Antipolo v. Zapanta [G.R. No. 65334. December 26, 1984.

] Facts: The Municipality of ANTIPOLO, for more than 50 years now, has considered the disputed property, described below, to be public land subject to ANTIPOLOs use and permission to use within the prerogatives and purposes of a municipal corporation. There is indication to the effect that it had been the site of the public market as far back as 1908, or at the latest, since 1920 up to today. Gradually, additional public structures were built thereon, like the Puericulture and Family Planning Center, the Integrated National Police Building, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, and the public abattoir. Those public structures occupy almost the entire area of the land. On 8 August 1977, a single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal, Branch XV, Makati (the Registration Court). One of the two applicants was Conrado Eniceo. He had applied for registration under the Torrens system of a parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was Heirs of Joaquin Avendao, and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of Antipolo. The applications were approved by the Registration Court on 26 February 1980. ANTIPOLO took steps to interpose an appeal but because it failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed. On 22 May 1981, ANTIPOLO filed a complaint (Civil Case 41353) of the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII, Pasig against named Heirs of Joaquin Avendao, and their assignees praying for nullification of the judgment rendered by the Registration Court. The defendants, in their Answer, pleaded a special defense of res judicata. After a preliminary hearing on the mentioned special defense, the case was dismissed. ANTIPOLO perfected an appeal to the then Court of Appeals. A notice to file Brief was issued by the Appellate Court, which ANTIPOLO claimed it had not received. Upon motion of the Avendano heirs to dismiss on the ground the ANTIPOLO had not filed its Brief within the reglementary period, the appeal was dismissed on 23 August 1983 despite the fact that before the dismissal, ANTIPOLO had submitted its Appellants Brief. ANTIPOLO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Appellate Court denied on 27 September 1983 for lack of legal and factual basis. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the subject parcel of land was a property of public domain.

HELD: The claim of the AVENDAO HEIRS that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO which had borrowed the DISPUTED PROPERTY from them, since they had been in possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership thereof since that time. They forget that all lands are presumed to be public lands until the 4 contrary is established. The fact that the DISPUTED PROPERTY may have been declared for taxation purposes in 5 their names or of their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1918 does not necessarily prove ownership. They are 6 merely indicia of a claim of ownership. ANTIPOLO had also declared the DISPUTED PROPERTY as its own in Tax Declarations Nos. 909, 993 and 454. Since the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of public property of ANTIPOLO, its Decision adjudicating the DISPUTED PROPERTY as of private ownership is null and void. It never attained finality, and can be attacked at any time. It was not a bar to the action brought by ANTIPOLO for its annulment by reason of res judicata.

It follows that the titles issued in favor of the AVENDAO HEIRS must also be held to be null and void. They were issued by a Court with no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Perforce, they must be ordered cancelled. ...It follows that "if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included" (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503; Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769). xxx xxx xxx Under these circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic vs. Animas, et al., supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. * * *. Certainly, one of the essential requisites, i.e., 8 jurisdiction over the subject matter is absent in this case. (Emphasis supplied).

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs SANTIAGO G.R. No. L-41278 April 15, 1998 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to nullify and set aside the orders and decision of the respondent Judge and mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioners Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporations application for registration. On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the Director of Lands. On Deb. 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago. A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as required by law. On Jan. 23, 1957, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent corporation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision was contrary to the facts and to law. The motion was however denied.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and decisions: 1. 2. 3. admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of land in favor of respondent corporation; declaring the Director of Lands in default; and denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial.

HELD: The petition is GRANTER; the Order of general default against the petitioner, and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the decision dated February 17, 1975, as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporations subject application for land registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent corporations application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of the Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty (30) years. First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands to which the applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as required by law. (The private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if they were trying to conceal this vital fact) More than anything else, however, registration in this instance cannot be granted on the basis of Section 48, par. b, of the Public Land Act as said provision applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from the Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971, that the subject lands.. were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant herein, through its predecessors-in interest, had been in possession for at least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia and Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the lands had been declared as alienable and disposable. The opposition or answer by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his opposition or answer. The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded.., cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received the applicants evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the governments claim. The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioners Motion for New Trial, ignored the established rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment. The Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in court and given them an even chance to face their opponents. The Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent case, the remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on the records before it. In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in the petitioners opposition to the application were so casually ignored.