Salient Point 1 Public Transportation Is an Easy Target Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 201, terrorists

ts carried out nearly 1,804 attacks on surface transportationkilling more than 3,900 people (Chapter 2, Page 21-22) Public transportation is an easy target because of the vast amount of modes the public has to choose from, it is readily accessible to anyone, runs on a schedule and is utilized by a fair share of the public. Public transportation is almost everywhere and in almost every country and city, from buses to trains to airplanes to subways. Some cities have all four of these modes of public transportation, which requires these cities to be even that more vigilant against would-be terrorists who wish to do harm to their citizens. To properly achieve this, cities need to educate their customers on what to be aware of, how to properly report it and what to do if they believe they are in danger. The ease of access to public transportation makes some modes of transportation easier targets of opportunity than others, such as buses over airplanes. Since September 11, 2001, flying had become an arduous task for most, with the constant scrutiny of airport security, pat downs, x-rays and restrictions, this public mode of transportation is now a very unlikely target. I am not saying airplanes will never be used by terrorists again to cause another catastrophe, I am just saying airplanes will probably be tried as a last resort due to heightened security practices that almost all airports now employ as a result of 9/11. While one could disturb or destroy a section of train track causing a derailment, again this would be hard to accomplish since one would need to disturb the track in a populace area to kill the most amount of people, they are also very susceptible to being noticed during the act. The most vulnerable mode of public transportation is the buses, since they make such frequent stops with passengers getting on and off at different intervals allows for one to place an IED or some other related device to provide the most destruction and produce the most casualties; more bang for ones buck, I guess you could say. Salient Point 2 It Is All In Their Head! The work of too many new researchers is built on a weak foundation of assumptions and conjecture rather than data and rigorous research. (Chapter 4 Page 45) Right after 9/11 happened, the media was suddenly flooded with so-called terrorist experts, flooding the airwaves with their expert opinions and knowledge. Some came from academia, while others came from the Government; the military (retired Generals) and others from threeletter agencies; retired and currently employed. The failures some of these so-called experts suffered was from a lack of understanding of these bad actors and their actions, not to point of becoming a sympathizer but in the aspect of what is going through their minds. Building psychological profiles against these different entities allows others to analyze their past actions and to hopefully discover future actions. Building psychological profiles is not an exact science by any stretch of the imagination, but is a foundation that is built on ideology, past activities, known associates and their agenda. Of course, it is not a simple as just connecting a few dots and you have solved the equation, it takes research, data and analysis to develop even the most opaque picture. One of the reasons it is so hard to actually pinpoint root causes or future actions is that terrorist are just like the rest of us; they are human, which means their thought processes can be logical at some point and illogical at others and act rational at times and irrational at others. It is the human element that adds complexity to the equation and profile, without it, diagnosis would be easy and accurate every time, which we all know is not the case. This why

focusing on the broad concept of involvement in terrorism (Kamien, 2012, p.52), is such a bad idea, as it allows for over-generalization (Kamien, 2012, p.52) of findings. Salient Point 3 Chemical and Biological Warfare, Oh My! The emergence of such a deadly pandemic, for which the nation was unprepared to respond, could change America forever. (Chapter 5, Page 60) Employing this type of warfare allows the enemy to exact his might on a populace without firing a single bullet or destroying crucial equipment or infrastructure. Chemical and biological warfare have been around since people were catapulting plagued-riddled bodies over castle walls long ago. This type of warfare has been refined over the ages in terms of delivery, quantity, quality and lethality. An incapacitated enemy no longer has the will or means to fight and is therefore neutralized from the fight. Engaging in chemical and biological warfare is dangerous from the start, no matter how it is going to be employed or delivered, because of the possibility of exposure or contamination by malfunctioning equipment, untrained and ill-equipped people or leaking containers. With the plethora of countries that have lost count or control of their chemical and biological stockpiles, nations such as the United States of America are acutely aware of the potential for a rogue individual or group or even a terrorist group to get their hands on these poor mans atom bombs and attempt to use them against the US and Americans. This also goes same for rogue individuals or groups who might want to synthesize or weaponize a virus such as smallpox or SARS, as the United States knows this could have a potentially deadly outcome, especially from viruses that either have no antidote or only have a very limited amount of antidote on hand. Salient Point 4 Homeland SecurityAnother Layer of Bureaucracy [President Bush] presented homeland security as critically necessary because of the vulnerability to American society (Chapter 6, Page 73) The Department of Homeland Security was stood up with passing of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 on the heels of 9/11, whose primary mission was to protect the homeland from terrorist attacks (Kamien, 2012, p.73). Through the following years after the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security several Homeland Security Presidential Directives were issued that either refined, consolidated or broadened a plan or resource(s) or they called for new plans or resources to be designed and/or implemented to aid the United States emergency preparedness. The Department of Homeland Security issued the National Preparedness Guidelines, with several updates issued since its initial release to the public. The National Preparedness Guidelines established guidelines, protocols, and standards for planning, training and exercises, personal qualification and certification, equipment certification and publication management (Kamien, 2012, p.78). Since its inception in 2002, the scope, mission areas and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security has evolved and in 2007 the Homeland Security Council released the new National Strategy for Homeland Security (Kamien, 2012, p.78) Salient Point 5 The Money Trail Money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations. (Chapter 7, Page 99)

The old adage, money is the root of all evil echoes very loudly when it comes to the United States relentless pursuit and prosecution of the financiers of terror. Like I stated in the Salient Point number one, with money you can buy anything and I do mean anything, as everything has a price. Without funding, terrorists do not have a way to carry out their agenda, whether it is training new members, buying weapons or supplies or traveling to another place to perform terrorist acts. A terrorist organization cannot advertise without funding, just like they cannot communicate without funding, nor could they bribe government officials. Money rules world and without it one stays put, right where they are. Nothing happens without money, nothing. Salient Point 6 Counterterrorism The U.S.A. Patriot Act was rushed through Congress and passed 26 October 2001 in the wake of 9/11 (Chapter 8, Page 133) The impetus behind the Patriot Act was enhancing domestic security against terrorism followed by other aspects of the act dealt with investigations and surveillance, which would have wide spread implications several years later down the road. The Patriot Act also broadened the scope of regular law enforcement investigations to now include the ability to subpoena personal customer records from ISPs, financial institutions and credit card companies, without notice to the targeted suspect (Kamien, 2012, p.133). The new act also allowed for the sharing of foreign intelligence with officials of federal law enforcement, protective enforcement, immigration, national defense and national security (Kamien, 2012, p.133). It also eliminated a legal barrier or at least a perceived legal barrier between sharing information with different three-letter agencies. There are several provisions within the Patriot Act that deal with financial institutions such as money laundering and the required termination with foreign banks that ignore US subpoenas. For all of the lovers of the Patriot Act, it does have its fair share of disdainers who are against certain provisions of the Patriot Act. A ruling in 2004 determined that the National Security Letters that were used to obtain personal email and phone data was unconstitutional as it violated the First and Fourth Amendments. Another ruling in 2007 determined that the sneak and peek provisions were unconstitutional as it violated the Fourth Amendment. Salient Point 7 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) (Chapter 9, Page 152-153) The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) were passed by congress to implement the sharing of intelligence between entities. The act also included a provision that required the President to establish an Information Sharing Environment that provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies (Kamien, 2012, p.152-153). Basically, this act says that any information that is germane to terrorism or terrorism investigations must be shared and at the local levels. This brings to mind the awful job the FBI did sharing information with Bostons law enforcement during the Boston Marathon bombing that occurred this year. The FBI failed to inform Bostons law enforcement agencies concerning the would-be bombers, that they actually investigated one of them a few years before the bombing incident after being tipped-off the Russian government. I still hear stories in the news of one agency have information about a certain entity and other agency knowing nothing about the entity. It seems there is still a great deal sharing of information that is

still not happening as it was portrayed to the American people. While I do truly doubt the information the FBI withheld, or did not share with Bostons finest would have prevented the Boston Marathon bombings, it may have reduced the amount of time it took the actually identify the two brothers. Salient Point 1 Those Who Dont Remember The Past Are Condemned To Repeat It! human failures of leadership and planning (Chapter 11, Page 196) The lack of sharing of information regarding incidents and events that could have otherwise been avoided or at least mitigated to a point where it could have been managed at the lowest level and minimal costs. Also, assuming technology will either prevent or solve a problem/issue without regard to those who will actually have to use this new technology is another problem companies and governments share when it comes to attempting to be proactive. There is also the deficiency of actively reading, analyzing and implementing after-action reports or lessons-learned from incidents that happen at similar institutions. The proverbial burying of heads in the sand, thinking it will not happen here only makes matters worse when this type of mentality is condoned by both leadership and management. The allowance of cutting corners or disregarding established policy and/or procedures is another avenue that is often used until an incident refocuses the attention on the already established policy and/or procedures that would have alleviated the incident from happening in the first place. Take the Exxon Valdez accident, the Alaska Oil Spill Commission determined the whole incident could have been avoided, had the Exxon Valdez followed the established rules regarding passing through Prince William Sound; procedures that had been around since 1977 (Kamien, 2012, p. 204). The same can be said with regard to information or intelligence that is obtained, but never disseminated to the appropriate channels. Why collected the information or intelligence if it is only going to be held close to the vest? For some reason some feeling releasing the information or intelligence to other is going to somehow diminish the importance of those who originally attained the information or intelligence in the first place. It is this type of mindset, which permits history to repeat itself...again and again. Salient Point 2 Is Everyone On The Same Page? The National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) (Chapter 13, Page 278) While the governments initiatives to share information or intelligence to other agencies such as federal, state, local, tribal, private sector and international partners (foreign governments) should have happen well before 9/11, there is still an issue of the vernacular that is being used, which is not conducive to sharing information when it has to be analyzed and translated before it can be put into productive use. For some reason, our government constantly attempts to design and use acronyms to the point of ad nauseam, which only confuses things. When you have to translate and interpret at the same time you are attempting to decipher a report, you are only increase the timeline to which you are attempting to decrease by sharing this information. Well it seems someone figured this out, which lead to the establishment of NIEM. NIEM was designed to allow diverse communities to speak the same language when sharing information between them. Instituting this model permits the efficient exchange of information and cuts down or eliminates nebulous language between partners. For example, where judicial, welfare, and health agencies might all have information about a child at risk of abuse, each data system might use different words to refer to the child. A youth in one system was a minor in another, and a

juvenile somewhere elseeven though they all referred to the same person in the real world (NIEM.gov, p. 3). Utilizing NIEM-based standards allowed for the connecting of dots, dots that would not have been connected if it were not for the use of extensible mark-up languages (XML) and its many subject matter-specific terms (NIEM.gov, p. 3). Salient Point 3 con-FUSION Without an analytical function, who will carry out an essential element of intelligence-led policing (Chapter 14, Page 295) It is common knowledge among the practitioner community that the average police department does not possess analytical personnel or the function itself (Kamien, 2012, p. 295). This statement goes completely against the call for sharing information and having fusion centers. While the concept of the regional fusion centers is impressive, here is the true problem with the standing up of regional fusion centers. Most of the region fusion centers are typically ran and manned by law enforcement, such as sheriffs, not analyst or even intelligence officers and therein lays the problem. Law enforcement deals with law enforcement, not intelligence, so now we have these regional fusion centers manned with law enforcement that are now expected to interpret, analyze and disseminate intelligence to other local law enforcement agencies in a timely manner, which I feel is way beyond their scope of their job and their knowledge. It is like taking a cook and making him a security guard! Salient Point 4 Let Us Collaborate! The Intelligence community moved from a positions of need to know to need to share. (Chapter 15, Page 325) Collaboration is ultimately about information flow and that conduit must be a two-way street, regardless of the medium employed (Kamien, 2012, p. 328). Effectively communicating is about trust, establishing good relationships, having transparency and common goals. Intelligence that is received at one organization, may be useful or fulfilling to another organization, but the latter organization may not know that intelligence is attainable if the first organization does not share it. This is where collaboration comes in and this is also where the other factors (trust, establishing good relationships, having transparency and common goals) aid in the collaboration between the two organizations. Collaboration is also a way to conserve resources and eliminate duplication of processes or paperwork and can be an effective way to improve the way organization does operate. Achieving effective collaboration efforts can only be done through culture changes that develops and rewards such endeavors (Kamien, 2012, p. 330). Without collaboration, much needed intelligence and information just lies upon the floor of a hording organization or entity, only to be discovered after a tragic event has happened. Salient Point 5 Risk? What risk? the total risk cannot be eliminated, but it must be reduced and managed. (Chapter 16, Page 333) Mitigating and controlling risk is all about having a thorough and methodical step-by-step process that is followed in the event of an incident happening that warrants the implementation of an emergency action plan. While companies and governments cannot realistically have specific emergency action plans for every type of scenario that may happen, they can determine which events would likely happen and what would be the course of action to eliminate it or at least mitigate it. Risk and vulnerability assessments are the key tools that are used for

identifying such weaknesses or flaws in a system, process or procedure. Once these limitations have been discovered it is up to the organization to determine how probable it could happen, how it affects them, how long it could affect them, how much it could cost them and what they can do to either eliminate it or least mitigate it. This is often portrayed as a matrix and is often priorities with the most critical events listed at the top. But there are limitations to both the risk and vulnerability assessments, as they are only as good as their last review. By this, I mean, both the risk and vulnerability assessments need to be looked at the very least annually, but need to be review, altered, modified and updated as technology grows and matures, laws and regulations change and as newly discovered risks and vulnerabilities arise. Another aspect that needs to be addressed is the implementation of emergency action plans, it is one thing to have an emergency action plan, and it is entirely different monster to actually implement it. Who are the key people that need to be in place when an emergency action plan is implemented and do they know how they are? Has the organization ever participated in a dry-run scenario? Was the scenario successful and was there a lessons-learn presented to both the key players and leadership? It is one thing to talk the talk; it is another to walk the walk. Salient Point 6 Ready, Set, Go! The more prepared and state or region is, the less impact that event is likely to have. (Chapter 17, Page 379) The art of readiness means being in a constant cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluation and improvement activities designed to enhance capabilities that prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from and reduce the consequences of both natural and man-made disasters and terrorism (Kamien, 2012, p. 379). Readiness goes hand in hand with risk and vulnerability assessments as they identify key areas that or flawed or limited and yet are of great importance. Without accurate risk and vulnerability assessments, you do not know what to get ready for, nor do you know if you have what you need to either eliminate or mitigate it. Spending all of your time and resources learning to fight fires does not help you when it comes to a flood and vice-versa. Also, attempting to plan for every type of scenario is costly and futile; this is why a risk and vulnerability assessment is crucial. This also goes with prioritizing your most critical assets, as identifying what you have is just as important as identifying what you do not have. Salient Point 7 Communication Is the Key Health, safety and environmental risk communications are a central social function, shaping relationships between citizens and authorities. (Chapter 18, Page 400) How we communicate tells others volumes about ourselves, from tone, delivery, topic, confidence, knowledge, eye contact and even body language. We can also transmit information from what we do not say by either consciously or unconsciously omitting information and or details. Just as we engage our audience with our confidence and knowledge about the topic we are delivering, we disengage them when we are insecure and ill-informed. This is the same when a crisis happens, we look to and for the people who know the facts and deliver them concise and with confidence and who are not afraid to answer any questions. All too often we have witness the unprepared and ill-informed standing in front of a podium looking disheveled, sounding incoherent and repeatedly saying, I dont know when they are asked questions relevant to the situation at hand. This type of presentation demonstrates a lack of understanding when it

comes to informing their audience and it likewise shows they do not care, unfortunately. When the speaker displays confidence and knowledge in their voice and message, it reassures the audience that the right people are on the job and they feel confident they are getting factual, upto-date information passed to them. The same can be said when the inverse is demonstrated. Salient Point 8 Lack of Interest Leads to Abolishment Ultimately whenhigh threat levels became the norm, HSAS lost creditability and the publicbegan to fail to take the alert system seriously. (Chapter 19, Page 427) The publics lack of understanding between distinctions of the different threat level along with the continuous display of elevated threat levels started contentment about the system that was instituted to help alert the very people it was designed to inform. While the system did have its good points such as being easy to read and only had five levels, it did have its bad points such as being vague and rarely changing. It was analogues to the little boy who cried wolf, it constantly showed the wolf was on the prowl, but never showed up. And while the DHS, who was in charge of the changing the conditions, was purvey to intelligence concerning threats and actions that were never shared with the public. It was this lack of information on the side of the public that eventually lead to its demise. You cannot have a public system and not inform the public about it, this is what led to the publics complacency and eventual disregard of the system. I believe the system would probably still be in place had DHS been more vocal about how terrorist plans were quashed by intelligence and active law enforcement and yet lowered when there was nothing present. It was the lack of sharing that steered the Homeland Security Alert System to the island of forgotten toys

References Kamien, D. (2012). Homeland security handbook: Strategic guidance for a coordinated approach to effective security and emergency management. (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ACLU. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.aclu.org/reform-patriot-act (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.niem.gov/documentsdb/Documents/Success Stories/SuccessStory_SAR.pdf