COLLEGIUM BUDAPEST Institute for Advanced Study

COLLEGIUM BUDAPEST Institute for Advanced Study

D o m o k o s K o s r y , Ordinary Member and former President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, President of Szchenyi Istvn Art Academy. Born in 1913. M.A. Etvs Lornd University, Budapest. Ph.D. Sorbonne, Paris. 193839 Institute of Historical Research, London. 193750 Professor of History, Etvs Lornd University, Budapest; Director of the Institute of History (Teleki Institute). 194649 Founder and Editor-in-Chief of the French-language Revue dHistoire Compare, published in Budapest. 1949 divested of all his offices under the Stalinist regime. Autumn 1956, President of the Revolutionary Council of Historians. Sentenced to four years in prison, to be released in 1960. Employed as an archivist, later appointed scientific researcher then academic counsellor at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 1982 elected Corresponding Member, and in 1985 Ordinary Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 198590 President of the National Committee of Hungarian Historians. 199096 President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences after the change of regime. Recent Publications: Les petits tats face aux changements culturels, politiques et conomiques de 1750 1914. Lausanne: Universit de Lausanne, 1985. The Press during the Hungarian Revolution of 184849. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1986. Cultur and Society in Eighteenth Century Hungary. Budapest: Corvina, 1987. A trtnelem veszedelmei: rsok Eurprl s Magyarorszgrl (The perils of history: Writings on Europe and Hungary). Budapest: Magvet o , 1987. Hat v a tudomnypolitika szolglatban (Six years in the service of science policy), Budapest: MTA Trtnettudomnyi Intzet, 1996. A chilloni fogoly olvasnapl, 1958 (The prisoner of Chillon). Budapest: Magyar rszvetsg, Belvrosi Knyvkiad, 1997. Magyarorszg s a nemzetkzi politika 18481849-ben (Hungary and international politics in 184849). Budapest: Histria Knyvtr Monogrfik, 2000.

Public Lecture Series No 22

Domokos Kosr y The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in the Context of European Histor y

No 22

Public Lecture Series

Domokos Kosry

The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in the Context of European History

Lecture given at Collegium Budapest: 8 October 1998 Public Lecture Series No. 22

September 2000

ISSN: ISBN: Graphics: Typeset by: Printed by:

1217-582X 963-8463-94-5 Gerri Zotter Edit Farkas Sd Nyomda, Szekszrd.

Collegium Budapest 2000

COLLEGIUM BUDAPEST Institute for Advanced Study

H-1014 Budapest Szenthromsg utca 2. Telephone: (36-1) 224 83 00 Fax: (36-1) 224 83 10 E-mail: collegium.budapest@colbud.hu

I look back with great pleasure on my conversations with old George Macaulay Trevelyan at his home (Garden Corner, Cambridge) in the spring of 1939, and I still keep, as a prized souvenir, his book on the English Revolution of 1688, which he presented to me, signed, with the words "this is my weapon against Hitler!" I therefore regret having to begin my talk by refuting his well-known assertion that "1848 was the turning point at which modern history failed to turn". History cannot be regarded as an inattentive driver who misses the proper turn. Liberal, constitutional freedom, to which Trevelyan, with his Whig outlook, expected Europe to turn from autocracy in 1848, was only one of the forces in operation in contemporary Europe. And history generally follows the resultant, the outcome of an intricate conflict of several different forces: that is, the line of greater probability. This was what happened in 1848. However, Europe did not remain as unchanged as some historians have supposed. A. J. P . Taylor, a left-wing historian who characterised himself in his "Personal Diary"-with a kind of self-irony-as a man of "strong views weakly held", echoed Trevelyan in his own assertion that in 1848 "German history reached its turning point and failed to turn". His friend Lewis Namier, bitterly attacking the German "Revolution of Intellectuals", declared that 1848 left its imprint only in the realm of ideas. A little later, in 1952, the American historian Priscilla

*on the cover: Lszl Teleki (engraving)

Robertson minimised the effects of the revolutions of 1848, which in her opinion - had no results anywhere. After the Second World War, under Soviet rule, the eastern zone of Central Europe - which began to be more and more identified with Eastern Europe proper, that is, Russia disappeared even further from the West's sphere of historical interest. In their turn, the small nations of this zone tended to adopt what one might call a 'Ruritanian' approach to history. They considered their own national rivalries and conflicts as the main feature and central problem of 1848 in Europe, each of them being inclined to adopt a rather narrow, ethnocentric view and to believe that only its own national and territorial claims had been right and just. This, in principle, contradicted the seemingly international character of their new regimes. In practice, however, the latter were more than ready to make use of old slogans of romantic nationalism in order to sweeten the dry and bitter pills of Marxism, with a view to making them easier to swallow. The nineteenth-century mechanical concept of human cultures all going inevitably through the same phases of the same pattern has lost its validity. But how can one analyse a historical incident in its European context if there was, supposedly, no 'European culture' to speak of? A British historian, Alan Sked, has recently suggested that we cannot speak about 'a European culture' in the singular, since our continent has always been characterised by great diversity in
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every respect. In his opinion, the Europe of which historians try to discover evidence in the past is just an arbitrary notion projected back onto earlier centuries by those endeavouring to justify their political programme of European integration. Of course, this reasoning with a postmodern flair is not likely to be popular among those who know from history that this very diversity within a greater entity has been one of Europe's principal characteristics. We could cite a number of sources including Hungarian ones - which bear witness to the fact that people have long been aware both of this diversity and of the existence of a common European culture and a coherent 'system of states', despite its inner conflicts. Another significant characteristic of this Europe is that the social system based on feudal privileges came to be replaced, by virtue of spontaneous development, by a new-so-called bourgeoissystem based on civil liberties, equality before the law, parliamentary constitutionalism, modern political institutions, and the market economy. Furthermore, it is from this Europe that these things have spread all over the world. We know that the historical structure of Europe consisted of different zones characterised by unequal levels of development. Its more advanced epicentre or 'plateau' was surrounded by less advanced lateral and border zones. Being more or less closely interrelated, these components influenced one another. As a
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consequence, the introduction of the modern social and political system - a fundamental change - was the result of a long historical process, accompanied, in most cases, by revolutions and wars. The process started in the more advanced countries at the Western epicentre, in the Netherlands and seventeenth-century England. It continued, at the end of the eighteenth century, in France, amidst particularly dramatic events which resounded mightily throughout the continent, although today they are rather regarded as a French variant - as Furet said, as an accident rather than as a model of general validity. This process then reached the eastern zone of Central Europe in the middle of the last century, with the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 as the main feature. The Poles, after having bled to death in an earlier uprising - not yet of a liberal character - were unable to strike a decisive blow, although Polish migrs later came to Hungary's aid. The Czechs' feeble attempt in Prague was rapidly smashed by the Austrian army. The new political lite of the Romanians in Bucharest attempted in the summer of 1848 to start a revolution, which was crushed by Turkish and Russian forces before attaining real results. The Hungarian political lite, on the other hand, had successfully led their country through this great transformation, in March-April 1848. I shall attempt to point out a number of lessons from this historical turn which had Europe-wide ramifications. The first is that Hungary, although well prepared for the
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change, could implement it only because of external circumstances which were the result of a crisis in the international political system of 1815. From the early 1830s, it had had a national reform movement led by liberal noblemen, since more and more members of the privileged classes had come to recognise that the old system was untenable, harmful, and dangerous, and that they would have to follow the new model of the West. Hungary's new political lite had a wide intellectual horizon and good political practice acquired at autonomous county meetings and in the debates of the feudal Diet, not to mention a new political press. But in a country subordinated to Habsburg power, decisive action could commence only after the French revolution in February 1848 - together with the international chain-reaction which it provoked - managed to overthrow the current European political system. Metternich's fall, on 13 March, was followed by a series of further movements. In Hungary, the events took place in two phases and in two political centres. The first step was taken on 3 March, under the direct impact of the French revolution, at the feudal Diet in Pressburg (Pozsony, now Bratislava). Kossuth, leader of the opposition, proposed an address which demanded, on the one hand, a constitution for Austria as well, thereby giving a strong push to the coming revolution, and, on the other hand, the immediate implementation of the reforms which had already been accepted. Although he did not - could not - yet demand a complete reform, nevertheless his address was blocked in the Upper House. Namely, the leaders of the old regime brandished the threat of Russian
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intervention. After the events in Vienna of 13 March, however, there was no longer any obstacle to transforming the address into a call for a complete reform. On 15 March, a delegation set out with it to Vienna, and on the same day the young radicals of Pest, led by Petofi, took the first steps of a revolution by proclaiming their 12 points. On 11 April, the new laws were sanctioned. The first responsible government was formed with Count Lajos Batthyny as prime minister. Due to this "lawful revolution", as one HungarianAmerican historian has called it, the changes had a legal, that is a more solid basis than those of most contemporary governments created by revolution. The feudal system was abolished, never to return. The decisive phase of the revolution was successful, and so it is a mistake to speak pessimistically of the 'fall' or the 'failure' of the Hungarian revolution. Its most important results - the liberation of the serfs, the granting of civic liberties, and so on were great positive achievements. The revolution was, in fact, victorious. The war of national independence was lost, but it was, although closely interconnected, not coterminous with the revolution. France was also ultimately defeated at the end of the long wars which followed the revolution; the Italian national movement suffered several military defeats in 1848 and 1849; while German unification, the main hope of the Hungarians, proved to be unattainable at that time, and the disunited, local German revolutionary movements were bloodily suppressed by German forces under Prussian leadership. A defeat, after many victories, at
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the hands of the united armies of two great powers, greatly superior in numbers, is no reason for lamenting, with demoralised self-pity or as a form of perverted boasting, that Hungarians are doomed to suffer adversity. We cannot so easily deny responsibility for our own deeds or omissions. In September 1848, Hungary had no other choice but to surrender or to take up arms to defend itself. Our second lesson is that this turn of events was again due mostly to the transformation of the international situation, this time for the worse. The February revolution in France was provoked by the government's inability to handle the social and political tensions between the higher and petty bourgeoisie and the new working class. These tensions, characteristic of this phase of capitalist development, were sharpened by a traditional agricultural crisis which led to a serious shortage in the food supply. This fatal coincidence of difficulties old and new also manifested itself in England, but did not lead to a revolution there, partly because the repeal of the Corn Laws made bread cheaper and the middle classes already had wide access to politics. Conversely, the French government had all the discontented forces ranged against it. The result was a revolution which can be described in terms of four phases. In the first phase, the united forces of the opposition managed to overthrow the government. In the second phase, this common front broke up, and the liberals abandoned and turned against the radicals and the partisans of the 'social republic'. In the
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third phase, the left-wing - mostly the workers - tried to reverse this process with an uprising which was bloodily suppressed in June 1848. Finally, in the fourth phase, autocracy returned to power and pushed aside also the liberals. At the end of the year, Louis Bonaparte - the future emperor Napoleon III - became president of the French Republic. British policy had played a significant role in this process, having opposed the radical and revolutionary forces in France. Another chain-reaction followed, as one retreat followed the next. A similar process could be observed in the less developed Italy and Germany. Their internal conflicts did not become as sharp as in France, but the liberal bourgeois leaders became frightened by the French example, while the radicals did not get from France the help they had been hoping for. Namier was wrong to assert that the cause of the German liberal collapse was neither class division nor the strength of the conservative forces, but nationalism, which would have threatened human rights even if it had been victorious. Nationalism was, in this case, evidently a uniting and not a dividing force. Human rights were no less threatened in France, as the French government crushed its own workers. The mistake is characteristic: Namier, in the guise of a rather snobbish upper-class English historian, was in this instance expressing the prejudices of a former refugee from the Czech lands. When Piedmont - as vanguard of the Italian national movement attacked the Austrians, it did not wish to seek assistance from France because - according to a contemporary diplomatic report C OLL EG IU M B UD A PE ST Ins ti tu te f or A dvan c ed Stud y

it feared the effects of the French revolution more than the Austrian army. At the end of July, Radetzky defeated the Italians. A month later, the Austrian Court, having regained its strength and confidence, demanded that Hungary give up the quasi-independent position guaranteed by the April laws and hand back the affairs of finance and defence to the central authorities in Vienna. In April, a minister "by the person of the king" was appointed to deal with the affairs of "common interest" between Hungary and the Empire. This was a compromise accepted by both parties in the hope that it could later be modified in accordance with their wishes. The Hungarians, who called this office their "foreign ministry", wished for mere personal union. Their hopes were based on the concept that German unity, if realised, would include the Austrian provinces, as members of the German Bund of 1815, a body to which Hungary had never belonged. In this case, Hungary would have had a greater degree of sovereignty than Austria. For a time in the summer of 1848 - the Hungarians even hoped to transfer the centre of the Habsburg Monarchy to Hungary, threatened as Austria was by political instability. The Court, however, regarded Hungary's new position as a "forced" concession which it intended to withdraw at the first opportunity. It was not in Hungary's interest to become involved in an open confrontation. However, once events took such a turn, it was better to choose armed self-defence than submission. The government was replaced by the National Defence Committee under the leadership of Kossuth.
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In the first phase of this conflict, the case of Hungary, a little known Habsburg province without internationally recognised sovereignty in the eyes of the West, seemed without hope. Its 'diplomatic' mission to Frankfurt, at first well received, together with a project for a German-Hungarian alliance against Russia, had to cease its activities. Count Lszl Teleki, a brilliant and radical aristocrat, who had arrived in Paris in September with the previous consent of the French government, was not officially received and owed his influence only to his personal talents and social connections. As the representative of a country without a diplomatic network he could well co-operate with the Polish migr, Prince Czartoryski, head of a diplomatic network without a country. As Hungary was more or less cut off from the West by Austria, Teleki, for a time, had to play the role of a foreign minister abroad. When Lszl Szalay, one of the former Frankfurt envoys, arrived in London in December and sent his credentials to Palmerston, he received the following negative reply: "Viscount Palmerston is sorry he cannot receive you. The British Government has no knowledge of Hungary except as one of the component parts of the Austrian Empire; and any communication which you have to make to Her Majesty's Government should therefore be made through . . . the Representative of the Emperor of Austria at this Court". The situation changed somewhat in the spring of 1849, when the newly born Hungarian army drove out not only the Austrian army, but also the first Russian troops which had unofficially
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intervened in Transylvania. Hungary, with its legally justifiable claim to be acting in self-defence, was becoming popular in England. Now Palmerston was ready to have unofficial, private talks with Ferenc Pulszky, a friend of Kossuth who had fled Hungary, and had been sent to London by Teleki to gain the sympathy of the press and public opinion. The Hungarian military successes, however, had two more consequences. One was Russian intervention in Hungary with overwhelming forces at the request of Austria on the basis of the Habsburg-Romanov treaty of 1833. The other consequence was the Hungarian declaration of independence and the dethronement of the Habsburgs in April 1849. This step did not provoke Russian intervention, but it was still a political mistake to surrender the principle of legal self-defence. "Finissez en vite" - said Palmerston to the Russian ambassador. Both Teleki and Pulszky warned Kossuth that the most they could expect from Palmerston was mediation in the interest of a peaceful compromise between Austria and Hungary. On 21 July, in a debate held in the House of Commons, Palmerston gave the following reply to a group of MPs who had pointed out the international dangers of Russian intervention: "Austria is a most important element in the balance of European power. Austria stands in the centre of Europe, a barrier against encroachment on the one side and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up,
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in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great power." But, he added, a peaceful settlement would serve also the interest of Austria. If Hungary "should by superior forces be entirely crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her own right hand". Therefore, "not simply on the principle of general humanity, but on the principle of European policy, it is devoutly to be wished that this great contest may be brought to a termination by some amicable arrangement between the contending parties". The crushing of Hungary by superior forces was followed, however, by a brutal, bloody revenge. Some historians believe that Hungarian policy had a little overreached itself. Nevertheless, this unequal fight made Hungary, despite its defeat, a better known and more respected factor in international politics. Some years later, when Austria had to look for a partner to reorganise the weakening structure of the Monarchy, Vienna chose as the strongest of the rival candidates Hungary. The Compromise of 1867, the system of the Dual Monarchy, gave Hungary the time and the position to find a way of dealing with one of its greatest problems after 1848, the so-called nationality problem. Our fourth - and probably the most important - lesson is that the attempt by the Hungarians to transform their old, multinational country into a national state had to fail. The model of an exclusive national state was - and still is - scarcely compatible with the ethnic conditions of the Danube region.
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The great process of European transformation had an important concomitant: the birth of modern nations. Of the long list of authors dealing with this problem let me refer here only to four historians - all friends of mine - who are unfortunately already deceased: the Hungarians Jen Szcs (for the origins) and Zoltn I. Tth (for the conflicts in 1848), the Czech Ernest Gellner (for the connection between nationalism and the needs of industrial societies), and the Briton Hugh Seton-Watson (for the positive, creative role of liberal nationalism and its traditions and for the dangers posed by present-day extreme nationalisms). The French nation-state served as a model for subsequent national movements. A single nation was supposed to live within the borders of the state: the French. There was also a single official language: French. In reality, of course, there were in the French state other ethnic elements who barely spoke French. But, as citizens, they too became, officially, French. This example was followed also by the national movements in East Central Europe. But here conditions were very different. Nationalism was an integrating force in the case of the divided Italians and Germans. But it was a disintegrating force in multinational dynastic empires such as Turkey and Austria. In 1848, old, historical Hungary had two different functions. As the homeland of the Hungarian national movement, it tried to loosen the political framework of the Habsburg empire. On
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the other hand, in the eyes of several other neighbouring national movements, Hungary itself constituted a kind of empire, a multinational framework. Even if Hungary, in its historical past and geographical structure, otherwise differed a great deal from the Habsburg Monarchy, it was still, in Szchenyi's words, a smaller network or texture ("szvedk") within a larger one. The country had had various other ethnic elements and foreign settlers as early as the Middle Ages. Owing to subsequent devastating wars, followed by immigration, Hungarians came to represent less than half about 40 per cent - of the population, although they still constituted the largest single ethnic group in their country, and the second largest in the whole Habsburg empire, after the GermansAustrians. The majority of the country's population was therefore composed of other ethnic groups: Germans (dispersed in many places), Romanians (in the south-east), Slovaks (mainly in the north), Ruthenians (Ukrainians, in the north-east), and Serbs (in the south), as well as a number of minor ethnic groups confined to single areas (Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and so on). These ethnic groups very often mixed with one another. To these differences in ethnic proportions must be added the fact that, while in France the Bretons had the Atlantic Ocean at their backs, here, beyond the Serbs in Southern Hungary, there was a Serb principality under Turkish sovereignty, and behind the Romanians in Transylvania there were two Romanian principalities of similar status. And with a slight effort the Slovaks could be pushed towards the Czechs.
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In their strong position in 1848, the Hungarians - liberals and radicals alike - believed and hoped that by abolishing feudal privileges, liberating the peasants, and granting individual rights and civil liberties to all, regardless of origin, they could win the hearts of the other ethnic elements, who would, in return, support their cause and even join their ranks. In fact, only the Croats were recognised by the Hungarians as a separate nation since they too had a feudal lite and a political past. Most of the German (and Jewish) urban elements were attracted by this promised future. And at first most of the other ethnic groups welcomed the great reforms, except those who (like the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Transylvanian Saxon Germans) had lost their old privileges. Soon, however, a number of other national movements started to formulate their own demands, claiming recognition for their respective nations, collective rights, and separate territorial units. It was not surprising that the Serbs asked for a Voivodina in which they made up barely more than one-third of the population, the majority of the population being Germans, Hungarians, and Romanians. Small nations can be just as resolute and ambitious as big ones. As Vienna hastened to utilise these nationalist movements against the Hungarians, the latter sought to dismiss them as the product of Austrian and Russian pan-Slav agitation. For a time, they were unable to realise that these were spontaneous, rival national movements. It is true that, due to the policy of Vienna, armed conflict could be hardly avoided with the Croats (although
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Hungary belatedly offered them even secession), and with the Serbs, influenced also by irregular armed units from beyond the frontier. There was, however, a civil branch of the Serb movement which, in the beginning, could probably have been persuaded by a happier Hungarian policy to accept a political compromise. There was a - not particularly strong - Slovak nationalist movement as well, but many thousands of Slovak soldiers joined the Hungarian army. In the Romanian-Hungarian relationship great common interests visibly mingled with highly antagonistic ones. Transylvania, which a little later was united with Hungary, was an asset against Austria, but also a grave legacy because of the extremely backward conditions in which the Romanian peasantry had to live. It was hardly possible to avert an explosion. Young Hungarian radicals blamed the Transylvanian landlords - mostly Hungarians - for their "past crimes", and declared that the Romanians had "mortal grievances against the infamous Transylvanian aristocracy". The Hungarians were too slow to realise that the neighbouring nations wished to obtain for themselves what the Hungarians - or so it seemed - had already obtained. They also feared for the integrity and independence of their country, which, taken to pieces, could easily be swallowed by Russia. However, the Olmtz Manifesto, issued by the Austrian government in March 1849, disabused the leaders of the different national movements of their belief that Vienna would satisfy their claims. Negotiations were started with the Hungarians, who began to gain ground
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against the Austrians. Lszl Teleki, who in Paris met Polish, Romanian, and other migrs, urged his government in the spring of 1849, to come, by all means, to an understanding with the neighbouring nations and to reorganise Hungary "on the basis of a confederation". On 15 May, he wrote to Kossuth: "The future of Hungary depends, in my view, on our being as generous as possible towards the diverse national groups in respect of granting them rights. Not only Austria has died, but also St. Stephen's Hungary." In Hungary, this view was supported only by a group of young radicals. The government answered that it could not consent to the dismemberment of the country or the "creation of federal status". True, this would have been difficult in the middle of the war, but the government had also tried to come to an understanding with the Serbs, and, particularly, with the Romanians. On the proposal of Nicolae Balcescu former foreign secretary of the Bucharest revolution, the Hungarian government managed, in spring 1849, a "projet de pacification". A little later, this served as a basis for the Nationality Law - the first of its kind - which was adopted in Szeged at the end of July. It guaranteed the free development of the nationalities, the use of their languages in dealings with the authorities, and in local administration, autonomous organisations, and schools. The importance of this legislation should be acknowledged even in the knowledge that it came too late, it could not be implemented and to determine the extent to which these cultural concessions might have met the demands of the affected national movements could not be determined.

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Some historians maintain that the various national demands could not have been neutralised even by more generous concessions, mainly because of the irreconcilable character of their territorial claims. This opinion may be realistic in many respects, but it also serves to provide an easy excuse for those nationalists who refused to give concessions for the wrong reasons. It would have been more reasonable on the part of the Hungarians, regaining their leading position in 1867, not to adhere to the fiction that all citizens of Hungary belonged to the Hungarian 'political nation', as formulated in the Nationality Law of 1868, which otherwise offered many concessions regarding the use of different languages, but was never really put into practice. It would have been better to try to make a serious effort - even to take risks - to make everybody feel more at home in a common, civilised country, than in some other state which may have come into being at a later date. Considering the historical trend of national evolution, it seemed unavoidable that the peoples in this region should, one after the other, develop into separate nations, with an identity of their own and following their own paths. The answer to the question 'Where to?' was therefore given as a matter of course. It was not, however, determined from the outset how, in what way, and under what circumstances this separation would take place. Would it happen in a relatively peaceful way, through negotiations, so that co-existence and co-operation would not
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become impossible, or through bitter conflicts, or even, in case of a European crisis, by way of an explosion in which the whole boiler would burst into pieces, flying asunder in unknowable directions? Hungarian policy had - ought to have - to try, while it still had the time - a whole generation - and the appropriate means and position, to avoid obstructing this inevitable process, and to channel it, to give it an outlet which would be more or less acceptable to all the parties concerned. Prime Minister Klmn Tisza should not have closed three Slovak high-schools in 1875: he ought to have given them a university. It is possible - in fact, advisable - to pursue one's interests in a reasonable way. Esteem for others is not a sign of weakness, but rather one of strength and of intelligence.

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No. 9 John M. Litwack Economic No. 10 Rogers Brubaker and Europe No. 11 Leonhard Schmeiser Zur Kontroverse zwischen Leibniz und Clarke ber die Philosophie Newtons No. 12 Anton Pelinka Leadership, Democratic Theory, and the 'Lesser Evil' No. 13 Andrei Pippidi About Graves as Landmarks of National Identity No. 14 Alessandro Cavalli Patterns of Collective Memory No. 15 Jrgen Trabant Thunder, Girls and Sheep, and Other Origins of Language No. 16 Ivn Szelnyi The Rise of Managerialism: The New Class After the Fall of Communism No. 17 Thomas A. Sebeok Semiotics and the Biological Sciences: Initial Conditions
C OLL EG IU M B UD APE ST Ins tit u te f or A dvan c ed S tud y

The Dilemmas of Hungarian Economic Policy No. 19 Jnos Kornai Ngy jellegzetessg. A magyar fejlds politikai gazdasgi megkzeltsben No. 20 Claude Karnoouh Le ralisme socialiste ou la victoire de la bourgeoisie No. 21 Claude Karnoouh Postcommunisme/Communisme. Le conflit des interprtations No. 22 Ale Debeljak On the Ruins of the Historical AvantGarde: The Institution of Art and Its Contemporary Exigencies No. 23 Jnos Kornai Paying the Bill for Goulash-Communism: Hungarian Development and Macro Stabilization in a Political-Economy Perspective No. 24 Erzsbet Szalai Two Studies on Transition: Intellectuals and Value Changes: Notes from the Belly of a Whale. A World Falling Apart No. 25 Martin Krygier Virtuous Circles: Antipodean Reflections on Power, Institutions, and Civil Society No. 26 Alexei Shevtchenko The Philosophical Experience of M.K. Mamardashvili as the Reconstruction of Metaphysics in the Post-classical Age No. 27 Alexei Shevtchenko The Concept of Transformed Form and the Problem of the Unconscious No. 28 Gyrgy Csepeli, Political Change -- Psychological Change: Ferenc Ers, Mria Conversion Strategies in Hungary during the Nemnyi, and Transition from State Socialism to Democracy Antal rkny No. 29 John Btki Woman as Goddess in Krdys Sunflower.
Pu bli c Le ct ure Se ri es

No. 18 Jnos Kornai

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No. 30 Julia Szalai No. 31 Claude Schkolnyk No. 32 Jnos Kornai No. 33 Jnos Kornai No. 34 Victor Neumann No. 35 Katalin Fbin No. 36 va Hos

No. 37 Lszl Csontos,

Jnos Kornai and Istvn Gyrgy Tth No. 38 Gyrgy Mrkus Antinomies of Culture No. 39 Ion Ianoi Leben als berleben. Ein ost-europisches kulturelles Bekenntnis No. 40 Zsolt Enyedi, Ferenc Authoritarianism and the Ideological Spectrum Ers, and Zoltn in Hungary Fbin No. 41 Grayna Skapska The Paradigm Lost? The Constitutional Process in Poland and the Hope of a Grassroots Constitutionalism No. 42 Marina Glamocak Les processus de la transition No. 43 Pavel Campeanu Transition and Conflict
C OLL EG IUM B UD A PEST I nst itu t e for Adv an ced Stu d y

Two Studies on Changing Gender Relations in Post-1989 Hungary. Lutilisation du mythe en politique. Le centenaire de Petfi The Citizen and the State: Reform of the Welfare State Adjustment without Recession. A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilisation Multicultural Identities in a Europe of Regions. The Case of Banat County Within Yet Without. Problems of Womens Powerlessness in Democratic Hungary At the Crossroads of Ancient and Modern. Reform Projects in Hungary at the End of the Eighteenth Century Tax Awareness and the Reform of the W elfare State

Un logos sans ethos. Considrations sur les notions dinterculturalisme et de multiculturalisme applique la Transylvanie No. 45 Benot de Trglod Lhomme nouveau en rpublique dmocratique du Vit Nam. Histoire dune rinvention (194864) No. 46 Robert Wokler The Enlightenment. The Nation-State and the Primal Patricide of Modernity No. 47 Diane Masson Le Mmorandum de lAcadmie serbe des sciences et des arts de 1986. Tentative de reconstitution dun prodrome au conflit dans lex-Yougoslavie No. 48 Jnos Kornai The Borderline between the Spheres of Authority of the Citizen and the State. Recommendations for the Hungarian Health Reform No. 49 Jerzy Hausner Security through Diversity. Conditions for Successful Reform of the Pension System in Poland No. 50 Assar Lindbeck Lessons from Sweden for Post-Socialist Countries No. 51 Stephan Haggard, Politics, Institutions and Macroeconoic Robert Kaufman, Adjustment. Hungarian Fiscal PolicyMaking in Matthew Shugart Comparative Perspective No. 52 Joan M. Nelson The Politics of Pension and Health Care Delivery Reforms in Hungary and Poland Essential Fiscal Institutions in Selected Economies in Transition No. 54 Vladimir Gimpelson The Politics of Labour Market Adjustment
Pu bli c Le ct ur e S e ries

No. 44 Claude Karnoouh

No. 53 Vito Tanzi

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No. 55 Bla Greskovits

No. 56 Roland Habich Zsolt Spder No. 57. George Barany

No. 58. Jnos Kornai No. 59. Jnos Kornai No. 60 Jnos Kornai No. 61 Alois Riklin

Brothers-in-Arms or Rivals in Politics? Top Politicians and Top Policy Makers in the Hungarian Transformation Winners and Losers: Transformational Outcomes in a Comparative Context LandesBaumeister Csicsinyi and Hungarian Political Culture: Observations about a Shifting Concept and a Shifting Man The System Paradigm Hardening the Budget Constraint: The Experience of Post-Socialist Countries Hidden in an Envelope: Gratitude Payments to Medical Doctors in Hungary Montesquieus So Called Separation of Powers in the Context of the History of Ideas

Ungarn - 26. Oktober 1998 No. 7 Hans-Georg Heinrich (ed.) No. 8 Institution Building in the New Democracies Studies in Post-Post-Communism

Michael Gervers (ed.) Dating Undated Medieval Charters

OTHER PUBLICATIONS (ART CATALOGUES) Anna Wessely (ed.) Anke Doberauer: Vierzehn ForscherFourteen ScholarsTizenngy tuds. (199899) Dra Maurer (ed.) Kp s KpisgBild und Bildlichkeit. (199899)

WORKSHOP SERIES No. 1 Hans-Henning

No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6

Eladsok a mfordtsrl [Lectures on Literary Paetzke (ed.) Translation]f Jrgen Trabant (ed.)Origins of Language Ludwig Salgo (ed.) The Family Justice System: Past and Future, Experiences and Prospects Les tensions du post-communisme/Strains of Postcommunism Conference on Centres of Excellence Buchprsentation - Historische deutschsprachige Buchbestnde in
C OLL EG IUM B UD A PEST I nst itu t e for Adv an ced Stu d y Pu bli c Le ct ur e S e ries