting Foreign Secretary in Delhi Indian Minister in Washington) warned of "the most advers e and violent reaction of Indian public opinion" and expresse d concern about the political pressures which our decision woul d place on Mrs . Gandhi's Government . They expressed fear tha t our sale might seriously affect India-Pakistan negotiation s which have been showing some signs of progress . They took serious exception to the rationale for our sale which had bee n previously conveyed to them . They explained that Pakistan wa s arming only against India . Therefore, they said the GOI mus t
Downgraded at 12-year intervals ; not automatically declassified .
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State - Assembled by Center for Indian Military History - 12958, as amended E.O. June 9, 2005
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take an extremely serious view of any addition to Pakistan' s armed strength . They claimed that India had expressed simila r views with the same force to the Soviet Union about its suppl y to Pakistan and that the Soviet Union had reacted positivel y to this warning , On October 8, the Indians issued a press statement announcin g their protest and indicating that they were not satisfied wit h U . S . explanations for the sale . The statement alleged that ou r decision was against the interest of peace in South Asia . I t said "the resumption of inflow of arms" to Pakistan, which ha s committed aggression against India three times, is of grav e concern ; Pakistan is armed only against India . The statemen t said that Pakistan used U . S . arms against India in 1965 despit e U . S . assurances, and the new U . S . special supply "is not eve n subject to any such assurances . " While we recognize that because of internal politica l requirements the GOI had to publicly criticize our sale, w e believe their statement goes far beyond what was necessary . They have failed to take into consideration : (1) the limite d nature of the sale ; (2) that the sale was a one-time exceptio n to our embargo which remains in effect ; (3) that we are sellin g primarily replacements or unsophisticated equipment ; (4) tha t we are not selling tanks . To the contrary, this statemen t incorrectly refers to the "resumption of inflow of arms" an d is likely to provoke additional public reaction rather tha n control it . Furthermore, the Government of India has reacte d much more strenuously to our sale offer than it did to th e decisions of the Soviets and the French to supply much large r quantities of military equipment to Pakistan . We have tol d the Indians here of our views on their statement and instructe d Embassy Delhi to express similar serious concern about it . Meanwhile, we are proceeding to discuss with the Pakistani s arrangements for carrying out our sales offer, a subject which President Yahya will probably raise in general terms wit h President Nixon during their bilateral talks . Clearances : NEA/PAF - Mr . Spengle r cc : U, J, C NEA - Mr VardIoilen
NEA/INC : DT Schneider :jlb : an 10/9/70 'x ' 41
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State - Assembled by Center for Indian Military History E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
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Telecon Secretary Rogers 10124170 6:20 p . m .
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 page 2
R: Y e s , s h e really let her hair down. She said w e w e r e against h e r father and h e r . She s a i d she resented o u r pressure and o u r activities. I said just tell us what you have in mind and w e ' l l s t o p it. I said it's a little difficult f o r us; w e ' v e been in office only 20 ,months and you are
holding against us a paranoia going back to John F o s t e r Dulles.
: That's good. It/ s interesting considering h e r f a t h e r w a s the darling of the American intellectuals.
R: When it w a s over I said to the F o r e i g n Minister let's continue this. So he came o v e r t o my apartment t h i s morning. H e told m e how they f e e l about out aid. I told him w e a r e not interested in havifng t h e m indebted t o us. I said all w e w a n t is a little friendship; everything w e get from them is a l m o s t acrimonious.
K: I think t h i s will help. They are just probing until they meet a little resistance. They have a t e r r i b l e paranoia.
R: I s a i d do y o u think w e a r e doing something? I s a i d I don't think Keating has done i t - - he's a p r e t t y a c u t e person. It w a s a v e r y interesting discus sion. It ,may g e t a little bit better now.
K: Once t h e y know w h e r e they stand and with whom they are dealing i t m a y g e t a lot b e t t e r . I think youlll have a b e t t e r time w i t h them now.
I said i f w e are faced only w i t h suspicions and animosities f r o m years gone by there's nothing w e can do. H e said our aid mission should be reduced. I said we've reduced it considerably from w h a t it was; don't you know that? H e said y e s . I said t h e n why don't you thank us instead of just complaining m o r e .
d u s a l i s t of specifics. R: I ~ i give
K: I think it is paranoia. They are suffering because they w e r e the leading non-aligned country and now they' r e just another undeveloped one.
t t h e UN. R: I gave her a going over on V i e t n a m . She spoke a g a i n s t us a She g o t d r a m a t i c and said "I would g i v e my life f o r freedom. I ' I said w e are giving our lives f o r it. We've l o s t h e r i c a n s and more casualties and w e don't like h k it~ at all when you are s o critical about w h a t w e ' v e done, I also gave them a going o v e r about cultural centers. 1 said you accused us publicly, you had no evidence, you didn't even speak t o u s privately before you m a d e your ppblic c h a r g e l . I s a i d it's false and w e resent it.
f y o u watch K: I think your relations with them are going to improve. I them dealing with each other outside they play t h i s moral game, but inside
...
T elecon
Secretary Rogers 1 0 / 2 4 / 7 0 6:20 p.m.
page 3
they a r e tough as hen. 1 don't k n o w what more w e c o d d have done f o r them. They get 40 percent of our aid budget. W e penalized Pakistan with an a r m s
embargo.
there.
R; W e ' v e done everything w e could. I went there; the President w e n t Lf h things done to her father bug her and she doesn't t r u s t us . . .
K: Kennedy practically slobbered over her.
R: I know.
I just thought you'd b e interested.
February 8, 197 1 Dear Mr . -Secretay I have received the following message from m y President for immediate communication to President Nixon : MESSAGE BEGINS : Your Excellency , I must tell you of my serious concern over th e turn of events which has resulted in a rapid escalatio n of tension in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent . This ha s been brought about by what appears to us to be India' s deliberate over reaction to an incident for which Pakistan could not be held responsible . Two young men from Indian occupied Kashmi r hijacked an Indian plane flying from Srinagar to Jamm u on 30th January and landed at Lahore . My Governmen t took prompt steps to fulfil its obligations under internationa l conventions and arranged repatriation of passengers an d crew of the hijacked plane to India at the earliest opportunity . We also employed every means to have the plane release d from the hijackers . Despite our sustained efforts, thi s object could not be achieved and the hijackers destroyed the plane on 2nd February . Although the hijacking was the result of repressiv e measures adopted by the Government of India in occupied Kashmir, my Government deplored the action of th e hijackers . Instead of appreciating our helpful attitude, th e Government of India for its own reasons used th e incident to intensify tension between the two countries . Highly provocative statements have been made by responsibl e Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister, blaming Pakistan for the incident and threatening retaliatory action . The Indian authorities have also been allowing massiv e and violent demonstrations against the Pakistan Hig h Commission in New Delhi which has resulted in damag e to property and injuries to personnel of the High Commission . On 4th February the Indian Government took the

extraordinary step of banning flights of al l Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory . By taking this arbitrary measure of stopping direc t flights between the two wings of Pakistan, Indi a has committed a serious breach of its internationa l and bilateral commitments which has resulted i n hightening tensions . A situation has thus bee n created that could lead to developments which w e in Pakistan very much wish to avoid . Considering the degree of interest whic h your Government has taken in preservation o f peace and tranquility in the sub-continent, I fel t you would be interested in using your good office s with the Government of India for preventing a further deterioration of the situation and for bringin g it back to normal . I and my Government woul d highly appreciate any effort that Your Excellenc y might make in this direction . With kind regards . Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan . MESSAGE ENDS . I will be grateful if you could kindly transmit it to it s high destination . With my best personal regards . Yours sincerely ,
( A . Hilaly )
The Honourabl e William P . Roger s Secretary of Stat e State Department Washington D . C. DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
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:
12 April 1971
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MEMORANDUM
0-
THE W i 1 1A
.,uv
--
WASHINGTON
MEETING May 2 6 , 1971 May 26, 1971
-.
- 3 R WSAG
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Samuel M. Hoskinson
5 K
SUBJECT:
Indian Guvernment Decisions on Pakistan Crisis
1. Refugee Situation: The Indian Ministry o f IIorne Affairs reported that:
--The refugee situation along the East P a k border w a s becoming "desperatew the mid-May figure was over 2. 5 million.
--
--The financial responsibiLity f o r the refugees would place an impossible burden on the Indian economy and infrastructure.
--They recommended the Zndian Government take every aCep t o force the GOP to cease pressuring East Pakistanis to flee and to force the GOP to
repatriate refugees.
2.
Bangla Desh Government in Ejdle in Calcutta: External Affairs reported that:
--Recognition of Bangla Desh must be considered only i n light of the specific material help that India was prepared t o make available t o the East Pakistan liberation front.
-Bangla Deeh should o n l y b e recognized when India made the decision to risk military action against Pakistan for the liberation of t h e G e t .
--The E&ernal Affairs report stressed the extremely negative reaction of the third countries (especially Muslim nations) to t h e East Pakistan situation and the "wait and see" attitude of the major power 8 , notably
the U. 5 . and USSR.

3. Military Situation i n East Paldstan and Possible Indian Military Action: The report from the Defense Ministry, while stressing the preparedness of Indian armed forces and the weakaess of Pakistani armed forces, recommended against unilateral Indian military action for the following reasons:
a. Inability to determine at what point the Chinese would become involved.
b . Willingness of some Mudim countries (Turkey and Iran) t o help Pakistan.

e.
Indian inability t o assure continuing military supply from thixd countries (notably USSR) if hdia initiated what could be a. long war,
the East would involve India in a
d. An invasion t o achieve the liberation of
two-front war which could create a requirement for the milibry occupation of all of Pakistan.
4.
The following decisions were made:

a .
Defer recognition of Bangla Dash for the immediate future.
b.
c.
Maintain constant military readiness, Take every diplomatic step to force t h e major powers to take action to force the GOP to atop the refugee flow and to repatriate those who have crossed into India, including hints that M i a might b k e unilateral military action.
d, Seek financial aid from all sources to temporarily support the refugees.
They also decided to release off-the-record press comments that India is reaching the point where s o m e s o r t of action, possibly milibry, was possible if there i a not immediate relief for the refugee problem,
In a follow-up meeting with opposition leaders, Mrs. Gandhi reaffirmed India1s

priority of putting all possible diplomatic pressure on the major powers to pressure Pakistan to change its palicies, Stressing the gravity of the current crisis, she pleaded for broad eupport o f current Indian policy "regardless o f where it led. [When queried about possible unilateral M a n actions, she avoided using the words "military action. " The source reports that qpposition left to right took a tough line demanding some s o r t of military action there were no resolution t o t h e refuget problem i n t h e immediate future. ]
-1
--
Comment: As you can see, the Indians are engaged i n a fairly sophisticated diplomatic and public relations campaign, More importitntly, their decision-ma king

has not reached yet t h e stage of war or peace. This report would indicate that Mrs. G m d h i is still moving w i t h considerable restraint, given the circumstances, and that there is scope for us to reinforce t h i s .
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E AGENCY
OFFICE
O F NATIONAL ESTIMATES
22 September 1971
MEMORANDUM SUBJECT:
I/ The Indo-Pakistani C r i s i s : S i x Months Later-
NOTE
t o warrant Enough has happened since we l a s t p u b l i s h e another assessment o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n South Asia. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g we discuss t h e current s i t u a t i o n ; l i k e l y developments w i t h respect t o Pakistan, India, and t h e Bengali i n surgents; the roles of t h e great powers; t h e contingency of larger hostil i t i e s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n ; and possible resol u t i o n s o f t h e problem,
I/ Z/ -
This memormdwn was prepared by the Office of NationuZ Estimates und coordinated w i t h i n C I A .
S#IE 32-71, 12 Apr-iZ 1971, Prospects for Pakistan; and Memorandwn, 28 M a y 1971, Indo-Pakistani Tensicns . The pz.in&paZ judgments in both remain v a l i d .
The Imurgency
1.
The s i t u a t i o n i n t h e subcontinent, and particularly i n

The
E a s t P a k i s t a n , has become increasingly tense and vol a l i 1e.
West Pakistani army and paramilitary security services i n E a s t Bengal , now augmented t o around 80,000 men, control the ci t i e s
and parts of t h e countryside, a t l e a s t i n t h e daytime.
They do
have some a1 1 ies among the populace, notably t h e 1-2 m i l l i o n
non-Bengal i Urdu-speaking " B i haris", and some ardently a n t i Hindu

Bengal i s .
Many o f t h e i r supporters have been organized
i n t o o f f i c i a l ly appointed "Peace Committees" which perform some
governmental f u n c t i o n s .
2.
B u t t h e military and i t s allies have not been able t o
crush an insurgency movement operating throughout much o f E a s t

Pakistan.
Bengali propaganda, such as t h a t from t h e outlawed
Awami League (AL) leaders now in India,alleges t h a t t h e resis-
tance forces are formidable.
L i t t l e i s known, however, about
t h e real capabi 1 it i e s of t h e M u k t i Bahini ( t iberation F i g h t e r s ,
a term frequently used t o designate a l l armed Bengali insurgents,

o f whatever o r g a n i z a t i o n or pol i t i c a l persuasion, whether based
i n E a s t Pakistan or
in India).
In I n d i a there may be
a s many
as 50,000 E a s t Bengalis i n some way o r another a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

a r e s i s t a n c e force.
Many if not most o f them f o r m e r l y belonged
t o the pre-March 1971 Pakistani army and t o t h e paramilitary

Bengali security service.
Perhaps as many as 15,000 cross t h e
border from time to time and carry out guerrilla operations.

3.
The larger group t h a t has so far stayed i n India may
be planning t o seize and hold, a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n i military countera t t a c k , a s i z a b l e chunk o f East Bengali territory i n which i t
could establish a functioning, independent Bangla Desh
--
a move
which would be b o t h highly p r o v o c a t i v e and of u n c e r t a i n outcome.
Or i t may be sirni l a r t o t h e Algerian army based i n Tunisia u n t i l

1962, i .e.,
i n t e n d i n g n o t t o f i g h t irmnediately b u t rather t o
w a i t and t a k e o v e r the country when the West P a k i s t a n i s leave.
I t i s a l s o q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t decisions as t o the use o f t h i s
force have y e t t o be made.

made t o screen i t so as
In any case, some e f f o r t has been
to assure i t s loyalty t o t h e AL-controlled
Bangla Desh government-in-exile in C a l c u t t a .
4.
The p o l it i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i onal guerri 11as
themselves, t h e i r e x a c t numbers, command structure, etc., are
generally unknown.
But Bengalis are traditionally individualistic
even anarchic i n character.
The i n s u r g e n t s probably i n c l u d e a
number o f d i s p a r a t e , even c o n f l i c t i ng groups of indi v i dual s and
bands
who operate independently o f one another. Those loyal t o
the AL may make up t h e l a r g e s t number, but a t l e a s t some o f the

insurgents a r e hard-1 i n e extremists s i m i 1 a r t o t h e urban guer-
r i l l a s in India's s t a t e o f West Bengal.
5. The Mukti B a h i n i have shown an i n c r e a s i n g degree o f

sophistication and e f f e c t i v e n e s s a g a i n s t t h e Pakistanis, though
n o t so much as they claim.
B y blowing up b r i d g e s , sabotaging
ships and b o a t s , mining roads, and derai 1 i n g t r a i n s , they have

badly d i s r u p t e d the a r e a ' s transportation system. They have
assassinated a number o f Peace Cornmi t t e e members.
Striking
hard a t t h e jute industry, Pakistan's p r i n c i p a l export e a r n e r ,

t h e Mukti Bahini 's a c t s o f sabotage and i n t i m i d a t i o n have helped
t o reduce output of jute products to about a q u a r t e r o f t h e
former 1eve1 . Casual t i e s have been i n f 1i c t e d on the P a k i s t a n i

army, b u t we have no re1 i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on how many.
Our
Consulate i n Dacca has reported a number o f explosions i n t h a t

c i t y ; a t one t i m e o r another t h e c i t y ' s power system and gas
supplies have been p u t o u t o f a c t i o n , and t h e lobby o f the most

prominent h o t e l destroyed by a bomb.
School attendance, p a r t i c -
ularly i n the u n i v e r s i t i e s , is v i r t u a l l y a t an end.
"Pacification"
remains unreal ized, t h o u g h Is1 amabad continues t o c l a i m t h e
s i t u a t i o n i s i n hand.
6. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Mukti Bahini and the

I n d i a n government remains a s u b j e c t o f controversy.
Islamabad
claims t h a t only active I n d i a n backing and c o l l a b o r a t T o n have
p e m i t t e d t h e "miscreants" t o operate; t h a t peaceful c o n d i t i o n s

and t h e end o f t h e refugee f l o w would have been achieved i f
o n l y I n d i a had closed t h e border, disarmed the i n s u r g e n t s fleeing
t o I n d i a , and severely r e s t r i c t e d their a c t i v i t i e s .
New De7 h i
rep1 i e s w i t h denials of such support, and w i t h arguments t h a t
the 2,500 mile Indian-East Pakistani b o r d e r i s so long and t h e

t e r r a i n so d i f f i c u l t a s t o make control o f i t i m p o s s i b l e .
New
D e l h i further claims t h a t neither i t nor anyone e l s e can t e l l
whether Bengalis i n the area are fmm East P a k i s t a n or from West

Bengal , t h a t the insurgency i s a mass popular uprising i n s i d e
East Bengal i t s e l f , and t h a t i t is unable t o m o n i t o r , much l e s s
s t o p , t h e a i d given the M u k t i Bahini by sympathizers i n I n d i a .
7.
There i s some t r u t h i n both sets o f c l a i m s , b u t I n d i a n
involvement w i t h t h e Mukti B a h i n i
is c l e a r l y greater than New
Del h i pub1 ic l y a d m i t s .
o b s e r v a t i o n by such o u t s i d e r s as Western newsmen i n d i c a t e t h a t
t h e Indian m i 1 itary and t h e parami 1itary services
are arming,
equipping, and t r a i n i n g
--
as we1 1 as p r o v i d i n g sanctuary t o
--
E a s t Bengalis i n c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers.
Numerous artillery duels
and open border ski mi shes between regular I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n i
military forces on the border a l s o p o i n t t o d i r e c t Indian s u p p o r t

o f border crossers. While some private a i d t o the insurgents
i n I n d i a has taken place, n e i t h e r the conventional n o r t h e guer-
r i l l a units o f the Mukti Bahini could have acquired arms and
munitions i n any quantity except from the Indian military.

8.
There are a number o f reasons why New Del h i i s pursuing
t h i s policy.
The Mukti B a h i n i I s cause i s enormously popular in
I n d i a ; repressive measures against them would generate major

p o l i t i c a l backlash.
In terms of r e a l p o l i t i k , I n d i a considers
i t s sel f- i n terest served by any weakening of i t s t r a d i t i onal

foe.
The Indians may t h i n k e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n t o Is1 amabad's
rule i s greater t h a n ' i t actually i s , and probably downgrade the
actual strength o f t h e West P a k i s t a n i s ' m i l i t a r y power i n East

Bengal
A t each stage, they have been w i 11ing t o arm more guer-
r i l l a s and t o abet more border crossings i n the hope t h a t t h i s
would finally begin the toppling o f Punjabi military r u l e there,

9.
I n h e l p i n g t h e insurgents, New Del h i a l s o seeks t o
maintain some degree o f control over them.
India's s t a t e o f
West Bengal has long been a hotbed of sDme o f the most v i r u l e n t
and extreme p o l i t i c a l movements i n the world, ones which have

already i n f l i c t e d considerable damage on t h a t s t a t e ' s (and
I n d i a ' s ) urban industrial economy.
Heavy r e p r e s s i v e measures
have so f a r kept these movements under control.
The Bengalis
of E a s t Pakistan a r e equally susceptible to such views ; i f

such radicals ever took over c o n t r o l o f an independent Bangla
Desh, they would pose a formidable threat t o I n d i a n security. Indeed, I n d i a i s worried about the p o l i t i c a l f a l l o u t
i n West
Bengal even now.
N e w Del h i i s probably n o t merely g i v i n g support
t o E a s t Bengalis i t regards favorably, b u t also i s t r y i n g t o

check t h e e x t r e m i s t s .
The Refugees 10.
The violent acts o f b o t h t h e P a k i s t a n i forces and the
M u k t i Bahini , t h e reprisals and counter-repri sals have i n f l icted
grave damage on E a s t Bengal and its peopl e .
Economic a c t i v i t y
i s now some 30-35 percent of what i t was prior t o March 1971,
if that.
E s t i m a t e s (really guesses) say t h a t some 200,000 o r
more residents o f t h e area have been k i 1led, and t h e area has
seen one of the largest and m o s t r a p i d population transfers i n modern t i m e s .

Since March 1971, over 8 million o f t h e 76 million
East
Pakistanis have f l e d t o I n d i a , and t h i s movement continues.
The t i d e ebbs and flows ; since i t s peak rate i n June when it

averaged 100,000 daily, it has rarely fa1 1 en be1 ow 20,000-30,000
a day.
11.
Hindus.
Probably 80-90 percent o f those fleeing have been
I t may be t h a t the refugee flow i n t o I n d i a will stop
only when nearly a1 1 the Hindus have f i n a l l y crossed t h e border.

Some 6 million plus have already l e f t Pakistan; t h e remafning
3-4 million may n o t be far behind.
Depending on events i n t h e
area, this could occur even by the end of the year.
Moreover,
i f East Pakistan s u f f e r s severe food shortages i n the n e x t few
months, the H i ndus may be joined by addi t i o n a l mi 11ions o f Musl irns

12.
W h y t h i s i n c r e d i b l e movement o f people?
There are a
number o f reasons, but many i f not rnos t of the Hindus fled for
f e a r of t h e i r 1ives
Tikka Khan
A t the beginning of t h e c i v i 1 war, General
--
then t h e Governor and M a r t i a l Law Administrator
--
apparently cal cul ated t h a t he could i n t i m i date h i s recalcitrant
These are Indian statistCcs, but they are generally corroborated by outside obseruers, including those from the Ufl. In addition, the I n d i m government has appropriated fmds to take care of th<s nwnber. The P a k i s h n i s on t h e u t h e r h m d ctaim the figures are h i g h l y exaggerated, and say the total is cZoser t o 2 m i Zlion. In the f o t towirtg, we asswne, on the basis of the bast evidence now avaiZabZe, t h a t the Indim figures a m more l i k e l y the correct ones.
province i n t o q u i c k submission.
Troops mostly from t h e Mest
P a k i s t a n i Punjab (an area now almost I00 percent Muslim and
strongly conmunal i n o u t l o o k ) appear t o have made H i n d u s ,

d a r k l y suspected anyway o f being I n d i a n spies and s e c e s s i o n i s t s , t h e i r special targets.
In this virulent atmosphere,
orators have become accustomed t o m i s t r e a t i n g t h e Hindu religious

minority.
The t o p leaders i n Islamabad have since t r i e d t o s t o p
these practices, b u t t h e i r e f f o r t s have sometimes been unavai 1ing.

13.
The Indians have accepted the refugees and have

They seem
provided them w i t h the rudiments o f subsistence.
prepared t o continue doing so, a t l e a s t f o r t h e moment.
From
early o n , they hoped t h a t most o f t h e heavy costs would be borne

by t h e wealthier outside powers,
To date, these hopes have been
mostly unavai 1 i n g ; extensions o f f o r e i g n assistance f o r t h e r e f -
ugees have so f a r amounted t o some $200 m i l l ion ( a c t u a l del iv e r i e s
have been much smaller) ; the t o t a l c o s t t o India through t h e

n e x t s i x months
or so may come t o f i v e times t h a t amount.
India's
comparatively chari tab1 e response probably resul t s 1ess f r o m

a1 t r u i s m than from l a c k o f a1 ternatives.
To forcibly drive
t h e m i 11i o n s o f refugees back across t h e b o r d e r might resul t
in the death o f many i f n o t most o f them.
If I n d i a p e r m i t t e d
retal i a t o r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t Musl ims i n I n d i a , including
e x p e l l i n g them i n t o Pakistan, i t would r i s k making i t s
I I
60 million Muslims f a i r game for Hindu f a n a t i c s ( o f whom

there are many).
Were such t o happen and g e t o u t of hand,
as i t probably would, t h e present noes o f East Bengal
would
seem small -scal e.

14.
In many respects the refugee problem i s the p r i n c i p a l

The sheer numbers o f
New De7 h i
t h r e a t t o peace i n t h e subcontinent.
refugees may burden I n d i a beyond i t s capacity.
rnight then conclude t h a t i t had no c h o i c e b u t t o invade E a s t
P a k i s t a n e i t h e r t o i n s t a l l a government t h a t would l e t the

refugees return, or t o s e i z e enough Pakistani t e r r i t o r y t o
resettle them.
T h i s k i n d o f reasoning i s a t t r a c t i v e t o many
Indians, and pressures f o r an i n v a s i o n w i 11 grow i f the exodus
continues.
But t h i s move would probably
only make a bad s i t u a t i o n
worse
--
and a t l e a s t some prominent Indian l e a d e r s are p r o b a b l y
aware o f t h i s .
An a t t a c k on E a s t P a k i s t a n , w i t h accompanying
heavy f i g h t i n g , movements of large armed forces, etc., would
c r e a t e s t i l l another group o f refugees, further d i s r u p t trans-
port, and destroy crops and stored food in an area where the
l a t t e r i s already i n s h o r t supply.
S i m i l a r l y the seizure o f
a Bengali area large enough t o resettle s e v e r a l m i l l i o n people
could achieve i t s purpose o n l y i f many present residents were
expel 1ed and made hornel ess themsel ves .

15.
Most Hindu refugees now i n India would probably not

under any c o n d i t i o n s
want t o r e t u r n t o E a s t Bengal
--
though
I n d i a i s re1 u c t a n t l o acknowledge this.
Hindu properties have
been parceled out t o others, memories o f a t r o c i t i e s
remain
fresh, and H i ndu-Musl i m antagonisms
--
a1 though now muted
amongst Bengalis by comnon grievances against the West P a k i s t a n i s
--
remain s t r o n g ,
B u t whether these n e g a t i v e factors will con-
t i n u e t o be recognized by the I n d i a n government i s another matter.

Famine in E a s t Bengal? 16.
T h i s i s s t i l l uncertain.
There i s s t i l l t o o l i t t l e
hard i n f o r m a t i o n , too few means of f i n d i n g out exactly how much

food, t r a n s p o r t -- o r even how many consumers
i n t h e n e x t few months i n E a s t Pakistan.
--
t h e r e w i l l be
Taking i n t o account
w a r c o n d i t i o n s , f l i g h t of farmers, n e g l e c t o f c u l t i v a t i o n , and
earlier natural disasters (severe floods i n August 1970, t h e

cyclone of November o f t h a t year) t h e production o f rice, the
.*
Some 5 million Hindu Bengalis l e f t Em t Pakistan in hhe 23-year period be w e e n independence mtd e a r l y 19 7 1.
area's p r i n c i p a l food, will of course be down, though by how

much i s unknown.
But w i t h the flight o f 10 percent o f t h e
popul a l i o n , and t h e probable a v a i labi 1 i ty of emergency food
shipments from abroad, the s i t u a t i o n may not assume c r i t i c a l

proportions.
17.
T h i s may n o t be the case, however, f o r i n d i v i d u a l
f a m i l i e s , villages, or larger food d e f i c i t areas.
East P a k i s t a n ' s
internal t r a n s p o r t a t i o n network has been c r i p p l e d , and movement

of food from p o r t s and surplus areas w i l l be very d i f f i c u l t ,
often impossible.
Much of the
former local administrative and

In addition there w i 11
Food d i s t r i b u t i o n
d i s t r i b u t i ve apparatus has disappeared.
be c o n t i n u i n g obstacles of p o l it i c a l o r i g i n .
i s viewed by each side as something t o be used f o r i t s own ad-
vantage, or a t least as s o w t h i n g to be denied to the enemy.

Thus there a r e reports of some members of t h e P a k i s t a n i army
and t h e Peace Committees deliberately w i t h h o l d i n g food from
Hindus.
Some M u k t i B a h i n i leaders for their p a r t have t h r e a t -
ened t o a t t a c k and sabotage emergency food d i stri bution e f f o r t s ,
i n c l u d i n g those of t h e UN, because such w i 11 be ultimately run

by
and f o r t h e i r West Pakistani oppressors.
In any e v e n t , the
food s i t u a t i o n i n E a s t Bengal i s 1ik e l y t o remain uncertain, w i t h

t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a disaster o f major magnitude.
. .
. .
Ateitudes of New DeZhi and IsZmabad

18.
The two governments continue t o be hostile, s e l f -
r i g h t e o u s , and emotional w i t h respect t o one another.
Prime
M i n i s t e r Indi ra Gandhi , who got a sweeping electoral mandate
last spring, i s c l e a r l y i n charge i n New Delhi.
Elected on
a platform promising a major effort t o reduce unemployment

and to raise 1 i v i n g standards, she has been compelled i n s t e a d
to preoccupy herself w i t h the Pakistani c r i s i s .
On the whole,
she has been a force f o r moderati on, resisting demands for a1 1 out war from t h e xenophobic Jan Sangh party and other extremists.
Her policies have so far received general pub1 ic support.

19,
The Paki stani m i 1 itary continues to rule a1 1 sections
o f the country through i t s strict Martial Law Administration (MLA).

Whether President Yahya Khan i s absolute boss or simply one o f
a number o f generals ruling c o l l e c t i v e l y cannot be e s t a b l ished.

I n any event Yahya and t h e MLA show almost no s i g n s o f p a r t i s a n
disagreements or lack o f resolve.

who g o t most o f t h e West P a k i s t a n i
Z . A . Bhutto, t h e politician
votes i n t h e December 1970

I n his
e l e c t i o n s , has so f a r not been p e r m i t t e d t o t a k e o f f i c e .
frustration he frequently lashes o u t a t t h e MLA i n p r i v a t e (and
occasionally in p u b l i c ) , b u t he will remain powerless so long as
13
55/390
t h e military continues
to rule. And i n t h e present c r i s i s
atmosphere, t h e r e are few s i g n s t h a t t h e MLA w i l l i n f a c t

renounce i t s a u t h o r i t y . 4
20. The I n d i a n s say t h a t t h e West P a k i s t a n i s ' a c t s i n
the e a s t wing are n o t only wrong
--
i n t h a t they are trying
to negate through m i l i t a r y acts t h e A L ' s electoral mandate

but a l s o doomed t o failure.
--
They probably see t h e degree o f
Bengali resistance as t o o g r e a t for Islamabad
ever to s t i f l e ;
i n any event, they feel morally o b l i g a t e d t o support i t , even
though t h i s p o l i c y entails obvious r i s k s .

mounting costs and continuing failures
They calculate t h a t
--
much o f i t resulting
from t h e activities o f the Indian-supported Mukti B a h i n i
-- will
eventually force t h e West Pakistanis to grant autonomy to t h e

east wing and probably t o abandon i t entirely.
The I n d i a n s
a1 so seem t o feel
, or
hope, t h a t these o b j e c t i v e s may be a c h i e v e d
sooner r a t h e r t h a n 1 ater, and w i thoul a f u l l -scale Indo-Pakistani
war,
21.
Besides aiding t h e i n s u r g e n t s , India has a1 so given
asyl urn to many c i v i 1ian AL leaders who were able t o f l e e East
The other principal P a k i s t a n i poZiticaZ leader, t h e AL's Mujibur Rahman, remains in prison. Pstamabad has announced t@t he is being kried in camera for treason, but has not dzsczosed the verdict or sentence. Even so he remains overwheZnringZy the most popular poZitician i n East BengaZ.
Bengal , and has extended considerable a i d t o the Bangla Desh government-in-exi 1 e which these leaders s e t up i n C a l c u t t a
some months ago.
H o s t of them have proved t o be uninspiring
figures, w i t h 1 i t t l e stature or p o p u l a r i t y i n t h e i r own r i g h t .

None can claim, as could Mujibur Rahman, t o speak for t h e
Bengal i people.
Mrs. Gandhi has so far resisted domestic
pol itical pressures t o extend formal diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n

t o t h i s shadow regime. Such an act would almost certainly lead
to a break .in relations w i t h Pakistan and p o s s i b l y t o serious

h o s t i l i t i e s as w e l l .
Were t h e l a t t e r t o e r u p t anyway, o r t h e
insurgency to c o n t i n u e for an extended period, however, t h e

odds f a v o r i n g recogni l i o n woul d grow.
22.
F o r h i s p a r t , Yahya sincerely be1 ieves t h a t Pakistan
i s t h e aggrieved p a r t y , t h a t i t i s only suppressing a treason-
able, secessionist movement i n o r d e r t o maintain the i n t e g r i t y

o f the country,
Because the Indians support t h e Bengali insur-
gents, Islambad a s s e r t s t h a t they are the aggressors and are
responsible f o r the suffering, bloodshed, and refugees.
Even
so, there are occasional rumors of a p o s s i b l e accommodation

b e i n g reached between President Yahya and t h e AL.
But t h i s
would probably require such major (and a t the moment unlikely)

concessions by Yahya
--
p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e release o f Muji bur
Rahman
--
as t o make i t improbable.
Rather, t h e MLA i s likely
t o remain morally and emotionally committed t o i t s present
course.
23.
That course imp1 ies more t h a n j u s t continued m i 1 i tary
rule.
President Yahya has r e c e n t l y declared an amnesty for
most Bengalis, removed t h e harsh General T i k k a Khan from E a s t
Pakistan, and appointed a Bengali c i v i l i a n as governor there.

B u t the new governor i s an 01 d man not noted for s k i l l , dec i s i veness , or popular appeal
He has chosen a c a b i n e t o f
civilians, b u t his province continues under martial l a w and

t h u s under army c o n t r o l ,
About 40 percent o f the AL members
elected i n December 1970 t o p r o v i n c i a l and national assemblies

have been o f f i c i a l l y cleared t o t a k e t h e i r seats when and i f
t h o s e bodies meet; e l e c t i o n s t o replace those proscribed are

promised by t h e end a f 1971 many if not
B u t t h e M u k t i Bahini w i 11 i n h i b i t
most o f those who have been cleared from serving,
and will also probably d i s r u p t any new e l e c t i o n s which m i g h t

be he1 d .
On balance, we expect t h a t Yahya's military regime
w i l l continue t o seek ways o f b r i n g i n g on c i v i l i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rule in a l l p a r t s of Pakistan, but will f i n d t h e obstacles
formidable, and the goal probably u n a t t a i nab1 e .
Any c i v i l i a n
government established i n East Pakistan under t h e army's
aegis i s l i k e l y t o be more shadow than substance.
24.
West Pakistan itsel f has experienced some d i f f i c u l t i e s
i n t h e p a s t s i x months,
Military spending i s cutting into
development and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ; stock market p r i c e s are t h e

1 owes t i n s ix years ; pri vate investment i s near1y non-exi
stent ;
Even
and t h e r e are some press r e p o r t s t h a t p r i c e s a r e rising.
so, West P a k i s t a n has so far n o t f e l t t h e severe economic p i n c h
and consequent pol i tical d i f f i c u l t i e s which some experts thought
would r e s u l t from t h e troubles in the e a s t wing.

ment has n o t seriously increased.
Urban unemploy-
More than 70 percent o f i t s
workers are fanners who would n o t be much a f f e c t e d by developments

i n the
urban, industrial sector.
Except f o r occasional
complaints by the f r u s t r a t e d Bhutto and some o f h i s associates,
there has n o t been much pub1 i c unrest or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h

the government and i t s
policies i n the west wing.
Yahya's
moves have so f a r been well accepted and probably p o p u l a r there,
This, l i k e t h e economic s i t u a t i o n , may change, b u t i t does not

seem 1 ikely a t any t i m e soon.
25.
West P a k i s t a n ' s f o r e i g n exchange position has remained
considerably b e t t e r than expected.
Soon a f t e r the c r i s i s broke,
Is1 arnabad unilateral ly declared a s i x months moratorium on its

foreign debt payments, s a v i n g i t s e l f $60 mill ion i n f o r e i g n
exchange.
Its f a i r l y large t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y has lost much of
i t s c a p t i v e market i n the e a s t wing, b u t i t apparently has been
able t o export i t s products elsewhere.

i m p o r t s have been c u t sharply.
A t t h e same time, consumer
Development spending in t h e east,
o f course, has been greatly curtailed i f n o t ended e n t i r e l y .

Thanks t o these steps , Pakistan ' s f o r e i gn exchange r e s e r v e s have
f a l l e n only from $254 million a year ago t o $217 m i l l i o n .

powers have made no s i g n i f i c a n t
Western
new extensions o f foreign a i d
since March 1971, b u t there i s still enough a i d i n t h e p i p e l i n e

t o l a s t several
more months, possibly longer. P a k i s t a n ' s mora-
t o r i u m on f o r e i g n debt repayments expires i n October and t h e

government i s seeking more liberal repayment terms from i t s
creditors.
I f such are not forthcoming, Is1 arnabad could then
declare another moratorium and continue a s b e f o r e
--
though t h i s
wou1 d further antagonize a t 1e a s t some of i t s f o r e i g n c r e d i tors.
South Asia and the Outside Pmers
26. Since March 1971, both I n d i a and Pakistan have, o f
course, sought o u t s i d e backing for t h e i r r e s p e c t i ire positions ,

and have shown considerable concern with f o r e i g n responses t o
their moves.
N e i t h e r country has taken i t s case t o t h e UN i n
t h i s d i s p u t e , probably in p a r t because n e i t h e r would be likely

t o g e t t h e strong endorsement o f any s i g n i f i c a n t group of na-
tions there.
I n some cases foreign s u p p o r t , or lack o f it, has
had only marginal impact.
I n d i a has been disappointed, though
hardly damaged, by t h e support g i v e n the P a k i s t a n i s by the

Arabs whom New D e l h i has so l o n g c u l t i v a t e d and endorsed i n
t h e i r d i s p u t e w i t h Israel
O f f a r g r e a t e r consequence has been
I n d i a ' s f a i l u r e t o g e t a l l . P a k i s t a n ' s p r i n c i p a l sources o f economic a i d t o suspend t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e pending a p o l i t i c a l
s o l u t i o n i n East Bengal
B u t the two South Asian c o u n t r i e s have
concentrated most o f t h e i r e f f o r t s
in seeking t h e backing, vari-
o u s l y , o f t h e US, t h e USSR, and China.

a.
China
27,
Peking has n o t i n v o l v e d i t s e l f much i n t h e c u r r e n t South

E a r l y on, i t
A s i a n c r i s i s , a t least not openly and d i r e c t l y .
d i d send a nasty, i f somewhat equivocal, note t o t h e Indian

"
L>- : ,
,
A -
< ~ W ~ ~ . , ' ,, , . ' ;. - -% ; : < .- - .
* : , . z + >
. . . .. , .
- .. ...
-HT
government t e l l i n g the l a t t e r n o t t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e a f f a i r s
o f others, b u t i t has since been generally s i l e n t on t h e c i v i l
war i n E a s t Bengal.
So f a r as we know, t i e s w i t h t h e Islamabad
government remain cordial
, and
China's s u b s t a n t i a1 economic and
m i l i t a r y a i d programs w i t h P a k i s t a n appear t o continue as before.
Well before March 1971, Peking had begun t o mute i t s normally harsh a n t i - I n d i a n posture.
During t h e p a s t year o r so i t has
made no polemical a t t a c k s on Mrs. Gandhi, and has a p p a r e n t l y

ceased i t s propaganda support o f the smal I t r i b a l insurgencies
in
northeastern I n d i a .
Indeed, t h e r e are numerous rumors i n
India t h a t major moves i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a detente w i t R Peking

are i n the offing.
28.
I n any case, China remains an important f a c t o r i n both
Islamabad and New Del h i ; t h e contingency o f a j o i n t P a k i s t a n i Chinese a t t a c k on i t remains a p r i n c i p a l I n d i a n bugaboo.
This
has been even more the case since t h e I n d i a n s 1earned o f M r .

K i s s i n g e r ' s t r i p f r o m Pakistan t o Peking and o f President Nixon's
impending t r i p t o China.
E v e r s u s p i c i o u s and-prone t o fear
t h e worst, many i n l n d i a sunnise t h a t they face n o t merely t h e
c o o r d i n a t e d hos t i 1i t y o f thei r t w o t r a d i t i o n a l enemies, b u t fear
t h a t b o t h w i l l have t h e backing o f t h e US.
We continue t o es-
t i m a t e t h a t the Chinese p r o b a b l y would not j o i n i n an Indo-
+
20
62/390
"-
.,-
..,.
. .
. ... .
P a k i s t a n i c o n f l ic t - -- though i n c e r t a i n circumstances they

m i g h t engage i n
such t h r e a t e n i n g gestures as maneuvering t r o o p s

W e a l so be1 i e v e t h a t t h e Indians
n e a r t h e Chinese-Indian border.
themselves probably do n o t consider the Chinese l o be an actual i m n i nen t t h r e a t .
Nonetheless, they are uneasy, and c o n t i n u e
t o seek ways both o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g themselves m i 1 i t a r i ly and o f f i n d i n g s u p p o r t e r s a g a i n s t a . p u t a t i ve . US-China-Pakis tan co-
a l it i o n a g a i n s t them. b. 29.
The USSR
These fea rs have been a m a j o r factor i n India's deMoscow has n o t
velopment o f even closer t i e s w i t h t h e USSR.
backed I n d i a c o n s i s t e n t l y and u n c r i t i c a l ly since t h e Bengal i
cri s i s erupted.
I t has continued .del i v e r i e s under it s eco-
any o f t h e o t h e r great powers, t h e USSR has l i n e d up w i t h I n d i a s i n c e March 1971; i n N e w Delhi's eyes i t remains a b a s t i o n a g a i n s t any t h r e a t , real o r imagined, t o an I n d i a i s o -
l a t e d f r o m o r h o s t i l e t o t h e other p r i n c i p a l powers.
The
Friendshi p T r e a t y o f August 1971 f u r t h e r cements and formal izes

Indo-Soviet t i e s ,
I t reaffirms mutual f r i e n d s h i p , . i n c o r p o r a t e s
promises not t o a s s i s t one another's enemies i n case of an a t t a c k

by a t h i r d party, and agrees t o mutual "consul t a t i o n " i n the event
o f such an attack o r a threat of one.
H o w much enhanced i n f l u e n c e
o r "control", i f any
--
say t h r o u g h secret understandings
--
t h i s t r e a t y actually gives the Russians over the Indians i n f o r -
e i g n p o l i c y matters i s s t i l l unclear.
A t the very l e a s t i t pro-
v i d e s some s a t i s f a c t i o n t o t h e S o v i e t s i n formalizing t h e i r present

satisfactory position i n India.
It appears likely t h a t they
approve and support t h e present l i n e s of Indian p o l i c y , and t h a t e w Del h i from h e a t i n g they n i l 1 contlnue their efforts t o prevent N
up the s i t u a t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y fmrn 'launching an all-out w a r .
30.
The t r e a t y has a1 ready had a considerable i m p a c t on b o t h
t h e Indians and t h e Pakistanis.
In what can be construed as t h e
f i r s t f r u i t s of " c o n s u l t a t i o n " , I n d i a a f f i r m e d , i n a j o i n t s t a t e ment o f the Indian and S o v i e t Foreign Ministers a few days a f t e r
the treaty was signed, t h a t "there can be no military s o l u t i o n

and considered t h a t urgent steps be taken i n East Pakistan
achievement of a p o l i t i c a l solution
for
....".
Whether this implies
a permanent r e n u n c i a t i o n o f I n d i a n use o f force i n East Bengal
as well as a condemnation o f P a k i s t a n ' s acts t h e r e remains t o be

established.
However, a later reference i n the j o i n t statement t o
... . .
t h e s e t t l i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l probl ems by peaceful n e g o t i a t i o n s
does p o i n t i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . * 31,
A t l e a s t up t o now, the t r e a t y
has served as a sta-
b i l i z i n g f a c t o r , muting t h e mil itancy which had p r e v i o u s l y
raised i t s voice throughout much o f I n d i a ,
Hawks have found
i t more d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e government t o listen t o their de-
mands f o r f o r c e f u l a c t i o n a g a i n s t Pakistan, or t o a t t r a c t much
o f a popular following.
Over t i m e , the treaty may have wider

I t i s s t i l l t o o early t o
ranging consequences i n other areas.
tell
, however,
whether t h e treaty m i g h t l e a d t o greater Indo-
Soviet :cooperation i n m i l itary or other matters.

32,
For t h e i r p a r t , t h e P a k i s t a n i leaders w i 11 probably
f i n d this new formalized re1 a t i o n s h i p an i n h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t

launching
an attack on I n d i a , and against assuming t h e y w i l l
g e t very much assistance from t h e Chinese i n t h e event o f a war.
S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o promote r e s t r a i n t and avoid an Indo-Pakis-
t a n i war w i l l probably continue, and may c o n t r i b u t e t o keeping
ConuerseZy it can be argued that MPS. Gundhi might fee2 Lhak w i t h opsn Soviet backing she can now adopt far more r i s k y policies than she has in t h e past. To date, nothing in t h e behavior of the Indian government tends to confirm such a view, even though i t s Leaders insist t h a t their freedom of action has been l i m i t e d not a k aZZ by t h e treaty.
---
t h e situation under c o n t r o l .
But the USSR's leverage, 1 ike
those o f a1 1 t h e g r e a t powers w i t h respect t o South A s i a , i s

n o t l i m i t l e s s , and developments c o u l d b r i n g on major h o s t i l i t i e s
d e s p i t e a l l attempts
c.
t o forestall them.
The ihited States
33.
Efforts t o be even-handed w i t h respect t o these two
m o r a l i s t i c South Asian a n t a g o n i s t s have always been d i f f i c u l t
a t best.
I n d l a has been g r e a t l y angered by US policies since
Pakistan's troubles began, and leaders i n New Delhi c l a i m that

re1 a t i o n s between the two countries are now worse than a t any
time i n the past.
US decisions, which have had more symbolic
than s u b s t a n t i v e impact on developments
--
particularly the
continued shipments of small q u a n t i t i e s of m i 1it a r y equipment
--
have roused extremely s t r o n g Indian i r e . The P a k i s t a n i
government has, o f course, been pleased by such a c t s , and i t

has been accommodating and h e l p f u l t o t h e US i n a number of ways.
Nonetheless t h e r e i s probably wariness i n Is1 amabad o v e r t h e fu-
t u r e course of US South A s i a n p o l i c i e s (particularly i n 1i g h t o f

Congressional and press c r i t i c i s m s o f them), and concern t o maint a i n independence in basic d e c i s i o n making.
34.
Overal I , i t i s l ikely t h a t t h e leaders o f both India
and P a k i s t a n consider t h a t the US, i n the l a s t analysis, will
play a comparatively 1 i m i t e d role w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e subcon-
t i n e n t , whatever t h e psycho1 ogical impact of US pol ic i es
US
m i l i t a r y involvement i n t h e area seems t o than out o f t h e ques-
tion.
US m i l i t a r y a i d programs, q u i t e large and important u n t i l
1965, have been almost completely terminated.

and P a k i s t a n
Nor are I n d i a
as c r i t i c a l l y dependent as they were a few years ago
on US and o t h e r Western f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r economic h e a l t h and

development.*
T h i s i s not t o say t h a t e i t h e r has become pros-
perous, or t h a t t h e permanence o f t h i s independence i s assured.
35.
But especially i n t h e case of I n d i a , those grievous
trade d e f i c i t s w h i c h had t o be closed by generous o u t s i d e f i n ancial a i d have been rectified, a t l e a s t temporarily.
Thus,
in 1967 I n d i a had a trade gap of over a bfllion dollars ( i m p o r t s o f $2 billion and e x p o r t s only h a l f o f t h a t ) .
T h i s gap
was covered by foreign a i d , about h a l f from t h e US, w h i c h
Both s t i l l need and receive US food a i d in substmztiai! quantities. With war conditions in East P a k i s t a n and mi Z Zions of refugees throughout BengaZ, these needs w i Z Z increase substantiaZZy. But this is gene~ally r e f e r r e d to as "hwnanitarian" and not gerleraZ Z y beZieved l i k e l y t o US economic and mi Zi tary be cut off in any circmstances a i d programs were skopped duAng the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, b u t food shipments continued.
assured what economic development t h e r e was.
B u t i n the
most re-
c e n t Indian fiscal year, exports and imports were nearly i n balance.
I n d i a , o f course, s t i l l receives foreign non-food a i d , b u t
uses more than ha1 f of what i t gets merely t o repay the debts i n -
curred f r o m previous external assistance programs.
Were I n d i a
now t o be faced w i t h the t h r e a t o f denial o f f u r t h e r a i d from t h e
US or o t h e r Western powers, i t would, o f course, be seriously

concerned.
I t coul d , in e x t remi s , declare a temporary moratori urn
or even d e f a u l t on debts previously incurred, and would probably be a b l e t o g e t along without s u f f e r i n g major calamity, though
additional hardships wouId be f e l t by some s e c t o r s o f t h e popul ation.
36.
In
some ways t h e P a k i s t a n i s are already going through
t h i s process.
As noted above, Pakistan, w i t h no i m p o r t a n t new
extensions o f economic ass istance s jnce March 1971 , has decl ared
a moratorium on repayments of f o r e i g n debts and i s drawing on

a i d already i n t h e pipeline.
The economy o f West Pakistan i s
These debks m e nou very Zarge for both India and P a k i s t a n , as are the annual debt servicing payments, In 1969, India 's indebtedness to Western economic u i d donors was over $9 biztion, and debt servicfng was over $200 million. In Pakistan ' a case the figures were $ 4 bitZion and $1 SO rniZZion, A2 2 have since r i s e n . respectivsZy.
n o t doing badly even w i t h the shambles i n t h e east w i n g .
Par-
ticularly w i t h a diminished foreign debt burden, i t could pro-
bably continue to s u r v i v e , a l b e i t considerably less comfortably,

w i t h o u t major o u t s i d e help for some time.
Accordingly, i t , T i ke
I n d i a , would probably be a b l e t o resist such s p e c i f i c pressures

as threats t o terminate a i d programs.
37. This i s n o t t o say t h a t e i t h e r I n d i a or P a k i s t a n has l o s t i n t e r e s t i n seeking US a s s i s t a n c e , economic or p o l i t i c a l .

They, o f course, do need it, do value it h i g h l y , and
will consup-
t i n u e t o seek n o t o n l y economic a i d b u t as much p o l i t i c a l
port from the US as t h e y can get. They w i l l a l s o remain q u i t e

concerned about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f US a i d programs
--
military,
economic, or whatever
--
which m i g h t be provided to the other.
B u t a t the same l i m e , US influence over both states has dirnini s h e d over t h e p a s t several years.
T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t , i n
c e r t a i n circumstances, I n d i a and Pakistan might not be recep-
tive to t h e i d e a o f mediation by the US as t h e g r e a t power least

committed t o one s i d e or the other.
38.
To date t h e f a c t o r s working t o r e s t r a i n t h e two powers
from f i g h t i n g one another have been stronger than those impel1 i n g
them i n t o a major conflict.
Whether and how l o n g t h i s will
continue i s basical ly unpredictable.
A war coul d e r u p t ,
perhaps
ready sought (and have been denied) permission t o a t t a c k and
destroy nearby g u e r r i l l a bases i n I n d i a .
Were some f i e l d com-
manders t o disobey orders and cross t h e b o r d e r i n f o r c e , a b i g

e x p l o s i o n m i g h t become unavoidable.
delusions h e l d by t h e two hostile p a r t i e s encourage dangerous
r i s k - t a k i n g , and moves taken by e i t h e r

by design
--
e i t h e r accidentally
or
--
c o u l d s e t o f f major f i g h t i n g :
a.
Accident.
Perhaps " s t u m b l i n g into war" or "inad-
vertent e s c a l a t i o n " are more appropriate terms. Miscalcul a t i o n and self-deception m i g h t play a r o l e here, b u t s o would
t h e vagaries o f chance.
With r e l a t i o n s as v o l a t i l e as they a r e ,
such i n c i d e n t s as i n f i l t r a t i o n of guerrillas i n t o Kashmir by

t h e P a k i s t a n i s , or o f f a i rly 1 large Mukti Bahini conventional
mil itary u n i t s i n t o E a s t Bengal by the Indians could snowball

i n t o a1 1 -out h o s t i l ities
--
though n e i t h e r party intended t h i s
when i t began t h e operation. b.

Specific Decision.
There i s also the danger t h a t the
t o p leaders o f e i t h e r I n d i a o r Pakistan w i l l decide t h a t t h e
s i t u a t i o n h a d so deteriorated t h a t a full-scale war i s t h e p r e f e r a b l e a1 t e r n a t i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f begun w i t h a

strike.
pre -empti ve
A d e c i s i o n t o do so would, of course, be secretly
a r r i v e d a t and, g i v e n t h e h i g h s t a t e of preparedness and readiness o f both p a r t i e s , e i t h e r one might b e able t o achieve a
t a c t i c a l surprise i n the e v e n t of an i n i t i a l a t t a c k .
40.
F o r example, e i t h e r s i d e might come t o b e l i e v e an
a t t a c k by t h e o t h e r was imminent, and decide t o a n t i c i p a t e i t .
Or Islamabad m i g h t , a f t e r a considerable period o f time, f i n d

i t s e l f bogged down i n an e n d l e s s , c o s t l y , unwinnable g u e r r i 1 l a
war, The prideful , honor-conscious generals i n charge o f Pakis-
t a n , faced w i t h t h e h u m i l i a t i o n o f d e f e a t , might then decide t o

mount a sudden a s s a u l t on India.
They would probably r e a l i r e t h a t
t h e odds were a g a i n s t victory, b u t might s i m p l y hope for 1 uck and
perhaps
--
i f w o r s t came t o worst
--
f o r great power i n t e r v e n t i o n
t o provide a face-saving means o f e x t r i c a t i o n .

41.
I f e i t h e r decides d e l i b e r a t e l y t o i n i t i a t e h o s t i l i t i e s ,
i t i s somewhat more 1 ik e l y t o be New Del h i which might convince i t s e l f t h a t a war would be preferable t o l e t t i n g the s i t u a t i o n
drift.
The immediate danger of an a t t a c k by India seems t o have
receded f o r t h e moment, b u t tensions are 1 ikely
t o arise a g a i n ,
Indian m i l i -
a s will the o p p o r t u n i t i e s for an I n d i a n a s s a u l t .
t a r y movements i n t o E a s t Bengal would be f a c i l i t a t e d a f t e r t h e
end o f the monsoon season i n October o r November; N e w Del h i ' s fear o f moves by t h e Chinese would be lessened by the heavy
snows i n t h e Himalayan mountain passes from January u n t i l June.
42.
How long a war would l a s t and which s i d e , i f e i t h e r ,
would win i t , woul d depend on many unknown factors including

l u c k and outside d i p l o m a t i c , p o l i t i c a l
tion.
, and mil i tary
interven-
The h e a v i e s t f i g h t i n g would probably, as i n 1965, be
on
t h e border areas between West P a k i s t a n and I n d i a , though t h i s
time t h e Indians would attempt t o s e i z e p a r t or a l l o f East
Pakistan as well.
Barring extreme incompetence or some very
bad breaks, t h e I n d i a n s by sheer weight of numbers would continue t o be heavy f a v o r i t e s
in any war fought t o a f i n a l conclusion

B u t d e c i s i v e victory in any such a l l -
w i t h Pakistan alone.*
o u t c o n f l i c t would 1 ikely take weeks or months t o achieve if
i t were achieved a t a1 I , and t h e aftermath f o r b o t h p a r t i e s i n

human and economic terms would be fearsome.
Denouement ?
43.
The Indo-Pakistani crisis shows no signs o f going
away, much l e s s o f being settled.
Its resolution
--
perhaps
f a r i n t h e distance
ways i n c l u d i n g :
--
m i g h t be accomplished in one o f several
a,
A war, w i t h I n d i a expelling the West Pakistanis from
Bengal and s e t t i n g up an independent, but I n d i a n - i n f l uenced Bang1 a

Desh.
This might be accompanied by a return o f m o s t refugees, or
The Indian army has some 1,100,000 soldiers, Pakistan abou* 300,000, O w l know ledge of current deployment a f the Indian army is Zess than compZete, but there are almost certainZy enough &mops in position to cope w i t h the situation in a22 like29 areas of f i g h t i n g .
by an agreed population transfer wherein several mill i o n West
Bengal MusI i m s go t o the new s t a t e t o compensate for t h e Hindus

who had come t o I n d i a .
b.
A war on b o t h f r o n t s which no one wins, followed by a
c e a s e - f i r e with I n d i a n and Pakistani forces
--
along w i t h UN
observers
--
occupying parts
of East Bengal as well as areas on
t h e Western f r o n t .
T h i s m i g h t be followed by some k i n d o f tern-
porary s o l u t i o n f a c i l i t a t e d by one o r more o f t h e g r e a t powers,
say working through t h e UN.
c . A slow defusing and d e - e s c a l a t i o n following the success

o f c o n c i l i a t o r y West Pakistani e f f o r t s i n E a s t Bengal.
The E a s t
and West P a k i s t a n i s c o w t o some kind o f mutual accomnodati on.
The insurgency s t o p s as does the refugee flow.
Some o f those who
f l e d t o India (principally t h e Muslims) go home and I n d i a grudgi n g l y accepts t h e remainder, though a t heavy c o s t . d.
The insurgency continues, possibly f o r years.
The West
P a k i s t a n i s become increasingly war weary and economi cal ly hardpressed, and eventually depart.
e.
The insurgency continues, b u t t h e Bengal i s 1ose heart
and West Pakistani hegomony i s restored.
44.
There are, o f course, other p o s s i b l e scenarios.
If
war i s avoided, we b e l i e v e t h e outcome described i n subparagraph

d . above would be most l i k e l y , though the manner and t i m i n g o f
West P a k i s t a n ' s departure and the e s t a b l ishrnent o f an independ-
ent Bangla Desh cannot now be forecast.
I n any case, t h e l o t
o f t h e Bengal i people, a1 ready bad enough, i s l i k e l y t o dete-
riorate even more.
The odds a r e a g a i n s t any outcome which would
soon alleviate the hardships and sufferings which have been and
are y e t to be inflicted on them.
Rather, Bengal w i l l remain a
serious problem for I n d i a , Pakistan and the world a t large.
Grave-
ly overcrowded, devoi d o f natural resources, wracked w i t h v i ol ence,

i t s people w i 11 probably become even more prone t o extremism
and a c t s o f desperation than they now a r e
--
and t h i s in turn
w i l l cal I forth more repressive measures by the governments i n

charge.
MAR 7 1 FM AMCONSUL DACC A TO SECSTATEWASHDC IMMEDIATE 298 9 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABA D INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORIT Y AMCONSUL LAHOR E AMEMBASSY LONDO N AMCONSUL CALCUTT A AMEMBASSY BANGKO K AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI CINCSTRIK E CINCPA C MA C
SUBJECT : SELECT IVE GENOCID E HERE IN DACCA WE ARE MUTE AND HORRIFIED WITNESSE S A REIGN OF TERROR BY THE PAK MILITARY . EVIDENC E CONTINUES TO MOUNT THAT THE MLA AUTHORITIES HAVE A LIST OF AWAMI LEAGUE SUPPORTERS WHOM THEY ARE SYSTEMATI CALLY ELIMINATING BY SEEKING THEM OUT IN THEIR HOME S AND . SHOOTING THEM DOW N
TO 2 AMONG THOSE MARKED FOR EXTINCTION IN ADDITION TO A . .L. HIERARCHY, ARE STUDENT LEADERS AND UNIVERSITY FACULTY. I N THIS SECOND CATEGORY WE HAVE REPORTS THAT FAZLUR RAHMAN, HEA D OF APPLIED PHYSICS DEPARTMENT, PROFESSOR DEV, HEAD OF PHILOSOPH Y DEPARTMENT AND A HINDU, M . ABEDIN, HEAD OF DEPARTMEN T OF HISTORY, HAVE BEEN KILLED. RAZZAK OF POLITICA L SCIENCE DEPARTMENT IS RUMORED DEAD . ALSO ON LIST ARE BULK O F MNA' . S ELECT AND NUMBER OF MPA' S
1 .
MOREOVER, WITH SUPPORT OF PAK MILITARY, NON- BENGAL I MUSLIMS ARE SYSTEMATICALLY ATTACKING POOR PEOPLE' S QUARTERS AND MURDERING BENGALIS AND HINDUS. STREETS
3.
OF DACCA ARE AFLOOD WITH HIINDUS AND OTHERS SEEKING TO GET OUT OF DACCA . MANY BENGALIS HAVE SOUGHT REFUG EIN
HOMES . OF AMERICANS, MOST

4. T
OF WHOM
ARE EXTENDING SHELTE R
IT IS BEING REIMPOSED AT NOON) PAK MIL I TARY SEARCH AND DESTRO Y Y OPERATIONS . THERE IS NO RPT NO RESISTANCE BEING OFFERED IN DACC A MILITAR TO .
SEEMS DESIGNED TO FACILI TATE
5. FULL HORROR OF PAK MILITARY ATROCITIES W ILL COM E TO LIGHT SOONER OR LATER. I, THEREFORE, QUESTIO N CONTINUED ADVISABILITY OF PRESENT USG POSTURE OF PR ETENDIING TO BELIEVE GOP FALSE ASSERTIONS AND DENYIN G, FOR U N DERSTOOD REASONS, THAT THIS O FFICE IS COMMUNICA TING DETAILED ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN. WE SHOULD BE EXPRESS ING OUR SHOCK, AT LEAST PRIVATELY T O GOP, AT THIS WAVE OF TERROR DIRECTED AGAINST THEIR OW N COUNTRYMEN BY PAK MILITARY. I, OF COURSE, WOULD HAV E TO BE IDENTIFIED AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION AND PR ESUMABL Y GOP WOULD ASK ME TO LEAVE . I DO NOT BELIEV E SAFETY OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY WOULD BE THREATENED AS A CONSEQUENCE, BUT OUR COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY WOUL D . BE COMPROMISED. G P-3
IGHTNING OF CURFEW TODAY (
BLOOD
MAR 7 1 FM AMCONSUL DAcC A TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 300 4 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABA D INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORIT Y AMCONSUL KARAC HI AMCONSUL LAH ORE AMEMBASST NEW DELH I AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
SUBJ :
PAK MIL I TARY OR CRACKDOWN: LISTING OF MILITARY VERSU
CIVILIAN INCIDE
NTS
REF :
A DACC A95 2(NOTAL) B. ISLAMABAD 279
1. I TEM : AMERICAN PRIESTS (PROTECT) IN OLD DACCA REPORT ARM Y ACTED WITH NO PROVOCATION ON PART OF BENGALS EXCEPT BARRICAD E ERECTION . ARMY EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSABLE FOR ALL FIRES . TEC HNIGIUE WAS TO HOUSES AFIRE AND THEN GUN DOWN PEOPLE AS THEY LEFT THEIR HOMES . UNWILLING ESTIMATE NUMBER OF CASUALTIE S BUT ADVISED THAT MUST BE VERY HIGH . BELIEVE HINDUS PARTIULA R FOCUS OF CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH AREAS INCLUDING NON-HINDUS ALSO
BORNED OUT STATED ARMY LOOKIN GAWMILEURSBTALY MORE I NDI SCR IMATE THAN SELECTIVE IN APPROACH. MO ST ARM Y DESTRUCTION NIGHTS OF MARCH 25 AND 26 : LESSER ON MARCH 27 AND 28. ALSO REP ORTED WHAT TERMED RELABL E ACCOUNT FAMILY 0F ELEVEN ALL KILLED NITE . OF25TH 2 . ITEM: RECURRENT REPORTS MANY UNIVIERSITY PROFESSOR S KI LLED. A LTHOUGH CI R CUMSTANCES VAGUE . M ANY SAY ATTEMPT UNDERWA Y WIPE OUT ALL SOURCE POTENTIAL INTELLECTUAL FERMENT . . BRITIS H SAY SIX CONFIRMED DEAD, INCLUDING TWO DEANS AND EX-GOVERNO R DR . M.N. HUDA, ECON DEPT . HEAD . IN DIANSCLMTE SIX DEAD ( FIVE N A MES SAME AS BRITIS H LIST, WITH ADDITI ONF DR . D . C . DEV OF PHILOSPHY DEPARTMENT, WHO RECENTLY RETURNE D .FROM US VISIT AND WHO ACCORDING NUMEROUS REPORTS IS DEA D WELL- C ONNECTED BENGALI PREVIOUSLY NOTED FOR PREVIOUS RELIABILIT Y PROVIDED NAMES OF FIVE PROFESSORS REPORTEDLY KILLED . WHE N TALLIED, TOTAL OF THOSE RELIABLY REPORTED DEAD IS TEN : (COMMEN T : UNSUBSTANTIATED WHETHER KILLED IN C ROSS-F IRE WHEN STUDEN T HALLS A TTACKED O R WHETHER SELECTIVELY SHOT . ALSO STILL UNCLEA R WHETHER ALL S HOT AT TIME WHEN ARMY OCCUPIED CAMPUS OR WHETHE R SOME KILLED SUBSEQUENTLY) . 3. ITEM : SAME BENGALI CITED ABOVE OPINED VIOLENCE RANDOM I N
. AS EVIDENCE, CLAIMED HE WAS EYE-WITNESS TO ONE FAMILY WITH NATUR E
NO GOVERNMENT OR AWAMI LEAGUE CONNECTIONS BIENG WIPED OUT B Y ARMY. CLAlMED HOUSE OF THREE OR FOUR SE N I OR CI VIL SERVANT S ENTERED BY ARMY AND INHABITANTS KILLE D . 4. ITEM:WEHAVERCEIVDWIESPREAD N,WEBLIEV RELIAB E REPORTS OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN LOOTING HOMES (BEATING THOSE WH O OBJE C T, INCLUDIN G MIDDLE LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL S) AND SHAKING DOWN REFUGE S .
LOOT . BENGALI DWELLINGS . THEREBY ABETTING CRIMINAL TENSIO NS BENGALI- NON-BENGALI TENSIONS VERY HIGH (CONGEN OFFICERS THI S
MORNING (MARCH 29) WITNESSED BUTCHERING OF ONE CIVILIA N BY ANO TH ER IN AREA OF BENGALI-NON-BENGALI D ISCORD, ALTHOUG H INCIDENT POSSIBLY OF OTHER ORIGIN). BENGALIS REPOR TEDLY E . BIDING TIME TO RETALIAT 6. ITEM: BENGALI INTELLECTUALS IN SCARED BUT SURPRISINGL
5.
ITEM: MILITARY REPORTEDLY IS STANDING BY WHILE NON-B ENGALI
SOBE R MOOD TOLD CONGEN OFFICER OF WITNESSING UNPROVOKED ARM Y FIRING ON NEIGHBORING SHANTY-TOWN . REASON THEY ASCERTAINE D WAS . THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE TYPE WHO BUILD BARRICADES, E TC SIX BODIES SEEN. ALTHOUGH MUSLIM, THE Y CONTENDED ARMY GOI N G AFTER HINDUS WITH VENGEANCE, CITING DESTRUCTIO N OF PREDOMIN A TLY HINDU AREAS IN OLD DACCA . STATED POLICE SIMPLY EXECUTE D IN MOHAMMEPUR (DACCA SUBUR B AND ELSEWHERE BECAUSE ARM Y CONSIDERED THEM POTENTIAL THREAT. HEARSAY HAS IT 1800 POLIC E KILLED IN SURPRISE ATTACKS, THEY N0TED-POSSIBL Y MORE RELIABLE, ALTHOUGH ESTIMATES STILL SUBJECT TO QUESTIO N, THEY COMMENTED, WAS REPORT FROM SURVIVOR OF ARMY ATTACK O N EAST PAK RIFLES (EPR) CAMP AT PEELKHANA. OF APPROXIMATEL Y THOUSAND EPRS PRESENT AT TIME, 7 00 KILLED, 200 "OVERPOWERED", AN D 100 ESCAPED. THEY ALSO REPORTED HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHE S UNDERWAY, WITH "FOUJI MEN" (EX- BENGALI SERVICEMEN) BEIN G SPECIAL . TARGETS AND BEING SHOT ON SITE WHENEVER FOUN D ITEM : USAID PUBLIC SAFETY CHIEF REPORTS POLICE APPARENTL Y N O LONGER EFFECTIVE AS FORCE, WITH COMMUNICATION FACILITIE S GONE AND RAZARBAGH POLIICE LINES RAZED . SPECIAL BRANCH BUILDIN G PRACTICALLY DEMOLISHED AND APPEARS ABANDONED . SENIOR POLIC E OFFICALS ON DUTY AT OFFICE AT EDEN BUILDING AWAITING ORDER S FROM MLA . NON-COMMMITAL ABOUT SITUATION, BUT ONE IMPLORE D " PRAY FOR U S ." NO POLICE SEEN ANYWHERE IN DACC A .
7
8. ITEM USAID PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR EYEWITNESS TO WHA T APPEARED TO BE UNPROVOKED FIRING BY MlLITARY ON CHILDRE N AND FlSHERMAN AFTERNOON MARC H 28. N O CURFEW IN EFFECT AND N O EXPLANATION FOR FIRING . APPROXKMATELY 20 TO 30 SHOTS FIRE D, BUT SEEMINGLY NO ONE HI T . AFFAIR WITNESSE D BY MANY PERSON S, . MOSTL Y AMERICAN S COMMENT: AS DETAILS OF HORROR STORIES OF VARYING RELIABILIT Y 9. FILTER IN IT APPEARS ARMY SEEKING (A ) TERRORIZE POPULATIO N IN GENERAL AND THEREBY CRUSH WILL TO RESIST ( ALTHOUG H RES I STANC E IN DACCA ENDED SEVERAL DAYS AGO), AND (B) ELIMINATE ALL ELEMENT S OF SOCIETY THAT POSE POTENTIAL THREAT TO CONSOLIDATION AN D GP- 3 MAINTENANCE OF MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITY BLOOD
MAR 7 1 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABA D TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 767 5 INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTT A AMEMBASSY COLOMB O AMCONSUL DACC A AMEMBASSY KABU L AMCONSUL KARACH I AMCONSUL LAHOR E AMEMBASSY LONDO N AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
SUBJ: REACTION
TO EAST P'AK EVENT S
1 . ACTIONS BY PAK MIL I TARY, BEGINN I NG WITH NIGHT MARCH 25-2 6, TO CLAMP FULL CONTROL OVER EAST PAKISTAN PRESENTS USG WIT H WE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS FOR BOTH SHORT AND LONGER TERMS. O THE IMMEDIAT E NOW DEALING WITH SOM E T HAVE BEEN AND ARE Y PLANNING, SECURIT SUCH AS EVACUATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, SPOK DEPARTMENT E AND THE OF OUR COMMUNICATION S WITH DACCA, WE ARE STUDYING AND WIL L MAN'S HANDLING OF PRESS QUESTIONS .
BE SENDING RECOMMENDATIONS SEPARATELY ON CURRENT ECONOMI C ASSISTANCE ISSUES SUCH AS THE SPECIAL PL-480 LOAN FOR P OST. FY-1971 PROGRAM LOA N RELIEF AND THE PENDING CYCLONE SUCH AS THE FUTURE OF OUR POLITICA L LONGER-TERM ISSUES STANCE TOWARD EAST PAKISTA N, WITH THE GOP, OUR RELATIONSHIP AND OUR VARIOUS OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS HERE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE REVIEWED . PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE SOM E PRELIMINARY REACTIONS.
MOTIVATIONS BEHIND CURRENT MILITARY ACTIONS IN EAS T BE TRACED TO EVENTS AT LEAST AS FAR BAC K AS TH E CREATION OF PAKISTAN IN 1947. HISTORY OF DIVERSIT Y IN INTERESTS AND SOCIAL PATTERNS BETWEEN EAST AND WES T WINGS IS W ELL KNOWN . SO TOO IS UNEQUAL SHAR E BETWEEN EAST AN D WEST WINGS AS REGARDS DIVISION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AN D RELATED EAST PAK GRIEVANCES AGAINST WEST PAK DOMINATIO N . THERE WAS VERY CONSIDERABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR EFFORTS B Y EAST P AKISTANIS TO SEEK GREATER SHARE O F THIS PIE COMMENSURAT E WITH THEIR HAVING MAJORITY OF COUNTRY'S POPULATION . PRINCIPL E OF A BETTER DEAL FOR EAS T WING HAD WON INCREASING ACCEPTANC E IN WEST PAKISTAN, EVEN AMONG HARDLINERS (SUCH AS MILITAR Y LEADERSHIP) FOR WHOM "INTEGRITY" OF PAKISTA N WAS THE SUMMU M BONUM. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN YAHYA'S PROTRACTED EFFORTS T O ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL BASIS FOR TRANSFER OF POWE R .
2.
PAKISTAN CAN
IT HAS BEEN THIS EMBASSY' S CONSISTENT OPINION THA T YAHYA WAS SINCERE IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICA L SOLUTION UNDE R A SYSTEM RECOGNIZING THE POPULATION MAJORIT Y OF EAST PAKISTAN . HE NEVER LEFT ANY DOUBT, HOWEVER, THA T THE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONCEPT O F ONE PAKISTAN RATHER THAN TWO ( OR MORE). IT WILL BE DISPUTE D WHETHER YAH YA AND THE MILITARY CAME DOWN TO FINAL STAGE S OF THE POLITICAL PARLEYS IN DACCA IN MARCH WITH TRU E DESIR E TO WORK OUT DIFFERENCES, OR WHETHER THEY WERE MERELY STALLIN G FOR TIME WHILE BRINGING IN MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS . TH E TRUTH MAY BE MIXTURE OF THE TWO. WE BELIEVE THAT YAHY A CONTINUE D TO PREFER A POLITICAL SOLUTIO N ACCEPTABLE TO AL L THE MAJOR PARTI ES : ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS DOUBTLES S CONSIDERED AT LEAST PRUDENT TO BEEF UP THE MILITARY PRESENC E EAST . WING AS CONTINGENCY MEASUR E
3.
4. YAHYA'S USE OF MlLITARY FORCE IN EAST PAKISTANNO MARCH 25-26-. PRECISELY TWO YEARS AFTER HE REPLACED AYUB A S PRESIDENT CAME AFTER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS DURIN G WHICH MUJIB AND HIS AWAMI LEAGUE HAD IN EFFECT BEEN RULIN G EAST PAKISTAN THROUGH A PARALLEL GO V ERNMENT . THE ORDER S PROMULGATED AND ENFORCED BY THE AL AMOUNTED TO A REBELLIO N AGAINST TH E ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT . TH E DESTRUCTION OF PAC K FLAGS AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY BENGALA BEST STANDARDS, AN D IMPEDIMENTS PLACED IN THE WAY OF GOP CIVIL AND MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EAS T PAKISTAN, ACTS . OF INSURRECTIO N
COULD HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED A S
E 5. WE CAN HOLD NO BRIEF FR WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TH BRUTA L, RUTHLESS AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE BY PAK MILITARY NOT ONLY IN PUTTING DOWN LIMITED RESISTANCE BU T IN SEEKING OUT AND DESTROYING PRESUMED OPPONENTS IN EAS T PAKISTAN . INCIDENTS INVOLVING WANTON MILITARY FORCE WHIC H CONGEN DACCA AND OTHERS HAVE REPORTED AROUSE OUR INDIGNATIO N AND WE CAN APPRECIATE THE SENSE OF HORROR FELT BY WITNESSE S AT THE SCENE. SINCE W E AREA NOT ONLY HUMAN BEINGS BUT ALS O GOVERNMENT SERVANTS, HOWEVER, RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION IS NO T OF ITSELF AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR OUR REACTION TO THE EVENT S NOW OCCURRING IN EAST PAKISTA N. THE CONSTITUTED GOVERNMEN T IS USING FORCE AGAINST CTIZENS ACCUSED OF FLOUTING IT S AUTHORITY. THE STRUGGLE PAKISTANI AND PAKISTA NI . N (FORTUNATELY, A NO AMERICANS HAVE BEEN INJURED AND NO AMERICA : NOR DO W E PREMISES HAVE BEEN DAMAGED, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE HAVE REASON T O COMPLAIN, SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, OF INADEQUAT E .) PROTECTION FOR Y OUR PEOPLE AND PROPER T Y
6. AT EARLIER STAGES IN THE PRESENT CRISIS, BUT E BEFOR MARCH 25-26, USG DECIDED IT SHOULD NOT INTERVENE EFFOR T TO INFLUENCE GOP DECISION-MAKING OR ACTIONS IN MATTER DEEME D TO BE ESSENTIALLY OF INTERNAL NATURE . CRISIS HAS CHANGE D BUT PROBLEMS REMAI N COURSE AND HEIGHTENED THEN, N ESSENTIALLY . INTERNAL TO PAKISTA S ADSVYET7.CURPMLIOBHN'W, E NDESIRABLE THAT THEY B IN EAST PAKISTAN MAY BE, IT IS U RAISED . TO LEVEL OF CONTENTIOUS INTERNATIONAL POLITICA LISUE T (SO FAR AS WE KNOW, ONLY INDIA HAS SOUGHT TO MOVE CURREN VARIOUS GOVERNMENT S INTERNATIONAL ARENA PAK PR OBLEM IN THE .) FACTS PRESENTE D TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NEW INCLUDING OUR OWN WILL HAVE DEALING WITH PAKISTAN, AS T O NEW HERE IN ALLUDED BY EVENTS IN PARA ON E ABOVE . WHILE WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THIS MOMEN T TO MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDAT IONS REGARDING OUR PROGRAM S HERE, WE BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT WE SHOUL D KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPE N INTEREST SAEVNTCOIU SO AS TO BE ABLE TO PROMOTE OUR TO UNFOL D .
8 . THAT ABOVE PHILOSOPHY
HAS GUIDED
US
IN OUR SUGGESTION S
RE CAUTION IN HANDLING PRESS QUERIES (ISLAMABAD 2793) AN D IN MY OWN GUIDANCE TO AMERICAN EMPLOYEES IN PAKISTAN O N EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN COMMENTING O N RECENT DEVELOPMEN TS HERE (ISLAMABAD 2813 AND 2814). GP- 3 FARLAND
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 PAKISTAN - AMERICAN RELATIONS ** AREASSESSMEN T
BACKGROUND The developments leading up to and flowing from the military take over of East Pakistan on the night of March 25-26 may represent a watershed in the history of South Asia and of Pakistani-American relations as significant as that which resulted from the Sino-India n conflict of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 . The Government of Pakistan's decision to resort to force to suppress a popularl y elected movement has fundamentally altered the political, economic , and psychological situation there . The following paper analyzes the situation which now prevails, assesses U . S . and other external interests in South Asia and indicates the major policy strat egies which the United States might pursue in these changed circumstances . I. A. Military : THE CURRENT SITUATION *
After three weeks of military operations against
the Bengali separatists, a civil war continues in Fast Pakistan . Although the Bengalis are seriously disadvantaged by a lack of arms , there is little indication that they have acquiesced in the military takeover despite the bombing of several cities, raids against selecte d villages, and arrests of the separatist leadership . The separatist s
A further analysis of the situation is contained in SNIE 32-71 entitled Prospects for Pakistan, of April 12, 1971 .
are, however, largely unorganized, and their only significant sourc e of arms is India . The Provisional Government announced on April 1 4 controls no major population centers . If the GOP continues t o reinforce its military units and solves the complicated problem s arising from dangerously extended supply lines which will soon b e aggravated by monsoon conditions, the army will have a capability t o hold the province in subjugation for an extended period . The separatists , however, will retain a significant sabotage and civil disobedienc e capability . Only the Indians have an existing capability in the area to intervene decisively on the side of the separatists, and they no w seem reluctant to take a step which could lead to a major escalatio n of the war in South Asia with the attendant danger of direct Chines e involvement . Without this intervention, a prolonged period of inconclusive military activity may occur . While the army may be able t o maintain an uneasy control over the major population centers in Eas t Pakistan for months and conceivably years, political and economic pressure s may be such as to force a change in strategy by the military leadership . B. Political : From all evidence available to us, the vas t
majority of Bengalis now reject the concept of a united Pakistan rule d by West Pakistanis . The Bengalis made this clear in the overwhelmin g vote of confidence which they gave to the Awami League in the Decembe r election . This support was reiterated in massive demonstrations of
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 public loyalty to Mujibur Rahman during the period of his n egotiation s with President Yahya for an autonomist or confederal solution to th e constitutional problem . The military's subsequent actions agains t the Awami League leadership has apparently converted what was onc e only autonomist sentiment into a widespread demand for independence . Those killed on the days following March 25 are already viewed a s martyrs to that demand . Psychologically the concept of a united Pakistan is dead in Bengal . We see no way in which President Yahya can establish a civilian government based on any significant degree of popular support . There are, however, signs that some of the non-Awami League politica l leaders in East Pakistan, motivated either by fear or hatred of India , concern for the suffering of the Bengali people or by personal ambition , will come forward to re-establish a civilian administration i n cooperation with President Yahya . They may be joined by some Awami Leaguers who are unwilling to adopt a revolutionary posture . The GOP will probably attempt to transfer some power to them to give th e military administration a facade of legitimacy . It may even concede most of the Awami League's six point autonomist program . Eventually i n its search for legitimacy, the GOP might hold controlled elections o r perhaps a constitutional referendum in East Pakistan under a franchis e excluding Hindus and dissident g roups . The only alternative would
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 seem to be direct negotiations with the Award League leadership . Such negotiations would in present circumstances probably have only one issue to resolve -- the terms of independence, though a solutio n such as confederation remains an outside possibility . For the present , negotiations seem unlikely and, because of the bitterness and mistrus t engendered by the civil wars, could probably only take place if Yahy a himself were to offer to step down. The Pakistan Government will not only have to maintain itself in power by force in the Fast but will have to deal with complicate d constitutional problems in the West . The four regions of West Pakista n have also been seeking enhanced autonomy . Pressures for constitutiona l change from the constituent units, notably the Northwest Frontier and the Sind, are likely to increase . These may place added strains on the political viability of the Yahya government . While we do not anticipat e demands for independence from the units of West Pakistan, there will be growing demands for a transfer of power to elected representatives . In the case of the Punjab and Sind, the radical and militantly anti Indian People's Party of Z . A . Bhutto would be the immediate beneficiary of a return to parliamentary government . If these pressures are no t met, there could be violence and disturbances of the severity which brought down the Ayub goverment in 1969 . In both Fast and West Pakistan, but particularly in Bengal, a failure to reach a political accommodation is likely to result in a
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 radicalization of political activity in which extreme leftist partie s and policies gain in influence and violent methods replace th e relatively moderate methods of the past . In East Pakistan this coul d well be the extreme Maoist/Naxalite form which has appeared in Wes t Bengal . The development of such a movement with substantial popula r support could lead to a virtually permanent destabilization of Fast Pakistan and of the adjacent regions of India . C. Economic : The economic costs of a civil war are high .
Pakistan's limited shipping and commercial air facilities are alread y diverted to the supplying of the army . In East Pakistan much of th e communications infrastructure has been destroyed ; goods will get t o market with difficulty, and development works will be set back . There will be significant losses of foreign exchange for the centra l government because of the disruption of jute exports . Pakistan' s foreign exchange resources were declining before the crisis . Taking into account the losses in foreign exchange earnings from the curren t suspension of East Pakistan's exports and a falling off in privat e remittances, these resources could be exhausted within a few month s unless international relief is forthcoming or imports are sharpl y cut back. The latter step would contribute to a downward economi c
spiral, to an industrial slowdown, and potentially to large-scal e unemployment, which in turn could create serious political pressures,
particularly in West Pakistan . Nonetheless, the economy can probabl y survive these pressures for longer than the actual foreign exchang e balances would suggest . Almost irrespective of the political outcome , Pakistan's overall development effort has been severely set back i n west as well as in East Pakistan . The momentum in both wings can only be recovered with substantial external resource inputs . D. Conclusion : The Government of Pakistan will be faced in the
future with numerous problems arising from a continuing insurgenc y situation, the political alienation of the mass of the population in East Pakistan, and deteriorating economic conditions . All of thes e factors will produce growing pressures on Islamabad for a politica l accommodation with the Bengalis . Nonetheless, even in the absence o f an accommodation, the military can undoubtedly maintain its contro l over the 'cities for an extended period unless India should invad e East Pakistan with regular forces . The ferocity with which it ha s already fought to preserve a united Pakistan suggests that it wil l not give in over the short term barring a coup in Islamabad, greater separatist military successes or a major economic crisis . None o f these are immediately likely, and we must be prepared to face a situation in which the present stalemate lasts for many months . In this period, while the political situation is sorting itself out , our actions or inaction will affect, to a limited degree, the outcome
and the timing of that outcome . If the stalemate continues over a much longer term, the West Pakistanis will become increasingly dependen t on the U. S . and other Western nations for economic aid and militar y equipment, and how we aid our friends in the consortium will have a n important impact on the hard political and economic decisions whic h the Government of Pakistan will have to take . II. A. U . S. Interests : EXTERNAL INTERESTS The United States has no vital securit y
interest in South Asia as a whole . We do, however, have importan t interests involving: (a) The peace and stability of the region ; (b) The prevention of either the Soviet Union or China from becoming dominant in the region or in an y country of the region ; (c) The prevention of the development of radical or militantly nationalistic regimes inimical to the United States ; (d) Effective use of economic assistance Hinds and the development of economically self-reliant states ; (e) The protection of U . S . citizens and of U. S . commercial and investment interests . These interests apply for India as well as Pakistan, but ou r ability to support them in Pakistan has materially diminished as a result of recent developments : (a) The relative peace and stability of the pre-March 2 5 period has given way to civil war and political instability ;
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 (b) The prestige and influence of the Soviet Union in India and of China in Pakistan may hav e increased, at least in the short run ; The prospects for a democratic political syste m in East Pakistan have receded ; Conditions in which economic development can tak e place in East Pakistan have for the presen t largely disappeared ; We have been able to protect our citizens i n East Pakistan, but many citizens in Wes t Pakistan remain vulnerable to popular xenophobia . The prospects for our investment and trade ar e uncertain .
(c) (d)
(e)
These developments in East Pakistan have reinforced the relative priority of our interests in India which was alread y apparent by virtue of India's greater size, resources, an d political, strategic, and economic potential . In contrast t o the deteriorating situation in Pakistan, India seems to b e moving into a period of new political stability with enhance d prospects for economic development and with a renewed willingness to develop a cooperative relationship with the Unite d States . Nonetheless, our concern for regional stability and e q uilibrium makes it incumbent on us to work for a viable relation ship with either a united or divided Pakistan . Historically
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 we have assumed that our interest in regional stability wa s best served by a united Pakistan . That assumption now require s reexamination . If there is a possibility that through a loose confederation the political aspirations of the Bengalis could be me t and the beneficial features of a united country preserved , it would seem to be in our interest to support such a solution . However, on the basis of our analysis of the situation i n Pakistan, we have concluded it can remain united only throug h military force with dwindling development prospects an d continued potential for growing political radicalization an d instability . A Pakistan divided into two viable and politicall y stable states would be almost as acceptable from the point o f view of U . S . interests . An independent East Pakistan in which moderate Bengali forces were in control would be less vulnerable to radical internal pressures, would be more likely to work for an accommodation with India and for regiona l cooperation, and would have a political mandate within whic h development activity could be resumed .
There is no assurance, of course, that our choice i s simply between a Pakistan united only at gun point and on e divided into two viable and politically stable states . One or both of the new states might well be non-viable, politicall y unstable, and/or controlled by an extreme left-wing leadership , in which case -- over the medium term at least -- even a militarily unified Pakistan might serve some of our interest s in the area . B. Indian Interests ; India has traditionally perceive d
a united Pakistan to be in its interests . It has always hope d that the Bengali majority would ultimately become dominan t and would moderate the traditional West Pakistani hostilit y toward India . It has feared that an independent East Pakista n would come increasingly under radical Chinese domination and , by offering a focus for West Bengal's dissatisfaction, woul d undermine India's own national unity . India's perception o f its interests, however, has changed in recent weeks . It now appears to believe that the Bengalis would never be allowe d to control Pakistan and that the only way to preserve a
moderate Bengali orientation towards India is by supportin g the aspirations of the Awami League . India has consequentl y publicly announced its sympathy, solidarity, and support fo r the Bengali separatists . It has provided material assistanc e including arms . To date, Indian support has stopped short o f direct military intervention, which the Indians recognize coul d lead to war with Pakistan, perhaps on two fronts, and Chines e intervention on the side of Pakistan . The limited assistance given by India is, in effect, an investment made in the hop e that, if the Awami League comes to power, it will be repaid i n a cooperative, mutually beneficial Indo-Bengali relationship . C. Soviet Interests : For geo-political reasons alone ,
the Soviet Union has a greater interest in South Asia tha n the United States . The Soviet Union has a primary interes t in limiting Chinese influence in the area and has conclude d that India represents a significant political, military, an d economic counterweight to China . Having given fundamenta l priority to its interests in India, the USSR does not wish t o disassociate itself from the Indian position with respect to
Pakistan . The Podgorny message to President Yahya not only serves to support the Indian position but also contributes t o the other major Soviet interest in South Asia that it be a n area of relative peace and stability . The Soviets see thei r interest, as at the time of Tashkent, in bringing hostilitie s to an end and in creating political conditions which contribut e to regional stability and minimize Chinese involvement . The y are likely to continue to work in this direction . Because o f fears of a radicalization of East Pakistan, the USSR has als o concluded that it must adopt a positive attitude toward s Bengali aspirations, while keeping open its options shoul d Yahya succeed in keeping the country united . The Soviet Unio n would see it in its interest to have good relations with bot h successor states in order to counter potential Chinese an d U . S . influence, and it would not lightly throw away the influence it has obtained through its limited past militar y and economic assistance to West Pakistan . It also probabl y assumes that West Pakistan will continue to need the Sovie t Union, and its assumption may have been reinforced by President
Yahya's relatively restrained response to President Podgorny' s message . D. Chinese Interests : China's major interest in Sout h
Asia is that there be no major military threat on its borders . It also has an interest that India not emerge independentl y or in combination with any other country as a threat to China' s position in Asia . The Chinese have, therefore, worked to kee p India weak, divided, and politically unstable and have supporte d Pakistan as India's principal enemy and rival in South Asia . China still regards Pakistan as the most effective counter force to India and apparently does not wish to see that forc e reduced by the break-up of Pakistan . It probably also believe s that ultimately the instability which the civil war creates wil l radicalize the East Pakistan masses and provide opportunitie s for Maoist-oriented indigenous revolutionaries . China probably does not want to take any risks which coul d lead to war with India, particularly in view of the Indo-Sovie t relationship ; and China is, therefore, not likely to pursue
its
interests to the point of military involvement unless the crisis
escalates, and West Pakistan is faced with the prospect o f total defeat by the Indians . III . U . S . INVOLVEMENT
Since the events of March 25, the United States Governmen t has taken the position that the crisis is essentially a n internal affair of Pakistan . We have tried to avoid an y direct involvement in the events in East Pakistan except a s required to bring about the thinning out of our dependents an d personnel . Nonetheless, because of our many on-going program s and the political discussions which have taken place, a degre e of involvement has been and will be inevitable . A. Political : 1. Although our thin-out was fundamentally a measure
to protect our citizens, it has obvious political ramification s since it implied a degree of skepticism that conditions coul d be returned to normal as quickly as the martial law authoritie s asserted . 2. All foreign newsmen were expelled from Eas t
Pakistan, and their film and notebooks were confiscated . We
protested this action to the Government in Islamabad . 3. In our public statements in Washington, we hav e
expressed concern for the loss of life, damage, and hardshi p suffered by the people of Pakistan and have called for a n end to the conflict and a peaceful accommodation . 4. In private we have reiterated these concerns and
indicated our added concern that American arms were used . 5. We have responded negatively to Indian effort s
to stimulate UN Security Council discussion of the issue . 6. We have continued to broadcast extensively on VOA ,
particularly on medium wave to East Bengal, information abou t the crisis and U . S . policy towards it . B. Economic : 1 . We have indicated our willingness to participat e in an international relief effort if asked by the Governmen t of Pakistan and, as conditions permit the distribution o f relief throughout the province, and have urged the GOP t o accept international offers of assistance .
2.
We have delayed signature of a PL-480 agreemen t
for 150,000 tons of food grains for the cyclone affected area s of East Pakistan and have delayed shipment of another 150,00 0 tons of PL-480 food grains . 3. We have postponed consideration of the FY-197 1
$70 million program loan , 4. We have questioned the GOP about the equitabl e
nationwide use of U . S . program funds already committed bu t not yet allocated . 5. We have diverted one of several grain ships i n
Chittagong to Korea . We have concurred in a GOP reques t to divert to Karachi a number of other grain ships in Chittagon g which have been unable to discharge their cargoes . C. Military : 1. Arms supplied under our pre-1965 MAP have bee n
used extensively by the army in East Pakistan . These include Chafee M-24 tanks and F-86 fighters . 2. We have not responded to a Pakistani request fo r
an extension of the letter of offer for maritime patrol air craft under the 1970 one-time exception .
3 . We have expressed concern to the GOP about th e use of arms . In almost all of these situations we have taken interi m decisions which will require formal reaffirmation . To date our actions have signaled to the GOP and to the world at large that we are concerned about the welfare of ou r own people, the use of our arms in East Pakistan, and th e sufferings and hardships of the East Pakistanis . We hav e indicated that we do not intend to interfere directly t o affect the outcome of the civil war. . Although we hope for a n early peaceful accommodation, our public and private statement s that current programs are under review have indicated to th e GOP that we are not prepared to carry on exactly as before as lon g as our programs can not operate, our disaster relief can no t be provided, and resource transfers can not take place on the equitable basis we had originally assumed in making our loan s to the Government of Pakistan . IV . PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS AND U . S . LEVERAGE Over the years since 1952, Pakistan has been a major recipien t of U . S . assistance . In FY-1968 Pakistan received $357 .6 million
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 in loans, grants, and PL-480 assistance . In FY-1970, despit e a substantial reduction in PL-480, the total was $215 million . These inputs have been a vital ingredient of the Pakistan i development program representing about 1870 of Pakistan's annua l imports of goods and services . For the coming year, the Pakistanis have been expecting at least $70 million in ne w loan commitments . About $120 million is in the pipeline fro m previous loans, and a substantial portion of the $87 millio n November 1970 PL-480 Title I Agreement has not yet been shipped . In the military assistance field, the one-time exception o f armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, and fighte r and bomber aircraft remains in abeyance . The total value o f this equipment and of spare parts on previously supplie d equipment which Pakistan needs could amount to as much as $7 0 million if the sales go through . These unfulfilled agreements and Pakistan's desire fo r continued political ties indicate a substantial Pakistan i interest in its relations with the U . S . They may not provid e us with the leverage to achieve a major reorientation o f Pakistani policy . But if used with discretion, they can
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 probably affect the course, direction, and pace of politica l negotiations . The importance of U .S . economic assistance an d thus the potential U .S . leverage at this time are enhanced i n view of Pakistan ' s currently low level of foreign exchang e reserves . We have preliminary indications that the IBRD an d the IMF may be reluctant to provide fresh assistance to th e GOP in the present circumstances, and what we do will obviousl y affect the whole tenor of consortium decisions . (We have little specific information on likely reactions of other consortiu m members although the preliminary position of Britain an d Germany is not to provide new aid at this time .) Tota l external aid excluding Chinese assistance amounts to abou t $500 million annually or about 50 percent of Pakistan' s merchandise imports . West Pakistan also needs the Soviet Union for the $20 0 million Karachi steel mill which the Soviets are committed t o construct . The Chinese for their part are also committed t o $200 million of aid, much of which was to have gone for East Pakistan, including the proposed Brahmaputra bridge . No one externa l power can fully make up the gaps if the others were to withdra w and Pakistan continues to remain dependent on the maintenance of
its triangular tightrope foreign policy to obtain the resources , both military and economic, which it requires . In considerin g alternate strategies, we should, therefore, keep in mind tha t Pakistan needs us more than we need it . While the Chinese could replace in part assistance withhel d by the U . S . and other donors, they do not have the capabilit y and probably not the willingness to assume full responsibilit y for the defense and development of Pakistan . In addition , because of the Indo-Soviet relationship, Pakistan is unlikel y to turn to the USSR to meet gaps and will, therefore, continu e to look to us for help even in the event we adopt a mor e positive attitude towards Bengali aspirations .
VI :
POLICY STRATEGIES AND OPTION S A. The Dilemma ,:
Although it is our assessment that Pakistan a s
a unitary state cannot survive, it is possible that the military ma y be able to hang on in East Pakistan for months and conceivably fo r years . We face the problem of what policy to adopt over the shor t and medium term until the ultimate denouement takes place, an d
how to maintain a constructive relationship with Islamabad whic h will survive the break-up of Pakistan and which will simultaneousl y make it possible for us to work cooperatively with the Bengalis . Our
dilemma is increased by press and Congressional criticism of our pas t policy, particularly the use of American tanks and aircraft in th e military operations in Bengal . We also face the continuing dilemm a of how to support our relatively greater interest in India whil e maintaining a relationship with Pakistan which, if it remains unite d for years rather than months, will continue to be a major Asian natio n with important development potential . We are already faced with the further problem of how to dea l with a provisional East Bengali government, which controls a portio n of East Pakistan and enjoys the support, though not the forma l recognition, of India . Such a government will actively seek bilatera l and UN support . The resolution of these dilemmas is particularl y difficult in this period of transition when emotions are runnin g high throughout South Asia . B. U .S . Objectives : Subsidiary to our general concern fo r
the peace and stability of South Asia, there are several specific
objectives which we are pursuing :
(a) the prevention of the escalation of the civil war int o an international conflict . (b) the creation of conditions which would reduce politica l instability and permit economic development to proceed . (c) the preservation of a relationship with both East and Wes t Pakistan in circumstances either of a united or divided Pakistan . (d) the prevention of any major external power from achievin g a decisive advantage in South Asia as a result of the crisis . As the statement of our involvement makes clear, we have alread y gone beyond the point where we can adopt a posture of inaction . Th e sections which follow address the broad strategies we might pursu e and the specific policy decisions which we must take under presen t circumstances . An additional section indicates steps we might have to tak e if the situation were to get out of control and lead to a majo r conflict between India and Pakistan and China . Although, as indicated in Section I above, the Pakistan Government may be able to maintain a degree of military control over th e major population centers in East Pakistan for some time to come, th e policies we adopt in support of our objectives have an important tim e factor because it is likely that the longer the conflict continues : (a) the more the dangers of escalation through direct India n and/or Chinese involvement increase . (b) the more extremists in both East and West Pakistan are likely to gain in popular support . (c) the greater the likelihood of a major food distributio n problem in East Pakistan perhaps leading to famine conditions .
(d) the greater the probability of accelerating economi c decline in both wings . (e) the greater the stress on West Pakistan's politica l structure and unity . Policy Strategies : Taking into account the dilemmas which
C.
we face and the objectives we are pursuing, there are three basi c strategies which we might adopt in present circumstances : 1. Relative Hands-off Policy which would seek to continue existin g
programs as far as possible given Congressional objections and th e situation in East Pakistan . Advantage s -- Would support our objective of maintaining a con structive political relationship with the Governmen t of Pakistan . -- Would slow the deterioration of the West Pakistan i economic situation and permit continuation to a limited extent of a coordinated development effort . -- Would keep the Chinese from significantly increasin g their influence in Pakistan . Disadvantage s -- Would adversely affect our relations with India an d would allow the Soviet Union to strengthen its relation ship with India . -- Would create no immediate basis for a constructive re lationship with the Bengalis .

-- Could lead to a prolongation of the conflict and t o a long-term deterioration of the political an d economic situation in the country as a whole . 2. The Use of Selective Influence combining support for pro -
grams which are consonant with our development objectives, but holding of f from programs which would contribute directly to a prolongation of th e civil war . We would maintain a degree of public disassociation fro m West Pakistan in order to facilitate a relationship with the Eas t Bengalis at a later date . Advantage s -- Would create a degree of public distance between our selves and the policies of the Government of Pakistan, whil e keeping open a relationship with it which would b e required either if GOP rule in the East is more pro tracted than we now anticipate or in the event tha t Pakistan splits . -- Would minimize Chinese and Soviet ability to capitaliz e on the crisis . - - Would be consistent with the policy being adopted b y other consortium members and the USSR . Disadvantage s - - Would give us limited influence over the outcome of th e civil war and hence would risk the further radicalizatio n of East Pakistan, and some continued economic deterioration . -- Would be seen in India and in East Pakistan as only a partial commitment to self-determination for the peopl e of East Pakistan .
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3.
All out effort to bring an early end to hostilities, b y
using our available leverage to prevent escalation and to achiev e a peaceful political settlement . Advantages . - - Would give relative priority to our interest i n relations with East Pakistan . - - Would reduce the prospects for a protracted wa r and the consequent dangers of escalation and of succes s for Maoist-oriented groups . -- Would lay the foundation for a relationship wit h Bangla Desh and would contribute positively to ou r relationship with India . Disadvantage s - - Would be deeply resented in West Pakistan, and migh t lead to a fundamental change in our relations wit h Islamabad . - - Would accelerate the deterioration of the Wes t Pakistani economic situation . -- Would run counter to established policy of not inter fering in the internal affairs of others . -- Would lead to increased Chinese influence in Wes t Pakistan and enhance the prospects for a radica l military takeover in Islamabad .

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D.
Policy Decision s Within the framework of these broad strategies there ar e
various specific policy decisions which cannot be delayed . Thes e include decisions on (1) a response to President Yahya's letter t o President Nixon, (2) our public posture and the posture of the Voic e of America in its broadcasts to South Asia, (3) contacts with the Pro the recognition of it , visional Government of Bangla Desh and at an appropriate time/(4) th e implementation of our one-time exception to our military supply polic y announced in October 1970, (5) shipments of ammunition and spare part s under the basic 1967 arms policy, (6) PL-480, (7) the program loan fo r 1971, (8) relief activities, (9) on-going economic assistance, an d (10) anticipated request by the GOP for suspension of debt owed t o us in the next three to six months . As a first step and a precursor to any decisions made with regar d to our economic assistance program, we need to consider re-establishin g regular channels of communications at all levels of the GOP and wit h other international aid donors, including a full exploration of curren t factual information on Pakistan's economic development situation an d program . The people in West Pakistan are not informed of the situatio n in East Pakistan, and President Yahya may not fully understand th e seriousness of the country's current economic conditions . It is important to work closely with other donors in developing an economi c assistance policy toward Pakistan since the US contribution -- althoug h n (about 25 percent significant in itself -- is only a portio ) of total external aid . Unles s donor actions are coordinated the effects of US action could be neutral ized . The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the

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other consortium donors could seek a full review of Pakistan' s development situation, plans, and prospects . On the basis of infor-
mation currently available, the World Bank and IMF do not believ e there is now a basis for proceeding with economic support and development assistance . It is therefore important for the consortium and the IMP to seek a basis for proceeding with development activities in Pakistan . The burden for making a case for development rests, of course, with the Government of Pakistan . 1 . Relative hands-Off Policy . If we choose a hands off policy we woul d (1) Letterto Yahya - respond acknowledging his descriptio n of the sequence of events leading up to the crisis -- express our sympathy for the sufferings in East Pakistan and our hope for a n early resumption of our development activities and a peacefu l resolution of the crisis . intervention with the GOI . (2) Public Statement - maintenance of our current public postur e of concern and sympathy -- avoidance of suggesting that delays Undertake to raise the issue of India n
in
implementation of policies are anything more than routine -- limi t our coverage of Pakistani events on VOA . (3) Contacts and Recognition - avoid contact with Bangla Des h representatives defer any decision on recognition until the Govern ment of Pakistan had accepted the division of the country .

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(4) One-Time Exception - continue action to implement th e one-time exception including extension of the date for the lette r of offer for maritime patrol aircraft . (5) Ammunition andSpare Parts-- take no overt action t o suspend sales of ammunition and spares for lethal end item s permitted under the 1967 policy -- delay deliveries of ammunitio n until situation in East Pakistan clarifies . (6) PL-480 - Sign the 150,000 MT cyclone disaster agreement and as soon as the Government of Pakistan requests, proceed with shipment s from the US of the 150,000 MT cyclone food grain and the 150,000 MT under an earlier agreement waiting to be loaded -- defer completely t o the GOP as to the proper disposition of PL-480 food grain ship meats . (7) New Development Loans - Indicate we would like to procee d with the FY 1971 program loan for up to $70 million ; however, befor e proceeding, we will need information on Pakistan's future development plan s and seek assurances from the GOP that it will be able to implement an d achieve the objectives of its development program and not diver t to military purposes resources intended for economic development - proceed with the outstanding project loan for West Pakistan ($5 million ) and tell the GOP we are prepared to proceed with a consulting service s loan for East Pakistan as soon as conditions permit . (8) ReliefActivities - Inform the GOP again that we would participat e in an international relief effort and would provide assistance as soon as Pakistan's requirements can be identified and we have assurance s that commodities can be delivered .
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended 112/390 June 9, 2005
(9) On-goingEconomicAssistance - Continue all on-goin g assistance activities, making only changes that are necessitated by the physical obstacles to implementation in East Pakistan . (10) AnticipatedRequest for Suspension of U .S . Debt - Infor m the GOP that the U .S . is prepared for a limited period of time t o suspend U .S . debt servic e 2 . Selective Influence . A policy of selective influence would see k
to keep open our options with regard to the two parts of Pakistan, to us e a degree of leverage to shorten the conflict and encourage a political settlement and to encourage other countries to play a constructive role . Specificall y it would include : (1) Letter toYahya - emphasize our sympathy for the suffering s of the people of Pakistan -- point out that we have been unable t o carry on our development activities and look forward to a resumptio n of normal economic activity on the basis of our established develop mental criteria-- express our hope that to avoid famine steps be take n as soon as possible to restore internal communications-- encourage th e GOP to accept an international relief effort and indicate our willing ness to participate in it . Point out the growing public and Congressiona l concern at the use of American arms in East Pakistan and the need for a n early political accommodation . 2 Public Statements - increasingly emphasize our hopes for a n O early restoration of peaceful conditions and the resumption of a politica l dialogue with the elected representatives of East Pakistan -- stress thi s theme in VOA broadcasts to all of Pakistan, possibly adding concern over th e use of US arms . (3) Contacts andRecognition .- Refrain from extending any de fact o or de j
ure
recognition until the Bengali separatists have effective control
over virtually all of East Bengal -- maintain discreet informa l contacts by U .S . officials with Bangla Desh representatives i n Calcutta or elsewhere as appropriate . (4) One-TimeException -- continue to defer effective implementation of the one-time exception sales offer . Instruct th e Department of Defense not to conclude a firm agreement with th e Government of Pakistan on the sale of 300 armored personnel carriers , and to suspend, or cancel if necessary, the DOD contract with th e manufacturer for these items . (5) Ammunition and Spare Parts -- defer all deliveries o f ammunition and spare parts under FMS and commercial sales fo r lethal equipment, particularly F-86 Sabre Jets and M-24 tan k which have been used or might be used in East Pakistan . Permi t the continued sale of non-lethal equipment and non-lethal spar e parts reviewing each decision on a case-by-case basis . (6) PL-480 -- having assured ourselves that steps are bein g taken to resume food distribution in the disaster area, sign th e 150,000 MT cyclone disaster agreement, and indicate that grain shipments will be held until there is evidence the food can be unloade d and distributed . Inform the GOP that we will ship the 150,000 M T
(authorized under an earlier agreement and now at US ports waitin g to be loaded) as soon as there is evidence the food can be unloade d and equitably distributed in East Pakistan . Continue to urge the GO P
to do everything possible to unload and distribute the US food grai n now waiting offshore East Pakistan, and to take steps to prepare fo r the PL-480 vessels enroute to East Pakistan to handle local food shortages as they arise .

114/390
(7) New Development Loans -- defer new development loans , which in the past have been designed for both wings of Pakistan - examine closely with other consortium members, as well as the GOP , the developmental case on which Pakistan's future economic assistance would be based, and accordingly ask the World Bank to call a consortium meeting as soon as possible to review Pakistan's revise d development programs . (8) Relief Activities -- encourage the GOP to accept internationa l relief assistance, expressing US willingness to participate in such a n effort as soon as conditions permit the extension of relief through out East Pakistan . (9) On-Goin g Economic Assistance -- maintain on-going technica l assistance and loan activities (which total $120 million) that we ca n now justify as consistent with our overall developmental objectives , and which can be implemented, including, for example, all current loa n activities in West Pakistan . (10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of US Debt -- be prepare d to participate in a limited debt exercise on condition there would b e full participation by other consortium donors . 3 . &11-Out Effort . An all out effort to use our leverage in Pakista n
to achieve an early end to the civil war and a political settlemen t would involve the following : (1) Letter to Yahya send a letter to President Yahya at least a s strong as that from Prime Minister Reath and Soviet President Podgorny --

115/390
tell Yahya that his present course is tantamount to national suicid e and urge him to resume the political dialogue with popularly electe d representatives as soon as possible -- urge the release of Mujibu r Rahman and indicate our unwillingness to proceed with discussions o n our political and military assistance programs until political negotiations had been resumed and the fighting stopped -- indicate ou r willingness to be generous once a stable political solution had bee n achieved . (2) Public Statements -- bluntly criticize the actions of th e martial law regime and acknowledge that we were suspending economi c assistance programs -- inform Congress of our decision not to go ahea d with any lethal military supply including the one-time exception .- encourage the VOA to feature these decisions in its news coverage t o East Pakistan in particular . (3) Contacts and Recognition -- recognize the Government of Bangla Desh once it achieved control - over
substantial portion of East Bengal an d
once it had been recognized by other countries including India . (4) One-time Exception -- inform the Government of Pakista n that the one-time exception is cancelled . (5) Ammunition and Spare Parts - permit no sales of spare part s for lethal end-items or ammunition . (6) PL-480 -- continue to defer signature of the 150,000 MT disaster agreement and shipment of the additional 150,000 MT alread y authorized until there is evidence the food can be unloaded an d
appropriately distributed in East Pakistan -- Refuse to acquiesce in th e diversion of further PL-480 grain vessels from Chittagong to Karachi - stress to the GOP our concern at pending food shortages and the urgen t need to take whatever steps necessary to offload and distribute US foo d
assistance .
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State 116/390 E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
(7 ),(8) New Development Loans/On-going Economic Assistance Inform the GOP that we are postponing discussions on new US ai d commitments and suspending all unobligated economic assistanc e
until the MLA modifies its policy toward East Pakistan -- be pre pared to implement on-going assistance once negotiations are unde r way and to sign new loan agreements as progress is made . (9) Relief Assistance - Urge appropriate international organizations to mount an international humanitarian relief effor t specifically addressing the needs of the Bengali people . (10) Anticipated Request for Suspension of U .S . Debt - inform the GOP that even if others are prepared to do so, we do not believ e it appropriate at this time to participate in a debt relief exercise . Contingency Decision s Despite the formation of a provisional Bangla Desh Governmen t and more precise Chinese statements of support for the Government o f Pakistan, there now seems somewhat less likelihood that the civi l war will escalate into a major conflict . The Soviet Union is activel engaged in urging restraint on both sides and the Indians continue to follow an extremely cautious policy with regard to direct militar y support for the separatists . We should, however, be prepared for the possibility that a borderi incident might escalate or that Pakistani military reverse s might lead to a desperate pre-emptive stance from West Pakistan agains t India . To prevent an escalation we should : -- include in our public statements explicit appeals for restrain t and an early cessation of hostilities . y
E.
-- hold private discussions with the Indians encouragin g them to adhere to their present policy of not providin g military support to the separatists . -- follow up with the Soviets the March 26 Rogers/Dobryni n conversation, indicating our intention not to interven e and urging the Soviets to counsel restraint in New Delhi . Should an escalation take place we should be prepared to engag e the United Nations' attention to the dispute promptly looking to th e early creation of a UN peace keeping operation .

May 25, 197 1
MEMORANDUM FOR MR . HENRY A . KISSINGE R THE WHITE HOUS E Subject : Contingency Study for Indo-Pakista n Hostilitie s
There is attached a draft contingency paper on th e prospects for Indo-Pakistan hostilities . I would appreciat e your distributing this paper to members of the Washingto n Special Action Group for consideration at its meeting o n Wednesday May 26 .
Theodore L . Eliot, Jr . Executive Secretat y Attachment : Contingency Study fo r Indo-Pakistani Hostilities
CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR INDO-PAKISTANI HOSTILITIE S
I. Introduction The civil war in East Pakistan has now continued for two months . The Pakistan Army has advanced to the Indian borders and has control over al l of the major population centers in East Pakistan . Despite this apparen t military success, the prospects for political and military stability ar e poor and the danger that the situation will escalate into an internationa l conflict is growing . Thus the situation is moving from a level at whic h our interests were only secondarily involved to one that could pose a direct threat to the bases of U . S . policy in South Asia . This paper assesses the contingencies under which an escalation might take place and suggests steps which the US should take either to prevent escalation or t o terminate it once war has broken out . II. Danger Signals In the last ten days we have received clandestine reports of military movements by Indian forces near the East and West Pakistan borders, an d signs of Indian contingency planning for war . The Indian Government has reinforced Border Security Force (BSF) units and has moved regular India n Army units to within three kilometers of the border . Tanks have been see n moving to forward cantonments in the Punjab . These developments reflec t
the growing Indian concern at the flood of Hindu refugees pouring out o f East Pakistan at a rate in excess of 100,000 per day . Over 3 .4 million have crossed into India . The Indian Government faces strong public an d Parliamentary pressure to stop the refugee inflow and to support th e Bengalis . The GOI fears that if there is not a cessation of the refugee
flaw, the states of Eastern India could be inundated under as many a s 8 million refugees . In Indian eyes this would pose an intolerable burde n on the social and economic structure of the area . In addition to its concern about the refugee problem, the GOI ha s been taking steps to support the Bengali struggle for independence i n the face of the military successes of the Pakistan Army . The BSF has established camps at which 10,000 Bengalis are reportedly receivin g training in guerrilla and sabotage tactics . Lim ited quantities of arms
and ammunition continue to be provided to the Bengali separatists and some Indian forces have infiltrated into East Bengal to provide assistance an d training to the separatists . There have been several border incident s involving Indian and Pakistani border units and at least one violation o f Indian air space by Pakistani aircraft . While India probably still does not seek a war with Pakistan, it ma y come to believe that its national interest requires a preemptive strik e against Pakistan . The Pakistanis, for their part, probably believe tha t
it is only Indian political and military support that will keep the insurgenc y alive . They may therefore decide to strike directly against guerrilla train ing camps within India in order to relieve the pressure . Over the longer term there is also the danger that the Pakistanis will provoke a conflict i n order to distract international attention than the internal situation i n East Pakistan and in order to convince the East Pakistani people that there is a threat from India sufficiently great to justify the continued unit y of Pakistan and the West Pakistani military presence in the East .
There are still s tromg negative factors Working against escalation . Both Governments, with the experience of 1965 in mind, are aware that a decisive victory cannot be won and the costs of war are extremely high . On the Indian side, there is added a fear of China and the recognitio n that an Indo-Pakistani conflict could result in direct Chinese involvement . Given the highly emotional context in which decisions are being made in India and Pakistan, however, one cannot assume that rational argument s militating against escalation will overrule the more immediate needs t o respond to specific incidents or provocations . III . Scenarios for Escalation There are a variety of circumstances in which escalation might tak e place : (1)The Indians, faced with something approaching genocide of th e Hindus in East Pakistan and inundated with an unmanageable Hindu refuge e inflow, might decide to move in to stop the killing, end this refugee flaw . and establish a moderate Awami League Government in Dacca . (2)The Pakistanis might take action against BSF guerrilla / trainin g camps in
India or might fire upon Indian border units while pursuing retreatin g Bengali separatist infiltrators . (3)Other types of border incidents might in themselves provok e escalation . For example, the Indians might shoot down a Pakistani aircraft violating Indian air space . (4)The Pakistanis might engage in a diversionary maneuveur in Kashmi r to distract Indian and world attention from the Bengal situation . In extremis
the Pakistanis might attack India in the Punjab . (5) The GOI in the Parliamentary session beginning May 24 will com e under increased pressure to recognize the Bangla Desh Government . Should it do so, a break in relations with Islamabad would probably result . An Indian decision to recognize Bangla Desh would also probably be followed b y more overt Indian support for the separatists, which in turn would increase the likelihood of an open conflict . Of these scenarios the one most likely to lead to escalation at sthi time is the one deriving from the refugee problem and its impact in India . However, if an effective insurgency gains momentum as a result of India n involvement, the Pakistanis also will come under increasing pressure to tak e action against India . In both cases, as long as there is no fundamenta l solution to the underlying political problem, the danger of war will remain . IV. Secondary Escalatio n Escalation would in the first instance involve only a direct confrontation between India and Pakistan . However, we have learned from intelligence sources that China may have given a conditional promise to assist Pakista n in the event hostilities break out with India . The Chinese may have als o given assurances that they will initiate military action "along the Tibetan border" if Indian troops deliberately cross the Pakistani frontier in force . Should the Chinese become directly involved, it is likely that the Sovie t Union will openly support India and will presumably provide such military assistance as is required .
V.
Steps to Prevent Escalatio n Although US influence in India and Pakistan is limited in the presen t
circumstances, there are various actions which we might take to promot e our interest in preventing the crisis from escalating . As indicated above , the dangers of escalation will remain as long as there is no resolutio n of the basic political issues in East Pakistan . If a peaceful accommodation between the East and West can be achieved resting on genuine popular suppor t in East Pakistan, there is little doubt that the refugee flow would sto p and that India would accept the political accommodation and back away fro m its support for any residual Bengali separatist movement . In view of the bloodshed of recent weeks, a political accommodation will be extremel y difficult to achieve, but it is in our interest .to accelerate efforts t o achieve it . We might therefore : - Continue to stress to the Government of Pakistan the urgent nee d for political accommodation and indicate that our ability to assist Pakista n depends on progress toward such an acccmnodation . - Consider a more active use of the leverage of our military an d economic assistance programs to induce Pakistan to begin political negotiation s with the Bengalis . (The merits of this was discussed in the SRG pape r reassessing US Relations with Pakistan . ) - Continue to stress in both Islamabad and New Delhi the importanc e of restraint and our hope that neither side will over-react to border incidents or provocations . Warn the Indians of the dangers of Chines e intervention in the event of escalation, and tell them that they canno t automatically count on our support in this event .
-- Continue to emphasize a) to the Indians our willingness to assis t them in alleviating the burdens created by the refugee flaw, particularly by providing increased US financial assistance, and b) to the Pakistani s the importance of creating conditions in which the refugee flaw will sto p and be reversed . -- Emphasize to the Indians the desirability of conducting India' s relations with representatives of East Bengal so as to minimize tension s. with Islamabad . As long as the Indians withhold recognition of Bangla Desh , they are less likely to go beyond the modest levels of military support tha t they are now providing . -- Consider approaching the Chinese to urge them to continue to exercis e restraint in the present situation . It might be possible to persuade the British, the Canadians, or the French to express the need for restrain t through their missions in Peking . -- Confidentially discuss with the USSR the steps which we might tak e to prevent the outbreak of war . -- Support and encourage third country offers of assistance as mediators . (The Swiss are already engaged in facilitating the repatriation of India n and Pakistani diplomats from Calcutta and Dacca .) Additional countries at a later stage might take on a mediatory role . Canada, with good relation s in Islamabad, Delhi and Peking, might be encouraged to do so . -- Consider encouraging the UN Secretary General to adopt .a more open political role, going beyond his present efforts to achieve an internationa l relief effort, perhaps including a public appeal for a political settlemen t or an offer to travel to the area to seek the views of South Asian leaders .
-- Consider supporting the Indian proposal for a UN Security Counci l meeting to consider the international security aspects of the refugee . problem . -- Consider using our economic leverage with India to achieve restraint . VI . Actions in the Event of Escalatio n Should the crisis escalate into an open war between India and Pakistan , we will be faced as in 1965 with many difficult decisions . The situation will be significantly more complex than in 1965 since it is possible that the conflict will be joined on both India's eastern and western border s and will involve the Chinese and the Soviets to some degree or other . Except in the unlikely event of a major Chinese attack against India, n o US military commitment would be involved . In the event of escalation, w e will need to act swiftly to halt the conflict . We should be prepared to take the following actions : -- Immediately call the United Nations Security Council into session and strongly support any UN action designed to terminate hostilities . -- Formally and publicly suspend all military programs to India and Pakistan . . -- Immediately send Presidential messages to President Yahya and Prim e Minister Gandhi calling for an end to hostilities . -- Coordinate closely with the USSR and the UK on steps which we migh t take jointly with the GOP and the GOI . -- Depending upon the circumstances in which the fighting had broke n out, consider suspending our economic assistance to Pakistan and/or Indi a until peace is restored.
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 -- If there is an unprovoked/ Chinese attack on India in support of Pakista n going beyond border incidents : (a)consider whether and what kinds of military assistanc e to India could be resumed . (b) initiate consultations with the Indians as provided in the 1964 Air Defense Agreement . -- Withdraw the four C-130s which may be in the area of conflic t carrying out a refugee airlift .

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON SOUTHASI A
In the three and a half months since the Pakistan Army moved against the Bengalis the problems facing South Asia nave increased in complexity and intractability . Although the Pakistan Army has reestablished general control over East Pakistan, military action s have not completely ceased against separatist elements and minorit y communities . Guerrilla activity, supported from sanctuaries in India , has developed . A massive flaw of refugees engendered by the Pakistan Army's activities has taken place . According to Indian sources ove r six million East Pakistanis, mostly Hindu, have sought refuge i n India. To date only a few have returned to East Pakistan and thos e that remain in India pose a massive threat to the political and economic stability of the sensitive eastern regions of India and to peace in the Indian subcontinent . The situation in the last three months has moved from a level in which our interests were onl y secondarily involved to one that, because of the danger of war , could pose a direct threat to the bases of US policy in South Asia . US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES The United States has no vital security interest in the South Asian subcontinent . However, as a global per we are inevitably concerned for the stability and well-being of an area in which one-fifth of mankind resides and which. holds a geopolitically
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 significant position between China and the Soviet Union . Our interest is that India and Pakistan succeed in their developmen t efforts, maintain or create politically on societies and withstand political pressures which could lead to the dominance of an externa l power in the region . Peace is the essential precondition for the maintenance of . our interests in South Asia . Hostilities could easily disrupt the economic, social, and political life of the subcontinent, and ope n the way for outside pavers to extend their influence . If, despite our efforts, hostilities did break out it would be our objectiv e to ensure that neither we nor any of the other principal external powers became directly involved . Within South Asia itself both India and Pakistan are important to U.S. interests. Our interests in India, however, are of greate r
significance . India, the world's second--most populous Country, wit h

strong and stable political institutions, the fourth largest arme d
forces and ninth highest GNP, is a force in South Asian regiona l affairs and in the broader context of the Indian Ocean and Southeas t Asia . India aspires to be one of Asia's major powers in the nex t decade . Pakistan, although the world's fifth most populous country , has neither the resources nor the ambition for such a role in worl d affairs . Its political and economic viability have been seriousl y weakened by recent developments . Overall, it has a much smaller capability for influencing US global interests . On the other hand , India's internal problems could in time bring about a situation in
which it also could exercise little external influence . In formulating US policy in the region the relative preeminence of ou r interests in India should be an underlying factor in decisions whic h we take. Given our interests in South Asia and recognizing that ove r the long-term the prospects for the continued viability of Pakista n as a united country are doubtful, US objectives have been to maintai n a constructively close relationship with India and reasonable relations
with Pakistan avoiding any steps which would mortgage excessivel y
our as yet undefined future relationship with East Pakistan . I. Present Strategy Within the overall context of our efforts to pursue con structive bilateral relations with India and Pakistan and in the fac e of the crisis which has arisen in East Pakistan since March 25 which threatens the peace and stability of South Asia our policy has had
three major ingredients :
1. Restraint :
Because of the possibility that th e
situation in East Pakistan and eastern India could escalat e dangerously we have counseled restraint on both sides . 2. International Relief : : Because of the enormous huma n
problems which have been created in the area we have supported international efforts to provide humanitarian relief assistance to th e refugees from East Pakistan in India and to the peoples of Fas t Pakistan who have been affected by civil strife .
3. Political Accommodation :
We have emphasized that
normalcy can be restored in East Pakistan only within the context of a peaceful political acccmmodation . Such an accommodation i s also important in order to create conditions for the return of th e refugees in India. In addition to these steps and in order to maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan we have taken severa l important policy decisions . Assistance : Economic 1. We have decided to attempt to
keep our economic assistance to Pakistan separate from politica l pressure on the Government of Pakistan and have indicated tha t future assistance would be conditioned primarily on developmenta l and legislative criteria . 2. Military Assistance : 3. We have since early Apri l
(a) put a hold on delivery of Foreign Military Sales items from Department of Defense stocks, (b) instructed the Office of Munition s Control to suspend the issuance of new licenses and the renewal o f expired licenses for items on the Munitions List under either FM S or commercial sales, (c) held in abeyance any action on the on e time exception anus supply offer announced last October . In addition we have suspended valid licenses issue d before March 25 and have not to date stopped shipments of item s purchased under these licenses, the total value of which may excee d $25 million.
II.
Limitations on Present Strategy The three major strands of our policy have met our immediat e
requirements but they have not provided the basis for a viable long term resolution of the crisis . India has exercised restraint but th e refugee problem, which could be exacerbated by a second wave o f refugees later this year fleeing famine conditions in east Pakistan , remains unresolved . International relief assistance has begun t o reach the refugees . But the total annual cost, according to the Governmen t of India, of supporting over six million refugees is in excess of $60 0 million . International contributions have not net even half of thi s amount . On the Pakistan side, relief and rehabilitation efforts have onl y begun to get under way . A.viable political accommodation with the elected representatives of East Pakistan appears to be only a remote possibility , as President Yahya seems unwilling or unable to negotiate with the Award . League or its leadership . The longer term prognosis is thus uncertain . The ability of the military and civilian authorities in east Pakistan to revive the econom y and prevent famine, even with substantial international help, is in seriou s question . Many refugees may not return and may pose a virtually permanen t burden on India ; insurgency may gather momentum under Indian guidanc e and support ; viable political accommodation may not be achieved, an d American influence in both Islamabad and New Delhi could continue t o decline . Although our military supply and economic assistance policie s toward Pakistan have succeeded to a degree in maintaining a constructiv e relationship with Pakistan, they have not resolved the basic underlyin g
political and economic problems . Our decision not to impose a total embargo on shipment of arms has been generally well receive d in Pakistan. However, when these shipments are completed, pressure s to remove our hold on DOD deliveries and the one-time exception wil l build up. Insistence on developmental criteria for aid has halte d new commitments to Pakistan . Given the disruption of the eas t Pakistan economy, it is unlikely that normal developmental criteri a can easily be net soon . On the Indian side, our failure to embargo armsshipment to Pakistan has resulted in bitter criticism of US motives an d policies, and has affected our effort s . to promote a constructive relationship with India . A resumption of aid or military suppl y to Pakistan would have a seriously adverse affect in our relation s with India . Thus the dilemma which we face is that existing policie s will only maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan for a limited period . In the interim our relations with India suffer an d our credibility and influence in New Delhi decline . Aid to Pakistan sufficient to restore or maintain our influence would, on the othe r hand, be seen in India as an endorsement of the repressive policie s of the martial law regime, and not as an instrument for futur e US influence in Islamabad . Under these circumstances, if we ar e to help preserve the peace in South Asia, to avoid enhance d Chinese and Soviet influence and to support the political and economic development of the area, additional
efforts will be required . The following sections revie w the basic elements of our policy and indicate the step s which we might take to build upon the policies which have been followed since March 25 and t o, use our limited influence in support of our basic interests . III . Additional Steps . A. Restraint . In the emotionally-charged
atmosphere
prevailing in the subcontinent after March 25, even though w e have counseled restraint,
the
dangers of war have continued .
The two most likely scenarious for escalation assume that (a) India may take unilateral military action designed t o bring about political change
in
east Pakistan which wil l

into
in turn act to stop the further flow of refugees
India ,
and (b) that Pakistan will take action against Indian crossborder activities . We have urged restraint and forbearanc e on both governments through letters from the President to Prim e Minister Gandhi and President Yahya, in private discussions wit h the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors here, and in discussion s with the respective governments . These demarches have contribute d to some extent to the restraint being exercised on both sides , but tensions continue at a dangerous level . In India cross-border support for separatist guerill a activity continues although it has not reached major proportions,
in part because of a lack of Bengali capabilities . The Prime Minister has . appealed against political pressures designed t o force the Indian government into precipitous action against Pakistan , most recently in a meeting with members of her own party on June 29 . Our counsel has reinforce th e advice against war which she has received from her military advisors . On the other hand, ou r intelligence indicates continued contingency planning for a n attack against East Pakistan and grading internal pressures fo r forceful Indian action . Our counsels of restraint in Pakistan have been less success ful . Although military action against Hindus has declined, it ha s not ceased and communal tensions have not been checked. The w flo of refugees has been greatly reduced from its high point in exces s of 100,000 per day, but it has continued at a rate in excess o f 30,000 per day in recent weeks . Nonetheless, Pakistan has responded less sharply than might have been anticipated to Indian cross borde r activities and has been more forthcoming on questions of admitting a UN presence for refugee rehabilitation . Additional Steps : Our efforts to achieve restraint wil l
need to be continued either as long' as conditions in East Pakista n do not return to normal, there is no political accommodation, an d the refugees do not return, or until the Indians accept the permanen t resettlement in India of most of the refugees . The use of both diplomatic Channels and public statements will be needed . Specific actions which we might take include :
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 1) Public speechorstatement by either the Secretary o f State or the President outlining US policy tow ards South Asia . It walla include a public call to India and Pakistan and if necessary other external powers to exercise restraint while efforts to dea l with the refugee problem and achieve a political so lution are being worked out . We would also plan to use such a statement to expres s for the first time at a high level our humanitarian concern over th e East Pakistan refugee situation, and to renew our commitment to humanitarian relief under UN auspices on both sides of the border . Pro -- would put the United States more clearly o n record than in the past in opposition to conflict in South Asia . might encourage other countries to join us in support of restraint and of relief and recon struction efforts . -
would demonstrate high level concern for th e humanitarian aspects of the situation . Con -- would be resented in India, as have pas t demarches and statements, as an unjust equatin g of India and Pakistan . --- would have only a limited impact on Indian an d Pakistani policy makers . -- reference to external powers could irritat e Peking which has in fact exercised considerabl e restraint .
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended 10 June 9, 2005 2) Consultations with the Soviet Union . Since the singl e
mast-likely cause of hostilities is an Indian attack designed to pu t an Awami League Government in power in Dacca and since the Soviet Unio n has both greater credibility and greater influence in New Delhi tha n the United States at the present time, we may wish to attempt to engag e the support of the USSR in counseling restraint by India and Pakistan . Since the 1966 Tashkent Conference the Soviets have consistentl y identified themselves with peacekeeping efforts in South Asia althoug h their efforts have been designed to support their greater interest s in India . A high level approach to the soviet Union urging it s
constructive cooperation with us in the maintenance of peace could be undertaken . Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin raised the Pakistani crisi s with the Secretary on
March 26 --
asking about US plans -- so we coul d
easily take up a dialogue, underlining our own policy of restraint and expressing hope for a similar Soviet policy . We might indicate to the USSR that we would continue to counsel restraint in both capitals a s well . We might also take this opportunity to seek Soviet acceptanc e of and support for a larger UN role and presence, not only in the coordination of relief efforts, but also in facilitating on both sides of the border the return of refugees to East Pakistan . Pro --- If the Soviets were to act vigorously thei r action would probably be decisive in achieving Indian restraint . --- would lay the basis for cooperation with th e USSR in the event hostilities broke out .
-- would be a positive response to the Soviet dis cussion of March 26 indicating US willingnes s
to cooperate in strengthening peace and i n

creating conditions for the return of the refugees . Con The Soviets might be reluctant to offend the Indian s and might see our approach as an effort to obtain their support for the Pakistanis and hence t o weaken their influence in New Delhi . --could be seen in Peking and Islamabad as a collusiv e Soviet-American effort against them . 3Y 'Discuss the Chinese Threat with the Indians . We have some
intelligence indicating that the Chinese may have given a conditional under taking to support Pakistan if India attacks Pakistan . We estimate that China will limit its support to increased military and economic assist ance, although we cannot rule out the possibility that it might seek t o create increased tension along the Sino-Indian frontier, perhaps b y provoking border incidents . We have no indication of imminent Chinese military moves . We would probably not wish to share our assessment of the rela tively restrained Chinese position with the Indians as that might convinc e them that they could engage in hostilities with little risk of Chines e intervention . If more direct evidence of Chinese military intentions were available we might wish to share it. We might, also, with the danger of escalation in mind, pass an alarmist assessment of Chinese intentions to the Indians, and in private and confidential discussions with th e Indians indicate that they could not count on our support or on th e automatic implementation of the 1964 Air Defense Agreement if China
12 attacked as a result of an Indian attack on Pakistan . Pro would indicate to the Indians the perils of a n attack on Pakistan . -- a sharing of intelligence would be seen as a positive collaborative action . Con reference to the Air Defense Agreement would b e seen as a threat by the United States, and woul d be bitterly resented in India . if it became public could further undermine ou r bilateral relationship with India. any alarmist assessment shared with the Indian s would risk undermining our credibility in New Dehli which has independent means of making it s
awn intelligence assessment .
4)
Seek to Encourage Chinese Restraint .
The-Chinese in
recent years have pursued a restrained policy towards South Asia an d probably would be reluctant to involve themselves deeply on Pakistan' s side . If there appeared to be a change in Chinese policy we might , however, wish to discuss with the Canadians, the French or othe r third powers with missions in Peking, Islamabad and New Dehli th e possibility of approaching the Chinese to urge than to act with cautio n in the present situation . If we made such an effort we might conside r informing India of it in confidence. Pro --- could lessen the danger of additional third country involvement in the sub-continent .
would be seen as a constructive effort favorabl e to India . Con unlikely to be effective in influencing Chines e policy . if the Chinese were responsive could, in fact, act as an encouragement to Indian military actio n against Pakistan . pressure on the Chinese could have an adverse impac t on our relations with Pakistan . 5) UN Involvement and Presence in Border Areas . The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees has indicated a willingness and interest in placing UN personnel in refugee camps and resettlement centers on both sides of the border . While the primary purpose of such a presenc e would be to assess relief needs and facilitate refugee return, it might also have a deterrent effect on Indian cross-border activities and military intervention . We are encouraging and should continue to encourage the UNSYG and his representative the UNHCR to proceed with the latter proposal and to seek Indian, Pakistani and Soviet suppor t for such a proposal . Pro -- provides an additional measure of restraint on Indian activities . Con -- By provoking Indian and/or Soviet opposition coul d endanger the UNHCR' s broader relief role in India .

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B.
International Assistance .
Because the refugee burden repre-
sents the most likely proximate cause for escalation, our effort s have concentrated on mitigating the burden which the refugees repre sent for India .
TO
date we have offered grants of $70 .5 million and
a $20 million supplemental development loan . We have been instrumenta l in supporting the international relief effort of the UNSYG through hi s the designated representative / UN High Commissioner for Refugees . The more than six million refugees represent an increasing political and economi c burden to India and are a serious destabilizing factor . There is no way in which we can directly address the political problem which th e refugees pose for India . We can assist and have assisted in easing the economic burden but we should not exaggerate the effect of our ai d which leaves untouched the social and political problems . This burden is likely to continue for a long time into the future as many of th e refugees, particularly of the Hindus, who constitute perhaps three quarters of the total, may return to East Pakistan only in circumstance s in which the government in per is one which they can trust . Such a government would have to be truly secular-in outlook .
On the
Pakistan side we have also actively promoted an inter -
national relief effort, both to deal with the immediate relief need s in the area and also to facilitate the return of refugees . Within the framework of this international effort we have signed two $1 millio n grant agreements to enable the Government of Pakistan to charter foreig n vessels to deliver food grains and other essential relief supplies t o the cyclone affected areas in East Pakistan and other places where

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 serious food shortages now threaten . Additional steps on which we should focus include (a) the crea tion of conditions conducive to the refugees' return, (b) contingenc y
planning for the permanent resettlement of at least some refugees, and
(c) the encouragement of a more extensive UN role on both sides of th e border . 1) Conditions in Pakistan Conducive to Refugee Return. We have
tired to impress o n, President Yahya the need to create conditions conduciv e to the refugees' return . He has responded by indicating publicly hi s government's willingness to see the return of all refugees irrespectiv e of religion . He has established reception centers to receive returning refugees and facilitate their return home . Nonetheless, we have intelli gence reports that suggest these public statements are designed for international consumption while some action against the Hindus continues . Specific programs have not yet been articulated to assure the refugees that they will in fact get their homes and property back, that the y will receive relief until they can reestablish themselves or tha t they will be compensated for damages caused by the Pakistan Army . Moreover, the threat of famine, continued disruption o f transportation and basic government services, and a minimal level o f economic activity, persist throughout the province . Only as the conditions in general improve will there be a chance for specifi c measures to encourage refugee return to be effective . We shoul d therefore persist with our efforts to get the Government of Pakista n to take measures to deal with the basic human problems of the population remaining in East Pakistan, and the creation of an effective inter - Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -
national humanitarian program to support those measures . It is not

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at all clear haw long it will be before same semblance of norma l economic life returns . Meanwhile, we should suggest to the Govern ment of Pakistan, and have the UNHHCR encourage, various additiona l steps which need to be taken to facilitate the return of refugees . Specifically these steps should include a program of (a) guarantees of personal security, (b) restoration of or compensation for real and personal property, (c) resettlement allowances, (d) housing recon struction, (e) food and general relief assistance . Support for such measures could be included in the scope of our humanitarian aid fo r East Pakistan through the UN . We would keep the Indians fully informed of our efforts . Pro would be a positive step in encouraging the return of those refugees who are willing t o go back without regard to the terms of politica l settlement . would encourage the Indians to continue thei r policy of restraint by holding out hope for a substantial refugee return . Con -- would possibly be seen as an overly intrusive attempt to influence Pakistani internal decisions . --- could be seen in India as an indication that the international cornunity did not intend to
intervene
to achieve political accommodation in East Pakistan . It might therefore reinforce the arguments of thos e in India who argue that India must take unilatera l action.
2) Conditions in India Conducive to Return .
While the pri -
mary problem connected with refugee repatriation is in Pakistan, ther e are also additional steps which need to be taken in India . At present the Indians are reluctant to agree to an international presence in th e refugee camps to facilitate refugee return . They also seem to be taking the position that the refugees should not be encourage d, to return unless a friendly government is in power in Dacca . This position takes into account domestic political pressures and the fact that they canno t afford to urge the refugees to return if there is any remaining threa t to their lives and security .
Finally
Indian support for Bengali cross -
border operations contributes to the general sense of fear and insecurit y in East Pakistan . We should raise these issues with the Indians urgin g
than (a)
to agree to a UN presence in the camps, (b) to be flexible in

their
setting political conditions on repatriation, and (c) to curtail support for cross-border operations .
Pro -- would, if followed, somewhat enhance on the Indian side the likelihood that the refugees would return . -- might make political accomodation easier . Con -- would in the present climate in Indo-US relations be resented . -- even if agreed to might only 3) Permanent Resettlement Planning .
marginally
increase
the chances of a substantial refugee return . Fran all evidence available to us a substantial portion of the Hindu refugees may never wish to retur n to East Pakistan . At present the Government of India is not prepared to
consider permanent resettlement which would be an enormously comple x and expensive proposition and would imply that politica lacomdtin was impossible . Although for the time being any public acknowledgmen t on the part of the US Government that it regarded the refugee retur n as impractical would be of concern to the Government of India and offer s of resettlement assistance would be rejected out of hand, we have begu n contingency planning for such an eventuality . We should specifically consider (a) financial resources required to transport refugees t o other parts of India, (b) USAID initiatives to create labor-intensive projects in West Bengal where most of the refugees remain and wher e the most urgent need of housing and accommodation will arise, (c) a U S initiative with regard to Calcutta redevelopment, (d) a possible UN rol e as resettlement coordinator . 4) Enhanced Relief Contributions to India . If the economi c
burden which the refugee problem represents for India is to be trul y eased more than the contributions of the US will be required . To date the contributions of other countries have been inadequate . We have already gone to the UNSYG and to the UNHCR to suggest that they appea l directly to potential donors for more substantial contributions . We should again encourage the UNSYG and the UNHCR to launch a more active publicity campaign, and support these efforts through our Embassies . We should simultaneously encourage the Indians to be more active i n seeking international assistance .

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Pro -- is essential step if adequate resources ar e to be mobilized . would help meet Indian demands for a more adequate international response . Con -- could generate pressures for further large U S contributions . -- would not deal with the political roots of th e refugee problem . 5) Relief in East Pakistan . The UN-coordinated relief progra m
in East Pakistan is just getting under way . To date however the onl y significant bilateral contribution to support the program has been ou r own . The UN appeal for assistance of June 16 has evoked very littl e other response, and U Thant is considering a further appeal . We should encourage the UN to develop further support for the relief program an d should urge other countries to contribute . We should also press th e Pakistan Government to help in this process by gearing up their awn relief organization in East Pakistan and restoring equitable an d effective civil administration . Pro -- is important to give substance to a program o f relief and rehabilitation to strife-torn Eas t Pakistan . without such a program, conditions conducive to the return of refugees in significant numbers ma y not evolve .
Con -- does not deal with the basic political question . -- given Bengla Desh guerrilla activity restoratio n of effective civil administration may be beyond th e Government of Pakistan's capabilities . C.
Political Accommodation .
The third element,, in our current
strategy is to urge the Government of Pakistan to proceed as expeditiously as possible with political accommodation- Recognizing the complex issues involved and that because of domestic pressures in Pakistan Yahya may hav e limited political flexibility, we have not endeavored to spell out th e details of such an accommodation. We have, however, urged Yahya to deal with representative political leaders . These efforts have had only a limited effect and have not as yet led to a meaningful basis for a political settlement . Yahya has stated he hopes to transfer parer to the people in about four months' time, but has not lifted his ban on
the Awami League or shown any predisposition to negotiate with Eas t
Pakistan's outstanding popular leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman . While we will need to continue urging Yahya to work toward a politica l settlement, for our urgings to be effective we may have to be mor e direct in our suggestions for such a settlement, pointing out to hi m our concern that failure to achieve a settlement could increase th e dangers of war . Specifically, we might suggest the following :
1)
- Shorter Timetablefor Accommodation.
The four months
which Yahya has referred to would mean that no transfer of power woul d take place before late October or early November . If by early

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September Yahya could have promulgated what seems to be a firml y scheduled and otherwise reasonable return to civilian rule, havin g some democratic basis and a fair degree of regional autonomy, it i s possible that conventional Indian military action might be forestalled . "Pro would support our efforts to achieve India n restraint . -- would be the first step towards a longer-tern s political settlement . Con -- would be resented by Yahya as unnecessary inter ference and be rejected as running counter to his an domestic requirements for a more delayed transfer of power . 2) Liftingthe Ban on the Awami League, Although we do not
wish to involve ourselves in suggesting the terms of any constitutiona l settlement, we might indicate to Yahya our view that the Awami League i s the only party in Fast Pakistan with a genuine popular following and that its participation is essential to a viable political settlemen t in East Pakistan . While it would be desirable if Yahya could be brough t to negotiate with Mujibur Rahman directly, it is extremely unlikel y that we could bring this about . Even direct negotiation with the Awami League will not be easy to achieve since it may run counter t o Yahya's own assessment that the Bengalis will knuckle under to a les s extensive form of political accommodation .

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Pro -- reflects our assessment that a viable politica l settlement is unlikely without Awami Leagu e participation . if accepted would offer the basis for a lasting political accommodation . Con -- such suggestions could well be rejected out o f hand by Yahya who has devised his own politica l timetable and who believes
Mujibo
be a traitor .
could be resented as interference in Pakistan' s internal affairs and might precipitate Yahya' s overthrow and replacement by a more extreme militar y government . 3) Indian Flexibility . While we are pursuing a politica l
strategy with Yahya we will want to urge the Indians not to be inflexible in their own position on the terms for a political settlement in Eas t Pakistan . In particular, we might emphasize to the Indians the desirabilit y of continuing to conduct their relations with the representatives o f East Bengal now resident in India with circumspection . We should also urge them to continue their policy of not recognizing the Bangla Desh government in exile, and to limit support for it . Pro --- would reinforce policies which India is alread y pursuing . Con -- could be resented as gratuitous advice . 4) UNSYG Involvement. Since our leverage in Islamabad i s
limited we should also consider mobilizing other forms of international

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opinion on behalf of a political accommodation . This might includ e encouraging the UN Secretary General to adopt a more open political role , going beyond his present efforts in support of an international relie f effort . We might for example encourage him to make a public appeal fo r a political settlement, or to travel to South Asia to seek the views o f representative political leaders in Pakistan, or to offer mediatory assistance . We might urge India and Pakistan to request, or accept , his good offices . Pro - If successful, would bring greater pressure to bear on Yahya - hence add to the chances for a n accommodation . - would follow logically from UN relief effort s - would prolong the talking stage between the parties . Con - Might not be welcomed-by the UNSY G 5) Third Party Involvement . In addition to the UN Secretary
General we may wish to consider approaching other third parties to se e if they would be willing to offer their good offices either in dealing with the internal Pakistan political problem or with the Indo-Pakista n problem . Muslim nations such as Iran, Jordan or Turkey, might be usefu l in the former role . Impartial neutral states such as Ceylon o r Malaysia might be used in the latter case . In addition, going beyond the possible role of individual third parties we should consider the possibility of calling an international five-power conference, includin g the USSR, China, France and the United Kingdom and ourselves to work ou t a permanent political settlement between India, Pakistan and possibl y Bangla Desh . Such a proposal would be premature at this stage, but may
be necessary if tensions in the Sub-continent intensify . Pro - Any single or multinational mediation effort, i f acceptable to the parties involved would provide a graceful facade behind which difficult compromise s might be made . Con - unlikely to commend itself to smaller powers i n view of the deepseated and bitter animositie s involved . - a five-power approach might be difficult to achiev e because of Sino-Soviet differences . 6) UNHCR Facilitative Pole . The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees has indicated to us his willingness and interest in placing UNHCR representatives on both sides of the border not only to asses s relief needs in India, but also to act as a facilitative body in bot h countries for the return of refugees . The Government of Pakistan has indicated its willingness to allow a UNHCR presence in the receptio n centers . The Indians, however, have initially balked at a simila r presence in the Indian refugee camps . In addition to the obviou s facilitative role which such a
UN
presence would have, it would als o
have a significant deterrent effect on Indian cross-border activities and perhaps overall on the prospects for escalation . To achieve such a presence we will not only need the acquiescence of the Indians but probably also the support of the Soviet Union which may not be enthusiastic about an expanded UN role, particularly if costs for participating nation s looked to be high . (This subject would be suitable for discussion with the Soviets in addition to the general problem of restraint proposed in DECLASSIFIED - Assembled by Center for Indian Military History PA/HO, Department of State 151/390 E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
Pro - an effective UNHCR facilitative role could b e important in reassuring refugees that they will no t be mistreated on their return . Con - Pressure on the Indians to permit a UN presenc e could be abrasive in our relations with them . 7) Resort to the Security Council . India at various times
since March 25 has threatened to take the East Pakistan issue to th e Security Council, but has found no firm grounds on which to do so . We have actively discouraged the Indians from such an initiative pointin g to the rhetoric which such a session would probably create . Given the heightened tension in South Asia, however, we may wish to reconsider thi s position . The objective of UNSC consideration of the problem now would be to achieve an even-handed resolution calling on both parties to reduc e tensions and urging all states to promote the peace and stability of th e area . Such a use of the Security Council would not be designed as an effor t directed against one party but as an even-handed attempt to get both side s to cool their confrontation . Pro - would throw spotlight on situation and may thus help deter the parties . - could demonstrate parallel US-USSR interests i n maintaining peace in South Asia . - by having UN in the middle would help preserve U S credentials and leverage with both parties
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- precedent exists for UN involvement in India-Pa k problems - could provide logical basis for further UN mediation effort, e .g . SYG or SYG representativ e Con - Security Council resolution might go uninforced since UN has no enforcement capability - sessions could degenerate into Indian-Pak shoutin g match with no positive result . - might detract from quiet diplomacy among parties an d interested powers - Pakistan may oppose SC consideration, arguing Eas t Pak situation is "internal affair" ; this might als o have adverse effects on US/PAK relations if we pres s for, or support UNSC discussion . IV. Military and Economic Programs .
In view of our desire to develop cooperative relations with bot h India and Pakistan, our econa is and military assistance programs tak e on considerable importance . The dilemma inherent in those programs in Pakistan is that While they support our interests in Pakistan they simultaneously damage our interests in India. A. Military Supply. The stability of the Martial Law Adminis -
tration is heavily dependent on the continued strength and morale of th e military. Military sales therefore are of paramount psychologica l and practical significance to the martial law regime . Our decisions in this area are regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an earnes t of our overall policy towards Pakistan . Under our existing policy,
only orders for military equipment licensed prior to March 25 ar e
being shipped to Pakistan . Major items of military significance , including those in the 1970 one-time exception, are being held i n abeyance . This residual program has been strongly criticized b y India which sees any arms to Pakistan as a direct support fo r the Army's suppressive actions in East Pakistan . It has damaged our ability to maintain a constructive relationship with India . Our ability to influence India in the direction of restraint ha s declined, since India believes we are increasingly committed to a policy of support for Pakistan and give only secondary importanc e to India's role and importance in South Asia . Pakistan is also likely to became dissatisfied with our policy which denies to it many of the end-items and spare part s which it had hoped to procure in the future . The policy is als o highly vulnerable with Congress which strongly opposes any anu s shipment to Pakistan . At present the principal requirement of US policy is tha t there not be any recourse to armed force . This will require the support and cooperation of India . We therefore recommend a suspension of all shipments of arms to Pakistan, including any residual ship ments which remain from the pre-March 25 period, in order to restor e a degree of credibility to our calls for restraint and to suppor t the relative preeminence of our interests in India . Once peacefu l conditions are restored and a satisfactory political settlement achieved , we should then review this suspension . If we wished to stop short of a publicly announced suspension of all further shipments to Pakista n we might state that we had
decided to review remaining items in the pipeline, clearly implyin g that sensitive items, such as lethal spare parts and ammunition woul d not be permitted to be shipped . Pro - Would support our primary interest in influencin g India to act with restraint - would improve relations with India and increase ou r influence in New Delhi - would remove an abrasive source of dispute wit h the Congress and thus hopefully would gain us broade r support for our policies in South Asia. - would have a positive impact on public opinion in. East Pakistan and hence ultimately on any futur e relations with East Pakistan . Con - would seriously irritate the Government of Pakistan and greatly reduce our influence on it . - would increase Chinese influence in Pakistan a s the major arms supplier - might lead to more intransigent Pakistani positions with respect to military action against Bengali s and political accommodat ion - could encourage India to take military action agains t Pakistan . B . Economic Assistance Our basic economic assistance strategy has been to condition futur e development loans, which would provide fungible sources of foreig n exchange to the Pakistanis, primarily on developmental and legislativ e
criteria . Political criteria are being minimized and economic aid DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department 155/390 of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
is not being used directly to put pressure on Pakistan to achieve a political accommodation . This policy is consistent with our worldwide view tha t aid should not be conditioned on short-term political considerations . In adopting this position we have set ourselves apart from some of th e other donor countries, who have specifically set political conditions fo r resuming aid, but have nevertheless taken a position broadly consisten t with that of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium as a group . Aid is an important ingredient in Pakistan's development, and given the enhance d pressures on the Pakistan economy since March 25, it will be an increasingl y important factor in the future economic viability of Pakistan . The prospect of US aid in the future is a carrot which we are holding out before th e Pakistanis and which may be important if we are to have an effect i n dealing with sensitive political subjects such as politica lacomdtin with Mujib . We recommend that we adhere to our policy of deemphasizin g political criteria for aid but insisting on devel op mental criteria t o ensure that our aid will go for purposes of economic development and tha t the entire country will benefit from our resources . Pro - makes aid the major positive ingredient in ou r relations with Pakista n - is consistent with worldwide policie s - indicates our continuing concern for Pakistan' s developmental prospects and to a degree protects our past inputs . -
will
somewhat counterbalance Chinese influence i n
Pakistan .
- consistent with approach adopted by other member s of Aid to Pakistan Consortium . Con --if the situation in East Pakistan does not improv e sharply, application of developmental criteria coul d lead to provision of very little aid except humanitaria n assistance, and to the ultimate erosion of our leverag e with the Government of Pakistan . - any aid to Pakistan will be resented by India, althoug h if it was clearly conditioned on developmental term s would not necessarily be a major negative factor i n our relations .
V. PROSPECTS FOR HOSTILITIES
Although there are strong negative factors working agains t an Indian decision to attack Pakistan, the danger of war remains real . With the experience of 1965 in mind Indian decision-makers are aware tha t a decisive victory over Pakistan cannot easily be won . The costs of war are high and there is a recognition that an Indo-Pakistan conflict coul d result in direct Chinese involvement . The policies suggested in the earlier sections of this paper would reinforce the intrinsically counter vailing factors in the situation . Nonetheless there is still a signifi cant possibility that India despite these negative factors will in th e next three to six months go to war with Pakistan . The Indian decision would be based on domestic political pressures, and an assessment that the influx of refugees is likely to lead to radicalization in Bengal and wil l ultimately threaten India's inter-communal cohesion, the political fabric
in Bengal, Assam and tribal states of Eastern India, an deconmi development prospects . These interests India may well consider "vital " and worthy of protection through the "lesser evil" of war . There i s probably still an interim period in which the Government of India will wai t to see whether international pressures and domestic compulsions i n Pakistan will bring about a political accommodation, the restoratio n of peace and security in East Pakistan and a start to the process o f repatriation of the refugees . If no progress is made in these areas by September or October, the chances for hostilities will . increase Our actions, in the event of escalation would be determined i n part by the circumstances in which hostilities broke out . It is most likely that war would result from an Indian attack on Pakistan or fro m a gradual process of escalation involving border incidents on both sides . In the latter case, responsibility might not be clearly laid on one side or the other . In the first instance hostilities are likely to be confined to India and Pakistan alone . It would be in the US interest to see tha t the hostilities not expand to include third parties, particularly China . It would also be in our interest to see that the hostilities were no t protracted since a prolonged war would do profound damage to the political , economic and social fabric of India and Pakistan . Thus, should India attack Pakistan despite our efforts, our interests would be best served by a n
early end to the conflict and by negotiations among all parties concerne d
leading to a withdrawal of Indian troops and an overall politica l settlement . The following sections consider options open to the United
States both in the event of war which was localized to India and
Pakistan though possibly fought on two fronts, and a war in which external powers, particularly China, VI . HOSTILITIES OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF In the event hostilities break out between India and Pakista n the United States could pursue one of three broad strategies -- it could : (a) adopt a passive hands-off role, (b) provide military suppor t to the victim of attack, (c) intervene politically to localize the conflict . A. Passive International Role . We might adopt a relativel y passive role indicating our basic neutrality in the dispute . We would seek to avoid being drawn more directly into the dispute on either side . Such a role might be particularly appropriate in circumstances in whic h the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was unclear or where w e judged the likelihood of Chinese involvement to be small . A passive role need not necessarily do irreparable damage to our interests i n either India or Pakistan . Both sides might interpret our neutrality as implicit support for their position . This stance might allow us to adopt a mediatory position encouraging a negotiated political settlement when circumstances made such a role possible . Such an approach woul d only be sustainable if the conflict appeared likely to be of shor t duration, since a protracted conflict would bring serious long-ter m damage to the internal cohesion and viability of both India and Pakistan , which would not be conducive to the longer term peace and stability in South Asia which we seek . In pursuing this option we could :
would
become involved .
adopt a public posture that we did not intend to become directly involved and would not provid e assistance to either side . support efforts in the Security Council to end th e hostilities -- suspend all aid and military programs to both side s until the outcome of the-hostilities was clear . offer our good offices in arranging negotiation of a political settlement . Advantages Limits US involvement allows US maxirnum flexibility as events unfol d preserves a relationship with both India and Pakista n Disadvantage s -- risks serious damage to our interests in South Asia i f the conflict were protracted . could increase Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and Pakistani dependence on China without any gain fo r the US in either country . B. Military Supp ort. At the other extreme would be a decision t o
support one side or the other with military assistance . The US ha s limited commitments to both sides (through ma and SEATO with Pakistan ,
and through the 1964 Air Defense Agreement with India) . Although neithe r set of agreements provides for automatic US involvement in an Indo Pakistan conflict, the Pakistanis or Indians might seek to use them t o gain our involvement . If we wished to demonstrate our support for the DECLASSIFIED - Assembled by Center for Indian Military History PA/HO, Department of State 160/390 E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005
party which was the victim of attack we might respond positively t o these overtures . 1. To Pakistan . Under the most likely scenario for escalatio n
-- an Indian attack on Pakistan -- the Pakistanis would turn to us a s they did in 1965 . If we judged it to be in our interest to assert th e paramountcy of our interests in Pakistan and in its national unity an d integrity we might offer to assist Pakistan's defense effort through th e supply of military equipment, although not with US combat personnel . Such assistance would in the short run not affect the outcome of th e conflict, but it would be politically effective in creating a ne w relationship with Pakistan . Such a course would have a serious negative impact on our interests in India and any future independent Bangla Des h and would destroy the basis for a constructive relationship with India . Specific actions we might take include the follwing :
develop
in coordination with the Government o f
Pakistan an emergency military supply progra m -- actively move to terminate all US programs in Indi a take the lead in developing international efforts calling on India to end her intervention and return to the status quo ant e -- support a Security Council Resolution condemning India
Advantage s --
would support our interests in Pakistan and in it s national unity
would diminish Chinese influence in Pakista n would strengthen our relations with Muslim power s of the Middle Past Disadvantages would severely damage US interests :in and relation s with India would have little effect-on the outcome of the conflic t would lead to increased Soviet influence in India would leave no basis for a conciliatory role by th e United States 2. To India . Military support to India is a less likely strategy
in the context of a limited Indo-Pakistan conflict . However, if China were to intervene massively on Pakistan's side and seemed to threate n
India in a major way, e .g . by an attempt to seize the Brahmaputr a

valley, we would want to consider providing military assistance to India . Such assistance would be politically easier to provide if India were no t the initiator of hostilities with Pakistan . Such support of India i f
clearly offered in the Chinese context would be a positive element

supporting our recognition of India's relatively greater importance to u s in Asia . Relations with Pakistan would be strained even though the sarm would not be provided for use against Pakistan .
It might still be possible
to maintain a post-war relationship with Pakistan, particularly if th e
United States had been actively engaged in simultaneous political effort s (see C below) to achieve a negotiated political settlement . Specific
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actions we might take include the following : -- offer to consult with India under the 196 4 Air Defense Agreemen t - - develop, if India desired, an emergency militar y assistance program -- share intelligence with Indians on Chinese militar y deployments -- coordinate with the British and the Soviets o n additional assistance measure s Advantage s -- would be consistent with our overall Asian policy of assisting states threatened by China, or the victim s of Chinese aggressio n would establish a fine basis for a close relationshi p with India -- would counteract the recent growth in Soviet influenc e in India -- could form a part of a cooperative effort with the Soviet s Disadvantage s -- would create severe strains in our relations with bot h China and Pakistan -- would run risks of gradually increasing US involvement escalating into a more extensive commitment, involving direct US confrontation with one or more outside powers .
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C.
Political Intervention .
Given our interest in maintainin g
relations with both India and Pakistan and our desire to preven t Chinese involvement and to limit external influence in the subcontinent , a policy of political intervention would give us considerable flexibility . The principal purpose of our political efforts would be to localiz e hostilities and end them . We would also wish to work vigorously for a negotiated political settlement which would remove the basic cause s of tension . Actions we would wish to take immediately on the outbreak o f hostilities would include : -- an immediate call for a UN Security Council session to consider the crisi s -- support for a Security Council resolution calling fo r an immediate ceasefire and direct negotiations betwee n the two sides on the terms of withdrawal and a politica l settlement -- immediate Presidential messages to President Yahya and/o r Prime Minister Gandhi calling for an end to hostilitie s and/or a negotiated settlement . -- immediate discussion with the Soviet Union and with Grea t Britain on ways to bring the hostilities to an end --- privately urge continued restraint on the Chinese directl y or through third partie s If hostilities have broken out because of an India attack o n Pakistan we should :
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-- move to terminate our residual military sales program for India, carefully assessing the likelihood of a Chines e attack on India before taking definitive actio n -- hold up all shipments and licenses of military supplie s destined to Indi a -- not resume shipment of military assistance to Pakista n pending the outcome of our diplomatic efforts to terminat e the hostilitie s -- prepare to hold economic assistance to India in abeyanc e
at least for the duration of the hostilities . (A de facto

suspension of assistance would take place in Pakistan sinc e most AID and PL-480 programs would be disrupted as a result o f hostilities . ) If the circumstances of the outbreak of hostilities were thoro ughly ambiguous and murkey we should : -- announce publicly a temporary suspension of military suppl y to both parties -- consider whether, in order to bring hostilities to an end , to suspend all economic assistance programs to both side s -- urge other arms supplying powers, such as Britain, the Soviet Union, and France to suspend airs shipments . Advantage s --- would provide US maximum flexibility in a complex- situatio n - would maximize use of US programs and leverage to shorte n hostilities, and inhibit third party intervention
- - would make it possible for the US to maintain relation s with both India and Pakistan (and perhaps Bangla Desh a s well) in the aftermath of hostilities . Disadvantages since the actual effect of such a policy could be to put pressure on the invading country (probably India i n occupation of a portion of East Pakistan) it could lea d to strains in our relations with the Government of India . -would be seen in Pakistan as a repetition of 1965 an d a failure of the US to fulfill its treaty commitments .

ANNEX A - PRE-HOSTILITIES CONTINGENCY ACTION S
Irrespective of the political courses which we decide d to pursue to keep the conflict localized or to bring it t o an end various American programs would be immediately affecte d and contingency planning by appropriate US agencies shoul d be undertaken to meet these contingencies : 1) US ships destined to India and Pakistan should b e warned not to call at belligerent ports if carrying carg o for both belligerents . As in 1965 it can be assumed tha t any cargo which arrives in India destined for Pakistan o r vice versa will be immediately confiscated . 2) Hostilities could involve bombing of airfields o n both sides . MAC and commercial air carriers should hav e made contingency arrangements for overflying the are a without stopping in either India or Pakistan . 3) Evacuation plans may have to be implemented o n short notice for all posts in India and Pakistan and the y should be reviewed in the context of a possible Indo-Pakista n war involving hostilities in both East and West Pakistan . 4) Intelligence coverage of Chinese intentions an d capabilities to intervene in South Asia should be intensifie d in order to provide maximum possible advance warning of an y significant Chinese actions .

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SCENARIOFORACTION IN INDO-PAKISTAN CRISIS In the present situation our two principal objectives are to prevent famine in East Pakistan and to deter hostilitie s between India and Pakistan resulting either from the continuin g refugee flow or escalation of cross-border activities . Additional subsidary objectives are therefore to : (a) encourage progress toward a political settlement . (b) stop the refugee flow from Pakistan . (c) prevent its re-emergence once stopped by comprehensive and effective relief measures to aver t famine . (d) end cross-border activities from India . Beyond this, to achieve a return flow of any magnitud e there will be necessary at least : -- a return of normal security conditions in Eas t Pakistan . -- the elimination of the threat of famine . -- assurances of a return of property and jobs . -- impartial neutral monitoring and assurances to the refugees of their personal safety .

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-- international participation and monitorin g of relief in East Pakistan and India . A full return would probably only take place if ther e is an agreed political settlement with the Awami League . Our efforts must begin with Pakistan because it is i n Pakistan that famine conditions will occur, it is onl y there that steps can be taken to create conditions conduciv e to the refugees' return and it is there that the fundamenta l problem of political accommodation can be dealt with . The basic requirement for ,a durable and viable settlement of the current crisis is the achievement of a politica l accommodation with the Bengali people . Until such an accommodation is achieved, normal conditions will not be restored , the insurgency will continue and India will only to a limite d degree agree to compromise and cooperate in efforts to defus e the situation . There are many specific steps to propose t o President Yahya in other areas, particularly with respec t to famine relief and the restoration of more normal law and . order conditions . These are outlined below . None of them can hope to be fully effective, however, except in a change d and more constructive political atmosphere . Our basic approac h to President Yahya should, therefore, emphasize the necessit y for actions to reverse the current negative political trends
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and to move toward reconciliation .
It is recognized that
any progress toward political accommodation risks Yahya' s own political position and that direct negotiation with Mujib or other established leaders of the Awami League ma y not now be politically feasible . Nonetheless, there i s still scope for an accelerated timetable of constitutiona l reform and direct dealing with a substantial percentage o f the elected Awami League members . These proposals are als o included in the following scenario as are those steps whic h can be taken with respect to the refugees and famine problems . These problems are critical in the short term if hostilitie s are to be avoided . Pakistan Refugee Outflow . Because of the inter-relationship between the refuge e problem and the dangers of war, our first efforts must be t o end the refugee outflow and to prevent its resumption becaus e of famine conditions . Without this there is little prospec t that the Indians will agree to other proposals we are making , i .e ., an end to cross-border activity and a UN presence o n their side of the border . We should, therefore, approach Yahya through a Presi dential letter or through Ambassador Farland indicating our
concern that a continued refugee flow threatens the peace and security of South Asia and requesting that : (a) his government stop summary military reprisals agains t predominantly Hindu villages, and indicate that punishment i n the future will be meted out through the judicial process . (b) there be a restoration of a civil administration, . leaving the maintenance of law and order to the police an d provincial para-military forces . (c) mount a massive and effective effort to deal with th e threat of famine . (A paper on East Pakistan humanitarian relie f making detailed program recommendations is attached . ) In suggesting immediate and effective steps to avoid famine, , we should stress the need (1) to work through internationa l humanitarian relief agencies using UN and foreign voluntar y agencies to the maximum, and (2) to improve port operations and to restore normal inland distribution of food and other relie f supplies . Return Flow . We should also indicate our view that further steps mus t be taken to facilitate and encourage the return of at leas t some of the refugees and that in our view this will require tha t the GOP emphatically make clear through other actions and publi c announcements that it is prepared to : (a)
call
for national reconciliation and a common effor t

to rebuild East Pakistan .

(b) announce that because of the need for a period o f reconciliation and common effort, the Government is ready t o declare a general amnesty for all those inside and outsid e of East Pakistan, except those engaged in armed resistanc e or specifically charged with criminal offenses . (c) announce that refugees can return to their homes wit h full personal security and restoration of their personal and real property . (d) announce that there will be no further allocation t o Muslims of Hindu property, . and implement the proposal to retur n property already allocated . (e) develop specific plans for financial assistance on a n individual and family basis to compensate refugees for losse s as a result of the conflict . Political Accommodatio n Finally, we should tell Yahya that in our view it is vita l that progress be made towards a political settlement which embrace s all Awami League representatives, except those specifically charge d with heinous crimes or actively engaged in resisting . This proposal coul d be made to Yahya in the context of his already stated willing ness to deal with the elected representatives of the people . Because political accommodation clearly is vital to a long term solution and is perceived as vital in the shorte r term by the Indians, we should specifically urge Yahya :
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(a) to proceed as rapidly as possible with his efforts to achieve a settlement with the elected representatives o f the people, on the basis of maximum autonomy for Eas t Pakistan (whether "Six Points" or otherwise) . (b) to avoid exacerbating the situation by a trial o f Mujibur Rahman, an d (c) to appoint a new governor to replace Genera l Tikka Khan, preferably a civilian and a Bengali and t o search for new leadership for the martial law administratio n in East Pakistan perhaps by calling out of retirement prom inent West Pakistanis who enjoy a degree of confidence i n East Pakistan -- General Azam, or Admiral Ahsan . abolish (d) the Peace Committees, which have become symbols of the martial law rule . Phasing (a) We should tell Yahya that we are pressing th e Indians to refrain from giving assistance to the insurgen t movement and that we anticipate the Indian response will be increasingly affirmative as progress is made on ending th e refugee outflow, on developing a province-wide famine pre vention effort, and on a political accommodation .

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(b) in anticipation of a situation in which some of the refugees would be wilting to return we plan to pres s the Indians further to accept a UN presence on their sid e of the border to facilitate the return flow . This phased scenario with the Pakistanis emphasize s interim measures which are most immediately achievable i n the hope and expectation that this will improve the prospect s for political accommodation which is essential to any genera l restoration of the situation in East Pakistan . Economic and Military Assistance . In addition to inter-relating developments in Eas t Pakistan with our proposed demarche in India we will als o have to phase our bilateral economic and military programs . Simultaneously, with our urging on the point of province wide famine relief efforts, we should reiterate our willing ness to support Pakistan's relief plans within the UN frame work with additional food and coastal vessels . Direct cas h assistance can be added as plans for its use are put forward . If reasonable progress on humanitarian programs is made by fall, it may be possible to work out tacit agreement to a continuation of Pakistan's unilateral debt moratorium .
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Our broader development assistance should await the creation of conditions in which development can take plac e and which we have referred to under the general rubric o f developmental criteria . We should indicate to General Yahy a that in our view this is closely related to the creation o f conditions in which the refugees can return to their homes . Finally, our hold on military shipments, which wil l have become almost total by mid-August, should not b e lifted until there is an end of military activity agains t the civilian population and until the army is returned t o its barracks and effective civilian administration is in operation . We should indicate to General Yahya that thi s is likely to happen only when there has, in fact, bee n progress toward a political settlement . India On the Indian side our strategy must be one whic h seeks : (a) to ease the pressure on India of the existin g refugees, (b) to end Indian support for cross border operations , and (c) to remove such obstacles to the refugees' return as India may be placing in the way .
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RefugeeBurden To meet the immediate burden India faces and to diminish th e Indian sense of desperation we should be prepared to make an ex plicit offer of an additional $100 million for refugee relief fo r the current fiscal year . (Half of this in food and other PL-48 0 commodities could be provided at once . The balance in cash woul d have to await congressional authorization and appropriation . The House version of the Foreign Assistanc e -Act contains authorizatio n of an additional $100 million for relief in India and Pakistan . ) In discussions with the Indians we should also indicate ou r willingness to sign a first tranche FY 1972 $100 million develop ment loan and a new PL-480 agreement . We should indicate in makin g these loans that our economic assistance programs can only continue in conditions in which economic development can effectively tak e place . We would, of course, be concerned if Indian military actions were to interfere with India's development or if India were obdurate under circumstances in which there is marke d improvement in the situation in East Pakistan . It might then be difficult for us to continue our development assistance . Refugee Outflow and Return . We should tell the Indians of our efforts with Yahya t o end the outflow of refugees both immediately and in the future context of famine . We should say to them that a s the flow subsides we would expect them to agree to measure s which would facilitate the return process, notably a UN
presence at collecting points on their side, for nonpeacekeeping purposes, and a de-linking of politica l accommodation with refugee return . At that point we should also inform the Indians o f the steps we have taken and propose to take in Pakista n with respect to the security of returning refugees, th e creation of more normal conditions in East Pakistan and 'movement towards a political settlement . Cross Border Activit y Because insurgency and the Pakistani response to it ar e causes of the refugee outflow we should also urge th e Indians to refrain from giving official support to cros s border activities, and generally to cut back on training an d logistic support and the sending of Indian personnel o r units across the border . We should point out to them tha t sabotage activities against rail and inland water transpor t facilities contribute to the probability of famine-induce d refugee migration and interferes with the distribution o f famine relief supplies in East Pakistan . We might als o urge them to use their influence with the Mukti Fauj t o avoid activities likely to result in reprisals agains t Hindu villages .

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We recognize that India is unlikely to accept these suggestions at this time . Agreement on their part would imply accept ance of a West Pakistani victory, an end to Bangla Des h aspirations and the probability of the radicalization of th e insurgent movement . None of these are acceptable to the GOI . Even if accepted, it would not result in a complet e cessation of insurgent activity since there is now a limited indigenous insurgent capability in East Pakistan . In addition , non-official communist and Naxalite-supported cross-borde r activities would continue to take place which the GOP woul d charge was Indian-sponsored . We should indicate that we would take a most seriou s view of any official Indian involvement in a Mukti Fau j effort to seize territory in East Pakistan and that suc h an involvement could seriously affect our ability to assis t India . We should also continue to pursue our efforts at th e United Nations to get a UN presence in place on the India n side of the border, either through the consensus currentl y being sought by the President of the Security Council, throug h a Security Council meeting or through our own bilateral efforts . As Pakistan demonstrates progress toward more norma l conditions, attested to by our own people in East Pakistan
and by neutral UN observers, we should become more insisten t in demanding a complete cessation of Indian support to th e guerillas using such influence as our on-going programs in India give us . It would be well to recognise, however, that unles s progress and a positive evolution of the situation in Eas t Pakistan can be demonstrated to the Indians, efforts to ge t them to act with additional restraint or to accept a UN presence will probably be of limited effectivenes s In devising a scenario for India we have endeavore d to avoid actions which would cut directly across Indi a ' s perceptions of its vital national interests and which, i n fact, could be presented to the Indians as consistent wit h the Indian interest in refugee return and a political evo lution in East Pakistan . In this regard, a continuin g confidential dialogue will be essential to share assess ments on such crucial subjects as the food situation in East Pakistan and to keep India abreast of the danger s in the situation, and of the motives for specific action s we may take to alleviate those dangers . Soviet Rol e A possible moderating influence on the Indians is th e USSR . Soviet support for a UN presence would have an impact
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 179/390
in New Delhi . India, now feeling itself diplomaticall y isolated, is increasingly relying on the Soviets, and thei r influence and counsel are likely to be more effective tha n ours . For this reason alone it is important for us at an early stage in our scenario to engage cussion with the Soviets with a view : (a) to obtaining a Soviet assessment of events i n South Asia . (b) to indicate to them our concern about the danger s of famine and war and to ascertain their views about wha t might be done to avert them . (c) to inform them in general terms of our ow n thoughts on what needs to be done . (d) to encourage them to counsel restraint in bot h Islamabad and New Delhi, and (e) to seek their support for UN relief efforts o n both sides of the border . British Role Both Britain and the US have significant interest s in breaking the vicious cycle into which the South Asian crisis has reduced itself, and in working towards fundamenta l solutions through a viable political accommodation and an en d to the Indian-supported insurgency in East Pakistan . Although
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in a high-level dis -
British influence in Pakistan is minimal at present, it i s still important in New Delhi . We should, therefore, in th e near future engage them in high-level consultations preferabl y in Washington, but also possibly in London .
The purpose of these consultations would be : (a) to consider the substance of steps which nee d to be taken with the Indians and Pakistanis in New Delh i and Islamabad . (b) to consider possible alternative ways of makin g our respective presentations and to consider other mean s of getting across to the Indians and Pakistanis the nee d for a basic reorientation of their policies . This might include (I) a joint effort by the US and UK Ambassadors / High Commissioners in New Delhi and Islamabad ; (2) desig nation of a senior British or Commonwealth official t o undertake a special mission (for example, Sir Morric e James, former High Commissioner in both India and Pakista n and negotiator of the Rann of Kutch dispute, or H . Shirle y Amerasinghe, Ceylonese Permanent Representative at the UN) ; (3) support for the five commonwealth nation proposal o f Prime Minister Bandaranaike .
(c) to consider ways in which the Soviets could b e associated with our initiatives either formally or informally . (d) to discuss ways to mobilize UN members and the U N organizations in both refugee and famine relief efforts an d in political action . UN Role Concurrently with the working out of our scenari o bilaterally in India and Pakistan, we will need to kee p in mind the constructive role which the UN may be able t o not only in the relief context but also politically . play in the crisis/ The President of the Security Counci l is already engaged in the search for a consensus on th e UN Secretary General ' s proposal for a UN presence on bot h sides of the Indo-Pakistan border . Pressures for a Securit y Council meeting are growing and Pakistan now seems to favo r a meeting . If a Security Council meeting does take place , we should consider ways in which we might use the UN t o reinforce the efforts we are making bilaterally, and to give th e UN a more effective operating role with respect to relief . We. migh t also seek to support a Security Council or Secretary General sponsored initiative to send a representative or a team t o the area to explore ways of reducing tensions . In any event, we would wish to keep the UN Secretary General in formed of the success of the efforts we are making bilaterall y with the parties . NEA/INC :ACEQuainton/emg 6/29/71

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MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI L
MEMORANDUM FOR : FROM:
DR . KISSINGE R HAROLD H . SAUNDER S SAMUEL M . HOSKINSO N Gandhi Visit--Advisor's Meeting i Cabinet Roo m n
SUBJECT :
The Advisors' Meeting in the Cabinet Room while you were with the President and Mrs . Gandhi covered the full range of issues concernin g the current situation in South Asia . Joe Sisco did most of the talkin g on the US side and T . N . Kaul for the Indians . The general tone wa s friendly but firm on the issues . Much of the time was spent by Kaul explaining at length the standar d Indian positions . Beyond those, the major operational points t o emerge were : --Sisco described Yahya's favorable response to the idea that he open a dialogue with certain Awami League or Bangla Des h representatives, perhaps speaking on behalf of Mujib, an d urged India to react positively-, to such ideas for getting a political process started . He told Kaul it seems to us askin g the impossible to insist that the process start with Mujib . Kaul's "tentative" response was that under any condition s this probably would be a non-starter since the Bengalis ar e bent on independence and only Mujib would have a chance o f settling for less, and even he might not now . Kaul did concede- in response to an idea presented by Ambassador Keating--tha t it might be "worth trying" to have someone talk to Mujib i n jail if Yahya would go along with it . The general thrust of hi s response, however, was skeptical and negative . Mujib, he felt , had been out of touch and it might not be very meaningful t o involve him unless he were out of jail and free to re-establis h himself with his colleagues .
--Sisco also described Yahya's acceptance of the idea of a unilateral Pakistani military withdrawal . Kaul's respons e was tentative but negative, saying that India could not affor d to take security risks until the political problem in Eas t Pakistan was resolved . He added that India had no territoria l designs and was not trying to dictate the terms of a settlemen t between East and West Pakistan but if attacked, India wa s determined that it would be a "decisive war with decisive results . " --Kaul stressed that it was putting the "cart before the horse " to suggest Indo-Pak talks or the exercise of good offices betwee n India and Pakistan . This was a problem between West and Eas t Pakistan and could only be settled by them . Moreover, India has little influence . --Kaul stressed that "all" the refugees, irrespective of thei r religion, "must" return .

136. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:429:51 a.m.
Nixon: I told Keating that I would see himhe was there last night at this little party we had and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think well just have him for a half hour and then have him Kissinger: I saw him leaving. Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be sure we dont get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or another, so forth and so on. Kissinger: Hes almost fanatical on this issue. Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it? Kissinger: Oh he thinksI tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out of Nixon: PushI dont want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with me. Kissinger: Mr. President, actually weve got to keep Yahya, we have to keep Yahya [unclear] public executions for the next month. Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldnt do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. Its going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: No resources. Theyre going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then theyre going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind. Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan.

137. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13-5:40 p.m. Nixon: Like all of our other Indian ambassadors, hes been brainwashed. Completely throw in [unclear]. Anti-Pakistan. Keating: All right, now let me Nixon: Where are your sandals? Keating: Give me Nixon: [unclear] Keating: Give me 5 minutes. Nixon: I hope you havent turned the Embassy over to those hippies like your predecessor. [unclear exchange] Keating: Let me have 5 minutes to Nixon: Go ahead. Keating: just give you a little background. Then you want to ask me some questions about the Foreign Minister. Nixon: Go ahead. No, Ihe should meet with the Foreign Minister, dont you think so? Kissinger: Yeah. Are you going to leave Keating: Yes, Ill be Nixon: I think he ought to come in with him. [unclear] Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: The point is, the point is its best to get you with the Foreign Minister. If he wants to talk to us, talk to the Ambassador. We dont normally have ambassadors in. Id get some iced tea? Would you like iced tea? Keating: No, no. Nixon: Booze?
Keating: No, nothing. Nixon: Coffee? Kissinger: Coffee. Nixon: Maybe coffee. Keating: Now in all seriousness Nixon: India thinks that theyre [unclear], youre a good Ambassador, I know. Keating: They are difficult. Nixon: I listen to it all the time. Keating: The Indians are Nixon: [unclear exchange] Keating: Let me say personally, Im delighted that youre starting off that way because Nixon: Im not [unclear]. Keating: Dont let any of these bastards get you down. And youre not, thats great. ThatI dont mean any. Nixon: Yeah. Keating: The Indians are difficult, and time after time Ive had to talk to them, to have stood up to them on Vietnam and many other things. Since this election, and that tremendous majority she got350 out of 520 membersthe next party to her is 27, which is the left-wing Communists. The next party is the right-wing Communists, 25. Because you expect India to Nixon: Yeah. Keating: But the rightist parties were completely wiped out. And since that time there has been evidence of greater stability and a better relationship with us. Nixon: Thats good. Keating: Let me give you chapter and verse of two things. Remington Rand and Union Carbide have big interests there. Union Carbide very big. Theyve been trying for several years to get a license to extend their activities. All bureaucrat stuff from one ministry to another. Three weeks after the election they were called in and said were going to approve your license. Get going. We need employment. Have as much of your product as possible, export oriented, but get going
and there will be no delay. And the presidents of the Indian companies of those two concerns came in to see me. And weve been trying to help. Just delightful, and they are. I went to call on the new Minister of Industrial Development, Choudhury [Moinul Haq], who succeeded my friend Mr. Dinesh Singh, the son-of-a-bitch, and he is a top notch. Just top notch. And I had a conversation with him that I have never had since Ive been in India. He said, now Mr. Ambassador, we have a list, as you know, of things in the public sector. We have things in the private sector. We have a big list of things that can be either public or private sector. And, by the way, he said with a smile, "I might point out to you that the percentage of our gross national product in the public sector is about half of what yours is in America." I said, "Im aware of that." And he said, "in this 146 items, which are in the private sector, there are some that we cant possibly fix, where we need foreign investment. The impression has gotten abroad that we dont want foreign investment. I want to disabuse your mind of that. We want, and let me say something else to you, if you have a business group from America come in there and they want to, there is something that isnt on that list, you come and see me and well work it out." Now, I have never had a conversation like that with any Indian since Ive been there. Hes top notch. He wants to work with us. Next, Mrs. Gandhi. Our relations have always been pleasant. She has never turned me down when I wanted an appointment. But since then, theyre more cordial since her election. Now part of it is because shes got this weight off her mind. She was trying to run a government with a minority party. And now she can, if she has the will, can do the things that she thinks ought to be done. I escorted her to a concert that Mahalia Jackson gave her; if I had the time Id tell you about it, it was the most fantastic performance and she just loved it. And she couldnt be nicer in her dealings with me. So that I consider that there is a change in the situation. And I sent two cables to the Department. Henry, the numbers are 5311New Delhi 5311and 6031. Nixon: [unclear] Keating: One was sent shortly after the Army went in and started the killing in East Pakistan. Kissinger: Yeah, Ive read it. Keating: You know, it was the result of a lot of talk. It represents my
Kissinger: The basic principle is that [unclear]. Keating: Yes. [unclear exchange] The main thing is to... Im convinced there is a change in the subcontinent. And that India should not be equated with Pakistan. India is a strong, stable power now while Pakistan is having all this difficulty. The other one, the second one, had to do with the aid program and my recommendations as to what should be done about aid. And both of those I stand on as my recommendations, which Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: No, I didnt see that. Nixon: Is it something to act on now? Keating: No, no. They represent in further form my views, and they're the consensus of my staff that is super. I have a wonderful staff, I think, and theyre so loyal, and theyre just great. Nixon: Thats good. Keating: Now, I presume youre interested in knowing what the Foreign Minister is going to say to you. And I can only guess, but I have talked Nixon: What does he want? Does he want to talk aboutI suppose he wants to talk about Pakistan. Keating: Yes, thats it. Because Nixon: What do they want us to do? Keating: Well this Nixon: Break up Pakistan? Keating: No. No. In the beginning they were, just as we were, for a single Pakistan after that election, because this sheik, Mujibur Rahman, was Pro-Indian and Pro-American. He wasthey envisioned a different picture in that they were going to be friends with Pakistan. And then when the army walked in and knocked out the elections of course they were upset. There were two reasons they were upset. That was one. The other was that there are Bengalis on both sides of the border and they have family ties and all that. Now I went to see him to tell him about the aid were to give him. And its greater now. And I think hell express his appreciation for that, he should. I believe he will.
Nixon: What are we up to now? Keating: Seventeen and a half million. Kissinger: Yes. Keating: And Nixon: The first one was two and a half million. Keating: Yes, it was two and a half million when I went in. Kissinger: The C130s. Keating: And the C130s. Thats all a newwere doing quite a little. And he should be, I believe will be grateful. Hes a very nice fellow; I dont know that youve met him. Nixon: No. Keating: Very kind fellow. Now, beyond that, he will say, as he did to me: "This aid is great. We appreciate it very much." But he said the basic problem is to try to get these refugees back into Pakistan. We cannot stand this drain on India, which, if it lasted for a year with the present numbers would cost $400 million Nixon: What is it, 300,000? Kissinger: No, its about Keating: Five million. And add that its in a crowded part of India. Nixon: Sorry, it was 300,000 we were feeding. Keating: Thats right. Thats correct. About five million, and of that about three of them Nixon: Why dont they shoot them? Keating: About three of them are in Calcutta. Calcutta is the size of New York. Itd be like dumping three million people into New York, except that Calcutta is in much worse shape than New York. Not too much, but its worse. And its a horrible problem. Now, he said theyre still coming at that time at 100,000 a daythe latest I heard was 150,000 a daybecause theyre killing the Hindus. And the thing that, in the beginning, these refugees were about in the proportion to the population85 percent Muslim, 15 percent Hindus. Because when they started the killing it was indiscriminate. Now, having gotten control of the large centers, it is almost entirely a matter of genocide killing the Hindus. And the intellectual leaders, the leaders in the
country that they want to get rid of, primarily these Awami League people, theyve killed them. Theyve outlawed the Awami League that got 98 percent of the polls, elected 167 out of the 169 members of Parliament. And they arrested him as a traitor, Mujib, and they have outlawed the Awami League. Now what he is going to plead for, I have heard that even since I have left, they have come to the conclusion that because of this horrible refugee problem, this is since Ive talked to you, they are for a political settlement of any kind in East Pakistan which will get the people back. Now the Hindus, I dont think, will go back. But a lot of the Muslims would go back if there was some kind of a political settlement. And I think he will probably urge a political settlement there. The thing thattwo things: he wants to stop the refugees coming, which means stop the killing. And two, get the refugees flowing the other way back into Pakistan. Nixon: What does he think, Ken, we should do? What would we recommend? Keating: He thinksI think he thinks Nixon: We should pressure Yahya? Keating: Yes. I think he feels thatwhat he said is Russia and the United States are the only ones that can influence Yahya to stop the killing. And he said in my judgment the United States has more leverage with him than Russia has. And the only way is an economic way. Of course, I understand that theres no plan to just go on as business as usual in economics. After this consortium meeting, the Bank and thethis informal meeting that takes place next weekthe [World] Bank and the International Monetary Fund sent this Peter Cargill [Director of the South Asia Division of the World Bank] up there. And he is going to make a report to them on what he has found and what he feels should be done. And the next thing theyre going to consider it back here and take it up at that time. No commitments, I believe, are going to be made at this Paris meeting. But I suspect he will find that the situation in East Pakistan, which Yahya says is normal, or practically normal, is far from normal and wont be normal in a year. And what the political settlement is that he can bring about, that Im not able to get in my head because this Amin was the biggest leader next to Mujib, he got one or two members of Parliament, and they tried to get, Yahya tried to get him to head it up and he wouldnt touch it because hed get his throat slit. Now they had a few, Im told, a few members of the Awami League, about nine, who
are ready to help form a government. But the bitterness is so great that I believe, and indeed Joe Farland does, that the old Pakistan is through. There will bethey cannot catch this together. Joe has said that in his cable, and I feel it very strongly. And theres got to be a new pressure. Now, I am conscious of the special relationship that you have with Yahya. And I respect it and I dont to want to Nixon: [unclear] Keating: Personal relationship. Nixon: Not only just that, but there are some other major considerations. Keating: Well Nixon: Well, let me say this, when do we see Singh? Tomorrow? Kissinger: Thursday, Mr. President. Nixon: Thursday, fine. [Thursday was June 17. The meeting took place on June 16.] Keating: There has been some suggestion that it will be possible for you to, I dont think this has come to you yet, but its something weve talked about in the Department Nixon: Yeah. Keating: It will be so long before aid to Pakistan, in the way of developmental aid, will be possible that a diversion, a certain amount of that, to help India with its refugee problem. It might be possible for you to suggest that to him in this meeting. That paper I dont know whether thats reached you yet or not. But Kissinger: No, no. I know about theConnally told me about it. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Thats a scheme they thought up of taking $25 million out of Nixon: The Pakistan aid Kissinger: The Pakistan aid and give it to India. Nixon: I think we just better find the money to give to India. Keating: I dont think any, I dont think anyI think they had about $80 million for Pakistan. And it will be some time before they
Kissinger: Well they want to taketheres $70 million for Pakistanwell, there are two issues here. One is whether they could use it, whether the Pakistanis could use it if we gave it to them. The second is how Pakistan will react if we take money from their budget for India. [Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia] Nixon: Let me say this, I dont want to give you the wrong impression about India. There are 400 million Indians. Keating: 550. Nixon: 550? [unclear] Keating: There are. Nixon: I dont know why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country but they do. But nevertheless, I know that country is trying to make it [unclear] basically with some semblance of democracyprivate enterprise, call it whatever you want. And I know that looming over from the north are the Chinese [unclear]. Its, therefore, very much in our interest to see that India, we want them to succeed. Because there are 550 million people, we want them to do well. And they always hate us [unclear] internationally, we know that. Keating: Not always. Nixon: Not always. But thats irrelevant. I mean [unclear] but what Im getting at is here, right now, you can be sure that we will play a friendly game with the Indians. Particularly in view of the fact that the Government is more stable, that is good, and you can take a more rational line on things like Kashmir. But the other thing is that, I think we have to realize too, that it would not be in our interest, maybe there is going to be a Pakistan collapse, depends on what happens in the next 6 months. It may never be in our interest. But it certainly is not now for reasons we cant go into. Under those circumstances, what we have to do, Ken, is to find a way to be just as generous as we can to the Indians, but also we do not want to do something that is an open breech with Yahyaan open breech, an embarrassing situation. And thats really the problem. You can reassure Mrs. Gandhi, [unclear] we want to help here in every way we can [unclear]. Keating: Yes.
Nixon: And let me say, the openness as far as the Congress is concerned, there really isnt anything in it. [unclear] Not one goddamn bit. Its not a popular country in this Congress. Keating: No, I know that. I served there. I know that. Nixon: But that is even less popular today because foreign aid is less popular. Keating: Thats right. Nixon: But nevertheless Keating: But in the Congress theres a strong feeling on this PakistanIndia Nixon: I understand that, I understand that. [unclear] Hell, they had us involved in a civil war in Biafra, and now they want us out of Pakistan. But nevertheless, weve got to take up here for reasons that go far beyond India-Pakistan relations another position. So we will be very, very conciliatory with the Foreign Minister. But we must not do it in a way, I hope our Embassy has our position on this [unclear] refugees in both Pakistan and India wherever they are. But, on the other hand, not to allow the refugee problem to get us involved in the internal political problems. You see thats our policy too. He might, if he asks me about it [unclear]. Keating: And we also must avoidif possibleany conflict, armed conflict, between the two. Nixon: Oh, God. Keating: And the Indians, theyre pressing Mrs. Gandhi so hard, and Parliament is now in session, the politicians are Nixon: Yeah. Keating: And up to date I must say shes been a [unclear]. Theyre pressing her very hard that we cant stand this refugee thing. Well just go in and take a little piece out of Pakistan where you can put these refugees. We cant hold them here, so that means war. And he will probably bring that up. [Omitted here is a discussion unrelated to South Asia. Nixon and Kissinger continued their discussion after Keating left.] Nixon: I dont know what the Christ we are up to. Kissinger: The most insulting way we can Nixon: You have to go now?
Kissinger: I have an appointment with Rush but he can wait. Nixon: [unclear] My God, does Farland, is he sending memoranda that he thinks Pakistan is finished also? Kissinger: Baloney. Hes got this maniac in Dacca, the Consul General who is in rebellion; the point is, Mr. President, first of all, Ive talked to the Indian Ambassador as Ive said to you, I said you want to have a direct communication through him with Mrs. Gandhi. That we need 3 or 4 months to work it out. We will find them some money, we will gradually move into a position to be helpful, but weve got to do it our way. Just to shut them up. Nixon: Right. Right. You told him that? Kissinger: I told him all of that. Nixon: We dont tell the Foreign Minister that? Kissinger: No, you can tell the Foreign Minister that above all. But in front of Keating hell blab it all over. Yeah, Id say we have great sympathy, but they must be restrained. And well try to find some money but we cannot take it out of the Pakistan budget. Nixon: Well the Ambassador will tell the Foreign Minister that. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: But Keating will go blab it over to the State Department. What Keating had [unclear] Pakistantheyre out of their goddamn minds. Of course were not going to take it out. That would bring down the Pakistan Government. Kissinger: Well it would be considered such an insult by Yahya that the whole deal would be off. Nixon: I dont know what the Christ hes talking about. Kissinger: I will, when Im talking to the Chinese, set up a separate channel so that were not so vulnerable. I mean we cant be that Nixon: Of course, I dont know, Henry, it just may be that the poor son-of-a-bitch cant survive. Five million? Is it that bad really or are they exaggerating? Kissinger: Of course, I dont know how many of them they generate? Nixon: Yeah.

138. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:583:41 p.m.
Kissinger: Now on the Indian whos waiting; the basic problem is to give him a combination of both sympathy, so that he can go home withto Mrs. Gandhi and Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: and great firmness. Now I have, in addition to what you will say, but with Sisco there you wont have much of a chance to. Ive told Yahya that he had a personal channel through me to you. Im just trying to keep them [the Indians] from attacking for 3 months. Now, if you could say that you are directing, that $60 million be made available for refugee support after July 1. Nixon: Do they know that yet? Kissinger: No. This is why it would be very helpful. Nixon: Does Sisco know? Kissinger: No, but its based on a recommendation from the State Department. Nixon: Thats all right. Kissinger: Out from the Embassy there. Theyll be delighted. Nixon: Fifty thousand? Kissinger: Yeah, and $20 million. You will see whether you can get $20 million from other programs this month. Now, they wanted to take it out of Pakistan. I stopped that. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: But we can take a little from Turkey and a little from Indonesia and pay it back to them after July 1st. But if you could give those two figures, then youll get the credit for it and Nixon: And that we are concerned.
Kissinger: Well, hell have a story. And that we cannotthat you think that overt pressure on Pakistan would have a counter-productive effect, and that you are working with Yahya in your own way. Its a little duplicitous, but these bastards understand that. Nixon: I must say I am not too damned impressed with Keating. I think hes just gone overboard. Now I must say maybe theres a hell of a problem on which the TV is starting to pick it up now. Kissinger: Oh, it is a hell of a problem. [Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: I dont want to see [unclear, them start war?] just now. Kissinger: Because you saw harm on it from Pakistan. Nixon: I know, but I dont want to see it more. You see? I just, theyre wasting my time. I just [unclear]. Kissinger: That really depends what we have to do. We have to keep them from attacking for our own reasons. [Pleasantries were exchanged as Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Ambassadors Jha and Keating, and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco entered the Oval Office. The White House photographer was present at the beginning of the meeting.] Singh: Our Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmth and greetings. She greatly appreciates your letter, the United States [unclear] conveyed in that and she asks me to convey her greetings to you [unclear]. Nixon: Sure. I appreciate that. Tell her that we were all very impressed by her great political victory out there. It gave her the stability that she, that she needs now. Its much, much better to look after a very successful election like that. [unclear] Theres a lot more to this. She has more confidence than previously. Singh: Yes [unclear] Nixon: Things are going well from what Ambassador Keating tells me. Singh: Yes, she has always had confidence, but now she also has strength to Nixon: Thats right.
Singh: put them on [unclear] Nixon: Oh, I know. I know. Singh: And, in fact, she was looking for a period when, as a result of this victory Nixon: Yeah. Singh: shed have both peace and opportunity to implement the socio-economic content of the program on the basis of which she won. Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh: But suddenly shes confronted with a Nixon: Yeah. Singh: type of situation not of her making. Nixon: Oh. Yes. Singh: Not to place blame here. . . Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh: . . . [unclear] being subjected at this present moment. Nixon: Uh-huh. Singh: [unclear] and she wanted to, wanted me to convey, Your Excellency, the latest situation, as the present one has no [unclear] and we are coming and that every second [unclear, refugees they come?] Nixon: Every second? Singh: Every second. So this is the type of situation that we face. And this has caused a tremendous problem to us, because they come in an area that traditionally is very dependent, both politically and economically. Nixon: Would you like some tea or coffee? Singh: Thank you very much. Nixon: [aside] Ken? Singh: Im all right. Nixon: [aside; whispering] Some tea perhaps, please. Thank you. Singh: [unclear]
Nixon: No, I cant. Singh: Politically, economically adept. And if another six million people are ready to come in a state of anger, frustration, and destitute, that adds to the [unclear] ability and the social-economic tension that all of them have created. [unclear] Weve reduced any financial [unclear]. In this situation, that we seek your advice how we should achieve that objective. But perhaps most important thing in that situation [unclear] will use this movement of refugees which always [unclear]. Technically, on this issue, we gave a clear [unclear, signal?]. We [unclear] the objective will be [unclear]. In this situation where we [unclear] many field commanders that we called feel its their own problem. It ceases to be an internal problem and it should affect [unclear] tension [unclear]. And its the best end right now that weve got. Support for this approach of ours and help with [unclear]. How to meet this objective, we believe that if the building of the [unclear] can be seen [unclear] make up their minds. [unclear] can be sure as he can be [unclear] security take [unclear]. Nixon: Hmmm. Singh: And secondly, then, the condition that they are to be restored should enable you to return that. In the statements we are prepared to take, we must perhaps create this. [unclear] And for this, obviously some political settlement is needed. You mentioned in your letter to the Prime Minister you are engaged in this task in your quiet manner and tried to impress on them what you have done. We believe that the return from [unclear] is possibility if the military actions of trying to solve a situation [unclear]. Apparently those people who have now demonstrated [unclear] that they enjoy the confidence of the people [unclear]. In the long range there are really two guys [unclear]. This will be a situation in which [unclear]. Nixon: What do you think is the, what do you think is the benefit of [unclear] being able toEast Pakistan will to have to become independent, or what happens in the long run? This does not mean that your personal view, I knowthats not what I meant. How do you see the historical process working down there?
Singh: I have a feeling, Mr. President, that showing, telling the United Nations that theres a very good chance of saving Pakistan and [unclear]. [unclear] maintain central authority in an area of confrontation of the [unclear] can they handle central authority? Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: [unclear] Theres a very good chance to have. Even the course of the negotiations, with all that we know, would even the Awami [unclear] more than contained in their six-point program in the direction. [unclear] without direction of this nature, and we have authority to create [unclear], so it could be saved. The Council has become most angered because they [unclear]. The confidence has been very rudely shaken. When the military rulers in Pakistan can still bring back the country themselves, those for the present moment who find themselves in the [unclear]. Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: [unclear] Then it appears that theyre pushing them more and more into the point of, the position of the point of no return. And it appears [unclear]. They must. We have an opposition quite clearly; its developed between the central authority of Pakistan and the leaders. So that [unclear] anything that we want to. They do not realize that from our point of view is when they separate from [unclear]. But we are bothered by the continuance of conditions of instability. Continuation of the conditions there you will find [unclear]; continuation of conditions where the military rule is pitted against almost united will of [unclear] people. [unclear] Well do that to maintain control of the situation. And that is something [unclear] from our [unclear]. [unclear] from our point of view; certainly from our point of view and maybe even from your point of view. Because it is a holy land, trying to resort to that. That your country and ours, we can work together, work in a [unclear] manner. To that extent [unclear] stability, so much in common. We should not. Nixon: You dont, you dont have a feeling that the situation would be to your interest to have a, to have an independent country? What would be in Indias best interest? To have it independent or under the central government, for example Singh: No, we havewe have no fixed position on that. Nixon: Thats up to them, isnt it?
Singh: On this matter we leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of the Awami League to decide about their future in any manner they like. We will not press one or the other solution, or [unclear] to it. We are interested in observing the neutrality in [unclear] considering the situation. Nixon: Um-hmm. Singh: That being our fixed position. Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Singh: [unclear] silent spectators all [unclear] agreeing with what, to our arrangement to [unclear] the people and until then, it seems to me, there will be unstable conditions, at least. Nixon: Yes. Singh: And we are conscious of our responsibility and even when we were facing this big trouble in the end with these people when we [unclear] did our best. [unclear] All provisions are to be clear which were settled by [unclear] extra-constitutional means. [unclear] Nixon: Sure. First let me say that we, that you couldnt have a man more [unclear] in so far as bringing this matter to our attention, than your own Ambassador here. Hes talked to our people and hes a very persuasive man and has let us know what the position is. And, of course, he haswe have great respect for him. And on our part we couldnt have a person who is more vigorous in presenting this point of view which you have described. Of course, you would describe it in a more precise way than, which you naturally can in your position. Its obvious that Ambassador Keating, of course you know an old friend of mine in the House and Senate. He lives here. We had a long talk yesterday. We went over all these matters. Singh: [unclear] Nixon: He is, he is justhe is concerned as your Ambassador, and of course were aware of this. So I am keenly aware of the problem. Im aware, too, of the enormous agony that must be causedI have not been, Rogers has been only once. [unclear] I have not been to Dacca, but I know that part of the subcontinent, that the problems of poverty are serious, very serious. And added to it is this instability. However simple their homes may be, they are their homes. And pouring into an already overcrowded city. This must be a terrible agony for a country to go
through. Were aware of this thing. Also imposed upon your country, big as it is, 600 million people. Nevertheless, five million people is a lot of people, because. . . Singh: We count six, Mr. President. Nixon: Six million. Yeah, thats right. [unclear exchange] Nixon: One every second, thats 60 every minute. Singh: [unclear]? Nixon: [unclear] Thats over 600 an hour. Singh: [unclear] Nixon: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Now the, theI am sure you realize, too, that what we can do, you know, what we feel is one thing; what we can do is another. We have the deepest sympathy and we will try to do as much as we can. We dont want to do anything that would be, that has the opposite results from what we want, you know. Naturally, ourwith regard to the Government of Pakistan, we of course have our contacts with them, our relations with them, with the President, of course. Its terrible. The question is how we can discuss this matter with them in a way that will maybe, may bring about action that would lead to amelioration of the situation. Or how we, orand avoiding [unclear, the woodshed?] might set up, as often is the case when such things are done too publicly, which would set up an antagonistic attitude. Im not speaking personally from the standpoint of those who would look for something to be antagonistic about. That might just upset it all. We, I would like to say this: that we, I think that under best course of actionId like to talk first of all what would we need your advice with regard to what we can do with the meeting situationthe best course of action we think as a Government is for us to, is for you to have confidence, and I want you to convey this to the Prime Minister, on a completely off-therecord basis. Discussions that are publicly talked about would have exactly the opposite effect on that. Youve got to, you must have confidence that one, I am acutely aware of the problem. I am deeply concerned about the problem for humanitarian [unclear, reasons?] and I am concerned about it for its foreign policy implications, for all this could erupt into some armed conflict. We know that. Nowtherefore, we, I will use all the persuasive methods that I can, but I must use
them in the way that I think is the most effective, in a way perhaps that, say, she might never use, in a way that any nation would want used when we talk with their leader and so forth. But I am aware of the problem, I shall try to use my influence as effectively as possible at least if effectively means not using it in a public, blunt way. And I [unclear] such and such is, had been. Not only has our concern been expressed but that you will have this in mind in future discussions that we have that we have to do it this way. And that has to be answered. The second thing is, of course, looking at the immediate problem that you need more funds; the Ambassador has discussed with us the various options that we have. We have an immediate problem between now and July 1st, and its just for here [unclear, til then?] And, but on the other hand, but because, you know, weve run out of money because its all been spent with only 15 days left. On the other hand we have out of other aid programs that wont need any [unclear] because that would cause problems for where they came from. But we have been able to acquire $20 million that we will, we will find immediately available. And then in addition to that, on the July, on July 1st, we will be able to apply $50 million, so which will give you a total of $70 million to relieve them, the aid problem. Wed give you more, but thats, thats as much as we can find. You see, we have to take from various other commitments that have been made. So you get $20 million between now and the first of July, $50 million more on the first of July or just as soon as the fiscal year begins. Keating: Yes. Nixon: And that your Government can count on. Is that correct, roughly speaking, or is the 20? Kissinger: The difference is that we had to piece together the $20 million, Mr. President, out of other programs. Nixon: Right. The point is well find the $20 million. You can count on it. The $50 million Kissinger: Thats right. Sisco: Weve got that. Kissinger: Including the lowest parts of your supplemental appropriations Nixon: Right. And weve got to look down towards that, but on the other hand, Im aware of the fact that this will take care of how many? Six million people. For how long? Not long. Itll help.
On the other hand, I realize that that does not get at the long-range problem. The long-range problem is how do we stop this inflow of people? Howmaybe youd start having them turn around, start outflowing them. Thats what were getting at. I think you, you first, you brought it to my attention when you met me. The Prime Minister and you heard this conversation with our Ambassador, Ambassador Keating. All brought it to my attention and Im convinced of the seriousness of the problem. I will, I will try to find the methods that I think will be effective. I think it will protect [unclear] cant do that. [unclear] effective. There may be other ways for this to be effective. But I think we have to, I think it must not be in a way that appears that were, that what has happened here is that the United States is inserting itself into basically an internal situation in an open way. That is we have towe can be most effective by persuading the parties involved to come to a decision of theirs rather than one thats imposed upon them. Thats at least my [unclear, instinct?] telling the individual players and so forth. Thats the way I see it at this time. And we willthe results will tell us whether were right or not. And also after trying that method for a while well have to see the situation, but in the meantime, I think, and to the extent that we can, to keep as cool as possible, in terms of charges and counter-charges and all that sort of thing. WellYou can count on our financial assistance to the extent that we are able. And thiswe will find this money. [unclear] Second, you will have the, on other side which is far more [unclear, important?] the governmental side. Let us, if you will, let us do that in our way, in the way we think will be more effective. Thats the way I would like to do it. Youre, do you approve or do you think theres a better way to do it? Singh: We greatly appreciate your sentiment and [unclear] in coming to a concrete conclusion in a short time. [unclear] This is an international responsibility. [unclear] We appreciate it, yes. [unclear]. You yourself mentioned it. [unclear] The question, one, how to stop it, and how to create conditions [unclear]. Nixon: This is the fundamental question now. Singh: This is the fundamental question. [unclear] Nixon: I know. I am aware of that. I am aware of the, I am aware of the fact that the funds, while essential, [deal] with a temporary problem do not handleI am not suggesting at all, or
have any illusions, that if we found $700 million to put into this thing that would simply buy the problem away. The problem is going to go away only as the deeper causes are resolved. And I am aware of that. How we get at those deeper causes is a very sensitive problem as you well know, and the Foreign Minister has to be highly sensitive to how people feel and approach us and so forth. And how other governments may feel about this, how they react. One way the public pressure, another way the private, shall we say persuasion. I have always believed in the latter myself as the most effective way, particularly when I know the individuals fairly well. Singh: That we are agreed. Perhaps the whole problem can be divided into two parts. There are some aspects, which could [unclear]. France has agreed to make a statement to that effect. [unclear] in Moscow. And also the necessity of their returning. I agree that thats a question to how [unclear]. We know what is actually happening. [unclear] Nixon: We will then proceed on that basis . I dont think anything, however, certainly at this point, would be served by any indication of the United States putting public pressure on Pakistan. That I know would be wrong if we want to accomplish our goal. On the other hand, something might be, something might very well be accomplished in other directions. I am aware of that. I would like to try it this way. We will, you can be sure that were as totally concerned about it as we can be, not being there. Incidentally, how much did the Germans provide? How much are they providing? Singh: The German money, I honestly Nixon: How about the French? Sisco: I looked at a figure today, Mr. President, I think the Germans are somewhere around two million, and the French are something a little less than that. Nixon: Thats not enough. Sisco: Thats not enough. Nixon: All right, thats not enough. The French and Germans have just as great an interest as we have. Here they are making all sorts of big statements and doing very little. Now, you head over to the French and Germans and their colleagues formally, that clear? The same with the low countries that talk big and dont help much. I have no sympathy for them. [unclear] made a
statement when he was here. The Germans can affordif we can afford $70 million, the Germans can afford 10, easyor 15. Kissinger: Weve already given 17.5. Nixon: Thats right. Well, weve put in 100 so the Germans should put in 25. Thats the way it ought to be. Because you know, we dont believe in this office of talking big and doing little.

146. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the British Foreign Secretary (Douglas-Home), and the British Ambassador (Cromer), Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m. Douglas-Home: This India thing we have here is really very serious, indeed. The guerrilla warfare we have now is really operating in a very wide area of the countryside in East Pakistan, and it is [unclear] refugees out of East Pakistan, which is still not prepared for 4,000 a week, or even more than that. Theyll take [unclear] to run through there. In the last 3 weeks or so, 11 trips taking food and supplies to East Pakistan have helped a lot so far. And one of our shipping lines is now refusing to take any more stuff to East Pakistan and Chittagong. And, third, this is all going through that particular situation where I dont know [unclear] however much the United Nations wants to rebuild communications to help all that. Its not going to be possible with this guerrilla stuff going on. Nixon: Hmmm. Douglas-Home: Weve done what we can, and then what youll do what you can to get Yahya Khan to move that quickly, on a visible front . And I just dont know if he can make contact with the Bangladesh people in Bengal. And if he could, I think he will get more substantial people to cooperate than he is able to get now because the Indians have them, and the people hes talking to in the civil administration now are people of no consequence. And they will all still be. Now this entire notionbut I suspect Kissinger: [unclear] Douglas-Home: Yes. Kissinger: Speaking here in this room with the [unclear] for you [unclear]. We have been in touch with Bangladesh people in Calcutta. And we were trying to set up a meeting between the Bangladesh people and the West Pakistanis outside of India. And we had Yahyas agreement to that. And the Indians have now totally thwarted it. They made it impossible for these people to
deal with us; theyre forcing them to check everything with them, they are padding demands, which are totally incapable of fulfillment. Douglas-Home: [unclear] Nixon: Yeah. [overlapping conversation] Nixon: Weve really got a crisis. [unclear] Theyre sosmug is the word, and Kissinger: Its really hard to believe. Even I could get relief in there. Douglas-Home: Thats very bad news. Kissinger: Theyve cut, theyve cut the supply lines into the food deficit areas you pointed out. We have offered them guarantees that the convoys or ships that go in there will not carry troops out, which is really a tremendous invasion of sovereignty, just to make sure there will be no additional refugees produced by another [unclear]. They refuse to cooperate with that. Douglas-Home: [unclear] Nixon: The Indians did insist theres this, and, you know, theyre hypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now theres no question that Yahya has handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expect in [with?] all the military backing. Hes a very decent man, but its just been handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as its inevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indians are playingI'm afraid from all reports, theyre playing a game here that I think is wrong. I think theyre deliberately trying to make it insoluble. And if it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India, which cant even digest what they already have, probablyhow the hell are they going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, and there is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decide to have a fight. Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir? Nixon: Certainly. Kissinger: Weve had an intelligence report todayI dont know that [unclear]Well, that theyre thinking of going into Kashmir because this situation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable.
Nixon: What can we do? What can be done? [unclear exchange] Kissinger: Well, we havent totally failed with the Indians because the Bangladesh people, as you correctly point out, are actually quite eager to talk. Douglas-Home: Yeah. Nixon: They are? Kissinger: Yeah, but theyAt first, they were willing to settle for autonomy, and as we all know autonomy would produce independence, there is no other way it can go. Kissinger: Now the Indians have escalated their demand into total independence immediately. Well, that Yahya will never agree to. There has to be a face-saving formula and a transition period. Douglas-Home: Thats right, and I think it will. I think two [unclear] with regard to everything. Youve got to have it. Kissinger: We told the Indians that if they could separate the political process and if they could give a little more time to that and to the relief process we think everyone could achieve this objective. Douglas-Home: Mrs. Gandhi is coming to see us quite soon, and if you could Nixon: Shes seeing you? Douglas-Home: She did stop by in London. Shes coming back. Nixon: [unclear] and after that comes here, doesnt she? Kissinger: Shes coming in November [unclear] Douglas-Home: Well, if you could tell us, if you could, you know, keep us informed before she comes, we can all [unclear] Nixon: So that she doesnt come in here and, frankly, pull our legs. I mean, lets be sure were in contact on this thing. Can you tell us too? Douglas-Home: And well tell you [unclear] Nixon: Now I raised this subject with Gromyko. And I was very tough with him. I said, Now if theres a warI said We just cant have a war. You cant encourage the Indians because then
Pakistan might He said, Oh, we dont want a war, and its what were, we have And he said they had told her that in Moscow. Right? Kissinger: Yeah, but Nixon: I dont know whether he was telling the truth or not. Kissinger: But what the Indians are doing now is the, are equipping these guerrillas with really very advanced weapons and wanting them to [unclearadvance to this area?] Douglas-Home: The only thing apparent in my mind as a part of this thing, is he is ranting about this thing. He cant see any sense Nixon: You remember when he came in to see us. I told you that I didnt like the way he handled himself. Douglas-Home: [unclear] what can we do? Kissinger: Well, I think that if we could shock the Indians we wouldbecause our judgment is that Chinese almost certainly come in at the Indians Nixon: Thats the other thing. Kissinger: And whether the Soviets then will forgo the opportunity to settle scores with the Chinese is ultimatelyI think if the Indians could be shocked into being reasonable, if thats possible the problem is soluble. But if theyre really concerned about East Bengal that problem is soluble. If theyre concerned with using East Bengal to disintegrate all of Pakistan, to say it never should have existed then that, I think, is in the back of this complicated Indian mind. Douglas-Home: What I wanted to say, to maintain [unclear] above all things, is that they ought to be encouraging Yahya Khan in his political moves. [unclear] Kissinger: Thats right. Douglas-Home: Political realism. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: And my judgment, I had a long talk with Yahya when I was on the way to China. And hes really [unclear]. Hes not very bright, but he has tried. Nixon: Hes a decent man, an honorable man. Kissinger: He needs some face-saving formula to go to autonomy.
Douglas-Home: Thats right. Kissinger: Given the difference in culture and in public leaning, autonomy must be the answer. Theres no other way it can go. Douglas-Home: No. Nixon: Now letsthis could be one, this could be a parable. This could be [unclear]. Wouldnt that be something to have a [unclear] in that visible place? All that I can say is that I think the British got out too soon. Really, you know? Douglas-Home: Uh-huh. Nixon: Ive been down that area, you know, theI was there, I forget the lastbut, and I know its inevitable. But when you think of India and Pakistan they just arent ready. They just arent ready, thats all. [Omitted here is concluding conversation unrelated to South Asia.]

150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Presidents Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:15-9:00 a.m. Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch. Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. Itsto them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan. Nixon: I think Ill make the meeting today a rather briefcool. [unclear] I dont mean by that cool in terms of not trying to bring up [unclear] Ill talk to her a little about Vietnam, and Kissinger: Id let her talk a little more, maybe today Nixon: Yeah? Kissinger: to be a little less forthcoming. But basically, Mr. President Nixon: So I was trying to give her no excuses. Now Ive talked to her, told her everything were going to do. Now its up to her. Kissinger: While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. You very subtlyI mean, she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didnt give her a warm reception and therefore, in despair, shes got to go to war. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: So her objectiveshe has a right to be a little sore because you thwarted her objective. She would rather have had you give her a cool reception Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: so that she could say that she was really put upon. Nixon: Oh, we really Kissinger: And Nixon: We really slobbered over the old witch.
Kissinger: How you slobbered over her in things that did not matter, but in the things that did matter Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: you didnt give her an inch. So that shes Nixon: She knows. Kissinger: She knows she isnt coming out of here with anyshe cant go home and say, The president promised to do the following for me, and then when you dont do it Nixon: Did you get across with that clown yesterday afternoon at 5:00? You went on the, that as far as the, as she was concerned that she would consider letting him Kissinger: Yep. Nixon: consult with regard to the designation. We want to be sure he understood that was the situation. Kissinger: Right, and I fixed it in the memorandum of conversation which Im giving him in such a way that itjust a little. Ive made it a little more explicit. Nixon: Now youve covered Rogers for long enough Kissinger: Oh yeah, Rogers is in good shape. Nixon: Hes prepared to be told this? Kissinger: Oh yes. Theyve apparently treated him personally in a way that he doesnt like, so hes very Nixon: Ha! Kissinger: No, no. Hell be very tough with them. Nixon: Yeah, hes likely to be sharper with them than I was, you know. He can do that [unclear]. Kissinger: Well, he will be personally sharper but he doesnt like her. In substance he wont be as tough as you Nixon: Hes likely [unclear]. Kissinger: because he doesnt know the subject so well. I mean the skill Nixon: You should have heard, Bob, the way we worked her around. I dropped stilettos all over her. Its like, you know
Kissinger: She didnt know [unclear exchange] about the guerrillas in East Pakistan. [unclear]. One thing that really struck me, the blown up [unclear] and that takes a lot of technical training. I wonder where they got that. Nixon: She [unclear] so fast. Kissinger: She said the East Bengal rifles [unclearused to?]. Thats where it came from. Nixon: Thats right. We also stuck it to her on that bookHenrys book about India-Pakistan. Kissinger: She said she studied a lot about the problemshow these conflicts started. Read a book by Maxwell, called India-China War, which is a book that in effect proves that India started the 62 War. It was done with an enormous politeness and courtesy and warmth. Nixon: Well I acted as if I didnt know what the hell had happened Haldeman: Yeah. Nixon: so she couldnt say anything. But she knew goddamn well that I knew what happened, dont you think? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. You stuck it to her about the press. Nixon: On that I hit it hard. Kissinger: And I told Nixon: I raised my voice a little. Kissinger: And I told her assistantI told my opposite number that the thing that is really striking to us is that last year Mrs. Gandhi, during her election campaign, made official protests that we were intervening when we werent. And she never produced any proof. And yet every opposition candidate gets a royal reception, tremendous publicity, personal meetings. And then after you do all of this you come over here and ask us to solve all your problems. Nixon: You told him that? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: Good for you. Kissinger: I said look at the record the last 3 months. Youve had a press campaign against us. You put out the word that our relations are the worst ever. You get Kennedy over. You get that
Congressman Gallagher over. You make a treaty with the Russians. And then you come here and say we have to solve your problems for you. Nixon: Well if it was any Kissinger: But, Mr. President, even though she was a bitch, we shouldnt overlook the fact that we got what we wanted, which was we kept her from going out of here saying that the United States kicked her in the teeth. Weve got the film clip of this; youve got the toast. Youve got the general warmth that you generated in the personal meeting. Nixon: I do think at dinner tonight [unclear]. Kissinger: You didnt give her a goddamn thing. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: If you would have put on a Johnson performance, it would have been emotionally more satisfying but it would have hurt us. BecauseI mean if you had been rough with her Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: then shed be crying, going back crying to India. So I think even though she is a bitch, Id be a shade cooler today, but Nixon: No, no. I mean, cool in terms of, like yesterday, as you noted, I tried to carry the conversation. Kissinger: No, Id let her carry it. Nixon: And was sort of saying, "look, were being as good as we can in dealing with Pakistan. What else can we do?" Today, Im just going to say [unclear]. Kissinger: Thats what I would do. Except for Vietnam, Id give her 5 minutes of the Tito talk because it will go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese. Nixon: Will it? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia. They leak everything right back to them.

135. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38-10:44 a.m. Kissinger: Indira Gandhi has written you a letter. Nixon: I know about Kissinger: Well, no. We should answer it. Let me say one other thing. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Well you can tell heryou can use it to bring pressure on her not to take military action. Also, I talked to the Pakistan Ambassador. He said that Yahya might appreciate a letter, which would give him an excuse to answer all the things by saying, listing all the things hes doing because he cant get any publicity here. Nixon: No. Kissinger: And conversely, Indira Gandhi, I checked with the Indian Ambassador, theyre getting so devious now Nixon: She wants Kissinger: She would like to be able to say that one result of her letter was Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: that youve written to Yahya. So everybodys happy. The Pakistanis Nixon: But we dont say anything against Yahya? Kissinger: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be able to go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you thats exactly what he wants. Ive got it all arranged with the Nixon: Good. Go ahead. Kissinger: Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indians to pipe down Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: And well keep Yahya happy. Nixon: The Indians needwhat they need really is a
Kissinger: Theyre such bastards. Nixon: A mass famine. But they aren't going to get that. We're going to feed thema new kind of wheat. But if they're not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war [unclear]. Kissinger: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there. Nixon: The Indians? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Sure.
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Te1Con :10 :42-Nov . 26, 197 1 Mr . Kissinge r The President K: P:
Mr . President . Henry anything going on today ?
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia .]
P:
I noticed with interest the Pakistanis claim they are doing pretty wel l and I would like the Indians to be embarrassed . The Indians have pulled off on this one but they are going to hav e to come back Keating finally delivered the message an d they are all over him . What we should do with the arms is wai t until they make another military move . Pakistan provocation . . . I saw that they admitted it they were i n there . . . Oh yes, they admitted it . The New York Times wrote a scorche r Against India . , Did you talk to the Times and tell them that was the case? Yes I talked to (?) I said if anyone is to blame for the wa r it is by following your advice . Cutting off aid to Pakistan .
K:
P: K:
P: K:

P: Well and the thing is novel - it is the point I have been makin g and I hope you pushed it on Pakistan that we cut off their ai d because of their internal conduct not for their external conduct . So we cut off aid and India busts into Pakistan and that is worse . Was it a strong editorial ? Oh yes, Mrs . Gandhi has betrayed her father .
K:
P : Of course her father was just as bad as she is . What she sai d wa s so unconscionable and the Pakistanis were so prefabricated .Oh the Pakistan thing you feel no action on the arms thing should be taken . K: P: I think as soon as military action starts again we should cut off aid . I still want Connally, State and Hannah to say nothing is being move d into the economic aid pipeline into India . Are they riding her d on this! They will get the message . Oh no question . We are just not saying anything . We are not signin g the PL 480 and we wont say what the reason is for . The Chinese I told them you can't just say you are against the Indians and yo u better tell the Pakistanis what you are going to do .. Do it independentl y and show them the resolution you are putting forth . . . We are going pretty far in condemning India ... You talked with Heath .
K:
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia .]
R : On Pakistan Ambassador . Has no instructions but thought a good idea . Communications slow from here to his government so working out an arrangement for him to send through our channels . He feels sure they wil not oppose. They feel same thing in UN . K: I think we should wait until we hear from them. We can wait until tomorro w morning. R : There's a lot of criticism on why we don't do something . Ambassador had a press conference today and a lot of press critizing us for not taking action . Otherwise if we don't do it someone else will . K: As soon as we hear from the .[?] If we can get an answer tonight, sure . R : Sooner we have the monkey off our back so the President can say he ha s acted. K : The President does want to act . Wants to take a line to condemn the Indians . R: It's not a matter of condemning or blaming . It's trying to stop it. If we blame India a general war will break out. K: In the subcontinent . R : We are short-sighted if we think our general approach is castigating India. It's to bring a ceasefire. K: And withdrawal. R : If we say let's condemn India, what does that do? We are trying to brin g about ceasefire. K: That's what we want to do but to make clear who started action . in order to get that we hav e
R: That's in the Security Council . If we don't take lead for in the security counci l in for action then first we have lost the opportunity because someone else wil l and no advantage for railing against India now if we have Security Council K : I mean before the Security Council . R : Right. K : I think we should get the Security Council in a way that's not offensive t o Pakistan if it can be done . So what if the Belgians go to the Security Council? 233/390
Rogerss/ Kis singe r 3:45 p .m. 12/3/7 1
R : The President said don't let them blame me and people will . Church sayin g we are not doing a thing . K : We should hit back . R : How can we ? K: We have done a lot . Neglect India on refugee thing . He will hit at us n o matter what we do . R : If war breaks out and we do not move quickly to bring it to th e Security Council in conjunction with others, the President will be blamed fo r inaction . K : As soon as we know they don't object . R : This fellow doesn't and getting in touch with ambassador in NY who has bee n in touch with his government. I don't think we should wait until tomorrow . K : Let's talk again in a couple of hours .
K:
John, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assembl e a group of the NSC tomorrow at 1 :30 about the India-Pakistan situation so if you don't mind, why don't we have our lunch at the White House . That's fine ; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to . You'll be bus y as hell ; why don't we just cancel it ? Well, because you will be over there anyway . No, I'll have 45 minute s or so . All right or we can do it anytime . I'll be at the White House anyway so hell that makes more sense ; I'm going to be there till 12 :15 or so. So when I leave the President's office, I'll just come right to you r office . Good, but in case I don't -- in case something happens that does mak e -- cause either of us to cancel it .
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C:
K:
C:
K:
T E LC ON Mr . Kissinger/Secretary Connall y December 5, 1971 (? ? ) C: K: C: K: Just don't worry about it . Well, let me tell you what the issues are . All right.
And where the President tends to be leaning but that's not in an y way to prejudice your judgment . The basic problem is now that th e Indians have launched a full-scale attack into East Pakistan, how w e should tilt . Now the argument that State is making is doesn't mak e any difference anyway, it's too late . Secondly, we will just drive the Indians into the Soviet arms if we get tough . them I'd like to . Go ahead. (laughter) Well, you're talking my language . The thing that concerns the President and me is this ; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours . Secondly, we have a situatio n where one of the motives that the Chinese may have had in leanin g towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might happe n to them . Yep . So that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for som e principles is important for that policy . Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsa l for a Middle Eastern war . Yep.
C: K:
C: K:
C:
K : So our -- what the President's tentative view is is to start throttlin g the economic aid program to India . We don't get a hell of a lot ; what do we get from them? We've put $10 billion into it . C: K: C: K: We don't get a goddamn thing . And when people say that we're driving them into Soviet arms, wha t does that mean operationally ? That's right . What more can they do than what they are doing ?
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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 TELCON Mr . Kissinger/Secretary Connall y December 5, 1971 (? ? ) K: C: K: C: K: C: And I think we have to show that it's too risky to kick us in the teeth . You know I'll agree with that position . Well, you've been so soft in the last few weeks - (laughter ) -- that I've just wanted to check around . of cours e Well, /you know it's a very practical matter . It seems to me that India as an ally is an enormous liability under any circumstances political and economic and military liability . Yeah, yeah . By what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the bette r off we are, regardless of where they go .
K: C:
K : That's right . Well, then where the hell are they going go . They have their reasons to be independent . There is as good a chanc e that they will try to win their way back into our favor as there is - C: I agree with that .
K : Because if we -- now, no matter what we do, we can't do as much fo r them as the Soviets have already done on the thing that interests the m which is to rape Pakistan . C: K: Yep, yep . So that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up tha t way but that's at any rate where the President is leaning at thi s moment . And he wanted me just to explain why we have done th e things we have . All right . And, of course, you will hear the rest of it there . Good .
C: K: C: K:
But let 's try to get together for lunch . I'd like to hear what happene d Europe . Military History - Assembledin by Center for Indian
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TELCO N Mr . Kissinger/Secretary Connally December 5, 1971 (? ? )
C: K: C: K:
All right, fine . Good, John . Thank you, Henry. Bye .
TELCON Vorontsov/Kissinge r 4:55 p .m. - 12/5/7 1
V: K:
Hello . I am sorry to call you on a Sunday, but I was just talking to th e President to report our conversation and I mentioned that at th e end of our conversation you said that in a week or so it will b e over and he said that he would like you to report to Moscow tha t in a week or so it may be ended but it won' t be over as far as w e are concerned if it continues to take the present trend . Yes . He wants it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relation ship if it continues to go on this way . I understand . We cannot accept that any country would take unilateral action s like that .
V: H: V: H:
Amembassy NEW DELH I WHITE HOUSE
WHITE HO USE PASS TO SECRETARY ROGERS ON AIR FORCE ONE SUBJ : Indian Policy in South Asia Crisi s REF : 1. State Indian Ambassador Jha called at his request t o
respond to the Under Secretary's demarche on India n war aims (reftel) . Jha accompanied by Rasgotra and . Verma, Quainton and Schneider present from NE A -
2. Jha began by saying he had discussed this subject in New York with Fon Min Swaran Singh, India, he said , had no war aims ; it did not want war and did not star t it . India clearly did not and does not covet any par t of Pakista n ' s territory, In Bangla Desh, GO I s first
first action had been to hand over civil administration to B D officials in order to avoid having to take law into own hands . Jha said he could say categorically that GOI was anxious to se e BD remain completely independent of India , 3. In West, India ' s position was the same, i .e ., it does no t
covet any Pakistan territory . GOI, however, felt concern abou t giving USG assurances on this kind of issue without knowin g whether USG had received comparable assurances from Pakistan . India did not wish to create situation in which Pakistan coul d wage war with nothing to lose . GOI anxious not to make bilatera l commitment to US if it might have adverse impact on Pak policy . What he had said was not for conveying as an assurance to Paks . Jha said he could not predict what would be GOI policy if ther e were prolonged war . From beginning and as of now GOI did no t want to take any part of Pakistan , 4. Jha noted that Under Secretary had earlier raised questio n
about Azad Kashmir . He noted Kashmir had been subject o f discussion on more than one occasion . Kashmir belongs to Indi a and any part which Pakistan holds is illegally held . GO I through force . position has been not to seek change of situation / All
evidence we have of Pakistan strategy is that GOP wishes to gra b more territory, Therefore GOl would like to know whether US G has assurance from Pakistan that it will not try to get furthe r territory in Kashmir . He said it would be unfair if the GO P keeps its options open and GOI does not , 5. Under Secretary replied that Pakistan on various occasion s has accepted a cease-fire and withdrawal to status quo ante . He said he wished to make clear USG would find unacceptable an y attempt by GOI to alter or rectify its borders between Indi a and Pakistan in Azad Kashmir . 6. Jha asked whether USG would take same view if Pakistan sough t
to alter borders? Under Secretary said he had been speaking t o existing situation and did not wish to speak on basis o f hypothetical proposition . Generally speaking, we have urged a return to status quo ante and would like to see both side s withdraw . Jha asked whether we mould regard it as mor e legitimate and defensible for Pakistan to hold on to a portio n of Kashmir than India . Under Secretary reiterated we 'wanted bot h countries to return to their own borders . We do not want eithe r country to hold any portion of other . Jha said he hoped Under
Secretary understood that his question was no more hypothetica l than one which had been put to India . He hoped USG di d not have categoric view on how it would react if India hel d portion of Pak territory but not if Pakistan held portion o f Indian territory . Under those circumstances it would b e difficult for India to be categoric in its assurances, Unde r Secretary asked about question of India's future control ove r East Pakistan . Jha said this was a new question to which h e could not give a firm answer . Later in the conversation , however, Jha said that one way of insuring that BD not b e controlled by India was for it to come into the United Nation s as a member in its own right . India does not want BD to becom e an Indian protectorate and is anxious not to have control over it . 7 . Under Secretary noted that evacuation of Dacca had bee n completed successfully . Approximately 20 Americans remain an d presumably will stay right through . USG will provide names o f those remaining to UN, GOI and GOP . We look to GOI and B D authorities to do all in their power to protect safety o f those Americans as well as other third country nationals .
8. Under Secretary also noted that ICRC has written agreemen t with the GOP for protection of foreigners in Dacca in neutra l zones . There is no similar agreement with GOI, and he urge d GOI to consider signing an agreement for protection o f foreigners . Jha said he would forward suggestio n
but commented that it would be preferable to take this matte r up in New Delhi as they more familiar with matter . GOl wa s anxious to insure complete safety of lives of foreign nationals , and it would be very cooperative and responsible in thrashin g out any problems there might be . 9. Finally, Under Secretary said he wished to raise a matte r
about which we had no independent verification . Pakistan Embassy had telephoned us with message from Islamabad indicatin g that one Pakistani officer who had been taken prisoner b y Indians had been sent back to Comilla fortress by besiegin g Indian forces . He took back message to effect that if all di d not surrender they would be handed over for butchery by Mukt i Bahini, Pak Embassy brought this to our attention as violatio n of Geneva Convention . Jha said he could assure us report wa s "complete and total fabrication . " Chief of Indian Army Staff
had made public appeal assuring Pak Army of humane treatmen t under Geneva Convention . Yesterday in New York, Foreign Ministe r End IRWIN had spoken with leader of BD delegation suggesting that BD G should announce its adherence to principles of Geneva Convention . Under Secretary said he recognized and accepted India' s declared position but urged that all possible effort s be made to insure that there were no exceptions even in hea t of battle .

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156. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 24, 1971, 12:271:12 p.m. Rogers: I dont believe theres any difference of views on anything. I would just like to express some of my own thoughts on that. First, it seems to me we should engage in the maximum diplomatic efforts to do everything we can to caution restraint on both sides at the highest level always so that everyone can look at the record and see that we have done everything we can diplomatically. Secondly, I think that our relations with Yahya are good and should continue to be good and we should continue to keep very close to him. Three, I dont think we should try to mastermind a political solution. I never thought so. I dont think its possible, and I think he is coming to the conclusion that something has to be done politically. Nixon: Yahya do it on his own? Rogers: He is going to have to do it on his own. Nixon: Do you agree with that? Kissinger: Completely. Rogers: Now, he is Nixon: As a matter of fact, when the foreign minister was in here, he seemed to me, I didnt get too specific, but he seemed to be awfully reasonable on that subject. Rogers: Well let me say that I think hes going to be forced to do something, either that or hes going to get out. There is a possibility he would turn over to Bhutto, which would not be a good development. Nixon: Bhutto! Kissinger: But hes planning that anyway. [unclear] Nixon: Turn over to Bhutto?
Rogers: Well, he says he is, but Im not so sure. I have a feeling that if he can pull this out that he may stay in some capacity. But in any event, I think that the thing we have to face up to, and not make any decisions, so this is not to ask you to decide anything, but I think, I want to express my view that I think that its probably going to get worse. I dont see any solution forso that I think that our principal objective should be to do what we can to prevent fighting from breaking out. Nixon: Let me ask this, just 1 minute to bring me up to date. I saw the morning papers and the morning report. To what extent are they fighting now? They had a jet fight, I understand. That doesnt mean that theres a damn war going on. Rogers: Well Nixon: Are theredo the Indians deny still that they had divisions in there? Rogers: Yes, yes. And I think maybe that they dont have divisions but they certainly have brigades. And theyve got people in there Nixon: Its like North Vietnam still denying they are in South Vietnam. Rogers: And its true there is one building, a major penetration. And in two other areas it looks as though there is penetration. No one is exactly sure. But I have no knowledge. Its tough to tell them apart, of course, because theyre with the guerrillas. Now Kissinger: The guerrillas, the guerrillas have been operating with brigade strength with artillery support and air support and tanks. So even if theyre technicallyI mean, this doesnt just happen [unclear exchange]. Rogers: The question really is how, how much are they involved and how [unclear] will they say, and so forth. My own judgment is that they are going to get more involved. Secondly, I think that we have to face the fact that Yahyas position militarily is extremely weak. Hes got 6080,000 men in East Pakistan. He has a whole lot of trouble Nixon: Hell be demolished there. Rogers: Yeah, and thats, of course, where the fighting is going on. And its a 2,500-mile flight around the edge of the land. So that the logistics, you know, are impossible from that standpoint.
And the, as I say, my own judgment is that probably it will get worse, and probably we have to face up to the fact that it will get worse. Nixon: [unclear] avoid getting too much blood [unclear]. Were not really responsible for every war. Rogers: Oh, were not getting the blame so far. Nixon: What is our [unclear] so far? Rogers: No. Nixon: Youre responsible even more than we were, very much for this, dont you think so, Henry? [unclear exchange] Rogers: I think thats what we should continue to try to do since [unclear]. I think the other thing that I want to stress [unclear]. Our ability to affect the course of events is quite limited. We dont have much leverage. We have a few things we can do. We are still providing some military equipment and spare parts, and its not lethal weapons, but its very, very insignificant. Our aid program is pretty well committed. Theoretically, we could turn some of it off, but it would create all kinds of legal problems. Hell of a problem with banks and companies that [unclear] equipment. And it wouldnt have any effect on the military situation at the moment. Whether we should take some actions that would be symbolic or not I think is something you wont [will?] decide. We could take some action. For example, I already have told my people administratively not to grant any export licenses. Not just say that [unclear] process them. Kissinger: To whom? Nixon: India? Rogers: To diminish the total. Kissinger: [unclear] Rogers: Oh, no, no, no. Just said to the processing officer to slow down the processing. As of yesterday but dont grant them until we decide, until the President decides what he wants to do. Secondly, I have told our aid people that theres another, there is about $11 million not committed. I said "lets dont commit it till we see what develops." Nixon: Where is this [unclear]?
Rogers: But the fact of the matter, without going into all the details, that I have gone over very carefully [unclear] some of which we dont know, some of these things are done by the Congress, and some are done by the [unclear], you know all that, but still the leverage we have on India is very minimal. If we take some action against them, which you might decide to do, it would be symbolic rather than substantive. Now the other point I want to refer to briefly is the United Nations. I do not think, and have never thought, that we should take any action to take it to the United Nations. On the other hand, I think the United Nations will be a very useful organization if things get worse, because, and I have a feeling that Pakistan will come to this conclusion itself Nixon: Will they [unclear] beyond the UN? [unclear] Rogers: Thats why India has just written, why Mrs. Gandhi has just written us a letter in which she urges us not to do anything, not to take it to the UN. Obviously, the Indians are worried about it. Nixon: Huh. Rogers: You see she doesnt Nixon: Do they have the votes? Hell, they can get all the Russian votes. They got the African Kissinger: This is the Security Council. Nixon: Oh. Rogers: You see what would happen in the Security [Council] Nixon: I see. This wouldnt be a General Assembly thing? Rogers: No, no. Kissinger: By Thursday. Rogers: No, it wouldnt be. The reason that India doesnt want it is because she doesnt want any United Nations presence. She doesnt want any observers there. Pakistans position is much more reasonable than Indias. Thats why India doesnt wantshes made an appeal to keep it out of the Security Council. Nixon: Well, whatwe probably [unclearhave not?] got much control. I think thats your view, isnt Henry? The United Nations, we are not going to take it to the United Nations? Kissinger: No.
Rogers: Well, I think what we ought to keep in mind, though, is I think on balance it will be the only alternative that Yahya has and it will be helpful to him. He wants to get through December because hes got his plans made for this new, for this Constitution to go into effect at the end of December, first of January. If he can keep peace there for a couple of months then he may feel that hes on the road to a political solution. What will happen in the United Nations, in the Security Council, is that they will, among other things, they will say why dont we send a United Nations observer team to the area and make a report and so forth. Now shell resist that. Shes already resisted it. She said she doesnt want the United Nations there. She doesnt want anybody to look at what theyre doing. Yahya has the United Nations people in East Pakistan. Hes perfectly prepared for that. He also is prepared to withdraw his troops from the border if India will do likewise. So that the things that the Security Council would recommend in the way of military action and observers and so forth I think would all benefit Yahya. Now the risk, of course, is that India will also bring into the Security Council political questions. But I think that those are manageable. Of course, India will be tremendously embarrassed if it goes to the Security Council. Now I say these things, not with the thought that we should take action, but with the thought that we should resist fighting Pakistan who will move in this direction. Yahyas told us that this is his only alternative, really. Nixon: At this time? Has he said it recently? Rogers: I dont know. When I say recently I know its less than Nixon: Yeah, what I mean is since the trouble started. Rogers: Yeah, I think this is one of the things that they are considering. And, of course, in the Security Council we would be China, Pakistan, and the United States all on one side, so weve got some pretty good leverage. And what we would do is emphasize keeping the peace. And we would say, "We urge both sides to exercise extreme restraint." We would urge United Nations to send observers there to find out what the conditions are. We would urge a mutual withdrawal. We would urge the very thing that Yahya has offered. Thats why she resists this. Thats why her very strong letter to you, in order to keep it out of the Security Council. Nixon: [unclear exchange]
Rogers: It wasnt yesterday. Nixon: Since the trouble started? Kissinger: No, no. Rogers: Oh, I guess probably I didnt notice the date. Nixon: Thats all right. Kissinger: It came in on Friday. Rogers: Whats the date today? Kissinger: Twenty-fourth. Nixon: Twenty-fourth. [unclear exchange] Rogers: [unclear] Very strong plea to keep it out of the Security Council. So I think what I would like to Nixon: She must have made that pleawhat Im just, the date is important. She made that plea knowing that she was going to order this attack on Pakistan. Rogers: Thats right. Nixon: I think. Thats my guess. She cant, she cant, [unclear] as you know, [unclear] without doing some directing it, without a hell of a lot of planning. So she must have known. Rogers: [unclear] Nixon: You know, the thing I would say, the main point I would like to do [unclear], the only thing about the symbolism, Bill, that concerns me, is that I implied when I met her, and you also talked to her about the fact that the Congress [unclear]. And I talked to her and said [unclear]. We know India has lots of friends, but I said theres no way that Congress [unclear] with Vietnam and everything. I said theres one thing thats happened in this country, and it doesnt make any difference where it is, whether its Nigeria, or South Asia, or anywhere else. The American Senate is [inclined] to [keep] hands off any situation where fighting breaks out. Thats their attitude. And I was very strong on that. Now I know it can be said that it wont do any good, and we dont have any leverage, and its only symbolic and the rest. But on the other hand, I want you to look into what we could do that is symbolic because I think we need some symbolism. The
other thing is, which I think is very important, looking at the balance there, the Indians are going to win. And they are going to lose too. But they are going to win without any question. Pakistan eventually will disintegrate. East Pakistan [unclear] a little down the road. So it is very much in our interest to get the damn thing cooled if we can. In other words, just on the merits India doesnt want to cool it. They want Pakistan to disintegrate. Despite what she says thats what she wants, theres no question about that. Now under those circumstances, it seems to me that, clearly apart from the fact that Yahya has been more decent to us than she has, clearly apart from that, I think that our policy wherever we can should definitely be tilted toward Pakistan, and not toward India. I think India is more at fault. Let me put it this way, if we could get, if the Congress could get all excited about cutting off aid to Pakistan when it involved an internal Pakistan problem Rogers: Yeah. Nixon: it seems to me that Congress should get twice as excited when it involves cutting off aid to India when India is engaged in a violent, across the border operation. Now my view is that very strongly, I mean, I didnt frankly feel that Congress should cut off aid to Pakistan. I mean, when the country has internal problems [unclear]. Is the British thing worked out? Is that [unclear exchange]. Lets support them on that. Rogers: Oh, sure. Nixon: Home should know that we will back him. Kissinger: Well we Nixon: [unclear] Rogers: Oh, yeah. Nixon: Well I want you to know that you could letbe sure Home knows it. I told him when he was here that they had made a deal [unclear]. Now, so having said that, it seems to me that our whole game has got to be playedif you could find something symbolic to do I think it really has to be Rogers: Well, we can.
Nixon: She knows, she knows that we didnt shoot blanks when she was here. Maybe it doesnt mean anything. Second, in terms of the merits of the situation, to the extent we can tilt it toward Pakistan, I would prefer to play that. Thats where the UN game comes in. Now I would say there that if Yahya, he feels its in his interest, if he pushed the UN game, thats one thing. But I couldnt agree more with the proposition that we shouldnt push the UN game if theres any feeling that it might be to the detriment of Pakistan. Now you feel its the other way. Rogers: You know we havent done any [unclear]. Nixon: I understand. Well, I know we havent done anything yet. But the point is what do we do now. Theyre going to ask are we prepared to go to the United Nations and all that. Joe [unclearSisco?] talked about that today. Rogers: Well there are two things about the United Nations that I think we should keep in mind. One, I think on balance that Pakistan will come off better than India. Nixon: In the UN? Rogers: In the UNin the Security Council. Because theres nothing you can do by way ofwe can try to work out a political accommodation. Thats something that has to be done inside Pakistan. There are many things you can do to counsel military restraint. You can send people there. Ive talked to all the UN people whove been out there and theyve all been very upset about the lack of cooperation on Mrs. Gandhis part. Shes made, I think, a very bad impression in this country by saying that she didnt want the United Nations presence and so forth. So I think on balance, I think they would benefit by the Security Council action. There would be some fallout that would be critical of Yahya, even Mujib, but I think that would be less important than the action that the UN would take to have a presence in India. Thats what she doesnt want. She doesnt want to get caught at it. Shes denying that these troops are invading Pakistan. Shes denying that they are training guerrillas and all these other things. Now if you had a presence of the United Nations, there youd have a good answer. She will resist it. She will resist it strongly. Shes very strongly opposed to it. So I think on balance it would be helpful to Pakistan. Ill let that be your own judgment. But where does that lead me? It just leads me to this conclusion: that we shouldnt do anything to discourage it. I dont think we should carry the lead. And I dont think
we should counsel [unclear] if were asked. I think it would be beneficial to Pakistan. And I think most people that have studied it will come to that conclusion. Secondly, I agree fully with the idea that we ought to tilt toward Pakistan. We have. My problem is I dislike the Indians so goddamn much. I had trouble even being reasonable with them. Nixon: Right. Well, in tilting toward them for 25 years, it has only gotten us a kick in the pants. Rogers: So, really now when you say youre [unclear]. Nixon: How do we do it? Rogers: Oh I [unclear] bring over here this afternoon, which you can take with you, which will suggest several ways we can take action. One would be right now wed just announce that were not going to grant any more export licenses in their sales act. And that would be perfectly consistent with what we did in the case of Pakistan. It doesnt have any, it doesnt have any real meaning to it. But the symbolism. Nixon: Small arms. Rogers: Thats right. Nixon: Spare parts. That could be done. Rogers: That can be done. We actually could embargo everything in the pipeline. Weve got maybe, well we may have $10 or $15 million worth in the pipeline. Nixon: Military? Rogers: Military equipment. But most, a lot of it is communications equipment. Some of it is tools for manufacturing ammunitions. Nixon: Yeah. They got arms? Rogers: We could do that. Thats quite a job if we embargoed everything. That would really be passing judgment. We did not do that in the case of Pakistan. If you remember we did not grant any new licenses. [unclear exchange] Now, we just close the pipeline off. We could, we could say that were not going to permit economic assistance [to be] committed, its about $11 million worth. Its insignificant. I think that would be probably not a wise thing to do because were going to have to provide help for them for the refugees anyway. We got a lot of money, $250 million, for food and that sort of thing.
Nixon: What at the present time, though, are we doing for Pakistan? Have we got nothing going there? Rogers: Oh, yes. Yeah, we have Nixon: Still, some economic stuff. Rogers: Yeah. Oh, yes. Weve got about, what is the total, Henry, 200 [unclear exchange]. Nixon: I guess, any action on Pakistan. Kissinger: Well, the astounding thing [unclear] Mr. President, where the argument is made that economic assistance isnt effective. Cutting it off isnt effective. Its almost the best argument against economic assistance. [unclear] Rogers: Well, Henry, all Ive got to say is [unclear] that its committed. In other words, economic assistance to India, $300 and some odd million is done in irrevocable letters and credit, so we cant get out of that. Now on some of these contracts we had a lot of Nixon: At least let me see, let me see what the operative [unclear]. You know we just, I just may want to take a hard line on that. Kissinger: We had 11 million, as Bill says, in obligated total funds [unclear]. And then we have 107 [unclear]. And then from then on it gets more difficult. Rogers: Yeah, 380 million. The bulk of it is committed. We just cant dicker with it. Kissinger: In addition to that, theres an appeal for an aid agreement thats ready to be signed if we can drag out these arms. Rogers: Oh, [unclear] thats no problem. Kissinger: And then theres another $100 million item. Nixon: Well I just want to see that. [unclear] It may be Kissinger: One point I would like to make, Mr. President, for your consideration, I agree on the UN. Im in total agreement with Bill. I think we should [unclear] absolutely right. And its going to go that way. We should take then initiative if it comes that way. Nixon: Now lets, just on the UN thing, because I wont be exposed to any questioning on this till Monday or Tuesday, till Tuesday of next week.
Rogers: Your press conference is on Tuesday? Nixon: I may have it Tuesday. But it depends on how much of this in the Cabinet. You may be exposed to questions and Ziegler may. Now what do we want to say about this in your opinion? Rogers: My opinion Nixon: See, I dont think you can sort of take the idea that. . . I dont think you can take the idea that well the UNa very delicate thing. A lot of people are, why the Christ arent we for the UN getting in? What do you think? Kissinger: Well, we havent said were against the UN. Nixon: I know. Well, thats the point. What should Bill say? The same thing. What I meant is I think weve got to do nothing about getting in the UN. But it sort of appears that, well thats what do you think? Rogers: I Nixon: What can you say? Rogers: Well, I think the ideal Nixon: You may be put to that very soon. Rogers: I think our position should be for the moment were watching developments, were actively engaged in diplomatic activity. Nixon: Thats right. Rogers: Im going to talk, in fact, to the Indian Charg, hes trying to see me with some special message now. And Ill try to see the Paks so we can say weve talked to everybody. And weve talked to the Russians. So that we can say that weve done all this and that kind of activity. Now, weve gotten a good deal of credit for that already. Nixon: I think so. Rogers: Weve been very active, and we arent committed necessarily to either side. Secondly, on the, it seems to me we can say were doing this, were watching the situation carefully, were consulting with all the parties concerned. That we haventthat theres no judgment on that yet. We have no decision. That we would assume that thats something that each nation will want to
consider itself, leaving the impression that that really helps Pakistan. Pakistan makes the first move and India resists, theyll gain a good deal. Nixon: Yeah. Rogers: Because people will say that India must be responsible. India [unclear] the United Nations. And I think that they Nixon: Thats the thing that I cant understand Bill, that Mrs. Gandhi, that shes reading the P.R. wrong there, dont you agree, Henry? Because theyve resisted the UN on refugees and everything else. Pakistan has invited them in. Kissinger: Well, their crimes are not in P.R. [unclear exchange] Well, Mr. President, its not inconceivable that the Indians are trying this one on because they dont seem irrevocably committed to go in deep. Theyre sort of [unclear] in nearly division strength. So, if we show at this point, not yet [unclear] irrevocable strength, I think it would be wrong to cut away now. But if we Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: We could do a number of things that warn them that something is coming. And if it escalates Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: All we would have done is a very mild dmarche to [unclear]. Nixon: Theres another reason that it just, I feel that it might have an effect. Bill, you know, I called on her after you met with her. You told her, "Now look here, youre going to catch hell on this." I think, I feel that we must not shoot blanks. Because I also told, well even Tito when he was here. I said [unclear] I told him much more directly when we were talking at dinner [unclear]. He was on the Indian side of course. I said, well lets just understand one thing. I said I dont know whats going to happen. But if theres a breakout of war, you can forget United States aid to India. And I feel that we ought to do something symbolic, I really feel it. Rogers: Yeah, theres no problem there. Nixon: That I think something symbolic might have an effect, might have an effect, on restraining India. ThatI dont know. Many people think it wont?
Rogers: Well, we havent gotten the reports back from the telegrams we sent out. Ill see this fellow when I get back to the office. But I think what, Mr. President, maybe Nixon: Keatings a traitor. Kissinger: [unclear] Rogers: I think what we might do is wait until Friday, this announcement on Friday that we have suspended the, issuing any further export licenses. Now thats what we did last time. Nixon: Let me suggest this, I think it would be helpful, HenryBill its on the list here today for Ziegler to say that this was the subject of the discussion, is that all right? Kissinger: I think that would be very Nixon: We had an hour discussion on IndiaPakistan and then I think we will continue to meet on Friday. In other words, we will have a whole new conversation and so forth. But that gives us time to think about it. I want to read the paper, could you have something by five oclock? Rogers: Oh, yeah. Nixon: I mean that these alternativesthings are options that we can do. I wont, as you know [uncleardo?] anything that is useless or anything. Rogers: We dont want to seem petulant. Nixon: But on the other hand, very firm. That we want to be helpful. But I think, I think in anything that we say there should be a very positive statement that the United States commitment to help refugees, to help hungry people, et cetera remains. And thats where, Henry, you can continue with this potential PL 480 to both Pakistan and India, granted so that we are feeding people there. Right? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: On the other hand, military stuff. Boy, we could be awfully tough. Rogers: I wish we had. [unclear] Nixon: One thing, I mention this [unclear] with SALT. Ive mentioned this to Henry, this multilateral aid thing, we have got to get some stroke. I think thats a study for the next 2 or 3 months. Rogers: I couldnt agree more.
Nixon: I just, every time we turn around and we try to fight the UN; Bill, we havent got any stroke with anybody. [unclear exchange] Nixon: World Bank Kissinger: I dont think they would lightly go into a confrontation with us, if we catch them early enough. Nixon: Who? Kissinger: The Indians. Nixon: Now, the interesting thing is how do you both read the Russian thing? You read the Russian thing totally that theyre acting in a restraining way on India? Do you believe that? Rogers: I do. Nixon: Do you? Kissinger: I think they are trying to restrain them but not very hard. Rogers: Why? Kissinger: Why, because there is some advantage to have [unclear] the Chinese presence. Nixon: They want to screw the Chinese. Kissinger: Humiliate them. Nixon: On the other hand, well, on the other hand, its going to cost Russia a hell of a lot of money. I mean by a lot a great deal because theyve got to support India in this war. And that theyre not for, are they? Thats why they ended the other onethe India-Pakistan [unclear war?] Russia didnt do that. Kissinger: Well, I think the Indians are such, my reading of the Indians is that any rational assessment should indicate that there is only one way a political revolution can go [unclear]. So they know theyve got that. But what they are pressing for is so traumatic a settlement on the East Pakistan situation that the West Pakistan situation starts unraveling also. And what they want is to reduce West Pakistan to something like Afghanistan status. And that they are the only significant country. They want to turn East Pakistan into a sort of Bhutan. And after that, Im
willing to predict [unclear]. Because East Pakistan suffers from neglect from West Pakistan. I think the Indians have a vested interest in keeping them down. Rogers: Yeah. Kissinger: Because if East Bengal becomes even nominally [unclear] then West Bengal is going to be attractive. Nixon: Its already a horrible place. Kissinger: So they want to make sure that East Bengal is worse off than West Bengal [unclear]. Nixon: Thats right. Rogers: Im not sureI think that Henrys right. I suppose theres a lot of that thinking. But also a lot of it is just hatredthey hate. Just sheer hate. Kissinger: No thats [unclear exchange]. Nixon: I think actually that both Pakistan and India hate each other so much that they are totally irrational about [unclear]. They really are. You talk to a Pakistani and get his take. Rogers: Just like a man and wife. They hate each other and they are too jealous to care about the welfare of the children. They just hate each other. Nixon: I dont think Yahyas that far. Rogers: No, he isnt. Nixon: But Bhutto. Now whatreally what he did is disgusting. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Good God. What am I thinking? Rogers: Not helpful. Hes supposed to be, hes more leftish than Nixon: Oh, hes leftish. I know. But which way? Is he anti-India? Anti-US? Kissinger: Violently anti-Indian. Pro-Chinese. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: But in a way we gain a lot if he comes in. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: we have less obligations to
Nixon: Bhutto might make a deal with the other fellow. Would he make a deal with this Mujib guy? Rogers: No. Nixon: No. Rogers: Thats, of course, part of the trouble. The reason that Nixon: You ever met Bhutto? Rogers: No. No. Nixon: More important, have you ever met his wife? Boy, she is one of the most beautiful women in the world. Kissinger: It depends, Mr. President. [unclear exchange] Kissinger: If Mujib is, if theyre thinking of a united Pakistan then Bhutto would never deal with Mujib. Because hes afraid that Mujib will aim for the prime ministership. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: If, however, to [unclear] Bengal, then Bhutto is in a better position to present himself than Yahya. Yahya is a better man for reconciliation. Bhutto is Nixon: Yahya is a thoroughly decent and reasonable man. Not always smart politically, but hes a decent man. Rogers: Quick note on what Henry said, and that isif Yahya steps out of the picture,which is quite possible. That means that hes given up on East Pakistan. Cause Bhutto cant Nixon: Yeah, yeah. Bhutto basically has beenhe hasnt changed. My last report is one of my basic [unclear] in 67 when I was there, is that the son-of-a-bitch is a total demagogue. And therefore Ayub Khan gave me a rundown on him, and hes a pretty good judge of men, and he said this fellow is just bad news. Rogers: Let me say, Mr. President, when you asked me what I thought the Russians were doing, I think they would like to have a major war avoided. But I agree that they are not restraining the Indians too much. In other words, they want the Indians to do much as they are doing. I think they hope a major war can be avoided. I think to that extent they help. I wouldnt be surprised if
they pull back a while on it. I wouldnt be surprised if next week or so it cools off a little bit. But I dont think its going to cool off Nixon: Well, let me talk to one other subject, which I think also relates to thisrelates to what you, we decided on Friday. I dont want us to get caught in thiswe of course are interested in resultsbut I dont want to get caught in the business where we take the heat for a miserable war that we had nothing do with. Rogers: No. Nixon: I think its very important that we do enough, that we appear to bebut I think we just got to get it across to the American people that we cannot be responsible for every goddamn war in the world. Now we werent responsible for the Nigerian war. We are not responsible for this war. The idea that this thing, and the refugees, and Pakistan and the rest, we couldnt avoid that, could we? Rogers: As a matter of fact, thats another advantage of having the thing in the Security Council, because then it does put the heat on the United Nations, and distinguishes it from us. Theres very little we can do. Nixon: Do you have any thought there as to how weI think we got to, I sense these political things developing. You know, were doing well in several fields. But I just dont want this thing to muddy the water. I mean, how can we avoid getting caught in the [unclear]. Now the United Stateswhy didnt we avoid the war with India-Pakistan? Kissinger: The truth of the matter is, if anything produced the war, not saying we did it, was the Indians [who] see the Pakistanis in a uniquely weak position, with the world opinion turned against them. And basically theres an opportunity theyll never get again for at least [unclear]. So if any mistake was made it was being too hard on Pakistan. [unclear] Secondly, I think, we have a very aggressive record. Of one we havent backed down, first for the refugees, secondly for relief in East Pakistan, and thirdly in moving things concretely towards the political evolution. Were the only ones that pass that test. Rogers: Yeah.
Kissinger: We got the military governor replaced with a civilian governor. We got them to admit UN observers. We got them to permit UN peace [unclear]. [unclear exchange]

162. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 6, 1971, 6:14-6:38 p.m. Nixon: I had a thought or two on India-Pakistan. First, Stans wants to report to me. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: I thought wed have him report to the Cabinet. I dont think its a good idea. Ill tell you what I had in mind. I think he should report to you, Henry, Ill tell you why. I think we ought to cool it with the Russians. Kissinger: I couldnt, Mr. President Nixon: [unclear] Stans will want to have a press conference and tell them about all the progress hes made on this thing. And we have got to cool it. And Id just simply tell him [unclear] lets get a damn signal across on that. Now Maurys going to be hard to handle. Maybe you could get it a little reversed. Kissinger: Ill get a hold of it. Ill do it. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: No, Ill do it. Maury will be hard to handle, but hes a great team player. And he sees now that we deliver. This is the sort of signal the Russians understand. Nixon: If theres anything thats outstanding now, in the way of, let me tell you, in the way of licenses, or anything with the Russians, just drag our feet. Kissinger: Youll be better off, Mr. President, 6 months from now. If they lose respect for us now, theyll put it to us the way its never been [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia] Nixon: What I was going to say, Henry, what Im concerned about, I really worry about, is whether or not I was too easy on the goddamn woman when she was here. Kissinger: Well
Nixon: Think I was? Maybe I was. Now I dont know, maybe it wouldnt have helped. Kissinger: Well Nixon: I think, I think she was out on a course to do this without any Kissinger: I have sought out Nixon: [unclear] She suckered us at that. Suckered us. Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, I wonder now in retrospect Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: now that you put the questionwell, you followed your recommendations we all made to you. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: So if anyone is to blame Nixon: If anything, if anything, I was a little tougher on her than the talking paper, you know what I mean? Kissinger: Oh, yes. Nixon: I was not soft on her on this thing. I told her that Kissinger: No, but our advice to you was not to give her a pretext. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. Kissinger: And you even said to meI remember when you went out Nixon: Gracious remarks, I went "boom!" Kissinger: But on the other hand, well, the public thing had to be gracious. But when I look back on it now could we have recommended to you to brutalize her privately? To say now I want you to know Nixon: I should have. I should have. Kissinger: You do this and you will wreck your relations with us for 5 years and we will look for every opportunity to damage you. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. Kissinger: I just want you to know that. Thats probably what we should have done. Nixon: Yeah. And another weakness weve got is Keating there as Ambassador.
Kissinger: Oh, hes a bastard. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Of course, we dont Nixon: [unclear], soft, son-of-a-bitch. Kissinger: But she was playing us. Nixon: She was playing us. And you know the cold way she was the next dayshe didnt [unclear]. And this woman suckered us. But let me tell you, shes going to pay. Shes going to pay. Now I mean on this aid side, I am not Kissinger: And lets fight it in the campaign. The Democrats will make issue Nixon: Theyll probably say were losing India forever. All right, whos going to care about losing India forever? Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, if we go to the American public and say what weve done and what they did, by that time there will have been a massacre in East Pakistan under their aegis. Weve got to keep the heat on them now. They have to know they paid a price. Hell, if we could reestablish relations with Communist China, we can always get the Indians back whenever we want to latera year or two from now. Nixon: Would you check to see what the hell that letter from Suharto was that his ambassador brought in. I want to be sure to follow up with Suharto [unclear]. The Indians are following up. Kissinger: But its precisely with people like him that we have to show that were going to be tough. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: So that he doesnt get swallowedget ideas Nixon: Now, I wantwell sleep, Henry, on my proposition with regard to the Chinese Kissinger: I havent done anything yet Nixon: But I feel strongly that we should do it. I think weve got to tell them that some movement on their part we think toward the Indian border could be very significant. And that as far as were concerned that we have sentjust say that we have sent a very tough note to the Russians and
that we are cooling our relations. That is anything you canI dont know how to put that. But the President is [unclear]you know what I mean? Kissinger: Weve gottenthe way we could put it, Mr. President, is to saywe shouldnt urge them to do it because theyll get too suspicious. If we could say, we have, if you consider it necessary to take certain actions we want you to know that you should not be deterred by the fear of standing alone against the powers that may intervene. Nixon: Right. Right. Thats right. And then say, "We have done this and this and this ourselves and we have done it first." And then say, "It is apparent that it appears frankly now that the only thing that on the briefing, the confidential briefing that we have had, it appears the only thing the Indians fear is the possibility of [unclearsanctions?]." You know? I dont know if you want to be that specific or not. I dont know. But damnit, I am convinced that if the Chinese start moving the Indians will be petrified. They will be petrified. Kissinger: Except the weather is against them. Nixon: I dont give a damn. Thats more incentive if they can get through that pass. Kissinger: Ill look into it. Nixon: Henry, be surebe sure to move on that point. You know what I mean? The Chinese, you know, when they came across the Yalu, we thought they were a bunch of goddamn fools in the heart of the winter, but they did it. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Im not so sure. We know what the Paks can do. Kissinger: Because whats going to happen is after this is over, the fact is they have to get a friendly government over into West Pakistan. This has been a great operation for the Indians. Because this isits going to lead to the overthrow of Yahya, for sure. And tobut Nixon: Its such a shame. So sad. So sad. Tomorrow were going to have a meeting on Vietnam. [Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam] Nixon: Coming back to this summitI mean this India-Pakistan
Kissinger: One mistake we madeit wasnt your mistake but it wasit took us 2 weeks to get the bureaucracy. If we could have got the bureaucracy on the first day of the Indian attack on East Pakistan to do the things they finally did today, that might have given them enough of a shot to blow them up. That might have given the Russians enough of a shot. Nixon: You know, Mrs. Gandhi shes in her parliament and theyre thumping their desks with their fists [unclear] Kissinger: But she would have snubbed them [unclear]. By that time she had crossed the rubicon. The time to [unclear] Nixon: [unclear] She attacks us, so forth and so on. Kissinger: But shes been pretty cautious about attacking us. And shes not the only one. Shes never mentioned us by name. Nixon: Were notthats one of the reasons why I shouldnt get out on a press conference. Because Ill have to take her on and Im not going to do it. I dont want to be in a position of attacking. Ive got to stay out of that. Kissinger: I think so. Nixon: Or do youyou agree? Kissinger: No, I think you ought to stay out of it. You definitely ought to stay out of it. You dont want to get into an argument with her, particularly as for a brief period it will look as if shes winning. No. Absolutely not. Nixon: The main thing is we must not lose or be blamed for this goddamned thing. Well get blamed. Kissinger: No, no. Nixon: Church. Teddy Kennedy. Kissinger: No, I went to Joe Alsops house the other night and Teddy Kennedy was there. Of course, hes such a jerk. He started mumbling that we didnt do enough. And I just jumped all over him. I said, "We did this and this and this. What would you have done, Teddy? What more would you have done?" He said, "I would have shown more sympathy." I said, "We gave them
250 million dollars. Do you really think sympathy" Well, he pulled way off. He said hed like to meet me and talk about it a little more. Nixon: Yeah. Incidentally, that Helms report [3 seconds not declassified] Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Give me a copy of that. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Im going to put it out to the press. Put the whole goddamn thing out. Now who would be a good one who would like to have such a nice week? Kissinger: I think that Scali and Colson would be better judges of that. Nixon: Oh, I [unclear]. But Ive got to Kissinger: Joe Alsop would [unclear] it up. Nixon: Well, would Joe use it? I dont know. What side is he on in this? Kissinger: Oh, hes on ours. Oh, God. Nixon: Okay. Let me ask you to do this. Is there a waycan you get it into Joes hands? I want that report of Helms put into the hands of a columnist who will print the whole thing. Now I want you to get it out. Now this is a smart thing to do, Henry. I know. You know what I mean? You just happened to get a [2 seconds not declassified] report [3 seconds not declassified]; it will make her look bad. I know thats their tragedy. Now thats the way they play it. Thats the way we got to play it. You dont agree? Kissinger: Yes, I do agree. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: Another thing Nixon: Who would you give it to? Would you give it to Kissinger: I, myI shouldnt do it. Ive never played Nixon: Give it to Scali. Kissinger: Id give it to Scali and let him. Nixon: And tell him to get it out? Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Tell him that this is gospel. You can give it to anyone you want, but dont get caught. Dont give it to Colson cause hes Kissinger: Hed disrupt this. Nixon: Scali will know how. Okay? Kissinger: Ill do that. Nixon: Just say that this report came out. And, but just be sure to get it yards away from the White House. Kissinger: Right. Ill get that done today. Nixon: Okay. Boy-oh-boy. Its interesting. Were done with the Russians. Kissinger: Well, we couldntBrezhnev is in Warsaw. And we only sent a message last night. Today we sent a letter. Nixon: The Russians, theyve just said hands-off to us. Kissinger: Well, we wrote them a pretty tough one. Nixon: What did we say? Kissinger: Well, we said this threatens the whole climate of confidence weve tried so hard to establish. I told him yesterday that [unclear] its exactly the opposite of what they should want. Theyre driving us into aligning ourselves with countries that we have no particular parallel interest in on the sub-continent. And I said, "How can you talk to us about Security Council guarantees if you thwart the Security Council?" And I threatened them that we would not carry out the Middle East negotiations. And they seemI havent talked to you about thisand we cant do it. But they have been bugging me to come to Moscow. I dont want to [do?] it. Ive just tried to use it because of the Rogers problem. But theyve sent me a formal invitation now. I dont want to do it, but he raised it again yesterday. And I said, "under these conditions thered be no chance at all talking about it." Nixon: Thats correct. Kissinger: To put it on the basis because they have turned it off. We can just cancel this visit, which I never had any intention of [unclear-going on?] in the first place. Nixon: But lets cool it on the Stans thing.
Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Well meet tomorrow. Ive only got 5 minutes for whatever they want to do. [unclear] Kissinger: Then I would suggest also, Mr. President, the Indian Ambassador must not be seen under any level higher than the country desk officer. [unclear] Nixon: Did you put that out? Kissinger: No. Nixon: Well put that out. [unclear] the Indian Ambassador. I want it as an instruction on my part: "The President instructs the Indian Ambassador to not be seen at any level other than the country desk level." Also, I want you to send a message to Keating. He is to be totally cold in his relations. Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Put that out. From me.

165. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:205:01 p.m.
Nixon: But Nelson [Rockefeller], how did he feel about the media on the India-Pakistan? Mitchell: Oh, he thinks its disgraceful. Nixon: Incidentally, before I sayI called Newton, while you were there. I called just beforehand because I heard he had a press conference [unclear]. I said youve done a hell of a job. And I repeated some of the lines. He said he was sitting there reading your backgrounderI dont know whether you got any press out of it. But I said, made this point. I saidand he raised a point of morality. He went through a very interesting exercise. He said Charlie Bartlett was in to see him. The difficulty, he said, was the press is like the Kennedys were because the Kennedys were obsessed with the idea of the Indian mystery and all of the God-like qualities and so forth of the Indians. He said those of us who work with the Indians up here know that they are the [unclearmost?] devious, trickiest sons-of-bitches there are. And he went on to say, I went on to tell him, I said how come we got so many votes. He said, "yeah, we got all the votes except Indias, the Russian satellites." And we even got Rumania. He said, "well first of all, you know a lot of Mid-Eastern votes were with us." [unclear] They were sort of reflecting the Israeli thing. I can see that, you know, on withdrawal, they cant be against withdrawal. But then he said there are countries like Namibia and a lot jackass places like that [unclear]. He said they alsothis idea, you see this is where The New York Times and the rest are wrong, where they said that if aggression is engaged in by a democracy its all right. But where its engaged in by a dictatorship, its wrong. They forget that most of the countries in the world are dictatorships, including all these little countries. Second point, the point that I made to him which I [unclear], now look theres a totally moral attitude of our critics here. First they say, they make the point
that because theres 600 million Indians and only 60 million in West Pakistan, were on the wrong side. We should be with the 600 million Indians. I said since when do we determine the morality of our policy on the basis of how many people a country has? I said the second reason that theyre wrong, then they say but India is a democratic country, and Pakistan is a totalitarian country, a dictatorship, and therefore Indiawe shouldnt be on the side of a dictatorship but on the side of the democratic country. I said if aggression is engaged in by any country, its wrong. And in a sense its even more wrong for a democratic country to engage in it because democratic countries are held in a higher degree of morality. And I said international morality will be finished-the United Nations will be finishedif you adopt the principle that because a country is democratic and big it can do what the hell it pleases. I really think that puts the issue to these sons-of-bitches. Kissinger: I found something, Mr. President, which you can use against Teddy Kennedy. I knew there was a secret deal that Kennedy made with Pakistan. State denied it. I said Nixon: Ayub told me there was one. Kissinger: I knew there was one. Nixon: He told me there was one and I didntwhen I was there. The Ambassador, the Ambassador denied it to me. I said that Ayub told me that. The Ambassador told me no there wasnt. He knew nothing about it. Kissinger: [3 seconds not declassified] I said it must have gone backchannel. Mitchell: Was that when Jackie got the horses? Nixon: See McConaughy was not Ambassador when I was there. This was a later Ambassador. Mitchell: Was that when Jackie got the horses? Nixon: Jesus Christ. Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: Election day 1962. Mitchell: I heard [unclear]. Nixon: Ayub was [unclear]. Kissinger: [unclear] They even had a legal obligation. But at any rate
Mitchell: Well what [unclear] the Pakistani Government has? Nixon: They have. Kissinger: They have. Nixon: Not on the basis of that but on the basis of their treaty. [unclear] The treaty I understand Kissinger: We have a bilateral treaty. Nixon: Gives us an out, doesnt it on India? Kissinger: Well Nixon: Well, I mean I understand it could. But this doesnt. This meant with India. The deal. Kissinger: The treaty gives us a slight out. But it [uncleardoesnt cite?] to India by name. And weve got the UN defining them as aggressors. Nixon: So how can we play this Henry? Kissinger: Well, the next time they say were anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani, and that you have a liking for [Nixon took a brief phone call unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger: I think at the right moment when they say you have a liking for these military dictators. [unclear] You could certainly say that to the contrary you were carrying out a commitment made in two administrations. Both [unclear] and previously in the Eisenhower administration. But that they were general in nature. And that the specific one made by President Kennedy to General Ayub which applies here, particularly to the case of India. What we will maintain Nixon: Have you told John about what were doing? Kissinger: Well this is what I want to discuss with you, Mr. President. Nixon: Incidentally, I dont want that to go any further. Kissinger: Theres no way it can be done. I got a message to you from the Shah, in which he says he can send ammunitionhe is doing it now. He cannot sendhe cannot send airplanes a) because the Pakistanis cant fly the airplanes anyway because Nixon: They cannot read.
Kissinger: But most importantly because the Soviet-Indian treaty makes them vulnerable to the Soviets. Hes proposing that the Jordanians send their planes to Pakistan, because the Pakistanis can fly the Jordanian planes. And then he sends his planes to Jordan with Iranian pilots to cover Jordan while they are engaged in Pakistan. Nixon: I should thinkI could think we could get a commitment from Israel on the Jordanians. Kissinger: Oh, no problem. Nixon: The Israelis sure are on our side on this one, arent they? Kissinger: I see Golda Meir on Friday. [December 10] Nixon: Well when you talk to her, you tell her, Henry, that this is a goddamn Russian ploy. Thats what shes got to understand. Kissinger: Well, what we are betting on, Mr. President, [unclear], as long as the war with East Pakistan [unclear]. But the Indian plan is now clear. Theyre going to move their forces from East Pakistan to the west. They will then smash the Pakistan land forces and air forces, annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan and then call it off. After that has happenedand then you have another [unclear] message from the Shah saying this section of West Pakistan now would be a mortal threat to the security of Iran. When this has happened, the centrifugal forces in West Pakistan would be liberated. Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier [unclearProvince?] will celebrate. West Pakistan would become a sort of intricate Afghanistan [unclearof five states?]. Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Kissinger: East Pakistan would become a Bhutan. All of this would have been achieved by Soviet support, Soviet arms, and Indian military force. The impact of this on many countries threatened by the Soviet Union or by Soviet clients [unclear]. I talked to Helms this morningI wanted to check my judgment; I didnt have an advisor. He thinks it will have a catastrophic impact on the Middle East. No one could [unclear] guarantee or give up any territory that they have because they wont believe it. The Arabs will think if they can get the same cover from the Soviets that the Indians got, they could try another round and maybe more. The Chinese, now this part is my judgment, up to a certain point being aggressive [unclear]. But if it turns out that we end up with the complete dismemberment of Pakistan, then they will conclude, "All right. We
played it decently but were just too weak." And that they have to break their encirclement, not by dealing with us, but by moving either [unclear] or drop the whole idea. So I think this, unfortunately, has turned into a big watershed, which is going to affect our chances in the situation in South Asia. Now I dont mind our saying publicly [unclear] Nixon: Oh, I know. Kissinger: But the fact of the matter is that unfortunately we are confronted with a tough situation. Nixon: Hmm. Kissinger: And it seems to me what we have to do now, or what I would recommend, is where we went wrong before is not to try to scare off the Indians. Nixon: But how could we scare them? Kissinger: If we had designedif we had understood. I understood it, but I thought I could maneuver it instead of hitting it head on. Nixon: I dont know what would have affected them. Kissinger: Well what would have affected them is if we said, on Mrs. Gandhis visit Nixon: Right. Kissinger: Weyou did exactly what all your advisors recommended. But if we had recommended to you to be brutal to her rather than to be nice to her, and if you had said, "Now I just want you to know" Nixon: Our whole plan was to Kissinger: Exactly. I mean you did exactly what we all recommended to you. Nixon: As a matter of fact, Rogers, if anything, on this was tougher than I was. No, I inferred that it would bewell at dinner I told her that there, any war would be very, very unacceptable. And then Rogers said he told her that the corollary Kissinger: Well we didntwe toldour feeling was we shouldnt give her a pretext to come back home Nixon: Exactly. Kissinger: And then say
Nixon: And then say she has no friends that she can Kissinger: She has no friends [unclear]. Nixon: Well that was a mistake. Kissinger: The mistake was that we should have understood that she was not looking for pretextthat she was determined to go. And secondly, we should have been much tougher with the Russians. Nixon: Well, what could we have done? How? Kissinger: We should have told them what we finally told them last Sundaythat this would mark a watershed in our relationship, that there could be no Middle East negotiations if this thing would grow. We would have had to play it tough. And thirdly, we should have, once the cat was among the pigeons, when they moved on November 22, we had cut off, as you wanted, but we couldnt get the bureaucracy to do. We could have cut off economic aid the first or second day, plus all of arms instead of waiting ten days and diddling around. Nixon: Weve done all that. But I ordered all that as you recall. Kissinger: Im not blaming. Nixon: We just couldnt get it done, okay. Kissinger: The mistake was that in every other crisis, Mr. President, what I have done is IveI blame myself. When I have analyzed properly. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: In every other crisis, our basic attitude was the hell with the State Department; let them screw around with the little ones. But I forgot that in the other crisis we had all the elements of positioning. Even though it was late when we moved, since nothing could happen until we moved, we didnt pay for the delay. In this situation, we got in a fast moving situation that we could not hold up, so that the delay accelerated the situationwe were always a little bit too late. We always did the right thing. You ordered it at the right moment. But we maneuvered it wrong. [unclear] Mitchell: [unclear] Kissinger: No, we couldnt touch the Russians.
Nixon: I wonder. I wonder. Kissinger: At any rate, weve got the same problem in the West now. Nixon: Now what do we do? Kissinger: We have two choices now. KeatingI told Alex Johnson a few minutes ago that I hope he will [unclear]. Nixon: Well, forget what hes doing. Kissinger: Well the trouble is we have to convince the Indians now. Weve got to scare them off an attack on West Pakistan as much as we possibly can. And therefore weve got to get another tough warning to the Russians. I meanbut you pay a price because you are risking the summit. On the other hand, the summit may not be worth a damn if they lose, if they kick you around. Weve got to warn the Russians about some kind of attack on West Pakistan. I would encourage the Jordanians to move their squadrons into West Pakistan and the Iranians to move their squadrons into Nixon: Now tell me, about the moving the squadrons, what effect will that have? Kissinger: Enough. Militarily in Pakistan we have only one hope now. To convince the Indians that the thing is going to escalate. And to convince the Russians that theyre going to pay an enormous price. It may not work, Mr. President. Weve gone pretty far and we cant make up six years of military imbalance. Nixon: We should have never let it get out of balance. We didnt. Kissinger: Again, if they Nixon: Frankly, Johnson, to his great discredit Kissinger: But again, this is an example where the bureaucracy got us. You promised Yahya on your first visit to send some arms there. Nixon: We did. Kissinger: Well, it took us a year to get the bureaucracy to fulfill your promise. And the arms were just starting to move when the Bengalis attacked. [unclear]. So it isnt Nixon: I know.
Kissinger: We are not to blame. We didnt know there was going to be a war in 71, but it took a year to get your promise to Yahya worked out. Nixon: Now lets see, first with regard to the planes, whats the purpose of [unclear]? Kissinger: The purpose of the planes isI think where were in trouble Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: I think the bestor we could play tough. Nixon: I agree. Kissinger: If we did this, we could give a note to the Chinese and say, "If you are ever going to move this is the time." Nixon: All right, thats what well do. Mitchell: All they have to do is put their forces on the border. Kissinger: Yeah but the Russians I am afraidbut I must warn you, Mr. President, if our bluff is called, well be in trouble. Nixon: How? Kissinger: Well, well lose. But if our bluff isnt, if we dont move, well certainly lose. Mitchell: You think well lose the [unclear] with the Russians? Kissinger: But they will lose [unclear]. Nixon: What we have to do, Henry, is to get it out, calmly and cold-bloodedly make the decision. Thats all there is to it. Kissinger: But weve got to make it within 36 hours. Nixon: Oh, I know. Thats what I mean. No, I think what we need to see here, and Ive got, Im not going to have a meeting. No more goddamn meetings to decide this. Kissinger: Well Ive got a WSAG scheduled for tomorrow morning. Nixon: Im not going to have a meeting. Kissinger: While Rogers is out of town. Nixon: What the hell good is Irwin going to be if theres a meeting? Or do you want a meeting? Kissinger: It wouldnt worklet me do this. Well have a WSAG meeting in the morning. I will then present you what your choices are.
Nixon: What I would rather do, I think the WSAG meeting is fine, why dont you figure out now what these two choices are. In other words, I see the choicesin other words, take the line. Do one of two things. First, we can let the goddamn thing just deteriorate. Kissinger: Which is to say, its not our war. Nixon: Its not our war. Which is basically the State line. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Or has been the State line. Mitchell: [unclear] Nixon: He already has, John. Mitchell: He has? The Shah? Nixon: No, Yahya. Hes already asked for help. Kissinger: Hes already asked for help. Mitchell: Whats he going to say about it? Nixon: He wont say that. He wont embarrass the Chinese. But, what Im getting at Henry is weve got to look at our options here. All right, now if we let it go, your fear is that it will certainly screw up the South Asian area. All right, thats screwed up. The otheryour greater fear, however, is that it will, it will encourageit will, may get the Chinese stirred up so that they do something else. Kissinger: No, I would Nixon: And theyll move towards India, or towards Russia, or both. And it will encourage the Russians to do the same thing someplace else. Thats the dangers on the one side. Kissinger: In the Middle East. And because, it will affect countries like Iran and Indonesia. Confronted either with a Soviet threat or a Soviet client threat. If Iran were to be confronted by both, with deciding that were just not steady enough. I meanwith all our good intentions, we have just too many [unclear]. Nixon: Yeah. All right, fine. Thats one side. Then we go on, well go through with the summit and all that crap. The other possibility is to do these things. You understand? Im for doing anything if theres a chance that were
Kissinger: Let me play this scenario a little further. If the Chinese should draw the conclusion up to now weve improved our situation with the Chinese. Nixon: How? Kissinger: Well, weve played a tough line at the UN. Nixon: Have they gotten anything for that? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Do they think the UN is worth shit? Kissinger: No, no. But they thought that we might be in collusion with the Indians and the Russians to sucker them into war. Nixon: They thought so? Kissinger: I think so. Nixon: Jesus Christ. Kissinger: So I think up to now weve helped ourselves. But the second problem is our people say we haventthe Chinese havent done any more than we. Thats true. But their problem is they havent got the forces to do a hell of a lot more. Mitchell: They also have a problem with their military. Kissinger: And they have a massive problem with their military. But they made them decide on Mitchell: [unclear] in the leadership of their military. Nixon: Theyre afraid of them. Kissinger: They may decide weve done the right thing. But we havent got the punch to make it effective. Nixon: Yeah, but you know we cant do this without the Chinese helping us. As I look at this thing, the Chinese have got to move to that damn border. The Indians have got to get a little scared. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: All right. Now I wonder Mitchell: The other side, the other side
Nixon: I wonder if theres a way, do youwell get a message to the Chinese. Kissinger: They wont give us a prior commitment. The problem with the Jordanian planes actually, Mr. President, I think we wont have any real choice because the Jordanians, in my view, are going to send their planes anyway. [unclear exchange] Nixon: Let me say this, in view of the, in view of thisso do we have to make, we dont make any announcement about the Jordanian letter or anything like that. What do we have to do in order to get the Jordanian thing? A prior commitment from the Shah? Kissinger: No, we just had Nixon: Ive already done that. Kissinger: All you have to do is tell the Jordanians Nixon: All right. Kissinger: that we dont accept it. Nixon: All right. But youthey have to be told that immediately. Thats the least we can do. Kissinger: Right. I think, Mr. President, we can wait 24 hours to Nixon: Why? Kissinger: Well, because I think I should present you calmly what everyone else saysour military Nixon: Henry, if you raise this thing at the WSAG meeting Kissinger: It isnt a WSAG meeting because Nixon: About the Jordanians? Kissinger: Yes, because Nixon: Then the whole damn thing will get out in the papers. Kissinger: Because it came in the open channels, there was no way I could hold it. Nixon: Then it will be out in the papers. Kissinger: Well, if you move two squadrons of planes it will be in the papers. Nixon: I know, but they moved them. But my point is Kissinger: Well its illegal for them to move them without [unclear]. Mitchell: [unclear]
Kissinger: No, we can get it done. Nixon: And try, Henry, to see what we, what really we can do to affect the outcome. Kissinger: There are two things to consider. One is, the Jordanian move without our support, which we can probably engineer, is possible, but wont be a deterrent on the Indians unless the Indians feel we are behind it. Nixon: Id like to make sure that the Indians know we are behind it one way or another. Kissinger: I believe Nixon: I think it will be in the papers. Kissinger: [unclear] No we canI got a message to the Jordanians today Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: [2 seconds not declassified]. They had to press these goddamn [unclear] for two dayswell they told us there was a message, but they also said the King was hoping that we wouldnt answer it because he didnt want to give his [unclear] for the opposite to be true. I got a message [3 seconds not declassified] to the King today telling him we were not yet ready to give the permission but we understood the problem, and that he shouldnt construe our silence as a lack of [unclear]. He knows [unclear]. He didnt commit us to anything. I mean, it isnt any one move weve got to make, Mr. President. If we do it, weve got to go all out or we shouldnt do it at all. We should thenthe thing that worked so well in the Middle East was Nixon: Jordan? Kissinger: In Jordan we suddenly just started pouring things in there. Now I have a little task force working on all the measures you could take if you wanted to go tough. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: Well thats what Im working on. [unclear] well take an aircraft carrier from Vietnam into the Bay of Bengal for the evacuation of American civilians that are in the area. We dont say theyre there toit would be a mistake. We just say were moving them in, in order to evacuate American civilians. That shouldnt [unclear]. Nixon: We certainly used that as a pretext, a pretext in the Jordan crisis.
Kissinger: Thats right. Now allIm sure all hell will break loose here, but they will pay us off on success. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: I mean after all [unclear] Nixon: Would you, John, move the aircraft carrier? Id do it immediately. I wouldnt wait 24 hours. Mitchell: The goddamn Indians have [unclear]. Kissinger: Weve had arrangements made to get airplanes into Dacca. Mitchell: The only way we can get the [unclear] is by helicopter. Nixon: The aircraft carrier is easy. Now what else? Kissinger: Well the aircraft carrier, according to the Indians, would have to be delivered here because Keating will have a heart attack Nixon: What the Christ is Keating doing? Fucking around again? Kissinger: Sort of. Keating has Nixon: Did you tell Rockefeller? Kissinger: No, no. Nixon: You want to put Keating on the goddamn [unclear]. Kissinger: I told, I told Alex Johnson. Keatingthe Indians had the nerve to call in Keating, and said that their recognition of Bangladesh proves their peaceful intent because it meant that they had no annexationist desires, it meant that they were going to leave Bangladesh on its own for a period. And Keating said he agreed with them. So they feed him this line thatthe Indian foreign minister said Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: "You shouldnt call me an aggressor" he said. "I wouldnt have used this term. I would have said what you were doing was an offensive-defense." You know [unclear] Nixon: Now theres one thing, theres one other thing, Henry, that, you know, [unclear] Bush has done at the UN [unclear] and it plays balls out. I may just have to go on in a press conference, to
[meet] the press on this subject, and say they are aggressors. And, you see what I mean? Now thats anotherit brings the whole right Kissinger: I think if were going to play it at all, weve got to do it fast and hard. The worst thing could be to wait for every little thing to develop as we have done on the East Pakistan crisis. Nixon: Now, what about Indian aid? Is there anything more that we can do there? Kissinger: We can assessthe only other Nixon: Remember, on this I was for doing it more openly. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: And all weve doneremember the whole line was, "Well lets do it but not say anything." Well, weve done that and it hasnt worked. Right? Kissinger: God no. We did all Nixon: On the economic side, you know Kissinger: On the economic side Nixon: Do you remember two weeks ago I got Connally in before he left and he said, "Now you cut off everything that you can." We told him everything, Henry, here. Kissinger: Yeah, but Connallythe difference was you told both Connally and Rogers. Connally moved the same afternoon to cut off Ex-Im Nixon: Right. Kissinger: and hes been holding up loans at the World Bank. State blew 2 weeks to prepare position papers. The day we announced our munitions cutoff, partial munitions cutoff, they did it in the form of a release that said what we would continue to ship. So we didnt give the Indians the real shock effect when they still were onlywhen theyat first the Indians were not claiming they were invading. First they said they were Bengalis. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: But that is water over the dam. Mitchell: What were the Russians going to do about [unclearBangladesh?] Kissinger: They havent decided yet.
Mitchell: Are they going to? Kissinger: Probably. Nixon: Well, we wontever. Kissinger: But what we should do, Mr. President, and we have another 24 hours to make the decision, I dont want to talk you into it now, because we should do all these things simultaneously. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: We should get a note to the Chinese. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: We should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon: I agree with that. Go ahead. Kissinger: We should Nixon: Lets, lets talk about the things I mean. One, Id agree with him. Second, with regard to an announcement, with regard to the aid thing, I mean just cut it off. All aid to India, period. Kissinger: Well, its practically all cut off now. Nixon: Economic? Kissinger: Except for the $124 million worth of goods that Nixon: Well, how about saying it will not be included in our next budget. We can announce the budget, see. Aid to India will not be included. Kissinger: That we can do. And Id let theId let the Jordanians move Nixon: Put that to them [unclear exchange]. Kissinger: another squadron to Pakistan simply to show them some exclamation and let the Iranians move their two squadrons to Jordan if they want to. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: Thirdly, I will get a stem-winder of a note to the Russians to tell them that it will shoot everything, it will clearly jeopardize everything we have Nixon: One of the real problems we have here is that Dobrynin is not here. You can fill him in. I can bring him in and tell him; it would have a hell of a lot more effect.
Kissinger: And you could tell the Chinese what youre doing and tell them of the advantage for them to move some troops to the frontier. Now, some of these things I defend. Pakistan [sic. India] is, in my view, going to move East. The Jordanians are going to move their two squadrons anyways. There are already Pakistani pilots. That is hardly [really?] necessary, so that countries like Iran dont forget to [unclearbe impressed?]what in Gods name did Yahya do for us? When we get in trouble, this is what all these countries are going to do for us. Nixon: You say its illegal for us to do, also for the Jordanians. Kissinger: Well, the way we can make it legal is to resume arms sales throughif we, if you announce that Pakistan is now eligible for the purchase of arms. See, one thing these guys never told us when they cut off licenses to Pakistan Nixon: That would be tough, Henry, to go that way. Did they say that Pakistan now can get arms? Youd have one hell of a Kissinger: Im getting to the legal provision. Nixon: Oh yeah. Kissinger: If we had not closed the pipeline to Pakistan then Jordan could transfer its arms to Pakistan legally. Because the law says that any country which is receiving or eligible for American arms aid can receive American arms from other countries. Mitchell: Well, thats all [unclear] Kissinger: But the way you get the Jordanian planes in there is to tell the King we cannot give you legal permission. On the other hand, wed have to figure out a message, which says, "Well just close our eyes. Get the goddamned planes in there." Nixon: Can we send a special emissary to him? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: Wed have to do it that way. We cannot authorize it. Nixon: How would we do it? Through some embassy or is that? Kissinger: No, no, no. Wed have to use either, wed have to use Nixon: Helms? Helms could do it, couldnt he?
Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: All right. Lets get that one down. Kissinger: We might even be able to get the Israelis to get someone in there. Nixon: Talk to the Israelis and see if you can do something on that, will you? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Well, at least tell the Jordanians, too. Well hold them harmless against the Israelis. See? I mean, weIf they found out that were talking with the Israelis, I think thats something we could leak Kissinger: We cannot leak it. Legally it is not possible for Jordan to get our [unclearpermission?]. The way to do it is the way weve had to deal with Iran. But the Shah of Iran doesnt dare do it anymore unless he gets a formal commitment from us, not because of the Congress but because of the Russians. This is the same. If the situation is Nixon: Now, whats the formal position? [unclear] Kissinger: Well, either way, unless we make a formal declaration, the Russians may jump ship. Mitchell: [unclear] Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: Can we do that through a private communication? Do we have to do it in public? Kissinger: Well, his planes have an additional problem, Mr. President. That they would have to be flown by Iranian pilots. Nixon: Oh, I know. Kissinger: The better arrangement is for the Iranian planes to go to Jordan, and the Jordanian Nixon: Yeah, I know. I know. All right. We can work that proposition out. But its difficult for the Russians. I dont know what we can say that you have not already said. Kissinger: A stiff note. Right now, I havent replied to the note they gave us on Monday. And I think we should just say nothing until weve done something because weve got nothing left to say. Mitchell: By the time your note gets through that Russian bureaucracy theyll be so far down the line.
Kissinger: No, wed give [unclear] Nixon: To Brezhnev. Kissinger: It goes directly to Brezhnev. Nixon: Yeah, we have a way. Kissinger: If State did it, they would just sit on it. [unclear exchange] Kissinger: After youvebecause we havent got enough to tell them yet. After youve made the final decision on the Jordan thing. And after weve movedwe shouldnt move the carrier until youve decided on theI think if we do anything we should do it all together. Nixon: Well, it seems to me that [unclear] very much. But we move the carrier, the Jordanians move their planes Kissinger: [unclear exchange] The Chinese move their forces. Nixon: Well, the way we do that is you get a message through Walters? Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: Just go to New York and say, I have a message from the President to Chou En-lai. Put it on that basis. I wouldnt fool around. Mitchell: Whats the prospect of the Chinese moving? Nixon: None. Well, thats what I mean. If theres a chance, you told me none, Henry, yesterday. Remember? Kissinger: No, but that was when they thought they were completely wrong. Im not so sure theres none, Mr. President. Because they know that this is a dress rehearsal of what may happen to them. Nixon: What I would like to do in the note to the Chinese is to state exactly that, that I consider this to be a dress rehearsal and I think their move, some move toward the border would restrain India. And that as far as were concerned we hold them harmless. The Russians arent going to dump the Chinese. Not now. Kissinger: My feeling, Mr. President, is that the Russians are not likely going to give up the trade, the Middle East negotiations, and the SALT negotiations
Nixon: Incidentally, a small thing, but did Haig work out something for Stans? [unclear] I told him, dont give anything away. But dont worry about it. Stans got his message. Let Haig handle it. Kissinger: They are still afraid that youre too bright. [unclear] And I think that their whole governmental system was geared towards relaxation with us. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: This is a godsend that President Nixon comes their way, [unclear] and therefore I dont think [unclear]. Nixon: What is it then? Kissinger: Well, then the Pakistanis are going to lose. But even then we are not that directly, that much involved. The carrier Nixon: Well, my point is theyre going to lose anyway. At least we make an effort, and there is a chance to save it. If they lose anyway, were no worse off than if we didnt try. Thats the way I look at it. Dont you agree, John? Mitchell: Yes, and I know there are time factors here that people arent taking into consideration. That the Pakistanis in East Pakistan are going to keep the Indians busy for quite a while before they can move west. Kissinger: I think, if I had a guess, I think that it is not inconceivable to me that the Chinese will start a little diversionnot a huge onebut enough to keep the Indians from moving too many troops west. Nixon: [unclear]. But do you think we could encourage them that way? Kissinger: Well, it would certainly take a load off their minds. But the advantage is if we communicate all this stuff with Haig to the Chinese, and they see that we meant business. Secondly, we told the Shah of Iran, and the Jordanians, and other friends that you do everything you can. And you would do more if it were not for this goddamn Senate. I think its better [unclear]. They were sending cables to the King of Jordan lecturing him about the immorality of getting involved in a war 500 miles away. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia]
Kissinger: Mr. President, if anyone had predicted five years ago that Pakistan could be dismembered with Russian assistance, without anyone doing something, they would have thought that was insane. Nixon: I think were setting this up as a public relations campaign, both at the UN and [unclear]. Its very helpful. Thats one of the few good things thats happened. [unclear exchange] Nixon: Im not concerned about the Teddy Kennedy [unclear]. Are you? Mitchell: Not at all. Kissinger: I think theyre all on the wrong side of the issue, because in 6 months it will be apparent that Indian oppression of Bengal is much worse than Pakistani oppression. Mitchell: That stupid Kennedy. At the same time that hes got India on the table, hes attacking the British. [unclear] [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: In what you discuss at your meeting, I just strongly urgedont let, keep as much of it under the hat as you can. What I mean is lets do the carrier thing. Lets get assurances to the Jordanians. Lets send a message to the Chinese. Lets send a message to the Russians. And I would tell the people in the State Department not a goddamn thing they dont need to know. Right, John? Mitchell: I would hope so. Kissinger: Except that they have to know of the movement of the Jordanian planes. And I would rather Mitchell: Well, youve got to give them the party line on that or all a sudden the Secretary of State will say thats illegal. Kissinger: Id rather just have Nixon: All right. Kissinger: Let Johnson in on it now. Nixon: All right.
Kissinger: To say that if they move them against our law, they are not to have [unclear sanctions?]. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: I mean, Ive got to tell them that much. Nixon: All right, thats an order. Youre goddamn right. Kissinger: OK. Nixon: Is it really so much against our law? Kissinger: Whats against our law is not what they do, but our giving them permission. Nixon: Henry, we give the permission privately. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Hell, weve done worse.

166. Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03-8:12 p.m.
Nixon: What I was thinking of with regard to the options, and I want you to know that Im supposed to be working on them now Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Maybe we have to really put it to the Russians and say that we feel that under the circumstances that we have to cancel the summit. Kissinger: No, I wouldnt do that yet. Nixon: No? Kissinger: Thats too drastic. Nixon: Well Kissinger: I think, Mr. President Nixon: I want you to know that Im prepared. Kissinger: Well, I know Nixon: Because if these people areweve got to look at down the road. You got a minute now? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: The things that weve got to consider are these: 1) the cost of letting this go down the drain. All right, that will be great. And then doing the other things. Then, on the other hand, weve got to figure if we play this out the fact [is] that we may not be around after the election. We have to just figure as simply as that. And its a tough goddamn decision. Yet on the other hand, being around after the election, if everything is down the drain, [it] doesnt make any difference.
Kissinger: Exactly. Mr. President, if we play it out toughly its my convictionthis may go down the drain, but if we play it out toughly we will get some compensation somewhere, and you can go to Moscow with your head up. If you just let it go down the drain, the Moscow summit may not be worth having. Thats the reluctant view. I mean, after all the anguish weve gone through setting this thing up, nobody wants to jeopardize it either. Nixon: We might say this, for example, and Im going toIll do the note taking and refresh myself; my thought is to say I was very pleased with Secretary Stans conversations. I was very pleased with the conversations weve had with regard to the Mid-East; Im pleased with the progress on SALT. Its hard for me to understand that all of this could be jeopardized by this area of the world, but it is being jeopardized. And that under the circumstances, I think we have to take a look at itwe have to choose as to what we can do here. Kissinger: Thats what weve already set reservations on. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: I dont believe, Mr. Presidentthe major problem now is that the Russians retain their respect for you. If theyre going to play it into an absolute showdown then the summit wasnt worth having anyway. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: If they want a relaxation with us, we can give them plenty of ways out. Nixon: Now, with regard to the ways out, though, the missing thing here is what we want as a way out. In other words, what do we say to themwhat is the method of settlement? We cant say go back to the status quo ante. We can say, "Well, get the hell out of West Pakistan. Leave it alone, etc., etc., etc." Kissinger: At this stage we have to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: That is the matrix. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan, but thats something that will get watered down as they [unclear] at the conference.
Nixon: Right. Kissinger: But we have to prevent West Pakistan from getting [unclear]. Nixon: Weve got to say that that iswe have a treaty, wouldnt you say? Kissinger: Its a little premature yet to make a move towards the Russians. They still owe you an answer to your previous note. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: And therefore we have to hold it up a bit. But I thinkI believe, Mr. President, we can come out of this withif they maintain their respect for us even if you lose, we still will come out all right. Nixon: You mean, moving the carrier and letting the few planes go in and that sort of thing. Well, maybe. Kissinger: Well Nixon: That helps, I give you. Kissinger: Its not a good hand, Mr. President. But doing absolutely nothingright now were in the position where we are telling allies not to assist another ally that is in mortal danger and to which we have a legal obligation. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: Were in the position where a Soviet stooge, supported with Soviet arms, is overrunning a country that is an American ally of the United States Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Keep it to a minimum. Nixon: Hmm, hmm. Kissinger: And I think we will preserve a little bit of our honor. Nixon: Yeah. The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the hole there. That, goddamn, if theyd just move a littleI just think they might move a little if they thought we were going to play. Kissinger: But I think if we do absolutely nothing it will trigger the Soviets into really a tough attitude. Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: And if we can, if we can still scare somebody else, which is not excluded, I give it less than fifty-fifty, it may open the Middle East solution. Nixon: Hmm, hmm. Kissinger: If this thing blows, the Middle Eastwe wont Nixon: Right. Kissinger: be able to talk to anybody. Nixon: Well, dont underestimate the fact that if, by good chance, the Congress gets out this week and, if we smack North Vietnam pretty strongly, thatll be somewhat of a message to these people. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Huh? Kissinger: Thats right. Although, we ought to time itif we send a message to the Chinese to leave a little integral between the message and package it so that they dont think we used it as a pretext to get at Vietnam. Nixon: Yeah. I think the message to the Soviets Kissinger: Is more important now. Nixon: At the moment isnt it? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Its a little risky [unclear]. Kissinger: Thats right. Absolutely. Nixon: We cant assume [unclear]. Although, they must be agonizing over this now. Kissinger: But theyre so weak. Their trouble is that theyve just had a semi-revolt in the military. Nixon: Have they really? Kissinger: Yeah. And theyve had a million peoplethey have a million Russians on their border [unclear]. Nixon: Boy, I tell you a movement of even some Chinese toward that border could scare those goddamn Indians to death.
Kissinger: No question about it. As soon as we have made the decision here, we can then talk to the Chinese. I would rather do that on Friday. [unclear] Nixon: Yeah. Well, if we could enlist them some way thatd be something.

168. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44-1:27 p.m.
Kissinger: Muskie came mumbling up to me about India-Pakistan. Nixon: What did you do? Kissinger: I said Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Actually, what he said wasnt all that bad. He said hes for ceasefire-withdrawal and what he said publicly. I said, "Look Senator, we will be able to demonstrate that the Indians deliberately provoked this war. In the 10 minutes weve got here I cant go into any details but I just want to tell you that we will be able to demonstrate this." [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger: Now, to get back to the Pakistan issue. We have this letter from Brezhnev. Its a pretty rough deal for us. What hes proposing is a ceasefire in return for negotiations between Yahya and the Awami League. Nixon: Which means? Kissinger: Which means Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: I supposewell, if they dont spell it out. Our problem is 1) to prevent an attack by the Indians on West Pakistan. Nixon: They are already attacking. Kissinger: Well not at full force yet. Right now the West Pakistanis are still attacking them more than the other way around. The danger is that if nothing happens between nowif the war continues India will wind up with a Bhutan in the east and Nepal in the west. And the
consequences of this, the rape of the sovereign country and one that has an alliance with the United States, including a secret commitment, particularly applicable to this situation, I think would be severe in Iran, in Indonesia and in the Middle East, at least. And Dick Helms agrees with this. I had him make an independent assessment. Now, there is no good deal possible anymore at this stage. And if the Russians want to press it to a brutal conclusion, were going to lose. On the other hand, the letter is in a very conciliatory form and we have a number of answers: One, they want the Middle East Nixon: Has the letter from the Agricultural Minister arrived? Kissinger: No. The letter is a reply to the letter we sent him on Monday, which was very tough. One, they want a Middle East settlement. Two Nixon: They put that in the letter? Kissinger: No. But we know it. Two, they want a European Security conference. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Three Nixon: Three, they want trade. Kissinger: They want trade. And four, they want you there, and theyre afraid theyll drive you completely towards Peking. So we have, we are not without assets. The State Department position, as I understand it, is to do nothingis to say we shouldnt get involved and at the right moment urge Yahya to vacate that part of Kashmir that his forces have occupied in return for a ceasefire and forget about East Pakistan. Now the Russians have made us a better offer than that. The Russiansnow one advantage of accepting Nixon: Of course the Russians have indicated that theyre interested in negotiations. Kissinger: Between West and East Pakistan. Nixon: But when will the Russians believe [unclear]? Kissinger: Well, what this would do is keep the Russians from recognizing Bangladesh. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Yes. But they might. My recommendation would be this: First, to warn the Russians and the Indians if this continues, we could leak out or in some way make clear that Kennedy
made a commitment to Pakistan against aggression from India. This will shut up some of the liberals. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: I told them Nixon: [unclear] know that commitment? Kissinger: Yeah. Yeah. That sure doesnt mean anything. Nixon: Oh, it doesnt? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Why not? Kissinger: Because it was just a note from the Ambassador. Nixon: Lets put it out. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Lets put it out. What do you think? Kissinger: We should put it out as part of a general plan. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: Secondly, we should move the helicopter ship. Im not so much in favor of moving the carrier. Wed have to do a helicopter ship and some escorts into the Bay of Bengal. And claim that theyre for evacuation. Thirdly, on the Jordanian Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Well, it shows we arenot on the Indians but on the Russians Nixon: Why the carrier? Kissinger: Well because I think once the news of that hits therell be so many people screaming were [there] for intervention. And then we have to explain what we will never do. Nixon: [unclear] we didyou know that we did the whole damn Turkey thing [unclear] for the purposes of being able to evacuate Americans. You remember? Kissinger: Yeah, but in Nixon: Cant play this game here. Is that correct?
Kissinger: I would be reluctantyou know you should [unclearconsider?] both courses. From the Chinese angle Id like to move the carrier. From the public opinion angle, what the press and television would do to us if an American carrier showed up there I Nixon: What, whycant the carrier be there for the purpose of evacuation? Kissinger: Yeah, but against whom are we going to use the planes? Against whom are we going to use the planes? Are we going to shoot our way in? Nixon: So what do we move? Move a little helicopter ship in there? What good does that do? And why do it? Kissinger: Well its a token that something else will come afterward. Gets our presence established there. Nixon: All right. That way Kissinger: And the Jordanians Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Id let the Jordanians move some of their planes in. And Id get the Indian Ambassador in and demand assurances that India doesnt want to annex territory. Nixon: Now what part of this does State take action? Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, I know itit is embarrassing to hear India complaining constantly about the bureaucracy. Nixon: All right. [unclear] Kissinger: You have Nixon: I just want to know what we have to get across. Kissinger: Well, State objects. Every time we ask State "what do you do now," they have a telegram to Yahya asking him to do something. The choice is between adopting a generally threatening posture and indicating States policy is noninvolvementdont get any arms in, dont move anything. Nixon: Non-involved? Meaning? Kissinger: Rape of Pakistan. Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: Thats right. And they would propose a ceasefire in the west in return for in effect our recognition of Bangladesh, which is a total collapse, it would hurt us with the Chinese. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: No. But he may not feel Nixon: Now lets look at this from the standpoint, really look at what the realities are. You know you can handle these people [unclear]. When you look at the realities there Kissinger: The realities Nixon: The partition of Pakistan is a fact. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: We know that. Kissinger: Of course. Nixon: You see those people welcoming the Indian troops when they come in. [unclear]. Now the point is, why is then, Henry, are we going through all this agony? Kissinger: Were going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed. Secondly, to maintain our Chinese arm. Thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the worlds psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle a not so insignificant country without anybody doing anything. Now the purpose of the [unclearcourse?] that Im suggesting is whether we can put enough chips into the pot to get the Russians for their own reasons, for the other considerations, to call a halt to it. It may not work, after which Nixon: What are we going to ask the Russians to do? Kissinger: Ceasefire, negotiation, and subsequent withdrawal. But wed have to clear it with Yahya first before we did it. But before we ask the Russians Nixon: Ceasefire and negotiation on what basis? Kissinger: Between East, between Nixon: Bangladesh? Kissinger: No, between the Awami League. The word Bangladesh wouldnt be mentioned. Between the Awami League and Islamabad on the basis of the December 1970 election, which is
what theyve proposed here, which is, but within the framework of a united Pakistan. So the West Pakistanis would give by recognizing the Awami League, and the Awami League would give by not insisting on it as a precondition on Bangladesh. And the Russians would disassociate themselves from India on Bangladesh. Nixon: And then wed have a ceasefire and withdrawal would not occur though? Kissinger: Withdrawal would occur after the settlement. Nixon: Yeah. After the settlement? But there will be no settlement though? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Then what happens? Theres no withdrawal? Correct? Kissinger: But then West Pakistan would be preserved. Nixon: Why? Because theres not enough Indians there yet for withdrawal to matter? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: [unclear] to see whats at the end of the road. Kissinger: No, because right now the Indians do not yet hold much of West Pakistan and the West Pakistanis hold a little bit of Indian territory, so that comes out a wash. The major problem there is that the Pakistan army is not yet defeated in the west. Theyll run out in ammunition and POL in two weeks. Nixon: So theyre going to [unclear] including the Russians? Kissinger: Im not sure. But at least then well have separated them. Nixon: What can we do down the road about the Indians? Kissinger: Id cut Nixon: We could call in the Ambassador and tell him why. Kissinger: Demanding assurances. I would keep open the possibility that well pour in arms into Pakistan. I dont understand the psychology by which the Russians can pour arms into India but we cannot give arms to Pakistan. I dont understand the theory of non-involvement. I dont see where we will be as a country. I have to tell you honestly, I consider this our Rhineland. But politically it wont affect us through next year because our opponents are so far to the left Nixon: Yeah, of course, we will be all right. [unclear]
Kissinger: Well but Nixon: I guess you have to determine, Henry, now what is the political [unclear] Kissinger: Well but Nixon: The Jordanians Kissinger: It will make both your trips to Nixon: It may well be that we just have to say that [unclearweve done?] the best we can. We will lose public opinion [unclear] Chou En-lai, but thats all right. We lose public opinion. [unclear] Understand were not risking Kissinger: Yeah, but we could come out with a settlement too. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: On our present course well come out with a rape. Nixon: Yeah, yeah. I understand. Ive tried to put, thoughweve got to look at the options in their worse form. Its very possible that we come out without a settlement. It will appear that we intervened and failed. The Russiansthe American public opinion, [unclear] you see by becoming involved then you get into the whole dialogue about defeat or victory. You see? Were not in that now. Were not at all. It isnt quite [unclear]. We know, you and I Kissinger: And it will be obvious after Nixon: We know. And it will be obvious after time. I hear you, I hear you. I agree. We, but Im speaking now Kissinger: But other things Nixon: Now on this point we have to bear in mind thatand thats why actually we have to look clear down the road. We probably ought to risk, if were going to go we ought to risk the summit with the Russians. Kissinger: Yeah, but were risking it either way because if the Russians come out of it totally cocky, we may have a Middle East war in the spring. And which isand Peking may be a problem because what the hell is Peking getting out of us then? Were not going to give them Formosa; were not strong enough to give them any other assurances. But you are right, that is the other side of the story.
Nixon: What should we tell the Russians? Kissinger: I would tell the Russians if, Id say you recognize that good relations with the Soviet Union youve always believed are the cornerstone of peace that presupposes that neither side will take unilateral advantage of situations. Now, just when we were getting a settlement, just when we were beginning to move on the Middle East, the Soviet Union is encouraging a total change in the situation and the Indians have counted on them. You have to tell them that this will affect our relationship. And its bound to affect our relationship if they dont cooperate in bringing it to a close. Nixon: We told them that already in a letter. You think telling them in person is also a good idea. Kissinger: Yeah, because then hed have heard it from you. Weve got Butz saying something like that in his toast today at lunch. I think we are betterwell, but thats what I always think, so its my advice that doing nothing is the State Departments advice. Nixon: Well Im all for doing something, but just Kissinger: You are jeopardizing Nixon: We have to know what were jeopardizing and know that once we go balls out we never look back. Kissinger: Thats right. You are jeopardizing your relationship with the Soviets but thats also your card, your willingness to jeopardize it. If you dont do it, they come out of this completely ahead. Now I dont know Nixon: I suppose States objections and those who would oppose this [unclear]. Deep down they dont want to jeopardize their relations with India. Kissinger: Thats their principal objection. [unclear exchange] Nixon: Second, they do not want to jeopardize our relations with the Congress in terms of noninvolvement because Congress is for non-involvement around the world. And third, State [unclear]. Kissinger: But they know [unclearthe end?] Thats right. Nixon: Is that about the way [unclear]?
Kissinger: That is right. That is right. Nixon: So they say, "Why try?" They always say that things arent going to work. And that, of course, is always, sometimes, an excuse Kissinger: That is right. That is right. Now, of course, in our relations with the Indians we, no matter what happens Nixon: But just think, I am going to raise [unclearthe ante?] in the goddamn thing, except for [unclear]. Kissinger: Again you could argue that it will help us in the long-term with the Indians. Nixon: I dont give a damn about the Indians. I dont think it makes a damn bit of difference whether what the relations Kissinger: But you see we dont have to do a hell of overt things. You know the Jordanian airplanes; were talking only about less than twenty. Its only a symbol that things are getting out of hand. Once the Indians have launched their attack I would oppose Nixon: The Jordanian airplane thingI mean did you raise that in your Russian meetings? Kissinger: Uh, yeah, but theyre so opposed to it. What theyd say if we Nixon: Why have they [unclear]? I dont, I dont believeI dont want them to be able to know. We need a news conference for it. They went out having a luncheon meeting there and I dont know who that [unclear] probably put out that story to that effect. Who else there could have put out the story to the effect that I directly ordered it, or any of us were involved? Huh? Kissinger: I have no idea. I dont know. Nixon: Who could do it? Kissinger: I have no idea. I really dont know. [At] the UN, they sit in these meetings, Mr. President, on total sabotage without guts. Theyre sitting there. They never volunteer anything, sullenly dragging things out of them. They procrastinate on everything. I cant run in to you three times a day. Weve gone through hell for three weeks. But, thats my job so I cant do anything but bitching about thebut this is the first time we havent succeeded in getting done what needed to be done, because on Cambodia and Laos, on all these things, we held the cards. And even if we
waited a week or two longer than we needed to, nothing wrong was being done. This one, theyve just screwed it up 10 percent each day. Nixon: Whats Packard think? Kissinger: Hes on your side, but again none of them have the real strategic conception. Nixon: But at least hes on our side, though. Kissinger: No, no. Packard, Helms and the others are. Nixon: Theyre [unclear]. Kissinger: I explained. I discussed the situation with Connally. I mean, not the bureaucratic one, I didnt. Nixon: Whats Connally feel? Or has [unclear] put it off again? Kissinger: No, I gave him the pros and cons but probably in an unfair way. Nixon: All right. What did he say? Kissinger: He would do everything that I recommend, except moving the carrier because he thinks it might be a political liability. Hed move the helicopters there. Nixon: Why does he think the carrier is a political liability? Kissinger: Because he thinks people will then ask, "Are we going to intervene militarily?" And that, he thinks, is not feasible. Nixon: I know, but were not going to intervene. What does it mean? Kissinger: And then youll have Nixon: We cannot have stories about how we [unclear], but on the other hand, I happen to know damn well theyre lying. Kissinger: Its a close decision. I go back and forth on it myself. Nixon: Are there a lot of Americans in that area? Are there? Kissinger: There are 300 in West Pakistan and 200 in East Pakistan, something like that. Its on the order of 500. I dont know how many there are. Nixon: Could we put the carrier in safely? Kissinger: I told them all to give me their views by two oclock. Nixon: What did they say?
Kissinger: I havent letI didnt let them express any of it. Nixon: You asked for clearance moving carriers mainly for the purpose of evacuation? Kissinger: Oh yeah. Nixon: Dont, dont tell them. Well let them know when theyre engaged. Kissinger: Oh, no. Nixon: Dont let them in on the [unclear], on all our [unclear]. You understand? Just lie low. Kissinger: Hmm. Nixon: Right? Kissinger: Right. But if you want to be Nixon: On Jordan, let me say, on Jordan, Im just thinking of this thing. Listen, I really think we need more carriers involved in this thing. I think moving the carrier [unclear] why would that pose a problem? Goddamn it, Ive got a responsibility to protect American lives. Im going to do it. Ill just phrase it right out. Now, whats the argument against it? Kissinger: Uh Nixon: Why is that [unclear]? Kissinger: Nobody will believe it. Nixon: Huh? Kissinger: The Indians will scream were threatening them. Nixon: Why are we doing it anyway? Arent we going in for the purpose of strength? Well, what do we want them [unclear] for? Kissinger: Well Ihell, Id move the carriers so that we can tell the Chinese tomorrow to move their forces to the frontier, and then if the Russians intervene Nixon: Well, all right. Now, will the Chinese intervene if we dont move the carriers? We may just move the helicopters in. Kissinger: Itd be better to have the carrier. But wed have to do a lot of things, and wed have to do them toughly. Nixon: I understand. I think we ought to get started on it
Kissinger: I mean wed have to get the Indian Ambassador called in and demand assurances against annexation. Wed have to leak at that moment that secret understanding to protect the Indians [Pakistanis] against aggression. Nixon: I understand. I get the whole plan. Well get the whole thing together. Quite to, with regard to the, with regard to the Jordanians, how do we wield that now? Kissinger: The way we would do that is to [2 seconds not declassified] tell the King to move his planes and inform us that hes done it. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: And then we would tell State to shut up. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: If hewe would have to tell him its illegal, but if he does it well keep things under control. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. All right, thats the way we play that. And then State, the only thing theyve ever donewell, we need Congress to be gone for the weekend any way. Thats another good thing, though. You realize that its coming at a good time. Kissinger: What we should do, though, is tellthe reason I suggested getting these guys together, Mr. President Nixon: I know it. Kissinger: is to stop their [unclear], to tell them you want to overawe Nixon: I understand. When do we do it? [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: And then we go to the line. And tell him that were going to move the carrier. Do I tell him that? I dont know. Im perfectly willing to tell him everything. [unclear]. Are we going to tell them that Im going to approve the Jordanian thing, or not? [unclear] tell them to sit down Kissinger: Let me Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Let me think about it Nixon: [unclear] so dont worry. Ill, Ill
Kissinger: I think Nixon: Ill put it to him Monday Kissinger: for our game planIf youve decided to do this game plan, I think its more important that you see the Russian today because his cable would go back. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: And we could get the others in first thing in the morning because they cant, wont do a damn thing about it anyway. Nixon: See the Russian? Hmm. I think they do. [unclear] Let me ask you this: Why didnt we decide on a game plan now? Kissinger: I didnt find it Nixon: We decide the plan now. Figure it out. Kissinger: Right, but I Nixon: Ok? Now the way I look at the plan it leads on to the question of the carrier. Doesnt that bother you that much? Kissinger: It wont get there for 6 days anyway. Congress will be out of session. Nixon: And Congress is going to be out, so people will say "The carriers there." And Ill say its for the purpose of getting our people out. Kissinger: Right. Nixon: In case something happens. But when it starts to move, is that, will that get out? You get that? See, I dont want [unclear]. Kissinger: The carrier movement may get out. Nixon: The carrier will arrive. Kissinger: Uh, yeah. Id like to talk to Moorer to see whether we can keep the carrier back of the Bay of Bengal. Nixon: All right. And then can we move the other helicopter thing in on the other hand? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Fine. Ok, well move on that. Second, with regard to the Jordanians, no sweat. That should be on your [unclear].
Kissinger: Right. Nixon: And [1 second not declassified] will inform them. Kissinger: All right. Nixon: Well get him going on that. Third, with regard to the talk with the Russian, Ill make it today. Fourth, I [want to] know that the Chinese know were going to do that. Kissinger: Ill deliver that tomorrow. Nixon: Fifth, leak out the Kennedy thing. That ought to be done. So they know that we are concerned about the fact that we do have a deal with Pakistan. Kissinger: Well let State do that. When they call Jha in they will inform him of the commitment. Nixon: Youre going to have them call Jha in, or should I do it? Kissinger: No, No. Thats their baby. Let them have it for assurances theres no annexations. And while theyre there inform them that we have these commitments. [unclear] And that the Indians [unclearunderstand?] that there were commitments by Kennedy. Let them put it out. Nixon: All right. Thats what I told [unclear]. Kissinger: If you could give them advance guidance. What you needwithin 10 minutes say gentlemen its my decision to overto try to deter an Indian attack on West Pakistan. I want the Indians warned. I want [unclear] movement supported. And I want the bureaucracies [support] for evacuation purposes. I wouldnt say anything about Jordan. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: And I wantit is your responsibility to line up your bureaucracies to perform this with enthusiasm. And to stop the leaking. And to come up with ideas now how we can get this accomplished. Ten minutes and Id walk out. I wouldnt have a discussion with them. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: We have Irwin, and Johnson, and Packard, and Moorer, and Helms. Everyone will be on your side except Irwin and Johnson. [unclear exchange] Kissinger: Ill get a talking paper for both the Russian Nixon: Now, [unclear] on the issue of the Russian.
[Nixon and Kissinger closed the conversation by discussing when to schedule a meeting with the Soviet Minister of Agriculture and another with the officials from State, Defense, the JCS, and the CIA.]

169. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Charg d Affaires (Vorontsov), Washington, December 9, 1971, 4:00-4:41 p.m.
Nixon: I look forward, of course, to my meeting with the Chairman. And, of course, meeting him when I am there. I believe that this meeting could becould bethe most important meeting to take place between heads of representatives of major governments in this century. First, speaking in personal terms, you can assure the Chairman that I approach the meeting with the same feeling in the heart that he has. As the head of, each of us leading the two most powerful countries in the world, we hold in our hands the future of all the world. If we fail, it will be damaging to our people, to the Russian people, but to the people of the whole world. We approach this in a positive spirit. One problem, however, that is a current problem, I would like to discuss very frankly with the Minister and our friend Mr. Vorontsov is theit is a problem that greatly concerns us as it concerns, Im sure, Chairman Brezhnevthe problem of India-Pakistan. I dont want the, or expect the Secretary for AgricultureMinister for Agricultureto comment or, because, as you know, we are in correspondence with Mr. Brezhnev. But I believe that you as one who is very close to the Chairman, and, of course, you as our top ranking representative of the Embassy at this time in Washington, I want you to know how strongly I feel personally about this issue. And it may be that as a result of this conversation you could convey to Chairman Brezhnev a sense of urgency that may lead to a settlement. Let me begin first with the positive side. In the past 3 years since I have been in this office, great progress has been made. And I dont think that 3 years ago that anybody would have predicted that Soviet-American relations would have made as much progress as theyve made. Speaking quite candidly, most people said, "Nixon is a strong anti-communist. The Russian leaders dont like Nixon. They cant get along with him." But on the other hand, I am a very direct man. And I believe in negotiation. But as I said to Mr. Gromyko when he was here
that when you have two powers eachwe are equal today; we were not when we met before when that picture was taken. Then the secret for success for relations between those powers is total respect between the two. I respect the Soviet leaders, and consequently its in that spirit that I want to convey my views on our relations at this point. First, we have made progress on SALT. We have made progress on a historic Berlin agreement, in our view. We have agreed to a meeting of the highest level [unclearin Moscow?]. We also have discussed the possibility of working out in the future a European Security conference, and of very, very great importance to both sides, we have begun through our special channelbetween Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Dobryninat Mr. Brezhnevs suggestion discussions on the Mid-East. As I see it right now, we have an opportunity for a totally new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. We wont agree on everything, but if we can agree on Berlin, on limitation of armaments, on the Mid-East, on a European security conference, and then finally, as I say, if we can make progress in the field of tradewhere Secretary Stans received a very warm welcome and Im most grateful for itthis will mean that the United States and the Soviet Union will be as close together as we were during the great war. Thats what we want. I believe its possible for two nations with differences between governmentstwo nations with different, which we must recognize, different objectives in the world; your objective in the Mid-East is different than ours. But I think its possible for us to live in peace and to find areas of cooperation. And thats what I think our meeting in May is going to accomplish. But now speaking very frankly, a great cloud hangs over it. Its the problem in the subcontinent. In the United Nations we have disagreements. The Soviet Union on one side; the United States on another side. As far as the outcome of the present conflict is concerned, the Soviet Union is going to win. The client of the Soviet Union is India. India has 600 million people, and 600 million people are going to win over 60 million people. And if events go forward as they seem to be moving at the present time Pakistan, which lined up with China, will be cut in half. And, so consequently, looking at it in the short-range, this whole series of events on the subcontinent is dangerous for the Soviet Union; its a game for India; its a tragedy for Pakistan; and its been interpreted, of course, as being a setback for China because they back Pakistan,
the loser. What concerns me, Mr. Minister, is that it is certain that what is happening on the subcontinent will be a tragedy for Pakistan. But what would be far worse from the standpoint of the future of the world is that if we continue on a different coursethe Soviet Union going one way, the United States going another way on the subcontinentit could poison this whole new relationship, which has so much promise. It could be a disaster for it. So what I would like to suggest is that I do not believe that the gains that the Soviet Union may get from India winning or the dismemberment of Pakistan, gains which are probably certain, are worth jeopardizing the relationship with the United States. I do not say this to make trouble in any sense. But I think there is a better way. A better way is for the Soviet Union and the United States to find a method where we can work together for peace in that area. Now the first requirement is that there be a ceasefire. The second requirement is that, and this is imperative, that the Indians, who already have pretty much overcome the resistance in East Pakistan, the Indians desist in their attacks on West Pakistan. If they do not, the Indians after wiping out East Pakistan, if they then move their forces against West Pakistan, then the United States cannot stand by. Nowso the best way is the ceasefire and then maybe since the Soviet Union is open to the idea of withdrawalthe Chairman has suggested that there be political negotiationsI would say a ceasefire and then negotiations within a Pakistan framework in which Yahya will negotiate with the Awami League. And then bring [unclear] negotiations to withdrawal. Now this we think is a fair settlement, recognizing the interests of everybody concerned. The key to the settlement, however, is in the hands of the Soviet Union. They can restrain the Indians. If the Soviet Union does not restrain the Indians, the United States will not be able to exert any influence with Yahya to negotiate a political settlement with the Awami League. Now having said all these things, right now is the critical point. The critical point is that if the Indians continue to wipe out resistance in East Pakistan and then move against West Pakistan, we then, inevitably, look to a confrontation. Because you see the Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan. And in summary, it seems to me that its very
shortsighted for either of us to allow what happens in South Asia to interfere with these great new relations that now have so much promise. What I would like to simply to suggest tothat you convey to the Chairman my concernmy very reasonablebut it is important that he recognize the urgency of restraining the Indians at this point and moving toward a ceasefire and a political settlement. Having said that, may I say that I know there are lots of arguments that can be madeat the United Nations Mr. [unclear] has suggested it, Mr. Brezhnev covered some of these. But my purpose is not to argue those, make debating points. My purpose is to say, look, we have a difference here, but we must not allow the differences there and the opportunity for one or the other to gain, to endanger and jeopardize the relations that are far more important. In the view of Arms Control, the Mid-East, which is far more dangerous to each of us than anything that happens in India-Pakistan, and not to mention what I think it also terribly important over the long haul, trade and the future of Europe. So theres the message I would like to [unclearconvey?]. Im sorry that on a visit that I know is in another field that we have this current crisis. But I know my Russian friends always like candor, and I speak that way in that spirit. Matskevich: I am grateful for your very candid approach. Unfortunately, I was with Mr. Brezhnev [unclear] so thats why I didnt talk to it. We talked now with Brezhnev about four problems: the Middle East, Europe, SALT talks, and we talk trade. And I have [unclear] three proposals [unclear] and Im looking forward to meeting you. [unclear] appeal to you and Mr. Brezhnev to have some kind of agreement on agricultural matters when you meet in Moscow. And, of course, for you to decide on what night we are going to sign that kind of agreement on agricultural matters. This is why when I talk with Brezhnev [unclear] and I was not prepared Nixon: Oh, I know. No, I wouldnt want the Minister to comment on it, and I wouldnt want you, Mr. Charg, to comment on it, because you havent had a chance to get instructions from your government. But this is moving so fast that I want particularly the Chairmans good friend and you to know that we see it as a crucial test of our relations. And so we feel that now is the time to move, to settle this thing before it blows up into a major confrontation. Matskevich: When I see Brezhnev, Ill convey the spirit and letter of what you said.
[unclear] in the preliminary discussion, that the main thrust of the talk [unclear]. And actually I know that the President personally took many steps to avert the war between India and Pakistan, and appeal to them. Now as he [Brezhnev] understands the situation, of course, the war on the [unclear] and the root of the problem should be eliminated, which gave rise to [unclear]. He says the Pakistan leaders should be more flexible. Kissinger: We will have a formal reply for you tomorrow. Nixon: In the meantimeI wishI would like the Minister to convey, before he returns to Moscow, our feeling about this. Vorontsov: Mr. President, Ill Nixon: Because you see, Mr. Charg, its so critical. I want him to read my reply in the context of what I said to his good friend, the Minister. Vorontsov: I will report it today, and Secretary Brezhnev will have it today. Nixon: Well, I look forwardI hope we meet again in May. [At this point in the conversation, Matskevich and Vorontsov left the Oval Office. Nixon and Kissinger continued with their conversation]. Kissinger: I think, Mr. President, that Nixon: I think it will help. Kissinger: It will help. Theyre not serious. That will help. Now Im going to send that over to State. [unclear]. Im going to say this is what you said to the Russian Minister [unclear]. I thought Nixon: See, I really stuck it to him. Kissinger: Well, but you did it so beautifully. Nixon: When I said, "What happens to Pakistan would be tragic, but what happens to RussianAmerican relations could be disastrous to the world." And you know I said, "You go in. Youre going to win. Indias going to win. Youre going to embarrass the Chinese. But youre going to poison relations with the United States. [unclear]. But the point is, what can we do Kissinger: I think Nixon: What do we have to do?
Kissinger: Well, you told him what they should do. Ill have the Pakistan Ambassador in, because we dont want to do it behind their backs. Nixon: What is heis he willing to do anything? Kissinger: I think what you outlinedceasefire, promise of withdrawal Nixon: [Speaking to Alexander Butterfield] Send that Ambassador, send this to Vorontsov, pictures [unclear]. Kissinger: I think our friend, in fact, our friend isnt the right word. This is one of theI think we will lose 70 percent of this enterprise. The question is if we can save 30 percent; thats 30 percent more than the situation permits. And we will come out with some dignity. And Nixon: Well, what did you tell the Pakistani Ambassador? Kissinger: Well, I told the Pak AmbassadorI read him a few paragraphs from the Brezhnev letter. I said, here we are. And then I said my personal view, as a friend is, and then gave him, more or less, your program. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: I said it will give you time. It will stop the Indians. It will change world opinion. If there is another war, it will be a clear war of aggression. Its Nixon: An agreement. All that youre asking them to do is to agree to negotiate with the Awami League, is that it? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: They have no choice, hell. Kissinger: Well, they could totally be obstinate and say its their country and theyre not going to discuss it. But Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Right. Kissinger: [Speaking to Alexander Butterfield] Listen, get Haig to bring the paper in. I think, Mr. President, its one of these situations again. I think were going to have, if Yahya gives us a positive reply. Nixon: He wont.
Kissinger: Well, then we may have to do it without him. I just hate to do it without him because of the Chinese. Thats the big problem. But then we may have to let him get raped. See then we can just, you know Nixon: Throw up our hands. Kissinger: Then we can just say, "All right, we did what we could." And then hes just going to lose. Nixon: You know, I used the word complication with us in this thing. I said, "We have a treaty with Pakistan; youve got one with India." Theres a lot of hard language in this. Kissinger: It will end now. It will end. Well lose 70 percent. But thats a hell of a lot better. We were losing 110 percent yesterday. Nixon: I dont know. I dont know what theyll do. But at least theyll stop the goddamn Indians from going to the west. Do you think they will or not? Kissinger: Yes. Nixon: You think they would? Kissinger: Yep. Thats my judgment. Nixon: Will you have another talk with Vorontsovhe says, of course hell convey this message right away, wont he? Kissinger: Mr. President, the thingthe things I have learned in my association, that if you push chips into the pot, you might as well push a lot in. Youre not going to lose Nixon: Yeah. I agree. Kissinger: I think this will end.

171. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 9, 1971, 5:57-6:34 p.m.
Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, this thing is beginning to shape up. [5 seconds not declassified] Bhutto is coming over here. The Pakistan Ambassador. Not the Ambassador, the Pakistan Representative at the UN. Nixon: Bhutto? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: That son-of-bitch? Kissinger: Yeah. But we understand that his instructions are to offer a settlement very close to what we have. What we are putting to them. Nixon: I noticed, I read that in the news summary, I mean in this mornings briefing. Kissinger: That hes coming? Nixon: Yeah, that hes coming, and that Yahya may be setting him up to make a sell out in order to [unclear]. Hes a bad man. Bhuttos a terrible bastard. Kissinger: But the point is if we get this, you see, if we get this offer, if we get Yahya to agree with this proposition, then we can go back to the Russians and settle this thing. And well be in good graces with the Chinese because weve got the summit with Yahyas concurrence. Well have squared the circle. Then after we settle it, we put the bastards here to the torch by saying that we were playing this game [unclear]. I think were going to pull it off. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Well, they will lose East Pakistan. Theres nothing to be done about that. Nixon: We all know that. Kissinger: But the question is how they lose it. Nixon: And West Pakistan, they think theyre going to lose it anyway, dont you think so? Kissinger: Well, they may be so demented that, well, yes by now they have to think it.
Nixon: Well, for Christ sakes. Well, how will it be done then? Itll be done through, theyll make an offer for a political settlement with East Pakistan? But thats, beyond that point, the Indians will never accept that. Neither will the Russians. Kissinger: No, but that wouldnt be, no, the Russians will. Thats the interesting thing in the Brezhnev letter. The Brezhnev letter says the negotiations should start at the point at which they were interrupted on March 25, 1970. At that point, East Pakistan was part of Pakistan. And if we could get the Soviets to state that as their idea of a settlement. If we make a choice Nixon: They have. They have stated that. Kissinger: No. Nixon: In the letters. Kissinger: In the letter. Now if we, if you and Brezhnev, could make a joint declaration. The way I see this thing evolving, if we get Yahya aboard by tomorrow morning, and the time factor works for us Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: It could be a joint appeal by you and Brezhnev along these three lines. If the Indians reject it, then we go to the United Nations Security Council and getthis time the Soviets have to support us in the Security Council because its a joint Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: So then weve got the Indians at a disadvantage. And well have separated the Soviets from the Indians to some extent. Nixon: Um, hmh. Kissinger: If the Indians accept it, then what will happen, first of all, it will then save West Pakistan Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: for the time being. And if the Indians Nixon: The Indians will stop, and therell be a cease-fire. But the Indians will stay in East Pakistan.
Kissinger: Well, what will happen then is a negotiation between the East Pakistan leaders and the West Pakistan leaders, which if one, which will probably lead to the independence of Bangladesh anyway. But it will then be done not by us selling out but by Yahya agreeing to it. Nixon: All right. Now Kissinger: You know, its a lousy outcome, but we are now talking, Mr. President, of Nixon: Well, it was sort of inevitable. East Pakistan in my opinion could never be saved. In my opinion it could never be saved with the way it was going. Kissinger: I mean, when its all done it will Nixon: They were too clumsy, the West Paks, to have saved the damned thing. Kissinger: When its all, if we come out of it that way, Mr. President Nixon: If we can save a strong West Pakistan well have accomplished a lot. Kissinger: Well have accomplished a lot, and all the bleeders about India will again have been proved wrong, because after that Nixon: Well, if we ever get the Russians to go with us on this, that could be a watershed in the relations between the two countries. Thats why I wish Dobrynin was here so you could tell him exactly that. Kissinger: I know. But its better with this guy because hes got to report it. Dobrynin would have argued with you and tried to pitch. Nixon: Did you notice we stopped him? We didnt have arguments. Kissinger: Yeah, well it would have been harder for Dobrynin, to stop Dobrynin. So actually I think, I told Haig I thought this was one of your finest hours here because anybody else that I know would have said the hell with it. We have no chance. Its a long shot. Why jeopardize the summit? And I think youll have strengthened the summit when its all over. Nixon: The Russians could come back with a hard-nosed message. Kissinger: No. Nixon: I dont see how they can. Kissinger: No.
Nixon: You know, when you really put it in terms of basically a lawyer arguing a case, I made such a strong case of how much was on the plate, how much they were going to risk at such a cheap small game that they just cant. I dont see how they could possibly turn it down. If they do, they arent worth dealing with. Huh? Kissinger: Every instinct I have tells me they wont turn it down. Nixon: Well, Vorontsov, you know, made notes for [unclear]. Kissinger Every instinctbecause basically it accepts their framework. We should get a letter to them tomorrow sort of summarizing what you said as a formal reply. Nixon: Well, could you get something done, prepared? Kissinger: Yeah, Ill have it for you first thing tomorrow. Nixon: I think we ought to get it off right away to Brezhnev. Kissinger: Tomorrow morning. Now because Nixon: You know, its an interesting thing how these people are the same. This fellow here, who is incidentally, he is a nice guy, and he hasnt changed. Just think 12 years ago. He comes in and says I havent changed, but boy you should see him. He hasnt changed one bit. Still got the [unclear]. But this fellow went through the same line that Gromyko did about how Brezhnev was a warmhearted man, a good man, and so forth and so on. Kissinger: Brezhnev has a hell of a lot at stake in this meeting with you, Mr. President. Nixon: He wants it to succeed, you think? Kissinger: Yeah. The sons-of-bitches in this country can piss on you as much as they want. Nixon: They do. Kissinger: Outside this country you are the world leader right now. I mean, why the hell would Trudeau, who dislikes everything you stand for, who in his style, in his baggy style, is as different from you as two human beings can be. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: How, why does he say it was a fantastic revolutionary concept? First, because it was, of course, well put. But also because he feels he wants to be identified with the leader of the, at least the non-communist world.
Nixon: He was hurting with his identification with Kosygin, and he wanted to be identified as American. Kissinger: Yeah, but he didnt say this about Kosygin. And he couldnt have because his domestic opinion wouldnt Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: If he had said Kosygin made a revolutionary Nixon: Well, that vote at the UN wasnt too bad too. That had some reflection of this. Kissinger: Thats right. I mean, our liberal establishment is intellectually, its morally corrupt, but its also intellectually so totally corrupt. What theyre telling you is, in effect, to preside over the rape of an ally, to which Kennedy has a commitment. What you are almost certainly going to achieve is the preservation of West Pakistan which is, its a tragedy but Nixon: Well, it was done before. Kissinger: But we didnt urge him to go into East Pakistan the way he did. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: And we cant be given the impossible. Nixon: One thing I want you to do, Connally mentioned to staff. I want you to take, this is an order, $25 million, take it out of the Indian money and go to the Indonesians in need of it. Now by God that is to be done. I want the Indonesians to be, a Muslim country to know that were their friends. I think that will have repercussions right away. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Agreed? Kissinger: Absolutely. Nixon: All right. Can you issue that order? Kissinger: Ill get it done this minute. Nixon: Put it out. What I meant is, Henry, put it under my name if necessary. Kissinger: Oh, no, no, no. Nixon: Im not going to have any screwing around. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
Nixon: You think State will call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that? Kissinger: Well, Irwin was so shaken he hardly knew what to say. Nixon: Well, give him instructions. Give him a talking paper and the rest. Will he do that? Or what? What are you going to do? I dont know what the hell theyre Kissinger: Oh no, no. Hell now carry it out. Nixon: Well goddamnit, it must be, it would be very easy for me, for anybody to tell the Indian Ambassador we will not tolerate acquisition of territory, right? Well, for Christ sakes, youve got to say that much. Kissinger: No, no. Were in. Nixon: What else they do, I dont know. Kissinger: Were getting it. Nixon: Ill tell you one thing, the Kissinger: I think well be over it by this time next week. Nixon: [unclear] Hes going to feel, theyre going to think twice over there before they allow any inspired leaks, piss on the White House for a couple of days. Oh, theyll still come, but they cant help but know, that whole establishment over there, how I feel about it. I mean, I know what theyre doing. I read the damn papers. Kissinger: I think were over the hump. My instinct tells me that this is not going to build into a confrontation. These Russians are slobbering all over you. Nixon: You think weve got the bureaucracy lined up [unclear]? Kissinger: I thought it was essential. Well have a well-behaved WSAG meeting tomorrow, I hope. First time in 4 weeks. Nixon: For the first time in 4 weeks you say? Kissinger: Yeah. The others arent so bad, I mean, Packard is fine. Moorer is fine, Packard is fine, Helms is fine. Nixon: Well, they got that Moorer knows about moving that ship. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Oh, no, were doing everything that can be done now. Nixon: Were right to move the carrier. If youre going to make a move, Christ, move the carrier.
Kissinger: In fact, even if there is a settlement, we should move the force in there just to show we can do it and take it out again. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: Then no one can accuse us of anything. Nixon: Thats right. We move the carrier. Get the planes over. Call in the Indian Ambassador. I thought it was good to report to this group that Ive just told the Russian minister, and youre going to tell him anyway. Kissinger: No, but this way I dont have to tell him. Nixon: Good. Kissinger: This is even better. This way I dont Nixon: [unclear] told the Russian. Kissinger: This way I dont have to do Nixon: Without poisoning our relations. Also, I thought it was, nobody that was there was taking it down, but, you know, its too bad Kissinger: No, Haig was taking it down. Nixon: The point that I made that, I said I know the usual line here is the same as whats Kissinger: I know. Nixon: The diplomatic line is to let the dust settle until you no longer see the grave. And I said thats not my policy. Kissinger: I thought that was powerful. Haig said this was the most powerful statement hes heard you make in WSAG. It was really strong. You know, if it works it will look inevitable. [Omitted here is discussion of the Presidents schedule.] Nixon: Ill bet you that wire to Moscow is humming right at this moment. Kissinger: Well have an answer to that tomorrow. Saturday morning at the latest. Nixon: Well, I was conciliatory though, Henry. I did say, I said as far as this deal is concerned, all that we ask is restrain the Indians, lets have a ceasefire, they must have a political settlement. As a matter of fact, it was his deal that we were talking about.
Kissinger: Well, there were a few hookers in there the way you put it. You said, "Talk to the Awami League." Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: And the way they put it was, it has to start where it stopped on March 25, which really means freeing Mujib. Nixon: I see. Kissinger: On the other, but Nixon: Thats negotiable too. Kissinger: But I would figure, Mr. President, thats not what we get into in the first phase. In the first phase, we should state a few general principles. The major thing is to defang the Indians now. The Pakistanis have lost 80 percent of their POL. They bombed Karachi completely. The Pakistanis are going to collapse in 2 weeks, incidentally. If we can save West Pakistan it will be Nixon: Thirty percent? Kissinger: An extraordinary achievement, which is not warranted by the situation. Nixon: Because the Indians are ready to gobble it up? Kissinger: Because if State played its usual game, it will send a message to [New] Delhi, it will send a message to Islamabad, all of which plays into the Indian hands just as our strategy the first week of the operation did. They then take 5 days to reply. The reply will be inconclusive. Nixon: You know another point that State needs to get pounded into its goddamned head is that we do not determine our policy around here solely on the basis of how many people are on one side. Kissinger: Yeah. Yeah. Well, you made that point. Nixon: And how many, and whether a country is a democracy or whether it is not a democracy. Kissinger: Thats another point you made. Nixon: By God, we just dont do it that way. I mean, it doesnt make, an evil deed is not made good by the form of government that executes the deed, Henry. I mean, as Ive often said, the most horrible wars in history have been fought between the Christian nations of Western Europe.
Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Right? Does that make them right? Kissinger: Absolutely. Nixon. No, sir. No, sir. Kissinger: And between, the governments prior to World War I were all more or less the same, with the exception of the Czar. I mean, that German emperor wasnt all that powerful. Nixon: Well, he was a Christian monarch. Kissinger: I mean, they had a pretty democratic government. He sort of strutted around and made it look as if he were powerful. Nixon: Well, I dont know. I hope it works. I hope it works from the Russian standpoint. I just cant believe Brezhnev can hear this being said. And I must, I think your hunch is right, saying it to this guy was, it was just an accident. But saying it to him was very important. He could see that I was fair, I was conciliatory, but tough as hell. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: And he saw that too. And I said thered be a confrontation. Kissinger: And you listed all the things you were willing to do. It was a masterpiece. It was the subtlety, and then you were expectingyou want to jeopardize European Security, Middle East, SALT, all of that, for what? And you said thered be a confrontation. Nixon: Also pointing out that we had a treaty with Pakistan, just as they had one with India. [unclear] And he just assumes we might do something. Kissinger: Mr. President, if this were a key country to them they might challenge you. But why should they run this risk to back you down? First of all, no one knows youve threatened. Nixon: No. I told him, you know. I said, "I am not threatening anything." Kissinger: And besides, you can do a lot of things. I mean, if the principle gets established that the stronger country can prevail with the backing of another country, we could unleash the Israelis and kill the Egyptians. Nixon: We might do that. Kissinger: I mean we wont do it but
Nixon: Who knows? Kissinger: But I mean, just looking at it from their point of view. Nixon: Who knows? Who knows? Kissinger: Every time weve played them this way its come out all right. And they know, they said youve just done too many unpredictable things. No, I think this was a great day. Nixon: We shall see. We shall see. Kissinger: We may lose on it. We were certain Nixon: Well at least we tried. Kissinger: We were certain to lose the other way. We may win this way. Nixon: Well, we tried. Some people, the Russians cannot ignore this. They just cant let the Kissinger: Oh, no. Oh, no. Youll get an answer within, by Sunday morning. Nixon: The Russians, I think, the real question is whether they will just lean on the Indians now. Kissinger: Thats what it amounts to. And anything we get in this connection is money in the bank a) in the sense of defeating, of protecting Pakistan. But even more importantly, it will teach the Indians that there are bigger games than, the Indians know theyve got the Pakistanis where theyve wanted them. Nixon: Sure. Kissinger: So if we can stop an Indian onslaught on West Pakistan now, the Indians will consider that being thwarted. Nixon: You think so? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: Well, theyre going to be thwarted in another way. Now, I will not listen to any suggestions that that aid be restored. Kissinger: No matter what happens, Mr. President. Nixon: No, sir. Kissinger: That is what we have to be
Nixon: I will not listen to it. Now these bastards have asked for it, and theyre not going to get it. Now I think were going to have to play that game. They chose Russia. Let Russia aid them. Correct? Kissinger: Absolutely. What I would do with the Indians, Mr. President, is keep them in the deep freeze until after your election. After youre elected theyll come to you hat in hand. Nixon: Well, we dont want Kissinger: No, no. But then, I dont think Indian animosity can hurt you if theres no war. I dont know which American likes India. Nixon: Nobody. Kissinger: Except those intellectuals who are against you. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Yeah, but theyre against you anyway. [The brief conclusion of the conversation is unclear.]

172. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51-11:12 a.m.
Kissinger: Today, I want to tell you what I have done, tentatively, subject to your approval. Nixon: Lets go ahead. Kissinger: Theyve got this East Pakistantheyve got the offer of the commander of the Pakistan forces in East Pakistan to get a ceasefire and so forth. They were going to run to the Security Council and get that done. We dont want to be in a position where we push the Pakistanis over the cliff. Nixon: No. Kissinger: So I told them to link the ceasefire in the east with the ceasefire in the west. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Kissinger: The ceasefire in the west is down the drain. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: I mean the east is down the drain. The major problem now has to be to protect the west. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: So Ive told them that they should link any discussion of ceasefire in the east with ceasefire in the west. And to use this to wrap the whole business up. Ive got Vorontsov coming in at 11:30 and Im going to tell him what the Pakistanis did in the east Nixon: was a result of our Kissinger: was as a result of what we did. Which is true. Im going to show him the Kennedy understanding. Im going to hand him a very tough note to Brezhnev and say, "this is it now, lets settle thelets get a cease fire now." Thats the best that can be done now. Theyll lose half of their country, but at least they preserve the other half. The east is gone. Nixon: What is it the east in effect offered?
Kissinger: Well, the eastthe commander in the east has offeredits a little bit confused. Hes asked the United Nations to arrange an immediate, honorable repatriation of his forces. In other words, turn over to civilian authority. Nixon: Right. And? Kissinger: And thats, in effect, all. And a promise that the Indians would eventually withdraw too. But thats going to happen anyway. I mean, to participate in that is a nice humanitarian effort, but it does not solve the overwhelming problem of the war in the west. Nixon: Does State understand that? Kissinger: No. Well they understand it now, believe me. Nixon: Yeah. See the point is, our desire is to save West Pakistan. Thats all. Kissinger: Thats right. That is exactly right. Nixon: All right. Fine. What is State up to now? Were still getting, youre still getting those keep those carriers moving now. Kissinger: The carrierseverything is moving. Four Jordanian planes have already moved to Pakistan, 22 more are coming. Were talking to the Saudis, the Turks weve now found are willing to give five. So were going to keep that moving until theres a settlement. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: When are you going to see the Chinese? This afternoon? Kissinger: 5:30. Nixon: What are you going to tell them? Kissinger: Im going to tell them everything we did, and Im going to tell them that we, Im going to tell them what forces were moving. Nixon: Could you say that it would be very helpful if they could move some forces or threaten to move some forces? Kissinger: Absolutely. Nixon: Theyve got to threaten or theyve got to move, one of the two. You know what I mean? Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, thats what they must do. Now goddamn it, were playing our role and that will restrain India. And also tell them that this will help us get the ceasefire. We dont want to make a deal with the Russians [that] the Chinese will piss on. Kissinger: Absolutely. Oh, God. Thats why Nixon: The Chinese at the present time are kicking the hell out of the Russians about this, you know. The Russians are kicking the Chinese saying that the Chinese are playing with the Paks and the Paksyou know what I mean? This is a Russian-Chinese conflict. Kissinger: Mr. President, if we stay strong, even if it comes out badly, well have come out well with the Chinese, which is important. Nixon: How about getting the French to sell some planes to the Paks? Kissinger: Yeah. Theyre already doing it. Nixon: All right, why not? I mean, if they need some supplies, why not the French? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Now the French are justtheyll sell to anybody. Kissinger: Yeah, they are selling them now. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to Pakistan.] Nixon: Let me say this on the French thing, can you talk with the French? And, is there any way we can get themI mean we talk about the United States helping, furnishing arms to Pakistan, how about getting the French to sell them in some instances? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Its a question of sales, isnt it really? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Yeah. [Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.] Nixon: Now coming back to this India-Pakistan thing, have we got anything else we can do? Kissinger: No. I think were going to crack it now. Nixon: Then I hope that the Indians will be warned by the Chinese, right? Kissinger: Well, Ill have to find out tonight.
Nixon: You do your best, Henry. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: This should have been done long ago. The Chinese have not warned the Indians. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: They havent warned them that theyre going to come in. And thats the point. Theyve got to warn themits just Kissinger: Uh, huh. Nixon: All theyve got to do is move something . Move their, move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act. Were not doing a goddamn thing, Henry, you know that. Were just moving things around, arent we? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: But these Indians are cowards. Right? Kissinger: Right. But with Russian backing. You see, the Russians have sent notes to Iran, Turkey, to a lot of countries threatening them. The Russians have played a miserable game. Nixon: So well do the same thing, right? Kissinger: Exactly. Nixon: Threatening them with what? If they come in and what? Kissinger: Theyll do something. They havent said what theyll do. But theyll settle now. After your conversation with Matskevich yesterday, theyre going to settle. Nixon: What basis [unclear]? Kissinger: The ceasefire in the west is all thats left. Nixon: The ceasefire in the west. And what, though, on East Pakistan? What do we do about that? Are we going to just say that Kissinger: No, we Nixon: Indian occupation or Bangladesh? Or what? Kissinger: What we Nixon: Are we going to oppose Bangladesh recognition? Whats our position? Kissinger: The best would be
Nixon: Is anybody involved on these things? Kissinger: Yes, yes. The best not [unclear], but the best would be if Nixon: See, how are we, if we cannot tell those people how we want it to come out, we cant have a decent plan. Thats what we havent had at this point. Kissinger: Thats right. Well, weve hadafter the Brezhnev letter came yesterday we sent a copy of it to Yahya. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Weve told him the pros and cons of accepting it. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: And now Yahya has come back with a proposal saying ceasefire, negotiations for mutual withdrawal, and negotiations to settle the political future of Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: And then what will happen on the Bangladesh, Mr. President, is that whatever West Pakistan and these people work out, we will accept. But we will not be in the forein the front. If we can get Nixon: Whatever West Pakistan works out with whom? Kissinger: Withthe negotiations on East Pakistan. Nixon: India has not evenbut India will not agree to negotiations on East Pakistan. Kissinger: Yeah, but the Russians have already agreed to it. So what will happen, lets be realistic, what will happen is that the representatives of East Pakistan will demand independence. And in practice I think that is what West Pakistan will then agree to. But then it wont be us whove done it. This will solve the problem of do we recognize Bangladesh against the wishes of the Pakistan Government. Nixon: Thats right. We must never recognize Bangladesh. Thats why no answers the right thing, until West Pakistan Kissinger: Well, thats the point. Nixon: Gives us the go-ahead. Bhutto will do it. Now, I want a program of aid to West Pakistan formulated immediately. Have some sort of a program, you know, after theyre there. We cannot
let them hang out there by themselves. I dont think we can do much from a military standpoint, but lets find a way to let others do it. Thats one suggestion. On the French thing, I want you to talk to the French cold turkey. Wed like to find a way to help to work with the French, can we? You got any arms in there? Kissinger: I will do my best. Nixon: Can you think of anything else? Kissinger: No, I think Nixon: I dont think we can getfrankly Henry, I dont think we can get through the Congress arms sales to West Pakistan. Thats what I mean. Do you? Kissinger: No. Nixon: All right. Then what was our answer? Give them a hell of a lot of economic assistance, correct? Kissinger: I can let them convert it into Nixon: And let them convert intowell thats their, thats their, we dont ask the Indians, weve given the Indians all this economic assistance, and we didnt ask any questions when they made a treaty with the Russians and bought Russians arms. Did we raise any questions about that? Kissinger: And the point you made yesterday, we have to continue to squeeze the Indians even when this thing is settled. They cant getthese 84 million dollars are down the drain. Nixon: Thats right. Thats gone. And incidentally weve already spent 25 million of it on the crap thattake another 25 million and give it to the Paks. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Weve got to for rehabilitation. I mean, Jesus Christ, theyve bombedI want all the war damage; I want to help Pakistan on the war damage in Karachi and other areas, see? Kissinger: See the reasonIm getting Vorontsov in, Mr. President, at 11:30 Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger: Im going to put before him, Im going to show him that Kennedy Nixon: Yeah. And say, "This is what the Presidents talking about." Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: Now, and say now listen, we didnt [unclear] and we just want to say were notdont get, just say the President is, as you know, you must never misjudge this man. He doesnt pound on the table, and he doesnt shout. But when he talks the way he doesIve walked with him for 3 years, this is the way he means it. Its just cold fact. Id put it that way. I think youve got to be [unclearpersonable?] Kissinger: Mr. President, I dont have, this was, if this thing comes up, between you and me we know that West Pakistan is lost. If you can save West Pakistan it will be an unbelievable achievement because West Pakistan has had all its oil supplies destroyed. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Theyve had no spare parts from us for months. Their army is ground down. And 2 more weeks of war and theyre finished in the west as much as they are in the east. So if we can save West Pakistan, it would still be a defeat, but we would have done it. And the Chinese will know that. And the Russians will know it. And the Indians will not be happy with it. Nixon: I dont want the Indians to be happy. I want the IndiansI want also, put this down, and get Scali in. Use him more. I want a public relations program developed to piss on the Indians. I mean, that atrocity of the [unclear], for example. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: I want to piss on them for their responsibility. Get a white paper out. Put down, White paper. White paper. Understand that? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: I dont mean for just your reading. But a white paper on this Kissinger: No, no. I know. Nixon: I want the Indians blamed for this, you know what I mean? We cant let these goddamn, sanctimonious Indians get away with this. Theyve pissed on us on Vietnam for 5 years, Henry. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: And what do we do? Here they are raping and murdering, and they talk about West Pakistan, these Indians are pretty vicious in there, arent they? Kissinger: Absolutely.
Nixon: Arent they killing a lot of these people? Kissinger: Well, we dont know the facts yet. But Im sure [unclear] that theyre not as stupid as the West Pakistanisthey dont let the press in. The idiot Paks have the press all over their place. Nixon: Well, the Indians did, oh yes. They brought them in, had pictures of spare tanks and all the rest. Brilliant. Brilliant public relations. Kissinger: Yeah, but they dont let them in where the civilians are. Nixon: Oh, I know. But they let them in to take the good shots. The poor, damn Paks dont let them in at all. Kissinger: Or into the wrong places. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: The Paks just dont have the subtlety of the Indians. Nixon: Well, they dont lie. The Indians lie. Incidentally, did Irwin carry out my order to call in the Indian Ambassador? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Yeah. Nixon: He did? Kissinger: Within an hour. Nixon: And he told him he would not accept awhat they, well it came out fortuitously, didnt it? The right thing to say at this time. Kissinger: It could not have worked better. Its all working together. Nixon: Because we said to them that the acquisition of territory will not be accepted, correct? Kissinger: Right. Nixon: And that we had to have their assurance. What did the Ambassador say on [to] these instructions? Kissinger: Well, he said, "How can you even suspect this?" and "What gave you this idea?" Nixon: Thats what you expected him to say. Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

177. Conversation Among President Nixon, the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Presidents Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45-9:42 a.m. Kissinger: As you know on Friday, Yahya somewhat at our pressure had agreed in effect to accept a Brezhnev proposal. But then on further thought Nixon: He decided not to. Kissinger: He decided not to, and the Chinese carried on. I think, frankly, in that case, rather than accept the Brezhnev proposal, wed be just as well off letting nature take its course. And let them get raped. If they want to accept it, yes. But I think we should stay off it then. I think if we cana simple ceasefire is really the best we can, at this moment, get out of it. I think if this thing emerges with the United States joining with the Soviet Union in a proposal that you disapprove, then it was made 3 days after it was made just because of the military defeat, we would suffer a very severe setback. Nixon: Oh yeah. Kissinger: No, no. I was the one who pressed it, in fact. What you said to the Agricultural Minister and to, what we said to his Nixon: Yeah, yeah. Helms' report and he examined [unclear]. Kissinger: Uh. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Uh, yes. [10 seconds not declassified] Nixon: I, Im referring to Kissinger: I know. Nixon: the Helms report Kissinger: I know the one. Nixon: where, which would be very helpful here. Kissinger: Ive told him to do it.
Nixon: I think we to [need] make more use of our own PR people to get across our side. [unclear] I think we have to realize [unclear]. Get across our point of view. [unclear] Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: We cant do that. Weve got to use the elements here. Kissinger: And the departments. Nixon: Well, the departments are not very useful. Weve got to use them where we can. But what I meant is within the White House. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: That is when we can get the departments to take on, to carry the lead on something, they ought to carry it, thats for damn sure. And they ought to do more. But I meant on the PR side of getting it across, as you well know. Its an awfully weak reed to say well, you put this out. Now Bush, you can use Bush, for example. Sometimes the department fellow will do very well, as we know. But I think that here in the White House [unclear]. But our point of view isthe Indians have been just loading wires and so forth, what their view is, making us look bad. Now the report on Mrs. Gandhis Cabinet meeting where she said that, she said deliberately that they were going to try to conquer West Pakistan, they were going to move their forces from the East to the West, should have got out. The report, for example, with regard to the Soviet men, the naval vessels found off the, the Pakistan submarine, should have gotten out. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Haig looks at this and says its, its very interesting how much Soviet [unclearinitiative?] but there hasnt been any column. Kissinger: No. Nixon: I say that should get out. You cant do it, Henry, youreits just hard talking about Kissinger: Well, Roland Evans has a column today with [unclear]. But still its, youre right. Theres not enough Nixon: [unclear] have gotten out? Kissinger: It shouldnt have to be
Nixon: I think here youre, youve just got to get Scali here. Just call him in. He likes to talk. Just tell him, and let him go over the place. Hes a White House horse. Heand I want him now. I dont thinkand that isnt the most important of the game, but it does affect certain things for reasons that were aware. Its rather interesting to note that Mrs. Gandhi said that, speaking to an Indian youth group, that they have not rejected the UN General Assembly. Theyyou probably didnt see that. Kissinger: No. Nixon: Its in the other summary . She says, she said yesterday: "We did not reject the UN General Assembly, but we have it under very serious consideration." Now why did she say that? She said it for obvious reasons that she thought that there was some world opinion building against her. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Now were being goddamn fools to not build that [unclear] thing against the Indians. See what I mean? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: [unclear] So, Id like to see the Soviet presence get out. [unclear] Kissinger: Ive had last night put a paper together Nixon: Helms report Kissinger: of how much Nixon: [unclear]. The world opinion thing is going to affect the Indians. Weve just got to get, its got to get out the fact that theyve been condemned in the press and that they rejected a majority vote. Thats got to be said. Get the word to State and everybody in every statement that India has rejected an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly. That has to be said. Kissinger: I pulled together what the Soviets received. What the Communist world sent to India in the last 6 years: 739 medium tanks, 176 light tanks, 329 carriers Nixon: Fine. Lets put it out through a European source. Kissinger: No, that is Nixon: Just have Scali put it out to the whole press corp.
Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Thats the way to do it. Or somebody. Youve got to get it out. You see, [unclear] others as well. The reason is were really not using people. Were not bringing them in and telling them enough about it. So I would bring them in. Thats a very good statement to get out. Thats a very good statement to get out. It must seem more than a column. Kissinger: Well, now we have Yahyas complete concurrence to our game plan, which is to drop the political tract, to go in with a Nixon: Yeah. Ceasefire. Kissinger: To gofirst to go in with ceasefire and withdrawal. I called Bhutto yesterday evening after we talked just for the record, and I said I dont want to hear one more word from the Chinese. We are the ones who have been operating against our public opinion, against our bureaucracy, at the very edge of legality Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: And if they want to talk they should move some troops. Until theyve done it, we dont want to hear one more word. I really let him have it. Nixon: [unclear] the Chinese sit there and bullyrag us. Theyve got to learn, damn right. Henry, youre so right about the Chinese and the Soviets, each for reasons that transcend India and Pakistan. They have to have their meetings with us. You know that. Thats their goddamn problem. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: That doesnt mean that you [we] can just thumb our noses at them all the time. Kissinger: Actually, strangely enough, I think the Chinese is (sic.) more precarious than the Soviets because Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: For the ChineseI mean these idiots who say we are doing things toBraden has an article today blasting you and me. Of course theyve got the bureaucracy. Its like Cambodia again, nicely out of it again. Blasting you and me that we are sacrificing India so that you can take a China trip.
Nixon: Hmm. Kissinger: The trip as such is a symbol of a policy. If the Chinese feel we are nice people, wellmeaning, but totally irrelevant to their part of the world, they lose whatever slight, whatever incentives they have for that opening to us. The opening to us got the Soviets under control. This is the Nixon: Well, then lying about sacrificing the trip is [unclear]. Kissinger: Besides Nixon: Thats going to be Kissinger: Roy Jenkins, I saw Roy Jenkins last night and he mumbled something like it. I said, India put itself on the Soviet side. We didnt drive them there. Nixon: Is he British? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Is he over here? Kissinger: Yeah. Hes a good man. He said, after he talked to me, he said, "We made one great mistake and that was not to put it out 3 weeks earlier." He says he completely sees the point now. And hes an honest guy. Because he didnthe opposed his own party on the Common Market. Nixon: Im not concerned about Braden and the rest mumbling around about whos responsible for jeopardizing the China trip. What matters there is the fact. It isnt necessary, it doesnt make a difference what they all said about it. Dont worry about it. Kissinger: I dont worry. Nixon: Those bastards are going to do that. Kissinger: No, I take it as a symptom. Nixon: That message is very juvenile, kind of [unclear] because they dont like the idea of the trip, we know that. Kissinger: Braden has no brain. Nixon: Yeah, but hes taking that from somebody else. Kissinger: Exactly, thats why its significant. Thats the only significance it has.
Nixon: The question is whether now I should call in, because I think we got to start playing a better, more effective game here, the Indian Ambassador this morning. Now, before knocking out such a tough ploy, to call him in and say, "Look here. We want to be very understanding. We noted with interest your rather savage press campaign. I have no objections to that. I understand youve got to play [unclearthis thing out?] But lets get one thing very clear. Now, that East Pakistan thing is practically resolved, that ifincidentally were going to make certain diplomatic moves. I dont know what they are, but if this Indian action against the West continues against the overwhelming weight of the world public opinion, then I will have to make a public statement labeling India as the aggressor, as a naked aggressor. Now thats one way. Another way to do it is just do it. Do it right now. You see the thing I feel is that the Indians are susceptible to this world public opinion crap. Theyre susceptible to it because they have lived on it for so long. And they got accused here, and the reason theres very, very little, very, very little of anything we can say. Well, maybe Rolly Evans has got it. As far as the general news is concerned, theres been damn little pointing out that India either has Soviet support or is continuing this operation far beyond the reason they say brought them in in the first place. That they are now continuing with efforts at Indias [unclearbehest?]. Theres been hardly anything, believe me, in the press to the effect that the vote in the UN was one that India defied. Now thats our fault, Henry. We havent gotten it across. Kissinger: I agree. Nixon: Thats my point. Another point is weve got, I think, weve got to get it across. Its got to be said. Its got to be said. I mean you had a backgrounder and thats a little blip. Kissinger: Well, it should have been Nixon: Its the opposite from the way that you intended. Kissinger: Well the Post, that was just a deliberate lie. Nixon: Thats whats right here. Kissinger: I know. Nobody else played it that way. Every other leading paper in the country had it on its front page whether I madebut the fact is to do this sort of operation Nixon: Now look, we can talk all about the past.
Kissinger: No, no. I mean Nixon: Right now weve got to go to Kissinger: No, no. But it should have been pumped out, day in and day out, from every spokesman in the Government. Nixon: I know. I understand. It should have been. But we know we have a tough problem Henry. Weve known that for a long time. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: We went through this time after time before, and were going through it again. But right now Kissinger: Well use Scali. Nixon: Now, picking up the pieces and doing the best we can. The question is what do we do. Kissinger: Mr. President Nixon: Do we get out [unclear] and check out the [unclear] put the heat on Indias back? Kissinger: I am a little reluctant to shoot the big gun. To have you call India and have them kick you Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: To have the Indian Ambassador in. To give that bitch the satisfaction. If we had the assets there, Mr. President, if this Nixon: Instead of a phone call, lets make a statement. Kissinger: If this were a serious situation like 57, or 70, Id be in favor of brutalizing the son-ofa-bitch. But why let him go around and say that he looked you in the eye and, you know, this is the problem. Nixon: What Im trying to get at is this: its my intention to make a public statement labeling India as an aggressor. Now the point is, will it do any good? Would it, might serve the purpose of letting him know in advance. You see, weve got to get across the fact thatyour conversation with Bhutto and the Chinese was correct in one sensewhere they said we started out strong, and then got the impression, a plague on both of your houses, which, of course, is unfortunate.
But incidentally, to an extent, because Pakistan mishandled the refugee situation in the beginning. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: It is a plague on both of your houses, but thats true only of East Pakistan. It is crystal clear that if the military action continues after East Pakistan is wrapped up, that that is naked aggression. Now that needs to be said. As indeed, as you said, a lot of gobbly-gook. Now we Kissinger: The Indian Foreign Minister has refused to give an assurance. That they dont have any territorial Nixon: Ambitions? Kissinger: Ambitions. He said "minor rectifications." Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: That means South Kashmir. Nixon: Yeah. All that you suggest this morning that we just wait and see what we hear from the Soviet Kissinger: No, my recommendation is Nixon: Or did you tell Vorontsov last night? No, youre going to let him know at noon. Kissinger: No, I called Vorontsov last night and said that if we dont hear from them this morning, we will go back to the Security Council. Nixon: All right. Kissinger: And I have some suggestions of what you might do this morning: issue a press statement from the White House. Wed have to, well have to change it because Nixon: Well whatgive me the general tone. Kissinger: The general tone is that in view of Indias refusal to accept the terms of the General Assembly resolution passed by the overwhelming majority of 10410 calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of armed forces, the United States has now decided again to take this grave issue to the Security Council. Nixon: All right, fine. Now have you checked that with State? Kissinger: No.
Nixon: Before that? Kissinger: No. Im meeting them at 11:00. Nixon: Not till then? Kissinger: Well, Ill check it earlier. Nixon: The bastards, all right get them up early. Get them up at 9:00. Kissinger: Then we would say, "Having occupied all of East Pakistan" Nixon: Have they occupied it all? Kissinger: Virtually all. Nixon: Did you call Bob? Kissinger: Not yet. But Nixon: "Having occupied" Kissinger: "Virtually all of East Pakistan, Indias continued military action, action by India can only be viewed as an armed attack on Pakistan as a whole, and increasingly takes on the character" Nixon: All right. Add one sentence. "If India defies," put it this way, "If India should defy the overwhelming weight, defies, should continue to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by a blankety blank vote in the UN General Assembly." After you add that sentence Kissinger: Yes. Nixon: "Indias continued defiance after the fact, that India will stand before the whole world as a naked aggressor." Now I think you have to get the naked aggression in there. That its got to be hit in there hard and tough. I feel, put it this way, look, were taking just as much heat, just as much heat, for using soft words as we do if we use hard words. Everybody says were kicking the goddamn Indians around. Right? Kissinger: Absolutely. Now Nixon: Now it is naked aggression, right? If they defy, thats the point, put on that basis, see then youre getting across two points. That the General Assembly has overwhelmingly voted to ask forall right put it this way. You dont want another thing in there which sounds like it was
written by some State Department pawn. For example, I would add in the sentence, "The General Assembly on blank, by a vote of blank, now the Security council by a vote of 112 called on [for] ceasefire and withdrawal." Kissinger: Thats not binding. Nixon: I know. Nothing is binding. "The General Assembly by a vote of blank to blank." Kissinger: Right. Nixon: "Called on so and so and so and so. Pakistan has accepted. India has refused." Kissinger: Thats it. Nixon: Now, "Pakistan has accepted. India has refused. India, supported the Soviet Union" Kissinger: That was the next question I wanted to put to you. Nixon: "India, supported by the Soviet Union, has refused"now we are going. Kissinger: Supported only by the Soviet Union. Nixon: Supported only by the Soviet Union. Well, some other Communist countries. Kissinger: Supported by the Soviet Union. Nixon: Supported by the Soviet Union. Can we say other Communist countries? Use the word Communist for a change. And, well that throws in the Chinese and the Romanians. All right, supported by, at any rate, supported by the Soviet Union. Thats enough. Now, then say that if now that East Pakistan is virtually gone, India continues to defy the overwhelming weight of world opinion as expressed by the vote of the General Assembly, you see, as reflected by the vote of the General Assembly, India will stand before the world as an aggressor. See? Now that is really what we need to say. This is contrary to every tradition for which India has stood since its birth as a nation. And we call upon the Government of India to join with the Government of Pakistan in having, in following the, no, in adhering to the overwhelming expression of world opinion to have a ceasefire. You see what I mean, or something like that. Thats the kind of language you need in this thing to get the goddamn point across. Kissinger: Youre absolutelylet me do this immediately. Nixon: Well, were going to, you see what Im getting at?
Kissinger: I know exactly what youre getting at and you are quite right. I asked somebody to draft it last night. Nixon: It isnt bad. Kissinger: It isnt good. Nixon: But it doesnt, it isnt that bad either. What I meant is, its what you would expect them to draft in view of what weve been saying about everything else. [unclear] Your backgrounder was excellent. And I, incidentally when I met with those leaders that morning somebody got the impression that I told the leaders that we were going to [unclear]. Hell, when I met with those leaders in the morning I was saying we were going to cut off aid to India. Kissinger: You were Nixon: No, no. You werent there at the leaders meeting. But I said, "Were going to cut off aid to India." I said, "You know weve already cut off aid to Pakistan. Were going to cut off aid to India. Do you have any objections?" They said, "Hell no." Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: But anyway, what Im getting at is, now, having said all this, what purpose does this serve to put out something labeling India asthe purpose as I see it, it serves, well it serves three purposes. It helps with our Chinese friends. Second, it puts a little bit of heat on the Russians. Third, it puts some heat on the goddamn Indians. Kissinger: Right. Nixon: World opinion. Fourth, it helps us with our own domestic situation here at home, only to the extent that were taking a beating. Im not concerned about it. I guess that isnt getting through to people. The sad thing is it isnt getting through to people for the wrong reasons. People dont give a shit whether were to blamenot to blamebecause they dont care if the whole goddamn thing goes down the cesspool. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Thats too bad. But nevertheless, it isnt hurting us, I can assure you. Nobodywhen you think about this as a great goal for our foreign policy. Bull. Its not in the minds of the American people. It is in substance, but not in propaganda.
Kissinger: I agree completely. Nixon: But the propaganda is important for the four reasons Ive just given you. See Kissinger: I agree. Nixon: And weve got to start Kissinger: Another thing you can do which is just a little Nixon: So we wont call in the Indian Ambassador? [unclear] Why not Rogers? Put him out there. [unclear] All right, is that what you have in mind? Or do we have Rogers try to put it out? Lets think. Lets think. Kissinger: I wouldnt mind having Rogers put it out. Nixon: Fine. Kissinger: It wipes out our attack. It has more punch if you put it. But the advantage of Rogers is they are sticking it all on you. In fact theyre even, theyre sort of oscillating whether to get me involved or to keep me out. I mean they either thinktheres two lines of arguments being made. One is you love Yahya Khan, and that its a personal pique at Mrs. Gandhi. Nixon: Yeah, shit. Kissinger: The other one is that you and I were plotting this in order to preserve the China trip. Those two are going to merge because Ive put myself so much [unclear]. Nixon: Sure. Kissinger: Conviction on your side. Nixon: Oh, everybody knows it. Kissinger: I mean its ridiculous. Nixon: They already knew we had [unclear]. But they, theyre not going to touch us with this thing. Kissinger: No. Nixon: Because, by God, the country doesnt give a shit. Thats the point. Thats what they forget. Vacate it. But the country doesnt care about it, Henry. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: About India and Pakistan.
Kissinger: That is correct. Nixon: All right, whatd you have in mind? Kissinger: Well, you could put something on the hotline to Brezhnev. Nixon: All right. Lets start with the hotline, the hotline to Brezhnev. [unclear] What about the British? I think the British, do you want to put a message to them? Kissinger: Theyre tooyeah. I would say we do a hotline to Brezhnev, which I would like to Nixon: You want to work on that? Kissinger: Work on it a little more. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: In which we say we are now going back to the Security Council. We hope to do it jointly with you. There is still time to do it jointly. Because this thing may become public. And that should sound conciliatory. Nixon: Yes. Kissinger: So it should have a few hookers in there. Nixon: Well, I would say, if I could suggest, I would say, "Mr. Chairman, we have not" Kissinger: His correct title is General Secretary. Nixon: Mr. Secretary. Kissinger: General is my word. Nixon: Yes. "Mr. Secretary, General Secretary, since we have not a response on our message to you on so and so, I am sending you this message under urgent conditions. That we, we are going to take it to the Security Council again. If you should determine again to veto it, then we urge you, or whatever you want to do then." See what I mean? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Id put it that way, right? Kissinger: Right. I wouldnt say that we are ready to go for ceasefire, because if they publish that wed Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Wed say, "Were willing to proceed along the course outlined to you"
Nixon: Yeah. "However were willing to proceed." Thats very good, along the course outlined. But we need to hear. Now whats the disadvantage of going to the hotline? It appears that we appear to be so anxious that maybe theyre about ready to accept it and they say, ah we wont do it, and tell us to go to hell. Kissinger: No. Nixon: Why? Whats the advantage of the hotline? It makes it more urgent to them? Kissinger: It gives us a public record. Nixon: The public record doesnt bother me a bit. If it makes it more urgent to them, its good. Kissinger: It makes it more urgent. Nixon: Has State been talking about a hotline at all? Kissinger: No. Also, we can let State in on that. Nixon: Huh? Kissinger: We can let State in on that. Nixon: Oh, sure. Kissinger: Now with the British, Mr. President, I think I should talk to Cromer Nixon: This morning? Kissinger: Rather than you talk to Eden. I should get Cromer in and say, "Now listen Nixon: All right, do it this morning. Kissinger: Yeah. "Youre blowing the whole bloody relationship. Youre going back to the Security Council," Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: And we just Nixon: Talk to Cromer and say, "Look, that we, that the President wants to have some really good talks with them. [unclear] Now look, Cromer, the President recalls that Heath on one occasionand Alec Home at great lengthtalked about their concern about Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean." I say, "Now youll have noted the greater Soviet presence in India here. The chips are now down. If we continue to let this thing drift, it will mean an enormous Soviet presence in the subcontinentthe subcontinent is going to the Soviets. Now, do you want
to play that game or do we want to join together and try to keep them from playing this," in other words, the idea that were really [unclear]. Britain has expressed great concern about the Soviet presence. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Ill tell him from me that I just want to [unclear]. Nixon: I would put it in terms of, look, you know the French are going to play their games. The President wants to work with Britain in Asia. We support you on Singapore. We support you on the Indian Ocean. But right now the whole goddamn house of cards is going to go tumbling down, unless we save whats left of Pakistan. The only way we can do it is for us to join together at this point in stopping the goddamnI think Cromer would hear that. Kissinger: I wanted to get this message drafted. Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger: And then Ill come right back. Nixon: Yeah. Now lets go over again what were doing in the message. I want to be sure we are doing the right thing. We have in mind a hotline message. Kissinger: The thing is, wed instruct State to go back to the Security Council. Nixon: Instruct State to go back to the Security Council. Kissinger: And to do it with a ceasefire and withdrawal. To implement the General Assembly thing. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: Get it vetoed if necessary. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: Then be prepared to get the Pakistanis to move toward a simple ceasefire. Nixon: Fine. Kissinger: It wont happen till tomorrow. But weve got that all lined up. Nixon: The Assembly wont meet today? Kissinger: No. It will take through today and probably Nixon: All right. Fine.
Kissinger: Then we will get the ceasefire, we have about a week before this thing plays out because they cant ship their armies that fast. Nixon: Well, the Paks will last for 2 weeks. Kissinger: Two weeks. Thats right. Nixon: So you got 10 days. Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Because they could make it exciting if they collapse before then. Go ahead. Kissinger: Then we ask for a, then we try to get the ceasefire resolution through as a next step. Nixon: Right. Right. I got all that. Kissinger: Now what do we do about the public statement. The public statement is first, the public statement along the lines you indicated. Nixon: All right, now what is the purpose of the public statement? The four purposes I mentioned? Do you think well of the public statement, or am I talking you into a public statement? Kissinger: I thought I talked you into a public statement. Nixon: Fine. Kissinger: We have to do [unclear exchange] Kissinger: We have to do a public statement to impress the Russians, to scare the Indians, to take a position with the Chinese. Nixon: Chinese. Thats the main thing. Kissinger: Mostly with the Chinese. Nixon: I think thats firstId putbut thats all right. Kissinger: Thats number one. Nixon: Because after what they said to you, youd better do something. Kissinger: Thats right. What they said to me. What they said to Bhutto. Nixon: All right. I think we need it. Kissinger: And
Nixon: And then to clear up American public opinion. Kissinger: And to clear up Nixon: Well, at least, taking the heat, the argument of American public opinion. Take it for a good reason. Kissinger: We wont take any more now. Nixon: Put the heat on the Indians who are the aggressors. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: All right. Lets let our opponents side with India at this time, with this aggression. People dont like war. They dont like it. Theyll turn against it. All right, so you believe a public statements in order. Now, are you going to try and get Rogers to make a statement? Or are you going to say the other thing? Is it worth trying to get Rogers to do it? Kissinger: Frankly it isnt worth it. Nixon: It isnt worth it because hell try to water it down too much. Kissinger: By the time he gets through explaining it Nixon: Yeah. All right Kissinger: I mean were again at the Cambodian situation. Weve got to go through the goddamn thing on our own. With whatever, with keeping the logistics to a minimum. And take care of the basic situation. Nixon: All right. Fine. I agree. You call Cromer in later. Kissinger: Ill call Cromer in. Were leaving at 1:00, so Ive got to do it well before we Nixon: Yeah. What about the reason for calling Cromer in? I had the idea that theres good reason to bluff him. Maybe we can wait on it. Kissinger: Ill call him. You shouldnt talk to him. Nixon: I understand that. I know. Is it worth it? Is it worth your doing it? I think it is. Lets get the British on salvo. Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: I have other reasons. Even if the British say no, were talking to the British about things that are very, very important.
Kissinger: Plus IIm just going to tell him Nixon: This is a chance for the U.S. and America to be, and England, to be together. The French arent going to go along. Were going to raise it with them, but we wanted to raise the problem with you first. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Thats a very clever thing to do, right? Kissinger: Yeah. Ive just Nixon: Use their influence. Kissinger: Id just put it to him very hard. And if I do it very hard it has the added advantage that they may figure it out. Nixon: Yeah. Fine. Now then the hotline. Kissinger: The hotline. Nixon: Were going to roll that. Are we being over anxious on the hotline? No were not. Basically all were doing is asking for a reply. Were not letting the Russians diddle us along. Point one. Second, all were doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agricultural Minister and what you said to Vorontsov. Right? Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Does that sound like a good plan to you? Kissinger: Its a typical Nixon plan. I mean its bold. Youre putting your chips into the pot again. But my view is that if we do nothing, theres a certainty of a disaster. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: This way theres a high possibility of one, but at least were coming off like men. And thats helps us with the Chinese. Nixon: Well, thats right. Thats right. Thats right. And if it goes down the tube now, well have done the best we can. Kissinger: Well have blamed it on the world. Nixon: What? Kissinger: If it goes down the tube [it will be] because we cant get anyone to support us.
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger: By tomorrow, our fleet will be in the Indian Ocean and Nixon: Yeah. Did you see all those Russian tanks, and the Russian ships, and all the rest lining up with the Indians and not one liberal newspaperman Kissinger: [unclear] A people of 500 million people. We are to blame for driving 500 million people. Why are we to blame? Because we arent letting 500 million people rape 100 million people. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. Kissinger: Thats the way to keep if Nixon: Everybody worried about Danzig and Czechoslovakia and all those other places. Kissinger: If South Africa gobbled up Basutoland and we said, "Well, there are 7million South Africans. . ." Nixon: Were on the wrong side. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: You know, Henry, the liberals have let themselves be totally exposed here. Theyre only interested in whos going to win. Kissinger: And if these bastards with this high-sounding morality leakwe dont even pretend high-sounding morality on some of these issues, except in the deepest sense of the [Omitted here is a portion of the conversation that relates to Vietnam. Haig entered at the end of the discussion of Vietnam with a message from the Chinese.] Kissinger: Oh. The Chinese want to meet on an urgent basis. Nixon: With you? Kissinger: Well, of course I cant Nixon: In New York? Kissinger: No, they want to meet Haig. Nixon: Oh. This is the Chinese? Haig: Huang Hua.
Kissinger: Thats totally unprecedented. Theyre going to move. No question, theyre going to move. I had that impression. Theyre not, to them, the Indians going to the border Nixon: Well, this may change our plans a bit. No, it doesnt change our plans at all. It makes the hotline more urgent, to get the hotline thing on. Kissinger: Well, youve [Haig] got to go down there. Nixon: Or go to New York. Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Haig, the reason they sent that to you is that you had told them, Henry, that youd be out of town, to see Haig [unclear]. Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: I understand. But my point is they said they wanted to see Al rather than you. Kissinger: Because they said, in view of my departure, Huang Hua wants to meet Haig. I told him Im leaving for the Azores. Nixon: All right, fine. Get up there. Kissinger: This afternoon. Wait until noon. I think we ought to trigger this anyway. This gives them more [unclear]. Nixon: Trigger what? Kissinger: What we discussed, the press release. Nixon: Haig, Al, do you really think this means theyre going to move? What else could it be? Kissinger: No question. Haig: No I think [unclear]. Nixon: We may not be able to do it, but weve got to guarantee it. Shit, they lie to us, we lie to them. Kissinger: Well, but we have to think that through. If the Soviets move against them, and then we dont do anything, well be finished. Nixon: So what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, is that what you mean?
Kissinger: Well, if the Soviets move against them in these conditions and succeed, that will be the final showdown. We have toand if they succeed, well be finished. Well be through. Because no one then will be Nixon: Well Kissinger: Then we better call them off. I think we cant call them off, frankly. Haig: I think that you call them off if you dont give them some assurances. But the price you pay for that [is] almost as bad as if you Kissinger: The thing is, if we call them off, I think our China initiative is pretty well down the drain. Nixon: Sure. Thats what I think. And our China initiative is down the drain. And also our stroke with the Russians is very, very seriously jeopardized. Kissinger: If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese, and if the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis, what we are now having is the final, we may be looking right down the gun barrel. Haig: Its the Chinese view that the Soviets wont Kissinger: Its the Chinese view, which they expressed to Bhutto yesterday that the Soviets will back off. I think the Soviets will back off if we face them. Nixon: Well, thats the point. The reason that I suggested that the Chinese move is they talked about the Soviet divisions on their border and all that sort of thing. You know that the Soviets at this point arent about to go ripping into that damn mess, having in mind the fact of their gains from the Indian thing. Kissinger: Well, weve got to trigger this quickly, so that we are positioned and not at the tail of the Chinese. Nixon: Sure. Kissinger: Otherwise, we have no moral basis whatsoever for supporting the Chinese. Nixon: Basically, Bhutto asked the Chinese to move too, didnt he? Kissinger: Theyre not doing it because of us.
Nixon: Thats what I mean. Let me just get that straight right away. Why are the Chinese moving? Kissinger: The Chinese Nixon: I think its a good idea. Kissinger: The Chinese, well, we asked, but thats not the reason theyre doing it. Nixon: The way you put it, Henry, the way you put it is very different as I understand. You said, look, were doing all these things, why dont you threaten them. Remember I said, threaten, move a couple of people. Kissinger: Well, and I said if you Nixon: Look, we have to scare these bastards. Kissinger: And I said Nixon: We cant scare them, can we? Kissigner: I said, youd be, and I said we will prevent pressures on you from other countries. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: But its immaterial who made them do it. We didnt make them do it. They are acting for the same reason they jumped us when we approached the Chinese border in Korea. Nixon: In Korea. Kissinger: Its exactly, to them Nixon: Is that what you think, Al? Haig: Yes, sir. Kissinger: Its exactly the same situation. But leaving aside whether we made them do it or not, we did not make them do it, my feeling would be the same, Mr. President, if I had not talked to them on Friday. They dont move that fast. This has been Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Oh, yeah. This has been building up. My feeling is, Mr. President, leaving completely aside what we said, if the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India, China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union, it will be a change in the world balance of power of such magnitude
Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: That the security of the United States may be forever, certainly for decadeswe will have a ghastly war in the Middle East. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: We will have Indonesia Nixon: Now, we can really get into the numbers game. What do you have? Youve got the Soviet Union with 800 million Chinese, 600 million Indians, the balance of Southeast Asia terrorized, the Japanese immobile, the Europeans, of course, will suck after them, and the United States the only one, we have maybe parts of Latin America and who knows. Kissinger: [unclear] Nixon: Isnt that the story? Kissinger: This is why, Mr. President, youll be alone. And well Nixon: Thats fine. Weve been alone before. The point is, Christ almighty, as you remember we sat around here and talked about the [unclear] the goddamn television programs [unclear]. And even Laos even more. Kissinger: Thats what we might consider. Nixon: All right, well do it. Kissinger: Mr. President, I should stay here and skip the Azores. Nixon: Huh? Yeah. Kissinger: Given whats coming up it wouldnt be better for me to stay here. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: What do you think, Al? Nixon: Well, lets think a bit. I dont know. I dont know. I think the communiqus are so good. I mean Ill end up making the decision. Al is totally capable of doing all this. And also there is something else that is important. Its just as well for us not to appear in such an urgent crisis and all that sort of thing. And the fact that when something occurs, you cant leave Washington but I can. You see my point? Now that wouldnt do. Kissinger: Yeah, Ive got to be with you. No question.
Nixon: But look at [unclear]. Kissinger: I know that. The right answer is you have to make the decision. Nixon: Yeah. Kissigner: And nobody else. Nixon: But Al, you have an idea Kissinger: Al was present Nixon: And I trust you to make [unclear] before the end of the day anyway. Kissinger: Al was present at the other meeting. No you better, you call them back. Set it for what, 4:00? Nixon: Well, why make it 4:00? Id go sooner. Kissinger: Well it should be after these [unclear]. I want Al to be here while were doing that. Weve got to get this triggered quickly so that we are positioned. I mean, this leaves no doubt now what weve got to do. Nixon: Right. Now lets come back to this general thing. You say they want to see Al. Tell him they are going to move. Kissinger: Thats what Ive been Nixon: What they want in the way of assurances, they maybe want something more direct. Well, let me see, the Kennedy memorandum of November 5, 1962 [unclear] and thats what theyll think. Kissinger: Theyll believe you. Nixon: The point is, the fact of the matter is Id put [it] in more Armageddon terms than reserves when I say that the Chinese move and the Soviets threaten and then we start lobbing nuclear weapons. That isnt what happens. That isnt what happens. What happens is we then do have a hotline to the Soviets and we finally just say now what goes on here? Kissinger: We dont have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go on alert. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: We have to put forces in. We may have to give them bombing assistance. I mean Nixon: One thing we can do which you forgot, we clean up Vietnam at about that point.
Kissinger: We clean up Vietnam. I mean, at that point, we give an ultimatum to Hanoi. Blockade Haiphong. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: Well blockade Haiphong. Now that will hurt China too, but we cant worry about that at that point. Nixon: Well, well say its for the purpose of protecting Americans, and there is great pursuit of a power struggle. Kissinger: But above all we have to give the Chinese the sense that if the Russians threaten themthe worst thing, we cannot desert them then move against Haiphong, because that would then say the U.S. and Chinawell pick up North Vietnam in the process of that. I mean, North Vietnam will be finished then. If Russia and China are at war we can pick it up at any time. Nixon: Well, were talking about a lot of ifs. Russia and China arent going to go to war. Kissinger: I wouldnt bet on that, Mr. President. Nixon: Well, let me put it this way. I have always felt that India and Pakistan, inevitably, would have a war. And there can always be a war in the Mideast. As far as Russia and China is [are] concerned there are other factors too overwhelming at this particular point for them to go at each other. Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, the Russians, first of all, are not rational on China. Secondly, if they can get a pretext to wipe out China then your trip and everything else is an incident. Your trip in their minds was an incident on the road Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: Your trip to them was an incident on the road where they would isolate China and could then turn against China in 7374. Now that works fine with us because it puts China over on our side and we could play. But if they see an Nixon: Well, what are you trying to suggest here? Are you trying to get to the point that maybe we tell the Chinese we wont back them? Kissinger: No, I think we have to tell them we will back them.
Nixon: What do you think, Al? You think we should tell them we wont back them and discourage them? Haig: I think they may premise action on three things. One is they said the Soviets are cowards. The United States stood the Soviets down recently in Cuba and in the Middle East. Nixon: Do they know that? You told them that, is that right? Kissinger: No, they said that to Bhutto. Nixon: If you think they believe that, then they got the message where nobody else did. Kissinger: The Chinese respect you. Nixon: How the hell do they know we stood them down in Cuba, for example? You must have told them that? Oh, everybody knows about Cienfuegos. Kissinger: Yeah, I told them that. Nixon: How about the Middle East? How would they know we stood them down there? Kissinger: Well, because they see what happened. They are tough customers. When all is said and done, they know that Syrian tanks pulled back unconditionally. Nixon: Fine. Now Haig: Thats the assumption theyre moving on. So they feel they know that if the United States moves on the Soviets that will provide the cover they need to invade India. And weve got to neutralize the Soviet Union. Nixon: So, the way to do this, let me hear how you Henry [unclear]. Haig: Well, precisely the same way. We have a terrible domestic problem in the sense that no one can conceive of the seriousness of this thing. It hasnt been postured. Nixon: No. Haig: Weve got to ease into that, we cant just go in Kissinger: Plus, youve got to do this. Haig: We have to tell the Soviets today the direction in which we are moving, and its going to up the ante of concern. [unclear] Nixon: We up the ante of concern and what else do we do? Then suppose the Chinese move and the Soviets threaten, then what do we do?
Haig: Well, weve got to move, I think, beforehand with the Soviets. Nixon: [unclear] Haig: That a war would be unacceptable. Kissinger: As soon as the Chinese move we have to tell them that. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: We cant tell them before the Chinese move because it would look like collusion. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. Okay. All right, the message should get off. I think the message is the right tone, but if you dont like the tone, tone it down some. Kissinger: No, now I think we have to strengthen it to Brezhnev. Nixon: Yeah, Yeah. Oh, the message to Brezhnev. I mean the public statement. Kissinger: No, let me write it and come right back with it. Nixon: Fine. Anything you want. [The brief conclusion of the conversation is unclear.]

178. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 12, 1971, 10:27-10:37 a.m.
Kissinger: I got the answer from the Russians. They are giving us a full reply later. The interim reply is that they have an assurance from Mrs. Gandhi that she will not attack West Pakistan, that Nixon: Sure its from Mrs. Gandhi? Kissinger: And that they will work outthey are working with her now to work out a ceasefire. And goddamn it, we made it and we didnt deserve it. And Nixon: Maybe we made it except, except that [unclear] overturned by this crew. You realize the danger, we must not be in a position where the Russians and we settle the son-of-a-bitch and leave the Chinese out. Kissinger: Exactly. This is why we had to go on the other route too. Ill just call Vorontsov back and say its too late. As I told you last night were going back to the Security Council. So far we have no formal assurance of anything, if they want to Nixon: Did you get that message? Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Tell me again, now, as to what the Russians, this interim reply Kissinger: The interim reply you areMr. President, I was just talking to Haig, you know, on these your perception of this is, well, youre right [unclear]. Nixon: Its not that I [unclear]. Kissinger: No. What you did this morning, Mr. President, was a heroic act. Nixon: I had to do it. Kissinger: Yes. But I know no other man in the country, no other man who would have done what you did. You did it not knowing any
Nixon: You know, if we put it up to State I can just see what would have happened. I dont mean Bill. I mean the whole Kissinger: Including Bill. Nixon: What? Kissinger: Including Bill. Nixon: No. What I meant is Im not, its the whole attitude, the whole government, the whole American establishment would say, well, dont start any trouble. Its all going to work out. Nothing ever works out unless you do something about it. Thats the trouble with the world. That is what caused World War I, we know that was just a clumsy bunch of bastards. But World War II, Henry, was a direct result, a direct resultI mean we can talk all we want to about Hitler doing in the Jews and all that. Sure, it caused all that. But it was a direct result of the Allies backing the pusillanimous [unclearleading wave]. Right? Kissinger: No question. Nixon: Thats what Kissinger: Mr. President Nixon: Thats why the biggest mistake we made was our decision last Kissinger: EC121. Nixon: The EC121. The biggest, and the biggest error frankly that hasit was a hell of an error on Korea for us to [unclear] wouldnt go across the Yalu. MacArthur was right. Right as hell. And now [unclear] to this point. I dont know whether [unclear]. Weve got to say were not doing it. Kissinger: Now, Mr. President, the next question is [unclear]. Mynow that weve played it this far this isI mean, weve broken the back of it. Nixon: Well, dont be too sure. Why have we broken the back of it? Kissinger: Because we have Nixon: Does Haig agree? Kissinger: State doesnt know Nixon: Does Haig agree?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: Why does he think we have broken the back of this? [unclear] Kissinger: Because, Mr. President, when we showed, when I showed Vorontsov the Kennedy treaty, they knew they were looking down the gun barrel. Nixon: Did he react? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Nixon: He did make Kissinger: Oh, man. Nixon: He did? Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Now that Nixon: You told him that at that time that thats what the President was talking about when he talked to the editor. Kissinger: Yes. But now the problem is, Mr. President, we have to go through. The big problem is as you, first of all, we have to turn the screw another half turn because if we let off the pressure too much and show any relief weve had it. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: Therefore, my strong recommendation is we trigger this UN thing as quickly as we possibly can because its the only way we can go on record now of condemning India. Nixon: Thats right. Kissinger: Second Nixon: Second the White House statement still goes. Kissinger: Thats what I meant. The White House statement triggers it. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: Its essential now that its a White House statement. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: Because we now have to play it to the Nixon: Do the Russiansyou dont have it prepared yet? Kissinger: Ive got it here.
Nixon: I need to see it. [unclear] Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Ha. Now you got it. Now weve got it. Its better than what I had. Kissinger: Okay. Nixon: It isnt, the rhetoric isnt as strong. But its better. Kissinger: Okay, now this has to go by 11:30. Nixon: Why not now? Kissinger: Well, because no one in the bureaucracy knows of it. Nixon: You mention foreign people? Yes you do. Kissinger: Yeah. I dont want them to read it on the ticker. Nixon: Yeah. All right, go on. Now, theres notell them the President dictated this. Kissinger: What I would like to do in the message is to say, now these are the orders, we cant horse around now. Nixon: You can say this. The President has been in the office since 8:00 this morning. Why dont you just say this? Kissinger: Right. Nixon: Or do you want to say this? Kissinger: I want to say Nixon: You say, "The President dictated this thing. This is it gentlemen." Kissinger: "We cannot afford to blink." Nixon: We cannot, we cannot, and this is the way it is. And tell them that I will notthat I have worked, tell them I have worked out every word, every comma is mine, and that theres frankly no appeal to this. Kissinger: Thats right. Nixon: Now Im not going to have a call. I dont want any. Nobody is going to call me. Kissinger: No, Im just going to tell them this is going to be released at 11:30. Nixon: Right. Right. Okay. Point two. Hotline?
Kissinger: Point two, yes. Hotline. "Thank you for the interim message. It arrived after the decisions had been made and they were irreversible. We are still prepared to proceed with you on the basis of my letter of so and so and so and so." Nixon: Right. Kissinger: "And we will stay in close communications." Nixon: Right. Kissinger: That definitely kicks them in the teeth. Nixon: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, the Russians have saidnow lets be sure that they are prepared to what? To go, that Mrs. Gandhithey have assurances that she will what? Kissinger: Mrs. Gandhi has assuredI havent got the exact text here because my idiot girl who took it down froze when she heard it. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: But theyre sending it over there. Prime Minister Gandhi has assured Minister Kuznetsov, who will send [was sent?] as a result of the Presidents appeal Nixon: Minister Kuznetsov? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: That ceasefireno military action against Nixon: West Pakistan. Kissinger: Against West Pakistan. In addition, within the spirit of the Presidents thing, were trying to work out a comprehensive proposal including ceasefire, complete guarantees for the integrity of West Pakistan and repatriation of Pakistan. Nixon: Thats in there? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Good. Well add Kissinger: Gromyko is coming backoh, we got them. But the big problem now is, Mr. President, not to give the, is toif we play this well, well come out ahead with both the Chinese and the Russians. Hell, we are doing this, Mr. President, with no cards whatsoever.
Nixon: Well, we have one card. Kissinger: Well, you Nixon: The Russians want something from us and we didnt, we didnt lecture. You know, not to talk about it, but even my friend good old Morefield was panting to go out and give the goddamn trade away. Morey, you cant give the trade away. Wasnt he? Important thing to do? Kissinger: Mr. President, your behavior in the last 2 weeks has been heroic in this. Nixon: Well. Kissinger: No. You were shootingyour whole goddamn political future for next year, you were doing Nixon: Whole summer. Kissinger: Against your bureaucracy. Against your, against the Congress, against public opinion. All alone, like everything else. Without flinching, and I must say, I may yell and scream but this hour this morning is worth 4 years here. Nixon: It wasnt easy [unclear]. Well, the reason for that, and the reason the hour this morning was that I had a chance to reflect a little and to see where it was going. The world is just going down the goddamn drain. It may do it; it may do it. Kissinger: Mr. President Nixon: As I told you on the phone last night, I dont know whether the United States has a viable foreign policy. Kissinger: No. Nixon: I seriously doubt it. Kissinger: The United States has not a viable foreign policy; it luckily has a viable President. You were here. Nelson, as much as I love him, would never have been able to do this. And hes the only one who could even have conceived it. Nixon: Well, Agnew would have done it. Kissinger: Agnew, Mr. President, would have done it so stupidly. Nixon: Connally would have done it. Theres one. Kissinger: Yeah. Connally is the only man.
Nixon: Although he might have been a little [unclear]. Kissinger: He lacks your subtlety. Connally, if you watch ConnallyI said the other day to Haldemanafter all, Connally was an undistinguished Governor, why is he a great Secretary of the Treasury? Because of you. Nobody ever thought of Connally as an outstanding man until you Nixon: No, they thought he was a good Governor. Kissinger: I beg your pardon? Nixon: They thought he was a good Governor. Kissinger: A good Governor. But not a great one. Nixon: No governors are great. Kissinger: Well. But Ive watched Connally at these meetings, and I dont fear the interrogation of him because he is the one I like by far. Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: He waits, his first instinct is often wrong, like when he said to cut off aid to both Pakistan and India. Then when I, and even more you, quarreled with it then he went the other way. I better get this done. Nixon: Yeah. Youre really encouraged by the Russians? Kissinger: I think weve got it now. The thing is to play it in such a way Nixon: [unclear] Kissinger: that the Chinese, and we may havenow we may have them, Mr. President. This is the complication. The Chinese may come anyway, and well have to face the Russians down anyway. Nixon: Yeah, but if the Russians and the Chinese come now they will, they will come [unclear]. The Russians want to settle it with us. If this means anything; if this means something. Now theres one great problem. I may be wrong but Communists generally use negotiations for the purpose of screwing, not for the purpose of settling. Now it may, with the Russians theres no, maybe for the purpose ofjust like they screwed us on Vietnam. Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: For 3 years. Kissinger: Theyre too scared. Nixon: [unclear] Do you agree? Kissinger: Theyre too scared. Nixon: Huh? Kissinger: Theyre too scared. Nixon: Scared of what? That we will not Kissinger: Mr. President, Rogers can say what he wants, no one believes him. But when I showed him [Vorontsov] the Kennedy letter, he knew you mean business. And they dontin 73 74 they may have you; theyre not ready yet. Now the big problem is Nixon: Yeah. All right. All right. Kissinger: We have to tell the Chinese what the message is. We mustnt fool them. Nixon: The Russian message? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: That the Russians arethat as a result of the Presidents ultimatum Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Id put it that way. The Russians have now Kissinger: I showed them the message, to tell you the truth. Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. This message? Kissinger: Yeah. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: Or at least read a summary of it. Nixon: Thats right. Thats right. Okay. Nixon: And that were going forward, Henry. Kissinger: And were going forward. And that, lets ask, see what they want. If they are threatened we will consider it Nixon: The Chinese know what my letter, what my conversations or letter, and letter to Brezhnev was.
Kissinger: I let them Nixon: They didnt go along with it. But they said they would abstain on that position. Kissinger: Not to me. They said it to Bhutto. But weve got to get this machinery figured Nixon: If they say this to Bhutto too, are you going to tell him about this? Kissinger: No. Nixon: Hes an elitist son-of-a-bitch. Tell the Chinese that. Tell them that this afternoon. Kissinger: Yep. Nixon: And now youll send the hotline off to Brezhnev. Kissinger: Yep. Nixon: But the tone will be moredont, no more conciliatory. Kissinger: No. Nixon: Say Kissinger: Were just changing it a little, saying, "since your message arrived too late we were already in the machinery" Nixon: "The President had already directed the Secretary General, I mean the Ambassador Bush to take this to the Security Council. We had already directed. However, the offer is still open." Is that what youre going to say? Kissinger: Exactly. Nixon: But time is of the essence. Kissinger: But I think were in business now.
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". '971 I N D I A N PRIME M I N I S T E R I N D I R A GANDHI T O L D

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T H A T ACCEPTANCE OF THZ UflITED NATIONS C E A S E F I R E ZESOLUTIOiJ AFTER TEE L I B E R A T I O N OF BANGLADESH M I G H T M A K E IT
P O S S I B L E T O A V O I D FURTHE2 COMPLICATIONS WITH THE UNITED S T A T E S

A N D MIGHT RULEHistory OUT - Assembled by Center for Indian Military -
ALSO
THE CURRENT P O S S I B I L I T Y OF- C H I N E S E INTER375/390
I/I
VENTiOii i N LADAKH.
DEFENCE M I N I S T E I i J A G J I V A N H A M A N D C E R T A I N
ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL AFTER THE A W A M I *LEAGUE REGIME I S ' I N S T A L L E D
20
THE S O V I E T UNION I S OF THE VIEW THAT I N D I A N SHOULD ACCEPT TiiE ACCORDING TO THE
C E A S E F I R E A S SOON AS B A N G L A D E S H I S LIBERATED,
P R I M E . M I N I S T E R THE S O V I E T S A R E CONCERNED AaOUT T H E P O S S I i 3 I L I T Y OF C H I N E S E INTERVENTION, I F THE C H I N E S E WERE *TO BECOJ1E D I R E C T L Y
INVOLVED I N THE C O N F L I C T , MRSu GANDMI SAID, THE CI-iINESE K N O W THAT
N THE SINKIANG REGION. T H E S O V I E T UNION WOIJLD ACT I
S O V I E T AL!?
NOTED THAT D E S P I T E P A K I S T A N I E F F O R T S TO EMBROIL THE C H I N E S E I N THE SUB-CONTIrJE:\lT
, PEKING
HAS REFRAINED FROM TAXING PART I N THE C O N -
F L I C T TO DATE,
PoNo DHAR, CHAIRMAN OF THE P O L I C Y PLANNING C0MMJ.S-
SIoN, IS C U R R E N T L Y I N N O S C O W T O D I S C U S S F U T U R E S I R A T E G Y W I T H
376/390
IN
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S O V I E T L E A D E R S A N D T O A S S U R E T H E S O V I E T U N I O N T H A T I N D I A H A S NO
PLANS T O A N N E X ' A N Y W E S T P A K I S T A N I TERRITORY,
P A K I S T A N M I G H T NOT A C C E P T T H E C E A S E F I R E R E S O L U T I O N B U T MJGHT D E C I D E T O C O N T I i J U E T H E WAR I N T H E W E S T T O A V E N G E T H E L O S S O F
4.
MRS,
G A N D H I S A I D T H A T I N T H A T C A S E T H E S O V I E T U N I O N WOULD
A T T E M P I T O C O N V I N C E T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S T O ACCEPT B ~ N G L A D E S H AS A
" F A I T ACCOIYPLI" I N T H E H O P E TI-(AT T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S W I L L P R E V A I L
1
I
UPON P A K I S T A N T O ACCEPT A C E A S E F I R E WITH AN- INDEPENDENT BANGLADESH.

I
I T S A N T I- I!UD I A S T A N C E
C H I N A - t4AY A D V I S E P A K I S T A N T O A C K N Q W L E D G E
I N D I A W I L L E M E R G E FROIrl T H E W!?i? A S I A A ND ALP '1
A S THE DOMINANT POVER I N SOUTH C H I N A W I L L R E S P E C T I N D I A A N D MAY OI'I T H E O T H E R H A N D ,
T H E I N D I A N OCEAN,
EVEN D E C I D E T O I M P R O V E R E L A T I O N S W I T H I N D I A *
P A K I S T A N W I L L L O S E I T S E C O N O > I I C P O W E R W I T H O U T S H I C H I T W I L L NOT B E
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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DEC 71 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABA D TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 209 6 INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORIT Y
SUBJECT : PAKISTAN'S OPTIONS AND US POLIC Y SUMMARY : COLLAPSE OF PAK ARMY IN EAST PAKISTAN APPEAR S IMMINENT. GOP WILL SOON BE FACED WITH DECISION WHETHE R TO CUT ITS LOSSES AND CONCEDE EAST PAKISTAN TO BANGL A DESH OR TO PURSUE FIGHTING AGAINST INCREASING ODDS ALON G WESTERN FRONTIERS . WE BELlEVE PAKS WOULD OPT FORME R COURSE OF ACTION IF PEACE WITH HONOR CAN BE OBTAINED . WITH UN ACTION INEFFECTIVE AT PRESENT WE BELIEVE UNCOMMITTED UK AND FRANCE CAN PLAY USEFUL ROLE WITH INDIAN S SEEKING LIMITATION OF FIGHTING IN WEST . WE FORESEE EVENTUA L RETIREMENT OF YAHYA AND RISE TO REAL POWER OF BHUTTO I N AFTERMATH OF PRESENT CONFLlC T. BHUTTO MAY LEND HIMSELF T O CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WHEN PEACE COMES . SOVIETS WILL PROBABL Y HAVE VERY LlMlTED ROLE IN FUTURE WEST P AK WIHLE WE

379/390
ANTICIPATE CHINESE WILL RETAIN POSITION OF MAJOR ALLY I N EYES OF WEST PAKS . END SUMMAR Y 2. GOP IS PREPARING WEST PAKISTAN POPULACE FOR LOSS OF EAST PAKISTAN AND APPROXIMATELY ONE FOURTH OF PAKISTAN' S ARMED FORCES. DECEMBER 12 AND 13 COMMUNIQUES DESCRIB ES SITUATION I N EAST AS "GRIM" ALTHOUGH GOP STILL REFUSE S TO CONCEDE PUBLICLY LOSS OF ANY SIZABLE EAST PAKISTA N TOWN . WITH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT EAST PAKISTAN WILL FOR AL L PRACTICAL PURPOSES BE BEYOND CONTROL OF GOP IN VERY NEA R FUTURE, NEXT STAGE IN PRESENT CONFLICT WILL SHIFT T O WEST . 3. WITH THIS IN MIND, EMBASSY SETS FORTH BELOW SOM E PRELIMINARY THINKING REGARDING FUTURE PROSPECTS . GIVE N VERY FLUID SITUATION WITH FIGHTING CONTINUING, THES E THOUGHTS MUST BE SPECULATIVE . SEPTEL CONTAINS EMBASSY' S FURTHER RECO M MENDATIONS RE BANGLA DES H . 4 . YAHYA . I N OUR VIEW, AFTER LOSS OF EAST, WILL HAV E TWO OPTION S : (A) TO CONTINUE FIGHTING IN WEST, UTILIZING AL L PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES IN HOPE OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICAN T GAINS IN KASHMIR, ENABLING PAKISTAN TO ENTER INT O NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIA . HAVING SOMETHING TO BARGAIN WIT H AND AT SAME TIME HELPING TO SALVE WOUNDS OF DEFEAT I N EAST PAKISTAN . PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL AND ARMY HONOR FAVO R SUCH COURSE OF ACTION. MAJOR DRAWBACK IS FACT PAKS WIL L B E HEAVILY OUTNUMBERED IN WEST AS INDIA BR I NGS ADDITIONA L FORCES (AIR, ETC,) TO BEAR AFTER TERMINATION O F HOSTILITIES IN EAST . THIS STRATEGY RUNS GRAVE RISK O F HAVING PAK ARMED FORCES BADLY MAULED IN WEST WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STABILITY IN WEST INCLUDING ARMY' S ABILITY TO HOLD PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP POSITION THERE , COLLAPSE OF PAK ARMY COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO WHA T PAK ESTABLISHMENT FEAR MOST--CONFRONTATION OF HAVE-NOT S VERSUS HAVES IN WEST PAKISTAN AND RISE OF B ALUCH, PUSHTOO N ANC . EVEN SINDHI SEPARATIST MOVEMEN TS (B) TO ACCEPT LOSS OF EAST PAKISTAN AND TO SEE K WAY TO HALT FURTHER FIGHTING IN WEST, SUCH STRATEGY
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SWALLOW, BUT WOULD PRESE R VE PA K ARMY QTE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY UNQTE AND WOULD ENABLE PA K ARMY TO RETA I N TO SOME EXTENT ITS PRIVILEGED POSITION . CONTROL OF MEDIA AND PROPENSITY OF PAKS TO ACCEPT THEI R N OWN PROPAGANDA MIGHT EASE PAIN OF IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT I EAST WITHOU T COMPENSATING GAINS IN WEST . PAK PROPAGAND A OF LAS T FEW DAYS SUGGESTING THAT INDIAN SUCCESSES ONL Y POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE MlGHT BE LINE PAK S . COULD US E DOME STICALLY TO PRESERVE THEIR HONO R
5.
ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PROBABLY STRONG EMOTIONAL AN D REAL PRESS U R ES ON YAHYA TO OPT TO CONTINUE FIGHTING, W E ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT PAKS WOULD PREFER TO CU T THEI R LOSSES IF SOME HONOR CAN BE RETAINED IN EXTRICA E ARE LESS SURE OF INDIAN INTENTION S, TION P ROCESS . W HAVING IN MIND TALK OF STRATEGIC RECTIFICATIONS ALONG LOWE R KASHMlR CEASE-FIRE LINE . WE STRONGLY BELIEVE IN USG' S INTEREST THAT FIGHTING ON WEST PAK FRONT BE LIMITED AN D THAT FIGHTING END WITHOUT TERRITORIAL GAINS BY EITHE R PARTY - GAINS WHICH WOULD SOW SEEDS OF INDO/ PAK CLASH I N FUTUR . E
6. ALTH0UGH IMMEDIATE RECOURSE TO UN AGAIN NOT LIKEL Y TO B E EFFE C TI VE, WE BELIEVE THAT OUTSIDERS, SPECIFICALL Y UK AND FRANCE, STILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERTAKE DlPLO C MATlC INITIA T IVES . B OTH HAVE REMAINED UN OMMITTED I N PRESENT CONFLICT AS MATTER OF POLICY, THEREBY ENABLIN G THEM TO PLA Y MEDIATION EFFORT . WE SHOULD URGE BOTH T O WEIGH IN AT APPROPRTATE TIME TO MAKE FOLLOWING POI NTS T O E INDIANS PAK ARMY, IF DESTROYED AS EFFECTIV ENTITY IN CURRENT FIGHTING, WILL BE REFORMED AT LATE R DATE . NEW ARMY LIKELY WOULD BE MORE RADICAL BOTH I N DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL POLICY THAN PRESENT ONE GROUNDED I N lNDIAN COLO N IAL TRADITION . COLLAPSE OF PAK ARMY, ONE O F INSTITUTIONAL MAINSTAYS IN WEST PAKISTAN, COULD LEA D TO CHAOS TN WEST PAKISTAN WHICH CONCEIVABLY COULD SPIL L OVER INTO OTHER SECTORS OF SUBCONTINENT . AND FINALL Y, DESTRUCTION OF ARMY WOULD PROBABLY GUARANTEE THAT REVAN CHlSME BECOMES MAJOR POLICY OBJECTIVE OF FUTURE PA K LEADER S. INDIANS KNOW THEIR NElGHROR MUCH BETTER THAN WE . BUT IN FLUSH OF VICTORY, INDIANS MIGHT WELL MORTGAG E FUTURE CHANCES OF LIVE-AND- L ET - L IVE RELATIONSHIP WlTH PAKS
FOR SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES
FM AME
DEC 7 1 MBASSY ISLAMABA D TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 20 97 INFO AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORIT Y
SUBJECT:
PAKISTAN'S OPTIONS AND US POLIC Y
7. WE WILL BE TELLING PAKS, WHO HAVE STUMBLED FRO M MISCALCULATION IN MARCH TO MISADVENTURE IN DECEMBE R, THAT TOSSING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD IN TAKING ON INDIA I N WEST IS SHORT-SIGHTED FOLLY . PERHAPS CHINESE, IRAN AN D FRIENDLY ARAB STATES COULD BE BROUGHT INTO THI S EXERCIS E WETHER 8. WE AND OTHERS CAN INTERVENE EFFECTIVEL Y ON EITHER SIDE IS DEBATABLE GIVEN HIGH EMOTIONAL CONTEN T BOT H PARTIES . BUT WHEN OPPORTUNITY ARISES, WE BELIEV E WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DO SO .
AFTERMATH OF LIMITED FIGHTING, WITH ARM Y EXHAUSTED BUT INTACT AS INSTITUTION, WE FORESEE PERIOD O F BITTER RECRIMINATIONS WITHIN ESTABLISHMENT AND AMON G GENERAL PUBLIC IN WEST PAKISTAN . WE CONSIDER IT PROBABL E THAT YAHYA W ILL BE GENTLY EASED OUT OF RETIREMENT . MILITARY WILL AGAIN CHOOSE NEW LEADER PROBABLY SKIPPIN G OVER YAHYA'S INTIMATE FRIEND AND DEPUTY GENERAL HAMID T O ANOTHER GENERAL . HOWEVER, WITH PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ARM Y PROBABLY SHAKEN AND FACED WITH LOSS OF SELF-CONFIDENCE , IN ITS OWN ABILITY TO GOVERN, ARMY MAY LEAN ON BHUTTO T O SHOULDER MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY HE LIKELY TO DO SO ON HI S OWN TERMS--THAT HE IS GIVEN SHARE OF REAL POWER RATHE R THAN TRAPPINGS ONLY . WE BELIEVE HE IS LIKELY BE GIVEN LARG E . MEASURE OF POWER BY ARM Y 10. USG ENJOYS EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS TO GOP DURING PRESEN T SITUATION . WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT SUCH ACCESS TO GO P LEADERS INCLUDING BHUTTO WILL CONTINUE FOR FORESEEABL E FUTURE AS RESULT OF USG POSTURE DURING UN DEBATES AN D GENERAL USG POSITION IN RECENT MONTHS . HOWEVER, WE SHOUL D NOT CONFUSE ACCESS WITH LEVERAGE WITH REGARD TO WHA T WEST PAKISTAN SEES AS ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS . NONETHE LESS, IN BE W ILDERMENT LIKELY TO FOLLOW DEFEAT IN EAS T, USG MAY HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY KEY ROLE IN PREVENTIN G WEST P AKISTAN FROM EMBARKING ON COURSE OF EXTREME S, EITHER TO LEFT OR RIGHT POLITICALLY . 11 . OPTIMUM FOR USG IS TO FOCUS PAKS ON OVERDUE INTERNA L SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS . THIS WILL NOT END HOSTILIT Y TOWARDS INDIA NOR DESIRE FOR REVENGE, BUT MIGHT OVER TIM E LESSEN CONFRONTATION POLICY WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED PA K DECLASSIFIED APPROACH TO SUBCONTINENT SINCE PARTITION WITH SUC H PA/HO, Department of State DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES . BHUTTO MIGHT LEND HIMSELF T 0 E.O. 12958, as amended THIS DIRECTION .
9.
IN
June 9, 2005
12 . RE OTHER POWERS, SOVIET UNION HAS BURNED ITS BRIDGE S IN WEST PAKISTAN . W HILE THERE IS HEALTHY RESPECT FOR USS R, SOVIET ROLE AND INFLUENCE IN WEST PAKISTAN WILL PROBABL Y BE VERY LIMITED FOR NEXT FEW YEARS . IT PROBABLE THA T SOVIE TS WILL PUSH PRO-SOVIET BENGALIS TOWARDS POSITIONS O F AUTHORITY WITHIN BANGLA DESH (SUCH LEADERS AS MUFAZZA R AHMED) . THIS WILL CONFLICT DIRECTLY WITH MIDDLE-CLASS
AWAMI LEAGUE LEADERS . WHATEVER MUJIB'S FATE, IT IMPOSSIBL E TO PREDICT HOW EXPECTED POWER STRUGGLE IN BANGLA DES H WILL END . WE ASSUME THAT SOVIETS (AND INDIANS) WILL B E AS CONCERNED THAT PRO-CHINESE BENGALIS SUCH AS MOHAMMA D TOAHA APE CONTAINED AS IN SEEKING TO INSTALL PRO-SOVIE T BENGALIS IN BDG . I3 , WEST PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD CHINA AS A MAJO R ALLY ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME RECRIMINATIONS DIRECTE D AT CHINESE FOR PROBABLE FAILURE TO INTERVENE MILITARILY . WE BELIEVE CHINESE WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT PROBABLE CHAOS I N BANGLA DESH DURING EARLY STAGES TO LAY GROUNDWORK FO R FUTURE PRO-CHINESE POLITICAL/ GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, TO LIMI T SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND TO EMBARRASS INDIANS . GP-3 . FARLAND

DEC 7 1 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELH I TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 474 2 WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIAT E
SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT CARRIER TASK FORCE IN INDIAN OCEA N

UP UNTIL LAST FEW DAYS I HAVE FELT ABLE TO DEFEND U .S . 1. POLICY ON THE BASIS OF OUR OVER-RIDING CONCERN TO BRIN G A HALT TO HOSTILITIES . I AM NOW TROUBLED BY FACT A NUMBER O F M Y DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES VIEW DEPLOYMENT OF CARRIER TASK FORC E AS MILITARY ESCALATION BY U .S .
2. THIS WAS FORCEFULLY BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION BY CANADIA N HIGH COMMISSIONER GEORGE WHO BELIEVES THAT OUR DECISIO N TO DEPLOY CARRIER TASK FORCE AT THIS TIME HAS SERVED A S ENCOURAGEMENT TO P RESIDENT YAHYA TO CONTINUE PAK MILITARY EFF0R T . IN THIS REGARD GEORGE BELIEVES THAT YAHYA'S DISAVOWA L OF INITIAL FARMAN ALI MESSAGE AND SUBSEQUENT MESSAG E FROM GOVERNOR MALIK WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO WORD O F CARRIER TASK FORCE DEPLOYMENT . 3 . FURTHERMORE, GEORGE VIEWS DEPLOYMENT AS DIREC T INJECTION SUPER POWER INVOLVEMENT WHICH BOUND T O INCREASE NERVOUSNESS OF BOTH SOVIETS AND CHINESE AN D LIKELY PROMPT OR SERVE AS SCREEN FOR THEIR INCREASE D INVOLVEMENT 4 . GEORGE HAS INDICATED THAT HE IS SENDING STRON G MESSAGE ALONG THESE LINES TO HIS PRIME MINISTER, RECOMMENDI NG THAT TRUDEAU IN TURN CONTACT PRESIDENT . 5 IN ORDER TO PLACE ME IN A P OSITION TO DEFEND THIS DEVELOPMENT
I WOULD WELCOME FULLEST POSSIBLE RATIONALE TO RESPON DTO FOREGOING ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY MY COLLEAGUES HERE . GP- 3 KEATING
TELCON President/Kissinge r 10:40 a . m. 12/16/7 1
K : The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West . We have make it . P : What's it mean ? K : Ordered forces to stop fighting . P : What's territory? From what you said yesterday -- taken Kashmir ? K : In West have some desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir . Major is to stop defeat of Pakistan army . P : What's the source ? K : Official announcement . P : It's the Russians working for us . We have to get the story out . K : Already a call from State . Until this morning we were running the UN thing . Now they are and say they will go over resolution . They are pulling off th e British Resolution . You pulled it through and should take credit . I will giv e a backgrounder tomorrow afternoon . P: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines . K : Can't do it today. We have to clean it up . P : Any other thing -- in view of Time Man of the Year thing get Schechter in . He will understand it . Or who at Time would know more about this subject ? K : I will start with Schechter . He has been decent . P : Time might write best analysis of crisis . You really feel that they mean - let me come back to it . You were bearish last night . K : I felt nothing would happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet becaus e Indians took longer on taking Dacca then they figured . So this morning I sai d next 24 hours will tell . P : If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on a n arms-length deal . K : We have to get straight what they did .
P : What they did in '67 June war .
388/390
President/Kissinge r 10:40 a . m. ; 12/16/7 1 K: 60% instead of 100% . P: June war. K: Except they lost .
P: They got credit for bringing peace to the M . E . Agreed to peace afte r defeat of their army . And they were responsible for the war . Not a public statement but internal relations with Soviets . You handle that . ? ? ? ? You agree? they K: Absolutely. So f ar/ they have not done anything. Indians did official doing . But I am sure its Soviets that produced it . P : On the unilateral ceasefire or what ? K : UN resolution making it official . When in for weeks they want to come out and mastermind it . We have agreed to the British . Chinese are set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done . P: The President is committed to it . We have told the British and Chinese Will the Russians accept it? K: Probably. P: Might not. If they do it's done . K : One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State i s trying to scavenge on your agony . Put it together mix with a UN resolution . P : The average person doesn't understand about this . Pick the real mover s d who an and shakers . Ask Scali and let him sit in . Ask him and Ziegler . I don't care if they are friends or enemie s Make it small enough to be powerful Maybe Kraft. It's very important to do Time people and maybe a couple o f network people . K : Chancellor. P : Anybody. You sit down there . Work it out . Get hold of Scali . A cold, . deal . On other levels let Scali carry the line . An dZieglr blooded K : That would be good . P : It's good to hear .
President/Kissinge r 10:40 a. m. 12/16/71
DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005 -3 -
K : The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way thi s morning . P : I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are puttin g the summit on the line . K : India would have taken Kashmir an d P : Shastri got India's victory wings . Only 30% of them . K: 30% more then we expected . P: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us . K : For us they would have done it (? ) . P: I want strictest -- President makes own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers . I don't want Indian aid to leak out but I will decide it . Shultz to examin e budget and no Indian Aid init . K : $300 million for S . Asia. $200 million to Pakistan and rest we wil l hold. P : Give it to Ceylon . K : Then we don't get argument we are cutting it . We can give agricultura l stuff to India for economic relief . P : They have to pay for aid . K : Congratulations, Mr . President . You saved W. Pakistan . P : Go off to other . No backgrounder until tomorrow . K: As soon as it's cleaned up . I will get on it . P : Don't do it pre-maturely . K: Get Sunday papers . P : Time and networks . K : Congratulations!

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Introduction

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 1/390

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 7/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

Office of the Secretary of Defens e

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 8/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by : Colonel Seymour Kravitz OASD(ISA)NESA Regio n

Approved by : The Assistant Secretar y of Defense (ISA ) Date : 26 May 197 0

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 9/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

ACTION 1085 3 June 11, 197 0

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDEN T FROM : Henry A . Kissing er

SUBJECT : Arms Supply Policy for South Asi a

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 10/390

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 13/390

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History -

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 16/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

Downgraded at 12-year intervals ; not automatically declassified .

NEA/INC : DT Schneider :jlb : an 10/9/70 'x ' 41

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 20/390

Telecon Secretary Rogers 10124170 6:20 p . m .

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 21/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

I just thought you'd b e interested.

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 22/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 24/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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AL leaden have been arrested, but 1ouer , I

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 25/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

- Assembled by Center for Indian Military History 26/390

DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005

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DECLASSIFIED PA/HO, Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended June 9, 2005