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book

is in

the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright

restrictions in
text.

the United States on the use of the

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024496337

THE

STOICS,

EPICUEEANS
AND

SCEPTICS

LONDON : PRINTED BT SP0TTI8W00DH AND 00., NEW-STBEBT SQTJABB AND PAELIAMBNT STEBET

7<i^'

CORNELL

<

v^ UNIVERSITY^.

THE

STOICS,
^

EPICUEEANS
<

AND

SCEPTICS
TRANSLATED FSOU THE GEBMAN OF

E.

ZELLEK

Professor of the University of Heidelberg

BY

OSWALD

J,

EEICHEL,

B.C.L.

&

M.A.

Ticar of Sparsbolt, Berks

NEW AND

BEVISEB EDITION

LONDON

LONGMANS, OREEN, AND

1880

CO.

50 X6\
t

PEEFACE,
The
present translation aims at supplying an intro-

ductory volume to a later period of the history of

mind in Greece, which may be

as the post-Aristotelian.

collectively described

To the

moralist and theo-

logian no less than to the student of philosophy this

period

is

one of peculiar interest

for it supplied

the scientific mould into which Christianity in the

early years of its growth was cast, and bearing the

shape of which

it

has come down to

us.

Spaesholt Vicarage
October, 1879.

CONTENTS.
PAET
I.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

CHAPTER

I,

THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OP GREECE AT THE CLOSE OP THE POUETH CENTURY, B.C.
PAGE A. Merits

and defects
totle
.

of the systems of Plato

.
.

and Aris.

B. Connection

between the theories Greek character

.

of Aristotle
.

and the
.

.1 .6
.

C.

Greece after the battle of Chseronea

12

CHAPTER

II.

CHARACTER AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE

POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
A. Causes forming the post-Aristotelian philosophy
1.
.

15
1.5

Political causes

2.

Intellectual causes

.17
.

B.

Common
1.

characteristics of the post

.
.

Aristotelian phi.

2.
3.

.19 losophy 19 Theory subordinated to practice 21 Peculiar mode of treating the practical problem These peculiarities illustrated by subsequent phi.

losophy

.22

viii

CONTENTS.
5

C.

Development of the post-Aristoteliau philosophy 1. Dogmatic Schools Stoics and Epicureans, Dogmatic
2.

Scepticism

25

Sceptical

Schoolsinfluences producing Scepticism and Eclecticism

.

26

3.

Eeligious School of Neoplatonists

.31

PAET

II.

THE

STOICS.

CHAPTER

in.

HISTORY OP THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CBNTTJEY, B.C.
A.

36

40 40
41

43

45
45 48

AUTHORITIES FOE THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY; ITS PROBLEM

A. Authorities
1.

2.

Review of authorities' Use to be made of authorities

.

......
AND
DIVISIONS.
.

53
.

53

.55

CONTENTS.
PAGE

Dynamical theory of Nature 1. Matter and force 2. Nature of force

.

3.

Deity

God as force God as matter

.

Pantheism
1. 2. 3.

..... ......
.

.139 .139
.

141 148 156 156 158

God

identical with the wofld

Relative difference between

God and
.

the world
.

Views of Boethus

.159

CHAPTER
:

VII.

THE STUDY OF ITATUEE 2. COUESB, CHAEACTEB, AND GOVERNMENT OP THE UNIVBESB.

The General Course
1.

of the Universe
.

161

Origin of the world

161

2. 3.

End

of the world

.163
.

Cycles in the world's course

of the

Government
1.

2. 3.

Nature of Destiny as Providence as Generative Reason 170 Arguments in favour of Providence 173 The idea of Providence determined 175
. .

Nature of the World

1.

...... .....

World

....
.
.

165

170

Its

2.

unity and perfection Moral theory of the world

....
. . .

182

183 187

CHAPTER
THE STUDY OP NATUEB THE ELEMENTS.
:

VIII.

3.

THE

IRRATIONAL NATURE. UNIVEESE.

194
197

A. The most general ideas on Nature

B.
(}.

The Elements The Universe 1. The stars

2.
3.

202

Meteorology Plants and animals

204 206 208


CONTENTS.
li

OHAPTER
A. The Soul
1.

IX.
:

2.

MateriaKstio nature of the soul Divisions of the soul

.....
THE STUDY OF NATtjEB
4.

MAN.
PAGE

B.
C.

The Individual Soul and the Soul

Freedom and Immortality

.... ....
. . .

.210
210 213

of the Universe

216
219

CHAPTER
ETHICS:
1.

X.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTEACT THEORY OP MORALITY.

Good
. .
.

A. The Highest
1.

.225
.

2. 3.

4.
5.

Nature of the Highest Good The Good and Evil Pleasure and the Good Negative character of Happiness The Highest Good as Law
. . .

225
235 239 240

.230
.

B.

Emotions and Virtue their nature varieties of 1. The Emotions 2. Idea of Virtue position and negative aspects of the virtues severally their mutual relations

.....
.

243 243

unity of virtue
C.

The Wise Man 1. Wisdom and Folly

2. 3.

.......

. .

254 268 268 272 275

Universal Depravity

Conversion

.....
. . .

OHAPTER
ETHICS:
2.

XI.

THE STOIC THEORY OP MORALS AS MODIFIED IN PRACTICE.

A, Things to be preferred and eschewed

1.

Secondary goods

.....
.
.

278

2.

Classes of things indifferent

Collision of. modified

3.

and abstract theory

280 281 284

xu

CONTENTS.

B. C.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

XIV.
ITS
PAGE 381

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHT AS A WHOLE AND

HISTOEICAL ANTECEDENTS.
A. Inner connection of the system
1.

2. Scientific
3.

Ethical side of Stoicism side of the Stoic system

.... ....
.
. .

Connection of the moral and

relation to Socrates

scientific

elements

382 383 385 387 387 392

B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems

1. Its

2.
3.

and the Cynics Relation to Megarians and Heraclitus

Relation to Aristotle Relation to Plato
place in history
.

4.

C.

The Stoic philosophy as a whole

1. Its
2.

Its

onesidedness

.... ..... .....

. . .
.

.396 .399
400 400 402

PART in. THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTER XV.
EPICtTREANS
A. Epicurus B. Scholars of Epicurus C. Epicureans of the Roman period

..... ....
CHAPTER
XVI.

AHD THE EPICUEEAJT SCHOOL.

404 408 411

OHAEACTEE AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN TEACHING. THE TEST-SCIENCE OF TKUTH.

A. Character of Epicurean system . 1. Its power of self-preservation

418 418

XIT

CONTENTS.
2.
3.

Aim

of philosophy according to the Epicvireans

Divisions of philosophy

Canonic or the Test- Science of Truth

1.

Sensation and perception

.

.... ....
.
. .

PAGE

420 424

.425
425

2.
3.

4.

Notions . . . Opinion . Standard of truth suhjective

.

,.
.

.428 .429
.

431

CHAPTER XVn.
A.

CONTENTS.

OHAPTEK

XIX.
:

THE MOKAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS 1. GENERAL VIEWS.

A. Pleasure

.....

xvi

CONTENTS.

PAET

IV.

THE SCEPTICS: PYJRSSO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.

CHAPTER
XXII.
PAGE
Historical position of Scepticism
1.
.

PYEKHO.
.

Relation to cotemporary dogmatic systems

2.
3.

Causes producing it Pyrrho and his followers

Impossibility of knowledge

614 514 515 517

521 521

Teaching of Pyrrho
1.

2.
3.

'Withholding of judgment Mental imperturbability

523 525

CHAPTER
A. Arcesilaus
1 2.

XXIII.

THE NEW ACADEMY.

.

Denial of knowledge
Probability
.

B.

Cameades
1. 2.

Negative views of Positive views of

...
. . . . . . .

528 528 534 535 588 553 563

C. School of

Carneades

GENEEAL INDEX

.567

PART

I..

STATE OF CVLTURE IN GREECE.

CHAPTER

I.

THE INTELLECTTJAL AND POLITICAL

STATE OF GREECE

AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.

In Plato and Aristotle Greek PMlosophy reached

its

Chap.
^'

greatest perfection.

In their hands the Soeratic

philosophy of conceptions had been developed into

elaborate

systems,

embracing the whole range of

it

A..

Merits

contemporary knowledge, and grouping

finite

from de- 'Ti "^S'^x points of view so as to afford a connected view systems of

of the universe. The study of nature had been sup:^^f^^^ plemented by careful enquiries into morals, and had been itself transformed, enlarged, and enriched by
Aristotle.

In metaphysics, the foundations of a phibuilding had been by

is

losophical

him

laid deeply,

everything that

having been thoroughly referred

to first principles, so as no previous philosopher

had

attempted.

A multitude of
of mental
;

phenomena which

earlier

thinkers had carelessly passed by, in particular the

phenomena

life,

had been pressed into the

service of research

new

questions had been raised

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Chap,
"

new answers given. Into every branch of knowledge new ideas had reached and penetrated. Idealism,
that beautiful and telling expression of the Greek
set forth by Plato in pure brilliancy, and had been united by Aristotle with the most careful observation. Practice and theory had brought the dialectic method to the position of an art, and a

mind, had been

valuable instrument of thought had been gained in

the scientific use of terms of which Aristotle was the

T-eal

originator.

Within a few generations the

intel-

lectual treasures of Greece had been increased manifold both in extent and value.

The heritage received

successors.

by Socrates from
Oreat
as

his predecessors could hardly be releft

cognised as the same

by Aristotle to his

was the progress made by Greek phi-

losophy in the fourth century before Christ, equally

great, however, were the difficulties with which it had perpetually to contend not less difficult the problems for the solution of which it had to labour. Already Aristotle had pointed out the weak points
;

in the system of Plato, rendering

it

impossible for

him

to rest therewith content.

still

From

the platform

of present knowledge

further objections

would

be naturally urged.

And

again as r^ards AristotleJ

even in his system inconsistencies on some of the most important points may be found concealed under* a certain indefiniteness of expression,
fatal if once

brought to light to the soundness of the wholeJ "With all his ingenuity, Aristotle had not succeeded in blending into one harmonious whole all the ele^

ments out of which his system was composed. Hence

MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

the divergencies of his immediate followers from the
original Aristotelian teaching

Chap.
'

may be

explained.

Nor were these

easily got

defects of a kind that could be

over.

On

the

contrary, the

more the
the

matter

is

gone

into, the clearer it

becomes that these

defects were

embedded in the foundations of

systems both of Plato and Aristotle, underlying in

short the whole previous career of philosophic thought.

Leaving
tion,

details
all

and minor points out of considera-

they

ultimately

may be

traced to two

main

sources, either to

an imperfect knowledge and expe-

rience of the world, or to the hasty conclusions of an

idealistic philosophy of conceptions.

To the former
fell,

cause

may be

attributed the

mistakes in natural
Aristotle

science into which Plato

and

and the
that it

limited

character of their view of history; to the

latter, the

Platonic theory of ideas with

all

involves

the antithesis of ideas and appearances, of

reason and the senses, of knowledge and ignorance,

of the present world and the world to come
likewise the

and
is

corresponding

points in the

system

of Aristotle

such, for instance (to mention

some of

the principal ones only), as the relation of what

particular

and what is general, of form and matter, of God and the world, of the theory of final causes and of natural explanations, of the rational and the irrational parts of the soul, of speculative theory and
practice.

Both causes are, however, closely connected. The Greek philosophers were content with an uncertain and defective knowledge of facts, because they trusted

b2

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Chap,
'

conceptions too implicitly, being ignorant of their

origin

and worth

and they had this unconditional

its

trust in the truth of conceptions because the study

of nature was yet in

infancy.

Their knowledge

of history was as yet too limited for

them

to note

the difference between the results of a careful observation and those of ordinary unmethodical experience,

the uncertainty of most of the traditional principles

and the

induction.

more stringent method of to both Plato and Aristotle lay in attaching undue prominence to the dialectical method inherited from Socrates to the neglect of observation, and in supposing that connecessity for a

The

fault

common

ceptions expressing the very essence of things can be deduced in a purely logical way from cxirrent beliefs and the uses of language. In Plato this dialectical
exclusiveness appears
sion in a telling

more strongly, finding expresmanner in the theory of recollection.

For certainly, if all our conceptions are inherent from the moment of birth, needing only the agency
of sensible things to
ence, it

make

us conscious of their exists

may be

legitimately inferred that, to

know

the essence of things,

we must

look within and not

without, obtaining our ideas by development from the mind rather than by abstraction from experience. It may be inferred with equal reason, that the ideas

drawn from the mind are the true standard by which experience must be judged. Whenever ideas and
experience disagree, instead of regarding ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon the data of experienci
as imperfect,

and as inadequately expressing thi

MERITS AND DEFECTS OF EARLIER SYSTEMS.

ideas which constitute the thing as
it really exists.

Chap.
'

The whole theory of

implies,
is

ideas, in short,

and

all

that

it

a natural corollary from

the

Soeratic

theory of conceptions.

Even

those parts

of this

theory which seem most incongruous are best explained by being referred to the principles of
Soeratic process.

the

PVom

the

onesidedness

of

these

suppositions
at-

Aristotle is only partly free.

Undoubtedly he

tempted to supply the defects in the Soeratic and Platonic theory of conceptions by observation, with which Plato's experimental knowledge cannot be
compared, either in point of accuracy or extent.
Neither can
it

be ignored that therewith

is

con-

nected that complete transformation of 'the Platonic

metaphysics,

whereby

the

same

right

is

secured for particulars over against the universal, as

the philosopher had already secured for observation

over against conceptional knowledge.

But

Aristotle

did not go far enough.

In his theory of knowledge

he cannot wholly discard the supposition that thesoul has its knowledge by a process of development

from within, being not only endowed with the capacity of thinking, but possessing from its birth the^ substance of ideas. In his scientific method the
critical investigation of

common notions and of idiom,

that in fact which he himself calls proof by probabilities, is constantly taking the place of strict
induction.

antagonistic currents in Plato's teaching

His endeavours to harmonise the two may have

all sincerity,

been undertaken in

but the antagonism

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Chap,
"

was too deep-seated to yield to his

efforts.

It not

only reappears in the fundamental ideas, but colours

the most general results of his system.

Beginning

with the antithesis between forvn and matter, it ends in the contrast between the world and a sovl outside the world, in the conception of reason regarded even in

man

as

something coming from

without, and never combining with the lower parts

of his nature to form one complete living unity.
B. Con-

Granting that the above features

may

be proxi-

tween the

niately deduced from the Socratic theory of concep-

theories of tions, still

that philosophy, it must be owned, expresses

it
'

and Greeh the character of the nation to which

clmraeter.

belonged.

In

^^

earlier

work

it

has been shown

life

that the com-

monest peculiarity of

in Greece consists in the

undisturbed unity of the outer and the inner world,

in an artless belief that nally

mind and matter were origiconnected, and are still in perfect harmony
"When the whole mental
it is
life

with one another. ing in

of a

people bears this impress,

its

not likely to be want-

philosophy

also.

Besides the advantages,!

therefore,

which accrue from the close connection of

\

those two elements, philosophy will also share the defects unavoidably

connected with any view of their

intimacy which ignores a real distinction between

them.

Only gradually and imperfectly will the mind become aware of the distinctive peculiarity of mental
life,

of the notion of personality, of the independence

of moral rights and duties of all external circum^

'

Zeller's Philosophie

der Grieolien.

Part

I.

96.

PHILOSOPHT AND NATIONAL CJSAMACTEM.

stances, of the share of our
ideas.

own

will in creating our

Chap,
L_

On

the other hand,

it will

have

less hesita-

tion in transferring the phases of consciousness

imme-

diately to things themselves, in regarding the world

from ideal points of view borrowed from the domain

of our

own minds,

in accepting our

own

notions of

things as something real, without testing their actual

truth, nay, even treating

them

as higher

compared

with the reality of the senses, and in confounding

the critical analysis of a notion with the experimental
investigation of a thing.

If in the time of

its

highest

perfection the philosophy of Greece was not free from

these mistakes

if,

further, these

were the cause of

aU the important
their

faults in the systems of Plato

and and

Aristotle, not the framers of these systems only

immediate successors ought to bear the blame,

but rather the whole mental peculiarity of that people,

of which within the province of science these

men

were the greatest representatives.

In proportion

as the close connection of the faults

of the Platonic and Aristotelian

systems with the

whole character of Greek thought becomes apparent,

the more
difficult, it will

be

felt,

was

it for

G-reek

thought

to.

emancipate

itself

from these

faults.

To
lines

compass this a sweeping change of the customary

of thought would be requisite.

The

origin of our

ideas, the primary meaning of our conceptions, must

needs be examined
distinction

much more closely; a sharper made between what is supplied from withis

out and what

supplied from within

the truth of

several axioms received in metaphysics, more carefully

STATE OF CULTURE IN OBEECE.

Chap,
^'

Science had been done as yet. must accustom itself to an accuracy of observation, and to a strictness of inductive process, never as yet
investigated, than

reached in Greece.

Sciences resting on observation

must have attained a pitch of completeness which it was vain to hope to reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The anthropomorphic way of looking
at nature, allowing questions as to facts to be an-

swered by speculations on
quiries into man's

final causes

and the desire

of nature to realise beauty, must be dropped.

En-

moral nature and functions would have to be severed from a regard for purely natural relations, the disturbing influences of which may
be seen in the national exclusiveness of the Greeks,
in the onesided political character of their morality,

in the institution of slavery.

would have to be changed in the conand views of Greece before this pass would be Could it be expected that a stricter and reached
ditions
!

How much

more

scientific

method would obtain

life

rule so long as

the tendency to look upon the

logous to the
life

of nature as ana-

kept alive by a religion Or that moral science would shake off the trammels of the Greek propriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels were in full force? Or that a sharper distinction between what comes from without and what from
of

man was
?

such as that of Hellas

within in our ideas

look for in Aristotle

prevail, until a depth and an intensity had been given to the inner life, and the rights and value of the individual as such had

a would

distinction which

we

vainly


PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.
obtained a recognition which
it

required the combined

Chap

influence of Christianity and the peculiar Grermanic

character to

bring

realise the national

about? The more vividly we stamp and the surrounding na-

tional conditions of the

the characteristics of the national

to

Greek philosophy, with all life, the more ready

its

hand

is

the conviction, that to heal

defects

defects

most
avail

brilliant

which are apparent even in its greatest and achievements nothing short of an

actual revolution in the mental tone of Greece would

such

as history has at length seen

accom-

plished after

many

shifts

and many centuries.

life

On

the platform of the ancient

of Greece

such a change could not possibly have come about.

Thereby certainly the

possibility is not

excluded,

that under more favom-able circumstances a further

development of Greek philosophy might have taken

place in the same course of purely intellectual en-

quiry which

it

its earlier representatives,

had followed hitherto in the hands of and more particularly of

Aristotle, with

results

The the most important results. which might in this way have been possibly

attained,
is,

we cannot

exactly determine.

Speculation

however, useless.

In point of
It

fact,

the historical

circumstances under which philosophy had to grow

cannot be ignored.

had only become what

it

had

The under the influences of these circumstances. Socratic theory of conceptions, and the Ideal theory
of Plato, presuppose on the one hand the high cul-

ture of the age of Pericles, and the brilliant career

of Athens and Greece following on the Persian war.

10

STATU OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

Not
'

Chap.

do they presuppose the political degradation and the moral exhaustion of Grreece during and after
less

the Peloponnesian war.

In his purely intellectual

attitude, despairing of every direct practical activity,

in his broad view of things, his

knowledge of every

kind, in his system matured and elaborate, and

em-

bracing

all

the results of previous enquiry

Aristotle

appears as the child of an age which was bearing to

its

grave a great historical development, in which

intellectual labour

had begun to take the place of

hearty political action.

The bloom
closer

of Greek philosophy was short-lived,

but not more so than the bloom of national Ufe,

examination shows that the one depended- on

the other, and that both of these phenomena were

due to the operation of the same

for politics,

causes.

With

a high appreciation of freedom, with a ready aptitude

with a genius for

artistic creations, the

politics,

Greeks produced, within the sphere of

result

one

of its

kind unrivalled and unique.

They

neglected, however, to lay the foundations wide and

deep.

Their political duration could not keep pace

with their versatility and excitability.

ties limited

Communi-

in extent and

simple in arrangement

sufficed for
all
all

them, which, however, could not include

branches of the Greek family, nor satisfy at once

legitimate interests.

Within the range of science

we likewise see them forming rash conclusions, advancing from individual experiences at once and without

any mediating links to the most general conceptions, and constructing theories upon a foundation of

PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL CHAMACTEJR.

limited and

11

imperfect

wholly inadequate to bear.

far,

the intellect

which it was Whether, and in how of Greece, if left to itself, might

experience,

Chap.
'

have remedied these defects in a longer protracted,

undisturbed deyelopment,
impossible
to
is

a question which
intellect

it is

answer.

That

was

far too

intimately bound up with the political, the moral,

and the religious .life in short, with the whole mental tone and culture of the people not to be

seriously affected
too,

by any of their changes. It in the character and historical progress of

lay,

this

people to have only a brief period of splendour, and

one soon over.

of Greece reached its highest point in Plato

Aristotle, in all other respects Greece

At the time that the philosophy and

was then in a
Notwithstanding indiit,

hopeless

state

of decline.

vidual attempts to resuscitate

the old morality

and propriety of conduct had disappeared since the

beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

Together withi

them, too, the old belief in the gods was gone.

the bulk of the people the rising philosophy with
ethics afforded no substitute.
cultivated, could

To
its
,

Art, however carefully

no longer come up to the excellence

classic

of the

strictly

period.

Political relations

became daily

more

unsatisfactory.

If in the fifth

century before Christ the rivalry of Athens and Sparta

had ranged the

states of

Greece into two groups, in

the succeeding century disunion spread further. Even the attempt of Thebes under Epaminondas to found

a new leadership only multiplied parties. Destitute of a political centre of gi'avity, the Greeks, of their

12

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

own
choice, drifted into a disgraceful dependence on
'

Chap,

the conquered and

now

declining Persian empire.

Persian gold wielded an influence which Persian

arms had never been able to exercise. The petty jealousies of Kttle states and tribes wasted in endless local feuds resources which needed only unity and
leadership to do wonders.

With

the decline of civil

order the well-being

and martial prowess of the

nation declined also; and the increasing technical

war contributed to take the decision of battle more and more out of the hands of free citizens, and to place it in those of the numerous
cultivation of the art of

mercenaries which are one of the most injurious

phenomena
As
this

of this age, a sure sign of the decline of

freedom, and of the approach of a military despotism.

danger with the threatening

rise of

the Mace-

donian power came nearer, patriots in Greece might

still

deceive themselves

with the hope that their

self-devotion would avert the danger.

An

unbiassed

glance at history can, however, only see in the failure

of this attempt the natural and inevitable
conse-

quence of causes
ter

so deeply rooted in the Grreek charac-

and the course of Greek history, that not even the most heroic exertions of individuals, nor the resiststates,

ance of the divided

which came too

late,

could for one moment render the final issue doubtful.

C. Greece

By
^^^

the battle of Charonea the

doom

of Greece

laUle^of Glmronea.

sealed.

Never since then has Greece attained to

All attempts to shake off the

real political freedom.

Macedonian supremacy ended in exhausting disasters. In the subsequent struggles Hellas, and Athens in

DECLINE OF GREECE.
particular,

13
rulers, the

was the play-ball of changing

Chap.
'

continual arena of their warfare.

Not

until the

second half of the third century was a purely Grecian

power formed

the

Achaean League
rallied.

round
How

which

the hopes of the nation

How

inadequate,

however, was this attempt compared with what the

real

wants of the country required!

soon

it

became apparent that no remedies were here

found to heal the
ills

to be
I

from which

it

was suffering

That old hereditary

failing of the Grreeks, internal

discord, still rendered it impossible for

them

to be

independent in foreign relations, and to be united

and

settled at

home.

Achseans,

-Sltolians,

In perpetual struggles between and Spartans, theii- best re-

The very individual who sources were squandered. had led the Achseans against the Macedonians, in
the
cause
of

independence,

now summoned

the

Macedonians back to the Peloponnesus, to gain their

support against Sparta.

When the supremacy of Macedonia was broken by the arms of Eome, a more avowed dependence on Italian allies succeeded. And
was incorporated in the Roman empire, even the shadow of freedom which up to this time had been
assured, departed for ever.

"when, in the year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia

Sad

as the affairs of Grreece at this period as

became,

and marked

was the decline of

its

internal reits

sources, not less important

was the extension of

mental horizon, and the

culture.

more general diffusion of its ascendancy, dealing as it Macedonian The

did a death-blow at the independence of Grreece, also

14

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

broke down the boundaries which had hitherto sepaGreeks from foreigners. A new worM was
for her energies to explore.

Chap,
'

rated

opened out before the gaze of Greece, and a vast

territory offered

She

was brought into manifold contact with the Eastern nations belonging to the Macedonian monarchy,
securing for her culture the place of honour

among

the nations of the East, but producing at the same

time a tardy, but, in the long run, important backcurrent of Oriental thought, traces of which appeared
in the philosophy of Greece a few centuries later.

By

the side of the old famed centres of learning in

the mother country of Hellas,

new

centres arose,

suited by position, inhabitants, and peculiar circumstances, to unite the culture of East

to fuse into one

forces

and West, and homogeneous mass the intellectual of different races. Whilst Hellas, by the
of emigrants

number

who

left

her shores to settle in

;

Asia and Egypt, was losing her population

to foreigners; the

whilst

the Greeks in their ancestral homes were succumbing

most extensive

intellectual con-

quests were being gained by her over nations by

whom

and with

whom

she had been oppressed.

TOST-ABJSTOTELIAN PHILOSOPJIT.

16

CHAPTEE

II.

CHAEACIEK AND CHIEF FEATURES OF THE POSTAEISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The

circumstances which have been hastily sketched

Chap.

in the preceding chapter, are of the greatest import-

ance as affecting the character of the post- Aristotelian

philosophy.
offspring of
political

^- Ca^'Ses

Greek philosophy, like Grreek art, is the tlmpostGreek political freedom. In the play of f^'^i'i^ life, throwing every one on himself and his
O-) Politi-

own
to

resources, in the rivalry of unlimited competition

for all

the good things of Ufe, the Greeks had learned

free use of all their

make

mental powers.

From

his consciousness of dignity

far

connected

by a Greek

more

closely

citizenship
life,

from

than by us with the privilege of

his superiority to the needs of daily

a freedom of thought had sprung up in his mind

which could boldly attack the problem of knowledge, without any ulterior aim,' With the decline of political independence, however, the mental powers of the
nation received a fatal blow.

No longer

borne up by

a powerful esprit de corps, weaned from the habit of working for the common weal, the majority gave
'

Conf. Arist. Metaph.

I. 2,

282 b, 19.

16

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

^^-

Chap.

themselves up to the petty interests of private life and their personal affairs. Even the better disposed
-were too

occupied in contending with the low tone and corruption of the times, to be able to devote themselves in their moments of relaxation to a free

much

and speculative consideration of things.

What

could

be expected in such an age as that which preceded the rise of the Stoic and Epicurean systems, but that
philosophy would take a decidedly practical turn, if

indeed

it

were studied at

all ?

age like this did not require theoretical knowIt required to be morally braced and strengledge. If these desiderata were no longer to be thened.

An

met with
amongst

in the popular religion in its then state

all

if

the cultivated

circles
it

philosophy had

taken the place of religion,

philosophy should

was only natural that

Is it

meet the existing need.

more particularly asked what course, under the circumstances, was it possible and more especially necessary for moral energy to take
to seek.
?

the answer

is

not far

There was

less

scope for creative ingenuity

less

than for resolute self-devotion;

actions than for inward feeling
;

for

outward

less

opportunity for

public achievements, more for private reforms.

utterly hopeless

So

had the public

state of Greece beit

come, that even the few who made

to provide a

their business

remedy could only gain for themselves As matters then stood, the honour of martyrdom. no other course seemed open for the best-intentioned,
save to withdraw entirely within themselves, to en-

trench themselves within the safe barriers of their

CAUSES OF POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

own inner
life

17

against outward misfortunes, and to

Chap.
^^'

make
ward

happiness dependent entirely on their own instate.

Stoic apathy, Epicurean

self-contentment, and

Sceptic imperturbability, were the doctrines which

suited the political helplessness of the age.

They

were therefore the doctrines which met with the most

"general acceptance.

Suited, too, was that sinking of

national distinctions in the feeling of a

common

humanity, that severance of morals from politics / which characterise the philosophy of the Alexandrian

and Eoman period.

away.

Together with national indepen-

dence, the barriers between nations had been swept

East and West, Greeks and barbarians, were

united in large empires, placed in communication,

claring that all

In deand compared in most important respects. men are of one blood and equally

privileged citizens of one empire, that morality rests

on the relation of

man

to

man

independently of his

nationality and his position in the state, philosophy

was only explicitly stating a truth which had been

already partly realised in actual fact, and which was
certainly implied therein.

By

the course, too, which it had taken during

itself

(2) .intcl^"^^'^'^^

the last century and a half, philosophy

had pre-

pared the way for the turn which now set in. Socrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt, had
each devoted themselves to the practical side of philosophy and more definitely still the Cynic School
;

had paved the way for Stoicism, the Cyrenaic for Epicureanism. These two Schools, it is true, play
c

18

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

a subordinate part in
tlie

Chap,
"

general conditions of the

pMlosophy-of the fourth century, and sophistry by the close of the same century was already a thing of the
past.

Nor can

Socrates, although turning his

all

back

compared with the post-Aristotelian philosophers, the desire for knowon physical enquiries, be at
ledge being
still

keen in him.

He

wished, however,

to busy himself only with

practical use in
life
;

subjects which were of

and yet his theory of knowledge

involved a reform quite as

practical philosophy,

much

of speculative as of

and that reform was accomplished on a grand scale by Plato and Aristotle. Little as the course of development taken by Greek
course of
its

philosophy during the fourth century agrees with the

subsequent development,

still

the specu-

lations of Plato

way for
ideal

and Aristotle helped to prepare the the coming change. The chasm between the
set up,

and phenomenal worlds which Plato

is

and

Aristotle vainly attempted to bridge over, leads ulti-

mately to a contrast between what

is

within and what

without, between thought and the object of thought.

or forms, which Plato and
real, are, after all,

The generic conceptions

Aristotle regard as

most truly

fabrications of the

human mind.
is

The conception

of

reason, even in its expanded form as the divine Eeason, or reason of the world,

an idea formed by

abstraction from our inner

life.

And what

is really

meant

by identifying form in itself with what

is

is,

and

matter only with what

possible, or even (as Plato;

does) with what is not, or by placing G-od over against and in contrast to the world, except that man finds in

POST-AJRISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
his

19

own mind a higher and more

is

real existence

than

Chap.

any which he
that what

and must be in the mind in its ideal nature, apart from and independent of all impressions from without ? Plato and
finds outside of it in the world,

truly divine and unlimited

Aristotle in fact declared that reason constitutes the

real essence of
iiniting itself

man

reason

coming from above and

itself
life

with the body, but being in

in time

superior to the world of sense and

and

that man's highest activity

is

thought, turned away

from

all

external things, and meditating only on the

It

inner world of ideas.

in the

was only one step further

to

same direction

for the post-Aristotelian philo-

sophy to refer

man back

himself, in complete

severance from the outer world, that he

may find that

peace within which he can find nowhere in the world

besides.

This step was taken by the Schools of the Stoics,

Epicureans, and Sceptics.

B. Com-

Appearing in the

first

^l^f^ig'
ties

half of the third century before Christ, superseding

of the

the influence of the older Schools, and asserting

until the beginning of the
Schools, however else they
in

this- totelia/a

supremacy without great variation in their teaching i'**first

century, these three

differ,

two fundamental points in subordinating theory to practice, and in the peculiar character of their
practical philosophy.

may

at least agree

The former point appears most

seen, in the School of Epicurus.

clearly, as will

be

(i) Theory

It is nearly as clear

^^^fll

in the case of the Sceptics, who, denying all possi- practice.

2

20
Chap,
"

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

bility of knowledge, left as the only

conviction based on probabilities;

ground of action and both these

Schools agree in considering philosophy as only a means for securing happiness. By the Stoics, on the
other hand, the need of philosophic speculation was
felt

more pressingly but even in their case

;

it

may be
and
first

readily seen that this need was not felt simply

for its

own

sake, but

was subordinated to practical

For,

considerations and determined by these.

of
all,

the Stoics, like the Epicureans, restricted them-

selves in the speculative part of their system to

more

ancient views

fact of itself proving that speculation

was not the cause of their philosophical peculiarities, but that other investigations were of greater value in
their eyes, in which, too, they considered themselves

more

proficient.

Moreover, they expressly stated that

the study of nature was only necessary as a help to the

study of virtue.

It

is

also

beyond question, that

their

chief peculiarities, and

those which give

them an

importance in history, are ethical

their system,

the other parts of

by practical con-

and those in which their distinctive

Hereafter, these statements will be sub-

tenets appear, being only regulated

siderations.

stantiated

in detail.

It

may

therefore suffice to

observe here, that the most important question in

the logic of the Stoics

truth

the question of a standard was decided by a postulate that the

practical
; ;

of

fundamental principles of the Stoic metaphysics are only intelligible from the ground of their ethics ; that
for natural science the Stoics did very -little

that in

their theory of final causes on which they lay so

much

FOST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
stress

21

nature

is

explained by moral considerations

Chap.
'

even their natural as well as their positive theology

bearing ample testimony to the practical tone of their
system.

Standing in advance of the Epicureans by

their higher intellectual bearing

and their learned

energy, and decidedly opposing the Sceptics by their

dogmatism, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both

these Schools in the essentially practical character of
their teaching.

_
is

This relationship

more

strikingly seen in the (2) Pem/ dealing

way in which they dealt with practical problems. The Epicurean imperturbability is akin to that of the
^ Sceptics
;

both resemble the Stoic apathy.

All three

"^^^ **, practical problem.

Schools are agreed that the only

consists in peace of

way

to happiness
all

mind, and in avoiding

those^
j

,.;-|'.

ii_i^
,

disturbances which sometimes arise from

influences, at other times

external
;

'

'

from internal emotions

they are only divided as to the means by which peace

mind may be secured. They are also agreed in making moral activity independent of external cirof

cumstances, and in separating morals from politics,

although only the Stoics set up the doctrine of the

original unity of the whole
sisted

human

family, and in-

on being

citizens of the world.

Through

all

the Schools runs the

common trait

of referring every-

thing to the 'subject, of withdrawing everything within the sphere of mind and of the inner life, one

consequence of which
faction of this

is

to press into notice practice

rather than speculation, another being that the satis-

want can only be had in internal selfconseiousness, and in a mental equilibrium attained

22

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

by the
exercise of the will

Chap,
"

and the cultivation

of the

intellect.
(3) Their

The same character

attaches to philosophy in the

Ue^flZt
trated by

centuries succeeding the rise of these three Schools

^^^myent
iojphy-

nor were the circumstances out of which it grew In addition to the followers of ^^aterially altered.
the old Schools, Eclectics were

now

to be

met

with,

gathering from every system what was true and probable. In this process of selection, however, the

determining element was a regard

for

the practical

wants of man, and the ultimate standard of truth

was placed in our own immediate consciousness,

everything being referred to the subject as
its centre.

In

ethics, too,

and natural theology the Eclectics

were also mainly indebted to the Stoics.

in its tendencies

new

School of Sceptics also arose, not differing, however,

from the older one.

Neopytha-

goreans and Platonists appeared, not satisfied with

human knowledge, but

aspiring to higher revelations.

Professing to appeal to the metaphysics of Plato and

Aristotle, these philosophers nevertheless betray their

connection with the later post-Aristotelian Schools,

not only because they borrowed extensively from the

far

and ethics, but more by their general tone, knowledge being for them even far less than for the Stoics an end in itself, and they are further from natural science.
Stoics the material for their theology

Their philosophy
religion, its

is

subservient to the interests of

lation

aim being to bring men into proper rewith Grod and the religious needs of mankind
;

are the highest authority for science.

POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPRT.
The same
observations apply also to Plotinus and

23

Chap.
'_

his successors.

These philosophers are not lacking

in a developed' science of metaphysics.

too,

The

care,

with which they elaborated this science leaves no

scientific
Still

doubt as to their lively interest in

pleteness and
scientific efforts

comthese

systematic correctness.

bear with

them the same

relation to

the practical aim of philosophy as with the Stoics,

who

in point of learning and logical elaboration of

their

a system are quite

real interest in

match.

Undoubtedly a
but
it

knowledge was one of the elements;

which brought Neoplatonism into being

ment, th& practical and religious one.

was

not strong enough to counterbalanee another ele-

The mind

was not

suflBciently

independent to be able to get on

without appealing to intellectual and theologicalauthorities

;

the scientific procedure was too complex

As-

to lead to a simple study of things as they are.

in the case

of the Neopythagoreans, the ultimate

ground
world
is

of the system is a religious want.

only a portion of

The divine human thought projected

business of phi-

out of the mind, and incapable of being fully grasped

by the understanding.
losophy
is

The highest

to reunite

man
To

with the divine world

this

external to himself.

attain

end,

all

the

means which
finite

science supplies are employed.

Phi-

losophy endeavours to explain the steps by which the

gradually came to be separated from the origi;

nal infinite being

it

seeks to bring about a return

in this

by a regular and systematic course; and

attempt the philosophic spirit of Greece, by no

24
Chap,
_

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

means
its

extinct, proved its capabilities

by a

result of

J^l

kind unrivalled. If, in the problem was so raised as to impress philosophy into the service of religion ; still, in the long run, it
fail to be seen that, with the premises assumed, a scientific solution of the religious ques-

first instance, the

could not

tion was impossible.

"With

its

idea of an original

being, the system

had

started from

a conception

which in
its

this

form was

a reflex of the religious sen-

timent, and not the result of scientific research.

In

doctrine of a mystical union with a transcendental

it

being,

had concluded with a

of the thinker.

religious postulate,

the gratuitous assumption of which betrays an origin

in the

mind

Neoplatonism, theresystems

fore, in its

whole bearing, stands on the sam ground

post- Aristotelian
;

as the other

and

it

is

hardly necessary in further proof of this relationship

to point to
its

agreement in other respects with

Stoicism, and especially in ethics.

Far

as these

two

systems

lie

asunder, the one standing at the begin-

ning the other at the end of the post-Aristotelian

philosophy, nevertheless both display one and the

same attitude of thought ; and we pass from one

links.

to

the other by a continuous series of intermediate

The character of the post- Aristotelian philosophy assumed, as might be expected, various modifications
in course of time in passing from School to School
nevertheless,
it

reproduced

certain

common

ele-

ments.
nality,

Such was the neglect of intellectual

.

origi-

which drove some thinkers to a sceptical

POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY:
denial of all knowledge, and induced others to take
their knowledge at second

25

Chap.
"

hand from older authorities. Such was the prominence given to practical over speculative questions. Such was the disregard
for natural science, and, in

comparison with former

times, the greater importance attached to theology,

appearing not only in the controversy between the

Epicureans and Stoics, but also in the apologetical

writings
of the Stoics and Platonists.

Such, too,

was the negative morality which aimed at independence of the outer world, at mental composure, and
philosophic contentment;

the separating of morals

from

politics

the moral universalism and citizenship

the going within self into the depths

of the world

of the soul, the will,

and the thinking powers

the deepening of the consciousness accompanied at

the same time by a narrowing and isolation of it, and the loss of a lively interest in the world without, and in the simple scientific study thereof.

This mental habit,

first

of

all,

found a dogmatic
science,

C.

Dcve-

expression in philosophy.

Not only moral

^^2.riatotelian

but logic and natural science were treated in a way corresponding therewith, though partially built on to
the older teaching.
science in
particular,

sophy.
(i)

In the treatment of moral

.

Sog-

two Schools come to view, ^j*^j,

peculiarities,
(-^j)

markedly

different

and decided in their

s'^aics

The

almost exclusively the universal Stoics regard

"-'^^

^^

cureans.

element in the
being.

mah who

seeks contentment withm,

the Epicureans catch at the individual side of his

The

Stoics

regarded. man exclusively as a

feel-

thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of

; ~

26

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

ing.

Chap.
II.

The-Stoics made happiness consist_inhis subor-

of

dination tailifi-iaiW_of the whole, in the ju^ression all personal feelings and inclinations, in virtue

the Epicureans in the independence of the indi^ddjial

I

from eve7rytMng external, in the unrufl0[ed_serenity

'of the inner_life, in painlessness.

The

theoretical
cor--

assumptions on which their teaching was based

Violent as was

responded with these fundamental ethical positions.

(J) Boff7c'epticism.

the rivalry between these .two

Schools, both, nevertheless, stand on the

same

plat-

form.

Absolu te composu re ^f min^jjrefidomjaf Jhe

life

inner

from every external disturbance,

Therewith
arises the
it

is

the

"goal at which both Schools aim,^althongh following

different courses.
'

demand

to

elevate this

common

element, making

the essential
If the philo-

aim and

subject matter of philosophy.

sophic axioms of these systems contradict one another,

what may be thence concluded save that the aim may be attained independently of any definite dogmatic view in short, that we may despair of knowledge in order to pass from the knowledge of
;

our ignorance to a general indifference

to every-

thing and to an unconditional repose of mind.

as the third chief

Thus

Scepticism joins on to Stoicism and Epicureanism,

form of the philosophy of that age,

represented
in

finding detached representatives in Pyrrho's School,

and most Academy.

(2) Seep*Soh0als.

influentially

the

New

The

rise,

the growth, and the conflict of these

three Schools, by the side of which the older Schools

have only a subordinate value, occupies the

first

por-

POST-AJtISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
tion

27

of the period of post-Aristotelian philosophy,

Chap.

extending from the end of the fourth to the begin-

1
('*) ^"''

ning "
the

of

the

first

century

before

Christ.

The

fluenoes

distinctive features

of this epoch consist partly in produdni/ of the

predominance

above tendencies, and

being
After the middle of the

"fi'**'
(-)

partly in their

separate

existence, without

Pouti.
*""
,

modified by intermixture.

second century a gradual change

may

fluenec oj

"f^

be observed. Rome.
con-

Greece was now a

tinually on

Eoman

province, and the intellec-

tual intercourse between Greece and

Eome was
learned

the increase.

Many

Greeks

resided at

Eome, frequently
;

as the

companions of

families of high birth

others living in their

country, were visited by

Eoman

pupils.

own How, ia

the face of the clearly defined and sharply expressed

Eoman
of the

character, could the power

intellect, already

and independence
?

Greek

unquestionably on the

decline, assert its ancient superiority

How

could

Greeks become the teachers of Eomans without ac-

commodating themselves

to their requirements,

experiencing in turn a reflex influence ?

and Nor could

the philosophy of Greece be exempt from such an

influence, its originality long since in abeyance, its

now openly avowing that it could place no trust in itself. To the practical sense of a Eoman no philosophical system could commend itself which did not make for practical results by the shortest To him practical needs were the possible route.
Scepticism

,
'

ultimate standard of truth.

Little did he care for

rigid logic and conclusive accuracy in the scientific

procedure.

Differences of schools, so long as they

2S

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

II.

Chap.

had no practical bearing, were for him of no importance. No wonder that Greek philosophy, touched by the breath of Eome, lent herself to Eclecticism
!

(0)

JCrdcl-

Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks

lectual in-

Jluence of Aliixmi-

were experiencing the influence of the nation that had subdued them, on the other they were assimilating the views of the Oriental nations

whom they had

subdued alike by martial as by mental superiority. For two centuries, in philosophy at least, Greece had
held her own against Oriental modes of thought.

Now, as her internal incapacity continually increased, those modes of thought gained for themselves a
foothold
in her
first

place where

philosophy. Alexandria was the and most completely the connection

of Greece with the East was brought about.

In that

centre of commerce for

all

parts of the globe, East

and West entered into a connection more intimate and more lasting than in any other centre nor was this connection a mere accident of circumstances it was also a work of political forecast. From its founder, Ptolemy Soter, the Ptolemsean dynasty in;

herited as

its

principle of government the

is

maxim
is

of

always combining what

native with what

foreign,

and of clothing things new in the old and venerable forms of Egyptian custom and religious ceremony. At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards the
beginning of the
first

century before Christ, a School

calling itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean,

which

later still, in the shape of Neoplatonism, gained the ascendency over the whole domain of

philosophy.

The very

fact,

however, that such a

POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
change in philosophic views did not appear before,

i'i)

Chap.
;

may suffice to show that it was

called for

and produced

by external circumstances, but that notwithstanding these circumstances it would never have come into being had not the intellect of Greece in the course of its own development been ripe for the change. The same remark holds good of the rise of that practical Eclecticism which we have before traced Even in the period of to the influence of Kome.
its intellectual

*^*s"'.

(j) Scep"'"^

dsm.

exhaustion, G-reek philosophy became

what
it

it

did not simply from the force of circumstances,

but, under the influence of those very surroundings,

developed in a direction to which

If

its

previous

course already pointed.

we except the lingering

remains of a few small Schools, which soon expired,

there existed, after the beginning of the third cen-

tury

before

Christ,

only

four

great

philosophic

Schools

the

Peripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean,

and the School of Platonists, converted to Scepticism by Arcesilaus. These four Schools were all permanently established at Athens, and thus a lively interchange of thought, and a thorough comparison of their several teachings were rendered comparaThat they would not long exist side by tively easy. side without making some overtures towards union
and agreement was a perfectly natural prospect, one, too, hastened on by Scepticism, which, after denying
the possibility of knowledge, only allowed a choice between probabilities, that choice being decided by

the standard of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the second century before Christ, these

30

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

philosophic Schools
or less from

Chap,
'

may

be observed to emerge more

their exclusiveness.

An

eclectic ten-

dency

steals over philosophy,

aiming not so much at

distinctive doctrines of
;

scientific

knowledge

as at attaining certain results

of a practical kind.

The

each School drop into the background

belief that infallibility
itself,

and in the

resides solely in the

mind

such portions were selected from each system

seemed most in harmony with the selecting mind. Yet just as this eclectic mode of thought lay in germ in Scepticism, so, on the other hand. Eclectias

cism involves doubt, which appears again, soon after

the Christian era, in a

new school
There

of doubt, continuing
is

until the third century.

thus, on the one

is

hand, an urgent demand for knowledge, which

first

sought for in the practical interest of religion

m'orals
;

and

and, on the other hand, a disbelief in

the truths of existing knowledge, and, indeed, of

knowledge generally, which some openly avow as Sceptics, others clearly enough betray in the unsettledness of their Eclecticism.
coalescing,

These two currents

we

arrive

at

the thought that truth,

which could not be attained in the form of intellectual knowledge, exists outside of it, and is partly to
be sought in the religious traditions of the early
days of Greece and the East, partly by immediate
divine revelation.

This effort gives

rise to

such a

notion of God, and of His relations to the world, as

is

suited to this belief in revelation.

lies

Man knowing
own
deity, as

that truth

outside himself, and doubting his

capacities to attain thereto, has

removed

POST-AHISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
the atsolute source of truth, into another world.

31

Chap.

The need

of a revelation of truth

still

existing, the

interval between

intermediate beings,

God and the world is peopled with who were sometimes conceived

of as purely metaphysical entities, and at others

appeared, according to the popular belief, as demons.

This mental habit, which, among the older systems,

belongs particularly to the Platonic and Pythagorean,

forms the transition to Neoplatonism, the appearance of

which introduces the

this last phase of

last

stage

in

the

development of Greek philosophy.

Yet even

Greek philosophy was

(3) JRaU-

not uninfluenced by the circumstances of history.

School of
tomsts.

Since the end of the second century after Christ, the Neopladecline of the

Eoman Empire,
it

the terrible dangers

which threatened
All

on

all sides,

the pressure and

startling progress.

the necessity of the time, had

vailing to stem destruction.

made

means of defence hitherto employed proved unaWith ruin everywhere staring in the face, the desire and longing for some higher assistance increased. Such assistance could no longer be obtained from the old Gods of Eome or
the religious faith of the day.
stances were daily

Despite these circumhopeless. Stronger

becoming more

and stronger became the inclination which had been

gradually spreading over the

Eoman

world since the

last days of the EepubHc, and which the circumstances of the empire had greatly favoured, to have The highest recourse to foreign forms of worship.

power in the state had, moreover, favoured this inclination under the Oriental and half Oriental emperors

32

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

who
for nearly half a

Chap,
__^^'_

century

a;fter

Septimius Severus
state

occupied the imperial throne.

The

and the

were continually losing their hold Meanwhile, on the one hand, men. on the respect of Oriental worships, mysteries new and old, and foreign

Gods of the

state

heathen religions of the most varying kinds, were

ever gaining fresh adherents.

On

the other, Chris-

tianity was rapidly gaining a power

it

which enabled
of

openly to enter the

lists for

supremacy among the

recognised religions of the state.

The attempts

a series of powerful monarchs about the middle of the third century to build up the Empire afresh,

could not have for their object a restoration of a

specifically

Eoman form

of government.

Their only

aim was

to bring the various elements

which com-

posed the Empire under one sovereign will by fixed

forms of administration ; a result which was actually

reached

under

Diocletian and
itself,
it

Constantine.

The

Eoman

character asserted

indeed, as a ruling

and regulating power, but

subordinate
character.
artificially

was at the same time

an originally foreign
congeries of nations

to

another

of

The Empire was a

plan
their

held together, and arranged on a carefully

;

designed

centre of

gravity lay not

within the nation, but in the simple will of a prince,

standing above
all

rules

and laws of

state,

and

deciding

everything

without appeal and without

responsibility.

In a similar manner Neoplatonism united all the elements of previous philosophical Schools into one
comprehensive and well-arranged system, in which

POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.
each
class of

33 Chap.
II

existences

had

its

definite place as-

signed

to

it.

The

initial

point

in

this

system,

'___

however, the all-embracing unity, was a being lying

beyond it, soaring above every notion that experience and conception can supply, unmixed with the pro cess of life going on in the world, and from his unattainable height causing
all

things, but himself

subject to no conditions of causality.

is

Neoplatonism

the intellectual reproduction of Byzantine

Im-

perialism.

As Byzantine Imperialism combines Ori-

ental despotism with the

so Neoplatonism
fills

Eoman

idea of the state,

out with Oriental mysticism

the scientific forms of Greek philosophy.

In Neoplatonism the post- Aristotelian philosophy had manifestly veered round into its opposite. Selfdependence, and the self-suflScingness of thought,

have made way

for a

for a resignation to

higher powers,

longing for some revelation, for an ecstatic

departure from the domain of conscious mental activity.

Man

has resigned the idea of truth within

for truth to be found only in

God.

Eemoved

into

another world,

God

stands over against

man and

the
All
ex-

world of appearances, in abstract spirituality.

the attempts of thought have but one aim

to

plain the procession of the finite from the infinite,

and the conditions of

its

return into the absolute.

But

neither the one nor the other of these problems

could meet with a satisfactory intellectual solution.

That even this form of thought betrays imdeniably the

personal character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy

has been already seen, and will be seen

still

more

in

34

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

the sequel.

Chap,
_

Therewith undoubtedly the creative powers of the Greek mind were exhausted. Losing

the platform of her national existence for centuries step by step, Greece saw the last remaining fragments
torn from her gi'asp by the victory of Christianity.
iBefore surrendering them, Neoplatonism

made

one

more

futile

attempt to rescue the forms of Greek

culture from her mighty rival.

With the

failure of

that attempt Greek religion and Greek philosophy

set together.

HISTORY OF THE

STOICS,

36

PART

II.

THU STOICS.

CHAPTEE

III.

HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE

SECOND CENTDKT

B.C.

A STRIKING
brings
of
all

feature in the history of the post-Aristo-

Chap.

telian philosophy,
forcibly

and one which

to

at the

same time

;_

home
is

us

the thorough change

circumstances,

the fact that so

many

of

its

come from eastern countries in which Grreek and Oriental modes of thought met and mingled. For centuries still Athens continued to have the rerepresentatives

putation of being the chief seat of Grreek philosophy

nor did she cease to be one of the most important

seminaries of philosophy, even

when she had

'as

to share

that reputation with other cities, such

Alexandria,

Eome, Ehodes, and

Tarsus.

Yet even

at Athens there

were teachers not a few whose foreign extraction indicates the age of Hellenism.

Next
is

to the later

platonic School, this remark

of none

Neomore true
con-

than the Stoic.

With

this fact

we may always

nect the world-citizenship of this School, whilst

D 2

we

;'

36 Chap.
Ill,

THE

STOICS.

are careful not to attribute a general characteristic of the then state of the world to purely external circum^
stances. Nearly all the most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago.

Then

follow a series of

Eoman

Stoics,

by the

side of

whom the Phrygian Epictetus occupies a prominent place ; but Greece proper is exclusively represented
by
A. Zeno.

men

of third or fourth rate capacity.

The founder

of the Stoic School, Zeno

'

by name,

was the son of Mnaseas,^ and a native of Citium' ia Cyprus. Leaving his home, he repaired to Athens,*
' For the life of Zeno, Diogenes is the chief authority, who appears to be chiefly indebted for Ms information to Antigonns of Carystus, who lived about 250 B.C. In proof of this, compare the account of Diogenes with the extracts given by Athenseus (viii. 345,

is

himself called a Phoenician 15 ; 25 30 ; ii. CSiog. vii. 3 Suid. Z-fiv. Athen. xiii. 114. A continuCic. 1. c). 563, e.
; ;

565, d ; 603, e 607, e ; and, in particular, ii. 65, f) from Antigonus' life of Zeno. Of modern authorities, consult WMjennumn, in Fa/aly's
;

xiil.

563, e

Eealencyclop. * Biog. vii.

PVut, Plac.
8, 4.
i.

1.

SiuAd. TA\vav.

3, 29.

Pamsan.

ii.

He

is

called

by others

Demeas.
' Citium, which the ancients unanimously call the native

ous connection between Citium and Phcenicia is implied in Diog. vii. 6 oi ^v ^iSwvt Kirtets. The details are differently given by Diog. 2-5 31 Plwt. Inimic. Util. 2, p. 87 and Seii. Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts relate that he came to Athens for trading purposes, and accidentally became acquainted with Crates and philosophy after being shipwrecked. According to other accounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise, and devoted himself to philosophy.
; ; ; ;

Demetrius of Magnesia {Themist. Or. xxiii. 295, D) further relates that he had already occupied himself with philo-

city of Zeno, was, according to

Diog.

vii. 1,

iriKiffiia ^'LWrtvtKbv

^oiviKas

iTTOiKovs

iiTxvi^^s,

i.e.

Phoenician immigrants had settled there by the side of the old Greek population, whence its inhabitants are sometimes e Phoenicia prof ecti called
'

sophy at home, and repaired to Athens to study it more fuUy a view which seems most

likely,

because the least sensa-

tional.

(Oic. Pin. iv. 20, 56),

and Zeno

ZENO THE
about the year 320
b.c.,^

STOIC.

37

wh,ere he at first joined the

Chap.

Cynic Crates.^

He

appears, however, to have been

m.

previously disgusted with the extravagances of the

Cynic mode of

life.'

Besides, his keen desire for

knowledge could

no satisfaction in a teaching so meagre as that of the Cynics/ To supply its defects

find

he had recourse to Stilpo, who united to the moral

teaching of the Cynics the logical accuracy of the
'

The dates in Zeno's

life are

very uncertain.

He

is

said to

have been thirty when he first came to Athens (Siog. 2). Persseus, however {Ibid. 28), his pupil and countryman, says twenty- two. These statements
are of little use, since the date
of his coming to Athens is unknown. If it is true that after reading with Crates he was for ten years a pupil of Xenocrates,

he only attained the age of seventy- two {CUnton Fast. Hell. n. 368 capriciously suggests 92),

and was altogether

only fifty years in Athens. On the other hand, in his own letter to Antigonus (Diog. 9), he distinctly calls himself an octogenarian, but the genuineness of this letter, borrowed

by

Who

died 314 B.C. (Timoerates

in Diog. 2), he

must have come

to Athens not later than 328 But this fact may be B.C. doubted. For his whole line of

thought resembles that of Crates and Stilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil
in the Academy, and in addition have enjoyed Polemo's Altogether he is teaching? said to have frequented the S'chools ef different philosophers for twenty years before opening
his

Diogenes from ApoUonius, the Tyriau about 50 B.C., may perhaps be doubted. The year of Zeno's death is likewise unknown. His relations to Antigonus Gronatas prove at least that he was not dead before the beginning of his reign in 278 B.C., and probably not till long afterwards. It would appear

from the calculation

of his age,

own

(Bioff. i).

According

to ApoUon. in Siog. 28, he presided over his own school for

fifty-eight

that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may, then, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C.; but these dates are quite uncertain. ' Diog. vii. 2 vi. 105. ; ' Diog. 3 ivrevSey fixovir eroS
:

KpdTTjTOS,

\Aws

fieu eiirovos

nphs
nrphs

years,

which

is

tpihoffofplav,

alB^fioav

5k

us

hardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age of ninety-eight [Diog. 28 ; Zmeian. Macrob. 19). According to Perssus {Diog. 28),

T7IV KvifiKriv a.vai<Txvvrlai>.

' Conf ., besides what immediately follows, Diog. 25 and ^v Sk (riTTiTtKhs kbL irepl 15
:

jrAvTuv aKpiPoAoyoifjtevos,

38
Chap.
III.

THE
Megarians.

STOICS.

He

also studied

under Polemo;

it is

said likewise under Xenocrates and Diodorus the logician, with whose pupil Philo' he was on terms of

After a long course of intellectual preparation, he at last appeared as a teacher, soon after the beginning of the third, or perhaps during the last

intimacy.

years

of the fourth

century

B.C.

From

the Stoa

the place which he selected for delivering his followers derived their name of Stoics, lectures, his having first been called after their master Zenonians.^
TToiKikf),

Such was the universal respect inspired by his earnestness, moral strictness,' and simplicity of life,* and
the dignity, modesty, and affability of his conduct,*
IHog.vu.2;i;-ie;20;2i;
ii.

114; 120. Numen. in JSJus. Polemo Pr. Bv. xiv. 5, 9 6, 6. is called his teacher by Oie. Fin. iv. 16, 45 Acad. i. 9, 35.
;

very simple. According to one acooimt CDiog. 13), he brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000 talents, and put it out to interest.

Theinist. Or. xxi., p. 252,

On 67, p. 614. Xenocrates compare p. 37, 1. ready he was to learn from

Straio,
xiii.
1,

How

others is proved by the saying in Diog. 25; Phd. Fragm. in Hesiod. ix. T. T. 511. W. ' Diog. 5, according to whom, he gave instruction walking to

and fro, like Aristotle, but never to more than two or three at a time (^Dig. 14). It is not probable that he gave any formal
'

says that he forgave a debtor his debt. He is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of the 100 which he asked for (Diog. 25). Nor is there any mention of a Cynical hfe or of poverty. But, according to Divg. 5, Plut. and Sen., however, he had lost his property

According to Sen. Consol. ad Helv. 12, 5 (contradicted by Diog. 23), he owned

almost entirely.

lectures.

no
do,

slave.

Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of Greek customs. Gonf. Diog. 13 and the quota;

Had he been well to he would hardly have ac-

tions in Athen.
e,

xiii. 607,

563,

from Antigonus of Carystua. * SeeMusonius inStob. Serm. His outward circum17, 43. stances also appear to have been

cepted the presents of AntiThat Zeno was ungonus. married appears from Diog. 13. ' GoM. Diog. 13 16; 24; 26; Athen. in the passage quoted p. Clem.. Stiom. 413, 36, 1 Suid. A. It is mentioned as a peculiarity of Zeno, that he avoided
;
;

ZENO THE

STOIC.

89

that Antigonus Gonatas vied with the city of Athens

in showing his appreciation of so estimable a philosopher.'

Chap.
III.

Although lacking smoothness of

style

and

using a language far from pure,' Zeno had neverthenoise and popular display {Biog. 14); that, though generally grave, he relaxed over his wine, and that too much that he could not tolerate many words, and was very fond of epigrams. See Dwg. 16 ; 20
all
; ;

their appreciation (,IHog. 6; Plin. H.N. xxxiv. 19, of him, and Zeno always 32) insisted on being a Citian {Mog. 12 ; Pint. I.e.).
2

his to

countrymen in Citium

fail

show

He

himself {jDiog.

vii.

18)

24
10

; ;

Athen. 36 19
;

I.e.
;

Stol.

Serm. 34
is

compares the \iyoi

iTnjpTio-jiieVoi

23.

He

said to

have carried his parsimoniousness too far in this respect a thorough Fhcenician (^Diog. 16). The presents of Antigonus he never sought, and broke with an acquaintance who asked for his interest with the King. Still he did not despise them, without abating from his dig-

nity.

The

loss of his property

;

he bore with the greatest composure {IHog. 3 Pkit. and Sen.). Antigonus (conf. Athen. xiii. 603, e Arrian, Diss. Epict. ii. 13, 14; Simpl. in Epict. Bn^l. V. H. ix. 26) chir. 283, c was fond of his society, attended
;

of the dffrfAoiKoi to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being better, were often lighter than those of Athens, He is charged in particular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new ones, whence do. Tuso. v. 11, 34,oalls him ' ignobilis verborum opifex,' and Chrysippus, in a treatise tr^pi rod Kvplas Kexp^ff^cw Tois ov6fia(riif, disparZ-fivuva ages this KaiviiTO/ieip 4y ro7s ovdijiaai (_GaUn. DifC. Puis. Ill,
1.,

vol. viii. 642, K.).

He is also

his lectures, and wished to have him at court an ofEer which Zeno declined, sending two of his pupils instead. The Athenians, to whom, according to

Elian's untrustworthy account vii. 14 he had rendered political services, honoured hira with a public panegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial That the in the Ceramicus. keys of the city were left in his keeping is not probable. The ofEer of Athenian citizenV. H.
ship he declined {Phit. Sto. Nor did Sep. 4, 1, p. 1034).

charged with maintaining that nothing should be concealed, but that even the most indelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further charged with having propounded no new system, but with having appropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, concealing his plagiarism by the use of new terms. In Diog. vii. 25, Polemo says KKfTirav ri
:

and Cicero frequently repeats

the charge (Fin. v. 25, 74 ; iii,. 2, 5; iv. 2, 3; 3, 7; 26; 72; v.

8,22; 29, 88. Acad. ii. 5, 15. Legg. i. 13, 38; 20; 53. Tusc.
ii.

12, 29).

40
Chap.
III.

THE
less

STOICS.

an extensive following.
disease,

lar moderation,

Leading a life of singu'^ he reached an advanced age untouched

by

although he naturally enjoyed neither

robust health nor an attractive person.'

slight

injury having at length befallen him, which he regarded as a hint of destiny, he put an end to his own

His not very numerous writings* have been with the exception of a few fragments, some no doubt dating from the time when, as a pupil of Crates,
life.'^

lost,

he adhered more
afterwards the case

strictly to
;

Cynic ideas than was

for-

nor ought this point to be

gotten in sketching his teaching.

B. Pupils of Zeno.
(1) CUanthes.

The

successor to the chair of

Zeno was Cleanthes,'

a native of Assos in the Troad,^ a

man of a strong and

firm character, of unusual endurance, energy, and con' Biog. 28, that he was

1.

&voiros

The statement must be

taken with some limitation, according to Diog. vii. 162; Stoi.

Floril. 17, 43.
^

thorities are given by Fah-io. Bibl. Gr. iii. 580. ' This appears at least probable from Diog. 4 cms fikv oZv rivbs iJKOVffe TOV KpoLTIJTOS ' 5t
:

Diog.
18.

28

31.
Floril.

Lucian,
Inst.
7,

KOI T

V T^oKireiav avTOv

yptiypavros^
itrl

Macrob.
iii.

19.

Lacta/nt.

Tiyes eXeyov vai^ovres

rrjSTOV

Stdb.

45.

Kuvhs oitpas aur^v yeypatftevai. * Mohnilie, Cleanthes d. Sto. :

' The list of them in Diog. to which additions are made Diog. 134. The 34; 39; AtarpiPal QDiog. 34 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 205.; 346; Math. xi. 90; may perhaps be identical with the

Greifsw.1814. CleanthisHymn.
in Jovem, ed Sturz, ed. nov. cur. Merzdorf. Lips. 1835. ' Straio, xiii. 1, 57, p- 610. Diog. vii. 168. ^/wm, Hist. Anim. vi. 50. How Clemens, Protrept. 47, A, comes to call him niiraSeus, it is hard to say, nor is it of any moment. Mohi nike, p. 67, offers conjeoturesw Mohnikealso rightly maintains;
:

i,

'ATTo/uirnKwsifi.aTa 'KpdriiTOS {Diog.

4),

the Tex>"l ^piTiKri {Diog. 34),

4).

with Tex"^ (Diog.

An

ex-

position of Hesiod, which been inferred to exist, from

had
(M.o.

N. D.

14, 86, Ki-ische, Forsch. 367, rightly identifies with the

i.

p. 77, that Cleanthes i

novnKhs

treatise

with the

toG Sa.ou, and this treatise irtpl lijs <f>i!ircws {Stoh. Bel. i. 178). Other auTrepl

in Diog. ix. 15 must be the same as this Cleanthes, and Cohet

strikes out the after KK^ivBiis,

words

6 liavTi,Kh^

ARISTO AND HERILLUS.

tentment, but also slow of apprehension, and some-

41

Chap.

what heavy

in intellect.

Eesembling Xenocrates in

mind, Cleanthes was in every way adapted to uphold his master's teaching, and to recommend it by the

moral weight of his own character, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establish-

ing

it

on a wider

basis.'

Besides Cleanthes, the best

pupils of
'

known among the

and Herillus of

(2) Arixto
^g,.,7^,

Zeno are Aristo of

Chios,^

According to Antisthenes

(the Ehodian), in Diog. 1. c, Cleanthes was a pugilist, who came to Athens with four djaohmae, and entered the school of Zeno (according to Hesyoli. v. Suid., that of Crates, which is impossible for chronological reasons. Conversely, Valer.

Sto. Eep. 4, p. 1034). He died of self-imposed starvation ( Biog. 176; Lucicm, Macrob. 19; Stob. Floril.7, 54). His age is stated by Diog. 176,at eighty; hj Zucian

and

Valer.

Max.

viii. 7, ext. 11,

at ninety-nine. Diog. 174, gives a list of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral siibjects,

Max.

viii. 7, ext. 1 1,

makes him

a pupil of Chrysippus, confounding the relations of pupil and teacher, as we have met with elsewhere), in which he Studied for nineteen years (^Diog. 176), gaining a maintenance by working as a labourer imog. 168; 174 Plwt. Vit. ^r. Al. 7, 5, p. 830 Sen. Ep. 44, 3
;

which is supplemented by iii. 551, Harl. and Moknike, p. 90. Cleanthes was held in great esteem in the
Fah'ic. Bibl.

Kj'isohe

Forsch.).

public

maintenance, which was ofEered him, Zeno induced him to refuse, who, in other ways, tried his power of will by the severest tests. It is, therefore, all the more improbable that Antigonus gave him 3000 minje (JDiog. On the simplicity of his 169). life, his constant application, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see 37 PVwt. De moff. 168 170 Cie. Tusc. ii. Audi. 18, p. 47
;
; ;

Stoic School, even in the time of Chrysippus (^Diog. vii. 179 ; 182; ao. Acad. ii. 41, 126). At a, later time, the Boman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos {Simpl. in Ej>ict. Enchir. c. 53, 329, b). ^ Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by Krisclie, Forsch. 405, known as the Siren, because of his persuasive powers, and also as the Baldhead, was a pupil of Zeno iDiog. 37; 160; Cic. N. D. i. 14, 37 ; Acad. ii. 42, 130 ; Sen.

25, 60.

come an

also refused to beAthenian citizen {Plut.

He

Bp. 94, 2), but is said, during Zeno's illness, to have joined Polemo (Diool. in Diog. 162). Although it may be objected that his teaching does not diverge in the direction of Pla?.

43

THE
Carthage,'
III.

STOICS.
his teaching in the

Chap.

who diverged from

most opposite

directions, Aristo

confining

himself

tonism, but rather in the opposite direction, still Polemo's contempt {Biog. iv, 18) for dialectic may at one time have had its attractions for him. It is a better established fact that his attitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have been, according to his principles (Bratos and Apollophanes in Atlien. vii. 281, c) but the charge of flattery towards his fellow-pupil Persseus appears not to be substantiated(jiiAera.vi.351,c). His
;

with his being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus {Straho,

1.

c.

Diog.

vii.

162

iv. 40,

and

letters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes

{T/icviift.

Or. xxi. p. 255, b).

His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno {Diog. vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Cynosarges, Antisthenes' old locality
161),
(JOiog.

to Dlog. vii. Not only had his sunstroke. School disappeared in the time of Strabo and Cicero ( Cie. Legg. i. 13, 38 Fin. ii. 11, 35 ; v. 8, 23 Tusc. v. 80, 85 Off. i. 2, 6 Strabo, 1. c), but no traces of it are found beyond the first generation. The writings enumerated by Diog. vii. 163, with the single exceptiou of the letter to Cleanthes, are said tp have been attributed by Pansetius and Sosicrates to the Peripatetic but Krische's remarks, particularly after p. 408,
; ; ; ;

According 164, he died of

33).

thus claiming descent from Cynicism. Of his numerous pupils {Diog. 182 Plut. C.
;

Princ. Philos.

i.

4, p.

776),

two

are mentioned by Diogenes, 161; Miltiades and Diphilus. AthenEeus names two more Apollophanes, and the celebrated Alexandrian sage, Eratosthenes, both of whom wrote an 'Aristo.'
:

Sauppe's demurrer (Philodemi de Vit. Lib. X. Weimar, 1853, p. 7), raise a partial doubt as to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of 'O/ion^/iaro preserved by Stobseus seem to belong to a Stoic. Perhaps from the"0;uoio come the statements in Sen. Ep. 36, 3 115, 8 Pint. De Aud. 8, p. 42 De Sanit. 20, p. 183 De Exil. 5, p. 600 Prsc. Ger. Reip. 9, 4, p. 804 Aqua an Ign. Util.
;
; ; ; ;

The

latter
1.

is

also
2,

named by
15,

12, 2, p. 958.
'

Strabo,
'EparoirB.

2,

p.

Smd.

Herillus's native place

vii.

was

Apollophanes, whilst adopting Aristo's -views of virtue in JDiog. vii. 92, did not otherwise adopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by Diog. vii. 140, his psychology by Tertul. De An. 14. Since Erastosthenes was born 276 B.C., Aristo must have been alive in 250 B.C., which agrees

37; 165). If XoXxiSiicios is read by Cobetia the last passage, we have again the same confusion between
Ka\xiScl)i'

Carthage (Diog.

and KapmjSSi', which

Kapxt^irios.

made Xenocrates a

He came

as a boy under Zeno (_Dwg. 166; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129). Diog. 1. c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling

PUPILS OF ZENO.
rigidly to Cynicism, Herillus approximating to the
III.

4.3

Chap.

leading positions held by the Peripatetic School.

Other pupils of Zeno were Persssus, a countryman (3) Aratus, the well-known ^ ' and companion of Zeno
; '

Other
'

poet of

Soli

Dionysius of Heraclea in Pontus,

have taken a very easy view of
the Stoic principles (Diog. 13 36 Athen. iv. 162, b ; xiii. 607, a). It is. therefore probable that he did not agree with Aristo's Cynicism (Diog. vii.
; ;

them, however, oKir^imix"' M'"

5uf(ju6Q);

Be

fieffrd.

Oio.

De

62, speaks of a School bearing his name, but no

Orat.

iii.

17,

pupil belonging to
'

it is

known.

Citium was his birthplace.

His father's name trius (_Diog. 6 ; 36),

was Demeand his own

nickname
nepir.).

Dorotheus {Sidd. According to Diog.

;

36

Sotion and Nicias in Athen.

ii. 18, 8; Orig. 483, d he was first a slave of Zeno's, which agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house {Diog. 36 13,; do. N. D. i. 15, 38 ; AtJien. xiii. 607, e ; Pauma. ii. 8, 4).

iv. 162,

Gell.

C. Cels.

iii.

162), and his pupil Hermagoras vrrote against the Cynics (Stiid. 'Ep/iay.). Political reasons were at the bottom of Menedemus' hatred for him (Diog. ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as a genuine Stoic (Diog. vii. 120 ao. N. D. i. 15, 38 ; Mintte. Felix

Octav. 21, 3 ; Philodem. De Mus., Vol. Here. i. col. 14).

It is less probable that he was presented by Antigonns to Zeno

Compare p. 39, 2. The treatises mentioned by Diog. 36 are chiefly ethical and political. In
addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (Diog. 28) ; the ffviiiroTtKa wiro/Aj/iJ^aTO, or
tri'imaTiKol Buihoyot,

as

a,

copyist

(_I)iog.

36).

He

subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus {Athen. vi. 251, c xiii. 607, a; Themist. Or. xxxii.,
p. 358), whose son Halcyoneus \jEllian, V. H. iii. 17, says

from which
xiii.
;

Athea.
'IffTopla

(iv. 162,

607, a)

gives some extracts

falsely himself) he is said to have instructed (Diog. 36), and with whom he stood in high favour (Phit. Arat. 18 ; Athen.

251, c). He allowed, however, the Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by

vi.

Aratus, in 243 B.C., and, according to Paitstm. ii. 8, 4 ; vii. 8, 1, perished on that occasion. The contrary is asserted by Plat. Arat. 23, and Athen. iv. In his teaching and 162, c. manner of life, he appears to

(in Suid.). Cicero's statement is taken from a treatise omitted by Diogenes, or from that Trepl airs^ilas, it is hard to say. ' According to the sketch of his life in Buhle (Arat. 0pp. i. 3), Aratus was a pupil of Persseus at Athens, in company with whom he repaired to An-

and the Whether

tigonus in Macedonia, which can only mean that he was, together with PerssEus, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in Buhle (ii. 445) calls him so, mention-

; ;

u
Chap.
III.

THE
who
first

STOICS.

afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean

;

and Sphserus from the Bosporus, who studied and afterwards in that of Cieanthes, and was the friend and adviser of
School
'

in the School of Zeno,

Cleomenes, the unfortunate Spartan reformer.^

a few other pupils of Zeno the names are also

Of known ;'

but nothing

is

known beyond

their names.

No

ap-

ing one of his letters addressed to Zeno. Other accounts {Ihid. ii. 431 ; 442 446) describe him as a pupil of Dionysius of Hera;

clea, or of

Timon and Menede-

mus. A memorial of his Stoicism is the introduction to his ' PhiEnomena,' a poem resembling the hymn of Cieanthes.
Asclepiades (Vita in Buhle ii. 429), in calling him a native of Tarsus, is only preferring a

B.C., but was then himself no longer a member of the Stoic It is posSchool at Athens. sible that Sphaerus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission from the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have been

either

Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus cer-

tainly not Philopator, as

Bwg.
the

177

says.

If,

however,

better-known Cilician town to one less known.

'

Hence

mevos.

On
vii.

his name 6 Meraflshis writings, consult

;

Biog.
Cic.

166
ii.

37

23
;

v.

92
e

view is taken that it was Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sphaerus repaired to Egypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sphserus' numerous writings (Biog. 178 AaKaviKii-iroXiTeia also in Athen. iv. 141, 6) refer to all parts of philosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to Cic. Tusc.
:

Atlten. vii. 281,

x. 437,

Tusc. ii. 25, 60; Fin. v. 31, 94. Previously to Zeno, he is said to have studied under Heraclides i IlovTutbs, Alexinus, and Mene22, 71

Acad.

iv. 24, 53,

his definitions

were

demus.
Biog. 177 Plut. Cleomen. 11; Athen. viii. 354, e. Sphserus' presence in Egypt seems to belong to the time be'
;

2;

in great esteem in the Stoic School. ^ Athenodorus, a native of Soli {Biog. vii. 38 ; 100) ; Callippus of Corinth (Biog. 38)

became connected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cieanthes vii. (JDiog. 185 Athen. 1. c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there, at the court of Ptolemy, for several years. He had left him by 221
fore he

Philonidesof Thebes,

with

Persseus
;
;

to

who went Antigonus

;

(Biog. 9 Posidonius of 38) Alexandria (j)iog. 38) Zeno of Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno {Biog. 38; 16; Suid.).

THE LATER

STOICS: CHRYSIPPUS.

ir,

preciable addition was

made

to the Stoic doctrine

by

Chap.

any one of them. It was therefore fortunate

School by a

for

Stoicism

that

C. Chrys-

Cleanthes was followed in the presidency

of the

""^f^l^^J^^

man
./

of learning and argumentative

J.

Stmcs.

power like Chrysippus.' i '

J.

In the opinion of the an- ^^

at Soli in Cilicia,' after

Chrys-

ij>j)us.

cients,

Chrysippus was the second founder of Stoicism.'^

Born^* in the year

280

e.g.,"*

being a pupil of Cleanthes

and

it is

said even of

Zeno^

himself,

he

succeeded,

on

the

death

of
also

Cleanthes, to the conduct of his School,'

He

is

'

nal.
tiv

Bagwt, De Chrysippo. AnLoTan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822. ^ Et jU^ yap -fiv Xp^nTtwiras ovk
^v <rrod {IHog. 183).
:

Cio.

Acad. ii. 24, 75 Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum. At/ten. viii. 335,

According to Imcian, Macrob. 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to Valer. Max. viii. 7 ext. 10, completed the 39th book of his logic in
his birth.

his eightieth year.

^ This is the view of Bioq. 179; Plut. De Exil. 14, p. 605;

'Kpitriinrov

rhv

t^s

ctoos

TiyeiiSm.
'

See Baguet,

p. 16.

(Mog. 179) that he was brought np in early life as a racer, which is an

It is recorded

suspicious state(confer D, 168) ; and that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in JMog. 181). Subsequently, his domes-

exceedingly

ment

Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610; xiv. 4, 8, p. 671, and most writers. Alexander Polyhistor, however, in Biog. and Suid. Z^c. call him a native of Tarsus and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli (Strabo, p. 671), it is possible that
;

Chrysippus
in Tarsus.
'

may have been bom

tic establishment

was scanty,

consisting of one old servant iDiog. 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of Stoicism or of poverty is not

known. The

Floril.

Monac.

(in

Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 289) 262 calls him Ktrhs, ^x""
*

According to ApoUodorus

in Biog. 1 8i, he died c. 205 B.C., in his 73rd year, which would give 281 to 276 as the year of

this point all authoare agreed. When and how he came to Athens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of a citizen (Pl-ut. Sto. Rep. 4, 2, p. 1034). ' Biog. 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology. Authorities, however, do not look promising. ' Biog. Pro. 15. Strabo, xiii.
rities 1, 57, 610.

On

4(i

THE
m.

STOICS.

Chap.

said to have attended the lectures of Arcesilaus

and
and

Lacydes, philosophers of the Middle

so

Academy
their

;
'

thoroughly had he appropriated

critical

methods, that later Stoics accused him of furnishing

Carneades with the necessary weapons for attacking

by the masterly manner in which he raised (philosophical doubts, without being able to answer
them,''

them
skiU,

satisfactorily.

This critical acuteness

else, entitle

and
In

more than anything

him

to be re-

garded as the second founder of Stoicism.'

Jearning, too, he was far in advance of his predecessors,

and passed

for the

most industrious and learned

man of antiquity.*

Independent in tone, as his other

conduct and the intellectual self-reliance which ani-

'

JKog.

vii.

183.

It is pos-

Comm.
'

Not.

i.

4, p.

1059).

sible, as JRitter, iii. 524,

sup-

poses, that he was for some time in doubt about Stoicism, under the influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that

during this time he wrote the treatise against a-uvliBeta. This is possible, but not probable. But that he should have separated from Cleanthes, setting up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is not contained in the words of Biog, 179; 185. 2 mog. 18i ; iv. 62. ae.

a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes Give me the principles ; the proofs I can find myself.' Subsequently it is said of him If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus' {Diog. 179). See cAo. N. D. i. 15, 30, where the Epicurean calls him Stoicorum somniorum vaferrimus interpres: ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25; Divin. i. 3, 6 Chrysippus acerrimo vir ingenio. Senec. Benefic. i. 3, 8 4, 1, who com:

When

'

'

Acad.

ii.

27,

87.

PUt.

Sto.

Kep. p. 10, 3, 1036. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus' six books kotJi t^s (rw7)9eiaj. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in Ptut.
1.

c.

2,

5,

commends him

as

plains of his captiousness. Dionyg. Hal. Comp. Verb. 68, calls him the most practised logician, but the most careless writer. KHsehe, Forsch. i. 445. * Ding. 180. Athen. xiii. 566,
a.

being ruv 'AKadTjuLaKav irrpay

yaMSav
KoirlSa.

Damasc. V.
i.

Isid. 36.

die.

(Conf. Plut.

Tusc.

45, 108.

THE LATER

STOICS: CRRT8IPPUS.

47 Chap.
ni.

mated him* often proved,^ lie deviated from the teaching of Zeno and Cleanthes, as might be expected,
in

many

respects.'

Still,

the fundamental principles

of the system were not altered by

intellectual treatment

him

only their

was perfected and deepened.

In

fact,

the Stoic doctrine was expanded by

him with

such completeness in details, that hardly a gleaning

was

left for his successors to

gather up.*
;^

In multitheir titles,

tude of writings' he exceeded Epicurus

and a comparatively small number of fragments, being all that have come down to us.' With such
an extraordinary literary
pace.
fertility, it will

be easily

understood that their artistic value does not keep

The

ancients are unanimous in complaining

of their careless and impure language, of their dry

and often obscure

style, of their prolixity, their

end-

less repetitions, their

frequent and lengthy citations,

cureans

Diog. 179 183. Diog. 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he refused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedi'
;

disparaging

to

the

honour of their master. Hence the charge that Chrysippns had

written
against

Epicurus

in

cated none of his numerous writings to a prince. ' Oic. Acad. ii. 47, 143. Diog. 179. Pint. Sto. Kep. 4, 1, p. 1034. According to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special treatise irf pi TTjs KAftivflows KoX Xpvaimrou Bio</)opSs. * Quid enim est a Chrysippo prjetermissum in Stoicis 1 Oic.
Fin.
i.

rivalry (IHog. x. 26, and the criticism of ApoUodorus in Diog. vii. 181). ' Baguet, pp. 114-357, discusses the subject very fully, but omitting several fragments, On logical treatises, of which

alone there were

198),

311 (^Diog.

see Nlcolai,
:

De

logicis

2, 6.

Chrysippi libris Quedlinb. 1859. Pramtl, Gesch. d. Log. iPetersen (Philosoph. *0*Chrysip. Fundamenta Hamburg, 1827, 321) attempts a systematic arrangement of all the known books.
:

to Diog. 180, there were not fewer than 750.

^ According
.

10

Conf Valer. Max. viii. 7, ext. Zucian, Hermotim. 48. This appeared to the Bpi;

48

THE. STOICS. and

their too frequent appeals to etymologies, autho-

Chap.
III.

rities,

the Stoic teaching was brought to completeness

and other irrelevant proofs.' But by Chrysippus and

;

when he

died, in the year

206

b.c.,^

the form was in

every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be handed

down
(2) Zate?'
Stoios.

for

the nest following centuries.

A
what

extemporary of Chrysippus, but probably somehis senior,

was Teles, a few extracts' from whose

writings have been preserved by Stobaeus,^ in the

shape of popular moral considerations written from a

Cynic or Stoical point of view.

The same age

also

produced the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes,* a

man

distin-

guished in every branch of knowledge, but particularly celebrated for his

mathematical attainments^

Orat. i. 11, 50 See above 46, 3 Bwg. vii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puis. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631 K Hippoer. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; vol. v. 213, 295, 308, 312, 314, and ^aguet, 26. See also Pint. Sto. Eep. 28, 2 and Sergh, Commentat. de Chrys. lib. TrtpX aizotpaTiKwy
; ;
;

' See Cic. Dionys. Hal.

Be

joyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who hadbeen banished

ment
irepl

from his country. The banishof Chremonides being -in

B.C., Teles' treatise
iftvjTis

the year 263

must

have

been

Cassel, 1841.
^

The circumstances
;

of his

death are related differently in IHog. 184 but both stories are untrustworthy. The story of
the ass is also told in Zuoian, Macrob. 25 of Philemon the other version in Diog. iv. 44 61 of Arcesilaus and Lacydes. On the statue of Chrysippus in the Ceramicus see Diog. vii. 182 Die. Fiu.i. 11,39 Pausan. Pint. Sto. Eep. 2, o. j. 17, 2
; ; ; ;

written between 260 and 250 B.C. This is further proved by the fact that there is no reference in the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this date. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and Cleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called i
"Aaaios.
*

Ploril. 5,

33
83.

93, 31

98,

67; 40, 8; 91, 72 108, 82 and

;

In 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position en-,

'

' According to Sidd., born 275 B.C., and he died in his 80th year.

c.

THE LATER
who was gained
)i

STOICS.
Chap.
III.

for Stoicism by Aristo.^ Another cotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellow-

student,^

who

in

many

respects approximated to the

teaching of the Peripatetics/ was the Stoic Boethus.

The proper scholars

of Chrysippus were without doubt

numerous ; but few of their names are known to us.* The most important among them appear to have been Zeno of Tarsus, and Diogenes of Seleucia,^ who
'

See

p. 41, 2.
.
:

biguous whether

irpis

means

to

Conf Siog. 54
<pijffLV ?i/ai

&li

Xpi(r. ,

or against.
' Aristocsreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can be definitely men^

ttTTTOs Sta(l>ep6fj.vos irphs

ainiv.

Kpiritptd

cCiffS'qfnj/

KaX

That he was jvmior appears by his commentary on Aratus' poem. Appendix to Geminws, See Blem. Astron. (Petavii Dootr. Temp. III. 147). The Vita Arati (Von Buhle's Aratus,
irp6\riftv.

to

Aratns

tioned by name. See Diog. vii. 185 Pint. Sto. Eep. 2, 5, p. 1033.
;

What

is

known

of
j

this

vol. ii. 443), probably confounding him with the Peripatetic Boethus, calls him a

native of Sidon.
" We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his
,

Tdews of a

criterion,

and

of his

denial of a conflagration and destruction of the world. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among the Stoics. PAifc, Incorruptib.
947, C, classes him among SfSpes ev rots "ZTuiKois Siyfiaatv

philosopher is limited to the statements in Kog. 35 Suid. Zi\v. AiooK. Mts. Pr. Bv. xv. 13, 7 Arius Didymus, Ibid. xv. that he was a native of 17, 2 Tarsus (in Said, rivh say of Sidon, evidently confounding him with the Zeno mentioned p. 44, 3) that he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of Chrysippus that he
; ; ;

left

many

pupils,

but few

M.

writings ; and that he doubted a conflagration of the world. ' According to IXog. vi. 81 Lucian, Macrob. 20, he was a native of Seleucia on the
Tigris ; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon (Diog. vii. 39; 55; C?c. N. D. Divin. i. 3, 6 Plut. i. 15, 41 De Bxil. 14, p. 605). 0,0. Divin. i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of
; ;

the great importance of Chrysippus, and the esteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by the number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. See the list from Siog. 189 in Fabric. Bibl.
*

This

follows

from

Chrysippus; and Acad. ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in dialectic. Plut; Alex. Virt.
5, p.

iii.

549.

It is,

however, am-

328, calls

him a pupil

of

'

50

THE
:
The pupil and

STOICS.

Chap,

succeeded Chrysippus in the presidency of the School.'

successor of Diogenes, in his turn, was

Antipater of Tarsus,^ in connection with whom his countryman Archedemus is frequently mentioned.'
Zeno
says,
eTreiffe

(of

AioyeVTj

Tarsus). rhv

Zeno,
Diog,

he
"vii.

Ba^vKciiifLOV

^iXoffo<l>e1v.

71, mentions a SioXektik)) Te'xi"! of his ; and, vii. 55 and 57, a

rex^v
i.

'repl

ipwvTJs.

Oic. Divin.

speaks of a treatise on divination. Atken. iv. 168, e,

3, 6,

Acad. 1842, Hist. phil. kl. p. 103, and Plut. already remarks Tranq. An. 9, p. 469, seems to imply that he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilioia. The same fact is implied by the mention of Diogenists and
;

of a treatise irtpi ih-^eveias, xii. 626, d, of a work irepl v^ixav

Pana3tiasts at Athens (^Atlien. V. c. 2, p. 186, a) ; by the charge

brought
iPlut.
8, 6
;

against

Antipater
;

the same work probably which, according to (Ke. Legg. iii. 5, 14, was written a Dione Stoico.'
'

Garrul. c, 23, p. 514 Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.

Cic. Off.
'

iii.

12, 51, calls

him
;

magnus et gravis Stoicus Seneca, De Ira, iii. 38, 1, mentions a trait showing great
Diogenes presence of mind. was, without doubt, aged in 156 B.C. (^Oic. De Senec. 7, 28).

Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17, the fragment from Acad. Post. I. in Non. p. 65), that he never ventured to dispute with Carneades and by Diog. iv. 65 Stol). FlorU. 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he voluntarily put an end to his
; ;

and

According to I/ucian, he attained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.
' It was often on the strength of

own

life,

li Acad.
'

ii.

47, 143,

Cicero calls

him and Aiche-

Cic.

i.

15, 41,

Divin.

i.

supposed, N. D. 8, 6, that

demus duo vel principes dialecticorum, opiniosissimihomines.' It appears from Off.

iii.

12,
'

51,

where he

is also

Diogenes was the

immediate

called

homo acutissimus,' that

successor of Chrysippus.

The

words, however, consequens or subsequens, by no means On the necessarily imply it. authority of Arius, Eusebius,

he pronounced a severer judgment on several moral questions than Diogenes. Sen. Ep. 92, 5,
reckons

him among the magnos

and Suidas, it would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that Diogenes
followed Zeno.
2

Stoicse sectae auctores. Epiotet. Diss. iii. 21, 7, speaks of the

(popi,

'AvTiirdTpov Kal

'

Apx^^'hl'.'"'-

Cic.

Off.

iii.

12, 51,
;

only
it is

See Va7i Zynden, De Panaetio, 33 and Fabric. Biblioth. iii. 538 for his numerous lost
;

calls

him

his pupil

but

treatises.
'

clear that he taught in Athens from Pint. Ti. Graooh. c. 8, as philos. die Zwmpt, Ueber Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl.

Cic.

1.

c.

Strdbo xiv.
1.

p. 674, Epictet.

c.

4, 14, l>iog. vii.

55.

It does not follow that they

were cotemporaries, but only

THE LATER
Under
the

STOICS.

51

Pansetius, Antipater's scholar, Stoicism entered

Chap.
III.

Roman

changes, to
sequel.'

and there underwent internal which attention will be drawn in the

world,

that their writings and philoWe sophy were the same. have otherwise no accurate information as to the date of Archedemus. Passages where

he

is

mentioned may he found

in Fah-ic. Bibl. III. 540.

also appears to

He

be meant in

Coelo Schol.in Arist. In X)ioff. 134, he appears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In Simpl.
505,
a,

De

45.

Plut. De Exil. 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority he established a school in Babylon, and because he came there from Athens, Plutarch appears to have considered him an Athenian. ' ApoUodoms of Athens, the compiler of the Bi$\io6iiKri, a

Zenodotus (Stdd. ZrivoS.). A third is perhaps the celebrated Aristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A fourth. Crates of Mallos, called by Strabo, xiv. 5, 16, p. 676, the instructor of Pansetius, by Suid. a Stoic philosopher, who in Va/rro, Lat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus. Antipater's pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus {Diog. vii. 121) ; Sosigenes {Alex. Apia: De Mixt. 142); C. Blossius of Cume {Phd. Ti. Gracch. 8, 17 and 20
;

Val.
11,

Max. iv. 7, 1 do. LebI. 37). Eudromus, mentioned

;

well-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes (^Scymnus, Chins Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attains H., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158-138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144 B.C.,

would seem
assertion.

pupil he {Swid. 'A.Trii\kiS.'), was himself a pupil of Diogenes' successor, Antipater (<7ic. Divin. i. 3, 6), and can hardly have been older

to corroborate this Pansetius, whose is elsewhere called

vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and Pansetius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, Diog. vii. 84, names a certain ApoUodorus, the author, probably, of the fragments in Stoi. Eel. i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the ApoUodorus mentioned by Cio. N. D. i. 34, 93, and consequently a cotemporary of Zeno. In Diog. vii. 39, he is called \TToW6Saipos
'

by Diog.

than ApoUodoms. Another grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus {Diog. vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian him. E 2

instead of which Cobet reads 'AiroWdSufios Koi ^iwos. ApoUodorus the Athenian, mentioned by Diog. vii. 181, is witheut doubt the Epicurean, known to us also from Diog. X. 2 and 25. KHsche, Forsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to
6 'E<j)iWos,

52

THE
III.

STOICS.
ferred to by Bimpl. in Categ. Schol. in Ajist. 40, a ; 24, b, 16; 41,b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43 ! 72, b, 6 74, b, 4 ; 81, b, 12 83, a, 37 84, a, 28 ; 86, b, 20 ; 87, b, 30 88, b, 8 and 11 89, a, 1; 91, a, 25; b, 21. For this Nicostratus used the treatise of a certain Roman Lucius, whereas Roman treatises on the Categories can hardly have existed before the
; ; ; ;

Chap.

The age of Diogenes of Ptolemais {Mog. vii. 41), of CEnopides mentioned by 8tob. Eol. i. 58; Macrdb. Sat. i. 17, together witti Diogenes and and of Nicostratus, mentioned by Philodemus irepl flEwc Sia7B7?s Tab. I. 2 and perhaps by Artemidorus Oneirocrit. I. 2 Sch. is quite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have
Cleanthes,

written before the middle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from the Nicostratus who wrote on the Aristotelian categories in an adverse spirit, and is re-

time of Philodemus, a cotemporary of Cicero. However, both Lucius and Nicostratus appear to have been Stoics,

AUTHORITIES FOR STOIC PSILOSOPHY.

53

CHAPTEE

IV.
:

AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY

ITS

PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.

To
is

give a faithful, exposition of the Stoic philosophy

Chap.

a work of more than ordinary difficulty, owing to

L
for the

the circumstance that all the writings of the earlier ^- 4^"

Stoics,

with the exception of a few fragments, have

Those Stoics whose complete works are 'Si!'i'*^^ osophy. still extant Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus AureUus, n)jjmro Heraclitus, Comutus lived under the Eoman Em- / authoribeen
lost.'

pire,

and therefore belong to a time in which all Schools alike exposed to foreign influences had sursubstituting

rendered or lost sight of

peculiarities,

many of their original new elements in their

applies

place.

The same remark

to writers like

Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus,

and
con-

the commentators on

Aristotle,

who may be

sidered as authorities at second

hand

for the teaching

of the Stoics

but

it is

more than doubtful whether

everything which they mention as Stoic teaching

really belongs to the older
'

members of that
al ^ 5iSa(rKct\[a koX

School.
ir\ei(rT

Already

Si/m/pl.

in

Cat.

t4

Schol. in Aiist. 49,

a, 16,

says

tuv

(rvyyfMii.niT<i>y

lirt\i\oi7rev.

.54

TRE
'

STOICS.

Chap.

That teaching can, however, be ascertained with sufficient certainty on most of the more important points, partly by comparing accounts when they vary, partly by looking to definite statements on which
authorities agree for the teaching

and points of

dif-

ference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno,

Cleanthes, Chrysippus

partly too by consulting such

still

fragments of their writings as are

extant.

Yet,

when the

chief points have been settled in this way,

many
will

difficulties still

remain.

In the

first place, it

be found that only isolated points of their teach-

ing, with at

most a few arguments on which to base

;

them, are recorded

tenets,

but the real connection of those

rise to

and the motives which gave

them, can

only be

known by

conjecture.

Had

the writings of

Zeno and Chrysippus conie down to us in their enwe should have had a much surer foundation on which to build, and far less would have been left to conjecture. An opportunity, too, would then have been afforded us of tracing the inward growth of the Stoic teaching, and of deciding how much of that teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysippus. That now this work of arrangement can only be done very imperfectly, is the second difficulty which arises from the nature of our authorities. It may be
tirety,

ascertained without difficulty what the teaching of

the Stoics was since the time of Chrysippus, but

only on a few points are the differences between Chrysippus and his predecessors known. For the

most

part, the authorities

do not hesitate to attribute

to the founder of the School all that

was known to

AUTHORITIES FOR STOIC PHILOSOPHY.

them
as

55
as

belonging to

its

later

members, just

Chap.
^^'

everything Pythagorean was directly attributed to

Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato.

Still,

there can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was

very considerably expanded by Chrysippus, and that

it

was altered in more than one

respect.

But how
is little

considerable the alterations were, and in what they

consisted, are questions direct evidence.

upon which there

The path
Could only

is

thus marked out, which must be

fol-

(2) Use to
"

lowed in giving an exposition of the Stoic philosophy,

full

^ut^iori<

information be obtained respecting

it

the rise of the Stoic system and the form

assumed

under each one of

its

representatives, it

would be

most natural to begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar teaching, and to describe the
system as
it

grew thereout.

Next

it

would be right

to trace step

by step the changes and expansions

which

it

received in the hands of each succeeding

teacher.
for such a

But, in default of the necessary information

treatment of the subject,

it will

be better

to pursue another course.

The

Stoic teaching will

have to be treated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no longer be distinguished.
It will have to be set forth in the form which
it as-

sumed

after the

time of Chrysippus.

Nor can the

share of individuals in constructing the system, nor

their deviations from the general type, be considered,

except in cases where they are placed beyond doubt by the statements of the ancients, or by well-founded
historical surmises.

Stoicism will have to be de-

50

THE
-.1

STOICS.
is

Chap,
-

scribed in the first .place as it

traditionally

known,

_ without having
into their

its principles

explained or resolved

component factors ; without even considering how they grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it be possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as to fathom
its its

leading motives, to understand the connection of

various parts, and thus to ascertain
its

true posi-

tion in history.

^.ProUem

Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem

^ouTsiciic ^ philosophy presented itself to the Stoics, three pUlosopoints deserve to be specially noticed. In the first

place, philosophy

was determined practically by an

this

end in view. The character of

end was decided by

;

the idea of conformity with reason

and

this

view

was substantiated by an intellectual

{I)

proof.

lu

The
is

real business of all philosophy, according to

is

olim-acter.

the Stoics,

the moral conduct of man.

Philosophy

the exercise of an art, and more particularly of the

highest art
virtue.

virtue

'

it is therefore

the learning of

Now

virtue can only be learnt

is

by

exercise,

and therefore philosophy

Plwt. Plac. Pro. 2 ol liiv SnaiKol ^t^aaai), r^v /lev (ro<j)ittv ehai Belav re Kal avBpujr(>/wi/ iviati\iii\v t^i/ 5f ^iKoao'
:

at the same time virtue,^

is

striving after
is

wisdom

oZv

iplav

iffKnaiv rexvris iweniSeiott-

iiriTliSeiovS' ehaifiiai'
T7))/

KaiivaTaTa

-iperhv apcT^s Si reks yeviKordTtts rpeis, (pvffiK^v, fiBiKiiy,

Xoyixiiv, K.T.A..

See also Diog,

89, 4, wis-

vii. 92.
^

In Seneca, Bp.

dom is the highest good for the human mind, and philosophy

defined to be the knowledge of things human and divine philosophy to be studiwm virtutis, or gtuiHum cm-riff enda mentis. This striving after virtue cannot be distinguished from virtue itself Philosophia studium virtutis est, :sed per ipsam virtutem. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17, in Zactant. Inst. iii. 15) Philosophia nihil aliud est quam
;
:

wisdom

PROBLEM PROPOSED TO
tinct virtues.'

STOICS.
so

57
dis-

and the several parts of philosophy are

Morality
is

many

Chap.
IV.

the central point towards

:

which

all

other inquiries converge

even natural

science, although

lauded as the inmost shrine of

philosophy,

is,

according to Chrysippus, only neces-

sary for the philosopher to enable

him

to distinguish

between things good and

evil,

between what should

left

be done and what should be

speculation, on the contrary,
totle

undone.^

Pure
happi-

which Plato and Aris-

had commended

as the height of

human

ness, Chrysippus so far

from approving, plainly asserted

is

that to live for speculation

equivalent to living'

only for pleasure.'

With

this

view of Chrysippus
as to the rela-

most of the statements of the Stoics

agree, although there

tion of various branches of philosophy to each other

is a certain amount of vagueowing to reasons which will shortly be mentioned; and on no other hypothesis can the internal structure and foundation of their system be

ness about them,

recta viveudi ratio, vel honeste

.Vivendi scieutia, vel ars rectse

deaptas iropa\7)7rT^s

oStrijj

jj

irpbi

t^p
'

irtpl

ir/oBav

ti

Koxiei/

Sti-

errabimus, si dixerimus philosophig,m esse legem bene honesteque Vivendi, ,et qui dixerit illam regvilam yitSB, siium illi [nomen] reddidit. Pint, see previous note, ^ See JHoff. 'vii. i6 ai/T^vSk
:

vitse agendas.

Non

arairiv.

Cha-ys. in Phit. Sfco. Eep. 8<roi 8e iwoKaftfiivoviri ^lAoaocpots iiripiweiv //.dKiffra rhv
3,

r))v

StoXcKTiK^i'
iperiiD
^

avayxaXav eXvai
etSei
ti

KOI

ir

epUxovffta'

&peTis, K.T.\.

C/t/rys.ia Phi. Sto. Bep. 9, Sei yiip Toirois [so. Tois ipvtti-

icots] ffvvii^ai

rhv

irepl

KuKuv \6yoy,

oiic oSffiis JiMTji

iiyud^v Koi ap-

Xris ouTMJ' iiieliiorosoiS' ava<j>opS.s, ouS' &\KouTiyhseyeiteyrTJs(puaiKTis

axo\a(rTMhvPloyi.jt'apxvs,ovToi SoKovai iiafiaprAveiv vwovoovv^ TesSiayuyTJSTtvosUveKefSelvTovTo woteiv ^ &K\ov tivos toiJtqj TropaTr\r))rlov, Koi rdy SAoc $iov oSrai Tuis SieAttiiffai touto 5' ianv, tiv a-afZs fleapTjflJ, ijSias. Aiayuyii had, it is true, been treated by Aristotle, whose school is here referred to, as an end in itself but Aristotle had carefully dis/lot

tinguished StByioy^ from

riSoyf).

a
(JHAP. ^^-

THE
satisfactorily explained.

STOICS.
It
is

enough to remark here, as has been done before,' that the most important and most distinctive points established by the
Stoic School belong to the

domain of

ethics.

In

logic and natural science that School displays far less independence, for the most part following older

teachers
-

and

it is

expressly noted, as a deviation

from

the ordinary teaching of

the

School,

that

Herillus, the pupil of Zeno, declared

knowledge to be

the highest good, thus making

philosophy.^
(2) Neecs-

it

the chief end in

This view of the problem of philosophy

defined by

is

more

ntyforin- precisely
hnoreledge.

the Stoic doctrine

of virtue.

Philosophy should lead to right action and to virtue.

But
is

right action

is,

according to the Stoics, only

is

rational action, and rational action

1

action which
nature.

in

harmony with human and inanimate

harmony with the laws of the

Virtue consists therefore in bringing man's actions

into

universe, and

with the general order of the world.

possible
'

This

is

only

when man knows

ii.

that order and those laws

tionem relinquerent. v. 25,73 Sspe ab Aristotele, a Theo:

p. 19.

129 Herillmn, qui in oognitione et

^

do. Acad.

42,

scientiasummumbonumponit:
qui cum Zenonis auditor esset. vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. Fin. ii. 13, 43 Herillus autem ad scientiam omnia
:

phrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus scien-

tiam

fendit,

summum bonum esse de' neo rem uUam aliam

vii.
. .

per se expetendam. IHog. 165 :"HpiA\os. re'Xos elirt

tV

revocansunumquoddam bonum
In deter36 mining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, acvidit.
iv.

14,

itna-Tiiiiriv. Ibid. vii. 37. With less accuracy, it is asserted by

we

Iambi, in Stob. Bel. i. 918, that are raised to the society of the gods, kotA "TipiKKov, iirtiTT^/up,

PROBLEM PROPOSED TO
and thus the
kno-wledge
virtue
is
is

STOICS.

59

Stoics are

brought back to the princi-

Chap.
|
j

pies of Socrates, that

virtue

may

be learnt; that
|

indispensable for virtue, or rather that

identical

with right kno-wledge.

They

define virtue in so
as ignorance.

many words
it is

as knowledge, vice

If sometimes they

seem to identify
only because they

virtue with strength of will,

consider

strength

of will to be inseparable

from

knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived

of without the other.
of philosophy conducts with

Hence the practical problem them to the intellectual

Grranting that the attainlife are

philosophy

is

not only virtue, but without philosophy

no virtue

is possible.'

ment

of virtue, and the happiness of a moral

the chief ends which the Stoics propose to themselves,

still

the

possession
is

of

comprehensive

scientific

knowledge

indispensable, as the only

i

means

thereto.

These remarks prove the need for the Stoics of (3) Posithat kind of scientific knowledge which has to do ^ardsim igic with life, the morals and the actions of mankind, in "'^'^
short, of Ethics.

Whether in addition thereto

is

fur-

science.

ther scientific knowledge

necessary, was a question

on which the

earliest adherents of the Stoic

teaching
(a)

expressed different opinions.

Zeno's pupil, Aristo of

Ans''*<'*-

Chios, held that the sole business of

virtue,^
'

man

is
is

to pursue to purify

"*

and that the

:

sole use of

language
Inst.

Nam nee Sen. Ep. 89, 8 philosopMa sine virtute est neo
sine philosophia virtus. Ibid, all lie in the slumber 63, 8 of error sola autem nos philoilli te , Sophia exeitabit
:

totum dedica.
^

Lact.

vii.

7;

Ad

We
:

virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston disseruit. See

Stot. Bel. 4, 111.

GO
Chap,
IV,

THE
the
soul.'

STOICS.

This purifying process, however, is be found in logical subtleties nor in natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than
neither to

good, he- compared to a spider's web, which

useless as it
road.*
is

is

as

curious

or else to the
it

mud

on a

Those who studied

he likened to people

eating lobsters,

who take a

great deal of trouble for

the sake of a
shell.*

little bit

of meat enveloped in

much
free

Convinced, too, that the wise

man

is

from every deceptive infatuation,^ and that doubt, J<ii the purpose of refuting which logic had been
invented, can be more easily overcome by a healthy

tone of

mind ^ than by argument, he

felt

no par-

ticular necessity for logic.

Nay, more, he considered

Just as
little

that excessive subtlety transforms the healthy action

of philosophy into an unhealthy

one.'^

was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called encyclical knowledge

:

those

who devote themselves

to

this

knowledge instead of to philosophy he compared

the suitors of Penelope,
the mistress.'

to

who won the maids but

not

Natural science would probably have

received a more favourable treatment at the hands of

Aristo,

that it
'

had he not shared the opinion of Socrates, is a branch of knowledge which transcends
De Audiendo,
c. 8, <i6<pov
"

Plmt.
:

aS6^a<rTov eivai.

otheykp jSaA.oce/ou, (pntrlv p. 42 6 'AflffTuv, aire \6yov /i?) KaBalpovTos i(p\6s isTiv.
Stob. Floril. 82, 15. Diag, 161. * Stod. Floril. 82, 11. ' Ibid. 7. ' I>wg. vii. 162 iidKuTTa Si irpoffeixe ^tu'Ck^ doy/xaTt rep rbv
'

See Diog.

vii.

163.
:

' Aristo (in the 'Ofioi^iuiTa) in Stoh. Floril. 82, 16 i i^Xe-

Popos iKoaxipetrrepos

faev \ii(j>8eh

vii.

KaSalpei, eis Sh Trdvv trfUKpa rpiipeels wlyet o8t<b koI ^ Kora

<piKoiro(l>lav

XeirroXoylo.
1. c.

Stob.

4, 110.

PROBLEM PROPOSED TO
the capacity of the

STOICS.

61

human mind

'

and having once

Chap.
J

embraced
all

he was inclined to pronoimce _ physical enquiries useless. His attitude towards

this notion,

other sciences has therefore been generally expressed

by saying that he excluded from philosophy both logic and natural science, on the ground that both
are
useless
;

the former being irrelevant, and the

latter transcending our powers.^

Even
and

ethics

was

limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions

inquiries into

to
/
(

good and

evil, virtue

vice,

wisdom

and

folly.

The

special application of these notions

moral problems suggested by particular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile;
to the

proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children,

but not becoming for philosophers

See following note and Oic. Acad. ii. 39, 123 Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (ic. physicorum) sciri putat posse. ^ JHoff. vii.lQO T6vffe(l>vffLichv r6trov Kat rbv \<yytKhv av^pei, Keyav rbv fihv etyat i/irkp Tifias,
'
: :

wherever there
Math.
6
X'los
vii.
oti

'

Sext.

13:

koI

ii.6vov, &s re ((juiri/tV kbi KoyM^v Beuplav Sick rh avaxpe\es Kal "Trphs KaKov rots (pi\o(ro' ipovfftv vxdpxetVj aWa Koi tov

'ApiffToni Si

ipaat, xapriTeiTo Tf\v

iiOiKov tSttov Tivcts ffvfi-nepieypai^s

rhv 8* ohSkv wphs ijVSy, fi6vov Se rbv TjBtKhy eXvai vphs '^fias. Stob. 'Api(TTuy ^ipi] ruv Floril. 80, 7
:

Ka6direp r6v Te irapaiveTiKhi/

Kal

rbv viroBeriKby riirov roirovsyap els rirOas ttv Kal TraiSaytayobs

liirreiy

(nrov/ievaiv irapct Tois

</>i\0(r(ii/)<iir

(almost

literal

rk

fity etyaivpbsTiiiaSjTctSi /iiiSiv

ittias fiey

T^ S' fiirep rjfLas. irpbs to iidiKa, fiij irpbs ^/iSs 5e rh Sia\eKTi/cc /x^ yhp iruii^dKirpbs ijuSs,

\eadaL

irpds

iTraySpBatciy

$(av

translation is given of these words by Seneca, Bp. 89, 13) apKeitrBai Se irpbs rb /xaKapius ^i&vat rby olKeiovyra fiiy irpbs iper^v \6yov, airaWorpiovyTa Se
Kaxias,

inrip p'/iSs Se ret

^vaiKi

iSiyuTa

KaTarpexoyTa

Si

ray

yhp 4yv&{T6aL Kai ouSe irap4x^ty Mimie. Fel. Octav. 13, Xpeiay. and Lactamt. Inst. iii. 30, attribute this utterance to SoAccording to (Xc. De crates. Nat. De. I. 14, 37, Aristo expressed doubts about the existenoe of a God.

fiera^b roiiroiy, irepl & ol iroAAoi Seirroifiiyres KaKoSaip.oyov(Tty.

Bam partem neoa, Bp. 94, 1 philosophise, quse dat propria

:

cuiquepersonEeprEeoepta

....
.
.

quidamsolamrecepernnt

sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario banc partem levem existimat

'

iV2

THE
is

STOICS.

Uhap.
IV.

a proper knowledge and a right disposition, such

particular applications will

come
these

of themselves withare

out teaching

but when

wanting,

all

exhortations are useless.^

(_!/) Views of Zeno

These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo,

uiid Cle-

and
the

as points in
;

which he differed from the

rest of

imtlws.

his School

and, to judge from his controversial tone,

opposite views

were those almost imiversally

entertained by Stoics.
fact,

That controversial tone,

in

appears to have been directed not only against

assailants

from without

such

as

the

Peripatetics

and Platonists

but far more against those

who attached

member^

of the Stoic School,

greater importance

than he did to special ethical investigations, and to

and physical inquiries. Among their number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes for had not Zeno set the example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and natural science ? Do not the titles of his logical and physical treatises
logical
;
'^

non descendat in pectus ad illam habentem prsecepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait profioere ipsa deet quffi

usque

creta

philosophise

constitu-

tionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit, quid in quaque re faciendum
This is then further expanded following Axisto. ' Seneca, 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be necessary for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not ? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur aures ejus contraria
sit, sibi

ipse prseoepit.

monitionibus tuis fama possedit qui habet exaotum judicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te tacente tota ergo pars ista philosophise submoveri potest. In 17, he continues A madman must be cured, and not exhorted nor is there any diflEerence between general madness and the madness which is treated medi; ;
:

cally.
2 '

Diog.

vii. 39.

Logical

treatises,

those

irepl \iyo\i and if there were a rhetoric (see p. 40, 3) the Tex<"I

PROBLEM PROPOSED TO
prove this fact
theoretical
;

STOICS.

G3

as also statements in reference to

Chap.
IV.

knowledge and natural science which are

expressly attributed to
self

him

recommended
its

to others,

Moreover, Zeno himand himself pursued,

logical inquiries.'

Indeed, his whole mental habit,^

with

keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears testimony to an intellectual
line of thought
Aristo.^

which

is

It was, moreover,

and unadorned logical

greatest perfection
scientific

removed from that of Zeno who chose that curt style, which is found in its
far

in Chrysippus.''
are
also

Logical
to

and

treatises

known

have been

written by Cleanthes,' who, in his division of phi-

physical treatises, those

8\ou
39.
'

irepl

Cleanth. 102, believes this

work

and

irep!

oialas.

Diog.
8,

4,

was a

Plvt. Sto. Eep.

%Xve

treatise on life according to reason. The title is against this view, and it is also im-

Kod T7]f SmA.eKTi/cjJC, ws Toiiro iroieiv Svyafievriv, cKcAeue

tTo<l}ifTfjiaTa

probable, inasmuch as treatises

by

Sphffirus

and Chrysippus

vapa\afj.fidveiv

Tohs fia6T]Tiis. That he occasionally not only

bearing the same

solved but propoimded sophisms is proved by the fallacy quoted

title, are exclusively logical), mentions logical treatises irepl K6yov,

irepl ivtCTiiintSt

wepl

iSlaiv, irepl

riov
irepl

IHd.

Conf. Biog. vii. 25. 2 See above p. 36. ' According to Diog. 32, he declared at the beginning of his polity the iyKUK\ios naiSeia a testimony to be useless worth very little for it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of philosophy (as Sen. Ep. 88). Perhaps his polity
1.

&ir6pwv,

irepl

StaXe/CTiKTjy,

KUTTiyopTiiuiTav.

To these may
;

be added, from Athen. 467, d

irepl Tp6irtoy

471, b, the rhetorical treatises

and irepl fieraXit^eus. Of greater importance were the physical and theological
treatises
Aeirou
:

irepl

ttjs

tov Z^vuvos

<j>v(rio\oylas (2,

B)

tSk

'Hpoic;

i^riyi](rtis

(4,

B)

irpbs

ATjfidKpLToy, irepl Se&v, irepl fiavTi-

was nearer Cynicism than any

other of his writings. * Proofs will be given later. 5 The Catalogue in Diog. 174, iTfpl \6yov 3, B

K^s {Cio. Divin. i. 3, 6); irepl yiyoj'Tffli' (in Pint. De Flum. 5, 3) ; and the /nuei/cck (Atlien.
572, e), which is probably identical with the apxaio\oyia of Diogenes.
xiii.

G4

TSE

STOICS.

Chap,

losophy, allotted separate parts to logic, to rhetoric,

and

to natural science,*

and the name of Cleanthes is

one of frequent occurrence, not only in the natural science, but more particularly in the theology of
the
Stoics.
Still

more exhaustive
all

inquiries

into

logic and natural science appear to have been set on

foot

by Sphgerus
before

proving that the energies of

to these

the Stoic School

subjects

must have been directed

the time of Chrysippus, although

these branches of science were no doubt subservient

to
ethics,

ethics holding the

most important and

highest place in their philosophy.

At a

later time,

when Chrysippus had expanded the system

been devoted to
logic,

of the

Stoics in every direction, and especial attention had

the necessity for these sciences

came
was

to be

generally recognised.

More

especially

this the case

'

with regard to natural science, inAll ethical inquiries must

start,

cluding

theology.'

according to Chrysippus, with considering the universal order

and arrangement of the world.

Only by
is,

a study of nature, and a knowledge of what Grod

can anything really satisfactory be stated touching

good and
'

evil,

and

all

that

is

therewith connected.^
koI
tci

Diog. 41. Diog. -vii.nS,Toaentions(l) logical and rhetorical writings

'

OTiJfious

efSaXa,

irepl

irepl

T&y 'ZperpixSv Twc

irepl

<l>i\oa-6^uiv,

TTcpl 6/iola>v, irepl

Spay, Tcpl efetoy,

(3,

'HpoKAefrou (5, B),irplfiavTtKrjs. That Sphserus' detinitions were particularly valued, has been already seen,
44, 2.

alffBrimpiaiv, vepl

Trepl

avri\eyo/iv(ijv

B),
irepl

irepi \(i7ou, Te'xyi)

Sia\eKTi/c7) (2,

B),

KarnyopTifidraiv,
;

treatises on science irepl K(i(rftou (2, B), irepl cnoix^iav, irepl aitipnaros, irepl ""Xis. "'?! ^Aax'o'Tooi', irphs toi
afiiptPoMciv
:

(2)

in the 3rd B, Trtpl Phlt. Sto. Eep. 9, 4) ou ydp iariv eipfiv t^s SiKaiocriyris
'

Clirys.

BfSiv (in

tV

&\\tiv apxhv oiS' &7iJ\.i\v ytviffiv ^ ek toS Aibs Kol r^v 4k rrjs koiv^s tpiaeas ivTfvBfi/ yiip Sf7

PROBLEM PROPOSED TO
Less obvious
is

STOICS.

65

the connection between logic and

all

Chap.
IV.

the ultimate aim of

is

philosophical inquiries. Logic

to the shell of
; '

compared by the Stoics

an egg, or

to the wall of a city or garden

and

is

considered to

be of importance, because

it

contributes towards the

discovery of truth and the avoiding of error.^

The
is

value of logic in their eyes

is,
;

therefore, essentially

due to
art

its scientific

.method

its

proper aim
thus,

the

of

technical

reasoning;

and

following

Aristotle, an unusually full treatment is allowed to

the

doctrine

of the

syllogism.^
it

however, attached to
is

That the value, must have been considerable

proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus

K6yos
irphs

iray
et

rh toiovtov t^v a.pxhv ^X^'-^> iiiWofXiv Ti ^petv irepl ayaSiav KaX Kaxap. The same writer, in ^vffiKaX Beffeis (Ibid, 5) ov ydp iffTiif &Wojs ovS' oiKetirepov eT6\:

rh

ciKhs,

Strre

/x^

4vSiS6vaL avT^'), ai^eAeyl^a (

iffx^s
uir'
ctjtta-

iv \6y(f!,

ii(TTe

fii]

airdyetrdat

avTov

els

rh

aVTlK^ifievov'),

Tai(fTT]s

Beiv

iirl t))v

twv ayadwy Kol icaicSiv

inl
ft

(/layrafffas

(,= e^ts ayiX<p4poviTa ras inl Thv opQhv K6yov).

X6yov

oiiS 4ir\ Tcls apercls ouS'

eitSainovlaVj oA^'
^iffeios
rtol

^T"i ttjs Koivris

KStrfiov

07ri

t^s toO

SioiKiiaems.

Further

details

Its value was therefore chiefly negative, preserving from error. See Seneca, Ep. 89, 9 Proprietates verborum exigit et
:

above
'

p. 47, 2. Sext. Math. vii. 17

Diog.

40.
^

structuramet argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant. Seari^. Math. vii. 23 oxupuTiKov
:

The chief divisions of the

Se ijvai tt)s diavoias rhv SioAe/c-

logic of the Stoics (Siog. 42, 46) are considered important The docfor special purposes. trine irepl Kav6vu>v Itai KpiTr)piiim is of use, helping us to truth,

TiKhv tSttov
T71V

Pyrrh.

ii.

247

Texvvv

tV
el

^laKeKTiK^v
SiaKeKTiKol
airXitiS

tfyaaiy

&pfi7jKei/at

Stoics),

oiix
ri

virep

(the rod
St*

yvuvai

ix

rivos

(Tvydyerat,

by making us examine our

notions ipmhv, because it led to the knowledge of things bymeans of conceptions ; SiaKsxrmii (which includes the whole of formal logic), because it pro;

aWci
rk

irpoTiyoufievws

imhp rod
cLKfiOTJ

&Tro5eiKTtKuv \6yaiv ra
il'euSij

Kol

Kpiutiv i-wiffTaffBat,

duced
Tov
Ka\
fiii),

irdre

airprniTaaia ( = iiruTT'liixii ffvyKaTaTideffBai Se?

avetKaidrris

This may he seen in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 134-203, 229 Math, viii. 300 as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in Diogenes.
'
; ;

(=

lirxi'pi'

66
Chap.
IV.

THE

STOICS.
Stoics

devoted to the subject;' hence, the

logic was only an instrument,

would

never allow, in dispute with the Peripatetics, that

and not a part of phi-

losophy.

To

later writers that stiff logical

mode

of

description,

regardless

of all beauty of language,

appeared to be a peculiarity of the Stoic school,^ and

hence that school was characteristically known as the School of the Eeasoners.^ , Frequent instances
will be

found hereafter of the Stoic preference

;

for

dry argument and formal logic

in Chrysippus this

fondness degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of

taste/
C. Divisions of

The foregoing remarks have

universally
'

already established
^

pMloiophy.

the three main divisions of philosophy

which were

acknowledged

by the Stoics^
AiaXeicTiKoJ
is

Logic,
ordinary

The only part whicli incurs the blame of Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 1) is the
sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved tois
:

name.

It

is

their also

found in

ii-^vyhp inox^v

^yoviri Trepl

ndvTuv

tpyjtrl, tovto jroietv, Kal ffvvepydv iffri irphs h fioiiKovTat Tois 5' initrT'fiiJ.riv evepya^ofieyois,

iiri^dWet,

Kaff
Tcfe

%v dfw\oyovn4vas
'

Pia(r6fi,e8a

evavria trrotx^iovv.
Cic. Parad.

Prooem.

Cato

autem perfectus mea sententia

Stoicus in ea est hjeresi, . quje nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. Cic. Fin. iv. 3, 7 Pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiuncuUs angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil
. . :
:

Plut. Qu. Plat. X. 1, 2, p. 1008. Cio. Top. 2, 6 Fin. iv. 3, 6. * After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit of couching their arguments in the form of a question. Hence the terms \6yov epwTav (ZHog. vii. 186), interrogatio {Sen. Ep. 82, 9 85, 1 87, 11), interrogatiuTunila {Oio.), which are employed even when their arguments were not in this form. = See p. 48, 1.
; ;

" Called nepri, according to JHog. 39 ailso rdTroi, tlfS?), yhi). ' Diog. </>airi>' Tpi/nepTJ 39 eli/ai rhy KarcL tpiKoffo^iai/ \6yov' civaL yhp auTow rh juev ti (pvaiKhVy rh Sg ^BLKbv. rb 5h XoyiiiSv. oSra
:

commutantur animo.
Diog.
"

See also

vii. 18, 20.

iv

Se TrpuTos Siei\c Ziivav S KiTicfis Tiji TTcpl \6yov Koi X.pianriros if

a'

In

Sextus

Bmpirious,

r^

irepi

\6yov Kal iv

rfj

a'

DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.
Natural Science, and Ethics.
views

67
relative

As regards the

Chap.
'

worth and sequence of these divisions, very opposite

may be deduced from

the principles of the

(l) Three
sion.

Stoic teaching.
all are

There can be no doubt, and, indeed,

agreed in allowing, that logic was subservient

If therefore in arranging

to the other two branches of science, being only an

outpost of the system.

the parts the advance

is

from the

less

important to
first

the more important, logic will hold the

It will

place.

occupy the
is

last place if the opposite

mode

of

procedure

followed.

But the

relation existing
is

between ethics and natural science

tion.

an open ques-

On

the one hand, ethics appears to be the

higher science, the crowning point of the system, the

subject

towards

which

the

whole
;

philosophical

activity of the school

was directed
? ?

losophy practical knowledge

to lead to virtue

was not phiand was not its object

for

and happiness

On

the other hand,

virtue

tion to the laws of nature,

and the destiny of man consist in subordinawhich it is the province of

science to investigate.

Has
?

not, therefore, natiu-al

it

science the higher object

Does

not lay

down the

universal laws which in ethics are applied to

man ?

Does not, therefore, to it, in the graduated scale of sciences, belong the higher rank ?

In attempting to harmonise these opposite consiAt one derations, the Stoics did not always succeed.
Tav

'E^iWos

koi 'hTro\\6Sapos 6 iv rip irfiiTif -rHv eis -rk S/r/iia.Ta fiaayaiySiv, KuX EiSpofios fV Tp Tjfliicp (TTotxeiiicf', Koi ^10(pvaiKoiv,

yhris i BafivXdivios,
vios.

kclI

nocreiSci-

Seast.

Math.

vii. 16.

Sen.

14. The six diviEp. 89, 9 sions enumerated by Cleanthes Dialectic, Rhetoric, (Siog. il) Ethics, Politics, Physics, Theology (^Diog. 41) are easily reducible to three.
;

F 2

68
Chap.
ly.
(2) Relative im-

THE
time natural science
is

STOICS.

preferred to ethics, at another

science,' in the

time ethics to natural

parisons

enumeration

of the several branches of philosophy.

In the com-

pmiance
of each part.

by means of which their

relations to each

other were explained,^ ethics appears at one time,

at another time natural science, to be the
soul of the whole system.

aim and

Different views were even

entertained in reference to the order to be followed

40, the place was assigned to logic, the second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedenms, Bu'

According to Biog.

first

logical part may form the conclusion, only refers to the order

demus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found in Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in The latter, Seneca, Ep. 89, 9. however, observes (Nat. Qu.
Prol. 1) that the difference be-

in which they ought to be taught. ' In Biog. 39 Sext. Math, vii. 17 Philo, Mut. Nom. p. 105S, B. Hosch. (589 M) ; De Agricul.
; ;

189,

(302),

philosophy

is

compared to an orchard. Logic answering to the fence, Science

to the trees. Ethics to the fruit so that Ethics is the end and object of the whole. Philosophy is also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are represented by Logic, but in which the position of the

tween that part of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about man,
is as

great as the difference

between philosophy and other departments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand, ApoUodorus places Ethics
in the middle, as also Cleanthes does,andlikewise Pansetius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with science. This appears, however, only to have reference to their order in discussion (see Sext. Math. vii. 22, probably on the authority of Posidonius.) A few {Biog. 40) asserted that the parts could be so little separated, that they jnust be always treated at the same time. The statement of Chrysippus (in Pint. Sto. Eep. 9, 1), that Logic must come first, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theo-

other two is not clear ; to an egg. Logic being the shell, andj according to Sextus, Science being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to compare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constituted the bones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul.

But Diogenes has another

ver-

sion of this simile, according to which Science represents the soul and Ritter, iii. 432, considers the version of Diogenes to be the older of the two.
;

I)IVISIO:S

OF PHILOSOPHY.
In describing the Stoic

69 Chap.

iu teaching these sciences.'

system, preference will be here given to that arrange-

ment which begins with

science,

logic
;

and goes on to natural

not only because that

ending with ethics

its

arrangement has among

supporters the oldest and

most distinguished adherents of the Stoic School, but far more because in this way the internal relation
of the three parts to each other can be most clearly

brought
respects,

out.

For, granting that, in

science
still,

many

essential

natural
;

is

modified

considerations

in

the
of

by ethical development of the

are

system, the
principles on

chief results

science

used as

which ethical doctrines are founded

is

and

logic,

although introduced later than the other

the instrument by means of
scientific shape.

two branches of study,

which they are put into

Stoic teaching in the

If the

opportunity were afforded of tracing the rise of the

mind

of its founder, it

would

probably be possible to show

the original kernel of ethics.
only as

how

the physical and

logical parts of the system gradually gathered about

But knowing Stoicism we do from the intellectual development which

the time of Chrysippus, it will be
it

it attained after

enough, in analysing the form which

to proceed

then assumed,

from without to within, and to advance

from logic through natural science to ethics. When this has been done it will be time to attempt to retrace our steps backwards, and to explain how, from
the ethical tone of Stoicism,
tenets
its

peculiar speculative

may be

deduced.
>

See Sext. Pyirh.

ii.

13.

; :

70

THE

STOICS.

CHAPTER

V.

LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

Chap.
^-

Under
term

the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the

after

the time of Chrysippus, a

inquiries

number

of

A. Oeneral intellectual

were included which

would

remar
of

s.

^^^ ^^^
all.

-^^

considered to belong to

philosophy at
characterised

logic.

One common element, however,

all

them

they

all referred to

the formal conditions

of thought

and expression.

Logic was primarily

divided into two parts, sharply

tinuously and the art

marked

off

from each
former

other, roughly described as the art of speaking con-

of

conversing

the

being known as Ehetoric, the latter as Dialectic'

To

these two parts was added, as a third part, the

41
:

rh

Se

\oyiKhv

'Hepos ^irlv ivioi els Sio Siaipu<T0ai iTTKTT'fiii.as, ets pr)ropMiiv KalSitt\eKTtK^iv
firiv
. .

tI\v

Tf lit\ropu^v
Ae'^Eii'

iiruTT'l)-

oiffav

toS ej

TTcpl

tUv

cuit vocari. Cic. Fin. ii. 6, 17 Orat. 32, 113. Qidntil. Inst. ii. 20,7. According to these passages, Khetorio was by Zens compared to the palm of the

4y Sie^6Stf

\6yav

ko!

tV SioAekti-

Kiji'ToBopflSjSiaXe'yeirflai Treplrwy

Sen. Bp. 89, 17

v sponiicrei Koi airoKpiffei \6yui>. Superest ut ra:

hand, and Dialectic to the fist quod latins loquerentur rhetores, dialectic! antem compressius.

The

Stoics

agree

tionalem
:

dividam tinnaestantinterrespondentem et interrogantem discissa hanc

;

partem philosophise omnis oratio aut con-

with Aristotle in calling rhetoric avriffrpotpos rp SioXeicTiicJ

{Sopl in Hermog. v. 15, Walz.). See Prantl, Gesch. der Log. i. 413.

SibAe'ctikJ)!',

illam ^TjTopi/tV pla-

STOIC LOGIC.
doctrine of a standard of truth, or the theory of knowV.

71

Chap.

ledge

and, according to some authorities,^ a fourth

part, consisting of inquiries into the formation of

conceptions.

By

others,

these

inquiries

were re-

garded as the third main division, the theory of

knowledge being included under

' IHog. 41 Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic Tivej Se KoX els Th bpiKhv elSos, rb Trepl Kav6vwv koX KptT7]pi(av' eittot Se rh dptKhv trepiaipovo'l. (We have no reason to read as- Menage does TreptSiaipoufft, or to conjecture, as Meibom and Mcolai, De Log. Chrys., Lib. 23, do, irapaSioipoSffi.) According to this passage, SpiKhy must be identical with the doctrine of a criterimn. In a subsequent passage, however, the two are distinguished ; the doctrine of a criterimn is said to be useful for the discovery of truth Kal rh dpiKhtf 56 6pLoias irphs iiriyvwaiy
: :

dialectic.^

By

rhe-

Spaiv

rav tov

affreiov ^'.
Spojy

Spay Twy
avap.i<roiv

TQv
;

{pa{>\ov

j8'.

Twy

besides the further treatises ray oiiK opdws To'is Spoti aVTiT^eyofjL^paiy ^. HiBaya els Toifs
nepl

Spovs 0. Kal ysvav

may

The treatise irepX elSuv also be included

here

perhaps also that vepl tSk

KarTiyopTjfJLtiTQiVTrpbs M7]rp6Scopoy /.

Trphs UciffvXoy irepl KaTriyoprtfidTay

Bih yhp r<av evvoLoav TO Trpdyfiara Kafi^dveral. We may therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should be rh dpiKhv eiSos In Kal rh irepl Kavoyay, k.t.X, this case, we may understand by Spuchf not only the theory of definition a theory to which Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his Analytics (Anal. Post, ii.)but besides a theoretical disquisition on the formation of definitions,
TTJs a\-r]0eias-

Diog. 191. ^ No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental inquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears, however, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of dialectic. SiogAZ says that the branch of dialectic which treats of ai]ii.my6p.iva, may be divided 6?s re tov wepl rSov ipav8',

TOffiSiv riiToy

Kal

Tuy

iic

roiraiv

itpuTTaiifyav KeKTUV. (Seelficoloi

p. 23.)

Compare with this the words of Diodes, in Diog. 49

ctp^crtet Tois ^rw'iKois irepl
ffias

tpayra-

Kal

aia6i}(reciis

Trpor&TTety

a,

collection of definitions of

\6yoy, Ka96rL t6 npiriipioy ^ 7j dX^Qeiu Twy irpayfidray yiydnXKeTat, Karh yevos tpayraffla 4(rrl not Ka66Ti 6 irepl ffvyKaraQeffews Kal i irepl KaTa\i]^eais Kal voiiireus \6yos irpodyojv rcay &Way ovK Sl/ew
r^ay-raeias ffvylffraTai. According to this passage, the branch

various objects. Such collections are found in the treatises of Chrysippus (Diocf. 199, 189)
TreplTwv '6pav
ffr'.
^'.

of dialectic
<j>ayTa(rla

which treated of

^piav SiaKeKTiKCov

*6puv

rwv
rSts

Karct yevos C' Spwi'

Tuf Kara

&\Kas re^vas a^

included the theory of Diog. 43, Peterknowledge. conjecture is singular sen's


72

THE
Chap.
V.

STOICS.
was meant but a collection
;

toric, however, little else

of artificial rules, without philosophical worth

dialectic

'

and
in-

was in great measure occupied with

referring
,

quiries

only to precision of expression.

Dialectic was defined to

be the science or art of

true,' dialectic is

speaking well
saying what
is

and since speaking well consists in

used

becoming and

(Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 25) that the theory of knowledge may have been nndeirstood by Chrysippas under the name rhetoric. ' Our information on this head is very small. In the words ^jjTopi/cj) verba curat et sensus et ordinem, a division of rhetoric is implied by Seneca, little differing, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by Diog. 43 on Delivery elpai 5' OUT7JS r^v ^laip^ffiv efs re r^v evpeffiv Kol eis r^v tppdfrtj/, KaX els Tti^tv Kol eU t^v im6Kpiinv. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking a-viiPovheuriKhs, StxaftKhs, ^yKojfiiaiTTiKds and four parts in a speech irpooiijuov,
:

do. Mn. iv. 3, 7, ob28, 1. serves, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to
that of Chrysippus, that such was its nature that si quis ob-

mutescere

concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties. This neglect of the truly rhe-

torical element appears already in the quotations from Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2. "We have not the slightest reason to complain, as Prantl does, p. 413, of the

purely rhetorical value of dialectic with the Stoics. 2 See p. 70, 1, Alex. Aphr.Top. 3 Oi p-iv &7rb t^s 'Zroas dpi^6^evoi
;

Sffiyriffis, Tct

iirl\oyos.

and

nphs robs avriSiKovSf Definitions of Stiiyniris 7ropcSei7|Ua are given from

\4yfiv ipi^ovTai, rh Si eS \4yeii' 4v r(p iKrjBrj Koi irpotrfiKovra Aeyciy elvai ri64fifvoi, rovTO Se XSiop
Tjyoifievoi

Tov

(l>i\o(r6(lioVj

Kara

Trjs TeAcMTciTijs <j)i\o(ro^ias cl>4pouffiv

Zeno by the anonymous author in Spengel, Rhet. Gr. i. 434, 23 447, 11. The same author {IHd. 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the iirt\oyos must be fiovofiipiis. The Stoic definition of rhetoric has been already given, p, 70, 1. Another
Tex^l Tfpi K6(rixov KoL (lpr)iJ.4vov \6yov jd^iv is attributed to Chrysippus by Pint. Sto. Bep.

avrh KaX dik toDto

<t>i\6(ro(l>os

fi6yos h kut' avroiis Sia\eKTtK6s.

Aristotle had used the term dialectic in another sense, but

with Plato

it

expressed

the

mode

of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.

' See Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. vii. 8, W. oi
;

ZtuikoI Sk rh ei Keyetv l\e7o;' t6

oKtjdvi \4yeiv.

STOIC LOGIC.
to express the

73

knowledge of what

is

true or false, or

Chap.
'

what

is

neither one

nor the other,' correctness of

expression being considered inseparable from correct-

Words and thoughts are, according to this view, the very same things regarded under different aspects. The same idea (\6yos), which is
ness of thought.

(2)

Words

fji^igj^fg

a thought as long as a word as soon as

lectic consists of
it

it resides

within the breast,

is

comes

forth.^

Accordingly, dia-

two main

divisions, treating respec-

tively of utterance

and the thing uttered, thoughts

divisions, again,

and words.^
;

Both

have several sub^\6yay

' Diog. SSev Koi oStus 4:2 auT^c [t^v SiaA.6/CTi/c^w] Spl^ovrai,

&ydpaiiroi oux^ Ttp irpoipopLK^ K6y(p

Sia<p4pei

tS)V

^4'^v

aWh
oiSerepasv.

Ttt)

fvSiadeTtp.

(The same,

p.

62,

alone can be
Tpoi in
18,

The Stoics meant by the veti-

quoted from Posidonius, and in Sext. Math. xi. 187, and Suid. Aio\eKTiK'6.) ouSeTepio)/ being probably used, because dialectic deals not only with judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations.

Conf. Diog. 68. ^ This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between \6yos
ivSidBsTos

I7ieo. Srmjrn. Mus. c. are contrasted with the Peripatetics for using the terms \6yos iySidOsTos and TrpocpoptKds. They are also referred to by Plut. C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1, p.777 Th Se \4yeiy, 8ti Si5o \6yoL elirly.

who

and

TrpotpoptKhs^

dis-

d fiey iySiaQsrhs, riyefidyos 'EpjuoC Swpoy, 6 y iy vpotpopa^ SioLKTOpos Kal opyayiKhs e(t}\6v i(Trt. The

tinction subsequently employed by Philo and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal. Post. i. 10, 76 b, 24) ov irphs rhv e^at K6yoVf aWh irphs Thy iv T^ ^v^f. On this distinction see HeracUt. AUeg.
:

double form of Hermes is explained by Ileraclitus as referring to the twofold \6yos 'Ep/ii)s 'X.86yios representing \6yoy iySidSeray, and the heavenly Hermes(SicKTopor) representing

Hom.
'

c.

72, p.

142

hmKovs

\6yos T0V7UV 5' ot <f}tK6<ro(poi (the Stoics are meant) t))i' jnev ivSiiBeTov KaKovcri, Thy Se irpo^opiKdv.
6fxev oZv

Twy ^ySoy Koyifffiiiov

iffTty

the Trpo^opM6y. The distinction passed from the Stoics to others, like Pint. Solert. An. 19, 1, p. 973 Galen, Protrept. i. 1. ' IHog. 43 r^y Sia\K7iK^v Siaipe7ff6ai eXs re Thy irepl Twy ffrj; ;

KofleTjPKTai.
<r9oi Kol

4^i,yye\os, d S' iwh Tois dTepyois ^affl Se Toirtf xpri-

liaiyoiiivwv koX t^s ^wvtjs Td-jroy.

Ibid. 62
Kol

Tvyx^vei

5"

oKti;,

is i
:

Sext. Math, ri diloy. (conf. Pyrrh. i. 76) viii. 275 (paaiv '6ti . ot Si AoynaTiKoX .
: .

XpiifftTrnis fpv'^t, ircpl ffTjfjLaiyoyra

ffiiiJ.aiy6iieya.

KiKTiKl)

Seneca 1. c. Siain duas partes dividitur.

74
Chap.
V.

THE
divisions,'

STOICS.
us.^

which are only imperfectly known to

Under the

science of utterance, which was generally

placed before the science of things uttered,^ they included, not only instruction as to sounds and speech,

but also the theories of poetry and music, these arts

being ranked under the head of the voice and of

sound on purely external considerations/

is

What
on these

known

to us of the teaching of the Stoics

subjects, consisting, as it does, of a

differences,

mass of

definitions,

and

divisions, has so little philosophical

value, that it need not detain our attention longer.*

in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quEe dicuntur, et vocatula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between rh rrniaivov and rii ariiiiuv6ii,tvov, to which Ti Tv^x^'"*" (tlifi '^62'1 object) must be added as a third, will .be hereafter discussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist 4 WwOTa, Isag. c. 3, as Fabricius pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School, but, at most, to a few of its
later
'

viii. 11,

to the parts of logic is

Nicolai (De Logic> Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful. 3 mofj. 55. * Diog, elvai 8e rris 8iaKeKTiKTJs iSiov 't6-kov Ka\ T^v irpoei-

unhappy.

pjifi^poy trepl aiiTTis ttjs (fiavris, 4v

SeiKVurat tj ^yyp^fifiaros tpwy}! Kol rtpa ra roii h6yov fi^prty KaX

Kal fiap^aplfffiov
/cat

Trept tTO\omifffiov

Kal iroiTHidrtav KoX afjupi^oMay

CLKris

irepl 4p.fie\ovs fpavTJs Kal Trepl fxov-

Kal

-jrepl

'6puv

Kord rivas
The-

KoL Siaipeireuv Kal \4^scej/.

members.

Seneca continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving
it. ' There is much which is open to doubt in Petersen's attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund.

determination of conceptions occupies such an important place in the section irepl <paiyfis, that we might feel disposed to suppose some mistake in the authority. Still from the later authorities, pp. 60-62, it is seen that by many it is usually so

theory of

the

and division

represented.
' Further particulars may be obtained in Schmidt's Stoicorum Grammatica (Halle, 1839) LerscTi, Sprachphilosophie der Alten; Steinthal, Gesch. dei
;

221) to settle these divisions.

At the very beginning,

his referring the words of Sext. Math.

; ;

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
Two
parts only of the Stoic logic possess for us any
real interest

75

the theory

of knowledge, and that part

V.

of dialectic which treats of ideas,

and which in the

turns about the
is

main agrees with our formal logic. The Stoic theory of knowledge
true in our notions
is false.

B. Tlieory of liTwrnledge.

inquiry for a criterion or standard by which what

may

be distinguished from what

Since every kind of knowledge, no matter

its object,

what be

must be

tested

by

(1) General clmraoter of

this theory.

this standard,

it follows

that the standard cannot be sought in the

(Diog. 57) ; the \6yos has 5 parts, called (TToixf'o by Chrysippus
tipofxa,

Nicolai,

Sprachwissenschaft, i. 265-363 De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31. This part of dialectic began with, inquiries into the voice and speech. Voice is defined to be sound and speech, to be air in motion, or something bearable A^p vfir\r}yfi.4vos % rh tSiov aicrdriThi' aKorjs ; the human voice as ^vapdpos koL a-Kh didyoias

irpoffrtyopia,

jios,

UpOpov

to which Antipater

fiVH-'^y trrSfSea''

distingtiished of other aniaiip vwh Sp/iris veTrXryyiiivos {Diog. 55 ; Simpl. Phys. 97; Sext. Math. vi. 39; That the Gell. N. A. vi. 15, 6). voice is something material is proved in various ways {Diog. 55 ; Phtt. Plac. iv. 20, 2 ; Galen, The voice, in Hist. Phil. 27). as far as it is ivapBpos, or comis called Ki^is ; posed of letters, in as far as it expresses certain
4icniixiroii.ev%

is

from the sounds mals, which are

notions, it is Xiyos (JJiog. 56 peculiar Sext. Math. i. 155). national mode of expression

iietrdrTis, or adverb {Diog. 57 ; Galen, De Hippoerat. et Plat. viii. 3 ; Lersch, ii. 28 ; SteinthM, 29l). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain peculiarities of things were imitated in the chief sounds of which they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by etymological analysis ( Orig. u. Cels. i. 24 ; Aii^gustin. Dialect, c. 6 ; Chry0pp. T. L Ap. 17, c). sippus, however, observes (in Varro, L. Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice vers^, and (in Gell. N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings. See i^mpl Cat. 8, C- Five ad-

added the

(Ac'fis Kex'P7M^'") ^OviKus re /tol 'EWrji'iKwj il Ae'^is jroToirj)) was

called Si<i\eKTOs {Siog. 56). The elements of a4 are the 24 letters, divided into 7 (jmvTietna,
6
i<pava,

vantages and two disadvantages of speech are enumerated Diog. 59; Sext. Mat. i. 210; and poetry (Diog. 60), various kinds of amphibolia {Diog. 62 Galen,
;

and 11 semivowels

Soph. P. Diet. c. 4), the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.

De

THE
^''

STOICS.

Chap,

subject-matter of our notions, but, on the contrary,

in their form.

The inquiry

after a standard

becomes

therefore identical with another

the

inquiry as to

what kind of notions supply a knowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of forming conceptions carries in itself a pledge of its

own

truth.

It

is

impossible to answer these ques-

tions without investigating the origin, the various

kinds, and the value

and importance of our notions.

to the Stoics
is

Hence the problem proposed

to seeking

reduced

by an analysis of our notions to obtain a universally valid standard by which their truth may
be tested.

Whether

this inquiry

Stoics in all its

comprehensiveness

was pursued by the older is a point on

Boethus, whose which we have no information. views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus,

had assumed the existence of

several standards, such

as Eeason, Perception, Desire,

Knowledge.

Others,

in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Eight Eeason

{opOo^ Tii^yos) as being the standard of truth.'

it

Hence
of

may

be inferred that before the time of Chrysippus

the Stoics had no distinctly

developed

theory

knowledge.

Nevertheless there are expressions of

still

Zeno and Cleanthes

extant which prove that the

essential parts of the later theory

were already held

by these philosophers,' although

'

it is

no doubt true

IKoff. vii. 54.

The statements of Zeno

theory of knowledge from general principles respecting

and Cleanthes, for instance, in

reference to (pavTcuria, prove that these Stoics deduced their

They therefore started from the data supplied by the

notions.
senses.

A passage

in Zeno, ex-

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
that
it first
is

77
Chap.
'

received that scientific form in which

alone it

known to

us at the hands of Chrysippus.

(2)

The' character of this theory of knowledge appears

Prami-

mainly in three particulars:

attached by the
senses.

(1) In the importance

i^'t^'^"'*^
t^teori/
'" "

Stoics

to the impressions of the

of
^^'

This feature they inherited from the Cynics

(2) In the exalta-

and shared with the Epicureans.

tion of expression into a

conception
of

a trait dis-

tinguishing this from

either

the

two

other

contemporary schools.
truth.

(3) In the practical turn

given to the question of a criterion or standard of

We proceed

to the expansion of this theory

in detail.

The
the

origin of all perceptions {(pavTaaiai)

may be
on

(a) Per'tkeresiitt

referred to the action of

soul,'

some object

((J3avra<7rov)

the soul at birth resembling a blank page, ofimpresmitlumt.

and only receiving definite features by experience from without.* By the elder Stoics, this action of
plaining the relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction which they produced. ' Phit. Biog. Plac. iv. 12. vii. 50. Hemes. Nat. Horn. 76. *oi/Tao-i'a is iriifloj rp 'i/vxi 1016^aVTaaTUc6v, because no (pavraffrhv corresponds to (payTa(rriK6v

it is Sidxevos eAKvcr/ihs, TrdBos iv t^ i^u^p "' ohS^vhs tpavjairTov

yiv6ii,vov

and the object

is

of such

an empty perception
racr/ia.

a ^de-

Compare
vii.

Math.
is

2il

Sext. Sidxeyos eXKvcrfihs

^fxtv

also

called (pavraa-ia rcov 4v

iraBav.

fifvov^

iyBeiKvinevov savrS re Kol

Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being actual perceptions, are called by Diot).
51,^/i(/)io'eisai<ra>'ela7r!)u7ropxii>'-

in the same way, added, that light shows other things as well as itself
rh
it
irCT-oiT)K({s,

is

-rav yivd/ievat.

In a wider sense,
of

(pavraala

means any kind

(pavraffrhv is rh iroiovy rijv (payrafflav, and therefore tray 8 ti

tiv

notion.
*

P&i.Plac. iv. 11: oiSnoiKot

SiyrtTOt
is

Ktveiy

rije

'('"X^"-

<pa(Tiy

iayraaia

distinguished from

8toc yeyyrid^ 6 &y9panros Ix^i rh riyefioyixhy fiepos rris tfivxfis


THE
Chap.
V.

STOICS.
as grossly material,

objects

on the soul was regarded

to

Zeno defining a perception

{jvnraxns)

be an impression

this definition so literally as to sion

and Cleanthes taking compare the impreson the soul to the impression made by a seal on

made on the

soul,'

wax.^

Being himself a very exact pupil of Zeno's,

this comparison.

Cleanthes probably rendered the views of Zeno correctly in

The

difficulties of this

view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly defined a perception to be the change {sTspoLaa-ii)
produced on the soul by an object,
rately, the
or,

more accu-

change produced thereby in the ruling part

;

of the soul
H.

and whereas his predecessors had only

^^ Galen, reads), ets touto
different forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time avrhs ovv r^v
TiiToiaLv eiprtfrdai inrb
vtrevdei
ofitrre

Sxrirep x^^P'^VS (^x^P'^V^

many

Phil. 24, vol. xix. IvepyStv els airoypou^v,

7p(^Tai
</)7Js

pXav eKatTTTiV rwv evyoiwp evoTroTrpoTOS Se 6 ttjs aTroypaStii.

rod

Z'fivoti'os

avrl

ttjs

erepot^ffeais,

TpSiros d

Tw^

cutrd-ficreav.

elvat

roiovToi'

rhv \6yov'

See

p. 79, 2, Orig. o. Cels. vii. 37,

^avraffia ioTlv ^Tepoiteffis ^vxvs.

720, b, says that they taught

aiffd'fio'et

KaTa\a/M^civ(T6at Tct Koiraffav KardKr]^

Ta\afi^av6^va Koi
'

Plut.

Comm.
iv

Not. 47: ^av'^^^ ^XV45 and 50.

ratrla

riiraais

same

in Diog.

vii.

That this was also the view of Diogenes appears from what
follows.
2

Objection had, however, been raised to this definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gives rise to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more accurately {payraala iarl T^nraffis ev ^vxo ^s tiv 4y ^"XPj which was equivalent to saying
:

<pavra(rla iffrlif erepoiutris iv Tyye-

Scant.

Math.

vii.

228

KXtv9r;s fiiv "yhp ^Kovire Tivaxriv KOToi elffox'h'' Te

Kliov yivo^4v7}y

rijv

/jLoviK^ or else in Zeno's definition of (fiavTairla as TiJTroxns

Ka\

tov KTipov Tiiraa'tv. 372 viii. 400. Sext. vii. 229, continues XptJfftTTTros 5^ &TOTrov TjyeiTO rb toioCtok according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to receive at once

iv ^vxp they had taken ^vx^ in a restricted sense for rh fiyefioviKiv, which really comes to the

Conf. JUd.
'

vii.

same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence eTepolaxns was limited to mean change in feeling (eTepofwcis Karct trelffiv). But the definition is still too

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
considered ensible things to be objects, he included

79

Chap.
'

among
mind.i

objects

conditions

and

activities

of

the

The mode, however,

in which the change

was produced in the soul did not further engage his

attention.

It follows, as a necessary corollary from this view,

(j) Con-

that the Stoics regarded sensation as the only source "t^^^ of all our perceptions the soul is a blank leaf, sen- fromper:

sation

is

the hand which

fills

it

with writing.

this is not all.

Perceptions give rise to

repeated acts of
clusions
wjiich

memory

to experience.^

But memory, and con-

itwns.

based

on experience suggest conceptions

go beyond the sphere of direct sensation.

These conclusions

rest either upon the comparison, or upon actual combination of perceptions, or else upon

wide, as

Sextus

already re-

kclkiuv

ouSe ji6vov x^P^s ^al euep-

marked

for a perception is not the only feeling of change in the soul. A more accurate definition has already been
;

yetrtuv koL &\K(tiv ttoKKiov Karop-

a\Kk koI (ppovfiffeus Koi avdpeta^ koI Tutv \onrmv aperup.

dd>(rea>v,

quoted, 77, 1. The statements in Sext. Math. vii. 372 ; viii. 400; Diog. vii. 45 and 50; Alex. Aplvro. De Anim. 135, b Boeth. De Interpret, ii. 292 (Sohol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above re;

This passage must not he understood to mean that the oonoeptions of good and evil, as such, are objects of sensation (^iter, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are indioidual moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only obtained by a process of abstraction. ^ P^wi. Plac. iv. 11, 2 attrOavd/aevoi yap Tims olov AevhoD aTre\66vTos avTov fivtifiriv exotiirii',
:

marks.
Chrys. in Plut. Sto. Rep. 8ti lifv yap alffSriTd eVri rayadh Kol rci /caKO, koi roirois ^Kiroiet \ey6tv' oii ycip ^6vov rh ahv Tois tABij iarXv oiirSrjT^
'

19,

eifSfffii',

olov

Kiwn

ical

<p6^ot Kol

rh irapavKiiaia,

aWk

ko! rKotttis

'irav

Se

bfmeiSets iroAA.ai imrjiiai

-riTt (paffiv ^X^'" ^M'^''

Kol iioix^ias leal twv ifioitnv effriv Koi Ka66\ov iujypoaivris tuffSeffBai naX SciXios Kol

ytvwvrai
piav.

dXKwv ouK oKiyuv

: :

80
Chap.
V.

TEE
The formation
artificially, at

STOICS.

analogy;' some add, upon transposition and contrast.^

of conceptions

by means of these
spontane-

agencies sometimes takes place methodically and

other times naturally and
latter

(a) Koival

ously.'

In the

way

are formed the primary

formed
naturally.

conceptions,

-Tj-poXijyp'Sis

or Koival svvoiai,

which were

regarded by the Stoics as the natural types of truth

and

virtue,

and

as the distinctive possession of ra-

tional beings.*
:

To judge by many

expressions, it
;

' Diog. vii. 52 ^ Se KaTcJAijil/is ylverai Kar' avro^js aiadijtrei fjtev, usKevKau Koi fiehdycai/ Kal Tpaxeoii/

Kol \eiwv

'

K^ytf 5e

t&v

Si'

oiroSef-

^eus txvvayofi^vav, oStnrep rh Beohs Ttev eTvai Kal irpovos'iv roirovs

'

yap voov^4l/av rh
Trraxriv
ej/o'fi67],

flhy Karct irept'

(immediate
Tct Se

contact)

Kaff 6fjiOi6r7jTa,

rk

kvaXoyiav, to fierddeiTtv, T^ he /caret

Se
/car'
TO. 5e Kar' ^vavriatfftv
.
.

Se

Kara

irvi/Oeaii/,
.

Sext. (Math. iii. 40 ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of concaptions, in saying that all our ideas arise either kot' ifxTrfKatnti ruv ivapymv or koto; t)/v oirb tuv iyapyov fifT&$a<nv (cf. Diog. vii. 53), and in the latter case either by comparison, or actual combination, or analogy. ^ Diog. 1. c. Compare the

pourai, passage quoted from Seneca, Kara fierii^acrit' (transition* 81,2^ '^ from the sensuous to the superPTmt. Plac. iv. 11 twc S' sensuous) riva, i)S TO XeKTa Kal 6 ivvoiSav al lihv <pv(nKal ylrnvrai Kara T(iTros. Acad. i. 42 rovs Oic. 11, tpr}fx4t'ovs rp6'irovs (acComprehensio [ = KaTd\ri\jiis'] cording to the context, this facta sensibus at vera illi must mean by memory and experience), but perhaps the [Zenoni] et fldelis videbatur non quod omnia, qua2 assent in author of the placita has been, careless in his extracts here, re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in earn posset KoX aveirtrexoiirois al 8" fjSri 5i'
Se Kal
:

'

relinqueret,

quodque

natura

Tifierepas

quasi

normam

scientise et prin-

Aeias

cipium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur.

3.8
:

Xovvrai

Kal eVlfieauTOi fihy oZv Evvoiai Ka-_ ix.6vai, eKuvai, Se Kol

SlSair/caAfer

irpok-fitj/fis.

Diog.

vii.
eicri

51

\juy

Hid. Fin. iii.lO, Cumque rerum notiones in

'pavTaartai/']

al /ueV al Se S-rexvoi.
'

rexi'iKol,

animis fiant, si aut usu (experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut oonjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est.

Plut.
Kafl'

x6yos
A071K0I

Plac. iv. 11 b S^ %v iTpoaayopev6fi.(Ba

:

4k

rav rrpoXii^iav

cvji-

vATipovffdai

n-piirriv ejSSoMtiSo

\4yeTai Karh rijy (the first seven

years of life).

Comm.

Not.

3,

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
might seem that by primary conceptions, or Koival svvoiai,^ innate ideas were meant; but this view would be opposed to the whole character and connection of the system.
V.

81

Chap.

In

reality, these

primary con-

ceptions, or Koival hvoiai, are only those conceptions

which, by reason of the nature of thought, can be

equally deduced by all

men from

experience
evil,

even

the highest ideas, those of good and

other origin.^

having no

The

artificial

formation of conceptions

1,

says that to the Stoics beirapSt

tiam boni pervenit.

Similarly

longed Th
ao^eiv,
. .
.

Tcks

ivvolas Kal
tjyiho-

T&s vpo\'ri^eis tos

&ip' Siy

koii/Sls

pLdKiffTariiv a'ipefftv
^tJfref

Kal fidvTjv bfioXayeiv tt?

\iyovinv.
tionl

Sen.

Epist.

117, 6:

multiim dare solemus prEesum(irpiSxrul'is) omnium hominum apud nos argumentnm

;

Sea. Ep. 120, 4, replying to the question, Quomodo adnos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit ? observes, Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientise dedit,

yeritatis est, aliqnid omnibus videri. J'requent instances will

scientiam non dedit nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum
. .

SEepe f aotarum inter se collatio

occur of appeals to communes notitias and consensus gen tium. ' Diog. vii. 53 (\>vcnKSis Si voeiTou SlKaiSv ri Koi ayaJdSv. 64
. :

per analogiam nostri intellec-

tum et judioant.

honestum et bonum The notion of mental health and strength has grown
out of the corresponding bodily notions the contemplation of virtuous actions and persons has given rise to the conception of moral perfection, the -good points being improved upon, and defects being passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues serving to make the distinction plainer. Even belief in a God was produced, according to Diog. vii. See p. 80, 1. 52, by airiiS|ij. Conf Stoh. Eel. i. 792 oi niv
; . :

effri S'

Tj

Trp6\Tiiliis

^vvoia tpvaiKTi

Tuv KaB6\ou. In the same strain Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Kep.
17) spealss of ^^tpvroi of good and evil,
vpoKijil/ets
lii

Phit.

Frag. De Anim. vii. 6 T. V. 487 Wytt., the question is asked, Hov? is it possible to learn what is not already

The Stoics reply, By means of ipviriKoi ivvoiai. ^ Compare Cic. Fin. iii. 10

known?

hoc quarto [coUatione rationis] boninotitia facta est; cum enim ab lis rebus, quassunt secundum naturam, adscendit animus collatione rationis, turn ad noti-

ISroJlKoi Keyovtrt fiey eiidvs 4ix(pve-

rhv \6yov, Utrrepot/ Be avvaSpoiCeaBai inrh rav ai(fdi\aeav kuX (pavTaffiuv vepl SeKarefftrapa ctt;.
trdai

82

TEE
gives rise
to

STOICS.
is

Chap,

knowledge, which

defined

by the

Stoics to be a fixed
(3)

and immoveable conception, or

Persistently maintainis

Xmm- gyst^m
ing,

of such conceptions.'

formed

on the one hand, that knowledge

a system of a logical

'ally'

artificial

conceptions, impossible without

process

on the other hand, occupying the ground

felt
it

they did, they must have

imperative that

knowledge should agree in

its results

with primary

conceptions,^ agreement with nature being in every

department their watchword.

moreover,
it

For their system,

it

was as natural to derive support from a

supposed agreement with nature, as

their opponents to

was easy

for

show that their agreement with nature was imaginary many of their assertions, on
;

the

contrary,

being

wholly

opposed

to

general

opinions.'
() Rela-

Perceptions,
tlie''' l^eing
'

and the

conclusions

based

upon

^e^Unr'

thus, according to the Stoics, the two

:

T^v
5e

intffTfjfiTiv

elcai Se Stoh. Eel. ii. 128 KaTdKtj^iv ot.ff(paKTJ

'

to Zeno.)

ouk

tikijs Beatpias

ii/iv 8^ t^s Sta\eicrhv (To^hv &TrTarov

Kai aixerdiTTiCTOv itirb \6yov

to(oi5twi/,

erepav

iiriffriifniv ffiffTTjfia i^ iiriffrv-

^treffOai 4v \6ycf), ^ See p. 80, 4.

^ This was the object of Plutarch's treatise irep! tuv koiv&v iwoiwv. In the same ''^^7, the Peripatetic Dioge-

fj.uv

otoy

^ rSy Kar^
fficrrTifia

fiipos \oyiKii iv rif (TTrouSai^ vTrdp-

Xovffa

&\K7iy

5e

^|

i-rrLffTiiiiciii

TEX"}""''

^ auToD ex""

rh $4Paiov wj exotiffiv al aperal S\\i;vSc( knowledge in a relative sense) {ic </>a>>Ta<riui/ SeKTinJ)!' ajucTaTTToiToi' tnrh \6yov, %vTivi
i^cunv iv -rivif Kal Swifxti (so.
ijiux^s)
Keio-fla'.

Diog.

vii.

T^r 47
i)

aiTT^K TE

tV

eiriiTT^/ijii'

i^aaLv

KaTa\ri\S/iv tur^akri

^ ejiy iv (pav-

nianus (in hiseb. Pr. Bv. vi. 8, 10) casts it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst appealing to generally-received opinions, he was always going contrary to them, and that he considered all men, with one or two exceptions, to be fools

TairiMi' 5rpo(rSe|ei d/ieTtCirTaiToj' 6irh

and madmen.
*

\6yov. (This explanation, which Herillns used according to iWo^. vii. 165, certainly belongs

IMoff.

52:

fi

Si KOTa\i)i(J
oiVB^ffei iifv

yiverat bbt'

aliroiis

\evKav, k.t.K.

\6yip Si

tuv SC

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
sources of all

83

notions, the further question arises.

to each other?

Chap.
'

How

are these two sources related

It might have been expected that only perceptions would be stated to be originally and absolutely true, since all general conceptions are based on them. AbNevertheless, the Stoics are far from saying so.

<^ -

solute

certainty of conviction

they allow only to

knowledge, and therefore declared that the truth of

the perceptions of the senses depends on their relation to thought.'

Truth and error not belonging

to

disconnected notions, but to notions combined in the

form of a judgment, and a judgment being produced

by an
ledge

effort of

thought,

it

follows that sensations,

taken alone, are the source of no knowledge, knowfirst

arising

when the

activity of the under-

standing is allied to sensation.^

atroSei^ews tTvvayo[j,4yuv,
Siffirep

Or, starting from

rh

6iohs elvai, k.t.X.

ol Si Sext. Math. viii. 10 awh TTJs aroas Keyovfrt juey Twy re aiffdriTuy Tiva Kal twv voriTwv
'
:

SrwiKol Koivus eV \eKT^ rh ct\7j0es efyat Kal rb \^evSos KeKrhv Si viripx^iv (Jxwri rh Kara \oyiKiiv ipavraffiav v<filtTTAfjiei/ov XoyiK^v Si elvai tpavraaiav Kad' %v t6

h\Ti&ri,

ovK 4^

ei/deias Si rot aitrflTjTo,

tpatfraffSiv etrrt \6yt^ irapaffTriiTat.

avoupophv t^v ws ^tti Tct irapaKflfieva roirois vo7]Tti. ' fSext.l. c. continues .a\vi6is ydp etrri kot* airobs rh v-rdpxov

aWa,

icoTCt

twv

Se

XeKTWC tA
ret

fxiv

iWiTrri

Kal

avTiKeifiev6v rivi, Kal }^evSos

/ii)

ouroreA^ (conceptions and propositions ; conf. Diog. vii. 63) irpotrayopeiovtri Se rtvaray auTOTcXoSv Kala^i(&iJ.aTa,
KaKoviri

5e

rd

iiripxov Kal /i^ (this

fiJ)

is

iiirep

Keyovns
a|(M;UO

iJToi

itKriBetlo/uv
;

t)

obviously redundant as appears xi. from Math. viii. 85, 88 220, where the same definition avnis given without the /i^j)
;

\fievS6ij.iBa.

IMd. 74
5e

Bwg.
8

vii.

65

iariv,

Io-tik

Keiii,ev6v

Tivi,

inep

affufiaToi'
eli/oi

a^iu/ia

KaOecrriis

votiriv

every sentence containing an assertion ornegative, and there.fore being opposed to every Ibid. viii. 70 ii^iow ot other.
:

^ ^ciSos (see Cie. Tuso. I. 7, 14) ^ Trpay/ia (better KfKrhy as Gell. N. A. xvi. 8, 4 reads) avrmeKis hro<l>avThv iaov i(f>' laur^ is i Xpv<rnnr6s (pTicnv 4i/
aKi)6is

to7s Sia^iKTiKoTs Spois.

Aristotle

had already observed that the distinction between false and

a 2

84
Chap,
V.

THE
only be

STOICS.
its

the relation of thought to

object, since like can

known by

like according to the well-known

adage, the rational element in the universe can only

be known by the rational element in man.^

But

again, the understanding has no other material to

work upon but that supplied by

clusions.

sensation,

ral conceptions are only obtained therefrom

and geneby con-

The mind, therefore, has the capacity of formally working up the material supplied by the
senses,

but to this material

it is limited.

Still, it

can

progress from perceptions to notions not immediately

given in sensation, such as the conceptions of what

is

good and of God.

And

since, according to the Stoic

teaching, material objects only possess reality, the

same vague inconsistency may be observed in

teaching as has been noticed in Aristotle
^

their

reality

attaching to individuals, truth to general notions.

This inconsistency, however,

is

more marked in

their

case than in that of Aristotle, the Stoics so far ad-

hering to the Cynic nominalism' as to assert that no

reality attaches
true
first

to thought.^

Such

an

assertion

See

Zeller,

appears in judgment. Philosophie der

Griechen,vol.ii.b, 156, 2; 167,1. ' Sext. Math. vii. 93 ; as rh fih ipws, ^naiv S Hoo-eiStii'ios rhv VKiToivos Tlfiatov iitiyoiiievos, iirh Tijs ^oJToeiSoCs &ifiea>s Karaka)t.Pi,viTai, ri 5e tj>iev^ imh rrjs aeposiSoSs oko^s, oBtw kbI fj ruv

* Siog. 61 : ivii6t)ii.a (object of thought) 5e ian <f>dvTairiia Siavoias, oBtc ri %!> oirf itothv, axrovel Si rl iv xal ixravel iroiiiy. Stob. Bel. i. 332 rh ei/Ko^juoTO
:

(pnffl

n-f]Ti

rivi,

ehai

^-fiTi iroii,

ImravA Si rtvh koL iiaavfi

</>oi'T(ff/ioTa i/vxrjs

iroii
inri

tuCtb 5s

tSiv

apxalfv

IStas

irpoa-a-yopcie-

S\av

ipvffis uirb crvYyeiiovs 6<j>dXei

aSai

KwraKa)i.$6.V<79aiTov\6yov. Conf.

Plato, Kep.

vi.

508, B.

. . . TaSra [raiiTOs] Se oi 2Tm"iKol <pt\6(ro^oi (paaXv avmipkt ovs eivai, koXtSv pii/ iwoi\ni,Tav

^ See Zeller'g Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. b, 231.

/leTexeiK vims, t&v Si Trrdia-eay, &s SJ; irpoffiryoplas /caXoDtri, ruy-

'

Hid.

ii.

a, 211.

Xt^"""-

Although defended by

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
makes
it

85

all

the harder to understand

how

greater
it is said

Chap.
V.

truth can be attributed to thought, unreal as

to be, than to sensations of real

and material

objects.

Do we

then ask in what the peculiar character of

consists, the Stoics, following Aristotle, reply
is

thought

that in thought the idea of universality

added to

that which presents itself in sensation as a particular.'

More importance was attached by them

feature

to another

the

greater

certainty which

belongs

to

thought than to sensation.

All the definitions given

above point to the immovable strength of conviction

Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. 1. 420, 63, the last words as they stand do not appear capable of any
tolerable meaning. They are more probably corrupt. Phd. Plao. i. 10, 4 oi i,irh Ziivavos
:

tSms
e
;

eipa(rai>.

^mpl. Categ.
aTropet

26,

X/;iJffnr7ros

nepi

t^s

ideas,

elT6SeTL ^Biifferai,
5e
irepl

av/jLira-

tion of ideas, but that they asserted that these ideas were only ivvo^naTa an assertion which had also been made by Antisthenes. Compare what is said on p. 92 respecting the unreality of the \(kt6v, likewise what Sext. Math. vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to the Stoics ot'Te 5^ aKtiSets otfre ^ev-

pakfjUTeov

Kal riiv ffvvijdetajf

Seis elaiv at yeviKal [tpayrairiat]

'

Tuv ^TwiKuv
irpo(p4povTai

ruv yeviKav
oijTtva

TToiwv iras at intjoffets kot' aiirovs

rota ^ rota roWav ri yeyij oSre roia otfre Tola if

Sc y^p tA

etSr]

rh Koiv^irap'-avTohKeyeTai. Syrian on Met. p. 59. (In Petersen's Philos. Chrys. Fund. 80): &s aire irphs ri)ii &pa tA elfSr) ^(Tiv TTis ruv ovoiidTuv avuTtOiias
Kal
iry
. . .

mankind be divided into Greeks and barbarians, the yepiKhs

&v6pa!TTos

nor the

will be neither one other. The further

vapiiyero,
Sji/jios

iis

Xpiaiinros Kal 'Apx^riSv

. .

therefore a conception is reindividual limitations, the further it is removed

moved from
from
'

Kol

01 irXeious
.

STuiKav

SiTTfpov (f4]Sn(rav

ou ^tJi/ouBe

truth. Diog. vii. 54

ecrrt S'

fi

irpS-

voiiiMTi

liffi

Trap'

airois at iS4ai,

ATji/zts

ivvota ^vfftK^

ruv Kad6\ov.
(^Stob,

etpiiKe. liffTcpov &s KKedi/BTis Prantl, 1. c. takes objection to

Exc.

e Joam.
XptJffiTnros

Damtase.
rh
Si
ptev

rioril. ed.

Mein.
rh
^Si)

iv. 236),

Nr.
Kotl

StobKUS and Plutarch here say yet this view is not that the Stoics regarded their conception of the imdri/ia as identical with Plato's concep-

what

34

yeviKhv

7]bb

voTjrhv,

eiStKdv

irpoinrlirTOV

(^Petersen,

83
^84)

without
aiV8i)T(ic.

cause

suggests

86

THE
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

as the distinctive feature of

knowledge

;^

and of

like

import

is

the language attributed to Zeno,^ compar-

ing simple sensation with an extended finger, assent, as being the first activity of the power of judgment,

with a closed hand, conception with the

fist,

and

knowledge with one

the four processes

fist

firmly grasped

by the

other.

According to this view, the whole difference between

is

one of degree, depending on the

It is not

greater or less strength of conviction, on the mental

exertion and tension.^

an absolute difference

of kind, but a relative difference, a gradual shading

off of
(_d)

one into the other.

these considerations it follows that in the

Tlie

From

standard
of truth.
(a) Prac-

last resort only a relative distinction is left

whereby

the truth of notions

ral

may be

tested.

Even the gene-

tical need

of such a
standaird.

argument

for the possibility of

knowledge proceeds

with the Stoics by practically taking something for

granted.

Without

failing to

urge intellectual objec-

tions against Scepticism, as

ticularly since the

was indeed natural, par-

time of Chrysippus^

most pertinent ones'

'

and

often

^the

Stoics nevertheless speci-

See p. 82, 1. dc. Acad. ii. 47, 145. ' Stdb. Bel. ii. 128 Knowledge is defined to be e{ij ^av'
:

an intermediate place between two of the most impied

portant Eep. i.
Sceptics.
4, p.

1059.

raffiav Ssktik^ ^fieriiirTUTOS inrh

mentions
Arcesilaus.

Plut. Sto. Diog. 198 treatise against

K6yov,
*

r/iVTivd.

<j}ouriv

iy rSyc^ Kol

Svvd,/jLec K^iffOai.

Chrysippus opposed Arcesilas, with such success, according to the view of the Stoic School, that Carneades was refuted by anticipation and it was considered a special favour of Providence that the labours of Chrysippus had occu-

' Here may be noted the objection mentioned by Sext. Math. viii. 463 Pyrh. ii. 186 The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of arguing without proving their assertion and thereby practically admitting the possibility. Also another one urged by Antipater against
; :

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
ally

87
this,

took up their stand on one point, which was

Chap.
V.

that, unless the

knowledge of truth were

possible, it

would be impossible to act on fixed principles and

convictions.'

Thus, as a last bulwark against doubt,

result is obtained

practical needs are resorted to.

The same
question

from a special inquiry

If the

(/3)

Irre-

into the nature of the standard of truth.

is raised.

'*'***'*

How

are true perceptions distin1' ni.Tthe immediate

I i?

percej)tions the

n 1 .-LTj^ guished from false ones

reply given of truth.

standard

by the Stoics

is,

that a true perception

is.^

is

one which
are

represents a real object as it really

Carneades
34, 109)
:

You

no

( Cic.

Acad.

ii.

9,

28

ToSra. Following also the Stoic

line, Cic. Acad. ii. 1 0-12, makes Antiochus argue that Scepticism

He who

asserts that

nothing can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that he can with certainty

makes
2

all action impossible. In Sext. Math. vii. 244,

ipavTafriat

know

this. The replies of the Sceptics to these objections, and the way they turned them in their own favour, will be found in Sext. Math. 1. c. and vii. 433. ' Plut. Sto. Bep. 10 (see p. koX iv 66, 1) ; lUd. 47, 12 ye Tois "wphs Toiis 'AKaSyifJLa'LKoijs aywaty d TrAeTtrros out^ re XpvffIttvcii Kal ^Avrmdrptp ir6vos yeyove Trep\ Tov jU^Te irpirreiv [xiire ipfiav
:

aKTjOe'is

are,

first

of

all,

literally explained to

be

<pavra(riai,

Zy

effrii/
'

a\7i67J

kottj-

yoplay

troiiiffaff&at

then, under

the head of true

KaTaKtiirriKal

(jiavrairlai,

the

and oi Kara\TiKTif{ai

mV

&avyKara64T(os, oWai TrKafrfiara \4yeiv KoX Kevas vTroOeffets tovs a^iovvTas oiKcias ^ovTOffios yeyofiev7}s eitdvs

are distinguished, i.e., notions which are accompanied by a, clear impression of being true, and such as are not; and, in conclusion, <pavratTlaKaTa\7j7rTiK^ is defined tj airb rod inrdpxovTOS Kal Kar' aiirh rh virdpxov 4vawo~
:

tieixay/jievT]

Kal

4va'ireff(l>payta'fi4vr]y

dpfi^v ^^

^avras fiv^k
Ibid.

avyKaTaTtdefi4vovs.

adv.

Col. 26, 3, p. 1122: rrivSi repl vdvTwv iwoxh^ oiiS^ 01 TToWa TtpayfiaTeutrdfiivoi Kol KaTanlvavTes els

ovK iiy y4votra cCTri [ir) imdp^ XO'Tos. This definition is afterwards more fully explained:.
&iroia

The same explanation is given lUd. 402 and 426; viii. 85;
Pyrrh.
c.
ii.

TovTO ffvyypdfi^Ta Kol \6yovs iKlvtiaaii i.K\' in t^s StoSs auTTJs reKemwvres HaTep Topyiva t^v iLirpa^lav hrdyoyres kiniyipevffav. JEJpiet. (Arrian. Diss. i. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying obK &yu <rxo?^v rphs
;

iii.

242
;

Augustin,

Acad.

ii.

5,

11

Cic.
:

Acad.

ii.

6, 18.

Diog.

vii.

46

t^s Sc

sjiav-

Tafflas

r^v

/iey KajTdKTjlTTiK^v

t^v

5e
fxev,

^KaTdXtjiTTOv

KaTa\TyKTiKi]v
elvat

%v KptThptoe
(pacrl,,

tuv

irpay-

lidrav

tV

ywon4vi\)i AJi

88

THE
further with this answer,
to be asked,
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

and the question has again

be known that a perception

How may

it

faithfully represents a reality ?

The

Stoics can only

reply by pointing to a relative, but not to an absolute, test

the degree

of strength with which certain

oxir notice.

perceptions force themselves on

By itself

a perception does not necessarily carry conviction or

assent {av^KardOsais)
;

for there
is

can be no assent

until the faculty of judgment

directed towards the

perception, either for the purpose of allowing or of

rejecting
it,

truth and error residing in judgment.

Assent therefore, generally speaking, rests with us, as

does also the power of decision ; and a wise
fers

man

dif-

from a

fool quite as

much by

conviction as by

action.'
vvapxovTos
fiayiJ.4vT]V
'

Some
KttT* atirb

of our perceptions are, however, of

rb Hirapxav
evajro^e-

evaireffippaytfr^evriv

/col

aKarAKiiTrrov 54 t)?!//*^
airh

anh inrdpxovTOSf ^
fihr, fi^

imtipxovTQS

positam et Toluntariam. Ibid. ii. 12, 37; De Fato, 19, 43, Chiysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem
et quasi signabit in

kot' ai/rh 5e rb {nrdpxoVj

Tpapy) /iiiSe iKTViroy. Ibid.

animo suam

tV
50.
'

juj;

speciem sed assensio nostra erit in potestate. Plut. Sto. Eep.

yhp ^avToiriav $ov\647, 1 liems [A Xpitrmros'] oiiK oScroi' oSTOTeXi) avyKaTtiSeiTfus TTJs curiav aTToSetKvietv ^pijKev Sri $\d^ovtriv ol (Totpol i^6u56ts tjiavra:

fiev

Sext. Math. viii. 397 itrn oiv 7j diroSe(|ts, &s eCTi trap'
:

tV

tunuv oKoieiVj KaTaKijnTtKTJs

^oiKev elvai trpayfia
fcal

tpav-

Tairlas trvyKaTiBecris, jJtis 3it\ovv

rh

ixiv ri

IXd'
^Tri

aKoiffioPf rf) 54 cKoitriov Ka\

fihv

Tp Tiiierepif Kpiffei Kel^ivov. rb yap tpaviatntoBrivaL a^oiKijTov

irotuffiv

^v

Kcti oi/K 4irl

tQ
.

irtiffxovTt cKeiTO

hv at fpavraffiat avTOTcKus ris ffvyKaraffeo-eis, K.T.X. Id. 13: avBis Se <p7^(ri Xpvo'L'tnroSf KaX rhv Behv
trlas i/iTToiovvTeSf
ijifuSfis

&AV ivt r^ (pavrcurtovvTt rh ovraxrl

StaTeQ^yai . 64ir6ai Toirtp
,

cjun-oicu'
.

(pavratrlas

Kol

rh Se

ffvyKarat)ji'

ry
vii.

Kivfj^art Ikcito
^fflyra-

4ir\

T^

TapaSexofiej/tp

rhv ffo<phjf . Tjfias 54 tpavXov^ SvTas truyKaTarlBetrBai Tois TOiairais tpavrafflais. Id. Fragm,
,

<r(av.
i.

XHog.

14,

40

Acad, [Zeno] ad hseo quB

51
;

(kc.

De

An. 2
els

oi/x

kavr^iv

r^v

vi ^vxh TpeTrei twv irpay^rtov

visa sunt, et quasi acceptasensibus assensiouem adjungit animorum quamesse vxilt in nobis
:

KaTi\n<fiiv Kol airdTTiv, Karii robs

airh TTJs tTToas.

Mpictet, in Gell,'

N.A. xix. 1,15: visa animi, quas

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.
such a kind that they at once oblige us to bestow on

89

Chap.
V.

them

assent, compelling us not only to regard

them

as probable,

but also as true ' and corresponding with

Such perceptions produce in us that strength of conviction which the Stoics call a conception they are therefore termed Whenever a perception conceptional perceptions. forces itself upon us in this irresistible form, we are
the actual nature of things.
;

no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination, but with something real but whenever the strength
;

of conviction

is

wanting, we cannot be sure of the

Or, expressing the

truth of our perception.

same

idea in the language of Stoicism, conceptional or irresistible perceptions, ^avracriai KaTaXriimicai, are

the standard of truth.^

(pavTaaias
. . .

The
Cic.

test of irresistibility

philosopM appellant non voluntatis sunt neque

Acad.

i.

11,

41

[Zeno]

visis (

= (pavraaiais) nou omnibus

sed tI quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitandse ; probationes autem, quas auyKaraBiaiis Tocant, quibus eadem visa nosountur ao dijundicantur, voluntariEe sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu the difference between a wise man and a fool consists in
Arbitrarise,

adjungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quEe propriam quandam haberent deolarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (koto:

XtivriKii

<j>avTa(ria).

Ibid.

ii.

B-uyKaTaTiBeffBat
fell'.

and wpoireiriSo^dThe freedom of approba-

tion

must, of course, be so understood in harmony with

ut enim necesse est lanoem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere non potest objeotam rem perspicuam
12,

38

Stoic doctrine of the freedom of the vrill. ' On the difference between the conception of etfXoyo* and

that of KaraKirirriKii <pavTa(ria, consisting as it does in the fact that the latter alone is unerring, see At/ien. viii. 354, e ; Diog.
vii. *

Conf. Fin. v. percipiendi vis ita dea Stoiois, ut negent' quidquam posse peroipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse Siog. vii. 54 non possit.
26, 76 finitur
:
'

non approbare.

Seart.

Math.
(pairiv

vii.

227

xpirlipiov
elyBi
oi

toivw
&vSpes

o\jj9eias

ovroi

tV

KaraXijirTiKV

177.

(jiayrairiav.

It

was a deviation

Compare besides

p.

87, 2,

from the older Stoic teaching,

no

THE
( KaTd\r}-\lns)

STOICS.
first

Chap.
V.
(7) Pri-

was, in the

place, understood to

apply to sensations from without, such sensations,

according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the
material for knowledge.

mary

conceptions a

An

equal degree of cer-

standard
as well as
irresistible

tainty was, however, attached to terms deduced from

originally true data, either
ral exercise of thought, or

perceptions.

by the universal and natuby scientific processes of

these derivative

proof.

Now,

since

among

terms

the primary conceptions instance the

some
serve as

(^Koival iwoiat), for

basis for deriving others, it

may
In

in a certain sense

be asserted that sensation

truth.'

and primary conceptions are both standards of

strict accuracy, neither sensation

nor primary con-

ceptions (jrpoKrj-^sis) can be called standards.

to refuse, as the later Stoics did, to allow a conoeptional notion to be considered a test of truth, except with the proviso
verat KaTaairojffa
rdBefftv Kol
els
Tifias

The
Seofieyq

as ffvyKa-

&Wov
&K\a

iJ.riSevhs

T^

roiavTT] TrpoffirlTrreiv, k.t.K.

Hence Simpl.
av^pow
ivapyi].
TCt

Phys.
.
.

20,
Tr\iii'

that no argument could be adduced against its truth. Sext. 253 aA\a yhp 01 fx^v apxat^TepoL
:

b: t^

TWV

"ZTu'iKav KptT'fiptSv ^offtv slvai

' Kpir^piov Si Diog. vii. 54 T^s a\7ideias ^ao*! Tvyxdireiv tV

:

/coToA.TjirTiK^y

tpavTaalatff

tovt-

raiTTjv (pavraalav oi be vstinepoi jrpotreTiGeiray Kal rh firjbiy exovaav

etTTf
^ricri

r^v

virdpxov70s, KaBd Xpiatinros ip rfi ScoSeict^Ti;

aTrb

cases could be imagined in which a faulty

fv<TT7]fia,

since

view presented

with the This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine of a criterion for how could it be known in any particular case that there was not a negative instance ? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic teaching for a later Stoic (Hid. 257) to say of conoeptional perception oBttj yip
itself

(pvffiKiiv Kal 'AvTlvarpos Koi 'AiroW6dupos. 6 ^ev yi^p Bor]6hs Kpirijpia nKelova &Tro\eiTri, vovv

Twv

full force of truth.

Kal &pe(iv koi iirM(this looks like an approximation to the teaching of

Titia\v

KOI aiaStiaiv

the Peripatetics) iSi'X.piai-mras Siatpepdiieyos vpis ai-rhv 4y t^ Tp^Ttfj irepl \6yov xpiriiptii ^TjaLV.
;

cleat c^aSriffiv Kal

irp6\7}^tv

oAAot 8e Tives tuv apxatOTepwv StojVkwv rhv opBhv \6yov KptT'lipiov

07roAeiirou(nj/,

is 6

UoffeiBtivLos iv
^rjartv.

iyapy^s oiira ol ttXtiktik^ fiovomv^i tUv Tfixuv, (paai, Ka/tPi-

Tp Tepl above p.

KptTTiplov

See

76.

9l
is

THEORY OF KNOWLEBGE.
real standard,

whereby the truth of a perception

Chap.
V.

ascertained, consists in the power, inherent in certain

perceptions, of carrying conviction

ro KaTaXrjiniKov
place, to sensa-

a power which
tions,

belongs, in the

first

whether of objects without or within, and, in

in a natural

the next place, to primary conceptions forraed from

them

way

koivoX swoidi or TrpoXtjyJrsis.

On

the other hand, conceptions and terms formed

artificially

can only have their truth established by

scientific process of proof.

being subjected to a

How,
a

after these statements, the Stoics could attribute

greater strength of conviction to artificial than to

primary conceptions

'

how they could

simple

raise

doubts

as to the trustworthiness of

sensations,^ is

one of the paradoxes of the Stoic system, proving the

existence, as in so

many

other systems, of a double

is,

current of thought.

There

on the one hand, a

seeking for what

is

innate and original, a going back

to nature, an aversion to everything artificial

and of
ances-

human
tral

device, inherited

by Stoicism from

its
is

Cynicism.

On

the other hand, there

a desire
higher'

to supplement the Cynic appeal to nature culture,

by a

and

to assign scientific reasons for truths

which the Cynics laid down as self-evident.

The
'

latter

tendency will alone explain the care

had inquired into the truth of and
the perceptions of the senses, of the notions derived from

See above p. 82, 1. See above p. 89, 2, and do. Acad. ii. 31, 101: neque eos (the Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur. Chrysippus
''

them, in his treatise irepi a-uyijSilas, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections which he quoted against the theory. Sse p, 46, 2.


92

THE
'

STOICS.

Chap

and precision which the Stoics devoted to studying

the forms and rules which govern intellectual processes.

Attention to this branch of study

may be
Aristo

noticed in Zeno and his immediate successors at the

first
is

separation of Stoicism from Cynicism.'

the only Stoic

who
it

is

opposed to
attained

it,

his

whole
In
de-

habit of

mind being purely that

of a Cynic.
its

Chrysippus, however,

greatest

velopment, and by Chrysippus the formal logic of

the StoieS attained scientific completeness.

In later

times, in proportion as Stoicism reverted to its origi-

nal Cynical type, and in connection therewith ap-

pealed to the immediate suggestions of the mind,

lost
its

it

interest

in logic, as

may

be observed in

Musonius, Epictetus, and others.

however,
FormaTr~
let it sufi&ce to
is

For the present,

consider the logic of Chrysipto us.

pus, as far as that

C.

known

The term formal

doctrine

logic is here used to express

(V) TTtter-

those investigations which the Stoics included under

tjje

ance

of utterance.''
is

The common
is

object
or, as

of those inquiries

that which
is

thought,

the Stoics called

it,

that which

uttered

(Xe/cToz/),

understanding thereby the substance of thought

thought regarded by
differing alike
refers,

itself as

a distinct something,

from the external object to which it from the sound by which it is expressed, and

from the power of mind which produces it. For this reason, they maintain that only utterance is
not material
;

things are always material

in

even the

process of thought consists

>

a material change

See

p. 60.

See

p. 73, 3.

; ;

FORMAL
movement
'

LOGIC.

93

within the soul, and an uttered word, in a certain

of the atmosphere.'
Math.
viii.

Chap.
V.

A
7j

question

is

here

See

Seast.

11

oi

ycip imirr'liiiii irivTuy a\ij9S)y airo-

aith rrts (Ttoos, Tpia <pdfieyot ffv^U'

tpavriK^,

5e

iviffr-fifiti

Tris ex*'*'

yfiv a\\ii\ois, t6 te arifuuv6ii.ei'0v Kol rb arnioimv Kal rh Tvyxtivov.

Tiy)ioyiK6y

(Id. Math. vii.

38,

wv (TTifiaivoyiieyeivai r^v (pwj/^v

atjfjMtvifievoy
. .
.

5e tt&rb rh npay/xa

Tuyrh inr* avTTJs 57J\otJjuei/oy -rb ixrhs iTroK^l/ifVov X^vov roirwv Sh Sio fihv eTyat (rdfiaTa, KaBdirep t^v (f)av^y koX rh Tvy-

a similar statement is expressly attributed to a Stoic) likewise a similar statement which Sen. Ep. 117, discusses, and at length declares to be a mere quibble, but not till after a lengthy ref utation sapientiam bonum
;
:

X^-vov, %v 5e Sta^iiwroVf &(nrep rh ffTj^aivSfievov irpciyfia Kal \eKT6y.

esse, sapere

bonum non
rests

esse.

Sen. Bp. 117, 13, giving it expressly as the teaching of the Stoics, not as his own: Svmt, inqnit, naturae corporum has deinde sequiintur motus animorum entmtiativi corporum for instance, I see Cato walk corpus est, quod video.
.
.

on the assertion that nothing can be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself felt which is not material wisdom is material, because it
is mens perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, sapientise. i.e. Accordingly, \cKTby (as Am/mon. De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a fieffov tov re yoiifjiOfros koI rod irpdyfiaros' if, however, y6rifia be taken to express the thought itself, and not the process of thinking, it

The statement

Dico deinde

Cato

ambulat.

corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed enuutiativnm quiddam de corpore, quod alii
alii

Non

effiatum vocant, aliienuntiatmn, edoctum. Compare also on the \fKT6v Semt. Math. viii. 70
;

becomes identical with

\ticT6y.

(above p. 83, 2) Pyrrh. iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the Stoics to prove that the voice as opposed to utterance (XeKrby) is material, as has been
Illustrative of said, p. 74, 5. the distinction between utterance and the process of thought is the assertion (in iSeiBt. Pyrrh. ii. 81) that certainty as being a definite condition of the soul is material, but that truth itXeycToi self is not material Siaipepeiv T^r ctA7)9fos rb ci\r]Bes rpix^s, oviTt:f, <rv(rrd<Tei, Swifief ovaitf liiy, iirel rb fiiv a\5)6es a(r^liardv iffTty, ct^iufjia ydp itXTi KoX
;

Conf. Slmpl. Cat. 3, a, Basil. rk 8e \ey6fieva Kal KKra rh voiijuaT({ ^(TTiv, ws Kal rots ^rutKo7s i56Kei. In Pint. Plao. iv. 11, 4, a definition of ydriiia or iyySr/fia is given similar to that of \krby in Semt. Math. viii. 70 (jidvrafffia hidvoias \oyiHov ^tpov. See above p. 84, 4. The statement, however, of PhiUp. Anal. Pr.
:

Ix.

a,

Schol. in

Ajr.

170, a, 2,
rvyxi.yoyra,

cannot be true, that the Stoics

called

things

thoughts iKipopiKa, and sounds \eKra, whereas ixtpopiKby may be used of thoughts in the same
sense as \eKr6y.

\iKTby,

i)

Se oKifBeia

ffSiiui,

ian

94

THE
V.
of, viz.

STOICS.

Chap.

suggested in passing, which should not be lost sight

How

far

was

it

correct for the Stoics to speak

of thoughts as existing, seeing they are not material,

since, according to their teaching, reality only belongs

to material things ?

Utterance
is

may
it

be either perfect or imperfect.' It

contains a proposition
is
;

perfect

when

imperfect

when the

proposition

incomplete.^

The portion
falls

of logic, therefore, which treats of utterance

into two parts, devoted respectively to the considera-

tion of complete and incomplete expressions.

(2) In-

complete
expression.

much
mar

In the section devoted to incomplete expressions, is found which we should include under gramrather than under logic.

{a) The

grammwr
of words.

Thus all incomplete expressions are divided into two groups^one group
>

See
;

p. 84, 4.

This question

Te\r).

Various kinds of proposi-

raised in the Stoic School itself at least Sextus, not hesitating to attack the Stoic teaching from this side (Math. viii. 262), speaks of an ayiivvTos liaxn in reference to the Svap^is of Kexra, and he remarks (viii. 268) dpu^^v Se ois eiffl rives oi hvypjiKdres t^v virap^tv tS>v \kTUV, KOi OVX ot Tep6So^Ot fJi6j/0V,
:

was

tions are then

enumerated as
Follovring the ? see
:

being

avTore^Tj.

same authority, (Diodes IHog. 48) Mog. 63, says

(>io(ri

Se rh \eKThv eivai rh Karct ipavToa'iav ?^oyiK^p itpLO'Tdfievof. r&v Se A6KTWC rh fiev \4yovffiv flyai
01 StmikoI, tb Be iWnrri. iWiirfi fiiv o5c effri Tk ayairdprt(TTOV e^fOi/Tci TJ)K iK(popav, olov

auTOTeX^

oTov

ol ^ETTtKo^peLOL,

aK\ot,

Kal

ot

Tpd(l>ei

7rifi)ToC|Ue>/
5'

yip, Tls

au-

STwtKoVws
ois

oi Treplrhv BafffXefSijx',

TOTeA.^

iffrl

t^

aTr-f}prt.op.ivT\v

^So^e

jUTjSev

elvai

atrtifiaTov.

exoyra

t)\v

4K(popiiti,

otov Vpdfei

Probably the question was

first

2QJKpaT7js.

raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents. Basilides was the teacher of

Prmitl in saying, p.

438, that the Stoics divide judg-

ments (afiioyuoTo) into complete and incomplete, is inaccurate. Otherwise Only AektA are so divided, but Marcus Aurelius. the existence of XcktA was" KiKThv has a wider meaning spoken of as quite natural. than that of a logical judgment. " Sext. Math. viii. 70, see a^idS^ara are only one form of above p. 83, 2 tUv Si XcKTwy to AeKTci abTOTeK^.
:

fiev

ikhiWTJ Kahovo'i ret

5e

auTO-

FORMAL
cluding verbs.'
tively to

LOGIC.

05

including proper names and adjectives, the other in-

Chap.
V.

These two groups are used respec-

accidental,^

what is essential and what is and are again divided into a number of subdivisions and varieties.' To this part of logic
express
'

Plut. Qu. Plat. X.

1,

2, p.

otfrg Si/ otfre aSifxa,

aWa trv^^ffirj'

or a|u/ia) e| 6v6fLaTos Koi ^p-aros (rvviffTTjKeUf av rb p.kv irrwaiv ot 5ia\eKTtKol, rh Se Kar7iy6p7ip.a ko1008.
(irpiiToiris

A judgment

Khs Kol KaT7j7(Jprj/xo. Hence for the latter the names aijx&aim
trapaaiSfjL^apuz, See following note. ' In nouns the cases were distinguished, the nominative, according to Ammon. 1. c. being

and

\ov(Tiv.

The terms irTaais and xa-

belonging to the Stoic terminology, the Stoics must be meant by of SiaXtK-nml, In the first class of words they distinguish iiKO/ua and irpoffriyopla, limiting Svoiia to proper names,
nfyip^lio.

'yopia all general terms,

and understanding by irpoirriwhether

called ivoiia, and the other five cases irr^aeis a statement, however, which does not agree with the usual use of those terms. In Siog. 65, the oases (yevtKii, SoTiKJ), ttlTiaTixii') are called vKd-

substantives or adjectives (Diog. 58; BeMer's Anecd. ii. 842). According to Stol. Eel. i. 332,
tttSitij

Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, IHoff. 192. Similar were
/Lai TrTwcreis.

was only used

to -express

Diog. 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus irepl Tuv irpoffTiyoptKuv. For the meaning of KaTj)y6pt]p.a or ^jua, the verb, consult jKog. 58 and 64 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14 ; do. Tusc. iv. 9, 21 ; PorpTiyr. in Ammon.
irpoirriyopia.

the divisions of the KarriySprnia. According to Diog. 65, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (op9cii), such as dp^, Sta\eyeTat passive verbs (Birrio) such as ipSi/iai' neuter verbs
(oifSeTepa),

such as

tppovety, irept-

TTKriiv

and verbs which, with

De

Inter. 37, a.

According to
i.

Apollon.
pripia

De

Construct,

8,

a passive form, do not express a passive relation {avTnteaovMTa),

Kelpeffdat,
trelBearOat,

was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other forms being called Kariiyop'lipMTa.
The distinction between om/ia and KarriySprifia was somewhat bluntly referred to this logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be
'

&c.

Consult on this point Phih. De Cherub. 121, c Orig. 0. Cels. On the opBh, and utttio, vi. 57.
;

also

Monys.
;

TTirax.

15,

p.

886, Bekk. ; Sim.pl. Categ. 79, u, f Diog. 191 ; and respecting all three divisions, Lm-soh. ii.

seen in Stob. Eel.

S'

i.

336
Kal

atriov

S Ziivwv

(jiTiolv

fhai

5i' t,

o5 5c

oifTJoi'

(ru;ii/3e/37jK<!s

rh p.h
.

StemtlwX, Gesch. 196 der Spraohw. i. 294. They also distinguished between o-iJjii/Sa^uaand
;

ov Si aXriov KaTJiy6p7iTloireMvLOt rhiiiv fia. atriov %v Kat aSifM, o? Si airtov

ofTioj/ ffSina,
. . . . .

irapacripPaita

a verb, when used with a nominative, being called

aifiL^aiia

or

Kimi\y6pi>jM,

and

90
Chap.
V.

TEE
investigations into

STOICS.

the formation and division of

conceptions, and the doctrine of the categories, pro-

but it cannot be said with certainty what place they occupy in the logic of the Stoics.'
perly belong
;

Certain

it is
;

that these researches introduced little

new matter

all

that

is

known

of the Stoic views in

reference to the formation, the mutual relation and

the analysis of conceptions, differing only from the

corresponding parts in the teaching of Aristotle by

the change of a few expressions, and a slightly
altered order of treatment.^
Trapaaiii.paii.a

when used with an

;

oblique case

TrepiTroTc* is

ffiJ/t-

/Sa^ia, iierajjuiKei

Trnpaaifi^ajMi,,

irepiTraTeirequiring a nominative
(SoiKpoTTis), jiteTa^tteAei

requiring

If an oblique case was necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject, the verb was called iXwTTOV fl <riii$aim or f\aTTOv f) KaTjjy6pnij.a, as in the sentence Tlxdruv <j>i\e7, such, for instance, is fiXei, for these words only-

a dative

(Sw/tpt^Tei).

the meaningless Aov t!i 8iA ttcTpas TTAeti' T& 5e Trapatrifi.^aiJ.aTa, which at least gives a better meaning than the proposals of R. Schmidt, Sto. Gramm. 66, 91, ajid Lersch. 1. c. 33. Apollon. De Const, iii. 32, p. 299 Bekk. Suid. aipLfiaim (very inaccurate); Prisoian, xviii. p. 1118, who, in his equally inaccurate account, has SLffvfi^d/xaTa. The example which Imciam,. Vit. Auot. 21 employs to laugh at the Stoic

make a complete sentence by the addition of an object thus n\(Twr (/\el Aiuya, If this was necessary with a irapao'vfjifiafi.a, it was called lAoTToy ^ irapaai/ifiaiia
;

hair-splitting

anent
of

crii^Paiia

and
'

TTapaaiiifiajia,

course

proves nothing.

There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show

the position held
gories.

such, for instance,

is

the word /ic'Aci, for to complete the sentence it is not enough to say ^ancpdm iii\ei, but the object must be added, as in the sentence ^coKpAret juTa/l6Xei 'A\KifiidSovs. This difference is explained by Pm'phyr. in Am.mon. 1. c, 36, b, whom Lench. ii. 31, misunderstanding, blames. See Biog. 64 where the text is evidentlycorrupt. Without great temerity we mightsubstitute for
:

and most improperly under the head

of language.
*

by the cateseveral, definition division were treated of

By

to Diog. 60, 647, Spoj was defined by Ohrysippus as iSfou (which must be read in Diog. in place of xal) kviioais by Antipater as \6yQS Kar" avdKvffiv
Beltker, Anecd.
ii.

According

(Anecd. iwiyieqv) airapTi^6vTa>s 4K4)fp6iievos, i.e. a proposition in

FOUMAL LOGIC: TOE CATEGORIES.

Of greater importance is the Stoic doctrine
,

97

of the

Chap.
V.
(*)
.^'''

categories,'

In this branch of

logic, the Stoics

again

follow Aristotle, but not without deviating from

him

in three points.

Aristotle referred his categories to genes.

no higher conception regarding them severally as

whiolL the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. 'Opurfihs gives in detail what Sm/ia gives collectively (Simpl Categ. 16, (8). An imperfect 8pos is called iiroypaipri. Instead of the Aristotelian Ti ^v fTvai, the Stoics were content with the rl ^v of Antisthenes (Alex. Top. 24, m). Like Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing accurately the conceptions of words of similar meanings, X"P^. '''^pi(iis, rjSovh, ticppoffivv (Alex. Top. The relation of yevos to 96).
yeyos is f?8os is also explained defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (avoupaipeTojv
:

emoiiiidTav

which might mean

which, as integral parts of a conception, cannot be separated from it only this explanation would not agree with what follows, according to which one would more likely think of the different species Pramtl included in the genus. 422 suggests avaipopTfrSiv, p. which, however, requires exthoughts
;

(IKog. 61). Lastly, if iSe,vt. Pyrrh. ii. 213 (the previous definition of dialectic is found (as was stated on p. 73, 3), in Alcinmis Isag. 8, and he also mentions c. 5 three of the four kinds of division, instead of the fourth he gives two others), refers to the Stoics, four kinds of division are enumerated. The reference of the 8 hoApiffs mentioned by Prantl, p. 423, on the authority of BeltIter's Anecd. ii. 679 to a Stoic source is much more doubtful. There is a little that is new in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be said of what Simpl. (Categ. 100, /3 and S 101, e ; 102, ;8) quotes from Chrysippus (Trepl twv Kwrk frrdpTjtriv Xeyofxevtcv') on the subject of <rT4pn<ris and efis. Conf. JHog. vii. 190. ' See Petersen, Philos, Chrysipp. Fund. pp. 36-144, invaluable for its careful collection of
;

elSor as tJ iirh tov yivovs irepi^x^l'^'""' C-^*"?' ^^)' yeimcdraTOv is t> yevos hv yhos oix exEi' elSi/nSroToy 6 elSos %v oonf. elSos avK ?x' (.I>iog- 61 As to Sext. Pyrrh. i. 138).

planation)

Siai'peiris,

tnroSialpfais,

and

av-

(division into contradictories) nothing newis stated; but liepiff/j-hs has a special notice
TiSialpeiris

authorities, but in its attempt to build the Stoic system on the categories giving way to many capricious combinations. Trendelenbwrg, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; Pramtl, Gesch. der Logik, i. Our authorities for the 426. knowledge of the Stoic doctrine of the categories are besides a few notices on other writers principally Slmplicius, on the Categories, and Plotmm, Ennead. vi. 1, 25-30.

98

THE
class-conceptions;
V.

STOICS.
referred

Chap.

the Stoics

them

all

to

one higher conception.

categories
;

Aristotle

enumerated ten

the Stoics thought that they could do

with

four,'

which four only partially coincide with

Aristotle placed the categories
as

those of Aristotle.
side

by

side,

co-ordinate,

so

that

no

object

{a)
est

come under a second category in the same respect in which it came under the first one ^ the Stoics placed them one under the other, as subordinate, so that every preceding category is more accurately determined by the next succeeding one. mghThe highest conception of aU was apparently by
could
;

Conin-

ception

the older Stoics

declared to be the conception of

an

Being.

Since,

however,

speaking

strictly,

only

definite

Something,

what

is

material can be

said to have
refer to

any being, and

and many of our notions

incorporeal

therefore imreal objects, the conception of Something'

' The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too numerous, and endeavoured to show that they do not include every kind of expression (as if rejoined SMnplioiMS,C&teg. 5, a, this was the point at all). Compare Simpl. Categ. 5, o 15, 16, S, who quotes these as 5 objections raised by Atheno, ; ;

than by the inquiry (Phys. the various kinds of motion this inquiry being entirely based on the idea of their
less
V. 2) into

co-ordination. ' It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time speak of iv, at another of
as being the highest conception of the Stoics. The former is found in Diog. 61 y^viKdra.To^ Se ^ffrtv h yivos hv y4vos ovk. 6Xi, olov rb iv. Sen. Ep. 58, 8
t,
:

dorus and Coruutus, the former living in the time of Augustus, the latter in the reign of Nero. Observations of these writers on some of the Aristotelian
categories are given, Tbid. 47,
91,
o.
* C,

Nunc autem genus illudprimum

quEerimus, ex quo ceterse species suspensaj sunt, a quo nascitur omnis divisio, quo universa

That such was the intended position of the Aristotelian categories appears by the way in which they were introduced, no

comprehensa sunt
ing
the

after noticdistinction between

;

what

is material and what is immaterial, he proceeds quid

:

FORMAL LOGIC: TSE CATEGORIES.

was in later times put in the place of the conception
of Being. alike Chap.
V.

This indefinite Something comprehends

is

what

material and what

is

not material

in

other words, what has being and what has not being:

and the Stoics appear

to have

made

this

contrast

the basis of a real division of things.'

When

it

becomes a question, however, of formal elementary

conceptions or categories, other points are emphasised

having no connection with the division into things

material and things not material. Of this kind are the
ergo erit, ex quo hc deducantur ? illud quod est [ri iv'\ . quod est aut oorporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo
. . .
.

quibusdam videtur quid, for in rerum, inquiunt, natura qusdam sunt, qusedam non sunt examples of the latter are cen:

genus

est

primum et

antiquissi-

mum

et, ut ita dicam, generale [rh yevLKtiraTOv']. It is, however, more usual to find rl. Thus Plotin. Enn. vi. 1, 25 koivhv tX koX imX irdyroiv %v yevos Kaiifiivovai. Alex. Aphrod. Top. 155; Schol. 278, b, 20: o ^GiKviiOis %.v '6ri fjtij KaXus rh r\ ot airh (Troas yevos rod Sj'tos (t( as the genus, of which ip is a species) TiflevTac et y^prl, SriKov a\?C 4Keivoi vo'6ri KaX %v liodTii<raifTes aiirois rh hv Kara
:

taurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. Eitter,

txoiix6.TWV fi6vo>v

KeyeffBat 5ia(|>eu-

yoiev hf rb ^optiflhov Sia rovro

ykp rh

r\ yeviKclirepov

avrou

(paffiy

etvai Kar7iyopo6fiVoi/ ov Karci ffa-

ftdruv ^6vov aWet Kal a(ru)fjiartiDV. Schol. in Arist. 34, b, 11. Sesst.

Pyrrh.
X.

ii.

86

rh

rl, Sirep (f>a(riy

elvai irdprtav y^viKdirarov.

Math.
ra 5e

234

The

Stoics afiirm rSiv

e^vai fffitiiara

rivuv

to; [xiv

566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection could not have been raised, that what has not being is thus made an object of thought. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although it is not de Snitely proved by Stob. Bel. i. 390. Petersen confuses the two views, in thinking (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into Being and Not Being, subdividing Being again into what is material and what is not material. In other respects, too, he confounds the Stoic teaching with the consequences, whereby Phtinms 1. c. and Plut. Comm. Not. 30, sought to refute
iii.
it.
'

aatifMara. Sen. I.e. 13: Stoicivo-

lunt superpouere huio etiamnunc aliud genus magis princi-

See previous note and p.

92,2.

pal

primum genus Stoicis H

100

THE
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

four highest conceptions,'

all

subordinate to the

conception of Somethiing,

viz.

subject-matter or sub-

stance {to vTroKSi/isvov), property or form {to ttoiov),

variety {to Trms sxov), and variety of relation (to
TrpOS Tt
(j8)

-TTOIS

S^OV).^

Cate-

The

first

of these categories

denotes the sub-

gory of

ject-matter of things in themselves (to viroKsifievov),

the material of -which they are made, irrespective of

matter or
substance.

any and every

lies
all

quality,^ the

something which under-

definite

being,

and

which

alone

has

substantial value.^

Following Aristotle, the Stoics

rov imoKeifievov trrfiJLatySfjievov. B ; imoKeifieva fikv yhp trpuTB. rd^avres Kal r^p v\rff evravBa rwy &\\wy wpoTd^avTes. Galen. Qu. Qual. S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478 \eyovin n6vriv rijv irpiiTTjy S\riv aidtoy t &iroLov. Compare following note. It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, see p. 106, 4, that tiie Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (Petersen, 60) but contradicting as this would their belief that reality only belongs to material things,
iffTi

' The Stoics appear to have regarded them as yevM^Ton-a or vpSra yivri, rather than as cate-

Plot. 588,

gories. Conf. Simpl. Categ. 16, S (in other places as 51, /3

;

79, /3, he is speaking for himself and not of the Stoic categories) McM-c. Awel. vi. 14 Karriyopia did not suit them so
; ;

KaTiiy6prina.

well because of ^heir use of See p. 95, 1.

^ Simpl. 16, 8 : oi Sf ye SrwVKol els 4KdTToya irvffreWeiv ^^t-

ovfft
. .

rdv Tcov irp^Tojv yevwv

TTolovprat

api6fj.6y

ykp

rijv TOfiijf els

reffffapa

els

virOKeiiieva,

KOl "noia

exovra koX irpbs Ti iriiiS MxovTa. Plot. En. vi. 1, 25 Phit. Comm. Not. 44, 6. p. 1083. ' Instead of vtroiceifievov^ the Aristotelian category of being, oiffia, was substituted by some, not only without the School, but also by Posidonius, who in Stoi. Bel. i. 434 distinguishes ovaia and Troibs the change of the one and the other. Similarly his fellow-disciple Mnesarchus. * PorpTiyr. in Simpl. 12, 5 irpurdv 7) Te yvtp &irUK Baii . . .
Kal
TTiiis
:

and being mentioned by no

authority, although obviously so open to the criticism of opponents, it is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to state the belief in words. ' Simpl. 44, 5 ?oiKe Stoiik^ Tivi ffwrideit^ ffvi/e-jreadai, ouSev &\Ko ^ rh inroKeifievov elvat vopX^wf, T^s 5e irepl aiirh 8iatpophs ayvnoffTiiTous Tjyoifievos. Diog. 150. Stol. Eel. i. 322 (see below 101, 2) and 324 e<pn<re 5e i
:
:

XloffeibtStvLos rrjy

rwv

bKtav ovfflav

FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.

distinguish,' in
this

101

category of matter, between

Chap.
V.

matter in general, or universal matter, and the particular matter or material out of

which individual

things are made.

being increased or

The former alone is incapable of diminished. Far otherwise is the

This
is

material of which particular things are made.

can be increased and diminished, and, indeed,

ever

undergoing

change

so

much

so,

that the only-

feature which continues the

same during the whole

its identity, is its

term of
quality.
KoX
Kaff

its existence^

constituting

vK-riv ^-KOiov /cal &fiop(pov elvai,

iitrov

TaiSrTJs

oiiK

ael

tovto

Sianeveiif,

airoTerayfieuov ffXVI^^ ouS^ TrQidrrtTa (car' av7-f}v [fcaS' afir^r] ' ciel S' ly
iSiov ex^i
Tici irxhM-^'^^

ovSkv

&,\\a

SiaLpetffBat

Kal ffvyx^iffBai.

The same was held by Chrysippus, according to Stob. Eel. i. 432, who says Posidonius held that there were four varieties of change, those Karct Siatpeaiv, Kar' aWolaunv (water to air),
:

1^^

TroidrriTi

ejvai,

T^v ohfriav t^s SXt^j, t)}v oZtrav Katk r^v imSffTcurty^ iwimltf/iivov. <9i4pZ. Phys. 50
Staipepetf Se

rh

&iroioif

<Ta/xa
<pa<riv.

rijp

irponlffTt\v

iXilv elvai

Further par-

ticulars
'

on matter hereafter. Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12,

i(TTL

kotA ffvyxvffiv (chemical combination), Kar' avd\viriVf the latter also called riiv 4^ 3\ai'
/iCTajBoA^v.

ToirtDV S^ r^v Kar'

5itt6v

rh vTroKelfnyov ov
rris

fi6vov

KaTOL robs aTrh

<rToas

Karh robs Trpea^UTepovs. Deoeipp. See following note. ^ IHug. 150 oicrlav Se (piuTi Tuv tyrav airdvTwy t^v Kp^Ti)v iSk-i\v. So thought Zeno and Chrysippus v\7) Se iariv { ^s
oA.\a
:
:

aWoiaffiy Trepl rijv ovffiav yiyvscrfloi (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) ris Si iWas rpeis trepl rovs iroiobs \yo/i4povs Toi/s 4vl
rrjs

ovffias yiyyo[ievovs.

arcoAoiJ-

^TtSTjTTOTOuv yiyerai.

KaKe^rat 5e

Bas Si Toirois Kal rhs yeviaas T^v ykp ovaiav otfr' (Tvfi$aiveiv. . 4vl a^^eoBai o&re fieiovaOai .
.

Sixas
fih'
oi/TE

ovffia

re Kol
tj

ii\7], tJ

re twi/

Si

Twv

(5toT

Ttotuiv

(which

may

nivTuy Kal

fuv 4ir\ fiepos. ij oZv Twv h\av oihe TrKelaf iKdrrtev ylverat, ri Sk tuv
Eel.
i.

be understood, not of individual properties, but of individually determined things) olov Aiavos
Kal &e(avos, Kol av^iiffets Kal fj.eLciams yiyveaBai. (These words are

hrX fiepovs Kol irKiiav Kal iKdrrwi'.

Stob.

322:

{Ziivuvos-)

ovaiav 8e eivai t^ii rav ivrav irdvrav vpeiTTiv S\tiv, rairriv Se vSurav itSioj/ Kol oSre irKelia -yiyvofifinjv oine iKdrro), ra 5e juepj

explained by Pramtl, 432, thus qualitative determination admits increase or decrease of intensity but the use of the
;


102

THE
The second
comprises
all

STOICS.

Chap.
V.

category, that of property' or form,

those essential attributes, by means of

fidoKris,

(7) T/ie category of terms

ait,i\(ns

and

and

ras

[juei/]

iv f^^P^^ Trdtras ovffias

property or form.

indeed the whole context no less than the passage quoted from Diogenes, prove that they refer rather to the increase or diminution of substance in the
individual thing.)
fi^Vilv rijv eKdffTOu

pitp KoX 0pe(T6aL,

fiedelffas,

ra
oTs

fiev i^

avrwp

ra

Se

no6ep
Se

iirt6pra
irpiffGitrt

"TrpoirSsxo^iipas

Kal &7rei<nv apiBfiois Kol

TrA^fleffic,

TaDra
Sois,

ju?)

Siafj[.4petp,

aKK*

erepa

Sih

Kal vapa-

yiypeirdat

rats

eiprifiepais Trpo(r6-

iroi6T'rjTa ajr^

TVS yepeffeci}^
.

H-^XP'- "r^^ avaipeaeais.

/xev

raf iSiats irotuy 5i5o t^ SeicTiKO, fi6pta (individual things have two
.
.

eiri

5e

ilvai (pOfTi

component

parts,

which are

capable of change), -ri ii.h n Kara r^y t^s ovaias \nr6(no.<Tiv t!) /Se Ti Karct t^jv tov iroiov, rh yap
[ISiuS TTOlhv'] its TTOWdKiS Kiyoji^v

4^aWay^p rrjs ot}(rlas KafjLThat of this perpetually changing material it should be said /h<)t' av^6i),ipov iiewifisvop may appear fi^Te strange but the meaning is this it can only be said of an
^apoicTis.
;
:

individual thing that it increases and diminishes in so far as it remains as one and

T^u

aii^riaiv Kai ttiv fi^iuxriv hriSe-

Xeo'floi.

note.

Porphyr. See previous Dexipp. in Cat. 31, 15,

:

Speng.
SirrhVy
trrocis

oi/

ws itni rh uiroKeifievoi/ fiSfOv Kar^ robs airh rris

Kal KarciTohs irpea^vois

ciWh

repovSf ev ^61* rh \ey6fievov irpa-

rov

imoKeifiei^ov,
.

^ &Troios

SA-tj

the same subject, an iS'ms iroihp during the change but the material itself, which is ever changing, cannot be regarded as the one identical subject, of increase and dlimiuution. This idea is expanded by Alea;. ApAro. Quffist. Nat, I. 5.
; '

Seiirepoj/
fe

Se {nrokel[xevov rh

TTOibp

or
o,

"TToidrTjSf

and

also

Tfoibv

Koivws % (Siws v^iararai^

Troths (sc. \6yos').

According to

VTToKcificyov yb.p KoX 6 ')(a\Khs KoX

Simpl. 55,

many Stoics assign

i iwKpdrTjS.

44, 4,

Pint. Comm. Not. p. 1083 (the Stoics assert)

iKoffrAs iffnv viroKei-

us

5i5o Tiiiwv

fiepa,

rh fiiv ovffia, rh 5e [7rOi(J|/]. Kal rb jU6V cLcl ^ei Kal if>4peraL, /jiiir
av^6fivoy fiijre
'6\(i>s

a threefold meaning to iroidp. The first, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether
essential or accidental the tt&s ixop as well as the rroiip. In

i^eiQiifj.evoi/^

jU^t

otSu

iffrt

^tafievov,

rh Se

the second meaning

ties,

-nothp

is

SittjUeret

Kal au|civ6Tai Kol jUeiourai

used to express^e?-OTfflerei qualiincluding those which are and non-essential the (TxeVeij. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses Toils airapri^opras (KOTct r^p ^K(/)ophp) KaX 4ij.fj.6pas iipras Kar^ Sia<j>opcii' iroiohs, i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent
derivative
essential

Kal

'j:6,vra Trrftrxet

ravavriaQhriptf

(TVfinefpvKhs Kal trvvripfiofffiej/op Kal

ffvyKexvfiei'OV, Kal rTJs dia(f>opasT^

ai<r6'{i(reifi7jSafiovTrap4xoy oi^airBai,

The latter is the individual thing Itself, the former the material thereof, in reference to which Plutarch had just said
:

roi

Xiififiara

(Tvyxupovaiv oSrof,

attributes

in

their

FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.

which a
definite character is

103

impressed on matter

Chap.
V.

otherwise indeterminate.'
distinctive features. The substantive iroidTTis is only used in the last sense. ' Sim.pl. 57, 6 (the passage is fully discussed by Petersen, 85, and Trendeleiibwrg, 223)
TTjros rh
Atjtttt;!'
liri

If the definite character

the nature of the object to which they belong: rets fiiv ycip ffxe'ceij
TOLS iiTLKTfjTois KaTaffTdfTeffi xpc[KTvp^CetrBuL rhs Se e'|6is Tais i^ eavTcov ivepyelais. more limited

meaning, that of local position, is given to o-xeVis in Stob. Eel.

i.

riav ffoifjAroiV

Xeyovci

410.

Siocpop^v elj/ai Qi}alas oijk &n-oSta-

(separable,
Kal
idt6T7ira

i.e.,

from
^^^ ^^
fiiav']

matter) Ka6' eaurV, "^^'

P(Jj]/Aa

[sc.

The distinction between and (rvva<j>ii also belongs here. Only that, the oneness of which depends on an essential
Eveoffis

avoXiiyovffav

ovre

XP^^V

^^"^^

quality

is i)vujji.ivov

everything
or ix

else is either
aVTTIS T0!0UT(Jt1JTI, Kad' %V TTOLOV
Sieo'TtJTO);'.

(fvrt\ii}i,ivov

Sext.
:

In place of Petersen, 85, with the approval of Trendelenhwrg and

v((}i(rTaTai yevetris.

(also in vii. 102)

Tiay

Math. ix. 78 twx re ffufid4k

'

v6riij,a

tA

jueV iffTiv Tjvwfieya, res 5e

ffwanTOfievuv Tol.Se 4k
Tli/ufjLeira

SieffTciTajf

Prcmtl (433, 96), reads 4m6i\i).a. To me, Brandts Schol. 69, a, 32, appears to retain it with reason, the meaning being that iroi(JTT)r constitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of
conception. Non-essentialqnalities were by the Stoics excluded from the category of iroibv, and reckoned under that of viis
eX<"'-

e|e&)y
Kal

ohv effri to virb fiias KpaToifiefa, KaOdjrep tffvrol

fiev

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms 6|is and
ttokJttjtcs, or essential Gx^ffis properties, being called essential forms (ejeis or l/crtS) ; nonessential qualities being called features or varieties (irxe'ireis). See Simpl 54, y ; 55, e. In determining essential attributes, these, according to Simpt 61, (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 43), j3 are declared to be essential, not when they happeii to be perma'

(rvi/d<pia applies to f&ja chains, houses, ships, &c. ; combination 4k BieffTciirwy to flocks and armies. Seneca, Ep. 102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. Conf. Alex. Be Mixt. 143: ai/dyK-q 5e rh ev ffufia vnh fiias &s tpafftv e^ews ffvveXea'dat [1. avveSimpl. 55, e rhs yap XeffBaf]. ttohJttjtos eKTck Xeyovres oSto [of
:

^TCaiKoV\

4tr\

rWV

TJUCilfjLiVUP fiSfO^J/

iKTCt.&Tro\eiTroviTtv itrlSeTuv

KaTa

avvaip^v, oiov veois, Kal iirl rtev Karii Sidaraaiv, olov irrpaTov, /xii-

Sey elvai sKrhv )ii7]Se evplffKeo'dai TTvevpMriKdv Ti v iir' ainwv fitiSe cVa \6yoU '^xov Sxne ^m riva
virdtrraffiv 4\6etv [iias exeats.

Those e|eis which admit of no increase or diminution (eViToirij, and Syeffis) are called 8ioor permanent forms. Beffets
Virtues, for instance, which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where

nent, but when they spring from


104

TEE
STOICS.
class, it is called or, if it

Chap.
V.

be one which belongs to a group or

a

common

quality

Koiv&i

-irocov

be some-

thing peculiar and distinctive, it

quality
IhCtos ttolov.^

is

called a distinctive

Properties therefore combined

with matter constitute the special materials out of

which individual things are made;^ and quality in

this combination (Trotov), corresponds, as Trendelen-

burg has well

Aristotle.*

shown,' with the form

{ethos)

of

It

may, in

fact, like that,

be described
ojs /jLovffiK^

they exist at all, are SioflEcreis, but arts are only ?|6ij. Simpl. Categ. 61, 3 72, 5 ; 73, /3 Sohol.
;
;

avrcLs -KQiay afielyous, fiouirMov, K.r.\.

its

They also distinguish between a thing and

oiiiria.

in Arist. 70, b, 28; 76, a, 12, 24 ; StoT). Eel. ii. 98 and 128. Conf. Petersen, 91. A different

Stob. Eel.

i.

436

fiii

elvai Tc

ravrhv t6 ri
ouciay ^1 ^s
fi'fiS'

iroibv l^lws

KoX

TTij/

^(TTi

rovro, ju^

view was takfen by Aristotle

of the relations of these expressions.
' SyrioM. on Arist. Metaph. 21 p. 90 in Petersen: koI ot StmikoI Se Tovs Koivoijs ^otovs vph Tav IZiwv
,

IxevTOi

ye

erepov,

aWa /xdvov

ov Tavrhy, Sik rh
TTjs oiifflas Kol

T^irov,

TO

5'

kclI ^4pos elvat Tbv at/rhv e-n-e'xeii' eVepa rivuv \ey6fieya

detv Kai TSncft Kex^pfo'dai xoi jU^S'

ii4pei Seapt'ia'Bai. Conf. Sea^. Pyrrh. iii. 170 ; Math. ix. 336 at 5f ^tatKol olJTe erepov tov b\ov rh fiepos o^re rh avT6 tpaaiv vTrapX^iy and Seneca, Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus, a fellow disciple of Posidonius, accordingly compares the relation of an individual thing to its (ouo-io) with that of a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the iSdos iroibs distinguishes a thing from every other, there follows as a matter of course, what is asserted circumstantially and in detail by Chrysippus (in PMla, Incorrupt. M. 951, B), Sn Suo eiSoiroioiis [ = iSwi iroioij] tjrl T^s ouT^s QVffias ont.i\-)(avov ffutTT^:

TToiav airoTlBevTai.
;

Sfob. Eel.
2.
iSfcus

i.

434 see above p. 101, De An. 61, a, explains

Simpl.
Toibs
vii.

by
138
'

ctTo^tu^ei'
;

etSos.

Diog.
3.

Phit. 0. Not. 36,

Besides the passages already

quoted in note 2 on p. 101, from

Plutarch and Stobseus, see Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57 tol Ktpvdfifva (the intermingling materials, the question here is the possibility of mingling) e'f oiirias kh! iroiori}Tuv irvyKuaBal <l>atriv. Porphyry in Simpl. Categ. 12, S
:

this view himself. therefore, clearly distinguish e{r, or essential form, from the subject to which

contests

The

Stoics,

it

belongs

and Philo must

have been following the Stoics when he said (Nom. Mutat. ejeis yitp rav /for' 1063, D)
:

vai.
' *

L.

c.

222.

This

may be seen from the

FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.

as the active

105

and

efficient part of a thing.' Aristotle's

Chap.
V.

form, however, expresses only the non-material side

of a thing, whereas quality
as something material
is

regarded by the Stoics

in

fact, as

an
is

air-current.^

Hence the mode

reside in matter

in
is

which a quality

conceived to

that of an intermingling of eleapplies of

ments.'

The same theory of intermingling

course to the union of several properties in one and

the same matter,* and likewise to the combination of

passages quoted in note 2 on the previous page. Pha. St. Rep. 43, 4, p. 1054 r^v }i\T\v ap')hy 4^ eavTTJs Koi
'

iy To7s Trepl e^twp o^Stv

e'leis

&\\o ris

ir\^v &pas ehai tftijaiv' inrh rovTotv yctp tru^exeTat refc (rtj^fiara,
Kal 70V TTOihv iKaffrov
6 ffvv4xt^v
a-fip

eli/ai

aXriOS

a.Kiv7iT(yy itiroK&ifTdanaisiroiSTijiTiv

effTiv,

hv ffKKiip6^

airotpaivovatj
infeiifj.aTa

rks

5c

Trot6T7yras

oVtras Kal t6vovs aepct^4fie(ri

TTjTa i^kv 4v (nZiip(^, TrvKfirriTa S' iv \i8tp, \evK6TTiTa S' 4v apyvpcfi

5eis ots

Uv iyyevtovrat

ttjs

Ka\ov<nv.

UA-t/s eiSoTTotelv

eKaffra Kal

ffxn]fia.-

It is a carrying out of the Stoic teaching (as Simpl.

Ti(fLV.

Simpl. 69, 7: n tSsv ^TULKuv StJ^a KeyovTuv, (rdfAara dlj/at ri (rx'tlfiara Sxrirep ra &\\a

remarks) for Plotinus to reduce -noihiis to the classconception of Sivafus (Enn. vi.
57,
e,

Ibid. 67, e ; 56, S : vas 5e Kal TTPeu/xariK^ r) ovffia eaTai tuv

TToii.

atufiariKwy irotoriircav
'

aitov rou

irue^ifiaTos (rvvBerov ivros, k.t.\.

But the Stoic 1, 10, 574, P). definition of Svvafiis (quoted by Si/nvpl, 58, a ^ TrKiUvuv iirotariK^ ffv/jLTTTQifitirav, with the additional words KaX KaraKparodaa ruv iyepyeLuii/ does not directly ITokJttjs may refer to iroi6rTjs. also be connected with the Aoyos (TirepjuaTi/cds. See Plotin.

An. 143, AleoB. Aplvr. irws Se <xta^6vTwv eVri ttiv irepl

:rp6\'r]>iitv

De

Kpdaews KOtv^v
Kal

rh Keyetv
avr^jv
(t>VTOts

T^y

e|ii/

TOW exovatu

fj-efiixdat

KoX 7i]V (f>iffiPTo7s

Kal rh ^U)S
Tip

T^

aepi Kal Ti]y ^vx'h^

aiiiiaTi.

Ibid.

144,

a,

the

saying
Stoics
et6v.
*
:

is

quoted against the fisfux^at rf vKy rhy

:

ci 8e rh. iroio S\-i\v 29, 593, votav Keyoiey^ irpurov fjikv ol \6yoi auToTs em\ot aW' oiiK iv ii\ri
i.

Plut. C. Not. 36, 3 civ ovToi Kal Tr\drTovtTiy

K4yoviirl fiias

yevifievoL frvvBeTov Ti
. .
.

TtoiT\troii(Ti.v

ovHas Bio

Wiais yei/4(r6at Troiovs

ovK &pa avTol etSn oiSi \6yoi.

vii.

Diog.

148

tan

ii <piats ef is

(this follows from their hypothesis, but it is distinctly denied

7roi(iT7)s] ^1 avTrjs KiVOvpLivi), [ KaTcb ffTTfptiaTiKOv^ \6yovs airoTe-

by Chrysippus in
p. 104, 2) Kal
iroihviSius

hovai Te KaX awix"'""''

niir^s, K.T.\.
2
:

^5

thesis. See T^v aiiT^v ovffiav eva exovaaf 4vt6v7os erepov

SeX^'''^^^ '^^^ Siaxpuh&TTtiif dftoias

Plut. Ibid. 2 (Xpiamnos')

afMporepovs.

; ;

IOC

THE
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

several attributes to produce a single conception of

quality.'

In

all cases

the relation
is

is

supposed to be

a materialistic one, and

explained by the doctrine

of the mutual interpenetration of material things.^

This explanation, indeed, could not apply to every

Unable to dispense entirely with things not material,^ the Stoics were obliged to admit
kind of attributes.
the existence of attributes belonging to immaterial
things, these attributes being, of course, themselves

not material.*
:

What

idea they formed to themselves

said to be material and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject-matter and in every other property belonging to the same subject-matter it follows that this relation can
;

5e

' Simpl. 70, e koI oi StcoikoI TroUTTyras noioTt]T(av iroiovtrLv

tavTuv
e|eis

(?

[1.

iKT&v) iroiovvres cktols 6KTO Koi e|efs or e|ets

The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given above. The conception of a property is comonly].

pounded of several

attributes,

and, therefore, a property of several subordinate properties. If hevKhv is a xp^M* ^^^ ^^"" KpiTiKiv t^fus is the e|is, or form
of \iVKbv.

only be explained by supposing a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and

with their subject-matter.

' The proof of this will be given subsequently. Meantime compare the remarks, p. 92, 2 94, 1 on the \^kt6v.
*

This follows of necessity, independently of the above quoted language of Alexander, from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of B'or if that intermaterials. mingling of materials in which each one retains its properties
^

quite

Simpl. 56,

S,

and, 54,

(3

oi

Se 'Ztu'CkoX
^arirc^s,

rwf fikv awfidrwy ffoirap Se aaufidrav aatcixd-

(juifis

and

Kpaffis in

contrast to
icapdei(ns

chemical combination

defined to be the complete interpenetration of one material by another, without passing into a third i. (^Stoi. Eel. 376; Alex. De Mixt. 142, a Plut. C. Not. 37, 2) ; if, moreover, properties are

and

ffiiyxyc's')

is

Tovs elyai \4you(rt ras TroiiTTjras. Only the ffaifiariKol tokJttjtes are TrveinaTu, see p. 105, 2 ; incorporeal properties are called IktS, to distinguish them from e|6 (essential forms). Dexipp. in Cat. 61, 17, Speng.: eaviidfa Si Twv "SirmKuv X'^P^C^^'^^*' "^^^
e|eis airh rSav
IJiil

eKTWv

iurtifiara

yap

irapaSix^iievoi Kaff eavTh, Srav

fi ^irl

ipefrx^^eii/ Sedv
SioX'^i)(eis

ris roiairas

epxovrai.

But this use

of terms appears not to have

FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.

of these incorporeal attributes,

107

when

reality

was conit is,

Chap.
'

sidered to belong only to things corporeal,

course, impossible for us tq determine.'

of

The two remaining categories include everything which may be excluded from the conception of a
thing on the ground of being either non-essential or

(5)

The

^fi-^'etl
""/^

accidental.

ITT

In so

far as

such things belong to the

11;

,1

-,

variety nf
relation.

object taken by itself alone, they

category of variety
to
it,

{ttcos %oi/)

come under the but when they belong

(yrpo9

because of

its

relation to something else, they

come under the category of variety of relation

Ti TTtos s%ov).
ties,

Variety includes

all

accidental quali-

which can be assigned to any object indepenits

dently of

relation to any other object.^

Size,

colour, place, time, action, passion, possession,

mo-

tion, state, in short, all the Aristotelian categories,

with the exception of substance, whenever they apply

to

an object independently of

its relation to
(ttci)?

other
e%ov).

objects, belong to the category of variety'

beenuniversalamong the Stoics (Simpl. Categ. 54, 7), with

whom

different views prevailed tlie extent of the conception of 4kt6i>. According to

(rutj.d'Tuv erepas Se iirt toiv atrufnaTov aSrij i^etrrriKs. ^ Simpl. 44, S: b Se ttji'

touching

ar6.(nv koI t^v Kdditrti/ fii] irpoffvoiovp.evof (including sc. rois

oSo-ic) eoiite 'StusU^ tiki a-vvriOela

this passage it

was Antipater

who wished
e/CTO,

the

to include under nvjorTiiiaTa KOivh

nweTrfaBai
{nroKel/isyoi'
Trepl

ovSiv

&K\o

1j

t!i

(Ta^iiToiv Kol affwp.6,Tt>iv.

ris Se avrh Stmpophs ayvTroaraTovs

^ivcu vofiiQav,
lis
iriij exovra, outoc iv rots viroKeifieyois iriis

Conf. Simpl. 57, e, who after giving the definition of quality, quoted p. 103, 1, con'

iiyoifievos Kal

airoxaKuv
'

ex""'^'^ ""'^^

toSto rh

exeiy.

tmues

iy Si Toirois, ft

fii)

oX6v

Tc Korh rhv ixeivaiv \6yov Koivlv fivat ffifiirrafia ffufidruiv re koX

aaaiiirav, oiiKert effrat yhos fi TroKJTTjs, 4^^' ^repais /liv inl ruv

Dexipp. in Cat. 41, 20, Speng. ei Se tij eij t!) iris %xov
.

ffvyrdrroi

ras
1,

trKearras

Karii-

yoplas, Sffirep oJ Sraii/col iroiovffiv.

Plotin.

vi.

30, 594,

iraJs

Si

1C8
Chap.
V.

THB
On
are purely relative

STOICS.

the other hand, those features and states which

and fatherhood, &c.

from which

such as right and come under the

;

left,

sonship

category of
a category

variety of relation {irpos rl ttws sxov)

the simple notion of relation (jirpos rl)

must be

distinguished.

Simple relation

{-rrpos tI) is

not spoken of as a distinct category, since

it

includes

not only accidental relations, but also those essential

properties (ttokz) which presuppose a definite rela-

tion

to

something elsesuch as knowledge and

perception.*
ev Th
TTihs

^x^> iroWrjs Btatpopas

oijffiis
;

^v

avTots

ttws

yhp

rh

Tpi-JTTI^V

Kal T^ \evKhu 6tS tv [y4vos Bereov'], rov fiev ttouov tov

;

Simpl 42, e ot Si StidikoI fvhs yepovs Svo Kara rhv t6TQV TOVTOV apidfiOVVTOl, TBL fiCV y T0is'jrp6s Ti TLdevres, Tct 8' ey toTj
'
:

iivff

Se TTOiov liyros
KoX

ttws

5e

tI

ttotc
irits

vp6s ri
Trp6s

irojs

^xovo't,

koI

t^

/iev

nov irSts 5e exovra rh x^*s '^^ '^^ rh 4v AvKelip Kol ec

rh
;

'6\tiis

Ti avriSiatpout/res rots Koff

trepvffi

Kal

aina,
01

to 5e

irpcis

irois

eX"'"'''*
j8
:

^AKaSriyiif;

Tols Kara. Statpitpdv,

KaTct

(Ibid. 44,
TTliffTlS

Kal

'6\us
; .

TrSbs
.

Se

-xp^vos iris
irSis

StwVkoI l/O^t^outn
Siafpop^v
Tcfc

TT}S

^X^ ^Xoy
1x01/
^irl

ri Se
Kl
*5

Troietv

iris
ir&is

iStdrrjTOs

ainjX-

irdffxoy

ov

.iffwsB^

h.v fi6vovapiJi6iTt
Trits

^X^ '^"^ ^'^^ TOW ^X^^^ ^^^ ^^ ''"*'" exeiv ov irdjs fXof kA.A.4 eX""- Simpl. Oateg. 94, The Stoics included ex^'>'
' :

TOV

Heiffdai

rh

Kp6s rl ircijs ^x*"''^"') Sweet and bitter belong to to sp6s Ti to the other class belong
\6.xQo.i

Se^ihs, irar^p, &c.,

5 ^afft

TO.

KdTa dta(f>opau Kard Ti elBos x^P^'^'

under

Tris ^X""S,

^ saying as

TTipi^d/ieva.

Every

Kafl'

out!) is

Simpl. 16,

does that the Stoics

omitted
it

time, and place, must be meant that they did

iroahv,

also kutA Sia</>opdK (determined as to quality), and every irp6s rl iras ex"" is also a Trpis Ti, but not conversely. Conf. 43, /3. ft
KeyS/j-eva^
5o"a
KttT'

not treat these conceptions as separate categories. What they did with them Simpl. explains 1. c. 61 yhp rh TT^s ^X^** voiti^ovaiv
roiavra Trepihafj-^dveiif. Trendelenbwg, 229,withjustice, observes that, wherever the species-forming difference lies in iroffhv as in mathematical conceptions, there woahv comes
avTQts
Tct

Si Set ffatpeffrepoy fjLera\afieiy rcL Trpds ri fiiv Xiyovffiv

oiKeior x-P'^'^^P^ ^'""
KeifievA (or,
TTtos

anoyevei irphs frepov

according to the definition in Sext. Math. viii. 454 irp6s

:

Ti ^o'Ti

rh

Trpbs ereptp yooifievov'),

irpds Ti 5e irus

exovfa
}ii]

bira TreipvKe

fTVfi^aiveiv rivl kal

avfi^aivetv

under

ttoi6i'.

&vev T^s wepi ouret fiera^oKris Kal &\Koiiiffeus jUETct ToD TTphs rh iKrhs

FORMAL LOGIC: THE CATEGORIES.

The relation of these four categories to one another
is

109

Chap.
V.
(f)
^'''''-

such, that each preceding category

is

included in
it

the one next following, and receives from

definite character.'

a more

Substance never occurs in reality

categories
*" ""^

without property, but has always some definite quality

to give it a character.
is

another.

On

the other hand, property

never met with alone, but always in connection

with

some

subject-matter.^

Variety presupposes

some

definite substance,

and variety of relation supIt will hereafter

poses the existence of variety.'

ojrojSXeiretv,

be

Sffre

^av

jttey

kotA
tffrai,

Bia(l>opdv T( BiaKeifxevov irphs

Vk{)ffriy

erepov
Koi

vp6s Ti ^6vov rouTO

e^ts
'

&s

71

Ka\

71

iTria'T'tiiJ.rj

7]

aiffSTjcris

iyovffai/

Sia(f)ophp

Srav Se fi^ Kara riji/ Karh i/ziA^l/ Se

'

tJjc irphs
'iTp6s

Ti TTws

erepoy (rx^(^tv deoipTiTat, exayra earai S yhp

the addition of a fresh determination a better name for the second category would be {moKei^iva iroii- for the third, iixoKeifleya Trotd irus exoyra for the fourth, inroKeifieya Troii Trp6s tI ttws exocTtt. In support of this, he refers to Simpl. 43, a
; ' :

vihs Kal 6 5e|iis

SetJcTOi, TTphs

^aOev Tiywv

irpoff'

TTJV v7r6ffTafTLV
ytyofjL4v7]S

5tb

KoL

(i7\Bepiia.s

irepl aifrct,

fieTa$o\7Js y^voLr' hy 0VK4ri iror^p, Tov vtov a'iroday6yTOSj 6 Se Se|tis

rb (TvySeTa noieTyrAyeyri eKirporepuy Tiy&y Kal SeuTepcuy a>s t6 T^p6s rt iK TTotoO Kal 70V 7rp6s ri. Plut. C. Not. 44, 6 rerrapd ye iroiouffiy
eirerai Se avrols KaKelyo 6.tottov
:

rod
Se

irapaKeifjLevov fjLeraartiyTos
oiiK

'

rh

mrOKiifliva Trepl iKaffToy,

piaWov

hv aWoia yivoLTO el /x^ ffvufxera^dWot koIti irepl avTo, Siyafus. In this sense, therefore, 7rp6s ti belongs to Troihy, being composed (as Sim^l.

yKvKv naX nmpby

Plot. droiros v 593, Siaipeats iyBarepCfiTuy eiSwy t6 erepoy Tideiffa, Hairephy [elfj riy
7}/j.wy.

Se Terrapa eKa'jroy
vi. 1, 29,
.

Bnn.

Siaipwy TTjy

^Tri(rri]p.7]y

43, o, says) of Troihv

and

7rp6s ti.

ypafifiaTiK^v Kiyoi,

On the other hand, wp6s rl irws exo" only expresses, to quote Seriart, an accidental relation. PrcmtVs quotation (I. 437, 108)
from Simpl.
Stoics.
Trendeleribwg, 220, considers that these genera are in so far subordinate to one another, that the previous one

TLK^v Kal &\\o Tt

r^y fiky r^y Se ypafinaif iTotd are to

be

Bat) ttoiA,

of 8Ar|
2
'

and

eTSos or \6yos.

they are composed See

p. 48, 2.

44,

;8,

we have no

special reason to refer to the

See p. 103, 1. See p. 107, 2 Plotin. vi. 1, 30 "Why are iris exoyro enumerated as a third category,
;
:

since Trdyra
ixovTo.
;

irepl

rijy vKrjy

irtDs

continues in the next, but with

the Stqics would probably say that 7rai& are irepl TTjy u\7iy Triis ^xoyra, whereas the

110

THE
seen

STOICS.

Chap.
V.

how

closely these deductions, and, indeed, the

whole doctrine of the categories, depend on the metaphysical peculiarities of the Stoic system.

(3)

CoTii-

Passing from incomplete to complete utterance,

jilete ut-

we come,
tions,' all

in the first place, to sentences or proposi-

terance. (a) Jutlgvient.

the various kinds of which, as they

may

be

deduced from the different forms of syntax, were enu-

merated by the Stoics with the greatest precision.^ Detailed information is, however, only forthcoming
in reference to

the theory of judgment (a^lcofia),

which certainly occupied the greatest and most important place in their speculations.
a perfect utterance, which
Triis

judgment

is

is

either true or false.'

i!

exovTo, in the strict sense of the term, are irepl tA iroia. Yet since the woict themselves are nothing more than SAtj ttws %%'>'""'> ^11 categories must be ultimately reduced to liKi).

efi())Epijs

Po'm6\os

by Sextus

called n\eiov fl a^taiia), Ammon. in Waitz, Arist. Orig. i. 43, speaks of ten forms of senteijces

Prantl, Gesoh. d. Logik, i. 440-467. 2 In Diog. 66 Sext. Math, viii. 70; Ammon. De Interp. 4,
'
;

held by the Stoics, mentioning, however, only two, irpoaTaKTMis and e^KTUids (so reads the MS.
"Waitz suggests 4(piKriKds,

more

a (Schol. in Arist.
20)
;

93, a Sim.pl. Cat. 103, o

;

22, b,

probably it is cvktikos). Diog. mentions treatises of 191, Chrysippus on interrogatory

Boith.

De

Interp. 315 Cramer, Kneci. Oxon. iii. 267, conf. I. 104, a distinction is drawn between at^tafM (a judgment), ip(iTr]ii.a (a direct question, requiring Yes or No), TtiffjM (an Inquiry), irpoffTaKTLKdy, dpKLiiiy, apariKdv (wishes), (VKTiKhv (a piayer), iiroSetiKhv (a supposition), eK9tik6v(qs 4KKiiT6Q} svdeia ypttfifi^'), irpoirayopevTiK^v (an address),
6av^.aaTiK6v,
^^KTiichv,
hrairoprj-

and hortatory sentences. On the relation of an oath to df lu/^a light is thrown by Simpl. 1. c, also by Chrysippus' distinction
between
h.KT\QopKeiv and ^vopKiiu ^^vSopxeiy and iiriopKe^v in Stoi. Floril. 28, 15. ' JHog. 65 a^lmfia Si effriv 3 itrjiv a\Tj9esfi ^evBos. Questions
:

and other similar sentences are

neither true nor false (Ibid. 66

TiKdv, afjyqytj^TtKiiv (explanatory

and 68). This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to, see p. 83, 2, by Simpl. Cat.
do. Tuso. i. 7, 14 De Tato, 10, 20 Gell N. A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in Arist. 93, b, 35.
103, o
; ; ;

statements),

'6p.otoy

afn^fiari

(a

judgment with something appended,

as
:

&s

Upia/iiSriinv

;;

. ;

FORMAL LOaiC: JUDGMENT.

Judgments are divided into two
classes
:

ViV

simple
a simple
is

Chap.
'

judgments, and composite judgments.'

By

judgment the

Stoics understood a

judgment which

purely categorical.^

Under the head

of composite

judgments are comprised hypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and causal judgments.^

In the case of simple judgments, a greater

is

(n) Simple
'" '^'^"^
'

or less definiteness of expression

substituted by the

Stoics in the place of the ordinary difference in re-

spect of quantity

s"*

and with regard

(Schol.
aivo-

to quality, they

The purport
h^yos
8,

of the expression

aTro<pavrLK6s,

T^KTiv
;

(pavriv (in Dioff.

65

Gfell.

xvi.
4,

Amman. De
Math

Interp.

Sohol. in Arist. 93, b, 20) is the

same.
I

Seiet.

viii.

93

t&v

yap

a^tw[j.aT<aj/ TrpaTriv (TxeSiy Kal

KupitordTTiv iKtpepovffi Sicupopaf ot

Kafl' ^y rd li-^v iffriv avTuv airKa ret 5' ovx airAa. IMd. 95 and 108. Diog. 68 gives the

Bta\eiiTiKol

definitions of both. ^ Sext. 1. c., by whom Biog. must be corrected, see p. 113, 3.
^

Diog. 69

iv Se rols

ovx

atrKots Th ffvvriy^^hov koX

avvTififievov Kal

rh napa-

rb ffvinreirXeyfievoi^

Kal rh alriwdes Kal rb SieCevyf/.eyov Kal rb Biaffaipovv -rb iui.K\op Kal

in Arist. 44, a, 9 Prantl, 446, says this passage is not quite correct ; it only implies that the term a-vfm-XoKi] was confined to a copulative judgment); for the aiViSSej, which is characterised by a SiiiTi, and therefore is not identical with the TTapa(rutfT]fj.^vov, Diog. 72 and 74; for the 5ia(TOfpovv r^ ^a\}\ov and the Sioeraipovv tA ^ttov, Diog. 72 ; conf Crcumer, Anecd. Oxon. i. 188 Apollon. Synt. (iJcAier's Anecd. ii.), 481. These are only some of the principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million

rb ^ttov. Further details presently respecting the rb

Siacra(j>ovii
(rvvriiJLii.hov

and

Ste^evyjiivov.

the

i!apa<rvvr\iJiiihov

a
;

For

combinations might be formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus, however, proved that only
103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative judgments could be formed with that material (Pint. Sto. Eep. 29, 5, p. 1047; Qu.

tional sentence, the first

condipart of

which

is

introduced by

eVeiS);

see Diog. 71 and 74 for the characthe (rvfiireTrKeyfLevov, teristic of which is the Kal and Sext. Math, Kal, see Diog. 72 viii. 124 Gell. N. A. xvi. 8 and 9 Ps. Galen, EiVay. SioK. 13 Dexipp. in Cat. 27, 3, Speng.
; ; ;

Symp. viii. < There

9, 3, 11, p.

732).

is

division of general and particular. Instead of that, Sext. (Math. viii. 96) distinguishes oipiff/neVa as oStos

no notice of a judgments into

112

THE
not only

STOICS.

Chap.
V.

make

a distinction between afErmative and

negative judgments,' but, following the various forms

of language, they speak of judgments of general

and judgments of double negation.^ Only affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory relation to one another all other judgments stand to each other in the relation of cojitraries.' Of two proposiof
particular

negation, judgments

negation,

Kd6ir]rai,

aSpiffra as

rh

KddTjrai,
KtiBr/Tai,

and

fieira

as &v6p(onos

the subject stood in the nominative,

^coKpdTTJS irepliraTeL.

When

were called TrarayopevQBwg. 70) the others kuthiyopiKti a KarayopevTiKbv is ovtos TrepnraTeT* a kaivqyopiKiv, Aicay
ojptfjfi4va

a contrary fvavTiirns, putting both under the class conception of avrmeilieva. The Stoics reserved avrLKfl/ieva -for contradictories
dictory ayritpcuns,
(^Simpl. Cat. 102, S

TiKo

and

102,

C,

'

TreptiraTel.
'

An

was called
tive

affiimative judgment Kara^aTiKiv, a nega-

a Stoic discussion intended to show that the conception of ivavTiov is not applicable to negative sentences and conceptions), which is after all a difference in terminology. ''Eva.vrlov they also call

a7ro</>oTiKiJv,

by Chrysippus

only

in the fragment about to be quoted, and Simpl. Cat. 102, 8,

Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. 266, Oud. renders these terms by de-

{Apolhn. Synt. 484, Otherwise, following Aristotle, they distinguished

liaxififvov

Bekk.).

dicativa and abdicativa. For the manner in which they expressed negative sentences, see
Interp. 373 ; Schol. in Arist. 120. ^ Biog. 69 gives an example of apvTjTiKdVj ovSels irepitrarei * one of particular negation,
JBoith.
ffTepTyriKov

between

De

a(i}i?ijiv9pwn6s

etrriv

OVTOS

one of double negation,

inrepaTTOcpaTtKbl'

as,

ovxl

7ifi4pa

ovK iarl.
' Seait. Math. viii. 89 ; Mot/. 73 : avTiKeiiifva are Sc t^ eVepov iffrltf anro'tiaTlKij' Tov irepov or (according to' the outward treatment of these determinations) aTrO(/)({ffl -TrKeoyAC^l as. It is day, and It is not day. Aristotle called such a contra-

are in plain and immediate contrast, such as ipp6vriais and a<pp6vrnTis iyavrlus ^xoyra are those which are only contrasted by means of the ^mvrla, such as (j>p6vLfios and &tppa)y (Simpl. Categ. 98, 7). The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete notions. That every negative

ixov which

ivavTiov tvavrla are

and

iyavrltos

conceptions

judgment has an affirmative judgment opposed to it is elaborately proved by a series of quotations from poets, each one of which is four times repeated in the fragment wep! oiro{pariKiSv first

edited hyZetronne-

(Fragments in6dits,Paxis, 1838),

FORMAL LOGIC: JUDGMENT.

tions

113

which are related

rule,

as contradictories, according

Chap.
V.

to the old
false.

one must be true and the other

Among

composite judgments the most impor-

tant are the hypothetical and the disjunctive.

As
is

(^) Com,posite

judgments.

regards the latter, next to no information has reached

us.^

hypothetical

judgment

(crvvrjiiiisvov)

judgment
and
effect

consisting of two clauses, connected by the

'

conjunction
;

if,'

and related

to one another as cause

the former being called the leading

{fjiyovfievov),

and the

latter the

concluding or inferen-

tial clause {Xrj<yov).^

In the correctness of the infer-

ence the truth of a hypothetical judgment consists.

and subsequently emended, explained, and with a great degree of probability referred to Chrysippus by Bergk (De Chrysippi libro ir/>l airocpaTiKai/, Cassel, 1841, Gymn. progr.). In explaining the fragment Pi'antl, Gesoh. d. Log. I. 451 appears to have hit the truth in one point, where Bergk
'

' Divg. 71 ; Seast. Math. 109 ; Qalen, De Simpl. Medicamen. ii. 16, vol. xi. 499 ; Ps. Galen,

EiVa-y. Sio\. p. 15.

The

Stoics

is

not

satisfied.
;

Cic. Simpl. Categ. 103, /3 De Fato, 16, 37 ; N. De. i. 25, Further particulars above 70. p. 83, 2; 110, 3. " Viz. that the members of a disjunction, as well as their contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (adversa or pugnantia), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of these con-

distinguish most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary formal punctiliousness, the case in which the leading clause is identical with the inferential clause (ei ri/ifpa iarXv, vnepa eirrij') and the case in which it is different (el
riiiepa
iffrlv,

ipSs

ea-riv).

Con-

ditional sentences of the first kind are called iupopoiiuva

ffui-ri/i/ici/a.

Sext.

viii.
ii.

294; and 466; Pyrrh.

281 112;
;

conf. viii. 95; Diog. 68.

That

in all these passages Sujiopoifievov must be read, and not

Suupopoifiemv, appears according

ditions is false
vov).

(iropoSiefeiry^tte-

to ProMtVs (p. 445, 122) very true observation from the remarks of Alex. Top. 7, a Anal.
;

Sext.

N. A. xvi. Pyrrh. ii. 191

Gell.
7, b.

8,
;

12 Alex.

Pr. 7, b,
yifffioi.

on

Supopoinivoi

avWo-

Anal. Pr.

114

THE
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

As to the conditions upon which the accuracy of an

inference
rests, different

opinions were entertained

itself.'

within the Btoic School

'

In as

far as the

Sext.
fxej/

KOttiws

Math. viii. 112 ydp ^oativ &jrq.vm oi

AiaA.KTiKoi vyies eivai ffvpijfifievoVf Srtiy aKo\ot;0^ t^ ev avT^ ryyoufi,4vcf)

rh iy uiiT^ X^yoif.

irepl

Se

But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been {Diog. vii. 81), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences may be right, not that they

must be
aW'fiKovs Kal p-ax^fi-^va Trfs ttKoXovBias iKriBevrai Kpiriipta.
^ovtTi Trp6s

right.

ipso,

do. Acad. ii. 47, 143 In hoc quod in elementis dialec:

tici dooent,

quomodo judicare
:

oporteat, rerum f alsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut hoc Si dies est, lucet ; quanta conteutio est aliter Diodoro aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet.
I

(The further remarks on the points of difference between

Chrysippus and Cleanthes have no reference to hypothetical judgments.) The Philo here alluded to ^the same Philo

against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (^Diog. vii. 191 and 194), the well-known dialectician, and pupil of Diodorus had declared all conditional sentences to be right in which a false inferential clause is not drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view, conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause (jSteiKi. 1. u. viii. 245 and 449 Pyrrh. ii. 110). According to Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 104, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance among the Stoics, perhaps through ZenOjf or whose coimection with Philo see Diog. vii. 16.

Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of conditional sentences by the connection of their clauses, either requiring, for a conditional sentence to be right, that the contradictory opposite (ivTiviiiiivov') of the inferential clause should be irreconcileable with the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be potentially (Suvei/icj) contained in the leading clause (^Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 111). The first of these requirements, which is mentioned by IHog. 73 as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who accordingly refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case to be expressed hypothetically ( Cio. DeFato, 6, 12 8, 15) it was not right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur but, Nonet natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari morietur. It may be observed, in connection with the enquiry into the accuracy of conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion's life it
:

FORMAL LOGIC: JUDGMENT.

leading clause states something, from the existence of which an inference may be drawn as to the statement
in the concluding clause,
it is also called

115

Chap.
V.

an indica-

tion or suggestive sign.^

The modality

of judgments, which engaged the

(7)

-Hfo-

attention of Aristotle and his immediate pupils so

judgnietts.

much, was likewise treated by the

able' length
;

Stoics at consider-

but, from the sphere of these enquiries,

so

much

only is

known

to us as relates to possible and

chiefly of

necessary judgments,-

being the outcome

the contest between Chrysippus and the Megarian

Diodorus.^
It is in itself of

no great value.
'

Great

will cease

to

be true.

Such
is

Diodorus
is,

sentences were called cLirepiypi^wy fieTairiiTTovTaf because the time could not be previously
fixed false

Only what

or

possible.

had said that what will be, The Stoics, and

when they would become

{Slmpl.

Phys.

305,

a).

in particular Chrysippus, define Swarhii as what is capable of being true (rh ^mSeKriKhv rov
a\ri9hs efj/ai), if

Chrysippus also wrote on thcMcTairETTTOra, according to Dionys. Oomp. Verb. p. 72 Schaf er. Diog. vii. 105, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, characterising them, however, as
spurious.
' According to Seait. Pyrrh. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156, the Stoics distinguished be-

circumstances
;

'ctSivarov as 6 4(niv itriSeKTiKhp rod oi.\Tj6is thai. From the Swariv they distinguish the ovk ivayxatov,
fi'fj

do not prevent

which

is defined as t xa) a\iriB4s 4aTi Kol ^evSos oT6v re etvai ruv

ii.

tween
of

(TTifieia

virofjivria'riKa

artiieiahSeiitTiKi.

the latter
(or

and The definition was ivismTucbv

Ka6ri-

ixrhs fiT^Sev ivayriovfiivuif (^Phit. Sto. Eep. 46, p. 1055 Biog. 75 Boeth. De Interp. 374, Bas. The same thing is also stated in Aleas. Aphr. De Fato, c. 10,
; ;

p.

30.

SuyaTbi/

efvai

yev4ff9ai

a^lufia ev iryieT

(rvyrififievcft

rovTO

S' uir'

oh^Gvhs KoiX^sra lyeyc'

yoificpov

TrpoKoBnyoiiievov')
'

iKKaKimr iKhv rod \-fiyoVTos the vytes (Tui'Tj^juevoi/ being a sentence with both the leading and inferential

Pyrrh.
viii.

ii.

clauses true. Sext. 101 106 ; 115 ; Math.

;

a&ai Khv fiii yevTjTai.') On the other hand, ivayxmoi' is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or owing to other circumstances.

IHog.

and

JBoeth.

There was
definition of

249.

probably anothe

116

TRE
V.

STOICS.
it

Chap.

value was, nevertheless, attached to

by the Stoics,

in the hope thereby to escape the difficulties necessarily resulting

necessity.'

from their views on freedom and

illation,^ to

(J) Inference.

In their theory of

which the Stoics

attached special value, and on which they greatly

prided themselves,' chief attention was paid to hypothetical

and disjunctive

inferences.*

In regard to

these forms of inference, the rules they laid

well

down are

known;" and from these forms they invariably

took their examples, even when treating of inference

ovK hvayKaiov, as 6 if/euSof ot6v re eivat Tav ^Krhs fiij 4pavTiovfi4yoftf so that it might be said (Boeth. 429) that the ovk avayKatov was partly possible and partly impossible, without contradicting (as Boeth. and Prantl, p. 463 believe) their other statement, that the Smirhv was partly necessary and partly not necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are thus made to overlap, the

thoides preferred to attack another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past occurrence must necessarily be true (JEpictet. Diss. ii.

The Aristotelian 19, 2 and 5). position in reference to a disjunction, that When the disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true, without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the Stoics {Simpl.
Cat. 103,
j8).
' Pltit. Sto. Bep. 46, p. 1055, justly insists on this point.

former including the Necessary

and Not-necessary, the latter the Possible and the Not-possible.

definition of the Possible against the Kvpniiov of Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, tvvar^ a^vvarov
fiil liKo\ov6iv, without exposing the confusion contained in it between sequence in time and

To defend Ms

Premtl, pp. 467-496. Biog. 45 ; Sext. Pyrrh. 194, see above p. 65.
''

'

ii.

* Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term hypothetical. In the same way the Stoics include both among

causal relation {Alex. Anal. Pr. 57, b ; Philop. Anal. Pr. xlii. bj Schol. in Arist. 163, a ; Cie. De Fato, 7, 13 J Bp. ad Div. ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Pan-

the five oyoirdSfiKTOi. See below p. 119,2. ' Chain-argrmient seems to have been also treated of in the categorical form. See p. 120,
3.

FORMAL LOGIC: INFERENCE.

in general.'
cal

117

According to Alexander,'^ the hypotheti-

Chap.
V.
()

and disjunctive forms were considered the only regular forms of inference,* the categorical form
being considered correct in point of
1 in proper syllogistic form.''

Sypo-

fact,

but defective
infer-

In hypothetical

inference the 09'i-

ginal form.

As shown by Prantl, 468, 171 on Diog. 76 Seari:. Pyrrh. Apul. Dogm. Plat. iii. ii. 135 The latter rightly 279, Oud. refers to the fact, that Chrysippus discussed the main forms of hypothetical inference at the Tery beginning of his doctrine
'
; ;

pressed in definite terms, for instance. If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was
called TpSiros for instance, ei rh vpwTOff rd Seirepov. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a XoyirpoTros for instance, ei UKdraiv, avaTTpei Tixdrtov &Wa fjiijv t6 irpW' Tov Tii &pa deirepoy. The premisses were called KitiiiuiTa (in contrast to &|f(u/ia which expresses a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the

of inference, Seaat. Math. viii.

223
Anal. Pr. 87, b Si" {moeiaeus 5e &W7is, ws ehrev (^Arist, Anal. Pr. i. 23, 41, a, 37) tUv &
2
:

KaX o&s ol veiliTepot (ruKKoyi(TfjLoijs

^oiXovTai Xeyetf oStoi S* 5iefc rponiKou, ws (pcurl, koX Trjs irpoKiiy^ews yiv6fiuot, rov rpo' TTtKov ^ ffvi/rjfifievov (conditional) 6vTos tl SiEfei/y/neVou (disjunctive) fl trvfiTtivXiyiiivov (a copulative judgment suggesting partly hypothetical judgments like the aviiireTrKiyiiivov in Sext. Math. viii. 235, partly negative categorical judgments which have the force of hypothetical judgments, such as it is not at the Conf. and B. same time Siog. 80. Semt. Pyrrh. ii. 158 Math. viii. 226. Cic. De Fato,
fiSifous

eUrlv 01

major premiss was aVm", the minor irp6(!\if^is (hence the particles 5e ye were vpoaKtyirTiKos
(rivSe(Tiios,

Bekk.).
Itid. 519.

Apollon. Synt. p. 518, The conclusion was

hritpopd, also itritpoptKol (rvySefffiol,

The major premiss

in a hypothetical syllogism was called TpoTTiKhv, its two clauses

being called, respectively,

fievov (as

r/yoi-

the vednepoi, the for the terminology is theirs and the

vi.

12).

By

Stoics

must be meant,
;

Peripatetics) and \9iyov (by the Peripatetics iirdiiivov'). Diog. 76 ; Seont. Pyrrh. ii. 135 ; Math. viii. 301,

by the

227
109,
Ix.

Aless.

1.
;

c.

and

p.

88,

a
Pr.

Peripatetics, to whom it might otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original form of judgment. See Prantl, 468, 172.

a
;

7,

PMlop. Anal.

Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2 Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19 Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45

Amman, on

an inference was called \iyor when it was ex'

Such

Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud. Ps. Galen, Eltray. iiaX. p. 19. < Aleo!. Anal. Pr. 116, b, after

118

THE
V.

STOICS.

Chap.

ences a distinction was also

made between such

as are

connected and such as are disconnected.'

In con-

nected inferences the Stoics look principally at the

greater or less accuracy of expression,^ and partly at

the difference between correctness of form and truth

of matter.'

They also remarked that true conclusions

field

do not always extend the

of knowledge

and

that those which do frequently depend on reasons

conclusive for the individual,
universally acknowledged.'*
ever, to

but not on proofs

point,
is

The main

howtheir

be considered in dividing inferences

aiJ,eB65as Trepaivoirrei
fljjs)

mentioning

when

not only the illation

inferences incomplete in point of form, such

ffvWoyicTfiol, or
is

= B,B = C,.-.A=C, which as: said to want as its major pre-

miss Two things which are equal to a third are equal to one another. On these ane:

86Sus irepalvotnes of the Stoics

1. c. 8, a ; 22, b ; Aleai. Top. 10, Ps. Galen, Eis. Sid\. 59. then continues ois 8ti /ih nil

correct (iytiis), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as well as the conclusion, are materially true. The \6yoi itucoktikoI may therefore be divided into true and false. Seicf. Pyrrh. ii. 138; Math. viii. 310 and 412 ; Diog.
is

see

79.
* Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 140 and 185 Math. viii. 305 313 and 411 True forms of inference are divided into airoSeMTticoi and
; ; ;
:

He
.

Ktyoviri trvWoyuTTiKas (rvj/dyetv,

vytas \4yovffi
Sti
elvai
iTfiQis
ffiv, ^

[ot

ve^repoi]
dfioiovs

Se

TjyovPTat

av7oiis

oi/K

airodGiKriKol.

avoBeiKTiKol

=^

Tois KaTTiyopiKfHS
.

avWoyi-

ToO

iraj'T^s Bta/iaprdvov-

$1^ npaSi]\a>v &57i\6v ri avvdyovres' oiiK atrobeiKJiKol when

01

this is
(TvvaKTiKol or TiepavriKoX,

not the case, as in the

:

and

inference

'

imwanTiKoi or cmipavroi, or i(rvK\6yurroi. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 137 ; Math. viii. 303 and 428 JMoff. 77. 2 Syllogisms which are conclusive in point of fact, but wanting in precision of form, were called irepavrtKot in the narrower sense those complete crvWoyiVTMoi. also in form, Diog. 78; Ps. Galen, E'uray.
; ;

light It is day, .. It is light for the conclusion, It is light, is known as well as it is known

If

it is

day,

it is

that It

is

day.

The airoSeiKTiKol

may

proceed either iipoSevTMus from the premisses to the conclusions, or e<^oSevtik<i>s fi^a
4Kica\vTrTtKas

/cat

IioX. 58.
*

An

inference is true

(&Xi-

itpoSevrmas when the premisses rest upon belief (TrfffTlS and^V^/tl)) ; ^KKoAinTTIKUS when they are based on a scientific necessity.

FORMAL LOGIC: INFERENCE.

logical form.

119

There

are,

according to Chrysippus,'
division of Theophrastus,

Chap.
V.
(iSJ

who herein adopted the

five original

forms of hypothetical inference, the acis

Tlw

jwie

sympU

curacy of which

beyond dispute, and to which

may be referred and Yet even among these forms, importance is attached to some in which the same sentence is reother forms of inference
tested.^

all forms (rf thereby hypothetical inference.

peated tautologically in the form of a conclusion,'

proving

how mechanical and barren must have been

five

the formalism in which the Stoic logic so abounds.

The combination of these

all of

simple forms of in-

ference gives rise to the composite forms of inference,^

(7) Composite

forms of
inferenee.

which

forms.*

may be again resolved into their simple Among the composite forms of inference,
conclusion and minor premiss are identical. The first class are
called SitpopoiifjLemt If it is day, it is day ; It is day, .'.It is day. The

' According to i)i<ii^. 79, Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 157, others added other forms of avmr6ietKToi. Oic, in adding a sixth and seventh (Top. 14, 57), must have been following these au-

second

class,

it,5icup6pci)s

trepaivoy-

thorities.

Consult, on these five avaof Chrysippus (which need not be given here more at length, being absolutely identical with those of Theophrastus) JHog. 79-81 (on p. 79 we must read trvWoyiffriKav for See p. 118, 2) ; avWoyuTiiav. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 156-159; 201; Math. viii. 223-227 ; Cie. Top. 13 ; Simpl. Phys. 123, b ; Ps. Qalen, Zltray. Sia\. 17 ; Prwntl, 473, 182 ; on the ^efmros avaTr6SiiKTosSi^Tr\it6iiai/ Sext. Pyrrh!
'

iriiSeiKToi

Tes It is either day or night It is day, .". It is day. The latter term is, however, applied to both kinds. See Alex. Anal. Pr. 7, a 53, b ; Top. 7 ; Schol. in Arist. 294, b, 25 ; CX,c. Acad, ii. 30, 96 ; Prantl, 476, 185. * Oic. Top. ex his 15, 57
; :

modis conolusiones innumerabiles nascuntur. Sext. Math. viii. 228, in which passage it is
striking that avairdSeiKToi should be divided into aw\o7 and oux
a-ir\o7.

It has been suggested that ^TToBeiKTiKuv should be sub-

Cleomed. Meteora, pp. 41 and 47 ; Prcmtl, p. 475. ^ Two such cases are distinguished, one in which all three clauses, the other in which the
i.

69;

stituted for avairoSelKTav, but it is also possible that the latter word may be used in a najrow as well as in a wider sense. " IHog. 78 auWoyKTrucol [\6701] nev olv eiaiv oj ^toi ivavd:

THE
Ohap.
V.

STOICS.
are distinguished
'

those composed of similar parts

in the from those composed of dissimilar parts ; treatment of the former, however, such a useless
is displayed, that it is hard to say what If two or meaning the Stoics attached to them.^ more inferences, the conclusion of one of which is the first premiss of the other, are so combined that the judgment which constitutes the conclusion and

formality

premiss at once

is

omitted in each

case, the result is

a Sorites or Chain-inference.

The

rules prescribed

by the Peripatetics
cending
all

for the Chain-inference

were de-

veloped by the Stoics with a minuteness far transthe requirements of science.'

^irt

With

these

SetKTOt 0VT6S ^ aLifay6fievoi avairodeiKTOvs Kami ri

Toiv

tw

Tohs 6e^-.

expression. The same meaning must attach to iTn^iKtetic

According to Galen, rl Tivd. Hipp, et Plat. ii. 3, p. 224, Chiysippus had taken great pains io resolving the composite forms of inference (Diog. 190 and 194). Antipater suggested still simpler modes. 8ea;t. 229-243, borrowing the example used by iEnesldemus, bat no doubt following the Stoic treatment. Prantl, 479. Such a composite inference is that mentioned by Sex'

Aovt4s

t6

Kal

ifrtfiaWd/ji.epoi,

which are to be found

X^p'^s

eV rais

tri/i/6xws Kafi^avofievats Trporoureai

Twy ffvfivepaa'fiii'fuv for instance, A is a property of B, B of C, C of D ; .", is a property of D. iinfiaWifiei/os means the inference, the conclusion of

which

is

omitted;

iirifiaWtnv,

the one with the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three Aristotelian figures kotA ri iropoSeSoyiivov
flhp

tus

1.

^ '

b, 5,
ites,

c. 281. Sext. ; Prmtl, p. 478. Alex, on Anal. Pr. i. 25, 42, after speaking of the Sor-

avvBcTiKbv

Beiipriiia.

ol

irepl

'ApltrTOTiKTiJ/

7^ XP^^^
4<p*

irapafierpiiffayTes
Sffou

TrapeSatroi/,

ouT^

ciTrpTei, ot

Se airh t^s

continues (p. 94, b)

iv

rp

Tov [ffToas]
Kttl

irap' ^Keivoiv
4iroiTj(rav e4

Toiairri

ruv
ot

vporilireoav trvvex^iif
^ffrt
det^pTifia

die\6uTes

\a^6vTiS avrov rh

r6 T trvvderiKSv
. ,
.

KaX

KaKo{/^evoi

writ

twi'

KoKoifxivov Trap* avrois Seirepoy Kal rpirov Be/xa Kal riraprov, a/te-

4iri^\KovTes re Kal 4irt~ ^awifievoi. ffuvScTiKhv The Bfiipriiia (or chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be a Peripavut4[jqiii

M\aavTes fiiv rod xp^'^'^f.^v, trav Sh rh dirtoiTovv Svydfievav \4yeadat 4v rfi toioiJti) Beupl^f, k^v AxpV'ros
jj,

4ire^eK66yTes re Kal (ii\i(ravres.

is

Bef eieoce

made

to the

same

FORMAL LOGIC: INFERENCE.

composite forms of inference Antipater contrasted
other forms having only a single premiss,' but
it

121

Chap.
V.
C^) -^-

was

an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful

worth.

On

a few other points connected with the from a sin-

Stoic theory of illation,

we have very imperfect

is

in- ?^f i"'*-

formation.^

The

loss,

however,

not to be regretted,
is

seeing that in what

we

already possess there

con-

clusive evidence that the objections

brought against
It was in-

the Stoic logic were really well deserved.

tMng in Sivtpl. De

Ccelo ; Schol. in Arist. 483, b, 26 v StroioiiTri avdKvaiS tov \6yoUf 7] rb (TVfi:

refer to such composite inferences.

^

Called

fioi/QK-fifi(iaToi

ffvWo-

irepafffjLa KafjLfidi'OVffa

Kai Trpo(r\afj.-

ytaiiol.

^dpovtra iA\7iv Trpdraa-tv, kotA rb rpijov \ey6fjLevop irapot, jots 2TwiKois Bi^a Trepaiverai, the rule of

tpus &pa.

Such were r]ji.ipa inTi, &pa %(TTiv and avairviis, Cps

which is, that when a third proposition can be concluded from the conclusion of an inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be concluded also from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition. Both these passages appear to have escaped the notice of Prantl in his summing up, otherwise so accurate. Or else the irpSiTov,
'

See Aleai. Top. 6, 274; Anal. Pr. 7, a, 8, a ; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 167 ; Math. viii. 443 ; Apul.

Dogm.

Plat.

iii.

272,

Oud.

Prrnitl, ill, 186.

^ Compare the remarks of Prantl, 481, on Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 2; Alex. Anal. Pr. 53, b; GaUn, 1. Ps. Galen, Haay. Sia\. c. ; 57. If Posidonius, according to the latter passage, calls anaconclusions (rvvaKTilogical

Kovs

KttTct BivofjLtif d^iiiifiaTos,

and

deirepov, rpWov andTeVapToy 0/ia mentioned by Galen, Hipp, et

Plat.
ii.

Stoics also, according to Schol. in Hermog. Bhet. Gr. ed. Walz, vii. 6, 764, spoke of a Kara

the

3,

vol.

v.

224. Alex.

Anal. Pr.

53, b,

would hardly

diivafiLv TpoTTtubv, we have already met with the same thing, p.

suggest to him the various forms of the AfoiriiSciKToi instead of the formulae for the resolution of composite conclusions. The expressions Sih Sio TpoTri/cwc, Si4 rpiuv rpoTTiKwy, and the title of a treatise of Chrysippus irepl
TOV
Sict

119,

1,

clusion

where an analogical conwas included in the

which, by

a^e96Scas irepaivovres,

TpitOV

(SC. TpOTTlKWU

Or

3) in Biog. vii. 191; {Galen, I.e.; Seast. Pyrrh. ii. 2), appear to
\i\HjjAtuv

conf, p.

117,

the addition of an oi|fcii^a, can be changed into regular conIn the doctrine of clusions. proof the riiiroj jrapiiBofos was also treated of, according to ProM. in Euclid, 103, being probably suggested by the ethical paradoxes of the Stoics,

122

THE

STOICS.

Chap,

deed a petty carefulness to trace, as they did, even

the most worthless logical forms ' to the end.

(e) Me/'u-

Next to describing the inferences which were valid,

a^otlier subject
Stoics,

TaiCcifs.

engaged the careful attention of the

and afforded an opportunity for vindicating their dialectical subtlety. This was no other than
the enumeration and refutation of false inferences,^

and in particular the exposing of the many fallacies which had become current since the age of the Sophists and Megarian^. In this department, too, as might be expected, Chrysippus led the way.* Not that Chrysippus was always able to overcome the
difficulties

that arose

witness his remarkable atti-

tude towards the Chain-inferences, from which he

thought to escape by withholding judgment.^

fallacies,

The

however, to which the Stoics devoted their

attention,

and the way in which they met them, need

not occupy our attention further.*

' Conf Alea;. Anal. Pr. 95, a Galen. See above p. 120, 3. According to Ps. Galen, 1. o. p. 58, Chrysippus wrote these treatises on 'ZMWoyurrmal Sxpio'TO'. ^ Siog. 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.
.

ab

iis

dioitur rjavxi^eiv.
is
;

The
Seiet.

same remark
Math.
vii.

made by
Pyrrh.
ii.

416

253.

The same argument was employed against other fallacies

(^Simpl. Cat. 6, 7).

With

this

The

list

contains a

number

of his writings of treatises

less

among them no than five on the i^i/5(J/x6i/os. de. Acad. ii. 29, 93 Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim
on
fallacies,

interrogetur, verbi causa, tria

pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa

perveniat,quiescere,idest,quod

\6yos ri<Tvx^in>v (JDiog. 198), Prantl, p. 489, connects apyis \6yos {Cic. De Pato, 12, 28), regarding the one as the praotical application of the other, but apparently without reason, The apy})s K6yos, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad absurdum, could not of course commend itself to Chrysippus, nor is it attributed to him. ' Prantl, pp. 485-496.

ESTIMATE OF STOIC LOGIC.

In
all

123

these enquiries the Stoics were striving to

Chap.

find firm

ground

for

a scientific process of proof.

D-^sii-

Grreat as

was the value which they attached to such

a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle had

stoio

done

before, that everything could not

be proved, f^i^l
slurrt-

Here, then, was the weak point.

of filling up this

Instead, however,

weak point by means of induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory
of induction, they were content with conjectural data,

"'"""'?*

sometimes carrying their own truth in themselves, at

other times leaving
of their inferences.'
it to

be established by the truth

Thus, their theory of method,

like their theory of knowledge,

ended by an ultimate
lu
""'

appeal to what

is

directly certain.
(2)
'"'^

No

very high estimate can therefore be formed of

the formal logic of the Stoics.

Incomplete as
is

is

our

knowledge of that logic, still what

to determine the

known

is

judgment

absolutely.

enough That the

since the

greatest care was expended

by the Stoics

time of Chrysippus in tracing into their minutest

ramifications,

and referring

to a fixed type, the forms

see indeed.

of intellectual procedure,

we

At the same

time,

we

see that the real business of logic was lost

sight of in the process, the business of portraying

the operations of thought, and giving

its laws,

whilst

Sext.

Math.

viii.

367

oW

oil

Sei,

(patrl,

Tritirav

ajr6Sei^tv

\afjLfidi/iy, iirel oif

alruu, Tii/A ii KoX i^ fnroBiaws Suyfifferai npo-

Palveiv iiiuv i \6yoi, iav /ij) SoBfi Ti iruTThv ii alnov Tuyx'^''*"'lUd. 375 : ciWl' eiaBaaiv fmoTvyX^vovres Ae-ygiv iri trlffTis ecri

tov ifi^SaSai tV iir^eea-w -rh a\T\Bh eiplcrKeadai ixeii/o rh tois i^ tmoBitrws \-ii<pSeiaiii iiruS>ep6fiej/ov el yhp rb to{itois clkoKovBovv iarw fryiM, KaKcri/o ofs oko^ovBfi aKi)Br) Kol avaiupiKeKra
KaBiarriKiv.


124

THE
'

STOICS.

Chap,

the most useless trifling with forms was recklessly

indulged
or they

in.

No

discoveries of importance can have

been made even as to the logical forms of thought,

would not have been passed over by writers

ever on the alert to note the slightest derivations from

the Aristotelian logic.

Hence the whole contribution

of the Stoics in the field of logic consists iu this,

in clothing the logic of the Peripatetics with a

new
with

terminology, and developing certain parts of

it

painful minuteness, whilst other parts were wholly

neglected.
inference.

Thus

it fared
it

with the part treating of

Assuredly

was no improvement

for

Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather than

the categorical as the
original form of inference.
for

Making every allowance

the extension of the

it lost

field

of logic, in scientific precision

gained by the labours of Chrysippus.

more than it The history of

philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of

the Stoic system, so carefully cultivated by the Stoics
themselves, and so characteristic of their intellectual
attitude.

Yet, when

logic is only

all has been said, the Stoic an outpost of their system, and the care
it

which was lavished on

since the time of Chrysippus

indicates the decline of intellectual originality.

STUDY OF NATURE.

125

CHAPTER
THE STtTDT
'OF

VI.
POSITIONS.

NATURE.

FUNDAMENTAL

Or

far

more importance

in the Stoic system than the

chap.

study of logic was the study of nature.

This branch

^^

of learning, notwithstanding an appeal to older views,

was treated by them with more independence than

any other.
divided

The

subjects which it included

may

be

Fundamental positions 2. The course, character, and government of the universe 3. Irrational nature and 4.
heads,
viz.:
1.
;

under four

Man.'

The present chapter

ing the
first

will be devoted to consider-

of these groups

the fundamental posi;

tions held

by the Stoics in regard to nature

among

1 was Science Natural divided by the Stoics themeiSikiSs selves (^Diog. 132) (1)
:

by the mathematician (astronomy. Posidonius in Svmpl.

Phys. 64, b, discusses at length the difference between astronomy and natural science) and the third, ground which is shared by both the physician and the mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject into these divisions is not
;

iraiiiTwv Kal irept apxuv Kal tTTOix^iav Kal O^oiv Kal nepdraiv Kal r6irov Kal Kevov (2)

into

-rlrnoi irepl

divisions, yevMas into TTtpl KSaiiov, irepl atotx^lav, and The first of the aiTioXo7iK(ir. these divisions covers ground which is partly peculiar to

three

known.

natural science and

is

shared

At best, it would be a very uncomfortable division.

'

126

TSE
ism

STOICS.

Chap.
VI.

which three specially deserve notice

;

their Material;

their Dynamical view of the world

and

their

Pantheism.
A. Materialism.

Nothing appears more striking to a reader fresh from the study of Plato or Aristotle than the startling (1) Meaning of the contrast presented thereto by the Materialism of the
Stoics.

Stoic materialism.

Whilst so far following Plato as to define a

(a) Material or COTobjects.

real thing' to be anything possessing the capacity of

acting or being acted upon, the Stoics nevertheless

restricted the possession of this
objects.

power to material

(a) Reality

belongs to

material
objects

only.

Hence followed their conclusion that nothing real exists except what is material or, if they could not deny existence in some sense or other to what is incorporeal, they were fain to assert that essential and real Being only belongs to what is material, whereas of what is incorporeal only a certain modified kind of Being can be predicated.' FoUow;

Soph. 247, D. Plut. Com. Not. 30, 2, p. 1073 iyra yhp fi6va Tct trdfiaTa Ka\ovcriv, eiretS^ Svtos rh iroteTv ri Plao. i. 11, i: of Kol iriiTx^iy.
'

(see p. 95, 2)
fiev

and 338 Xpianriros

:

tdriov iivai \eyei oUriQV %v

5i*

ii.

Kol rh
k.t.A.
S'

Kal

ff Sofia,

HoffsiS^vios Se
^(TtI

OT^Ttas.

alriov

STwi'Kol TTfivTa Tct oYtio ffafiariKd

TTvev^ara ydp. Kol ffw^a T^v

Spdijxevov

iv.

20

ot 8e StwI'-

tpcoviiv'

TTav

yap rh
"

h 4K^tvo, fl rh apxvyhv TTOiiiiTews, Kal rh fi^j/ atrtov tv Ka\ ffafia, ou Si atriov oUre Sy oUre ffcHfia, aWci ffv^^e^Khs Kol Kanj5i*

twos

^ Kai

'kolovv (Tufia
.
. .

rj

Si

y6priii.a.

See

p.
:

95,

and

2.

fri ttoi/ Sp^ rh Kivovv KoX ivox^ovv ffwfiii ^ffiiv Ti fray rh Kivovfievov trcD/xa
(paiv^ irotei Kai

dc. Acad. i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam eflSci posse ab ea [natura] quas expers esset corporis nee vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur (more accurately in
i<TTiv.
.

Ding. vii. 56 According to Chrysippus, Diogenes (see Simpl. Phys. 97, a), and others, the voice is material, vav yhp Tb TroioCx iraiid iari. Ibid. 150: oiiffiav Si tpaffi tuv ^vruv andvTaiv T^v irpdoTT]!/ iS\riy, us Kal Xpvtrtirtros iv T7? Trpdrji

tv
.

(pvffiKav Kal

Zi]vuv

S\7i Se iffTiv, ^|
.

?s

driSi)-

quo

effioeretur aliquid. Conf. Bitter, iii. 677) posse esse non corpus, Seneca, see below p. 128, 1 ; 129, 1 Stob. Eel. 1. 336
;

iroTOvv yiyerai . irufia Si iffri Kar' ai/Tobs 7] ovffia. Sippolyt.

Eefut. Haer.

i.

21

alifl.a^a S\

wdyra

{nriBevro, k.t.\.

STUDY
regard

OF-

NATURE: MATERIALISM.
it

127

ing out this view,

was natural that they should

the soul and virtue.
'

Chap.

many

things as corporeal which are not gene;

rally considered so

for instance,

Nevertheless,

it

would not be correct to say

it

that the

Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity

more extended meaning than

and they

usually bears.

For

they define a body to be that which has three dimensions,^

also lay themselves out to

prove how

things generally considered to be incorporeal material in the strictest sense of the term.

may

be

Thus,
they

besides upholding the corporeal character of all substances, including the

human

soul

and

Grod,^

likewise assert that properties or forms are material

all attributes

by means of which one object

is dis-

tinguished from another are produced by the existence of certain air-currents,* which, emanating from
the centre of an object, diffuse themselves to
extremities,
its
(fi)
"-f

Theory
-""'>'

'^'f

and having reached the

surface, return

again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.*

'

As do

Bitter,

iii.

577,

and
der

Plut.

Com. Not.

50, 1, p.
/col

1085
i,

Sclileiermaclier, Philos. 129.

^

Gesch.
:

tois Ttoi6TT)ras

ovalas

a-iiiiaTa

TToiomiv,
a-iSim 5' effTi
if)U(riKp)

and Ibid,

ii,

the

Diog.

vii. 1.35

(<()rj(rlc

'AiroXXiiSwpos 6^ T5
Sioo'TOTii', k.t.K.

statement discussed on p. 101, 2. ^ Philo, Qu. De S. Immut.

p.

rh rpixv
'

See

p. 98.

nature^ of will be subsequently discussed,

The corporeal deity and the soul

298, D (the same in the spurious treatise 'De Mundo, p.

E) r\ Si [e|is = iroi(iT7js"| iari T!Vvfi,a avnarpi^ov 4ip' laurd.

1154,
:

' See p. 105. Sen. Bp. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the

difference of %vai)i.iva (see p. 103, 1) nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantibus conuno enim spiritu unum Stat bonmn contineri ac regi debet,
:
:

Spx^oi nev yap iarb rav fleaav ^irl ri irepara TeiveaSai., ifiaii<rav Se t,Kpas 4Truj>ayelas amxdfiVTH
Tr6.\iv,
/cijTai

Sxpis &v
TcSTroi/,

M
:

cup'

iipfiitrSn.

e^eais S

rhv aurhv &<ptoV rh irpuTov amexhs olnos

k.t.A.

ilavKos

&(pSapTos,

Qu.

unum esse uniusboniprincipale.

Hence the objection raised in

Mund. S. Incorr. Mundo, 1169, A]

960, ^ 5' [e|is]

[De
Io-tI

128

THE
Nor was the theory
attributes.

STOICS.

Chap.
VI.

of air-currents confined to bodily-

It was applied quite as

much

to

mental
to

attributes.
rial,'

Virtues and vices are said to be mate-

and are deduced from the tension imparted

is
is

the soul by atmospheric substances therein subsisting.^

For the same reason the Good

called a body, for

according to the Stoics the Grood

tSvos. There can be no doubt that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in
9ri/u/iaTiKds

only a virtue, and

Rep.
7, 4, p.

thes, in Plut. Sto.

1034

irKTiy^ irvphs 6 t6vos

eVrt

these passages. The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the Divine Spirit pervades it. Further particulars hereafter. Conf Alea;. Apkr. De Mixt. 142, a:
Tivuirdat
iros]
fikv

^vxfi y^yjjTai 4iri$iiWovTa Tphs rh KaAeiTai Kol Kpdros. iVxf's Stob. Sxnrtp Iffxiis rod Eel. ii. 110 trdtfiaros rSvos 4(TtIv iKavhs Iv
e7riT\eTi/
Tcfc
:

Khv iKavhs iv ry

veipots,
Iffx^s

oiiroj

KaX

rj

ttis

"^vxris

t6vos

4<n\v

iKavhs iv

t^

Kpivetv Koi irpdrreiv Kal n4\.

vTroriBeTai [Xp^ffiirohaiajf -kv^v-

All properties may be classed under the same conception of tension. See p. 127, 5 and Plut. Com. Not.
:

tV

ffijxtraffav

fiarSs TLvos Si^

Koi/TOs,
6(^'

avr^s 5t^ov ffwdyerai re Koi

Trdffris

49, 2, p. 1085 7^v jji.ev yap tcraa-i Ka\ tSSwp oijTe ouTct (Xuvex^tv otfre
eVepa, irt'evfiarlKTis Se /*eT0Xf7, Kol Kvp^dovs Svvdfieais r^v kv6ri\Ta

auT^ rh irav, (That must be the reading, the next sentence containing Tmv Se, K.T.\. Conf.
avfifievei Koi ff^inraQh iffrtv

Sta<pvKdTTeiv' a4pa Se Ka\ irvp avriov t'

elj/ai 5i*

iVToviav SKTartKa

Ka\ TOis Svfflv iKeivois eyKSKpaiJ-eva

Alex. 143, b, carefully 143, b). denies the statement, that the all penetrating Breath keeps things together. > Plut. Com. Not. 45. See Sen. Ep. 117, 2: p. 129, 3. Placet nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, f acit quidquid f acit corpus sapientiam bonum esse est diount: sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere. Conf. p. 129, 1. ' This is the conception of t6vos, upon which the strength of the soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. Clean:

t6vov irap^x^iv kol rh fidvtfi'ov Kal ouiriSSes. Ps. Censorin. Fragm. c. 1, p. 75, Jahn Initia rerum eadem elementa et principia diountur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam; ten:

orem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem conoresoente rursus a

summo

Seneea, however, Nat. Qu. ii. 8, conf. vi. 21, endeavours to show that intemHo belongs to spwitus more than to any other body.

referatuT ad t6vos equivalent to iri/eOfia.

medium.
is

Here tenor or

made

STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.

virtue
is

129

a definite condition of that material which

Chap.
VI.

constitutes the soul.'

is

In the same sense also truth

said to be material, personal

and not independent

is

truth being of course meant,^ that

to say,

know-

ledge, or a property of the soul that knows.

since according to the Stoics

And

knowledge consists in

the presence of certain material elements within the

soul, truth in the sense of

knowledge may be rightly

called something material.

Even emotions, impulses,

notions and judgments, in so far as they are due to

material causes, the air-currents pouring into the

soul (n-vevfiaTo), were regarded as material objects,

and

for the

same reason not only

artistic skill

but

individual actions were said to be corporeal.'

' Sen. Ep. f aoit, prodest

Yet

106,

i:

bonum
f acit

Xe.

Kol

eMrus,

(pacrl.

tovtI /iiy

enim quod

yap

a^i(iifj.d

e(rTi,Th 3e a^iu/Mi\eK'

corpus est

mum
poris.

et

bonum agitat aniquodammodo format et

:

t6vj t6 5e KiKrdv hffdifxarov naKiv 5e rj ahiiBsia (rufid

Trap' iffov ^TTiffT^/AT/

avditrriy

continet, quse propria sunt corQuie corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quse et hoc coranimi sunt. pus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis si adf actus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et avaritia, crudelitas, indurata Titia ergo et malitia et ergo et . species ejus omnes bona. It is then specially re-

-K^vrav a\ri6ut/

airo(l>avrtK^ SoKetTvyxdveii/

iratra

5e

iirifTTiifiTt Ttiis
.

Nam

%x^ ^fnXv TjyeSe Ttye/jLoviKdv

fjLoj/tKdv

t6

Kara to^tovs imripxe. Similarly Pyrrh. ii. 81. See p. 92,

(T&fia

2.

Plut. Com. Not. 46, 2, 6.roTrov yap eS /xcA.a, ras operas Kai r&.s KoKias, irphs Se rairais r&s rexvas Kal rb.s fiviifias
^

p.

1084

Jtdffas,

en

S^ tpavraaias Kal irdBrj

Ka\
trvyKaTa6e(reis

marked that the Good, i.e. virupon the body, tue, works governing it and representing
itself therein.
2

Ka\

dp/ias

(Td^fiara

irotov/ievovs
.

iv
. .

^rjSevl

Conf

Sext. Math. vii. 38

p. 128, 1. rh' 5e
:

ol^' ov liimv rhs kperhs Kal rhs Kaxtas

f^Ja etvai \eyovffiy, oiiSh
fiSvov,
Tct

(pdyai Ke'tffBat, K.r.K.

ndOri

a\iiBetav olovrai rives, Kal jidKurTO, 01 ciTrb -rris (TTOas, Sia<p4peiv toA.))oirffny . 6ovs Karcb rpeis Tp6'Kovs fifv Tap' Ztrov v nev SX^ffeia a&iid
. .

opyhs KoX <ftd6vovs Kai Kiiras

Kal iirixatpeKOKlas, ou5^ KaraXij^ets Ktu tpavrafflas krI ayvolas ovSe

iart rb Se &\ii9hs turdiiuerov

inriip-

riisrexyas f^a, r^p aKurorojuKitv, 4A.\i vphs X"^"'"''"''"'^''

tV

130

THE
VI.

STOICS.

Chap.

(7) The eawses of actions material.

and dancing, can hardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any more than being wise was called a body ' but the
certain actions, such as walking
;

objects

which produced

these actions,
itself felt,
it

as

indeed

everything which makes

to be corporeal.

were consideired

To us

appears most natural to

refer these actions to the soul as their originating

cause

but the Stoics, holding the theory of subject-

matter and property, preferred to refer each such

action to

some

special material as its cause, consideris

ing that an action

material.

due to the presence of this

Stoics.

The

idealism of Plato was thus reproduced

in a
TouToty
t))v

new form by the materialism of the

(fol

rets ivifr^^ias ffdaiiara

KaX^^aTToiovai, rhvieepiTraTov ^^of,

irpoaaySpeviTiv,
vK60efftt'^ t^v r^v \oiBoplav. Plutarcli is here speaking as an opponent. Seneca, however (Ep. 106, 5), observes Non pnto te dubitaturam, an adfectus corpora sint tanquam ira, amor, tristitia si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutant: Quid ergo 1 tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a oorpore? See Stob. Eel. ii. 114 p. 129, 1 The Stoics consider virtues to
6pj(7jffiUj

profiteer esse. Quas sint ergo que antiques moverint,

. .

riiv

dicam,
esse.
.

Animum constat animal

. .

aliud est,

quam animus
:

dammodo
animal

Virtus autem nihil quose habens ergo

est.
:

Deinde
agi
(4p/tJ()
:

agit aliquid sine impetu

it is

autem

virtus nihil If potest.

:

urged

Each individual

win thus
merable

consist of an innunumber of living

be substantially identical (rcks ouTai Kofl' m6aTaaiv) with (the

leading part of the soul (^7/toviKhv), and consequently to be,
like
it, ffdiiara

and

fiya.

Seneca,

Ep. 113,
plainly
:

speaks still more Desideras tibi scribi a

1,
:

beings, the reply is that thtese animalia are only parts of one animal, the soul ; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and the same viewed from different sides : idem est animus et Justus et prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens. From the sameletter,p. 23, wegatherthat

Cleanthes explained ambulatio

as spiritus a principali usque in pedes permissus, Chrysippus as prinoipale itself.
'

me, quid sentiam de hao qusestione jactata apud nostros an justitia, an fortitude, prudentia ceterseque virtutes animalia
sint.

See

p.

92, 2, the extract

...

Me

in alia senteutia

from

Sen. Ep. 117.

STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.

Plato had said, a

131

man
is

is

just and musical

when he
;

Chap.
'

participates in the idea of justice

Stoics said, a

and music

the

man
is

virtuous

ducing virtue

in

him

musical,

when the material prowhen he has the

(*)

material producing music.

Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena
of
life.

Wide

Hence, not content with calling them bodies,

g/ mate-

the Stoics actually went so far as to call

beings.

them

living "^^"

It seems, however, quite as startling to hear

such things as day and night, and parts of the day

and parts of the night, months and years, even days of the month and seasons of the year, called bodies.'

unhappy expressions Chrymeant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on certain material conditions by summer is meant a certain state of the air when highly heated by the sun by month tbe moon for a certain definite period
singularly

But by these

sippus appears to have

during which
'

it

gives light to the earth.^

eaXT!6ji(vov,

From

all

^. 1084
fi.a/Twv

Phit. Com, Not. 45, 5, Xpva'nntov livrnioveiovres

: '

k.tA.

Stoi. Eel.

i.

iv Tif irp^Ttfi ray (pvffmwv ^tjttjouTto TrpoffdyovTos oitx V

iffriv,
r]

Chrysippus defines tap ctovs &pav KeKpafiipTtv iK x^^H-^^os

260

a'jroK'fiyoyTos Kal Oepovs

,
.

tihv ui^ ffwfid

5'

effirepa

apxofieyov 6epos Se Spay T^y /xt\iO'T' a^'

fieT6Tro)pov Se
fiiu trph

Kal 6 op6hs Hal rh fxetrov ttjs vvKrhs

adofiaTa

ijKiov diaKsKov^evriv

ovK

%ffTllf

'

ouSe

t\

fiip

&pav %tovs t^v fierh 6epos

Tip.4pa ffufjA iffTlv^ o^xi Se Kal ^ voviifivia (Toi^a, Koi t] SckaJt?], koI TreVTeKaiSeKdrri Kal fi rpia/c&f Kal 6
fxrfv ffcop^d 4irTL

x^i/zufos 5e KcKpafieyriv x^^t*-^^' 5e &pav ^rovs r^v fj.ti\itrTa Kare'^uyfi.ivftv, ^ riiv t$ ircpl yriv aepi
KaT^vyfjL4vt]v, Ibid.
:

Kal rh 64pos Kal rh iviavrSs.

:

According

(t>6tv6vtiipov Kal 6

IHog. 151 x^'i"'"'"" I"" rhv Oirkp yrjs &epa Kare^vyii4mv Sici r^v -rov ri\iou irpdaa itfrnSoi', eop 8e t^iv fiKpairlai> toB
'

elvai

(fiatrt

to Empedocles and the Stoics, ^^^ cause of winter is the preponderance of air, the cause of summer the preponderance of
fire.

JMd. 556

fi-els S'

iirrl, (fniirl

arpos

KaTcfc T71P irphs Tjftas iropeiav,

[XpiSffiiriros]

rh tpaivSfieyov %

rris tre-

9epos ii rhv fnrip pis aipct KaraTL

Kiivris irphs t\ims,

atKiivf] fiipos

132

THE
'

STOICS.
is

Chap,

these examples one thing

clear,

how

impossible
is

the Stoics found

material,

it to

assign reality to -what

not

{l)

The in-

Z^^-"^
material,

In carrying out this theory, they could not, as might he expected, wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could not deny that there are certain things which
it is

absurd to

call material.

Among

such include

empty

space, place, time, and expression (Xsicrov)-^ Admitting these to be incorporeal, they still would not This view belongs allow that they do not exist at all.

only to isolated members of the Stoic School, for

which they must be held personally responsible.^

How
to
(2)

they could

harmonise belief in incorporeal

not on record.
is:

things with their tenet that existence alone belongs

what

is

material

is

Comes

The question next before us

What

led the

Xce<i tie' Stoics to this materialism ? Jt might be supposed Stoic mathat their peculiar theory of knowledge based on

sensation was the cause

but this theory did not pre-

clude the possibility of advancing from the sensible

to the super-sensible.
It might. quite as well be said

that their theory of knowledge was a consequence of

their materialism,

and that they referred

is

all

knowpro-

ledge to sensation, because they could allow no real

being to anything which

not material.

The

bability therefore remains that their theory of

know-

%Xowa

(f>aw6ii.ivov

jrphs

TiiiMs.

something immaterial.
7>itf^. vii. 140 Stob.'Ecl.i. 392; Sexf. Math. x. 218 and 237 viii. 11 vii. 38 Pyirh. ii. 81 iii. 52. See p. 92, 2. * See p. 94, 1.
' ;
;

Cleomedes, Meteora, 112, distinguishes four meanings of

In the two first it means something material in the others, as a definition of time,
livv.
;

STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.

ledge and their materialistic view of nature both
indicate one and the

133

Chap.

same habit of mind, and that

for these causes in the in(a)

both are due to the action of the same causes.

Nor

will it

do to seek

The

fluence exercised by the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic

^^^^"
not am, ra-

philosophy on the Stoic School.

it

At first sight, indeed,

their

might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from '^p^2tetheir

Heraclitus

materialism, together with

;

tio views.

other views on nature

or else

it

might seem to be

an expansion of the metaphysical notions of Plato

and

For if Aristotle denied Plato's disform and matter to such an extent that he would hardly allow form to emat at all except in union with matter, might it not appear to others more logical to do away with their distinction in
Aristotle.

tinction of

thought, thus reducing form to a property of matter

Were

there not difficulties in the doctrine of a Grod

;

external to the world, of a passionless Keason

were

there not even difficulties in the antithesis of form

and matter, which Aristotle's system was powerless to overcome ? And had not Aristoxenus and-Dicsearchus before the time of Zeno, and Strato immediately after his time, been led from the ground occupied by the And yet we Peripatetics to materialistic views? must pause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism appears, from what is recorded of his intellectual growth, to have been repelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any other; nor is there
the least indication in the records of the Stoic teaching that that teaching resulted from a criticism of
the Aristotelian and Platonic views of a double origin

184

THE
of things.

STOICS.
the proposition that every-

Chap,
'

Far from

it,

thing capable of acting or being acted upon must be

material, appears -with the Stoics as an independent

(J) iTie Stnic Via-

axiom needing no further proof. The supposed connection between the Stoics and
Heraclitus, so far from explaining their materialistic
views, already presumes their existence.

not Aue to
ttig.

Yet long
historical

before Zeno's time the philosophy of Heraclitus as a

living tradition

had become

extinct.

No

connection therefore, or relation of original dependence, can possibly exist between the two, but at

most

a subsequent perception of relationship

directed

can have
of the

Zeno to Heraclitus.

Zeno's

own view

world was not a consequence, but the cause, of his

sympathy with Heraclitus.

In

short, neither the

Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first

impulse to Zeno's materialism, although they

may
on

have helped in
that subject,
(c)

many ways

to strengthen his views

when already formed.

must
therefore be

Prae-

The

real causes for these views

^oftheStoio

nought elsewhere, and will be found in the central

the whole system of the Stoics

philosophy idea of
the cause.

the practical
the
first

character of their philosophy.

From

devot-

ing themselves with

pied the ground of

all their

energies to practical

enquiries, in their theory of nature the Stoics occu-

common
what
is

views, which

know

of no
cor-

real object excepting

grossly sensible

and

poreal.

Their aim in speculation was to discover a

''firm basis for

human

actions.'

In action, however,

men

are brought into direct and experimental contact

>

See p. 66,

1.

STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.

with objects.
senses are,
reality

135

The objects then presented to the we must know, regarded in their naked
is

Chap.
'

without concealment, nor

an opportunity
Their reality
us and

afforded for doubting their real being.

is

proved practically, inasmuch as

it affects

offers itself for

the exercise of our powers.

In every

such exercise of power, both subject and object are

always material.

veyed to

Even when an impression is conthe soul of man, the direct instrument is

something material

the
:

voice or the gesture.

In

the region of experience there are no such things as

non-material impressions.

This

was the ground

is what either Such a thing is

occupied by the Stoics

acts

a real thing
us.

on

us, or is acted
;

upon by

naturally material

ideas not being able to soar above

and the Stoics with their practical what is most obvi-

ous, declared that reality belongs only to the world

of bodies.

Herefrom

it

would appear to follow that only

in- (3) Con-

dividual perceptions are true, and that all general ^qf-u^^oic If each "inate' conceptions without exception must be false.
.

notion (XsKTOv)
real,* will '

is

incorporeal,
_

and consequently un'

riaUsm. (a) j.

not absence of reality in a

much
is

degree belong to the notion of what

^w*^"*^ higher percepgeneral ? tims alone

i.e.

Individual notions refer directly to perceptions,

to something incorporeal
;

^^j^^f
as-

nevertheless they indirectly trutk

i.e.

refer to the things perceived,

to

what

is

material, general
.

But general notions do not even

indirectly refer to ??-

twm.

anything corporeal; they are pure fabrications of the mind, which have nothing real as their object.
>

Seep. 93; 182,

1.

136

THE
'

STOICS.

Chap.

This the Stoics explicitly maintained.'

notwithstanding to these

To

attribute

general conceptions, to

which no real objects correspond, a higher truth and

certainty than belongs to the perceptions of individual
objects,

was a gross inconsistency, but one which the

Stoic system

made not

the slightest attempt to over-

come.
(J) Tlieory
"salinter-

The materialism

of the Stoics likewise led to

some

remarkable assertions in the matter of natural science.

If the attributes of things, the soul and even the

powers of the

soul, are all corporeal,

the relation of

attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body, of

one body to another body,

is

that of

mutual

inter-

mingling.^

Moreover, inasmuch as the essential

attributes of any definite material belong to every

part of that material, and the soul resides in every

part of the body, without the soul's being identical

with the body, and without the attributes being

identical with the material to

which they belong, or

that one body

with one another

it follows

may

intermingle with another not only by occupying the

vacant spaces in that body, but by interpenetrating

all
its parts,

without, however, being fused into a

it.*

hoinogeneous mass with

This view involves not

it

only a denial of the impenetrability of matter, but

'

'
'

See See

p. 84, i. p. 105, 3.

Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of whiph is heavy, hard, hot, &o. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with another, or yyith the iron itself, but each one runs through the whole iron,

if each attribute is due to the presence of some material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing

Now,

its

own

identity.

; ; '

STUDY OF NATURE: MATERIALISM.

further supposes that a smaller body

137

when mingled

Chap.
VI.

with a greater body will extend over the whole of the

latter.

Tt is

known

as the Stoic theory of universal

So

intermingling (^Kpaais

oKwv), and

is

alike different

from the ordinary view of mechanical mixture and

from that of chemical mixture.

penetrated by every part of the
latter,

It differs

from the
is

former in that every part of the one body

other;

inter-

from the
still

because the bodies after mixture

properties.'
151
iv
koI

retain

their

own

This peculiar theory, which

tos

'

IKog.
d

vii.

Kptl(reis
<j>ri<Ttp

Se SiS\ov ylv(r6at, KaOd

XpitriiTTros
rfj

union of substances, in which each retains its olKeia. ovtrla or

itohJttjs

Tptrp

Kara

rijv

irepiiypwpiiv j

TUV

fj}V(riKUUf

KOl fX^
"

KOTCt TTepi-

ypo^Tjv Kal TTopdOefriv Koi yoip els ireKayos oAiyos ohos ^Kridfls ^irl
iTffffoi'

avTiirapeKTad^fTeraL

etra

irviiip9ap'l)ff(Tcu.

According
374, the

Sfoi.

Bel.

i.

to Stoics

more

accurately

distinguish

aiyxvais, in which both substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed ( ipSeipeadai ), giving rise to a third body KpaffLs = 5vo ^ Kal irXeidvuv tiv&v ffotfA.d'caiv tiKaiv 5C SXx}p avTiirapeKraaiv aWiiKais oStois, Sttrre
eKoxTTov avrSJv 4v rp fii^ei Tp roia^Tr] r^v tc oiKeiav oltriav Koi T^s ef auTji 7roi6T7iras. Materials thus united can be agairt separated, but yet are they so united ws fi-rtSev n6piov iv aurots Ti/oi ju^ fierexov vdvruv tuv iv t^
(rdi^eip
:

jui^ts, KpouTis,

vapddeffis, ffvyxvffts.

napoLdeCis is trafjtdrwp awaip^ Karh

T^s

iiTKJiavelas

for instance, the

Siio
fl

combination of various kinds

of grain.
Mili; is
Kal
TrKcL^Vfjov tratfidTuif avTiirapeKTatTis

SC HXaVf vno^evovaav ruv trv^t^vSiv owTct TTOioT^Tftiy for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called juijis in the case of solid bodies, Kpams in the
KipX
;

fjdyfjiart.

case of fluids.
ij

"Siyxvan

is

Sia

For such a union to be pos(1) it must be possible for one body to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a homogeneous mass.
sible,

Ka\ 'ir\ei6vuv iroiOT'hTuv wepi rh, fTf^/xara jUTa)3oX^ els erepas Statpepoifftjs toiStwi' jtokJttjtoj

Hence

the expression aafia

Sio.

fftifiaros eLvriirap^Keiv, trufia

ffd^a-

yeve-

TQs elvat riirov Kal ffw/Aa x^P*'^^

5th
c(ifjt,aTQS

aw, as in the making up salves and medicines. Very much in the same way according to Alex. Aphr. De Mixt. 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three KapdQemsy or kinds of /**f t?
;

K6j/aujUT}6cTcpov trepie-

XOVTOS
37, 2,

a.\7\A

Tov

TTh-iipovs

K\T\peS iv5uOfiVOV {^Plut.

tU T^ Not.

p. 1077 ; Alex. 142, b Themist. Phys. 37 Svmpl. Phys. 123, b ; Hippolyt. Eefut. Haer,
;

138

TBE
is

STOICS.
distinctive features of

Chap.
VI.

one of the

much debated but

the Stoic system,' cannot have been deduced from

physical causes.

On

the contrary, the arguments by

which Chrysippus supported it prove that it was ultimately the result of metaphysical considerations.*
21) (2) it must be possible for the smaller body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by Chrysippus : ouSey dirfxew xpii.
;

capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties frankincense, for instance,
;

fiepoSf olvou a-raXayfibv

va Kepatrai

r^v fliXoTToy, or even eh iKov vhv K6(rfiov Stareveiif rp Kpdffei rhv trraKayfiiv (^Phct. 10; AUx. 142,

b;

IMog.). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them {Alex. 142, b

burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. So (pirns does in plants, and ?{ does in all which same it connects. (4) The holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons and perfumes in things with which they are mixed, and of light,

when

which penetrates air. The first of these arguments

clearly does not embody the real reason in the mind of

463, C. Fie. 860, 14, Or.). The absurdities which this theory iniv. 7, 8, p.

Platin. Bnn.

volves were already exposed by Arcesilaus (^Phit. 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Bextus, and Plotinus, by the latter in a whole treatise (Enn. ii. 7) irepi rrjs Si* cf\i' Kp^reus. * IloXXe^ ix^v yhp Xeyerat Trepl
Kpitreais Kal

Chrysippus it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second for the
; ;

phenomena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of simple intermingling
plete
(iropdSeffjs)

or com-

trx^^^v ai^vvroi irepl

tTKefifiards

Tov irpoKiifiiVov
trapa

eltn

Tois

AoyfiartKOis
iii.

ffrrfo'ets.

Sext. Pyrrh. vious note.

^

56.

See pre-

mixing. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory of the corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of Kpaa-is as distinct from
((ni7xi'0'ii)

Trapiieffis

and

ffiyxviris.

For

According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus (1) The argument from Koival Imoiai
:

our notion of xpaais is different from that of <riyxv<rcs or irap<Seffij. Many bodies are (2)

heat, according to the Peripatetic view, might be regarded as a property of what is hot, light as a definite property of a transparent body (conf. Alex. 143, a), vapdSeiTts and (riyxiHTis sufficing for other

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

139

We

have, moreover,

all

the less reason to doubt this

materialistic undercurrent of
it

Chap.

fact,

inasmuch

as the

the Stoic system affords for

the best explanation.

Although the stamp of materialism was sharply B. Dycut, and its application fearlessly made by the Stoics, ^f^,"'^ they were yet far from holding the mechanical theory nature.
of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary con- andfm'er. sequence of strict materialism. The universe was

explained on a dynamical theory

the notion of force

was placed above the notion of matter.

To matter,
but the

they held, alone belongs real existence;

characteristic of real existence they sought in causation, in the capacity to act

and to be acted upon.'

This capacity belongs to matter only by virtue of

certain inherent forces,
attributes.
.things. insisted

which impart to it definite Let pure matter devoid of every attribute

of God to the world, can hardlybe otherwise explained than as Chrysippus did, if once material existence be assigned to

Even the fact, greatly upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed can be
again separated into their component materials (Alex. 143, a Stob. i. 378) was not conelusive. As long as the knowledge of the actual composition depended on isolated cases and crude experiments, like the one named by Stobseus (into a mixture of wine and water, put an
;

the soul, to ((>i}ir(s, to e|ij, and to God. We have, therefore, here the real ground on which this theory of Kpdais was based and Simplioius rightly deduces it herefrom (Phys. 123, b) rh Se
;
:

croi/ia

5iA adifikwros j^apeiv ol iiiv

oiled sponge, it will absorb the water and not the wine), and as long as the substantial change of elements, advocated by the Stoics as well as by the
Peripatetics,

was no

difficult

was clung to, it matter for an

apyaioi as ivapyis aronov i\dn$avov, oi 5e ani rris ffroas Strrepoif vpoffiiKavTO ws ctKoKovBovv rais (npZv airav inro6e<reaiv . . . aiiimra yap \4yeiv irivra SoxoSyres, koI tos iroidxTiTos koI riiv if/ux^"; <"' ^^^ vavThs Spuvres toC
ffd/ia/ros ical t^iv 'fivxhv xwpoSo-oi/

opponent to reply. On the other hand, the relation of the

soul to the body, of property to

koI tAs iroiiiTijTar iv ra!s Hpiaeiri, avvcxtipow crufM S<4 adifiaToi

x'"f"''''

gubject-matter,of <(ii(risto<()uTiv,

See

p. 95,

3; 126,

1.

140

THE
'

STOICS.
all definite

Chap,

be considered, the matter which underlies

materials,
will

and out of which

all

things are

made

it

be found to be purely passive, a something

subject to any change, able to assume any shape

quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality,

and and
This

unable to produce any change whatsoever.^

inert

and powerless matter

is first

reduced into shape

by means of

attributes,^ all of

which suppose tension

in the air-currents

which produce them, and conse-

quently suppose a force producing tension.*

Even

the shape of bodies, and the place they occupy in space is, according to the Stoics, something derivative, the

consequence of tension

tension keeping the

different particles apart in one or the other particular

way.^

Just as some modern physiologists construct

nature by putting together a

sum

of forces of attrac-

tion and repulsion, so the Stoics refer nature to two

forces, or,

speaking more accurately, to a double kind

of motion

expansion and condensation.

;

Expansion

works outwardly, condensation inwardly condensation

produces being, or what
is

synonymous with
8J)

it,

mat-

' On &voms 8X17, as the universal inoiceifieyov or ovffia koiv^, see p. 100. Sext. Math. x. 312 awoiov fiiv oiv Kol eyhs adifuvros
:

rcTTapa (TTOixeia
ovaiav
'
'

fti>ai

A^oS riiv

&itoloi/

ttji/ lihijj/.

See p. 141, 2. Pint. Sto. Rep. 43.

1.

See
;

p.

T^v Tuv ^Kuv

oJ SrwiKot.

inreffT'tiffavTO yevstriv

105,
*

ct.pxh 7ckp

TUP &t>'
5
;

See

p. 105, 1

and 2

127,

ot' OAiTois iffTiv 7) &iroios v\ri Koi Si' b\av rpexT^, iKTafiaXKoiant T6 Tairns yCveTai rcl Teaaapa
ffTOixeio,
-irvp,

128, 2.
'
:

k.t.\.
:

Pint.
ri

C.

Simpl. Cat. 67, e (Schol. 74, a, 10) Th Toivvv ffXW" ol 2to)ikoI riiv Titriv irapexeaBai
\4yov(riv,
Sia-vsp

Not. 48,
avriiv

2,

p. 1085
oSffa
xii.

SXij Kofl'
&iroios.

tV

m^toJu tuv

li\oyos

Kal
:

iTTifieimv SidtTTaffiv.

Sih Kol ivSelav

M. Awel.
KOLvii, Ktui

30

iiia
ISites

ohaia
iroiois

dpi^ovrai ypa/iii^v riiv els &Kpoy

Teranivriv.

Sielpynrai

tr^fiari

fuipiois.

Diog.

137: t4

; :

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

ter
;

141

expansion gives

rise to

the attributes of things.'

Chap.
VI.

Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything really

must be material, they still distinguish in what is material two component parts the part which is acted upon, and the part which acts, or in other words matter and force? The Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato and Aristotle so far as to allow to formal and final causes a place side by side with this acting force or
existing

(2)

The

nature of
force, (a) Force Utitited to

efiBcient cause.

If in general anything
68,

may be

called the notion

of efficient
cause.

Simpl.

Cat.

oi

Z\

2tco{Ko1

Ziiva^jLiv^

\tJaXKov KivriffLv

Archedemus, and Posidonins. Sext. Math. ix. 11 oi airii t^s

:

cFToas Sva Kfyoi/res apx^s^ Behv Kal

rideVTaij r^v fiey 4irl tA effw, T'qv Be eirl to I|(M * koL t^v juev ' Tov elyatj rijv Be rod trothf eJvat voiji(ovaiv aWiap. Nemes. Nat. Horn, et SI \4yoifv, KaBdnep oi c. 2, p. 29
;

&noiOf S\71P, rhv fikv 6ehy

{tnei\ii(l>atn,

iroiety

ttjv Sk S\t]v trila'xetv

re

Kal

TpeVetrflot.

Alex.

Aph.

De
i.

Similarly Mixt. 144

3,

AcUll. Tat. Isag.

c.

124,
;

^TutKol, roviKTiv riva eivai

trepi Tct
(Tdofiaraj ets

Kivtjtrty

ri etrw Sjua

Koi els Th e|(u KtvovjxlvTiv, KaX rijy

^ev eisrh
Ttav

|ft)

fieyeOiai/ Kol itoi6t7]-

aitoreAeffTiKiiv

ilvtu^ T7?v

5e

89 Stob. Bel. i. 306 322, according to the passage quoted, p. 101 2, from Zeno respecting B\7) Sia toiJttjj 5i Siadeiv rhv rod navrhs \6yov ftv
PI. Phil.
;

PMt.

3,

eU rh %(Tui ev^aeas Koi oiialas. This remark is confirmed by what is quoted, p. 128, 2 from Censorinus, and by the language of Plutarch (Def. Orac. c. 28,
Schl. p.

eyioi elfiaptieviiy KdKovffiv, ot6vtrep

iv rp y6vri t6
:

ffTrepfia.

Sen. Ep.

Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici 65, 2 nostri, duo esse in rermnnatura,

425), in reference to
:

TroWdKis etpjKtiiy, rh airrjs iieaov ri ouffia Kai rats ctirb Tov avTTJs fxetrov Stoi-

Chrysippus
8ti tois CIS

KeiToi Koi avvix^'^^^

-

Kiiffifffffi.
;

Diog.

vii.

134

So/cei

5'

avTois &px^^ elyai rwp B\av SvOf rh TTOtovv Kal rh vdffxoy. fh fiej/

ex quibus omnia fiant causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e. ratio, materiam format etquoconquevultversat, ex ilia varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa
:

odf w&a'xoy slvaL t^v tiirotov oi/fflay r^v liKrtVy rh Se iroiovv rhp iv avrri Tovrov yiip Hyra \6'Yov rhv di&v, &tSiOv Sii irdffns aiiTfjs Srifuovpye^v
e/caiTTo.

est,

illud materia.

Tbid.

23

Universa ex materia et ex Deo

constant potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.
. . .

Such

is

the teaching

of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus,


142

THE
STOICS.

Chap.
VT.

a cause which serves to bring about a definite result'

and
others'

various kinds of causes

may be

distinguished,

according as they bring about this result directly or

indirectly,

by themselves alone or by the help of

in the highest sense there can be, according

to the Stoics, only one acting or efficient cause.

The

form

is

part of the efficient cause.

due to the workman, and is The type-form

therefore only a
is

only an

instrument, which the

workman employs
is

in his work.

The

final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it repre-

sents the

workman's intention,
all,

only an occasional

cause
it is

in as far as it belongs to the

work he

is

about,

not a cause at

but a result.

There can be

but one pure and unconditional cause, just as there

'

Sen. Ep.

65, 11:

Nam

si,

quocumqne remote quid effici non potest, id causam judicant

esse faciendi, &c.
ix.

time, place, and motion, ought to be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced with-

Sext.

Math.

aXrdv i<TTiv ov irap6vTos yiverai ri &TroT6\6(r)UO. This appears to be the most general
:

228

ei

Stoic definition, That given by Pyrrh. iii. 14 tovto, Si' h evepyovv yiverai rh aTroreXeff/xa and by him said to express the views of several schools, expresses a narrower conception the conception of efficient cause, which, however, for a Stoic, is the only essential one. ^ Seait. Pyrrh. iii. 15, distinguishes between irweKTMh, avvalria, and ffivepya aXrta, all of which are, however, subordinated to the Si' i, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca 1. c. maintains that, according to the definition given above.
Seiet.

out these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (De Fate, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus
relative to causEe perfectse et principales, and causae adjuvantes et proximae, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of alnov Si' h and oS oiiK Si'cu. See teller's Philo-

sophic der Griechen. In the same way, Plut. Sto. Kep. 47, 4, p. 1056 distinguishes between alria auroTeXV and npoKarapKTiKii, Alex. Aph. De Fato, 72, blames the Stoics ir/irji/os yhp
:

anitov KaTdKeyovfft, Tct fievirpoKaTapKTLK^, Tct Si iTvvairta, tA Se eKTiKd, Tot Se irvpeKTtKci, ret Se ^\Ao
Ti.

Conf. Orelli ad locum.

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

can be but one matter
;

143

and

to this efficient cause

Chap.

everything that exists and everything that takes place

^
(V) CIm^y^g

must be

referred.'

In attempting to form a more accurate notion of

this efficient cause, the first point

which deserves

g^.

attention

is,

that the Stoics believed every kind of

^'''"*

cause.

action ultimately to proceed from one source.

hovr could the
xmity,

For
were

world be such a self-circumscribed

whole,
unless
?^
it

such a harmonious

governed by one and the same force

everything which acts
is

Again, as

material, the highest efficient

;

cause must likewise be considered material

all qualities

and since

and

forces are

produced by vapour-like
the cause of
;

or fiery elements, can it be otherwise with the highest

acting force?'

Everywhere warmth
life

is

nourishment and growth,

preserved and kept in
*

and motion

all

things

have in themselves their own natural heat, and are

life

by the heat of the sun.

fi

1. c, after enuthe four causes of Aristotle, to which the Platonic idea is added as a fifth, conThis turba causarum tinues embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam

Seneoa,

irparov irotoOv
<reais.

Th apxvy^"

ttoi'/j-

merating

etgeneralemquserimusoausam. Hebo simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quserimus
quse sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim,

^ C^c. N. De. ii. 7, 19, after speaking of the consentiens, conspirans, oontinuata cognatio rerum ((ru/iTrcEfleio ray SAaiy), continues: Hsec ita iieri omnibus inter se concinentibus

mundi partibus prof ecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur.

See Semt. Math.

ix.

78.

qusecumque

retulistis,

non sunt

multse et singulse causse, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quse faciet. Conf Stob. Eel. i. 336 ofrioi' S'
.

The same view is further expanded in Sext. Math. ix. 78.

Couf. the quotation on p. 127,

Z^i/wi'

^alv

ehai

5i'

*
'

XpifftTTiros oitTiof ilvai \eyei

.
.

81'

from Alexander. ' According to the remarks, 105 and 126, this requires no p.
5,

noiTt^{ij/ios 5e oSraiy

cCiTioi'
fi

proof,

5'

iari

twos

5i'

ineho,

ri

144
Chap.
VI.

THE
What
world as a whole

STOICS.

applies to parts of the world

;

must apply

to the

hence heat or

fire is

the power to

which the
referred.'

life

and the existence of the world must be

This power must be further defined to be the soul

of the world, the highest reason, a kind, beneficent,

and philanthropic being

versal belief

in short, deity.

The

uni-

and the universal worship of God prove this, as the Stoics think, beyond a doubt ^ still more Matter can never accurate investigation confirms it.
;

move

or fashion itself; nothing but a

is

power inheresults.'

rent as the soul

in

man

can produce these

perfect

The world would not be the most

plete thing it
'

and com-

is

unless Eeason were inherent therein ; *

9,

23 (oonf. apparently as the view of Cleanthes, who alone is mentioned, 9, 24. All

ac. N. D.

ii.

ea et ipsa tota natura fervida

est, et cjeteris

ill.

14, 35), gives it

naturis

omnibus

salutarem impertit et vitalem

living things, plants, and animals, exist by heat nam omne quod est calidnm et igneum cietur et agitur motu sno. Digestion and circulation are the result of heat ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover omnes partes mundi calore fultse sustinentui. There must be fire in earth and stones, else it could not be extracted therefrom. Water, especially fresh
: :

Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes suscalorem.

tineanturoalore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diutuinitate servari eoque magis quod intelligi debet, oalidum ilium atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis,

&c.
* On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult Pint. Sto. Rep. 38, 3 Com. Not. 82, Oic. N. D. ii. 2, 5 Seneca, 1 Benef. iv. 4 Sex:t. Math. ix. 123 and 131, where different varieties of it are given, even a particular one from Zeno.
;

spring water, is warm, more particularly in winter, and as motion warms us, so the roll of the waves does the sea. From water likewise as it evaporates, air derives its heat. Jam vero Teliqua quarta pars mundi,
.
. .

"

Sext.
Oie.

Math.

ix. 75.
:

N. D. iii. 9, 22 Zeno enim ita ooncludit quodratione

:

utitur,

melius

est,

quam

id,

quod ratione non

utitur.

Nihil

' :

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

nor could
it

145

contain any beings possessed of conscious-

Chap.
VI.

ness, unless it

were conscious

itself.'

It could not

produce creatures endowed with a soul and reason,

unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason.^

Actions so far surpassing man's power could not

exist, unless there

were a cause for them in perfection

equally surpassing that of man.'

The suhordination
would be inexplicto a reasonable

of means to ends which governs the world in every

part

down

to the minutest details

able, unless the world

creator.*

owed

its origin

The graduated rank of beings would be

(Tuyepar^ rb -Trpoiefievoy (Tirepp.a KoyiKov Kol aiiTh \oytK6v sffTiv 6 Se K6tTfios vpoleToi tTTrepfia \oytKov, Koymhr &pa effrly d Kdffftoj. The same proof in Sext. Math. ix. 77
' '

autem mundo melius. Katione igitur mundus utitur. The same, ibid. ii. 8, 21, and 12,
rh Kpetrrdv fvti KoyiKov iffTLV, ouSej' 5e ye K^fftiov KpuTT6j/ 4(TTi, \oyiKhv &pa d kSitijlos . . ri yap poephp rod fi^ voepov K(d ^fifl/vxov TOV fi^ ifiyjtixov KpstrT6if 4ffTiv oi/Bev S4 ye K6(riJL0v Kpeirrov voephs &pa KaX ^pApvx^s ifftiv 6 Likewise Diog. 142, K6(riios. says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius agree that the world is Cfov xal \oyMhv rh yap Ktd efirl/vxof Kol voep6v C^Oy TOV p.^ Q4^ KpetTTOV ouSei/ Se TOV KAffflOU KpslTTOV Cv^ ^P*
Sext. XoyiKhv Tov
34.
ix.
:

Math.

104

ei

Conf ibid. ii. where also the passage in Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 8, quoted by Sext. ix. 94, is
;

and 84

(Mo.

1. c.

31, 79; 6,

18,

referred to.
'

Cfic.

1.

c.

iii.

10,
:

[Chrysippus] igitur
est, inquit,

si

quod homo

25 Is. aliquid efScere

:

non

possit, qui id effioit

melior

'

'

6 K6(Tp.0S.
'

ao. N. D.
:

affirms

Zeno ii. 8, 22 NuUius sensu carentis

:

est homiue. Homo autem hsec, quae in mundo sunt, effioere non potest. Qui potuit igitur, is praestat homini. Homini autem prsestare quis possit, nisi Dens 1 Est igitur Deus. The same,

only a
ii.

little

pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu

6,

16.

more fully. Hid.. To this argument^

muudus.
^

Diog. 143
iKetdev

ip.-^vxov 5e [Thv

K6ffp.oy\ 6ts StjXoc ck ttJs rifieTepas

ij/vxvs
oHfTris
airofftrda'-

(noTos.

Math. ix. 101 Sext. Z^vofv 5e d KiTTiehs airh "Bevo^SiviKpop^'l)V

ha^iiiV'

Toy T^f

ovrwffl

another favourite one of the Stoics, based on the fulfilment of prophecy, belongs. * Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to. prove the existence of God. Of this nature are all the f our> arguments which he employs in do. N. D. ii. 5, but particularly

; :

146

THE
VI.

STOICS.

Chap.

incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all whose moral and intellectual perfection cannot be
surpassed.^
first

Although

this perfection belongs, in the

place, to the world as a whole,'' nevertheless, as

in everything consisting of many parts, so in the world

the ruling part must be distinguished from other

It is the part from which all acting forces emanate and diffuse themselves over the world,' whether the seat of this efficient force be placed in the heaven, as was done by Zeno, Chrysippus, and
parts.

the majority of the Stoics;*

the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist withoub a builder no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. Therewith Cicero connects the abovenamed argument of Chrysippus. The same writer, N. D. ii. 32-66, gives very fully the physical theological argument for the existence of providence, which is given in a shorter form by Cleomedes, Meteora, 1 Seneca, De Provid.i. 1, 2-4 Nat. Qu. i. Sesut. Math. ix. Ill conf. Ps.
; ;
;

or in the sun, as by

See p. 143, 2 ; 144, 1-4 145, 1 and 2. = Sext. Math. ix. 102, ex-

panding Zeno's argument given,

p. 145,
i//ox^*

2 ir(ff7js yhp (p^itreus Kol V Karapx^ Trjs Kivifffstas

:

ylvfffSat 8oKe(

^LTrh

TiycfioytKou koX

P-^PV tov B\ov 4^aTro(rTe\\6iJievat SvvdfieLS s oirii

vaffat

at iirl

t^

Tiyos Tnjyris tov riyefiavtKov |oiro-

Censorvn. Fragm. i. 2, p. 7.5, Jahn ; Phit. Plao. i. 6, 8 belief in gods grows out of consider:

(TTeWoKTai. Cie. N. D. ii. 29 according to Cleanthes, omnem enim naturam necesse est, quse non solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [ = Tiyf/iovLKiv] ut

in

homine mentem,

&c.

Itaque necesse est illud etiam,

in quo sit totius naturas principatus, esse omnium optimum. See following note.
* Cic. Acad. ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoiois Eether videtur summus Deus,

ing the world and its beauty, an argument also quoted by Sext. Math. ix. 26.
' See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in Sext. Math. ix. 88-91) and the Stoics (in Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings Plants, Animals, Men, and that being which is alto-

mente prsditus, qua omnia

gantur. aethera

re-

N. D.

i.

14, 36

Deum

dicit.

(Zeno) 15, 39:

:

ignem prsterea

et enm,

quem
vii.

gether reasonable and perfect

deity.

antea dixi, aethera (Chrysippus

Deum

dicit esse).

JHog.

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

Cleanthes;'
or in the

147

centre of the world, as

all life

Archedemus.^
G-od.

This primary source of

by and
is

Chap.
VI.

motion, the highest Cause and the highest Reason,

ultimate grounds of things.'
138
:

Grod therefore and formless matter are the two

ovpavbs Se iffTiv
4v

i)

io'xd'TV

TT^pKjjfpeia,
Bf'iov.

^ trdv i'Spurat rh IMd. 139 rhv i\ov Kdfffiof

:

^^ov 6vra

/cai

^fi^vxov Kal \oyiKhv

fiev

considers the original deity; for this does not exclude the other. No doubt he identiiied o(8))p with calor (see p, 144, 1),

exeiv TjyefioyiKhv

rov al64pa,
.
.

KaBd
.
. .

<jyi\atii

'Aprlirarpos
, , .

Xpiffnrjros

S'

kc^ Xloaeih^vios
(pafTi

T^v ovpav&v vixbv ToC K6iTiiov.

irii\iv

He

rd iiyefiocontinues
:

believing that it emanated from the sun. Biog. 139: KAcdvflijs 5e [rh TyytptsviKiv fpTifft] rhy TfjXiov. Ar. Didyrmis, 1. o. TiyepLOPiKhv Sh Tov K6fffjLov KKedvdei fiev ^pf(re
rhv ^Kioy eiyat 8io rh ix4yi3Tov rav dnrpav imdpx^tv KaX irKeiffTa ffvpL&dKKiffQai nphs t^v tuv &\uv SioIktktiv, k.t.\. Stob. Eel. i. 452 Ps. Cemorin. Fragm. i. 4. According to Epiphait. Exp. Fidei. 1090, c, he called Ihe sun the ScfSovxos to the universe. ^ Stoh. 1. c. 'Apx'5aoj (leg. with Cod. 'Apxe'Sw") Ti ^7efioviKhv TOV K6(rijLou iv y^ utrdpx^iv
; :

6 ficyrot XpifatinTos Siatpop^repoi

r6 Kadaptirepov rov alOepos

iv ravr^ ovpdycp] A koI irpoTou dedv Keyovfftv, aUrdrjTiKus

&(Tircp KEXupT^KeVai 5icb rSiv 4v a4pt

"''V [

Kal

SicL

rwv

^tp^v

a-nivTaiv
ai/TTJs

koI

ijtvT&i/j Sict

S^ Trjs yijs

Kad'

eJu'.

Arius Didymus, in Ens.

:

iipeffe]

Xpva-lwirip Prsep. Bv. xv. 15, 4 Se [7]yefiovtKiv rnv K6(rf/.ov etvai rov alBepa Tbv KaBapdyraTov KaX elKtKptvetTTaTOV, are TrdvTUf

evKtyryrSTaTOV Svra Kal t^i' 3a.ij/ Kiaputu tpiffiy. irepidyoVTa rov

Ibid. XV. 20, 2 According to the Stoics, the air surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. Cornut. Nat. De. 8 Os. Zeus dwells in heaven, iirti iKei iffTi rd Kvpi^arov fiepos rrjs rov K^ffpiov >livxfis. TertulUa/n (Apol.
:

dirc^ilvaTO the same statement without mentioning rthe name in Ar. Didymus, 1. c. This reminds one somewhat of the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus. The resemblance to the Pythagoreans is greater, if
:

SlMpl.

De Coelo, Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45, is correct in saying

that the earth

; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.

47

Archedemus denied with the

Pythagoreans

was in the centre of the world. 'See p. 141, 2; 143,1. Aristooles,

CleanAcad. 1. c. solem dominari et rerum potiri = Kpareiy twv ^vrtev putat. He speaks with less accuracy {KrUehe, Forsch. 428) ether he in N. D. i. 14, 37
'

die.
. .

in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14

[of ^tw'CkoI']

thes

ffToix^'iov eivcd tpairi

Twv

ivTiav ih irDp, KaS&irep 'HpdK5'

AeiTOS, TOiirov
6ehv, ats

&px.^s ii\T]v Kal

nhdruv.

L 2

148

THE
VI.

STOICS.
Stoics in reference to

Chap.

The language used by the

the Deity at one time gives greater prominence to the material, at another to the spiritual side of their
conception of God.

(3) Deity, (a) The conception

As a

rule,

both are united in ex-

of Deity

mvre

ac-

pressions which only cease to be startling

when taken

curately
defined.

in connection with Stoic views in general.

God

is

spoken of as being Fire, Ether, Air,

as

most commonly most base and

being

-n-vsvfMa

or Atmospheric-Current, pervading
is

everything without exception, what

ugly, as well as what
is

described^ as
'

most beautiful.' He is further the Soul, the Mind, or the Eeason of

rSiy

Fuller particulars p. Hi, Hippolytus, Eefut. Haer. i. 21 Chrysippus and

1
;

ari/iardTuv.

Tei'tulUan,

146.

Ad

Zeno suppose apx^^

(aether).

1^'^^

^^^^ '^^^

Nation, ii. 4: Zeno makes God penetrate the materia mundialis, as honey does the honey-

jriinwy, ffufia Svra rh KaSaptiraToy

combs.

See

p. 105, 3.

Diog. 148: Antipater

ov(rla
i.

calls

the

6eov

aepoetS^s.

Clemens, Strom, v. 691, A: <paffi yap ffw^a lyat Tby Bfity oi

^Tto'iKol

Stob. Eel.

60

Mnesarchus (a

Kai

iry^vfia

Kai'

ovaiav,

pupil of Panastius) defines God to be rhv tc6(r^ov rijv npuirrii' OV' (riav ^xoyra eirl irvei^aros. Sciet. Pyrrh. iii. 218 StwikoI 5J [A.e':

i,

Ibid. 295, C: {oi Stw/jtoI) ffwfia 5>^a rhy fleiy 5i& rris aTtfi(ndn\i ^\7js
aij.4\i

&tnrp

nai r^v ;|w;^i'.

Tretf>otT7iit4vat

Keyovffiv ou KahSts.

yovtri Sebc]

Tri/eGjUO Si^/cov

Kai

Sicfe

Protrept.
a.Tifj.OTdr'ijs,

44,

A:

toiis airb

T?r
\4-

rav

fiStxBHv

(the

adverse).
995, b,
a,

(TTOas, 5ict irdtrris ii\7js, Kai Siek Ti)y

AUx. Aphr. on Metaph.

31 (Schol. in Ar. 607,

rh Buov
u.

StijKetv

19)

Tols atrh ttjs (Ttous So|ey 5 Bibs Kai rb iroifiTiKiiV oXnov iv ttj v\ri

Cels. vi. 71: Tuy '^rtaiKuty (paffitlyrwv Sri & Bebs nvevfiA 4tti 5(i ir dyroiv Sie\Ti\vBhs

yovras.

Orig.

Ibid. De Mix. 144, gives credit: xi/oJ^ari as 5ii TfdvTioy Zii\Kovri av6.'miiv t6 t ivai eKdiTTOv Kai rh e^QeffBai Kol
elmi.

Hal irdyr' 4y

eavT^

trepiex^y.

Op-

them

ponents like Origen,. 1. c. and i. 21, Alexander, De Mixt. 1. c.

and

avixixiviiv.

tions p. [rb^ vovv^ Kai 4v ro7s tpavKordrots

:

Compare the quota127, 5 and De An. 145

eivai Beiov 6yra,

iTToas eSo^fv.

us toTs airb Trjs Lvcicm, Hermot.

81 ws

aKovofi-sy Se
6 deh^

iia\

avrov KeyovTos, ovk 4v olpav^ effrty,

7re(f>oTJ]Kei',
f<f I0^',

dX\&
iihaiy

Sih TTiivTQiy
>rol

oToy
'"'

Plutarch, Com. Not. 48, naturally attack them for their materialistic views. = 6toJ. Ecl.i.58. See following note. Diog. 138 (according to Chrysippus and Posidonius) : rby S^ K6afiov oiKGitrBai Kara vovv Kai TrpSvoiav ely &iray avrov . fipos SffjKovTOs ToD pov KaBdiTep
.

\i8aiy Kol

&xpi

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

tlie

149

world ; as a united Whole, containing in

Him-

Chap.
VI.

self the

germs of

all

things

as the

Connecting

Sy /tey fiaWov, 5(* Sv 5J ^ttov. More popularly, iJi(J. 147: Scbv

^Iva.t

mur

voepbl' ^p ebdaifiovi^,

C^av aB6.vaTov hoyinhv TeAetoi/ KUKOV irafteal

et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is called irp6voia. M. Awrel. iv. 40 iis ev
:

Q^ov rhv K6ffiMV

fiicLV

ov(riav KcA

rbs
fiov

avexiieKTOV, irpovoriTlKhp K6ff-

^vX^^
to6tou
Alleg.

f^^^^

^jrexov

re

ruv

eV

Kfjfffi^, ^u^

tlvai

hrivoeiv' -nas

ew

a'iadt]ffLy

truyexus [liavT^v

fi.4yT0t iaidponcSiiap^ov.

eivai

8^
icai

TTtivTa dLyaSWoTcu icai

Thv

fi9 Srifiiovpyoi/

twv

Hkcuv

ipfi-ri fii^

irdvTa irpdiriTei.

vws HeracUt.

Sxrvep vanpa. Trmrrtnv Koivui re Kal rh fiepos avTov rh Si^Koy 8ick

ApoL

21

Hom. 72. TertvMan, Hunc enim (Xirfo'y)

:

vdfTwv,

ft

ToWcus

irpoffTiyopiais

Zeno determinat factitatorem,

qui euncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatiun
voeari et Deum et Jovis et necessitatem

jrpovovafiti^effdtu Karot

ras

ivifdfieis.

Phmd. Nat. De.

(JPhilodem,. irepl

ei(r0ei<is) Col. 1

and

Oio.

Nat.

De. i. 15, 39, quoting from him According to Chrysippus, Zeus

is Kotvij 0d(rjf, eiftappi^yTj, ctra7K7;,

animum omnium

rerum. Haec Cleanthes in spiri-

tum

K.T.X.

Hid. CoL 3

He

con-

torem
L, 5.

sidered
1. 0.
:

vim

ySjios to be deity. (Me. legis perpetute et aeterrse . Jovem dicit esse.

. .

congerit, quem permeaimiversitatis affirm^t. Similarly Laetant. Inst. iv. 9,

Epijjlian,.

Haer.

v.

1,

p.

12:

According to the Stoics,

is

Themist.
Tffiifaivos

De

An. 72, b
8i^

toTj

ciTrli

God

vovs,

residing

in the

...

TrdtTTis

oi/irlas

iretpoiTtiKevoL

rhv Behv

TiQefievais^

Kal 'K9V iLiv eivax povv, ttov Se tfrifX^jv, 1C9V Se tpiiftv, TTOV 8 e^iv. Oic. Aead.ii. 37, 119:

world as its soul, and permeating the fj-epucal ovcrlai. Zeus is also spoken of as being the soul of the world by Carnutus, Nat.
De. 2 by Plut. Sto. Eep. 39, 2, and by Chrysippus, 1052 iHd. 34, 5, p. 1050: t 8" t,
;

No

can doubt hune

sapientem,

mundum

Stoic esse

p.

habere

mentem,

quae se et ipsura fabricata sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Id. N. D. ii. 22, 58: . . natura ipsius vero mundi
.

solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenoue diei-

non

artificiosa

6 Koivos ttjs ipiKoA rpSyota Kal Zeis iffrtv owSe roijs ayTitroSas K\ri0' Travraxov yhp ravra 6pv' AezTOi ine* avTuy. Stoi. Eel. i.
Koiv}} t^6ffis Kal

trews

\6yQs

elfiapfjLevTj

178: Ziivwv
Swd/iiy

[t)\v elfiap^ivTjy'^

provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. ... As every nature develops from its stock, sic
tur, consuitrix et

KivTjTtic^iv

T^s

v\7]s

Kari

TavTa Kal

^trairtos, ^yrtva fi^ SiatpiLfffiy

tpfpeiy np6yotay Kal

Ka\e7y,

Ar. Sidymns, in Eus. Pr. Ev.

XV.

Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios oonatusque et appetitiones, quas ipnhs
Grseoi vocant, et his consentaneas aetiones sic adhibet ut

God cares for man 5, 2 He is kind, beneficent, and loves

]
:

men.
oiiTios

Zeus
ToC

is

called K6trnos as

fpi/, ei/iap/ieyri,

because

nosmet

ipsi,

qui animis move-

Koytp SioiKet all things, iipdareni, 8t( oliSky larty airby

eipofiiV(p

: :

150

THE

STOICS.

Chap.
VI,

element in all things; as Universal Law, Nature, _ Destiny, Providence as a perfect, happy, ever kind and all-knowing Being nor was it hard to show that
; ;

no conception could be formed of God without these attributes.* Both kinds of expression are combined
a'no^iSp6.ffKeiv,
Tft

irpSvoia,

hrt

vphs

XP^*''*/"*"'

olKovofiet

cKaffra,

AristocJes (Ibid. .xv. 14): Pri-

Farther nolle: non possnnt. details respecting the beneficent nature of the Grods in Sen.
3-9 and 25-28 ; 7 ; Nat. Qn. v. On the divine omni18, 13. science Ep. 83, 1 ; "V. Beat. 20, 5. ' According to CUc, N. D. ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the argument as to God's providential care of the world into three parts. The first part went to establish that if there existed Gods, there must also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that can be done. If, moreover, deity is the highest being, the
Benef. i. 9 ; Clement, i.
;

mary fire contains the causes and \6yoi of all things; the unchangeahle law and destiny
of the world supplies their connection. Sen.' Benef. iv. 7, 1 Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mnndo et partihus ejus inserta? Hunc eundem et fatum si . . dixeris non mentieris. (Similarly Frag. 122 in iaof. Inst. ii. Id. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2 8, 23). God or Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature, the World. Stob. Eel. i. 178: 'AvriiraTpos &
.

iv.
5,

^Tu'iKbs 6e6p tLTTetp^voTO

ftevTiv.

T^v

elfxap-

called Koivhs v6fios by IHog. vii. 88 ; by Cleanthes at the end of his hymn (Stab. Bel. i. 34) ; likewise ae. N. D. i. 14, 36 says of Zeno Naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Plict. C. Not. 32, 1; Sto. Eep. 38, 3 and 7 (here following Antipater): God must be conceived of as naxdpios,
is
einroiTjTiKbSf

Zeus

world must be governed by

deity.

The same conclusion is arrived at from the wisdom and power of deity, which must
always busy
itself

with what

is

best and highest. Lastly, it is stated, that inasmuch as the stars, heaven, the universe, and all powers in the world are divine, it is clear that every-

^ikavSpcewoSf

KTjSe-

Mkstm. (in Stob. Floril. 117, 8) God is the type of every nTtue,iieya\ippav,
fiopixhs,

a>^4\ifios,

itfepyeriKOSf

fl>i?uiv8pBinos,
:

if.T.X.

Sen. Ep. 24, 49

Quae causa est Dis benefaciendi ? Natura. Errat, si quis iUasputat nocere

thing must be governed by divine reason. The second part proved that the force and skill of nature prodnced and sustains all things. All the more reason that a universe so skillfully formed and so harmoniously arranged must be directed by a natura sentiens. And since, in its parts, it could not be more

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

in the assertion that

161

God

is

the fiery Eeason of the

Chap.
VI.

World, the Mind in Matter, the reasonable Air-Current, penetrating all things, and assuming various

names according to the material in which He resides, the artistically moulding Fire, containing in Himself the germs of everything, and producing according to an unalterable law the world and all that is
therein.'

beautiful or adapted to its purpose, it must be true of it more than of any human work of art, that it owes its origin to a The third forming reason. part aims at proving, on physico-theological grounds,quanta admirabilitas ccelestium sit rerum atque terrestrinm. ' Stob. Eel. i. 58: ^loyivits KoL KKeavBtis Kul OtvOTriSrjs t^v Tov K6aftov i^vxhv [Oehv \eyovtri\
noo'ei5c6p(os iri/eCjUa voephv . . Kol irupwSes, ovk ^x^ t^^ iiopip^v fiera^dAKoj/ 5e els t ^oiKerai Kat
.

Kei

hi'

'6\ov

TOV

K6a'fiov' 6 Beds els

KOT* avTobs, Zebs juep KaT& rb C^ov T^s SKtjs ovofia^6iiej'os, "Hpa Se

Tdv hepa Kal ra Komh. Ka&' eKtKTTOV TTJS SAtjs fiepos, St' ^s Ksx^P^ite, KaXoiixevos. The latter
KaTct

explained by Biog. thus continues Ai'o ftv t^ irdvra' fi.ev ydp <paa'i Bt Zrjifa Se uaKovtri trap' ^ffov tov ^yv C^Tl6s iffTtV fl Sict TOV ^^V K^X^pTi' Kev. (This, too, in Stob. Bel. i. 'AdTjvav Se Kara t^v eis 48.) aldepa StiTOffij/ tov TjyefjLoviKov avTov.'*Hpav Se Kara T^y eis aepa.
passage
147,
is

who

(Tuve^QfioiotSfiej/ou

iraffLU

TA]-

vwv
vov.

6 "SrwiKhs vovv k6<tplov ir^pL-

lb. 64; Plut. Plac. i. 8, StooikoI mep'ov (^Plwt. 01 KQiv^repoy) 9ehy aTcotpaivovTOi irup ytviaei, TcxyiKbi' iS$ $a5i(ov K6<riiou (a similar definition of nature is given by Zeno in (Me.

/caret t^jv els t6 TexvtKhv Trvp. Kal noffetSwya Kari T^v els rb vyp6v. Kal AijfiiiTpav

Kat "Hcftata'Tov

17

Karii

Nat. De.
yovs,
icaff

ii,

22, 57)

iiJ.TTpiiX.Ti<f>6s

T^y els yvv Sfiolots Se koI T&s ^\Aas npoa'Tyyopias ^x*^M^^o Ttvos 6iioi6T'iiros aireSoffav. Plut. rbx Behv C. Not. 48, 2, p. 1085 trcDjua voephv Kal vovv 4v SAp . . TroiovfTes. M. Awel. 5, 32: rif
: .

re irdvras robs

ffirepfiariKoiis

\6-

ots civavra {PI. ixaanC) Kaff eliiapiiiviiv ylvi-rai, Koi vvevfia

^kSi^koc,
Si'

tov k6(Tijlov, ris 5^ irpo<Ti\yopias furaXafi^&vov Sii Toil rris vKvs, Si.' ?s (teXf^Pltf M^Following the same TaA.\tf|eis. source, AtTienag. Leg. pro Christ.
'6\ov
c. 5,

ovffias SiijKOVTa \6yoVj PorpTiyr. in Bus. Pr. Bv. XV. 16, 1 rbv Se Qebv . . irvp voephv elirSvTes. Orig. c. Gels, vi. 71 Kara fjiev oZvTobs hub rris GToas . . . Kal & \6yos tov Oeov 6 }iexpt avBpda-nuv KaX tuv i\axiifTuv KaTa$alvav ohSev &\\o eiTTlv ^

5i&

Trts

K.T.A..

Sehl

y^p

S fi^' Sths irvp

irvevpa

<r(ji>fiaTtic6v.

The same

TfXviKbv, K.T.K. (the same down to ylverai) rh Se TrveSfia avrov Bi^-

combination of nature.and mind

in the conceptions of

God

is


152

THE
'

STOICS.

Chap.

As used in the Stoic system, these expressions mean one and the same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original cause is described as an Air-Cun-ent or as Ether, or as Heat or as Fire. It is an Air-Current, Air-Currents being, as we have already seen, the causes of the properties of things, giving them shape and connection. It is also Fire, for by fire is only meant the warm air, or
generally

the fiery

fluid,

which

is

sometimes called Ether, at

is

other times Fire, at other times Heat,' and which

expressly distinguished from ordinary
fire.''

More-

over the terms, Soul of the world, Eeason of the world. Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny
all

trating the whole world.

expressions.
Stoics

mean the same thing, the one primary force peneEven the more abstract
Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the
an essentially gross meaning, implying not

only the form according to which the world is ar-

ranged and governed, but also the essential substance

of the world, as a power above everything particular
found in the hymn of Cleanthes (in Stot. Eol. i. 30), Zeus being
described as the ipxny^s <j>v<ras, who directs the Koivhs \6yos is

137
tv

hiunirai

fikv

oZv ttvai ri irvp

iii atS'epa KaAeio-floi.

Sm
'

irivTuv 0(jit^,
Stoi. Eel.
i.

by means

of

Trvp iei^uiov.

' Stob. Eel. i. 538, on the authority of Zeuo ; Ckc. N. D. ii. 15, 40, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the diSerenoe

374: Chiysipri tn
iri/cDjua

consists in this: Ordinary (Stcxyoc) fire consumes things; but the vvp rexvtKhv, which consti,tutes (piais and >iivx\ preserves things. Heraclitus, too, in making primary fixe the basis of things, did not mean fiame,

pus teaches
Tou,
fi

clvoi

KLvovv ^aurhvphs eauriicol i^ 4auTTvevfia

eauT^

Kiifovv irprffrw

KOI owltru

iryevfKi Be ^KryiTTai 5ia

rh \4ye(T0ai avrh aepa etvai utyoijievov ^vti\oyov Sk yiyveaQai

eireiTo [?
fj']

perhaps

aurf),

aWephs,

fiirre

Kai tis

or: TTupis Koivhr

vii,

but

warmth, which may be

?i.6yov

Treffeic

airii.

Diog.

equally well described as atmospheric substance or as ifnix^.

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

and individual.' If Nature must be distinguished from Destiny, and both of these notions again from
Zeus,'' TI.

153

Chap.

the distinction can only consist herein, that

the three conceptions describe one original Being at

different stages of His

manifestation and growth.

it is called

Viewed
viewed

as the

whole of the world

Zeus

as the inner

power in the world, Providence

or Destiny;' and to prove this identity at the close

of every period, so taught Chrysippus, Zeus goes back

into Providence.''

Upon

closer examination, even the difference beidealistic description of

tween the materialistic and

Grod vanishes.

God, according to Stoic principles,

can only be invested with reality when

Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, God may also be called fattim nam cum fatnm nihil aliud sit quam series implexa
'

He

has a

ille est prima omcausa, ex qua ceterse pendent. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 1 Vis

causarum,

nium

Heine, Stoic. De Fat. Doct. p. apparently without reason, conjectures Kal Tiji fiiy ati/iari rhv KSfffioy), rp Se ^vxy T^y ""prfyoiay Srav oZv ix ir-dpuffis yevTjTai fi6yov &^9apTuy oyra rhy Aia rSiy 0ewy avaxapiXv ^irl ttiv 'irp6yotay,
25,
:

ilium fatum vocare

bis.

Non

erra-

elra 6jxov yepofjieyovs

iir\

fitas TTjs

ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. The same applies to the name See of providence and nature.
est,

Hie

rov aidepos
repovs.

ovirlas SiaTe\e7y ap.<pQ-

p. 162, 2.
^ iStob.

Eel.
:

i.

178

(Plut.

Hocr(iS<iyios [t^k 28, 5) rplTTjy airh Ai6s. elfiap^emjv^ vpSrrov fiev ykp eTvat rhv Aia, SedTepov Sk T^y (pv(riy, rpWiiV Se tt]v

Plac.

i.

Conf. do. Divin, i. is deduced, according to Posidonius, (I) a Deo, (2) a fato, (3) a natura. Plut. C. Not. 36, 5, p. 1077 \76i yovv Xpvanriros, 4olKivai Tw fiev kvQpdiirtj) rhv Aia Kal rby K6(Tiioy (instead of which
elpiapiiiintv.

55,

125,

where prophecy

To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by Phih, Incorrup. M. 951, B, where, too, irpdyoM is equivalent to ^vxh TOU KdffflOV. ' According to Chrysippus. A different view is taken by Posidonius. "With him Zeus stands for the original force, ^tliris for its first, and ei/iapi^evii for its second production. * Plut. 1.0. &. Bp. 9, 16: Jovis, cum resoluto mundo et Diis in uuum confusis paullisper cessante natura acquieseit sibi cogitationibus suis traditur.

154

THE
material form.
'

STOICS.

Chap, VI

Hence, when

He

is

called the Soul,

the Mind, or the Keason of the world, this language

does not exclude, but rather presupposes, that these

conceptions have bodies

and such bodies the Stoics

fluid

thought to discern in that heated

one time
call

which they at

the all-penetrating Breath, at another

Ether, or primary Fire.'

minations appeared to

Each of these two deterthem indispensable,^ and both

as the Stoics did, that

became

identical

by assuming,

the infinite character of the divine Eeason depends on

the purity and lightness of the fiery material which

composes

it.'

Seneca

is

therefore only following

it

out the principles of his school when he calls

indifferent whether

quite

God

is

regarded as Destiny or as

an all-pervading
'

Breath.''

Those who charge the

noster calor, quo hsec qn^ nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent.

Compare, besides what has been already quoted, Oic. Acad. i. 11, 39 (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. Sokci 5e auroij Siog. vii. 156
: :

Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiaeque hoe

calore teneantur et propterea

riiv

iiei> <pi<riv

elvai irvp

Tex"*!"'

moveanturacsentiant,mundum
esse sine sensu, qui integro et puro et libera eodemque acer-

6S^ PaSi^ov

eij yiveijiv, Sirep 4itt\

vvevp-a TTupoeiSes

Kol Tex'"'E'5ej.
:

Stob. Eel. i. 180 Sivaiuv TTvevfMTiKiiv

Xpu(rnr7roj

tV
:

oi<rlav

T^s

eifiapfievris
;

Td^ei toS iroyrbs

rimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur. Conf. Ar. Bidymus, in the passage quoted, p. 146, 4,
p. 105, 127.
< Consol. ad Helvid. Id 8, 3 actunl est, mihi crede, ab lllo quisquis formatio universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio
:

SioiKTiTmi\v

another

according to definition eifiapfievri ^crrly S ToB xSanov K6yos, ^ K6yos

or,

ruv

if rif K6iT)i(f vpovolif SioiKoi/-

/levay, k.t.a.

Instead of \6yos,
iX^Seia,

he
2

also

used
p. 143.

^iaks,

aiVfo, avdyien, &c.

ingentium operum
divinus
11,

artifex, sive

See
Oic.

spiritus

per

omnia

N. D.

ii.

30

Atque

maxima
fatum
et se

ac

etiam mundi ille fervor puiior, perlacidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus

tentione [

Eequali inrdvoj] diffiusus, sive

series,

minima

immutabiliscausaxum

commovendos

quam

hio

inter cohaerentium Conf. p. 153, 1.

DYNAMICAL VIEW OF NATURE.

Stoics with inconsistency for calling God at one time Eeason, at another Soul of the universe, at another Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe,'
'

155

Chap.

forget that they are attaching to these terms a

mean-

ing entirely different from that in which they were used by the Stoics.^

The more

the two sides of the conception of Grod

(J)

6od

^the

material

and the

ideal
is

are

compared, the ^'^^^

clearer it becomes that there

no difference between

Grod and primary Matter.

substance, which,

substratum,

is

Both are one and the same when regarded as the universal known as undetermined matter but
;

when conceived

of as acting force,

is

called all-per-

vading Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air,

Nature, Soul of the world, Eeason of the world, Providence, Destiny, Grod.

Matter and power, material

and form, are not, as with Aristotle, things radically Far from different, though united from all eternity. it, the forming force resides in matter as such ; it is in itself something material it is identical with Hence the difEther, or Fire-element, or Breath.
;

ference between eflBcient and material cause, between

Grod and matter, resolves itself into the difference

between Breath and other elements.

too, is

This difference,

no original or ultimate
:

difference.

According

' de. N. D. i. 14 Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-per-

vading
shall

Eeason

deity.

(We

come back presently to

what he says

as to the divinity Cleanthes gives of the stars.) the name of deity to the world,

reason, the soul of the world, and ether ; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the universe, and etemil law. " Xrische, Forsoh. i. 365.

156

THE
VI.

STOICS.

Chap.

to the Stoic teaching, every particular element has

in process of time developed out of primary fire or

God, and to Grod

tive

it will

return at the end of every

period of the world.'

It is therefore only a deriva-

concerned.
its

and passing difference with which we are here But taking the conception of Deity in full meaning, it may be described as primary
is real is

matter, as well as primary power.

all

that

the divine

The sum total of Breath, moving forth

Deity

from

itself

and returning
fire,

to itself again."

itself is

primary

containing in itself in

germ

both God and matter;^ the world in

gaseous condition
;*

its original

the Universal Substance changing

into particular elements, and from

itself again,

which regarded in

its real

them returning to form as God

includes at one time everything, at another only a

part of real existence.^

C. Pa/atlieism.

From what
the world.
theistic.

has been said

it follows

that the Stoics

(1) God identical with the I world. I

admitted no essential difference between God and

Their system was therefore strictly panThe' world
is

the

sum

of all real existence,

and all real existence is originally contained in deity, which is at once the matter of everything and the creative force which moulds this matter into particu

See pp. 153, 2; 153,4. Chrysippus. See p. 152,

1.

note
*

\iy6vT<t>v ff&fia Tpeirrhv hi6\ov /cal i.KKoiwT'bv Koi jjLeTafiKiiTbv Kaf 7roT trtivTa <l>6eip6yrai/ koX fiiifov

AHstocles.
3.

See

p.

147,
i.

note
'

Mnesarehus, in Stob.
p. 148, 1.

60.

See
'

rhv dehv KaTaKiirSvTuv. Ihid. iv, 14 6 rav ^tu'^kuv debs Sre ir&fia Tvyxavuv Sre itkv riycfioviKhv ?x" T^i/ iiKr]v oittrlav Urav ij iKirOpuffis
:

Orig. c. Cels. iii. 75, p. Xtu'Ikuv 9fhv ^BapThr 497, A flaa-yipTuv Ka\ ^^v ohalav avrov
:

3t6 Se inl ficpovs yiverat

SiaK(!ir/ir)(ris.

aitTTJs

iraf ^

; ;

PANTHEISM: GOD AND THE WORLD.

lar individual substances.

157

We

can, therefore, think

Chap.
VI.

of nothing which

is

not either immediately deity or

In point of essence, Grod and the world are therefore the same indeed, the two conceptions are declared by the Stoics to be abIf they have nevertheless to be solutely identical.'
a manifestation of deity.
;

distinguished, the distinction

partial.

when

it

is only derivative and The same universal Being is called God is regarded as a whole, World when it is re-

garded as progressive in one of the many forms

Besides the quotations already given from Chrysippus on p. 153, 2, and Cleanthes on p. 155, 1, compare Phrsdr. Nat. De. {Philodem. irtpl 6uo-c0cas),
'

oKoy

Kdfffioi/

Kai rhv dvpaviv.

Ar.
15,
iriiv

Bidym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 1 and 3 i\ov Se T'bv K&ff^ttv

:

rols eauTov fifpeiTi Trpoaayope{iov(rt

/col Zevs \4yirat Orig. o. Cels. v. 7 o'a</)cDs 5^ Til/ i\ov h6(rfjiOV AeyovffLV ilvcLL B^hv 'S.Tw'iKol fisv rb npuTov. The arguments given,

6e6y.

Sih S^

Col, 5 ^ioy4vr)s 6 Ba^vX^vios iv T^ trepl TTJs 'Adtjvas Thv Koafiov

:

5'

d K6tTixos.

ypd^et
tj

Tq}

irepicxeiv

Bptairov

Alt rhv avriy virapx^tf^ rhv Aia xaBdirep i.vCic. N. De. ii. ^vx^v.

17, 45 : Nothing corresponds better to the idea of God, quam

ut

primum himc mundum, quo

fieri

excellentius potest, esse et Deum jndicem. Ibid. 13, 34 Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mimdo. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3
nihil

animantem

Vis

ilium

vocare

mundum ?

Non

est hoc quod vides totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et Quid sua. Ibid. Prolog. 13 Mens universi. est Deus?
falleris.
:

Ipse enim

p. 144, for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the same as the world. The existence of God is proved by showing the reasonableness .of the world. Aratus gives a poet's description of the Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the Phsenomena: Zeus is the being of whom streets and markets, sea

and

land, are full,

whose

off-

Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitude sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari
potest,
si

solus

est

omnia, opus suum et extra et

Diog. vii. 148 intra tenet. ohaiav Se 0Eot) 7A}vuv fiev ^at rhy

spring is man, and who, out of regard for man, has appointed signs in the heaven to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known lines of Virgil, Georg. iv. 220 iEn. vi. 724. The round figure of the Stoic deity, Sen. Bp. 113, 22 De M. Claud. 8, 1, has also reference to the world as God. Conf. ao. N. D. i. 17, 46.
;

158

THE
ference,

STOICS.

Chap.
VI.

assumed in the course of its development. The diftherefore, is tantamount to assigning a difference of meaning to the term world, according as
it is

used to express the whole of what

exists, or

only

the derivative part.'

(2) Oif-

Still this distinction

^'-

does not depend only upon

tw^Go'd
relative,

^'^y ^ looking at things,

but

it is

founded in the

and the nature of things. ^ worUonly

.

Primary
this

force, as such,
i, I what

^/*. nre, primary reason, constitute

is

/ primarily n Grod.
Hence

primary

Things into which

itself are

primary substance has changed

only divine in a derivative sense.

is

deity,

which

ultimately identical with the whole

of the world,

may

again be described as a part of the

world, as the leading part (to '^ys/j,ovtKbp), as the

Soul of the world, as the all-pervading fiery Breath.^

'

Stoi. Eel.

i.

Hi

K6<rfiBv S'

ing) &s

tpTjtrt

IloffeiS^vios

etj/al ^Tjffiv

6 XpitTiirnos (riffrtifw.

e| ovpavov koI yi^s Kal rSn/ iv Toii' ij rh iK Beuv Kal avBpilmav aiarniia koX Ik tUv Jve/ta TO^rwv yeyovSrotv. \4yeTat S' ^r4pus Kdff^os 6 &ehs, Ka& tv 7j

fftJffTr^/AO 4^ ovpavov xal yrjs ical tSiv iy TO^TOis ip^ffeoay, % (third

rois (piffeuv

meaning)
afSpdonoiy

aitrrrnia Ka\

ix 6f&v Kal

yeyovitity.

Tuy eyexa roirtay Ar. Didym. in Eus.

:

SiaK^O'fnto'ts y'lverat koL TeXetovrai.

name
iroihy,

Pr. Bv. XV. 15, 1 KiSff/tos is the for rb ck jriffirjs ttjs ovaias

JMog. vii. 137 \fyovin Se xdafiov Tpixus avTiiv T rhv dehi/ rhif ix
: '

and for rh

xaTh, -r^y Sialeal

ic6aii.riaiy rijy

roiairriy

Stdra^iv

TTjs andffTjs obtrlas iSiws troihvj ts

S^ &(pdpapT6s
STj^iovpyhs
Karct
&)V

iffrt

KoX ayevyttTos
SiaKoa-p/qiretas

TTJs

xp^v^v MffKuv els

oiitriav

Tij/iy nepi6Sovs h.va-

exoy. In the former sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God in the latter, created, and subject to change. Com;

eauT^i'

r^v

airaffav

Kol

'jrfiKiv

e| eavrov yevvStv.

pare also the quotations from the mathematician Diodorus,

in Ach. Tat. Isag.
b.
-

KaX aiir^i/ Se r^y dtaicScT^'no'tv

a<TTip<jOV KdiXflov
sli/aL

tuv
KOt,

c.

6. p.

129,

Keyovffl

rplrov rh truyeCTTjK^s ^|
ol etrri xiff/ios
f;

afitjyoiy.

(according to
S

the

first

meaning of the word)

twv HKwv ovfflas, (universal substance in its definite quality) tj (second meantStws Troths Tris

See p. 148. The two ideas blend into each other. Thus Seneca, Nat. Qu. Prol. 13, says God must be the Eeason of the world and must also be the universe itself; and he con-

PANTHEISM: EXCEPTION OF BOETHUS.

The distinction, however, is only a relative
is

169

one. "What

Chap.

not immediately divine

is

nevertheless divine de-

VT

"

rivatively, as being a manifestation of

primary

iire

and
is

if

the soul of the world

it

is

not identical with the

It

body, at least

pervades every part of that body.'

a distinction, too, which applies only to a part of

the conditions of the world.

period, the

At the end

of every

sum
is

of aU derivative things reverts to the

unity of the divine Being, and the distinction be-

tween what

originally

and what

is

derivatively

divine, in other words, the distinction between

God
(3) Goe-

and the world, ceases. Boethus alone dissented from the pantheism of the Stoics by making a real distinction between Grod and the world. Agreeing with the other Stoics in
considering deity to be an ethereal Substance,^ he

^glnu^run tkepan^j^e

Stoics.

would not allow that

it resided, as

the Soul, within

the whole world, and, consequently, he refused to call the world a living being.^ Instead of doing this, he

placed the seat of deity in the highest of the heavenly

spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars,

and made

it

operate upon the world from this abode.'*

tinnes
ter

The oppoBiJr/flos

Quid ergo interest innaturam Dei et nostram 1 Nostri melior pars animus est,
:

'

Diag. 143
Qifov

S4 ^riaiv

ouk

cTi'oi

tiv

K6criiov.

The

in illo nulla pars extra animum Totus est ratio, &c. est. ' The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, and the argu-

words of Pliilo, Incorrupt. M. 953, c ^^vxk Se tov k6(tp.ov kutA robs dvTi5o|oSj'Tas 6 Behs imply the same, but these words evidently are not taken from Boe-

thus.
*

ment quoted by TertuUian from

Zeno on
%Kav.
=

Siog. 148:

BMos

p. 148, 1, is

a
:

xpaa-ts Si'

irtpl ^ia-etas ohiriav

Se iv ifi 6eov t^v tuv

See p. 135. Stot. Eel. i. 60 aXBipa Bilv are(j}iimTO.

BiiTjflos tIiv

&irAai/Si/ (r<()ar|Da)' which must be understood in the same sense as the corresponding statements

160

THE
site
VI.

STOICS.

Chap.

view detracted, in his eyes, from the unchange-

able and exalted character of the divine Being.

How

anxious he was to vindicate that character will also

be seen in the way in which he differed from his

fellow-Stoics in reference to the destruction of the

world.
of other Stoics the iiyeiiovtKhv of the world resides in the purest part of the ether. Yet, inasmuch as the world is no living being, nor is deity the soul of the world, it must, according to the view of Boethus, act upon it from without. This is expressly stated in Philo, Incor:

rup. M. 953, B, God is described as the charioteer guiding the

world,
stars

and irapifrrcJ/ieros the and elements. But this

passage, beginning at koI /u^ttot' eiKiiTtos, is evidently Philo's own expajision of what he has
just quoted

from Boethus.

GENEMAL COURSE OF THE UKIVERSE.

161

CHAPTEK
,

VII.

THE STUDY OF NATUKE. COITESE, CHARACTER, AND GOTERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.

Bt

virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary

for, in-

chap.
^^^

Being passes over into particular objects;

volving as
it

does the conception of a forming and A. The

it

creating force,

must

universe, as a seed or

as necessarily develope into a ^gJ^J^f ovum must develope into a *' *-

plant or animal.'

Primary fire

following Heraclitus

so taught the Stoics, (i) OHgin

"f

first

goes over into vapour,

is

*^

then into moisture

one part of this moisture

pre-

cipitated in the form of earth, another remains as

water, whilst a third

part evaporating constitutes

atmospheric

and air, again, enkindles fire out of itself. By the mutual play of these four elements the world is formed,' built round the earth as a
air,
Diog. vii. 136 kot' 4px^* oZv Hoff aiirhi/ Syra [rhr 6ehv~\ rpeveiv rijv iracrav oiaiav 5i' dtpos
'
:

13, 1

Rre
:

likv

world

will consume the hunc evanidum con-

Kol Sffirep in tj 701^ rb (nrep/ui irepiExcToi, o8tib koI toS-

as

S!<op

sidere, et nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura, igne restinoto,

quam humorem.
mundi spem
i.

In hoc futnri
JStob.

TOP

ff'KepfjiariKht'

\6yov Svra rov

latere.
5.

Eel.

K6(Tfiov ToioflSe viroKtir4(r9ai

h t$

372 and414,
i.

See pp. 161, 2

Z'^i/ura Se

vyp$ ivepyhv ourqj iroiovvTa ri]V Sktiy Trpii! riir ray iljris yiyfffiy, K.T.X. Seneca, Nat. QuEest. iii.

164, 2. ^ Stob.

370

oBras

wiroi^idvtaeiu Sio()/i^8i)v

TomiTijy

162

THE
centre;' heat, as it
is

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.

developed out of water,^ mould-

ing the chaotic mass.

Se^trei eivat

By
rod
8i*

the separation of these

&vbi
tpiifflv

iv

irepio^c/t

ttiv

Tptir6fiivov

aii^etrOai

'

iiXov Siajc6(Tfnj(riv ix rris

outrias.

Srav

itf

TFupbs rpoTT^

ets

SSap

aepos yevTjTai rb juev ti u^iffTatrfloi Kal yrjv (rvviffraffQou, 4k tov \onrov fie rh fihv Stofieyeiv SSup^ iK Se tov aTfii^ofieyou a4pa yiveffdai, i rivos 5^ TOV aepos irvp ^^dwreiv. Diog. vii. 142 ylyeirBaL Se rhv k6<!)iov tirav ix trvphs ^ olffia rpair^ St* p,4pos els vypSTTira, elra rh TraX":

Kal ipx^o'dai SMKOiTfietv Tb '6\ov, Kal TotauTrjy TfpioSov ael Kal Star iy tjj K6a'iir](rLi' 'jroiov/ievov tov

T&v H\ay

oifffia t6vov (for this favourite expression of Cleanthes, see p. 127, 5 128, 2) m^ -"aieaBat
:

rStaKO(r^oiJ)Uef3i/

to SXovJ. Sxnrep

yhp kv6s Tivos

KOVfTL
TO,

Th

fiepif]

irtJfTO

tpierai eK ffirep^Ttov 4v toIs KaBi}-

juepes

avTov

tTvffTh.v d.TTOT\eirB^ yij

jiepT],

XP^^OLSf OVTOl K(^ TOV iKou Sip Kal TO fijJo Kal t4

Tvyxiiyei, iv Tois KaQi)tp{reTai.

rh Sh

^eTTTOjLiEpes i^aepuB^ Kal tovt' iirtTrXeov \enrvif9ky Trvp airoyevv'fjtrTi eJra Karit fii^iv iK T0i5;

^vTk ovTa
Tives

KovTt xp6vois

Kal

fiffjrcp

tpurd, T Kal ^^a Kal &\\a yimj. Chrys. in Plut. St. Eep. 41, 3, Se vvphs ineTafioXii p. 1053 Ti iffTi TOia&rri St' &4pos els SSwp rpeirerat kolk* roirov 7^s &<ptffTafihlis A^p ivOvtiiarai Keirrvvofieyov Se tov aepos 6 ai8i]p
:

Tuy

fxepuy eis oirepfia trvviSvTes ixiyvvyTai Kal a^dts 5;oTU)V

\6 yoL

KpiyovTat

yevofiej/ue

tuv

fiepuf,

'

'

TrfptxeiVai

KiKhtp.

The same

writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod's Theogony, v. 459, oTi Kadiypaip SvTuv twv '6>mv koL
ofiBpaiv

KaTatpepofjtevuv

voWuy

T^jv eKKpifftv ToiiTav

fjLiia-dai.

Kp6vov avo-

Oonf. Cleinens, Strom.

oStus i^ ev6s Te trdfTa yiyyeirBai Kal 4k irdyraiv ets %v trvyKplveadai, (conf Heraclit. in vol. i. 467, 1), dS^ Kal ffviitpiiivais Sie^tovtTTjs ttjs irepidSoi). A few further details are supplied by Macrob. Sat. i. The myth respecting the 17. birth of Apollo and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. Namque post chaos, ubi primum coepit condeformitas in rerum fusa
.

Stoi. i. 312. Eel. i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth. 2 Stoh. 1. KA.ct^pflTis Se c. ovTOi irds <p'ri(Tty iK^KoyiffOevT os TOV TtavThs ffvui^eiv tI> fieffov auTov
V. 599, c,
'

and

StoJ).

formas et elementa nitescere, terrseque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque instabili
convalesoente sede mutaret paullatim setheres calore atque inde seminibus in earn igneis defluentibus (the connection of Zeus, i.e., of Ether, with Leto, the Earth) hasc sidera edita esse credantur et solem maxima caloris vi in suprema raptum lunam vero humidiore et velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tepore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam iUe magis substantia patris con:
; ;

'

TTp&TOfj eira to: ix^t^^ya airoofieyvvfrQai St' ^\ov, tov Se Trofrbs

i^vypavSevTos,
TTuphSf

ri

kvTiTV'K'i)travTos avTtp

ecxaTov tov tov

TOvvaV'
is,

fi4<Tov, TpiireffQai irtiKiv ets

Tt'oy

(the probable

meaning

that the last remains of the

original fire begin a

motion in
effl'

the opposite direction)

outm

GENERAL COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

elements, a distinction between the active and the

163

Chap.
VII.

between the soul of the world and the body of the world becomes apparent.
passive powers of nature

The moisture
in
it

into which the primary fire was first

as the heat' latent

changed represents the body, just

represents the soul
division of the
;

or,

taking the later four-

fold

elements, the two lower ones

correspond to matter, the two higher ones to acting

force.*

As the
stet,

distinction

between matter and force has

St6\ov
Stjs
fj.v

(2) Mul of the world:

hseo matris. The statement that besides other things plants and animals had their

yap

&i/ 6 K6ffixos -nvpdi4(rTtif

u0uy Kol i^ujf^

SauTou

origin in the intermingling of elements {Stob. and Siog.) must be understood in the sense of generatio sequivoca. Lactmit. Inst. vii. 4, says the Stoics make men grow like sponges out of the earth, and Sext. Math. ix. 28, says the Stoics speak of the earth-born men of prehistoric ages.

Kol 7iyefiovtK6v. 8t Se fieTafia\&)V eis Th {r/pbv KoX t^v ivairoXeKpdeT-

aav ^vy^v rp6i:ov

Kal l^etnivaL
'

Tivh,

eis

ffwfjia

^vx^l' fJ-ere^aKev &(TTe

^k
TO^TWtf,

av-

&\\ov rty^

sffx^ \6yoy,

p.
Ttt

72

Nemes. Nat. Horn. C. 2, Keyouffi di ot Srwi'/coi, twv

:

(TTOix^iccv Tct flic elt/at

SpatrrtKcL
p.f

56

iraOriTiKii

'

SpaiTiKct

There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from which a new creation could emanate. Philo, Incorrupt. M. 954, C, observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire
'

aepa KOt iriJp, wadfiTtKh Se yriv Kal SSwp. Pint. Com. Not. 49, 2.

at the

iKTiipinais,

the

fire itself

would be extinguished, and no new world would be possible.

5i6 Kai TLj/es
.

Tuv

diri

ttjs trroas

e<j)a(xav,

hri fier^

t^v

e/cjriS-

puCiVj iireibav A peos K6afjiOS fieWrj

Si]fiioupyetff9ai, aifiTvaj/ jxiv

ob

(r/Sei/yi/Toi,

irotr^

rh irvp 5e ris abrov

1. c.

fio7pa viro\inerai.
'

See above p. 127, 5. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points connected with the Stoic philo* sophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or deity (and likewise the human soul) should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force and the statement that properties are atmospheric currents as, indeed, the whole distinction of subject-matter and property follows from this view of
;

Chrys. in Plut.

41, 6

things.

164

THE
its

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.

origin in time, so it will also have an end in time.'

Matter which primary Being has separated from itself

to form its

body

is

being gradually resolved into priso that, at the

mary Being again;

end of the present

which
its

course of things, a general conflagration of the world

will restore all things to their original form, in

everything derivative will have ceased to exist, and

pure Deity, or primary

original purity.^
'

fire, will

alone remain in

This resolution of the world into

(according to

The
is

Diog. there

Stoics, according to 141, where, however,

Nwmenius

see

apparently a lacuna prove that the world (5io(ci(fffH7iris, not K6<rfws, in the absolute sense, see p. 158, 1) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences ot to [vulgo o5 Te T&, Coiet: oStit6]

Ens'. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1) : Zivuvt Koi KAecifdei Koi Xpvffltrvtii apeiritei

in

the

text,

r^v

fiera^&Wety otov eis (Philo, Incorrupt. M. 956, B, expresses himself against this description) koI 7rd\tv iK TovTov Toiahrtfli &iroTeoi/triav
tTTrep/ia

rh

irvp

KeiffQai T^jy SioKSfffiTiirtv oTafrpdre'

pov

fiefnj

(pOaprd

iffrL,

KaX rh ^\oif

'

rcL

^v. Seneca, Consol. ad Marciam, gives a graphic description of the end of the

Se

fiepTj

Tov

K6fffiov

(pOaprctf els

&K\it\a yoip fieTa$ilK\ei

fipa d k6cthos
forrl rijs ivl

^Baprhs

and (1

ti iwiSeucTir

<l>6apT6v

rh x^'po" ii^Ta$o\9is, iiTrt KaX 6 K6ff^os &pa

^^avxiMtyrat yap Koi i^vSarovTai.

Conf. AlesB. Meteora, 90. In Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 2, p. 1054, Chrysippus asserts that the oi(ria is immortal, but to K6a^os belongs a &airfp a.<p9aptria. Plut. Sto. Eep. 39, 2, p. 1052 [XpiitnTTTTOs] iv t^ Trpdrep
:

world, which recalls the language of the Revelation. Compare, on the subject of iiaripatris, Diog. vii. 142, 137 (see above p. 158, 1) Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. 15, 1 Plut. Com. Not. 36 (see p. 153, 2) ; Hera;
:

ettt.

5rcpl

irpovoias

-rhv

Ma,

ipijalv,

ai^eadat iiexpis tivch airhv oirayra KaTavaAiiari. iirel yctp i BdnaTos

fxev iffTi

^vx^^ x^P^^f^^s ^^^ TOW

Alleg. Horn, c, 26, p. 53 Acad. ii. 37, 119 N. D. ii. Sen. Consol. ad Polyb. 46, 118 i. 2 Alex. ApTvr. in Meteor. 90, In the last-named passage, a. it is urged by the Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of water are dried up or else take the place of dry land. Sirniyl. Phys. iii.
Cie.
; ; ;

tj S^ tov Kdfffiou ypvx^ oh Xwp'CcTai likv, atf{6Tai Se iruj/exSs /tfXP" *" f's a{ni]v ^avaXtiffy i^Atji/, oh ^tjTeov atrodviiffKeiv jhv Kda/ioii, Stoi. Eel. i. 414

(rdpLaTos,

De Coelo ; 487, b, 35 Justin. Apol.

b
c.

tV

Gels.

iii.

Schol. in Arist. 489, a, 13; i. 20 ; ii. 7 ; Orig. 75, 497, a ; vi. 71.
;

and

Since at the

iKvipaiais every-

GENERAL COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

fire

IGo

or ether,' the Stoics thought, would take place,

its

Chap.
'

through the same intermediate stages as

tiou from the

genera*

primary

fire.^

Cleanthes, following

his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing

force

in the world, supposed that

sun.''

its

destruction

would come from the

No

sooner, however, will

its

everything have re-

(3) Cycles

turned to
thing
:

original unity,'

and the course of the

CIS

in

tlie

Korld's

is resolved into deity, Pint. C. Not. 17, 3, p. 1067, says ^av iKirvptetratrt rhv xdcfiov
oi/TOtf Kouchy fiiv
oiiSt*

^aKeiu
*

iavriy,

expressly asserted that everything, without exIt

is

driovv airo'

ception,

is liable

to this des-

Keiirerat,

rb

5'

^\av

ipp6vijjL6t'

iari

TqvMa.vTa Kol
'

ffot^ov.

Numen.
:

in Bus. Pr. Ev. xv.

tkiStt/j,

18, 1

ap^tTKei Sh rdti irpea'^urdctjri

Tois

ruv

t^s atp4ffeas

i^aypovffOat trivra KaroL ireptdSovs

Tivas Tcis fieylffraSf els-irvp aldepuSes avotKvofievuv wdfrav. Ac-

cording to Philo, Incorrup. M. 954, B, Cleanthes called this fire ipA.i|, Chrysippus avyh. Respecting &pBpa(, 0A.(if, aiyli, see The observations ibid. 953, B. on p. 151 respecting the identity of irDp, TTxeujua, aWiip apply
here.
^ This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by Stob. Bel. i. 314) expressed by Heraolitus, that, in the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene, in a retrograde order, as in their generation.
*

neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. Conf. Sen. Cons, ad Marc. 26, 7 Nos quoque felloes anlmse et jetema sortitse (the words are put in the mouth of a dead man), cum Deo visum sit iterum istamoliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsas parva ruinae ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur. of Chrysippus says the Gods, in Plut. Sto. Bep. 38, 5 Some of the Gods have come into being and are perishable, others are_ Helios and Selene," eternal and other similar deities, h'av6 Zeus is come into being eternal. In Philo, Incorrupt. M. 950, A, Orig. c, Cels. iv. 68, Plut. Def. Or. 19, p. 420, Com. Not. 31, 5, p. 1075, it is objected that, at the general conflagration, the Gods will melt away, as though they were
tiny
;
:

See p. 147,
Plut.

1.

Com. Not.

31, 10:

iirayaviC^fievos d K\eiv9ris

rg

inrh.

Trvpixru \4yei

tV irf\'i\rnv, KaX

Xonra. (uTTpa rhv liXloi/ i^o/ioiliffai peg. -'] TrdpTu fttvT^ Kol liera-

or tin. According deuv Stayuyiji, Tab. i. 1, Vol. Heroul. vi. 1, even Zeuo restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods of time.
of

made
to

wax

PMlodem.

Trepl

166

THE

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.

world have come to an end, than the formation of a new

world will begin,' so exactly corresponding with the

previous world that every particular thing, every
particular person,
it,'

and every occurrence

will recur in

precisely as they occurred in the world preceAriug, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv.
^nl Koi
TOffovTo
'ir\eiaiv

'

19

Se

Trpo7^6itv &
fiei-

Koivhs \6yos Koi Koiv^ ^itris

^wj/

yevo^ejrq

reKos

ava^vptivaffa Traz/ra Koi eis

lauT^

iv ry ircitrp ovffla occupies the room of the whole substance) iirave\6ovffa eU rhif TrpSyrov ^devra \6yov Koti ils avAaraffiv [? koto-

avoKa^ovtra

yivfTtti (it

longer, and that therefore Apollo, who represents the state of perfect unity was honoured nine months with the paean, whilst Dionysus, torn to pieces by the Titans, the emblem of the present world of contraries, was only honoured for three with

ffiv

the dithyramb, some mistake seems to have crept in. Proeither to read or to transpose the passage from Bioic(i(r^7)(riy to

?3

eKeivTjv

r^v

troiovtrav

bably

we ought

iviaurbv rhv fieyiffiov, Koff %v air' aiiTTJs fjtivrii ets avr^v miXivyiyerai
7}

8jrep irphs rpia Ik,

airoKaTdffTcuris (the

same
B.

in
ii.

ifcnvpatriv.
* The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus. The belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding

Pliilop.

Gen. et

Corr.

Schl. p. 70), TravfXeov<ra 8J SiSi T6.i^iv a^' o?as SiaKofffieiv ojfratJrws Ijp^aTo Kara \6yop irtiKiv t^v avr^v Sie^aycoy^v irotetrat. See
p.

161.

According to Nemes.

Nat. Horn,
iisTripains

c, 38, p. 147, conf. Censorin. Di. Nat. 18, 11, the

takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words, when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was estimated by Diogenes
(^Plut. PI.
i.
i.

one is first encountered among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Endemus, in a passage which has generally been lost sight of in describing

Pythagorean teaching, had taught (in Simpl. Phys. 173)

(

32, 2

Stul. Eel.

Se Tts iritrreiaeie rots IlvBayo-

264) at 365 periods, or 366 x 18,000 ordinary years. Pint. De Ei. ap. D. 9, g, E, p. 389 mentions the opinion, hnp rpia trphs tv, rovTO r^v BmKdff^Tiffijf XP^^V ^pbs r^v iKiriipuaif efvai.
it had been previously said that the duration of Kdpos (i. e. iKiripaurts) was tne

pelois,

us TT(i\ij/ T^ ainci aptdfup Kayi: itv9o\oyi)aai rh ^a$Siov ex""

ifiiy

KaBJi/ievois oStoi koi

S[iiola>s ejei,

ri &\ha

wdfra

wal riv XP^"""

Inasmuch as

iiKoyiv imi ^t)v airhv flvca (in that case the time must be the same as the present time). The
Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pytha-

GENERAL COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

ding.

167

Hence the
must

history of the world

and of Deity

Chap.
VII.

as,

indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting

necessarily be the case

force,

revolves in an
stages.'
Still

endless cycle through exactly the

goreans (unless with other Orphic-Pythagorean views it

same

who would appear in

the future

was known to Heraclitus), and

it

world would be numerically identical (efj h.pS)uf) with the

present Socrates or not ? {Simpl. 1. c.) the answer being, that they could not be numerically
identical, since this

commended

itself to

them

as

being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught ^hetA riiii iniripatrtv
:

would

in-

Trdvra TavroL iv rtf Kitrfxtf yeveffQai /car' apLdfihv, iis Koi rhv
'7rd\iv

iip6ffdev eTval

rhv avTby r^ re koX ylveffOai eKeiycp r^ K6<Tnif {Alex. Anal. Pr. 58,
iSitios

TTOthy TrdKiif

b).

toiJtou

5e

o^Tftjy

exovTos,

as ovZiv aStJi/arov, Koi jj/xas fier^ rh TeKevTTJaai Trd\iv ircpU^uv Ttvwv elXrjfifjLeyojy xp6vov iis hu vvv ^fffiey KaTaffT-fiffetrBcu (rx^jtta (Chrysippus, -irepl Uponlas, in Zactant. Inst. vii. 23. Conf. Seneca, Ep. 36, 10 Veniet iteram qui nos in lucem reponat dies). This is to apply to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the irnAi77EViffia or aTroKariffTaffis (as the return of a former age is called) thus there will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be accused by another Anytus and Meletus.
hrt\ov,
: :

volve uninterrupted existence, but that they were alike without a difference (dirapiiAAoKTOi). Others, however, chiefly among the younger Stoics, appear to have held that there could be noticeable differences between the two. {Oi-ig. v. 20, 592, c.) This remark appears to have given rise to the false notion \Mvppohft. Eefut. Hser. i. 21 ; Epiphan. Hser. v. p. 12, b) that the Stoics believed in the trans-

migration of souls. The remark made by Nemes., that the Gods know the whole course of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one, can only apply to one highest God, who, however, does not require such empirical knowledge. The other deities will not have survived the general
conflagration.
'

Hence M. Awel. vii. 19, xi. 1, deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. Simpl. Phys. 207, b; PMlop. Gen. et Corr. B. ii. Schl. p. 70
Tatian. c. Grseo. c, 3, 245, d Clemens, Strom, v. 549, D ; Orig. c, Cels. iv. 68 ; v. 20 and 23; Nemen. 1. o. Plut. Def. Or. 29, p. 425. Amongst other things, the Stoics raised the question. Whether the Socrates
;

Ar. Didym.
ToiotSrcoi/

1.

c.

continues
ai'Siou

1WV
yiip

"mpiShav ^|

yivofjUvwv
rrjs

hKarairaiiiTTus.

oire

ioxh^ ahlav Kol [del.] jraiTiv ot6v T6 ytv4(r$ai, otfre rod SiotKovvTos airrd. oiiciav re yhp
Tois ytvo/i4j/ots ^tpeffrdvcu SeiTeipv-

Kviav B^vaSex^'^Bat ras fifraPoKks

irdffas

Koi

rh
S"

SrnxiovpyTJffov

e|

oJt^s,

K.r.\.

airop^iTeie

Conf. &v tis,

Phihp.:
lis
<fni(nii


1G8

THE
times,

STOICS.

Chap.
vir.

there were not wanting, even in comparatively early

who entertained doubts on this teaching and among the most distinguished of the later Stoics some gave it up altomembers of the
Stoic School
;

gether.'

Besides the periodical destruction by

.

fire.

'AXe'^avSpos, Trpbs ^Api(rror4\'r].

ci

much empty
ixTtipaiTis.

space outside the

y^p
^(TTi

7]

S\fj
rtai

Tj

auT^
troiav

cti

SLafi4vif

Si

T^
Sib.

iruiririKhi/

tdriov ri

world as was necessary for the world to be dissolved in at the

ayrb
tt

airlav ovxl KOTCt TcepioSdv TLva tT\slovos xp^vov

ael, TTJS avTTiS ^\1JS TCL aiiTot irii\iv
tear* aptBfjLbv utJ

The

diilerence be-

tween

OTTip rii/es

{/)affi

icoTct

ray avr&v %ffrat t^v iraXiy^

j

view and the older Stoical view which Bake (Posidon. Rel. 58). deduces from
his
Stub. i. 432, is purelyimaginary. Antipater, according to Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance can be attached to the statement in (ac. N. D. ii. 46, 118, respecting Pansetius, addubitare dicebant ; whereas the words of Stob. are irieaianipav vofii^ei riiv il'SKJTrjTO toS KSfffiOu ; and those of Diog. &<f>8apTov airetp'livaTO rhv k6(T^ov.
:
-.

yeyeffiav Kal
ffv^^aiveiVf iv

rhp fieyav ivtavrhv

airoKOTtJiTTaffis

^ -jrdvTav Tuv ainuy yivtrai. See M.

Aurel. V. 32.
'

corrup.

According to Philo (InM. 947, C), besides

;

instructor {Diog.
Bel.
i.

Posidonius and Pansetius, his vii. 142 Stob.

414), Boethus asserted, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, the eternity of

the
this

world.

Philo

adds that

also the view of Diogenes of Seleucia, in his later Moreover, years. Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority of Numenins (in Buseh. Preep. Ev. XV. 19, 2), considered that the destruction of the world by fire

was

could

not

be proved

(i/>a(rh'

T^s iKnvpc&treus rav 3\ai</). But these statements are elsewhere contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is confirmed by Phit. PI. Phil. ii. 9, 3 {Stob. Bel. i. 380; Eus. Pr. Ev. XV. 40. See Achill. Tatian, Isag. 131, c), who says that Posidonius only allowed so
^TTtffx'^'iv Trepl

Boethus emphatically denied the destruction of the world, his chief reasons (in Philo, 1. c. 952, 0) being the following (1) If the world were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an efiect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those Kari Siaipeaiv, Karh ivaSpe:

ttokJttjtos (as in the crushing of a statue), kbtA aiyxuffiv (as in chemical resolution), not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of
<Tiv rrts ^irexoiffTii

God on the world, in fact. His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything were con-

; :

GENERAL COURSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

periodical destructions by floods
'

169

were

also

assumed;

Chap.
VII.

there being, however, a difference of opinion as to

whether the whole universe, or only the earth and

inhabitants, were subject to these floods.^

its

sumed by fire, the out for want of

fire

must go

fuel.

With
a new

flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totse

that, the possibility of world is at an end.

rudes innoxiaeque generentur [res humante] neo supersit in

deteriora praeceptor (29, 5) peraoto judicio generis humani exstructisque pariter feris . . antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo
.

The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by Phct. Plao. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion of matter. Hitter, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching.' How Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 391, and SchUiermacher, Gesch. d. Philos. p. 129, in view of the passages quoted, can absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world, is hard to
comprehend.
' The fiood and its causes are fully discussed by Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 27-30. Eain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all

inscius scelerum but this state of innocence will not last long. Seneca (29, 1) appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign of the
:

contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a, destruction has been ordained. in the course of the world. It comes cum fatahs dies venerit, cum adfuerit ilia necessitas temporum (27, 1), cum Deo visum, ordiri meliora, Vetera finiri (28, 7); it has been fore-ordained from the beginning (29, 2; 30, 1), and is due, not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water The object of this (29, i).

supposed to

destruction by water are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of Censonn. Di.Nat. 18, 11, evidently quots d from Varro, conf. John, p. viii.

Crab,

its

when they

Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus sestas autem eopyrasis. Conf. HeracUt. AUeg. Hom. c, 25, p. 53 When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by iKiripaKTis, if the element is ei S* &6pow SBwp iKpayelri, fire
.

KaraKKvtrii^ rht/ k6<t^ov aTToKeiff'

90.1.

' For the former view, the language of Heraclitus and

Censorinus tells, for the latter that of Seneca.

170

rjm
One point
struction of the world

STOICS.

Chap.

established

by the generation and deuncertainty of

all

^^'

the

par-

B. Govern- ticular

wm-ld.

things, and the unconditional dependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the

iVjNatwre

of Destiny, (a) Besenquiries

uniygrse

is

into nature.

throughout a leading one in the Stoic All things in nature come

PmX'
dence.

^y virtue of a natural and unchangeable connectiou of cause and effect, as the nature of the
^^^*^

universe and the general law require.

lute necessity, regulating all
is
(ij

This abso-

Being and Becoming, expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny Viewed from the point of view of siiMipiisvr))^
is

natural science, Destiny

only another

name

for

primary Being,
world.2

for the all-pervading, all-producing

fire

Breath, for the artistic

which

is

the Soul of the

But again the

activity of this

Being being

always rational and according to law. Destiny

also

may

be described as the Eeason of the World, as

universal

Law,
149

as the rational

form of the world's

JHog.
?

vii.

naff etixapiii8'

se gignat.

Sen. Nat. Qu.

intelligis

ii.

36

vi)v

</)oiri

-rh

irivTO, ytvea'Bai

X/)rfirr7ros,
jueV?)

k.t.K.

fan

iupf)

fatum ? existimo neoessitatem renim

Quid enim

aWia Tav
iiv

fivTwv eipojihri
(tiiff/ios
:

omnium
nulla
5, 8
:

K6yos Kaff

Stf^dyerai.

A.
in

Gell. vi. 2, 3

libro

irepl

irfovolas

(Chrysippus) quarto

riter

actionumque, quam rumpat. De Prov. Irrevocabilis hrauana paac divina cursus vehit.
vis

flliapii.ivi\v esse ^vffixiiv Tiva aivTa^iv tuiv '6\av ^j aXSiov roTs Irepoij ettokoiripav TMi' \oudoivTO)V Kal /icTct iroKii fihv odv

dicit

Hie ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed

sequitur.
jussit.
'

Semper paret, semper

ItTTapafiirov
avixirKoKTis.

oS(ri)s

Trjs

Toiaims

Divin. i. 55, 125 (according to Posidonius) Fatum, or diMpiiitn], was called

Cio.

p. 152 and Stoi. 180 (P/*. Plao. i. 28), Xpiamiros Sivafuv irvevinarm^v

Conf.

Bol.

i.

tJjv ovaiav

t^s

ei/mpfifi/ris TtJJei

ordinem seriemque oausarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex

toG vavThs

Sioikjjtik^i'.

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

course.'

171

When
Nature

regarded as the groundwork of na-

Chap.

tural formations, this primary

is called
;

Being or general Law

vn.

but when
^

it

appears as the cause of

the orderly arrangement and development of the world,

it is
is is

known

as Providence

or in popular language it
;

called Zeus, or the will of Zeus

and

in this sense it

said that nothing happens without the will of Zeus.*

cJvai
fi'i]Te

Hence Chrysippus' definition (Plut. and Stot.) fluapiiivn iffrXv 6 rov K6fffi.ov K6yos ^ \6'yos
:

t5

4v(Triiff6fjievoy rf} otKovofiiif

Tuv

iiepaif ixri^ii/
tl

ex^iv

'd-Trtos

Kiniflijo-eToi

ffx^"'"

SX\ms [^]
Cleanthes, i. 30) v.

(^Plut.

vAjios^

ruv

4v
'

r^

KSiTfAtp

Kara
12,

r^if Koiir^v (pitriv.

vpovoltf SioiKovfi4fo)y

^ \6yos wafl'
Tci

Hymn,
18
1.
''

(in Stoh.

Eel.
ii.

tv rh

fihv

yeyovora yiyovs,

hi

M. Aurel.

3.

See p.

ytyvS/ieva yiyv^rat, rh Se yevt^ffifievayevfiaerat.

161,

Instead 'of X(J7os, Chrysippus also used a\7)6fia,

TTieodoret.
14,
p.

alrla, (^iais, aydyKv.

It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another.

Cur.

Gr.

Afi.

vi.

87:

Phit.
:

Com. Not.
<j)ri(n

Chrysippus assigns the

same

meaning to

eitiapiieyov

and KaxTj-

p. 1076 et Si, Sis ou5 Tov\iixio'T6y

34, 5, Xpiaiinros,
fiepuv

ian tuv
fi

vayxaaiiinv, explaining et/jLopfi4v7j to be Klvrjffis aibios avvex^s Kol TeTayiiiim ; Zeno defines it (as Stob. i. 178, also says) as also dvvafiii Kij'rjTiK^ ttjs ii\7is as tl>6ffis or irpivoia ; his successors as \6yos t&v iv rif Koa-ficp vpovoit^ hLoiKovfi4vaiPj or as etpfibs all lav. (The same in Plut. Plac. i. 28, 4. Nemes. Nat. Horn, Even rixv, he c. 36, p. 143.) continues, is explained as a deity (or as Simpl. Phys. 74, b, has it as a detov koI haiiJ.6viov) but this supposes it to be essentially identical with ilinapChrysippus in Piict. Sto. fievTl.
; ;

txftv i.KKfas
34,

aW'
Si

$ov\Ti(riv, K.r.\.

Kara tV ^*is Conf. Sto. Eep.

rrjs

o^TQ)

tuv SAwi*
avayKoiov
%xvi^V,
fftviriv

oiKOvoiiias Trpoayovfrris,

Kara TaiTrjy, &s &y

ex^tv
elre
Tiixcis,

iroT*

e^TC trapa

r^v

iSiav votTovfTeSy elfre TrfirTjpwfievot,

ypafifiaTiKoX
. .
.

fi,ovtnKo\

yeyov6res % Karh, rovrov Si rhv

\6yov Tck jrapavX'fuTia ipovfiev Kal irepl T^s aperris T}fi.53v fcol irtpl rris KOKlas Ka\ rh i3\ov Twv t^xv&v Kal

Twv yhp

OTe^cviwr, s
iffTtv i.\Kois

%<p7)v

ov6iv
fiepos

T&v Kafk

yeceffflol, oiiSi

rob\dxi(rTOVy

&\V ^

Eep. 34,
KoiPTJS

8,

p.

1050:
ls

rrjs

yap
5la-

Kara ttj*' Kotyijv <l>iffiv Koi Karh Tbc iieelpiis \6yov. Hid. 47, 4 and 8. Cleamtli. Hymn. v. 15
:

(piffstas

irtfi'Ta

ohSi Ti yiyvitai ifr/ov

iiti

xfloi/l

TeivotSffTis Se^irei

vav rh

dTrwffovv

aov Slxa,

Soufiov,

yipAfievov

ipT^ 3A^ koI twv [xopiatv

\6yov kotA
t!
4Ji)s

o^e
irAiii'

Kar* aidepiov 6e7ov tiSKov oijT*

iirdffa ^i{ou(n kokoI aiperf/itf-

drtiiow Kar' iKelvvv yevf<r6ai Ka\

4vl ir6vTCi>f

Thv

ixeiviis

ffiv

avolais.

172

THE
"

STOICS.

Chap.

In action as the creative force in nature, this universal

Keason also bears the name of Generative

(J) See-

generative reason.

Eeason (X670S aTrsp/iariKOs). It bears this name more immediately in relation to the universe, not ^^^ ^^ being the generating power by v?hich aU things are produced from primary fire as from seed
according to an inner law, but because in the present condition of things all form and shape, all
life

and reason, grow out of

it,

in short, because pri-

mary
of all

and reason contain in themselves the germ things.' In the same sense, generative powers
fire

in the plural, or \070t airspfiaTiKol, are spoken of as belonging to Deity

and Nature
soul,

and in treating

of man, X0704

o-irspfj-aTiKol

denote the generative

powers as a part of the

as bearing the as

and must be thought of

same relation to the individual soul the generative powers of Nature do to the soul

By the term Generative Eeason, theremust be understood the creative and forming forces in nature, which have collectively produced the universe, and particular exercises of which proof natiue.''
fore,
'

See
;
;

the

quotations
; ;

on

Phtt. Atlwnag.
SpuTicrei/
Sia^(r;iir)<Tii/

M. Aurel.

ix. 1

p. 161, 1

164, 2 144, 161, 2 145, 2, from Diog. vii. 1 ; 148 136 ; Stoi. Bol. i. 372 and 414

[i, (fiats']

eVl r^ySe t))*

rii/as

cruWa^oi'O'a

}^6yBus

tuv

Iffoiiivav koI Suvdftfiy

Sext.
iv.

do. N. D. Math.
14
:

ii.

10,

28
:

22, 58

yoi/i^ous aixcpiaaaa, k.t.K.

vi.

Ibid.

ix.

101

M. Aurel.
T( yevvi]-

ivtKf>avt(T0iitrii

Alexander and his groom robs ai/Tohs rov iK-titpdrnrav th

24
:

(ravTt, /xa\Aoi/ 5^ avaKfjipOiitrji els

KSafiou

inrepfiaTiKoi/s
vii.

K6yovs.
Se
tpitris ffirep-

Tbv \6yov ai/Tou rhv

Karck
i/zuxal

o-trepfxaTtKhv
:

Diog.

148

^(Tti

iiera^oKfiv.
.
. .

IHd. 21

ot

e^is 4^ auTijs Kiuovfieyrj

xar^

cty

rhp twv (i\wv

hfO;Ka^^av6-

fiariKohs

ffnepiJMTiKhv
/levai.
'^

Kiyov
p.

157
iv

Kdyovs, 5^ jLt^piJ

K.r.K.

Ibid,
Keyovtrtv

^v^s

oKTti),

ras irevre

altrd^n fis Kai

See on
of

finition

151, 1, the dedeity from Stob.

iiixiv

trvepfiaTiicovs

rohs \6yovs koL rh

(pavriTiKhv koX

rh hoyuTTMiv.

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

duce individual things.

173

These

forces,

agreeably with

Chap.
'

the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the

original material, or material

germ

of things.

On
of

the other hand, they also constitute the

things

the

form

law which determines their shape and

\6yos

qualities, the

only we must beware of trying

Just as the

to think of form apart from matter.

igneous or etherial material of primary

itself

Being

is

in

the same as the forming and cheating element

seeds of individual things, the

in things, the Eeason of the world or the Soul of

nature

so in the

atmospheric substance, in which the Stoics thought

the generative power
itself
is

(air^pfjui)

alone resides,'

is

in

germ out of which the corresponding thing produced by virtue of an inherent law.^ The inthe
is

ward form
tutes

the only permanent element in things

It consti-

amid the perpetual change of materials.'

the identity of the universe
is
;

and whereas

matter

constantly changing from one form to

another,* the universal law of the process alone con-

tinues unchangeably the same. All parts of the

Stoic system lead so unmis-

(2) Argu-

takeably to the conclusion, not only that the world favowr of as a whole is governed by Providence, but that every -P'

As the primary
is

ether

or lire called the seed of the

Qusest. Conviv.
is
o-euj.

ii.

3,

3 and

4, it

defined as y&ms

eVSe^ij yfvi-

world (p. 161, 1), so, according to Chrysippus (in Biog. 159),
the
(Tirepfui

in the seed of plants

is

and animals
oinriatf.

a irMu/ta

kot'

' a-irepimT mhs \6yos is also used to express the seed or the

See p. 101, 2. This is particularly manifast, not only in the history of the world, but also in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements,
*

egg

itself.

Thus,

in

Mut.

174

THE
part of
it is
'

STOICS.

Chap,

subject to the same unchangeable laws,

that no definite arguments would appear necessary

to establish this point.

Nevertheless, the Stoics lost

no opportunity of meeting objections to their views

(a) Argvr jn ment from ^,
tij^ fullest
.

manner.'
.

In the true
,

spirit of
,
.

a Stoic,
.

thegeneral
cotime-

Ohrysippus appealed to the general conviction of

'

twns of

manUnd.

mankind, as expressed in the names used to denote ^ fate and destiny,^ and to the language of poetry.'

(i) Argti-

Nor was it diflBcult to show* that a divine government of the world followed of necessity from the
Stoic conception of the perfection of God.
Besides,

llTp^-"^
faction of

in proving the existence of a Grod by the argument

(c) Argti-

drawn from the adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world was at the same

Tke^tJwmj ofneaes-

^^
ner.

proved.*

Chrysippus also thought to defend his

theory of necessity in the same strictly logical

man-

For must not every judgment be either true or false ? ^ And does not this apply to judgments which refer to future events, as well as to others ?
Judgments, however, referring to the future can only
Seine, Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina (Naumb. 1859), p. 29. ' Compare what the Peripatetio Diogenianus (in Hus. Pr. Bv. vi. 8, 7) and Stob. (Bol. i. 180) observe on the
'

also Ps. Arist.

De

Miindo,

c. 7.

The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in Sen. Benef. It. 4, follows another tack.
' Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting

derivations of et/iap/ievri, jrewpiDjueVr), Xpe&y {Heine, p. 32, 1, suggests on the strength of TAeofZwci, Cur. Gr. Affect, vi. 11, p. 87, 4, who transcribes the quotation from Eusebius rhv Xpivov Kara rb xp^up. ought rather to read, according to Tlieod. Gaisf. rh xp^^" ""t^ rh XP^os), ^olpai, KKuBii : and the quotations p. 170. 1 171, 1

in Eus.
*

1. c.

8, 1.

We

See do. N. D. ii. 30, 76. = The two are generally taken together. Compare the quotations on p. 145, 4. = See p. 83, 2 110, 3 Aristotle and the Peripatetics thought differently. See Simpl.
;
;

Cat. 103,

(3.

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

be true when what they affirm must come to pass of
necessity affirm
is
;

175

Chap.
'

they can only be false

impossible
;

when what they

and, accordingly, everything

that takes place must follow of necessity from the

causes which produce
it.'

The same

process of reasoning, transferred only (a) Argu"j-en.tfrom

from the outer world to the inner world of mind, underUes the argument from the foreknowledge of
God.''

foreknon-ledge
"'

If in the former case

is true,

it

was handed down that

is

^''^'

whatever

before it comes to pass,

neces-

sary, so in this case it is said to be necessary, if it

can be truly known before

To
to

this

it comes to pass. argument may be added a further one

(e)

Argu-

importance-^the which the Stoics attached great ' argument from the existence of divination.' If it is
impossible to
is

'^f'^tfrom the easutence of

know beforehand with

it is

certainty what ^*^'^'

it.

accidental,

also impossible to predict

But the

real kernel of the Stoic fatalism is ex- (3) T7ie

pressed in the

maxim, that nothing can take place

differently

^*'*

?/"

without a sufficient cause, nor, under given circumstances, can

dence de*''*"*

happen

from what has hap-

pened.^
Oic.
'

This were as impossible, according to the

(a) Provi-

dence as

De
ra

Orel.
.

Alex. rb Se
:

Fato, 10, 20. l)e Fato, p.

3,

1)

Chrysippus proves, by

**2'-

92,

Xeyeij' eli\oyoi> etyai

eiro/ucco irpoeiSeVoi

roiis fltoJis
.

Tovro Xayt^avovTas koto(T/ceuiifeiv irupaaSai Si' airov rh Tidyra 4^ &vdyKris re yivea-Qcu Kal Ka.9' tt/iapiieyril' oStc a\Ji6is oire
.

KoX

eij\oyoy.
'

Oic.

N. D.

ii.

65,

162

De

the existence of divination, that all things happen Kaff etfor divination would ixapixiin)v be impossible, unless things were foreordained. Alem. De Fato, c. 21, p. 96: 01 S^ vfiifovvres tV fUiVTMriv /cal kotA rhy avrav \6yov ii6vov ffdj^effOat Keyovres ainiiy koX toiIti? irlarei toC iravTO

Fato, 3, 5 (unfortunately the previous exposition is wanting) JMogeniaii (in Mis. Pr. Ev. iv.

naB' (luapiiiv-nv yfwo-floi xpi^li^yot, k.t.X.

Plut.

De

Fato, 11, p. 374

'

176

THE
Stoics, as for

STOICS.
;

Chap.
VII.

something to come out of nothing

it does,

were

it

possible, the unity of the

world would be
in the chain-like

at an end, consisting, as

dependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of every thing

and of every change.*

The

Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct con-

sequence of the Stoic pantheism.

ting cause of

The

divine power
absiolute uni-

which rules the world could not be the

all things, if

there existed anything in

any sense independent of it, and unless one unchanging causal connection governed every thing.
(J)

Prom-

(Hence divine
dividual

Providence does not extend to in-

denee directed imto the uni-

things taken by themselves, but only in

their relation to the whole.

verse, in-

Everything being in

every respect determined by this relation, and being

directly to
duals.

consequently subject to the general order of the

Kuril 8e rhy ii/amlov [^K6yoy] nd\icrra fifv kolI TCpurov ehai S6^eie
fiTiSiv
/caret

inrh

tpitreas

SiotKoifievov ^utiktjs

rb

Te KoX JwyiKTi^ Kol

t)\v

voepas ex^tv

avaiTius

yiyeffdat,

aW^L
'

irpoTjyov^4yas

alrlas

SeiS-

otBiov Karct etpu6v Tiva KaX rd^iv Trpo'iov-

rwv

tji/Tav

BiolKritnv

Tpoy 8e rb ^iffei
rhv KiSfffioc,

SiotKeiffdcu

tSvSc

aiirhv

aiimvom (tol (Tv/iirBfl? avrt^ iiyra. Then come

aav so that everything is connected as cause and effect, i.Wa

;

iravri

re

t(|j

ytvofieytfi

erep6y ri

the considerations confirmatory of that view divination, the wise man's acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. JVemeg. Nat. Horn. el yhp tuv avruv C. 35, p. 139

iiraKoKovdeiv, fiprijfievov i^ avrov

oir'

aviyKTis

Sis

airlov, khI irav

rh
its

ytv6fievov exetv
riots ii4\re elyai

n irph avrov,
yhp
/i-fire

airltp ffvyiiprijTai' firiSev

avat-

yiveadat rue
firiS^v eJvai 4v

4p T^J

K6(rfji.(jt

Sict

rh

avr^

aTro\e\ufjLevtjy

re Kol Kex^pi

alrluv irepieffTTiKSTUVf &s fpaffiv avTol, iraffa avdyKTj ra ai/ra ylveirBtti.

'

cfievov
/iilKeri

rap TrpoyeyoySrtov andpruv

yap Kal
Kiiir/xoi'

StatnraffOat

SiatpeiffBai Kal

rbv

Alea;. Tie

Fato,
tpcuTi

u.

ifjiiu6v

T6

fivai

22, p. 72: Kol 6fiol(as

Kara
yoiro
65,
X. 5.

/iiav rd^iv

eva fueyeiv ael, re Kal olxoyoiilav

(Mo. Divin.
i.

StoiKo{ifievoy, ei iiyairi6s ris eludKlyrjiris.

;

aSvvaToy rh d.vaiTiws
Tt 4k
'
fir]

Ttp yiveffBal

See

ivTOs.
1. 0.

125

De Fato, i,7;M. Aurel.

Alex.

p.

70

ipturl
. .

5^ rhv
.

K&ffyiQv rivSe

'4va

tvra

K(ii

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

world,
it follows

177

that

we may say that

also

Grod cares not

Chap.

only for the universe, but for all individuals therein.*

vn.

The converse

of this

may

be asserted with equal

justice, viz. that God's care is directed to the whole,

and not to individuals, and that it extends to things great, but not to things small.^ Directly it always
extends to the whole, only indirectly to individuals

throughout the whole, in so far as they are contained

therein,

and their condition

is

determined by
is

its

condition.^

The

Stoic notion of Providence

there-

fore entirely based

on a view of the universe as a

whole

individual things and persons can only

come
(c) mffi-

into consideration as dependent parts of this whole.

The

Stoics were

thus involved in a difficulty

which besets every theory of necessity the diflSculty of doing justice to the claims of morality, and
of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility.
the Stoic says Nee vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immorta'

cutties

connected
niAth the

themij of
necesidty

In

Cic.
:

N. D.

ii.

65, 164,

in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argu-

libus consuli et provideri solet. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 46 Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen Tim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. do.
:

ment may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God's care of the whole world. M. Ati^el. vi. 44 ci niv oiv i0ovKdffavTo irepi ifiov Kail r&v 4^^ol
:

ffv/ji^rjvai

b(l>Gi\6vTuv oi
.

fleol,

Ka-

N. D. 66, 167 Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt. Itid. iii. At tamen minora Dii 35, 86 negligunt ... ne in regnis
:

\oJs e$ou\eiitravTO

Si fi^
^juoi),

ejSouAe^ffarro Kar' iSlav irepl

vepi ye

tuv koiv&v irdvrus 4Pov-

KtiaavTo,

quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dioitis.

Cicero uses the following to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities
'

oTs kot' iTaKoKoiBria-ui Kol ravra aviifiaivovra hairi^eaBai Koi aripyeiv o</>eI\u. Similarly,

ix. 28.

argument

It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special

providence, was caused by the connection of nature.

178

THE

STOICS.
all

Chap,
VII.
(a) State-

This diflSculty 'became for them

the more pressing-

the higher those claims were advanced, and the

more

ment of
several
difficulties.

severely they judged the great majority of their fel-

low-men.'

To overcome

it,

Chrysippus appears to
efforts.^

have made most energetic

establish that

The

existence

of chance he could not allow, it being his

aim

to

some hidden
thing
is

what seems to be accidental has always Nor would he allow that everynecessary, since that can only be called necause.'

cessary which depends on

and
is

is

therefore always true

no external conditions, ;* in other words, what

and unchangeable, not that which comes to pass in time, however inevitable it may be.* And, by a similar process of reasoning, he still tried to
eternal

rescue the idea of the Possible, little as that idea accords with the Stoic system.
'

As

AlesB. c. 28, p. 88, fitly

observes.
" The great majority of the Stoic answers to itoKKi, iirti\iia,ra (puffMd TC KaX ^SiKct Kol Sia\eKTih, which (according to Plut. De Fato, c. 3) were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong to him. ' See p. 171, 3, Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Eep. 23, 2, p. 1045. He assigned as a general reason rb yctp Itvairiov 8\ui i.viTTopKTOv ejvai Hal rh aiirSfiaTOV. Hence the Stoic definition of

themselves they can take place, and 5ii toSto ipcurl /aiSh ri yev6fieva Kaff ei/iapfi4vTjp, Kodrot

&napa-

Piras
irBai,

yiv6iifva, i^ kviyirns ylvf-

8ti

^(Ttiv
t!i
:

o4toTs Svvarhv
(Me.

ytviaiai Kal

avjiKiliievov.

Ex hoc genere Top. 16, 69 causarum ex seternitate pendentium f atum a

'

Stoicis nectitvir.

Alex. De Fato, o. 10, p. 32 j Cic. De Fato, 17, 89; 18, 41, and above, p. 115, 2. Hence Pbit. Plac. (similarly .Nemeg. Nat. Horn. c. 39, p. 149) : & n^r

yap

eTvai war' iiviyicriv,

& Sh

Kofl'

rvxT} is atT^a 6.irpov6riTos Kal

fi8;-

\os

hivBpbyirivtf

\o-yifffi^

in Plut.
;

De De

Fato,

c.

7, p.
i.

29, 3 {Stab. Eel.

672 Plac. i. 218) Aleoj.

;

& S^ xarct itpoaiptaiv, & 8e Karh, "rixv, & Sk koto rh auTo/iaTbf, which is evidently more explicit than the laneluapiiivriv,

Falo, p. 24;

i^mpl. Phys.

74, 6.

Bee

p. 171, 1.

' Alex. 1. c. The Stoics assert that things are possible wLich do not take place, if in

guage used by Stob. Eel. 1. 176, and the statement of Theo-, doret on p. 171, 1. ' See p. 116, 2. Opponents
such as Plut. Sto. Kep.
c. 40,

GOVERNMENT OF TBE WORLD.

In reference to
sense of the term
this did

l~d

human
'

actions, the Stoics could

Chap.
^^^"

not allow the freedom of the will, in the proper

;

but they were of opinion that

(^)

j^<-<lI

deciding-power.

not prejudice the character of the will as a uiUy mnFor was not one and the same ^'^"*^'f-

all-determining power everywhere active, working

in each particular being according to the law of its

nature, in one

way

in organic beings, in another in

inorganic beings, differently again in animals and

plants, in rational

and

irrational creatures?^

And
\

albeit

every action

may

be brought about by the

not

co-operation of causes depending on the nature ot

things and the character of the agent,

free,

is it

still
|

the resultant of our

it

own impulses and decision ?^

it

Involuntary

would only be were

produced by

external causes alone, without any co-operation, on

the part of our wills, with external causes,*
and
Alex., pointed out

Moral
iyepyovffiv

how

il-

fievov

i-jrl

toIs

oiJtws

attempt was. According to the latter, he fell back on the simple result, maintaining that, in the case of things happening Kofl' etimpnevny, there is nothing to prevent
lusoiry this

NeToes. appeals to Chrysippus, and algo to Philopator, a Stoic of the second century,
ehat.

Of bim he remarks, that he has consistently attributed t4

A.D.
eif'

riiuv
*

to lifeless objects.
:

the opposite from coming about, so far as the causes which prevent this from happening are unkuown to us. ' See above, p. 171, 3. Chrysipp. in Gell. N. A. vii. 2, 6; AUic. De Fato, o. 36,
''

p. 112. ' Gell.

Alex. c. 13 1. c. Nemei. Nat. Horn. c. 35, p. 138, Alex. c. 33 (on which see 140. Seine, p. 43), gives a long argument, concluding with the
;

De Fato, 18, 41 In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causae prinoipales et perfecfeefromcaussBadjuvantes, his meaning being that everything happens according to fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus. Conf. Cic. Top. 16, 59. Although these causes may not be in our power, still it is our will which assents to the imdie.

words

irSi'

rb

Kofl'

iffi'iiv

yivi-

pressions received.
2

CEuomaus

180

THE
on freedom of the
will is

STOICS. depends only be possible

Chap, vn,

responsibility, according to the Stoics,

will.

What emanates from my

it

my

action,

no matter whether

for

me

to act differently or not.'

Praise and blame,

rewards and punishment, only express the judgment of society relative to the character of certain persons
or actions.^
or not,
is

Whether they could have been

different,

irrelevant.
.

Otherwise virtue and vice must

be set down as things not in our power, for which,

consequently,

we
is

are not responsible, seeing that

when a man
be otherwise
the
Grods,
*

once virtuous or vicious, he cannot

;'

and the highest perfection, that of

absolutely

is

unchangeable.*

Chrysip-

even endeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in harmony with the

pus

claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that

it

presupposed their existence.

The arrangement
is

of

the universe, he argued, involves law, and law involves the distinction between what
ally

convention-

right and what

is

conventionally wrong, be-

tween what deserves praise and what deserves blame.^

and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a 7iiilSov\oi> of the will, because he laid so great a stress on its freedom.
(in Eiu. Pr. Ev. vi. T, 3
'

TroioriiTuv
Ko\d(reis.
'
' '

/ij)

iryyoov/iivuv,
ipciyot

no!

hruvoi ^iv Kal

koI tiimX Koi

Aleso. c. 26, p. 82.

Alex.

c.

32, p. 102.

Cfell. vii. 2,

13

CXc.

1. c.

106, puts in the mouth of the Stoics t4 liiv ran (i^av ivipyiiffei iil6vov, rh i\
" Aleso. c. 34, p.
:

irpilct

-rii

Ko-fiKh, KtHrii

iHv

aiuxf-

Tl^trerai,

yiip

t^ S^ KaropBdafffi. Tavra Toirois Karh <pvffiv ju^y, tivrav

afiapTTifuiTuv KaX KaTopBufid-

usual the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus. 'Alex. c. 36: Xc7ou(ri 7<if>' obx ^(rrt rotairr} ft^y ij flfiapfi4v7jf

The

arguments

among

Se

ffa!

tnov, Kill

rwv Tomiruv piatuv kui

ohK ^ari SJ vevpap.iv^ (It never happens that there is a eifiapfiitni but not a ircTrpw/iEf >)) oiSc iim


'

OOVBRNMENT OF THE WORLD.

Moreover,
it is impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to think of the world without thinking of the Grods, who are supremely

181

Chap.
VII.

good.

Hence the idea of destiny

vice,

involves also that

of goodness, which again includes the contrast be-

tween virtue and

between what
If his
is

is

praiseworthy

and what
tiny,

is

blameworthy.'
everything
action
is

opponents ob-

jected that, if
individual

determined by des-

superfluous, since

what

has been once foreordained must happen, come what

may, Chiysippus replied: There is a distinction to be made between simple and complex predestination; the consequences of

human

actions

being
the

simply results of those actions, those consequences

are

therefore quite

as

much

foreordained
'

as

actions themselves.^

second argument imh t^s

Mint ii\v dXaaj ohx [ouSe] eCTi 5^
i/etJieffts'

oJttjj
;

TraKaiffTpas is

the following

OVK

iiTTi liiv vtiieffis^

'

ovk

oh irdpra
oiiK iffri
'jr6dtffT0S

tffri 8^

v6nos ovU HffTi iiip t/6ii0Sf OVK etTTi 5e Xd^os op&bs TrpoffTOMTLKhs fiiv Sv TTOtTjreov avayopevriKhs
afiapTav6fieva, TtpofTrAr'

ei^p^eyijVj Se aKt^KvTOs KaX hrape^^

fjiev

effri Kaff

Tl

TOV

Kdo'fJLOV SLOtKTja'lS

ovSe effTi
K6ffiJLOs
'

fjL^v

toCto, ovk

Iffr*

Se&poi/notrjTeov' aAAck ^irayope^eToi jUei/ tA Terai Sh rot KaropBtifiara

eo-Ti /iiv TOiairt)
ii

oitSe ^(TTi /Acy Kifffios,

5^ ovk

eluapiiivri,

ovk &pa ovk

(for K6a'iios, according to the definitions of Chiysippus, is the whole, including

eiVl Se Seoi

Hara-

e<rn Sf a/uapr^^uara Kal KaropOiiiw' el iarai a^opT^juara KaX KOTopfldi/ioTO, ^ffTiK a.per'if koX

gods and men.

e(

See p. 158, 1)

Se

eiffi

deo!, eialv &rytt6ol ol 0eoi

Koxiaverhi/,

56 toSto,

Iitti

KaKhv Kol

TovTOf ^ffTiV aper-tj &X\' 1 effTO/ aperii, %aTi ^p6vr)ais- &W'

ei

&\?C

iuaxp6v aX\ct ri
&pa iari Toiairji
oliK

liiv Ktt\hv ^irai-

el

rovTO

tffTiy

ri

i'jriiTT'fjfiTj

iron\-

rh Bt cuaxpiv ^eKT6v ouK

fiiv
f)

Tewv T6 KoX ov
TTOiriTea fiey effri

KoiTirewv
Tcfc

^Wb.

cijctop^nej/ij,

KaTopSt^fiara,

iaji 8e iTiiuveriy Kol

is

\fiiKT6v.

What
Tifiii

praiseworthy deserves or y4pas ijdiiirii, and what

ov TroiriTea Se TCi afiapriiixaTa, k.t K. OVK Upa irivra iiXv ytveTU Kaff
elfiupiievtiv,
Ktxl

OVK iari B^ yepaipeiv

is

blameworthy merits KdMtrts

iTrayopGovy.
"

or inavSpBaais.

ao.

De

^AUx.

c.

37,

p.

118:

(itt

Fato, 12, 28 ; DioMis. Pr. Ev, vi. 8,

182

THE
From
all
'.

STOICS.

Chap.

these observations, it appears that the

Stoics never intended to allow

man

to hold a dif-

ferent position, in regard to destiny, from that held

by other beings.
/destiny

All the actions of

by his relation to things one individual only differs from another in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against
:

are decided

man in

fact his

his will, conforms to the eternal law of the world.'

c.

Natme

mm-U.

Everything in the world being produced by one aid the same divine power, the world, as regards
its

structure,

is

an organic whole, in respect of

Things

its

16)

Sen. Nat. Qu.

ii.

37.

which were determined by the

co-operation of destiny alone Chrysippus ' called irvyKaSfifiap/ueVo (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted, which Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 489, erroneously attributes to the Stoics themselves, went by the name of apr^hs \6yos (ignava ratio). Besides the oji^bs \6yi)t, Plvt. De Fate, c. 11, p. 574, mentions the iipl^av and the -\6yos irapA t^v tifiapfi4vriv as fallacies which could only be refuted on the giound of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea ((Enomans, In JHus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the foreordained results.

incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap. ' Sen. (after Cleanthes, whose verses in Epicteit. Man. 52) Ep. 107, 11 Ducunt volentem fata, noleutem trahunt. Hippolyt. Eefut. Haer. i. 21, has put it very plainly: ri Kafl' eluapfUvfiv dvai irivTti Sif$e$tuti<ravro rapaSelynari xPV^f-ivoi roioirif,
:

8ti &airep ix/Hicn-os Sty

ir6ai,
. . .

?j

l{|pTi)-

/ieVos Kiuv, ictv liiv jSo^ATrrai eirt-

Kal IXKcrac koI lircTai ixiiv

iav Si ^Jj $oi\7fr<u circirfloi, Trdvras i,vayK<ur8iitrfrat, rh airi Siiirov Kai ^irl ruv ivBpiiirav icai fi^ $ovK6iixvoi yip &Ko\ov9f!p&vaffKaa6i)aovrM urivras eis rh irerpcs

The same idea expanded by M. Awel. vi. 42: All must work for the
liivov flae\8eiy.
is

whole, ^K

wepiovcrias Sk Kal 6
a,VTi$iidvttv

iiefi-

(p6iievos Kal d

iteip^-

According to Amnum, De Inter.

106, a, Luoia/n, Vit. Auct. 22, the Sfpl^av was as follows Either you will reap or you .will not reap: it is therefore

Heyos Kol iiyaipfiy rk yiydfieva, Kal 7aip ToS roioiroii ^XPPJV" ' K<i<r;uo.
is man's business to take care that he acts a digniiied part in the common labour.

It

NATURE OF fHE WORLDPERFECTION.

constitution perfect.

1S3

The unity

of the world,

Chap.
"

doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the Epicureans, followed as a corollary

mary substance and of primary force. It was further proved by the intimate connection, or, as the Stoics
called
it,

from ,.,. IT..

the unity of pri-

^^^ , miity Olid pe^fee**""*"

(i).

the sympathy of

all its parts,

and, in par-

by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and heaven.* Its perfection followed generally
ticular,
After all that has been needs no fvirther confirmation. Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity of the world. See p. 143, 1, 2. Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29, p. itivra 425. M. Awrel. vi. 38
'

said, this

Dioff. vii. 140 4v SJ K6aiuf lurtSiv elvai Kevhv T/yua'dai avThy^ tovto yhp hvay' KiiC^iv T^v Ttov ohpaviuv vphs to. 4irlyeia aifiirvoiav Kal avvTOviav, Ibid. 143 3ti ff ils 4arTi Ztivuv

4\A^Xoij.

T^

iW

iLKKiiKois iirnreir\eKrat

Koti

irdvTa

KarA TovTO iplKa 8[AA^\ow itrri TOVTO Si SiCi T^V TOyiK^JV . .

,

Tov li\ov Kal ^AiroWiSupos . Kol notreiSiivtos. Alex. De Mixt, 142, a, see p. 127, 5 ; ao. N. D. ii. 7, 19 ; Bpictet. Diss. i. 14, 2:
ipitffltf

4v

T^

trepl

XpifftvTTOs KaX

KivTJITlt'

KOti

ffiflTTfOiai/

KoX

T^V

cvuffiv TTjs oiKrlas.

Ibid,

vii. 9,
:

2 Sext. Math. ix. 78 tSv ffafx^Tav Tct /xcf iffTiv Tjvan^va, Tct Si ix avvanTopievav, ret SJ Ik SiefTT^Tuv . . . htel oiv Kal 6 K6tT/ios ffwfid itrriy, ^TOi ^I'w^

oh SoKft irot, ^<^7?, TjifutrBat Ta irdyTa ^0Ke7, ^<jyr) t Se crvjuiraBeiv Ta 4nlyeia toTs ovpavlots ov
; ;

SoKel aot

Aoke7,

^i^t;,

Cicero

/Aevov

^(TtI

ffufjia

fj

iK ffvva/KTo-

fievuv

^ ^K SieffT^uw o6t Si 4k
irepl

mentions the changes in animals and plants corresponding to the changes of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of the
sun. M. Awel. iv. 40. From all these passages we gather what the question really was.

avva-KTofievuv oUtc 4k SteffTti^uv,

is Seixm/iev 4k tuv
crujUirafleiSv

Karft

yiip

airhv riy rrjs

TroWefc

ffeX^i^s ou|^(rei$ Kal

<l>eiiiet

tti&iffeis

Tuv T6 itriytiwv ^(fwp Koi BaXuffaiav

re Kol at^eTcu, iiiwilnfis Te
Kai ir\T)/t/up(S6s (ebla
Toi.

and

irepi Tii/a litpri ttjs 9a\d(ra'ris

flood), yivov-

In the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising of the
stars
:

was not only whether other worlds were possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with the earth, so as to form an organic whole (fv""! Hiog.
It
vii. 143).

4^

wv

avfitpayis,

3t* Tjyu-

liivov Ti aufia KoSinTiiKiv 6 xianui, 4nX fiev yitp tuv 4k trvvavTOixei/ai'

i)

5i6o:t<6tv o4 av/irriirxfi

to /tepq

The Stoic conception of av\i.was not used to denote the magic connection which it
ireSfleia

184

THE
pies.'

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.

from a consideration of their fundamental princi*

But the

Stoics

made

use of

many arguments
example of
beauty, and,
to ends.^
its

in support of

it,

appealing, after the

preceding philosophers, sometimes to

at other times, to the adaptation of

means

An

appeal to the former

nature

is

the assertion of Chrycreatures for the

sippus, that

made many

sake of beauty, the peacock, for instance, for the

sake of

its

tail

and

the dictum of Marcus Au-

relius, that

what

is

purely subsidiary and subservient

to no purpose, even

what

is

ugly or frightful in
its

nature, has peculiar attractions of

expresses in ordinary parlance,

own ;* and the

but the natural coincidence between phenomena belonging to

the different paits of the world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, oonjunotlo, or continuatio naturse {Oie. N. D. iii. 11, 28 Divin. ii. 15, 34 In 69, 142). this sense, M. Awel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like fire is attracted upwards, earth downwards beasts and men .^ieek out each other's society e ven amongst the highest existences, the stars, there
; ;
;

SioiK&v KSyos ovSefAav iv lauT^ aiTiav ^x^^ '^'^^ KaKOTTOieiv KaKiav

'

ykp QVK
oiiSk

ex^t, oiiSe t(

kokus
utt*

iroiet,

$\iiirTeTal

Tt

^kciVou.

vdfTa bh Kar' iKeTvov

vepaiveTOi.
'
:

yii/eraL koX

Diog. 149 TuiTiiv 8f [tV Kol rov ffVfKl>4pOVTOS (TTOxdfeirfloi Kol riSopris, as SijXov iK Tr/s ToG hvBp^nov Srjiitovpytas. ' Pint. St. Kep. 21, 3, p.
(pifftv'^

1044

eiiriv [XplicriTTiros] 8t(

.
.

<pi\oKa\i'iv
TroMiXlif

T^v

tbilTtV

Tn

x"-^?"^""-"

f'^is
'

iffTl,

ravra Kar^ K4^lu

fipjjKe

ytvntro

exists a ivairis ix SieffrriKdraiv, a

ffvfivddeLa ^v StfffTufft.

Even the

remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection ; nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt at a distance by virtue of a conneclast

S" tiv /ui\urra roirov iyt^aais iirX T?s xipKou 10V Taii. Conf. the Stoic in Cic. Fin. ii. 5, 18 Jam
:

membrorum

alia videntur

propter eorum
.

usum a natura

esse donata . alia autem . nuUam ob utilitatem, quasi ad

quendam ornatum, ut cauda

pavoni, plumse versicolores columbis, viris mammse atque barba. * M. Aurel. iii. 2 It is there
:

tion of soul.
'

M. Awel.

vi. 1

ri

ray iKuv

oiiria

(the matter of the world)

proved by examples,

Sti

ital

to

iitiyiviiifva toTs (piird ytym/iii/ots

NATURE OF THE WORLD PERFECTION.

Same kind of consideration may have led to the Stoic assertion, that no two things in nature are altogether alike.' Their chief argument, however, for the

185
.Chap.

!^

beauty of the world, was based on the shape, the

size,

and the colour The other line

of the heavenly structure.^ of argument

expressions.
is

followed not so

much

in individual

But owing no

doubt to the same reason

tical character of its

the predominantly prac-

treatment of things
the
Socratic,

the Stoic

view of nature, like

world.

has ever an

eye on the adaptation of means to ends in the

As, on the
to ends
is

one hand, this adaptation of

the most convincing proof of
so,

means

the existence of deity,

on the other hand, by

it,

more than by anything else, the divine government of the world makes itself manifest.' Like
Socrates, however, they took a very superficial view-

of the adaptation of

means

to ends, arguing that

everything in the world was created for the benefit of

some other thing

plants for the support of animals,

.

animals for the support and the service of man,^

, . iX^i Ti iSxapi naX iira-yuybv trx^Sbv oiBw oux' ""' ''wv Kai'

has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a sky the most
perfect in colour, &c. ' See the passages quoted p. 145, 4, particularly CHo.S. D.
ii.

iTTaKO\o(iBrii7w avjxfiaa/dmuii

ifiiilis

nus SuuTwiffrajBai. Sen. Cie. Acad. ii. 26, 85 Ep. 113, 16. The latter includes
' ;

32.
*

this variety of natural objects

PUd.

Cin
:

Porphyr.

De

the facts, which must fill us with admiration for the divine artifices. ^ Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2 KoXhs Si i Kdfftios StjKov S' ix toD ax'hpLaros kolI tov xP^f^^"^^^ '^"^ '^'^^ fuyiSovs (tol T?s irepi ibv xdiTfiov Tuti aarepau iroLKiKias ; the world

among

Abstin. iii. 32) ctw" iKiivo ri] A/a toO XpualTnrm mBxvbi/ ^v, as Viuis avrav koI aW^iKuu ol fleol
x'^P"' f'^oiiiaavTo, iiiiHv Si tA fi?a, aviiTroKeii.ftv /ih imrovs xai avvdripctJctv K^ivas, atfSpelas Si yvfivdtrta

vapSaAns ol &pKrovs KaiXcofTas, Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37 k.t.X.

186

THE

STOICS.

Chap.

the world for the benefit of Gods and

men

'

vn.

not
and

^infrequently degenerating into the ridiculous

pedantic, in their endeavours to trace the

special

end for which each thing

Scite enim clypei causa

existed.''
bent.

But, in asking

Chrysippus ut inrolucrum, va:

The earth with its plants and animals was created for the
service of

ginam autem

gladii, sic praeter

mundum csetera omnia aliorum

causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra
gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut

man. In Ori^. c. Cels. iv. 74, p. 559, the StoicS

assert that Providence created all things for the sake of rational beings ; M. Awrel. v. 16

equum vehendi

causa, arandi bovem, venandi et oustodiendi canem. Id. OS. i. 7, 22 Placet Stoicis, quse in terris gignan:

and 30 Gell. vii. 1, 1. Hence the defiiiition of Kia^ws quoted

;

on

p. 158, 1.

tur ad
creari.
'

usum hominum omnia

iii.

die. Fin.

20,

67

Prse-

claj-e

enim Chrysippus, cetera

nata esse

hominum causa

et

* Chrysippus (in Phit. Sto. Rep. 32, 1, p. 1049) shows how useful fowls are the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (^Clemens, Strom, vii. 718, B),
;

Deorum, eos autem communiN. D. ii. 53, 133, in describing the Stoic teaching Why has the Tiniverse been made ? Kot for the sake of plants or. animals, but for the sake of rational
tatis et societatls suse.
:

was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place

of salt, to prevent its corrupting (Oio. N. D. ii. 64, 160; Fin. V. 13, 38 Pint. Qu. Conviv. V. 10, 3 and 6, p. 685; Porphyr. De Abstin. iii. 20); oysters and birds for the same purpose also {Porphyr. 1. c.). In the same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs, see The Stoic in Cic. p. 189, 1. N. D. ii. 63, 158, following in the same track, declares that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding and helping man,
;

and men. It is then shown (c. 54-61), by an appeal to the structure of man's body, and his mental qualities, how God has provided for the wants of man and the argument concludes with the words. Omnia, quse sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a, city, and what is
beings, Gods
;

fishes for eating,

and birds

therein, exists for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is intended for the use of Gods

prey for divers uses.

of Epictet.

and men. Even the stars quanquam etiam ad mundi cohse.rentiam pertinent, tamen et
spectaculum

homiuibus

pras-

Diss. ii. 8, 7, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being intended to carry burdens for this purpose he must be able to walk, and in order to walk, must possess the power of imaginaMon.
;

NATURE OF THE WORLDMORALITY.

the further question, For what purpose do Grods and

187
Chap.
'

men

exist? they could not

help being at length

brought beyond the idea of a relative end to the

idea of an end-in-itself.

The end

for

which Gods
Or, exphilosot
'^

and men

exist is

that of mutual society.'

pressing the same idea in language

phical, the

more

end of man
;

is

the contemplation and has only importance

is

imitation of the world

man
;

as being a part of a whole

fect

only this whole

per-

and an

end-in-itself.^

The

greater the

importance attached by the

{2)M<n-al
.'^

Stoics to the perfection of the world, the less were *J^^^y they able to avoid the diflBcult problem of reconciling the various forms of evil in the world.

By

the attention which, following the example of Plato,

they gave to this question, they may be said to be Ihe real creators of the moral theory of the world.' The character of this moral theory was already

determined by their system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law of the whole,
it

met the charges

is

preferred against the evil found

imperfec-'\

in the world

by the general maxim, that

tion in details

necessary for the perfection of the/

whole.*
'

This maxim, howevet, might be explained'

p. 186, 1.
ii.

See

'

do. N. D.

14,

37

Ipse

autem homo ortus

,dum,nullo
est

est

ad muu-

dum oontemplandum et imitanmodo

perfectus, sed

quaedam particula perfeoti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nee est quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est,

' We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Btoio theory of the moral government of the world. Phit. Sto. Kep. 37, 1, p. 1051, says that Chrysippus wrote several

treatises irepi toS itrfi^v 4yK\i)T}n/ elmt /iijSe funirrhv K6iriup.

* See p. 187, 2, and Ghrysippus (in Plmt. Sto. Eep. 44, 6)l :

188

THE
to the term necessary.

STOICS.

Chap,

in several ways, according to the

meaning assigned

If necessity was taken to be

physical, the existence of evil was excused as being

a natural necessity, from which not even deity could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the neces-

was not a physical one, but one arising from the means to ends, evil was justified as a condition or necessary means for bringing about good.
sity

relation of

combined in the three chief questions involved in the moral, theory of the world the existence of physical evil, the existence of moral

Both views

are

evil,

and the relation of outward circumstances to

existence of physical evil gave the Stoics

morality.
{a) Exisst-

The
evil at

"plmUal
evil.

little trouble, since

all, as

they refused to regard

it as

an

will

be seen in treating of their ethical

evils of

system,
this kind

It

was enough for them to refer

diseases, for instance

to natural

causes,

and to regard them as the inevitable consequences of causes framed by nature to serve a definite purpose.'
Still,

they did not

fail

to point out that

TfKcov M^" i K6ffiios iTuiid iiTTiv, oi TfKea Sf Tcb K6trixov /jLtpri t^ vphs rh h\ov Ttas ex'"' ""' i"^ "o^' oStA chai. Compare also the statement in Plut. Solert. An. c. 2, 9, p. 960, that animals

must be

irrational, because the irrational must be contrasted with the rational. ' 6'eK. vil. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus, in his treatise Treplirpoi/oior, discussed, amongst other things, the question, ei oi rav ivSpdirav
v6(roi Koxii
ifiiaiv -/liiovTai.

piincipale naturee consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios . . . sed cum multa inquit atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agbata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quse f aciebat coharentia eaque non, per natuiam sed per sequelas quasdam neoessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat hotA irapaKO:

KoiBriirir. . Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partse

.

Ex-

sunt
Av/rel.

dum
vi.

salus paritur.

M.

istimat autem non fuisse hoc

36

All evils are

NATURE OF THE WORLBMORALITY.

many
things only become evil by a perverted use,'
as evil,

189

Chap.
"

and that other things, ordinarily regarded

are of the greatest value.*

Greater diflSculty was found by the Stoics as by

(j) Exigt-

others to beset the attempt to justify the existence ^^.^{^i of moral evil the diflSculty being enhanced by the

extent and degree of moral evil in the world ' accord-

ing to their views.

for
If,

By

their theory of necessity

they were prevented from rolling the responsibility

moral evil from natural law or deity on to man.

nevertheless, they did not altogether exclude this
\

course,

inasmuch as they refused to allow to deity any

man,'' they only acted like other
Koi
c.

participation in evil, and referred evil to the free will

and intention of
itriyevviiiiaTci

6 and 9, p. 1015: abrol 5i (the Stoics) Kaxtav Kal Kaxotaifiovlav

Plitt.
TOffaiir-iiv
.

Ka\wp.

ruv trefij/uv An. Procr.

RaT* itraKoKo^Bitffiv

the house of nature all the waste has its uses. ' A circumstance which Plut. Com. Not. 19, p. 1067, dexterously uses against the
Stoics.
* Cleantheg, (see p. 171, 3)

yeyovivai \4yovfftv.

Sen.

Nat,

Qu.
'
:

vi. 3, 1.

Hymn.
;

v.

17

Sen. Nat. Qu. v. 18, 4

and

Plut. St. Eep.

13 Non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si vitio male utentinm nocent ... si beneficia naturae utentium pravitate perpendimns, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.
^ Chrysippus. (in Plut. St. Kep. 21, 4] remarks that bugs do US good service by preventing us from sleeping too long, and mice warn us not to leave things about. He also observes {liid. 32, 2) that wars are as useful as coloni es, by preventing over-population. See the quoM. tations, p. 185, i 186, 2. Aurel. vui. 50, makes a similar weeds. In regard to remark in
;

tS)V

Chrysippus affirms, is altyxp^^ ^i 6e7ov vapairiov yiveffBai ovk eii\oy6v iirriVf law is
33,

innocent of crime,
piety.

God

of im-

Id. (in Gell.

vii. 2,

7)

Quanquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali

coacta atque connexa siut fato omnia, ingeniatamen ipsa mentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas . . . sua saevitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta, et in errores se ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues, in a pas-

sagequotedin Greek by Gellius; iis Tuv j3Aaj3uv exdirrois Trap'

'

190

THE
The
real

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.

systems of necessity, ia not treating this solution as

final.'

solution which they gave to the

difficulty
is

was partly hy asserting that even the deity

not able to keep human nature free from faults,' and partly by the consideration that the existence of evil is necessary, as a counterpart and supplement to,
good,' and that, in the long run, evil would be turned

by the deity into good.*

axtrois

yivofteyuv Ka2

Kaff dpfi^v

ain^v afiapraySyruv re KctL ^XairTOfievuv Kal Kar^ t^v ahrSov 5iaKoiac KOI vpASitTiV. In Phit. Sto. Rep. 47, 13, p. 1057, Chiysippus says that, even if the Gods
representations to man, it is man's fault if he follows those representations. Conf. Epictet. Ench. ^. 27: &<rvep ffKOTrbs irpbs rh itvorvx^tv ov rfderai, oiirus oiiSe KaKov (piffis (evil in itself) iv xAaiuf ylvercu. Id. Diss. i. 6, 40. Such observations bear out in some degree the statement of Phit.
false

7(i>CTai

Eep. 35, 3 (C. Kot. 13, 2)! yhp avrii tus [ii kbkIo] KOT^ rbv Trjs <p^iTftos \6yop Kol

Vva o0Tetfs elfjrw oiiK &XP^'^'^^^ yivfTou vphs TO SAo, ovSk yhp ttv

make

rhyoBbv ^v. C. Not. 14, 1 : As in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the

whole, o0Ta
oiK
1,

i|'|io5 ttv

axn^v
S'

4<p*

eavTTJs T^JK Kiuciav

rots

iiXXou
vii.

M. Awel.
:

&xi">''''^' iarir. vi. 42.

Similarly
Gell.

Plac. ii. 27. 3, that, according to the Stoics, rh laiv tlnipBai, ri

Sk avei/idpecu.

See above p. 179,

3,4.

Chrysippus
; :

recogmsed

2 (Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui opinantur^ bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala nam cum bona mails contrariasint, utraque neoessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverse quaeque fulta. nixu (HeracUtus' h,VT\\o\/ arvii:

this and hence he says (in Oell.) It has been also de-

consistere nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario

(ftepov)
:

creed by destiny that the bad should do wrong. ^ Chrysippus in Phit. Sto. Eep. 36, 1 kukiW Se KaB6\ov
:

altero.

Without

injustice,

could not know what justice and valour are. If there were no evil,
<pp6y7)tTLS

cowardice, &c.,

we

Spot otfre hvvtvrov itrriv oih* Ix^' Ka\us ap6i)vai. Id, (in Gell.
1, 10): As diseases spring from human nature, sic herole inquit dum virtus hominibus vii.

as

iirifrr^fiTi

h.ya6wy

(fol,

KOKup

would

be

impossible

(Plut. C. Not. 16, 2, p. 1066). Cleanthes, Hymn. 18

aWh trh

KciX

rh irepurah

iiriarairai,

per consilium naturas gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt. ' Chrysippus in Pltit. Sto.

Aprta OetKat
Ko) Koa-iieTv

TO &Koirna, koI ov <piKa ao) (pi\u iariv

NATURE OF THE WORLDMORALITY.

The
third point in the moral theory of the world,!

191

Chap,

the connection between moral worth and happiness,

enffaged all the subtlety of Chrysippus and his fol1

vn.
(") Cbwnectionhe-

lowers.

m J : iv. ^A between them would any connection l To deny

i.-

tneen
"'"^
';'*^"f

have been to contradict their ordinary views of the Besides, they were prerelation of means to ends.
pared to regard a portion of our outward
judgments.'
Still
ills

as divine

there were facts which could not,

be reconciled with this view

required explanation.
facts appears to

virtuous, the good fortune of the vicious

the misfortunes of the and which

of explaining these

The task

have involved the Stoics in considerBut, in the spirit of their sysSt. Rep. 37, 2) in answer to thes question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, says trdripop &jUc\oufifvuy Tivuv KaGdnep iif olKlats
:

able embarrassment, nor were their answers altoge-

ther satisfactory.^

iff0\a KaKOifftv
&ffd*

(va yiyveaBai irAvTuy \6yov

aiiv idvra,

Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1 rhv $eh KO\d(eiv ^trl r^v Kaxiav Kai ToAXck 701611' iirl KO\dtrei rwv irovori fifv ret Svffvqpuv , .
'
: ,

fiei^otri

irapairivret Ttva irlrvpa Kal

iroaol

nvpoi

rives

rwv ^\av c
Slol

oiKovofiovfievui/
ffrourdat 4Trl

fl

rh

KoBi-

XpTjffTa

(TvfjL^aivetv

<pr]<rl

rots

ayaOots oitx Siffvep rots tpauKots '^^^^ "'"' SaAtjv Kohitrfus

tpav\a

ray Totoirav Saifjt6via 4v oh rip 6vrt yivovrai

x^P^"

iyK\nT4ai&fi.4\eiai; Similarly the

oiKovofiiav Sautref} iv rats Trd^eaiu

[to Ka*ca] cfjrovefieTai Karcb rhv Tov Aths Kdyof ^toi iirl KO\d.

ffEi

t)

kot'

SXAijc

^x'"""^"

""'

in Oic. N. D. ii. 66 Dii curant, parva negli^ gunt, hardly satisfactory explanations for any theory of
Stoic

Magna

Id. vphs rh 3Xa o'lKoi/oiilav. 15, 2: TaiTii<l>7i<n roiii Btobsvoieiv

Siraj

Tuv

irovtipuv KoKa^oiiivuv oi

Kotnoi trapaSeiyfiatri roirots

iroieiv.

XP^

^fvoi ^TTOC iirtx^ip^trt rutQVT6v ti

At the beginning of the

necessity. It is still more unsatisfactory to hear Seneca (Benef. iv. 32) justifying the unmerited good fortune of th^ wicked as due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason

same chapter, the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule.
Conf. Qoaast. Eom. 51, p. 277. ' Thus Chrysippus (in Pint.

assigned
Plut.')

-nohh HifuxOai does

2
:

by

Chrysippus
rb

(in

Ktti

rijs hydyKtis

monise with Plut.

ov yhp
5}

not quite ha^.^ C. Not. 34,

uAtj

7e

ri xanhv 4^

192

TRE

STOICS.

Chap.
VII.
.

,tem, only one explanation

was possible

no

real evil

could happen to the virtuous, no real good fortune

fcould fall to the lot. of the vicious.'

ifortune will therefore be regarded

j

Apparent misby the wise man

partly as a natural conseq\ience, partly as a whole-

\some exercise of his moral powers f there is nothing which is not matter for rational action everything
;

that happens,
to our

when

rightly considered, contributes

is

good
is

nothing that

secured by moral de-

pravity
kamris
iari Kol

in itself desirable.^
Siruios

With

this view, it
KaV

itapitrxni^^^,
irrfo-ai

yip

Kal xp^trdai
&pfjiTitrev.

avr^

itp'

oTov

ttv

Siros Se'xcToi 5tnKii'oOi/Tos outJjc Kol

^ofhs inh ToO

<rX'!i'''''(foi/Tos

Iffx^f.

liftle

does Seneca's test artifex mutare materiam (De Prov. 5, 9) agree with his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world. For, according to the

Just aa Non po-

' Seneca's treatise, De Providentia, is occupied with expanding this thought. In this

'treatise, the arguments by which

matter is ultimately identical with reason and deity. These contradictions do not, however, justify the doubt expressed by Seine, Stoic, de Fato Doct. 46, that Seneca is here not speaking as a Stoic. For Chrysippus says very much the same thing. See p. 190,
Stoics,

outward misfortunes of good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are (1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune he cannot receive at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds,
the
:
I

1,2.
'

M. Awrel.

ix.

16

oiie

iv

assign to himself (c. 2, 6). (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training ; a hero in conflict with fortune is a spectaculum Deo dignum (c. 1, 2-4. Conf.

veiaei, aKiC ivepyflif, rh toD Kayt-

KoG (ifov KaKhy Kal iyaBhv, iffirep oiiSi fi apcTJ) Kai Kaxla auroD iy
ireto-et,

iWh

ivepyiicf.

'

M.

Aurel.

viii.

36:

%v

Tp6irov iKilvTi [v ^ims] irSi/ rh ivuTTiiievoy icdl avrtPaimv intirepiTpewet Kal KaTaTdfrffet cU r^y
etfutpiifpriv Kol ftc'poj

Ep. 85, 39). mis(3) The fortunes of the righteous show that external conditions are neither a good nor an evil (c. 5). (4) Everything is a natural consequence of natural causes (c. 5). Similar explanations in Hjpictet. Diss. iii. 17 ; i. 6, 37
i.

Iout^s

iroiet,

24, 1

Stoh.

Eol.
;

oSras Kal rh Koywhy f^joy Siyarai ray KdiKv/ia fi\iiy Ibi/toS iroieif

Awrel.
X. 33.

iv.

49

vii.

i. 132 M. 68 and 54 ;
;

NATURE OF THE WORLD: MORALITY.

ment, by saying that what to a good
cise of his powers, is

193

was possible to connect a belief in divine punishman is an exera real misfortune and conse-

Chap.

vn.

quently a punishment to a bad

man; but we

are

not informed whether the scattered notes in Chrysippus really bear out this meaning.

The whole

investigation

is

one involving

much
fre-

doubt and inconsistency.

Natural considerations

quently intertwine with considerations based on the

adaptation of means to ends
;

the divine power

is

oftentimes treated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at

one time arranging

all

things for

the best with unlimited power, at another time ac-

cording to an unchangeable law of nature

these
inconsistencies

but

all

and

defects

belong to other

moral theories of the world, quite as much as they

belong to that of the Stoics.
' PMlodem. irepl BfZv Sio^ay^y, col. 8, Vol. Here. vi. 53 liioiTiKus AvavTos aitT^ [^f^] Sdvafiiv waOevTes, 8toi' ^h rSov
:

ihiyx""'

''rieCiDi'Tai,

Tifrc

Kctra-

((>eT)7ou(Ti>' ^irl

ri Sii toSto

i)i(r/ceii/

Taa'ui'oirT(Jjtti'a(whatis suitable)

u^

iroieic,

3ti oh

niyra

Btivaro:,

94

THE

STOICS.

CHAPTER
lEKATIONAL NATPEE.
Chap.

VIII.

THE ELEMENTS.

THE UNIVEESB.

Turning now from the questions which have hitherto

A. T/ie

;_ engaged our attention to natural science in the stricter sense of the term, we must first touch upon
^ ^^^ characteristic questions afifecting the general
conditions of all existence.

ral ideas on nature,

Yet even here the

all

Stoics

hold

little

that

is

of a distinctive character.

matter or substance of which

corporeal.'
sible,

things are
is

The made is

All that
it is

is

corporeal

infinitely divi-

although
all

never infinitely divided.^ At the

same time,

things are exposed to the action of

change, sinpe one material

into another.^
totle,
'

is constantly going over Herein the Stoics following Arisin contrast to the mechanical theory of nature,*
; 101, 2 Stoi. Eel.
;

See above, p. 126

135.

101,3

FiuutoiimiaexomnibTis,

Diog.
i.

Conf

410.
is

^ In Swg. 150, there difference made between lodorus and Chrysippus. Eel. i. 844 Pint. C. Not.
;

no

ApolStoh.
38, 3,

ex aqua aer, ex aere aqua, ignis ex aere, ex igne aer ... ex aqua terra fit, cur nou aqua fiat e terra ? omnium elementorum in alternum recursus
. .
.

p.

Sext. Math. Similarly Aristotle.

1079
'

x.

142.

sunt. Similarly Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. Conf. p. 101, 2 198, 3. This is borrowed
;

PZm^.Plao.i.

9,

01 StoiikoI

not only from Heraclitus, but

also
*

TpeTTTif Koi oWoicoTTji' Kol K6TO$\r[T')]VKa\piv(rr^vi\i\vSCiKovT^v

v\riv.

from Aristotle. They only called the

Ktmiffis.

first

Didg. 150.

<Ss.

Nat. Qu. iii.

kind

Aristotle under-


IRRATIONAL NATURE.
distinguish change in quality from mere motion in
space.

195

Chap.
VIII.

They enumerate several varieties of each

Nevertheless, they look

kind.'

upon motion

in space

as the primary

form of motion.^

Moreover, under
^
;

the conception of motion, they include action and

suffering.'

The condition

of all action

is

contact

and since the motions of different objects in nature are due to various causes, and have a variety of characters, the various kinds of action must be distinguished which correspond with them.' In all
stood by change.
>

Klin)(Tu

every form of
404, 408, gives

Stoh. Eel. i. definitions of xlvrfais, of <poph,, of and noirq, taken from Chry-

Simplicius himself 77, b, 33. contradicts this statement. It had, however, been already ad-

vanced by Aristotle.
'

Simpl.
:

1.

c.

sippus and ApoUodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110, P (Schol. in Arist. 92, 6, 30. Eespeoting the kinds of /iera^oKii see the extracts from Posidonius on p. 101, 2) distinguishes between fifveiv,
ijpefieiv, Tiffvx^C^tVf oKiinjTiiv,

78, a, 28)

The

78, j8 (Schol. Stoics who, ac-

cording to p. 84, , Schol. 79, a, 16, very fully discussed the categories, made the following Statpopal 76J/WC; rd i^ainwv KtveiaOat,
rijs
Si'
(Sis ij

/j-dxaipa

t6 refiveiv

^/c

but

otKitas Ix^t KaroffKey^s

rd

this is rather a matter of language. Smvpl. Cat. 78. fi, relates that the Stoics differed from the Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and discusses their assertion that KivEio-Bai is a wider, kivuv a narrower, idea. 2 Simpl. Phys. 310, b ol
:

eavTov ivepyeiy r^v

troiriatv

kIvtj(tiv, its

al tpiffeis KoX at tarpiKol

T^jv

Swd^eis
;

anh T^s (TTOos kotA Ttaixav Kivr/frii/ f\eyoy ^eivat ttiv toitik^v, ^
KOTct

nfya\a

Siarr'lifia.'ra

fl

Karci

for in developing into a plant tA &<p' eavTov TToietVj or dird iSias bpfiris iroie7v, one species of which is rd ciTr6 \oyLK7is ip/ATJs rd Kar aperiiv ivepyetv. It is, in short, the application to a particular case of the distinction which will be subsequently met with
inrepyd^ovTat

instance,

the

seed,

\6y(f> dea;pT]Ta iKpKnaflivTjV.

78,

&mpl. Categ. 78, j8 (Schol. Plotinus and others a, 23)

: :

of |is, Koyudi^

ifiiais,

ij'ux^i

and

^^ux^

The celebrated grammatical distinction of opBit and

nected
vwTia mentioned p. 95, 3 is conwith the distinction
ttol^Iv

introduce into the Aristotelian rh doctrine the Stoic view

Kotvov Tov
-rroiiiv

KaX Trdffxeiv eXvM

77,

between

and

ndirxftv.

Tas

Kivhfftis,
1.
y^.

;8

Schol.

Conf. Simpl. p. 79, 78, b, 17 and 30.

u, (;

Schol.

o 2

106

THE
these statements there

STOICS.
hardly a perceptible devi-

Chap. vni.

is

ation from Aristotle.

Of a more

peculiar character are the views of

the Stoics as to the intermingling of substances, to

which reference has already been made.' Even with regard to Time and Space, they found some innovations

on

Aristotle's

theory to be necessary.
is

Space

(tottof),

according to their view,

the

room occu-

pied by a body,^ the distance enclosed within the

limits of a body.^

From Space

they distinguish the

Empty. The Empty is not met with in the universe, but beyond the universe it extends indefinitely.^

And hence

they' assert that

Space

is

limited, like the

world of matter, and that the

Nay, not only Space,

'

Empty is unlimited.* but Time also, is by them set

Hence rivos corcalled x^P"responds to a full, Kevhv to an empty, x<i>pa to a half -empty, vessel. Setk. Math. x. 3, Pyrrh. iii. 124, speaks to the same effect. Cleomed. Meteor, p. 2, 4 ; Simpl. Categ. 91, S. According to the Stoics, iropu^firTOToi Tois (rdtiiiuriv 6 riijros Koi rhy hpov ciir* avruv trpoffKc^ifidvet rhv t^^x^ roffovie, Ka06iroy irv^7r\r]povvTat [-oCrai] uirb

Stab. Bol.

See page 135. i. 382

ZV"" kuI

avTov 4vt6s ^ev toO K6afwv eivat Kevhif ^|at 8' avTOv Sireipoi/ (conf Themist. Phys. 40, b Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4 ibid. c.
ol Att'
firi^ei/
. ; ;

20, beginning ot SroiiKoi koX EnKovpos). biatpfpetif Se Kev6v r6rtov Kol Ti /iiv Kcvhv eivai Xiipct" iprj/iiav ffd^aros, top ie rStrov t6
4Trex^P-^vov inrd (rcifiaros,

r^v Si

X^p^v tA 4k

fiepous

4irx6iievop

ray ffafid'

(Plut. adds, like a half-empty vessel). Stob.i. 390 Chrysippus defined tSttos = rh KaTex^fievov 5i' S\ov vird tyros, ij rh otov Kare:

ray.
so understood
;

X^cdai

6irb

tiVTos

KaX

St'

Saou
eifre'

The Stoic idea of space is by Themist. Phys. ^mpl. Phys. 133, a. 38, b * See previous note and in
'

Karex^fJ-fvov elfre vwh rivhs iirh rivuv. however, If,

only

one portion of the

Xeirflai inrh

oliv tc koteivros is really filled,

Diog. 140 (where, however, instead of iur^ftaToy Si, we should read Keyhv Sk') definitions of
Key6y.
*

the whole is neither Kev)>v nor rdtroSt but rfp6u ti oiiK uvo^ktvTlifvov, which may possibly be

Stob. Eel.

i.

392, quoting

Chrysippus.

THE ELEMENTS.
down as immaterial and yet to the conception of Time a meaning as concrete as possible is assigned, Zeno in order that Time may have a real value. defined Time as the extension of motion Chrysippus defines it, more definitely, as the extension of the motion of the world.^ The Stoics affirm the infinite divisibility of Time and Space,^ but do not appear
; ' ;

107

Chap.
'_

to have instituted any deep

point.

researches

into

this

In expanding their views on the origin of the

world, the
Stoics begin with the doctrine of the

B. Ele"^''**-

four elements,* a doctrine which, since the time of

Aristotle

cepted.
'

and Plato, was the one universally acThey even refer this doctrine to Heraclitus,
2.
f.

See p. 131,
;

limited, the present is limited

Schol.

Simpl. Categ. 88,

80, a, 6
arrjiia

twv

8^ "S^rnKfev Ziivatf

fiev ir(^7)s

aTr\ws Ktvijffeus Sti-

Thv xpivov elire [ooii. Plmt. Plat. Qusest. viii. 4, 3) Xpiai-nitoi & Zi6,irri\iia rris tov K6ffiJLov Kivii' o-eais. Conf. Ibid. 89, a, $ ; Simpl. Phys. 165, a. More fuU i S^Xpiffmis Stob. Eol. i.260
:

JTOS

xp&voy

ejvai Kiviiffeus Sida-

T7j/to Kofl"

S iroTC Ae'yfToi iiirpov

rdxovt T Kol PpaSirriTos, tj rh irapaKo\ov8ouif Stdarriiw. ry toB The passages KiJiT/iou Kivii<rei.

quoted by Stob. Ibid. 250 (_Pl/ut.

Plac.
i.

and IHog.

22, 2), 254, 256, 268, 141, from Zeno,

present cannot be accurately determined, it is the boundary between the past and the future (Archedemus in Phit. C. Not. 38, 6, p. 1081), lying partly in the one, partly in the other (Chrysippus, iJi<i. 38 8*) Semt. Math. x. 142 Plut. Com. Not. 41, p. 1081 ; Stob. i. 260. * For the conception of <rroix'<w', which is also that of Aristotle (Metaph i. 3, 938, b, 8), and its difference from that of ipxh, see Diog. 134 ; 136. The
' ;

the

difference,

however,

is

not

Chrysippus, ApoUodorus, and Posidonius, are in agreement with this. In the same places occur several other observations on Time, which are, however, of no importance, such as that Time as a whole, and likewise the past and the future are un-

observed. Chrysippus (in Stob. Bel. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of In one sense, it is. irroix^hv. in another, the four elefire ments in the third, any material out of which something is
; ;

always

made.

198

THE
natural science.'

STOICS.

Chap.
VIII.

wishing, above all things, to follow his teaching on

On

a previous occasion, the order

and the stages have been pointed out, according to which primary fire developed into these elements in
the formation of the world.^
these elements

In the same order,

now go

over one into the other.

And

yet, in this constant transformation of materials, in

the perpetual change of form to which primary matter is subject, in this flux of all its parts, the unity

of the whole

still

remains untouched.'
;

The

distincis

tive characteristic of fire is heat

that of air

cold

"

Lassalle,

Heraclitus,

ii.

fLiV

84.

yiyverat x*'"'" ' BSajp, Seirepa Se ^| SSaTos els a4pa, rpiri}

Se oi ^ffx^TTfi
eis irvp.

See p. 161. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into water Si' ocpos (i. e. after first going over into air, not passing through air as an already existing medium, as Lassalle, Heracl. ii. 86 inaccurately says), and water goes over into the three other elements. In this process there
''

On

ac-

count of this constant change, primary matter is called {IMd. 316, where, however, the text is obviously corrupt, and therefore only partially intelligible)
4 ipx^l KcQ 6 \6yos Kai ^ itStos Sipafiis 6(y avT-fiv re vdvra , KaTava\l<TKovcra Ka\ ri [4(] air^s
. ,

iriAtv

&,TroKaBtffTtt(Ta

is,

however, a

difficulty.

Fire

KoiSS^.

Teray/xevus Bpictet. in Stob. Floril.

derive its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation of the upper eleis said to

108, 60: Not only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, oAAtb icai ri fleio, Kai cj) Ai' avrll tA, Terrapa oToixeio &va Hal k&tu TpiiteTOi
ttal nerafiiXKei- Kal y^ re 8Sp yivpTtu KoX iiSap aj)p, oStos Se

ments
'

312

(as Lassalle, p. 88, does). Chrysippus, in Stoi. Bel. i. irpdJTTjs /nS* yiyvofieviis t^s

iK TTvphs KOTtk ffviTTOLatv eis ie'po jW6Toj3o\iis, SeuT^pas S' kirh To6rov
eis CSap, rplTTjs
S'

^rt

fiaWov Karck

fUTaPiKKfi- Kal avrhs rpdiros ttjs fiera^oX^s HvaSev Kdrai. On the flux of things, see also M. Awrel. ii. 3 j vii. 19 ; ix. 19 ; 28. Ous. N. D. ii. 33, 84 : Et cum quatuor sint genera coiporum, vicissitudine
iniKiv CIS ai64pa

rh afdKoyov (TwiffrajiivovTOv ffSctTos <ds Yijv, Tr6.Ktv Se otTrb rairris

SiaXvO|ue'i/i)i

eorummundioontinuata ( = am2,

Kol Smxfoiieprisnp^TT]

tx^s conf Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, oontinuatio est partium inter
;
.

THE ELEMENTS.
that of water, moisture
;

190

dryness that of the earth.'

Chap.
VIII.

These essential

qualities,

however, are not always

found in the elements to which they belong in a pure state,^ and hence every element has several forms

and

varieties.'

Among

the four essential qualities

of the elements, Aristotle had already singled out

two, viz. heat and cold, as the two active ones, call-

ing dryness and moisture the passive ones.

Stoics do the same, only
sider the

more avowedly.

The They con-

two elements to which these qualities pro-

perly belong to be the seats of all active force, and

distinguish

them from the other two elements,

distinguished from the body.*
con]'iinotio)

as

the soul
se

is

In their

non intennissa
est.

ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex deinde retrorsum aere aether vicissim ex aethere aer, ex aere aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sio natura his, ex quibus omnia snrsum, deorsum, constant, ultro oitroque commeantibus mundi partium conjunctio oonnatura
:

Nam

tinetur. See p. 194, 3. ' eTrai Si -rh likv Diog. 137 irvp rh Sep/ihv, t!) 5' SSup rh iyphv,
;

each element as its distinguishing feature, assigning cold to water, moisture to air. 2 Thus the upper portion of the air, owing to its proximity to the region of fire and the stars (iSsm. Nat. Qu, iii. 10), is the warmest, the driest, and the rarest but yet owing to the evaporation of the earth and the radiation of heat, warmer than the middle, which
;

in point of dryness and density,

r^v yij;' ri iTip6v. Pint. Sto. Rep. 43, 1, The air is, according p. 1053. to Chrysippus, ipiaei foifepbs and
t6i/ t* oiepa

t^ i^vxp^v

tiii

vpdyras ipvxp^^Frig. 9, 1 ; 17,

^^'
1,

De Primo

p. 948, 952 Galen, Simpl. Medic, ii. 20, Nat. Qu. iii. Sen. vol. xi. 510. frigidus per 10 i. 4 Aer natura enim seetobscurus Conf. Oie. aeris gelida est. N. D. ii. 10, 26. Of the four properties by the pairing of which elements arise, even Aristotle had attributed one to
;
: .

between the two, but exceeds both in cold. See p. 146, 4. ' Chrysippus, in Stob. i. 314 KeyetrBai 5e vvp rh wp&des irav KoX aepa rh aepuSes kolI dfioitos t& \onrd. Thus PMlo, Incorrupt.
is
:

M.

963, E,

who

is clearly fol-

lowing the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire fivflpal, <t>\i^, avyii. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial fire, which, after all, forms only one
:

small portion of fire. Pp. 128, 2; 148, 2; 151,1:

163, 2.

200

THE

STOICS.

Chap. VIU.

materialistic system, the finer materials as opposed to

the coarser, occupy the place of incorporeal forces.

The
light
;

relative density of the elements also deter-

mines their place in the universe.

water and earth are heavy.

Fire and air are

Fire and air
; '

move away from the

centre of the universe

;
'^

water

and thus, from above and earth are drawn thereto to below or, what is the same thing, from without to within the four layers of fire, air, water, and

earth are formed.'

'

The

fire

on the circumference

This statement must be taken with such modification as the unity of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to -move altogether away from the centre, the world would go to pieces. Hence the meaning can only be this that the difference of natural motions can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together, and so far a natural motion towards the centre can be attributed to all bodies as a distinctive feature, anterior to the contrast between heaviness and
:

Stoics maintain that the world continues in empty space, irel ndvTa ai/Tov ra /Ae'pij iirl rh iiiffov rhevKe. The same reason is assigned by CUomedes, Meteor,
p. 5.

Stol. Eel. i. 346 {Pint. Zeno, lUd. 406 12, 4). oh TTiivTus 8e ffupM 0(ipos ex^'^i
2

PI.

i.

ciAA*
. .

a^aprj
,

elvai

aepa

koX

Trvp

tp^fTii
Sicfc

y^p

aviifpotTa

tout'

eivai

pipovs.
p.

rb fni^evhs fierex^^v Phii. Sto. Eep. 42,

1053

Kivi](Tias,

In the treatise Chrysippus calls

ci,v(o(pepes

trtpX

fire

apapes

and

koI

roirtp
juev

irapa':r\7itrlus

rhv aepa, tov

lightness. Conf. Chrysippus, in Sto. Rep. 44, 6, p. 1054 The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together, not to go asunder. oSra Sh rod

PM.

^\ou

TGtvofjievov eis

ravrh Koi

Kt-

SSaros T^ 7p fiaWoy npotjyeiiO' iUEj/ou, TOV 5' aepos, Tip irvpi. (So too in Ack. Tat. Isag. i. 4 in Pet. Doctr. Temp. iii. 75.) On the other hand, in his *u(rucal Tcxfoi, he inclines to the view

vovfievov
tr^fiaTOS

Kal

tuv ^opiuv Ta{m\v

iriBavhy^

that air

in itself
light,

is

neither

heavy nor
0iffGais,

which how-

natTt

rots
KOTck
Tutrl

a^fjLoaiv
(piffui

elfat

r^v

ir/je^TTjc

ever can only mean that it is neither absolutely, being heavy

Kivriaiv irpis
ft.\v

rh toC
OVrots

KOtT/JiOV flCffOV, rif

K6tTtJitp

compared with fire, and light compared with water and

earth. * Diog. 137: avar&Ta ft.\v oZp HvM "ri vvpi 5^ aiBfpa KoKtiffBai,^

Ktj/ounevtp Trphs avrhvj

de

as tiv fi4pe(riv odaiy. Aoldll. Tat. Isag. 132, A.: The

fiipetriu

THE ELEMENTS.
Its most remote porof Ether.' by Zeno Heaven ^ and it differs from earthly fire not only by its greater pmity/ but also because the motion of eartSily fire is in a straight line, whereas the motion of the Ether is circular.'' A radical difference between these two kinds of fire, which Aristotle supposed to exist, because of this

201

goes by the

name

Chap.
VII]

tion was called

difl'erence of

motion, the Stoics did not feel

it

necesthat,

sary to admit.*

They could always maintain

limits
it

when beyond the

fire

of
as

its

proper

locality,

tried

to

return to

quickly as possible,

(Tipaipap yj/i/a(r6aij

vKavw^ei/wv. fxeff etrarh SSoip, imofTTidfirivBk iriivTUV

rijy

t^v tuv ^v rhy aepa,

elra

= In Ach. Tat. Isag. 130, A, he defines ovpavhs as aiBepos rb

IffXttToic,

^1

oh

H.a\

4v

^(TtI

yv^y

[i.i(n\v

aTctii/Tuv oZfrav.

lUd. 156; 3ee

these main smaller masses

To p. 202, 3. masses, all other

of

the same

element in difEerent parts of the world are attracted, because all seek to reach their natural place. Conf M. Awel.
.

vdvTa ifitftavus. Similarly Diog. CUmmd. Met. p. 7. 138 Otherwise the term is used in a wider sense. ' See p. 146, 4. * Stob. i. 346 rii fAv wepl;

yetov

(ftas

kot* evQe7av, t6
Kivilrai,

S'

ai64-

piov irepitpepus

See p.

ix

9.
'

Sm. Nat. Qu.

mundi
and

vi.

16,

(totum hoc ccelum, quod igneus

aether,

summa

pars

claudit),

p. 198, 3,

the same thing

is called aether by Cicero. Stobseus, See p. 146, 4. The same thing

where irvp by

3. It is only of terrestrial that Zeno can {Stob. Eel. i. 356) say, it moves in a straight line. Cleanthes even attributed to the stars the spherical shape, which on the strength of this passage he attributes to it. See Plut. Plac. ii. 14, 2 Stob. i. 516 ; Aoh. Tat. Isag.

202,
fire

meant by Zeno, where he says (jSoJ. Eel. i. 538, 554, and Cleanthes says the same in do.
is

133, B.
*

They denied
c.

it,

according

N. D.

ii.

15, 40.

Ach. Tat. Isag.

133, o) that the stars are made of fire ; not, however, of vvp

irexvov, but of
(piais,

irvp

TfxviKbv.

which appears in plants as

in animals as
^vx'h-

See

do. Acad. i. 11, 39, says Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with four elements statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quaeque gignerit, et mentem atque
Cels. iv. 56.
:
:

to Orig.

p. 201, 5.

sensus.

STOICS.
it

202

THE
a
circle.

Chap,
VIII.
c. The universe.

whereas within those limits

moved

in the

form of

Taking this view of the elements, the Stoics did not deviate to any v^ry great extent, in their ideas of the World, from Aristotle and the views which
were generally entertained.
water, above the water

In the centre of the

air.

Universe reposes the globe of the earth;' around

it
is
is

These three

form the kernel of the world, which is in a state of repose,^ and around these the Ether revolves in a circle, together with the stars which are set
strata

therein.

At the

top, in one stratum, are all the

fixed stars; under the stratum containing the fixed

stars

are

the planets, in seven different strata

Saturn, Jupiter,

Mars, Mercury, Venus, then the

the Moon.^

Sun, and in the lowest stratum, bordering on the

region of
'

air, is

Thus the world con-

of the a matter of course, and is mentioned by Aoh. Tat. Isag. Plut. Plao. iii. 10, 1 126, c Cleom. Met. p. 40, gives 9, 3.

The spherical shape

is

earth

an elaborate proof of it, for the most part taken from Posidonius.
c. 36, 145, also affirm that the earth is in the centre, vmmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by Stob. i. 408, to
^

earth is the natural framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it water has been poured, out of which the more exalted spots project as islands. For what is called continent is also an island: atrh Se roO Sdaros rhv ^epa
^J^<(>eoi

HeracUt. AUeg. Hom.

KoSiircp

i^wriua^ivTa
Sk

and Diog.

ir<l>aipiKas Kai irepiKcx"<r9'u, ix

be

Further proofs its weight. in Cleomcd. Met. p. 47. ' Stob. Bel. i. 446 toS 5^ . Kiirfiov rh fikv elvai irepi<j>ip6iJievop irep\ rh /i4aov, rh 8' vwofievov, -KepLtpepifiivov nkv rhv
i

su9f pa, tmopiivov Si riiv

i-ir'

ftfi/

Ka\ Tck

aiiTrjs

iypa

/col

rhv otpo.

The

roirou rhy al94pa dpaidTarai' tc KaielKiKpiv4<riaTor. It moves in circular form round the world, Then follows what is given in the text as to the stars, next to which comes the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the earth, Conf. Achil. Tat, Isag. 126, B, see p. 200, 3. The language of Cleomed. Met. c. 3, p. 6, is

THE UNIVERSE.
sists,

203

as with Aristotle, of a globe containing

many

Chap.

strata,

one joining the other,'

That

it

cannot be

vm.

unlimited, as Democritus

and Epicurus maintain,

follows from the very nature of body.'

The space

within the world

is fully occupied

by the material
an empty place,
there be a

of the world, without a vacant space being anywhere

left.'

Outside the world, however,

is

or else

bow

the

Stoics asked

would

place into which the world could be resolved at the

general conflagration ? *

Moreover, this empty place

must be unlimited

for

how can

there be a limit, or
is

any kind of boundary, to that which

immaterial
is

and non-existent ? ^

But although the world

in

somewhat divergent. He places Tat. Isag. 152, A, who probably the sun amongst the planets, has the Stoics in view, the axis between Mars and Venns. That of the world consists of a curArchidemus also ref usedto allow rent of air passing through the the earth a place in the centre centre. On the division of the
has been already stated, p. 147, The language of Ach. Tat. 2.
Isag.
c. 7,

heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the earth into five
zones, conf. Diog. 155 ; Straio, ii. 2, 3, p. 95. ' Stob. i. 392 ; Simpl. Phys. jii. 6 ; Diog. 143 and 150. s Mog. 140 ; Stob. i. 382 ; Phit. Plac. i. 18, 4 ; Sext. Math, vii. 214 ; Theedoret, Cur.Gr. Afi.
iv. 14, p.

131, B, is ambiguous

As the circumference originates

from the centre, so according
to the Stoics the outer circle originates from the earth ; when

compared with the quotations on p. 161, 2 162, 1.

;

356 ; Plut. Plac. ii. Siog. 140; Cleomed. Met. pp. 39 and 46 ; Meradlit. Alleg. Horn. c. 46. Ihid. on the perfection of this form and its
'

Stob.

i.

58

Sippolyt. Befut.

2,

i.6, 3;

Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of avTiTrffAatturii,
i.

Haer.

21.

without supposing the existence

of

adaptation for motion. Comparing Achil. Tat. Isag. 130, c, Phct. Plac. ii. 2, 1 {Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 11), with the passages on p. 201, note 4, it appears probable that Cleanthes believed in a spherical form of the earth. According to. Ach.

empty

space.

A number

of

arguments against the existence of empty space may be found in Cleomed. Met. p. 4.
* See p. 168, Met. 2 and 5.

Cleamed.

'

Chi7sippus,injS*J.i. 392:

The Empty and the Non-Mate-

; ;

204
Chap. vin.

THE

STOICS.

empty space, it does not move, for the half of its component elements being heavy, and the other half
light, as

a whole

it is

neither heavy nor light.'

;

(1)

SttM-S.

The
but the

stars are spherical masses,^ consisting of fire

fire
is

not in

all cases

equally pure,' and

is

sustained, as Heraclitus taught,

rial
is

by evaporations from
;

unlimited.
oviev

Sirirep

yhp
oSto>

rh

/XTibev

iffri ir4pas,

KaX rod /jLTtSevhs, oJ6y 4itti rh Kev6v. The Empty could only

Diog. 145 Plut. Plac. ii. 1;22, 3;27,1; Stoh.i.blG; 540; 554; Ach. Tat. 133, D.
2

14,

be bounded by being

filled.

To

the same efiEect, Cleomed. p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see Diog. 140 and 143 Stoh. i. 260 and 382 Plut. Sto. Eep. 44, 1, p. 1054 C. Not. 30, Plac. i. ii. 9, 18, 4 2, p. 1073 2 Theodoret, 1. o. and p. 196, 2. That Posidonius denied the infinity of the Empty has been already stated, p. 168, 1. Chrysjppus, in aflttrming, that the world occupies the centre of
;

the reference to Cleanthes on p. 201, 4, with which, however, the statement in Stob. i. 554, that he considered the moon iriAoeiS^s
(ball-like
miKoeiSri)
' ii. i.

Compare

the

MSS.
Cic.

have
N. D.

does not agree.

According to

15, 40, IHog. 144, Stob. Eel.

was therefore contradicting himself, as Plut. Def. Or. 28, p. 425, Sto. Kep. 44, 2, observe. ' Achil. Tat. Isag. 126, A; 132, A, see p. 200, 1; Stoh. According to Stoh. i. 408. C. Not. 30, 2 and i. 442, Plut. 10, p. 1073, Plac. ii. 1, 6 ; i. 5, 1, Diog. 143, Seaat. Math. ix. 332, Ach. Tat. 129, D, the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was included or excluded in the conception. Including the Empty, it is called ri trav without it, iXov (ri iKov, rtb 8ao, frequently occurs with the
space,
Stoics).
is

314; 519; 538; 554; 565, Phit. Fao. Lun. 5, 1 ; 21, 13, p. 921, 935, Plac. ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, Galen, Hist. Phil. 15, Philo, De Somn. 587, B, AeMl. Tat. Isag. 124, D 133, c, and above p. 200, 3 ; 162, 2, the stars generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of irvp rexv'Khv, or Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earthlike, since (as Plin. Hist. Nat. ii. 9, 46, without doubt after Stoic teaching, observes) owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in
;

vapour.

Perhaps

it

was owing

The

Tray,

it

was

said,

neither material nor immaterial, since it consists of both. Plmt. C. Not. 1. c.

to this fact that it was said to receive its light from the sun (Diog. 145) whicli, according to Posidonius in Plut. Fac. Lun. 16, 12, p. 929, Cleomed. Met. p. 106, not only illuminates its surface, but penetrates some

depth.

Cleomed. 100, believes

: ; :

; : ; ;

THE UNIVERSE.
the earth and from water.'

205
this
is

With

process of

Chap.

sustentation the motion of the stars

brought into

vm.

connection, their orbit extending over the space in

which they obtain their nutriment.^

sun, but the

Not only the

moon

also,

was believed to be larger

than the

earth.'

Plato and Aristotle had already held

stars

that, besides the light of the sun, it has also a fight of its

without

anything
;

"very

own.
'

Biog. 145;
;

538

554

Stob. i. 532; Floril. 17, 43 Pint.

;

De
1
;

Is. 41, p.

367

Sto. Eep. 39,

;

Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 4 Plac. ii. 17, 2; 20, 3; 23, 5 Galen, Hist. Phil. 14; Porphyr. Antr. Nymph, c. 11 Cic. N. D. iii. ii. 15, 40 14, 37 46, 118 Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, 2 Heraclit. Alleg. Horn. c. 36, p. 74 and56, p. 117; most of whom affirm that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars are also
; ;
;

peculiar in Stob. i. 448 ; 538 Pint. PI. ii. 15, 2 16, 1 ; I>wg. 144; Cleomed. Meteor, i. 3. Eclipses are also discussed by Biog. 145 Stob. i. 538 560 ; Pint. Fac. Lun. 19, 12, p. 932 Plac. ii. 29, 6; Cleom.ed.pTp.WG and 115, nor is there anything remarkable. Quite in the ordinary way are some observations of Posidonius and Chrysippus given in Stob. i. 518;
; ; ;

b 165, c. The information quoted from Posidonius by Cleomed. Meteor, 51 Prod, in Tim. 277, B
JtoAiZ. 3'a#. Isag. 132,
;

said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Kep. 41, 3, adds to the

passage quoted p. 161, 2

aarepes
4k
6a\d.a-inis

oi 3'

Tl\lov avdTTTovTai.

toD Plut. Ibid. 2 efiypvxov TjyeiTai rhv n^\iov, iripivov iina KOI yeyfvriiiei'ov 4k tjjj i.vafieri

Sv/uiffeas fls irvp ;uTa/3oAoi<(rrjs.

Id. C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084 yeyoyevat Se Koi rbv t^\iov ifi^uxof

\4yovffi ToO ir/pov
tls irvp voep6ii.
^

fifraPdWovTos
;

Stob.

i.

532
i.

Cic.

1.

c.

quoting CleanthesandMacrobius Plut. Diogenes of Plac. ii. 23, 5. Apollonia had already expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the
Macrob.
Sat.
23,
;

Straio, ii. 5, 14, p. 119 respecting observations of Canobus have no bearing on our present enquiry. ' Stob. i. 554 (Plut. PI. ii. This statement, how26, 1). ever, appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by Biog. 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but alsobeoause of the spherical form of the earth's shadow in eclipses of the moon. Biog. 1. c. Macrob. Somn. i. 20 Keracl. AUeg. Horn. c. 46 Cleomed. Met. ii. 2. According to Cleomed. p. 79, he allowed to it an orbit 10,000 times as large as the circumference of
;

!S06

THE

STOICS.
;

Ohap.
VIII.

that the stars are living rational divine beings

and

the same view was entertained by the Stoics, not

only because of the wonderful regularity of their

motion and

orbits,

but also from the very nature of

the material of which they consist.'

wise,, is filled

The
;

earth, like-

by an animating soul
stars ?
^

or else

how

could

it

supply plants with animation, and

afiford

nutriment to the
soul,

Upon

the oneness of the

which permeates

all

its parts,

depends, in the

opinion of the Stoics, the oneness of the universe.

(2) Meteorology.

Most thoroughly, however, did the

in particular, Posidonius
^

and, devote themselves to

Stoics
54
1.
;

in-

the earth, with a diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in Cic. N. D. ii. 40, 103, only calls the moon half that size and Cleomed. p. 97, probably following Posidonius, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The other stars, according to Cleomed. p. 96, are
;

Acad.
;

ii.

37,

110: Porphyr.

Ackill. Tat. Isag. o. 13, Hence, in several of p. 134, A, these passages, the sun is called
c.

after Cleanthes and Chrysippus a voiphv &vafi^a (or e^aju/tci) ck

daKda-frris.
' Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also the quotations' on p. 144, 1,

of them as large as, and others larger than the sun. Posidonius, according to PUn. His. N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon's distance from the earth at two millions, and the sun's distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He estimated the earth's circumference at 240,000, according to Cleomed. at 180,000 according to Htrabo,

some

from

Oic.

N. D.
vii.

ii.

9,

and on

p. 161, 1,

from Diog.
152
treatise

147.

138, of his, called fiereupoKayiKTj or juCTew-

Mog.

and

mentions a

po\oyiii^ ffToixeioKTis ; also, yii. 136, a treatise nepl nendpav. in

several books. Alexander, in iSimpl. Phys. 64, 6, speaks of an

^^yTjffis iJ.rewpo\oytKa>u,

which,

li.

2, 2, p. 95.
'

judging by the

title,

may be a

618 43 Put. Sto. Kep. 39, 1 41, 2 c; Not. 46, 2 Plao. ii. 20, 3 Diog. 146 Pluedr. Nat. De. {Philodem. irepl cutrEySedu) Col. 3 Oio. N. D. i. 14, 36 and 60 ii. 15, 39 and 42 16, 43 21,
;
;

Conf. Stoh. i. 66; 441; 532 538 ; 554; Floril. 17,

; ;

commentary on Aristotle's meteorology. Geminus had made an extract from this book, a long, portion of which on the relation of astronomy and natural science is there given. Whether these various titles really belong to these diflerent treatisas is not

; ; ;

TEE UNIVERSE.
-Vestigating those problems,

207

which may be summed

This portion,
of little value as illusIt

Chap.
VIII.

up under the name

of meteorology.
is

however, of their enquiries

trating their philosophical tenets.

fore suffice to
it

may

there-

mention in a note the objects which included, and the sources whence information may

be obtained.'

The same treatment may apply

to

Posidonius is probably clear. the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca's Naturales Qusestiones, in which he is frequently named (i. 5, 10 13 ii. 26, i 64, 1 vi. 21, 2 iv. 3, 2 vii. 24, 6 20, 2 4), particularly in his meteorological treatises.
; ; ; ; ; ; ;

donius (further particulars in Schol. in Arat. v. 1091) considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca declared for the opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of

' On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle, looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see Stoi. Plvt. Plac. iii. 1, 10; i. 676;

Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 15. On the comets, which are explained in a similar way, Stob. i. 580

called iruyavl^i, see Arrian in Stab. i. 584; Sen. Nat. Qu. i. 1, 14 15, 4. On a4\tts, consult Biog. 153 ; Sen. i. 15 ; on halo (Samj), Sen. i. 2 ; Alem. Aphr. Meteorol. 116 ; on the rainbow, Siog. 152 ; Sen. i. 3-8 ; on virg/B and pa/rlielia, Sen. i. 9-13 ; Schol. in Arat. v. 880 (Posidonius) on storms, lightning, thunder, summer lightning, cyclones,
fire,

light

and

SoKol, etc.,

and

8. Whether the Diogenes mentioned here who looked upon comets as real
(Plac.
iii.

2,

Diogenes the Stoic, or Diogenes of ApoUonia, is not The former is more clear. probable, Boethus having been just before mentioned) Arrian,
stars is
;

siroccos, Stob. i. 596 ; 598 (Plac. iii. 3, 4) Arrian, Ibid. 602 ; Sen. ii. 12-31 ; 51-58 (c. 54, the view of Posidonius) ; ii, 1, 3 ; Diog. 163 ; on rain, sleet,
;

in Stob. i. 584 JHoff. vii. 152 and, particularly, Sen. Nat. Qu. vii. We learn from the latter that Zeno held (vii. 19-21 30,
; ;

with Anaxagoras and Decomets are that mocritus, formed by several stars uniting whereas the majority of the
2),

snow, Diog. 153 Sen. iv. 3-12 on earthquakes, Diog. 154 Plac. iii. 15, 2 Sen. vi. 4-31 (particularly c. 16 21, 2) also Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102 on winds, Plac. iii. 7, 2; Sen. v. 1-17 Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29 iii. 2, 5, p. 144 on waterspouts^ Sen. iii. 1-26 the Nile floods,
hail,
; ; ; ;
;

Ibid. iv. 1

Strabo, xvii.

1, 5, p.

790;

Stoics

and,

number,

Pansetius

amongst and

their Posi-

Cleomed. Meteor, p. 32; on tides, Strabo, i. 3, 12, p. 55 ; iii. 3, 3, p. 153 ; 5, 8, p. 73 on ;

seasons, p. Ill,
'J,.

208

TEE

STOICS.

the few maxims laid down by the Stoics on the sub1_ ject of inorganic nature which have come down to us.' Nor need we mention here the somewhat co* pious writings of Posidonius,^ on the subjects of geography, history, and mathematics. Plants Little attention was devoted by the Stoics to the (3) About this fact there '^o'^ld of plants and animals. mil!""*' can be no doubt, since we neither hear of any treaChap,
tises

by the Stoics on
is,

this subject, nor

do they ap-

pear to have advanced any peculiar views.

The most
things in

prominent point

that they divided

all

nature into four classes

the

class of inorganic beings,

the class of plants, that of animals, and that of rational beings.

In beings belonging to the

first class

a simple quality {s^is) constitutes the bond of union

in those of the second class, a forming in those of the third class, a sgul
;

power

{j^vats);

and in those of the

of this diviri

fourth class, a rational soul.'

' Thus colours are explained as being irpuToi ff;t7jjLtaTiff/xol t^s

By means

ixev efei SioiKehai rck Si ipisft,

Se &\6y{f ^vxV> "^^ ^*

ix<>^<n>

'^"^

XAyojr

8Xi)s (Stob.

i.

364

Plac.

i.

15,

""'

Sidvoiav.

Themist.

5) ; and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the air by Plmt. Plac. iv. 19, 5 ; Siog. 158. ^ Conf Posidonii Bake,
.

M. Awel. vi. 14 Philo, Qu. De. S. Immut. 298, D De Mundo, 1154, E Leg. Alleg. 1091, D Ihoorrupt. M,
72,

De An.
;

Rhod.
245.
'

Eeliquise, pp. 87-184 ; Muller, Fragm. Hist. Grasc. iii.

Sext.

Math.
Tck

ix.

81

rSiy

fivu/ievaiv

(on fnaais see

p. 103,

1)

traiid-raiv

?ffa>s avvix^'ra.i,

T^ Si uirb &s MBot Kal

KaBdrep
C$a.
:

fi^v imh \jii\tis tA Se Imi ipiffiui, ^vxvs nal ejeus uiv

iiiXo,
<j>i<rfas

Si,

ret

(()i>Tck,

^vxvs Si ri

Pint. Virt. Mor. o. 12, p. 451 Kae6\ov Se tuv ivTav airol TE </)a(ri Kol SriJ\.6v iariv Sti tA

947, A Platin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c, Bas. 861, Cr. (Otherwise Clc. N. D. ii. 12, 33. See p. Eespecting the dif146, 1). ference of (piais and ifux^l, ^iJiris is said to consist of a moister, colder, and denser irxeD/ia than but, on this point, see ifiux'S Phit. Sto. Rep. 41, 1 ; Com. Not. 46, 2 Galen, Hipp, et Plat. v. 3. Vol. v. 521. Qu. Animi Mores, c. 4. Vol. iv. 783. In IHog. 139, ejis and vovs as the
; ; ;

THE UNIVERSE.
were on a gradually-increasing development of the powers of life. But no serious atsion, the various branches of a science of nature

209

Chap.
VIII.

mapped

out, based

tempt was made by the Stoics to work out this With the single exception of man, we know exceedingly little of their views on organic
thought.
.

beings.'
highest and lowest links in the series, are contrasted. IHd. 156, there is a definition of
<\iiffis

-nvp
i^

rexvLK^v
auTTis

dScp

^aSi^ov

eis

yeveaiv;

and (148) another

Kivovfihi)

= e|ts
TE
(cal

Kara

ffirep/jLariKobs

\6yovs

ci,iroT6\ov<rtl

&ptfffji^yois

Spacra

avvixfivaa ri ^| aurijj iv ;^p(ifOs Koi Totavra acp' olav StireKplOT). It

hardly need be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time appears as fij, at another as <jii<ris. Conf. Themist. 1. c. Sext. Dioff. 138
; ;

of sleep, death, and age in Pint. Plac. V. 23, 4 30, 5 ; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason (on this point see PMt. Solert. An. 2, 9 H, 2, pp. 960, 963, 6, 1 967), but also (according to Chrysippus in Oaleti, Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 3 ; v. 1, 6. Vol. v. 309, 429, 431, 476) in emotions (or as Galen also says in Sviihs and iTriBu/ila), even in man the
; ; ;

emotions being connected with

the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement ( Galen, p. 476), and Chrysippus believed that animals had a Tiyeiiovmiv. QChaloid in Tim. He even discovered p. 148, b.) in the scent of dogs traces of an unconscious inference. Sext. PjTrh. i. 69. See also p. 225,
2.

Math.
'

ix. 84.

belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries {Sen. Nat. Qu. ii.
15, 1), which was shared by the Peripatetics, deserves to be mentioned here, Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 15, 1 also the explanations
;

The

' '

210

TSE

STOICS.

CHAPTER

IX.
MAN.

THE SirDT OF NATURE.

Chap.
IX.
A. The
soul.

The stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting, when it treats of Man and the line it here follows
;

was decided by the tone of the whole system.

the one hand, the Stoic materialism could not
to

On
fail

(1)

Maof

terialistic
natti/re

show

itself

the soul.

ment

of anthropology

most unmistakeably in the departon the other hand, the con;

viction that all actions

must be referred to

active

powers, and all the several active powers to one original power, could not be held without leading to a
belief in the oneness

and in the regulating power

it

of

the

soul.

Not only does

follow, as

a corollary

from the materialistic view of the world, that the soul must be in its nature corporeal, but the Stoics took pains to uphold this view by special arguments.
Whatever, they
it

said, influences the body,

is

and

is

by

influenced in turn, whatever

united with the

corporeal.

body and again separated from

it,

must be

How,

then, can the soul be other than corporeal ?

a&na
voiiivif

Cleanthes, in Nemes. Nat. Horn. p. 33, and Tert. De An. c. aadifiaTov avfiiiiax^^ o65>' 5 tr<i)uaTt oirSe daivjUc^T^ ffw/xa a\\^
:

criifmrt

o-u/iircJirxei

Se

^x^ TV

irdiiaTi

voaowri
aSifui

(col reix-

Kol

th

rfi

^xS

oXffXwofiiviis yovv ipvBphy yfycTOi

THE SOUL: ITS NATURE.

Whatever has extension in three dimensions is corporeal and this is the case with the soul, since it
;

211

Chap.
IX.

extends in three directions over the whole

body.'

Moreover, thought and motion are due to animal

life.^

Animal

life is

nurtured and kept in health by

the breath of

life.'

Experience also proves that mental

qualities are propagated

that they

by natural generation, and must be consequently connected with a corporeal substratum.* As, therefore, the mind is
nothing but
scribed
fiery breath, so

the

human

soul

is

de-

by the Stoics sometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, at other times, more accurately, as warm
breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a

bond of union
Kal <l>o$ovii4v7}s
7}

for

the body,^ in the very same

yiv6^9a, Kari rh trw/xa,
Karh.

way
koX

Tpuxh;

wxp^v ffu^ia &pa Chrysippus in Nemes.

'

aWa.

T^y ^^vxhv, rois

Tois Sta94ire(n

irdBeffi, rots
'

p. 34
^vy^TJs

b &iyaT6s

iffri
*

xwptcjttbs

^fleci,

ffwfiaros Se

avh

(Ti^fiaTos

ovS^v

Se

atrii/xaTOV Airi a^fiUTOS x'^'P^C^Tat

ovSe y&p itpdiTTerai

(Tii^fiaTos

atr^-

fiarov 7} 5e ij/ux^ Kai ^(piirTerai Kal xwpi ^6To( Tov ffdfiuTOs (Tw/xa Spa ri i^ux^. The same is said
'

rh SfAOiov Kal aj/ifioiov, ov^l Se aadfiaTov ffufia fipa ri i//ux^* The same in Tertullian, 1. c. ' Chrysippus in Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1. Vol. v. 287 ri
:

by
30.

Tertullian.
'

Nemes. Nat. Horn.

Diog. 157;

c. 2, p.

ae. N. D.

ii.

14, 36.
' Zeno, in Tertull. 1. c, and very nearly the same in Chalcid. Quo in Tim. p. 306 Meurs. digresso animal emoritur con: ;

cuvex^s -navrX rtf frdfiaTL SirjKOv. Zeno. Maorob. Somn.i. 14 Zenon [dixit animam] coneretum eorpori spiritum . . Boethos (probahly the Stoic, not the Peripatetic of the first century, is meant) ex aere et igne [se. constare]. Diog. in Oalen,ii. 8, p. 282 rh klvovv tov di'dpunov rhs
:

sito

autem

spiritu
:

animal emoritur

corpus spiritus autem spiritus anima est ergo corpus est anima. Chrysippus
:

digresso ergo consitus consitus est,

Kara
D.

irpoaipeffiv

Kivfiffeis

ij/yxttt^

ris ^ffriv avaBv}jiia(ni.

iii.
;

Cie. Nat.
i.

14,

36
;

Tusc.

9,

19

18, 42

Zeno considers the soul

Pansetius believes

to be fire

in Chalcid. 1. c. Cleanthes, in Nemes. 1. o. 32 ov \i.6yov 'dfioioi rots yofevtri

:

burning air. Diog. L. vii. 156, on the authority o Zeno, Antipater, Posidouius,
that
it is

212

TEE
IX.

STOICS.
is

Chap.

that the soul of the world

diffused

throughout

the world, and forms a bond of union for the world.'

This

warm
;

breath was believed to be connected with

the blood

and hence the soul was said to be fed

by-

vapours from the blood, just as the stars are fed by vapours from the earth.

orig;in of

to

The same hypothesis was also used to explain the the soul. One part of the soul was believed be transmitted to the young in the seed.^ From
it is irwCfia ffifi^vrov,
^v9epfiov.

says that
TTceu/ia

Eel. i. 796 (^Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 3). Cornut. N. D. p. 8 ko! yap oi fiii4Tepat }pvxctl irvp eitrt. Ar. Didymus, in Hus. Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1 Zeno calls the soul ata-Bvffiv t)
Stob.
:

Clm/sippus. See previous This diffusion is further explained Ijy Iamb, in Stob. Eel. i. 870 and 874, Themist. De Anim. f. 68, a, Plotin. iv. 7, 8,
'

note.

p. 463, c, as

being

xpaa-is, i.e.

an

avaBvfitairiv

(should be

oiVflijTi-

K^v

vivaBvuiturtVf

conf, 2
:

and

Ps. Pint. Vit. Horn. c. 127 ^vxhy 01 STwi'Kol Spi^ourat vj/eO^ua

ffufiipvh

tV

Kol

ayaOviilatriv
airh

aiffBri-

intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for the body, and not vice versS, was a point vindicated by the Stoics against the Epicureans. Posid. in AcMl.
Tat. Isag. o. 13, p. 133, E ; Sext. ix. 72. Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, p. 282, on the authority of

TiK^v
(TiifmTt

avaTTTOfievTiv

tS>v

4v

Longin. in Eus. Ibid. 21,1 and 3. Alex. De An. 01 inrh ttjs ctoSs Trv^vfia 127, b
iypav).
:

Math.
'^

auT^V XeyofTes

eTvai ffuyKeifj.ev6v

Zeno,

Cleanthes,
;

TTws eK T iruphs KoX a.4pos.

Since,

and Diogenes
;

Chrysippus, Longin. in Eas.

;

however, every irvcC/na is not a soul, a soul is stated to be TrreE/jo iriis exo" {Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 4, p. 458, B) and the distinctive quality of the soulelement is its greater warmth and rarity. See Plvt. Sto. Eep. 41, 2, p. 1052 Chrysippus considers the ^vxh to be apai6Tepoii
;
:

Pr. Bv. XV. 21, 3 M. Aurel. v. 33 vi. 16 ; Ps. PUt. Vit. Horn.

127.
^

Zeno described the seed as

juefl'

TT^ey^a

vypov ^uxvs
. .
.

fJ-^pos

Kol
tJjs

aTr6criTa(r^a

fiiyi^a

tuv

^vxvs

lifpSiv

(Arius Didymus, in
K^pofffia

jEus. Pr.
ffifiixiyfut

Ev. XV. 20,

ttal

1), or as rihv t^s

irpev/jia

r^s

(piKTeaii

Kol XeirTop^pi-

(TTspov.

Similarly,
c.

Galen,,

An. Mores,

4.

Vol.

iv.

Qn. 783
:

The Stoics say that both (piiris and iuxh is irueviM, but that the neuiw. is thick and cold in (pvffis, dry and warm in ^vx'^-

Swdfieav (Pint. Coh. Ir. Similarly Chrysip. in Dioff. ,159, Conf. I'ertullian, De An. c. 27. According to Sphserxis, in Diog. 159, the seed is formed by separation from all parts of the body, and can consequently
ifiux^s

15).

TRB SOUL: ITS PARTS.

the part so transmitted there arises, bv development

213

Chap.
"

within the womb,

first

the soul of a plant

and

this

becomes the soul of a living creature after birth by This view led to the the action of the outer air.'
further hypothesis that the seat of the soul

must be

in the breast, not in the brain

since not only breath

and warm blood, but

also the voice, the

immediate
(2) Divi-

expression of thought, comes from the breast.^

Nor

is

this further

hypothesis out of harmony

with the notions otherwise entertained by them as to

produce all, as Democritus had already said. Pansetius (in Cio.
Tuso. i. 31, 79) proves, from the mental similarity between parents and children, that the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother's share in producing the soul, see Ar. Did, I. 0. See above p.
127, 5. ' Pint. Sto. Eep. 41, 1 and 8, C. Not. 46, 2, p. 1084. p. 1052 De Primo Frig. 2, 5, p. 946 oi 'S.Tia'iKoX KoX Tb TTVet/jLta \iyovffiv iv rois ffd}^a,tTi Twc ^fii^wv Ty
;
;

^""/"^^''^

brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. Sea^. Math. ix. 119; Diog. in Plusdr. Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. Knsche, Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysip. in

QaUn,

1.

c. iii. 8, p.

349.

It appears, however,
1. c.

from Galen,

Trepuj/tJ^et tTTOixovtrdai

KaX ixerafidK-

i. 6, ii. 2 and 5, iii. 1, pp. 185, 214, 241, 287, TeHull. De An. c. 15, that the most distinguished Stoics Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, a,nd ApoUodorus decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that

iK <pia'ea>s '^eveffdai ^vxh^. Similarly, Plotin. Enn. iv. 7, 8, p. 463, c ; Conf. Bippolyt. EeTertull. fut. Hser. c. 21, p. 40 De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac.
\ojf
;

16, 2 ; 17, 1 ; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul,
V.

which

is

warmer and rarer than

the vegetable soul, has been developed thereout by cooling and condensation. 2 On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed.

Some
iv.

(not
5,

all,

21,

asserts)

as Plut. PI. Phil, made the

the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still did not shrink from using it. Galen, 1. c. p. 254, 261. At the same also time, he appealed to the fact (ii. 7, 268 iii. 1, 290, c. 5, c. iv. 1, 362) 321, 7, 335, 343 that, by universal assent, supported by numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the feelings proceed from the heart.
; ;

214
Chap,
IX.

THE
the nature of man.
fixed

STOICS.

Plato and Aristotle had already

on the heart as the central organ of the lower powers, having assigned the brain to reason, with
the view of distinguishing the rational from the

mere animal

soul.'

When,

therefore, the Stoics as-

similated man's rational activity to the activity of

the senses, deducing both from one and the same

source, it was natural that they
Aristotle's view.

would depart from

Accordingly, the various parts of

the soul were supposed to discharge themselves from

their centre in the heart into the several organs, in

the form of atmospheric-currents.

Seven such parts

Biavo-

were

enumerated, besides the dominant part or

reason,

which was

also

called

'^ysfioviKov,

TjriKov, Xoyia-TiKov, or XoyLcr/Mos.

These seven parts

power of reproduction, and the power of speech;^ and, following out their
consist of the five senses, the

view of the close relation of speech and thought,'

' Aristotle had assigned no particulai organ of the body to reason. * Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2. Ibid. c. 21 : The Stoics consider the TiyeiioviKhv to be the highest part of the soul it begets the (par;

110 and 157 ; Porphyr. and lamblich. in i^ob. 1. 836, 874, and 878 ; Chaleid. in Tim;
Dioff.

Tojiai,

ffvyKaToBeiriis,

ala0iiirfis,

307 ; Nicomachns, in lamll. Theol. Arith. p. 50. But there 'was no universal agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to Tertull. De

and

6p/ial,

Xoyurji6s;

and is by them called from it the seven

An.

divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as TrveS/io SiareTj'oj' airh rov riy^ixoyiKov
(fiexpis

14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some among the later

Stoics enumerated as many as ; Pansetius only held six, and Posidonius went still further away from the view cur-

ten

6(p6a\fiay,

Htuv,
yXdiTTris

/hvk-

rfipuiv, y\d>Tr-ns, itri^aveias, irapv-

trrdTuv,

Kpdpvyjos
1,

Ka.1

Stoics. The reof Stob. 1. 828, probably refer to the Peripatetic Aristo.

rent

among the
See

marks
'

Tuv

olxeiaiv

1. 0. iii.

bpyavav). Galen, 287. See p. 215, 2 ;

p. 73, 2.

THE
great

SOUL,

215

importance was

attached to the power of

Stoics upheld the

Chap.
IX.

speech.^

At the same time, the

oneness of the substance of the soul with greater

vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had

done.

Eeason, or to
derivative

^ysfioviKov, is
all

with them the primary

feeling

power, of which
derived from

other powers are only parts, or

powers.'*
it,

Even

and desire are

in direct contradiction to the teach-

ing of Plato and Aristotle;' and this power was

'

Conf Clecmth. Hynm. 4

.

et operffi

non enim mem-

e/c <rov

yap y^yos Kax^vres

^irl

icrfihf irjs fiiftTjfia

fiovvoi, 3(ro ^dei

re koL epvei

i/t^t*

yaiay.

- See p. 214, 2 and Chrys. in Galen, 1. c. iii. 1, p. 287. Conf. p. 211, 5 rairris oZv [t^s
:

i^ux^s]

Tuv

fiepwv eKiiffTtp Siare-

ray^4iov
ouTTJs els
^itiVTiv

\<i3v~\

ixoplcj), rb StTJKOp r^f rpa^eiav otpn]plav

bra smit snbstantiee animalis, sed ingenia (capacities). Iambi, in Stob. i. 874 The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics, the same relation to the soul that qualities have to the substance and their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the nveip.a.ra, of which they
:

eivoUj

rb 5k
Kol

els
T-b

6^9d\fiohs
els

ifiv,

K.T.\.

Spxeis,

eTep6p Tiv' ^X"*' ToiovTov \6yoyj tnrepfiaTiKbv, els t Se trvfjL^diveL irdvra Toyra, 4f ttJ KapSl^ elvai, fiepos %v avTiis Tb TiyefiovntSv, Plmt. Plac. iv. 4, 2 tov iiyelioyiKov dcp' ov lavra irivTa eirneraxrai \_ = TaTOi\ 5iq; tuv omeitav
:

consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union of several qualities in one subjectmatter, the latter being necessary, for %yenovmbv to include
^avTaffia^
(ruyKarddeffiSf
opy.^,

and

\6yos. Flut. Virt. Mort. c. 3, p. 441, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus vojii^ovinv oux

opyavwv irpocrtpepvs rais tov voKiConf. Sext. ToSos irheKTivais. Alex. Aphr. Math. Lx. 102. therefore denies (De An. 146) the Stoical assertion, that the xfivxtKii Simiits is only one, and the activity of tliat every soul is only the action of the wijs exov 7iyefj.oyiK6v. Conversely TertulUan, De An. 14, speaking quite after the manner of a
Stoic, says:

rb vaBriTiKbv koX &\Qyov Sia(l>op^ TlVl Koi IpVffet y^VXVS TOV KoytKov SiaKeKpifievoVf kWa t6 avTb TTJs ^vxvs fiepoSj t 5^ Ka^
eivai
A.ou<rt

Stdvotav Koi TiyeiioviKbv, Zi6\ov Tpeird/J-evoy Koi fieTa^dWov ev T6 Tots Trddeffi Kol tclIs Korb.
e^ip
fl

Btddeaiv /A6Toj8o\a7s KaKiav

Te

yiveo'Oai Kol

apeT^p Kal
1.

fiTi^ep

^X^^^ &^oyop ip eavT$, Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen,

1,

Plac.
c. iv.

Hujusmodi autem
vires et efficacise

non tam partes animae habebuntnr,

quam

Chrysippus some364 times speaks as if he admitted a distinct Sipaitis ^iri9u/i7)TiKi) or

p.
:

216.

THE

STOICS.

Chap.
IX.

declared to be the seat of personal identity, a point on -which former philosophers had refrained from

expressing any opinion,'

B. The
in-

The
'vrhole

individual soul bears the same relation to

dividual
soul and the soul of
t?ie

the soul of the universe that a part does to the

The human

soul

is

not only a part, as are

all

uni-

verse.

other living powers, of the universal power of

life,

but, because it possesses reason, it has a special rela-

tionship to the Divine

BviioeiS'fis
;

Being *

a relationship which
:

at other times, as if
it.

he denied
;

latter is clearly his meaning. Ibid. v. 6 Se XphffvK-Kos ohQ^ erepov 6, 476 sJuBU vofxi^ei 7h vaBjiTiKhv ttjs ^vXVs Tov hoyKTTiKov Kai Tuv aK6yc0v

The

spiritus sedet ... in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus incertum est, habitat Deus. Id.

Cvuv
209,

^tpaipeirat Tct irdBTf,

1.

See p. Iamb, in StoK Eel. i.

:

890;

Orig. c. IHoff. vii. 159. Gels. V. 47 robs a-vh ttJS ffroas apvovfievovs rh rpifjiepes Trjs ^uxv^.

Posidonius (in Galen, 1. c. 6, 476) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view, by a passage in which he contrasts Sujuij with A6yos but this is confounding a rhetorical flourish with a philosophic view. Chrys. (in Galen, ii. 2, 215) ovTuis Se Kai rh ^yij Ksyoix^y Kara toSto (the primary power in the breast) SemvivTes ouroiis

Bp. 66, 12 Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently, reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as in the soul of the universe, as Iambi, in Stol. Eel. i. 886, states as a Stoic view. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces in a well-known simile (see p. 84, 1) the soul's capacity for studying nature, and Cicero (De Leg. i. 8, 24) the universality of a belief in God. All souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively regarded as one soul or reason. Marc. Aurel. ix. 8 is ft^v Tck &KQya, ^Qa fiia i^x^
:

ec T(p airatpaiveffSat t^v htivoiav

clvai,
' Cleanthes, v. 4, p. 215, 1. Mpictet. Diss. i. 14, 6 oi ^ux'^ ffvva<peis Tq? Be^ fire aiiTov fi6pia
:

SppnTai"
\oyiKii
%v
Upeffty,

ci'j

Si

Tck

Ao7iKt
xii.

fila

^x^

p.fp,epuTTai.

30

<^m TjKiov, Kttv SteipTjTat toIxois, &Wois fivplots fiia oiiffia

'

Koiv^, Khe StelpyriTai iblas irOLois

(rd/jxairi

oZa-ca Kal
8, 11.

a-iroa-irdfffiaTtt.

Id.
4, v.

ii.

fivplots-

fila

^todl,

ictti'

M. Aurel.
the soul
calls the
:

ii.

27,
26,

^iffetxi SiiiprfTat fivplais Kal iSlats

calls

puipos

ijr6pf>oia,

irepiypa^ats.

This oneness, how-

hir6aTrairiia flcou;

and,

xii,

ever, must, as the

comparison
:

even

human

xoOs Bi6s.

Sen. Ep. 41, 2

Sacer intra nos

shows, be understood in the sense of the Stoic realism the

THE SOUL OF THE UNIVERSE.

becomes closer in proportion as we allow greater play
to the divine element in ourselves,
i.

217
Chap.
'

e.

to reason.'

On

this very account, however,

the soul cannot escape

the law of the Divine Being, in the shape of general necessity, or destiny.

It is a

mere delusion

to

suppose that the soul possesses a freedom indepen-

dent of the world's course.

everything else in the world,

is

The human will, like bound into the in-

dissoluble chain of natural causes,

tively of our

and that irrespecknowing by what causes the will is

Its

decided or not.

freedom consists only in that,

instead of being ruled from without, it obeys the call

of its

own

nature, external circumstances concurring.^

To

this

power of self-determination, however, the

is

greatest value

attached.

Not only are our actions due

are, as

to it to such an extent that only because of it can they

be considered ours,' but even our judgments

the Stoics thought, dependent on
it.

The

soul itself

inclining towards truth or error, our convictions are

quite as

much

in our power as our actions

both
just

are alike the necessary result of our will.

And

as the individual soul does not possess activity inde-

pendently of the universal soul, no more can the

individual soul escape the law of destiny.
It, too,

at the end of the world's course, will be resolved into the primary substance, into the Divine Being,
universal soul, in the sense of etherial substance, is the element of which individual souls consist. See also Ma/rc. Awrel.
viii. 54.
'

bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humane hospitans. * Further particulars, p. 174,

180, 189.
' <

11,

In this sense. Sen. Ep. 31, calls the animus rectus,

See See

p. 179.

p. 88, 1.

THE
Chap.
IX.

STOICS.

The only point

time as separate
held.'

alxiut
all

cided was, whether

which the Stoics were undesouls would last until that

souls,

thes, or only the souls of the wise,

which was the view of Cleanas Chrysippus

Diog. 156 Plwt. N. P. Suav. Viv. 31, 2, p. 1107 Plac. Ar. Didymus, in Eus. iv. 7. 2 Prsep. Bv. xv. 20, 3 Sen. Consol, ad Marc. o. 26, 7 Ep. 102, 22 117, 6 Cio. Tusc. i. 31, 77. Seneca (ad Polyb. 9, 2 Bp. 65, 24 71, 16 36, 9, and in Tertnll. De An. o. 42 Kesurr.
' ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;

to the ether, and there, according to M. Aurelius, united to

the ainp^riKhs \6yos ruv Z\tav, it lives, according to the common view, until the end of the The ether is also alworld. lotted to the blessed, for their residence, by Oio. Tuse. i. 18, 42 Laotant. Inst. vii. 20; Phct. Cam. c. 1) and M. Aure- N. P. Suav. Vivi. 31, 2, p. 1107. lius (iii. 3 vii. 32 viii. 25, 58) The souls, as Cicero remarks, are only speaking kot' li,v9fuTrov, penetrating the thick lower air, in seeming to doubt a future mount to heaven, xmtil they life after death, in order to disreach an atmosphere (the juncti pel the fear of death in every ex anima tenui et ardore solis case. It is, however, a mistake temperate ignes) congenial with of Tiedeinann (Sto. Phil. ii. 155) their own nature. Here they to suppose that they, in many naturally stop, and are fed by passages {Sen. Bp. 71, 102, M. the same elements as the stars. Aw. ii. 17 v. 4, 13), supposed According to Chrysippus (in the immediate dissolution of Eustath. on II. xxiii. 65), they the soul after death. It is, on there assume the spherical the contrary, clear, from M. shape of the stars. According Awel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul to Tertull. De An. 54, conf. lives some time after death, Liican. Phars. ix. 5, their place and is not resolved into the is imder the moon. Zeno, in world-soul till the general con- speaking of the islands of the flagration. But even this is blest (Zact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), a variation from the ordinary probably only desired to enlist view of the Stoics. According popular opinion in his own to Seneca (Consol. ad Marcum) favour. The souls of the foolish the souls of the good, as in the and bad also last some time doctrine of purgatory, undergo after death only, as being a purification, before they axe weaker, they do not last until admitted to the ranks of the the end of the world {Ar. Did. blessed and here this purifica- Thendm-et. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23, tion is no doubt required on p. 73) and meantime, as it is physical grounds. When the distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. soul is purified, both in sub117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactanstance and morals, it rises up tius, they are punished in the
; ; ;
; ;

FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY.

The
effects of the Stoic principles

219
chap.

appear unmis-

takeably in the above statements.

They, however,
c.

^'
Free-

pervade the whole body of the Stoical views on

man.'

point of view, the theory of ne- tmmorcessity, and the denial of everlasting life after death, *^%-

From one

seem quite unintelligible in a system the moral tone of which is so high yet the connection of these
;

theories

with the

Stoic

ethics

is

very intimate.

These theories commended themselves to the Stoics,

as

they have done in later times to Spinoza and

Schleiermacher, because they corresponded with their

fundamental view of morality, according to which

the individual can only be regarded as the instru-

ment
of

of reason in general, as a dependent portion

the collective universe.

Moreover, since the

of limited, but same practical results from the current belief of Seneca,^ that

Stoics admitted a future existence

yet indefinite, length

the

followed from their belief as

in immortality.

The statements
;

this life is a prelude to a better

that the body

is

a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to

its

own home
will

his joy in looking forward to the day

which

rend the bonds of the body asunder,

hominis magno pondere permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non f uerit illi exitus liber was not required by their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School, ^ Conf. Sam; Seneca nnd Paulus in Hilgenfeld's Zeitextriti

Tertullian in nether world. placing a portion of the souls of the foolish in the region of the earth, and there allowing them to be instructed by the wise, is probably referring to the puriticatiou mentioned by S'eneca. For the supposed transmigration of souls see p. 166, 2. The peculiar notion mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 7) as belonging to the Stoics ani'

mam

schrift fiir wissensch. Theol. 2, 221.

i.

220
Chap.
IX.

THE
the birthday of eternal

STOICS.
calls

which he, in common with the early Christians,

life
; '

his description of the

peace of the eternity ther6 awaiting us, of the free-

dom and
of natxu:e

bliss of

the heavenly

life,

of the light of
all

knowledge which
;

will there be shed

on

the secrets

his language on the future recognition

and happy

society of souls

made

perfect

his see-

ing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence

Ep. 102, 22 Cum venerit qui mixtum hoc divini humanique seoernat, corpus hie, ubi iuveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam per has mortalis vite moras illi meliori vitEe longiorique proluditur. As a child in its mother's womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14 The body is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16. ^ Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3
'
:

dies

ille,

Alius tuus terminos intra quos servitur excepit ilium magna et aeterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or compassion
:

disturbs him. Consol. ad Polyb.

IHd.
9, 3, 8
:

26,

5.

Nunc

fratris mei velut ex diutino oarcere emissus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturae spectaculo fruitur fruitur nunc aperto et . libero ccelo et nunc illic
. . . . .

animus

libere vagatux omniaque rerum naturae bona cum summa voluntate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12 : Tunc animus noster habebit,
sibi, cum emistenebris . . totum et ccelo redditus sue fuerit. Ep. 102, 28 Aliquando naturae tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet, which Seneca then further expands. ' In Consol. ad Marc. 25, I, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas (the addition excepit ilium ccetus sacer Hanse rightly treats as a gloss) and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3.

quod gratuletur
sus
his

diem admiserit,

Imago dumtaxat fllii tui periit ipse quidem seternus meliorisque nunc status est, de. . .

oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, enveloping the soul in
spoliatus

darkness nititur iUo, unde dimissus est ibi ilium seterna requies mauet. Tbid. 26, 7 Nos quoque f elices animae et seternfe
: ; :

sortitse.

Ibid. 19, 6

Excessit

FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY.

will

221

be pronounced on every one

life
^

; '

his

making

Chap.
IX.

the thought of a future

the great stimulus to

moral conduct here

the thought that
hereafter
'

even the way in which he

consoles himself for the destruction of the soul

it will

live

by again in another form

at

all

contain nothing

variance with

the Stoic teaching, however near they

to Platonic or even Christian

may approach
of thought.*

modes

' Bp. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille latiirus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies quo, remotis strophis ac fuois, de me judicaturus sum. Compare the hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24. 2 Bp. 102, 29: Hsec oogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum
.
. .

animo subsidere
humile,
nihil

sinit, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari jubet et seterni-

tatem menti proponere. = Ep. 36, 10 Mors intermittit vitam, non eripit veniet iterum qui nos in lucem
:

reponat dies,

quem multi

re-

cusarent, nisi oblitos reduoeret. Sed postea diligentius dooebo omnia, quEe videntur perire, animo debet mutari. rediturus exire. The souls cannot return, according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration and that is on the supposition that the same persons will be found in the ful ure world as in the pre-

Mqm

sent.

See

p.

166, 2.

As long

as the latter lasts, the better souls continue to exist, and only the particles of the body

are employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to the return of personality after the conflagration of the world. Besides the definitions of oiiffB^ais in Diog. 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeling is in the riyeiioviKhy (Phit. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following statements may be mentioned In the proSpanKiv cess of seeing, the TTvevfitt, coming into the eyes from the TiysfioviKbv, gives a spherical form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its tov^kt) Klrqais (on t6vos, see p. 128, 2), and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in contact with things ; and since by this process rays of light emanate from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158 Alex. ApTi. De Auim. 149 Pint. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear. Mog. 158 Phit. Plac. iv. 19, 5. On the voice, called also (jiavaev, see Plut. Plac. iv. 20, 2 ;
:

222
Chap.

THE
L_

STOICS.

Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his School

in one particular direction, in which it harmonises

most

closely with

Platonism

and, of

all

the Stoics,

Seneca was the most distinctly Platonic.

Excepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time,' and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions, which will

be considered subsequently,

little

is

on record re-

lating to the psychological views of the Stoics.

21,
p.

4 ; Diog. 55, and above 214, 2 Disease is 74, 5. caused by changes in the iri/e5/io, Diog. 158 ; sleep ixXvofiivou toG a!<r6r)TiKoS rdyuu irepl ri iiyfiioviKhy, Diog. 158 Tertull. De An. 43 ; and in a similar way, death iK\voiifvov 70V t6pov Kttl irupie; ;

fi^vov,

Iambi, (in Stoh. Eel.

i.

who, however, does not mention the Stoics by name. In

922),

the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is only a liberation of
rational souls.
'

Page

77.

ETHIC OF TRE

STOICS.

223

CHAPTEE
ETHICS.
ETHICS.

X.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC

ABSTRACT THEOET OF MORALITY.
Chap.
"

Whateter
lies,

attention the Stoics paid to the study of

nature and to logic, the real kernel of their system

as has heen already observed, in their Ethics
'

even natural science, that

sophy,'

most divine part of philo-

being only pursued as an intellectual prepa-

ration for Ethics.

In the domain of Ethics the true

spirit of the Stoic system

may

therefore be expected

to appear,

and

it

may

be anticipated that this subspecial care.

ject will be treated

is this

by them with
;

Nor

expectation a vain one

for here the springs

of information ilowing freely give ample data re-

specting the Stoic doctrine of morality.

theless, "respecting the formal

Never-

grouping of these data

only vague and contradictory statements are forth-

coming.
so

Moreover, the Stoics appear to have been

little afraid

unequal in their treatment, and so

of

repetitions, that it is hardly possible to obtain a

complete survey of their whole system by following

any one of the traditional

^

divisions.'
Kbv fiepos Trjs ^ihoao^ias Siaipovaiv its tc rhv ite/jI ipftTis xal eij

The chief passage in Diog.

84, is as follows
:

vii.

ri>

Se

ijBi-

224
Chap. X.

THE

STOICS.

Proceeding to group the materials in such a way

as to give the clearest insight into the peculiarities
Thv
Trepl ayoBiav Kal KaKSiv tStcov Kal rhy irepl iraduv Kal wepl itper^s

KaX tcepl t4\ovs Trepi re t^? irpd^ryis

a^ias Kal ray Trpd^euu Kai irepi tuv KadriKSpTCoy trpoTponSiv re Kal airoTpoiruv.
01 irepl

Kal

oi^7(a S' viro^laipovffiv

^

third of Epictetus (which, according to what follows, rather refers to the critical confirmation of moral principles not specially mentioned by Diogenes), but rather with his first

Xp^ffLiriroif Kai

hpx^^fllJ^ov

Kal Z^j/wi^a Thv Tapffia Kal 'AiroA\6Stopov Kal Aioyeyriv Kal 'Aj^^6 fi^y varpov Kal TlotreiS^vioy yhp KiTTieiis Z^ij'coj' Kal 6 K\eiv6ris &s ttv apxaiSrepoi a(pe\ea'Tpov
'

irepl

Tuv irpayfiiriDv 5ieKa$ov. There may be doubts as to the

punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of the first sentence; but the fonn of expression seems to imply that the five first portions contain main divisions, and the six following subdivisions. The
ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would therefore be divided into the following main divisions irepl dpfiys, irepl ^yaSuv
:

division treating of 6pe|Eij and 4KK\i(reis. Stobseus again differs from either. In his survey of the Stoic ethics (Bel. ii. c. 5), he first, p. 90, treats of what is good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of the end-in-chief, and of happiness, in this section discussing at length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on, p. 158, to consider the KaBrixov, the impulses, p. 166, and the emotions (irii97), as being one kind of impulse), appending thereto, p. 186, a discussion on friendship and, concluding, p. 192 to 242, with a long trea;

tise

on

ivepytifiara

(KOTopfliil-

Trepl iraQStv but it would be hard to assign to these

Kal

KaKtav,

divisions their respective subThe statement of Mpictetns, Diss. iii. 3, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes in his introduction to virtue three t6ttoi b Trepl ras 6p4^eLs Kal Tcfcs iKK\i{rets, called also 6 irepl TO TrdOn d Trepl t&s
divisions.
:

the greater portion of which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to Sen. Ep. 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of Posidonius, that
juara, a/jLapriinaTa, ouSerepa),

not only praeceptio, but also

dpju^s

Kal

aijyopfiks

Kal aTrXws 6

and exhortaand, moreover, causaru^i inquisitio (which, however, can hardly have been called etymosuasio, consolatio,
tio,

vepl
trepl

Tb

Kafl-^Koy;

and, lastly, i
& Trepl rhs avy-

T^v

aya^a-jraTTjiriav Kal ayei-

Kal6Trira Kal
KaTaSe'ireis.

bKws

The first of these divisions would correspond to

the third of Diogenes, the second to his first; but the division Trtpl ayaSwv Kai KaKtJov does not harmonise with the

logia by Posidonius, as Hanse reads but setiologia) and ethologia, description of moral states, are necessary. In Ep. 89, 14, the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three the first determining the value of things, the second treating de aotionibus,
;

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

fl,nd

225
first dis-

connection of the Stoic principles, the

Citap.
'
'

tinction to be

made

will

be one between morality in

In con-

general and particular points in morality.

sidering morality in general, those statements which

give the abstract theory of morals will be distin-

guished from those which modify

it

with a view to
into the

meet

practical wants.

The former again may be

:

grouped round three points

the enquiry

highest good, that into the nature of virtue, and

that relating to the wise man.

The enquiry

into the destiny

and end of man

all.

a. The
'"^'"''*

turns, with the Stoics, as it did with

moral phi-

losophers since the time of Socrates, about the funda- (i)Nufure

mental conception of the good, and the ingredients

necessary to
ness.'

%]',"st
O""'!-

make up

the

highest good or happi-

Happiness, they consider, can only be sought

in rational activity or virtue.

Speaking more ex-

the third de impetu, Trcpl ipuris. Two of these parts coincide indeed with those of Diogenes, but this is not the case with the third, which is only one of the subdivisions in Diogenes
(irepl
TiSi'

problems proposed by
ii.

Cic.

Off.

irpaffoiy)

and even

Seneca's first part more nearly agrees with one of these (Trspl Unforturris trpdTTis alias). nately, Seneca does not mention his authorities ; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division is a genuine Stoical division. A similar division will be subsequently met with in the eclectic Academician

the three sections enumerated by Mpict. Enchir. o. 51 (76), in which Petersen (Phil. Chrys. Fund. p. 260) recognises Seneca's three main divisions of Ethics. In the midst of such contending authorities it seems impossible to establish the main division of the Stoic Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were themselves not agreed on t'lie subject. Petersen's attempt, 1. c. p. 258, appears to' me a
5,

18, or

failure.
'

(SioS.

Ed.
t6

ii. l.'SS:

t4\us Se
06

Eudorus
gustns).

(living under AuNone of the divisions

!/>a(rii/

ehai

euSaifiovsTy,

ej/eKo

Trwra vpdrTerai, avjb Sk

fiiv,

quoted agree with the three

xpiiTTeTui

oiSevbs Si

'ivsKa.

226

THE
plicitly,'

STOICS.
is

Chap.
X.

the primary impulse of every being

towards self-preservation and self-gratification.*

follows that every being pursues those things

It

which

are most suited to its

nature,' and that such things

'

Diog,

vii.

85

die. Fin.

iii.

Benai

Kal

t&

oiKeia
1. c.

irpotrieTai.

Sell.

N. A.

xii. 5, 7.

That

the two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly from their literal

agreement with each other, and partly from their adopting a uniform method in refuting
the Epicurean statement, that the desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably the treatise of
Chrysip] us ire^l -riKovs, since it distinctly referred to by Diogenes. Plwt. Sto. Eep. 12, 4, quotes from it: Sis oiKewiufBa irpos ainabs eiiBiis ysvo^evoi Kal to f^epTj Koi Tct ^icyova eaurwv. The difference mentioned by Alex. Aj>hr. De An. 154 that at one time self-love, at another the preservation of one's own nais

ture, is the impulse

is

unim-

portant. ' Diog.

Spfi'fjv tpatri

vii. 85 thv Se irpirqv rh Cv^^ tff-xeiv 4ir\ ro

:

[outm]
<pfl(riv

Tjjs (pia-fas air'

*5

apxvs, KuBd

Antisthenes had already reduced the conception of the good to that of olKeioy, without the Here the fuller explanation. Academic theory of life according to nature, which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno's teacher, is combined therewith. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question whether all living creatures possess a consciousness (^ffuveiSrifftSy senown nature sus) of their without such a consciousness, natural self-love seemed to They the Stoics impossible. thought, however, that this question (according to Sen. Bp. 121, 5, conf. (Mc. 1. c.) could be answered in the affirmative without hesitation, appealing for evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue what is to
Similarly, Cie.
5, 16.

XpytTiTTTToy

iv

r^

Trpilorta

their interest, without

denying

TTepl

TiXwv, Trparov oiKetov elpai

trdvTi
^(itf>

that the ideas which children

\4yuv
oijTc

t^v

aitrov

(xii-

UTa.(nv al t%v -raiiTTis avvel^Tjirtv.

aliTov

and animals have of themselves are very indistinct, that they

dnly

y&p aWiiTpmfTat cIkos ^v [Cobet incorrectly out!i]

oUre
noiriffat tty [1. ttoltjtftvo'Lv']

know

their

own
its

consti-

rb

fejjoj',

(raffcw sc.

T^v

avrh

fifir'

a\Korpiu(rat

fiiir'

ouk

[must

evi-

dently be struck out] olKemarm.

airoAitirerai rotpvv Af-yFiv (TUffTT?-

true conception (constitutionis finitio Coustitutio, or Sen. p. 11). ffiio-Tainj, was defined by the Stoics, Sen. p. 10, as principale
tution,

but not

animi quodam modo se habens

erga corpus.
'

curb oiKiiuis npus iaurS * oBtui yap t( tc ^\dnTOVTa Biu<X0Lfx4vi)v

Cic. Fin.

iii.

5,

17

6, 20.

; ;

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

only have for
it

2i7

a value (a^ia).

Hence the

highest

good

the

end-in-chief,' or happiness
is

can

only be

Chap. X.

found in what

conformable to nature.^

Nothing,

however, can be conformable to nature for any individual thing, unless

it

be in harmony with the course

and reaintelli-

of law of the universe,^ or with the universal reason of

the world

nor, in the case of a conscious

it

sonable being, unless

proceeds from a recognition

of this general law

gence.*

in short,

from rational
is

In every enquiry into what

conformable
ipx^fJi-^yo^
.

' The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the hair splitting with which the Stoics distinguished (^Stoi. Eel. ii. 136) three meanings of TeAos, between Te\os and (TKi^Tros.

opQhs \6yos Sict irilyTuv 6 avrhs &v t( Ait

. .

elvai

S'

ainh rovro aper^v Kal

tV

toO

6uSa(;uocos
fiiovy

eiSpoiav

'irav

ndfTa

TTpfiTTTlTai KttTCt

T^V

ffVfjLtpU-

ytav Tov Trap' eKtiffTip ^aip-ovov

irphs.
j6oi5-

134 and 138 Diog. vii. 88 94 Plut. C. Not. ae. Fin. iii. 7, 26 10, 27, 9 33 Sen. V. Beat. 3, 3 conf. Ep. 118, 8 Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 171 Math. xi. 30. In Stob. ii. 78 and 96, formal definitions are given of aya3\)V, tcXos, and eliSaiiiovitt. The latter is generally paraphrased by eipoia ptov, as Zeno had defined it. Various f ormulse for the conception of a life according to nature are given by Cleanthea, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panse*

Stoh.

ii.
;

T^p TOV rwv SAwz*

\Tl(Tiy.
'

SlOlKTJToO

Stob.

ii.

160 (conf. 168)

SiTTas

QeaipeiffBat riiv re if

roh
:

XoyiKOLS ytyyofievTiv &pfi^y Kol 7^v 4v ro7s a\6yois C^ois. Diog. 86 Plants are moved by nature-

means

without impulse, animals by of impulse. In the case

of animals, therefore, t6 Kara T'hv (piiTiv is the same as rh Korei t5)j/ ipii^y. In rational creatures, reason controls impulse ; and

tius, Posidonius,

and others in Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. 416; Stob. 134 and Diot/., all apparently taken from the same
;

accordance with nature means, accordance with reason. In Oalen, Hippoc. et Plat, v.' 2 p. 460, Chrysippus says rifms
:

oiKeiovffBai trphs fidvoy

rh

Ka\6j/..
f^'ij)

M. Awel.
T\

vii.

11

t^j Ao-yi/cif

source.
'

Bioff. vii.

88

Sii57rp

reAos

yiferai rh h,KO\oi&(os ri] ipvffei Qjv 'oTrep iffr) Kard re t^v ainav Kol Kuril. T^v T&v '6\wVf ovSev

auT^ Trpa|ts Kar^ ^vffiv iirrl Kal Kara xiyov. Hence the definition of a virtuous life, or a life according to nature (^v kwt' ifi:

neipiav rSav

(^iSffet

(rv^^aiv6vruv

^t/epyovj/xas

wp

inrayopeiieiv ettoBev
itrrlv 6

d vSfXos

KOLvhs iicnrep

(Chrysippus, in ySioJ. 134 ; Diog. 87 ; Cl&m. 1. o. ; also Diogenes,

2

: : :

228

THE
to nature, all turns
X.

STOICS.

CHAP.

upon agreement with the essential constitution of the being, and this essential constitution consists, in the case of man, simply in
reason.'

One

and, the

same thing,

therefore, is al-

ways meant, whether, with Zeno, life according to nature is spoken of as being in harmony with oneself,

or whether, following Cleanthes, it is

simply

said to be the

agreement of
is

life

with nature, and

is

whether, in the latter case,

(j>vcns

taken to mean
nature in
that the

the world at large, or

particular.^

limited to

human
is,

In every case the meaning

sippug and mented the additions. the words

Antipater, Archedemns, Posidonius) ; and that of the good rh Ti\etoi' KctTct <piiTlv KoyiKQv &s XoyiKov (^Diog. 94). ' Sen. Ep. 121, 14: Omne
suae conciliari

his followers augformula by several

Sioif.

animal primum constitutioni hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse

:

87 attributes to Zeno, adding, however, 89, that Chrysippns understood by (piiTis, rfiy re Koiviji' Ka\ Idioos t^v avdpaTrivr]Vf
rp' ipiaei

whereas Cleanthes understood

TT^J/

et ideo conciliari

hominem

sibi

KoivTiy pAvtlV OVKfTt 6 Kal T7)V

liepous.

non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo The body is est. Id. Ep. 92, 1 subservient to thesonl, and the
:

These differences however, not important. The simple expression d/ioXoyovfievws Cyv means, without doubt, aK6xovBov iv piif, the Cpir
iirl

are,

irrational part of the soul to the rational part. Hence it follows

Koff GvaK6yovKai(ri/x(pu)yoi'(^Stob.
ii. 132 and 158), the SfioXoyia TTavrhs tov filou QDioff. vii. 89), the vita sibi concors, the Con-

In hoc uno positam esse beatam

vitam, ut in nobis ratio perf ecta M. sit. Similarly, Ep. 76, 8. Awrel. vi. 44 crv/jLipepet 5e eKatrrtp rh Kara. 77)v IoutoD KaTa<TKfv}}V
:

Hal (pviriv
2

7]

Se

4iJL^

(piKTts

\oyiK^
ii.

KolTroXtTMfi. Conf. viii.

7andl2.

132, Dioff. vii. 89, the ancient Stoics were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobseus to have defined t4\os = Sfio\oyov-

According to

Stcb.

Cleanthes first added Cf)i> the words rp ^uo-ei, and Chrynevais

;

cordia animi (Sen. Ep. 89, 15 V. Be. 8, 6), the unum hominem agere, which, according to Sen. Ep. 120, 22, is only found in a wise man in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency. Nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions accord with the requirements of the character of the agent. Accordingly, Stob. ii. 158, places iKoKaidus rii eouToji/ ipvcru by the side of aK6XovBov iv pitp. Cleanthes
;

; ;

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

life

'22'i^

of the individual approximates to or falls short

Chap.
X.

of the goal of happiness, exactly in proportion as it

approaches to or departs from the universal law of

the world and the particular rational nature of man.

In a word, a rational

life,

an agreement with the

general course of the world, constitutes virtue.

principle of the Stoic morality
briefly

expressed in

The might therefore be the sentence Only virtue is

:

good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue.'

Iff^owever, following Socrates, "the 'goodTTs defined

as being

what

is

useful,^

then the sentence would

num, secundum naturam is specially considered. To prove
their position, the Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally fond. Thus Ghrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Kep. 13, 11) ri ayaBhv atperSy Tb 8* alperhv apetrrdy rh 5* kp^ffThv i-Tratyerdv t^ 5' 4TraiveThv Ka\6tf. (The same in Cio. Fin. iii. 8, 27,
:

therefore, in adding to the expression ^juoAoyoujueVwy the

words rf </)i<rei, which, however, according to Diog. 87, Zeno had done before him, was only going back to the next condition of dfioKvyov^^vus Cw- ^V'e can, however, hardly believe with Diogenes that Cleanthes understood by <pviris only nature in general, but not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to kolv^ <^iais or KOivhs v6fios only, with the
praise of which his well-known hymn ends, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature, which is only a particular form of nature in general. Ghrysippus therefore

and

iv.

18, 50,

where

would
:

suggest the reading validius instead of vitiosius.) Again rb ayaQhv x^T^^ "^^ ^e ^^prhv
'

(refiv6v

rh 5e

ffep.vhv

Ka\6v.

(The
in

same somewhat expanded

Cic. Tusc. v. 15, 43.)

expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his

only
master.
101 30 94 Stob. ii. 200 138 Sext, Pyrrh. iii. 169; Math. xi. 184; do. Fin. iv. 16, 45 Tusc. ii. 25, 61 Sen. Farad. 1 Acad. i. 10 Ep. 71, 4 Benef. vii. 2, 1
'

Mog.

vii.
;

74, 1

76, 11

85, 17

120, 3

where the relation of the conceptions honestum bo118, 10,

kyaBhv yap Kai SoKifiafrrhv Kai Trav Se KaKhy itratverhy virdp^^tv ipeuKThi'. Another sorites of the same kind in Sen. Ep. 85, 2. ' Stab. ii. 78 94; Biog. vii. 94 and 98; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 169 Math. xi. 22, 25, and 30. According to Cie. Fin. iii. 10, 33, Diogenes reconciled this definition with the definition of the good and the perfect quoted on p. 227, 4, by observing that the useful is a motus aut status natura absoluti.

126

Ttav

Stoh. ii. alperhv elvai,

apetTrhv

'

330

THE
run thus
thing
:

STOICS.
useful
;

Chap,
'

Only Virtue

is

advantage cannot

be distinguished from duty, whilst to a bad

is useful,' since,

man

no-

in the case of a rational being,

good and
life is

evil does

not depend on what happens to

him, but simply on his own conduct.^

cides with virtue, the

view of

here presented to us in which happiness coin-

good and the useful with duty

neither any good independently

and reason. There

of virtue, nor
evil.
(2) T/ie
is

is

there in virtue and for virtue any

The

Stoics accordingly refused to

admit the ordi-

eM

""'

nary distinction, sanctioned by popular opinion and

the majority of philosophers, between various kinds and degrees of good ; nor would they allow bodily advantages and external circumstances to be in-

cluded

among good
qualities.

things, together with mental

and moral

A certain

distinction between

goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds of goods are mentioned by them in their formal
division of goods.*
Sext.

But
ii.

these distinctions amount,

the good in itas the virtuous man is connected with virtue, which is a part of himself. See Sea)tws 1. 0. and above p. 104, 2), or, what is the same thing, iperii fi rh fierfxof apeTTJs. {Sext. Math. xi. 184.) A distinction is made between three kinds of good t6 inp' oZ % a<t>' oS eimv
iitp4\eLa,

'

1.

c.

Stob.

188

with

/ijjSeVo

aauAoK

firiT

oKpeAeTirSai

self, just

Aeii/ iirxe'v

thai yhp ih w^eopfrV, Kol rh ii<j>e\e7crBai KiveTaBm kot' Bper^v. Ibid. ii. 202 ; Phit. Sto. Rep. 12; Com. Not. 20,1; Cio. OS. ii. 3, 10 ; iii. 3, 11 ; 7, 34.
H-llTs ait>e\i7i/.
/car'

*
'

M. Awel.

ix. 16.
;

See Diog. 94 Stob. ii. 96 124; 130; 136; Se(et. Pyrrh. iii. 169 Math. xi. 22 Oic. Fin. iii. Sen. Ep. 66, 5. 16, 55 Good is here defined to be either a^iKeia or ovx ertpov i><j>tAe/os (inseparably connected
;

-rh naif 4 aufiPaivei w^eAewreai, rh ot6v re a<^Ki!v. Under the first head comes virtue, under the second virtuous actions, under the third, besides the two others, virtuous

ii</)eA6T(reai,

) ;

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

in the end, to

L>ai

no more than

this, that whilst

some

Chap.
X.

goods are good and useful in themselves, others are

only subsidiary to them.

The

existence of several

equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at

variance with the conception of the good.

is

That only

a good, according to their view, which has an un-

conditional value.

That which has a value only in

else,

comparison with something

or as leading to

something

else,

does not deserve to be called a good.

The

difference between
is

what

is

good and what

is

not good

not only a difference of degree, but also

;

one of kind
subjects

and what

is

not a good per se can never

selves)
;

men,

Gods, and de-

fourthly and fifthly,

mons. A second division of goods {Diog., Sext. iii. 1 81, Stob.) is into goods of the soul, external goods, the possession of virtuous friends and a virtuous country, and such as are neither (t6 avrhv Iout^ eTcai otrovSatot/ hol evSaliwva, virtue and happiness considered as the relation of the individual to himself, as Goods his own possessions). of the soul are then divided into SiaBeaiis (virtues), ejeis (or instances of iiTLTri^evfiaTa, as which Stub. ii. 100, 128, quotes
fiaj/Tttc^

IMiKra (as ^ineicvia

and
etc!
i,il

eiryqpia),

and

ajTAft

or &fitKTa (such as

science), (virtues),
{otov

and the and ovk

irafdvTa,

Trap6vTa

xopcfc)

TfeptirdTTiffts').

The

corresponding divisions of evil are given by Diogenes and Stobaaus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in addition, the ayada. h KLvfja-ei (jcapo, &c.

and

iv a-x^im (etfraKTOS ^irux^a,

&c.), the latter being partially if |i the a7afla KaO' aura (vir;

and

(pi\oye(M}fji.erpla,

tfec,

these are not so unchangeable

as peculiarities of character, and are therefore only H^is, p. 103, 1), and those which are neither fis nor BuiSfirfis acthird divitions themselves. sion of goods {Diog., C'w. 1. c, distinguishes Stob. 80, 100, Hi) TiKtKa or Bi' avrh. atpera (moral actions), irontTiKa (friends and the services they render), re^iica and ttoi^jtikA (virtues them-

tues) and Trphs tI ttws exovTa (honour, benevolence, friendship) the goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are
;

not necessary (^x^pK

/iHTo).

6iriT7)5eu-

Seneca's list is far more limited, although it professes to be more general. He men-

tions,

prima bona, tanquam gaudium, pax, salas patrise

secunda, in materia infelici ex-

pressa,

patientia ; tertia, destus incessus.

tanquam tormentorum tanquam mo-

THE
Chap.
X.

STOICS.

The same rea good under any circumstances.' marks apply to evil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its relation to something else. Hence only that which is absolutely and only good, or virtue, can be considered a good that which is absolutely bad, or a vice,^ can be considered an evil. All other things, however great
be
;

their influence

may

be on our state, belong to a class

of things neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or

dSid(popa.^

Neither health, nor riches, nor honour,

a good
;

not even
death

life itself, is

and just

as little are

the opposite states

poverty, sickness, disgrace, and

indifferent.

evils.*

Both are in themselves

Se

' Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33: Ego assentior Diogeui, qui bonum definiet id quod esset natura absolutum [ouTOTeAes] . . . hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando sed propria vi et senlimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione ciim aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi Eestimandum, sed ea sestimatio genere valet non magnitudine, &c. ' Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1 Nee malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nee bonum nisi honestum. J lev. Apk. De Fat. c. 28, p. 88: Kai ^ KaKta jj-dfai 1} tJ.tt aperi] Tt
:

KoX

rsAeuTOtiiii

rpiirov

^afflv

aStatf>opov

rh

fi'tire

trphs evSaifiayiaif

fJ\TS nphs KaKodaifjL iviav

fiavoiMfvov.

truAAo^-

To this category begoods,

health,

long
&c.
Sta

external

ioTiv eZ koI kukus XPVf^^ai, TovT\iiv itii aSiti^opoV'

TTOPT^JS
S*

^ yap

aperi]

juej/

KaKUS,

KaKi(jc

Se Kaicm, vyisi^ 5h Kai Tois

TTore fiiv

iTfpt (Tc^fiaTL

ev iroT6 5e

KaKus IcTTi xpvi'^ai. Similarly, Pyrrh. iii. 177, and Uioi/. 102, who defines ovBerepa as '6<ra /a^t*
affteKei
fJiiire

^KditTei,

Stob.

ii.

li2:
fi'fjTe

aSid(/)o/)oi'

= Tb
tJ*

/i^re ayadhp

KoKby, Koi

/a^tc aiperhv

/i^Tf <pvieT6v.
:

Pint. Sto. Rep.

31, 1 ^ yap ia-nv e5 XP^"'"'^'" Kai KOKws tovt6 <l>aai /ii^t' ayadbj'
slvai fii\Ti KaK6v.
^ Zeno (in Sen. Ep. 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have mistrusted Nullum malum gloriosum est mors autem gloriosa est (there is a glorious
: :

Kar'

aitTohs

1}

/j-kv
;

ayaOhi/

tJ

5e

kukSv.

229 233, 1. Sext. Math. xi. 6] after giving two irrelevant defini(See p.
,

tions of aBiiiipopov: Karb. Tpirov

; ;

: ;

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

a material whicli
or else for evil.^

233
for good'

may

either be

employed

Chap.
X.

Peripatetics were most hy the Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on chance. For how can that be a good under any

The Academicians and

attacked

vigorously

circumstances, which

bears

no relation to man's

moral nature, and

cost of morality
:

is

even frequently obtained at the

If virtue renders a

? ^

man

happy,

death) ergo mors non est malum. In general, two considerations are prominent in the Stoic treatment of this subject that what is according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death are not despised. See Sen. Ep.
30, 4
viii.
;

he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter ilia, in quibus virtus utra^^ue ostenditur . . virtutem materia non mutat. Ep. 71, 21
.

Bona
:

ista aut

mala non

eflScit

77, 11, 82, 8

;

Cons, ad
ix. 3

Marc. 19, 3
58.

M. Aurel

And other passages in JBaumhauer's Vet. Philosoph. Doctr. De Morte Toquoted

luntaria, p. 211.

materia, sed virtus. Ep. 85, 39 Tu ilium [sapientem] premi putas malis 1 Utitur. Id. Ep. 44; 120, 8; Plwt. G. Not. i, 1 Sto. Bep. 18, 5 Chrys31, 1 ippus, in Ps. Plitt. Be Nobil. 12, 2 Bioff. 102 Stoi. ii. 90 ; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 181; Alex. Aphr. Top. 43 and 107.
; ; ;
;

Sext.

Math.
3.

xi.

Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto.

above, p. 232,

Pioff.

Rep.

15, 4)
Tt

All virtue
fi

is

done

away with,
i-yieiav
i

fey

T^v^ionijufi t^c

The good can only and never do harm

Koi
oijre
7j

See 103: do good,

61.

ou /xaAAo;'

ruv

&Wiiii/, h jU^ Ka\6i/

{tyieia

ItTTiv, Id. (in Plut. C. Not. 5, 2) Iv t^ ^toOv y.6vov etrri Ti apsriju Kar^ iv^a.ifi6vtcs, TWf &Wiiiv oifdett SfToip trphs 7],'ias oiiS" els tovto trvpepyo{/pSimilarly, Sto. Eep. 17, Tuv. 2. Sen. Vit. Be. 4, 3 The only good is honestas, the only evil turpitudo, cetera vilis turba
:
:

aryadhy airoKlTrufiei'.

oiiK

lip''

aya66v

n\ovros
e5

ofid'

vyieia.

Again

^
5e

ecTTiv

Kal

aaKais

tout' ovk effTzy

Ktii

aya96v

XP^^^***, TtXointp

iiyieia

^ffriv eS Kai

Kaaus

Xprjireui, K.T.K.

In Sen. Ep. 87,

rerum, neo detrahens quicquam

beatte vitse nee adjiciens.
:

Id.

There is no differBp. 66, 14 ence between the wise man's joy and the firmness with which

11, instead of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics (interrogationes nostrorum), apparently taken from Posidonius (see p. 31, 35, 38) :

(1)

Quod bonum

est,

bonos

; : :

234

THE
it

STOICS.

Chap. X.

must render him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is not happy altogether. If, on the other hand, anything which is not in man's power were allowed an influence on his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of
that imperturbable serenity of

virtue,

and man would never be able to attain to mind without which

is

no happiness
facit
f ortuita
:

conceivable.'
proved by the argument, quoted in Sen. Bp. 85, 30 Quod malum est nocet quod nocet deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt
: :

bonum non

fa-

ciuut ergo non sunt bona. (Similarly in M. Aii/rel. ii. 11, iv. 8 Whatever does no moral harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo ouique contingere ao tur:

pissimo potest, bonum non est opes autem et lenoni et lenistse contingunt ergo, &c. (So, too.
:

Marc.

Awrelitis,

v.

10.)
:

(3)

ex malo non fit divitije fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia ergo, &c. (Conf. Alex. Aphr. Top. 107 T^ SiA KaKOv "ytrfV^:

Bonum

fievov ovK eariy a'ya,Q6v' ivKovros

S^

Koi

Sta

iropvo^offKla^

Kanov

(4) Quod dum consequi volumus in mult a mala incidimus, id bonum non est dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c. (5) QuEe neque

uvTos jiviTai, K.T.K.y

magnitudinem animo dant nee

fiduciam neo securitatem, contra autem insolentiam,tumorem, arrogantiam oreant, mala sunt a fortuitis autem (previously, not only riches but health had been included in this class) in hsec impellimur ergo non sunt bona. That riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in die. Fin. iii. 15, 49) that poverty and pain are no evils is
:

ergo mala non sunt. The Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view. Nature, says M. Aurel. ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad consequently, what both enjoy equally life and death, honour and dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty can neither be good nor evil. On the value of fame, see id. iv. 19. This view is compared with the Academician in Clc.' &. Tusc. V. 13, 39 18, 51 Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as Quid potest desiderare 4, 24 is, cui omnia honesta contingunt? et quid stultius tur;

'

piusve,
, . .

quam bonum

rationalis

animi ex irrationalibus nectere 1

non intenditur

virtus, ergo

ne beata quidem

vita, quse

ex

THE BIGIIEST GOOD.

Least of
all,

235
Chap.
'

however, according to the Stoic view.

can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as

___1^^
(^) ^^"'r the good.

by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest obiect in life. He who places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue;' he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and the peculiar

value of virtue;^ he appeals to feelings, rather

;

than to actions
virtute est.

he reqiures reasonable creatures to

the highest good, justice (the Peripatetic view) might perhaps still be safe, since, in

Conf. Bp. 72, 7: Cui aliquid aocedere potest, id

est.
'

imperfeotum

Cleanthesexpandsthis notion, in rhetorical language, in

Conf. Sen. [Virtus] non est virtus si sequi potest. Primse partes ejus sunt duoere debet, imperare, summo loco stare tu illam jubes signum petere. Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2;

do. Fin. ii. 21, Benef iv. 2, 2

.

69.
:

comparison with pleasure, it as the higher Still, this was only a good.

may be regarded

13,5;
^

14, 1.

Compare on this subject, the words of Chrysippus on p. 233, 1, quoted by Plwt. Sto.
Eep. 15, and, for their explanation, Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4 Non indignor, quod post volup:

preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it was out of harmony with the true conception of the good, and changed the difference in kind (on which see p. 232, 1) between virtue and other things into a simple difference in degree. Plutarch (Sto. Eep. 15,

with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against

6),

tatem ponitur

virtus, sed

quod
con-

omnino cum

voluptate

feratur contemptrix ejus et hostis et longissime ab ilia Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1 resiliens. Pais honesti non potest esse
nisi

honestum, nee sumraum

si

bonum habebit
suam,

sinceritatem aliquid in se viderit

Aristotle that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes impossible, but not other virtues for how could n, Stoic, of all philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues 1 Evidently the zeal of controversy has here carried away the
;

dissimile meliori. According to Pint. 15, 3 ; IB, 3, Com. Not. 25, 2, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance with another statement of his, in which he says If pleasure be declared to be a good, but not
:

philosopher beyond the point at which his own principles would bear him out. ' M. Awel. vi. 15 i niv
:

iptX6^Q^os
iSioy

cLWorpiav
'

iv4pyeta
*

cLyaBhtf {nroha/ipdyei

&

S^

tpiKii^Qvos l^iav TTcitTiv

& Si vovp

236

THE
pursue what
is
'

STOICS.

Chap,

unreasonable, and souls nearly allied

to Grod to go after the enjoyments of the lower ani-

mals.'

Pleasure must never be the object of our

pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is

invariably involved in virtue.

It
is

That

it

no doubt

is.^

true that there

is

always a peculiar satisfaction,

and a quiet cheerfulness and peace of mind, iu moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack
and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone knows what true and lasting pleasure is.' But even the pleasure afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but
of inward peace
;

only a natural consequence, of

virtuous

conduct;
is

otherwise the independent value of virtue

paired.''
eXwt' ISiav 'Kpa^iv.
oitK iv neitret,

im-

Coni. ix. 16
ivepyeicf,
Karciz/

mog. 94
;

Virtue
Sh

is
Ti\v

a
re

d\V

rhTov
Kai

good

^TTLyevtrfitiaTa

KoyiKov TToXiTiKoD ^i^ov

a'YaB6i/.
'

X^P^v KoL
3
:

t\iv evippoffi)Vi]V KaX

ra

irapawKiicia.

Sen. Benef.
sit,

iv. 2,

iScn.
;

Ep. 92, 6-10

;

Vit.

It is a question

utrum virtus
an ipsa

Beat, 5, 4 9, 4 Sen. Ep. 92, 10.

^

Posidonius, in

summi boni causa

Taking the expression in meaning, it is hardlyallowed by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Understanding by iiSovii an emotion, i.e. something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they
its strict

Seneca, of course, says the latter. Conf. De Vit. Be. 4, 5 The wise man takes pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex bono suo ortis. Tbid.
:

summum bonum.

9, 1

Non,

si

voluptatem
est,
. .

prses-

assert that the wise

man

feels

tatura virtus banc petitur

est

ideo propter voluptas non

delight (xP") gaudium), but not pleasure (fiSavii, Isetitia, voluptas). See Sen. Ep. 59, 2 IHogf. 116 ; Alex. Aplir. Top. 96 the last-named giving definitions of x*P" 7i^ov)i, Tepij/is,
;

merces nee causa virtutis, sed accessio, nee quia delectat

placet, sed si placet et delectat. The highest good consists only in mental perfection and health, in ipso judicio et habitu optimse mentis, in the sanitas et libertas animi, which desires, nothing but virtue ; ipsa pretium sui. Ibid. 15, 2 : Ne,

59, 2
4,

Sen. 14
;

Ep. 23, 2;
;

72, 8
ii,

27, 3; Vit. Be. 3, 4

De

Ira,

6, 2.

THE SIGSEST GOOD.

^or may
pleasure be placed side

237

by

side with

Chap.
X.

virtue, as a part of the highest good, or be declared

to be inseparable from virtue.

Pleasure and virtue

Pleasure

are different in essence and kind.

may be
in hand

immoral, and moral conduct

with
difiEculties

may go hand
is

and pains.

Pleasure

found among
pleasure

the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good;

virtue
is is dignified,

untiring, imperturbable

grovelling, effeminate, fleeting.

as a

Those who look

;

upon pleasure
those in
sure,

good are the

slaves of pleasure

whom

virtue reigns supreme control plea-

and hold it in check.' In no sense, therefore, ought any weight to be allowed to pleasure in a
:

question of morals

pleasure

is

not an end in view,

"^

but only the result of an action

not a good, but

something absolutely indifferent.

pleasure

The only point on

is,

which the Stoics are not unanimous

is

whether every

contrary to nature,' as the stem Cleanthes

vir-

gaudium quidem, quod ex

non magis quam
tranquillitas
ista
. .

may be

tute oritur, quamvis bonum sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est,
Isetitia

et

bona,

sed

sunt enim consequentia

summum

bonum, non consum-

mantia. Here, too, belongs the statement in Stoh. ii. 184, 188 (conf. 31. Aurel. vii. 74)
:

placed the inference in Clem. Strom, iv. 483, C, which bears great similarity to the third argument, quoted on If thirst be painful, p. 233, 2 and it be pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause ofthis pleasure: 070605 SeiroiTjTixbii rb Kaxiv om Uv yivoiro, /t.T.\. ^ Siog. 85 84 Kiyovai
: :

TTffvTa
Xffniv

bvrivovv atp^KovvTO, wfpiKiiav airo\afji$tiviu irop*

Thv

tivSj irphs ijSov^y yiyvfodai Tijf

irpc^TTiv
&pfii]v

rms

^^Jois,

iltevSos

avrh toSto, for the reasons stated, p. 230, 1. Sen. Vit. Be. c. 7 and
'

anotfjaivovtrii^.
(paa-iv, ei

iniyevvrffia

ydp

&pa ^trrh,
naff

riSoviiy ehai,

Stok

avTri

tt,M]v

v ^i<ris
tfj

Among

M. Aurel. viii. 10. the Stoic arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil,
10-12
;

eVifriT^o-offa -rh

ii;ap)i6QjVTa

avarian aTrohdpri. " Taking pleasure in

widest sense. In
its

its

more

re-

'

; : :

238
Chap.
X.
is

TKE

STOICS. whether there

asserted, in the spirit of Cynicism, or

such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure.'

the conditions of
like

Virtue, on the other hand, needs no extraneous additions,

but contains in

itself all

happiness.^

The reward of virtuous conduct,

the punishment of wickedness, consists only in the

character of those actions, one being according to
nature, the other contrary to nature.^

And

so un-

conditional

is

this self-sufficiency of virtue,* that the

iiSovii,

strioted sense, they reject

understanding thereby a particular emotion. See p. 236, 2. ' Sext. Math. xi. 73: rhv
ijSov^v
eJi/al

per se expetendam nee metu nos ad. illam cogi neo mercede condnci. Non esse justum cui

& juev 'Eirifoupos ayaShv tpTicriy 6 Se eiir&jv * fiaveiijv

'

quicquam in hac virtute placet praster ipsam. Id. Bp. 87, 24

Maximum scelerum supplicium

in
ipsis
est.

fd.aK\ov ^ fiaSeiiiv

KaK6v

ol 5e

cLTch

(Antislhenes) T^s (rroas aSid'

Benef.

iv.
?

Quid reddatbeneficium

12: die tu
Sec.
;

(popov Kal ov Trporyy/ieyoi/.

KA.ecy0r]s
fiey fi-tfTe
fiiire

aA\ct

mihi, quid reddat justitia.

Karct

ipimv
^x^*^

ahr^v

fJvai

a^iav

quicquam non expetis.

si

prseter ipsas, ipsas

M. Awel.

ix.

42

auT7]v 4v T(f ^iify

KaBiiirep Se
tp{itTiv fi^

rh

Ti

yhp Tr\eoy
;

fleXets 5 iroiTjiros &ytoiJtqj, St* kqtc^

KiWvvrprv
d
eJyat

KttTtt

elvat

Bpcoiroy
(pitriy

ovk apK^
ffiiy

5e 'Apx57]/ios

koto

tpifflv fiev

T^v

Tt

effpo^as, aAAcl

iy juocxo^T? Tpf^'^^i ovxl Se Kal a^iav ^X^*"* IlavaiTios Se Ttca fiev Kara tpvtrty inrapx^ty
Tcis

as

riyoi
'

6e irapa (pvuiv,

Accordingly, it is also defined to be rex^'J^wSoi/ioWas irot-t)Tiicfi. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b". ' IHog. 89 t^i' t' AperV
:

roirov /wrShy fTjTeis ; When man does good, ireiroiTjKe vphs tt Kare(TKeOafTTai Kal exf* Tb auTou. Id. vii. 73 ; viii. 2. See pp. 230, 1 236, 4.
airdpicn 127 Sioff. vii. r^y aper^y vphs eiiSat^ovlav. ac. Parad. 2 Sen. Bp. 74, 1 Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est. This airipKeia is even asserted of individual virtues, by virtue of the connection between
*
:

elyai

tiaQifyiv

ilvai

dfioKoyovfievriv Kal
elyai oiper^c, ou

ayrV

5i*

ain^y

Sid Ttya <p6Poy ^ iKtriSa ^ ri ray e^ajdey eV ouTp t' eZl/af t^v euSalfjioylay,

St' oiJtn; [-tjs]

[-Tjs]

ij'tJxp

['?^]

veiTotT)fji,eyri

irpbs i^oAoyiai'
ASfe?i.

TTcw'Tis
1, 1
;

ToO ^I'ou,

De Clem. i.

Quamvis enim recte facto-

rum verus f ruct us sit f ecisse, nee uUum virtutum pretium dignum
illis

all. Of (ppdyncris, for instance, in Sen. Ep. 85, 2, it is said Qui prudens est, et lemperans est. Quitemperans, est et constans. Qiji constans est,
:

them

81, 19.

extra ipsas ^p. 94, 19

sit.
:

Id. Ep.

iEquilatem

imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia


THE HIGHEST GOOD.
happiness which
of time.'
it affords is

239
Chap.
"

not increased by length

himself thereby
abso-

Eational self-control being here recog-

nised as the only good,

man makes
satisfied.^

independent
lutely free,

of

all

external

circumstances,

and inwardly

The happiness

of the virtuous

man

a very distinctive feature of Stoicism

and thus
is

this is far

(4) Nega^ac!ter"of
Itai'piness.

more negative than positive. It consists more in independence and peace of mind than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it. In mental

disquietude

says Cicero, speaking as a Stoic

consists misery

in composure, happiness.

be deficient in happiness, he enquires,

How can he whom courage

preserves from care and fear, and self-control guards

? ^ How can he happy who is in no way dependent on fortune, but simply and solely on himself ? * To be free from disquietude, says Seneca, is the

from passionate pleasure and desire

fail

to be absolutely

est.

est.

Qui sine tristitia est, beatus Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam

'

Plui.
8, 4,

Sto.

Eep.

26;

C.

Not.

where Chrysippus is charged with at one time denythat

Similarly in respect This of bravery (_ibid. 24). ainipKeia of virtue was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed by Alex. Apia: De An. 156, on the ground that neither the things which the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable (vpoi\y/ueyo), nor, on the other hand, the na*ural conditions of virtuous action, can be without effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as only negative conditions (fiv oxjk &vfv). See Phd.
satis est.
C.

ing

happiness

is

aug-

mented by length

of time,

and

at another declaring momentary wisdom and happiness to be worthless. C'io. Fin. iii. 14, 45 Sen. Ep. 74, 27 ; 93, 6 ; Benef v. 1 7, 6 ; IM. Am-el. xii. The Stoics are, on this 35. point, at variance with Aris; .

totle.
' This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Proofs will be found subsequently, " Tusc. v. 15, 43 14, 42. Parad. 2.
;

Not.

4,

and

11, 1.

240

ritE STOICS.
peculiar privilege of the wise
is
; '

Chap,
'

the advantage which

gained from philosophy

is,

that of living without

fear,

and rising superior

is

to the troubles of life.^

Far

more emphatically, however, than by any

expressions
this negative view of

isolated

moral aims sup-

ported by the whole character of the Stoic ethics,

the one doctrine of the apathy of the wise

sufficiently

man

proving that freedom from disturbances,

an imconditional assurance, and self-dependence, are the points on which these philosophers lay especial
value.
(5)

The

The

Grood, in as far as it

is

based on the general

is

amid as
law.

arrangement of the world, to which the individual

subordinate, appears to

man

in the character of

Law.

This law being, however, the law of his own nature,

Good becomes the natural object of man's desire, and suits his natural impulse. The former view, which was never unfamiliar to moral philosophy, was
the

and view of morality forms one of the points on which Stoicism subsequently came into contact, partly
zeal
;

cultivated by the Stoics with peculiar

this

with

Roman jurisprudence,

partly with the ethics of

the Jews and Christians.

Moreover, as the Stoics

considered that the Eeason which governs the world

' De Const. 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hao aliquando fece in illnd evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi expulsis et

testatem
est,
^

infestimabile
fieri,
:

bonnm

suum
.

erroribus
Quseris,

absoluta

libertas.

12 Quid ero-o philoaophia prastabit ? Scilicet ut malis tibi placere, quam populo, .utsinemetu
.
. . .

Ep. 29,

quae sit ista ? Non homines timere, non Deos. Nee turpia veils nee nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam po-

IJeorum hominumque vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias. ' See Xrische, Forschungeii, 368 and 476,

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

is

241

the general

Law

of all beings,' so they recognised

Chap.
X.

in the moral demands of reason the positive and

negative aspects of the

Law

of God.*

Human

law

comes into existence when m^an becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises its claims on him.^ Civil and moral law are, therefore, commands absolutely imperative on every rational being.''

No man

can

feel

himself to be a rational being without at

the same time feeling himself pledged to be moral.'

>

to the Stoic definition (<Sfoo. Eel. ii. Floril. 44, 12, and in 190, 204 the fragment of Chiysippus quoted by Marcian in Digest, i. 3, 2, and the Soholiast of Hermogenes in Spengel, %vvay. Tfxv. 177,jEm6'Ae, Forsch. 475) = \6yos op6})s irpoffraKTiKhs fJ-ev
^ v6ii.os,
;

See p. 148, 2, according

human

creation sed geternum

quiddam, quod universummundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens

omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis (conf. Fin. iv. 5, 11, in the fragment in Lact.
Inst. vi. 8).

It

is,

accordingly

tSiv TTonqTsoiVj atciiyopevTiKh^ 5e Twy

u noi7]Teojv. It is therefore a-rroi'Sa?<ii> Ti or aaruov, something of moral value, imposing duties

as Chrysippus 1. c. says in the words of Pindar. {Plato, Georg. 484, B), irdvTwv &atTt\ehs Beluv re
Ka\ d.v9pQyirlpoJv irpayfidTwv.
'

ao. Leg.

i.

6,

18;

ii.

4,8;

on man.

of this for in the \6yos Koivhs, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to
Dioff.
vii.

The ultimate source \6yos must be looked

5,11.
<

Or

as

presses
64(rei.

it,

Stob. ii. 184, exSiKuiov is ipiaei Kal ixt)

88,

who here

(ac-

' This is proved by de. Legg. i. 12, 33, in a chain-

cording to the passage quoted from de. N. D. i. 15, 40 on p. 148, 2, is apparently following Chrysippus) = i opBhs Kdyas Sia
It is the ratio summa insita in natura, quae jubet ea quse faciehdasunt, prohibetque contraria (Cic. Legg. i. 6, 18, conf. the quotation from Oio.
i.ct.

argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics Quibus ratio

:

a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et
lex,

quEe

est

recta ratio in

jubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic definition of
KaT6p6afm as
a,)j,i,pTi\fia
eu;'((/ir)/iit,

N. D.

i.

14, 36, respecting

4,

on

p.

150).
ii.

"^-e.'Tg.

Zeus According to Che. 8 and 10, it is no

'that of

as

hi6iii]iia.

242

THE
X.

STOICS.

Chap.

Obedience, therefore, to this law is imposed upon man, not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The good is for him an object of pursuit the natural object of man's will on the other hand, evil is that against which his will re-

volts.'

The former

arouses his desire

:

{opfi.-q),

the lat-

ter his aversion

'

{dcfiopfj,!])

and thus the demands of

impulses of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done
{^avrarria. &p/jL7]TtK^ tov KaBiiK6v'

The good alone, or

;
;

is aipeTSf

virtue, evil is i^evxriv. See

p.

229, 1 238, 3, and Stoh. tttpeThv is, howEsl. ii. 202. ever. Ibid. 126, 132, h a'lpeffiv

iSxoyov

KLvel,

or,

more accuKivri-

rately, Th
;

bpiirfs

auToreKovs

nK6v and alperiv is accordingly distinguished from \7iTrT6i' alperhv being vrhat is morally good, \rijrTiti being everything which has value, including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction (according to Stob. ii. 140 and 194) with unnecessary subtlety between oipETic and atpiTiov, and similarly between bp^KThv and bpeKreov^ vTTQfjLeverhv and uTrojuei/ercov, using the first form to express the good in itself (for instance,

that every impulse contains an affirmative judgment in itself (^avyKardSeiris), to

Tos)
;

which has been superadded a

KLvy\iiK6v
;

(TvyKaTAdiffis

apply-

ing to particular propositions

(those in which truth and falsehood consist. See p. 110, 3
83, .2),

whereas

ipii.ii

applies to
activities

xarriyopiifiara

(i.

e.

the latter to express the possession of the good (for

<pp6pT)(ris),

instance, tppovftv).
*

expressed by verbs. See p. 95, 1 and 2), since every impulse and every desire aims at the possession of a. good. 'Opfiii \oyiicii is defined to be <popa, Siai^oias iiri n Totv iv r^ TrpdrreiVj

ipn't] is

defined by Stob.
;

ii.

and

is

also called

6piiii irpoKxi/cJ;

160, as ipopk^vyris iirlTt

atpapfiii,

is contrasted therewith in Ejnct. Enchirid. 2, 2 Diss. iii. 2, 2, 22, 36, as (according to the most probable correction of the text) tpopk Btavoias Si.tr6 Tivos. See p. 243, 3. A further distinction

which

(only a rational being being capable of irp5|is). If the (jyopi

Siavotas refers to something future, the dp/iii becomes an ipf^'s, for which the text twice reads Spovtris. Among the varieties of 6piiii irpoKTi/cJ), Stob.

(connecting herewith what may be otherwise gathered from the statements of Stobseus respecting the Stoic doctrine of impulses) is made between the

enumerates
irapaffKevijy
'irp6de(ris,

irpdBeiris,

iiri$o\ii,
aipiffis,

^7XffpiJ0'iS,

j3oiJA7;(tis,

fleXijfff?,

the

definitions of which he gives, passing then lo tlie doctrine of

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

morality, besides arising from the natural impulse
of a reasonable being, are, at the same time, also
X.

24.'{

Chap.

an object towards which his desires are naturally

directed.'

However simple

this state of things

it

may be

to B. EmoX'^,*^"'*

a purely rational being,

must be remembered that

man

is

not purely rational.*

rational as well as rational

has, therefore, ir- (i) I'lie emotions. , TT impulses, ' He is not (^a) neir

He

nature.

emotions, these being also a

kind of ipfih. It appears, therefore, that activities of feeling

and will are included in the

conception of ipfiM, as will be subsequently seen more fully in the doctrine of emotions, the conception of which likewise includes both.
'

rh Aoyixbv (foy aKo\ovdT]TiKhy (f>6iTei ^orl ry \6ytp Kai Kark rhy \6yoy as hy Tiyefidya jrpoKTtKdy troWdKis fi4vTot koI

368

Klihn)

'

Stoi.

ii.

116,

similarly
icvdpt^novs

&\?iMS </>6peTat ini riva Kai Sltt^ Tiyaiy (for so we must punctuate, the reference being to ip/iii and aipopii.il, according to the definition, p. 242, 2) iwreiflSs t^ Xiytp Q)8o6fi^yov iirl irXeioy, k.t.A.

108

irdi/ras

yap

From
(in.

atpopii&s

ex^tv ^k ipiirews nphs apeTTjy KaX olovel rh [1. rhv^ ruv

this, it appears that Chrysippus' definition of 6piiii

Pint.

Sto.

Rep. 11, 6

= Toi;

Tjfiiafjipeudajv

X^you ^X^^^ kut^ rhy

hvOptjo-rrov

Kiyos

TrpoffraKTiKhs

K\dv6riv, 80ei/ dreAets fihv Svras eJyat <pa{/\ovs, Te\eta6fVTas Se

airovSaiovs. Diog. 89, see p. 238,

soul rests on the of life with itself (virtue) extraneous influences corrupt it, eirei ^ tpiuis aipop/jLcts SlBaffiy aSiaa'Tp6(f}ovs. Sen. Bp. 108, 8 Facile est auditorem recti cupiditatem concitare ad

The harmony
3
; ;

avT^ Tov voie'iv') must not be understood (as in BaMviliauer's Vet. Philos. Doct, De morte voluntaria, p. 74) to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses.
Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature ; or else Kiyos must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion oi idea, for all impulses are based on judgments, see p. 242, 2 and it is clear, from Cio. Fin. iii. 7, 23 ('as our limbs are given to us for a definite pur;

omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.

"

The one

to do. N. D. distinguishes
is,

ii.

point, according 12, 34, whicti

man from God

that God is absolutely rational and by nature good and wise. ^ Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippccr. et Plat. iv. 2, vol. v.

pose, so ipnTi is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use '), that ipn))

244
Ghap.
X.

THE
originally

STOICS.
he

virtuous,

but

becomes virtuous by
'

overcoming bis emotions.

Emotion or passion

is

a movement of mind contrary to reason and nature, The an impulse transgressing the right mean.^
Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in ac-

cordance with nature, was stoutly denied by the

Stoics.*
all

The

seat of the

emotionsand,
Emotion
is

indeed, of

impulses and every activity of the soul*

'^ys/xxiviKov.^

^is

in

man's reason, the

is

that state

of the ^ys/MOviKov in which it

is

hurried into what

contrary to nature by excess of impulse

Like

virtue, it is
is

due to a change taking place simultawas in one of the lost books (^Heeren suggests in the
If it

itself rational, but becomes rational by the direction given to it by man. ' The term emotion is used

not in

first

treatise
V. 28),
'

irepl

Traflaii/

opyr\5

Diog.
1

was that book genuine

:

to express irdBos, although the terms of modem psychology are more or less inadequate to Express the ancient ideas, as Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 35, already observed. 2 ZHocf. vii. 110 : eo-ri 5e avrh
Hoi

Acad. i. 10, 39 que eas perturbationes

Cic.

Cum[iraflr)]

Spfii)

irapa ^vffiv ypvxv^ kIi/tjctis ^ irAeovafouira. The same

definitions are
36,
166,

found in iStob, ii. with this difiEerence, that aireidris r^ aipovvTt \6ycp

antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem coUocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur [Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes volun1 arias esse putabat, opinionisque judicio suscipi,et omnium arbitrabatur perturbationum
esse matrem immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. Fin.
iii. 10, 35 Nee vero perturbavi aliqua tiones animorum naturali moventux. Tusc. iv. Ipsas perturbationes 28, 60 per se esse vitiosas nee habere quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium. * See 242, 2. p. 215, 8 = Chrysippus, in Galen, iii.
: . . . : ;

stands in place of &,\oyos, as in Maro. Awel. ii. 6. Cic. Tuso. iv. 6, 11 iii. 11, 2i 21, 47 Chrysippus in Oale.n. De Hipp,
; ;

v. 2, 4, vol. v. et Plat. iv. 2, 4 368, 385, 432, 458 Kuhn., and Id. in Pint. Tirt. Mor. 10, Schl. p. 450 Sen. Ep. 75, 12. A similar definition is attributed to Aristotle by Stob. ii. 36, but it is no longer to be -found in his extant writings.
; ;

7,

p.

835

V.

and

6,

p.

476

and above,

p. 215, 8.

: '

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

heously, nob to the effect of a separate extraneous
force.'

2i5
rJHAP:

Imagination, therefore, alone

it

calls

it

into

X.

being, as
arise

does impulse in general.^

All emotions
false

from a fault in judgment, from a

evil,

notion

and may therefore be called in so many words, judgments or opinions * avarice, for instance, is a wrong opinion as to the value of money,'' fear is a wrong opinion as regards future, trouble as
of good and
;

regards present
ral

ills.'

Still, as

appears from the geneimpulses,^ this

is

view of the

Stoics

respecting

language does not imply that emotion

retical condition.

only a theoefifects

On

the contrary, the

of a
will,
its

faulty imagination

to which it gives rise

the feelings and motions of are expressly included in

being)
iv.

Pint. Virt. Mor. 3, p. 441 part of this passage has been already quoted, p. 215,
'

(the
3,

first

Key. e?j/.], trapaKafi^ilveiTBai [add S^] TT^v d6^ay iiyrl ttjs aaOeyovs
iiroKTiifieiis. Conf. Cie. Tusc, Sed omnes pertur7, 14 bationes judicio censent fieri et opinioue . opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Id. iii. 11, 24 : Est ergo causa omnis in opinioue, Dec vero segritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum 1 Fin. iii. 35 Perturbationes 10, autem nulla naturse vi commoventur ; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis. Acad. i. 10. See p. 244, 3. Diog. 1. u. > die. Tusc. iii. 11, 25 iv. Posidon. (in Galen, iv. 7, 14. Chrysippus defined 7, p. 416)
:

the

continuation
5e

\eye(r6cu

[rh

Tyye/xoviKhv^

&\oyov, Zrav
dpfjLTis

T^

ir\^ov6.^ovrt ttis

iffxupv yeyofji^i/Cj} Kal Kparitffavri Trp6s ri rav kT^nuiV irapa

alpovyra \6yoy iKtpeptiTai yhp rh irafloj, k.t.K. See below, note 3. 2 See p. 242, 2. ' IMog. Soice! 5' vii. Ill
rhi/

Kol

avToTs
tprjiri

Tcl irdBri

KpCffeis clcoi,

KoBd

XpiJfftiTTros

iv

r^
o.

irepl TraOSiv.

Put.
rb

Virt. Mor.

TrdBos eivai

p. 441 \6yov vovuphv KaX

3,
(col

i,K6\aaTov ix ipai\ris
TTjfievTjs
bdiixriv
:

8ir)/nap-

Kplffeus

(T(l>ohp6T'r]ra

Ka\

irpoaKa^&vra. Stob. ii. TrivTuv St tuv t9\s 168 ^vxrts Traday cttI 5(J|as outo \eyouaw ilvai [instead of which read vdvray , - . iradwy S($|as cartas

apprehension
trp6ff<t)aTos
'

(_&<rii) as KaKov irapovfflas, See p. 242, 1.

S6^a

240

THE
conception
; '

STOICS.
credible, as

Chap.
X.

nor

is

it

Galenus

states,*

that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.^

The

Stoics, therefore, notwithstanding their

vp6ir(paTm being Kii^TiKiv avaTO'KTis (iK6'yov
''

Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 15: Sed quse judicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis pertnrbationes solum positas esse diount, verum ilia etiam, quse eflElciiintiir perturbationibus, ut segritudo quasi morsuui quendam doloris ef-

i/Ktipffeas.

De Hipp,
:

et

p.

429

XpiiffiTTTTOS fikv

Plat. v. 1, oZv iv r^

irpdtrtp

irepX

TTftpafai,

Kpiffets

ira6av aTrobeiKvvvai rivas eivat rov

Tr&Byj, Z'fjvuiv 5'

XoyiffTiKov TO

ov

ras

Kpiffeis aiiTas,

csWa tAs

ivtyt-

metus recessum quenet fagam: Islitia profusam hilaritatem libido

ficiat:

yvofi4vas
T7IS

dam animi

XiJfrcts, itrdptreis

avrais avtTToXhs Kal re Kal t4$ nrtiffeis

iv6fit^ev etyai

^vxvs
iv.

to

irddTj.

effirenatamappetentiam. Galen. Hipp, et Plat. iv. 3, p. 377:

(T.-ilvuvt

Conf.
p. 377.
'

2,

p.

367,

and

3,

KoX iro^Aoiy &\Kois ruif

oit

Dwg. Ill
3,

^Tw'iKav) ot T^s yfnixii^,

rairats
Sefjets,

Tcts Kplffeis auTcts

245,

and the

(see above, p. definition quoted

dA\o koX [should perhaps be struck out], rhs iirl

aK6yovs
(TvffTo\iis

on p. 245, 5) confirms the view that, in the passage referred to

Kal

rairciyiiafis Kol Sfffeii

[both for

and

for \^$is in the

to.

passage about

be

quoted

from Plutarch, Thurat, Etudes

sur Aristote, p. 249, suggests S4(rfis S^|cis is more probable, confirmed too by Cicero's morsus doloris] iirdpireis t6 Kal

by Galenus, Chrysippus explained the emotions to be Kpitreis. Elsewhere Galenus asserts (iv. 2, p. 367) that he called Ki-iTTj a fielatris iirl (pevKT^
i<p'

SoKovvTt

TjSov^j

an

eirapffis
;

alperi^ SoKovvri vndpx^tv

and

charges him (iv. 6, p. 403), quoting passages in support of the charge, with deducing

rfis

^"X^^ irdBii. Plut. Yirt. Mor. 10, p. 449 t4s i-nniaeis T&v traduv Kal rhs (Tf^oSpoTTjras uG
:

?]

ylvioBai kotA Kplaiv, iv a^prrjrtKhv, ciAAct t&s A^Jfis [8^{ij] Kal ras trvaroXas
<j>aa't

tV

emotions from arovia and aadeveia xlivxvs. That Chrysippus agreed with Zeno in his definition of emotion, has already

rh

been stated (p. 244, 2). No doubt, too, with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobseus also (ii. 166) defines inoia emotion as (violent mental motion), the

T(j) a,\6ytii S^xonevas. results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given, p. 244, 2. In reference to this pathological action of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (Stob. ii. 170 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 7, 14) as 56^a irp6cr<t>aTos,oi opinio recens boni (ormali)pra3sentis,

Kul rh ^TTOX

The same

words used being

iraaai/ irTolav

trdBos fivai Kal irdkiv irdQos irrolav ;

and, in Galenus (iv. 5, p. 392), Chrysippus says : oiKeias 5e

t4?

Twy 7ra6w^
7]

y4vei

iLirobldorat

Kol

Tnaia Kara rh iv(T$o$r}iJ.fVOV TovTO Kal <t>ip6iJievov (K^. Chrys-

EMOTIONS AND VIMTUE.

theory of necessity, did not originally assent to the
Socratic dictum, that no one does

247

wrong

voluntarily,'

although younger members of the School

used
it

may have

an excuse for human faults,^ fearing lest, in allowing the freedom of emotions, they should
as

give up their moral inadmissibility and the possibility of

overcoming them.'

Nay more,

as all that

on

ippus even repeatedly insists the difference between

emotion and error error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition to the
of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of the impulses (jTiv (\}vfftK^v rap ipfiSav ffvfjLfieTpiav unepfialj/eiv). He shows that both Zeno's de-

claims

This is clear from the fact that the modes in which the pathological character of emotions displays itself are appealed to as evidence. See his words in Galen, iv. 6, p. 409, T^ [1. T(i] re yhp flu/nji
tion.
ipepefftiat

wai

e|0'T7jWi Koi

oi/

vap^ etiyTOis ovS' 4v eavTOiS elfat

Kal
irdvff
'6<Ta

finitions
iv. 2, p.

Stob.

ii.

come to this ( Galen. 368 and iv. 4, p. 385 170), and elsewhere
;

/j-apTvpei T(p Kpltreis

roiavra <pavepws ehal ri irdBTj

Khf

TTJ \oyiKrj

Swdfiei rijs ^uxv^

trvyia'TaffSai Kadtiirep Kal

explains (Plat. Yir. Hor. 10, p. 450) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to irrational conduct. The quotations on p. 246, 1 from Cicero and Stobseus are an explanation of positions of Chrysippus, of which Chrysippus is himself the source. And were he not directly the source, Galenus (iv. 4, p. 390) observes that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was generally held in the Stoic School after his time. In designating the emotions Kpitreis, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended thereby to exclude the emotions of impulpe and feeling. All that he meant was, that emotions, as they arise in the individual soul (we should say as conditions of consciousness), axe called forth by imagina-

^XO'Ta.

rk oiirois the other hand, Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion, as is perfectly clear from the expression of Galenus, quoted pp. 246, 2 246, 1. Stob. Eel. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50) The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, exercises no indulgence for indulgence would suppose rhv itnap-

On

'

TijKiJTa

p.)]

Trap'

ainhv TifiaprtiKlvai
irapa

wdyTwy ap.apTav6vTQ)v
ISlav KaKiatf.
^

t^p

Ejnctei. Diss.
;

i.

28, 1-10
1
;

ii.

26
;

M.

18, ]-7; Av/rel. ii.

;

xii. 12. 14 This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, p. 244,
iv. 3
*
;

viii.

xi.

18

and from Sen. De Ira, ii. 2, Anger can do nothing by itself, but only animo adpro8,

bante

nam

si invitis

nobis

'2i8

THE
X.

STOICS.
is

Chap.

proceeds from our will and impulse

by them de-

clared to be voluntary,' so too emotions are also in

our power ; and, as in the case of every other conviction,^ so in the case of convictions

out of which emo-

tions arise, it is for us to say whether

we

will yield or

would they allow that only instruction is needed in order to overcome emotions for all emotions arise, as they say, from lack of self-control,^ and differ from errors in that they
withhold assent.'
Just as
little
;

assert themselves

How

irregular

and oppose our better intelligence.* and irrational impulses arise in reason

was a point which the Stoics never made any serious

attempt to explain.
nascitur,

cumbet.
invicti

nunquam rationi suoOmnes enim motus

inevitabiles
179, 3, 4.

from Chrysippus, of whom similar remarks were quoted, p. 246,

Trav yap irdOos &tciffTiK6v eariv, Koi voWiiKis 6pwi/Tas robs iv Tois trddeoty SvTas Sti (TvfjiipepeL

qui non voluntate nostra fiunt

et

sunt,

(J)?

&c.
'

Seep.
See

p. 88, 1.
:

Cic. Acad. i. 10, 39 Perturbationes voluntarias esse. Tusc. iv. 7, 14 Emotions proceed from judgment itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosse, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt potestate, upon which follow the definitions quoted, p. 246,

: ;

T^y tTtpoSa6T7iros ^Ktpipofkivtws . cLvdyeffOat . vphs rh TTotf'tv avrh irdvres

T(i5 ov TTOieiy, uirb
. . .

S'

oi

iv TOLS trdOeffiv litres airo-

aTp^<povrai Thv \6yov, ou iropairKriffiws Se rots e^ipraTTtfievots iv &TUOVV, &^\* i5ia^6vT(os. ot fihv

yhp
.
. .

ijnaTTifievoi

SiSaxflevTcs
'

iuptffravrai Tris Kpitreas

Ktiv fieTaSiSax&&(yiVf
fl

ol

S*

iv ToiS Trd0e<Ttv ^cres,

Kti.v fid-

Boifft

bn

ou

1.

Sci

XimeTaSai

0o$f7ff6ai

^ SAks

Oic. Tusc. iv. 9,

22

Om-

nium autem afllectionum fontem esse diount intemperanquas est a tota et a recta ratione def eotio sic aversa a prffiscriptione rationis ut nuUo modo adpetitiones anima nee regi nee contineri queant.
(&/tptTcio)

dfitos

iv To7s trdOeatv eTvai rijs }]/vxVSy ovK aipiiTTavTai Toinav aXV

inrh

&yovTai

tUv iraBuv

e*s

ri vwh

tiam

Toinuv

Kpareio'dat rvpavviBos.

A
by

mente

different
JBpiatet.
TrjTOi-

view
Diss.
i.

is

taken
:

28, 8,

who o
il,i)Trd-

proposoi Medea remarks

iiit,ov

owrp
ou

ivapyus, 3ti

i^r]TrdrnTo.i, Kol

iroi^trei.

'

Sttib.

Bel.

ii.

170, probably

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

Emotions being called forth by imagination, their
peculiar character depends on the kind of imagination which produces them.
are directed to

24{)

Chap.

Now,

all

our impulses

(?)

T-'urie-

what is good and evil, and what appears to us to be a good, or in avoiding what appears to us to be an evil.' This good and this evil is sometimes a present, and sometimes a future object. Hence there result four chief
either in pursuing
classes of faulty imagination, and, corresponding

consist emotion.

with

them, four

classes of emotions.
is

From an
;

irrational

opinion as to what

good there

arises pleasure,

when
evils

it refers to things present

desire,

when

it

re-

fers to

things future.
;

faulty opinion of present

produces care

of future evils, fear.'^

Zeno had by
his

already distinguished these four principal varieties

of emotions.^

The same

division was adopted

pupil Aristo,* and afterwards became quite general.

Yet the vagueness, already mentioned, appears

Stoic system in the definition of individual
tions.

in the

emo-

By

some, particularly by Chrysippus, the esis

sence of these emotions

placed in the imagination

which causes

them

by

others, in the state of

mind

which the imagination produces.^

See p. 2i2, idea is expressed in applying the terms alperhv and (f>evKThv to good and evil (Stob. ii. 126 and 142 see p. 229, 1, and
'

The four

principal

2.

The same

In Clem. Strom, ii. 407, A, the words being vpbs iKov ri

*

nrptixopBov,
$ov,

tiSqvtjv,

Autttiv,

(p6-

iTnOvfilav,

iroWij? Set t^s

io-Kija-eajs

xal fiixts.

232, 3). ^ Stoh. ii. 166 Cic. Tusc. Fin. iii. 11 ; iv. 7, 14 ; 15, 43
; ;

iii.

10, 35.

' According to Dioff. 110, this distinction was fovind in the treatise irepl iradav.

definition of Kimi) or (Cicero EBgritudo) as S((|a irpdff^aros kukov irapovtrias is explioitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in Cio. Tusc.
Sffjj

The

iv.

7,

14

praasentis, in

Opinio recens mali quo demitti oon-

250

THE
classes of

STOICS.

Chap.
X.

emotions were again subdivided into nume-

rous subordinate classes, in the enumeration of which

the Stoic philosophers appear to have been more

guided by the use of language than by psychology.'

In treating the subject of emotions in general,

far less

importance was attached by the Stoics to

accuracy than
to

psychological

considerations

of

moral worth. That the result could not be very

animo rectrnn esse videatur), as also the definition of <pl\apyvpia= bir6\T)'^i^ rav to apyipiov Ka\bv ^Ipai. See p. 254, In like manner jhe'St), axo4, 5. Kaaia, and the other passions, were, according to Siog. 110, defined. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions quoted Tusc. iv. 7, 14 iii'. 11, 25 of TjSoo^ (Ifetitia, voluptas gestiens) = opinio recens boni prseellerri sentis, in quo rectum videatur of fear = opinio immali quod intolerapendentis bile esse videatur, agreeing Vfiththe irpoaSoKia xaKovot Siog. 112 ;of desire (cupiditas, libido, dwiBvn(a) = opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam prsesens esse atque adesse. It is, however, more common to hear Atot) (Biog. Ill ; Stob. 172 do. Tusc. iii. 11) described as a.ireid))S tri/ffToA^ y^/ux^s ^6y^, more briefly crvToX)\ &Koyos, fear as ^kkKktls a.Trei9^s Kdytp^ ijSou^ even according to Alex. Aphir. top. 96, as SAoyoj hrapais
trahique

satis-

latter definitions appear to belong to Zeno. They were pro-

bably appropriated by Chrys-

and the additions made which are found in StobEeus.

ippus,
'

be

Further particulars gathered from Diog.

;

may
vii.

Ill Stoi. ii. 174. Both include under KiTrri sub-divisions

as
'i\ios,
<j>06vos,

^Aos,

f7)^o-

Dio&X0OS, avla, o^ivrj. genes adds ifSxAriC's and iriyTuiria,

Xuff's
fiirr).

Stobsus TTeVfios, Both include under

;

&x<>^, <p6pos,

Seijita,

ijKvoS)

ai(rx^vTj,

6K7r\7?|is,

86pvl3os,

i.yu)i>ia;

Stobaeus adds

Seos

and

SeKridaifjLovia.

Under
ic-ft-

ilSovii,
XTjffts,

Diogenes includes
;

iirixaLpsKaKiai, repT^is^ Sid-

Xi'C'S

Stobaeus,
iiriSv^ia.
fitffos,

i-TrixaipucaKiai,

&(rjuVia^ol, yorjTetai Kal

Under
CTrdviSj

ra d^oia. Diogenes places

;

tpLXoveiida,
8uiJ,6s

ipms.
opy)}

/ivfLs,

opy^, Stobseus,
{Qviibs, irtKpia.
trSOoi,

KoX

X^XoSy
K.T.K.),
*{fj.pot,

rh i57j avTrts KdroSy M^ws,

epwres
cr(podpo\,

^piKti^ovioUy

(()L\0'ir\ovTiai,

two different translations of which are given by Cio. 1. c. and Kin.

c'^' alpsTcfi

SoKovvTi iniipxeiv,

ii. 4,

13, iiriOvfAla as ^pe^ts

d.-irei-

or titio opinati
e5)s \6ja!,

immoderata appemagni boni. The

Definitions for all these terms which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus may be found in the writers named. Greek lexicographers may obtain many useful hints
(pi\oSo^iai.

from Stoic

definitions.

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

factory, follows

261
stated.'

from what has been already

UHAP.

Emotions are impulses, overstepping natural

contradicting reason

limits,

upsetting the proper balance of the soul's powers,

in

a word, they are failures,

disturbances of mental health, and, if indulged in,

become chronic
'

diseases of the

soul.'^

Hence a Stoic
jU^

Plwt. Yir. Mor. 10, p. 4i9

afxafyria kot^ ^(XTiv KaX ttSs 6 Kinro^ixevos
itriQvixiav
CLfjLap-

^auoviTi

Tct

atperet

ircpiSpa

irav ^iv yctp Trddos

ainovs
rdvei.

alpcTh flvai (Stob. translations of the definition in Cicero and

^ tpo^O'v^evos ^

The

Stoics are therefore

anxious to

make a marked

dis-

tinction in the expressions for

Seneca). The opposite of such 56^11, or a confiision arising from false fear, is an opinio vehemens iuhserens atque insita

emotions and the permitted mental affections, between

pleasure and joy, see p. 236, 2, fear and precaution (eiAa/Seio), desire and will (Soi!\i)irif, Diog. 116; cupere et velle, Sen. Ep.
116, 1), alffxii'V and alSiis (^Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 2, p. 529). ' On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult Dio0. Oic. Tuso. 115 ; Stob. ii. 182
;

de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda such as hatred of womankind, hatred of mankind, &o. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevents our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states

iv.

whose remarkable 10 agreement with Stobeeus seems to point to a common source of

;

of the soul are called o^^wo-t^/iaTa,negrotationes {Diog. ; Stob.; but this Cic. Tus. iv. 13, 29) distinction is, of course, very uncertain. , The same fault is at one time classed among v6iroi, at another among oi^^m;

information
directly
iii.
;

directly

or

in;

drawn upon by both

Galen. Hipp, et 10, 23 Plat. V. 2 ; Sen. Ep. 75, 11. Ac-

cording to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabiles soluti et If they are freeoncitati. quently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defiiied as
5(i|a

and Cicero (11,24; 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ete/wrranrfai) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are
a-Tiinara;

13,

evKaracl>opittt

els

irddos.

Diog.y

iwiBv/iias i^^vnKv7a eis e^ik

The distinctioij between vitia and morbi (6'ie. 13) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconStob., Cic. 12.
sta^ntia

et

repugnautia,

like-i

; :

252

THE
demands
only exist where this

STOICS.

Chap. X.

their entire suppression: true virtue can

process

has succeeded.

As

being contrary to nature and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly free from them.' When

we have once

learnt

to value things

according to

and to discover everywhere nature's unchanging law, nothing will induce us to yield to emotion.^ Hence the teaching of Plato and Aristheir real worth,
totle,

requiring emotions to be regulated, but not up-

rooted, was attacked in the

most vigorous manner

by these philosophers. A moderate evil, they say, What is faulty and opalways remains an evil. posed to reason, ought never to be tolerated, not even
in the smallest degree.*
wise vitiositas in a, habitus in tota vita ineonstans the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this
;

On
'

the other hand,

when

Olc. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non

view to call KaKiat, Siadeffeis and kJitoi, as well as a^j>a>arl]fiara and evKaTa(f)opiat, e'lety (^Stob. ii. 100, on the difference between e|is and SidSfins. see 102, and, accordingly, Heine 1) suggests (De Font. Tuscul. Dis. Weimar, 1863, p. 18) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (_&n., Cic). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated byChrysippus with excessive care. Posidonius contradicted him, ho w;

tollerent . herent in

sed

eam

contra-

cerent

angustumque deduhie omnibus his quasi

morbis voluit carere sapientem. lUd. ii. 43, 135. "We shall find subsequently that the mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable. 2 do. Tusc. iv. 17, 37. ' Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22 Omne
:

enim malum, tiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id

agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. Ibid. iv. 17, 39 Modum tu adhibes vitio ? An vitium nullum est non parere rationi ? Ibid. 18, 42 Nihil interest, utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an
:

ever, in part ( Oalen, 1. c, Cic. 10, 23 12, 27) ; but their differences are not of interest bo us.
;

moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit,

is

partem susoipit vitiorum.

EMOTIONS AND
an emotion
is

VIRTXIE.

253

regulated by and subordinated to rea-

Chap.
"

son, it ceases to

be an emotion, the term emotion

of the Peripatetics, that
are

only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed

to reason.^

The statement

certain emotions are not only admissible, but

useful and necessary, appears of course to the Stoics

altogether wrong.^

To them,
:

only what

is

morally
all

good appears
useful, virtue
is

to be useful
;

emotions

are,

under

circumstances, faults

and were an emotion

to be

would be advanced by means of what

right relation, therefore, towards

wrong.^

The

emotions

indeed, the
emotionless.''
it as

only one morally tenable

hostility.

is

an attitude of absolute

The wise man

feel, but,

must be
regarding

Pain he he will

may
suffer

not

an

evil,

no

affliction,

and know no fear.^ He may be slandered and illtreated, but he cannot be injured or degraded. Being
5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insaniendum, modlce segrotandum. Ep. 116,

Sen. Bp. 85,

a virtute mahim, ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.

117 </>a(rl Si koL Tin (T6(fiov, 5io rb hviiaTwrov (faultless) dvai. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished,
'

JDiog. vii.
sTfai

airaSij

Ego non video, quomodo 1 salubris esse aut utilis possit

:

uUa mediocritas morbi.

' Sen. De Ira, i. 9, 2 particularly with reference to anger, conf. Ep. 85, 10. ^ Full details are given by Cic. Tusc. iv. 19-26 ; Off. i. 25, 88 Sen. De Ira, i. 5, 21 ; ii. 12 ; particularly with regard to the use of anger. s In the same spirit Sen. i. 10, 2, meets the assertion 9, 1
; ; ;

'

Chrysippus
:

Floril. vii. 21)

(in Stoi. ihyflv pev rhv

ij.ii

a-6(pov nil Pacravi^effBai S4-

-yip

ivSiSSmi rp
6, 6
;

ij/uxs.
;

Sen.

Bp. 85, 29
25, 61 ; Phd. Sto.
;

Prov. Cic. Tusc. ii.

11, 25.

De

12, 29

iii.

Eep. 20, 12
19,
;

Musonius (in
16)
;

Stoi. Floril.

that valour

cannot dispense

with anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvanda absit hoc est se contents
.
.

Const. 2 3 ; 5 ; 7 ; 12. The second titleofthistreatise is nee injuriam nee contumeliam accipere sapientem.
:

Sen.

De

254
Chap,
'

THE

STOICS.

untouched by honour and dishonour, he has no vanity, To anger ' he never yields, not needing this irrational
impulse, not even for valour and the championship
also feels no pity,** and exercises For how can he pity others for what he would not himself consider an evil ? How

of right.

But he

no indulgence.*

can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake

of others, which he would not tolerate for his

own

sake

If justice calls for punishment, feelings will

not betray him into forgiveness.

application of these principles.
(2) Idea

We

shall subse-

quently have an opportunity for learning the further

Virtue

is

thus negatively defined as the being

as

(a^Positive

exempt from emotions,

.

apathy
r

;*

but there
,

is

also

and

a positive side supplementing this barely negative

.

negative
aspects.

View.

Looking at the matter

,-,

ot virtuous action, this

may be
ral

said to consist in subordination to the geneits

law of nature, looking at

Virtue
it is
is
^

manner, in

rational

self-control.'

exclusively a matter of reaelse,

son

in short,

nothing

but rightly-ordered

reason.'

To speak more

explicitly, virtue contains

'

See 253, 2 and 3 and do.

iii. 9,

6, p.

24)

rliv t' opcT?)i/ Siofleiny

Tuso.
2

19.
iii.

eTvai iiioKoyouiiivriv.
9,

Cie. Tusc:
ii.

20
vii.
;

De Clem.
'

Diog.
ii.

Sen. 123.

' do. Acad. i. 10, 38 Cumque superiores (Aristotle and

:

Stoh: Eel.
;

190

Floril.

Sen. 1. c. 5, 2 ; 7 ; Diog. 1. c; Gell.'S. A.-Kiv. i, i. * Ps. Pint. v. Horn. 134 ot lih oiv StioVko! Trji/ iperiiv rlSef46, 60
:

TcLi

iv T7 wiraBdi}.
'

See p. 193. Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b. Virtue consists in iK\oy)i T&v /carol ipiaiv. Diog. vii. 89 (conf. Plut. Aud. Po. c.

others) non omnem virtutem in rations esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas hie [Zeuo] omnes in ratione ponebat. ' do. Tuso. iv. 15, 34 Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Conf. Sen. Ep. Virtus autem nihil 113, 2 aliud est quam animus quodam: : :

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

in itself two elements
dilative.

256

one

practical, the other spe-

Chap.

At the

root,

and

as a condition of

all

rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right

knowledge

and on this point they are at one with

Natural virtue,

the well-known Socratic doctrine, and with the teach-

ing of the Cynics and Megarians.

or virtue acquired only

by

exercise, they reject alto-

gether, defining virtue, after the

manner of

Socrates,

as knowledge, vice as ignorance,' and insisting on the

necessity of learning virtue.'*

Even the avowed enemy

All

of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was on

this point at one with the rest of the School.

virtues were

by him referred

to wisdom,' and, conse-

quently, he denied the claims of most to be virtues

at
all."

But, however closely the Stoics cling to the idea

that
all

virtue

is

based on knowledge, and

is

in itself

nothing else but knowledge, they are not content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above
modo
marks,
'

se habens,
p. 128, 1
;

and the

re-

tues into
.tikoI

eVirrTifio>/i/al

Ka\ fleaprj''"wf
;

The

129, 3. proof of this will be

{crva-raaw

ex"""''"

found subsequently in the Stoic

"deiinitions and vices.

and kee^frifToi for by the latter must be underecajprjiCioTwy)

of various virtues Compare preliminarily 254,6 and Biog. vii. 93 8' ayvoias Ttis KaKi'as, S ai elrai
:

operal

iirurrrjuai..

Stob. Ecl.

ii.

ravras lifv ovv ras ^rjfleio-ns aperis Ts\4as ehtu \eyov<Ti irepl

108

Tij/jSioc/caitrweo-TTjicwaieKflewpi)/iiircoj'.

It is not opposed to these statements for Stob. ii. 92 and

stood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states resulting from them health of soul, strength of will, and the like. On the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see Cic. Tusc. iv. 1 3, 30. ' Diog. vii. 91 (following Cleanthes, Chrysippus and others) ; Ps. Pint. V. Horn.

110, to distinguish othervirtues besides those which are re'x'''"

144.
'

and

ittia-rriii.ai

nor for Hecato

vii.

See p. 260, 3. Pint. Sto. Bep. 7

161
;

Diog.

in {Diog.

vii.

90) to divide vir-

Galrni, vii. 2, p. 595.

256

TSM

STOICS.

Chap,
-

practical activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we have seen already that, with them, knowledge was only a means towards rational conduct,' so it is expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teach-

ing of the School, that Herillus of Carthage, Zeno's

pupil, declared knowledge to he the end of and the only unconditional good.^ Virtue may,
true,

Ufe,
it is

be called knowledge, but

it is,

at the

same time,
;

and strength of mind, a right state of the soul agreeing with its proper nature ' and it is required of man that he should never desist from
essentially health

labouring
good.''
is

and contributing

towards the

common

Thus, according to Stoic principles, virtue

action

such a combination of theory and practice, in

is

which

invariably based

on

intellectual

knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge finds

See p. 56. See p. 58, 2. Diog. vli. "Hpi\A.os Si b 165, Conf. 37 KapxvSivios t^Kos elire tV ^tiaT-fiix-ni', Kirep icrrl fpv oel irdvTa
'

good
from
X^s
i

in
i.TOiiia

our
la-xis

conduct from
;

'

drovia and

what

is

bad,

koX lta-8tveia

-rrjs \liu-

and

(ibid. vii. ], p. 590)

ava(l>epovra irphs
f-ris

-rh

/it' inar-l}-

Cv" tol

f'h

T?)

a.ivoi(f

Siafie-

he referred the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the soul. Bj
Aristo, p. 220, 1, virtue is defined as health by Stub. ii. 104, as SicESsiris i/zox^i ain^aivos aurp; by Siog. 89, aa SMeais
;

$\r]ij.emr.
'i^iy ii'

iiuat 5e

tV ^iruTTiiiinv

(jmvTainav irpoaSi^fi i/ierdirraTov iirh Xiyov. On the definition, seep. 82, 1.

' Cleanthes (in Plut. Sto. Rep. 7) When rSros, on which see p. 128, 2, is found in the soul in a proper degree, l<rxiis
:

6ii.o\oyovfii.4vn.
' Sen. De Otio, Stoioi nostri dicunt

i.
:

(28)

usque ad

KoXeiToi Kal Kpiros

oD'tt)

r)

8'

iVxir

t!> Kp6,Tos Srav fjiiv iir\ ivufavidiv ^/ifisyeTioif iyyevriTai iyxpdTfid 4<rTi, k.t.\. In

Kal

Toir

the same way, Chrysippus (according to Galen, Hipp, et Plat, iv. 6, p. 403) deduced what is

vifee finem in actu erimus, non desinemus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa

ultimum

mors

otiosa.


EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.
its object in

257 Chap.
'

moral conduct
be taken to

is

it is,

in shqxt, power of

will based

on rational understanding.^

this definition

Nor yet must imply that moral knowonly subsequently re-

ledge

precedes will, and

ferred to will, nor conversely that the will only uses

knowledge as a subsidiary instrument.

rable, but they are one

In the eyes
Virtue

of a Stoic, knowledge and will are not only insepa-

and the same thing.

cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor knowledge without virtue.^

The

one, quite as
so.ul,

much
or,

as

the other,

is

a right quality of the

is

speak-

ing more correctly,

reason,

the rightly-endowed soul,

when

it

is

as it ought to be.'

Hence virtue
and
it
is

may

be described, with equal propriety, either as

;

knowledge or as strength of mind

anterior in point of time.

irreis

levant to inquire which of these two elements

But how

are

we

to reconcile with this view the

of virtues and their Stoic teaching J r o of a plurality As the common root from which mutual relations ?

(j) The "''*"''

severalli/.

they spring, Zeno, following

Aristotle, regarded

un-

derstanding, Cleanthes, strength of mind, Aristo, at

one time health, at another the knowledge of good and evil.* Later teachers, after the time of Chry' This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.

amhs

iperiiv

iiroiei

kcH

iyifiav

ayiiiiiofe,

k.t.X.
3,

Jd.

on Zeno,
p.

see p. 260,
236,
3.

and Cleanthes,

See pp. 59, 1 56, 2. ' See Sea. Bp. p. 254, 7. 65, 6, after describing a great Talis ar.d noble soul, adds
'
;
:

According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one virtue to be the knowledge of good

and

animus virtus
*

est.
:

Pint. Vir. Mor. 2

/jLif

'Aplaruv

evil (Hlpp_. et Plat. v. 5, p. : KdWiovoli/'Apla-Twi' i XTos, oi/re iroWiis ehcu rot Apsris rfjs

168)

Be 6 Xios Tp

ovai(f liiav koX

r/fi/xi)'

aTroiprii/diJ.eiios,

AAAA

/itai',

358

THE
X.

STOICS.

Chap.

sippus, thought that it consisted in

knowledge or
divine.'

wisdom, understanding by wisdom

ledge, the

absolute know-

knowing

all things,

human and

From

this

common

root,

a multiplicity of virtues

was supposed to proceed, which, after Plato's example,

are grouped under four principal virtues^
ivuTTimnv iyaSav te koI kukSiv thai i/jijo-iy. vii. p. 595. 2, vofxitxas yovv 6 'Apicrrtav, fiiav
iiv

intelli-

elvai TTJs ypvxvs Siva/jLiv,

fieda,
/cat

y \oyi^6-

r^v ap^r^v
iitLiTT'fifiTiv

ttJs

^vxv^

^6eT0 ^iav,

hyaSSov Kal

Koxav.

The statement that

Aristo

made

health

of

soul

consist in

and evil guage of Plutarch. Perhaps Zeno had already defined

as StTLffTijfnn a7a0ei)j/ KaX KaKUV, ' Conf. p. 255, 1. Cic. De
(pp6yi}(^ts

a right view of good agrees with the lan-

ing particular virtues as springing from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific virtue. In Zeno's definition too, as later writers would have it (^Plwt. Vir. Mat. 2), to <^p6vi\ais was given the

meaning of
2

eTrio-T^/w;.

Aperal irpwTiu.
ii.

Diog. 92

Stoi.

104.

153 Princepsque omnium virtutum est ilia sapientia, quam <ro(j)tai' Grseci vocant prudentiam enim, quam Grseci (ppSvjiffiv diount, aliam quandam intelligimus quse est rerum
Off.
i.

43,

Posidonius Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the

In stating that four counted

subdivisions,

whereas

Posi-

donius confined himself to the four main heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this
division of virtues, another, threefold, division is also met with, see p. 56, 2 ; 57, 1, that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the whole of philosophy and likewise its parts are brought under the notion of virtue but it is not stated how this threefold division is to harmonise with the previous fourfold one. A twofold division,

expetendarum f ugiendarumque scientia. Ilia autem soientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque human-

A similar deof wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et horum 'oausas, is found Ibid. ii. 2, 5. Sen. Ep. 85. 5 PlMt. Plac. Prooem. 2 ; Straho, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus ;
arum
scientia.

finition

and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between ao^ia and (pp6miins, in the Stoic school, although Aristo had preceded him in distinguishing them. Explain-

made by Panetiusandreferre4 to by Seneca (Ep. 94, 45)

that into theroretical and practical virtues

is

an approxima-

tion to the ethics of the Peri.patetics.

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

.genee,

259
Intelligence

bravery, justice, self-comtrol.'

Chap.
X.

consists in
is

knowing what

is

good and bad, and what

;

neither the one nor the other, the indifl'erent

bravery, in

knowing what

to

choose, what

not to
;

avoid, and what neither to choose nor to avoid

or,

substituting the corresponding personal attitude for

knowledge, bravery
control consists in

is fearless

obedience to the law

Self-

of reason, both in boldness and endurance-''

knowing what to choose, and what to eschew, and what neither to choose nor eschew * justice, in knowing how to give to everyone what is
;

his due.*
'

In a corresponding manner, the principal

sine timore. The last-named characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed to the Stoics by Cic. Off. i. 19, 62 Virtus propug:

The scheme was in vogue

"before Zeno's time. See Plut. Sto. Eep. 7, 1, and the quotations, p. 260, 3.
KoL
oitSerepuv,

or

kKatnwv

Stv

nans pro aequitate.

* itTitrj'tju.Tj

oh iroifiTeov koL oiiSeStobseus adds, that the definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the definition of every virtue, (p^ffei TroMriKoO fyow. But this is superfiuous, for only
troLTiriov KoX

CilpeTwy Koi (ftevK-

Tipant.

Stob. 102.

Ttov

KaX

ovSerdpotv.

Stob. 102,
<fip6vriiris

in the same, word for word. See p. 258, 1 that of valour in Diogenes is not very different. Since all duties
definition of
is

The

Cicero

in the case of such a being can the terms good and evil apply. Diog. 92; iSeart. Math. xi. 170 and 246; Cio. I.e.
' itriffTiifjiTj

refer to irotTjrea

and

ob troiTjrea,

the definitions of the remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of ippovriiTis.
* iniffT-fifiTi

Setviav f ol o& Seivwy

aTTovefiriTLK^

ttjs

Kai ovSerepaiv (^Stob. 104) ; i-TrurTflfiTJ ^v aipereoi/ Kol uv v\a$ljTeovKcii ov^erepuv {Dioff.)
Ti]IJ.i\
;

iiriff-

Sc xp^ ea^jiiiv ^ fiii Ba^peiv {Galen. Hipp, et Plat. vii. 2,

.597).

Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 63, conf. V. 14, 41: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit, scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiendo ac perierendo, summie legi parens

in Stob. Id. p. 104, further enumerates the points difference between the four of virtues Intelligence refers to KaS4]KovTa, self-control to impulses, valour to {nroinoval, justice to aTrove/iiiirfis. See also the distinctive peculiarities of the four virtues in Stob. 112.
dji'as iKiiirTijj,
:

Below,
s 2

p. 263.

'

260

THE
faults are traced

STOICS.

Chap.
X.

rance.'

Probably

back to the conception of ignoall these definitions beldng to

less,

Chrysippus.^
predecessors,'

Other definitions are attributed to his

some more, others

agreeing with

him
were

in respect of their conception of virtue.

Within
precise
all

these limits, a great

distinguished,

number
their

of individual virtues

differences

and

shades of meaning being worked out with

the

pedantry which characterised Chrysippus/

'

The dei4ri

Diog. 93

Stol. 104.
:

The

Stoi/

fikv

oiv alpeiffBal re
<l>e{ryeiv rh. /co/ccb,

TTfuTai icaKlai are a^poffvvi}, SeiA(o, i.Ko\airia, aSmia. The de-

T&7a0a Kol
VT)!/
lii]
'

tV

hri(TTi\p.l\v TT^vde

/coXei actxppoffi-

finition

of cuppoavni is

&ymia

Urav Si irpaTTew

fiey rayoBit,
tppdjnjffiv

ayaOwv koI KaKwv Kol oi/Berdptev. See p. 255,- 1. ' This follows from the fact that the conception of iTruTriiiiri is the basis in all. See p. 258,
1.
'

TrpaTTeiv Sh

Tcfc Ko/ccb,

avipeiav Se (irav to fihv flo^^p, tA 5e (pe^yy' Sto// 5e rh Kar* &^lav CKaartp vefirj, SiKaioiT^VTjv evl 5e
\(J7q/,

yiv(^ffKov(Ta

/le//

fi

^vxh

Xcupls Tov TrpdTTeiv rayaOii t6 /col

Of Zeno, Phit. Vir. Mor.

says:
iv
5'

2,

/CO/C& <ro(pta t' itrrl

/col

iirurTriiiii,

p.

441,

dpi^d^ievos

r^v

Trphs Se rits

Trpd^els h<\>lKvov^fvri

l^p6v7\(TlV

fJLGV

CLTTOVe^TireOtS Si-

KawcrivTjv iy
cr6vi]f iv

S*

alpiTeois (rco(ppo-

TOJ \a^pdvi

/cotJ -rhv ploy ofd/UOTO ir\eiai

Tci

irpoaprifieva.

We

iirofievr4oLs ^vSptav.

know, from Pint.

The
Sto.

like in regard to justice in

Sto. Eep. 7, 4, see p. 256, 3, that, according

Eep.

7,

2.

On

hand valour
<t>p6v7i(Tis

is

the other here termed

in iiiepyriTeoi!.

He also

to Cleanthes, strength of mind, %ray p.iv eVl toTs iirt(pav(riv ^jtifievereots iyKpdTeii 4yy4p7iTaif
iffTiv
lirav
S*

says, p. 440, that, according to Aristo, ri apsTij jroiriTEo /liv im(TKOiroVffa KoL fX^ VOltlTSa K4K\7}Tai
<pp6i'ri(ns'

iv tois virofifve-

reois, avSpeia' trepl

SiKcuotr{ivT]
'

rhs a^ias

Sh,

irepl

tAs

alp4(reis /col

^TTiBvfiiav Se KOfTfjt,o\iffa

4KK\i(reLS, (TaKppoaiinr].

With him,

KaX

t6

fjLejpaoj/

Kai

rh

eitKaipov

4v

ridotfcus

dpiCovffa^ atatppoffiirff

too, if Plutarch's account is accurate, iyKpdreia, or persever-

Koivavi\im<ri
6p.t?i.ov(Ta

5e

/col

<rvfi.$oKalois

To7s trphs

erepot's,

5i-

Kcuuirivr).

Farther particulars as to Aristo may be found in Galen. Hipp, et Plat. vii. 2, p. 69.5 Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can only have one virtue, the eVitTT^^Tj ayaduj/ /col KaKuv.
:

ance, takes theplace of <l>p6yri(rts, do. Tusc. iv. 24, 53,*quotes no less than three definitions of

bravery given by Sph^rus. See

p. 259, 3.
'

Phct. Vir. Mor. 2, p. 441,

charges
(Tfirivos

him with creating a

aperaii/

ov

irvvTjBfs

ou5e

yviipifiov,

and forming a

x'p'e>'-

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE,

finitions of a portion or

261

them have been preserved

Chap.

by Diogenes and

Stobseus.'

In a similar way, too, _^!_^___

the Stoics carried their classification of errors into

the minutest details.^

The importance attaching

virtues, the ultimate basis

to

this

division

of

(c)

Mutual

on which

it rests,

and the

relation

which they bear, both to one another and to

essence of virtue, are topics

"tj^^^j^al mrtues.

the

common

Zeno never entered.

and
at the

Plutarch, at least, blames

upon which him^

for treating virtues as

many, and yet

understanding.

inseparable,

same time
of the

for finding in all only certain

manifestations

Aristo at-

tempted to

settle this point

is

more

precisely.

Accord;

ing to his view, virtue

speaking of

in itself only one

in

many

virtues,

we only

refer to the va-

riety of objects with

t6t71!, iiTe\6TTis. fi.ja\6Tris,

which that one virtue has to

'

Ka\6eu-

T7JS, eVi5e|t(JT7?9, euoTrai/TT7(rio,

<pp6vTlffts,

Stob. 106, includes under evXoyurria, eiifiovKia,

voui/exfut,

Tpaire\ia, after
irpa6Tris,
ii.

the anology of

d7x(>'oio,

eu/XTixaWa
Koff;

avSpffa, &0.

In Stoi.

under
(uSttis,

aanpfoaiirn,

euToJia,

Stoic virtues, is found an ipanxT} as lirtirT^/*?; (v(puai>, &e., and a viwv flTJpos {rvfiiroTiKi] as ^niar^iMT] rod wwy 86* e^iyeirSat tA trvfivSaia Kai tov An ipuTlKh Treifs Set ffvfi-n-lveti'. and o-u/iitotik}) aperii are also
118,

among the

aiSriiiO<rivn,

iyicpdreta

under ai/Speia, Kaprepia^

tjjv, iieyaKo<f>vxia,

6a^^a\i6^v^vxia, ipiAo-

vovla ; under StKaiorriit/f], eutre0eia (on which jyiog. 119),

xP^^'^^'^'^^t

evKoivuvnfyia,

eiiffw-

mentioned by Philadem. De According to Mus. col. 15. 4it/tft. 162, b (Vol. Here, i.), PerBiEus,

had

in his avfiiroTucot Sid\oyoi, discussed a-viiiroTiKii at'

;

and since, according length to the Stoics (&. Ep. 123, 15: Stob. 1. c), none but the wise

Diog. 126, is slightly Stobseus gives the different. definitions of all these virtues, and Diogenes of some. By Stobseus, they are generally described as ima-TTJiuu by Diogenes, as e|eii or Siafleireit. Otherwise, the definitions are the same. A definition of ei;

aWa^la.

know how to live aright and how to drink aright, these arts
belong to a complete treatment
of wisdom.

toi'o is

given by

Cic.

OS.

i.

40,

142.
^ "

Diog. 93 ; Stob. 104. Sto. Eep. 7.

^63
(Jhap.

THE
do.'

STOICS.
is

The

difference of one virtue from another

__1^__

not one of inward quality, but depends on the external conditions under wliich they are manifested
it

only expresses a definite

relation to something

else, or, as

Herbart would

say,

an a,ccidental aspect.^

The same view would seem to be indicated by the manner in which Cleanthes determines the relations
of the principal virtues to one another.^
It was,

however, opposed by Chrysippus.

of

The assumption
upon an inward

many

virtues he believed rested

;
''

difference

each definite virtue, as also each defi-

nite fault,

becoming what

it

does by a peculiar
itself
;

change in character of the soul

in short, for
it

a particular virtue to come into being,

is

not

enough that the constituent element of

all virtue

should be directed towards a particular object, but

'

Pint. Vir. Mot. 2

'Apia-Twv

fi^vv, as of MeyaptKol, aA.Ai Kai

[1.

Be 6 Xios Ty ^\v ohtria [liav Kal aifrhs apsri^v eiroiet Kal tyUtav

koto] t& irp6s ri nuts ex^tv

(soil.
fievriv').

koWois

6j/6fiafft

icoXou-

av6fia^e

'

T<f Se Ttpis rt

Sia^dpovs
tt^i'

Kal ir\slovas, ois e? Tis i64\ot

SpaiTiv 7]/x(ov
Pai/Q/j.4i/Tjv

KevKwv

fi^j/

avriKafi/ie~

\evKo6eav KaKuv,

Kaviav 5e fnXavdiatf ^ Tt roiovTov erepoy^ Kal ykp ri oper^, k.t,\.

See

Xalpiov

p. 260, 3. tv ix4v

KoBdTrep rh /la4(rTty,

&WoTe
/xt^

5g

icWo
Trepl

Sioipet' KaL -rh

irvp

ivepyet
(pitret

CAoy
^

5ta<p6povs

Xp^/J'.^vov.

See p. 260, 3. Their distinguishing features fall under the category of iroihv, to tise Stoic terms, not under that of Trp6s ri vus exov. as Aristo maintained. * G'alenus 1. c. continues: 6 'Toivvv Xpvannros Seifcyuctv, OVK 4v rp 'jrp6s ri ff^fVei yey6^ipov t& TrA^flos Tuv apeTunt T koL KaKiui/,
*

Galen. Hipp, et Plat.

d

vii.

dXA' 4v tojs olxelais

oviriais wttoA-

p. 590 : vofii^ei ycLp iKs7yos, fdav o^Krav t)}v

1,
TTp6s Ti

avT}p

aperijy

haTT0fi4vais KOTci riy ttoiiJttjtos. Plut. Sto; Kep. 7, 3 XpiKTnriros,

:

ovdfiaffi TrXsloffiv ovofld^eaBat

riiv

ax^aiv. 5 and Diog. vii. 161 iperds r' oSt ttoAAAs elffTJyev, ws & Z-f]vwv,
:

Karh Conf. note

'ApiffTuyi fiky SyKaXuv, 3ti /iias operas (rxeVeis fAsye tAs SaAoj

'

ehai.
iros Si

Karh rh

Id. Vir. Mor. 2 Xpijcriwiroihv aptT^y iSia

:
-'

oifTC fiiav TToAAoij dvdfxatn /coAou-

iroiirriTi (rvyiffToaBai yofii^anr.

: .

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

to the

263

common element must be superadded

a fur-

ther characteristic element, or differentia; the several

virtues being related to one another, as the various species of one genus.

Chap. X.

All virtues have, however, one and the same end, which they compass in different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,' which is

Only to be found where

ceases to exist the

it is

to be found perfect,

and
its

moment

it is

deprived of one of

They are, indeed, distinct from one another, each one having its own end, towards which it
component
parts.''
is

primarily directed; but, at the same time, they again

its

coalesce,inasmuch as none can pursue

own end with-

out pursuing that of the others at the same time.^ Ac'

Stob.

ii.

110

ApcTefcs,

<^<Tat.

iTTiarrifxaX

iriaas Sc rir elffi Kol

virtus sit

nihil demi, ut virtus

.

nomen relinquatur.
Ep. 66,
'

Tex""' (compare on this additions p. 255, 1) Kotyd re fleojp^ftara ex^iv KoX t\os, is itp-qrat (p. 108 the same is more fully given by Panetius, p. 112), ri
auri,
5(8

Conf Sen See p. 267. Stob. 112 (conf. Diog. 126)

9.
S*

Siafpepeiv

a\\'fi\tov

to?? K^ipaetyat
/ce-

\aiois.

ippovfiffews 'vap

KaX

axotpiffrovs

iivaf

(pdKaia rh fiev Oiupilv Kal TrpdrTeiv & 'Konjreov irptnjyovfifvcos, Kara e

rhv yhp fiiav exoi'Ta Trdffas ^X^^^j Kol rhv KaTct fjilatf Trpdrroyra /carcb IHog. 125 rir irdcras Trpdmi". S' apfT^s KiyoviTLv avTOKoKovOeie oXA'^Aois zeal Thv fiiay syovra jrdffas ^x^tv elvai yap aiiriav Tci 9eaipi)/j.aTa Koii/ct, as Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. Thv yap impeTOV BsapriTiKdv t' ehai Kal irpaKTiKhv -rav Tronyriaiv.
:

rbc SevTepoi' \6you rh deotpetit Kal & Set anovE^etf. Xdpiv tou aSiaiTTdrus irpdrretv
S^
O'cc<ppoffvv)]^
tl

TroLTireov

r'/jy

IfSio*'

Kftpd\at6y-

(TTaSets Kal
fievctts,

iuTt rh '7rap4xE<T0ai ras dpfias ydewpuv auras irporjyovuirh

TO

KaT^ Se rhy Se^irepov \6yov ras &\\as aperas^ eVe/ca

T<J

Se

iroirjTe'a

KOi
Kttl

aipcria

iSTl

Kol vTropLevriTea
all

i.T!OVip.T\Tia,

knowledge and action including

the four principal instincts. 2 Cw. Parad. 3, 1 Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potest, quo magis
:

Tou aSiawTCAiTuis 4v rals 6pfj.a7s ava<rTpe<j)e<rdat. Similarly of bravery, which has for its basis Tray 5 Sc? vTropLfveiv and of jusa(lav tice, which has rb KaT Uda-Ttp. Plwt. Alex. Virt. 11; The Stoics teach that /ii'o ijiiv vpwTayiavKTTil aperi] irpd^ews sKdcTTiSt irapaKaKe7 Se ray &k\as
;

Kal avvrelyei trpbs rb tc'Aos,


THE
Chap. X.

STOICS.

cordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from

its

other parts.

Where one

virtue exists, the rest are

is

also to be found,
is

and where there

one fault, there

all

faulty.

Even each
all

single virtuous action contains

it

all

other virtues, the moral tone of which

comes
virtue

including in itself
virtue,
tion.^

the

rest.'

What makes

and vice

vice, is

simply and solely the intenit

The

will,

although

execution,

is

worth quite as
is

may lack much as

the means of the deed

;

wicked desire

quite as criminal as the gratification

of that desire.^
virtuous which

Hence only that action can be

is

called

not only good in

;

itself,

but which

proceeds from willing the good

'

and although, in the

.

Stob. 116
'

<ptw\ 8 J xaX Trdvra

Titiis

TToieTi/

Thf fficpop Kara wdfras roLS aperds iratrav yap irpa^iv TeKeiav avTov flvat. Plut. Sto. Eep. 27,
1,

conf. Aleie. Virt.

1.

o.

-rhs

^ffi [Xpu(ri7nros] auraKo\ov6etv aW'fi\ais, oil ^6vov t^ t^v

apercis
fiiav Ix^*''^'* TTtiffas exeiv, kwhi. Kai

Ty rhv KOTct liiav inovv ipepyovvra

Karii irdfras ivspyeiv
t\>tiff\

oi"?
flij

&v$pa
Tcdffas

TcAeiOi/ elcat

rhv

^Xovra Ths apsras,

oijre

irpa|ic

TeKelav, iJtis ov KaroL trdffas trpdr-

hominum metienda stmt. Sen. Benef vi. 11, 3 : Voluntas est, quEe apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by a parable of two slaves, one of whom diligently seeks for the man whom he is sent to find but without success, whilst the other taking it easy accidently comes across him. Ibid. i. 5, 2 A benefaction is only ipsa tribuentis voluntas. Non 6, 1
: :

TToi T&s dpETaj. If Ghrysippus allowed, as Plutarch states, that

quid fiat aut quid detur sed qua mente.

'

refert,

the brave

man

does not always

cal

Compare also the paradoxi-

act bravely, nor the bad man always like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by experience, contrary to Stoic principles.

statement Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit

which Sen. 1. o. ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying Cum omnia ad

:

animum
*

referamus, fecit quisvoluit.

Floril.-

do. Acad.

virtutis

bat] Stoic

1. 10, 38 Neo usum modo [Zeno diceTit superiores (whom the

:

que quantum
6,

Cleanthes, in Stoh.
hrtBvfiuv
Koi'fjoet

19:
eti/exer'

evidently wrongs), sed

se esse prae:

StTTts

cucrxpov

ipsum habitum per

trpdyp.i3.ros

clarum. Id. Parad. 3, 1 Nee enim peccata rerum eventu sed

ovTos

tout'

iav

Kaiphv

\dPv.

EMOTIONS AND VIRTUE.

instance, the difference between the discharge and the neglect of duty {KaTopOwjjia and dfidpTTjfj^'i) depends on the real agreement or disagreement of
first

265-

Chap.
X.

our actions with the moral law,' yet that alone can

be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty

which
'

arises

from a morally perfect character.^

KaSriKov navras iirexoy Tabs &pid'
liiois.

the notions of Kardpafidprrifia, see Pint. rb icaTopBuifnA Sto. Rep. 11, 1 tpaffi f6fj.ou TTpofTTdyfjia Jtfai, rh 5*
BtafjLa

On

and

do. Fin.

iii.

18,

69.:

afj.dpT7]fjLa

vdjxov anaydpevfia.

To

a Bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and not commands

ov yap Svvarat KojTopBovv.

Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfeotum offioium erit autem
;

ChrysKardpSiKato:

etiam inchoatum ut, si juste depositum reddere in rec:e

;

ippus, Ibid. 15, 10:

Sufj.a

mv
koL

factis

Kal

eufj6fx7ii.ia

ponatur

irpdyriixd iari.

StoJ). ii.

192

%n

S^ T(UV ivefjyrip.dToty ^airl ra p.^v

flvai Karopdt&fiaTa,

t&

5'

afiapr-fi-

7d S' ouSerepa (examples of the latter are speaking, givirdvTa Se Tci xaroping, &c.) .
pLaja,
. .

in officiis (Kae^Ko>To) depositum reddere. Ofi. i. 3, 8 Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfecthe tum ; former is called kotdpOoifiaf the latter KodTJKov. virtuous action can only be
sit,
:

Btofiara SiKatoTrpayiifiaTa eJuat fcal

e.vvoiifjia.Ta
Tct.

Kal evTOJCTiipLaTa, k.t.K.

done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. do. Fin. iv. 6, 15 If we under:

Se apiapT-flfKXTa ix Ttov avrtxeipievcitv aSiK-tificLTa Kal Ofop.^pta'ra

Kttl

stand by
nature,
est,

'a.

life

according to

aroKjiipLaTa.
^

what is rational, rectum quod KaTSpBioiia dioebas,

:

view that the distinction between itaTdpiaijm and KaBriKov refers from the one
It is to this

side.

KoSfinov (the concep-

which will be subsequently more fully discussed) is, in general, any discharge of
tions of

duty, or rational action KarSpewiM only refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. Couf.
;

S^ Ka8riK6vT<ov tiJ T4\eia, & Sii Kol Karop&di' KaTop0t&p.aTa\eye(rdat.

:

Stob. 158
/iiv

rav

ehoi
5'
.

(paffi

pjara
fjiara

elyai
. .

to kot' ctperV ^'epT^ih Si xaffnitov reXeiai:

Qontingitque sapienti soli. Off. Illud autem officium, iii. 3, 14 quod rectum iidem [Stoici] appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nee prseter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16 When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Gato and Laelius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man are not attributed to them in the strict sense of sed ex mediorum the term officiorum frequentia similitu:

Simiflev Kar6p9wiJ,a yiveffSai. A Km6p9aim is a larly, 18i

dinem quandam gerebaut

oiemque sapientum.

spe-

' :

THE
Chap. X.

STOICS.

Such a character, the Stoics held, must either

exist altogether, or not at all
sible whole,
;

for virtue is

an indivi-

Viity

which we cannot possess in part, but must

either have or not have.^

He who

has a right in-

tention, and a right appreciation of good

is

and
is

evil,

virtuous

he who has not these requisites

;

lack-

ing in virtue

there

is

no third alternative.
vice.^
kpf-ri]

Virtue

admits neither of increase nor diminution,' and there'

is

no mean between virtue and

This being
and
Texvi)

See In

p. 263, 2.

tween
61,

the
a|i(i-

Sim.pl.

Categ.

one being preceded by an

Koyos
TrportoTT^,

(Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: rij /*ei/ e'l^is en-iT^ivstrOai
Siiva<Tdai

simple

^iriT7)5ei(!T7;j
;

the other by a {Simpl.

a,

Kai

avietrScu-

Categ. 62, 3

Schol. 71,

38).

T(Js 5e SiaQecrets dveirtTdrous eli/ai

There

Thus straightness is, for instance, a Sui6e(ns, and no mere e^is. ovjaxxl Se /cal ras
Koi dvirovs.

is also a definition of TEX"") attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53 (Jahrb. fiir.

aperas Siadeaeis
IJi.6viiJ.ov

elvai,

oif

Karci

rh

Philol. See Supplementb. xiv, 239), to Zeno, Cleanthes, and

ISiuna, aWa kcltcl rh aveTrWaTov Kai aveiriSsKTOv rou fia\\ov' Tas Se rexvas^ ijrot SuffKivf]Tovs otia'as ^ fji.^ (add ouk} elvai SiofleVcij, Conf. p. 103, 1. Jbid. 72, S (Schol. 76, a, 12): rav

Chrysippus
Pyrrh.
Paras,
iii.
;

to
;

241

Zeno in Sext. Math. vii. 109

ii.

and 373

more

fully in Zuoian,

c. 4,

Conf. Cic. Acad.

:

7,22. ' Diog.

^TuCKOiV, o'inves SiiK6fievQi x<wpis

Tots Aperiis airb

twv

fl^ffuv

rex^^^

vii. 127 apetrKet Se auTois foiSiV fiiffov eTvai opeTTJs KaX KaKias- rHv UepnrarnTtKav
/liTo^ii

TavTas

oi/Te iirtTeiveadat \4yovirLV

atire avleirdaij tcis 5e /leffas T;^j/os

Kai fnWauiv Kai &vfftv S^x^^jGat

Simpl. (73, a. Schol. 76, 24) replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in theoretical conviction such a conviction must be either true or false, and does not admit of more or less truth (for the same line of argument, see p. 267, is 1); but it otherwise where it is a matter
ipaaiv.
a,
:

opeTrjs Kai uaKfac eivai \py6vTQtv T^v trpoKOTriiv us ycip 5etv, tpacriVj fi 6pdov elvai ^v\ov ^ (TTpe^Khv, oStws ^ SlKaiov fj &StKOv oiJTe Sk StKaiSrepov oUre dStKtiirepov, Kai iirl ruv &\Kav dixoius. Similarly, Sen. Bp. 71, 18
'

se

Quod summum bonum est supra gradum non habet hoc

.

nee remitti neo intendi posse, noimagis, quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, iiectes. Quicquid ex ilia mutaveris in.

exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction was made be-

for

juria est recti.

dpeTTJs
jeTa{lJ,

Stob. ii. Si KOI KaKittS oviev

116:
elvai

; :

; :

EMOTIONS AND VIMTUE.

the case, and the value of an action depending wholly

267

Chap.
'

on the intention,
either

it follows,

necessarily, that virtue

If the intention must be good or bad, the same must be true of actions and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad intention has in it nothing good, the

admits of no degrees.

same

is

true of actions.
;

good action

is

uncondi-

tionally praiseworthy

a bad one, unconditionally the latter, only where

blameworthy, the former being only found where

virtue exists pure and entire
;

there

is

no virtue at

all.

All good actions are, on

the one hand, according to the well-known paradox,

equally good
;

all

bad actions, on the other, of equal

moral worth.

an absolute
altogether.'

The standard of moral judgment is one and when conduct does not alto;

gether conform to this standard,

it falls

short of it

'

The much-disoussed para( Cic.

away.

Similarly,

Stobasus
all errors to t5i/
iru<;8e'-

27 IHog. 101 and 120 Stub. 218 Plut. Sto. Eep. 13, 1; Sext. Math. vii. 422 Sefi. Ep. 66, 5) Sti iaa tA a/uopr-^^iioTO is this It was, acKct! T(i KwropeiimTa. cording to Biog., supported, on the one hand, by the proposi;

dox

Parad. 3

Fin.

iv.

The Stoics declare

be Ua, although not o^oio7cip rii ij/eCSos ^Trdrijj ij/eCSos

p-i]Kiv

(a statement quoted as Stoical by Alex, in Metaph. p. 258, 3 Bon. 667, a, 19 Brand) every o/iaprio is the result of a
Suiij/euffis.

It

is,

however, im-

tion,

irSj'

ar/aSbv

eV

ixfov ehai

aipiThv icai /nijre TOirii/ Six^aScu

&iie(riv fi'fiTe iiri-

on the other hand, by the remark, to which Sext. and SUmpl. in Categ.,
;

possible for KaTopSii/mTa not to be equal to one another, if vices are equal iiiiiiTa -ydp can reAeio,
;

SiiSirep

oik'

x^"*

SiifaiT' ^.v

ihXe'meiv oiff mep4iMJiiKwv. Cicero

Schol. in Arist. 76,

If truth

a, 30,

refer

and falsehood admit of

no difference of degree, the same must be true of the errors

man is not of our conduct. at the mark, no matter whether he is one. or a hundred stadia

and Seneca devoted particular attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero in the Paradoxa result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 263, 2, from which it follows that nothing can be recto rectius, nor

THE
Chap.
X.

STOICS.
it follows

From what

has been said,

that there

cau be but one thorough moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction between the virtuous and
the vicious
;

and that within each of these whole and entire

;

classes

there can be no diflference in degree.

sesses virtue possesses it

He who
;

pos-

he who

lacks it lacks it altogether

or far

from possessing
is

it is

and whether he is near a matter of no moment.

He who

only a hand-breadth below the surface of

bono melins.
faults
is
a,

The equality of corollary from the equality of virtues ; it also follows from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at De all is equally forbidden. Pin. It is said, all faults are equal, quia nee honesto quidquam honeslius nee turpi tur;

accesset ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adjici potest, defuit ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes
: . .
.

homines, quibus
. .
.

illae

contigere

unaindudturhumanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est

Nihil ratio recta simplexque. est divino divinius, ccelesti coelestius.
.
.

Saneoa (Ep. 66, 5) raises the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods (see p. 230, 3 end), can all be equal in value 1 and at once
pius.
Is virtue or, what is same thing, a rightlymoulded soul the only primary good ? Virtue, indeed,

Mortalia
est.

crescunt, &c.

una natura

minuuntur divinorum Ratio autem

;

nihil aliud est,

humanum
. .

replies

the

quam in corpus pars divini spiritus . nullum porro inter mersa divlna discrimen est ergo nee Omnes inter bona. Ibid. 32 virtutes rationes sunt rationes
: :

admits of various forms, according to the activities imposed on it, but can neither be increased nor diminished De;

crescere

enim

summum bonum

potest, nee virtuti ire retro It cannot increase, licet.

non

quando incrementum maximo non est nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius
:

sunt rectse si rectse sunt, et pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, ergo tales et actiones sunt omnes pares sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina On the variante materia, etc. same ground, Seneca, Ep. 71, equality defended the of all
:

vero,
tius.

quam temperato temperaAll virtue

consists

in

modo, in certa mensura.

Quid

aooedere perfecto potest ? Nihil, aut perfeotumnon erat, cui

all good actions, in particular p. 18, where to the quotation given, p. 266, 3, the 8i reotior words are added ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri, ne qu,^ ab ilia quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.

goods and of

THE WISE MAN,

the water will be drowned just as surely as one who
is five

2C9

Chap.
X.

hundred fathoms deep

little

he who

is

blind sees

equally

whether he will recover his sight to-

morrow

or never.'

divided by the Stoics into two classes

wise and those
are treated
;

The whole of mankind are thus those who are

who are foolish ^ and these two classes by them as mutually exclusive, each one
itself.

being complete in

Among

the wise no

folly,

among the foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible.^ The wise man is absolutely free from faults and mistakes all that he does is right in him all virtues
:

centre

he has a right opinion on every subject, and

is

never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what

Plut. C. Not. 10, i:va\,

merely

>

tpaalv
oitSev

aW^
7)7X01/

&fftrep

&

tttjxvp

tLTrexdiV ^v

BaXdrTTj ttjs inKftapfias

irpiyerat

tov Kara-

Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Then follow the same comTel recte facere.

opyvias irepraKOciaSf 5e5uK(jTOS oiirots ovSe 01 irs\ti^ovTS aperf

T&y

fioKp&v SvTiey firrdv elaiv 4v Kal KaOaircp oi TV<p\ol KUKia

Tv<p\oi

eict

Kttv

dyajSAeireii/

fieWwffiV^

oKiyov Varepov ovtus ol

irpoKdiTTOVTes fixP*^ **" "^^^ aperijp ava\d$oi(riv ap6T)Toi koX noxSrtpoX

parisons as in Plutarch. Sen. Ep. 66, 10 As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus ills contigere. Ep. 79, 8 What is perfect admits of no increase ; quicunque f uerint sapientes pares erunt et
:
:

Diog. 127 (see p. ZiaiiivoMLV. 266, 3). Stoi. ii. 236 irivrav
:

re 7WV afiOprrifJuiTap
Kal
cipai

Iffaiv

ovTtov

Ttav

KaTopdotfidroiP
iirlffris

Koi Tois

&<l>pova5

vdvras
"!
''"'VP

&ippopas

sequales. 2 Stoh. ii. 198: ApcVKei yhp T^ re 7.^v(i>pt KoX roh air* aiirov ^w'lKols ^i\o(t6^ois, 5i5o yivT] tupavdpciTrotP eJval, rh /jl^p tup fftrovSa{wp t5 Se rup (jiai/Koip Kal rh

T^p

aurV

SidBio-ip.

Cic. Fin.

iii.

^X""'''" 14, 48
:

fiep

TUP

(Tnovdalaip dta iraprhs

rov

^iov XP')'^^*^ rais kp^TOLS rh 5^

Consentaneum

est

his

quffi

ruv
'

(l>a{iKwp Tats KaKlats.

dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui ilium bonomm finem quod ap-

Plui. Aud. Poet. 7, p. 25

Ti {pavKop aperij irpoaelpat KaKta x,pvo''rhp a^uwaiPj aWa

jttTJTC

pellamus extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare

jtf^re

fiep 4p irao'ip afxap^uKbp rhp ifiaf-ri, irepl irdpra 5' ad KUTOpGovp rhp acTTUop.

iraVTOis
eXpai

; ; ;

270
Chap,
'

THE

STOICS.
contrary, can do
;

an opinion.

The bad man, on the

:

nothing aright
cruel,

he has every kind of vice

is

he has

no right knowledge, and

altogether rude, violent,

and ungrateful.^
Stoics delight in insisting

upon the perfecman, and contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in a series of paradoxical assertions.^ The wise man only is free,
tion of the wise

The

because he only uses his will to control himself;

only
is

'

he

beautiful, because only virtue

is

beautiful and
{svtvxtj^),

attractive;^

he only

is

rich

and happy

because goods of the soul are the most valuable, true

riches consisting in being

independent of wants.*

Nay, more, he

is

absolutely rich, since he

who

has a

right view of everything has everything in his intellectual treasury,"

and he who makes the right use

of everything bears to everything the relation of

owner.'
also only

The wise only know how to obey, and they know how to govern they only are there;

fore kings, generals, pilots

' Stod. Eel. ii. 116; 120; 196 198 220 232 JHoff. vii. 117; 125; CSc. Acad. i. 10, 38 ii. 20,66; Phit. Sto. Eep. 11, Sen. Benef iv. 26 Sext. 1 Math. vii. 434. ' Compare the collection of expressions respecting the wise and unwise in aam/K5Mr, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt.
;
; ; ; ;
.

'

they only are orators,

' Cic. Parad. 6 Acad. 1. c. ; Cleanthes, in Stob. Floril. 94, 28; Sext. 1. o. Alex. Aphr. Top. 79. Sen. Benef. vii. 3, 2 ; 6, 3
;

8, 1.
'

Cic.

Acad.
;

1.

c.

Siog.

vii.

125.
1. o. Diog. vii. 122; 206; Pint. Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, Plvt. C. Not. 3, 2 De Adul. Tran. An. 12, p. 472 16, p. 58 '

Oic.
ii.

Stoh.

p. 169.
'

Diog. 121

32

Cic.

Acad.

44, 136. Parad. 5: 8ti ii.6vos b (Tuiphs 4\ev8epos Kol irSj &(pp<ov SovKos.
ii.

Ps. Pltit.

Fin.

iii.

Phit. C. Not. 28, 1 ; Cic. Acad. 1. c. Sext. Math. xi. 170.

*
;

106

De Nobil. 17, 2 ; Cif. 22, 75 Sor. Ep. i. 1 Sat. i. 3, 124,.

;

; ;

: ;

THE WISE MAN.

poets,

271

and prophets

'

and since their view of the

Chap.
X.

Gods and
only, only

their worship of the

Gods

is

the true one

amongst them can true piety be found

;

they are the only priests and friends of heaven

foolish

all

men, on the contrary, being impious, profane, and enemies of the Gods.^ Only the wise man is capable of feeling gratitude, love, and friendship,'
he only
is

capable of receiving a benefit, nothing

being of use or

advantage

to

the foolish

man.''

To sum
solutely
;

up, the wise

free

man

is

absolutely perfect, ab-

from

passion

and want, absolutely

happy as the Stoics conclusively assert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, since time, the only point in which he dififers from Zeus, does
not augment happiness at
the foolish
perverse
;

all.'

On

the other hand,

man

is

altogether foolish, unhappy, and

or, in

the expressive language of the Stoics,

;

' Cig. Pint. Tran. An. 12 Divii ii. 63, 129 Stab. ii. 122 conf Ps. Plut. Vit. Horn. 1 43.
; .

122 and 216 ii. 119; Sen. Provid. i. 5. Philodemws, iripl 6eiav Siayaylis (Vol. Heroul. vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wise are the friends of heaven, and heaven of the wise. ' Sen. Ep. 81, 11; Stoh. ii,
'

Stob.

IHoff.

118.

a Deo difiert. THd. 6, 4 Jupiter says to the virtuous Hoc est, quo Deum antecedatis ille extra patientiam malorum est, tos supra patientiam. Ep. De' Const. 8, 2 Cic. 73, 11 N. D. ii. 61, 153 Mjpictet. Diss. Man. 15 i. Horat. 12, 26 Bp. i. 1, 106. ' Seep. 239, 1 Sen. Ep. 53, Jl; Kon multo te Di antediutius erunt. At cedent
; ;
;

Sen. Benef. v. 12, 3 ; Pint, G. Not. 20, 1 Sto. Eep. 12, 1 and above, p. 230, 1. * Stob. ii. 196 Pint. Stoic.
*
; ;

mehercule magni
clausisse

artificis

est

totum

in

exiguo.
:

Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis setas patet. 73, 13

quo antecedit virura bonum-? Diutius bonus est:
Jupiter
sapiens nihilo se minoris sestir mat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore clauduutur.

Abs. Poet. Die. 1, 4. Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Eep. 13, 2 Com. Not. 33, 2
;

Stoh.

ii.

198.
ipse

Seneca, Prov.

i.

Bonus

tempore tantum

272

THE
"

STOICS.

Chap,

every foolish man is a madman, he being a madman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most
closely affects him.^

2) Vhipritvity^'

This assertion was

*^
Stoics

all

the more sweeping, since

recognised

neither virtue

nor wisdom
it,

outside their

own system or one closely related to

holding at the same time a most

unfavourable opi-

nion of the moral condition of their fellow-men.

That
sets

their opinion should be unfavourable was inevi-

table from their point of view.

system which

up

its

own moral

ideal against the current no-

tions so sharply as that of the Stoics can only be the

offspring of a thorough disapproval of existing cir-

cumstances, and must, on the other hand, contribute

thereto.

According to the Stoic standard, by far

were
foolish

the majority, indeed, almost the whole of mankind,

belong to the class of the foolish

all

people equally and altogether bad, mankind must

have seemed to them to be a sea of corruption and

vice,

from which, at best, but a few swimmers emerge

at spots widely apart.*

Man

passes his life

had already been the complaint of Cleanthes ' in wickedness. Only here and there does one, in the
^

such

TTas &<j>pwv
;

fiaivejai.
iii. 5,

do,
;

ffS^ovs

yyov4vat.
5.

Similarly

Parad. 4 vii. 124

^

Tusc.
Stob.

10

Diog.

Plut. Sto. Rep. 31,

Eel.
43.

ii.

124

Horat. Sat.

ii. 3,

Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in !us. PriEp. Ev. vi. 8, 10)
;

The

Seayt. Math. ix. 90 in the argument quoted, p. 146, 1 Man cannot be the most perfect
;

TTws odv oithsva

<^s

&vQpwTrov, %s

being, oiav evBeas, Sti 5io /caic/or iropiieTai rhv irivra xpi^""", ' Se /cal yhp cX fi^ ye, rhv irKiiaTOV
*

ovxl ixcdvetdai
'OpeffTTj Kal
rr6<j>0u
^
^

(Toi

SoKct /far' Xffov

Trore irepty^voiro &pT^s,

oi|/e

Kal

A\KfJ.aiuij/t, ttK-^v
ff

tov

Trphs rats
yli/srat.

rod

fiiou dv^fxais irepi-

eVa 8e

Svo

fidi/ovs ip^s

THE WISE MAN.

evening of
virtue.
life,

273
to
Chaj>.

after

many

wanderings, attain

And

that this was the

common
is

opinion

among

IJ

the successors of Cleanthes,

witnessed by their

constant complaints of the depravity of the foolish,

and of the

rare occurrence of a wise man.'

No

one probably has expressed this opinion more

frequently or more strongly than Seneca.

We
shall

are

wicked, he says

we have been wicked

;

we

be

Our ancestors complained of the decline of wicked. morals we complain of their decline and posterity The limits will utter the very same complaint.
;

within which morality oscillates are not far apart

the modes in which vice shows itself change, but
its

power remains the

a condition to do
cowardly, impious

same.''

All

men

are wicked
is

and

he who has as yet done nothing wicked

it.
;

at least in

All are thankless, avaricious,

all are

mad.'

We

have

all

done
;

wrong and we shall all do wrong to the end of the chapter.'' One drives the other into folly, and the foolish are too numerous to allow the individual to improve.^
one in a less, the other in a greater degree
' This point will be again considered in the next chapter. Compare at present S?a*. Math,

Sis laiSfv Sio^fpeiv &\\ov liWov, nalveaBai Sc bjiolas irdj/ras, Philodem. De Mus. (Vol. Here, i.),

eio-lc Spa says ouK ijpeaKe tois airb Tris iroaSy fiexp^ '''o^ ^^^ ayevperov avTobs rod aofov. SvTos kut' -Alex. ApTwod. De Fat. 28, p. 90 tSi/ %\ avSpdirav ot irXeiffToi Kaicol, fiaWov Se ciyaflbs /ih iTs ?)

ix.

133,

who

(ro(/>of

8irp

col. 11, 18 The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has declared it to be profane and impious. ^ Benef. i. 10, 1-3. ' De Ira, iii. 26, 4 Benef.
:

Seirepos
fivBeierai,

inr'

airav
ri
(piffiv,
. . .

yeyovhai
irapiiSo^ov

V. 17, 3.
*

&<rirep

De Clemen,
ii.

i.

6,

3
i.

De

^^ov Ka\ TTopoi ToS *oij/iKos

KOKai Koi

airavidiTfpov

Ira,
'

iiriffris

ol Si irdvTes ciWliKots toioStoi,

28, 1 ; iii. 27, 3. Ep. 41, 9 ; Vit. Be.

i.

'

274
Chap.
X,

THE
He who would
great
is

STOICS.

be angry with the vices of men, in-

stead of pitying their faults, would never stop.

So

the amount of iniquity

No
sors

doubt the age in which Seneca lived afiforded

arnple occasion for such effusions, but his predeces-

must have found similar occasions in their own

Indeed,
all

days.

the principles of the Stoic School,

when

made it impossible to consider the great majority of men as anything else but a mass of fools and sinners. From this sweepconsistently developed,

ing verdict, even the most distinguished names were

not excluded.
If asked for examples of wisdom,

they would point to Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes,^

and, in later times, to Cato
;

but not only would

they deny philosophic virtue, as Plato had done before

them, to the greatest statesmen and heroes of

early times, but they would deny to

every kind of virtue.*

them all and Even the admission that ge-

neral faults belong to some in a lower degree than to

'

See the pathetic descrip-

as

flEioi.

tion,

' See the immoderate Ianother passages the following :. guage of praise of his admirer Ferariun iste couventus est Sen. De Const. 7, 1 The wise certatnr ingenti quidem man is no unreal ideal, although, certamine major like everything else that is nequitise quotidie peccandi cupiditas, great, he is seldom met with ; minor vereoundia est, &c. ceterum hie ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. Diog. vii. 91 TeKfiiipiov Si ToO {ynapKT^v elvai t^v aper^v Hid. 2, I Catonem autem cer(/>7)(ric Iloo-eiSiii'ios iv rif irpiiTif tins exemplar sapientis viri ToC ijBiKou \6yif rb yeveffBai iv nobis Deos immortales dedisse

De

Ira, ii.

8-10,

amongst

:,

''

(S

irpoKOTrrj

Tois

irepl SuKpaTiji',

yeirnv KaX 'AvTurBevTiv.

The

Alolimi-

tation likewise containedherein will be presently discussed, Epictet. Man. 15, mentions Heraolitus as well as Diogenes

quam Ulixen et Heroulem prioribus sseoulis. * Pluta/rch, Prof, in Virt. 2, Cic. Off. iii. 4, 16, p. p. 76 265, 2,
;

THE WISE MSN.

others can hardly be reconciled with their principle

275
.Chap.

of the equality of all

who

are not wise.^

X.
(3) Conversion.

The two moral

states

being thus at opposite poles,

is,

a gradual transition from one to the other

of course,

out of the question.

folly

There

may be

a progress from

and wickedness in the direction of wisdom,^ but

instantaneous.^

the actual passage from one to the other must be

momentary and
the foolish
is
*

Those who are

lately

still

progressing belong, without exception, to the class of

;

and one who has

become wise

in the first

moment
. :

unconscious of his new state.*

Abs. Poet. Die. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man

Sen. Benef iv. 27, 2 Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoieos quid ergo 1 Achilles timidus est ? quid ergo 1 Aris'
:

tides, cui justitia nomen dedit, injustus est ? &o. Non hoc

dicimus, sic

omnibus,

omnia vitia esse in quomodo in qui:

bed ugly, poor, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous, rich, happy, and a king. In
to
vicious, miserable,

may go

busdam singula eminent sed malum ac stultum nuUo vitio vacare omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in
.

Prof, in Virt. 1, p. 75, a saying of Zeno's is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are advancing in
virtue.
See p. 266, 3 ; Plut. Prof, in Yirt. 1; Com. Not. 10, 2; see p. 269, 1 ; Sen. Ep. 75, 8. = PImt. C. Not. 9, 1: t?j

singulis extant (i. e., all points are not equally prominent in each one). It hardly requires to be noticed how nearly this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how close a resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and unbelievers. 2 Plut. C. N. 10, 1 ; Prof, in Virt. 12, p. 82; Sen. Bp.

hpcTTis Kol rTis evSaifioplas irapa-^

veffdat

iroWdKis ou5' ai(r$iiThy KTTiffdfieyov oiovrai Sia\\7jd4yai 8' avrhy Sri fiiKp^
yiyofievTis

TTp6(r6va6Ku&TaTosS>yKala.xpoy4<r-

Taros

vvv

dfjLov

<pp6yifios

Kal

So Sto. Eep. In explanation of these 19, 3. words. Sitter, iii. 657, aptly refers to Stub. ii. 234 (_ylyye<r9ai
jiaKapios yiyovev.

8e

Kal

Sta\e\ri66Ta
KarSt

TtySi

ffo^hy

vofj.i^ov(ri

robs

irptirovs

75,8.

Xpiyovs),

and Philo, De Agric.

Plut.

C.

Not. 9

Stoic.

p.

325

Those yet inexperienced

I a

'

76

THE
The
'

STOICS.

Chap.

transition takes place so rapidly,

and his former

few points of contact with the one on which he has newly entered, that the mind does not keep pace with the change, and only becomes constate aifords so

scious of

it

In this

by subsequent experience. picture of the wise man, the moral

its zenith.

ideal-

ism of the Stoic system attained

all

A virall

tuous will appears here so completely sundered from

outward conditions of

life, so

wholly free from

the trammels of natural existence, and the indivi-

dual has become so completely the organ of universal

law, that
it

may

be asked.

What
?

right has such a

being to

call

himself a person

How

can such a

being be imagined as a

man

men ?

Nor was

this question

among fellowunknown to the Stoics

living

themselves.

Unless they were willing to allow that

practically impossible,

their theory was

and their
escape

ideal scientifically untenable,

how could they

the necessity of showing that it might be reconciled

with the wants of

reality
?

human

life

and the conditions of

Let the attempt be once made, however,

and withal they would be forced to look for some means of adapting it to those very feelings and opiin

wisdom

iropo tois

cj>iAo(riJ<j>iii;

StoA.6\7j0(JTs iivai

Keyovrai cofpot robs yap &xi^ (rocpias &Kpas eA.?7\aKiSras Kol Twi/ Spmv auTTJs Spri
jrpuTov a^afiiiiovs aii-lixavop ciSevaij ^aalf r^v ^avTwv rsKslaifTiv.

/i^

7a:p KctT^

-rhv

avrby xP^''""

&[j^u (TvvlffTaffOai riiv re irphs rh

irepas Hfi^iv Kal rijv
KaTiiXTii\iiv,

t^s

i,(pl^e(i)s

&A\'

(Ivai

puBipiov

i,yvi>iav, K.T.K.

Sen. Bp. 75, 9,

likewise investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained the consoiousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the PrantVs wise. conjecture (Gtesch. d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the (To^is Sta\i\ri0(iis is connected with the fallacy known as hia\av96,viev, appears to be questionable.

THE WISE MAN.

nions towards which their animosity had formerly

277

Chap.

been so great.
layed.

Nor could the attempt be long

and to
its

de-

_JLi__

Daily a greater value was attached to the

agree-

practical working of their system,

ment with general

opinion.

If, therefore,

the origi-

nal direction of Stoic morality aimed at the absolute

and unconditional submission of the individual to the law of the universe, still, in developing that
theory, the rights of the individual asserted themselves unmistakeably.

From

this confluence of op-

posite currents arose a deviation from the rigid type

of the Stoic system,

some

varieties of which, in the

life,

direction of the ordinary view of

deserve

now

further consideration.

278

THE

STOICS.

CHAPTER XL
THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY
PRACTICAL NEEDS.
Chap.
'

The
an

Stoic theory of Ethics

is

entirely rooted in the

proposition, that only virtue

evil.

is

a good and only vice

A. Things
fei'red

This proposition, however, frequently brought

eselmwed.

and the Stoics into collision with current views ; nor was In ^ without its difficulties for their own system.

the

first

place, virtue

is

made
it
is

to

depend

for its ex-

istence

upon certain conditions, and

to lead to cer-

tain results, from which

results,

inseparable.

TheSe

we have already
in the
list

seen,'

were included by the

Moreover, virtue
is

Stoics

of goods.

said to be the only good, because only

what

is

accordis

ing to nature

is

a good, and rational conduct

for

man
this

the only thing according to nature.

But can
self-

be so absolutely and unconditionally stated?

the primary impulse, does not

According to the Stoic teaching the instinct of

preservation being
this instinct manifestly include the preservation

and

advancement of outward
fore,

life ?

The

Stoics, there-

could not help including physical goods and

activities

among

things according to nature

'

for in-

See

p. 230, 3,

THINGS TO BB PREFEBRED OR ESCHEWED.

stance, health, a right eDJoyment of the senses,

279
Chap.
XI.

such

like.'

Practically, too, the

and same adnaission was

if

forced upon
is

them by the
choice

cotsideration' that,

there

no difference in value between things in them-

selves, rational

motives

and,

indeed, all acting on

re-

is

impossible.

At the same time, they

is first

ject the notion that what

according to nature

must
truth

therefore be perfect or good, just as in theory

they allow that the source of knowledge, but not

itself, is .derived

from the senses.

When man
what
is

has once recognised the universal law of action, he

will,

according to their view, think

little of
it

sensuous and individual, only considering

an in-

strument in the service of virtue and reason.^

1

ao. Fin.
xii.
5,

iii.

5, 17.

Gell.

a.vd\oyop.
TrpaJra

Conf.

Ibid.

p.

60,

N. A.

The primary
;

where the enumeration of the

Kara <^vfftv is also in the Stoic sense, and above, p. 225. ^ Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50 Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum quam si non ullam esse
:

objects of natural self-love are the irpaiTa Kara (pvatv and selflove consists mainly in this Ut omnibus corporis sui com-

modis gauderet [unusquisque], ab incommx)dis omnibus abhor-

Some Sfob. Bel. ii. 142 things are according to nature, nature, contrary to others others neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among things according to nature. Ibid. p. 148: T&v Se KaTCKpiiTiv aiuupSpuv uVTtuv TO. fief i<TTi irpSiTix faTa (piffiv .t4 hi Kara /j6Tox^>'. Trpura
reret.
:

dioeremus, oonfunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone nee uUum sapientis munus aut opus
;

IJ.fv

i(TTi

KOTO!

ipiaiv

xivvffiS

tl

iTxeVis

KXTCl

Tois

a-TTeptiariKoiis

Kiyovs

yivop.evr\,

olov

vyieia Ka\

ulffBriffts,

\fy&> Se t^I" /rariJxijif'ii' Kal Icrxi". ""Ttt |iTOxV 5e .^ olov X'ip apria leal aS>im iyia'i/ov
.

Kal

iwVWo-ei!
Be Kal

fiil

jreiTTjpaiyue'i'oi.
<ftvtrtt/

dfiotcijs

twv

irapa

Kar^

inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque nllum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The same argument was used by the Stoa against the theoretical aitanpopla of the Sceptics (see above, p. 37, 1), with which the practical i).Sia(bopla of Aristo, differing only in name from the imapa^la of the Sceptics, is most closely connected, Aristo declining to Scepticism. See p. 61, 1. ' do. Fin. iii. 6, 21 Prima est enim oonciliatio [oiKei'ucris]
:

THE
Chap.
XI.
Still, it

STOICS.

would be difficult to say how this can be The contemporary opponents of the Stoics already took exception to the way in which the first demands of nature were excluded from the aims
possible.

of a life

'

according to nature

and we,

too,

cannot

suppress a feeling of perplexity at being told that all

what is primarily according what is according to nature must not be looked upon as the aim of our actions ^ since not that which is simply according to nature, but the rational choice and combination of what is
duties
to

aim

at attaining

nature, but that

according to nature constitutes the good.'

Even

if

the Stoics pretend to dispose of this difficulty, they

could not, at least,
fail to see

that whatever contri-

hominis ad ea quae sunt seeundum naturam, sinrnl autem

cepit
Ivvotav

intelligentiam

vel

no-

tionem potius, quam appellant

illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordlnem et ut ita dicam conoordiam, multo earn pluris sestimavit quam omnia

ilia

quEe

primum

dilexerat

atque ita cognltione et ratione ooUegit ut statueret in eo collooatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expeten-

reote dici possib, omnia officia eo ref erri, ut adipisoamur prinoipia naturse nee tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod uon inest in primis nature conciliationibus honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur. = Plut. C. Not. 26, 2: 617^^ auT^ fj.ev [to] irpura Kara tftiatv
:

ayaBii

fiii

ia-nv,

71

6'

eihSyiffTOS

iKKoy^ Kol A^i^is avTUV KaX rh

iravTo. TO. trap*
atrroi/

dum bonum
sint

cum igitur
.

in

'4vena

eavrhv Ttoieiv '4ktov Tuyxo-veiv tSiv

<pi(riv,

eo sit id bonum, quo referenda

irpciTUV

KdT^

K.T.A.

ellTfp

omnia

quamquam

yap
fi'fjS^

o'iut'Tai,

fi^

ffroxaCofievovs

post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quEe sunt prima naturae propter se nihil expetendum, &c. Similarly

GeU.
'

1. 0.

Plut. Com. Not.

iv.

4; do.

Pin.
89.
2

17;
Fin.

t.

24,
6,

72;
22;

29, TJt

4^ifiEvovs rod Tv^uv ^KeTcov rh leKos ^X^^^i a\K^ o5 Set iKHva ai'a(f:eptT6at, r^v roirttiy eK\oy^v, Kat fiij TavTa. t\os fiiv ykp tS 4K\4y^(FBai ttol Kan^dvetv 4Ke7va iKelva S' aura koI rh <f>povliJiojs rvyx^vetv avjuv ov TfAos, a\\* &<nrip ii\ri ris imdKsiTai rhv 4k'

\ektik})!' i^iav Ixovira.

Cic.

See

Cic.

iii.

p. 279, 3,

THINGS TO BE PREFERRED- OR ESCHEWED.

butes to bodily well-being must have a certain posi-

281

Chap.
'

and must which no higher good

tive value,

be desirable
suffers
is

in all cases
;

in

in consequence

and,

conversely, that whatever

opposed to bodily wellare not involved,

being,

when higher

duties

must

have a negative value

deserve to be avoided.'

(aTra^t'a), and,

consequently,

Such objects and actions

"^

they would not, however, allow to be included in the

class of
it

goods which are absolutely valuable

and

was

therefore a blending of the Stoic with the

Peripatetic teaching

when

Herillus, the fellow-stu-

dent of Cleanthes, enumerated bodily and outward

goods as secondary and subsidiary aims besides virtue.^

Nor yet were the

Stoics

minded

to follow the con-

(2) Classes
fnHif!!'''^

temporary philosopher, Aristo of Chios (who in this

platform of the Cynic philosophy), in denying any
difference
ferent''

point, too, endeavoured to place their School on the ferenU

in value

between things morally indifin

life

and
1.

in

making the highest aim

'

Stoi.
2

20 ; Pfaf. 1. c. Diog. vii. 105. See p. 232. Stob. ii. 132

C?c.
o. 6,
;

however, says that he taught ra

/ueTofu operiis ko! xaxias aSid^opa
:

ii.

142

Sia^epeiv Si K4yov(riv aipcric Koi

?K7ITTThv
. . .

Kal Ka06Kou rh aya-

ehcu ; and Cic. Off. i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as an upholder of
o5m</)opfo. It would appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true Stoicism. According to

ehv ToC a^iav ex<""''i".

Herillus 165 taught SLiKp4peiv TeKos Koi inore\lSa- (On this expression compare Stob. ii. 60) Trjs ixiv ^Apwal Touj liii ffoifiovs ffTOX^C^i^Sai, rov Hence Cic. 5e fidmv riv <ia<p6v. Fin. iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, becau.se he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the ultimate aim. Siug. 1. c,
'

Biog.

vii.

Cic. Fin.ii. 13,

43 (conf. Offic),

he had no followers after the time of Chrysippus. * Cic.Legg. i. 21, 55 Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum
:

esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, cete^-as res omnes plane pares

ac ne

minimum quidem utrum

; :

82

THE

STOICS.
Their

Chap,

consist in indifference to all external things.'

virtue bearing, in comparison with the Cynic virtue,

the more positive character of an energetic will, they

required

even for the outward circumstances and

activity

conditions of this

some

definite

relation

which should regulate the choosing or rejecting in short, the practical decision. Accordingly, they
divided things indifferent into three classes.
first class

To

the

belong

all

those things which, from a moral

or absolute point of view, are neither good nor evil,

but yet which have a certain value;

no matter

whether

this value belongs to

them

properly, because

they are in harmony with

it

human

nature, or whether
are or

belongs
for
it

to

them improperly, because they

natural
life,

means

advancing moral and

belongs to

whether

them on both grounds.

The
it-

second class includes everything which, either by

self or in its relation to higher aims, is

opposed to

nature and harmful

the third, things which, even

ixifii

adessent an abessent interesse. Ibid. 13, 38. Fin. iv. 17, 47 Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nee esse res iillas prseter virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset." Ibid. ii. 13, 43 iii. 3, 11 ; 15, 50 iv. 16, 43 ; 25, 68
; ;

t]vtivovv 4v avTo2s lrapa^AaaTro^ciTroi/Ta

yhv

a\X'
Cic.

Mtrns

iiri

ir({i'Ta)</

exoi'Ta.

Acad.

1. c.

Huio
phora)

summum bonum
neutram
:

est in

Acad. ii. 42, 130 Offio. Fragm. Hortens. (in Norm, Pr^fract.) Diog. vii. 160 Sext. Math. xi. 64. Cic. usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.
V.

25,

73

Diog. 1. 0. re'Xos ^(pnffev Tb a!>ia(p6pais ex"'''''" Cp" vphs ra uerajfi aper^j leai xaicltts
'
:

eTrai

(the morally adiain partem moveri quae aSia<popia ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in Pint. C. Not. 27, 2 Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good only consists in that state of indiilerence. StoT). i. 920; Clem.. Strom, ii. See Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 416, c. 68, for Chrysippus' attack on
:

his rebus

this 48iO(^o/)

a.

THINGS TO BE PREFERRED OR ESCHEWED.

in this conditional sense, have neither positive nor

283
Chap.

negative value.

The

first class

bears the

name

of
;

XL

things preferential {jrporijiiEVov), or things desirable

the second

is

the class of things to be

;

eschewed
the strict

{dTro-TrpoTjyfisvov)

the third
latter is

is

the class of things

intermediate.'

The

called, in

sense, indifferent oBi,d(f>opov.^

It includes not only

what

is

really indifferent,

but whatever has such a

slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire nor aversion.

and

diroTrporjyfiivov are defined to

Hence the terms -n-porjyfjJvov mean respectively

Stoics in-

that which has an appreciable positive or negative

value.^

Under things

preferential, the

clude partly mental qualities and conditions, such as

*

Diogi. vii.
iJL^v

105

rwy

aSia-

tp6pwv TO,

\eyou(rt i:pOT\yiieifa
TtpoTiyfieva
ctirotrpoTiy-

tion from aya66y: irporiyfievov S' eJval \4yovtriv, & aSiA^opov %v e/c\ey6fjie$a Karct itpoTiyoifieyov
, . .

ra Se
fiev rh.

airoirpoTiyfi^va.

Kdyov

^xovTa a^iav

tA airai^iav exovTO. By the three meanings of which axe discussed, they understand here /xeffriv rivi. tivafuv fl xp^^^y cv^^aKKofLivTiv mphs Thv Karh. (pviriv ^iov. 107 twv nporiyfievQiv ra /j.v Si* avrh TrporjKTal, Tcfc Se Si^ ertpa, ra Se St' aina Kol mpa ... Si' airh jiiv iri Si' Kara tpvcriv iarl. Si' eVepa 5e 8ti
fiiva 8e a|(o,
:

ovSev 5f r&v ayadutf eJycu vpor^yfievov, Sih. t5 t^p lieyiffTtiv

ii^iav

ainh.

^x^*^*

'^^

^e TvpoTjyai^iav

fieyoVf rij"

Seirepavx^pO'V KoX

exor, tTvyeyyi^eiif iruts rp twv ayaOui/ tpiffei oiiSh yap iy av^.y ThyvpoTjyovfievov elvaiThv ^aaiXea,
'

aAAa rhv
'

fier' ai/Thv
:

Terayfievov.

aSitii(>opo S' Stoi. ii. 142 ejpat \fyovffi toi fiera^b t&v a7a-

ircpmoiei

XP^^^^

"'^

oKiyas.

i/iolais Se ?x*' ""' inrOTrpoTiyiJ.4vov EssenKarci rhif ivavriov \6yov.

tially the

same account, only

fuller, in Stoi. Eel.

6up Ral Toiv KoKwv^ Sixus rb aSid^opov yoE^adai tpdfieiroi, Kaff" epa fjiei/ Tpiirov ri) ^i]Te dya&bv flilTf KaKitv KoX rb /^^re aUierbv ;U^Te Kaff erepov Se rh ffljTe (f>evKT6v
'

somewhat
ii.

dpfiTJS

fJi'fire dtpitpfjirjs

kivi)tik6v

Conf. Cic. Acad. i. 10, 36; Fin. iii. 15, 50; if. 26, 72; Seiet. Pyrrh. iii. 191 ; Math. xi. 60 Alex. Aphr. De An. 157. Zeno (in Stojb. 156; Cic. Fin. iii. 16, 52) explains the concep142.
;

KaQdira^

dSidtpopa.

t& Similarly

IHoff. vii. 104.

Sext.

M.

vi. 60,

distinguishes a third meaning. It is, however, only a subdivision of the second.

'

Stoi.
;

ii.

144, 156
xi. 62.

Smef. P.

tion wporiynefov, and

its distinc-

iii.

191

M.

284
Chap,
"

THE
far as it is not yet virtue

STOICS.

talents and skill, even progress towards virtue, in as

;

partly bodily advantage

itself
;

beauty, strength, health,

life

partly external

goods

riches,

honour, noble birth, relations, &c.

to be eschewed, they understand the
;

Under things
ferent,

opposite things and conditions

under things indif-

whatever has no appreciable influence on our

choice, such as the question whether the

number
leave

of

hairs on the head

is

even or uneven ; whether I pick

up a
(3) Hoi-

piece of waste paper

from the

floor, or

it

whether one piece of money or another

is

used in

payment
tial,

of a debt.'

Yet they made a

rigid difference

modified aiid ahtlwory.

between the purely relative value of things preferen-

and the absolute value of things morally good.

latter

Only the

were really allowed to be called good,

all

because they only, under

circumstances, are useful

Of things morally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain circumstances, be bad, and the worst sickness, poverty, and the like may, under certain circumstances, be
and necessary.

useful.^

Just as

little

would they allow that the

independence of the wise

man

suSered by the recog-

nition outside himself of :a class of things preferential.

For the wise man, said Chrysippus,^ uses such things

'

Diog.

vii.

106 Stol.
; ;

ii.

142

15, 51 Pint. Sto. Eep. 30.

iii.

Cio. Fin.

Sea^. 1. o. The Stoics

Academician Carneades, allowed it. Sen. Ep. 102, 3, even

quotes
it

as a Stoic

maxim

that

were not altogether' agreed as to whether fame after death belonged to things to be desired. According to Oic. Fin.
Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it whereas the younger Stoics, pressed by the
iii.

posthumous fame is a good, But probably bonum is here inaccurately used for Trporiyiiiiiov.
do. Fin. iii. 10, 34 16, Sext. M. xi. 62. See p. 232 and 283, 2. ' Sen. Ep. 9, 14 Sapientem
'
;

17, 57,

52;

THINGS TO BE PREFEBRED OR ESCHEWED.

without requiring them.

285

Nevertheless, the admis-

Chap.
"

sion of classes of things to be preferred

and to be
is

declined obviously undermines their doctrine of the good.

Between what
is

is

good and what

evil,
;

third group

introduced, of doubtful character

and

since we have seen the term dBid(j>opov was only in its more extended meaning applied to this group, it became impossible for them to refuse to apply the term

good to things
ally

desirable,'- or to

exclude uncondition-

from the highest good

many

of the things

which they were in the habit of pronouncing indifferent.^

Nor was

this concession

merely the yielding

particular instances

of a term, as will appear

when

are considered.

Not only may Seneca ' be heard, in

Aristotelian manner, defending external possessions

as aids to virtue

not

only Hecato, and even Dio-

genes, uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted

nulla re egere [Scio-flai], et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse
[xp^i""]' Plut. Si Sto. Kep. 30, i T^ irpiircf irepl dyaSiiv rpdirov SiSwci Tols Tifct ffvyx^P^'^ '^**' PovKoiievois TB irponyiiha Ka\elv
:

dyoflii Kai Kaici

ramvrla TaiTus

103, says that Posidonius ineluded bodily and external advantages among the dyoBd. In Sen. Bp. 87, 35, he, howe-s^er, expressly proves that they are not goods. ^ Sen,. Bp. 95, 5 Antipater quoque inter magnos sectse hu:

Tots Aejecriv
KoTck
Tcts

ecrri, et -ns /3oii\ETai,

irapaWajas (with reference to the greatness of the difference between

TomuTaj

jus auctores aliquid se tribuere dioit externis (namely for the perfection of the highest good),

irp(yi\yii.hov

and

dwoir poiiyiiivov)

rh tieii ayaShv av-rSiv \iyetv rh Se . iv liiv ToTs. ffTifMtvoKoK&v . lievois ob SiariirTovTos avTov TaS'
.

sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a horesy, but he himself says (De
Vit. Be. 22, 5)
tise
:

Apud me

divi-

SXAo

aroxa.Coii.evov

t^s kkto tos

and the previous remarks on the division of goods, p. 230, 3. Diog,

hvoiwjrias avvTiSelas. 1 ; Ole. Fin. iv. 25, 68,

Seep. 284,

aliquem locum habeut, only not summum et postremum.

But what philosopher would have said they had this 1

^

De

Vit. Bea. 21.

STOICS.

286

THE
and forbidden gains
pression t"
^

Chap.
XI.

not only Pansetius giving exfalls

much

that

short of Stoic severity

but even Chrysippus avows that

silly

in his opinion it is

not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from

and that a statesman may treat honour and * adding that the whole Stoic School agrees with him in thinking it no disparagement for a wise man to follow a profession which lay
pain,^

wealth as real goods

under a stigma in the

common

opinion of Grreece.*
it is

He
'

did not even hesitate to assert that

better
It
is

to live irrationally than not to live at all.*

Cic. Off.
iii.

12, 51

13,

.55

91; 15, 63; 23, 89. Diogenes of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money, knowingly to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such like. Hecato of Bhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, thinks that not only will a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he believes that in a
23,

condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. Still more at
variance with Greek customs was the course advocated by Chrysippus (in Plut. Sto. Rep, 30) KaX Kv^tfTTrjaeiv rpls Trl touAaj8(ii'Ta TaKayroj/. Tif) Chrysippus himself (In Biog.) enumerates the objections to the modes of life just named, and, in general, to all trading for money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him con:

famine he will prefer to let his slaves starve, to maintaining

them
^

at too great a sacrifice.

According to Cio. OfE. ii. 14, 51, he would allow an attorney to ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least
probable. = Phtt. Sto. Rep. 30,
* '

clusive. ' Pint. Sto. Rep. 18, 1 and Com. Not. 12, 4: AuiriTE\ 3. ^ipv &(t)pova fiaWov % p.^ ^tovv kUv
flTiSeinyre

2.

t^eWr} (ppovijcreu'
:

or,

aS

lUd. 5. According to Plut. Sto. Rep. 20, 3 and 7 and 10 30, 3,

;

it is

expressed, 11, 8

Heracli-

the following Chrysippus, admit three ways of earning an honest livelihood by teaching, by courting the rich, by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer
Biog.
vii. 188, Stoh. ii. 224,

Stoics,

and Pherecydes would have done well to renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a wise man in the shape of a
tus
beast.

PERFECT AND INTERMEDIATE DUTIES.

impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to

287

Chap.
'
'

adapt their system to general opinion and to the

conditions of practical
life,

the Stoics were driven

into admissions strongly at variance with their pre-

vious theories.,

It

may hence be
down those

gathered with certheories, they

tainty that, in laying

overstrained a point.

had

By means

of this doctrine of things to be pre-

b. Perfect <^

a further addition ferred and things ' to be eschewed,

'"-

mediate
duties.

was made to the conception of duty.

or

Under duty,

what

is

proper,'

we have already

seen, the Stoics

understand rational action in general, which becomes

good conduct, or KaTopdw/xa, by being done with a

right intention.^

The conception

of duty, therefore,

contains in itself the conception of virtuous conduct,

and

is

used primarily to express what

is

good or

rational.

Now, however, duty appears to have a

and things good.
If the

twofold meaning, in consequence of the twofold characters of things desirable

good were the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be but one duty that of realising the good and the various actions which contribute

to this result would only be distinguished by their

being employed on a different material, but not in

respect of their moral value.
is

But

if,

besides

what

absolutely good, there are things relatively good,

things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases

in which they

may

be pursued without detriment to

the absolute good or virtue

'

'

if,

moreover, besides

KaflrJKoj',

an expression introduced by Zeno, according to

See p, 265,

Diog. 108.


288

THE

STOICS.

Chap.
XI.

vice, as the absolute evil, there are also relative evils,

which we have reason to avoid in the same cases

the extent of our duties
is

increased

likewise

number

of conditional duties are placed by the side

of duties vinconditional, differing from the latter in

that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred,

and avoiding things

platform,
all

to be eschewed.
is

From

this

that accords with nature

regarded as

proper, or a duty in the

more extended sense of the

is

term

and the conception of propriety

extended

to include plants and animals.'

Proper and dutiful

actions are then divided into those which are always

such and those which are only such under peculiar

circumstances
latter

the former being called perfect, the

it is stated, as

intermediate duties;^ and

:

Diog. 107

na^TiKov
'

(pairiv

elvai h 'npax^iv eijKoydv tli^ f^X^*

aTToKoytirflhv otoif tJ)

'''V

i'^V (tlie same StTC^ Kol ^Tri TCt (pVTO. KoX Ql^O. SlO-

aK6Kovdov 4y in Cicero),
K&irl

reipet'

&paff6at

yap

tovtuv

Stob. 158: ipiferat 5^ t)> KaOrJKov rh iiKdKovQov 4v ^w^, % irpax^^v ^ijKoyov hnroKoyiav ex^i* irapa t6 KaQviKovZk ^vavrioi^. toOto Siare/j'ei KoX iXs Tot &\oya K&Ke'iva Tav fywj', eyepyei ydp
Ka6i]K0VTa.

dpsT^V OVK del Si rh ipurav rh diroKpii/eirdat Kai irepiiroTetf Kai TO S^om. Cic. Fin. iii. 17, 58 : Est autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus f acti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium me-

Qv

dium quoddam esse, quod neque

in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis quoniam enim videmus, &c. (see p. 265, 2) .
. . . . .

quoniamque non dubium

est,

eiri aKoKoiOws rij eauTwi/ (^t^trel 5e raf KoytKav ^ywj' oSras diroSiSorai, rh aKdKovdov iv ^lai. KaBijKov is, in general, what is according to nature, with which aK6\ovBov coincides. (See p. 228, 2.) See Diog. 108 Mpyvina 5* avrh [ri) KO.BriKOtf'^ elyai raty
' :

quin in us quEe media dicimus

sit alind sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut dicitur communi officio continetur. Also Off. i. 3, 8. Acad,
i.

10,

37.

Corresponding to

irpoTiyiiepoy

and

diroTrporiy^fvov

Karh, (pvffLV KaTatTKcvais olKe7oy.

'

X>iog. vii.
Tck fiEi/ kii

Tav
aet'

109 rHv KaSriKSvKaM\Ka th. tk ovk

;

Zeno placed officium and contra officium, as media quaedam between recte factum and peocatum. Stob. ii. 158 ray Si
:

Kai del /iiy KttBiiKei rh kot'

KaBriKivTav

tA

niy

ehai

ipairi

PERFECT AND INTERMEBIATE DUTIES.

pectiliarity of the
latter,

289

that,

owing to circuma duty

Chap.

stances, a

course of conduct

may become

XI

which would not have been a duty without those peculiar circumstances.' In the wider sense of the
term, every action
is proper or according with duty which consists in the choice of a thing to be pre-

ferred (Trporjy/jLevov)

and in avoiding a thing to be

is

eschewed.
fulfilled

On

the other hand, a perfect duty

only

by virtuous action.

virtuous

life

and a

wish to do good constitutes the only perfect duty.^

Te\eta,

&
.

S)^
. .

\4yeff6ai
Qtij^iara

ra

fx^

Kal KaTopBt^^ara ohx e?vot Se KaropoSras ^x'^^'^^t ^ ^^

fi4iTa,

ffufiirepi<f>epea'9ai

fpl\ois
fij)

'

iraph rh

KttSiJKOv Si

Stra

atpe! ?,6yos,

ovSh TcAeia, tcaO'fiKOVTa irpocrayopevovtrtv,

fjLeiv,

dM.a

itBcUj
'

rb t&

trpetrfieietv,

olov rh 7arh StoAeye-

e.g. neglect of parents ; olhe BJ KaSiiKovTa oUre napa rh KadrjKov, Stra oSQ' alpel T^yos trpdrreiy oUt^ airayopeiieit o^ov Kdptpos ayeXetrOatj

ToiSrois H/iota.

Stob. 160.
elj/ai
Tcfc

jttey

Dioff. 1. 0. : tA KaG'fiHovra &vev irepi-

trTd(rtos,

&yiv piv

jrepiffrdo'eeiis

Kal 8e irepiiTTaTtKd. ToSe, vyeias

Kal aiffOTiTTipiav Kal
diafi-

iirifie\e7tT6ai

T&

bfioia'

KOTct iraplfTTatTiv Sh rh

inipovv eavrhv Kal r^v KTTJtrtv ^iTTTety. dydKoyov Sk Kal

irapd t6 KadrlKoy.

Twf This distinction, of course, only applies to The uncondilieffov KafliJKOK. tional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any circumstances.
' Compare, on this point, besides the quotations on p. 265, 2, Dioff. 108 tmi/ y&p Kofl'
:

Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that KaBfiKov includes not only actions which aim at a moral good, but those which aim at a simple irpofiyp.^vov and, in view of the latter, koStikov is included among things intermediate, or aSid(popa in its more extended meaning. (Mc. see iStob. 158, says that p. 288, 2. those Ka9i]K0VTa which are at the same time KaTopBdimra, are
K.T.\.
;
;

oi/Se

r4\eia, ctXA^ fieffa

irapa-

fierpeiffOat
dSta<l}6poLS

Sh

rh lieaov KaBrtKov
Ka\ovpLvois

Tiffl

Ss

irap^ (piatv Kal Karct ^itriv, ToiauT7]V

Sffr'
S*

evipviap Trpo(Ttftepop.evoiSt
fi^

l>pph)v fvepyovfievatv

KaSriKovra elvat, tA Se Kov, T& 5' oSre KaSiiKOVTa aire Ka^Kovra vapa Th KoSriKov. piv oiv iivai iaa 6 \6yos alpei (demands ; see p. 244, 2, the alpSiv \6yos) iraieiv. ws ^x** '''^

r^ p.^v naph rh

HaBii-

et

KapL^dvoiiiiv

ahrh ^
(if,

Stw&ovixiBa

d-KepitrirdffTUs

without particular occasion, or

as Diog. 109 observes, &vev weptgrddea! see previous note we despise or reject them) pAi

eiSaiptovetv.

yove^s

Tijii^y,

Sids\(povs,

Trarpt5a,

290
Chap.
XI.

THE
Some
by the
confusion
is

STOICS.

introduced into this teaching

fact that in setting

up the standard

for dis-

tinguishing perfect from imperfect duties, the Stoics

sometimes look at the

aspects distinct.
fect

real,

sometimes at the per-

sonal value, of actions, without keeping these two

They

therefore use the terms per-

and imperfect sometimes to express the difference

;

between conditional and unconditional duties

law.'

at

other times, to express that between morality and

Far worse than the formal defect

is

the group-

ing in this division under the conception of duty

things of the most varied moral character.
If once

things which have only a conditional value are ad-

mitted into the

circle of duties,

what

is

there to pre-

vent their being defended in the practical application

of the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repug-

nant to the legitimate consequences of the Stoic

principles
C. Eirw?

In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic

system sought in another respect to meet facts and
practical wants
terity of its

tiom. (1) Permitted

affections.

by abating somewhat from the ausConsistently

carried
out,

demands.

those demands require the unconditional extirpation

of the whole sensuous nature, such as was originally expressed by the

demand

for apathy.

But

just as

the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified

by the admission of Trporjj/jLeva, so this demand was modified in two ways the first elements at least of the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and whilst emotions were still forbidden,
;
'

In the latter sense

Ka6riKoi>

and KarSpduim have been already

discussed, p. 264.

'

EMOTIONS.
certain mental affections were permitted, and even

291

Chap.
XI.

declared to be desirable.

Taking the

first

point, it

was allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at certain things he does not remain
wholly calm.'

They appealed

to this admission to

show that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics.'' For men to be entirely free from all such mental affections cannot be required, but only
that he refuse assent to them, and do not suffer

them
other

to obtain the mastery.' point,

In illustration of the
their

they propounded

doctrine

of

svwaOeiai, or rational dispositions, which, as distinct

from emotions, are to be found in the wise man, and in the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions, they distinguish three chief varieties, besides several subordinate varieties.'*
'

Although

this

Sen.

De

Ira,

i.

16, 7:

When

man sees anything revolting, non . . tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior ? Fateor, seutiet levem
the wise
.

quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis

quoque animo etiamcum vulnus sanatum eat, cicatrix manet.
Ep. 57, 3 De Const, Stob. Floril. 7, 21 Plut. C. Not. 25, 5 ; Bpictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 17. Conf. p. 253,
Id.
ii.

10, 4

5, 6.
*

Conf. Sen. De Ira, ii. 2-4, particularly the quotation in 6feU, from Epiotetus Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences, paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali peroepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, offioium mentis atque rationis prsevertentibus. But what distinguishes him from the foolish man is that only the foolish man and not the wise man assents ((riry/ta'
:

Sen. Brevit. Vit.

c.

14,2:
Stoicis

TOTfAerai, irpo(reiriSo|(ifi)tosuch

Hominis naturam cum

:

impressions
*

(if>ai'TO(roi).

vincere cum Cyniois excedere. Similarly Ep. 9, 3 Hoc inter nos et illos (Stilpo and the Cynics in general) interest noster sapiens vincit quidem inoommodum omne, sed sentit illorum ne sentit quidem.
TT

IHoff. vii. 115 : ehai St koX evTraHeias ^curl rpeis, X"'?^", evKd/8eio>',

^oiKi)(!iv

koI
(pcurlv

t^v
ehat

jiiv

x"-?^"

^"avrlav

rp

iidav^ oi<rav fSXoyov i-napaui

tV

8e ebXafinav rif

(pd^if

oiaav ejiTrtdvinlif

Xoyov
2

iicKKtaiv

tj 5i

292
Chap,

THE
XI
"

STOICS.

admission was intended to vindicate the absence

of emotions in the wise
feelings are not emotions,
line

man,

since the permitted

still it

made the boundary-

between emotions and feelings so uncertain that

in practice the sharply-defined contrast between' the

wise and the foolish threatened wellnigh to disap-

pear altogether,
(2) 3lodi-

This danger appears more imminent

observe the perplexity
,
.

JicaUon of apathy.

when we

m which the Stoics were placed

man
in experience.

when asked

to point out the wise

For not only do opponents asseverate that, according to their own confession, no one, or as good as no one, can be found in actual history who altogether
deserves that high
title,'

but even their own admis-

sions agree therewith.^

They dare

to describe even

Socrates, Diogenes,

and Antisthenes

as not

completely

virtuous, but only as travellers towards virtue.^ It

was

of little avail to point to Hercules or Ulysses,* or,

ivavriav
oSffau
tpairiv elj/at

r^v

^oiKTjtrtv

eSKoyov Sp{iv. divisionsof ;8oii\7)(risare

6u/icia,

Sub:

eScoia,

aa-iraiTiihs, iiyiiirritTis;
:

fi\d$eia

oiSij, ayveid

of of X"?"^

Sen. Tranq. An. 7, 4 Ubi invenies, quern tot seculis quEerimus ? (the wise man.) Ep. 42, 1: Sois quern.
^
:

enim istum

Tfpifiis, elxjipoiTivri,

Euflu/ifa.

same three firndBeuu tioned by Cio. Tuso. iv. 6, 12, with the remark that they only
belong to the wise. See Stob. 92, and Sen. Ep. 59, 14 72, 4 and 8, respecting the wise man's
;

The are men-

nunc virum bonum dicam ? Hujus secundae notse. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phoenix semel anno quingeutesimo nascitur,

see p.

273,

1,

just as

everything great

is rare.

But

compare
' Cio. p. 274, 2. *

p. 274, 3.

Fin.

iv.

20, 56,

and

cheerfulness.
'

Besides

the

quotations,

p. 271, see Kol 5

:

PhU.

^V oW
ii.

Sto. Eep. 31, afn'bv 6 Xpvffnnros

anocpaivet ffirov^atov,

oirerivhruv
KaOrrytf-ii""'.
;

(says Sen. De of the two named) Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus,

Hos enim
2, 1,

Const.

ouToB yvapliiav
Cie.

ti

etc.

Further
70.

particulars
c.

47, 145 Inst. xii. 1, 18.

Acad,

Quintil.

Seraelit.

AUeg. Horn,

in 33

and

EMOTIONS.
with Posidonius,' to the mythical golden age, in

293
Chap.

which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures of those heroes would have to be changed altogether,
to bring

them

into

harmony with the wise men

of the

Stoics

and Posidonius might be

easily disposed of

on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and

wisdom

are things of free exercise, and, since free

first

exercise was wanting in the case of the

men,

their condition can only have been a state of imconscious ignorance,

ality,

and not one of

perfection.^ If, in re-

there are no wise men, the division of

:

wise and foolish falls at once to the

men into ground all manall

kind belong to the

fools

the conception of the wise

It

man

is

an unreal fancy.
all

becomes

the more

difficult to

maintain the assertion that

all fools are

If,

equally foolish, and

the wise are equally wise.

instead of producing real wisdom, philosophy can

only produce a progress in that direction,

will hardly take such a

still it

modest estimate of its own success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a zealous student and a bigoted despiser of
its doctrines.

It

standinsf ^ their

was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithown maxims, found themselves com-

(3)

The
"/

*^''*''

progress.

pelled to recognise differences

'

among

the bad and

:

wise

Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these men of the old world

^ Sen. 1. Non dat c. 44 natura virtutem, ars est bonum

all Posidonius traced back kinds of useful discoveries, meant Posidonius is probably by the younger Stoics {Sesnt. Math, ix. 28), who say that they introduced belief in the Gods.
'
'

ignorantia rernm infieri virtus non nooentes erant . . contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exeroitatione perduoto. Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc nascimus, ka.
. . . .

294
Chap.
XI.

THE
differences

STOICS.
good.

among the

In reference to their

system these

dififerences

were, indeed,

made

to de-

pend

in the case of the

less difficulty

bad upon the greater or of healing the moral defects, or, in the

case of the good,

It

upon

qualities morally indifferent.'

was

also natural that

they should so nearly iden-

tify the state of irpoKoirr)

or progress towards wis-

dom, the only

it is

really existing state

with wisdom that

If there

could hardly be distinguished therefrom.

a stage of progress at which a emotions, discharges
is

man

is free

from
that

all
is

all his duties,

knows

all

necessary, and

even secure against the danger of

relapse,^ such a stage cannot

be distinguished from
or

wisdom, either by

its

want of experience

by the

>

Stoi. Eel.

ii.

236

iirav 5J

Tcov airavra TrdvTtus cnro5iSw<n rii

KoQ-fiKOVTCt KaX

imwv Twv afjLapTTjfjAruy eTvai rivas

4v ainois Statpof/hs, KU.96(rov tA fiev avTuv anh ffKktjpas Kol SvaiiiTou
5la94(Tews yiyveraij

ou^hv wapa\eitrt

rhv Se roirov ^lov ovk elyal

ipTjirlv

iru

evBaifiova

aAV

4irtyiyvf(r0aL

p.

251,

2,

tA 5' oft. (See for the difference

irav at /jieirai irpd^ets aSrai wpoaXdQufTt t& &

auTfj]

T^v

evSatfjLQviav

between emotion and disease of

the soul.) KoX Twv fTTTiiv^aiay ye &\\ovs &\\aiy TpoTpetrriKaTepovs
ylyyeffdai Kai irta'TtKuTepous

jSalov Kai KTlnhv

Tii/a \dpii)(riv.

Kai iiiav

irrj^lv

Chrysippus was probably the author of the division of progressers into three classes, which is discussed by Sen. Ep. 75, 8. Of those who have reached the highest stage it is said, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quas erant compleotenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tameu in ilia ugerunt quae f recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum liquet et . . scire se nesciunt.
.

en

5e

Kal a7xi'Oi"''^^pot^s, Kaii

(Tifjiv (rvfi^atvovo'ciiv, i. e.,

t& /x^ffo T^ ^^trepi^afx^avdiiiva ruv itnTavirtuous are not all equally secure. These differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom (nor on the other hand to folly), which admits of no increase, hut only to such properties as are included in the whole moral state, but are not themselves of moral nature. See Cic. Fin.

men

iv. 20, 56,

"

and

p. 275, 1.
7,

Stob.

Serm.

21

6 5' iv'

iKpttVf

(pTlffl

[XpiifrnrTTOs] TrpoK6Tr-

EMOTIONS.
absence of a clear knowledge of oneself.

295

For has
is

it

Chap.
XI.

not been frequently asserted that happiness not conscious of his

not

increased by length of time, and that the wise

is

man

howat first ? ever, the highest stage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of wisdom, because it
'

wisdom

If,

is

not sure of

its

continuance, and though free from

mental
it

diseases, it is not free

from

emotions,'^

how,

may be

asked, do these passing emotions differ

affections

from the mental

wise

which are found in the

man ?
?

Is

there any real distinction between

them

If the progressing candidate has attained

is

to freedom from diseased mental states,

the clanger

of a relapse very great

Besides, the Stoics were

really wise

by

no means agreed that the

all

man is

free

from

danger, Cleanthes holding with the Cynics that

;

virtue can never be lost

Chrysippus admitting that,

defectible.'

in certain cases,
^
2

it

is

After

all this

See pp. 239, 1 ; 271, 7. Quidam Sen. Bp. 75,-10 hoc proflcientium genus de quo
:

Chrysippus, it belongs to those points in which the original relation of Stoicism to Cyni-

locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, afifectus nondum (on this distinction, see p. 251, 2), et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiEB nisi qui totam earn exThe same view is upcussit.

cism was weakened by him.

Sen. Bp. 72, 6, speaking in the tone of Cleanthes, says that

elsewhere he considered a candidate of the first class secure against relapses. On the contrary, Simpl. Categ. 102, (Schol. in Arist. 86, a,
it,

48

held by Sen. Bp. 72, ' Diog. vii. 127

XpiiTLirros jxiv
PK-qriiv, Sii Xiav 6 86,

6. t^jk

otto/SAijt))!',

aper^v K\aito-

ivSifs 5e a</oir(J;8\i)T0i'
;iif'fli)!'

jjiiv,

Koi lieXayxo-

Sia avm6p\-riTov, Pf&alous Karahii'pfis. The latter view was that of the Cynics,

b, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ^v Kaipots (the reading K&pois is better) Koi iie\ayxo?^lats, virtue, together with the whole rational life (\oyiKii

eJu),

is lost,

and

Although

departed

from by

succeeded, not indeed by vice,

296
Chap,
"

THE
admission
is

STOICS.

only one

among many traits which prove

that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity of their demands.
but by a
question
ejij
is,
/ttco-rj.

similar

Whether the wise man can become mad ? which is answered in the negative by
Biog.
vii.

modifying clauses, Aphr. De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise
out some
Aleas.

man

118,

though not with-

will act virtuously in a frenzy.

when

APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.

297

CHAPTEE

XII.

APPLIED MOBAL SCIENCE.

All

that has hitherto been stated had regard to the

Chap.
^'^^

general principles only of the Stoics touching the

end and the conditions of moral action. Whether the mere exposition of principles be enough, or
whether the practical application of these principles
to the special relations of life does not also

form part

of moral science

was a question

as to

which the Stoic

Aristo, on this

School was not originally unanimous,

as

on other points a Cynic, was of opinion that this

the philosopher must confine himself ex-

whole branch of moral science was useless and unnecessary

;

clusively to things which have a practical value, the

fundamental points of morality.'

School, however,
this

Within the Stoic

not gain

view did
8,

much
is

' Further particulars have been already given, p. 61. Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which

as itapaivf7iK6s.

He who

himself insufficiently educated will do well (ririiv hiywv axoietv

uTrofleriKui' Trapci tS>v ireTronififvaiv

Aristo rejected, parsnetice, or pars prfficeptiva. Sextus speaks ot two TiJTroi a irapaivfTiKhs and

uitoSeriKSs.

Both

terras,

how-

ever, appear to denote the same thing ; for iroeeriKhs is defined

^pyov eiSepat riva fiev $\aPepli. Tiua Si a<pe\iim wSpd^rois. {moBsriKbs tiSttos is therefore identical with the suasio of Posidonius (in Sen. Ep. 95, 65),

See p. 223, note

1.

by Muson. in

Stub. Floril. 117,

298

THE
support.
Aristo,

STOICS.

Chap,
XII.

Even

Cleanthes, otherwise agreeing with

would not deny the value of an application of

theory to details, provided the connection of these

details with general principles be not lost sight of.*

Nor can there be any doubt

Chrysippus, details engrossed
of the Stoic philosophers.

that, after the time of

much

of the attention

Posidonius enumerates, as

belonging to the province of moral philosophy, precept, exhortation,

tius,

and advice.^ His teacher, Pansehad discussed the hortatory side of morality' in
books on duties, imitated by Cicero's welltreatise.^

three

known

The

division of ethics attributed

to Diogenes,'

and by him referred to Chrysippus,

;

leaves a place for such discussions

and, not to

men-

tion Aristo's opposition thereto, which supposes the

existence of applied moral science, the example of
his

fellow-student
'

Perseeus,

whose precepts
to,

for

banquet
'

have been already referred

:

proves

how

Sen. Ep. 9i, i Cleanthes utilem quidem judicat et banc partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab universe fluit, nisi decreta ipsa

vote his attention to officia, quorum prsecepta traduntur. Cicero then goes fully into
particulars.

He
and
;

treats

of

philosophiie et capita cognovit, 2 See p. 223, 1. ' See (Mo. Off. i. 2, 7 ; 3, 9 iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that he chiefly followed Pause;

amusement

occupation (i. 29, 103) of the peculiar duties of the young and the
old,

of

officials,
;

citizens,

fo-

tins (ifepl

Tuv KaBi\K6vTuv), not

as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita. See

p. 300, 2.
'
:
.

dc. OS., i. 3, 7 Omnis de officio duplex est qusestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum alteram, quod positum est in prseceptis, quibns
:

in omnes partes usus vitse conformari possit. He would de-

reigners (i. 34) of outward appearance, gait, conversation (i. 36) ; of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Pansetius must have given a similar treatment to the subject, * See p. 223, 1. ' Particularly in the portions treating irspl tUv KaBtik6vtii>v and vepl Trporpowav re Kal imoTpimuv.
'

See

p. 272, 2.

APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.

early practical ethics

299

had obtained a footing within

^

Chap.
XII.

the Stoic School.

Moreover, the elaborate theory of

virtue propounded by ChrysippuS and his followers

can hardly have failed to include

cipal occurrences in
life.

many of the prinThus a number of partito us,

cular precepts are

known

which are partly

quoted by other writers as belonging to the Stoics,

and are partly to be found in the pages of Seneca,

Epictetus,
tise

and Marcus Aurelius, and in

Cicero's treafirst

on duties.

Indeed, the Stoics were the

went

at all deeply into the subject of casuistry.^

who At

a later epoch,
settled

when more general questions had been

by Chrysippus, the preference for particular enquiries on the domain of applied moral science
appears to have increased
bably,

among

the Stoics.^

Pro-

however, none

but the later members of

the
unscientific

the
that
'

School advanced

assertion*

we ought

to confine ourselves to precepts for

Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health

^
;

See p. 260, 4, and 261, 1. According to do. Off. i.

2 7, Ad Att. xvi. 11, Pansetius, in the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from Off. i. 45, 159 23, 89, that 13, 55 iii. 12, 50 these cases were frequently discussed, not only by the pupils of Panaetius, Posidonius, and Hecato, but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of
; ;

and wealth ( do. Off. ii. 24, 86) and Hecato, in his treatise on duties, had added further
casuistical investigations (^Cic. Brutus, too, who, iii. 23, 89). like his teacher Antiochus, was

devoted to a moderate Stoicism,

and

of whom Sen. Ep. 95, 45, reports that he had laid down rules for the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his treatise ircpl toS ko9^koptos,
*

Tarsus.
treatise of Pansetius appears to have been used as a
'

may have
;

followed
95, 1.

The

Pan^tius.
Sen. Ep. 94, 1

chief authority,

not only by


00

THE
value.

STOICS.

Chap,

particular cases, since only these have

any practical

In this extension of the moral theory, besides

the longing for scientific completeness, the endea-

vour
of

may also be observed to subordinate all sides human activity to moral considerations. In the
;'

virtuous man, as the Stoics held, everything becomes

virtue

and hence everything

is

included in moral

philosophy.

Thereby, without doubt, the Stoic School

contributed in no small degree towards settling and

defining moral ideas, not only for
its

immediate con-

temporaries, but also for all subsequent times. Nevertheless, the

into the details of every-day

it

more the teaching of the School entered life, the more impossible became to prevent practical considerations from

overriding the natural severity of Stoic principles,

or to keep the strictness of scientific procedure from

yielding to the less accurate bias of experience.

The

order and division which the Stoics adopted

for discussing details in the hortatory part of

moral

science are not

known

to us

nor, indeed, is it

known
It

whether that order was uniform in

'

all cases.'

Stob.
fli/oi

ii.

128

only iv
IJ,6vas

irxeVci,

in e{i (not see p. 230) S^ ov

:

interest.

The third part, which Pansetius proposed to him.self

Tcts

tAs iperiis iwi. Kol T&s ^y Toj (TirouSatij) avSpi, liWoiiaBelaas vnh ttjs ipET^j KoX yevoufvas oni6TairT<iT0U9, olovel 7ctp apsT^s yiyvi-

SWos

TExi'ttf

a8ai.

The treatise of Pansetius learn from Cio. OfE. i. 3, 9 iii. 2, 7 discussed its 7, 33 subject first from the platform of duty, and then from that of
"

we

the collision between duty and interest was never fully oarried out. Cicero adds disoussions on two questions, which of two conflicting duties and which of two conflicting interests must be preferred (i. 3, ii. 25). Otherwise 10, c. 43 he appears in his two first books to follow the order of Panastius.

TUB INDiriBUAL.
will

SOI

be most convenient

for the

purpose of our pre^

first

Chap.
'

sent description to distinguish, in the

place,

those points which refer to the moral activity of the

individual as such, and afterwards to go on to those

which relate to

social life.

Subsequently, the teach-

ing of the Stoics on the relation of

man to

the course

of the world and to necessity will engage our attention.

It was consistent with the whole tone of the a. The

in-

Stoic system to devote, in ethics,

more attention

to

<^*^*'^-

the conduct and duties of the individual than had poHance

been done by previous philosophy.

Not that

pre-

vious philosophers had altogether ignored this side,

""^^g'|f. dividual.

Indeed, Aristotle, in his investigations into individual virtue, had been led to enquire carefully into
individual morality.
Still,

with Aristotle, the in-

fluence of classic antiquity

on the border-land of
throw the

which he stands was

individua;l into the

sufiBciently strong to

background as compared with

the community, and to subordinate ethics to politics.

In the post-Aristotelian philosophy, this relation was

exactly reversed.

"With the decline of public

interest

life

in

Greece, intellectual
also
;

in the

state declined

and, in equal degree, the personality of the inlife

dividual and circumstances of private

came into

prominence.
in

This feature

may be

already noticed

some of the older Schools, for instance, in the Academy and Peripatetic School. The Peripatetic,
its first

in particular, had already, in the time of

ad-

herents, travelled far on the road which the founder

had struck

out.

Among

the

Stoics,

the

same

302

THE
feature was required

STOICS.

Chap,

xn.

by the whole spirit of their system. If happiness depends upon man's internal state only, nothing external having power to affect it, the science which professes to lead man to happiness must primarily busy itself with man's moral
activity.

It can only consider

human

society in as

far as action for society forms part of the

moral duty

of the individual.

Hence, in the Stoic philosophy,

researches into the duties of the individual occupy

a large space, there being a corresponding subordination of politics.

These duties form the subject of

moral science

by

far the greater part of the applied

;

of the Stoics

and how minutely they entered in that

scientific harvest resulting

study into possible details has been already set forth.'

At the same time, the

from these researches
to their extent.
is

by no means in proportion

Confining our attention to form some idea of the

treatise of Paneetius

on duties to the two

first

books of

Cicero's work,

De

Officiis, after

a few introductory re-

marks, we find morality as such (honestum) described,

according to the scheme of the four cardinal virtues
(i.

5-42).

In discussing the
is

first

of these, intelligence,

recommended, and useless subtlety is deprecated. Justice and injustice are next discussed,
love of research
' See pp. 260, 298. Amongst other things, as we learn from the fragment in Athen. xiii. 565, a, Chrysippus discussed at length the question of shaving and Aleoj. Aphr. Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the useless enquiries of the
;

Stoics,

iv tois irspl KaBjiKivrav,

is proper take the largest portion before one's father at table, and whether it is proper to cross the legs in the school of a philosopher,

an enquiry whether it

to

THE INDIVIDUAL.
in all their various forms, due regard feeing had to the
cases of ordinary occurrence in
ness,
life.

303

Chap
XIT.

Liberality, kind-

justice

and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of and this leads to a consideration of human
;

society in all its various forms (c. 16-18, 60).

Next,

turning to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher draws attention to the fact that bravery is inseparably connected with justice.

He

then describes

it

partly as it

appears in the forms of magnanimity and endurance,

regardless of external circumstances, partly in the

form of energetic courage

cusses various questions

and, in so doing, he diswhich suggest themselves,

;

such as the nature of true and false courage, military and civil courage, and the exclusion of anger

from valour.
virtue
is
(c.

Lastly, the object of the fourth chief

is

27)

described, in general terms, as what

proper (decorum, irpkirov), and the corresponding

state as propriety, both in controlling the impulses

of the senses, in jest and play, and in the whole personal bearing.

made by
position.

individual nature, by time of

demands are discussed life, by civil Even outward proprieties of speech and
peculiar

The

conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in behaviour,'

life

honourable and dishonourable modes of

attention.^

do not escape

In the second book of his work, Cicero considers the relation of interest to duty and having proved,
;

f\na{,ia, evKaipia, talis

ordo

actionum ut in vita omnia sint

apta inter se et convenientia. 144. i. 40, 142
;

^ i. 43. omit Cicero's treatise, this section not being

We

found in Panjetius.

304

THE
at length,' that

STOICS.

Chap,
XII.

vantageous
to the
others,

is

most that is advantageous and disadbrought on us by other men, he turns

means by which we may gain the support of and by which affection, trust, and admiration

may

be secured.

He

reviews various kinds of serstate,

vices for individuals

and the

and embraces,

at

the same time, the opportunity of giving vent to his

grudge against despotism and republican court of the

people.

The

principles on

which this review

of

is

con-

ducted are such that objection can rarely be taken

to

them from the platform

modem
is

morality.

Yet

unmistakeably the Stoic bias

present in the conlife,

ception and support of the rules of

and parti-

cularly in the definitions of various virtues, few of

the moral judgments, however, are other than might

have been expressed from the platform of the Platonic

and Aristotelian

ethics.''

holds good of some other points on record,

The same remark by means

of which the Stoics gave a further expansion to their

picture of the wise man.^

Eevolting as their tenets

at times appear, there is yet little in their applica-

tion that deviated from the moral ideas generally

current.
' Panaetius still more diffusively, 5, 16. ^ Such, for instance, as the

frank (axlpSnXos), and with no

inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of
life (^airpdy/xav),

prohibition against being angry

with enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of
the Stoics and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions. See p. 252.
Diog. 117, says The aii^os or (TwouSoTos is free from vanity (Sti/^os), is earnest laiarnpbs),
'
:

lest he should do anything contrary to duty,

See
says

p.
:

323,

1.

Stob.
is

ii.

240,

The wise man

gentle

quiet (riirixios), and considerate (Kiaiuos), never exciting angry feelings against others, never deferring what he has to do.
(irpSo!),

'

THE INDIVIDUAL.
More
too
peculiar,

305
start-

and at the same time more

Chap.
^^^'
(2) Oyni-

ling, is another feature about the Stoics.

Let not

much

be

made

of the fact that they, under certain

lie.'

circumstances, permitted a

Were not

Socrates "^^"^
()
f^"**-

and Plato, at least, of the same opinion ? And, to be frank, we must admit that, although in this respect moral theories are strict enough, yet practice
is

stoics mth
'^^'"<''*-

commonly

far too lax

now.

Very repulsive, howthe

wise

ever, are

many
the

assertions attributed to the Stoics,

respecting

attitude

of

man

to the

so-called intermediate things.

Was

not this very in-

dependence of externals, this indifference to everything but the moral state, which found expression
in the doctrine of things indifferent and of the wise
' Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1 ^Ka-^ovuiv ol (rotpol
:

i/zcuSeTs

(pavraffias ifnroiovvreSj

ttp

mentioned by Xen, Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Eep. ii. 382, c. 389, B iv. 459, C, in which the
;

at
Tcts

tpavratriai iroiucriy

avyKaraOeffets

'

avTore\us ttoWAki^ yhp

wpbs rovs

interests of another or of the

community require deception)

Kar' &\\as oiKovOfdas tov ptov iro^Xds. In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Aloib. (Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64) that the Stoics

ol ffo<poi

;//iJSt j(^p5}vrai

Kol

(j>ai\ous
KiQav^iv,

KaX tpavTaffiav irapLffTaaL

ov

fj.i]v

airiay rrfs avyKatffrat Kol ttis

radetreais- IttcI KatTTis vnoKii^ews

alrla rris

il^euSoOs
ii.

awdrtis. Stob.

230 :/i^

t^siieaeai
i^/evSos

differ

from their predecessors

:

rhv

ff6ipov aXA.' ^v iratnvh.\7iBGvetv

oh yhp ^v

T^

K^yeiv tl
tj/eiSos

t6
/col

5iai|/EU(rTQ)s -rh
^ttI oiraTT)

\iyeiy

TiSy r\ria-lov.
TTOTe

t^

/ieV-

in that they reject all lies must be explained oute yap e^a-naT^lf ifjri iiKaiuti Kar avTobs o^TE ^id^effBat oUre ^.TToffrepuy, dA.X' E/C(iTT7j Twv irpd^euy toiitqiv
cLirh

Tot
[1.

i//ei55z

trvyxp'hff^^^^^

pLOX^T)pas irpAeifftv e^etos

Ka\

o-Eo-eai] voiii(ovini>

avThf Kara

&diK6s ia-Tip.

The point here in

;

voKKohs TpSTTOvs Sj/Ei) (TvyKaraAeVeiuj Kal yap Kara irrparriylav wphs ruv &yTl7rdKwv, Kal Kara Ti]if
TovtTV/j.<t)epovrosTrpo6pa(rtv (yrhich,

however,
as

may not be translated

'

for the iii. 662 does sake of advantage'; it rather refers to such cases as those

muer

dispute is simply verbal the Stoics were, in realitj', at one with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only for the reasons quoted by ^hrysippus and Stobseus.

30G
Chap,
XII.

THE

STOICS.

man's apathy, at the root of that onesidedness of life and principle which is so prominent in the Cynic
School, the parent School of the Stoics
?

Granting
still

that in the Stoic School this onesidedness was toned

down and supplemented by

other elements,

the

tendency thereto was too deeply rooted from its origin, and too closely bound up with its fundamental view of
life,

to be ever properly eradicated.

life

It did

not require, indeed, a Cynic

nay, more,
it

from

its

members
the Cynic's

even avowed that, except in rare cases,

;'

such a
life

life

ought not to be followed

;

still

was

its ideal

and when

it

asserted that it was not

it

necessary for a wise

man

to be a Cynic,

implied

that, if once a Cynic,

he would always be a Cynic.^

'

Stoicism took for

its

patterns

Antisthenes and Dio;

genes quite as

much

as Socrates

even those who

held with Seneca,'' that a philosopher ought to ac-

commodate himself

to prevailing customs, and, from

regard to others, do what he would not himself approve, did not therefore cease to bestow their highest

admiration on Diogenes's independence of wants, with

' do. Fin. iii. 20, 68 Cynicorum autem xationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem
:

nhi' o-o^bi' Svt'

ttv

ipiaaSai toC

KwurftoS.

dicuut, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, utid faciendum sit, alii nnllo modo. The latter must, however, have been in a

See p. 274, 2. According to the epigrams of Timon, in Diog. vii. 16, At/ten. iv. 158, a, Sext. Math. xi. 172, Zeno's
'

minority. ' Diog. 121 Kwie'iv t airhD [rjy aoif>6v~\ ehai yap rhv Kvvi:

School must have presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, the description is partially true of the earlier history of that School ; still I would attach no great value to it as illustrating the system. * Ep. 5, 1 103, 5 Fr. 19, in Lactant. Inst. iii. 16.
; ;

aiibv ffivToiwv iTf

li.piTiiii

dShv, Sis

'AirowdSoipos [on

whom,
tQ

see p.
:

Stab. 238 51, 1] ev rfi ^9iKp. Kvvteiy Te rhv <ro^hv Keyovfftv,

X<rov Tip
iirififpfiv

KwuTfuif, oh

THE INDIVIDUAL.
all its eccentricities.'

30',

More

consistent thinkers even

approximated to Cynicism in their moral precepts,' and in later times a School of younger Cynics actually

Chap. XII '_

grew out of the Stoic School.

Bearing, as the Stoics did, so close a relationship
to the Cynics, it cannot astonish us to find
(j) in-

amongst *^*i^j"f
traits in

them many
Cynicism

instances of the

most revolting

lation of right feelings

the contempt

for cultured habits, the vio-

fully justifying the righteous

indignation of their opponents. Chrysippus regarded

many

things as perfectly harmless in which the reli-

gious feeling of Grreece saw pollution,' in defence

of his opinion pleading the example of animals^ to

show that they were according tO' nature. The deceased relatives he not only proposed! to limit to the simplest mode of burial, but would have it altogether put in the background and he even made the horrible suggestion, which he described in full, of using for purposes of nourishment theflesh of amputated limbs and the corpses of even the Great offence, too, was given by nearest relatives.''
care for
;

See, on this point, Tranq. An. 8, 4 Benef v. 4, 3 6, 1 Ep. 90, 14. Sen. Ep. 29, 1, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom of sowing ex' ;
.

hortations broadcast.
^ As may be seen in Musonius and Bpictetus. ' Plut. Sto. Kep. 22 (the question being as to the pollution of the temples by the contact with the dead or lyingin women or unclean foods) in other cases indeed, as Plu;

tarch objects, he would not allow these considerations. * Besides i)i^. vii. 188, and Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, see Chrysippus's own words, in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 247 (Math. xi. 193). The majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of extreme necessity. See JHog. 121. Chrysippns had probably been speaking, in the context, of the difierent modes of treating the dead among various nations

X 2

HE

STOICS.

tbe Stoics, and, in particular, by Chrysippus, by their

'^^'

treatment of the relations of the sexes to each other

nor can
it

be denied that some of their utterances on

this subject

sound exceedingly insidious.

The Cynic

assertion, that

anything which

is

in itself allowed

may

be mentioned plainly and without a periphrasis,

attributed to the Stoics.'

is also

By

his proposals for

the dress of women, Zeno offended against propriety

and modesty,^ and both he and Chrysippus advocated community of wives for their state of wise men.' It
is,

moreover, asserted that the Stoics raised no ob-

jection to the prevalent profligacy

unchastity,* nor to the
still

and the trade in

relatives

worse vice of unnatural

crime.*

Even marriage among the nearest

;

was found quite according to nature by the leaders

of the School
*

and the atrocious shamelessness of

Diogenes found supporters in Chrysippus,^ perhaps,

too, in Zeno.*
<c) CynitJieoretical

It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great

ii^jiistice

conse-

to take these statements for more than mere theoretical conclusions drawn from the prin{Cio.

quenoe of
SStoic prin-

Tuso.

i.

46,

108),

in-

ciples.

tending to prove that no uniformity of practice prevailed. Oic. Off. 1. 35, '128, with the limitation Cynioi aut gi qui fuerunt Stoici p^ne Cy'
:

Pyxrh. iii. 201. Pyrrh. iii. 200 ; 245 Math. xi. 190 ; Clement. Homil.
*

Seaif.

Secet.

V.

18.

Sext.

205
Sto.

nioi.
2

Pyrrh. i. 160; iii. 246 Math. xi. 191 Pint. Rep. 22 Cle^nent. Horn.
; ; ;

mog.

vii.

33

koI

itrSTiTi.

Se

V. 18.

Kal yvvaiKas KoX fiTjdey fiopiov airoKfKpiipBai. The latter act is

iii.

only conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics. ' Mog. 33 131.
;

Plut. \. c. 21, 1. Sextus, however (Pyrrh. 206), attributes to him, as the representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus t6 t alaxpovpy^'iv
'
:

'

i Zifvuv otiK i,Tro3oKtiid((i.

THE INDIVIBUAL.
ciples to

309

racter of Zeno, Cleanthes,

which they were pledged. The moral chaand Chrysippus ia quite

It seems, therefore, strange that
felt

Chap.
'
"

above suspicion.
they should have
in theory

themselves compelled to admit

what

strikes the natural feeling with horror.

It cannot, however, be unconditionally accepted that

the statements laid to their charge imply as they used

them all
some

that historians find in them.

Far from

it

of

of their statements it

may not

only be said that

they do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral,

but that they are directed against actions customarily

allowed, the
actions
real

argument being, that between such and actions admittedly immoral there is no difference. This remark applies, in particular, to
It

Zeno's language on unnatural vice.'

was not,

therefore, in opposition to the older Stoics, or in de-

nial of their

maxim, that love

is

permitted to a wise

man,^ that the younger Stoics condemned most explicitly

any and every form of unchastity, and, in

particular, the worst

'

form of

all,

unnatural vice^'

His words (_Sext. Math. xi. 190; Pyrrh. iii. 245 Plut. Qu. Con. iii. 6, 1, 6) are as follows Siaffnpi(tiv Se furiSev liaWov ^ijSe
;
:

flirirov

jroiSittA
fl

t) /lii

TroiSiiti fvuSi

6ii\ftt

&p(Tva
ft-h

oil

yhp

&Wa iraiirpe'irei

SiKois ?
ij

TtaiS'toTs ouSe flr(\eiaiy

Tcl
;

&pjie<nii,

iXKk

amk

re

(fa! jTfie'iroi'Tti

pucas rbv vdTfpov oiv

fjiripia-ai
;

eCTi and: Sio/tefi^epdS^ecov; oiiK ^yaiye'

i-KeBi/iiiffas!

airhv 5iaai'Tii'
fi

leal

pd\a.

iAAa iwedi<">'

fLTiaas

Trapcurx^'f

i(pop-!l$ris

ice\evaai; fi^M'.
;

aW
oix

ineKevfras
vnnp4TT)<r4

ical <roi
;

ftd\o.
oii

fir'

yip.
is

The

form

of expression

certainly

very Cynic-like, but the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno's object is. not to justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt are morally on a par with the deed. ^ See the following note. ' Musonius, in Stoi. Serm. 6, 61 (conf. Cio. Fin. iii. 20, 68) Ne amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to Diog. vii. 129, Stob. U. 238, love is only directed'to beauty of soul. By Diog.,
:

310
Chap.
XII.

THE

STOICS.

In the same way, the language permitting marriage

between those nearest of kin, when examined,

very

is

much

milder than

it

seems.'

position for a

community

of wives

And Zeno's promay be fairly laid

to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the charitable excuses f which Plato
Still,
is

allowed the benefit.^

taking the most unprejudiced view of the

Stoic propositions, enough remains to raise an extreme dislike to them, imless they could, without difficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of their system.

moral theory which makes

is

such a sharp distinction between what

without and

what

is

within, which

r^ards the
'

latter alone as

essential, the former as altogether indififerent,

Stoi., Alex.
.Cic.

which
iv.

Aphr. Top. 75, and

45
:

Oonf.

Tuso. iv. 34, 72, it is defined to be ^7ri;8o\5) ^A.ovoAo.s

Kiiwos ifjLipaiv6fivop and, according to Pint. C. Not. 28,

Sia
;

The and evil depend alone on the intention, and declared external
actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: ehov odv fv T& irepX aZiatp6puv T6Tr(^
8ti
T(f
liiif

Orig. c. Gels. Stoics made good

f/iipaffts
;

xdWovs

is

an incentive

to love but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of Plat. Sym. 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated robs
epour64vras

\6yi)i

(the action

taken by itself) Bvyarpiat iniyvvffSai aSi6.^op6v iffTiv^ ci KaX ^^ XP^ v Tois KaB(TTci(raLS iroAtreiots
rh
ToiovTovtroi^'tv.
' .

Kalinrodeffsws

X'^P'-v

Trapi\-fi<paiTi

aiaxpcov -navetTdat Ka-

/xerit

T^y Ovyarphs

fi&vrns

rhf ffot^hv KaroXe-

KwvyGvo^ivuv. Love is excited by a sensation of tv^vla jrpbs aperiiv, its object being to develope this capacity into real virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving, in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship

XeijUjUevoi'TracTis

rovTuv avdpdnruv
Tvarrip iTvve\ci-

yfi/Qvs Sie<p6aofi4voUf KaX ^TjTOVfnv

CI

KaBTjK6vT0}S

&

rp Bvyarpl cLTroKetrBat rh
(feral
.

birep

rov
tui/

ti^

irav

ay-

BpdyirQiv
^

y4vos.

How strictly he respected

women

chastity and modesty in

is

proved by the fragment, pre-

served by Clem. Pasdag. iii. 253, respecting the dress and c, conduct of maidens.

between

equals.

SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGIN.

attaches no value to aDything except virtuous intention, and places the highest value in being inde-

311

Ohap.
'

dependent of everything

such a moral theory must

If its prominent

of necessity prove wanting, whenever the business of

morality consists in using the senses as instruments

for expressing the

mind, and in raising natural im-

pulses to the sphere of free will.

feature

is

to allow less to the senses than naturally

is

belongs to them, there

cases, in

a danger that, in particular

so obvious, the

which intentions are not

moral importance of actions will often be ignored,

and those actions treated

as indifferent.
will

The same observation

in reference to social

have to be made with

B. Social

regard to other positions which the Stoics laid down

relations.

Not that

it

was

their intention to detach

lation to other

men.

man from his natural reOn the contrary, they held

(i) Origin,

that the further

man

provement in himself,
to society.

^ work of moral im^J^"** the stronger he will feel drawn () Uriffin

carries the

By

opposite tendencies arise in their ethics

the introduction of the idea of society, ^lai^ one towards

individual independence, the other in the direction

of a well-ordered social
is
life.

The former tendency

the earlier one, and continues throughout to pre;

dominate
troduced

still,

the latter was not surreptitiously init

nay, more,

was the logical result of the

eye of an Epicurean

Stoic principles, and to the

must have seemed a

distinctive feature of Stoicism.

In attributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism had declared man to be indepecdent of everything external, and, consequently, of

i'-i

THE

STOICS.

Chap, XII

his fellow-men.
.

But

since this value only attaches

to rational thought and intention, the freedom of

the individual at once involves the recognition of

the community, and brings with
that everyone
it

the requirement

must subordinate

his

own ends

to the

ends and needs of the community.

Eational conduct

and thought can only then

pf the individual
is

in

exist when the conduct harmony with general law

same for all rational beings. All must therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole. Man must not live for himself, but for society. ^_^ The connection between the individual and society was clearly set forth by the Stoics. The desire for
this is the

and

rational beings

society, i.bey-held", is
\

immediately involved in Teason.

By
\

the aid of reason,

man

feels

himself a part of a

whole, and, consequently, bound to subordinate his

own

interests to the interests of the whole.'

for like, this

having always an attraction

the rational soul

Like remark
the

holds true of everything endowed with reason, since

is

in all cases identical.

From

consciousness of this unity, the desire for society at

once arises in individuals endowed with reason.^ They

'

Cic. Fin. iii. 19,

64:

Mun,

dum autem censent regi nnmine

eumque esse quasi communem urbem et oivitatem hominum et Deorum et unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi

Deorum

Ep. 95, 52: The whole is a unit membra sumus corporis magni. Natuia nos cogSen.

world

natosedidit. Hence mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep.48, 2: Alterivivasopor-

esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrse anteponamus. 2 M. Awrel, ix. 9 xii. 30.
;

Hseo socienos homines hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis hxunami.
tet, si vis tibi vivere.

tas

SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR ORIGIN.

are all in the service of reason
for all,
all
;

313

there

is,

therefore,

Chap.
XII.

but one right course and one law,' and they contribute to the general welfare in obeying this

law.

The wise man,

as a Stoic expresses

it, is

never

a private man.^

At other

times, social relations were explained by

the theory of final causes.^

exists only for the sake of

Whilst everything
is

else

what

endowed with

reaexist
is

son, individual
for

beings

endowed with reason

the sake of each other. Their social connection

therefore a direct natural command.''

Towards animals

w&

Jiever stand in a j)osition to exercise justice, nor

yet towards ourselves.'

Justice can only be exercised

towards
'

other

men and
:

towards Grod.^
22 Benef. 16, 30 xi. 18
i.

On
i.

the
3,

Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data ergo et lex, qii est recta est ratio in jubendo et vetando

Cw. Legg.

12, 33

7,

Sen. Clement,
1,

2
;

vii.
;

7
;

M.
viii.

Av/rel. v.
;

vii.

55 Diog.

vii.

59 129

ix. 1

Sext.
Cic.

(see p.

241,

2)

si

lex,

jus

Math. ix. 131. * Hence, according to

Fin.
iii.

quoque. At omnibus ratio, jfus igitur datum est omnibus. Ibid. prima Est igitur 7, 23
: .

21, 69, not only axj>e\'/ifiara and PKafifiara (moral good

and

evil),

but

ebxpri(rriiiJ,aTa

and

homini cum Deo rationis

cietas.

Inter quos autem eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quse cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi
inter

soratio,

smnus.

Inter quos porro est

communio legis, inter eos oommunio juris est. Quibus autem

hsec sunt inter eos communio, et civitatis ejusdem habendi Ps.-P?M. T._^ Horn. 119: sunt. The Stoics teach i/o fiiv elvat

(other advantages and disadvantages) are all common to men. ' According to Pint. Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man could wrong himself. If, in other passages, he seems to assert the contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double meaning of
Svffxp'ncriiii.aTa

aSiKEiK,

which sometimes means

Thy

K6(TfiOV, avfjiTToMTeiiiffOai Se iy

auTij)

0eobs Kci avSpilmovs, Sixaiatpiiff^i.

'to wrong,' at others, simply Strictly speaking, 'to harm.' a relation involving justice can only exist towards another.

uvyi)s fierdxovras
2

See
;

Oic. Tus. iv. 23, 51.

Oia.

Fin.

iii.

20, 67

Off.

on p. 315, 2. Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above

CHc.

SU
Chap, XII
^

THE

STOICS.

combination of individuals and their mutual support rests all their power over nature.

single
ot

man
cTeap
~

by himself would be tha most_helpless "" "

~Turei7'"'~~

The
rational

consciousness of this connection between ail

beings finds ample expression in Marcus

Aurelius, the last of the Stoics.

The

possession of
(vi.

reason
72).

is,

with him, at once love of society

14;
feel

Rational beings can only be treated on a

social footing {koivojvikojs) (vi. 23),

and can only

happy themselves when working for the community

(viii.

7); for
(iii.

all rational

beings are related to one

social unit {-TroXiToicov
is

another

4), all

form one

^-^(fva-TTjfia),
\

of which each individual

;

an integral
(ii. 1

part (awfnrX'qpmriKos) (ix. 23)

one body, of which

(fiiXos)
is
;

every indivdual
vii.

is

an organic member
social

13).

Hence the
in

instinct

a primary

instinct

man

(vii.

55),

escery:_manifestatioa-of

wWeh-"raratrrbtrtesr'^her---det]y--r,Jjjiiix^

5QQd_a_ihfi- whole

(ix.

23).

ought to be loved from the heart.

but because the benefactor
joy
is

Our fellow-men They ought to

be benefited, not for the sake of outward decency,

penetrated with the
himself."

of benevolence, and thereby benefits

Whatever hinders union with others has a tendency

passages,
in a relation involving justice. There is, therefore {Sext. ix. 131), a justice towards the Gods, of which piety (see p. 261, 1 ) is only a
part.
*

only consider yourself a part, and not a member, of human society, oiira knh xapSlas (j>i\eU
oUttoi at xaraXny^mh&s ev<^paivei rh eiifpyfreiv ?Ti ws vp4noy ai/rh jj/iKhv iroteTs oItttu is avrbv eS ttolui/.

roij avBpdmovs

Sen,

Benef

iv, 18.

3f. Av/rel. vii.

13

If

you

SOCIAL MELATIONS: JUSTICE.

to separate the

315

all derive their life (viii.

members from the body, from which 34) and he who estranges
;

Chap.
'

himself from one of his fellow-men voluntarily severs

himself from the stock of

mankind

(xi.

8).\We

shall

pr^ently see

^at

the language used by thdNphilo-

sophiB. emperor iKguite in harmony with the S^oic principle In relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental points are insisted on by the Stoics the duty of justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero, without

(2)Jmtice
merey.

doubt following Pansetius,' describes these two virtues as the bonds which keep

human

society toge-

ther,^ and, consequently, gives to

each an elaborate

treatment.'

Inv^xpanding the^e^ duties, the Stoics

were led by the fundajnental principles of their sys-

tem

tQ

most -distracting eo^seqiiences.

hand, they required from their wise

justice

ances

;*

which knows no pity and hence their ethical system had about

On the one men that strict and can make no allowit

an air of austerity, and an appearance of severity

and cruelty.

On

the other hand, their principle of

all

the natural connection of

mankind imposed on
and unre-

them the

practice of the most extended

served charity, of beneficence, gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited benevolence, and a readiness to for*

See
Off.

p. 298, 3.
i.

tribus autem leliquis [virtutibus, the thiee others besides understanding] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitse quasi com'

7,

20

De

tutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia,

quam eandem
tem
*
*

vel benignilavel liberalitatem appellari

Oflf. i.

licet.

7-13

il.

14-17.

munitascontinetur,oujuspartes duse sunt justitia, in qua vir:

See

p. 254, 2, 3.

THE
Chap,
XII.

STOICS.
is

give in

all cases

in -whicli forgiveness

possible.

This last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears principally in

the later Stoics they

in Seneca, Epictetus,
;'

Marcus AureHus, and Musonius

sible that
it

and, it is quite pos-

may hav^

given more jjrominence to

than their predecessors.

But the

fact is there,

that this aspect Is due, not only to the peculiar character of these individuals, but is based

on the

spirit

and tone of the whole system.^

The

qijestion then na,turally ariseSj'tp.w these

two

opposites

may

be reconciled

how stern

jiistice

may
Not
;

be harmonised with forgiveness and mercy.

Seneca,
:

who

investigated the question fully, replies

severity,

but only cruelty,

is

is

opposed to mercy
:

for
will

no one virtue

opposed to another

a wise

man

always help another in distress, but without sharing

his emotion, without feeling misery or

compassion

he will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and

improve

he will not remit punishments in cases in

which he knows them to be deserved, but, from a

sense of justice, he will take
c'bnsideration

in allotting

punishments, and

human weakness into make

;

every-^ossible allowance for circumstances.*

difficully.is not, indeed,
still,

Every removed by these statements those which remain apply more to the Stoic
for
shall

demand
'

apathy than to the reconciliation of

subsequently

We

have occasion to prove this in

detail. It may here suffice to ref er to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De dementia, and De Ira. On the value of

Nullam ex omnibus 3, 3) virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit nulla humai.
:

nior.
'

Conf.
i.

Pansetius,
ii.

in

Cie.

Off.
'

26, 88.

mercy, he remarks (De Clem.

De Clem.

5-8.

SOCIAL RELATIONS: FRIENDSHIP.

the two virtues which regulate our relations to our
fellow-men.'

317

Chap.
"

The

society for

which

all rational

beings are in- wFriend-

tended will naturally be found to exist principally

among
All

those

who have become

alive to their rational

nature and destiny

in other words, among the wise.

life,

who
love

are wise and virtuous are friends, because

they agree in their views of

all

one

another's

virtue.^

and because they Thus every ac-

tion of

a wise

of every other wise

express
it, if .a

man contributes to the well-being man or, as the Stoics pointedly wise man only makes a rational move-

ment with

his finger,

he does a service to

all

wise

men throughout the world.* On the other only a wise man knows how to love properly
friendship only exists between wise men.*

hand,
;

true

Only the

wise
'

man
Among

possesses the art of

the
points cha-

making

friends,' since

^
;

raoteristic of Stoicism, the cea-

sure deserves notice which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3 95, 33 Tranq. An. on gladiatorial 2, 13) passes
;

shows and the

Roman thirst for war. (Bp. 95, 30.) The attitude of the Stoics to slavery and the demand for love of enemies will be considered hereafter. 2 Stob. ii. 184 T<jy t iii6. miav iTrKTriiixriv ihai kowwv tryaSav, Sih /cal Tois ffTrouSafouj irkcras 6fjLoyottt aW-fiKois Sia rh trvfiL<pa:ve'iv iv rots Kari, rhv jSiox.
:

nobis diligetur. See Off. i. 17, Conf. p. 309, 3. 55. ' Plut. C. Not. 22, 2. The same thought ia expressed in the statement (ibid. 33, 2) that the wise man is as useful to deity (the universe) as deity is
to him. Sen. Benef vii. 12, 2 ; Bp. 81, 11 123, 15 9, 5; Stob. ii. 118 see p. 271, 3. Diog. 124. According to Diog. 32, Zeno, like Socrates, was blamed for asserting that only the good
.

(o-jrouSaiot)

among themselves

Oic.

N. D.

i.

44, 121

Censent

[Stoici] sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a

autem

are feUow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the bad are enemies and strangers, ' He is, as Sen. Ep. 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitia-

rum

artifex.

318

THE
love
is

STOICS.
If,

Chap,
XII.

only

won by

love.'

however, true friendits

ship

is
is

a union between the good and the wise, thereby at once established
;

value

and hence

it is

distinctly

enumerated among goods by the

Stoics.^

On

this point, difficulties reappear.

How can
is

this

need of society be reconciled with the wise man's

freedom from wants
cient,
?

If the wise

man

self-suffi-

how can another help him ? How can he stand in need of such help ? The answers given by Seneca are not satisfactory. To the first question, he replies,
that none but a wise

man

can give the right induce-

ment

to a wise

man

to call into exercise his powers.'

He

meets the second by saying, that a wise

himself for happiness, but not for
life.^

man

suf-

fices

Every-

where the wise

action
;

man

finds

inducements to virtuous

if friendship is

not a condition of happiall.

ness, it is not a

good at

observations more satisfactory.

says,''

Nor are his further The wise man, he

still

does not wish to be without friends, but

Kark
tois
-rhv
fiiov,
iis

Si vis amari, ama, says Hecato, in Sen. Bp. 9, 6. 2 We have already enoountered friendship in the Stoic list of goods. See p. 230, 3.
'

xp"!'^^'""'

w"

<pt\ois

eourois

(^JDiog.

12i). Similar definitions are given by Stoi. of varieties of

friendship
k.t.K.

7(pi/n<iT7)s, o-uWjfleio,

186, says, more accurately, that friendship, for the sake of

;SicJ.

the commonwealth, is not a good, Sia rb ixffiir kittiiiTTiiK6TWv i.yaSiiv flvai on the other hand, friendship, in the sense of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods in the sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual goods. On the value of friendship, Sen. 99, 3. Friendship is defined as /toivaiWa Piov (^Stob. 130) Kowuipla -ruv
; ;

the absolute community of goods among friends, see Sen. Bp. 47, 2 3, 2 ; Benef
;

On

vii. 4, 1
'
'

12, 1.

Ep. 109, 3 and 11. Ep. 9, 13 Se coutentus est sapiens ad beate vivendum,
:

non ad vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud tantum auimo
sano et ereoto et despiciente fortunam. ' Ep. 9, 5.

SOCIAL RELATIONS: FRIENDSHIP.

he can be without friends.
loss of happiness.

319
is

But the question

is

not

Chap.
^^^'

whether he com be, but whether he can be without

If the question so put

answered
is

in the negative, it follows that the wise

man

not

altogether self-sufficing

if

in the affirmative

and

a wise man, as Seneca affirms, will bear the loss of a friend with calmness, because he comforts himself

with the thought that he can have another at any

moment

then friendship
man

is

not worth much. More-

over, if a wise

can help another by communi-

cating to

man

is

him information and method, since no wise omniscient,' we ask, Is not a wise man, if not

in possession of all knowledge, at least in possession of all knowledge contributing to virtue and happiness ? If it be added, that

what one learns from

is

another he learns by his own powers, and

conse-

quently himself helping himself, does not this addition

is
still

overlook the fact that the teacher's activity

?

the condition of the learner's

True and beautiful

its

as is the

language of Seneca
;

Friendship has

value

in itself alone

every wise
;

man must

wish to find

those like himself

the good have a natural love for

the good

the wise

man

needs a friend, not to have

a nurse in sickness and an assistant in trouble, but to have someone whom he can tend and assist, and
for

whom

he can

live

and die^

nevertheless, this

language does not meet the critical objection, that

one who requires the help of another, be it only to have an object for his moral activity, cannot be wholly

dependent on himself.
Sen. Ep. 109, 5.

If friendship, according to a
^

Ep. 109, 13

9,

8 10, 12 ; 18.
;

: :

THE
Chap.

STOICS.
belongs to external
sense,

previously-quoted distinction,'
goods, it

makes man, in a certain

If its essence
is

dependent

on externals.

placed in an inward

disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends

on the existence of those

Besides,
cated,
it

for

whom

it

can be

felt.

involves the necessity of being recipro-

to such

and of finding expression in outward conduct, an extent that it is quite subversive of the
is the friendship of the wise the only form which appeared to the Stoics necessary

absolute independence of the individual.

Nor yet
of
society

and
law,

essential.

If

man is

intended

to associate with

his fellow-men in a society regulated

by justice and

how can he withdraw from the most common

institution

the

state

If virtue does not consist

in action, how dare he promoting good and represlife ? ^

in idle contemplation, but

lose the opportunity of
^

sing evil by taking part in political

See p. 318, 2. rhv yip v6nov Stoh. ii. 208 eXvoLi, KaBdirep iXirofnv, airov^aTov, dfioiws Sf Kat T^y ir6\tv. iKavws
'

If laws

wp^tp
Sen.

Trepl ^iofv
4ir^

Kal yctp KaKiav

itpopp.ijffstt'.

itpe^etv KaX

aperijv
:

De

Ot. 3, 2

Epicurus ait

non accedet ad rempublicam

sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit.

Sfr

Koi KKeiivdTis vep\ rh irvov5a7ov

eTyai

t^v n6\iy \6yov

irdKis
/Aei'

TtptitT7i(re

Zenon

ait

accedet ad rempub:

(wrongly struck out by Meineke) fffriv

i

rovTov

oiKTiT'fipiov

KaTOffKevofffjia

els

tt

licam, nisi si quid impedierit. Cie. Fin. iii. 20, 68 Since man exists for the sake of other
est huic natures, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura yivat, uxorem adjungere et velle ex ealiberos procreare. Stob. ii. 184 t6 re
:

Karatl>G{iyovTas ?ffTt SfKtjv 5oui/at

men,

consentaueum

Kal XajSeTc, ovk offreTov

iffrlv; Floril.

Br]

irdKis

44, 12.

See pp.
:

241, 3. Plut. Sto. Kep. 2, 3 Chrysippus recommends political

;

223

"

placing fitos (rxo^airrtKhs on the same footing with $los r]SoviK65. JKog. vii. 121 ttoKilife,
:

5lKat6i/
Betrei.

tpatTi

tpiffci

tlvai Kal fi^

kv6fifvov 5^ toiJtois {map^

TiviffQai
KutKij}^

(\>atriv

rhv aotphy

tiv fiij

tl iv

X^iv Kal rb voMreiefrBai rhy troiphy Kol rh vofiodeTeiv T Kal trai.

Sts

<p7i(ri

XpifftTTiros

Beieiv iivOptitnovs, k.t,\.

SOCIAL RELATIONS: THE FAMILY.

further the well-being
if

321

and security of the

'

citizensi

Chap.

they advance virtue and happiness, how can the\

XIL
'

wise

man fail
?
'

to regard

them as

beautiful and praise-

worthy

For the same

his respect.

reason,

command

He
men

will neither

matrimony will deny himself

of-

a union so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive the state of relays of

nor society

the sight of

well-ordered family life.^ Hence, in their writings and

precepts, the Stoics paid great attention to the state

and

to domestic

life.^

In marriage they required

and moderation. Love was to be a matter of reason, not of emotion not a yielding to personal
chastity,

attractions, nor a seeking sensual gratification.'

As"^

'

Cic.

Legg.

ii.
:

5, 11.

founding a family
love.
=

love for

koI ya/iiia'eiv, is 6 Ziivav t^Tjaly ^v iroAire^a, KOL

iroiSoiroi^ireo-flai.

'

Diog. Ibid.

wife and children is the deepest

Pint. Sto. Eep. 2. 1 i-rd TvoWh. jucv, &3S 4v \6yois,
:

IMd. 120 The

:

Stoics consider love towards children, parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in Eie^'on. Ad. Jovin. i. 191) The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus
:

Tolvvv

avT^

Z-fivcai/i,

7ro\\ct Se KA.(i*'0ei,

irAeitTTa 5e Xpvffitnrtft yeypafJLfiei/a

Tvy)(6.vei TTfpl iroAiTcfas Koi
^/);^EO'0ai

rov

KaX &pxety Kal StKa^fLv Kai ptfropeieiv. Conf. the titles

Antira/i^\ios and TeveflXios. pater (whether the well-known pupil of Diogenes of Seleucia, or the younger Stoic Antipater
of Tyre
ii.

mentioned by
:

Cio. Off.

not stated) in Stob. Wife and child Ploril. 67, 25 are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic life a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the purest. Musonius (^Ibid.
24, 86, is
;

in Diog. vii. 4 ; 166 175 178. Diogenes's list contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to be incomplete ; for Diog. vii. 34 131, quotes Chrysippus's trea; ; ;

tise

irepl

iro\iT6ias,

also quoted'

by

treatise Flut. Sto. Eep.

A philo67, 20, Conf. 75, 15) sopher ought to be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and discharge duties as a citizen by his
:

21 (1, 3, 5). According to Cio. Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Pansetius were the only Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars respecting
legislation, though others might have written much on politics. " Conf. the fragment of &. De Matrimonio, in Hieron. Ad.

322

THE
know

STOICS.
state,

Chap.
XII.

to their views on the constitution of a

'

that they prefer a miKed pounded of the three simple forms, without objecting to other forms of government. The wise man, accoiistitution,

we com-

cording to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling

of a prince, if his interest so require, and, if he can-

not govern himself, will reside at the court and in

.

camp of princes, particularly of good princes.'' \,_ The ideal of the Stoics, however, was not realised
the

in any one of the existing forms of government-hut.

inJhaJL4iolity-jaf.JJifi.j8dse-*hit5h-'EeinT-4eaM4b^ -mj-

dfluhtedly

when a

.C^c,^.-.^afe wi*A-^as-fully-eet

forttr "by 6'hrjgiyjpu.M^^

state without marriage, or

family, or temples, or courts, or public schools, or

coins
'

state excluding

no other

states,

because

all

differences of nationality

common

have been merged in a brotherhood of all men.' Such an ideal may

show that, for the Stoic philosophers, there could be no hearty sympathy with the state or the family, their al state being, in truth, no longer a state. Indeed,
Jovin. i. 191, Fr. 81 Haase, which, like the Essenes, requires absolute abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also preserved by Chrysippus's treatise on the education of children. See Qwmtil. Inst. i. 11, 17 1, 4 and 16 3, 14 10, 32 Saguet, De Chrys. (Annal. Lovan. iv. p. 335). He is reproached by Posidonius ( Galen. Hipp, et Plat. v. 1, p. 465) for neglecting the first germs of education, particularly those previous to birth.
;

'

JDiog. vii. 131.

Pint. Sto. Rep. 20, 3-5

;

30, 3
'
* *

C. Not. 7, 6.

Diog. vii. 4. Diog. vii. 131. Diog. 33 Kouds

:

re

yhp

IwiuKas

SoyfiaTl^fiv ifuiias iv rrj

Tlo\iTfiif Ko! Karh, Tois SiaKocrlovs

trrixovs, M^fl' lepi niire SiKaariipia.

/i^Tf

yvfivdiria
. .

iy
.

rats

Tri\itriv
S"

oiKoSoneurBai

v6iu(Tna

oSt'

oA\o7fls
131.

'iviKfv oU<r6ai Stti/

nara-

(TKevd^fiv oir' inroSiinias.

Ibid
p. 329.

PImt. Alex. Virt.

i. 6,

SOCIAL RELATIONS: PUBLIC LIFE.

the whole tone of Stoicism, and
still

328
cir-

more, the

Chap. YTT

cumstances of the times to which

it owed its rise and growth, were against such a sympathy. If Plato could find no scoj)^ for a philosopher in the political

institutions of his tinje,

how could

a Stoic, seeking

as he did for happiness

more

exclusively in seclusion

"ii^om the world, contrasting, too, the wise

man more
for

sharply with the multitude of

fools,

and living

the mositvpart under political circumstances far less

favourable
private
life

than Plato had enjoyed?

of a philosopher

To him the

must have seemed be-

yond compare more attractive than a public career. An intelligent man, taking advice from Chrysippus,'
avoids

business

he withdraws to peaceful retire-

ment

and, though he

may

consider it his duty not

to-^tand aloof from public

life, still

he can only ac-

tively take a part in it in states which present an

appreciable progress towards perfection.^

But where

could such states be found

Did not Chrysippus state it as his conviction that a statesman must either -Aiid|, displease the Gods or displease the people?^
?

did not later Stoics accordingly advise philosophers

not to intermeddle at
Plut. Sto. Kep. 20, 1

all

in civil matters ?

Labour

'

oXnm

iiupaivoiaais Tivh.
rtis

irpo/coTrJjc itphs

yap $yuye rhv

<fip6vtfwv Kal atrpd-

Te\eias irnAiTcias.

yfjiOvaehmKal6\iyo'irpdyfiovaKal tA aiirov irpdrreLVf dfiolws rris re

aliTowpayia! Kol S\iy(nrpayiw(rivris affTcluv tvruv t^ yap htni ipaivtTatbKarhr^v7]ffvxlav ^ios h.iiiv. . .

' Stob. Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew from public life, he

replied

TeiJejat [

Sitirt el fiiv iryj/Tjpa TroAt-

fferot], to*s 60is

aTro-

TE Kol aa(^a\h ^X""! "''A. Stob. Bel. ii. 186 ttoKireieffQat thv troiphv Kal fiAXttTTa iv
i<iv6v
'
:

peVei, ei Sc xflTToi, tois TroKWais.

rals

TOiairaif

iroAiTei'ais

tois

Sen. Ep. 29, 11 Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet virtus ? mails artibus popularis
*
:

T 2

324

THE
for the
is

STOICS.
only^then a duty
;"T)utj as

Chap.
XII.

commonwealth

is

when there

ne obstacle to such labour

a matter of

"fact, there is always

some

obstacle, an^ifi particular,

the condition of

all existing states.^

philosopher

who

teaches and improves his fellow-men benefits

the state quite as mijch as a warrior, an administrator, or

(*) Prac-

civil functionary.^

Following out this

idea,' Epictetus

dissuadgsirom

tical oAiersion to political

life.

matrimony and the begetting

that the family relation
nity of wise

of children.

Allowing
other-

may be admitted in a commuof opinion that

;

men, he

is

it

is

wise under existing circumstances

for

how can
?

true philosophetjBiigage in connections and actions

which withdraw him from the service of God

last

The

expression alrejidy

implies that unfavourable

times were not the only cause deterring this Stoic

from caring
limited one

for family of ,the state,

but that the

occupation in itself seemed to

;

him a subordinate and

in plain terms

this is even

stat^
autem

by
sa-

quseritur. Similem te facias oportet conciliari nisi turpi ratione amor turpium non potest. ' Sen. De Ot. 3, 3, p. 320, 8 It needs a special cause for devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem ilia late patet si respuhlica corruptior est quam

favor
illi
:

interest,

quomodo

piens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicse, si omnibus defutura respublica est. (So we ought to punctuate.) Semper autem deerit fastidiose quEerentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit
accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, etc. 1 Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam, quse

ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est mails ... si parum habebit [sc. sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nee ilium admissura erat respublica, si valetudo ilium impediet. Ibid. 8, 1 Negant
. ;

ad quamlibet rempublioam accessurum quid

nostri sapientem
:

sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in Sen. Tranq. An. 3, 2. 2 Athenodor. 1. c. 3, 3.
''

Diss.

iii.

22, 67.

SOCIAL MELATIONS: PUBLIC LIFE.

Seneca and Epictetus
too limited
verse
; '
:

325
citizefl

He who feels

himself a

Chap.
XII.

of the wprld finds in an individual state a sphere far

he
is

prefers devoting himself to the uni-

man

no douht intended to be active, but

is intellectual research.'*

the highest' activity

On

the

subject of civil society, opinions were likely to vary,

according to th\ peculiarities and circumstances of

individuals.
likely

The p&ilosopher on the throne was more

feel himself

than the freedvjnan Epictetus to

a citizen of

Eome

as

\^>ell

as a citizen of the world,^

and to lower the demaOi^s made on a philosophic statesman.* At the same time, the line taken by the
Stoic philosophy cannot be ignored.
' Sen. De Otio, 4, 1 Duas respTiblicas animo compleotamur, alteram maguam et vere
:

philosophy

publicam, qua Di atque homines

continentux, in

quanon ad liunc angulmn respicimus aut ad il:

ium, sed terminos civitatis nostrse cum sole metimux alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi. Does it not seem like reading Augustin's De Civitate Some serve the great, Dei 1 others the small state; some serve both. Majori reipublioae et in otio deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio Bp. 68, 2: Cum samelius.

does busy himself, not consulting the citizens of one city alone for the purpose of obtaining information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the citizens of the world, that vrith them he may converse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery.
TrihLKaiTT}V voKireiav iroKlT^vffafievov afBptiTrov, a{i
7ro\tTei5ffTai';
fjLOi

irvyddvri, ei

wSov

fiou

Koi,

el

6/)|ef ttolAlv ipa ffof f^tope, Ttoiav

apx^iv fi.el(ova ^s fipx^i Sen. De Otio, 5, 1

'

;.

6, i.

Marcus Awelim,
&s
[.lev
7]
'Ifcifj.7j,

vi.

44

n6Kis KoX irarpls

fiot

^Avravitp
d

pientirempublicamipsodignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam etiamsi

recesserit : immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in majora atque ampliora transit, &C:

i)S

Se

ajAdptti-iTCi}

k6itiios.

to.

rats TrdKetriv oZv to6iioi

rais di(pe\i^a, fi6va iffrl

ii.

hjaBd.

5
*

TTtitrfis

Spas tpp^vrtQe anKal &ppTiv.

:

^apS)s

5)S 'PwfjLoios

Do you iii. 22> 83 whether a wise man will busy himself with the state 1 What state could be greater than the one about, which he:E^et. Diss.
iask
:

Ibid. ix. 29 ipuria-oy 4^v Bib&Tat Kal /jtii irepi^Aejrou et Tty elfffcTOi fjLTiSk r^v XiKdrwvos 7ro\U reiav IXirife, aAAa apKou ti rh flpaxuraTOv itpiaun.

326

-.

THE

STOICS.

"

Chap, xir

which attaches moral value to the cultivation of intentions only, considering at the same time all external circumstances as indifferent, can hardly produce
a taste or a
terests
I

skill for

overcoming those outward in-

chiefly

and circumstances with which a politician is concerned. A system which regards the mass
as fools,

of

which denies to them every healthy endeavour and all true knowledge^ can hardly bring
unreseryedly to work for a state, the coiirse

men

itself

and
of

institutioils

its

of which depend upoii,the majority members, and are planned with a view to their

needs, prejudices, and customs.

Undoubtedly, there

were able statesmen among the Stoics of the

period
;

Koman

but Eome, and not Stoicism, was the Cause

of their statesmanship.

Taken

alone. Stoicism cotild

form excellent men, but hardly excellent statesmen. And, looking to

the
facts,

not one of the old masters of

office.

School ever had or desired any public

Hence, when their opponents urged that retirement was a violation of their principles,' Seneca could with
justice

meet the charge by replying, that the true meaning of their principles ought to be gathered
from their actual conduct.^

(c)

cm

The

positive

substitute

wherewith the

Stoics
civil

zensMp
of the world.

thought to replace the ordinary relations of

society was by a citizenship of the world.

No

prediffi-

ceding system had been able to overcome the

culty
of nationalities.

Even Plato and

Aristotle

shared the prejudice of the Greeks against foreigners.

'

, *

De

Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 1. Otio, 6, 5 ; Tranq. An.

1,

10.

'

SOCIAL MELATIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM.

The Cynics alone appear
as

327

the precursors of

the!

Chap.

Stoa, attaching slight value to the citizenship of anyparticular state, in comparison with citizenship of \ Still, with the Cynics, this idea had not

xn.

the world.'

'\

attained to the historical

importance which afterit

wards belonged to
of

it

nor was

used so

much

with

a positive meaning, to express the essential oneness

all

mankind,

as, in

a negative sense, to imply the

philosopher's

independence of country and home.

it first

From

the Stoic philosophy

received a definite
service.

meaning, and became generally called into

The causes

of this change

may be

sought, not only in

the historical surroundings amongst which Stoicism

grew up, but

easier
likes,

also in the person of its founder.

Far

was

it for

philosophy to overcome national dis-

after the genial

Macedonian conqueror had

united

the vigorous nationalities comprised within

'

his monarchy, not only under a central government,

but also in a

common

culture.^

Hence the
to, to

Stoic

citizenship of the world

may be

appealed

prove

the assertion, that philosophic Schools only reflect

the existing facts of history.

On

the other hand,

| I

taking into account the bias given to a philosopher's teaching by his personal circumstances, Zeno, being
only half a Greek, would be more ready to underesti-

mate the distinction of Greek and barbarian than any one of his predecessors. However mucEtliese two causes and, in parti-

' See Socrates Schools, p. 324.

and Sooratic
is

indicated by Plutarch's grouping the Stoics and Alexander

together.

This connection

already

: ,

28

THE
cular,

STOICS.
have contrihuted to brine

Chap, XTT

the

first

must

L_ about the Stoic ideal of a citizenship of the world, nevertheless the connection of this idea with the
whole of their system
society, as
is

most obvious.

If

human
for

we

have seen, has for its basis the identity

of reason in individuals,

what ground have we

limiting this society to a single nation, or feeling ourselves

All

more nearly related to some men than to others? men, apart from what they have made themselves
all
'

by their own exertions, are equally near, since

equally participate in reason.
All are

members of

one body

for

one and the same nature has fashioned,

them
tiny.'

all

from the same elements for the same des-

.Or, as-^piotetafr-expressfisitin religiQius_lan-

guage^ all- ifteB are -brethren, since' all have in the ame -iifigre God^fer-iheir. father. Man, therefore, who and whatever else he may be, is the object of
our solicitude, simply as being a man.^

No

hoaLlUty

and

ill lre atmnt-hcmld-'qTiengh--trur-beBevolenee.'*

No-

Sen. Ep. 95, 52 ; M. Aurel. 2 313. 2 Diss. i. 13, 3. Seep. 381, 2. ' Sen. Bp. 96, 52, continues after the quotation in p. 312, 2 Ex illius. [naturse] constitutione miserius est nocere quam Isedi. Ex illius imperio paratas sint juvantis manus. Die versus et in peotore et in ore sit homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. V, Be. 24, 3 Hominibus prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an libertini, justae libertatis an inter amioos datae quid ref ert ?

Nemo

non, cui alia desint,

See

p. 312,

hominis Bomine apud

me gratiosns est. De Ira, i. 6. * Sen. De Otio, i. 4 see p. Stoici nostri dicimt . . 256, 4
: : .

non desinemus communi bono operamdare, adjuvare singulos.

opem

f erre etiam inimicis. shall subsequently meet with

We

similar explanations from Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus In particular, SeneAurelius.

oa's treatise,

De
:

Ira,

deserves

to be mentioned here, Quid pecially i. 5, 2

aliornm amantius
festius
t

and eshomine quid ira in-

Ubicumque homo
ficii

est, ibi

locus est.

De

beneClem. i. 1

mutuum

in adjutorium genitus est, ira in exi-

Homo

; :

SOCIAL RELATIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM.

oae.ia.aQ low.feut that

329

jtrstice'^f his fellow-men.'

"^serving our
hjffTtghtsA

^jsteeffl^

he has claims on the. love .and Even the -slave is a man and able to claim from us

Chap.
XII.

Nor yet did the

prove of slavery.

^ Stoics go so far in their recogni-

tion of the universal rights of

mankind

as to disaplittle

Attaching in general

value

to external circumstances,' they cared the less to

run

Hie congregari vult, ilia discedere. Hie prodesse, ilia noeere. Hie etiam ignotis suetium.
currere, ilia etiam

nes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuas, libertines, servos, reges,

carissimos
:

perdere. IHd. ii. 32, 1 It is not so praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic vinoi turpe est, hie vincere. lohumanum verbum est ultio et talio. Magni animi est injuxias despioere. Couf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88 Violent anger towards ene. . . :

Non eligit domum neo censum, nude homine contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man. Only the body belongs to his lord his heart belongs to himexules.
;

self, c. 20.

The duties
limits,

of the

slave

have

and over

nihil mies must be blamed enim laudabilius, nihil magno

:

et prseelaro viro dignius placabilitate atque dementia. Even

against them stand certain definite rights (c. 21. Conf. De Clement, i. 18, 2). He enumerates many instances of selfsacrifice and magnanimity in slaves, and concludes by saying Eadem omnibus principia
:

when

necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in auger, since such

severity
is

origo, nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingen-

eademque
. .

an emotion cannot be allowed

at
all.
>

unus omnium parens ium neminem desmundns est

.
. . .

See p. 254, 1. Sen. Ep. 95, 52.

See
41.

p.

328, 3.
''

do.
1.

Off.
:

i.

1.3,

Even towards Cic. slaves, justice must be observed.

e.

Here, too, belongs the question, discussed at full by Sen. Benef iii. 18-28, Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he can, says Beneea (18, 2), is ignarus juris humani. Kefert enim cujus animi sit, qui prsestat, non nulli prseclusa cujus status
:

pexeris sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum homines: erigite'audacter animos, et quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas, &c. So Ep. 31, 11 V. Be. 24, 3. See p. 328, 3. Conf. Ep. 44 Rank and birth are of no consequence, and p.
. . .
:

270, 3.
'

Only the

wise

man

is

really free ; all wise are fools.

who

are not

virtus est,

omnibus patet, om-

; . '

330

THE
of their age.

STOICS.

Chap.
XII.

counter to the social institutions and arrangements

Still

they could not wholly suppress a

is

confession that slavery,

unjust,"*-

nor cease to aim

equ&l, all
is

at mitigating the evil both in theoryxand practice.^ If all

men

are, as rational bejngs,

men
com-

together form one community.

iJeason

tihe

mon law
therefore,

for all, and. those

who owe
state.*
its

allegiance to

one law are members of one

If the Stoics,

compared the wbrid, in

must,yith

more extended
have allowed

sense,^to a soci&ty, because df^ the connection of- its

^parts,^ "Wjey

far more' reason,

th^t the world, in the narrower s^nse of the term,

including

all rational beings,

forms one community,'

' Diog. 122, at least, calls 5emroTe(a, the possession and government of slaves, some-

and Plut. Com. Not. 34, 6, who makes the Stoics assert tIw k6(t:

fjiov

elvaL 7r6\tv koX

voKlras
:

roijs

thing bad. * According to Sen. Benef iii. 22, 1, Oic. 1. c, Chrysippus had defined a slave, perpetuus meroenarius and hence inferred that as such he ought to be treated operam exigendam, Sen. Bp. 47, justa prsebenda. expresses a very humane view
;
:

aiTTepas.
. . ,

&>S

M. Awrel. x. 15 ^T\<tov ip Tr6\et T^ K6fffitfi. iv.

iv. 4,
:

& K6ff}ios 5)ffave\ ir^Kis.

'

M. Awel.

and

ii.

16.

20, 67 Chrysippus asserts that men exist for the

do. Fin. iii.

of treating slaves, contrasting a man with a slave servi sunt

:

homines. He regards a slave as a friend of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power, speaks of himself as conservus.

immo

sake of each other quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humane quasi civile jus intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum justum,qui migraret, injustxmi fore. Therefore, in the sequel in urbe mundove communi. See 331, 2 and p.
;
:

312,

2.

Sen.

De
.

Ira,

ii.

31, 7
:

4 ei rb voepbv iifuv Koiyht/, Kot & \6yos Koff* tv KoyiKot ia^ev KotvSs e( Tovro, Kal
'

M. Awrel.

iv.

Nefas est nocere patriae ergo civi quoque ergo et homini, nam hie in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in
. .

S TTfiOffTCMTlKhs

T&V

TTOiTIT^aV

fj fxi]

\6yos Koiv6s
Koiv6s.
ei
fi

toOto, Kal & vofios TOvro, Tro\7ral iff^ev

ei

Stoi. Floril. 40, 9) i/o/i(f [<S 4iritK^s'\ elvai voKittjs ttjs tov
:

TOUTO, tro\iTe^fiaT6s nvos fiereXOfiev 1 T0V70, d K6afios ^iTav(\

<

Aihs v6\sus f) ffvvetTTijKev i^ h.V' BpdTTwv re Koi Beav. JEpiet. Diss, iii. 5, 26 ; Ar. Didym. in Eus.
Pr. Bv. XV. 16, 4.

See pp. 312,

1,

325, 3,

'

SOCIAL RELATIONS: COSMOPOLITANISM.

to

331

which individual communities are related, as the

-s,

chap.
^^^-

houses of a city are to the city collectively^

Wise

men, at least, if not others, will estpem this great community, to which all men belong, far above any particular community in which the accident of birth
has placed them.^
efforts

They," at least, will direct their

all

towards making

men
;

feel

themselves

to^

be

citizelis^f one

community

and, instead of framing

exclusive laws and constitutions, will try to live as

one family, under the

common governance

of reason.'

The platform of
universal width.

social propriety receives hereby a

outer world into

Man, by withdrawing from the the recesses of his own intellectual

becomes enabled to recognise everyfeel

and moral
self

state,

where the same nature as his own, and to

himthe

one with the universe, by sharing with

it

same nature and the same destiny. But, as yet, the moral problem
'

is

not exhausted.

M. Aurel.
^s al

iroXiTTjc
TT\s

i.vBpomov iii. 11 ^VTO jr6\ias rfis avmrd:

is

neither an Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply Kiaiuos

Xoiirtii

Tr6\its

&(nrep

oiKiai EiViV.
*

and uths Qeoii. Muson. 1. c. Banishment is no evil, since

Koty^ Trarpls Avflptiirwz' a-Kdvrtav b
Kdaitos

Sen.

De

See
5
:

p. 325, 1.

Ep. 68, 2.. Ot. 4 Vit. B. 20, 3 and

;

iarlv.
2,

Unum me
. .

[natura

omnis
Deos.

donavit omnibus rerum] et uni mihi patriam meam esse

.

Parad.

no

It is, says Cie. eril for those qui

omnem orbem

terrarum

unam

mundum

sciam

et

praesides
:

Ideo Tranq. An. 4, 4 magno animo nos non unius urbis mtienibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis cojnmercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum prof essi sumus, ut lioeret latiorem virtuti campum dare. lUd. Bpict. Diss. iii. 22, 83. i. 9 If the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man
:

uirbem esse ducunt. " Flut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6, p. 329 xol iihv v iro\h Savim^qnivn iro\iTeia rod rrjv ^twikuv aipuriv
;

Ka-rafiaKKoiiivov
/cori
ir(iA.ij

Zi\vmvos
(card

eis

%v
/li)

toBto awTelva xepdKaiov, tva

firiSh

Siifiovs

oiKuiuei', iSIois

emaaroi Sutipiirnevoi

SiKodois,

&AAa vdvras avBp^ovs

itai

Tiy^iieBa Sjj/iiJtoj koI iroAiTas, tls

Se fitos

Kiaiios, &irirep i.ye\ris

Tp6(/>o/*'j/5is.

(Tuvyd/iov p6it^ Koivif


12

THE
'

STOICS.

Chap.

Reason, the same as man's, rules pure and complete

in the universe
;

and

if it is

the business of

man

to

give play'tq reason in his

own conduct, and

it

to re-

cognise it inH^at of othei;^,

is

also his

duty to

subordinate himself to collective reason, and to the

course of the world, over which it\presides.
clusion, therefore, the relation of

In con-

man

to the course

of the world must be considered.

Firmly as the principles of the Stoic ethics inupon moral conduct, those ethics, judged, by their whole tone, cannot rest short of requiring an
sist

absolute resignation to the course of the universe.

This requirement

is

based quite as

much upon

the

historical surroundings of their system as

intellectual principles.
tical

freedom was

stifled

upon its How, in an age in which poliby the oppression of Macedo-

nian,

and subsequently of Roman domiuion, even that of the Roman conquerors being suppressed under the despotism of imperalism, in which Might, like a
living fate, crushed

every attempt at independent

action

how,

in such an age, could those aiming at

higher objects than mere personal gratification have

any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to

the course of circumstances which individuals and
nations were alike powerless to control a
?

In making

dogma

of fatalism. Stoicism was only following the

current of the age.

Atthe same
said, it

time,, asjyill be

seen from what has been

was -only following

the iiecessary .consequences

-of its -

wa -.principles.
only the

-All that is individual in the world -beiag

reBiilt-e-f---general-eoMieefein '^-arufie.aad,_ffect

MAN AND THE

bein g o nly
-a

WORLD'S COVRSE.

333

carrying out of a^miyersal Jaw^r^cbaL-

Chap.

:remaiii^-pDS8ifele^m.theiace.Qf, JJiia absolute peeefr-

^_

sityrbnt -to-yieW-uiicoiiditioiiaily

Hott tsarn-yield-

ing baialled_a,_
yii4fl~UL^nnf>ii"ng

sacrifice ,
Ipsjs t|ba.n

when the

lawJ;a,jjMclL-we the PYprpssinn f)f jPflfnt) ?

"ifeiree designation to the world's course

was a point

chiefly insisted
Tfag-rei-ses of

upon

in the Stoic doctrine of morality.

lmBthe8-,^in'Whtar1ir'gi(rtm.itymth,d,estiiiy

out-.ieaetxe.ia the leading, of

a-re-a-theBae

repeatedly worked out by the writers of this. SchooL

The virtuous man, they

say, will honour;

God by

re-

signing his will to the divine will

the divine will

;

he will think better than his own will

he will refollow

member

that under

all
is

circumstances

we must

destiny, but that it

the wise man's prerogative to

that there
is

follow of his to happiness

own accord;

only one

way

and independence that of willing nothing except what is in the nature of thingsji^iil
-fftrnt

will 'nnUnn I'trnlf inrlnpnnrlpTifjy pf pyi- will

Z.-^
.

'

In Epictet.
fully,
4,

Man.

o. iv.

53

bere se fato.

more
131;
ySe.

Ihid. Diss.

1,

34; and translated by Ep. 107, 11. Seep. 182, 1.

:

The verses are

fi,ivi\

S70U 5e /t' S ZeS Ka\ ah/

8iriw
TTofl"

t\

ritirpa-

viuv

ei/xi

SioTeroy-

jnej/os

Vit. Be. 15, 5 sequere. Quas autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi? Quicquld ex uni. versi constitutione patiendum est, maguo excipiatur animo. Ad hoc saoramentum adaoti sumus, ferre mortalia. In regno nati sumus Deo parere

Deum

is

fi|(0|uai

io/ti/os'

Se

/i^)

gcAoj
Ktixbs yei'6ii.ems ovSfy ^rriiv
?i//o-

^ai.

Sen. ProT. 5, 4 and 8 Boni viri laborant, impendunt, impendontur, et volentes qui-dem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.
2
: .

Ep. 97, 2: Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo ilium, non quia neoesse est, sequor, etc. Bp. 74, 20 76, 23 107, 9. Ejpiatet. Diss. ii. i6Kii.t)aov ava^Kii^as wphs 16, 42
libertas est.
;

rhj/

Sebf

elireiv, '6ti

xpa

irhv eis i hv e4\ris(rot,

M"' ^o'r dfioypwfiovu

Quid

est

boni

viri

Prae-

a6s

el{u.

oiSip TrapaiTov/icu

THE
Chap.
XII.

STOICS.

Similar expressions are not wanting^ amongst

other philosophers
sophy,
;

nevertheless,
is

by the Stoie philo-

the demand

pressed with partic;ular force,

and

is

Blosely connected with its whole view of the

world.

of the wise

In resignation to destiny, the Stoic picture man is completed. Therewith is includea~^

that peace and happiness of mind, that gentleness

and benevolence, that discharge of all duties, _and that_ harmony of life, which together make up the _Stoic definition of virtue.' Beginning by recognising
the existence of a general law, morality ends by unconditionally submitting itself to the ordinances of

that law.

The one
Twv
&ye.
trot
i.

case in which this resignation would give

hirov

Sq'Koi/VTtMtv'

0e\is,

7 The virtuous man submits his will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. HpeiTTov yAp iiyovntu t iv. 7, 20
12,
: :

magnitude super omnia effierens sese. Hinc intellecta est ilia

vita, secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. Quo-

beata

S Bfhs 4e4\t,

fl

[a]

iyii.

iv. 1,

modo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit 1 Dioam Nunquam

:

131, in reference to the verses oBttj ri dShs iv' of Cleanthes

:

i\fv9plav &yfi, aSxr) ftdpi) iiroAMan. 8 flf'Ae \ayi) SovKelus. yivftrBat ri ytv6^eva us yiverat
:

perfectus adeptusque fortunse maledixit. Numquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem credens labores velut
vir ille

virtutem

Kal

eiipoiitreis.

Similarly Fragm.

imperatos
inciderat,

subiit.

Quicquid

134, in^oJ.Floril. 108, 60.

M.

non tanquam malum

Awrel. X. 28 ^tpip Sedorai rh

:

}ii6vtp

r^ KoytK^
eveadtu
'Itretrdai

eicovtriws
rit

To7s
)pt\hv
viii.
'

ytvofjievois'
trafrtv
;

Si

avayKoioif.

Ibid.

45

x. 14.

Sen. Ep. 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind arrive at the conception of virtue ? and replies. By the sight of virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et oonstantia et omnium inter se aotionum concordia et

aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatnm sibi. Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam mails ingemuit, nunquam de fato suo questus est fecit multis intelleotum sui et non aliter quam in tenebris ]umen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium animos, cum asset plaoi. .
.
:

dus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter asquus, &c.

; ;

MAN AND THE

WORLD'S COURSE: SUICIDE.

is

335
is

place to active resistance to destiny

when man

Chap.
^^^'

placed in circumstances calling for unworthy action

or endurance.'

Strictly speaking, the first case can (2) Sui-

never
of

arise, since,

from the Stoic platform, no state

It does, however,

life

can be imagined which might not serve as an

for

occasion

virtuous conduct.

seem possible that even the wise man may be placed by fortune in positions which are for him unendurable and in this case he is allowed to withdraw from them
by
suicide.^

u'

The importance

of this point in the

Stoic ethics will

become manifest from the language

of Seneca,

man's independence of externals depends, among other things, on

his being able to leave life at pleasure.'

who

asserts that the wise

To

Seneca,

the deed of the younger Cato appears not onlypraiseConf.

'

BoMmhauer,
:

Vet.

tse,

breves,

faciles.

Agamus

Stoicorum Doct. de Mor. Volunt. Ut. 1842, p.

Phil, prsecipue

220.
^

gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. o. 5, 6,

Deo

Siog.

vii.

130

tbK6yas re

tpacrtv
tT0(l>hv

i^d^eiv kavrbv rov $iov rhy

(_i^ayayit is the standing expression with the Stoics for suicide. Full references for this and other expressions are given by Baiimhauer, p. 243.)

makes the deity say Contemnite mortem quffi vos aut finit aut transfert. Ante omnia
:

cavi,

ne quis vos teneret iuvitos.

.
.

Kat inrip irorpfSos Kai imip ^l7\Mv K&i/ iv <7K\iipoT4pif yeiniTai a\yriSdi'i fl T^piiriaiv J) v6aoii aviirois.

,ao*.

Eel.

ii.

226.

Conf. the

comoedian Sopater, in Athen. iv. 160, who makes a master

threaten to
sell

his slave to

. Nihil feci mori. Prono animam loco posni. Trahitur, Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita ducat via, &c. Conf . Ep. 70, 14 He who denies the right of committing suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius seterna lex

Patet exitus.

facilius,

quam

Zeno
'

iv' ^{070175.

fecit,

quam quod unum

in-

Ep. 12, 10

':

Malum

necessitate vivere. Sed cessitate vivere neoessitas nulla Quidni nulla sit 1 Patent est.

est in in ne-

troitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus multos. Ep. 65, 22

117, 21
;

29

viii.

undique ad libertatem

viae

mul-

JUjnctet. Diss.

120, 14 M. Awel. v. 47 x. 8 and 32 iii. 1 i. 24, 20 iii. 24, 96.

;
;

33

THE
1__ tiny, the highest

STOICS.

Chap,
.

worthy, but the crowning-point of success over des-

triumph of the human

will.'

By

the chief teachers of the Stoic School this doctrine

was carried into practice.

Zeno, in old age, hung

;

himself, because he had broken his finger

Cleanthes,

for a still less cause, continued his abstinence till

he

died of starvation, in order to traverse the whole

way to death and, in later times, the example of Zeno and Cleanthes was followed by Antipater.^ In these cases suicide appears not only as a way
;

of escape, possible under circumstances, but "absolutely as the highest expression of moral freedom.

Whilst

all

are far from being advised to adopt this

course,^ everyone is required to

tunity of dying with glory,

bind him to

life.*

embrace the opporwhen no higher duties Everyone is urged, in case of

need, to receive death at his

of his independence.

own hand,

as a pledge

Nor

are cases of need decided

makes a man unhappy moral vice folly must be met by other means. Death is no deliverance from them, since it makes the bad no better. The one satisfactory reason which
by what
really

or folly.

Vice and

the Stoics recognised for taking leave of

life is,

when
Conf.

'

De

ProT.

2,

Ep. 71,

will of Gtod.

ii.

15, 4.

16.

M. Am-el.
^ *
;

v. 10.

In the passages already quoted, pp. 40, 2 ; 41, 1 50,

2.
'

Muson. in
:

Stob. Floril. 7,

24, says
9irli(rKeui

HpiraCe rh

koASj
litrit

diro-

Sre l^fcm,

fiii

fuK-

See Epictetus's discussion

suicide committed simply in contempt of life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the rule (in Plato, Phsd. 61, E.) to resign oneself to the
of

phy -rh /iiv iiroBirllffKfiv o-oi irapf, rh Si Kahus firjiceVi i^y ; and, again He who by living is of use to many, ought not to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.
:

MAN AND THE

circumstances over which

WORLD'S COURSE.

337

we have no control make no longer desirable.' Such circumstances may be found in the greatest variety of things. Cato committed suicide because
continuance in
life

Chap.

of the downfall of the republic

slight injury received.
sufficient reason for

Zeno, because of a
it is

According to Seneca,

committing suicide to anticipate

age, incurable disease,

merely a considerable disturbance in our actions and

peace of mind.^

Weakness of

a weakening of the powers of the mind, a great de-

gree of want, the tyranny of a despot from which

there
is

no escape, justify us
oblige

cumstances,

us

to

and

even, under cir-

have recourse to this

remedy.?

Seneca, indeed, maintains that a philoso-

pher should never commit suicide in order to escape

sufifering,

but only to withdraw from restrictions in

following out the

aim

of his life

but he

is

never-

an more painful one in prospect, thus avoiding a freak of destiny and the cruelty of man.'' Besides pain and sickness, Diotheless of opinion that anyone
easier

may

rightly choose

mode

of death instead of a

genes also mentions a case in which suicide becomes

a duty, for the sake of others.*

M.
Aurel.
v.

According to another

'

29

Even
;

4lajoii'i)v tif anovZaltf ffvyx'^fov(n

though you were free from the body

here you
live as

may

koX ol ipi\6<ro(poi (i.e.

e?

ns

tov

Trpaatreiv avrhir
[1.

the Stoics), ovrus

(TTEp^creiEc],'

4av Si juj) imp4ira(ri, rin koX TOV ^rjv i^iBf oirras ixevTOi, us liriSev Kaxhv irdcrxuic. 2 Ep. See p. 338, 3. 70. Clem. Strom, iv. 485, A, likewise calls the restriction of rational action sufficiently deairlKa ell\oyov cisive reason
:

Ttipiiaiifv

oKtiu

us

/jLTfiKerl

aTroKeKu^dai aUT^/iijSe
98, 16
17, 9

4\iriSa ttjs Trpi^eus.

Ep. 58, 33
iii.

De

Ira,
'

15, 3./
11.

See Bp. 58, 36, and 70, See p. 335, 2.

38
CnA.v.
.
!

THE
in which

STOICS.

authority,* five eases were

it

enumerated by the Stoics

;

was allowed to put oneself to death

if,

by

so doing, a real service could

be rendered to others,

as in the case of sacrificing oneself for one's country

to avoid being compelled to do an unlawful action

otherwise, on the ground of poverty, chronic illness,

or incipient weakness of mind.

In nearly
as indifferent

all

these cases, the things referred to

which were reckoned and hence arises the by the Stoics apparent paradox, with which their opponents immediately twitted them, that not absolute and moral evils, but only outward circumstances, are admitted
belong to the
class of things
;

as justifying suicide.''
its life

point when

it is

The paradox, however, loses remembered that, to the Stoics,

as

and death are quite

much

indiiTerent as all
really

other external things.*

To them, nothing
068' S\as, (pcuriv,
itttos oStc noviiv

good

' Olympiod. in Phesdr. 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a banquet, ' Pint. C. Not. 11, 1 itapi.
:

oUrai Suy Xpiirin

r^
to7s

fil(f

-roh

afaSots,

oftr'

i^ayuy^v roh kokoIs

vapafierpe7if,
/corct <t>i<riv.

a\A&

fiearois

SA

Kal rots evSai-

fiorova-i

yiperat irort KaSrjKov i^dyetv iavrobs, kbI fiheiv aSflir

%vvoi&v iirriv, Mpuirov $ iravra rayaBb, irdpea-ri Kal /airijv

Skv 4vSt Trpbt evSainoviav Kal rh fuucapiov, roir(f KaBiiKeiv 4^iyeiv eouT(iv ^Ti Si fiaWoi/, ^ lariSev 6.yaS6p 4<rrt jutjS' ^arai tA Se Seivk TracTtt Kal tA Svffxfpfi (cal KoKct

n&pvrri koX Trdpeirrai BiA

roirifi
nil

Te'\ous,

KaBiiKeiv

avoKtyeirBai

r$ fpv tois KoKaSat^oi'oSa'ii'. Ibid. 14, 3. Sen. Ep. 70, 5 Simul atque occurrunt molesta et trauquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nee hoc tantum in necessitate ultima faoit, sed cum primum illi coepit suspecta esse fortnna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desiuendum sit. Nihil existimat sua
4v
:

rhu $loy
;

tiv jxi) ri vj)

Afa rwv dSiaIbid, 14, 3

;

auTij)

Trpoayivi)rat.
;

ref erre, faoiat finem an accipiat. tardius fiat an oitius. Non

22, 7 33, 3 Sto. Eep. Alea;.Ap?ir.DeAR.15S,h;l5S,h. ' Plut. Sto, Kep. 18, 5: aKK'

tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex stillicidiopotestperdere.Conf. 77,

6.

MAN AND THM

WORLD'S COURSE.

339

appears to be involved in the question of suicide.

Chap.
XII.

but only a choice between two things morally indifferent

one of which,

life, is

only preferable to death,

life

the other, whilst the essential conditions for a

according to nature are

satisfied.'

therefore, says Seneca,^ chooses his

as
in.

The philosopher, mode of death just

live

he chooses a ship for a journey or a house to

would leave a banquet when it is time. He lays aside his body when it no longer suits him, as he would lay aside worn-out clothes and withdraws from Hfe as he would withleaves life as he
;

He

draw from a house no longer weather-proof.*

A
life

very different question, however,

it is,

whether

can be treated in this way as something indif-

ferent,

and whether

it is

consistent with

an uncon-

ditional resignation to the course of the world, to

evade by personal interposition, what destiny with

its

unalterable laws has decreed for us.

Stoicism

may, indeed, allow this course of action.

'

But

in so

dc. Fin.

iii.

cum ab

his [the

18, 60: Sed media] omnia

proficiscantur officia,

non sine
;

causa dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes in his

Eeque miser est [stultus], nee diuturnitas magis ei vitam f ugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur, iis qui pluribus naturalibus f rui possint esse in vita

excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. Inquoenimplura sunt, quEe secundum naturam

et

manendum.

Stob.

226

The

sunt, hujus officium est in vita

in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntui, hujus officium est e

manere

good may have reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though they never should become vrise o6t yhp t^v aperV icoTe'xEij h t^ (yv, otre t^v Kaxiav iicpiWeiv

E quo apparet, vita excedere. et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. .. Etquoniam excedens e vita et manens
.

toIj Se koS^ikovsi koI to!s impa rb KoBrJKov fierpetaeai tc (aiiiv

tV

Kal -riv B&varov.

==

Ep. 70, 11.

in Stob. Floril.
5,

'Teles,
67, p.

127 Mein.

z 2

340

THE
doing does
it

STOICS.

Chap,
'

not betray

how

little it

had succeeded

in the attempt to comhine, without contradiction,

two ma.in-tendencies so different as that of individual independence and that of submission to the universe
?

STOICISM AND RELIGION.

341

CHAPTER

XIII.

THE RELATION OP THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.

It would be impossible to arive a full account of the

Chap.

philosophy of the Stoics without treating of their

XT TT

theology

for

no early system

is

so closely connected ^- G^'neral

with religion as that of the Stoics.

Founded

as their of

Stoio-

whole view of the world is upon the idea of oile Divine Being, begetting from Himself and containing in Himself all finite creatures, upholding them by His might, ruling them according to an unalterable law, and thus manifesting Himself everywhere,
their philosophy bears a decidedly religious tone.

*"!^

"^^

Indeed, there

is

hardly a single prominent feature

is

in the Stoic system which

not,

more

or less, con-

nected with theology.

that
gical questions

very considerable portion of

system, moreover, consists of strictly theolo;

such as arguments for the existence

of deity, and

for the rule of

Providence

inves-

tigations into the nature of Grod,

His government,
relation of
;

and presence in the world;

into the

human

activity to the divine ordinances

and

all

the various questions connected with the terms free-

dom and

necessity.

The natural

science of the Stoics

begins by evolving things from

God

it

ends with

342

THE
resolving

STOICS.
Grod
is

Chap,

them again into God.

thus the begin-

;_ ning and end of the world's development. In like manner, their moral philosophy begins with the notion
,

of divine law, which, in the form of eternal reason,

controls the actions of

men

and ends by requiring

sanction
is

submission to the will of God, and resignation to the

course of the universe.

A religious

thus

given to

all

moral duties.

All virtuous actions are

a fulfilment of the divine will and the divine law.

That
is

citizenship of the world, in particular,

which

constitutes the highest point in the Stoic morality,

connected with the notion of a

common

relation-

ship of

aU men

to God.

Again, that inward repose

of the

philosopher, those feelings of freedom

and

independence, on which so

much
is

stress

was
is

laid, rest

principally on the conviction that

man

related to

God.
i

In a word, Stoicism

not only a system of

philosophy, but also a system of religion.

it

As such

was regarded by

its
; '

first

adherents, witness the

as such it afforded, in

fragments of Cleanthes
later times, together

and

with Platonism, to the best

and most cultivated men, wherever the influence of Greek culture extended, a substitute for declining natural religion, a satisfaction for religious cravings, and a support for moral life.
' The well-known hymn to Zeus, in Stob. Eel. i. 30, and the verses quoted p. 333, 1. Nor is the poetic form used by

Cleanthes without importance. He asserted, at least according toJ'AiMem. De Mus. Vol. Here. i. col. 28 a^ilvovd ye elj/at rit
:

\6yov rod t^s (piXoa-otptaSy i^ayyeWtu' Svt>aii4vou ri flfio xal ImBpiiTriva, fi.ii Ixovtos 5e ifiiAoS tUv Beluv fieyeSSiv \ej6ij oMeias. -rci ii4rpa nal rd jucAt) Kal
Kal rov
ikoi/Ss /ikv

Tobs ^v0fiois us fidXiffra irpo(riKvet<r8ai

irphs.r^v a\ii6fiav ttjs

rZv

Qeiatv Beapias.

TTOiTjTtKit

Kai fiooffiK^ TTapaSf f7juaTa

STOICISM

AND

UELIGION.
is

343
Chap.

This philosophic religion

the traditional religion.
tains

quite independent of
Stoic philosophy con-

The

no feature of importance which we can pronounce with certainty to be taken from the popular
faith.

(1)

Cm-

stoicism
*"'**,

Even the true worship ^

and
in a moral

of Grod, according ' to

popular
foAth.

their view, consists only in the mental effort to

Grod,

know

and pious
its

life.'

A really accept;

able prayer can have no reference to external goods

it

can only have for

Still,

object a virtuous and devout

mind.'

there were reasons which led the Stoics

to seek a closer union with the popular faith.

system attaching so great an importance to popular

opinion, particularly for proving the existence of Grod,'

could not, without extreme danger to

itself,

declare

the current opinions respecting the Grods to be erroneous.

And

again, the ethical platform of the Stoic

philosophy imposed

on

its

adherents the duty of

upholding
creed

rather

that
:

than overthrowing the popular

creed

forming a barrier against the

^ M. Aurel. ix. 40 We ought not to pray the Gods to give us something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray
:

Compare the celebrated diotnm of the Stoic in do. N. D. Cultus autem Deorum ii. 28, 71 est optimus idemque oastissi'

mus plenissimtBque pietatis, ut

eos semper pura Integra iucorrupta et mente et voce venere-

SiS6vai avtovs rh

fi-fire

<po$i'!irBal

n roiToiv liiire e-niBvuftv rtvos roituv. Diog. vii. 124 "We ought, in fact, only to pray for what is good.
:

mnr

and more particularly Mpict. Man. 31, 1 t^s irepl Tohs

;
:

Sfovs ei(re$sias IffOi 3ti rb Kvpitira-rov 4KfTv6 iariv, op8as uTro\ii'liets Kfl (Tavrhv irepl auTcov ex^iv
.

'

See

p. 144, 2.

ix.

28, says that

Seart. Math. some of the

(Is

roSro Karamaxivai, rb

irel-

flca-flai

Toij yivoiiivoi!, K.T.\.

ii.

avTo7s Kal flKciv ip ira(n Id. Diss,

18, 19.

Further particulars

on

p. 345, 2.

younger Stoics (perhaps Posidonius, whose views on the primitive condition have been already mentioned, p. 293, 1) traced the belief in Gods back to the golden age.

: :

344
Chap,
violence of

THE
human

STOICS.

passions.'

The

practical value of

L_ the popular faith may, then, be the cause of their

theological orthodoxy.

Just as the Eomans, long

had been lost under the Greek culture,^ still found it useful and necessary to uphold the traditional faith, so the Stoics may have feared that, were the worship of the
after all faith in the Grods

influence of

(2) Free

'ofvT^lar
lelwf.

people's Gods to be suspended, that respect for God and the divine law on which they depended for the support of their own moral tenets, would at the same time be exterminated. Meantime, they did not deny that much in the POP^I^'^ belief would not harmonise with their principles and that both the customary forms of religious worship, and also the mythical representations of the Gods, were altogether untenable. So little did
;

they conceal their strictures, that

viction,
for

it is clear

that con-

and not fear (there being no longer occasion fear), was the cause of their leaning towards tradi-

Zeno spoke with contempt of the erection of for how can a thing be sacred which is erected by builders and labourers ? ' Seneca denies the good of prayer.* He considers it absurd to
tion.

sacred edifices

'

In this spirit, Epict. Diss,

32,

tifex Cotta, in do. N. D.

i.

22,

blames those who throw doubts on the popular

ii.

20,

61

iii. 2.
'

Gods, not considering that by so doing they deprive many of the preservatives from evil, the very same argumentum ab utili which is now frequently urged against free criticism. ^ Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pon-

vii. 33.
*

Plut. Sto. Kep. 6, 1 See p. 322, 5.

:

Diog.

Non sunt ad Ep. 41, 1 coelum elevandse manus nee exorandus sedituus, ut nos ad
aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat prope est a te Dens, tecum est, intus est. Nat. Qu. ii. 35, 1

: :

STOICISM

AND

RELIGION.
ever-beneficent

345

entertain fear for the Gods, those

beings.'
criiices

Chap.
XIII.

Grod he would have worshipped, not by sa-

and ceremonies, but by purity of

of the Grods, and

life

not in

temples of stone, but in the shrine of the heart.^

Of images

the devotion paid to

;*

them, he speaks with strong disapprobation

What
is

of the

the meaning of expia-

unchangeable ? They are only aegrse mentis solatia. See p. 343, 2.

tions, if fate is

quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in Lactmit. Inst. vi. 25, 3) Vultisne vos Deum cogitare

magnum

Deos Benef. iv. 19, 1 nemo sanus timet. Furor est

'
:

et placidum non immolationibus et sanguine multo colendum quae enim ex

.

enim metuere salutaria nee quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do
Ira, ii. 27, 1 Benef. Bp. 95, i9. It hardly needs remark, how greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, in which fear holds such a prominent
;

harm.
vii. 1,

De
;

trucidatione immerentium voluptas est ? sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt; in suo cuique oonsecrandus est pectore. Conf . Benef. vii. 7, 3

The only worthy temple

is

of

God
ii.

the universe. ^ In Fr. 120 (in Lact.

2,

place.
-

Ep. 9S, 47

Quomodo
:

sint

Di colendi, solet praecipi aocendere aliquem lucemas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nee lumine Di egent et ne homines quidem delectantur f uliVetemus salutationibus gine.
matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum humana ambitio istis offioiis capitur Deum Vetemus lincolit, qui novit. tea et strigiles ferre et specu:
:

Seneca shows how absurd pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of in their
14),
it is tx)

own

profession.

On

this point

he expressed his opinion with

great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which Augugtin. Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates (Fr. 31 Haase). The immortal Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary appearances and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are honoured is most foolish and absurd such as by mortification and mutilation, stupid
j ;

lum tenere Junoni

non quserit

ministros Deus. Quidni? Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubi-

que et omnibus prsesto est. Primus est Deorum cnltus Deos Deinde reddere illis credere. majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare ? Bonus esto. Satis illos ooluit,
. . .

'

346

THE
unworthy
fables of

STOICS.
;

Chap.
XIII.

mythology, with bitter ridicule

and he

calls

the popular Gods, without reserve, crea-

tions of superstition,

whom

the philosopher only in-

vokes because

it is

the custom so to do.^ Moreover, the

Stoic in Cicero, and the elder authorities quoted by

him, allow that the popular beliefs and the songs of

the poets are full of superstition and foolish legends.*

Chrysippus

is

expressly said to have declared the dis-

tinction of sex

among

the Grods, and other features

;^

in which they resemble men, to be childish fancies

and immoral plays, &c. The wise

man

can only take part in such

credes et coelo reoipies ? Fr. 39 Omnem istam ignobilem Deo:

acts tanqtiam legibus jiossa, non tanquam Diis grata. This view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus, who otherwise was so much admired

rum turbam, quam longo

sevo

longa superstitio congessit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus

cultum ejus magis ad morem

quam ad rem

pertinere.
24,

by the
'

Stoics.
i.

N.

D.

ii.

63

Alia

Fr. ligCinZaci.
est,

16, 10):

Quid ergo

quare apud poe-

quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit multitude Deo-

tas salacissimus Jupiter desierit liberos toUere 1 Utrum sexagenarius faotus est, et illi lex

rmn ; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt

hominum autem vitam superstitione omni ref erserunt. Atque hie locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est

Papia fibulam imposuit 1 An impetravit jus trium liberorum?

An

timet, ne quis sibi faipse Saturno ? Similarly Fr. 39 (in Av^ustin. 1. c.) Brevit. Vit. 16, 6 Vit. Be. 26, 6, the ineptige poetarum which, as in the stories of Jupiter's many adulteries, give free rein to sins. ' Augwstin. 1. o. Fr. 33 Quid
.

ciat,

quod

;'

physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoic, c. 28, 70, respecting the commentitii et Dei, the superstitioues ficti
. . .

ergo tandem ? Veriora tibi videntur T. Tatii aut Romuli aut

p^ne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic legends.

' Pho'drm (ThilodeTaus),col. 2 of his fragment, according to Petersen's restoration. Conf. Oic. N. D. ii. 17, 45 Moff. vii. of whom assert that 147 both the Stoics do not think of the
;
;

somnia? Cloaoinam Tatius dedicavit Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque PalTulli Hostilii

lorem, teterrimos hominum adfectus. Hsec numina potius

.

STOICISM
Zeno
jects

AND

RELIGION.

347
Chap,
XIII.

to

have denied any real existence to the popu-

lar deities, transferring their

;

names to natural ob-

and Aristo ^ is charged with having denied shape and sensation to the Deity.^
*

The

Stoics were, nevertheless, not disposed to let

fall

the current beliefs quite

through.

Far from

it,

they thought to discover real germs of truth in these

beliefs,

however inadequate they were in form

it

and

they accordingly made

that the

their business to give a re-

lative vindication to the

existing creed.

name

of

God
it,

belongs, in its full

Holding and ori-

ginal sense, only to the one primary Being, they did

not hesitate to apply

sense, to all those

in a limited and derivative

by means of which the Nay, more, in consideration of man's relationship to God, they found it not unreasonable to deduce from the primary Being Gods bearing a resemblance to men."* Hence they distinguished, as Plato had done,
objects

divine power

is

especially manifested.

Gods as human in form

Laetant.

and

purpose of disproving
their real opinion.

it,

with

De

Ir.

D.

c.

18

Stoici

Conf. Sext.

negant habere ullam fonuam

Math.

ix. 139.

Deum. The Epicurean

'

in Cic. N.

D.

i.

14, 36. Olc. 1. c. 37. Conf. Xrische,

i.

Forschung.
'

406 and 415.

vii.

Cfem., indeed, says (Strom. 720, D) obi'k aluBriffiwv ahr^

:

[t^
/ij)

flecji]

Sci,

KaOdirep

ijpe(X

rois

Stoiikois, liiMffTO, aKorjs

ital 6\fieas

camBut, according to XanPiveffBai. all accouhts, this must be a misClement conapprehension. founds what Stoic writers have conditionally asserted, for the
ykp
Sii/aaSai wore sTepms

Phut. Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology, evidently borrowed from a good source The Gods have been represented as being like men Si6ti rav fifv airdvToiv rb Bdov Kvpi^rarov, twv 5e Cv^v &v0punros KciWiiTToi' /col KeKotriiriiiifov aperp Sioufidpais kotoi t^v rov coB aunioTaaw, (rb Kpirunov probably these words should be struck out), toTs adv apurrdovai ri KpiTiaiov biioius ica! KaXus ^x^tv
:
:

Sieiioit6r)<Tav.

348

THE

STOICS.

Chap,
XIII

between the eternal and immutable Grod and Grods !_ created and transitory,' between Grod the Creator and Sovereign of the world, and subordinate Grods ; ^ in other words, between the universal divine power
as a

Unity working in the world, and

its

individual

parts

and manifestations.*
;

the

name Zeus

to

To the former they gave the latter, they applied the names

of the other subordinate Grods.

(3) The
*'*

In this derivative sense, divinity was allowed to

Pgi
theism.

many

beings by the Stoics, and, in particular, to the

called created
Grods,

stars, which Plato had Ai^otle had described

which

as eternal divine beings,

and
on

the worship of which lay so near to the ancient cultus

of nature.

Not only by

their lustre

and

effect

the senses, but far more by the regularity of their

motions, do these stars prove that the material of

which they consist

is

the purest, and that, of

all

created objects, they have the largest share in the

divine reason.* And so seriously was this belief held by the Stoics, that a philosopher of the unwieldy piety
of Cleanthes so far forgot himself as to charge Aris-

tarchus of Samos, the discoverer of the earth's motion

round the sun, the

Gralilseo

of antiquity, with im-

piety for wishing to remove the hearth of the universe from its proper place.'
stars

This deification of the

prepares us to find years, months, and seasons

' Phit. St. Eep. 38, 5 ; C. Not. 31, 5 Def. Orac. 19, p.
;

Deorum, and

whom
i.

ministros

420.

regni sui genuit. 16 (in Zact. Inst.

'
'

Sen. Fr. 26,

6, 26).

The numina, quse singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent on the Deus omnium
^

IHogi. vii. 147.

See

p. 206, 1.

'

Plut.

De

Fac. Lun.

6, 3,

STOICISM AJ^B RELIGION.

called Gods,' as was done
his School.
Still, it

349
Chap.

by Zeno, or at least by must be remembered, that the Stoics referred these times and seasons to heavenly
bodies, as their material embodiments.^

'^

As the

stars

are the first manifestation, so the

first

elements are the

particular forms of the Divine

Being, and the most

cise of

common
It

materials for the exeris,

the divine powers.

however, becoming
only

that the all-pervading divine

mind should not

state,
air,

be honoured in
its

its

primary

but likewise in
water, earth, and

various derivate forms, as

fire.*

elementary

All other things, too, which, by their utility to man, display in a high degree the beneficent power of God, appeared to the Stoics to deserve divine
hono\u:s, those honours not being paid to the things

themselves, but to the powers active within them.

of

They did not, therefore, hesitate to give the names Gods to fruits and wine, and other gifts of the
Gods."

How, then, could they escape the inference that among other beneficent beings, the heroes of antiquity, in particular, deserve religious honours, seeing

that in these benefactors of mankind, of

whom

le-

gend

tells,

the Divine Spirit did not show Himself

I'^ts,

under the lower form of a

'

as in the elements,

Cie.

]Sr.

D.

i.

14, 36.
i.

2 '

See

p. 131.

in partioular, to Zeno's pupil Persaaus. Krisohe (Forsohung.

do. N. D.

15,

39
;

ii.

i.

442) reminds, with justice,

26
1.

Mog.
Pint.
ii.

vii. 147.

'*

De
23,

Is. c.

66

Cio.

c.

60

i.

15,

38,

of the assertion of Prodicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to

where

this

yiew

is

attributed,

man.

350
Chap.

THE
nor yet as simple
tional soul ?

STOICS.
in plants, but as a ra-

xm.

<f)V(ns, as

Such

deified

men

had, according to

the Stoic view

which, on

this point, agrees

with the

well-known theory of Euemerus

in a great measure,
;

contributed to swell the mass of the popular Grods

nor had the Stoics themselves any objection to their

worship.'
qualities
'

Add
and

to this the personification of

human
what

states

of mind,^ and

it

will be seen

Phtedr. (7hi\oAemvLs),'Sa.t. Be. col. 3, and Cio. N. D. i. 15,

38, attribute this assertion specially to Persasus and Chrysippus. Id. ii. 24, 64, after speaking of the deification of Hercules, Bacchus, Eonmlus, &c., con-

such as the Gods invented by Hesiod for the purpose of his genealogies Coios, Hyperion,

&c. (7) Men who are honoured for their services to mankindHercules, the Dioscuri, Dionysus. This list includes not

tinues Quorum cum remanerent animi atque seternitate f ruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et seterni. Diog. vii. 151. See p. 351, 1. * This is done in Plut. Plac. Belief in the Gods, it is i. 6, 9. there said, is held in three forms ^the physical, the mythical, and the form established by law (theologia civUis). All the Gods belong to seven classes,
:

etSri (1) rb ^k toiv (paivon^vbov Ka\ lieTeipuv: the observation of the stars, and their regularity of
:

the changes of season. Sec, has conducted many to faith ; and, accordingly, heaven and earth, sun and

movement,

moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) rh $\&jrTov Kol utptKovv:

Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter: baleful Beings are the Erinnyes,
beneficent
Ares, &c. such as
(4

only things which deserve divine honours, but all things to which they have been actually given hence it includes, besides the pttrely mythical Gods, things which the Stoics can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions, on which see p. 345, 1 On the 346, 2. other hand, they could raise no objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list, the elementary Gods, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that followed by Dionysius (whether the well-known pupil of Zeno
: ;

1 or some later unknown), who, according to Tertullian (Ad Nat. ii. 2, conf. c. 14), divided Gods

see

p.

44,

Stoic,

is

and

5) irpdy/iaTa,
Euvo/iio
'Aippo-

into three classes

'E\irls,

Ai/cjj,

and
8iTr),

irafli),

such as "Epus,
(6)

U6Bos.

rh

ivh

tZh

the visible sun and moon, for instance the invisible, or powers of nature, such as Neptune (that is, natural forces as they

the

STOICISM

AND RELIGION.
for recognising

351

ample opportunity the Stoics had

Chap.
'

everywhere in nature and in the world of

wider sense of the term.'
allowed that the

man divine
had been

agencies and powers, and, consequently, Gods in the

When
it

once

it

name

of Grod might be diverted properly belonged and

is

from the Being to

whom

applied, in a derivative sense, to what

impersonal

and a mere manifestation of divine power, the door was opened to everything; and, with such concessions, the Stoic

system could graft into

of heroes

itself

even

the most exceptional forms of polytheism.

With the worship

doctrine of demons.^

is also

connected the

(4) Doc-

The

soul,
is

Stoic view already set forth,

according to the J^^,^ of divine origin, a

Or, distinguishing

part of and emanation from God.

more accurately in the

belongs.
evil

soul one part

from the

rest,

to reason only, as the governing part, this honour

Now,

since reason alone protects

man from

and conducts him to happiness this, too, was the popular beUef reason may be described as the guardian spirit, or demon, in man. Not only by

the younger members of the Stoic School, by Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, are the

popular notions of demons, as by Plato aforetime,'

make themselves

felt in the
;

i.-itoKiKoiTairnrK^v ii6vovTovAi))i,

elements and in planets)

and

those /flscW, or deified men. ' Plut. Com. Not. 31, 5

iXKh.
XpiaiiTitos

tv Trivras KaTora\<rKou(ri robs UfAovs.

tij
'

Conf.

kbI

K\eov9ijs,
Tiji

Ansiohten

Waolismuth, Die der Stoiker iiber

(Berl.

4fvireirK7iK6Te5,

as

^ttos eiviiy,

Mantik imd Dilmonen

1860), pp. 29-39. ' Tim. 90, A.

\6yif Seav rhv ovpavhv, riiv yriv, Bi^arrav, ovSiya rhv hipa, &iSiov Tftil/ TOffOVTOlV &tp6apT0V ou5'

tV

352

THE
explained in this

STOICS.
but the same method
is

Chap.
XIII.

sense,'

pursued hy Chrysippus, who made svBaifiovui,

happiness, consist
in a

or

man

(which, in this

harmony of the demon in case, can only be his own will

will of

and understanding) with the

God.^

Little

were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations, they were attributing to popular notions a meaning
wholly foreign to them. dian
'

But

it

does not therefore

follow that they shared the popular belief in guarspirits.'

Their system, however,

left

room

for be-

Posid. in Galen. Hipp, et

V.
6,

him each one has taken an oath

of allegiance, as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ^k fiiy ofiv{)ovffiv, axnov fi^ irpOTLfj.'fiffeLv %Tfpov evTavBa 5' avroiis airiivTuy ; so that, consequently, the demon is lost in the airhs
'

Plat.
iraBui'

p.

469:

-rh

H
ttjs

tZv
re

aXriov,

TovreffTi
irav

avoixoXoyias Kal rav KaKoSaifiot'os

filov,

rh

fi^

kotA

etreffdai

ry

^y auT^ Sal^vi ffvyyu/et re bvTt

ttal

r^v

dfjLoiav ip{)ffiv

exovTi
irtnh

r^ rhv
r^
$6
ffvviK-

ZKoV

K6fffiOV

dlOlKOWTlj
^tfdt^et,

vrithin.
SaifjiuVf

M. Aurel.

v.

27

X^ipovi
2,

KoX

KKivovras pepfirBai, Sen. Ep. 41, according to the quotation, p. 344, 4 Saoer intra nos spiritus malorum bonorumque sedet, nostrorum obserVator et custos. His prout a nobis traotatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11 Quid aliud voces hunc [animus rectus, bonus, magnus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem ? Just as Kant calls the moral idea, a primary
:
:

tv kKaartp vpotrriiTTiv Kol riyefidva d Zeiis $Sukv, an6irira(rfia eavTov. oStos 5 itrnv A eKdcTov fovs Kal \6yo?. See ii. 13 and

17
V.

iii. 3 Schl. 5, 6, 7, 12, 16 ; '' 10; viii. 45. ' See the passage quoted
; ;

from

Sioff. vii.

8% on

pr 227, 3.

(Diogenes had only just before named Chrysippus irepl teAous,

as
source),

which receives

its

explanation (if it needs one) from the above words of Posidonius.

' In this sense, the words of Sen. Bp. 110, 1, niustbe underSepone in praesentia stood quse quibusdam placent, uni:

notion which mankind has embraced, the moral tone a good

spirit

governing
:

Diss. i. 14, 12 Zevs] IfcdaT^ 7rop(rT?j(re' rhv fKdffrov SaifjLOvaj Kal irapeSaKe
<pv\d(Tfftv

us. , Mpict. (irlrpoTrov [i

cuique
dari

avrhv avr^ Kal Tovroy

nostrum psdagogum Deum, non quidem ordi. . .

aKoifiriTov Kal &TTapa\6yurTov.

He
To

retires within himself is not alone, a\\' 6 iths ^vSov 4<rTl

KoX d
vfiiTepos Sttifiuv iffri.

who

narium, sed hunc inferioris uote itatamenhocseponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoioos

STOICISM

AND

RELIGION.
soul and the spirits might exist, having

353

lieving that, besides the

human

Chap.
XIII.

of the stars, other rational souls

a definite work to perform in the world, subject to

the law of general necessity, and knit into the chain
of cause and effect.

Nay, more, such beings might

reason have we, then, to

even seem to them necessary for the completeness

of the universe.'

What

express doubt,

when we

are told that the Stoics be-

lieved in the existence of demons, playing a part in

man and

caring for

him?^

Is

there anything ex-

traordinary, from the Stoic platform, in holding that

some of these demons are by nature inclined to do harm, and that these tormentors are used by the deity for the punishment of the wicked,* especially
f uisse singulis enim et Genium et Jimonem dederunt, i.e., the old Romans, not the Stoics.
:

be mortal.

Stoics believe demons to Plac. i. 8, 2 &iiKris, nvBaydpas, VlKtiTwi/, ol ^TUtKol,

The

'

Conf. Sext. Math.

ix. 86.

SaiiJLovas virdpx^iy ouffias i^vxifctis.

things, quoted If p. 146, 1, it is there said living beings exist on the earth and in the sea, there must be rocpi ftia in the air, which is so much purer ; and these are the
:

Amongst other

A
-

special treatise

irep! ripiiav

koI

demons.
^

Diog,

vii.

151

^a&l

S' ilvai

proceeded from the pen of Posldonius, probably as was his wont, containing more learned than dogmatic statements, an extract from which is given by Macroi. Sat. i. 23, containing the etymology of Satfutiv.
Soi^((>'ij)i/

Kai Tivas Sal^iovas kv^pSnuv rv/iirdOftav exovras, iirSnTas twv avKa\ ?iptaas BfjUTTsiwv npayfiA'TUV
'

Phtt. Quaest.
:

Eom.

51, p.

277

KaBdirep

ol Trepl Xpiffitnrov

oXoyrat

<t)t\6(roipoi

<pav\a SaL^vta
ol

TtepivoffreiVy

oXs

BioX

Stifilon

360 Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, with the hold, and Chrysippus old theologians (amongst whom
ij/BXir.
Plii-t.

De

Is. 25, p.

Xptavrai KoKcurrtus 4irl rohs &.vofflovs Kai ciSfKovs hiQpilmovs. Id.

Def. Oracl. 17, p. 419

. .
.

<^ai\ovs
/cal

SaifjLOvas
.
.

ovk

'E^iireioKKTis

Wachsmuth,

p.

32, 40, rightly

tl6vov

wjreKnr^Vj

aWht,

thinks of the Orphics), that the demons are stronger than men, from which the language used of them by Chrysippus does not follow. Def. Oracl. 19, p. 420
:

Xp^tmrKos a statement which, particularly as it is extended to Plato, would prove little. The baleful Gods of mythology (p.
nXt^Tftiy Kai ^evoKpdTTis koX

THE
Chap.
xiir.

STOICS.

when in such a strict system of necessity these demons could only work, like the powers of nature,
conformably with the laws of the universe and withas lightning, earthquakes,

out disturbing those laws, occupying the same ground and drought? And yet

the language of Chrysippus,

when speaking of

evil

demons who

neglect the duties entrusted to them,'

it

sounds as though

were only figmative and tentaBesides, the later

tive language, not really meant.

Stoics

made themselves merry over the Jewish and Christian notions of demons and demoniacal possesYet, even, without accepting demons, there were

sion.''

not wanting in the Stoic system objects to which the

popular beliefs could be referred,
to find in these beliefs
if it was necessary some deeper meaning. Not

but that these

process of

beliefs

were often so distorted in the

accommodation as to be no longer recognised. Thus a regular code of interpretation became necessary, by means of which a philosophic mind might see its own thoughts in the utterances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as by their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of interpretation was found in the method of allegorical interpretation

a method which now received a most extended

from Stoicism, but from Plato (Eep. X. 615, E) and the Neoplatonists.
'

350, 2) were explained as being evil demons by those who did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which purify the soul in another world (Sallust. De Mund. c. 19, p. 266, and whom VUloinn on Cornutns, p. 553,

Phtt. Sto. Eep. 37, 2.

See
after
illu-

p. 191, 2.

TeHull. Test. An.

of

3.

speaking
dit ea.

demons,

adds

Aliqui Chrysippi seotator

reminds

of),

are not borrowed

THE ALLEGORISING
the older

SPIRIT.

355
Chap.
XIII.

application, in order to bridge over the gulf between

and the more modern types of culture.' Zeno, and still more Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their
successors, sought to discover natural principles

and

moral ideas
Grods,^

the

\6-yoi (fivcriKol, or phytiicse rationes,

in the Grods of popular belief and the stories of these

supposing them to be represented in these

stories in

a sensuous form.'

In this attempt, they

The Stoics are not the first resorted to allegorical explanations of myths. Just as before philosophy had broken away from mythology, a Pherean Empedocles, the cydes, Pythagoreans had, whether consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of legend, and even subsequently Plato had used a veil of poetry so, now that the breach between the two was open,
'

who

Lampsacus, and other followers Anaxagoras (according to Sesych. even Agamemnon was explained to be the ether). It appears to have been a favourite method in the time of the
of

many attempts were made

to

conceal its breadth, and individual beliefs were represented as the real meaning of popular beliefs, it being always supposed that the original framers had an eye to this meaning.

Sophists {Plato, Theset. 153, c Eep. ii. 378, D Phasdr. 229, C Crat. 407, A, to 530, C ; Gorg. 493, A Xen. Sym. 3, 6), as appears from Euripides and Herodotus. It follows naturally from the view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth in popular notions without attributing to it any higher value.
; ; ;

The founder of cynicism and his

followers pursued it zealously. From the Cynics the Stoics appear to have derived it. They carried it to a much greater extent than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater influence on" posterity than the Cynics. 2 ac. N. D. 24, 63 ; iii. 24, 63, see p. 346, 3. ' The definition of allegory : ykp SWa juej/ ayopeiav rp6iros,
iS

twofold method of treating the myths resulted that by natural explanation,

Thus

and that by

allegorical inter-

pretation. The former method referred them to facts of history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific and both methods agreed in

looking for a hidden meaning,

besides the literal one. This method of treating myths had encountered already been among the older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of

vvfitas aKKi)'yopia

erepa Se $v \4yei (TTifjuilyav, iirti)KaAeTrat (^Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 5, p. 6).

A 2

; ; ;

THE
Chap,
XIII.

STOICS.
Hesiod, the Bible

clung to the poems of

Homer and

of the Greeks,' without, however, excluding other

mythology from the sphere of their investigation. One chief instrument which they, and modern lovers of the symbolical after them, employed was that
capricious playing with etymologies of which so

many
they

instances are on record.^

also laid

Like most

allegorisers,

down

certain principles of interpretation

enough theoretically,* but proving, by the was made of them, that their scientific which use appearance was only a blind to conceal the most Approaching in some of their capricious vagaries.
sensible

explanations to the original bases of mythological

formation, they were stiU unable to shake off the

Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical expression. In earlier times, according to Phit. Aud. Po. c. 4, p. 19, it was

N. D.

i.

15, 41).

put. Def. Orac.

12, p. 415,

Compare also and

termed {m6voi.a, whioli term is found in Plato, Kep. ii. 378, D, conf lo. 530, D Xen. Symp.
.

respecting the theological literature of the Stoics ViUoinn on Cornutus, p. xxxix. Among the Romans, the same method was followed by Varro (^Preller,

3,6,

Eom. Myth.
writings

29),

and from

his

Zeno treated in this way all tlie poems of Homer and Hesiod (ZWo Chrysost. Or. 53,
'

p.

275 ; Biog. vii. 4 Erisehe, and so did Forsch. .393), vii. 175 Cleanthes (^Diog. Phedr. [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3 Plut. Aud. Po. 11, De Fluv. 5, 3, p. 1003 p. 31 and Perseus. Xrisohe, 433) Ctrysippus explained the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Mus8eus (^Phtsdr. col. 3 Galen. Hipp, et Plat. iii. 8, vol. V. 349, Erisclie, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes {Phced. col. 5 Cie.
; ;
;

Heraclitus (living under Augustus) derived the material for his Homeric Allegories (edited by Mehler) and Cornutus, for his work on the nature of the Gods edited by Osann from Villoisin's papers. 2 do. N. D. iii. 24, 63. ' Corn. c. 17, p. 80 Set fi^l avyX^^v Toils jUiSflow, fvfjS* 4^
:

Irepou
Tats

Tct

ov6^Ta

i^'

erspov

fiercKpepetv, firiW

^ mrpoffeirKdirBTj

KaT

avTobs irapaSiSofisvais

yevea\oylats inrb ruir fi^ avvevrav & alvlTTOvrai KexpVI''^'""' S" auToir

&s

-rots vKitriitiuriv,

aK6ya>s rlBe-

irOat.

THE ALLEGORISING

SPIRIT.

357

perverted notion that the originators of myths, fully

conscious of all their latent meanings, had framed

Chap.
'__

them

as pictures to appeal to the senses

cases,

; ^

and, in

innumerahle

they resorted to explanations so

that they would have been impossible to anyone possessing a sound view
entirely without foundation

of nature and the origin of legends.

tally

To make theory
School

with practice, the founder of the

following Antisthenes, and setting an example after-

wards repeated by both Jews and Christians

tained that

main-

Homer

only in some places expressed

himself according to truth, at other times according

to popular opinion.^
itself

Thus did Stoicism surround

with the necessary intruments for the most ex(2) Inter*"*

tended allegorical and dogmatic interpretation.

Proceeding further to enquire how this method

was applied to particular stories, the

attracts attention is the contrast

first

point which

^/jg

which they draw myths

re-

between Zeus and the remaining Gods.

From

their the

gods.

belief in one divine principle everywhere at work, it

followed as a corollary that this contrast, which else-

where in Greek mythology was only a difference of degree, was raised to a specific and absolute differProofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and
'

Conf. Sen. Nat. The ancients did ii. 45, 1 believe that Jupiter hurled thunderbolts broadcast

Cornutus.
:

Qu. not
his

276, K. speaking of Zeno's commentaries on Homer, says 6 Si Zivav ouScy tuv toS 'O/iiipov
:

Ae'^f i,
koiii,

aWa Siriyoi/ifvos Kai StSdafiiv kotc* Si^av,

in t&

rk
.

Be
. .

sed
in-

kbto
Se

a\i]eeiav^ yeypaxptv.

eundem, quem nos Jovem

telligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiri-

Koyos ovros 'AvTurBfveds 6 4<ttl i:p6Tepov &AA' 6 fiXv ouk i^eipydcaro avrhp ou5e Kara tuv
. . .

turn mundi, &c. 2 JMo Chrysost.

efl /nefJous 4Sii\a(rev.

Or.

53, p.

58

THE
ence.

STOICS.

Chap.

xm L_

Zeus was compared to other Gods as an in-

corruptible

God

to transitory divine beings.

To the
is

Stoics, as to their predecessor Heraclitus,

Zeus

the

one primary Being, who has engendered, and again

absorbs into himself,
all

things and

all

Gods.

He

is

the universe as a unity, the primary

general law or destiny.'

fire,

the ether,

the spirit of the world, the universal reason, the

All other Gods, as being

parts of the world, are only parts and manifestations

has

names of the one God who names.^ That part of Zeus which goes over into air is called Here (a'^/a) and its lower strata, full of vapours. Hades that which becomes elementary fire is called Hephaestus that which becomes water, Poseidon that which becomes earth, Demeter, Hestia, and Ehea; lastly, that portion
of Zeus
special

only

many

which remains in the upper region

in the

is

called

Athene

more
Zeus

restricted sense.

And

since, according

to the Stoics, the finer elements are the same as

spirit,
is

not only the soul of the universe,

are
;

'

Special

references

Cornutus,

who

give further au-

hardly necessary after those already quoted, p. 148, 1 153, Conf. the 2; 164, 2; 165, 5. hymn of CfeaftiAes Chrysippus, in Stoi. Eel. i. 48 Arat. Phsen. Begin. Phit. Aud. Poet. o. H, Varro, in August. Civ. p. 31 D. vii. 5 6 9 28 Servius, in Georg. i. 6 Heraclit. c. 15, c. 23, 49 c. 24, 50 p. 31 Corn. pp. 7 26 35 38, where Zeis is derived from (^-^v or
; ; ;
;

thorities for the following in

the notes

fe'eii/

and

Aiby

from

Sik,

8ri

8i'

on the respective passages. The same on Cornutus, p. 6, discuss the derivation of 6ebs from flfeic or TifleVai; of alBiip from affleii/ or ael Beew. portion of these etymologies is well known to be Platonic, ^ noKvivvjios, as he is called by Cleanthes v. 1. Conf. Diog. 147; Corn. c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea

out!>i/ Tci

irivTa; conf. Villoisin

maybe found in the Neoplatonio

doctrine.

and Osann on the passage of

THE ALLEGOmSING

SPIRIT.

359

The same Zeus appears in other respects as Hermes, Dionysus, Hercules.^ The Homeric story of the binding and liberation of Zeus ^ points to the truth, already
but Athene, Eeason, Intelligence, Providence.'
established in Providence, that the order of the world
rests

Chap.

xm.

on the balance of the elements.

is
*

The

rise

and

succession of the elements

symbolised in the hang-

ing of Here

the arrangement of the spheres of the

universe, in the golden chain, by which the

Olympians
of

thought to pull down Zeus.^

The lameness

He-

phaestus goes partly to prove the difference of the

1. c. ; do. N. D. Phied. (PMlodem.), Fragm. col. 2-5 ; H&i-ael. c. 25, p. 53. On Here, consult Eeracl. Corn. c. 3 c. 15 and 41, p. 85 on Hephaestus, Iferacl. u. 26, 55 ; 43, 91 ; Cm-n. c. 19, p. 98 ; Plut. De Is. c. 66, p. 377
'

See Biog.
;

ii.

26, 66

Homer, that {HeracUt. 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth. That even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as parts of one general divine power or Zeus, is rendered probable by Erigche, Forsoh. 399, by a comparison of PJued/r.

(^Diog.

1. c.

perhaps confounds
399,

as Knsche, p.

supposes,

common
but
is-

lire

with

irSp tcxcik!)!',

also possible that the mythologyartificial God of may haye been so explained now one way now another in
is

with the passages quoted from Cicero and Diogenes. ^ Sen. Benef iv. 8, 1 Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Hercnlem et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia
col. 5,
. :

omnium

the Stoic school, which is not always uniform in its interpretations) on Poseidon, Heraol. c. 7, 15; c. 18, 77 ;c. 46, 117; Cm-n. u. 12 PUt. De Is. c. 40, Schl. p. 367 on Hades, whom Cicero 1. c. makes the representative of terrena vis Heraol. Com. 5 c. 41, 87 c. 23, p. 50 on Demeter and Hestia, Corn. on c. 28, p. 156; Pint. 1. c. Athene, Heraol. c. 19, 39; c. Corn. c. 20, o. 61, 123 28, 59 103. It is only by forced interpretation of a passage in
; ;

parens sit. Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, qiiandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes ilium est numerusque et ordo et scientia. The solution of Helios into Zeus (^Macrob. Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic
. .

origin.
'

Heraol.
395.

c.

25, 52. 40, 83

Conf.
;

n.
18.

t. ^

Heraol.

c.

II.

xv.
viii.

lUd.

c.

37,

73

II.

18.

60

THE
"

STOICS.
fire,

Chap,

earthly from the heavenly

and partly implies

that earthly

fire

can as

little

do without wood as the

Hephsestus

lame without a wooden support ; and if, in Homer, is hurled down from heaven, the meaning
is,

of the story

that in ancient times

men

lighted

their fires by lightning

from heaven and the rays of

of

the sun.'

The connection

Here with Zeus

points

to the relation of the ether to the air surrounding

and the well-known occurrence on Mount Ida The still more offensive scene in the Samian picture was expounded by Chrysippus as meaning that the fertilising powers (\070t airepiiaTLKol) of God are brought to bear upon matter.'' A similar meaning is found by Heraclitus in the story of Proteus,^ and in that of the
it;

was referred to the same event.^

shield of Achilles.

If Hephsestus intended this shield

to he a representation of this world,

what

else is

thereby meant but that, by the influence of primary

fire,

matter has been shaped into a world ?

Herael.
u.

apof interpretation to the legend of Prometheus (otherwise interpreted by Corn. c. 18, 96), Corn.o. 19, 98. On the lameness of Hephsestus, Plut. Fao. Ltm. 5, 3, p. 922. ' According to Eustath. in
'

26, 54,

who

plies the

same method

this explanation is given veryfully. The occurrence on Mount

Ida is said to represent the passage of winter into spring,

Here's tresses are the foliage of trees, &c. See JDwg. vii. 187 ; Prooem. 6 Orig. con. Gels. iv. 48 Tlienphil. ad Autol. iii. 8, p. 122, c ; Clement. Homil. v. 18. ^ K. 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes
;

n. p. 93, 46, probably following

a Stoic interpretation, Here

is

the spouse of Zeus, because the air is surrounded by the ether but does not agree with him, because the two elements are opposed to one another. = Herael. c. 39, 78 (conf.
Phit. Aud, Po. p.
19),

unformed matter the forms which he assumes denote the

;

four elements,

Seethe description. Alleg.

Hom.

where

43-51, p. 90, of which the above is a scanty abstract.

TSE ALLEGORISING
explained by

SPIRIT.

361

In a similar way, the Homeric theomachy was

Chap.
XIII.

many

to

mean

a conjunction of

tlie

seven planets, which would involve the world in great

trouble.'

Heraclitus, however, gives the preference

an interpretation, half physical and half moral, which may have been already advanced by Cleanthes.^ Ares and Aphrodite, rashness and profligacy, are opposed by Athene, or prudence Leto, forgetfulness, is attacked by Hermes, the revealing word ^ Apollo, the sun, by Poseidon, the God of the water, with whom, however, he comes to terms, because the sun Artemis, the is fed by the vapours of the water moon, is opposed by Here, the air, through which it passes, and which often obscures it Fluvius, or That earthly water, by Hephaestus, or earthly fire/ Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon, no one doubts * nor did it cause any difficulty to these
to
;
; ;

'

According to Seraelit.

53,

112.

learn from Ps. Plut. 5, 3, p. 1003, that Cleauthes wrote a Bfoiiaxl", a small fragment of which, containing a portion of the Prometheus legend in a later and evidently apologetically moulded form, is there preThe theomachy here served. explained by Cleanthes (for the Stoic appears to be the one
'

We

De

Fluv.

the moral interpretation given by Heraclitus to Homer's Aeoy^ax^n is quite in the style of the interpretation of the legend of Hercules, probably borrowed from Cleanthes. ' Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Horn. o. 72,
141.
*

Alleg.
.

Hom.
;

c.

54.
c. 6, p. 1 1

'

Conf Heraol.
;

here meant) appears not to be the Homeric one, but the struggle of the Gods with the Giants and Titans, identical with the book irtpl yiyiivToiv {Dwg. vii. 175). Perhaps on this occasion he may have discussed the other. At any rate

Com. 32, p. 191 34, 206; Cie. N. D. ii. 27, 68 Plimdr. (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2. In Phmd/rus, too, col. 2 (to6s 5c t4v 'ATniWio), if ^kiov seems too wild, perhaps ipSs should be
substituted for robs, for Apollo cannot well symbolise the
earth,

362

THE
mythologists
to
find

STOICS.

Chap.

the

moon

also

in Athene.'

XUI.

Many

subtle discussions

were set on foot by the

Stoics respecting the name, the form,

and the

attri-

butes of these Gods, particularly by Cleanthes, for

whom

the sun had particular importance,^ as being

the seat of the power which rules the world.'

stories of the birth of the

The

Lotoides and the defeat

of the dragon Pytho are, according to Antipater,

symbolical of events which took place at the formation of the world, and the creation of the sun

and

moon.*
'

Others find in the descent of two Grods from

Fao.

Plut.

Lnn.

5,

2,

p.

author

Macrobius found the

922.

The

Stoics address
1.

the

moon
2

as Artemis

and Athene.

See p. 147,

' The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in Ma-

derivation of iriBios from iriBsiv (because the sun's heat produces decay). Other explanations of these as well as of other epithets of Apollo, of the

orob. Sat.

i.

17,

i>s btt" &}0\.u>v

nal

name

t^s avaroK^s ivoiovjMevov by Chrysippus, as derived from a private and iroXhs, &s Twy TToWiav Kal tpaiKay ovxiai/atuf rov inphs 6vTa. The latter
6.\K(av 't6'Koiv
;

of Artemis and her epithets, of the attributes and symbols of these Gods, are to be found in abundance in Cornutus,
bins,
1.

c.

32, 34,

and in Macro-

explanation is quoted by Plotin. V. 5, 6, p. 525, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have borrowed it thence, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus.
Cicero, in imitation, makes his Stoic derive sol from solus. The epithet of Apollo, Loxias, is referred by Cleanthes to the A.iiis Koifll of the sun's course, or the a.KT'Lves \oJal of the sun ; and by OSnopides, to the \o^hs xiKKos (the The ecliptic). epithet AiiKioj is explained by Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis ; Antipater, &irh Tov \evKalveff0aL niivTa
<l>aTl^ovTos Tihiov.

who probably got the most of them from Stoic sources.

c,

In the same

The first of these stories is explained by Maerob. Sat. i. 17, down to the most minute dein the sense of the tails, cosmical views already given, p. 162, 2, and likewise the story of the slaying of the Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the heavy vapours of the marshy earth, which were overcome by the sun's heat (the arrows of Apollo). This interpretation being expressly attributed to Antipater by Macrobius, it appears probable that the first one came from the same source. Another likewise quoted by him according

THE ALLEGORISING
forth out of darkness.'
clitus,

SPIRIT.

363

Leto the simpler thought, that sun and moon came In the same
spirit,

Chap.
XTTT

Hera-

without disparaging the original meaning of

^

the story, sees in the swift-slaying arrows of Apollo

a picture of devastating pestilence
;

but then, in an

extraordinary manner, misses the natural sense, in

gathering from the Homeric story of Apollo's reconciliation (II.

i.

53) the lesson, that Achilles stayed

the plague by the medical science which Chiron had

taught him.'

Far more plausible

is

the explanation given of

the dialogue of Athene with Achilles, and of Hermes

with Ulysses. These dialogues are stated to be simply

soliloquies of the

two heroes respectively.*

But the

Stoic skill

in interpretation appears in its fullest

glory in supplying the etymological meanings of the

various

names and

epithets which are attributed to

for

Athene.'

We

learn,

instance, that

the

name

TpiToysvsia refers to the three divisions of philosophy.

to which the dragon represents the sun's course is perhaps also
Stoical.
' Cornutus, c. 2, p. 10, points to this in explaining Leto as Aijfli, and referring it to night,

Athene are given from aflpelv by Heraol. c. 19, 40 Tzetz. in

;

because everything

is

forgotten

ifenod/Ep.Kol'Hjue.TO; Etymol. Mag. 'Afliji/a from BriKvs or Bit\i^eiv (^h6itvr) = kBii\Ti or i.dr\Xa. =^M^ flijXoCouiro), by Pluedr. Nat. D. col. 6 Athenag. Leg.
;

in sleep at night. ^ c. 8, especially p. 16, 22, 28. Ibid. c. 12, p. 24, 28, the clang of Apollo's arrows is explained to be the harmony of the spheres.
'

pro. Christ,
flcii/u,

c.

17, p.

78from
never beaten

because
itself
aie^jp

virtue

allows

to be

from

rafa, so that 'Aflrivofa

= tdeepovam.
This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to Phced/r. col. 6. Cor-

c.

15, p. 31.

Ibid. c. 19, 72, p. 39, 141. See Corn. c. 20, 105, and VilloiMn's notes on the passage, The most varied derivations of
'

'

nutusalso mentions it (20, 108), but he prefers the derivation

from

-rpitv.

364

THE
heads of Cerberus.'

STOICS.

Chap.

Heraclitus discovers the same divisions in the three

xni.

Chrysippus, in a diifuse manner,

proves that the coming forth of the Goddess from the

head of Zeus

is

not at variance with his view of the

It has been already observed that Dionysus means wine, and Demeter, fruit;' but, just

seat of reason.^

as the latter

was taken to represent the earth and

its

nutritious powers,'' so Dionysus was further supposed

to stand for the principle of natural life, the pro-

ductive and sustaining breath of

this breath

life

'

and since

comes from the sun, according to CleMoreover, the stories of the

anthes, it was not difficult to find the sun represented

by the God of wine.*

birth of Dionysus, his being torn to pieces

33, p. 69. It is to be found in Oahn. Hipp, et Plat. iii. 8, p. 849'

by Titans,
fl

c.

col. 2

T^v

A'fifiTiTpa yrtv

rh 4v

aurp
Ariii

y6yevfj.a [ySyi/xov TryevfiaJ,

On Demeter
liiiTrip,

353, but, according to Plicedr. (Philodem.') 1. c, conf. Oe.

156,
'

and

as 71) /vfiTiip or see C(n-n. o. 28, p. Villoison on the pas1. i;.

;

N. D. I. 15, 41, was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest place in the universe. Cornut. 0. 20, 103, leaves us to choose between this ex-

Plut.

Dionysus
i.

is

rh

ySvijuov iri/eujua Kal rp6<pifiov.

"

Macrob. Sat.

18

Clean-

thes derived the

name Dionysus

from

iiaviaai, because the sun daily completes his course round the world. It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of Apollo with
is

planation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head as the seat of the iiyefioviKov. Heracl. c. 19, 40, states the latter, ustath. in H. 93, 40, the former, as the reason.
'
'

Dionysus was common, and it elaborately proved by Macrobius. Serviiis, too, on Georg.
i.

p. 349, 4, CorH. 30, p. 172.

See p. 359,
Schl.
p.

1,

Piut.

De

Is.

367: Demeter and Core are rh Sta tiJs 7^s koI

c.

40,

5, says that the Stoics believed the sun, Apollo, and likewise Bacchus and the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno, and Proserpine to be identical. Other etymologies of Aidvmos are given by Cm-n. c. 30, 173.

THE ALLEGORISING
his followers,'

SPIRIT.

365

no

less

than the rape of Proserpine,^

and

the institution of agriculture,'

and the names of

Chap. xin.

the respective Gods, afforded ample material for the

interpreting taste of the Stoics.

The Fates

(ixolpai),

as their

name

already indi-

and invariable rule of destiny;^ the Graces (j(;o(OtTes), as to whose names, number, and qualities Chrysippus had given the
cates, stand for the righteous
fullest discussion,^ represent

the virtues of benevo-

lence and gratitude

culture."

the Muses, the divine origin of

Ares

is

war ;* Aphrodite, unrestrained pasp.

' Cora,. 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also Heraol. c. 35, p. 71, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage. 2 Corn. c. 28, p. 163, who

Phit. Sto. Eep. 47, 5 Corn. c. 13, 38 and Plato, Kep.x. 617, c. ' According to Sen. Benef. i. 3, 8 ; 4, 4, he had filled a whole book, probably of a treatise not
; ;

refers the legend and worship.of Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of Persephone, to the sowing of fruits. Conf Cic. N. D. ii. 26, 66. According to Pha. De Is. 66, p. 377, Cleanthes had already called Uepae<p6vri, rb ^ik Tuv KopiT&v <j}ep6fA.evov Kal

also

otherwise mentioned on kind deeds, with these ineptise ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique beneficii pauca ad-

dicat, neo his fabulas, sed hsec fabulis inserit. A portion of these was made use

modum
of

by Hecato

in his

work on
Plimdr.

this subject.
Chrysippus, in (Philodemus), col. 4.

Further

^ovevSfievoyiryevfia.

A somewhat

different explanation of the rape of Persephone is given in

a passage of Mai's Mythograph vii. 4, p. 216, quoted by Osann.

on Comutus, p. 343. ' The legend of Triptolemus, which is explained by Comutus,

1.

particulars in Sen. 1. c, and Corn. 15, 55. Somewhat similar explanation of Airoi is the (Cw-K. 12, 37 ; Heraol. 37, 75), which at best are only casual personifications. ' Corn. 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their

names and number

PMlodem.

0.

p. 161, historically as re-

De Mus.

ferring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus. ' Chrysippus, in Stoi. i. 180; Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7 (jnisodm-et. Cur. Gr. Aff. vi. 14, Conf. p. 87), see p. 171, 1.

Vol. Here. i. col. 15 ; Erato indicating the importance music for ipariKr) apfrii. Ibid. of 10, 33, on the 'Erinnyes ; 29, 171, on the Horoi. Herac. 31, 63 ; Plu. Am. 13, 15, p. 757.

366
Chap.
XIII.

THE
sion, or,

STOICS.
; '

other more generally, absence of control interpreters, and among them Empedocles, consider

Ares to represent the separating, Aphrodite the uniting,

power of nature.^ The

stories of the

two

deities

being wounded by Diomedes,'' of their adulterous

intrigues,

and their being bound by Hephaestus,^ are

explained in various ways

nically,

morally, physically, techHis

and

historically.

In the case of another God, Pan, the idea of the

AUnear was suggested simply by the name.

earth,

shaggy goat's feet were taken to represent the solid

and the human form of his upper limbs im-

plied that the sovereign power in the world resides

above.'

To the

Stoic without a misgiving as to these

it
'

and similar explanations,^

Herael. 28, 60;
30,

was a matter of small

62,

and above,

p. 360.

2 Ibid. In this 69, 136. sense. Aphrodite might be iden-

tified
col.
1

with Zeus, which

:

really done

was by Pktsdr. Nat. De.

evi/
.
. .

av6.Koyov

Bat

[Petersen suggests euvo/ieicrfloi, but probably it should be ovojuti^efffloi] rbi' Afo Kal rijv
Koiv^v
fiei/T]V

ndvTOi]/

tpvffiv

Kal elfiap-

Kal a.v6.yKyiv koX

r^v avr^v

efj/ai

Kal Kvvo^iav KoX AiKr]v koX KoX EipiiUTjv Kal *A(f>po-

In Phit. And. Po. i;. 4, p. the connection of Ares and Aphrodite is explained as meaning a conjunction of the two planets. Heracl. 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to the union of <^t\ia and yei/cos, which produces harmony, or to the fact that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephsestus) into objects of beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given
19,

'Oli.6voiav
SIttiv Kal

rh TrapawKfitrioj/ Trav. ' The story of Ares, wibtok h KEvewva, means, according to Heracl. 31, 64, that Diomedes,
Tct Kfvh rrjs tuv avTejrii\uj/ ri^eus iropeKTcXeic, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (oK/ipooiSi/ij, Hid. 30, 62), that, by his experience in war, he
iirl

by Corn. 19, 102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the union of strength and beauty. ' Corn. 27, 148 ; Plut. Krat.
408, c.
"

His lewdness was said to

;

overcame

the

inexperienced

the fullness of the \6yot in nature his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the world.
indicate
(T-TrepfiaTiKol

troops of barbarians.

THE ALLEGORISING
difficulty to

SVIRIT.

867

make

the Titan 'laTreros stand for lan-

guage or

and Kotos for quality or ttoiottjj.^ Add to this the many more or less ingenious explanations of the well-known stories of Uranos and Cronos,^ and we are still far from having exhausted
'IdijiSTos,

Chap. xni.

the resources of the Stoic explanations of mythology.

The most important attempts of this kind have, however, been sufficiently noticed.

Besides the legends of the Gods, the legends of

the heroes
attracted considerable

(3) Alle-

Stoic Schools.

attention in the plied to Specially were the persons of Her- lieroio

gory ap-

' Com. 17, 91. Conf. Osamn ad locvim who points out similar of interpretations, probably

Stoic origin, in the Scholia to the theogony, and also in Etymol. M. ' Besides the etymologies of oipavis in C<w. c. 1, and the observation of Plut. PI. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because she brings forth everything, the words in Cic. N. D.
ii.

A second explanation is given by Corn. 7, 21, after making (c. 3, 10) vain attempts at etymological interpretations of Cronos and Khea. Cronos (from Kpaiveiv) stands for the order of nature, putting
stars.

an end

to the. all too-violent

atmospheric currents on earth, by diminishing the vapourmasses (compare the quotation from Chrysippus on p. 161, 2),

and he is bound by Zeus, to

re-

24,

63,

on which

Xrisefte,

Forsch. 397, deserve notice. It is there said, probably after Zeno Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things. Cronos is Time (the same is
:

present that change in nature is limited. Maoroi. Sat. i. 8 (betraying a Stoic pattern by Chrysippus's definition of time
:

certa

dimensio quse

ex

ooeli

said by fferaclit. c. 41, 86, who sees in Bhea the ever flowing motions), and consumes his

conversione colligetur, conf. p. 197, 2), gives another explanation Before the separation of elements, time was not ; after the seeds of all things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity,
:

children, just, as Time does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course of time having been bound by the courses of the

and the

elements

had come

into being, the process came to an end, and the different sexes were left to propagate animal
life.

368

THE
cules

STOICS.
out, for the sake of illustra-

Chap,
'__

and Ulysses singled

ting the ideal of the wise man.'

of interpretation

But

here, too,

meet and cross. Acvarious modes cording to Cornutus,'' the God Hercules must be distinguished from the hero of the same name the Grod being nothing less than Reason, ruling in the world without a superior ^ and the grammarian

makes every effort to unlock with this key his history and attributes. Nevertheless, with all his respect for Cleanthes,'' he could not accept that Stoic's

explanation of the twelve labours of Hercules.

He-

raclitus has probably preserved the chief points in

this explanation.

Hercules

is

a teacher of mankind,

initiated into the heavenly wisdom.

He
i.e.

overcomes
the lusts

the wild bear, the lion, and the bull,

;

and passions of men he drives away the deer, i.e. cowardice he purifies the stall of Augeas from filth, i.e. he purifies the life of men from extravagances
; ;

he frightens away the birds,

i.e.

empty hopes

and

burns to ashes the many-headed hydra of pleasure.

He

brings the keeper of the nether world to light,

with his three heads

these heads

representing the

three chief divisions of philosophy.

In the same

way, the wounding of Here and Haides by Hercules

is

explained.

Here, the Goddess of the air repre-

sents the fog of ignorance, the three-barbed arrow

See p. 292, Beuef. i. 13, 3.
'

4,

and Sen.

^
'

C. 3]

187.

and what Vilhison quotes on Cornutus, p. 366, from Schol. ApoUon. among the natTiral
philosophers,

Plvt.
:

367
iv.

He

SiaipcTiicli)'

8, 1.

Is. 44, Schl. p. rb irXtixziKbv koI nvivy.a. Sen. Benef. See above, p. 359, 2,

De

is

Hercules

i. e., the Stoics, symbolises strength

and
*

intelligence, Pers. Sat. v. 63.

PROPHETIC POWERS.
undeniably (so thought the Stoics) pointing to philosophy, with its threefold division, in its heavenly
flight.

36

Chap.

The laying
secret.'

prostrate of

Hades by that arrow

explained by Hera-

implies that philosophy has access even to things

most
first

The Odyssey
strain,

is

clitus in the

same

he being apparently not the

all vices. ^
i.e.

so to do.^

In Ulysses you behold a pattern of

all virtues,

and an enemy of

the country of the Lotophagi,

sures
;

from from wicked pleaflees

;

He

he stays the wild rage of the Cyclopes

first

he

calms the winds, having

secured a prosperous
;

passage by his knowledge of the stars

tions of pleasure in the house of Circe

the attrac-

he overcomes,

penetrates into the secrets of Hades, learns from the

Sirens the history of all times, saves himself from

the Charybdis of profligacy and the Scylla of shamelessness, and, in abstaining

from the oxen of the sun,

desires. Such explanations may show how the whole burden of the myths was resolved into allegory by the Stoics, how little

overcomes sensuous

suffice to

they were conscious of foisting in foreign elements,

and how they degraded to mere symbols of philosophical ideas those very heroes on whose real existence

they continually insisted.

The
ova:

Stoic theology has engaged a good deal of

it is

C. Pro-

attention, not only because

compare

instructive to ^^^.^ general and in in detail, with their views,

similar views advanced nowadays, but also because

'

HeraoUt.

c. 33, p. 67,

who,

'

in the introduction, expressly refers to SoRifjuiraToi SrsJiKav.

C. 70-75. 0. 70-73, p. 137.

B B

370
Chap. xni.
it

THE
their entire system.

STOICS.

forms a very characteristic and important part of

To

us,

jnuch of

it

appears to
Stoics,

be a mere worthless trifling;

they seemed to be
\

but, to the

these explanations were solemnly earnest.

To them

the only

means of rescuing

the people's faith, of meeting the severe charges

brought
poets,

against

tradition

and the works of the

with these
traditions,

on which a Greek had been fed from infancy.'

to

Unable
they

break

entirely

would not sacrifice to them their scientific and moral convictions. Can we, then, wonder that they attempted the impossible, and sought to unite contradictions, or that such an attempt should land them in forced and artificial methods of
still

interpretation
(1) Dimnation.

Illustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards

positive religion are their views on divination.^

The

importance attached by

them
it.

to the prophetic art

appears in the diligence which the chiefs of this

School devoted to discussing

later

The ground

for the

teaching having been prepared by Zeno and

Cleanthes, Chrysippus gave the finishing touch to

the Stoic dogmas on the subject.'

' Conf. the way in whicli HeracUtus, 74, 146, expresses himself as to Plato's and Epi'

Particular treatises

curus's attacks
^

upon Homer.

Conf. Waclnmuth^ stieaXise mentioned above, p. 351, 2. ' Cie. Divin. i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on divination, which are also referred to (as

i. 6, 9) ; Phot. Qusest. {MontCoisl. p. 847) faugon, Phihydemus, irepl diSov ^layuyyis. Vol. Here. vi. 49, col. 7, 33 ;

Laetant. Inst.

Amphiloch.

Bibl.

and from which Cicero has borrowed Divin. i. 38, 82 it.

;

49, 101 ; 15, 35 41 63, 130 and perhaps De Fato, 7. Chrysippus also vreote a book, 17,
; ;
;

Waohsmuth,
Diog.
vii.

p. 12,

149

shows) by Varro (in

TTfpl xpi"';""''

{Oie. Divin.
;

i.

19,

37

ii.

56, 115

65,

134

PROPHETIC POWERS: DIVINATION.

respecting divination were drawn up by Sphaerus,

371

Chap.

Diogenes, Antipater, and, last of

all,

by Posidonius.'

xm.

The subject was also fully treated by Boethus, and by Panaetius from a somewhat different side.^ The

common notions as to prognostics and oracles could not commend themselves to these philosophers, nor could they approve of common soothsaying. In a
system so purely based on nature as
theirs,^

the sup-

position that (xod works for definite ends, after the

manner

of

men, exceptionally annoimcing to one or

the other a definite result

in

short, the marvellous

was out of place.

vcoTTiSs)
(Cie.
;

But
;

to infer thence
dications Divin. i.
of

as their op;

and one

irtpi

oveipav

Divin. i. 20, 39 ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27, 56 Smd. Tt/iapovvTos). In the former, he collected oracular responses in the latter, prophetic dreams.
: ;

a storm. Oio. 14 ii. 21, 47. On Pansetius's objections to /lapriKii a word will be presently said. ' Oio. Divin. i. 52, 118 Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum fissis aut avium cauti8,

Dioff. vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphaerus Trfpl/uavTiK^j. (Xc. (Divin. i. 3, 6 ; i. 38, 83 ; ii. 17, 41 43, 90 ; 49, 101) mentions a treatise having the same title with that of Diogenes of Seleucia, and two books of Antipater irepl tiavTiKrjs, in which many interpretations of dreams were given. The same writer (Divin. i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38,
'
;

bus

interesse

Deum
est,
fieri

enim decorum
dignum, nee

potest. IHd. 58, ilia testabor, non me sortileges, neque eos, qui qusestus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia
:

neque nee Diis ullo pacto 132 Nunc

;

quidem

agnoscere.

Simi-

larly in Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 2 (see p. 374, 3), the difference between the Stoic view and

83; 54,123; ii.70,144; 15,35; mentions a treatise of Posidonius vipl ;uo>ri/(?j, in five books, Diog. vii. 149 ; Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6 30, 64 55, 125 De 21, 47 ii. 15, 35 57, 130
49, 101)
;
;

Fato,
p. 395.

BoetL

De

Diis et
v.

Pr^sens (in

Orelli's Cicero,

1)

' Boethus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and explain the in-

the ordinary one is stated to be this, that, according to the Stoics, auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt signiflcent. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd belief that Jupiter should hurl bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an opinion invented ad coercendos animos impeiitorum.

B B 2

372
Chap.

THE
divination

STOICS.

ponents, the Epicureans, did

is

that

the whole art of

XUI.

a delusion, was

more than the Stoics

eeuld do.

The

belief in an extraordinary care of

for

God for individual men was too comforting an idea they not only appealed to them to renounce
; '

divination as the strongest proof of the existence of

Grode
also

and the government of Providence,'' but they diew the converse conclusion, that, if there be

must also be divination, since the benevolence -of the Gods would not allow them to refuse The conception to mankind so inestimable a gift.'
Grods, there
Pr.
Si*

Conf. Diogenian, in Mis. Ev. iv. 3, 5: rh xP^'^^ej airfis (divination) kxI $iu,ipe\is,
'

h Kol jUC^Xitrra Xpuimriros Soxei

T71V

Afiveiv

fiavTtKi\v

and M.

Awrel. ix. 27 ; God cares even for the vsrioked by means of prophecies and bv dreams.
2

Oic.

N. D.

ii. 5,

13,

where

four reasons from which Cleanthes deduced belief in Gods, the first is praesensio rerum futurarum, extraordinary natural phenomena pestilence, earthquakes, monsters, meteors, &c., being the third. lUd. 65, 165 The Stoic says of divination Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis, Sext. Math. ix. 132 If there were no Gods, all the varieties of divination would be unmeaning these are nevertheless universally admitted, die. Divin. i. 6, and the quotations on p. 175, 3, 4. ' Cio. Divin. i. Ego 5, 9 enim sic existimo si sint ea genera di vinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quseque colimus, esse

among the

Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, inquam, Quinte, defendis. Tbid. 38, 82 Stoic proof of divination Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quse f utura sunt, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse ho: :

minum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suae majestatis praesignificare

hominibus

quae sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem Dii prjesignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &o. Non igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (ovk &pa

the

eiffl fiky

6eo\ ov

irpoinjfiaivovfft Bk

well-known

expression

of Chrysippus for fleof ciViy, ov irpoa-rifiaivovffi, conf. p. 1 14, 1) sunt autem Dii significant ergo et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam, frustra enim significarent neo, si dant vias, non est divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater.
:
:

PROPHETIC POWERS: DIVINATION.

of destiny, too, and the nature of ma,n, appeared to

373
Chap.

PosidoniuS to lead to the belief in divination

all

'

if

that happens

is

the outcome of an unbroken chain

of cause and effect, there

the existence of causes,

result
;

must be signs indicating from which certain effects

and if the soul of man is in its nature must also possess the capacity, under circumstances, of observing what generally escapes its
^

divine, it

notice.'

Lest, however, the certainty of their belief

sufifer

should

from lacking the support of experience,

*

the Stoics had collected a number of instances of

verified prophecies
tion, that
;

but with so

little

discrimina-

did

we

noft

we could only wonder at their credulity, know the abject state of such historical
then existed, and the readiness with

criticism as

which, in

all ages,

men

believe whatever agrees with

their prejudices.'

In what way, then, can the two facts be comIt may be easily recognised as belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41 49, 101, again reverts to the same proof. Conf id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos
; .

^
' *

Cic.

1. c.

IMd.
See

55, 126. 57, 129.

;

p. 370, 3
i.

371,
27, 56

1.
'
(

"

do. Divin.
ii.

non putaie, quse ab

ficantur,
vii.

iis

signi-

149

contemnere. fol ;uV xaX

Traai"

IHog.
ij.avTiKi)v
ei
/tol

135 ccottIis), ii. 70, 144, quoting from Chrysippus i. 54, 123, quoting from Antipater i. 30,
TiiaapovvTos),

65,

vipe(rTii'ai

(ficunv,

7Tp6voiav cTroi.
Trp6voiav elvai,

Some read ^

xal

in which case the argument would be reversed, not from providence to divination, but from divination to
'

providence.
Cic.

Div.

i.

55,

125

Pat. 3, 5, from Posidonius gives instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, whilst their opponents either pronounced the stories to be false, or the prophecies to be deceptive, or their fulfilment to
64,

De

Primum mihi

videtur, ut Posi.

be
19,

donius facit, a Deo fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda.
.

deinde a

accidental ( Cic. Divin. i. 37; ii. 11, 27 66, 115 De

;
;

Fato

3, 5).

374
Chap,
'__

THE
bined

STOICS.
on the one hand, and,

the

belief in prophecy,

(2) ProTJli/BCU BSD-

plained hy

on the other, the denial of unearthly omens arising from an immediate divine influence ? In answering this question, the Stoics adopted the only course
-jpliich

refer-

their system allowed.

The marvellous, which,

was referred to natural

as such, they could not admit,

laws,'

from which

it

was speculatively deduced.

is

The

admirable Pansetius

the only Stoic who

is

reported

as having maintained the independence of his judg-

ment by denying omens, prophecy, and astrology.^ Just as in modern times Leibnitz and so many others both before and after him thought to purge away
from the marvellous all that is accidental and superhuman, and to find in wonders links in the general
chain of natural causes,
so, too,

the Stoics, by as-

suming a natural connection between the token and

its fulfilment,

made an

effort to rescue

omens and

divination, and to explain portents as the natural

symptoms of certain

occurrences.*

Nor did they con-

' Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained

as Wachsmuth rightly observes, this denial of Astrology (Divln.

the marvellous by a reference

to natural causes, even allowing the existence of presentiments within certain limits. ^ Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6, after

42-46), and he allows, c. 42, 88 ; 47, 97, that Pansetius was the only Stoic who rejected it. ' Sen. Nat. Quse. ii. 32, 3 Nimis ilium [Deum} otiosum et
ii.

the

passage

quoted

Sed a

pusillEe rei
aliis

Stoicis vel princeps ejus disciplinse Posidonii doctor disciptilus

ministrum facis, si somnia aliis exta, disponit.

degeneravit Pansetius, uec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Ibid. i. 7, 12; ii. 42, 88; Acad. ii. 33, 107 Biog. vii. 149 Epi])lian. Adv. Hser. Cicero appears to have borrowed from Panastius,
Antipatri
; ;

Ista uihilominus divina ope-geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennse

avium reguntur nee pecudum

viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione fatorum series explicatur .quicquidfitalicujus rei futurse signum est , cujus
.

rei
&:c.

ordo est etiam prsedictio

Cie. Divin.
i.

est, 52, 118, after

PROPHETIC POWERS: NATURAL CAUSES.

fine themselves to cases in

376
Chap,
'__

which the connection he-

tween the prophecy and the event can he proved.'

They

upon divination in cases in which it cannot possibly be proved. The flight of birds and
insisted

the entrails of victims were stated

indications of

to be natural

coming events

and there was said to

be even a formal connection between the positions

of the stars and the individuals born under those
If it was urged, that in this case omens more numerous than they were supposed to be, the Stoics answered, that omens were countless, but that only the meaning of a few was known to men.' If the question were asked, how it is that,
positions.^

must be

far

in public sacrifices, the priest

should always ofier

those very animals whose entrails contained omens,

Chrysippus and his followers did not hesitate to aflSrm

that the same sympathy which exists between objects

and omens

also guides

the sacrificer in the

choice of a victim.''

And
:

yet so bald was this hypoAs in the passage quoted from Boethus on p. 371, 2.
'

the passage quoted, p. 371, 3 Sed ita a prinoipio inohoatum esse mundum, nt certis rebus certa signa preecurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, &o. Posidonius, ihid. 55, 125 (see
p. 373, 2).

'

and

Conf. p. 374, 2 ; 379, 1, Cie. Div. ii. 43, 90, ac-

cording to whom Diogenes of Seleuoia conceded so much to

astrology as to alio w that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he would not yield, because twins often differ widely in their course of
life
'
'

Kor wasthe meaning

otherwise, when portents (according to Cio. Divin. ii. 15, 33 ; 69, 142) were based on a (TufiiriSea t?s (pvatios (on which see p. 183, 2), an opponent not without reason doubting whether it existed, for instance, between a rent in the liver of a victim and an advantageous business, or between an egg in a dream and treasure trove.

and

destiny. Sen. IS^at. Qu.

Cio.
1.

ii.

32, 5.
:

c. ii.

15, 35

ChryPosi-

sippus,

Antipater,

and

THE
Chap:
thesis, that

STOICS.

xm,

they had, at the same time, a second

viz.

answer in reserve,

that the corresponding change

in the entrails did not take place until the victim

had been chosen.'

in

In support of such views, their

only appeal was to the almighty power of

God

but,

making

this appeal, the deduction of

omens from

natural causes was at an end.^

Nor, again, could the Stoics altogether quiet a

suspicion that an unchangeable predestination of all

events had rendered individual activity superfluous,'

nor meet the objection* that, on the hypothesis of

necessity, divination itself

was unnecessary.^

They

quieted themselves, however, with the thought that

divination,
tion, are included

and the actions resulting from divinaamong the causes foreordained by

destiny.^
donius assert Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim
:

quandam sentientem atque divinam, qus tota conf usa mundo sit, as was explained I. 52,
118.
'

Cie.

ii.

15, 85
illis

Hind vero
. . .

multum etiam melius, quod

dlcitur ab
(conf.
i.

52,

118)
velit,

cum immolare quispiam tum fieri extorum mutaDeorum enim numini

See
p. 374, 3.
i.

tionem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut

supersit:
^

parere omnia.
(lie.

53,

120,

defends

auguries somewhat similarly by

arguing

If

an animal can
at
pleasure,

move

its

limbs

must not God have greater power over His ? (his body according to then! whole world). ' See p. 181.

being

the

* Cic. Divin. ii. 8, 20 Diogenian, in Ihis. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5 Alen. Aph. De Fat. 31, p. 96. ' Upon the use of divination depends the whole argument for its reality, based on the divine kindness. Cic. i. 38, 83, and above, p. 872, 1. Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37, 2 38, 2 Effugiet pericula si expiaverit prsediotas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in f ato est, ut expiet, &c. This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears from Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, and PHlodem. jrtpi flewi" 5107(07^$, Vol. Here. vi. col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation. In the above quoted and more general form it is found in Alexander and Euse; ;
:

bius,

probably also taken from

p. 181.

Chrysippus, see

;;

PROPHETIC POWERS: CAUSES.

Divination, accordingly, consists in the capacity
to read

377
Chap;

and interpret omens;' and

this capacity
gift,

xni.
is,

according to the Stoics, partly a natural

partly acquired by art and study. ^

and

(3) <?
tion.

The natural

gift of

prophecy

is

based, as other philosophers had already

laid down,' on the relationship of the

Grod.''

human

soul to

Sometimes

it

manifests itself in sleep, at other

for higher revelations will
is

times in ecstasy .'

A taste
sense,

be developed, in proportion as the soul

withdrawn

from the world of

and from

all

thought re-

specting things external.^

The

actual cause of the

prophetic gift was referred to influences coming to

in

Sea:t.

According to the definition Math. ix. 132, which

Oic. Divin. ii. 63, 130, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an iiriaritint ( Cic. more accurately a vis = Sivapus, since besides scientific there is also a natural

sophy, without, however, defending them. ' do. Divin. i. 30, 64 ii. 10, 26 The naturale genus divinandi is, quod animos arriperet
;
:

aut

exciperet

extrinsecus

a,

divinitate,

unde omnes animos

divination), fltaipijTiK)) koI ^JijttjTiK^ Tuv iy^rh 0euv i.vBpti>TTOis 5iSoStob. Eel. ii. fievtov (TTjfielav,

haustos aut acceptos aut llbatos

122 and 238

3, 5.

-EW. Pr. Ev.

iv.

haberemus. Pint. Plac. v. 1 where, however, the words kotA 9ei(iTr|Ta Tijs 'I'vxvs are only a gloss on the preceding words
ri ivOeoy, k.t.\. Galen. Hist. Phil. p. 320. ' Cit;. Divin. i.'50, 115, and Compare the many Plut. Stoic stories of dreams and presentiments in Cic. i. 27, 56 ; ii. 5, 134 ; 70, 144. 30, 64 ' See besides the passages just quoted, Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110 J 50, 113 ; 51, 115 and in particular i. 57. 129. Hence the prophecies of the dying (itid. 30, 63, according to Posidonius ; conf. Arigt. 1. c), and the statement (ibid. 53, 121 see p. 380, 1) that true dreams come of innocent sleep.
; ;

2 Phit. Vit. Horn. 212, p. [rf/S iiavTmrjs'] ri fihv 1238 TexvM&v (paffLV flvat ol ^tuikoI.
:

kotA

oioi/

Upo!TKOTriav Kol olavohs KoL

tJp

irepl ((i^fioi (col K\-ifi6vas (to! tru/i-

npoaTiydpevffav Th Si i/r^xvov KaX aSt&aKTov, rovretrriv iviiriiia koX

ifdovfftafffiois.

To the same
i.

effect,
ii.
'

Oic.

Divin.

18,

34;

11, 26.

Conf. the fragment quoted

in

'Aristotle and the Peripatetics,' p. 300, which throws light on old and well-known views in the spirit of the Platonic Aristotelian philo-

378

THE

STOICS.

Chap,
XIII,

the soul partly from Grod or the universal spirit diffused throughout the world,' and
souls

partly from the

which haunt the

air or

demons.^

External

causes, however, contribute to put people in a state

of enthusiasm.'
Artificial

soothsaying, or the art of divination,

depends upon observation and

guess-work.*

One

who could survey

all

causes in their effects on one

another would need no observation.

Such a one

would be able to deduce the whole from the given causes. But Grod alone is able to do this. Hence men must gather the knowledge of future events from the indications by which their coming is announced.^ These indications may be of every variety and hence all possible forms of foretelling the future were allowed by the Stoics the
;
;

series of events

Conf. the quotations on 4, from do. Divin. ii. 10,26; 15, 35 and his remarks on the instinotus afflatusque divinus. Cic. i. 18, 34. ^ According to Oie. Divin. i. 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic dreams were realised in one of three ways uuo, quod prsevideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur ; altero, quod planus aer sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tauquam insignitse
'

p. 375,

Posidonius can only have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular views; as a Stoic, he would only know of that oonnection with the soul of the universe which is referred to in the first mode, ' Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in Cic. Divin. i. 50, 114 36, 79, enumerates the impression derived from music, natural scenery, mountains, woods, rivers, seas and vapotirs arising from the earth,
;

notse veritatis appareant ; tertio.

quod

ipsi Dii

cum dormientibus

coUoquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the second, correspond with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed,
in
is
StoJ). Eol. ii.

But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he can have attached value to oracles (jMd. 18, 34) by lot or justified them otherwise than in the way mentioned on p.
375, 4.
> '

122, 238, liavrmii

flewprjTiK*)
J)

defined =

^TTio-T^A")
o[7rb

Oic.

i.

&riiA.elav

rav

BiSiv

SaiiJ,6vaip

Ibid.

i.

18, 34 ; 33,72. 56, 127.

PROPHETIC POWERS: CAUSES.

inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and

379
Chap,

other natural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and

xni.

omens of every

kind.'

Some

idea of the mass of su-

perstition which the Stoics admitted

and encouraged
Cicero's trea-

may be
tise

gathered from the

first

book of

on divination.

The explanation

of these

omens

being, however, a matter of skill, individuals in this,

as in every other art,

may

often go

wrong in their
tradi-

interpretation.^

To ensure against mistakes

;

tion

is

partly of use, establishing by manifold expe-

riences the

meaning of each omen

'

and the moral

state of the prophet is quite as important for scientific

divination as for the natural gift of prophecy.

is

Purity of heart

one of the most essential condi-

tions of prophetic success.

In
piety

all

these questions the moral tone of Stoic

and great pains were taken by the harmony with their philosophic view of the world. Nevertheless, it is clear that success could neither be theirs
is

preserved,

Stoics to bring their belief in prophecy into

in

making

this attempt, nor indeed in dealing with

belief.

any other parts of the popular

' Cicero, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously

Toiling with
affTpotiavrmii
Si'

9eo\7iiTTMii,
fioyixii

nor

ir^ffir)(rts

ovelpav.

33) treated them separately, Similarly, Ps. Pint. V. Horn, 8ee above, p. 377, 2. 212. Stoi. Eol. ii. 238, mentions of as varieties tentatively,
(i.

Maeroh. Somn. Seip. i. 3, gives a theory of dreams ; but in how far it represents the views of
it is impossible to Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.

the Stoics,
say.

littPTudi
t!>

t6 Tf bvfifoKpiTiKbv, KoL
koX

oiaivoaKoitMiv,

Bvtik6v.
:

Math. ix. 132, says If there were no Gods, there would be neither fiavTMii nor
Seait.

' '

do. i. 55, 12i Hid. i. 56, 127.

;

56, 128.

380

THE

STOICS.

Chap,
XIII,

indefatigable zeal in an attempt so hopeless, they

proved at least the sincerity of their wish to reconBut not less did they cile religion and philosophy.
disclose

by these endeavours a misgiving that science, which had put on so bold a face, was not in itself
religion,

but needed support froni the traditions of and from a belief in divine revelations.' Probably we shall not be far wrong in referring to this practical need the seeming vagaries of men
sufficient,

like Chrysippus,

who, with the clearest intellectual

powers, could be blind to the folly of the methods

they adopted in defending untenable and antiquated

opinions.
tical

These vagaries show in Stoicism prac-

interests preponderating over science.

They

also establish the connection of Stoicism

with Schools

which doubted altogether the truth of the understanding, and thought to supplement it by divine
revelations.

Thus the Stoic theory of divination

revelation.
;

is

the immediate forerunner of the Neopythagorean

and Neoplatonic doctrine of

' Ut igitux Cic. i. 53, 121 qui se tradet qnieti prteparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus (for instance, nourishment conf c. 29, 60 51, 115) ad tranquillitatem acoommodatis, certa et vera
:

cernit in somnis sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior.

STOIC SYSTEM AS A WHOLE.

881

CHAPTEE

XIV.
ITS HISTO-

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND

RICAL POSITION.

Having now investigated the Stoic system in detail, we shall be in a position to pass a definite judgment
on the scope of the Stoic philosophy, the import

Chap.
'_

^- Inner of the

and the relation of

torical

its

various parts, and

its

his-

position.

Its

peculiar

character manifests ^o^y-

itself before all

things in the three points to which

: '

attention was drawn at the very outset

its

pre-

eminently practical tone, the deteimining of this

practical tendency
virtue, the use of logic

by the notions of the good and and natural science as a Scientific knowledge is not, scientific basis therefor. as we have seen, to the Stoics an end in itself, but only a means for producing a right moral attitude,
all

philosophical research standing directly or indi-

rectly in the service of virtue.

Both in

its earlier

as well as in the later days of its existence the Stoic

School advocated this principle in the most determined and exclusive manner, nor was it even denied

by Chrysippus, the chief representative of and learning.

See p. 46.

its

science

382

THE
If
it

STOICS.
is

Chap. xrv,
(1) utkieal side of

be then asked what

:

the right moral attiVirtue, however,

n
,

tude, the Stoics reply

action conformable to nature

virtue.
i
,

and reason,

m other words,
On
^

implies two things.

the one band

it

implies the

j.i

resignation of the individual to the universe, obe-

dience to the universal law; on the other hand

involves the

it

harmony of man with himself, the domi-

nion of his higher over his lower nature, of reason

over emotion, and the rising superior to every thing

which does not belong to his true nature. Both statements may be reconciled, the law of morality being addressed only to reasonable beings, and this law being the law of their nature, and only to be carried into execution by their own exertions. StUl, in the Stoic Ethics, two currents of thought may be clearly distinguished, which from time to time come
into actual collision; the one requiring the individual
to live for the

common good and

him
is

for

society, the

other impelling

to live for himself only, to

emanfirst

cipate himself from all that

not himself, and to

console himself with the feeling of virtue.

of these tendencies brings

The

man

to seek the society of to dispense with

it.

others

the second enables

him

From

the former spring the virtues of justice, socia-

bility, love of

man

from the

latter, the inner free-

dom and

happiness of the virtuous man.

;

The former
the latter

culminates in citizenship of the world

in the self-sufficingness of the wise

man.

In as
is

far

as virtue includes everything that can be required of

man, happiness depends on

but virtue, nothing
is

it

alone

nothing
all

good
not

evil

but vice

that

is

CONNECTION OF THE SYSTEM.

connected with the moral nature
the other hand, in as far as virtue
is indifferent. is

383

based on

On human

Chap.

^^'

nature, it stands on the same footing with

all else

that

is

conformable with nature,

If its

own

peculiar

value cannot be surrendered, no more can

it

be re-

quired that
that
it

we

should be indifferent to the latter,

should not have for us some positive or negar-

tive value, or in

some way

affect

our feelings. There-

with the doctrine of things indifferent and the wise

man's freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly,

if

we look

at the

way

in which virtue exists in

man,
at

we
its

arrive at different results, according as

we look

essence or its manifestation.

Virtue consisting in

acting conformably with reason, and reason being one

and undivided, it appears that virtue forms an undivided unity, and must, therefore, be possessed whole
trast of the wise

and entire or not at all. PVom this proposition the conand foolish man, with all its bluntis

ness and extravagances,

only a legitimate conseat the conditions

quence.

Or, again, if

we look

upon

which owing to

human

nature the acquisition and

is

possession of virtue depends, the conviction

inevi-

table that the wise

man

as

drawn by the

Stoics never
is

occurs in reality.

Hence the conclusion

undefools is

niable that the contrast between wise

men and

more uncertain than it at first appeared to be. Thus all the main features of the Stoic ethics may be simply [/
deduced from the one fundamental notion, that rational action or virtue
is

the only good.

Not only does

liar

this

view of ethics require a pecu- \^) ^^^.

its scientific basis,
tificsideof

theory of the world to serve as

384
Chap,
'.

THE
but
it

STOICS.

has a reflex action also, influencing alike the

If the

tone and the results of theoretic enquiry.

the Stoic

duty of
it

man

is

declared to consist in bringing his

universe,

actions into

harmony with the laws of the

also necessary that

becomes

he should endeavour

know the world and its laws. The more knowledge of the world increases, the greater will be the value which he attaches to the forms of
himself to
his
scientific procedure.
If,

moreover,

man

Ls

required

to be nothing

more than an instrument of the unian ab-

versal law, it is only consistent to suppose

solute regularity of procedure in the universe,

an

unbroken connection of cause and

mately to
cause,

effect,

and

ulti-

refer everything to one highest all-moving and to include everything under one primary

substance.

If in

human

life

the individual has no

rights as against the laws of the universe, so all that

is

of individual occurrence in the world

is

powerless
if

against universal necessity.

On

the other hand,

in the case of

man everything

turns upon his strength

of will, then likewise in the universe the acting power must be regarded as the highest and most exalted. There arises thus that view of the world as a series of forces which constitutes one of the most peculiar and penetrating characteristics of the Stoic view of Lastly, if such an excessive importance is nature.' attached to action and practice, as is here done, that materialistic view of the world
is

suggested to

speculation, which finds its bluntest expression in

the Stoic Materialism and appeals to the senses.^

'

See p. 139.

See

p. 133.

CONNECTION OF THE SYSTEM.

At the same time the Materialism of the Stoics is superseded and limited by the thought of the universe and of a divine all-penetrating power and reason, just as their appeal to the senses is by the demand for the formation of conceptions, and the
general application of the process of demonstration
;

385

Chap.

XIV '__

the truth of knowledge itself

postulate,

is

based on a practical

and the greater

or less certainty of the

same
tion.

is

measured by the strength of personal convicIf these elements proved too contradictory to
;

be harmonised

if the

Materialism of the Stoics was

at variance with their view of the world as a series

of forces

if

appeals to the senses were obviously

it

in conflict with logical method,

was at

least there-

by clearly established that a practical and not a

purely intellectual interest lay at the root of their
system.

Of course

this statement

must not be taken to

(3) Con-

mean
verse,

that the Stoics first developed their ethical

"If^^^f
sciensl-0~
"tAfio

principles independently of their theory of the uni- and

and afterwards brought the two into connection with each other. On the contrary, it was by this peculiar connection of theory and practice that Stoicism itself first came into existence. The leading thought of Zeno consists in the attempt to vindicate the supremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of
the laws of the world
of a
;

^ents.

and he becomes the founder

new

School only by bringing to Cynicism those

scientific ideas
self in

and aims which he had learned him-

the School of Polemo, Stilpo, and Diodorus,

c c

and otherwise gathered from a study of ancient phi-

THE
Chap, XIV.
losophy.
tally

STOICS.

These elements are not therefore accidenbrought together in Stoicism, but they are co-

extensive,

in the natural science

and dependent one upon the other. As and theory of knowledge of

the Stoics, the experimental basis on -which their sys-

tem was

built

may

be easily seen, so the peculiar

tions respecting the universe

development of their ethics supposes all those posiand the powers therein

at work,

their natural science.

which form the most important part of Only by a scientific treatment

all

of this kind was Stoicism at

able to improve

upon

the onesidedness of the Cynic ethics, at least to the

extent in which
itself to
it really

did

so,

and to accommodate

the wants of

human

nature, so far as to be

able to exercise an influence at large.

Upon

this union

only of ethics and metaphysics does that religious

attitude of the Stoic system repose, to which
in a great measure its historical importance.
it

owes

There-

by only could

it

occupy so influential a position in an

for science

age in which intellectual power was indeed declining, but in which the interest

was keen.

But

that Stoic physics and metaphysics adopted this line,

and no other
sive scale,

that Zeno and his followers,

who draw

on former systems for their own on the most exten-

borrowed from these systems these and no

other positions, and expanded

them in

this

and no
ulti-

other direction

these results are, doubtless,

mately due to their moral attitude.

on the
subject of
;

All that bore

it,

ethics,

and supported

they

appropriated
jected.

all

that was opposed thereto they re-

The

Stoic system as such

may owe

its

rise

RELATION TO PBEVIOUS SYSTEMS.

to a union of ethical

aS7
in

and speculative elements,

is

Chap.
"

which both were more deinitely determined by one

another
;

still

the ethical platform

course and results.

the one on

which
rily

its

formation commences, and which primaits

determined

In order to obtain a more accurate notion of the

rise of Stoicism,

B. Rela-

the premises on which

it is

and the grounds on which

glance at
its relations

based,

we

proceeds, ^gi^^,,^ must take a topre-nous

it

to preceding systems.

The

Stoics themselves deduced their philosophical pedilatio^nto' gree dii-ectly from Antisthenes, and indirectly from Socratcx
Socrates.'

Clear as

is

their connection with both

Cynics.

these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a mis-

take to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism,

still

more to regard
it

it as

a simple following of Socrates.

self-

From both
evil,

undoubtedly borrowed much. The

sufficiency of virtue, the distinction of things good,

and indifferent, the ideal picture of the wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the precincts of the mind, and the strength
of moral will, are ideas taken from the Cynics.

In

the spirit of Cynicism, too,

Whether Diogenes, in conthe
Stoics with

it

explained general

'

ing of Antisthenes, says

KOTtip|oi
ttjs
. . .

SomT

necting

the

Se kk! t^s Si'SpmSeffTcJTTjs irraVK^s

Cynics, was following a Stoic authority or not (vii.), is a moot point nevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations of the two must have been well known, and the quotation from Posidonius on p. 274, 2, quite
;

olnos Trytia-aro xal

ciiraBdas koI
ttjs

^loyemus

accords herewith. Not to mention others, Diog. vi. 14, speak-

iyxparelas koI t^ ziivams Kaprepias, airis uiroflch^dos rf 7r(f\ei to B^iiiKia; and Jwvenal, xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a Cynicis tunica (the common dress in distinction to the tribon) distantia.
KpirriTos

C c 2

'

388

THE
ideas
as

STOICS.

Chap,
'

simply names.

Not

to

mention many

peculiarities of ethics, the contrasting of one

God

with the

many

popular Gods, and the allegorical

explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed

from Cynicism.

The

identification of virtue with

intelligence, the belief that virtue

was one, and could

be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit

of Socrates and also in that of the Cynics.

gument

for the existence of

The arGod based on the sub-

ordination of means to ends, the whole view of the

world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic

theory of Providence, are views peculiarly Socratic
;

and the Stoics followed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.

And

yet the greatness of the interval which sepa-

rates the Stoics even

from the Cynics becomes at

In refusing to medwith

once apparent on considering the relation of Aristo

to the rest of the Stoic School.

dle with natural or mental science, or even

ethical considerations at all, Aristo faithfully reflects

the principles of Antisthenes.

of virtue to such an extent that

In asserting the unity

all virtues

are

merged

in one, he was only repeating similar expressions of

Antisthenes.

In denying any difference in value to

things morally indifferent, and in placing the highest

morality in this indifference, he was, according to

the older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet.^
versely,

Condenying these statements as the great majowhich

;

rity of Stoics did, the points are indicated in

"

KHsohe, Forschung.
p. 145, 2.

i.

363,

On

Aristo see p. 59

260

and above,

281.

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

Stoicism differed from Cynicism.'

380

In the feeling of
he

Chap.
!

moral independence, and in his invincible strength

of will, the Cynic
is

opposed to the whole world

scientific

needs for virtue no

knowledge of the world

and
self
;

its

laws

he regards nothing external to himbut, in consequence, he

;

he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and

;

attaches value to nothing

remains with his virtue confined to himself

virtue

makes him independent

but
it

of

men and

circumstances,

has neither the will nor the power to interpose

effectively in the affairs of life,

and to infuse therein

insists

new moral

notions.

Likewise Stoicism

upon

the self-sufiiciency of virtue quite as strongly, and

will allow quite as little as

Cynicism that anything

individual

except virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of

the term.

But

in Stoicism the

is

not

nearly so sharply opposed to the outer world as in

Cynicism,

The

Stoic
is

is

too cultivated

he knows

too well that he

a part of the universe to ignore

the value of an intellectual view of the world, or to

neglect the natural conditions of moral action, as
things of no moment.
a

What he aims

at

is

not only

negation

independence

positive position

from externals

but
;

life

according to nature

that
is

life

only he considers according to

and nature which

is

in

harmony with the laws

of the universe as well

as with those of
'

human
he
is

nature.

Hence Stoicism

Aristo cannot, therefore,

be

considered

(as

by

Krisahe, Forsch. 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory. On the contrry,

he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in Stoicism against the other component
parts of this philosophy.

599

TEE
!_

STOICS.
its intellec-

Chap.

not only far in advance of Cynicism by a freer and milder

tual attitude, but its moral philosophy also breathes

spirit.

How

deep-seated the difis,

ference between the two systems

and how

little

Stoicism can be deduced from Cynicism as a philosophic system, will be at once seen; let only the
principles of the Stoics on the necessity
scientific

and value of
of
all

knowledge be compared with the sophisof Antisthenes, destructive

tical

assertions

knowledge; or the cultivated logical form of the intellectual edifice of the Stoics, with the chaotic
condition of Cynic thought
sical

or the careful metaphyand psychological researches and the copious

;

learning of the School of Chrysippus, with the Cynic

contempt
In
is

for all theory

and

all

learned research.

ethics, too, the difference of the

two Schools

also fully apparent.

Stoic morality recognises, at

least conditionally, a positive

external things and circumstances

absolutely no value.

and negative value in the Cynic allows

;

The former

forbids affection

contrary to reason, the latter any and every kind of

affection.'

upon human

The former throws back the individual The society, the latter isolates him.

former teaches citizenship of the world in a positive

sense, requiring all to feel themselves one with their

fellow-men

the latter in the negative sense, of feel-

ing indifferent to

home and
it,

family.

The former has

a pantheistic tone about

due to the lively feeling

of the connection between

and a

definite theological
'

man and the universe, stamp owing to its taking a

See p. 290.

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

stand by positive religion
alistic
;

391

the latter has a ration-

Chap.

character,

the wise
lief,

man

owing to the enfranchisement of from the prejudices of popular beit

with which

has exclusively to do.

In

all

these

respects Stoicism preserved the original character of

the Socratic philosophy far better than Cynicism,

which only caricatured them.

that character in two respects.

Still it departs

from

In point of theory

the Stoic doctrine received a systematic form and development such as Socrates never contemplated

and in natural

science, it cultivated a field avoided

by Socrates on principle, however much its doctrine of Providence, and its view of nature as a system of

means subordinated

to ends,

may remind
is

of Socrates.

On

the other hand, interest in science, although

limited to the subject of ethics,

with Socrates far

deeper and stronger than with the Stoics, the latter

only pursuing scientific research as a means for solving moral problems.

Hence the Socratic theory of

a knowledge of conceptions, simple though it

sound, contained a fruitful
culations, in

may
spe-

germ of unexpanded
all

comparison with which

that the

Stoics did is comparatively fragmentary.

ethics are not only

fully

The Stoic more expanded and more carethan those of Socrates, but

worked out in

detail

they are also more logical in clinging to the principle of regarding virtue alone as

an unconditional

good.

There are no concessions to current modes of

thought, such as those of Socrates,

who

practically

based his doctrine of morals upon

utility.

On

the
falls

other hand, the moral science of the Stoics also

392

THE
far short of the frankness
tic

STOICS.

Chap.

and cheerfulness of the Socrarespects it toned

1_

view of

life.

If in

many

down the

asperities of Cynicism, still it appropriated its leading principles far too unreservedly to avoid accepting

a great number of
(2) Rela-

its

conclusions.

Asking

in the next place in

how far

the Stoics were

Meganans ii^duced by other influences to change and Hethe platform of the Socratic philosophy,

and extend

we have

for

the practical tendency of their system, besides the

general tendency of the post- Aristotelian philosophy,

only to think of the example of Cynicism.

culative development, on the other hand,

Its speis

partly

connected with the Megarians, partly with Herato the Megarians the personal connection of Zeno with Stilpo points, to Heraclitus the fact that from him the Stoics themselves deduced their views on natural science, unfolding them in commentaries on his writings.' Probably the Megarian influence must not be Zeno may have thence received rated too high. an impulse to that reasoning tone of mind which
clitus
;

(ffi)

The

Megarians.

appears

with him in a preference for compressed

syllogisms
;

sharp-pointed
'

but

in

post-Aristote-

Apart from the testimony

(in Eus. Pr. Ev.

of

Numenins

xiv. 5, 10), to

which no great

value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno with Heraclitus is established by the fact that not only the ethics, but also the natural science of the
origin to him. See pp. 40, 3 ; 62, 2, 3 126, 2 141, 2 ; 144, 4 145, 1, 2 ; 146, 4 148, 2 ; 151, 1. Diog.
its
; ; ; ;

mentionstreatisesof Cleanthes, vii. 174 ix. 15, of Aristo.ix. 5, of Sphterus (vii. 178 ix. 15) treating of Heraclitus and Phocdiiis (Philodem.), Fragm. col. 4, says that Chrysippus explained the old myths after the
; ; ;

Stoic school

owes

of Heraclitus. Instances have often ocSee p. 144, 4 145, 1, curred. 2 Conf. Sen. En. 232, 4.
; ;

manner

83, 9.

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

lian times, contact witli

893
Chap. XIV.

Megarians was no longer

reasorier

wanted

for this,

and the greatest

his

among

the

Stoics, Chrysippus, appears

not only in no personal

logic
is

relations

to them, but

throughout a
the

simple continuation of that of Aristotle.

Far greater, and more generally recognised,

is

(*) Jleraclitiis.

importance of the influence which the doctrines of

the natural philosopher of Ephesus exercised on the
Stoics.

system which laid such emphasis on the

subordination of everything individual to the law

of the universe, which singled out universal reason

from the flux of things as the one thing everlastingly

related to their own,

and permanently the same a system, too, so nearly must have strongly commended and offered them many points If the view of this teaching, that life is dependent for its existence on matter, is repulsive to us, it was otherwise to the
with which to connect their own.
Stoics, for

itself to their notice,

whom

this

very theory possessed special

hardly a single the

attractions.

Hence, with the exception of the threeis

fold division of the elements, there

point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which the

Stoics did

not appropriate

fire

or ether as

primary element, the oneness of this element with universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny,

God, the flux of things, the gradual change of the primary element into the four elements, and of these back to the primary element, the regular alternation
of creation and conflagration in the world, the oneness and eternity of the universe, the description of

the soul as fiery breath, the identification of the

394

THE
mind with

STOICS.

Chap,

XIV

the demon, the unconditional sovereignty ^

of the universal law over individuals

-<

these and

many
system

other points in the Stoic system, originally

Heraclitus,'
its

derived from
is

prove how greatly this

there

indebted to
it

predecessor.
is

Nor yet must

be forgotten that neither

any analogy in Heraclitus to the reasoning forms of the Stoics, nor can their ethical views be referred to Moreover, with all his few and undeveloped hints.
the importance attached to natiiral science,
it is
;

with

the Stoics only subordinate to moral science the very fact that
author, proves
it is referred to

and
its

Heraclitus as
it

how

subordinate a position

held,

and the want of any independent interest in the subject.

Unmistakeable

it

also is that

even in natural

science the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus,

and that principles taken from Heraclitus often bear an altered meaning when wrought into the Stoic Omitting minor points, not only is the system.
Stoic doctrine of nature in a formal point of view
far
far

more developed, and with regard to its extension, more comprehensive, than the corresponding docwhole view of the world
so completely
is

trine of Heraclitus, but the

of the later system

by no means

identical with that of the earlier as

might be sup-

posed.

The

flux of things,

which the Stoics teach

equally with Heraclitus,'' has not for

them that
for

over-

whelming importance that

'

it

had

him.

The

Besides

meteorological

and other points of natural science, which the Stoics may have borrowed from Heraclitus,

Heraclitus' attitude towards the popular faith also belongs

here,
'

See

p. 101, 2.

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

matter of which the universe consists may be always
going
is

395
Ohap.
'

ovfer into

new

forms, but, at the same time,

it

for

them the permanent material and

essence

of things.'

Individual substances, too, are treated

by the Stoics as corporeally permanent.^

Moreover,

from the material they distinguish the active principle, Eeason or deity, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the same distinction is carried
into individual

things in contrast between matter

it

and quality.
to contrast

Thereby

becomes possible

for

them

much more

sharply than their predeces-

sor had done the reason of the world, and the blindly working power of nature. Heraclitus, it would ap-

pear, confined his attention to observing nature

and

describing

its

elementary meteorological processes.

Stoics embodies the
It sees its object

But the natural science of the idea of means working for ends.
man, and
it

in referring the whole arrangement of the world to

pursues this line of thought exclusively,

neglecting in consequence proper science.

Hence
Herathe

the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had

not the same meaning in the minds of both.

clitus sees this reason, primarily

and

chiefly, in

ordinary sequence of natural phenomena, in the regularity of the course by which to each individual

phenomenon
duration
is

its

place

in the world, its extent

and

prescribed, in short, in the unchanging

coherence of nature.
'

Without excluding

this aspect

See p. 160,
1.

4,

5; 101, 2;

140,
2

As an

illustration of the

difference,

take

Heraclitus'

statement of the daily extinction of tlie sun, which every one must admit would not have been possible in the Stoicschool.

396

THE
'.

STOICS.

Chap. XIV.

in their proofs of the existence of

God and

the rule

of Providence, the Stoics attach the chief importance

to the serviceableness of the order of nature.

The

reason which rules the world appears in Heraclitus

more

as a natural

power

in the Stoics, as intelli-

gence working with a purpose. For Heraclitus Nature is the highest object, the object of indepen-

dent and absolute interest

Being
world.

is

and hence the infinite no more than the power which forms the
;

The
man.

Stoics regard nature from the platform

of humanity, as a means for the weUbeing and activity of

Their deity accordingly does not work

power of nature, but essentially as the wisdom which cares for the wellbeing of man. The
as a simple

highest conception in the system of Heraclitus

is

that of nature or destiny.

Stoicism accepted this

it

conception also, but at the same time developed

to the higher idea of Providence.
(3) Con-

Shall
^^^'^

we be wrong

if

we

attribute this modifica-

^mithlristotle.

^ ^^ Heraclitean theory of nature by the Stoicsi

partly to the influence of Socrates' and Plato's theory

of final causes, but in a

still

greater degree to the

influence of the Aristotelean philosophy?

totle

To

Aris-

belongs properly the idea of matter without

qualities,
terial

no less than the distinction between a maand a formal cause. Aristotle applied the

idea of purpose to natural science far more extensively

than any other system had done before

and

although the
this idea has

mode

in which the Stoics

expressed

more resemblance

to the popular theo-

logical

statements of Socrates and Plato than to

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

Aristotle, still the

397

Stoic conception of a

natural

Chap,
'.

power working with a purpose, such

in the idea of artificial
is fire

as is contained
crTrsp/MaTiKol,

and

'Ko'yoi,

essentially Aristotelean.

Even many

positions

which appear to be advanced in opposition to Aristotle

were yet connected with him.

Thus the

exist-

ence of ether as a body distinct from the four ele-

ments is denied, and yet in point of fact it is asserted under a new name that of artificial fire. The Peri-

patetic doctrine of the origin of the rational soul

is

contradicted

by the Stoic theory of development,

latter is based

and yet the

lies

on a statement in Aris-

totle to the effect that the

in the

warm

air^

of the animal soul which surrounds the seed, warm

germ

air

carefully as

which Aristotle distinguishes from fire quite as Zeno and Cleanthes distinguished the

two kinds of fire. Even the point of greatest divergence from Aristotelean teaching the transformation

of the

human

soul

thing corporeal

and the divine spirit into somemight yet be connected with Aristhe Peripatetic School here meets

totle, and, indeed,

them

for this very reason.

Had

not Aristotle de-

most divine body, the stars formed out of it as divine and happy beings ? Had he not brought down the acting and moving forces from a heavenly sphere to the region of earth ? Had
scribed the ether as the

he not, as we have just seen, sought the germ of the And might not others soul in an ethereal matter ? go a little further and arrive at materialistic views ?

and

all

the more
'

so,

seeing

how hard

it is

to conceive

irvtC/ia

as with the Stoics.

)8

THE

STOICS.

Chap,
"

the extra-mundane intelligence of Aristotle, at once

and yet touching and encircling the world of matter, and in the human soul to harmonise personal unity with an origin in a reason coming
incorporeal,

from above ?

More

directly

had the Aristotelean speculations

as

to the origin of notions and conceptions paved the

way for Stoicism. On this point the Stoics did little more than omit (in conformity with their principles) what their predecessor had said as to an original possession

and immediate knowledge of truth.

How
Their

closely their formal logic

adhered to that of Aristotle

has been remarked on an earlier occasion.

efiforts

were confined

to building on Aristotelean

foundations, and even their additions have

ference to

more

re-

grammar than

to logic.

The

actual influ-

ence of Peripatetic views on those of the Stoics

appears to have been least in the domain of ethics. Here the crudeness of the Stoic conception of virtue, their entire suppression of emotions, their abso-

lute exclusion of everything external

from the

circle

of moral goods, their antithesis between the wise and

the foolish man, their polemic against a purely speculative

life,

present a pointed contrast to the caution

Aristotle's

and many-sidedness of
his careful
sibility of

moral theory, to

weighing of current opinions and the poscarrying

them

out, to his recognition of

propriety in every shape and form, on the one hand,

and to the praise which he lavishes on a purely speculative life, on the other. In ethics, the formal treatment of the ethical materials and the psycholo-

RELATION TO PREVIOUS SYSTEMS.

gical analysis of individual moral faculties, are the

399
Chap.
'__

chief points on which the Stoics

Aristotle
this
for instruction.

are indebted to

On

the other hand, in

province we must, on the contrary, look for

traces of the

teaching which Zeno received from

Polemo, and, perhaps, from Xenocrates.

The
offer

speculative portions of Plato's teaching could

(4) Con-

no great attractions to such practical men and

as the Stoics, either

^^;^

materialists

in their original PT'do.

form or in the form which they assumed in the older

Academy under Pythagorean

influence.

But, on the

other hand, such points in Platonism as the Socratic

building of virtue on knowledge, the comparative

depreciation of external goods, the retreat from sensuality, the elevation

and the purity of moral

ideal-

ism, and, in the older Academy, the

demand

for life

according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficingness of virtue, and the growing tendency to confine

philosophy to practical issues

notion of the later Eclectics

all

these were quesas the

tions for a Stoic full of interest.

is,'

Unfounded

that the Stoic and

Academician systems of morality were altogether the same, the Stoics, nevertheless, appear to have received impulses from the Academy which they carried out in a

more determined

spirit.

Thus the

theory of living according to nature belongs origi-

Academy, although the Stoics adopted it with a peculiar and somewhat different meaning. Besides moral doctrines, the attitude assumed by the
nally to the
'

So particularly Antiochus and also Cicero in

See above, p. 39,
2.

many

pas-

sages.

400
Chap,
older

THE

STOICS.

Academy towards positive religion may also have had some influence on the orthodoxy of the L_ Stoics, their most decided representative, Cleanthes, being in his whole philosophic character the counterpart of Xenocrates.

Nor was the new Academy,

origin than Stoicism, without

although later in

its

important influence on that system, through the person of Chrysippus, but at first only of an indirect
kind, obliging the Stoics by
to look about for a
its logical

contradiction

more

logical basis for their sys-

tem, and therewith to attempt a more systematic

expansion of their teaching.'

Somewhat
its

similar is

the case with Epicureanism, which by

strong op-

position in the field of ethics contributed to impart decision

and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine, and,

perhaps, in the same way,

it into existence,
c.

may have
it

helped to bring

The
,

By

the aid of these remarks

now becomes

pos-

plnlosopMj asawJtole.
(1) Its
jwsitiou.

'^i"}!'

sible to give a satisfactory J o

account of the history J of

Stoicism.

Belonging to an age morally debased and

politically oppressed, its founder, Zeno, conceived the

idea of liberating himself and all

follow

who were

able to

him from

the degeneracy and slavery of the

age by means of a philosophy which, by purity and strength of moral wUl, would procure independence

from

all

external things, and unruffled inward peace.

That

his endeavours should

have taken this practical

he should have proposed to himself not knowledge as such, but the moral exercise of knowturn, that

ledge as the object to be realised, was in part due to

"

See p.

46, 1, 2.

STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE.

the personal character of the philosopher, and

401

may

Chap.

he in part referred to the general circumstances of

the times.

1_

On

nobler and more serious minds, these

call forth

circumstances pressed too heavily not to

opposition and resistance in place of listless contemplation.

The sway

of the Macedonian, and afterfar too despotic to

wards of the

Eoman Empire, was

allow the least prospect of open resistance.

it

Nor must

be overlooked that philosophy

at which

itself

had reached a
speculative

pass

satisfactory answers

to

problems were no longer forthcoming, and

attention was

hence
of

naturally directed

to

questions

morals.

Haunted by
have
first felt

this longing for virtue,

attracted by that philosophy which

Zeno must had

at an earlier period cultivated a similar line with the

greatest decision, the Cynical, and

what he doubtless

identified with the Cynical, the old Socratic teaching.'

Anxious, on the other hand, for a more positive mean-

ing and Scientific basis for virtue, he strove to appropriate from every system whatever agreed with the

bent of his own mind.

his

By

using

all

the labours of

and keeping his eye steadily fixed upon the practical end of philosophy, he succeeded in forming a new and more comprehensive system, which was afterwards completed by Chrysippus. In point of form this system was most indebted to the
predecessors,
' The story in Diog. vii. 3, bears out this view, that Zeno was first won for philosophy by Xenophon's Memorabilia, and that on asking who was the representative of this line of

thought, was referred to Crates, According to the quotations on 387, 1, the Cynics pp. 274, 2 were regarded in the Stoic school as genuine followers of
;

Socrates.

D D

03

THE
Peripatetic philosophy
its
;

STOICS.
in point of matter,

Chap.
'

next to

debt to the Cynics, -which has been already men-

tioned, its chief obligation was to Heraclitus.

the-

But

moral theory of the Stoics was

as little identical

with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the

Stoics was with that of Heraclitus.

If the diverg-

ence was, in the

first

instance, due to the influence

still

of the Stoic principles,

patetic teaching
is

the influence of the Peri-

unmistakeable in the natural and

speculative science of the Stoics,

and the influence

Stoicism

of the

Academy

in their moral science.

does not, therefore, appear simply as a continuation

of Cynicism, nor yet as an isolated innovation, but like

every other form of thought which marks an epoch,

it

worked up into

itself all previous materials, pro-

ducing from their combination a new

process of assimilation
full of

result.

In this

much
;

that was beautiful and

meaning was omitted everything was absorbed that could be of use in the new career on which the Greek mind was about to enter.
It

2)Aiiojie"

was the fault of the age that

to the many-sidedness of
is

it

could no longer

""'*

come up
Plato.

an Aristotle or a

Stoicism, it

true,

approximates thereto

more nearly than any other of the post-Aristoteleau systems. But in its practical view of philosophy, in
its materialistic

appeal to the senses, in

its

theo-

retical self-sufficiency, the wise

man

rising superior
;

to the weaknesses

and wants of human nature and in

so

in its

citizenship of the world, throwing political interests

into the background

is

many

other traits

it

exponent of an epoch in which the taste for purely scientific research and the joy fulness of
the
fit

STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE.

amid the and their freedom, the idea of humanity was rising to fuller recognition. Of such an age Stoicism represented most powerfully the
practical creation was at an end, whilst

403
Chap.

overthrow of

XIV

states,

L_

moral and religious convictions, yet not without onesidedness and exaggeration.
will free

By an exercise of the and by rational understanding, man is to become and happy. This aim was, however, pursued with
human

such sternness that the natural conditions of

existence and the claims of individuality were ignored.

To man, regarded
little

as the

organ of universal law, as

freedom of will was allowed by the Stoic natu-

ral science in face of the inexorable course of nature as

freedom of action by the Stoic ethics in face of the

demands of duty.

The

universal claims of morality

;

were alone acknowledged

the right of the indi-

vidual to act according to his peculiar character,

and to develop that character, was

as

good

as ignored.

'

The

individual,

as

such, dwindled into obscurity,

whilst a high place in the world was

assigned to

mankind

collectively.

The

individual was subor-

dinated to the law of the whole, but by regarding

nature as a system of means and ends, and intro-

ducing the belief in Providence and Prophecy, the universe was again subordinated to the interests of

man a view against which a more careful research has many objections to urge. In both respects Epicureanism
whilst
its it
is

most decidedly contrasted with Stoicism,

it

otherwise agreed with

in the general tone of

its

practical philosophy,

and in
D D 2

aim

to

make man

independent of the outer world and happy in himself.

PART

III.

TEE EPICUREANS.
CHAPTEE XV.
EPICURUS AND THE EPICDEEAN SCHOOL.'
Chap. XV.
A. Jipi-

Epicurus, the son of the Athenian Neocles,^ was

born in Samos

in the year 342 or 341 B-C*

His
;
''

early education appears

'

to have been neglected

curus. curus'
It

Consult, on this subject,

was observed (Epi-

the valuable treatise of Steinhart, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopasdia, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459-477. ^ Diog. X. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging to the S^os Gai^ttos. JMog. 1. c. Lucret. Cic. Ad Fam. Nat. Eer. vi. 1 XV. 16 ; JEUan, V. H. iv. 13. ' Diog. i. Strata, xiv. 1 According to these 18, p. 638. authorities, and Oic. N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone That there as a xhiipovxos. this happened before his birth has been demonstrated by
;
;

Diog. 18) r^irporipa Tov ra/n]\twvos. Gamelion being the seventh month of the Attic year, the time of his birth must have been either early in 341 B.C., or the last days of 342 B.C. ' His father, according to Strabo, was a schoolmaster, and Epicurus had assisted him in teaching (Hermippus and Timon, in Diog. 2 ; Athen.
-will,
ScKcirT?

xiii.

588, a).

His mother

is

said to have earned

money by

Steinhwrt, p. 461.
* Apollodorus (in Diog. x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion, 01. 109, 3, as the birthday of Epi-

repeating charms (Kaflopjuol), and Epicurus to have assisted in this occupation (^Diog^ 4) Although the latter statement evidently comes from some
hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in early

EPICURUS.
and his knowledge of previous philosophic systems was very superficial, even at the time when he first came forward as an independent teacher. Still he can hardly have been so entirely self-taught as he wished to appear at a later period in life. The names, at least, of the individuals are on record

40a

Chap.

XV.

him in the systems of Democritus and although it is by no means an ascertained fact that he subsequently attended the lectures of Xenocrates,^ on the occasion of a visit to Athens,' no doubt can be felt that he was

who

instructed
; '

and Plato

life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education. His language in disparagement

made himself what he was

without a teacher, and refused
to

own

of culture would lead us to this conclusion, even were the express testimony of Sext. Math, iv iroWois yap i. 1, wanting afiaO^s 'EiriKOvpos eA7X6Ta(, oiide
:

shown

his obligations to those to be his teachers. Oie.

iv Tois KOLfois &fii\iats (in

com-

mon

expressions, conf. the cen-

sure passed on him by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aristophanes in Dioff. i, 13) KoBctpeiai'. do. Fin. i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior est enim . non satis politus in artibus, . quas qui tenent eruditi appelne deterruisset lantur aut

N. D. i. 26, 72; 33, 93; Seict. Math. i. 2, who mentions his disparagement of Nausiphanes JPlut. N. P. Suav. JMoff. 8, 13 V. 18, 4 conf. Sen. Ep. 52, 3. It is, however, established that in his youth he enjoyed the in; ;

struction of Pamphilus and of that Nausiphanes, who is sometimes called a follower of Democritus, sometimes of Pyrrho
Sea!t.;I)wg.:K.8; 13; 14; 69 ; Procem. 15 ; Smd. 'EiriK. Clem. Strom, i. 301, d). The names of two other supposed instructors are also mentioned, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (^Diog. Procem. 15 x. 13), but they almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus
(Cic.
ix.
i

64

alios

a studils. Athen.

xiii.

588,
&v.

iyKVK\lou iratdelas ' According to

&,(i6ijros

his

own

statement (^IHog. 2), he was not more than fourteen (Smd. 'Ettuc. has twelve) years of age when he began to philosophise, i.e., to think about philosophical subjects probably about chaos following the suggestion of
;

and Nausiphanes.
2 According to Oio. 1. c, he denied the fact. Others, how-

ever, asserted

it,

and,

among

them, Demetrius of Magnesia.

Uiog. 13.
"

Hesiod's

verses.

He

subse-

quently boasted that he had

Whither he came, in his

THE EPICUREANS.
Chap.

acquainted with the writings of previous philosophers, from

XV.

whom he

his doctrine,' and,

more

borrowed important parts of particularly, with those of

Democritus.
After having been active as a teacher in several
Schools
2

in Asia Minor, he repaired to Athens about

b,c.,*

the year 306

and there founded a School of his own.^ The meeting-place of this School was the founder's garden ,5 and its centre of attraction was
eighteenth year, according to Heraclides Lembus, in JXog. 1. Tpa<prjvii Conf. Strabo, 1. c.
:

mocritus.

Zucret.
;

iii.

370, v.

620, also speaks of

dem,.

Democritus

<l>a<Tiv

ivOdSe (in

Samos)

ical

iv

with great respect and PhiloDe Mus. Vol. Here. i. col.

a,v-hp oh (pvffiohoywTttTOS fx6v0V TOiV &pxoLio>v dAAct Kol TWV IffTopOV^eVOtV OuBevhs TJT-

36, calls

him

According to Hermippus Democritus first gave him the impulse to pursue philosophy but this is only a conjecture. Besides Democri'

(Dioff. 2)

TQv voKinrpiyfjLwv. ^ Diog. 1, 15, mentions Colo-

phon, Mytilene,and Lampsacus.

Strabo, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589, also affirms that Epicurus resided for some time at Lampsacus, and

Aristippus is also mentioned as a philosopher whose doctrines he followed (^Diog. 4). Epicurus is even said to have expressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (^Cie. JS. D. i.
tus,

there
of

made

the acquaintance

33, 93

JOiog. 8).
;

Nor

is this

Idomeneus and Leonteus. ' Diog. 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to him, Epicurus returned to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates, 307-6 B.C. In that case the numbers must be slightly reduced in the statement (^Diog. 15) that he came to Mytilene when 32, and taught
there
*

denied by Diog. 9 but it probably only refers to particular

points, or it

may have reference

to the attitude of later Epicureans, such as Golotes {Ptut. Adv. Col. 3, 3, p. 1108). Plat.
1.

c, says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself a follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus' respect for Democritus. Philodem. irep\ ira^^jifftas, Vol. Here.
V. 2, col. 20,

and in Lampsacus
Not
immediately,

for

five years.

ever, since Diog. 2, says, authority of Heraclides

/ie'i/

howon the
:

lue'xpi

Tivos kut'
OTT*

^iri/jLi^iav

to7s &\i5f^
ttojs

\ots

<pi\0(rotl>f'iy,

6iriT'

seems to refer to

r^v
"

ouToC KKttdetiTav aXp^aiv

expressions of Epicurus, exculpating certain mistakes of De-

On this celebrated garden,

EPICURUS.
the founder himself, around

407
a circle of friends
set of prin-

whom

Chap.

gathered, knit together by a

ciples,

common

XV.

by a common

affection for a master

they almost worshipped, and by a

whom common enjoyment

of cultivated society.' Opponents charged the Epicu-

reans with gross impropriety, because they admitted

not only women,^ but

women

of loose morality,^ to
;

this circle of philosophic culture state of Grreek society, such

but in the then

for six

conduct does not appear

extraordinary.
thirty years,

Here Epicurus laboured

this

and

and in

time succeeded in impresis

sing such a definite stamp on his School as

now
In

seen unchanged after the lapse of centuries.

the year 270 b-C* he succumbed to disease, the pains

and troubles of which he bore with great

fortitude.*

Out of the multitude of

after

his writings ^ only a few have

( C?o. N. D. i. 33, 93 P&i. Hist, Nat. Praef. 29). Conf. IHog. 5; irepl Philodem. iro/S^Tjir/as, Vol. Here. v. 2, Fr. 9. Athen. xiii. b, tells a fine story of self593, sacrifice of her daughter Danafi. * 01. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pytharatus, and in his seventy-second year. Diog. 15
;

which the Epicureans were cailed ol orri twi/ Kii-naiv, see Diog. 10, 17 Plin. H. N.
;

xix. 4, 51
V. 1, 3
;

Cie.

Fin.

i.

20, 65

Sen. Ep. 21, 10; Steinha/rt, p. 462, Epicurus had 463, 72. 45 purohased it for 80 minas. ' This subject will be discussed at a later period. 2 Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus
xiii.

Ad Fam.

Fat. 9, 19. Diog. 15 22 Fam. vii. 26 Fin.

Cic.
=
; ;

De

Cfio.

Ad

{Diog. 5 ; 25 26 Clem. Strom. iv. 522, D). ' Diog. 4 Cleomed. 6 ; 7 Meteor, p. 92, Balfor. ; Plut.
; ; ; ;

Sen. Ep. 66, 47 he put an end to his own life {Baumhaiier, Vet. Philo. Doot.
;

30, 96 ; That 92, 25.

ii.

De

Mort. Volunt. 322), Hermip-

N. P. Suav. Vivi.
6
;

4, 8
2.

16, 1

and

pus {Diog. 15) by no means

implies.

Lat. Viv.

4,

The

best-

known among Leontion, who

;

these Iraiiooi is lived with Metrodorus, a pupil of Epicurus {Diog. 6 23), and wrote with Theophrastus against spirit

According to Diog. Pro. he was, next to Chrysippus, the most voluminous

'

16, x. 26,

writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings filling 300

; ;

'

THE EPICUREANS.
Chap.

come down

to us, and these are for the

ones.'

most part
^

XV.

unimportant

On

the whole, these fragments

bear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents

expressed with regard to his style.^

Among
best
rolls.

the numerous scholars of Epicurus

are Metrodorus,^

the
of

known

and Polyaenus,* both

The titles of his most esteemed works are giyen by Diog. 27. Conf. Fdbnc. Bibl.
Grse.
'

Greece, however, on Ms own testimony, and that of Metrodorus {Sen. Bp. 79, 15), they
attracted little notice. ' A native of Lampsacus
(Straio, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589), and, to Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. (Kcero, Fin. ii. 28, 92, calls him psene alter Epicurus, and states (Fin. ii. 3, 7) that Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man {Diog. 18 Sen. Ep. 52, 3). Further particulars respecting him and his writings in Diog.

iii.

595, Harl.
;

Three epistles in IDUig. 35 81 122 and the Kipicu S6^ai, an epitome of his ethics, mentioned by ac. N. D. i. 30, 85, and 139. Of his 37 books irepl ipiiretiis, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited (Vol.
;

next

Hercnl. ii.). ^ Fra.gments in JHog. 5 7. Besides the testament and the letter to Idomeneus {Diog. 1622), many individual expres;

X. 6

18
;

21-24
;

Phihdem. De
iii.),

sions

of

Epicurus have been

Vitiis, ix. (Vol.

;

Here,

col.

preserved by Seneca. ' Aristophanes (in Diog. 13)

calls

his

style

iSnoTiKoiraTT).

Cleomed. Meteor, p. 91, complains of his awkwaid and barbarous expressions, instancing
ffapKbs tvffTaOTi KaiafTTTitiaTa'
.Trepl

to

Tairris

iritTTCi

iXirifffxaTa'

\nrd,iTfJi.a

o(p9a\fl5iv^ Upai

&vaKpav-

ydtTfJiaTa' yapyaXirr/xovs fftiifiaros.

In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him. See

above, p. 48,
'

1.

See FabHo. Bib. Gr. iii. 598 Harl. They were, no doubt, very numerous. Diog. x. 9, probably exaggerates theirnumber in saying the friends of Epicurus would fill towns. CKo. Fin. i. 20, 65, speaks of magni greges amioorum. Plut. Lat.
Viv. 3, 1, also mentions his friends in Asia and Egypt. In

12 21 27 Atlieii. vii. 279 ; Plut. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; Adv. Col. 3.3, 2 and 6; Sen. Ep. 98, 9; 99, 25. Fragments of the letters are to be found in Plutarch, Seneca, and Philodemus. Whether the fragments of a treatise irfpl aXaBifiToiv in Vol. vi. of Vol. Heroul. belong to him, is very uncertain. According to Diog. 23, he died seven years before Epicurus, in his lifty-third year, and must therefore have been born 830 or 329 B.C. For the education of his children probably by Leontion, whom Diog. 23 calls waWoK^, and Sea. Fr. 45 in Siern. Adv. Jovin. i. 191 calls his wife, provision is made by Epicurus in his will {Diog. 19, 21). ' Son of Athenodorus, like-

SCHOLARS OF EPICURUS.

409

whom whom

died before their master

Hermarchus,' upon

the presidency of the School devolved after

;

Chap. XV.

the death of Epicurus

and

Colotes,' against

whom
The

Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise.

Many

others are also known, at least by name.''

wise a native of Lampsaous {Biog. 24), a capital mathematician, according to die. Acad, it. 33, 106 Fin. i. 6, 20. Diog. 1. c, calls him 6TiiKJ)s koI ipiXiiKoot Metrodorus, in PMlodem. irepl ira^priaias (Vol. Her. V. a), col. 6, airotpOeyuttTLa^. Sen. Ep. 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus and Hermarohus, viros magnos.
;
;

' According to what is. stated in the testament of Epicurus. Diog. 16. " Colotes, a native of Lampsaous. Dog. 25. I'urther particulars about him may be obtained from Pkit. Adv. Col. 17, 5 ; 1, 1 N. P. Suav. Viv. 1, 1 Mac7'ob. Somn. Scip. i. 2. Vol. Hercul. iv. Introd. in Polystor.
; ;

Philademm

(Vol. v. b), Fr. 49, praises his frankness towards his teacher. son of his is also mentioned in Epicurus' will {D-iog. 19), whose mother would appear to have been a courtesan, according to Pint. N. P. Suav. V. 16, 6. ' This individual's name,

p. iii.
* In particular, Keocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobulus, the brothers of Epicurus (Dog. 3, 28 Pl-ut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 5, 3 where 'Aya86pou\os is evidently a copyist's error; 16, 3; De Lat. Viv. 3, 2) Idomeneus, a native of Lampsacus {Diog. 25 22 23 5 Pint. Adv. Col. 18, Straio, xiii. 1, 19, p. 589 3 PMlodem. irepi Atlien. vii. 279 TTa^^-qa-ias. Pr. 72, Vol. Here. v. 2 Sen. Ep. 21, 3 and 7 22, 5 Phot. Lex. and Hiiid. IliBia Kal
;

formerly written Hermachus, appears as Hermarohus in the modern editions of Diogenes, The latter Cicero and Seneca.

form is now established beyond doubt by the Heroulanian fragments from Philodemus (irep!
flewv SiaywT^Js,

vol. vi. col. 13,

iii.

20;

De

Vitiis Lx. vol.

col.

from whose historical writings many fragments are quoted by Muller, Fragm. Hist.
AfiXia),

25, 1),

and the inscription on a

to

(Antiquitat. Hercul. V. 17). His birthplace was Mytilene, Agemarchus being his father, {Diog. 17, 15, Diog. 24, gives a list of 24.) his books. Epicurus {Dog. 20) describes him as one of his oldest and most faithful friends, in the words /lera toS avyxarayeyrjpaKdTOS ijfuv iv (piKoaoiplif. On his character, see Sen. Ep.
:

monument

him

Gr. ii. 489 Leonteus, likewise a native of Lampsacus {Dog. Pbit. Adv. Col. 3, 3 5 25 Strabo, 1. c.) Herodotus {Diog.
; ; ;
;

and 34) Pythocles {Diog. 5 and 83 Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. P/dU12, L; Adv. Col. 29, 2
4
;

6, 6.

dem. irepl Tra^lnt^las, Fr. 6) Apelles {Plut. N. P. Suav. Vi. 12, 1); Menoeoeus {Dog. 121) Nicanor {Diog. 20) Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who afterwards fell out with Epi;
;

; ;

410

THE EPICUREANS.
garden which Epicurus in his will
left to

Chat.

the School'

XV.

continued after his death to be the external rallyingpoint for his followers. Hermarchus was succeeded

by Polystratus,^ together with

whom
.

Hippoclides

Hermarchus and is also naentioned^ as president. Hippoclides were succeeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius agairi by Basilides.'*
curus (JKog. i and 6 23 and 28 Cic. N. D. i. 33, 93 Plut. Adv. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 16, 9 Col. 32, 7 Comment, in SesioA. irepl Trapjn\Pr. 7, 1 Philodem. fflas, Vol. Here. v. a, col. 20). Timoorates must not be This confounded with the Athenian Timocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, together with Amynomaohus {Dioq. 16 Cic. Fin. ii. 31, 101). Both the latter were probably pupils of Epicurus. Other names of puMithras, a Syrian, pils are
;

Protarchus of Bargy-

standing thereupon, and at that time in ruins (parietinse), was in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero wrote (Ad

Fam.
11,

xiii. 1),

conf.

Ad

Att. v.
it

begging him to restore

"Whether he to the School. was successful is not known from Sen. Ep. 21, 10. ' Diog. 25, does not say that
Polystratus was a personal disciple of Epicurus, but it seems Fragments of a probable. treatise of his xtpl a,\6yov Kara<^povi]iTfas in the fourth volume of Vol. Hercul. ' According to Valer. Max. i. 8, ext. 17, both these individuals were born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a common
purse. Lysias, according to the older text of Diog. x. 25, was a cotemporary, at whose house Hermarchus died, as Falrio. Bibl. Gr. iii. 606 believes, and who is styled in Athen. v. 215, b, tyrant of Tar-

an

official

under Lysimaohus
;

Plut. Adv. {Diog. 4 and 28 Col. 33, 2 N. P. Suav. Viv. 15, 5) ; Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty 3 ; 10 Gell. ii. 18, iDiog. 21 the Macrob. Sat. i. 11) 8 ladies mentioned on p. 407, 2, 3 likewise Anaxarchus, to whom
; ; ; ; ;

Epicurus addressed a letter, and Timarchus, to whom Metrodorus addressed one {Phit, Adv. Col. 17 3) Hegesianax, who died early {Plut. N. P. Sua. Vi. the poet Menander, 20, 5) wliose wondrous epigram on Epicurus is to be found in the anthology and probably Dionysius 6 jXiToSiiievos. (See above
;

reads Coiet, however, irapaXiaei instead of iroptk Av(rl:f. * Diog. 25. The Dionysius
sus.

referred to can hardly be Dionysius

1),

lieraSefifvat

(see p.

44,

p. 44, 1.)
' Diog. 16. In Cicero's time, the plot of ground, to-

or

Diogenes would have

said so. Besides the chronology forbids such an assumption.

gether

with

the

tenement

THE ROMAN PERIOD.

Hum,' and his pupil, Demetrius the Laconian,'^ appear
to belong to the second century before Christ
;

411

Chap.

but the

time in which these philosophers flourished cannot be established with certainty ; and the same remark
applies to several others whose

names are on

record.'
B.C.
C. Ej)i-

Before the middle of the second century

Epicureanism
Rome.'*

is

said to have obtained a footing in

cwreans of the
period.

It is certain that it C. Amafinius is

was existing there not Roman mentioned as the

;

long
trines
'

after.

first

who paved the way

for the spread of

'

Epicurean doc-

by discussing them in Latin

mv.
2,

and

it is

stated

Stralo,

20, p. 658.

He

probably the Protarohus whose sayings are quoted by Themist. Simpl. Phys. 78, a
is
;

Phys. 27, a.
^ According to Strabo, 1. c, Diog. 26, Seict. Bmpir. Pyrrh. iii. 137, Math. viii. 3iS, x. 219, Urotiam, Lex. Hippocr. K\ayy<iSr), Demetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans.

* According to Athen. xii. 547, a JElian, V. H. ix. 12, two Epicureans, Alcius and Philiscus, were banished from Eome, in the consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C. see Clinton's Fasti), because of their evil influence on youth.
;

"Whether a treatise on mathematics, illegible fragments of which are found in Herculanum (Vol. Here. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. 2), is his, or belongs Demetrius mento another tioned by Strabo, xii. 3, 16, p. 548, it is impossible to say. ' Both the Ptolemies of

Although the story is obviously taken from a hostile authority, in Suid. ('EirfKovpos, T. l,b, 419 Bern. ) and is told with such exaggerations as to inspire grave mistrust it can hardly be altogether without some founda-

tion.
4,

says,

Pint. N. P. Suav. V. 19, that in some cities

DioAlexandria (^Diug. 25) genes of Tarsus {Biog. vi. 81 X. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Timagoras Orion {Diog. 26) and ((7ic. Acad. ii. 25, 80); also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went over from Epicurus to Cameades {Diog. 9) a very rare thing for an Epicurean to do may be named among his
;
;

severe laws were passed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong feeling in Kome against innovations, witness the well-known enquiry into the Bacchanalia instituted 186 B.C. * According to Cic. Tusc.
3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come forward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156, B.C. nor is this at variance with Diicr. v. 336, who claims primus cum primis

iv.

pupils.

412

THE EPICUREANS.
that these doctrines

Chap.

soon found

many -eupporterS,

XV.

attracted partly by

more often by the simplicity and the ease with which they could
their merits, but

be understood.'

Towards the

close of the second century

ApoUo-

dorus, one of the most voluminous writers on philo-

sophy, taught at Athens.'^

His pupil, Zeno of Sidon,

of that

the most important

among the Epicureans

age, laboured for a long time successfully, both orally

and in writing.^

About the same time Phsedrus

in Fin.
i.

is

to have set forth the Epicurean teaching in Latin. His works made a great impression at the time, according to Cic. 1. c. (cujus libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad earn potissimum disciplinam). According to Acad. i. 2, 5, he pmrsued natural science, carefully following the views of Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Eabirius,

7, 25, the question : Cur tam multi sint Epicurei ? ^ Surnamed it KniroTipapvos,

the writer of more than 400 books. Diog. 25 2 '13 ; vii.

; ;

181.
'

Sioff.

vii.

35,

x.

25,

and

Procl. in Mvolid. 55, say that Zeno was a native of Sidon, and a pupil of ApoUodorus nor can these statements be referred to an older Zeno, as some

we know not which one

is

meant, nor whether he was an Epicurean, qui nulla arte adliibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant nihil definiunt, nihil
:

partiuntur, &c. Couf. Tuso. ii. Cassius, too (Cic. Ad 7. 3, Fam. XV. 12), calls him and Catius (see p. 414, 3) maU verborum interpretes. ' Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post

previous writers maintained, believing ApoUodorus to be called in error a pupil of Epicurus by Diog. x. 25, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. For no trace of such a one exists and Diogenes vii. 35 would then have passed over the teacher of Cicero without notice who cannot possibly have been unknown to him.
;

Amafinium autem multi ejusdem ^rnuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt,quodquemaxumum argumentum est non dici ilia subtiliter, quod et tam facile
ediscantur et ab indoctis probeutur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinae putant. Conf.

According to Oic. Acad. i. 12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades and admired them and since Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been bom much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was really the successor of ApoUodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the second

; ; ;

THE ROMAN PERIOD.

heard of in
later

413

Rome and

Athens,'

period Philodemus,^

and at a little and Syro or Sciro in

i.

Chap.

XV.

century. But this fact is not sufBciently established. Cicero, in company with Attious, attended his lectures ( Oio. 1. c. Fin. i. 5, 16 Tusc. iii. 17, 38. In Cic. N. D. i. 2], 58, Gotta says the same of himself), on his first visit to Athens, 78 to 79 B.C. conf. N. D. i. 34, 93 but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno or Xeno (as however Krisclte, Porsch. 26 maintains) whom Cic. Ad Att. v. 10, 11 xvi. 3 mentions as living in 50 and 43 B.C. Cic. N. D. i. 21, calls bim princeps Bpicureorum (and Philo of Larissa, coryphaeus Epicureorum); Tusc. 1. c, acrioulus senex, istorum (Epicureans) aoutissimus. IHog. x.
; ;

Pin.
20,

5,

16

53)

had

v. 1, 3 ; Legg. i. also studied under

;

him
in

in Athens, and previously Rome, where Phsedrus must then have been residing (Ad Pam. xiii. 1). He was old

when

Cicero had, for the second time, relations with him. According to Phlegon, in Plwt. Bibl. Cod. 97, p. 84, a,, 17, he

was succeeded by Patron

177,
3,

(01.

25, calls

him iroxiypaipos iviip. From Procl. in Ihwlid. 55 59 60, we hear of a treatise of

;

or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the School, after holding it only for a very short time ; but this is not a well -ascertained fact. Cicero, 1. c, praises the character of Phasdrus. He calls him nobilisphilosophus (Philip. V. 5, 13). It was supposed that Cicero's description (N.D. i. 10, 25 15, 41), and that the frag;

ments

first

published by Drum:

mond (Heroulanensia London,

1810), and then by Petersen (Phsedri de Nat. De.
. . .

Zeno, in which he attacked the

validity of mathematical proofs. J-hilodemus^ treatise -n-tpi i:a^^r\o-los (Vol. Here. v. a) seems, from the title, to have been an

Hamb. 1833), and illustrated by Krische (PorFragm.

:

Cotemporary with Zeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during the Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and sometimes an Epicurean {Phd.
abstract from

Zeno.

schungen), were from a treatise of Phsedrus on the Gods, to which perhaps do. Ad Att. xiii. 39 refers. But Spengel (from the Heroulanean rolls,

14 23). See Zeller's Sulla, 12 Philosophic der Griechen, vol. Perhaps to the 11. b, 759, 2. time of his despotism the statement may be referred {Demetrius Magnes in Athen. xiii. 611, b) that the Stoic Theotimus, who wrote against Epicureus, was killed at the instance of Zeno. Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93;
; ;

Philodemus xcpl euirciScfas. Abh. d. Munch. Akad. Philos-philol. Kl. X. 1, 127) and Sauppe (De Philodemi libro de pietate.
.
. .

Gott. Lections verz.

fiir

Som-

mer, 1864) have shown that the Neapolitan (Vol. Hero. Coll. Alt. i. ii. 1862) editors are right in regarding these fragments as the remains of a
treatise
^

of

Philodemus

irspl

Philodemus
i.

'

Hero.

Ch-os,

(see Vol, Philod. Rhet.

414

THE EPICUREANS.
Eome,' and Patro,* the successor of Phsedrus, in Athens.

Chap.

XV.

The number
chiefly
cxii.

of Epicureans at

Eome, known

to us

by

Cicero's writings,' is not small,

no one of

; Prellcr, Allg. Encyclc. Sect. HI. Bd. xxiii. 345) .was a native of Gadara,in Coele-Syria (Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759). He lived at Rome in Cicero's time, and is mentioned by Cicero as

Att. V. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i. 2, 4, where besides

him an Epicurean Plato of Sardes is mentioned, and above

pp. 410, 1
'
;

413,

1.

a learned and amiable man

(Fin.
ii.

3.3,

119

Or. in Pison.

28). Besides philosophic works,

be also wrote poems (Cio. In

A Sat. i. 2, 121). of the latter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical works mentioned by Diog. x. 3 24, no fewer than thirty-six books were discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been published (Vol. Here. iv. Introd. in Polystr. iii. a portion of which have been
Pis.
;

ffor.

number

published). Spengel and Gros have separately edited Khet. IV. Sauppe, De VitiisX. and Petersen and Sauppe, the frag; ;

Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T. Albutius, called by Oic. Brut. 35, 131, perfectus Epicureus (Cic. Brut. 26, 102; Tusc. V. 37, 108 N. D. i. 33, 93 Fin. i. 3, 8 [De Orat. iii. In Pison. 38, 92 43, 171] Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator. 44, 149 In Caecil. 19, 63 Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281), and Velleius, who, as Kriaclie (Forsch. 20) proves, by a gloss on Nat. De. i. 29, 82 and Cic. De N. D. i. 28, 79 (conf. Divin. i. 36, 79) was a native of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Epi: ;

curean of his time (Oie. N. D.

i.

6,

15
:

21, 58

conf.

De

Orat.

ments
'

irepl ivffeSelas.

(Xo.

ii.

85,

Acad. ii. 33, 106 Fin. 119; Ad Fam. vi. 11.

;

Other Epicurean.3 21, 78). were C. Catius, a native of

iii.

According to Virgil, Catal. 7, 9 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Seii). Ad Eel. vi. 13, ^H. vi. 264, he

was the teacher of

Virgil.

The

variously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the grammarian
is

name

Gaul, named by Cicero (Ad Fam. XV. 16) as one long ago dead. By Quintilian, x. 1, 124, he is called levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auotor ; ani the Comment. Cruqu. iu Hck: Sat. ii. 4, 1, sS-ys that he wrote four books De Rerum Natura et

Pompilius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to Sueton.

lllust.

De Summo Bono

C. Cassius,

at the

Gram. c. 8, lived at Rome same time as Gnipho,

the teacher of Cfesar (^Ibid. c. 7), neglecting his profession for the Epicurean philosophy, and afterwards at Cumae. ' do. Ad Fam. xiii. 1 Ad
;

the well-known leader of the conspiracy against Csesar {de. Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; Plict. Brut. 37); C. Vibius Pansa, who died as consul at Mutina, in 43 B.C. {do. Ad Fam. vii. 12
XV.

26)

19); GaUus (Ad Fam. vii. L. Piso, the patron oi'

THE ROMAN PERIOD.

whom has obtained a higher repute than T. Lucretius Carus.^ His poem, carefully reproducing the Epicurean notions on natural science,
is,

415
Chap.
XA'.

therefore, one of

the most valuable sources for the knowledge of their

system.

Contemporary with Lucretius was the

to judge

cele-

brated physican Asclepiades of Bithynia,^ residing at

Eome, but

by the views on nature

attri-

buted to him, no genuine Epicurean, although connected with the Epicurean School.'
Philodemus
( Oic. in Pis. 28, see above, p. 41 3, 2 ; 1. c. 9, 20 16, 37; 18,42; 25, 59; Post Red. 6, 14); Statilius (^Plnt. Brut. 12) a second Statilius appears to be meant (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus, to whom Oio. Fin. i. 5, 13, delegates the of the Epirepresentation Moreover, curean teaching. T. Pomponius Atticns, the wellknown friend of Cicero, approached nearest to the Epiits School, calling curean adherents nostri familiares ( Cie. Fin. v. 1, 3) and ooudiscipuli (Leg. i. 7, 21), being a pupil of Zeno and Phasdrus and a friend of Patro's but his relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be ranked in any one School
; ; ;

from the chief passage Ep. 25, or respecting C. Trebatius from do. Ad Fam. vii. 12. C. Memmius (from the way in which he is spoken of Cic. Ad. Fam.
xiii. 1)

member

cannot be regarded as a of the Epicvirean School, although Lucret. De Ker. Nat. i. 24 v. 9, expressed the hope of winning him. ' Born, according to Hieron. (in Eus. Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in his 44th year, or 51 B.C. In Vita Virgilii, 659 ought therefore to be substituted for 699 A.u.c. It is clear,
;

from Nepos, Att. 12, that he was dead before the assassination

of

Csesar.

Teuflel

(in

(Cic.

Pam.

xiii.

1).

The same

Pauly's Eealencycl. iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that he committed suicide in a fit of madness.

observation applies also to his Saufeius {Nepos, friend, L. Att. 12 do. Ad Att. iv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Grata Ofe. iii. 16, (^Cic. Fin. ii. 22, 70 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. 1. c), and
; ;

According to Seat. Math, a ootemporary of Antiochus of Ascalon, whose language towards him is there quoted, and reckoned by Galmi.
*
vii.

201,

Postumius

(^lUd.)

be

called

Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with certainty respecting L. Papirius Psetus ( die. Ad Fam. vii. 17 to 26), not even

Isag. c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 among the leaders of the logical Schoolof Physicians. Hismedical treatises are often referred to by Galen. Plutarch in his Placita often names him. ' Known for three things

416
Chap.

THE EPICUREANS.
In the following century, too, several supporters of
the practical philosophy of the Epicureans are
to us,' but

XV.

known

no one apparently approaching Zeno or He differs, however, entirely

from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul apart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the
soul itself, to the action of the senses {Sext. Math. vii. 380 Ccel. Pint. Plac. iv. 2, 6; Atirelian. 1. c. in Fabric, on the passage of Sext. Tertullian, De An. 15). All that is otherwise stated of Asclepiades, apart from his medical views, for instance, that with Heraclitus he believed in a perpetual flux of things, is not at variance
;

his theory of atoms, his theory of the acquisition of knowledge, and his resolution of the soul

into matter. All bodies, he held, consist of atoms, differing, however,

from the atoms of Demooritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up of greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable
Pyrrh. X. 318
1.

(aimiiis).

Sext.

iii.
;

viii.

c.

9,

p.

363; 220 iii. 5 Galen. 698 Bionys. Alex,

ix.
; ; ; ;

32; Math.

(in Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4); Ccel. Aii/rsUan. De Pass. Acut.

with Epicurean principles.

See Fabric, on Pyrrh. iii. 32. The latter is probably in error in describing the primary atoms of Asclepiades as without quality, differing only in size, form, number and arrangement. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with whom he is genei.

14.

names

Quint. Inst. vi. 3, 78,k' L. Varus as an Epicurean, a friend of Augustus,

'

rally classed,

and applied,

like

him, the name oyKoi to atoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was traditionally derived from the Epicureans. He also asserted, with Epicurus (Antioohus, in SeH:. Math,
vii.

201):

tAs

ij.\v

aurOiiffeis

perhaps the individual who, according to Donat. V. Virg. 79, Serv. on Bel. vi. 13, attended the lectures of Syro, in company with Virgil. Horace, nbt; withstanding Ep. i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but only a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (Sat. i. 5, In Caligula's time, a 101). senator Pompedius was an Epicurean (Joseph. Antiquit. ix. 1, 5); under Nero, AuiidiusBassus, a friend of Seneca {Sen. Ep. 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the
elder Celsus {Orig.c. Cels.
i.

iivTccs Ka\

i\7]9wy &'Tt\^i|/ts elvai,

firjSef (iXats
Tjfias

8),

?<6ya} 5^

Kara-

and Diodorus, who committed

suicide {Sen. Vi. Be. 19, 1); under Vespasian or his sons,

he at the same time maintained that our senses cannot distinguish the component parts of things, even Epicurus together with Demooritus admitted this in respect
Aafiffdveiv.

If

of atoms.

PoUius {Stat. Sllv. ii. 2, 113). In the first half of the second century, Cleomedes, Met. p. 87, complained of the honours paid to Epicurus. In the second

THE ROMAN PERIOD.

Phsedrus in scientific importance.
Eehabilitated

417
Chap.

under the Antonines by the establishment of a public

chair in Athens, the Epicurean School outlived

XV.

most

other systems, continuing to exist as late as the

fourth century after Christ.'

half of the same oentirry lived Antonius, mentioned by Galen. De Prop. An. Aifect. v. 1, and Zenobius, who, according to Simpl. Phys. 113, b, was an opponent of Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived Diogenes Laertius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at least afriendof the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names of Athenseus (whose

does not justify us setting down Diodes of Magnesia as an Epicurean. ' Diog. X. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes fj re StSaxv -iraffuy ffx^^^v 4k\1'
:

irovff&y

tSjv lliKKwv

ifTaft

bia/JLf-

vovtra

Koi

vripi6/iovs

^PX^^

cfjroKiSovffa

&Wriv

4^

&\\ris

tuv

yraplfiuv.

The testimony of

epigram on Epicurus is quoted by Diog. x. 12), Autodorus

{Diog. V. 92),

and Hermodorus

(^Xmcian, Icaromen. 16)

may be
x.
11,

Zactantius, Inst. iii. 17, to the wide spread of Epicureanism, is not so trustworthy, although It it treats it as still existing. may be that he is only following older writers as Cicero does. See above p. 412, 1.

mentioned

but Di^g.

418

THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTER
TEACHING
Chap.

XVI.

CHAEACTEE AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN

:

THE TEST-SCIENCE OF TRUTH.

The

scientific value
is

and capacity
all

for

development of
its

Epicureanism
give diffusion

out of
tlie

proportion to

exten-

A. Clua-

and

length of time during which

Epicurean it continued to flourish.

mjKtem. (1) it

No

other system troubled

it

itself

SO little
;

about the foundation on which

itself so exclusively to

power of

rested

none confined
its

the ut^

7en^r'

terances of

founder.

Such was the dogmatism

with which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such

the conviction he entertained of their excellence,
that his pupils were required to
of

them

to

memory

; '

commit summaries and the superstitious devotion

for the founder

'

was with his approval" carried to

20: Quls

do. Fin.

ii.

7,

from him:
viruv

Sis

KoKdnns likv avrhv

enim vestrum nou

curi

edidicit Epi-

(jmtrioXoyoSi'To TrpoaKinAiaufv 70-

Kupfas Siijas? Diog. 12 (according to Diodes), Epicurus often exhorted his scholars (^Jhid. 83 85 35) to commit to memory what they had heard. His last exhortation to his friends was (Diog. 16): tuv
; ;

VeoKhris Se i 4k iralSai/ airoipalvoito fnjSeva ffotp^repov ^EiriKoipov yeyov4vai fintf eJvat * 7] 5e fi-firrip
wfidfievos-

aSe\<j>hs eiebs

irSfwus ia-x^r 4v airf! tooiStos,

oTai
<rvpe\6o!i(rat
trotphv JtK 4yevvTia-av.

Conf.

7<^.

Frat.

Am.

16,

SoyiiiTiDv
'

liefivria-eai.

He

speaks of himself and

Metrodorus in Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7, as wise men. Plut. IS. P. Suav. Viv, 18, 5, quotes, as coming

Adv. Col. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor, p. 89. Not only was Epicurus' birthday observed by the Epicurean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of
p. 487;

CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM.

such a length, that not the slightest deviation from
his tenets was

419

on a single point permitted. Whereas,

Chap. XVT.

even in Cicero's time, the writings of Epicurus and

Metrodorus found hardly a reader beyond the School,'

it is

asserted that as late as the first

and second cenit

turies after Christ the Epicureans clung tenaciously

to their master's teaching.^

for

Probably

was

easier

an Epicurean than

for

any other thinker to act

thus, he, like his master,' being indifferent to the

every month was celebrated as a festival, in honour of him and Metrodorus. In his testament, Epicurus especially ordered this tvfofold observance for the
future.
3), little as he can agree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully adhering to their master's teaching, a point in which only the Pythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said /xt^S' aino7s eiireiv 6,
:

XHog. 18 ; Cic. Fin. ii. Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 4, 8; PKn. H. N. xxxv. 5. Atlien. vii. 298, d 'Enmoipi6s Tij Ei/coSicrT^s. Epicurus' picture is constantly referred to {Cic. Fin. v. 1, 3 PUn. 1. c).
31, 101
;
; ;

woi

ivavriov

oiSre

&\\7i\ot7 oUre
[^fjiriSfva]

'EiriKoitpcf
flljShVj

firiSev

els

'6tOV Kal flVTlffdTJVat &^IQV,

ffTTiv

oW'

extravagant importance attached to Epicurus in his School is proved by the high eulogies in I/ttoret. i. 62 iii. 1 and lOiO v. 1 vi. 1. Metro;
;

The

fiaWov

Se

avTols Trapav6fii]fiaf cure^fld, Kal Karey-

Thus votarat rb KaiyoTO[jLr}64v. the Epicurean School resembles

a state animated by one
in which there are of party.
'

spirit,

no divisions

dorus, in Phit. Adv. Col. 17, 4, praises t^ ^'ETriKovpov us a\i]0ws

6e6tj>avTa opyia.

Oc. Tusc.

ii. 3, 8.

' Sen. Ep. 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the Stoics with the Epicurean's dependence on the founder sibi Nou sumus sub rege quisque se vindicat. Apud istos
:

quicquid dicit Hermarchus, quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum

refertur.

has been already ob406, 1, that Epicurus ignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and only confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked, not only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. JOiog. 8, probably on the authority of Timocrates, communicates his
It

served, p. 405, 1

Omnia quse quisquam in illo contubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the other hand, Numenius (in Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv.

remarks on Plato, Aristotle, and Vic. N. D. i. 33, 93: others. Cum Epicurus Aristotelem
vexarit

contumeliosissime, PhEedoni Socratico tu,rpissime

E 2

d20
Chap,
'

THE EPICUREANS.
labours of other philosophers, or unable to appreciate
their merits.'

For us

this

conduct of theirs has one

advantage

we can be
is

far

more certain that the Epi-

cureans reflect the teaching of their founder than

can that this

the case with the Stoics.

philosophical sterility, this

we But this mechanical handing down

intellectual

of rmchangeable principles, places the

value of Epicureanism on the lowest level.

servile

The
its

dependance of the Epicurean School on

its

founder can neither excuse

mental idleness nor

recommend a system
pendent training to
1

so powerless to give

an inde-

its supporters.

2)

Aim of

The want
^PP^^irs

of

intellectual

taste

here

displayed

'aceorMna
iotitelSjii-

cwreems.

^^^^ i'l ^^ view taken by Epicurus of the aim and business of philosophy. If among the Stoics the subordination of theory to practice was

frequently

felt,

among

the Epicureans this subordi-

nation was carried to such an extent as to lead to a

depreciation of all science.

The aim

of philosophy

was, with them, to promote human happiness. Indeed, philosophy is nothing else but an activity

helping us to happiness by means

thought.^

of

speech and

Nor

is

happiness, according to Epicurus,

minus notum est, quem ad modum quidque dicavobis, Vellei,

maledixerit. Pint. N. P. Suav. V. 2, 2 Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes

:

is

polite

rh yhp ir hvBpdivois
piiiiara,

rfffxiffTo

/Stu/ioXo^'os,

(rvyayay6vTes 'ApiaTorihovs Kai ^aKpdrovs Kal Tlvday6pini Kol TIp<BTay6pov Kal @o<ppd<rTov' Kol 'HpaK\eiSov Kal
\ilicv6uriiobs, K.r.\.

'Viriripxav, Kal tIvos yiip

inttljavuv, KaretTK^BaiTav.
'

oAx'
:

tw

tur ; vestra enim solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. liid. 1. Zeno not only despised 34, 93 cotemporary philosophers, but he even called Socrates a scuira Atticus, Macrob. Somn. i. 2 (Colotes ridiculing Plato's Republic).
:

Cic.

N. D.

ii.

29, 73

Nam

'

Sext.

Math.

xi.

169

'EttJ -

CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM.

directly

431

promoted by knowledge, but only indirectly

in as far as knowledge ministers to practical needs,

or clears

Chap. XVI.

away hindrances to

their attainment.
is

All

science which does not serve this end

superfluous

and and

worthless.'

Hence Epicurus despised learning

and the lore of historians, and declared it a piece of good fortune for simplicity of feeling to be uneontaminated by learned rubbish.^ Nor was his opinion different respecting mathematical science, of which he
culture, the researches of grammarians,

was wholly ignorant.'

ticians,

The

calculations of mathemafalse principles

;*

he maintained, are based on

They fetch

Kovpos ^\eyf rijv iptKotro^lav iyep' yeiav civai \6yots Kal dtaKoyitrtiois rhv evSaifioj/a ^iov trepnroiovffay,

Conf. Epic, in IHog. 122

The

demand

to study philosophy in youth, as well as in age, is sup-

ported on the ground, that it is never too early nor too late to be happy. It was mentioned, p. 408, 3, that Epicurus' own education was defective. Not content therewith, he upholds this de'

their philosophers, Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit, Epicurus (Diiig. 6 Plut.N.P. Suav.T. 12, 1 ) wrote to Pythocles iraiSeiav Si traaav (the Traiieia iyKvuKtoSf the learned culture), fiatipie, <ptvyf
like
;
:

rh
588,

avdriov
a)

cipifievos
1. c.
;

Apelles

(_Plut.
:

and to At/ten. xiii.

;

fiaKapl^u
Tritrris

ire.

&

q^tos^

Sti KoBaphs

cuTias (^Plut,
^By]fiarttiv

explains
S)pnil<ras.

it

r&v
iirX

tLTToffx^^evos)

^iXotrotplav

fectiveness on principle, NuUam

eruditionem, says the Epicurean in Oic. Fin. i.21, 71, esseduxit, nisi quae beatse vitae disoiplinam adjuvaret. In poets, nulla
solida utilitas omnisque pueriMusic, geolis est delectatio. metry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profeota vera esse non possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucuadius,
2
i.

Metrodorus asserted that it need not be source of trouble to anyone, a

(^Phit. 1.0.)

he had never read a line of Homer, and did not know whether Hector were a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and
if

writing, ypafifiuTutii in the limited sense, was the only art recognised by Epicurus. Sext.

Math.
'

i.

49.

e.

quo melius viveremus.

Fin.
ii. i,
:

Seost.

Math.i,
i.

aa. Fin.
p.

12 Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihilopusesse enm, philosophus

Oic.

i.

6, 20.
<

ao. Pin.

21 (see

431, 1),

which probably -only

qui futurus

sit,

scire

literas.

means, that mathematical ideas

422

THE EPICUREANS.
at

Chap,
'

any

rate,

they
it is

contribute

nothing to

human

happiness, and

therefore useless and foolish to

trouble oneself about them.'

The theory

of music

and poetry he likewise found exceedingly irksome, although he took pleasure in music itself and the
theatre
;

and

rhetoric, as an artificial guide to elo-

quence, seemed to

him

as worthless as

the show-

speeches which are the

thereof.

only result of the

study

The power of public speaking is a matter of practice and of momentary feeling, and hence the
skilful speaker is far

from being a good statesman.^

Nor did the

any better in
he set
use
;

greater part of logical enquiries fare

his

judgment.

Himself no logician,
Definitions
are of no

little store

by

logic.

the theory of division and proof

may

be dis-

pensed with; the philosopher does best to confine

himself to words, and to leave
alone.^
all

the logical ballast

Of

all

the questions which engrossed the

of the 4th Book, Vol. Hero. i. in particular, rejecting the

cannot be applied to phenoHence Acad. ii. 3.3, 106 (conf. Fin. i. 6, 20) Poly^nus Epicure adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse

mena.

notion

that

it
i.

has

a moral

effect, see col.

24, 28.

He

credidit. p. 85.
'

Conf. Prool. in Micl.

;

was even opposed to music at table (Col. 38, as Epicurus was in Phit.l. c). The statement
of Diog. 121, that onlythe wise man can give a right opinion on poetry and music, is not at variance with these passages, ' Philodemus, De Bhet. Vol. Hero. iv. col. 3 12. The same polemic is continued in the further fragments of this treatise. Ibid. V. Col. 6. * Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22 In logic istevester plane, utmihiquidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. ToUit definitiones nihil de
;
:

See p. 421, 1 Sext. Math, Epicurus rejects mathematics oiy rati fiaeriiidTuii firiSfv
i.

ffvvepyoiiiTiiiv Trphs
o-ij/.

(To^fu rf\t'm-

According to Diaff. 93, Epicurus calls astronomy tos

tSj'

ac5pa7ro8(6Seij
TEx'"'''e>as.
'

liiTTpoKiyav

Conf.
1.

Pwq.
13,
i.

79.

Pint.

0.

Philowepl

demus, in
lioiKTiKris,

his

treatise

discussed at length the value of music, as we gather from the fragments

had

CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM.

attention of Stoic logicians, one only, the theory of

433
Chap. XVI.

knowledge, was studied by Epicurus, and that in a

very superficial way.'

Far

greater, comparatively,

was the importance

he attached to the study of nature,^ but even natural science

was deemed valuable, not so

is

much

for its

own sake

as because of its practical use.

The know;

ledge of natural causes

the only means of liberathis

ting the soul from the shackles of superstition

is

the only use of natural science.

If it were not

for the thought of Grod and the fear of death, there would be no need of studying nature.' The investi-

gation of our instincts

is also

of use, because it helps

us to control them, and to keep

them within

their

natural bounds.''

Thus the onesided

85
:

practical view

dividendo ao partieudo docet.

fi^i

&\Ko

ri reKos iK rrjs irepl

.

Non quomodo effioiatur

daturque
via
ratio, tradit,

conolu-

fjLiredipuv ypcijffeats

vofii^eti/

captiosa
:

non qua solvantux, am-

Se? elvot ^Trep arapa^lav KoL wlffriv

bigua distinguantiir, ostendit. In dialectioa IHd. 19, 63 autem vestra nullam existimavit [Epic] esse nee ad melius vivendum nee ad commodius disserendum viam. Acad. ii. Ab Epieuro, qui totam 30, 97 dialecticam et oontemnit et
:

^e^aiov KaSdwep Kal i-nl raj/ \oinuif. et fniOkv Jifias Ibid. 112
:

atirepl rStv iji.ere<&puu inroi\/iat i]V(&x~

\ovp Ka\
hv
this

at irepl

Qaudrov

oiiK

irpotreSetfjuefla

<pv(no\oyias

but

becomes necessary, since without knowledge of nature, we cannot be perfectly free from fear. The same in Phit.
N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7; Conf. JXog. 79 and 143 Oio. Pin. iv. Lucret. i. 62 iii. 14 vi. 5, 11
;

Diog. 31 r'tiv 8io\ekTlK^V as irapeKKOvtrajf &TroSoKtfia^ovtTiV ' hpKeiv yhp robs (f>v(rtKobs ^apeii' Kara robs rav irpayiidraiii
inridet.
:

9.

<p66yyovs.
'

See p. 424. do. Fin. i. 19,

physicis
[Epic.].
sicis,
'

plurimum
Ibid.
6,

63: In posuit
:

17

In phy-

quibus

primum

gloriatur, totus est alienus.

maxima

Epic, in Dio0. x. 82

and

In ac. Pin. i. 19, 63, the Epicurean speaks of a iivefold, or, excluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science fortitude contra mortis timorem constantia contra metum religionis sedatio animi omnium rerum oocultarum ig<
; ;

424
Chap,
!

THE EPICUREANS.
of philosophy which

we have already encountered

in

Stoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme

length.

(3)

mvi-

Nor

is

it

otherwise than in

harmony herewith

pMhiopJty-

*'^^* ^^^^

^^^ ^^ receive a fuller or more perfect

of nature, going as it did far

treatment in the further development of their sys-

tem.

Even the study

more into particulars than logic, was guided entirely by practical considerations, all scientific interest in nature being ignored Following the usual method,
however, the Epicm-eans divided
three parts '

philosophy into

logic, natural science,

first

and moral science.

Limiting, however, the

of these parts to one

branch of

logic, the part

racteristics of truth,

which deals with the chaand which they therefore called

neither logic, nor dialectic, but Canonic, they really

reduced this part to a mere introductory appendage

to the

two other

parts,'

and studied Canonic

as a

part of natural science.'

moderatio noratione sublata natura cupiditatum generibus;

Moreover, natxu-al science

p. 423, 4.
vii.

que earum
'

explioatis.
:

Hence Sext. Math, Some reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide
14
:

Diog. 29

SiaipeiTai rolvvv
cis

philosophy

[ri

<pi\oao((>ia\

Tpla,

t6

tc
ircpl

Kavpvmhv Kol
Kpnriplov

(pvtniihv naX ii6m6v.

Canonic was also called

ttoi it.pxns

""l ffToix^mirepl irepl

tm6p

natural
KoJ

science,
Kol

yfvfafus
(j>iirem

(pBopas

into natural and whilst, aeoord; ing to others, he adhered to a threefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. Sen. Ep. 89, 11 Epicurei duas partes philosophise

moral science

; ethics, irepl atpeTwv koI ^EUKTeSx Kal irepi filav Kol t^Xoui. ' Diog. 30 rb /iev odv KavoviKbv iit)6Sovs iirl t^v irpayiiardav
:

?Xf''

Diog.

1.

c.

cMfliun /lenTot
<^u(riK9> fftivi.

rh

Kai'oi/iKbi' Sfiov Tip

TciTTeii/,

do. Fin.

19.

See

putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus cogerentur, ambigua seceruere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quodque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant, alio nomine
;

CANONIC.
was so entirely subordinated to moral science, that

425
Chap>
^

tempted to follow some modern writers in their view of the Epicurean system, giving to moral science the precedence of the two other
feel
'

we might almost

parts, or at least of natural science.^

The

School,

however, followed the usual order, and not without

reason
;^

for

although the whole tendency of the

Epicurean Canonic and natural science can only, like

the Stoic, be explained by a reference to their moral
science, yet their

moral science presupposes the testscience.

science of truth
fore,

and natural

We

shall, therefirst

do well to treat of Canonic in the

this

place,

and subsequently to prove how depends on Ethics.

branch of study

Canonic or the test-science of truth, as has been

B. Canonic

observed, is occupied with investigating the stan- '^J^^^^fS dard of truth, and with enquiring into the mode of truth. acquiring knowledge. The whole of formal logic, (i) <*" iation and , the doctrine of the formation of conceptions and percep-

,,

,.,^

conclusions,

is

omitted by Epicurus.* Even the theory

**""

of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with

him a

very simple form.

If the Stoics were fain, notwith-

standing their ideal ethics and their pantheistic

speculations, ultimately to take their stand on

ma-

terialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same?

In seeking a speculative basis for a view of life which refers everything to the feeling of pleasure
rationaleminduxeruntisedeum
aocessionem esse naturalis paitis
^ Steinliart in the treatise often referred to. ' Diog. 29 ; Sext. Math. vii. 22. * do. Fin. i. 7, 22. See p,

existimant.
'

Bitter,

iii.

463

Sohhier-

maohm; Gesoh.

d. Phil. p. 123.

422,

4.


426

THE EPICUREANS.
or

Chap, XVI.

pain,

he appealed far more unreservedly tha

they had done to sensation.

can alone inform us what
is

Now,

since the sense

pleasant or unpleasan'

and what

is

desirable or the contrary, our

as to truth or falsehood

judgmeE must ultimately depend o

is

the senses.

Viewed speculatively, sensation

;

th
c

standard of truth
pleasure or pain.'
still

viewed practically, the feeling

If the senses

may not be
and

trustee
\.

less

may knowledge

derived from reason

trusted, reason itself being primarily

entire]

There remains, therefon no distinctive mark of truth, and no possibility

derived from the senses.
certain conviction.

We

are at the

mercy of
is

unl:

mited doubt.
tory of itself that they can of

If,

however, this doubt

contradic

for

how can men declare they knov know nothing? it is also contradictor

human
all

nature, since it would do

away not

on!
ac

with

knowledge but with every possibility of

with
all

tion, in short,
life

the conditions on which

huma
ths

depends.^

To avoid doubt we must allow

is
;

sensation as such

always, and under all circun

stances, to be trusted

nor ought the delusions of

tl

senses to shake our belief ; the causes of these decej

22 8ext. according to Piog. 31, and Cio. Acad. ii. 46, 142, Epicurus named three
'

Cic.

Fin.

i.

7,

Liwi:

Math.

-rii.

203.

If,

iv. 467-519 ; die. Fin. Colotes (in Pint. 19, 64. Col. 24, 3) replies to the C;

Ad

criteria
irdBv
it is

instead of the above two,

only an inaccuracy of ex-

irpi\if^is, aiirSriiris,

and

pression, ir/)(i\r)i(iis, as we have seen, being derived from sensation. " Epicurus, in Piog. x. 146;

by sayinj SivaaBai Cv" *")^^ XPVoitu to In this case, as vpiy/nao'ii'. the case of the Stoics, the doj matism in favour of the sensi is based on a practical posti late, the need of a firm basis conviction for human life.
renaic scepticism
/n5)
i (

CANONIC.
tions not lying in sensation as such, but in our judg-

427

ment about
us,

sensation.

What

the senses supply

Chap. XVI.

is

only that an object produces this or that effect upon

and that

this or that picture has

impressed our

soul.
it

The

facts thus supplied are always true, only

does not follow that the object exactly corresponds

it,

with the impression we receive of

nor that
it

it

pro-

duces on others the same impression that

produces

on us. On the contrary, many different pictures may emanate from one and the same object, and these pictures may be changed on their way to the ear or eye. Pictures, too, may strike our senses with

which no real objects correspond.

object

picture with the thing, the impression

To confound the made with the

making the impression,

is

certainly an error,

but this error must not be laid to the charge of the

senses,

but to that of opinion.'

Indeed,

how

is it

possible, asks Epicurus,^ to refute the testimony of

Can reason refute it ? But reason is itself dependent on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against that on which its own claims to belief depend. Or can one sense convict another of error ? But different sensations do not refer to the same object, and similar sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, therefore, but to attach implicit belief to every impression of the senses. Every such
the senses
?

Epic, in JDiog. x. 50 and Sext. Math. vii. 203-210 Plid. Adv. vili. 9 ; 63 ; 185 ; Col. 4, 3 ; 5, 2 25, 2 Plac. iv. I/aor. iv. 377-519 ; Cic. 9, 2 Acad. ii. 25, 79 ; 32, 101 ; Fin.
'

i.

7,

22

N. D.
17;

i.

25, 70

Ter-

147

tull.

De An.

ticulars

Further parbelow respecting sense31

;

perception.
' JDiog. x.

Lacr.

iv.

480.

428
Chap. XVI.

THE EPICUREANS.
is directly certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus clear evidence {ivdpysia).^ Nay,

impression

more,
of

its

truth

is so

paramount that the impressiouE

in dreams, are true
real,^

madmen, and appearances

because they are caused by something

(2) Notions.

and

error

only becomes possible when we go beyond

sensation,

This going beyond sensation becomes, however.

a necessity.
a notion

By

a repetition of the same perception

arises.

(^TrpoXriyfris)

notion, therefore,

ie

nothing

else

but the general picture retained in the

mind
ing.

of what has been perceived.'

On

these notions

memory depends all speaking and thinkThey are what commonly go under the name of things and speech is only a means of recalling definite perceptions* to the memory. Notions are
retained by
;

Math. vii. 203 and In Diog. x. 52, instead of we should read with Cobet empyetat. Besides this peeuliar expression, Epicurus uses sometimes aXaBi\(ns, sometimes i/>oi'Ta(rfo ((Sfearf. 1. e.), for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls ipavraaT ik)i
'

Sext.

216.

ju^ Trp6Tepov ^yv^Keifiev

avrh

ivepyeias,

ouS* ttv uvoiidtra^ei/ rt /t^ wpdrepot

avTou HUTCL
fiaSdvTis.

7rp6\7j^tv

rhv Tinrov

Hence the exhortaEpicuras' letter to (in Diog. x. 37)

tion

in

Herodotus

vpSirov fxkv oiv to. vTroTerayfififo Tois <p96yyois Set ei\'ij(f>4uai Uttus

imPo>Ji. Biog. 50. " Diog. 32. ' Diog. 33 t)iv 8e

:

hv
TrpiJXrjifni'
fi

T(i

5o|a^a;;iEi'a

t)

^riToiiieva
ft

fi

atropaifuva

6X'"/'e>' f 's

iviyovrei

Keyovtrtv olovel KaTd\7]\ptjf

opdijv ^ ^vvoiav
dvaTroKetfjLeytfV,
?)

S6^av

sion

KofloXi/cV v6'i\(nv
fiv^fLTjv

perceptions

rovriffri

Every impres-, must be referred to definite apart from perceptions, no reality belongs to
^TriKplveiv, K.T.K.
;

TovTToWdKis^^uBev (^ayevros. By the help of this passage, Cicero's description, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected.
*

Diog.

1.

0.

S,ua

y&,p

r^

^iiBrivat &if6puiros eiiBbs Kartt irptJXtji|/iv

Kol 6 T^nos ainov ifourai

irporiyovfi4vuj/

tuv

alaB'fja'euv.

our impressions or, as it is expressed Semt. Pyrrh. ii. 107, Math. viii. 13, 258: The Epicureans deny the existence oi a XeKTbi/, and that between a thing and its name there exists a third intermediate something a conception. See also Sext,
;

ttovtI o^v ov6fj.a7i

rh irpt^Twy
iffri

5iro-

vii.

267.

TiTayfievoy ivapyh

Ktd oiiK

CANONIC.
presupposed in
all scientific

429

knowledge.'

Together

Chap.

with sensations they form the measure of the truth

of our convictions
;

and

it

holds true of

them

as it

did of sensations

that

they are true in themselves

notions,

and need no

proof.'

Taken hy themselves,

like perceptions, are reflections in the soul of things

on which the transforming action of the mind, changing external impressions into conceptions, has not
as yet

been brought to bear.

this very reason notions are not suflBcient. (3) Ojnn""*'

For

From
causes

appearances we must advance to their secret

;

from the known to the unknown.^

attached by Epicurus

But

far

too little value was

to the

logical forms of thought, or he

would have investi-

gated more accurately the nature of this process of

advancing.

Thoughts, in his view, result from sen-

sations spontaneously,

and although a certain amount

it re-

of reflection

is

necessary for the process, yet

quires no scientific guidance.

Sea^. Math. i. Siog. 33. oSre QtiTtiv otTe 21) iiropsiv li7Ti (cttTct rhv a6^ov 'EirIbid. Kovpov ivev irpoXii^fais.
'

The thoughts

arrived

57

(xi.

Tiii.

337, p. 521

Phd. Be An.
that
all

irparov ivvSrtiui Hofl' tKaarov <p$6Yyov fiXiireaBm Koi /aiSiv iiroSeflcus irpuo-SeTo-floi, rfirep i\ofixv t!> (nToip.evov fi cnropoipeyor xal Soia(6pievor i(p' i avd^o/iev.
t!>

The

difficulty,

learn-

ing presupposes knowledge, the

Stoics

ircpl

Diog. 33 (Conf 38, 104) tUv aS^Aav 4ir!) tuv (paiyo.

met by

(pvtriKai

hvotai,

piiywv xph (r-np-eioOaeat.

=

Epicureans by which accordingly

the

vpoKii'f/eis

are
1.

the
c.

p. 466,

See p. 422, goes too

4.

Steinhart,

far, in

saying

natural test of truth. ' See p. 426, 1. Diog.

olv e'uriv at to^auThy oirb leal Ti rtvis ivapyovs l^prirrai,
ivapyeis
Ae'pocTts Xtyop.ei'.
"

that
'

Epicums
Diog. 32
Traaai
:

defied all law

Koi

and rule in thought.

yhp koI
iiri-

irpoA^ifieis

irpoTf'pou
e<p'

yoiai

airh

tUv

aiirBiiaeav

t ana-

ypy6vaai, KOTiiTEirfpiirTai(ni'(pro-

See

previous
:

note

and

Epic, in IHog. 38

aviyKt] yh,p

bably; the coincidence of several sensations to be distinguished from their aivSaris or free com-

430
Chap, XVI.
at in this

THE JEPICUREANS:
way do not stand
as a higher

genus abovi

perceptions, but they are only opinions {yiroKfi^^ii

86^0.)

without a note of truth in themselves, an(

for their

depending
opinion

truth upon

sensation.
is

Tha
base(

may be

considered a true one which

is

on the testimony of the senses, or

the opposite

at least not con

trary to the senses, and that a false opinion in whicl

is the case.' Sometimes we suppose tha upon certain present impressions other impression for instance, that a tower which appear will follow round at a distance will appear round close at hand In that case, if the real perception corresponds witl
;

our supposition, our opinion

false.^

is

true, otherwise it

ii

At

other times

we suppose that
;

certain ap

pearances are due to secret causes

for instance,

tha

empty space

is

the cause of motion.

If all appear,

ances tally with their explanations,

bination)
Xoiievov
Ti

we may

considei

koI
Kal
;

av(i\oylai,v

koI

yelas,

6^ot6r7]Ta KoL

ffiSvOta'ti',

ffv/x$a\\oytfffiov.

rov
429,

and the corresponding doctrine of the Stoics, p. 80, with the teaching of Epicurus, on the genesis of thoughts from sfensations. Kal rh Soiturrhv ZHog. 33
Conf
.

p. 422, 4

1,

Se at re avTifiaprv ovk iirt^apTvpovfieva irphs rrjs eyapycias. HitteVy iii 486, observes that these state meuts are contradictory. Ac cording to Sextus, an opiraon ii
ifievSe'is

povfxet/ai Koi

'

&7rb irpoTfpov Tivis

ivapyoSs ^pTTjKal uirSKn^iv

(^aat

Toi

tV
ti.v

5e

S(j|ai/

only then true when it can b< proved and not refuted accord ing to Diogenes, when it can b( proved or not refuted. Th( latter is, however, clearly meani
;

Xiyovaiv.
ifiEvS^
il /ail

0X1)67)

T6

koI

by

Sextus,

and

is

affirmed bj
;

fiiv ycbp

iiriiiapTvprjrai
itX7)8ij
ti

iivTinapTvprirai
liii

etvui

iiiv

Sh

im/iaprvpriTM

auri-

^opTup5)Tat>)/6uS^TU7X'^''''. Seixt.

Hath.

vii.

211: rav
"

So|ui/

kotA
eiVii'

rhv 'EitiKovpov atiiiv oXTjSeis

ai 5e tfievSfis
&\Tjflj /iiv
avrifjLapTvpo{ifievai

ot Tt

Kal

ovk Ayrirris

Epicurus in Diog. 50 and 51. ^ Epicur. in Si^g. 50 Hid 33 Sext. vii. 212. The object oi a future sensation is called bj JMog. 38, rh irpo<Tfi4vov. Diog x. 34, himself gives a perverted explanation of this term, whicli probably misled Steinhart, p,
;

fjiopTvpoifievcu

nphs

ivap'

466.

CANONIC.
oui-

431

suppositions correct

if not,

our suppositions are

Chap.
"

incorrect.'

In the
is

first

case the test of the truth of

an opinion

that
it is

it is

supported by experience

in

the latter that

not refuted by experience.^ Have

we not

here

all

the leading features of a theory of

?

knowledge based purely on sensation

too slight to construct with
of materialism. Little pains
to

The Epi-

curean's interest in these questions was, however, far

them a developed theory

by Epicurus
was
(4) Stand-

seem

to have been taken

overcome the

difficulties

by which

his view

'H'Jjl s,,,i.
jectire.

beset.

If all sensations as such are true, the saying

of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each indi-

vidual that

is

true which seems to

him

to be true, that

contrary impressions about one and the same object

are true,

and that deceptions of the

senses, so

many

instances of which are supplied by experience, are

really impossible.

To avoid

these conclusions, Epi-

curus maintained that for each different impression

there
is

a different object-picture.
is

What immeitself,

diately affects our senses

not the object

but

a picture of the object, and these pictures may be innumerable, a different one being the cause of each
separate sensation.

Moreover, although the pictures

emanating from the same object are in general nearly

alike, it is possible that they
213. Sesct. 2 The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not, therefore, as Sextus expressly says, refer to the same
'

may
;

differ

from one-

1.

c.

true our impressions of the secret causes of these appear-

anoes must not be refuted. The former test applies to opinions

regarding tS -npoffinivov the latter, to opinions regarding -rh
;

cases.

suppositions in respect of external appearances must be proved, in order to be

Our

&ii]\ov.

Siog. 38.

432

THE EPICUREANS.
another owing to a variety of causes.
If,

Chap,

therefore, th

!^ same

object appears different to different individuals

is

the cause of these different sensations

not one am

the same, but a different one, and different picture

must have

affected their senses.

If our

own

sensa

blame does not belong to ou senses, as though they had depicted to us unreal ob jects, but to our judgment for drawing unwarrantec inferences from pictures as to their causes. This line of argument, however, only removes th(
tions deceive us, the
'

difficulty

one step further.

Sensation

is

said alway

to reproduce faithfully the picture which affects th*

organs of sense, but the pictures do not always re

produce the object with equal faithfulness.

Hon

then can a faithful picture be known from one whicl is not faithful? To this question the Epicurear
system can furnish no real answer.
wise

To say that

the

man knows how

to distinguish a faithful fron

an unfaithful picture * is to despair of an absolute standard at all, and to make the decision of truth oi error depend upon the individual's judgment. Sucl
a statement reduces
all

our impressions of the proIf sensatioD

perties of things to a relative level.

does not show us things themselves, but only those impressions of them which happen to affect us, it

does not supply us with a knowledge of things as they are, but as they happen to be related to us.
'

It

Compare the passages in

vii.

Sext.

206, quoted p. 427,

:

1.

^ Cie. Acad. ii. 14, 45 Nam perspicuitate sejungere, nihil qui voluit subvenire erroribus" profecit, ipsius enim opinionis Epicurus lis, qui videntur con- errorem nullo modo sustulit.

turbare veri oognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a

CANONIC.
was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this theory of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour be-

433

Chap
XVI.

longs to bodies in themselves, since some only see

colour in the dark, whilst others do not.'
predecessor, Democritus, he
to this view

Like his
of the

must have been brought

by

his theory of atoms.

Few

properties belong to atoms which

we

perceive in

things, and hence all other properties

must be ex-

plained as not belonging to the essence, but only be-

longing to the appearance of

things.'^

speculation was, however, too weak,

The taste for and the need of

a direct truth of the senses too strong in Epicurus

for

him

to be able to turn his thoughts in this direc-

tion for long.

Whilst allowing to certain properties

of things only a relative value, he had no wish to

doubt the reality of objects, nor to disparage the

object-pictures which furnish us with sensations.^
Adv. Col. 7, 2 (Stob. 366 Zucr. ii. 795) 6 elmi \e-/av rh 'Eirf/coupos ovK
'

Pl/ut.
i.

Eol.

Xpt^lio/ra

ffvftfpvTJ

tois
irpbs
ouk.

fffi)ixa(nv,

aWa yfvvaaSai
T(jeis (tol Sei

Karh. iroiAs
riiv

Tims
Sifiy.

Bfffsis

For says Epicurus,

TO cK
o-xdrei

oISo 'ivus
prjirai

ToCro 6vra

t&s Kari XP'^M'"''' "' ''^"^^ x^Moi^^ Lucret. 1. c. ' Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the impressions of the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in Diog. 68 kwh. /iijv Ka\ tA. axhnara Kal to xpifion-a Kai toj iis-yiBt\
:

Often some see Xpi4;i>aTO exeiv. colour where others do not ov tmWov oZv eXEi" ^ M^ ^X^'"
Xpaiia^vBiliTeTai
tXTOv,
' Simpl. Categ 109, /3 (Schol. in Arist. 92, a, 10 ) Since De:

koI tb, fidpea ko! Stro &\\a kott;yopeiTai koto tov (TiSjuotoj &s ttv *'' "''''^ Ps^tikStu koI irSffii/ ^611-

Tuv (TaiiidTUveKa-

to

fl

tois ipwrots

Kol

KaTo,

t^iv

aXffQfiffiv

avT^v yvuffTo7s, ou6' us

Kaff iavrds eiVi (pvireis Solao-jeoi/

(06 ycip
oSff

SwaThn
iis

^irixo^o-oi toSto),
eio-lc,

mocritus and Epicurus depute all qualities to atoms except those of form and mode of combination,
Aiyovai tos &\\as xoiiJTTjTas, Tds Te awKas,
iTriyiveirBai

8\us

ouk

oi0'

as

'dTepd tito

vpoamdpxovTa

Toir(f>

oSe' &s fi-opla ToiTov, a\K' iis Th '6\ov aSifui, Ka86\ov /ley 4k TodTaiv ivdvTiiiv T'tiv lauToO

acrd/MTo.

oXov 8epii6niTas Kal Aei(JT7)TOS, Kol

(jivcrw

ix""

4^'Sioi',

k.t.A.

434

THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTEK

XVII.

THE EPICUKBAN VIEWS ON NATURE.

Chap.

If Epicukijs and his followers underrated logic,

t(

natural science they attached a considerable value

A. General
'nature.

This value was, however, exclusively derived from

of nature confers in opposing superstition.
^^^"^

sense of the practical advantages which a knowledgf

(1) Ohject,

Withoul

menwd

of the gtudy

an object the study of nature would hav< seemed wholly superfluous.^ Such being their attitude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might hav been expected, indifferent about giving a complete

aim was

and accurate explanation of phenomena. Their on< to put forward such a view of nature a;
would do away with the necessity

intervention, without at the

supematura same time pretending tc

for

offer a sufiBcient solution of the

problems raised b]

science.^

Whilst, therefore, devoting considerable

attention to natural science,^ Epicurus does not seerr

' Epic, in Diog. 143 ou/c %v rhv tpo^oifiivov irepl tuv KupiaiTdTdiv \iuv jU^ KaTeiS^ra ris Tj tov
:

oi ykp
S(J|tjs

KepTJs
;i^pfoj',

iSio\oyias xa ^ios iifioiv e^e &A\ct 70v a6op^$ais 7j/ia.

Sjj

aifiiravTos (fiiais i,\\'

i).fv6v

{moTrTev6-

Qv.
'

Epic, in Diog. 87.

I>io^.

Ti rSiv

Karh. Tois ii.i9ovs.

27,mentions37booki
<pi(retas,

&vev (pvtrioKoyias i.Kepalas Tckj ^Socas iiroXapfiivav. For further particulars, p. 422.
Sicrre

ovK

^v

of

his

irepl

besides

smaller works.

GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

to have considered certainty to be of importance, or

435

Chap.
XVII.

even to be possible, in dealing with details of scienstudy. Of the general causes of things we can and ought to entertain a firm conviction, since the possibility of overcoming religious prejudices and the fears occasioned by them depends on these convictions. No such result, however, follows from the investigation of details, which, on the contrary, only
tific

tends to confirm prejudices in those

already emancipated from them.
details it
is,

who

are not

In dealing with
Epicurus to show

therefore,

enough

for

that various natural causes for

phenomena may be

imagined, and to offer various suggestions which

dispense with the intervention of the Gods and the

myths of a
in
'

belief in Providence.'
is

To

say that any

is

one of these expedients

the only possible one,

most cases to exceed the bounds of experience

Epic, in Diog. 78 koI ivhv ^kp rav KvptuTATaif at:

relveiv

(how very different from

Koi riiv

riav 4^aKpi$a(rai tl>viru)\oytas %p-

pHe

yov

elvai

Sei

vo/j-i^etv

koI

rb

fxaKciptov iv
yvtloffei

ry nepl roiv fiTetipaiv ivravBa ireTnwKivai' KoX

See Zellev, Philosoder Grieoheu, ii. b, 113, 3; 114,3; 359, 2), aA\' 6jUows rots ip6$ovs ex^tv rohs ravra KaTiS6vAristotle.

iv Ty, rives {pvceis at Oeupoifievai Kara to /xereoipa ravrl, koX Stra

avyyevi} irphs r^v els ravra aicpi0eiav en Se Kol rh irKeovaxus iv

Tas rives 5e at <f>v{Teis ayvoovvras Kal rives at Kvpi6rarcu tiuriat,Ka\ ei (as if) fi7] irpoa-ydeffav ravra, rdxa Se Koi nKeiovs, STav rh 6iifi0os ^k

rois roioirois
pLevus Kal

e'ivai

[evidently
exeiv,

jn);

eJvaijnTistheTead']fKalrh extBexo-

SxXws
eivai

ttois

aW

rovrwv irpoKaravoiitreais fii} r^v \i<nv Aa/iPdveiv nark r^v irepi ruv Kvpturdrwv oIkovop-iav. (Conf. iMcr.yi. 50; v. 82.)
rTJs

Zivt\rai.

airXas

p/ii

ev aipQdprtp Kal

5ih Sij Kal wKelovs airias evplcTKop^v

fiaKapia tp^ffet rS}V Sidnpiirtv viro0d\\6vraiv fl ripaxov firiSev Kal

rpoirwv, K,r.\.
ri]v {nrep roiruiv

Kal oh Sei vo/ii^eiv

XP^'""
rip,S>v
:

aKpifieiai/

Tovro Karaka^e^v r^ Siavoiif tffrtv rh 5' iv rp aTT\as otras eivai.

laropit} irewrinKhs rfis Siffeas (ca!

p.^ anetKritpevai 3(r?i Trpbs

rh &riipaavvreivei,

X""

""' piaKdpiov

k.t.A..

avaroXris Kal rpoTTTJs Kal eKKei^lietos Kal oaa ffuyyevri rovrois firiBev in
irphs

Kol Kar' &K\ovs Sh rpiirovs irXelovas 4v5exe-

IMd. lOi

rat Kepavvoiis airoTekeiiTBai. ii6uov

6 fivdos aTrearai,

rh pLaKdpiov

rris yvdiaeats <Tvv-

F F 2

436
Chap,

THE EPICUREANS.
and human knowledge, and to go back to the
pricious explanations of mythology.'
ca-

xvn.

Possibly the

world

may move, and possibly it may be at rest. Possibly it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or
have any other shape.
Possibly the sun and the stars

may be
they

extinguished at setting, and be lighted afresh

It
is,

at their rising.

however, equally possible that

may

only disappear under the earth and re-

appear again, or that their rising and setting

may

be due to yet other causes.

Possibly the waxing

and waning of the moon may be caused by the moon's revolving; or it may be due to an atmospheric change, or to an actual increase and decrease
in the moon's size, or to

some other

cause.

Possibly

the

moon may

shine with borrowed light, or it

may
and
that

shine with its own, experience supplying us with

instances of bodies which give their

own

light,

of those which have their light borrowed.*

these

From

and

such-like

statements

it

appears

questions of natural science in themselves have no

'

Ihid.

87

irivTa

fiiv

oSi/

ceed on suppositions chosen at

affeiarus (tard 7r(i'Tai>', Kara iiMovaxbti Tp6iTov ixKoBaipofiepuv (Tviitpiivas tois (paivoiisvois, 'irav Tis rh TnBavoKoyoi/ievov vwip avTun Se6ma>f KaraKliry. 8toc S4
ylvTai
Tij t!) fiiv AiroXiTTj),
d/iolas irijMpuvov
tn/

random
Setrlai,
;

(&|iii)fJOTa /cei/d koX

yo/w-

rh Sh 4K$dAri

t^

(paivo/ihip

Srj\ov 3ti Kol Ik ravThs iKirlTmi

ipvinoXo-yrtjiaTOS
iirl

Si riy iivBov
:

KoTo^^ei.

Ihid. 98

oi

Se rb %v

\afi.pivovTes

(those

who only

allow one explanation for every

phenomenon)
juiixoi'Tai
Bptiiirifi

tois tc (pavonimis

Kai toC tI SuyoTbi/ &v-

Oeupri<rai Sia-TreTTraiKaffti'.

In

Epic. 1. c. 86). Conf , 94 104 113. Imeret. vi. 703. ' Epic, in ZHoff. 88 ; 92-95, Many other similar instances might be quoted. In support of the view that the sun was extinguished at setting, Epicurus, according to Cleomed. Meteora, p. 89, is said to have appealed to the story (respecting which Posidonius in Straho, iii. 1, 5, p. 138) that, as it sets, the hissing of the ocean may be heard on the sea-shore,

investigating nature, they pro-

GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

value for Epicurus.

487

Whilst granting that only one

Chap.
'__

natural explanation of
sible,

phenomena
is

is is

generally posperfectly indif-

yet in any particular case he

ferent

which explanation
stress
is,

adopted.

Great

however, laid by

him on the

(2)

Me-

In contrast with the religious Is^Unaview which regards the world as a system of means t^on of
general explanation.

leading to ends, the leading business of the natural

science of the Epicureans is to refer all
to natural causes.

phenomena

To an Epicurean nothing appears

to suppose that the arrangements

more absurd than

of nature

have for their object the well-being of mankind, or that they have any object at all. The
tongue
is

not given us for the purpose of speaking,

nor the ears for the purpose of hearing.

As a matter

of fact it would, indeed, be more correct to say, that

we speak because we have a tongue, and hear because we have ears. Natural powers have acted purely according to the law of necessity, and among their
various products, there could not fail to be some

presenting the appearance of purpose in their ar-

rangement.

In the case of man there have resulted many such resources and powers. But this result is by no means intentional it is simply an accidental consequence of natural causes. In explaining nature all thought of Gods must be put out of sight, whose
;

happiness

is

inconceivable, on the supposition that

they care for

'

mankind and

his welfare.'
Ordine se suo quseque sagaci

The principle is thus expanded by iMCvet. i. 1021 : Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum

mente locarunt, Neo quos quseque darent motus

pepigere prof ecto

438

THE EPICUREANS.
Confining, as Epicurus did, his interest in nature completely to this general view of things, in carrying
it

Chap. XVII.

into details he was all the

more inclined

to rely

upon some older system.

No

one, however, appeared

better to correspond with his tone of

of Democritus, which, moreover,

to

mind than that commended itself

him not only by

and by

absolutely banishing the idea of

final cause,

but in particular by referring everything

its

to matter,

theory of atoms.

As Epicurus

placed in each individual thing taken by itself the

ultimate end of action, so Democritus had theoretically

made

all

that

is

real to

consist

in

what

is

absolutely individual or in
science, therefore,

atoms.

His natural

seemed to present the most naNolities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum Si non ipsa dedit specimen na; . .
.

Sed quia multa modis multis mutata per omne

Ex

infinito

vexantur percita

plagis,

tura creandi

Omne

genus motus et coetus exin tales dis-

periundo,

Tandem deveniunt
QuaUbus
T.

posituras, hasc rebus consistit summa creata.

Conf. iv. 820 ; v. 78 ; 195 419. In these views, he is only following Epicurus. Heavenlyphenomena, says the latter, in Diog. 76, ^^re KiiTovpyo\/vr6s rt;

156: Dicere porro

voluisse

vos vop.i^iv Set yiviffBat Kol Siat6.t70vtos ^ StaTa|ai/Toy koX afia

hominum causa

T^v

irairav

/tajcapttiTTjTa
*

exovros
Kal

Deos] parare Prseclaram mundi naturam, &c. Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis Gratia nostra queat largirier emolnmenti, Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur ? Quidve novi potuit tauto post
[soil.

/at' a<p9ap(rlas

ov yctp (Tv^<puvovai
tppopjiSes

irpayfiaTeiai

Kol

opyaX Kal

;i^(ipiTes

t^

^aKapidrijTi,
irpoff-

o^a'

cLtrdeveic^

Kal ^6^cp Kal

Se^iTei TDJj' irK7}aiov

ravra

yliferai.

Ibid. 97
)U7]Sa/.i^

ri

Beta ipicrts vpis

tuCto

irpoirayetrdu,

Toipy-fiTOS
K&ari

aAA' a\6(SiarTipeiaBa Kal iv Trj

Ibid.
113.
N".

fiaKapiiryiTi,

ante quietos Inlicere, ut ouperent vitam

tare priorem
1
. . .

With
mui.

these passages, Cic.

D.

20, 52,

and Phit.
;

Exemplum

porro gignundis re-

(likewise ii. 3, 2 are quite in agreement.

Plac. i. 7, 7 Stoi. i. 442),

bus et ipsa

GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

tural basis for the Epicurean Ethics.
If, therefore,

439
Chap.

the Stoics had already followed Heraclitus in their

;_

views of nature, Epicurus followed Democritus

still

more

closely,

single point, the additions

and hence, with the exception of one made by Epicurus to the

theory of this philosopher are philosophically unimportant.

With Democritus Epicurus agreed

that there
is
'

no other form of reality except ^ that of Every substance, he says in the bodily reality. words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be and whatever affects others or is affected by them
;

in holding (3) Atoms "'"^ empty

space.

itself affected, is corporeal.

Corporeal substance

is,

therefore, the oply

qualities

kind of substance.'

The

various

of things, essential ones as well as acci-

dental ones, are not therefore incorporeal existences,

but

simply chance

modes

of

body, the

former

being called by Epicurus

avfiTTTw/jLara.^
^

crvfi^sffriKOTa,

the latter,
is

But a second something

:

necessary
K.^K)iv

Imct.

i.

440

^""1

toC k^vov.

Prseterea per se quodcumqne erit ant faciet quid

^y-ra, oUr.
'"'""'
^""i'

fungi [W<rx.] debebit agentibus ipsmn, Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse seriaue At facereet fungi sine corpore nulla potest lis, nisi Neo ^ prsebere locum porro ^
aliis
'

Aut

't^""" '^"P^X^rai.

MM
'
^

rb 5e

oUre

Si,a.raL,_^l^?,k

l""!""
0.

^" ""'
A.7<-t

"<r"<iMT<,^ .i.a, r,;- >|,X^

Moram-

""

^i""''-

"yA^" 7"?

"^''^ '"'''X""

"

^8raT I" 'i" roiavTi,.

449,

^"^^ ^^' ^^- ^f\'," who expresses .rM3e^,dra

^y conjuncta and <r.^7rT<MaT by eventa. Among the latter,

and only comes to our know" ,,' , , , ^^^^^ through motion and rest. Likewise Epicurus, in Siog. 72 (conf. Stob. i. 252), shows that time is composed of days and
_
,

tertia ner se _, jv, ., KT 11 numero Nulla potest rerum in natnra reUnqui. relinaui natura
J.

-,

j.

'

Epic, in

JDivff.

oiiK etTTi voriaai

67 ko9' eavrh Se ih aa^iMTOv wKiiv

:

440
Chap,

THE EPICUREANS.
besides corporeal substance in order to explain phe^

xvn.

nomena,
is

viz.

empty

space.

That empty space

of weight in

exists

proved by the differences

else could
still

bodies
?

For what
It
is

be the cause of this difference

more conclusively by motion, moMine tion being impossible without empty space.'' as a moving cause, however, seems to Epicurus
proved
altogether superfluous.
sists

Everything that exists conspace,

of bodies and

empty

and there

is nc

third thing.^

Democritus had resolved the two conceptions

o:

body and empty space into the conceptions of bein^ and not being. True to his position, Epicurus dispensed with this speculative basis he holds to th(
;

ordinary notions of empty space, and of a materia,

filling space,*

and simply proves these notions

'
''

bj

nights, and their portions, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion or rest, and

JJucret.

i.
1.

358.
c.
;

Lucret.
;

and

i.

329

IHog.
vii.

40 and 67

Sext.

Math

hence that
(o-ii|U?rTii);na)

it is

only a product
a-vinrrci-

of these phenomena;

and these being again

fiara,

time is defined by the Epicurean Demetrius QSext. Math. X. 219; Pyrrh. iii. 187): aiimraim trvinrTariTuv irapcTri!re koI vu^i Koi &paLs
Kal irdBeffi Kol oTradelais Kuluiviiireo-i Kol novcus. The distinction between abstract and sensuous or undivided time {Steinhart,
1.

f/.evov Tjfiepais

213 viii. 329. Mostofth( remarks va Lucret. i. 846 anc 582 point to the same funda mental idea: Without vacan interstices, nourishment canno be diffused over the whol( bodies of plants or animals nor can noise, cold, fire anc water penetrate through solic bodies, or any body be brokei

up into

parts.

The same

ii

c.

466) does not appear to

exist in Diogenes.
Sid

His x?^""^
(^Diog.

47) are imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa, ratio que comperit esse, which, according to Luoret. iv. 792, are contained in every given time.

Klr^ov

eeapjirol

Themist. 40, b ; Simpl. De CceIo Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26. ' Lucr. i. 440 ; Diog. 39 Pint. Adv. Col. 11, 5. * Body is defined by Epi curus {Sext. Math. i. 21 ; x 240 ; 257 ; xi. 226) as t6 Tpixi SiaurraThv nera avrnmlai, or a irivoSos kotb idpournhy jUE7e0ou:

GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

the qualities of phenomena.

441

For

this very reason

Chap.

Democritus' division of body into innumerable pri-

xvn.

mary

particles

or

atoms appeared to him

necessary.

All bodies
parts,'

known

to us

most by sensation are

composed of
resolved

If the process of division were

infinitely continued, all things,

would ultimately be
so

into

the non-existent
;

Democritus argue
of the
first

and conversely

Epicurus and
all

things must

have been formed out of the non-existent, in defiance

principle of natural science that nothing

can come from nothing, and that nothing can be

resolved into nothing.^
Koi ffxht^'^'^os Kal &,VTtTtynlas KoX

Hence, we must conclude

j8\T)To ^irep fi^ fjteWct irdvTa els

^dpovs.

Emptiness

is

(accord-

ing to Sext.
or
^pTjfMos

X. 2) ^ia-is dvaipris Travrbs ff^fiaros.

When

occupied by a body, it is called .-6iros when bodies pass through it, it is x'^P" so that all three
;
;

expressions, as Stob. Eel. i. 388, rightly observes, are only different names for the same thing. To the same effect is the statement in Plut. Plac. i.
20.
'

Hence, in Diog.

69, &8poi-

<r/ia

and ffuii-neipopiifi.emi' are used

Ti liii hy <l>6apiiffeff6ai, i,\\' lirxiovTa uTFOfiepeiv 4u rais Sia\itT(Ti Sitrre ris Ttjov (TvyKplaedtv , &px^s &T6fiOvs avayKotov etvai ffU' fjidrtov tft/iffets. Ibid. 56 Ialgt. Furi. 147 ii. 551 ; 751 ; 790. ther arguments for the belief in atoms in iMoret. i. 498 Since a body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist composed of the full and the empty,
.
.

of bodies; in IHoff. 71, all bodies are called crufiirTdiixaTa and according to Epicurus
(_Sea!t.

Math.

x. 42), all

changes

in bodies are due to local displacement of the atoms. Plut. Amator. 24, 3, p. 769, observes that Epicurus deals virith a<t>ii

and
'

a-viiirKoKii,

but never with

;

the full by itself must exist, and likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space cannot be divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not exist, nor hard bodies

Epic, in Diog. 40
cu

tSv <raira
S'

fidrav

TO, jxev iffrt avyKpiffeis

Sy TUVTa
4|

avyxpifffis iTeiroir}VTai

without something full. If there were no indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The regularity of

5e iffriv &TOixa Kal afierd-

phenomena presup-

442

THE EPICUREANS.
that the primary component parts neither have of things can

Chap,
!__

come

into existence nor cease to exist,

nor yet be changed in their nature.'

bodies contain no

These primary

empty space in themselves, and

hence can neither be divided nor destroyed, nor be

changed in any way.^ They are so small that they do not impress the senses, and it is a matter of fact Nevertheless they must that we do not see them.
not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the

name
their

atoms being only assigned to them because

bodily structure will not admit of division.'
over, they

More-

have neither colour, warmth, smell, nor

;

any other property

distinct materials;^

properties

only belonging to

and

for this reason they

all

must

not be sought in the four elements,

of which, as

experience shows, come into being and pass away.^

They only

possess

the universal

qualities

of

all

corporeal things, viz. shape, size, and weight.^

poses unchangeable primary elements. All that is oomposite must ultimately consist of If simple indivisible parts. there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of innumerable parts as many in the smaller as in the greater body (conf Epic, in Diog. 56). If nature did not reduce things to their smallest parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in value, were borrowed by Lucretins from Epicurus. Plut. in ]Sus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that vinchangeable Being must be at the bottom of everything. ' Epicurus and Lucretius, 1. c. Zucr. i. 529 Sext. Math,
. ;

ix.
i.

x. 219 318 306 Plvi. PI.

;
f

Stob. Phil.

Eel.
i.

3,

29.
" i.

Epic, in Biog. 41
;

Lucret.

Coelo, Schol, in Arist. 484, a, 23. ' Siog. 44 and 55 Iiueret. i. 266, where it is proved, by
;

528

Simpl.

De

many

analogies, that there maj be invisible bodies Stob. 1. c.

;

Phd
'

Simpl. Phys. 216, a, Diog. 44 54 Lucr. ii, 736 and 841 Pint. 1. u. See
1.

c.

page 433,
*
'

2.

The

Zwcret. v. 235. Diog. ; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 29, statement there made, that

Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus added weight, is not a correct one.

GENERAL VIEWS ON NATURE.

shape, but there

443
Chap.
-^^^

Not only must atoms, like all other bodies, have must ex;ist among them indefinitely
varieties of shape, or it

many

would be impossible

to account for the innumerable differences of things.

There cannot, however, be really an infinite number of such shapes, as Democritus maintained, in any
limited body, as
is

intelligible

of itself, nor yet in

the whole universe,'

since

an unlimited

number

would make the arrangement of the world impossible, in

the world everything being circumscribed

by certain extreme limits.^

different

Again, atoms must be

for all materials
size.

in point of size

cannot

Yet even to this difference there must be some bounds. An atom must neither be so large as to become an object of sense, nor can it, after what has been said, be inbe divided into particles of equal
finitely

small.'

From

difference in

point

of size

the difference of atoms in point of weight follows.^

In point of number atoms must be unlimited, and

same way empty space must be unbounded For since everything bounded must be bounded by something, it is impossible to imagine any bounds of the universe beyond which nothing exists, and hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence
in the
also.
'

Biog.
;

42

Lucr.

ii.
i.

and 478

Plut. Plac.

3,

333 30

(where, however, it would he against the sense to substitute as Steinliwrt 1. c. p. 473 il for note 94 does)'; Alex. Aphr. in
fi.'ti

figures as great as the nvimber of atoms. {Hitter, iv. 101.) ^ Lucret. i. 500.
^ '

Lucr. ii. 381. See the passages quoted,

Diog. z. 55
6,
;

p.

442,

and 445,

5.

The

JPAi

tf^.

Gen. et Corr.

3,

Cic.

N. D. i. 24, 66. It does not, however, appear that Lucret. of ii. 333, made the variety

text of Stoiceus, Eel. i, 346, must be corrected by the aid of these passages. Plvt. Plac. i.
12, 5.

444
Chap.

THE EPICUREANS.
of bounds must apply to the mass of atoms quite
af

xvn.

much

as to

empty

space.

If an indefinite

numbei

of atoms would not find

conversely a limited
in
all

room in a limited space number of atoms would be losi

to

empty

space,

and never able

form a world.'

Ii

these views Epicurus closely follows Democritus

th(

no doubt, agreeing with him also in explaining

qualities of things
B. The

by the composition of their atoms.] the origin of things from theii In deducing

wwld.
(1) The
sreertiing

primary causes, Epicurus, however, deviates widel]

from his predecessor.

both

Atoms

aside of atoms.

have

so it

was taught
all

b]

by

virtue of their weight been eternall]

engaged in a downward motion.'

'

That

bodiei

Epic, in Diog. 41

aK\a

fjL^v

Koi rb Trap iwetpdv iari' rh

Treirepafffievov
Trap'

yap
5'

&Kpov

&Kpov Ixet rh Tep6y ti Oeapeirat.

SiiTTt

oiiK

exei, irepas S'

eJfjj

ixov 6,Kpov vepas ouk ohK Xov &Treipov ctv

Treirepair/i4voy.

follows too as a matter o: course, that he referred all thj properties of bodies to thi shape and arrangement of the atoms. Whenever he found ii the same body different quali

Kol

ov

The

same argument
cret.
;

is

used by Zu-

i. 951 1008-1020. He continues 984, 1021: If space were limited, all bodies would collect towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and

combined, he assumed tha was composed of differen kinds of atoms. For instance he asserted of wine ovk eha
ties
it
:

depfihv

avTorehus rhy

oivov, c(\A
ofrr^i Bep/ia
5'

Ixf"

Tivas ar6tiOus iv

^las OTTOTeXeo-TiKcij, iTfpoi

tf/vxp^TriTos.

a
thi
i

their motion
less

the

cease. Unquantity of matter

would

According to
constitution,

diiference of

were unlimited, the amount lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Oonf. also Plut. Adv. Col. 13,
i.

has on some a cooling, on other a heating efEect. Plut. Qu Conviv. iii. 5, 1, 4 Adv. Col This agrees with the re 6.
;

in Mis. Pr. Bv. i. 8, 9 ; Plac. 28 Alex, in Simpl. Phys. 107, b, who mentions the argument of Epicurus quoted above as the chief argument of the Epicureans.
3
;

marks made on Democritus

vol.

i.

ii

3,

597.
i ;

i.

' We have but little information but it has been already shown, p. 433, 2, and
;

47 CSc. N. E idea Epicuru formed to himself of motioi we are not told. We learn however, from IJiemist. Phys 52, b, that he replied to Aris totle's proof of motion, that m

Mog. 43

20, 54.

What

THE WORLDATOMS.
should move downwards in empty space seemed to Epicurus a matter of course ; for whatever is heavy

4A5

Chap. ^^""

must

fall

unless it

is

supported.'

He

was therefore

opposed to the Aristotelian view that heaviness shows

the form of attraction towards a centre, and consequently to his further supposition that downward mode of motion only belongs to certain
itself in

bodies, circular motion being for others

The

objection that in endless space there

more natural.^ is no above

meet by appealing to exsome things always appearing above our heads, others beneath our feet.* But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their downward motion meet together, thus giving rise to a rotatory motion, no such view commended itself to Epicurus. Nay rather all atoms will fall equally fast, since empty space oflfers no resistance, and falling perpendior below he could only
perience,^

cularly it

is

impossible to see

how they can

he

meet.'

To render a meeting

possible
a, 7.

supposed

the

constant quantities can be composed of indiyisible particles (Phys. vi. 1), by saying Whatever moves in a given line moves in the whole line, but not in the individual indivisible
:

portions of which the line conWith reference to the sists. same question, the Epicureans, according to /Smj?2. Phys. 219, b, asserted that everything moves equally quickly through indivisible spaces. ' do. Fin. i. 1074.
^
i.

6,

18

Lucret.

lAtor.

ii.
;

1052 (the text

Simpl.

The latter writer inaccurately groups Epicurus together with others (Democritus and Strato). The same point, according to Simjil. Phys. 113, b, divided Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zenobius, at the close of the second century after Christ, ' ks Aristotle had already done. Diog. 60 conf Plut. Def Orao. 28, p. 425. = Epic, in Diog. 43 61 Lti^r. ii. 225 Phd. C. Not. 43, 1082. This objection was 1, p.
;
.

being faulty)

De

Coelo,
;

borrowed from
Epicurus.

Aristotle

by

Schol. in Arist. 510, b, 30

486,

446
Chap,
^^^^'

TRE EPICUREANS.
smallest possible swerving aside from the perpei
dicular line in falling.

This assumption seemed

him

indispensable, since it

would be otherwise in

possible to assert the freedom of the

human

wil
fal'

For how can the

same reason

will be

free

if

everything
?

according to the strict law of gravity

this swerving aside

And

for th
t

was not supposed

proceed from any natural necessity, but simply the power of self-motion in the atoms.'

froi

In cor

sequence of their meeting one part of the atom

rebounds

so

Democritus also taught

the lighte

ones are forced upwards, and from the upward an

downward
arises.^

motions
this

When
is

of atoms

combined a rotatory motio motion takes place a clusterin the consequence, which by their ow
themselves

motion separate
mass,

from

the remainin,

and form a world of themselves.^

unchangeable, the

Atom
c

being eternal and

process

forming worlds must go on without beginning

end;' and inasmuch as they are also infinite

o
i:

number, and empty space

is infinite also,

there

mus
th
See
j

be an innumerable number of worlds.'

do. 316 251 N. D. i. 25, 69 De Fato, 10, 22 Plut. An. Procr. 6, 9, p. 1015 Solert. Anim. 7, 2, p. 964 Plac. i. 12, Stobtsus, Eel. i. 346, 5 23, i
'

In

Lucr.
6,

ii.
;

do. Fin.
3.

i.

6, 17.

Fin.

i.

18

Hi,
=

j)igg
;

^5

73

i,^^,,^
1,
3.

;
]

lOiS

Pint. Plac.

ii.

need hardly be remarked tha by worlds world-bodies ai

In IHog. 8( Epicvirus defines the world as part of the heaven, surroundin the earth and stars, having definite shape, and, toward other parts of the heaver

394.

hardly meant.

62 90 Plut. Plac. i. 12, 5 Fac. Lun. Stoi. i. 346 Lu4, 5, p. 921

2

Dioff.

44
;

oonf
;

cret. V. 432.

See above

Diog. 73 ; Z^ior. i. 1021. p. 437, 1 ; Plwt. Def. Or. 19, p. 420.

'

bounded.

THE WOBLBITS ORIGIN.

character of these worlds the greatest possible va-

447

Chap.
'

most imlikely that the innumerable combinations of atoms all

riety

may be

supposed, since

it is

brought

about

at

random
is

will
assert

fall

out

alike.

Equally impossible

it

to

that all these

worlds are absolutely dissimilar.

In general, Epi-

curus assumed that they are extremely different both

in point of size and arrangement, and that here and

there one

may be

similar to our own.*

Moreover,

since eternity affords time for all imaginable

com-

binations

of atoms, nothing can ever be

existed.''

brought
In one

about now which has not already

respect all worlds are alike
;

they come into existence,

are liable to decay, and, like all other individual

elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and

So we might have assumed from other Between the individual positions in his system. worlds both Democritus and Epicurus insert intermediate world-spaces, in which by the clustering
decrease.'

of atoms from time to time

being.^

new worlds come

thus described.
believes

into

The

origin of our world

is

of time certain period t^

very distant period

'
;

a
;

Lucretius'
world
is

At a
at no

(2) Origin
"-^

*^f world.

cluster of atoms of varying

proved i. 418 Epicurus makes the world decay in the greatest variety of
elaborately
6, 21.

Plao.

Diog. 45 74 ; 88 Stoh. ii. 2, 2 7, 3

; ;

Plut.
i.

do. N. D.

ii.

18,

48

490 Acad. ii.

Cic. Fin.

i.

Stoh.

40, 125. " Plut. in Ens. Pr. Bv. i. 8, 9 Epicurus says, 8ti ouSev ^ivov airoTEAeiTai iv rif vavrl irapi rhv
:

ways. Plut. Plac. ii. 4, 2. * Diog. x. 89. ' v. 324, arguing that historical
arts

fiS-q

yeyeim/iivov xp6vov &ireipov.

'

Mog. 73
;

89

Lucret.

ii.

wise go

1105

V.

transitory

91 and 235, where the character of the

memory would othermuch further back, and and sciences be of much

greater antiquity.

448

THE EPICUREANS.
shape and
space.
size was formed in this definite portion o; These atoms meeting, there first arose froir

Chap,
^^'^"

the pressure and rebound of

,

the

quickly-falling

particles motions of every variety in every direction

Soon the greater atoms pressing downwards, by dini of weight forced upwards the smaller and lighte: atoms, the fiery ones topmost and with the greatest impetus to form the ether, and afterwards thos( which form the air.' The upper pressure ceasing
these

masses under the pressure of particles

it

stil

joining

from below, spread forth sidewards, anc

fire

thus the belts of

and

air

were formed.

Nex
timi

uprose those atoms out of which the sun and star

are formed into the heights,

and at the same

is.

the earth settled down,

its

inner part being partiall;

B;

exhausted in those places where the sea now

the influence of the
sun-heat,

warmth of the ether, and th the earth-mass was bound together mor
was pressed out of
it,

closely, the sea

and the surfao

is

assumed an uneven character.^

On this point see Lucret, 1112. The principle that similar elements naturally congregate is there explained in
'

The world

shu

ii.

this
^

way.
Luor.
i.

V.

Plac.

i.

The

416-508 Phit. latter view has

;

views of Epicuius on the foi mation of the world do nc entirely agree with those c Democritus. It was probabl with an eye to Democritr (compare the extracts in vol. 608 from Orig. Philosoph.
]

been referred, in

vol.

i.

604, to

17) that Epicurus, in Diog.

9i

the Atomists. It would now appear that it must be deduced from Epicureanism, and its agreement with the views attributed to Leucippus in other places explained by the welltnown connection between Epiourus and Democritus. The

denied that the world could

increfised

from without, or thi sun and moon could in this wa be possibly absorbed in o\
world. I/iicret. ii. 1105, hovj ever, supposes an increase the world from without to I
(

possible.

THE WORLDITS ARRANGEMENT.

off

449

from other worlds and from empty space by thoKe

its

Chap.

bodies which form

external boundary,

xvn.
(3)

Asking, in the next place, what idea must be

Ar

formed of the arrangement of the world, we are met

^y"^^'

by the two

principles which Epicurus

;

is

never weary

of inculcating

one, that

from an intentional

we must deduce nothing arrangement by deity, but refer

everything simply and solely to mechanical causes

the other, that in explaining phenomena the widest

must be given to hypotheses of every is more absurd than to abridge the extensive range of possible explanations by expossible scope

kind, and that nothing

clusively deciding in favour of

any one.^

Thereby
value as

the investigation of nature loses for

such, nor
is

him

its

it

of any great interest to us to follow

his speculations

on nature into
viz.,

detail.

On

one point

he enters a protest,

that the framework of heaven

life

must not be considered the work of God,^ nor must and reason be attributed to the stars.* Otherwise, on nearly all the questions which engaged the
attention of astronomers at that time, he observes

the greatest indifference, treating the views of his

predecessors, good
ficiality

and bad
^

alike,

with an easy super-

which can only be explained by supposing

as to their truth.
*

him
'

altogether careless

The
; ;

state

On these moenia mundi, which, according to Lucretius, coincide with the ether or firebelt, see Epic, in Diog. 88 ; Id. irepl ^iaeios, xi. (Vol. Here, ii.) col. 2 ; Plut. Plac. ii. 7, 3 ; Luer.
i.

v.

81 Imcret. 78 and 114, where the confully brought out. C^a oipdvta, in Plwt. Plac. v.

In Diog. 77

trast is

more

By

20, 2,
"

we must by no means
stars.

think of the

73;
2

ii.

On 'See

1144; v. 454. this point see page 434.

p. 437, 1.

have already been met with, p. 436. A complete review of the Epicurean

Examples

G G

450
Chap, ^^^"
of his

THE EPICUREANS.
own astronomical knowledge
can, moreover

be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion that the sun, the moon, and the stars are either noi
at all, or only a little larger,

and may possibly

b(

even
also

less

than they appear to be.

The Epicureans

thought to support their theory that the earth borne by the air, reposes in the middle of the work

theory which on their hypothesis of the weight

is

of bodies

impossible

by the gradual diminutioi

It

in weight of the surrounding bodies.^

would

b(

impossible here to go through the treatment whicl

they gave to atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena

particularly as the principle already indicated

wa

most
as

freely used,
all
is

and many explanations were givei

with
v.

being

equally possible/
not worth our
:

astronomy

tire.

According to

while. It may be studied in the following passages For the substance of the stars, consult PUt. Plac. ii. 13, 9 for their rising and setting, Biog. 92; iMcr. V. 648 ; Cle&med. Met. p. 87 ; for their revolution and 112-114 ; deviation, Dioij. 92 Lucr. V. 509 ; 612 ; for the appearance of the moon, Diog. for 94, and Imcr. v. 574, 703 eclipses of sun and moon, Biog. 96 Lucr. v. 749 for changes in the length of day, Biog. 98 Lucr. V. 678. ' Biog. 91 do. Acad. ii. Sen. Qu. 26, 82 ; Fin. i. 6, 20 Nat. i. 3, 10 Cleomed. Met. ii. Phd. Plac. ii. 21, 4 ; 22, 4 1 imcr. V. 564. The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus {Plut. Plac. ii. 20, 9 Stoh. i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;

471, sun a;nd

moon

midway between
"^

Lticrel stan( ether an<

difficult
ti

earth in point of density.

It is still

more

imagine the world as stationary which is tacitly assumed. I would then be bounded by end less space, and soon come inti collision with other masses,
"

in Biog. 74,
col. 1.

Iaiot. v. 534. Conf. Epic and Tfpl ^ia^ws, xi

In the latter passage Epicurus appeals to the fac that the earth is equidistan from the bounds of the world. Further particulars oi clouds, Biog. 99 Lucr. vi. 451
:

Plut. Plac. iii. 4, 3 ; on rair Biog. 100 Lucret. vi. 495 ; o thunder, Biog. 100; 103; i* cret. vi. 96 ; on lightning, Bioi
;

101 ; Ltiar. vi. 160 on sirocci Biog. 104 laicr. vi. 423 Pla( iii. 3, 2 on earthquakes, Bim
; ; ; ;

MANKIND: THEIR ORIGIN.

Out of the newly-made earth plants
and afterwards animals came
fallen from heaven.^ at first grew,'
forth, since the latter,

451

Chap.

!_
(*) -P^*
rnals.

according to Lucretius, can by no possibility have

In other worlds, likewise, living

beings came into existence, though not necessarily in

all.'

Among

these beings were originally, as Einpe-

docles
site

had previously supposed,^ all sorts of compoor deformed creatures. Those, however, alone

continued to exist which were fitted by nature to find

support, to propagate, and to protect themselves from

danger.

Eomantic creatures, such

as centaurs or

chimaeras, can never have existed here, because the

beings of which they are compounded would require

conditions of
life *

altogether different.
did, at explaining the
C.

Aiming, as the Epicureans

origin of

Man-

men and

animals in a purely natural man-

kind.

ner, they likewise tried to

form an

idea, equally ac- of the

cording to nature, of the original state and historical

development of the human race, ignoring in

105
;

this

Zncr.
;

vi.

535

Plao.
vi. 20,

iii.

15, 11

Sen. Nat. Qu.

i)!o<7.
;

on winds,
Biog. 106
,

106; on hail,
iii.

Otherwise, we learn that the Epicureans attributed to plants a soul, just as little as the
Stoics.
'

Plac.

4,

on

Pint. Plac. v. 26,

;

3.

snow, thaW, ice, frost, JDiog. 107-109 on the rainbow, Diog. 109 on the halo of the moon, Diog. 110; on comets, Biog. 111; on shooting- stars, Biog. Explanations are given 114. by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738-839), of the magnet ( vi. 906-1087), of the reputed chilling of the springs in sum;

Lucr. ii. 1155 v. 787, giving further particulars as to the origin and maintenance of living beings, and the subsequent abatement of the productive
'
*

powers of earth,
Epic, in Biog. 74.

Anaximander, Parmenides,

mer
'

(vi. 840).

Anaxagoras, Diogenes, of ApolIonia, and Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth, ' Lucr. v. 834-921.

Litcret:

ii.

1157;

v.

780.

G o 2

452
Chap,

THE EPICUREANS.

attempt all legendary notions. On this point, notwithstanding their leaning towards materialism, they 1_ Miman q^ i)^q whole advocated perfectly sound views. The
race.

men

of

early times,

so

thought

Lucretius, were

stronger and

Eude and ignorant

more powerful than the men of to-day. as beasts, they lived in the woods

in a perpetual state of warfare with wild animals,

without justice or society.'

The

first

and most im-

portant step in a social direction was the discovery

of

fire,

the learning to build huts, and to clothe

themselves in skins,
life began,''

when marriage and domestic when speech, originally not a matter of

and
feelings,

convention, but, like the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts
loped.*

was deve-

The

older the

human

race grew, the

more

they learned of the arts and

which minister to the preservation and eigoyment of life. These arts

skill

by experience, under the pressure of What had thus been discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding the rest as teachers.* In exwere
first

learnt

nature, or the compulsion of want.

'

V.

92^-1008.

Polit. 274,
8,

B
4
;

Conf. Plato, Arist. Polit. ii.

i.

tA
-ras

?6j/7)

Tct

rSia Tcfl?</ai irpbs il

SijXtio-eis

^ttov

aiJupifi6\ovs

1269,

a,

Horace, Serm.

yevia9ai i.Wi\\oLs Koi

repair SijAou/ieVas.

avvroimin-

3, 99, appears to have eye to Lucretius.

^

had an

He who

1009-1025. iMor. ' Epicurus, in IHog. 75, thus sums up his views on the origin t& ovdfiara 4^ of language apxv^ M^ fleirei yev4iT6ai, dx\'
V.
:

vents any new thing puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. Luoret. v. 10261088, explains more fully that language is of natural origin, On the voice, Itid. iv. 522
Plut. Plac. iv. 19, 2. * Epic, in Diog. 75
{nroKTjTrreov Koi
tpifftv
ri]i/
:

aiTos
Kci6'

Tcks

(piffeis

tS>v SivSpanriov
<^av-

eKoiTTo iSvTt fSio naaxo^'f^s

KoX iSia \afj.Pavovffas

aX\^ jutji
avOptSiiriai

irddr]

twv

Ttto'^uaTa iSiws
,
.

itv

h.4pa iKirefitreiv

ttoWcl koL iravTota {nrh rai

vffrepov 5e Koivws Kaff UKatrra

atrr^v Trepietrrc^ay trpaynATWv Si

MANKIND: THE SOUL.

was developed. Indiand made themselves rulers. In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To crush the anarchy which then arose, magistrates were chosen, and order established by penal laws.' It will subsequently be seen that Epicurus explained religion in the same way by naactly the
society

463

same way civil

viduals built strongholds,

Chap. XVII.

tural growth.

The
rent
specially

apotheosis of nature, which has been appa-

(2)

TU

in Epicurus's whole view of history, becomes

soul.

prominent in his treatment of psychology.

all

This treatment could, after

only purely materialistic.
real being, is a body.
Zax'Srtval

that has been said, be

aoul, like every other

The

In support of this view the

T^tv

re Koi

ava.yKaiTBriva.i

'

Se Koyiffiihv rh inrh rairtjs irapeyyvri&^vTa Kol vffTepov 4TraKpi&ovv

Kal irpotre^evpifTH.^lv,

iv

fxev

Tifft

QarTov iv 5e tun Ppad6repov.

Lucr.

v.

1450

all arts

tJsus et impigiEe simul experientia mentis Paulatim docuit.

Um.

1103

:
magis hi viotum
vi-

Inqiae dies

tamque priorem Commutare novis monstrabant

rebu' benigni Ingenio qui prsestabant et corde

vigebant.

in metal (v. Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295). Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted, and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of planting and agriculture were from the natural spread of plants (v. 1359). The first music was in imitation of birds the first musical instrument was the pipe, through which the wind was heard to

men how

work

1239-1294).

to whistle

In harmony with these premises, Lucretius then tries to explain various inventions. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089). Forests on fire, melting brass, first taught

from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v. 1377). The
;

measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars

and, comparatively arts of poetry and writing (v. 1438). ' iMor. v. 1106.
(v.

1434)

late,

came the

454
Chap.

TRE EPICUREANS.
Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations of the

XVII
L_

body and the

Stoics.'

soul,

agreeing on this point with the

soul,

The body of the

however, consists of

the
is

and most easily-moved atoms, as manifest from the speed of thought, from the infinest, lightest,
is

stantaneous dissolution of the soul after death, and,

moreover, from the fact that the soulless body

as

heavy as the body in which there

is

soul.''

Hence
air,* or,
fire,

Epicurus, again agreeing with the Stoics, describes

the soul as a material resembling
fire

and

more
air,
sists

accurately, as

composed of four elements,

is

vapour, and a fourth nameless element.

of the finest atoms, and

It con-

the cause of feeling,"

and according
other kind.'

as one or other of these elements pre-

ponderates, the character of

man

is

of one or the

Like the
is

Stoics,

Epicurus believed that

spread over the whole

the soul-element
parents' souls,^

received by generation from the

it is

and that
as the

body,^ growing

body grows.'

At the same

time he makes a distinction somewhat similar to

that

made by
Liter, Liier.
iii.

the

Stoics in their doctrine of the

'

161
;

Siog. 67.

'
"

Liicr.

iii.

288.

See
^
'

p. 439, 1.
iii.
:

Diog. 63

177 Diog. 63. n i/iux^) aani iari

i\ov rh &6pouxiia

Kivroiiifiis trap'

(the body), Trapeairafiiivov

Tina Kpa(Tiv
:

vpo-

irefi(/)peVTaTov 54 iri/erJ/iOTi Stpfiou

fx""''''- S6 ii aTi/iuv avT^v (TvyKeifrSai Xeiordrui/ Ka\ trTpoyyvKordTav iroW^ tivl 5(o^epouo-Si" TMy ToC Truprfi, * Liwr. iii. 231 269 Plut. Plac. iv. 3, 5 (Stoi. i. 798), conf. Alex. Aphr. De An, 127, b.
; ;

According to Plut. Plao.v. 3, 6, he considered the seed an andairaarim ^vxvs Kol etijxaTos and, since he believed in a feminine afipua, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the intermingling of the soul-atoms of both
;

parents. Xbid. V. 16, 1. ' Diog. 63; iwCT'rf. iii. 216;

276

323 370. Metrodor. (Vol. Here, vi.),

; ;

'

irepl

ai<rei}rm

col. 7.

MANKIND: THE SOUL.

sovereign part of the soul (j^ysfioviKov).^
irrational part of the soul
is

466

Only the
its

diffused as a principle

CnAP. XVII.

of life over the whole body

seat in the breast.^

the rational part has

rational

To the

part belongs

mental activity, sensation, and perception, the motion

of the will and the mind, and in this latter sense
itself;
life

both parts together make up one being, yet

exist in different conditions.

they

may

The mind
It
is

may

be cheerful whilst the body and the irrational

soul feel pain, or the reverse

may be

the case.

even possible that portions of the irrational soul

may

be lost by the mutilation of the body, without detri-

ment to the rational soul, or consequently to life.' When, however, the connection between soul and
body
exist.
is

fully severed,

then the soul can no longer

Deprived of the surrounding shelter of the

its

body,

their lightness

atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to and the body in consequence, being
;

unable to exist without the soul, goes over into corruption.''

If this view appears to hold out the most

' Mog. and Zuor. In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed

> Ztior. iii. 98, contradicts the assertion that the soul is the harmony of the body Epicurus having already replied (in Philop. De An. B. 1) to one of the objections urged against
;

to leave the body (JDuw. iv. 913, conf. Tertull. De An. 43), whilst another part is forcibly

it

by
2
;

Plato.

confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant

Diog. 66 ; Tmct. iii. 94 ; 396 ; 613 Plut. Plac. iv. Lucretius calls the ra4, 3. tional part animus or mens, and the irrational part anima. The statement, PI. Phil. iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the T\yf)ju>viK>>ii was feel-

by
iii.

JOiog. 66.
'

136

Epic, in Diog. 64. Luer. 417-827, gives an elaborate proof of the mortality of the Other passages, Phit. soul. N. P. Suav. Vivi. 27, 1 and 3 ; 30, 5 Sext. Math. ix. 72, hardly need to be referred to. Observe the contrast between Epi;

ingless,

can hardly be

correct,

oureanism and Stoicism.

In


456
Chap, XVII.

THE EPICUREANS.
gloomy prospect
that
it

for the future,

so.

Epicurus considers

cannot really be

of evil ceases,' and the time

exist affects us just as
existed.^

With life every feeling when we shall no longer little as the time before we

his teaching alone can reconcile us to death

Nay, more, he entertains the opinion that by rethe nether world and
its terrors.^

moving

all fear of

Allowing that

many

of these statements are na-

tural consequences of the principles of Epicurus, the

distinction between a rational

must, nevertheless, at

system so

and an irrational soul seem strange in a thoroughly materialistic as was that of the
first

sight

Epicureans.

And

yet this distinction

is

not stranger

than the corresponding parts of the Stoic teaching. If

may be referred to the distinction which they drew in morals between the senses and the reason, not less are the Epicurean ethics marked by the same contrast between the general and the senthe Stoic views
suous side of the mind.

Hence Epicurus shares the

Stoic belief in an etherial origin of the

stoicism, the soul

human

race

;''

keeps the

oiK
iii.

iffiitv.

Id. in Sent. Pyrrh.

body together; in EpicureanIn ;,ism, the body the soul.

Stoicism, the soul sumves the ; in Epicureanism, this is impoSsible. In Stoicism, the mind js^J^nower over the world, and henc&over the body in Epicureanism, it is on a level

229

(_Alex. Apli/r.

Anal.
:

Pri.

bady

117, Top. 9. Gell. N. A. ii. 8, 1 ; Stob. Serm. 118, 30) 6 eivatos ouSek xpbs T]ii.as rb yhp Sia-

with the body, and dependent on it.

' Epic, in Diog. 124-127, for instance t!) fpiicmSfaTaTov oiv Tmv KaKuv i Bdvaros oiSiv irpbj iireihiyirep Sray jiiv Tjfiels fifjicis
: '

\v6hv avaia^SiiTf!, rh Sk avaiarBiitoCv ovS^ii irphs rjiias, Z/uer, iii. 828-975. ^ lAior. iii. 830. ' Diog. 81 142 ; Lucr. iii.
;

37.
'

IJuor.

ii.

991

Denique coelesti sumus omues semine oriundi, &c.

999 Cedit item retro de terra quod fuit ante
;

Sliev

b
i

STav 8^

BdvuTos idvaros

oh

iriptaTiv

irapfi T<iS' ^jUfis

MANKIND: SENSATION.
and although
implies
this belief as

467

at first expressed only

Chap.

that

man,

like

other living

beings,

is

composed of
with
it

etherial elements, yet there is connected

the distinction already diseased in the case

of the Stoics
parts of

between the higher and the lower man, which ultimately comes to be simply

mode of expressing the difference between mind and matter. Among the phenomena of the soul's life sensation is made to harmonise with the general prinanother
ciples of the

(3)

Senm-

Epicurean view of nature by the aid

(sl'SfuXa).

of Democritus' doctrine of atom-pictures

From

the surface of bodies

doctrine

the

this is the pith of that

finest possible particles are constantly

off,

being thrown
traverse

which by virtue of their

fineness,

the furthest spaces in an infinitely short

time, hurrying through the void.'

exhalations are arrested by some
their

Many

of these

obstacle soon after

coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into In the case of others the atoms for a long time retain the same position and connection which they had in bodies themselves, thus presenting a picture of things, and only lacking corporeal
confusion.
solidity. As these pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various organs of sense, our impressions of things arise.^ Even these impressions, which have

In terras

et

quod missum

est

of

this
^

theory,
air.

makes them
52 the Lucr.
;

ex setheris oris Id rursum coeli rellatum templa receptant. Democritus, from whom Epicurus has borrowed the rest
'

mould the

Epic, in Biog. 46-50

;

and in the fragments

second book irepl tjiiaeus iv. 26-266 722 vi. 921.
; ;

of

Oio.

Ad

458
Chap,
'_

THE EPICUREANS.
no corresponding real object, must be referred t For often pic such pictures present in the soul.'
^ and ofte; by a casual combination of atoms pictures are formei

tares last longer than things themselves

in the air resembling

no one single thing.

thus,
for

Some

times, too, pictures of various kinds are combined o

their

way

to

the

senses
is

instance, th

notion of a Centaur
picture of a

caused by the union of th

i:

man

with that of a horse, not only

our imagination, but already previously in the atom

picture.^
If,

therefore,

sensation

perfectly represents real objects, it

as being

distorts or im must be explaine

due to some change or mutilation in th

senses.''

atom-pictures before they reach our

In thus explaining mental impressions, the Epi

cureans do not allow themselves to be disturbed b
the fact that
all

we can

recal at pleasure the ideas

possible

things.

The cause of

this

power wa

rather supposed to be the circumstance that

always surrounded by an innumerable

atom-pictures, none of which
attention
is

we ar number c
unless ou

we perceive

directed to them.
^

Likewise the seemini

Famil. xv. 16; Pint. Qu. Conviv. viii. 10, 2, 2; Plac. iv. 3, 1; 19, 2 ; Hext. Math. vii. 206
vii.

PZwf.Def. Orao. 19,p. 42C ^P^ yeXav iv (/nAo(ro<(>(a r ("SaKa yiXnuneov rk Ranpk k(
ei

Se

iv.

N. A. V. 16 Macrob. Sat. the remarks of lAicr. 14 267 568 Plut. Plac. iv. 14, 2, on reflected images and the echo belong likewise to the doctrine of idola. ^ For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and madmen. Diog. 32 Lucr.
Gell.
; ; ;

Tv^pKa Kal

&i\ivx^a,

h.

iroi/iafi/oua-i

[sc. of 'EirofoiipEioi] hitXiTov^ h-i

irepMovs

iii.ipaiv6ixiva koi ireptvoa

tovvto. ir&vni

ra

nii/ %ti

(Jiina

ri Si viKai
' '

KoraKaii'Toiv ^ ki TaffaTrfvruv ano^^v^vra.

Luer.
iSext.

1. 1.

c.
c.
;

Liter,

ii

351.

iv. 730.

MANKIND: THE

WILL.
is

459

motion of forms which we behold in dreams

pictures, appearing to us as changes of one

Chap.
'_^

explained by the hasty succession of similar atom-

and the

same

picture.'

But

besides receiving pictures sup-

plied from without, spontaneous

to these pictures takes place

motion with regard

with
the
soul's

on our part, a motion

connected

in

the
it

first

instance

motion when
thereof.

receives

the outward impression,

but not to be regarded as a simple continuation

This independent motion gives
is

rise

to

opinion, and hence opinion

universally true as feeling.
ing, or it
it

not so necessary or so

It

may
It

agree with feel-

may

not agree with

it.

may be
its

true or

may

be

false.^

The

conditions of

being true

or false have

been previously investigated.^

(4) Will.

Impressions also give rise to will and action, the

soul being set in motion by impressions, and this

motion extending from the soul to the body.'' Into the nature of will, however, Epicurus does not appear to have instituted a more careful psychological

investigation.

It was
will.

enough

for

him

to

assert the

freedom of the

This freedom he

considers
'

absolutely indispensable, if anything

766-819
; ;

we

Iiucr. iv.

and on

iviiiapTup-qBy
ifietSos

fi

the incessant streaming forth of images, v. 141 Dioff. 48. Epic, in XHoff. x. 51 rh Se
''

yiveTai,

avTiixafnufyne^ rb 4av Se iirtjiap-

TupTjflJ

nil

oi/Ti/iapTupjiSp

rh

iAijAw.
" As to terminology, Bpicurus, according to Plut. Plac. iv. 8, 2, Diog. 32, called the faculty of sensation rfo-fljjo-ii,

SifinapTTififvov

ovK hv tntripxev,
Kol
fiWiji/

ei

nil i\aii.$dyoiJLev
niuriiriv
li.(v,

Tivck

iiiK-rp^iv

4v ri/uv avTois ffvvi\fLiiiv7iv [al. SuiKu-^a/] S'

Kara Si Toririjv rifv T^ {pavraiTTiK^ i-rriPoX^ [impression on the senses],

exoMav

and sensation
*

itself, iTraladritia,

ffuvTjfifievqj/

I/iwr. iv.

874

conf. Galen.
v.

De Hipp,
^^^' ^-

et Plat.

2, vol. v.

Siihrpfiiv S'

ix""""'''

^^^ >"'

i"^

460
Chap,

THE EPICUREANS.
do
is

to

be considered our own,

if

we

are nc

L_ prepared to despair of moral responsibility altogethei

able necessity.'

and to resign ourselves to a comfortless and inexoj To make freedom possible, Epicuru

had introduced accident into the motion of atoms z we have seen, and for the same reason he denies th truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to th future.'* In the latter respect, he, no doubt, onl
attacked the material truth of two clauses, with on

impugning the formal accuracy of the disjunction, i.e., he did not deny that of two contradictory cas either one or the other must happen, nor did h deny the truth of saying To-morrow Epicurus wi either be alive or not alive. But he disputed th truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied th
:

truth of the sentence, Epicurus will be alive

an

equally that of the contradictory, Epicurus will nc

be alive

on the ground that the one or the oth

statement only becomes true by the actual realisatio

of
'

an event at present uncertain.^

Diog. 133: rb Se

For

this

Trap' yifias

dSeffTToTov

KoX

-rh

fiefiwrhv Kol

least says, referring to the abov question Nisi forte voluimi

:

rh 4]/avTiovTrapaKo\ovde7t''ir4<^vKv. ^Trel KptiTTov ^v Tif TTEpl Oeuv liiBtp Ka.TaKo\ov6itv fi Tp tUv ^vtrMuv
iixapp.ivTi
^

SouKiieiv.
:

N. D. i. 25, 70 [EpiGurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum esset hujusmodi aliquid aut vivet eras aut non vivet Epicurus, alterutrum fieret necessarium totum hoc aut etiam aut non negavit esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97
Cic.
: ; ; ;

Epicureorum opinionem seqn qui tales propositiones nee vers nee falsas esse dicunt, aut cui id pudet illud tamen dicun quod est impudentius, vera
sed
esse ex coutrariis disjunctione, qu in his enuntiata esser eorum neutrum esse verun
:

Cicero indeed adds admirs bilem licentiam et miserabilei inscientiam dicendi but h has no reason for this exclams
I

De

' *

Fat. 10, 21. Steinluwt, p. 466. Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at

the for proposition Either A or B must follow not identical with the propos:
tion;
i

MANKIND: THE WILL.

deserves little blame.
is

461

that he did not

nature of the will

Our real charge against him more thoroughly investigate the and the conception of freedom,
he had treated the subject of

Chap.
^^^^-

and that he and

nature.
tion It A or of
:

treats the subject of the soul as scantily

as

superficially

may be stated either of B that it will follow,

Epicurus could, therefore, justly

allow the former and deny the latter. In so doing he is really following Aristotle.


462

THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTER

XVIII.

TIEWS OF EPICUKUS ON RELIGION.

Chap. XVIII
A. Critithe gods and the

Satisfied with the results of his

own enquiries

int
(

nature, Epicurus hoped by his view of the causes

things not only to

displace

the superstitions of

polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the prejudic

j^ favour of Providence.
_

populmfaith.

Indeed, these two obiec '

'

were placed by him on exactly the same

footinj
r(

So absurd did he consider the popular notions

attacked them,' he believed
in them.
it

specting the Grods, that far from blaming those wl

impious to acquiesc
to.

Eeligion being, according

evils,^

Lucretiu

the cause of the greatest

to

he who displaces

make way
as

for rational

views of nature deservi

the most dangeroi
r<

praise
'

having
:

overcome

Diog. X. 123
elalii-

otovs 8' oi-

In terris oppressa gravi sub

ligione,
Quffi

Toifs [toiis

06oi5] ol
oti

ttqWoX Voidyiip (pv\aT-

^OhSiv ovK
roviTiv
affefiiis

aiiTohs

o'tovs

vofil^ovcnv.
Tto;'

Se oxix ^ Til's
ctAA.' S

iroW&v

caput a coeli regionib osteudebat Horribili super aspeotu mort

libus instans, &c.

6eovs avuipat/

rks ruy iroX-

K^, S^l' 9^5 ^po(r<iTto^. Conf Cic. N. D. 1. 16, 42.

49 and, specially, the celebrated passage i. 62
iii.
;

^^ ^^^

^ ^o 101 :relhgio potuit suadc

ai

'

vi.

Tantum

maiorum.
Conf. Epic, in Diog. 81, above, p. 423, 3 437, 1.
;

Humana

ante oculos foede

cum

vita jaoerst

THE GODS OF POPULAR FAITH.

enemy
still

463

of mankind.

All the language of Epicurus

Chap.

in disparagement of the art of poetry applies in a

xvin.

higher degree to the religious errors fostered by

poetry.'

Nor

is it

better with belief in Providence

faith.

than with the popular

This belief
;

is

also

and the doctrine of fatalism, which was the Stoic form for the same belief, was denounced as even worse than the popular faith.' For how, asks the Epicurean, could
^

included in the category of romance

divine Providence have created a world in which evil

abounds, in which virtue often fares

is

ill,

whilst vice

triumphant

How

could a world have been

made

for the

sake of man, when

it ?

man

can only inhabit a

could nature be init so

very small portion of

How

tended to promote man's well-being when

imnerils his
life

often

and labour, and sends him into the helpless than any animal ? How can we world more form a conception of beings ruling over an infinite
universe, and everywhere present to administer every-

thing in every place ? *

What could have induced these

how and whence could known how to create it, had not nature supplied them with an example?' In fine, how
beings to create a world, and

they have

' Heraclit. AUeg. Horn. c. 4 ['ETrUoupos] airaaav d/iov ironjTi(cJlv Sffirep oKiSfiov f>.i%mv d4\ttp Ibid. c. 75. a^aa-ioifievos.

Cic. N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls irpdvoia anua fatidica, to

which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.

' *

2 Plut. Def. Orac. 19, p. 420: 'EiriKuupeiW Si x'^^"'^!^"^'

See

p. 460, 1.
v.

Luer.

196;

ii.

1090;

Kol 7e'\wTas otiTi <)>o;87)TV oTj T0\fiuai xi"!"^"'^ voias liVeoy

'"''

""''''

''^^ "''"'"

avT^v airoKoAovvTcs.

N. P. Suav. Viv. 21, 2; 8iaj3a\Xovres T^v wp6miav Sxrwep iraialv

"Efivavcrav

Xloiiniv

aMrriptdSri

Plut. Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in iwcmre, Jup. Trp.g. v;. 35, and especially c. 46. * Zucr. v. 165 ; conf. p. 437, 1 ; Plut. Plao. i. 7, 8.

KOI TpayiKr>)V ^viyeypann^vTiv.

In

464

THE EPICUREANS.
could

Chap.
XVIII.

God be

the happy Being

all

He must
fro

be
all

if

tl

whole burden of caring for

lay

things and

even

upon Him,

or

He were

swayed to and
?
'

togeth
fe

with the body of the world

such a
B. Tlie gods aocvrding to
Mpio^i/rris.

Or how could we

any other feeling but that of fear in the presence

God who troubles himself about everything With the denial of the popular Gods, the denial

demons,^ of course, goes hand in hand, and, togeth

with Providence, the need of prayer^ and of prophei

is

(1) Reasons for

his belief.

at the same time negatived.'

All these notior

according to Epicurus, are the result of ignoraui

and

fear.

Pictures seen in dreams have been

c6:

founded with real existences; regularity of motion:

the heavenly bodies has been mistaken by the ign

God 'events which accidental happened in combination with others have bei
rant for the work of
;

phenomen storms and earthquakes, have engendered in mer

regarded as portents
;

terrific

natural

minds the

fear of higher powers.^

;

Fear

is

therefo

the basis of religion

and, on the other hand, fre

dom from
philosophy.

fear is the

primary object aimed at

For
>

all that,

Epicurus was unwilling to renoun^

i.

Diog. 76; 97; 113; seep.

20, 62;

437, 1; Cic. N. D. Pint. Plac. i. 7, 7.

2
'

= Biog. 135; lAicr. v. 37 Plut. Plac. V. 1, 2 Cic. N. 20, 55 ; Divin. ii. 17, 40 ; Tt
;

Cic.

1.

c.

54.

tull.

De An.
;

46.
;

Lucr. V. 1159-1238 coi i. 83. vi. 49 iv. 33 Sext. Math, * Conf. the captious aigu.25 vi. 19 Biog. 98 115. ' This ment of Hermarchus, in Prod. view is especial in Tim. 66, E If prayer is ne- prominent in Lucretius. S cessary for everything, it is p. 462, 2. Oonf. Plut. N". necessary for prayer, and so on, Suav. Viv. 21, 10 do. N. D.
Phit. Def. Or. 19; Plac.
;
i

ad

infin.

20, 54.

THE GODS OF POPULAR FAITH.

belief in the Grods,' nor
is

465

it

credible that this un-

Chap.
XVIII.

willingness was simply a yielding to popular opinion.^

The language used by the Epicureans certainly gives" the impression of sincerity; and the time was past when avowed atheism was attended with danger.
Atheism would have been
as readily

condoned in the
however, pos-

time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most

unreservedly the popular faith.
sible

It

is,

to

trace

the causes which led Epicurus to

There was first the general diffusion of a belief in Grods which appeared to him to establish the truth of this belief, and hence be declared the existence of Gods to be something
beUeve that there are Gods.
directly certain,
{irpoXTj^jni).^

and grounded on a primary notion

Moreover, with his materialistic theory

of knowledge he no doubt supposed that the primary

notion which convinces us of the existence of Gods

from the actual contemplation of divine beings, and from the perception of those atom-pictures from
arises

which Democritus had already deduced the belief in

Gods.''
'

And

in addition to these theoretical reasons,

trea-

He drew up separate
and Trtpl
;

tises irepl Beuv

dtrtSTTiros.

gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina
anticipationem quandam Deoappellat Trp6\ri\fiiv Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be received with some caution, since Cicero appears to give up his own views as to innate ideas. Inasmuch however as he expressly refers to Epicurus' treatise irfpl Kav6vos, we may assume that belief
in

Biog. 27 Cic. N. D. i. 41, 115 ; Pint. N. P. Suav. Viv. 21, 11. ^ Posidonius, in Cic. N. D. i. 44, 123; Conf. 30, 85; iii. Pint., 1. c. 1, 3 ' Epic, in Diog. 123 fleol /iw
; :

rum ? quam

y6.p fifft

'

iyapyi]s juev
16,

ydp iariv

avTav

ri

yvuKris.
i.

The Epicurean
43
:

in Cic. N. D.

Solus

enim [Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisQuae est enim set ipsa natura.

Gods with Epicurus rests on a general Trp6\ri'fiis. * In support of this view,

H H

46&
Chap. XVIII.

TRE EPICURHANS.
Epicuras had
religious-

also

another,

half

assthetical,

half

the wish to see his ideal of happiness realised

it is this

in the person of the Gods," and

ideal which

determines the character of

all his

notions respect-

ing the Grods.

human

beings.

His Gods are therefore, throughout, Eeligious belief only knows beings
Epicurus expresses
it,

such as these,

or, as

only such

beings come before us in those pictures of the Gods

which present themselves to our minds, sometimes

in sleep, sometimes

when we

are awake.

Eeflection,
is

too, convinces us that the

human form

the most

beautiful, that to
it is

it

alone reason belongs, and that

the most appropriate form for perfectly happy

beings.^

Epicurus even went so far as to attribute

to the

Gods

difference of sex.'

At the same time

is

everything must be eliminated which

priate to a divine being.
see do. N. D. i. 1 8, 46. It is there said of the form of the

not appro-

Gods

A natura habemus omnes

Quffi

na esset et beatissima metus omnis a vi atque Deorum pulsus esset. IHd.

.

et

ira 20,

omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum.

cuirit

enim

alia

forma ooipviriK^

umquam

aut vigilanti

cuiquamautdormienti?
Trp6\ri^is is

here referred to sensations derived from efSuAa. Ibid. 19, 49 and Zucr. vi. 76 De corpore quae sanoto simulacra feruntur In mentis hominum divinse nuntia formse. IHog. 121. Cic. N. D. i. Si nihil aliud quasrere17, 45 mus, nisi ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur,
;
:

do not fear the Gods, et pie sanoteque colimus naturam excellentem atque prtestantem. IKd. 41, 115. Sen Benef.iv. 19,3; Epicurus denied all connection of God with th
56
:

We

world, but, at the same timO;

would have him honoured

as i father, propter majestatemejui eximiam singularemque natu.

^
ii.

ram.
Cio.

N. D.
;

i.

18,

46

Divin

'

Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 218 Plut. PI. Phil. i. 7, 18 (^Stoi. i 66); PJtcsdr. (Philodem.) Fragm Metrodot-ns, ircpl niVSr; col. 7
17,

40

satis erat

dictum nam et prses:

ruv (Vol. Here,

col. 16, 21.
^

vi.),

col.

10

tans Deorum natura hominum pietate ooleretur, cum et seter-

Cic.

N.

i.

34, 95.

THE GOBS OF POPULAR FAITH.

The two
happiness.'
essential

467

characteristics

of the Gods,

Chap.

according to Epicurus, are immortality and perfect/^

Both

of these characteristics

would be

(2)

-^'a-

impaired were we to attribute to the bodies of the

the Ejnmi,''^'^"^

same dense corporeity which belongs to our own. We must, therefore, only assign to them a body analogous to our body, etherial, and consisting Such bodies would be of little of the finest atoms.'^ In fact, they could not use in a world like ours. live in any world without being exposed to the temporal ruin which will in time overwhelm it, and, meantime, to a state of fear, which would mar their
Grods the
bliss.

S^As.

Epicurus, therefore, assigns to

them the space

between the worlds as their habitation, where, as

Lucretius remarks, troubled by no storms, they live

under a sky ever serene.^

Nor can

these Grods be supposed to care for the

world and the affairs of men, else their happiness

would be marred by the most distressing occupations

but perfectly free from care and trouble, and absolutely regardless of the world, in eternal contem-

plation of their unchanging perfection, they enjoy

the most unalloyed happiness.''

'

The view which the

;

liiv

Epic, in Diog. 123 TrpuTov liv Behv Qfov &(pBapTOv KaX

: .

It-axapiov voij.l(a}v
TTjs lupeapa-las

firiSiy /iiiTe

aKKdrpiov

/liirerfis

liaicapi6rrrros avo'iKnov
aiTTe, K.T.\.
i.

avT$ irpbaCic.N. D. ii. 646

;

/W(Z. 139.

17,45;

19,

51; Imcr.
ii.

Epicurus has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos his Gods have only quasi corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or, according to Lucr., tenues, so that they cannot be touched,

V, 165. " hid.

and are
N. D.
;

indestriictible.

23, 59
;

i.

18,
ii.

'

do. Divin.ii.17, 40; Luor.

; ; ;

49
17,

25, 71

26,

74

40

Lucr.Y. 148
col. 7

irepl aia&ifrav,

Divin. ii. Metrodor. Pint. 1. ^.

v. 146 646 iii. 18 Benef. iv. 19, 2. ' Epic, in Hiog. 77

Sen.

97

H H

; ;

468

THE EPICUREANS.
School formed to itself of this happiness we learn

Chap.

xvin.

from Philodemus.'

The Gods

are

sleep being a partial death, and not

exempt from sleep, needed by beings

yet he believes
q\

who

live without

any exertion.

And

that they require nourishment, though this must,

course, be of a kind suited to their nature.
also

Thej

need

dwellings,'^ since every

being requires some

of speech
tc

place wherein to dwell.

Were powers

be refused to them, they would be deprived of

highest means of enjoyment

th(

the

power of conversit pro-

ing with their equals.

language.'
society of

Philodemus thinks

bable they use the Greek or some other closely-aUiec

In short, he imagines the Gods to be

Epicurean philosophers, who have every-

everlasting life, no care and perpetual opportunities of sweet converse. Onlj need not b such Gods, the Epicureans thought," feared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and wor-

thing that they can desire

do. N. D. i. 19, 51 139 (amongst other things nos autem beatam vitam in animi
;
:

assigned that \4yoinai ij.ii iro^i Staipepoiffais Kara ras apBpdffei.

XP^^^^^ ^uvats, koX fi6vov oXSafie] jGyovdras Seohs 'EX\7jj/iSt yAt^TTi The first statemeni XP'"!"^'''""seems to refer to the words &. the divine language quoted bj Homer ; the second statement, to stories of appearances of the

securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimns, both of which features must therefore be attributed to the Gods)
Iiegff.
iii.
i.

7,
;

21
;

Imcr.
;

ii.

6i6
;

1092
.

iv.
4, 1

83

vi.

57

Sen.
.

Benef iv, 436 464,

;

19, 2.
1.

Conf

p.

466,

'

treatise
col. 12.

In the fragments of his irtpl rfis tZv BeSiv ei(r-

Toxov/i4vris5iayayyris,KaTii.Z-fivuvaf
^ The KXfcrm discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20, had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts. ' Col. 14: The reason being

Gods. For the whole tone o: the system militates againsi our thinking of men who havf afterwards become Gods. Th( Whethe: sceptical question, the Gods possess speech ? raisec by Carneades in Sext. Math, ix 178, appears to refer to thii
fivBoKoyla 'Evixoipov.
"

Cic.

N. D.

i.

20, 54

Sen

Benef.

iv. 19, 1.

THE GODS OF POPULAR FAITH.

shipped because of this very perfection.'
these

469

Moreover,

Chap.
XVIII.

Gods are innumerable.

is infinite,

If the

number

of

mortal beings
quires that the

the law of counterpoise re-

number

of immortal beings

must not

be

less.^

If

we have only the idea of a limited numit is

ber of Gods,

because, owing to their being so

in our minds the innumethese words appears to be, that ideas of the Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies, by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our senses (nee soliditate nee ad numerum, Diog. X. 95), but by single pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much alike, that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness and immortality. The passage of Diog. X. 139, ought probably to be corrected by that in Cicero. It runs y &\7^is Si <\>t\in, robs
:

much
'

alike,^

we confound

Philodem. De Mus. iv. (V. Here, i.) col. 4, says that the Gods do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show
it
:

ix6Xi<TTa

fxii/

btriais irpoKii^eaiv,

eiretTa Se KaX Tots /caret

rb

Koi.Tpiov

napaSiZofiivois
fJL^pOS.

Kd(Trtp rSiv

Kara

the seninterimant, belonging, however, to Cicero

2
1. 0. i.

do.

19, 50,

tence,
only.

et si quae

For Epicurus cannot have described his ease-taking Gods as sustainers of the uni Cie. N. D. i. 19, 49 (Epicurus) docet earn esse vim et naturam Deorum ut primum
:

non sensu sed mente cernatur nee soliditate quadam nee ad

:

numerum

ut ea, quae ille propter firmitatem aTipiiivta appellat, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum
infinita

6eobs \6ytp 6eup717obs elvai- ots fiev Kar^ apt0fihv v(pe(rTUTas, ots Se tcar^ 6iJ.oeiSiav iK Trjs truvexoSs ^nt^^direws twv dfjLolav eiStiiKuv ^irl

simillimarum imagin-

species ex innumerabilibus individuis exstat et ad Deos (probably instead of Deos, which gives no sense, we should read nos. See the commentators in the editions of Moser

um

and Kreuzer) affluat, eum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines

mentem intentam infixamque nostiam intelligentiam

capere quEe
et
seterna.
sit et

rb avrh d7roTT6Aeo'/Aej/ous avdpaiTToeiSSis. The similarity of most of the expressions leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority as Cicero (probably the same as Pint, Plae. i. 7, 18 followed), but in the words ois fih k.t.\., it asserts the very opposite of this and the Epicurean teaching. There must, therefore, be some error here, either due to Diogenes or a copyist. This error does not apparently belong to the

beata natura

The meaning of

words kot' apiOfihv, which Cicero renders ad numerum, so that

470
Chap,

THE EPICUMEANS.
rable pictures of the
,

Gods which are conveyed

to our

xvni.

souls.

Pridinsr themselves in contrast to the Stoics

their

on

agreement by means of

this theology with the

anthropomorphic views of the popular belief, and even outdoing polytheism in the assumption of injoin in

numerable Gods,' the Epicureans were willing to the customary services of religion,^ without being nearly so anxious as the Stoics to prove
in harmony with the popular creed. Whilst the Stoics in their anxiety to do this had plunged head over heels into allegory, no such ten-

themselves

is observed on the part of the Epicureans. Only the poet of the School gives a few allegorical interpretations of mythical ideas, and does it with

dency

more

taste

and

skill

than

is

usual with the Stoics.^

SteinliaH's suggestion, p. 477 Knfl' ap^nbj/ or /cafl' ap^uoiir is clearly wrong. It is more probably to be found in the words ofiy fiiv

o6s
'

natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods (col. 9) to fleio ToiauTo KaraKelirovcnv h Koi yivvnra koI <{)8apTci (palverai, ro7s S<
:

8e.
jLie^.

"We might suggest

ou
fjisvTOL.

iracnv

rifieTs

aKohovSais aiilovs

Kaifi-

for oOs
Trepl

Bdprovs elvai Soy^Ti^ofiev.

Here

In Plued/rus {PJdlodeni. u(r/3e(oj),Fragm.col.7(10) it is said in answer to the Stoics ^7ri^eiKvvaQoiua.v Tois troWols 'iva )i6vov {Bibv] aitarra. AeyovTes oiiSe
vivras
SwKGy,
o(

we have a phenomenon wit' nessed in modern times, Deisti

and Pantheists mutually accus ing one another of atheism
the former missi\ig personality the latter missing activity ii the deity of their opponents. " See p. 469, 1. * I/iiC7'. ii. 598, explains thi Mother of the Gods as meanini the earth, ii. 656, he allow the expressions, Neptune, Geres Bacchus, for the sea, corn, an( wine. iii. 976, he interpret the pains of the nether-worli as the qualms now brought O] by superstition and folly.

Sffous

ri

Koix-))

</)^/i)j

irape-

T]fji5ii/ ou ^6vov Tlav4Wf\ves ctAA.^

'6ffovs
itaX

^aaXv

vKftovas
toioiJtous

elvai

heydvruif

^Treifl' (Jti

ouSe fxefivKaffiv airoKelTreiv, oiovs ffE/SocTai TtivTcs Kol riixits dfio-

Koyovnev.

avdpuiiroeiSeTs

yap

iKe7iial

mi

ov voiiiQovaiv
icai

aWb, afpa
fliraiiii

jtvevp-ara

al94pa, liar' eytoye

Ka! Tefla^^ijudTws

toutouj
It

iiay6pov
is

/laWov

-nKtifiiieXeiv,

then shown

how

little

the

THE GODS OF POFULAR FAITH.

On
other points the Epicureans, not excluding Lucretius, observe

471

Chap.
;

towards the popular faith a negative

attitude, that of opposing it

by explanations

and

by

this attitude,

without doubt, they rendered one

of the most important services to humanity.

472

THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTEE XIX.
THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUKEANS.
PHINCIPLES.

GENERAL

Chap.

Natural science
dices

is

intended to overcome the preju;

XIX.
A. Pleasure.

which stand in the way of happiness

mora]

science to gire positive instructions as to the nature

(1) Phature the

higliest

and means of attaining to happiness. The speculative parts of the Epicurean system had already worked
out the idea that reality belongs only to individual
things, and that all general order
to the accidental

good.

same idea

is

must be referred harmony of individual forces. The now met with in the sphere of morals,

individual feeling being

made

the standard, and in-

dividual well-being the object of all

human

activity.

Natural science, beginning with external phenomena,

went back to the secret principles of these phenomena, accessible only to thought. It led from an
apparently accidental
verse of regular motions.

movement Not

of atoms to a uni-

otherwise was the

course followed by Epicurus in moral science.

Not

content with

human

feelings alone, nor with selfishlj

referring everything to the individual taken

self alone, that science, in

by himmore accurately defining the

conception of well-being, ascertained that the same

PLEASURE THE HIGHEST GOOD.

can only be found by rising superior to feelings and
purely individual aims, and by that very process of
referring consciousness
to itself

473

Chap.
'

and

its

universal

being, which the Stoics declared to be the only path

to happiness. It is for us

now

to portray this deveits

lopment of the Epicurean platform in

most proto Epiis

minent features.

The only unconditional good, according

curus, is pleasure
pain.'
;

the only unconditional evil

No

proof of this proposition seemed to

;

him

to be necessary

it rests
is

on a conviction supplied by
If proof, however, were re-

nature herself, and

the ground and basis of all our

doing and not doing.^

quired, he appealed to the fact that all living beings

from the

first

moment

of their existence pursue plea-

and that consequently pleasure is a natural good, and the normal condition of every Hence follows the proposition to which Epibeing.''
sure and avoid pain,^

curus in
1

common with

all

the philosophers of plea23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 194 Math. xi. 96. " Stob. Bcl. ii. 58 tovto S' [the teAos] ol kut' 'EAoupof
;
:

Epic, in iMo^. 128 :tV^S<'. .

i.px^v Kcl teAos \4yonsv elxai TrpuTov ToS liaxafiai Q,v . ayaBhv tovto koI O'i/iipmov . .
v'tiv
.

ircura.

olv

^5oi/j)

ayMv.
i.

<jii?^oa-o<povvTes

ov

irpoo-Se'xoi'Tai

Ka.66.Tref /col

&Kyr\ii>v iraffa KaK6v.

lUd. 141.
Tusc.
niat,
'

Cic. Fin.

9,

29
defi-

V. 26,

73

Cum

prseser-

Xiynv ivepyoijifvov, 5i& t!i iraSijtmIv uiroTifleo-eai rii tc'Aos, ob vpaKTm6v ifiov^ ydp HBsp Kal
t^iv ivvoiav a7roS/S(fain toS teAous, rb omsIws SiareBeTa-eai i^ coutoO

tim omne malum dolore

'

voluptate. Sioff. 129 Tairnvyiip i.ya9hv

:

bonum
Ka\

irphs

airhv X"p"'S t^*

iiriffoKTis.

^'''''

&^>^o re

irpwTOv
Kal

(TvyyevtKhv

eyvafiev

airda-ris

Alex. Aplir.

&Tri> Tairris KaTapxi/^^Ba vda-ris alpeaeas Kai (tiivyvs Kal eVl Tairriv KaTavTH/iev its Kavivi t^ iriBa t6 &7oebv KpivovTfs. Pint. Adv. Col. 27, 1. '

De An.
Kovpov
l5o Jex
*"''-

154, a
riSoyii

tois Se irepl "Etti-

Tb irpSnov o'ikuov
irpoiivTav Si
t'Iiv

eli/ni

aTrAcSi
TaliTi\v

SLapBpovaBai

iiSoviiv

Diog. 137

do. Fin.

i.

7,

474
Chap,

THE EPICUREAm.
sure appealed, that pleasure inust be the object of
life.

1_
(2) Free-

domfrom
paAn,.

At the same time,

this proposition

was
.

restricted
-.

m
.

the Epicurean system by several considerations.

first

In the

place, neither pleasure nor pain are simple

things.

There are many varieties and degrees of

pleasure and pain, and the case

may

occur in which

pleasure has to be secured by the loss of other pleasures, or

even by pain, or in which pain can only be In this case Epicurus would have

avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost

of some pleasure.

the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully

estimated, and in consideration of the advantages

and disadvantages which they

evil,

confer,

would under

circumstances advise the good to be treated as an

and the

evil as a good.

He

would have pleaif it

sure forsworn if it would entail a greater correspon-

ding pain, and pain submitted to

prospect of greater pleasure.'

holds out the

He

also agrees

with

Plato in holding that every positive pleasure prei.e. a pain which it proposes to remove and hence he concludes that the real aim and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain,^ and that the good is nothing else

supposes a want,
;

'

48

Diog. 129 Cio. Fin. i. 14, Tusc. v. 33, 95 Sen. De

; ;

Otio, 7, 3.

Epic, in Biog. 139 (^Gell. ii. 9, 2) bpos rov /j.ey48ous rwv Tidovwv 71 Ttavr})<! rod aXyovvToy inre^aipefTls. Id. in Diog. 128: ToiroiV yhp [raiv i^iBvu.iSov'^
''

aiinaros ir/Uiav Kol -r^v Tr\s eirel tovto toS '^vxns arapa^lav. /xaKapiais Cv^ ^^"^^ t4kos. roirov ykp xipiv SjrarTa wpdrToiiiv Sirms
-rov

N. A.

tii\Tea\yu^sv liAirs rap^a^Liv 'drav

Se Sttr^ tovto wepi i]fias \uTat iray b t^s ^"X^^
trphs
. .

'

yei/TjToi

x^^f^^v

aiT\av^s Qeapia traoav atpetriv Kal ipiiy')]v i-jravayayiiv olSev ivl t^iv

ovk ^^ot'Tos tov ^t^ov ^dSiCetf us iv^idv ri . tots ykp ^Soc^s xP^^"'" ^X"/*^"? ''rav eK tow

PLEASURE

IS

FREEDOM FROM
evil.'

PAIN.

476

but emancipation from

By

a Cyrenaic neither

Chap.
1_

repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle

motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed

as the object of life

made

to

and hence happiness was not depend on man's general state of mind, but
;

on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments.

But

Epicurus, advancing beyond this position, recognised

both the positive and the negative side of pleasures,

both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion.^

Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and immediate cause of happiness is
repose of

mind

arapa^ia.

Positive

pleasure

is

only an indirect cause of arapa^ca in that it re-

moves the pain of unsatisfied craving.^ This mental repose, however, depends essentially on the character of a man's mind, just as conversely positive pleasure
in systems so materialistic
attractions.

must depend on sensuous

on the part
the

It was consistent, therefore, to

;

of Aristippus

consider bodily gratification

highest pleasure

and conversely Epicurus was no

'

/AT/

irapilvai
fj.il

t^v

Srac Sf

7}5oj/^v aKywfiev a\yaiiv ovKiTi rrjs

^Boi/ijs 8e(!|Uefla.

Hid. 131

Hi

of ivefr/eia/^yapyeic}, but ivepyeit^ gives a very fair meaning they appear actually in motion. Sen.
:

oonf. Plut. IS. P. Sua. Viv. 3, 10 ; Stoi. Serm. 17, 35 ; Zuei: ii. 14; fifj. Fin. i. 11, 37.
'

Ep. 66, 45: Apud Bpiourum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summumilludbeatumquecomponitur,
'

Epicurus and Metrodorus,

1. c.

ut corpus sine dolore

sit,

in Plut.

7, 1.

animus sine perturbatione.

2 Dioff. 136, quotes the words of Epicurus ri /a-h jhp arapa^ia

:

Hence Sun.

Cum
.

Bpicuro
:

Brevit. Vit. 14, quiescere.

Kal airovia
riSovai,

KOTaffTjj/iOTiitof
i"*'

eiaiv

v Se x^P"
iii.

eiiippocrivTi

Benef iv. 4, 1 Quffi maxima Bpicuro felioitas videtur, nihil

agit.

Kara

Khrjo-iv

Ritter.

ivepyela fiXenofrai. 469, sugg'ests instead

476

TEE EPICUREANS.
less consistent in

Chap.

subordinating

it

to gratification of

xrx.

mind.

In calling pleasure the highest object in

Epicurus,

life,

says

we do not mean the

pleasures of profligacy,
all,

nor, indeed, sensual enjoyments at

but the

freedis-

dom

of the body

from pain, and of the soul

from

turbance.

Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the

lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor

the joys of the table,

make

life

happy, but a sober

for action

judgment, investigating the motives

for inaction,
B. Intelleetual

and

and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace, prejudices. The root from which it springs,
and, therefore, the highest good,
is is

happiness.
(1) Intelce.

intelligence.'

It

intelligence that leaves us free to acquire posses-

sion thereof, without being ever too early or too late.'

Our indispensable wants are simple,

little
;

being ne-

cessary to ensure freedom from pain

other things

only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not increased, or else

they rest on a mere seneasily attained.

timent.*
'

The
131.

little

we need may be
<t>cov

Dwg.

Similar views

are expressed by Metrodorus, in Clement, Strom, v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal
Kadapol KaX atr'fifiavTOi roi/Tov, h vvv ffufia neptfpepoures ovofxd^oiiev.

oihe yap &upos oi/Sels iffnv oijT Trdpwpos irpbs rh Kara 4'uxV iyiaivoy. He who says it is too early or too late to study philo-

sophy means
fjL'fiTTU

irphs eiSaiiiovtav

fi

Tcapeiifai

Svai.

t^v &pav ff Id. in Sen. Bp.

fitiKeri

8,

7:

Philosophiae servias oportet, ut

tibi contingat vera libertas. ' Epic, in Diog. 127 rwv iiri:

Id. in Plut. Adv. Gol. 17, i: Tt KoKhf ^irl Ka\oiSf 'jroi'fi(rci}fjLef lx6vov oh KaraSivTes Ttus dfioiotraBeiats Kol anaJtLXayepTes ix tov XaM''^ ^'^'*^ ^'^ '^^ 'ETTi/coi/pou ws
a\Tjdus 0e(J(^avTa &pyta.
'

Qvfiiuv at fi4v eiffi <pv(rtKaX at Se Kevai' Kal tSiv (pvatKwv at /liv

Tis &j/

Epic in Diog. 132 /ii^re v4os fxeWfTu <pt\0(ro(t}eii/ fi'fjre

:

hvayKoiat al 6^ tpvfftKol ^6vov. ruv Sk SivayKaiav at jitcc irpbs v5afioviav ehrlv avayKoiai, at Se irphs riiv TOV aiiimros u.oxKri<rlav, at 5e
irphs aiirh

yepuv

i)TT6,px^v

KiyiriiiTco

^i\o{ro-

t6 fpf.

Ibid. 149,

; ;

; ;

INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS: INTELLIGENCE.

Nature makes ample provision
for our happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting what she gives in thinking what we desire.'

477

Chap
XIX.

He who lives according to nature is wise man living on bread and water
envy Zeus
;^ is

never poor ; the

has no reason to

chance has

little

hold on
if

him with him

;

judgment
haps.^

everything,^

and
little

that be right, he

need trouble himself but

so irresistible as to

about external misto Epicurus

Not even bodily pain appeared

be able to cloud the wise man's he

of opinion that

happiness.

Although he regards as unnatural the

is

Stoic's insensibility to pain,' still

the wise

man may

be happy on the rack, and can

sweet
^

smile at pains the most violent, exclaiming in the

midst of torture.
sentiment

How

touch of forced
manifest

may be

discerned in the last expression,

and a trace of

self-satisfied

exaggeration

is

even in the beautiful language of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease.'
further particulars are given as to the classes. Ibid. 144; Lucr. ii. 20 ; da. Fin. i. 13, 45 Tusc. V. 33, 94 Plut. N. P. Sua. Viv. Mostrat. Eth. N. 48, b 3, 10 Sen. Vit. Be. 13, 1. ' EpiSen. Benef. iii. 4, 1 euro qui adsidue queritur, quod adversus prteterita simus ingrati. Epic, in Sen. Ep. 15, 10 Stulta vita ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum f ertur
; ; ;
:

Nevertheless, the
^y^oytfffihs Sic^KT]tte.

koX Kvpit^Tara 6

The
Cic.

like in Stob.

Bel.
;

ii.

354;

Fin. i. 19, 63 Sea. De Const. 15, 4 ; Epicurus and Metrodorus in do. Tusc. v. 9, 26, and Plut. Aud. Po. 14, p.
37.
'

Diog. 135

Kpurrov

eTi/ai

vofiiCav evKo-yi(rTas viTvxe'!vfia\o-

yla-Tas einvxeiv.

and
2

Iaict. iii. 929.

130 144 146; 30 34 23 Stob. Floril. 17 Sen. Ep. 2, 5; 16, 7; 25,4. ' IKog. 144 Ppax^'ia (ro<p$ (/.eyiara. rixv irapeii-irlirTet, tA
Diog. 11
i
; ; ; ; ; ; :

P. Sua. Tiv. 20, 4. Diog. 118 ; Plut. 1. c. 3, 9 Sen. Ep. 66, 18 67, 15 ; Cic. Tusc. v. 26, 73. ' Diog. 22 Cic. Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; M. Aurel. ix. 41 Sen. Ep. 66, 47 92, 25 Plut. N. P. Sua. Tiv. 18, 1, the
= '
; ; ; ;

Phd. N.

478

THE EPICUREANS.
principle involved
is

Chap,

based in the spirit of the Epithing, according to Epi-

L_ curean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony

of the founder.
curus,
is

The main

not the state of the body, but the state of

;

the

mind

bodily pleasure being of short duration,

;

and having much about it to unsettle mental enjoyments only being pure and incorruptible. For the

same reason mental

present
ills,

sufferings are

more severe than

past and

those of the body, since the body only suffers from

whilst the soul feels those

those to come.'
pleasures

In a

life

of limited duration the

of the flesh never attain their consum-

mation.

Mind

only,

by consoling us

for the limited

life

nature of our bodily existence, can produce a

complete in

itself,

and not standing in need of unif consistent

limited duration.^
(2)

Bea-

At the same time, the Epicureans,

^^''^ their principles,

riitw'' superiorto

cannot deny that bodily plea-

sure

is

the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate

source, of all pleasure,

and neither Epicurus nor

his
this

favourite pupil Metrodorus shrunk from

making

admission
latter
'

Epicurus declaring that he could form

Epicurus'
Tlie Epicureans desig33, 96. nated bodily pleasure by 5)Sfo-Bai,
1.

perverting

words to a

terrible extent.
oi fxev yctp

Biog.lST: ^TmphsToiisKv-

mental by

x'^^P^'"-

Pint.

fnjva'iKobs Bia(pepTai.

c. 5, 1

X^Lpovs T^s aoifiariKas a\y7td6yas Se Keyovai -rav ^iXiK&v ihs ^f/vx'iids. tV 70E1' a-apxa Sia rb vaphy jiivov x^'f^<^C^"'t ''''hv Se ^vxh" K"! 5'^ t!) TrapfABhv Koi rh oStids oZv iraphv Koi rh iiiWov.
. . .

iS

^ Diog. 145. Epicurus appears to have first used trApf to express the body in contrast to the soul, iru/ta, in his system, including the soul. See Diog. 144 137 140 Metrodor. in
;
; ;

Kol fxel^ovas ^Soccis elvai ttjj

Xijs.

if/u-

Further
1.

Phtt.

c.

3,

10

particulars in Cic. Tusc. v.

:

Plut. Colot. 31, 2. (^Pliit. in N. P. Suav. v. 16, 9 Plut. has yaaTpX instead of (rapKi.)
;

INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS.
no conception of the good apart from enjoyments of the senses Metrodorus asserting that everything
' ;

479

Chap. XIX.

good has reference to the belly .^

Still

the Epicu-

reans did not feel themselves thereby driven to give

up the pre-eminence which they claimed for goods of the soul over those of the body. Even the Stoics,
notwithstanding
the grossness of their theory of

knowledge, never abated their demand for a knowledge of conceptions, nor ceased to subordinate the
senses to reason, notwithstanding

their building a
all

theory of morals on nature.

But

character has

vanished from their joys and their pains.

Their only

distinctive feature can be found in the addition either

of

memory,

or of hope, or of fear
;

'

to the present feel-

ing of pleasure or pain

is

and their greater importance

simply ascribed to the greater force or duration

belonging to these ideal feelings as compared with

the attractions which momentarily impress the senses.*
Diog. X. 6, from Epicurus T\ovs : oil yhp c7W7e eX" ri voiiffoi Tctyoflbv iupaifitbv iiiv ris
'

T^jy aKporoiTfiv

x^P^" "'
5, 1
Ttfj
:

fiefiaio-

TTCpi

TdTT]V e^^t Tois

fievois.

^TviKoyi^i<rQa.f.

Suca-

IMd.

ri

fi^v t}^6-

Sta

x^Kwv

'/]Soj/a,s,

atpatpwu Se Kol

fievov Trjs

capKh^
elj

x*^^P*"'t* "^V^

Ttks Si' atppoSLfriwv Kol

ras

5i'

ctKpo{-rjs').

^UXVS
iXiriSt
'

uirepeiSocres, aSQis S' iK

-rh

aiidruv Kal ras 5ii ^op<pas

X'^'P^^TOS

7]S6iJLepov

tov rp

The
=

like, in

a more expanded
iii.

form, in Cic. Tusc.

Pint.
1.

18, 41.
:

ix'^P't" I""' iBpacrvpdfiTiv

irop'

iis Kal 9 ire ifiaSov "Eirmoipov opBas yanTpl (see

c.

16,

on
17,

reKevruvras. Conf., besides the extracts p. 478, 1 and 2, Cic. Fin. i.

55

Animi autem voluptaa

previous note) x'P'f'''^' > and Trep! yaarepu yiip, S> <j>vcno\6ye Conf. Ti^(i/cpaTs, tIi aya66y.
:

et dolores nasci fatemur e .corporis voluptatibus et doloribus

it is

only a misapprehension on the part of several Epicureans

to

ibid. 3, 1.

8ee p. 478, 1, and Epic, in Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10 rb yhp fia-iaeis (rapKhs KaTiar-niw,
"
:

sures

deny this fact. Mental pleaand pains may therefore

be the stronger ones for the reasons assigned above.

Koi t6 irepX Tairris

marhv

iKiriaiia

480

THE EPICUREANS.
Only accidentally
discourses
is

Chap. XIX.

the remembrance of philosophic

'

mentioned

as a counterpoise to bodily

pain

properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains

are not different from other pleasures in kind, but

only in degree, by reason of their being stronger and more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape the admission that we have no cause for reject-

ing gross and carnal enjoyments

lis

if

these can liberate

from the fear of higher powers, of death, and of sufferings ^ and so the only consolation he can offer
;

in pain

is

the uncertain one that most violent pains

either do not last long, or else put

an end to our life

pleasure.'

and the

less violent

ones ought to be endured since

they do not exclude a counterbalacing

(3) ViHve.

Hence victory over the impression of the moment must be secured, not so much by a mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by a proper estimate of the conditions and actions of the senses. In no other way can the necessity of virtue be
established in the Epicurean system.

Agreeing with

the strictest moral philosophers, so far as to hold

that virtue can be as
little

separated from happi-

ness as happiness from virtue,^ having even the tes-

timony of opponents
'

as to the purity
i.

and

strictness

In his last letter (Siog.

15,
;

49

Plut. And. Po. 14, p.

vii. 33, 64.

22), after describing his painful illness, Epicurus continues

36

M. Aurel.
*

avTLirapeTdrTeTO Se Tram Tovrois

Diog. 140: ovk effTiK ^Se'ws ^fv &vev rod (jtpovifiws Kol KaKus
Kol SiKaius oiiSi (ppovlfitos Kal 5iKalas &vv Tov ri^eus. The same Cic. Tusc. v. 9, p. 132, 138.

yeyov6ra)v
MI)2

Tjfui/

ZtaKoyiffiiSov fivij'

JKog. 142 IHog. 140

Cie. Fin.

ii.

7,

21.
=
;

26 Fin. i. 16, 50 Ep. 85, 18.

;

19,

62

Sen.

133

do. Fin.

INTELLECTUAL HAPPINESS.
of his moral teaching, which in
in
its results ditfered
;
'

481
CsIAP.

no wise from that of the Stoics

Epicurus, never-

XIX.

theless, holds

a position strongly contrasted with that

of the Stoics as to the grounds on which his moral

theory

is

based.

To demand

virtue for its

own sake

seemed to him a mere phantom of the imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object in life.' Only a conditional value belongs to virtue ' as a means to happiness or, as it is other;

wise expressed,''

Not

virtue taken by itself renders a

man

happy, but the pleasmre arising from the exerThis pleasure the Epicurean system

cise of virtue.

does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled,

'

Sen. Vit. Be. 13,

:

(conf.

'

Dioff.

138 Sia Se
:

ttj^ ^Soi/jj;/
oif Si*

In ea quidem ipse sententia sum (iuvitis nee nostris dipopnlaribus the Stoics cam), sancta Epicurum et recta praBcipere, et si propius aceesseris tristia: voluptas enim
12, 4)

Kal Tas apcTas Se7v alpe7(r$ai

auris

'

&<rirep rijv larpiKTiv 5ta t^*

vyieicof,

Ka6d
i.

(fyrjiri

Kal Atoy^vits.

Cic. Fin.
vii.

2)

42 rconf. ad Att. Ist enim vestr* exi13,

ilia

ad parvum

tur, et

quam

et exile revocanos virtuti legem

ille dicit voluptati Itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum, seotam Epicuri flagitiorum ministram esse, sed illud dico male audit, Infamis est, et immerito. Ep. 33, 2 : Apud me vero Epicurus
. . .
:

dicimns earn

pulcKeque virtutes nis| voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur ? ut enim medimias

corum

scientiam
. . . ;

non

ipsius

artis sed bonse valetudinis caiffia sic sapienprobamus, &c.

tia,

que ars vivendi putanda

;

est et fortis, licet

manuleatus

non expeteretur si nihil e<linunc expetitur quod ept tanquam artifex conquirendse
est,

ceret
et

sit. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of Epicurus, and calls (Ep. 6, 6) Metrodorus,

oomparandse

voluptatis.

Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, b: [^ h.perk{\ Trepi r^y iK\(yyi\v ecri Tuy
/jSduv Kar' 'ETriKOvptiv.
'

Hermarchus and Polyaenus, magnos viros. Conf. Cic. Fin.

ii.

25, 81.
2

quoque
riSoi/as
iir'

Sen. Ep. 85, 18 Epicurus judioat, cum virtutem

:

Epic, in Pint. Adv. Col.

17, 3 : iyi) 5' 4^' KOfaKaKii, koX ob

TTtov

trwex"'

operckj, Kevas

Koi fiaraias Kal rapaxt^Sety ^xoiiffas

habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efEoiat voluptas que ex virtute est, non
ipsa virtus.

KapTTuy TCLs iKviSas.

I I

483

THE EPICUREANS.
or of virtuous action, but in the freedom from dis-

Chap,

XIX.

and dangers, which follows as a conseWisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and death, by making us independent
quiet, fear,

quence from virtue.

of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing,

and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and

life.'

natural

Self-control aids in that it points out

the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and

pain, so as to receive the

maximum
;

of enjoyment

and the
that
it

minimum
life

of suffering

valour, in that it

enables us to overcome fear and pain;' justice, in

makes

possible without that fear of

and men, which ever haunts the transgressor.^

the Epicurean virtue
is

Gods To

never an end in
it

itself,

only a means to an end lying beyond

life

but

but happy

withal a means so certain and necessary,

that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness, nor

happiness without virtue.

to be required,
still

Little as

it

may seem
insist that

even he would ever

an action to be right must be done not

according to the letter, but according to the spirit

of the law, not simply from regard to others, or by

compulsion, but from delight in what

'jDio^. 132; C?c. Fin.
i.

is

good.

13,

v.

43

19, 62.
^
'

rest,
i.

do. Fin.
Cie.
TJ)v
1.

13, 47.
13,

c.

49.

Diog.

120:

7iVe(rfloi,

&vSpelav ^vaei /u); Aoyurn^ S^ toO iru^feSJ

i.

povTos.
*

Oio. Fin.
;

16,

50;

JHoff.

1152: The criminal can never and often in delirium or sleepbetrayshimself. Epicurus, however, refused to answer the question, Whether the wise man would do what is forbidden, if he could be certain of not being discovered? Phit. co\ 34,
1.
'

Plut. N. P. Sua. Viv. 6, 1 Sen. Ep. 97,' 13 and 15. Lucr.

144

Philodemus,

De

Ehet. Vol.

THE WISE MAN.

The same claims were
urged on behalf of
therefore advanced by Epi-

483
Ch.\i>.

curus on behalf of his wise

theirs.

man

as the Stoics

had

^
C. Til

Not only was a

control

over pain attributed to him, in nothing inferior to

the Stoic insensibility of feeling, but he endeavoured

himself to describe his

factory in itself.

most perfect and satisAlbeit not free from emotions, and

life as

being in particular susceptible to the higher feelings

of the soul, such as compassion, he yet finds his phi-

losophic activity in no wise thereby impaired.'

Within-

out despising enjoyment, he

his desires,

is

altogether master of
restrain

and knows how to

life.

them by

telligence, so

that they never exercise a harmful

influence on

He
;^

alone has an unwavering cer-

tainty of conviction

he alone knows how to do the

right thing in the right

dorus observes,^ knows

way he how to be
;

alone, as Metro-

thankful.

Nay,

more, he

is so far

exalted above 'ordinary men, that

Epicurus promises his pupils that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods

among
Happi-

men;'' so
calls

little

can destiny influence him, that he

all

him happy under

circumstances.'

ness may, indeed, depend on certain external condiT. a, col. 25: The laws ought to be kept rm /n); t^ Sttcpurliiva fi6viiv, aWi. Kol ra t^v dpLo-

Herc.

eiSeiai/

auTois exovra Sia!l>v\dTiJiii /iSmv ffuveMrav, kSv KaMvoiyLcv ct7ra|iirai'-

Ten/, KaKeiva

aWa
'

The Stoic assertion of the equality of virtues and vices was, however, denied by the Epicureans. Dioff. 120. * IHoff. 135 ; conf Plut. N. P. Sua. Vi. 7, 3 LvM". iii.
. ;

ras, Kol luff riSoviJ!, ou Si' a.vdyKvi', Koi Pffiaias, 4XX' oi ffoAeuojucVuis.
Dioff.
2 '

323.
=

Oic. Fin.

i.

19, 61

V. 27,

117; 118; 119. Plut. Adv. Col. 19, 2. JHog. 118 Sen. Bp. 81,
;

11.
I
I

80: Semper beatum esse sapientem. Tuso. v. 9, 26 Stub. Serm. 17, 30. See p. 477.
;


484

THE EPICUREANS.
tions
;

Chap, XTX.

it

may
; '

to happiness

is

even he allowed that the disposition not found in every nature, nor in

every person

but

still,

when

it is
its

found,

its sta-

bility is sure, nor

can time affect

duration.

For

wisdom
is

so

Epicurus and the Stoics alike believed

indestructible,^

never be increased by time.

and the wise man's happiness can A life, therefore, bounded

as

by time can be quite

bounded.'

complete as one not so

Different as the principles, and different as the

tone of the systems of the Stoics and of Epicurus

may

be,

one and the same endeavour

It is the tendency

may

observed in both.

yet be which cha-

racterises all the post-Aristotelian philosophy

the

wish to place

man

in a position of absolute indepen-

dence by emancipating him from connection with

the external world, and by awakening in

him the

consciousness of the infinite freedom of thought.''

'

Diog. 117. Diog. 117: nhv iira^ycvi-

an involuntary loss of wisdom, perhaps through madness.

of
'
i.

fifvov (Totphv utiKiri riiv ivavriav

Diog. 126

145

(Xc. Fin.
2.

\aii$iv(iv Biieiaiv /iiiS' iiraWdrTcif fK6vra. The latter words appear to admit the possibility

19, 63.
*

See also page 476,

THE lyVIVIDUAL.

485

CHAPTEE XX.
THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAIi POINTS.

The

general principles already laid

down determine
Epicurus,
it
is

Chap.
-^^-

likewise the character of particular points in the

moral science of the Epicureans.

true, never developed his

A. Thein-

moral views to a systematic

theory of moral actions and states, however

his pupils, particularly in later times, busied selves with morality

much
them-

and

special points in a system of

morals.'

Moreover, his fragmentary statements and

Still, all

precepts are very imperfectly recorded.

is

that

known corresponds with the notion which we must

All

form in accordance with those general views.

the practical rules given by Epicurus

aim

at con-

ducting

man

to happiness

by controlling passions
is

and

desires.

The wise man

easily satisfied.

He

sees that little is necessary for

supplying the wants

Xenophon's and

"We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus' treatise irepl Kama' icaX tUv tivTiKei/isvav iryaSav Kol t&v h oh
'

criticism of

Aristotle's omovoiuk6s. It is objected to the latter that the

master of the house

eiVl (cal irepl S.

The 10th book

made
bed

(col. ii.

is there 30) to rise earlier

of this treatise gives a portrait

and kindred faults, after the manner of Theophrastus the 9th, a mild
of the
uTTfpiiipavos,
;

than his servants, and to go to later than they do, such conduct being_ ToKalirwpon /cal
iiyolKtiov <pL\oir6<pov,

486

THE EPICUBEANS.
that of nature, and for emaneipatiug from pain imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches
;

Chap,

XX.

required by nature

may be

easily acquired

'

that

the most simple nourishment aflfords as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time
far

more conducive

to health

that therefore the re-

striction of

wants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich;' and that he who is not
satisfied

with

little will

never be satisfied at

all.''

He

therefore can with Epicurus live

water,^
'

and at
23 20;

upon bread and think himself as happy the same time

Stob.

mog.lii; 146; UO;

;

Floril. 17,

Lncr.
(r6(p(p

ii.

Philod.
5'

De

Sen. Ep. 16, 7 ; iii. 59; r. 1115; Vit. ix. col. 12 tpiXo:

ttKovtou jxiKp6v' S irapeS(iKaiiev aKoKoiiOus [for thus and not by evKaipaa must the
iffrl

one of his letters, asserts that he spent a mina every day on bistable. If this statement be not a pure invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his
friends.
It could otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmae, and when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived.

defective
rois

as be represented]
if

Ka6'fiyeii6(Tiv

Tois

irepX

irXoirov \6yois.

Conf. p. 476,

477. 2 Biog. 130.

Stab. Floril. 17, 24

and 37
; :

Sen. Bp. 21, 7 ; 14, 17 2, 5 Houesta, inquit, res est Iseta paupertas. Ep. 17, 11 Multis parasse divitias non finis mise:

Pint. Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates

{Diog. 6)
ififTv oTrb

mrhv

81j

ttjs

r/ufpas

Tpv^rjs')is certainly

riarum
*

fuit,

sed mutatio.

Stoi. Flor. 17, 30. Conf. Sen. Ep. 9, 20: Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen

an unfounded calumny. The moderation of Epicurus is admitted hj Sen. Vit. B. 12, 4 13, and Epicurus flatters him1
; ;

self,

miser

est.
;

in Sen. Ep. 18, 9 Non toto asse pasci, Metrodorum,

:

IKog. 11 Stob. Floril. 17, 34 ao. Tusc. v. 31, 89 Sen. Ep. 25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought against him was fully disposed of by Gassendi, De Vit. et Mor. Epic. 153. Timocrates, on the strength of
;

qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto and, in Diog. 11, because

;

he was

satisfied

with bread and

:

water. JMd. he writes ire'iuijfov fiot Tvpov Kvdvluv, ?]/' &Tat/ ^oiKtofiai iroKVTiXeiaaffBai, Siyufiai. Still less have we any reason

to connect the diseases of

which

THE INBIVIDUAL.
as Zeus.'

487

He

eschews passions which disturb peace

repose of
life
;

Chap.

of

mind and the

considering

it foolish

XX.

to throw

away the present

in order to obtain

an un-

certain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the

means

of a

life,

seeing he can only once enjoy

it.^

He

therefore neither gives

way

to passionate lovej nor to

forbidden acts of profligacy.'

of his scholars died (as Plut. N. P. Suav. V. 5, 3 does, herein following Timocrates in Diog. 7) with their presumed luxuriousness. Stab. Floril. 17, 30. p. 477, 2.
'

Fame he

does not

Epicurus

and

some

not only discusses the most suitable time for the enjoyment of love, but quotes as the words of Epicurus ei ^hav a
1,
:

a'o<lths

S>v KaX ii^ ^vva^isvos ttKti-

fftd^eiu eTi Ta7s

rwv KaXuv

aipais

See

Epicurus and Metrodorus,

in Stub. Floril. 16, 28; 20. Conf. Pint. Tran. An. 16, p. 474: i T^j aljpiot/ ^Kiffra Se6fievoSf S)S
(jyriffitt

'Ewi/coupos, ^Biffra

irp6(rt(ri

r^v aijpLov. Serious charges on this subject, against which Gassendi in Diog. 6, defends him, are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in Diog. 6j but neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose morality (see above p. 406) was in his society, can be considered conclusive. Chrysippus in Stob. Floril. 63,
irphs
'

(N. P. Suav. V. 12, 3). These enjoyments, according to Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do not entail any bad consequences {Diog. 118), or produce passionate states of feeling. Hence he not only forbids
Xii^'P^'
tj'r]\tt<j>iicr((ny

Kal

unlawful commerce (^Diog. 118), but declares ouk 4paaSi]ireadai.

rhv
co<p6ii. Dioq. 118 ; Stoh. Floril. 63, 31. Eros is defined (_Alex. Aplir. Top. 1h) aivravoi

3pe|is

SuppoSialotv.

Conf.

Plut.

It is con19, 16, p. 765. sequently a passionate and disturbing state, which the wise

Amat.

man must

avoid.

The

Stoics,

calls Epicurus kvaiaBjiTos. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality. Thus, in the quotation on p. 479, 1, he reckons T\iova\ ZC a^poiuritav among the necessary ingredients of the good. By Eustrat. in Bth. N. 48, such pleasures are included among ^uaiKoX (see p. 476, 3), not among ^8ool
31,

on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to express the
restlessness and confusion entailed by love, the state of dependence in which it places man, and the loss to his fortune

and good name.

His advice

is

They are treated in the same light by Lucr. v. 1050 and put. Qu, Oonviv, iii, 6, 1,
oca7Korai.
;

to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in

a calm way.

438

THE EPICUREANS.
covet; and for the opinions of
far as to

Chap,

men

he cares only so

^^'

wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to danger.' Injuries he can bear
with calmness.^

He
;

him

after

death

what may happen to nor envies any for possessions

cares not

which he does not himself value.*

It has

to rise above pains,

been already seen how Epicurus thought and to emancipate himself from

the fear of the Gods and death.^

And

it

has been

further noticed that he thinks to secure by

means of

Ins principles the same independence and happiness

which the Stoics aspired to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics thought to attain this independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content
to restrain

and regulate them.

Desires he would not

have uprooted, but he would have them brought into

proper proportion to the collective end and condition
of
life,

into the equilibrium necessary for perfect re-

pose of mind.
plicity,

Hence, notwithstanding his own simis far

Epicurus

from disapproving, under

life.

all

circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of

wise

The

man

will not live as a

Cynic or a beggar.^ Care

;

for business

he will not neglect

only he will not

ovk t?j

'

JDiog.

ii.

12,
'
'

28

120 140 Cic. Tuso. Lucr. iii. 69 993.

; ;

<f>lKuv avvrtyi, koI

f(f>B6vfi

vfioaayar/ris

toC

fiypoti

r^

BSpanri,

Sen. De Const. 16, 1. Diog. 118 oiSe to^^s ^pov:

koI

ftt/iVTi/ievos irliKeTO

tuv iaxiruv tfeoxXiovs \6yaf rp (itEri SaK-

nf'iv.
*

'

Zucr. iii. 7i. See p. 479, 455.

A further
:

argument may,

here quoted. Kuav. Viv. 16, v6ai( voaav anKlrf

however, be In Plvt. N. P. 8ti 3, he says

Tii'&s ktJTiiatis

piav iiSovji. It is true that a certain mawkishness and selfconceit may be detected in this language, JHog. 119; PMlodem. De Vit. \x. ool. 12; 27, 40.

THE mDiriDUAL.
give himself too

4S9
will pre-

much trouble therewith, and

art,

Chap.

fer the business of

education to any and every other.'

XX.

Nor

will

he despise the attractions of

although he

can be content when obliged to dispense with them.^ In short, his self-sufficiency will not consist in using

but in needing little and it is this freedom from wants which will add flavour to his more luxulittle,
;

rious enjoyments.'

a different one.
it

Nor is his attitude towards death Not fearing death, rather seeking when he has no other mode of escaping unendustill,

rable suffering,

the cases in which he will re-

sort to suicide will

be rare, since he has learnt to

bodi'y pains.
finds

be happy under
Epicurean.*

all

The

Stoic's re-

commendation of suicide

no favour with the

Diog. 120 ; xriifffas irpovoi\Kai tov /ieWovros, 121 ;i;p?;^T(r6(r6ai re atrh fi6v7]s ffotpias hiropiiaaiiTa. The limitation implied in the text would, however, seem to require /idyris. Pliilodem. in the same sense 1. c. 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his scholars. Conf. Plvt. adv. col. 18, 3, also
'

[dolores] feramus, sin minus,

ffiquo

treffBai

placeat,

animo e vita, cum ea non tanquam e theatro exe-

amus. Epic, in Sen. Ep. 12, 10 Malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere
:

col. 15, 31.

^

On the other hand, Ep. 24:, 22 Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent, et ait: ridicunecessilas nulla est.
:

any
nil

ei

Diog. 121: fiK^vasT^hvaB^' aSuupdpas c^etv tiv ixoi

'

lum

ffxoiv
:

(Cobei,

not
:

intelliko! riiv

est currere ad mortem tsedio vitae, cum genere vitse ut currendum esset ad mortem

gibly
"

aSia<t)6p<iis ttv (rxo(r;s).

Epic, in IHog. 130

avripKeiay Se iLyaBby p.iya vn^i^OfjLu

ovx Vva

TrdvTois rois oKlyois

Diog. 119, the older editions read kh! irnpuBAs ras fj}j/is fieB4^eiv avrhv rov piov. Cobet: fjLerd^e.v auThv rov $iov.
effieceris.
:

Xpti/ifBa,

aW'

Situs ihv ni) ixmin^v

Instead of

Tnjptij6i)s

TrfipuBivra is

rh TToWa toIs oKlyois xP'^f S"

veirnrrfiivoi
yvriffiajs

3x1

r^SiffTO

iro\vTf\e'.as airo\aiovtTivct
*
.

^Kurra

The Epicurean in
49
:

(Xe.

Ein.

read, or as we might prefer instead of fueTd^em lierd^et. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme oases. In Seneca's time, when an Epi-.

16,

SI

tolerabiles sint

curean,

Diodorus,

committed

400

THE EPICUREANS.
Fully as the wise
still

Ohap.
\

man

can

suffice for himself,

Epicurus would not separate him from conneeindeed, that he believed with Not, '
_ _
_

B. Cvril society

tion with others.

and

the

the Stoics in the natural relationship of

^si'^gs-'
life

all

rational

(\T&M
society.

Yet even he could form no idea of human

except in connection with

human

society.

He
for

does not, however, assign the same value to all forms

of social
life.

Civil society

and the

state

have

him

the least attraction.

Civil society is only an

external association for the purpose of protection.

Justice reposes originally on nothing but a contract

entered into for purposes of mutual security.^

are only

Laws

made

for the sake of the wise,

not to prevent

their committing, but to prevent their suffering injustice.'

Law and
own

justice are not, therefore, bindsake, but for the general

ing nor

for their
is

good

injustice to be

condemned

for its

own

sake,

but only because the offender can never be free from

fear of discovery

therefore,
justice.

and punishment.'' There is not, any such thing as universal, unchangeable

The claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and nations those, in fact, which were able and willing to enter into the

social

compact.

And

the particular applications of

differ in dif-

justice

which constitute positive right

suicide,hisfellow-soholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by the precepts of Epicurus {Sen. Vit. B. 19, 1). ' Epiat. Diss. ii. 20, 6 "E7r. Kovpos Srav avatpttv 9i\xi tV
:

<l)vaM^v KoiviaAav inepdirois irpbs aWijKoiis, K.r.\.

' Diog. 150; 154. From this point of view, Lucr. v, 1106, gives a long description of the rise of a state. Stoh. Floril. 43, 139. ' Diog. 150; IAuir.\. 1149; Sen. Ep. 97, 13, and 15 ; Plut.

Ad. Col.

84,

See

p. 482, i.

SOCIAL HELATIONS.
ferent cases,
is felt to

491

and change with circumstances.

What

Chap.

be conducive to mutual security must pass

XX.

for justice;

and whenever a law is seen to be inexno longer binding.' The wise man will therefore only enter into political life in case and in
pedient, it
is

as far as this

is

necessary for his

is

own

safety.
it

The

sovereign power

a good, inasmuch as
pursues
it,

protects

from harm.
taining
this

He who

without thereby atfoolishly.'^

object, acts

most

Private

individuals living as a rule

safely

much more calmly and

affairs
;

than statesmen,

it

was therefore natural that the

public

Epicureans should be averse to public

life,

after all, is a

hindrance to what
happiness.'

is

the real end-

in-chief
is

wisdom and
KdOs

Their watchword
the golden
lot in life.*

therefore

^idacras*

To them

mean seemed by

far the

most desirable

They only advise citizens to take part in affairs of state when special circumstances render it necessary,* or when an individual has such a restless nature that
Diog. Diog. ' Plut. N. P. Sua.
'

150-153.
140.

Plut.
c.

De Latenter VivenIn this respect, T.

do,
;

4.

Adv. Col. 31
Viv. 16, 9
;

33, 4

Epietet.

23, 6; Lucr. v. 112S; Cic. pro Sext. 10, 23. Philodem. irepl jnfTopMfis (Vol. Hero, iv.) Diss.
i.

Pomponius Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean, on whose conduct during the civil war and withdrawal from public
life,
*

see Nepoi, Att.

6.

col.

14: ouSe

xoi"''*'')"'

hyoiniBa

i7\v iroKiriK^v Suca/iiy, oUt^ abrois

ro7sKKTT]fiet'Ots,oljTeTaLS'tr6K(riVj
ai/riii/

Kad' a^i}V

'

aWa

iroWiKis

Metrodorus,ini%oi.Floril. 45, 26 ; 4v viKet ju^re as \4wv avaffTp4<pou ij/fire us la&j/uifi' ri fi^v yap iK-KaT^iTat rit 5e KaipQ<pj>XoKeirai.
" Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between Epicureans and Stoics in the passage quoted, p. 320, 3.

oiiiav KaX

avtitpopuv

h.vi}Ki<n<aVt

when combined with

ness, it benefits the

upright;

community,

at is sometimes useful other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.

and


492

TEE EPICUREANS.
he cannot be content with the quiet of private
life.'

Chap,

XX,

Otherwise they are far too deeply convinced of the

impossibility of pleasing the masses to wish even to

make

the attempt.^ For the same reason they appear

to have

been partisans of monarchy.

The

stern and

unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found

its

political expression in the

unbending republican
Naturally the

spirit, so often

encountered at Eome.

and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political
soft

principles so

much
it

at least

is

known that they

did

not consider
to

degrading for a wise

all

man

to

pay court

princes,

and under

circumstances they reto the powers

commended unconditional obedience

that be.'

Family life
is

is

said to have been deprecated

life.''

by Epi-

curus equally with civil

Stated thus baldly, this

an exaggeration.

So much, however, appears to

it

be established, that Epicurus believed

rally better for

to be gene-

the wise

man

to forego marriage

and

the rearing of children, since he would thereby save

himself

many

disturbances.^
c.

It is also quite credible

Pint.

Tranq. An.

2, p.

465.
=

Quamregereimperioresvelle et regna tenere.

* ^ici.Dissri. 23, 3 (against Epicurus) Smrl knoavn^ovMUis
:

Epic, in Sen. Ep. 29, 10:

Nunquam volui populo placere nam qua ego scio non probat
populus, quse probat populus ego nesoio. Similar expressions from Stoics have been previously quoted. ' JKog. 121 nal iiSvapxov iv Kaipcf Btpanteianv [rby ao(piv\. Lwor. V. 1125 Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum,
:
:

ts3

aoip^ reKvorpotpeti'

tI (poPy

TaCra els Kiwas iiiuriari ii. 20, 20 'EirfKoupoj ^k /iev avSphs Ttivr' ctireK(Ji).aTo Koi to oikoSeairdrou Kal <j>i\ov the last words proving how cautiously these statements must be underliii Sin;
:

stood. Diog.
'^

is,

119. The passage however involved in much

FRIENDSHIP.
that he declared the love of children towards parents
to be

493

Ohap.
^f^'

no inborn

feeling.'

This view

is,

after all, only

;

a legitimate consequence of his materialism

but

it

did not oblige

ther.

him

to give

Nay,

it is

asserted

up parental love altogeof him that he was anyaffections.''

thing but a stranger to family

The highest form of

social life

Epicurus to be friendship

a view which

was considered by
is

c.

Fnend-

distinc-

'^'^P-

tive in a system regarding

the individual as the

atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on individual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the Epicurean friendship rests is very superficial, regard being had mainly to its advantages, and in some degree to the natural
effects

of

common enjoyments ;* but

nuptiis.

it is also

treated

obscurity, owing to a difCerence of reading. The earlier text was Kol firiv Ka\ yaniiativ koI riKV(moii\ffetv rhv ffoiiibv. us 'Eiri:

Like riches, honours,

conlinio,

health, ita et uxores sitas in

bonorum malorumque

Koupos

iv Toit SioTopiois Kal

</)ii(Tctis.

Tais irepi

Kara

Trtpf'i raffti/

reads instead
Konh

Cohet 5e TTOTC /3iou oi ^ofi-^o-em. Kal lUTjSe yaiataeiv

:

grave aut esse viro sapienti venire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit. Plut. Adv. Col. 27, 6,-De Am. Prol. 2, p. 495 Jllpictet.
'

ft-qSe TfKpoirofiiffeii/

rhv
Si

iToip6v

Diss.
'

i.

23, 3.

TieplaTMriv

ttot*

fiiov

the MS. authority for this reading is, we are not told. In sense it agrees with Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 191, quoting from Seneca, De Matriyafji^iretv.

What

Diog. 10: ^ Tt vphs robs yovsas evxapiCTia xal ri irpbs rovs

o!c\<pois
tuiroiia.

Diogenes
Epicurus'

himself appeals to testament, ibid. 18. " Diog. 120 Kal

;

tV

<pi\iav
.

raro dicit Epicurus sapienti ineunda conjugia quia multaincommodaadmixta sunt

monio

5io

raj xP^ias

[yivtaiai]

(rwla-TcurSai SJ o4tJ)i/

koto koipuEpic. Ibid.

riav in toij ^Soi/ois.

494

THE EPICUREANS.
in such a way, that its scientific imperfection has no

Chap.

XX,

Only one portion of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained that friendship is pursued in the first ininfluence on its moral importance.

stance for the sake of

its

own use and

pleasure, but

that it subsequently becomes an unselfish love.' Moreover, the assumption that

among

the wise there exists

a tacit agreement requiring them to love one another

as

much as they love themselves, is

Still,

clearly only a

lame

shift.*

the Epicureans were of opinion that a

utility

grounding of friendship on motives of

was not

inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem.

Friendly connection with others affords in short so

pleasant a feeling of security, that it entails the most

enjoyable consequences

and since

this connection

can only then exist when friends love one another as

themselves,
friend
it

follows that self-love

and the love of a

must be equally strong.^ Even this inference sounds

i.

forced, nor does it

148 (also in Cic. Fin. Kai T^v iv auToTs rots

i.ff<t>dKfia/ </>i\fas

20, 68)

upttrfievois

fuiKiara kt^<ti

SeTvoiil^fiy (TvvTe\ov/j.4vnv. ( Cobit,

however, reads
KaTtSe7v
elvai

^iKias fui\urTa

ffvvTeKvfieyiji/f

in

which case

(l>i]\.l(}

should be sub-

quern ipse oircumventum hostili custodia liberet. Oic. Fin. i. 20, 66 Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spo
:

stituted for <pi\ias or else KT^crsi Sen. Ep. 9, 8: for KOTi56i>'.) The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola (a letter in which Stilpo's cynical selfcintentment is blamed), ut habeat, qui sibi segro adsideat, succurrat in vincula conjecto vel inopi ; sed ut habeat aliquern, cui ipsi aegro adsideat,

pariendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest, etc. On the same grounds, Philodem. De
Vit. ix. (V. Here,
iii.)

col. 24,

argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to

withdraw from
'

it.

CUb.

Fin.
70.

i.

20, 69.
20, 67.

'
'

IMd.

do. Fin.

i.

FRIENDSHIP.
fully state the

495

grounds on which Epicurus's view of

Chap.
^-^-

the value of friendship reposes.

That view, in

fact,

was anterior to

all

the necessary props of the system.

is

What
first

Epicurus requires

primarily enjoyment.

The

conditions of such enjoyment, however, are infear of disfor

ward repose of mind, and the removal of

turbances.
satisfying

But
these

as to trusting his

own powers

conditions,

Epicurus was far too

effeminate and dependent on externals.

He

needed

the support of others, not only to obtain their help

in necessity
this

and trouble, and

to console himself with

view

for the uncertainty of the future,

but

still

more, to

make

sure of himself

and

his principles

by having" the approval of others, thus obtaining an inward satisfaction which he could not otherwise have
had.

Thus, the approval of friends

is

to

him

the

pledge of the truth of his convictions.

In sympathy

with them his

mind
it is
life.

first

attains to a strength

by
too

means of which
circumstances of

able to rise above the changing

General ideas are

for

him

abstract, too unreal.

philosopher

who

considers

individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as

absolutely true, cannot feel quite
his

happy and sure of

ground, unless he finds others go with him.'

The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment and wherever of his own cultivated personality
;

this standard prevails, particular value

' The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus {Sen. Ep. 11, 8; 25, 5) Let every one choose some distinguished man as his pat:

is

attached
live, as it

tern, that so he

may

perpetually under his eye. Man requires a stranger give him moral support, to

were,

406
Chap,
"

THE EPICUREANS.
to the personal relations of society,
ship.'

and

to friend-

Hence Epicurus expresses himself on the value and necessity of friendship in a manner far exceeding the grounds on which he based it. Friendship
is

unconditionally the highest of earthly goods.^

It

is far

drink, than

more important in what we eat and

whose company we
drink.'

gency the wise

It is well

man
known

will

eat and In case of emernot shrink from sufifering

the greatest pains, even death, for his friend.*

that the conduct of Epicurus

and his followers was in harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less
celebrated than the Pythagorean.*
offensive

There may be an mawkishness and a tendency to weak mutual

admiration apparent in the relations of Epicurus to

his friends, but of the sincerity of his feelings there

As illustrations in modern times, the reunions of the B^rench freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be mentioned, It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the Epicureans, an important part was played by women. This is quite natural, when philosophy is confined to cultivated intercourse and conversation. ' Diog. 148 Si- i\ noipla rrapatoS b\ov piov (TKeuafeToi eis HaKapidritra iro^ii ii4yi<rr6v lariv rris (piAlas KTTJiris. die. Fin. Tl ii. Epicurus exalts 25, 80 friendship to heaven. In Diog. 1 20, Cobet reads instead of the usual (pl\ov re oiSha (cT^ffftrfloi [rii/ croiphv'}, which is altogether
' :

untrustworthy, (pi\av te oJSty

Kri\aea6ai.

Sen. Ep. 19, 10, with the Nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est. * Plut. Adv. Col. 8, 7 ; Diog, 121. have no reason to suppose, with Ritter, iil. 474, that this was not the expression of a real sentiment. That
'

addition

We

it is

inconsistent

we can

well

say.

tV

The Epicureans in Cic. i. 20, 65 At vero Epicurus una in domo et ea quidem angusta quam magnos quantaque amoris oonspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges, quod fit etiam nunc ab
'

Fin.

Epicureis.
"

Ihid.

ii.

25, 80.

Instances

have

already

FRIENDSHIP.
can be no doubt.

497

One

single expression, that referis

Chap.

ring to the property of friends,'

enough

to prove
;

XX.

what a high view Epicurus held of friendship and is evidence to show that he aimed at a higher improvement of his associates.^ In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation
there

of being a kind, benevolent, and genial companion.'

His teaching, likewise, bears the same impress.

sisting

It

meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by in-

on compassion and forgiveness,^ and super-

sedes its

own egotism by the maxim that

Oet^tret

it is

more

occurred, p. 418, 2, of the extravagant honours required by Epicurus nor did he fail to eulogise his friends, as the
;

Trap^

rb

redefiuTfievov.

Compare the remarks on

488,
^

p.

3.

fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and Pythocles (^IHog. 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauds him {Plwt. N. P.
&1S 6

fiil

Diog. 11: t6v tg ^KiriKovpov els rb Koivbv KararWer^s oi/ffias KaQdnep rbv Hv6ay6pav Kotvh ret tuv <^i\wv \4yovTa. aTTiffroivToiv yhp elvai rb
a^iovv
ffdai
'

TotovTOj/
tfiiKwv.
'

el

S"

aiFiiTTav

ovSe

Sua. Yit. 15, 5, Adv. Col. 33, 2) Te KaX vtaviKws i^ &irreus

PMlodem.
v. 2),

irepl

iraf^riatas
;

(V. Here.

Fr. 15

72

73,

otAaoe Kare^ri MlBpcp

S-iliTav. Ibid. 15, his thanks for a present

t^ ^iptfi $otJ' 8, he expresses

:

mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness towards friends. Probably the words in iSen. Bp. initium salutis est noti28, 9 tia peccati are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to

Sata>s

T6 Kal fieyaXoTrpeirSJs ^7re/A6\^0T7T6

TifiSiv Tct

Trepl

r^v tov
ejite

itItov ko/iL'

d}]v,

Kal ovpavofi-iiK-n
rrjs

ffTjfieia

ivSeSet-

X^e

irphs

euvoias

He

wrote of Pythocles before he

friend.
'

was 18

o&k eJvat (f}ii(rtv iv '6\ri T^ 'EWdSt a^elvu, Kal repariKas avrhp eS ctirayyeWeLj/, zeal Trd(rxeiy ad rh TUy yvvaiKtJov, eiixofj-eyos ave:

Not only does Diogenes

(9) praise his unsurpassed benevolence, his kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality,

trdyra KaX aveirltpOova peavtaKOv vnep^oKTJs tov {PlMt. Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said {Plmlodem. irepi
/AeffTjTO eluai

but Cicero
ii.

calls

him

(Tusc.

ii.

rTJS

19, 44) vir optimus,

25,

and (Fin. 80) bonum virum et co:

mem et humanum.
' Diog. oSre KoKiffeiv 118 oiKeras i\eii(Tetv /aeVtoi, Kal truv-

na^^narlas,
2, 11):

Fr.

6,

V. Here. v.

as

Sm

TIvBoK\4a

Tixv

KK

498

THE EPICUMEANS.
blessed to srive than to receive.'

Chap,

XX

The number
;

of

"

such maxims on record

theless, the

is,

no doubt, limited

neveris

whole tone of the Epicurean School

a pledge of the humane and generous character of

its

moral teaching.^
theory of utility

To
it

this trait the

Epicurean

School owes
its

its g;reatest

importance in history.

undoubtedly did

By much harm,

partly indicating, partly helping on the moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away from the outer world within himself, by teach-

ing

him

to look for happiness in the beautiful type

of a cultivated

mind content with

itself, it contri-

buted quite as much, after a gentler fashion, as Stoicism by its sterner tone, to the development and
the extension of a more independent and more universal morality.
yviitriv TivX efeiv

tuv

ffirovSalav.

121
'

iirixaplireiT9al

rtvi

ipse boiras vir fuit et multi

Tij?

SiopSd/Mari.

Phot. N. P. Sua. Vi. 15, 4 (similarly C. Princ. Philos. 3, 2, p. 778):_auTo! Se S^tou \4yov(Ttv Sis rb eS Troieii/ {JSiiiv iffri toO wdiTx"''Conf. Aleo!. Aphr. Top. 123. similar maxim is attributed by JEUan. "V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. Conf. Acts XX. 35. do. Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et

Eplcurei fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves neo
voluptate sed officio cousilia moderantes. Atticus isawell-

known example of genuine human kindness and ready selfsacrifice,

and Horace may be

also quoted as an illustration of the same character. Sei

Steinhart's remarks,

I.

c.

p. 470.

'^

COHERENCE OF THE SYSTEM.

499

CHAPTER XXI.
THE EPICUKEAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE
IN HISTORY. It has often been urged against the Epicurean philo:

ITS POSITION

Chap.

sophy, that
sistency.

it is

deficient both in coherence

and con-

XXI '_
A. laneyof the ^''''

If

Nor is this objection without foundation. we come to the study of this philosophy with the demand for a complete scientific groundwork, or a
strictly logical

development, there will certainly reIt is not

sult

therefrom a feeling of dissatisfaction.

show in what contradictions Epicurus was involved in professing to trust the senses wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the
difficult to
;

hidden causes of things

in despising logical forms

his

and laws, and

at the

same time building up

;

whole

system on deductions

in holding that all sensations

are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the

which they represent as belonging to things is only relative. Nor were other inconsistencies wanting; his acknowledging at one time only natural
realities

causes and laws, and ignoring any such thing as free

will

and imagination, and yet at another time, by

the doctrine of the swerving aside of atoms and of the

human

will, elevating

unexplained caprice to the

2

K K

500

THE EPICUREANS.
rank of law
;

Chap,
^

his referring all pleasures

and pains

to

bodily sensations, and yet calling mental states the

higher and more important states ; nay, more, his deducing from a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and
devotion.
It ought not, however, to be forgotten

that the Stoics, to

sistent

whom
The

the claim of clear and con-

thought cannot be denied, were involved in

Stoics, like the Epicureans,

similar difficulties.
built

up a

rational system

on a basis of the

senses.

They, too, constructed an ideal theory of morals on a

material groundwork of metaphysics.
clared that universal law
is

They, too, de-

the only active power,

whilst they maintained that reality belongs only to

the world of matter.

They, too, deduced a

strict

theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation

;

not to mention the inconsistent attitude which

To deny and connectedness of system, because of these scientific defects and inconsistencies, would be felt to be doing them an injustice. And can Epicureanism be fairly condemned, when its
they assumed towards the popular religion.
to the Stoics a unity
faults
little

are essentially of the

same kind (though

on
its

more obvious)

as those of the Stoics, without a

single extenuating plea being admitted

behalf?
favour

The
is

strongest plea to be advanced in

its

that the development of the Epicurean system

does not pretend to rest upon an intellectual platform.

Epicurus sought in philosophy a path to

happiness, a school of practical wisdom.

For him knowledge has only a secondary value, as contribu-

COHERENCE OF THE SYSTEM.

ting to this end, and indeed, both the tone and the
results of his intellectual activity

601

Chap.
'V""V'T '

were determined

by a reference to
however,
it

this end.

In the case of the Stoics,

has been already seen that the compara-

Logic and Natural Science to Moral Science, the going back to the older view of
tive subordination of

nature, the vindication of the truth of the senses

and of the reality of matter, grew out of their peculiarly one-sided

view of the scope of philosophy.

In
all

the case of Epicurus the same results appear, and

the more markedly, since Epicurus did not, like the Stoics, look for happiness in subordination to a
universal law, but in individual gratification or pleasure.

had not the same value as for the Stoics

scientific

For him the recognition of a universal law and conse;

quently Epicurus did not feel the same need of a

method as they had done. He could theremore exclusively content himself with the impressions of the senses, regarding them as the only unfailing source of knowledge. No necessity comfore

pelled

him

to advance from pure materialism to a

it is

view of matter in which

a soul and
the
to

described as possessing

made

to be the bearer of reason.

In

fact,

more exclusively everything was referred by him mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard
all

the individual with his pursuit of happiness as in-

dependent of
to himself

superhuman

forces,

and

left entirely

and

his natural powers.

No

system in

ancient times has so consistently carried out the

mechanical view of nature as that of the Atomists. None, therefore, afforded such a strong metaphysical

502

THE EPICUREANS.
support to the

Chap,

Epicurean views of the absolute

It was, therefore, as natu-

L_ worth of the individual.

ral for

Epicurus to build on the teaching of Demo-

critus as for the Stoics to build

on that of Heraclitus.
practical

But Epicurus, influenced probably more by

than by
scientific considerations,

allowed himself, by

his theory of the swerving aside of atoms, to destroy

the consistency of the theory of Democritus.^

It is hardly necessary to notice here

how

the dis-

tinctive features of the Epicurean morals were deve-

loped out of their theory of happiness, in marked

contrast to the Stoic teaching.

The happiness

of

Epicurus, however, does not depend upon

gratification as such, but

sensual

cheerfulness of disposition.

upon repose of mind and Hence his theory of

is

morals, notwithstanding its foundation in pleasure,

bears a nobler character, which
seen in
its lan-

guage as to the wise man's relations to the pains and desires of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and death, no less than in the mild humanity and the

warm and

hearty appreciation of friendship by the

Certainly the rationalising spirit

Epiciu-ean School.

of that School was opposed to any religious belief

which supposed an intervention of Grod in the course of the world, or the world's influence on man for weal or woe but its appeal to the senses without criticism raised no objection to admitting divine beings,
;

from

whom

no such intervention need be feared.

the most
natural
It

Nay, more, this belief seemed

ground

for explaining the

'

popular belief in Gods.

p. 445.

See

HISTORICAL POSITION.
satisfied

5C3;

an inborn and apparently keenly-felt want

Chap.
'

by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and

a standard by which to test the accuracy of moral
ideas.

Hence, notwithstanding

scientific defects

and

contradictions, the whole system of Epicurus bears a

definite stamp.

All the essential parts of that sys-

tem

are subservient to one

and the same end.

is

The
is

consistent working out of a scientific view of nature

looked for in vain

but there

no lack of consis-

tency arising from an undeniable reference of the

individual to a definite and practical standard.

Looking to the wider

Epicurean system, the

historical relations of the

first

point which calls for re-

b. His*''".^f^ .10/1 ^ of Ji^picu-

mark is the relation of that system to Stoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious
more important
that a constant
points.

attention having been already drawn to it on all the

It
is

m'Sation to

likewise well

known

rivalry existed

between the two

Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics

looked down on the Epicureans, and circulated

many

calumnies with respect to their morals.

statements proofs
pages.
in so

For these

may

be found in the preceding

Nevertheless, the two Schools are related

respects, that they can only be regarded () Points
"{^J^'i''''''

many

as parallel links connected in one chain, their dif-

ferences being varieties where the

same main ten-

dency

exists.

Both agree in the general character

In both practical considerations

of their philosophy.

prevail over speculation.

Both

treat natural science

and log^e as sciences subsidiary to ethics science especially in view of its bearing on

natural
religion.

604
Chap.
'__

THE EPICUREANS.
Both, however, attach more importance to natural
science than to logic.
scientific rule

If the Epicurean neglect of

forms a contrast to the care which the

Stoics devoted thereto, both parts are at least agreed

in one thing

in

displaying greater independence

in investigating the question as to a test of truth.

By

both this standard was placed in the senses

and by

to all appearances both were led to take this view

the same cause

appeals to the senses being a conse-

quence of their purely practical way of looking at

things.

Moreover, both employed against scepticism

the same practical postulate

the

knowledge must be
would be
possible.

possible, or

argument that no certainty of action

in not being

They even agree

content with the phenomena supplied by the senses

as such, although Epicurus as little approved of the

Stoic theory of irresistible impressions as he did of

their logical analysis of the forms of thought.

With

such appeals to the senses

how could

there be any

other result but materialism both in the Stoic and

Epicurean systems

But

it is

strange that the

ma-

terialism in both Schools should be based on the

same
(&) Points

definition of reality, corresponding with their

practical

way

of looking at things.'

In the expansion and more detailed setting forth

of
materialistic views

"iince.'

the

systems diverge,

more
dif-

widely, perhaps, than the

philosophers themselves,

whose leading they professed to follow.

These

ferences appear particularly on the subject of nature,

the Stoics regarding nature as a system of design,

>

Couf. p. 126,

2,

with 439,

1.

HISTORICAL POSITION.
the Epicureans explaining it as a mechanical product.

506
Chap.
'

Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw Grod

everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms,

and the theory of necessity.

gious freethinkers.

Whilst the Stoics were

speculatively orthodox, the Epicureans were irreli-

of natural science

spect of morals

Both meet again in that branch is most important in rethe part dealing with man. Both
which
is

hold that the soul

a fiery atmospheric substance.

Even the proof

for this view, derived

is

from the muto both.

tual influence of body and soul,

common

Both distinguish between the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the Epicureans in their
psychology allow a belief in the superiority of reason
to the senses,

and in the divine origin of the

however, ethics.

soul.

The arena of the warmest dispute between the

two Schools
is,

Yet, even on this

ground, they are more nearly related than appears

at first sight.

No

greater contrast appears to be

possible than that

between the Epicurean theory of

;

pleasure and the Stoic theory of virtue

is

and true

it

that the two theories are diametrically opposite.

Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and

the same end

the

happiness of mankind

but

the

conditions of happiness are also laid

in the

same
]jut

spirit.

According to
is

down by both Zeno virtue, ac-

cording to Epicurus pleasure,

the highest and only

virtue consist essen-

good

the former

making

tially in

withdrawal from the senses or insensibility

the latter seeking pleasure in repose of

mind

or

im-

perturbability, are both expressing the same belief.

506

THE EPICUREANS.
Man
can only find unconditional and enduring
satis-

Chap.
V-Y T

when by means of knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form that of
faction,

the ideal wise

features.

man for
wise

the most part with the same

of Epicurus
is,

The

man

as

we have

and want; he enjoys an excannot be lost and he lives among cellence which men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus,
seen, superior to pain
;

when worked out

into details, the difference in the

estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and

Epicureans seems to vanish.

Neither the Stoic can

separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from happiness.

But, whilst recommending a living for society,

both systems take no real interest in social

life.

The

recognition of a natural society amongst mankind,

of certain positive relations to state and family, above

all,

a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world,

characterise the Stoics.

The pursuit

of friendship,

and the gentle humanity of their

the
Epicureans.

ethics, characterise

Together with these peculiarities

one

common

feature cannot be ignored.

Both have

renounced the political character of the old propriety

of conduct, and diverting their attention from public
life,

seek to find a basis for universal morality in the

simple relation of

man

to

man.
all

The united weight of

these points of resem-

HISTORICAL POSITION.
blance
is

507

sufScient to warrant

the assertion that,

Chap.

notwithstanding their differences, the Stoics and Epicureans stand on the same footing, and that the
sharpness of the contrast between

^
{.c)'Fliere-

them

their laying hold of opposite sides of

is owing to greater one and the *^*'*

same

principle.

Abstract personality, and self-con-

sciousness developed into a generic idea, is for both

the highest aim. Compared with

it

not only the state

of the senses, but the scientific knowledge of things,

and the realisation of moral ideas in a commonwealth,

are of

minor importance.

In this self-consciousness
it in
is

happiness consists.
ject of philosophy,

To implant

man

is

the ob-

and knowledge

only of value

when and

in as far as it ministers to this end.

is

The
only

point of difference between the two Schools

their view of the conditions under

which that cer-

tainty of consciousness
to attain it

is

attained.

The

Stoics

hope

dual to universal law.

by the entire subordination of the indiviThe Epicureans, on the other

hand, are of opinion that

tent in himself external to

man

can only then be con-

when he is restrained by nothing himself. The first condition of happiness

from
all

consists in liberating individual life

depenfor-

dence on others, and

mer, therefore,

all

disturbing causes.

The

make

virtue, the latter

make

personal

well-being or pleasure, the highest good.

By

the

Epicureans, however, pleasure

is

usually conceived

of as of a purely negative character, as being free-

dom from
life.

pain, and
it is

is

referred to the whole of hucnan

Hence

always

made

to

depend on the moills,

deration of desires, on indifference to outward


: ; :

608

THE EPICUREANS.
and the
wisdom.
state of the senses,

Chap. XXI.

on intelligence and actions

arrive

conformable with intelligence, in short, on virtue and

Hence,

too,

the Epicureans

by a

roundabout course at the same result as the Stoics

the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of
those

who

are

altogether independent of external

(2) Itlation to Ariatippus.

and in the enjoyment of perfect inward harmony. Towards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears nearly the same relation as Stoicism. True it is that Epicurus and his School would not recognise their
things,

obligation to either one or other of his predecessors.'

' It has been already stated, p. 405, 1, 4, that Epicurus ad-

mitted his debt to Democritus, but not without some reserve, otherwise claiming to be enWith this tirely self-taught.
exception, he professed to have learned nothing from the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn, as to spare neither them JMog. 8, nor their writings. besides mentioning his abuse of

and admirers does not exclude hatred and injustice towards his predecessors, see p. 418, 2, of whom a fair estimate was rendered impossible by the superficial nature
his friends

knowledge and the onesidedness of his point of view.

of his
Sext. Math i. 2, attests ttji' irpis robs TTfp] \l\dTaiiia Hal 'ApurTOreKi]
Kol Toiis Sf>.olovs SviTiiivetav ; Plut.

Nausiphanes (sup. 342,

1), refers also to his calling the Platonists

Aiovv(Toi<6\ajcas, Plato himself in irony the golden, Plato, Hera-

clitus KuKijTTn, Democritus Atjp6KpiTos, Antidorus ^atviSupos,

26, 1, mentions a objection to Arcesilaus and Cic. N. D. i. 33, 98, says Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phsedoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in

Adv. Col.

false

the Cynics ix^P"^^ t^j 'EWtiSos, the Dialecticians Tro\v^0ovepovs,

Pyrrho i/MBris and dirai'SeuTos, and charging Aristotle and Protagoras with vices in their Diogenes refuses to youth.
allow that any of these statements are true, Bpicurus'friendliness being well known. But
the devotion of

harmony with a man whom Cic. N. D. ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad jooandum minimeque resipiens patriam.

Epicurus to

On these jokes he apparently prided himself as well as on a certain bombastic elegance. See p. 496, 6. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. Cie. N. D. i. 34, 93, says of Zeno

HISTORICAL POSITION.
But
far

509

from disproving the influence of previous

Epicureanism, like Stoi-

Chap.
'
'

systems on his own, this conduct only shows the personal vanity of Epicurus.

cism, starts with the object of bringing

down

science

from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form of

a practical science of
sophy, therefore, turn
life.

Both systems of

philo-

away from Plato and Aristotle, more exten-

whose labours they notably neglect, to Socrates and

those Socratic Schools which, without
sive

meddling with

science, are content with ethics.

Circumstances, however, led Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes.

Not only

in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of plea-

sure from the Cyrenaics; he likewise derived from

them

his

theory of knowledge, that the sense-im-

pressions are the only source of ideas, a,nd that every

feeling is true in itself.

Nor can he altogether deny

states,

the assertion that feelings only furnish direct infor-

mation respecting our personal

and hence

re-

specting the relative properties of things.

With

the

Cyrenaics, too, he taught that true pleasure can only

be secured by philosophic intelligence, and that this

intelligence aims, before all things, at liberating the

mind from

passion., fear,
is

and

superstition.

At the
dif-

sime time, he
fers,

by no means prepared to follow the

His theory of morals

Cyrenaics unreservedly.
as

has already been seen, from the Cyrenaic

Cic.

Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodoriiin,Silum,ceterosfigebat maledictis, sed Socratem
ipsum
fuisse
. .
.

Brut.

85,

292,

Epicurus
dis-

had already expressed a

irony),
nisi

paraging opinion of the Socratic

scurram Atticum
(according to

dicebat

Chrysippum nunquam Chrysippam vocabat.


510

THE EPICUREANS.
theory in this important particular, that not sensual

Chap. XXI.

and individual pleasure, but mental repose and the

whole state of the mind
possible for
is

regarded as the ultimate

life.

end, and the highest good in

It

was thus im-

him

to be content, as the Cyrenaics were,

with feelings only, with individual and personal impressions.

He

could not help pursuing a conviction

reposing on a real knowledge of things, since only on

such a conviction can an equable and certain tone of

mind depend.
(3) Relation to Devuicritus.

Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to feelings, in referring all feeling*
to impressions

from without, of which he considered

for theories of

them
upon

true representations, but he felt himself called

to

meet the Cyrenaic contempt

nature, just as the Stoics had

for science.

met the Cynic contempt

had

To the

physics of Democritus he looked

for a scientific basis for his ethics, just as they

looked to the system of Heraclitus.

But the
it

closer

he clung to Democritus, owing to the weakness of

his

own

interest in nature, the

more

becomes ap-

parent that his whole study of nature was subservient to a moral purpose, and hence of a purely
relative value.

Accordingly, he had not the least

by assuming the swerving aside of atoms and the freedom

hesitation in setting consistency at defiance,

of the will.

It

is

not only altogether improbable that

Epicurus was only a second edition of Democritus

for history

knows of no such repetitions but as a matter of fact it is false. A more accurate observation proves that even when the two philosophers

HISTORICAL POSITION.
agree in individual statements, the

511

meaning which
Democritus

Chap.

they attach to these assertions and the whole spirit

of their systems
is

widely divergent.

aims at explaining natural phenomena by natural

causes.

He

wishes, in short, for a science of nature

purely for

its

own
life.

sake.

Epicurus wishes for a view

of nature able to avert disturbing influences from

man's inner

Natural science stands with him

If in point of sub-

entirely in the service of ethics.

stance his system

is

borrowed from another system,

yet its whole position and treatment supposes an entirely

new view

of things.

The

Socratic introspec-

tion,

and the Sophistic resolution of natural philoits

sophy into personal rationalising, are

antecedents
;

historical

and

it

owes

its

existence to the general

aversion of thought for pure theory, which constitutes the

common

peculiarity of all the post-Aristo-

telian philosophy.

Excepting the systems named. Epicureanism

connected with no other previous system, so far as

is is

(4)

SeUPlato.

^^J^^^

known.

Even

its

attack upon those systems ap- and

of general dogmatic

pears to have consisted

superficial statements.

Still it

and must not be forgotten

that Epicureanism presupposes the line of thought

originated by Socrates, not only as found in the collateral Cyrenaic branch,

but as found in

the,

main

line

of regular development by Plato and Aristotle.

The

view of Plato and Aristotle, distinguishing the immaterial essence from the sensible appearance of
things,
is

and attributing

reality only to the former,

undoubtedly attacked by Epicurus as by Zeno, on

512

THE EPICUREANS.
metaphysicsl grounds, by his materialism.
tically,

Chap,
'__

Prac-

however, he approaches very

much

nearer to

this view in all those points in

deviates from the Cyrenaic,

which his teaching and resembles that of

the Stoics.

on a former occasion that the indifference to the immediate conditions of the

It has been observed
senses, the

withdrawal of the mind within

itself

itself,

the

contentment with

of the

thinking

subject,

which Epicurus required no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics, is nothing but a consequence
of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle.

Even the
is

materialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it

said,

was by no means a going back to the old preThese

sys-

Socratic philosophy of nature, but only a one-sided

practical apprehension of that idealism.

tems only deny a soul in nature or a soul in man, because they look exclusively to consciousness and
to personal activity for independence of the senses.

The

correctness of this observation

may

be

easily

proved from the Epicurean teaching, notwithstanding the severity and harshness of
its

materialism.

Why

was

it

that Epicurus relentlessly banished

all

from nature
purpose
?

immaterial causes and

did he confine

all

idea of

And why

himself ex?

clusively to a mechanical explanation of nature

Was

it

not because he

felt afraid

that the admission

of any other than material causes would imperil the

certainty of consciousness
;

because he feared to lose

the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invisible forces,

and

to expose

human

life

to influences

HISTORICAL POSITION.
beyond calculation
immaterial
?

613

if lie

were to allow of anything

view of
life,

Yet how

slightly, in his

Chap. ^^^'

does he adhere to present facts, since his wise

is

man
ideal
iso-

made

to enjoy perfect happiness

by himself alone,

independent of everything external.

is

The same
what
else

reproduced in the Epicurean Grods.

In their

lated contemplation of themselves,

do they

resemble but the Grod of Aristotle, who, aloof from

all

intermeddling with the world, meditates on him-

self alone ?

No doubt
mind
is

the independent existence of

the thinking

held only by Aristotle in a pure

and dignified manner.

By

Epicurus

it is

pourtrayed

in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form.

But the connection of the views of both cannot be

ignored.

similar relation exists generally between

the Epicurean philosophy and that

Aristotle.'

of Plato and

Little as the former can be

it

with the latter in breadth and depth,

therefore, be regarded as

compared must not,

an intellectual monstrosity.
development of the in-

Epicureanism

is

a tenable though one-sided expres-

sion of a certain stage in the

tellect of Greece.
'

Compare

in this connection the quotations from Metrodorus

on

p. 476, 1.

I.

514

THE

SCEPTICS.

PAKT

IV.

THE SCEPTICSPYRRHO AND THE OLDER

ACADEMY.

CHAPTEE

XXII.

PTKRHO.
Chap. XXII.
A. Historieal
'

Stoicism and Epicureanism are alike in one respect

they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite

dogmatic statements.
attempt to
the result
rea,ch the

position of Scepticism.
(1) Its relation to

The Sceptic Schools, however, same end by denying every

dogmatic position.
is

Varied as the paths

may
is

be,

in all cases the

same

happiness

made
all

to consist in the exaltation of the

mind above

porary
dogmatic
systems.

external objects, in the withdrawal of

his

man

within

own thinking

as the

self. Moving in the same sphere cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aris-

totelian Scepticism takes a practical

view of the and estimates the value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state It moreover agrees with and happiness of man.
business of philosophy,

cotemporary systems in
object at which
it

its

ethical view of life

the

aims

is

those systems

aim

repose

the same as that at which

of mind,

and imperturba-

HISTORICAL POSITION.
bility.

SI 5

It differs,

however, from them, none the

less

Chap
^^'''

for the

Epicureans and Stoics

make mental
it

repose to
its

depend on a knowledge of the world and

whereas the Sceptics are of opinion that
be obtained by despairing of
all

laws,

can only

knowledge.

Hence,
latter,

with the former, morality depends on a positive conviction as to the

highest

Good

with the
all

morality consists in indifference to

as

that appears

Good to men. Important as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and
Epicureanism, and that in renouncing
knowledge, and
it
is

all

claim to

all interest in

the external world,

only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of

into himself

man mon

which we have seen to be

the'

com-

feature of these Schools.

Not

only, therefore,

do these three lines of thought belong to one and

the same epoch, but such
tion, that they
is

their internal connec-

may

be regarded as three branches of

common stock. More than one

point of departure was offered to

(2) Caase.)
^'<'*''*'

Scepticism by the earlier philosophy.

rian criticism

The Megaand the Cynic teaching had taken up

Pyrrho, too, had received from

a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and

of
all

knowledge.

the School of Democritus an impulse to doubt.'

'

In

Democritus

had

denied

truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was more strongly apparent in Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math. Epijihan. Exp. Fid. vii. 88;
all

1088, a), although, notwithstanding his usual agreement with the physical views of Democritus {Plut. in Mus. 1. c. i. id. Fac. Lun. 15, 3, p. 8, 11 928; Sen. Nat. Qu. vi. 19), he cannot be considered a full
;

610

THE
particular, the

SCEPTICS.

Chap. XXII.

development of the Platonic and Aris-

totelian speculations by those

who were not

able to

follow them,

had made men

distrustful of all specu-

lation, until they at last

all

doubted the possibility of

Sceptical theories
Still
tlie

knowledge.

Not seldom do

follow times of great philosophical originality.

stronger in the sequel was the impulse given by

Stoic

and Epicurean systems. Eelated as these systems are to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was
natural that they should afford fuel to Scepticism. At

the same time the unsatisfactory groundwork upon

which they were

criticism.
If,

built,

and the contrast between

their

moral and physical teaching, promoted destructive

according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the individual

and the universal elements in

from the senses; greater dependence is, however, placed on thought. We must therefore take

Sceptic. Scepticism appears to have passed from to

Mm

Pyrrho, Anaxarchus being the

middleman (see p. 518, 2, 3), and herewith maybe combined

the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nausiphanes, it might be supposed that before Pyrrho's time a doctrine not unlike that of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We have seen that the doubts of Democritus only ex-

the

statement

on

TTavra iffTlv & &y rts itoi)ffai subject to this limitation. Anaxis said (Sea*. Math. vii. 87) to have compared the world to a stage-scene, which involvet no greater scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scep-

archus

ticism

from
is

Democritus

to

tended

to

sense-impressions,

not to intellectual knowledge.

Tlie case of Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived

not to be thought of. And as regards imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from Pyrrho, whom, according to Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and esteemed.

Pyrrho

HISTORICAL POSITION: PYRRHO.

the personal soul, the isolation of the individual as

517

Chap.
'_

an independent atom, and his being merged in a pantheistic

universe, stand

over against one another

;

without being reconciled

among the

Sceptics this

contrast has given place to neutrality.

Neither the
;

Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can claim acceptation

neither the unconditional value of pleasure, nor yet

the unconditional value of virtue

neither the truth

of the senses nor the truth of rational knowledge

neither the Atomist's view of nature, nor the Pantheistic

view as

it

found expression in Heraclitus,

can be vindicated.
certain

The only thing which remains

is

amid

universal uncertainty
itself,

abstract per-

sonality content with

a personality forming at

once the starting-point and the goal of the two con-

tending systems.

The important

back-influence of Stoicism and

Epicureanism upon Scepticism

may

be best gathered

from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis in the

New Academy
laid

after the
its

appearance of those systems.

Before that time

leading features had been indeed

down by Pyrrho, but they had never been deve-

loped into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor

rise to an expanded theory of doubt. Pyrrho was a native of Elis,' and may therefore have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and

given

(z-)p,jrrlio
5'*'^
'**''

'

followars.

'

xiv. 18,

Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. Diog. ix. 61. 1

;

We

Antigonus the Garystian, Apollodorus, Alexander Polyhistor,

Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities drawn upon by Dio-

are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our informatiou respecting Pyrrho. Besides

genes.

; ;

518

THE

SCEPTICS.

Chap. XXII.

Megarian criticism that criticism, in fact, which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. It can, however, hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor.'

To Anaxarchus,
ander's

a follower of Democritus, he attached

himself, accompanying that philosopher with Alex-

army

as far as India.^

Still

he

is less

indebted

to Anaxarchus for the sceptical than for the ethical

parts of his teaching.^
'

At a

later period

he resided

Attention has been drawn

to the chronological difficulties in ' Socrates and the Socratic Schools,' p. 255, note 1 (2nd edition). Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely called the The former son of Stilpo. seems more probable, Diug. ix. 61, having derived his state-

expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to the School of Democritus. Pint.

Tranq. An.

4, p.

Max.

viii. 14,

466. In Valer. ext. 2, he pro-

pounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite number of worlds and Clemens, Strom, i.
;

287, B, quotes a fragment, in

ment from Alexander's SiaSoxar,

it is quite the style of the compilers of SiaSoxaX to assign a Megarian teacher to a Sceptic whose connection with that School was suiEciently obvious.
''

and

Dioff. ix. 61
;

Aristocl.

1.

c.

18,

20

17, 8.

We gather from

which, agreeing with Democritus, he observes that iroXufiaBla is only useful where it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus followed Democritus, calling happiness the highest object of our desire and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet 6
evSai/xovLKhs
(
;

them that Pyrrho was originally a painter. Suidas Tlip^av only copies the present text of
Diogenes with a few mistakes. ' Besides the passage quoted

Clemens,
xii.

1.

c.

Athen. V. H.
pects,

vi.

250

548, b;

^Z.

ix.

.37).

In other res-

he differed from Democritus. For first he is charged

Clearch. in Athen.
xii.

from Sextus, p. 515, 1, which is known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus which Sextus, Math. vii. 48, ascribes to him, and since the latter quotes no proofs, it may be assumed that he had none. Anaxarchus appears to have been unjustly included
little

by
b,

548,

with a luxurious indulgence far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus

and according
52,

to Plut. Alex.

among the Sceptics, like so many others who were called

Sceptics

he had, when in Asia, renounced the independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure and Timon, in Plut. Virt. Mor. 6, p. 446, says he was led
;

by

later writers

on the

strength of a single word or

^iins riSovoirXi)^ contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have com-

away by

HISTORICAL POSITION: PYRRHO.

in his native city,' honoured by his fellow-citizens,*

619

but in poor circumstances,' which he bore with his

Chap. XXII.

He died, it would an advanced age,' between 275 and 270 Even the ancients, B.C., leaving no writings behind.* therefore, only knew his teaching by that of his pupils, among whom Timon of Phlius was the most
characteristic repose of mind.''

appear, at

mended

in Pyrrho (^Diog. ix. 63) an indifference which went

'

Diog. 66

62.

Examples
;

in Diog. 67.

It

a good deal beyond the imperturbability of Democritus and Timon commends him for his KiviKov liivos. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed in his much-admired dictum under the blows of Nitocreon's club Dioff. ix, 59 ; Pint. Virt. Mot. c. 10, p. 449 ; Clemens, Strom, iv. 496, D; Valer. Max. iii. 3, ext. 4 pMa. Hist. Nat. vii. 87; Tertull. Apol.
;

Dio Chrysog. Or. 37, p. 126, But he treats men with the same contempt'; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of independence, he spoils the whole by
60
K.
;

Conf. Plut. adroit flattery. Alex. 52 ; Ad Princ. Iner. 4, p. 781; Qu. Conv. ix. 1, 2, 5j Atlien. vi. .^l. V. H. ix. 37 His indifference was, at 250.
;

nobOity.
'

very much lacking in Eespecting Anaxarchus, see iMsac. Leet. Att. 181.

any

rate,

Diog. ix. 64

109.

According to

Diog.

64,

they made him head-priest, and, on his account, allowed to

philosophers

sounds, however, highly improbable and doubts were expressed by.^nesidemus whether his indifference ever went to the extent described by Antigonus. Ibid. 62, of not getting out of the way of carriages and precipices, so that he had to be preserved from danger by his friends. He must, moreover, have enjoyed a special good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless conduct. ^ All the dates here are very uncertain. Neither the date of his death nor of his birth is given, and the notice in Suidas that he lived after the 111 Olympiad (336-332 B.C.) is of no If, however, as Dicg. 62, avail. says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus at Alexander's first invasion of Asia, being then between 24 and 30, the statements above given are true. Diog. Pro. 16 102 Aristocl. in Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1
;

immunity ftom

taxation. According to Dioeles (_Dwg. 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.

better authorities than Seast. Math, i. 282, or Plut. Alex. Fort. 1. 10, p. 331. Neither does Sextus say that the sup-

posed poem on Alexander was

extant. The whole statement is evidently untrustworthy.

520
Chap. XXTI.

THE
important.'
pupils are

SCEPTICS.

Besides

Timon
after

several

other of his

known by name.^
Soon

His School, however,

was short-lived.*
'

Timon

it

seems to have

Timon

De Timone
1859) was

(see WacJismuth, Phliasio, Leipzig, a native of Phlius

public dancer (Diog. ix. 109). at first (JDiog. 109 Aristocl. in

;

E%is. Pr.

Ev. xiv. 18, 12),

when

tired of this mode of life he repaired to Megaia, to hear Stilpo (^Biog. 109). Stilpo being alive in the third century, and Timon's birth having happened

approximatelybetween 325-315 B.C., the connection is not so

impossible as Wachsmuth, p.
5, and Preller, Hist. Phil. Gr. et Kom. 398, suppose, though in the uncertainty of chronological data it cannot be positively stated. Subsequently

Timon became acquainted with

Pyrrho, and removed with his wife to Elis, leaving his staunch admirers {Biog. 109, 69 Aris;

tocl. 1. 0. 11,

14, 21).

He then

appeared as a teacher in Ghalcis, and, having amassed a fortune, concluded his. life in Athens It appears (^JDiog. 110; 115). from Biog. 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus (who died 241 B.C.), having nearly attained the age of 90. His death may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 820 B.C. For his life and character, see Biog. 110; 112-115 Athcn. x. 438, a, Ml. V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous writings, the best known is a witty and pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Respecting this
;

has collected the fragments. 2 Biog. 67-69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as his pupil, who, however, was not very successful in the way of keeping his temper; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecatsus of Abdera, the wellknown historian (on whom see Jl&7ter,Fragm.Hist. Grr.ii.384); and Nausiphanes, the teacher The last asserof Epicurus. tion is only tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Blis before 322 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes before 310 B.C. See p. 406, 3. According to Biog. 64, Epicurus must have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes. Nausiphanes is said not to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have admired his character {Biog. 1. c), so that he cannot properly be called his pupil.
latter, p. 51,

Numenius, mentioned by Biog. 102 (Conf. 68), among I^rho's

(Tuv^flets,

is

suspicious, J5nesi-

demus being named at the same time, and it may be questioned whether he as well as jEnesidemus does not belong to a later period of Scepticism. ' According to Biog. 115, Menodotus (a Sceptic belonging to the latter half of the second century after Christ) asserted that Timon left no successor^ the School being in

satire

{Biog.

110)

consult
3.

Wachtmuth,

p. 9

and

The

TEACHING OF PYRRHO.
become
Those who were disposed to be now joined the New Academy, towards whose founder even Timon made no secret of his grudge.^ The little which is known of Pyrrho's teaching may be summed up in the three following statements We can know nothing as to the nature of
extinct.'

621

sceptical

Chap. ^^^^-

B. Teachp,^,.""^

(l) Impus-

Hence the right attitude towards them is to The necessary result of suspending judgment is imperturbability. He who will live
things
:

"knoKUdge.

withhold judgment

happily

for happiness

is

the starting-point with the

Sceptics

must,

according to Timon, take these

:

things into consideration

things
?
is

What

is

the nature of
? ? *

What ought

our attitude to things to be

What
To the
reply

the gain resulting from these relations

first

of these three questions Pyrrho can only

to knowledge,

by saying that things are altogether inacessible and that whatever property may be

attributed to a thing, with equal justice the oppoabeyance from Timon to Ptolethe second i.e., until half of the first century B.C. Sotion and Hippobotus, how-

was a pnpil of Ms QSieid/Aparos

conf. i?ie^. ix. 113), he wascertainly not an a,clhereut of his views. See p. 43, 2. ' In Diog. 116, Enbulus is called a pupil of Euphranor, also on the authority of Sotion and Hippobotus. If PtolemEeus is named as the next one after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho's iyaryii can have been known for 150 years, Sing. 114. = Aristocl, in Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 2 i Se yi ime-iyrTis oiroS TifuDv f rjirl Suv rbv )ii\KovTa evSaifiovkimv els rpta radra 0\4ireii' irpaTov /ikv Imdla iriipuKe tJi rpiynaTcf^ deirepov U, -rim xpri Tpi-nov Tijihs vphs abtk JiaKeiffflof
''
:

mWs,

ever, asserted that his pupils

were Dioscurides, Nicolodius, Euphranor, and Praylus. His son too, the physician Xanthus, likewise followed his father. (Uwg. 109.) That, however, Timon was himself a physician, as Wachimwth, p. 5, supposes, does not follow with certainty from the words larfiKhv ^S(8aje, since these only mean he had been instructed in medicine. On the other hand, according to Sliid. ni^^iDV, the second Pyrrho, called Timon's pupil, was a changeling. If Aratus of Soli
:

622

THE
site

SCEPTICS.

Chap,

may be

predicated.' In support of this statement

Pjrrrho appears to have argued that neither the senses

nor reason furnish certain knowledge.^

The

senses

do not show things as they

pear to be,'

are,

but only as they apit

Eational knowledge, even where

seems to be most certain, in the sphere of morals,

does not depend upon real knowledge, but only upon
tradition

and

habit.*'

Against every statement the

with equal justice.*
If,

opposite

may be advanced

however, neither the senses nor reason alone can furnish trustworthy testimony, no

combined, and thus the third way

more can the two is barred, by which

we might possibly have advanced

to knowledge.^

How

many more
The

of the arguments quoted by the later

it
is

Sceptics belong to Pyrrho

short duration
it

impossible to say.

and

diffusion of Pyrrho's School

renders
TcXeOTaiOi'
*

probable that with

Ti

him Scepticism was

not
iiel

Se

irepUffTOt toTs

SIkoiov otfre &^iKov, Koi Sfxoius

oiirws ^x^^^^'^-

Aristocl.
(priffiu

1.

O.

t&

fxhv

oiv
KoCl
8tct

TrpdyfjLard
CLTTO^aivetv

avrhv (Pyrrho)
aiidifyopa

irdvrav^ fi'q^%v gfi/ai tt7 a\Tj6et(f, vdfitp Se koL e6ei irdvra tous avQp^irous irpdrreiv, ou yap fiaWov
T(J3
ft

iiriaTjs

TiiSe eJyai eKaffTOV,

affrdQfiTiTa

Kol
jU^TE

avswlKpLra,

Math.

xi.

140

Scxt. oUre ayad6v ri

TovTO
Tj^uv

[t5]
iJ.'flTe

Tcw

alffQ-fjcTfis

itrrt tpitrsi oijre

Kafcbi/,

aWct

irphs

ras

Srf^as

dXTjSeueti/
:

audpdjwav ravTa v6tf KeKpirat Kara

rbi/ Tifiava.

ov ^ ^peiSetrdai. Diotj. ix. 61 yhp fiaWov T6Se f) T6Sf ihai

fKaiTTov.

Gell. xl.

5,

Pyrrho is

In this sense the words of JiJnesidemus, in Diog. ix. 106,

'^

said to have stated ou p,a\\ov oBTusex^iTdSefi^Kslvojs^ovBeTepws, 2 See the above-quoted passage of Aristoeles and IHog. ix.
114.

must be understood
dpi^eiv

oviiv

ipriaiv

fhv Tivpfiwa SoynartKUS

ai/Ti\oytav.

Ji^

tV
'

See note

1.

Bioff. ix. 114,

^TTiXe'-yeij'

on Timon
titiBfl irohs

iTuyeX" Te

Timon, in Siog.
y\vKv
:

ix.

10.5

roiis riis aiirfl^ireij /ier' ivipLapru-

rh Tb

fjL^Ki '6ti ^(TtI

S' "

oil rlSrifit

8ti iptdvfTai ijxoXoySi.

ffKiv aire

Diog.ix. 61 olSivyhp iipaKaAhv oUri cuffxphv aire

povvros tov vov iyKpivovTas' ffvvijXflei/ 'Krvayas re koI Noviiiivios. The meaning of this proverb

has been already explained.

TEACHING OF PYRMHO.
far

528

advanced.
its

The same

result appears to follow

Chap.

from

further development in the

Academy.

The

ten rpoTToi,, or aspects under which sceptical objections were grouped, cannot with certainty be attri-

buted to any one before jEnesidemus.'

the arguments used at a later day

Portions of

may be borrowed
impossible to

from Pyrrho and his

Thus,
failure,

pupils,'''

but

it is

discriminate these portions with certainty.

if

knowledge of things proves to be a

(2)

WWi-

there only remains as possible an attitude of mdgme.rd. Scepticism and therein is contained the answer pure
;

to the second question.

We

know nothing whatever

and hence can neither

of the real nature of things,

believe nor assert anything as to their nature.

We
all

cannot say of anything that

it is

or is not

but we

must abstain from every opinion, allowing that of

which appears to us to be true, the opposite
equal justice be true.'
'

may with
our state-

Accordingly,

all

Bwg.

Tp6irai

ix. 79 refers these to Pyrrho, but inasmuch

sceptical statement Aiiyoi or rpifiroi Xlv^pdveioi. That they cannot belong to Pyrrho in the form in which they are presented by Sextus and Diogenes is clear," since they obviously

as

he

was there

describing

Sceptic views, the author of

which to his mind was Pyrrho, nothing follows from his statement. &a!t. Pyrrh. i. 36 generally attributes ancient Sceptics,

them to the by whom, ao-

cording to Math. vii. 345, he understood .Slnesidemus and

his followers. 18, 11, refers

demus, and have been referred to Pyrrho

Aristocles, 1. c. to ^nesithey may easily

them

by mistake, since ^nesidemus himself (i>itfy.ix. 106) and subsequent

Gell.
xi.
i,

Soph,

writers (Favorin. in Philostr. Vit. 5, 5 491) call every kind of

;

x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against the reality of time, and further states (Math. iv. 2) that Timon, in his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no assertion should bemade without proof in other words, he denied dogmatism, every proof supposing something established, i.e. another
; :

refer to later views, ' Sext. Math. vi. 66

proof, and so on for ever. * Aristocl, 1. o. 18, 3

Sii

524

THE
ments

SCEPTICS.

Chap, XXII.

(as the Cyrenaics taught) only express indi-

vidual opinions, and not absolute realities.

We

can-

not deny that things appear to be of this or the

other kind
;

but we can never say that they are

so.'

Even the

assertion that
is

things are of this or the

other kind,

not an assertion, but a confession by

the individual of his state of mind.^

universal
as

Hence,

too, the

maxim

of being undecided cannot be taken

an established principle, but only as a confession,

It must, howfar the captious

and, therefore, as only problematical.'

ever,

remain a matter of doubt how

turns of expression by which the Sceptics thought

to parry the attacks of their opponents,

come from
came

Pyrrho's School.

The greater
is

part, it is clear,

into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, the

lively play of
TovTO ovp
Self,

which

not older than the developyiyd}^Ko^iv,

iriDs 5'

fjLTiSf TTia'Teieit' avTa7s dAA' aSo^tiffrovs KoX 6.K\tveis Kol &KpaBdi/TOvs fhai Trepi Ij/bs iKitrrov KiyovTOS 8ti ov p,aWoy

Spufisv

fi

trus

voov^cv ayvoovfxev Ktti 8ti riSe \evKhv (palneraL SinyriiJ,aTiKas \4yajx^v

fuevov

ov

StaPefiaLoi/jLevoi
. .

el

Kal

Hanv ^
oiiK
ItTTiy.

oi)K

eiTTij',

^ Kai

^crrt

Kal

61/Ttos iffri

fOTiv, ^ oi-re ^<mv oSt' ovk Dioij. ix. 61. Hid. 76:
juijSez/

yap rh ipaivS-^ TiBe/ieSa 06^ wi tnl toioCtoi'

Koi
(j>vaiv

iv
ei
s

Ka\iirnTvpKaUiaiada.v6ii.e9aex^i Kavarmiiv,
c.
irepl
lirc-

oi fiaWov means, according to

Se

Timon, rb
OTrpofffleTeii'.
'

dpi^eiv

aW^
ix.

XOM^''*

Dio(/.

1.

St ttjs OiiSh
S/wtiav \7o-

.Snesidem.
:

in
ri/v

IHoff.

Spi^ca (puivrjs Ka!

rav
'

106
To7s

ovSiv dpi^eiv rbv Tlhppwva

8ii
&VTiKo-yiaii,

fiev

SuynaTMois
Si

<j>aiiiOfii,4vots

aKo\ovBe7v,
3.

ov y&p flstv \iyeiy 8ti (T^aipoflSiis iariv 6 /tiiir^os aWJi yitp rb /tec
ct'S

ov 5oyp.dT(i)v

ii^uoia

t^

Timou, Zind. 105. Seep. 522,

'

Diog.

ix.

103

vepl niv S>v

&fi.o\oyoiifJl.ev

iis&vBpuwoiTrdtrxOfiev
.
. .

irepl Se

Sv
tij)

01 S071UOT11C01 5ia-

Pe^aiovvrat

\6y</) <pdfi.evoi Ka-

Te(\7)(/)9oi iircxofiev

dS^\Bv
fi-fv.

vepl roirav is n6va 5 tA Triflrj yiviiTKo-rh p.iv yhp 3ti ipafxev S/io

i^oiioAoyhaeis elalv. otv Xiyojiev lufiev ipi^etv ovS' airh tovto 6pi(6fii.e6a. Diog. sta*es even this view in its later form, probably following Seait. Pyrrh. i. 197, but agreeing
4v

SSijAoi/, al Se

in substance with the quotations from Timou and Pyrrho,

hayoviiev nal rh 5x1 rdSe

I'oai'^Kei'

TEACHING OF PYRRHO.
ment of the Stoic theory of knowledge by Chrysippus,
and the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise.
In this despairing of anything like certain conviction
consists
a(f>a(Tia,

625

Chap.
\_

aKaToXrjyjna

or

siroyr],

the

withholding

judgment or state of indecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in speculation,' and from which the whole
of

School derived

its

distinctive name.^

From
bility or

this state of indecision,

Timon,

in reply to
,

{T)

Mental

the third question, argues that mental imperturba-

j^^j/^i^^''

arapa^ia proceeds, which can alone conduct

to true happiness.'

Men

are disturbed

by views and
all

prejudices
sion.

which mislead them into

efforts of pas-

Only the Sceptic who has suspended

is

judg-

ment

in a condition to regard things with abso-

lute calmness, unrufHed

Diog. Ix. 61 and 107: ArisThe expressions ai/iau. ala, dicoTa\Tn|/(a, liroxh, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use instead of them, a^/3e;p(a, ayvmcia t^s aA.7iBelas, K.T.\. If, according to Aristooles and Diog. 107, Timon first mentioned iupairia on occasion of the third of his questions, this statement is obviously inaccurate.
'

by

passion- or desire.''
is

He
Acad.
I.e. 18,

Apathy
ii.

substituted for ataCic.

tocl.

1.

raxy in Diog. 108;

42, 130.

14,

Timon. in Aristocl. speaking of Pyrrho;

aA\' olov rhv Arvfjiov iyii tSov ^S'

iSd/j-atrrov

Tramv,

Strots

SdfivavTai d^us

&(f)a-

toi re (parol t( (conf. M'aohs-

mmth,
.

p. 62)

\aSiv iBvea Kovipa, $apvv6iicv'' eyfla Kal evda

Uv^^clivetoL^ o-KiTTTtKol, aTiGpT}-

4k iraQewv ^6^11$ re Kol

/lofl^KrjS.

eiKcd-ris

vo-

TlKol, 4<peKTlKo'i, flJTTJTlKof.

Conf.
-

^^^'

p.-

Aristocl
(bna\
5'

1. c.

jo^s^^vroi

Id. in Sext. Math. ^ ^^^ ^^^^_

^

xi.

The

dloKeifj.ej'ots

ovTQi vepteffeffHai Ti-

Hai>

TvpuTOV
ot

Itoto

a.Tapa.{,iav.

t4\os Sk

fih atpaaiav Biog. 107 (TKeTTTiKol (pan t^v

'
'"'
_

&<ppwTtffTas

P?:"'"^ M^fl riauxiris Kal d<(ij/i)s

Kora toutA
^PO'^^X"" SeiAois r]Sv\6yot,
iro(|)(r|j.

iiroxhv, V "1"''^ ^P'*'""' ^'""^''fli ri arapa^la, Us (paaiv o'l te irtpl

rhv

TiV"''"

""^

Ali'e(TiSrifu)v.

Id. in Dioi/, 65.

526

THE
knows that
it is

SCEPTICS.

Chap. XXII.

a fond delusion to suppose that one

is

external condition

preferable to another.' In reality

only the tone of mind or virtue possesses value.^ Thus,

by withdrawing within himself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy.^ Absolute
inactivity being, however, impossible, the
will act

Sceptic

on probabilities, and hence follow custom;^

this

but at the same time he will be conscious that

conduct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction.'

To
tive

this province only of uncertain opinion all posi-

judgments respecting good and evil belong. Only in this conditional form will Timon allow of
goodness and divine goodness as standards of conduct.^
fore,

The

real object of this Scepticism

is,

there-

a purely negative one

T^
ttv

indifference.

It cannot

even be proved' that Pyrrho's School so far acom' ao. Fin. ii. 13, 43 Quas (externals) quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aagrotare nihil prorsus dioerent interesse. iii. Cum Pyrrhone et Aris3, 11
:
:

ipatvifjLvoif Travrl

(TBivei oSirep
Se.rt.

l\er,.

(Conf.

Math,
:

30.) Toty S^

vii.

106, of Pyrrho tpaivofA^vots aKoXovdeiv,

p. 524, 1, 2.

IHd.

See
*

p. 519, 4.

See

SfiH.

Math.
fj

xi.

20

Kara
^)

'

tone qui omnia exsquent. Acad. ii. 42, 130 Pyrrho aiitem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem,
:

fisi'

edos dyaShi'

Koxbv

aSki-

<f>opov

Trpoaar/opimiv

KaSdirip Kai
loi/te

qusttTTiifleionominatur. Epictet. Fragm. 93 (in Stol). Serm. 121,

Tlfuav iv Tots iviaKpiots

<J3^

^i)\ovv Hrav

28): Tlu^^Qiv ^Keyev fATiSey itatpepeiy ^yv

2
. . .

fi

nQvAvai,
:

yiip iyiiv

ipiu &s

fiot

KOTO$a-

'do. Fin. iv. 16, 43 Pyrrho qui virtute constituta nihil

verat

ett/at

/ivBov a\7i6iiTis opBhv

exan xaviKoi Toiya-

omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same Ibid. ii.

13, 43
= '
;

&s

7}

vaTov Beiov Te Qov atei,

Plos.

ipviTis

iii. 4,

12.
;

See p. 521, 3 Diog. 105 i

:

525,

3.

Tlfiaii iv

t$
'

Tl66tavi fpTiai jU^

^KjSejSijK^i'ot

Ui^^tava] T^v
Tois iySa\fio7s

(rijvi]9etap.

[rhv koL iy

According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Carystus (Aristocl.

1. o.

oStw \iyef ciAAa

18,

19;

TEACJIING OF PYRRHO.
modated
itself to life, as to

527

make moderation

rather

than indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and desires.

Chap. XXTT.

In this direction the

little.

School seems to have done but

Diog. ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised
for being agitated by saying It is difficult to lay aside hu;

between the apathy required by his system and practical needs. Neither do the remarks
of Ritter, iii. 451 prove that the doctrine of moderation belongs to Pyrrho and his school.
,

manity altogether. This language only proves what his aim was, and that he had found no mediating principle

528

THE

SCEPTICS.

CHAPTEE

XXIII.

THE NEW ACADEMY.

Chap.

Plato's School was the

first

to put Scepticism on a
it as

firmer footing, and to cultivate

a system.

It

laus^^' ^^^ ^^^'^ already remarked that after the time of (l) Denial Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculaledge.

^^^^ enquiries, limiting itself to Ethics.

To

this

new
it

tendency

it

consistently adhered,

when

shortly after

the beginning of the third century before Christ

took a fresh lease of

done,

life.

Instead, however, of simply

it had hitherto assumed towards knowledge an attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility

ignoring theoretical knowledge, as

it

of knowledge.

How
But

far this result

it is

was due to the

probable that

example

set

by Pyrrho

impossible to establish
itself

authoritatively.

it is

not in

the learned originator of this line of thought in the

Academy should have ignored the views of a

his

philo-

sopher whose work had been carried on at Elis in

own

lifetime,

and whose most distinguished pupil,

a personal acquaintance of his own, was then working at Athens as a prolific writer.' The whole tone
'

Conf. Dioy.

ix. 114.

Ten-

iv.

nemann's view (Gesoh.

d. Pliil.

at

190), that Arcesilaus arrived his conclusions indepen-

ARCESILAUS.
and character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the

629

New Academy
Stoic

betrays everywhere the presence of

Chap. XXIII.

influences.

By

the confidence of

its

asser-

tions it provokes contradiction

its

being necessary to

and doubt, without seek an explanation by impro-

bable conjectures as to the personal relations of Arce-silaus

and Zeno.'

This connection of the

New Academy

with Stoifounder,^

cism can be proved in the case of

Arcesilaus.^

its first

The doubts of this philospher are directed

Arcesilaus (see Geffers, Arcesila. Gott. 1842, Gymn. Progr.) was born at Pitane, in
'

dently of Pyrrho, does not appear to be tenable. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 10 6, 5, says that Zeno and Arcesilaus were fellowpupils under Polemo, and that their rivalfy whilst at school was the origin of the later quarrels between the Stoa and the Academy. The same may have been stated by Antiochus, since Cic. Acad. i. 9, 35, ii. 24, 76, appeals to him to prove their acquaintance at school. Still the assertion is valueless. There can be no doubt that both Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils of Polemo, but it is hardly possible that they can have been under him at the same time; nor if they were, would the intellectual differences of the two schools be referred simply to their personal
' ;

De

iEolia (^Strabo, xiii. 1, 67, p. 614 ; Biog. iv. 28). His birth year is but as Lacydes not stated {Diog. iv. 61) was his successor in 240 B.C., and he was then 75 years of age (^Diog. 44), it must
;

have been about 315 B.C. Having enjoyed the instruction of the mathematician Autolyous in his native town, he repaired to Athens, where he was first a pupil of Theophrastus, but was gained for the Academy by
Grantor {Biog. 29 Numen. in Mis. xiv. 6, 2). With Grantor he lived on the most intimate terms but as Polemo was the president of the Academy, he is usually called a pupil of Polemo (Oic. De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Fin. On the Straio). V. 31, 94; death of Polemo, he was probably a pupil of Crates but it is not asserted by Biog. 33, or Numen. in Mt^. 1. c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was -, pupil of either Pyrrho, Menedemus, or Dio; ;

relations.
^ ac. De Orat. ii. 18, 68; Diug. iv. 28 ; Bus. Pr. Ev. xiv. Cle4, 16 ; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220. mens, Strom, i. 301, c, calls Arcesilaus the founder of the

New

(second or middle) Aca-

dorus.

If
it,

demy.

imply

it

Eusebius seems to would seem to be a

MM

: :

5ao

THE

SCEPTICS.

Chap.

not only to knowledge derived from the senses, but

to rational

xxin.

knowledge as
^

well.'

The

principal object

of his attack was, however, the Stoic theory of irre-

and in overthrowing that theory Arcesilaus, it would seem, believed he had exploded every possibility of rational knowledge for the Stoic
sistible impressions
;

appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible

form of a theory of knowledge, and the theories of

misunderstanding of the statement that he made use of their teaching. Fortified with extraordinary acuteness, penetrating wit,' and ready speech (JHog. 30; 34; 37; CSc. Acad, Numen. in Mts. xiv. 6, ii. 6, 18 2; Pint. De Ranit. 7, p. 126; Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7 ii. 1, 10, 4 Stoi. Ploril. ed. Mein. iv. 193, 28), learned, particularly in mathematics {Diog. 32), and well acquainted with native poets {JDiog. 30, who mentions his own attempts at poetry, quoting some of his epigrams), he appears to have early distinguished himself. PromPfei. Adv. Col. 26, p. 1121, it appears that in Epicurus' lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he
; ;

retirement (^Diog. 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle, and genial character (^Diog. 37 quoting many individual traits, 44 vii. 171 ix:. do. Fin. v. 31, 94 Pint. 115 De Adulat. 22, p. 63 Coh. Ira, ^lum, V. H. xiv. 13, p. 461. 96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. Piog. vii. 171 Plut. De Adulat. 11, p. 55. He left no writings {Piog. 32 Plut. Alex.
; ; ; ; ; ;
;

Virt. 4, p. 328).
> Cie. De Orat. iii. 18, 67 Arcesilas primum ... ex variis Platonis libris sermoniliusque Socraticis hocmaxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit

quem ferunt esse omne animi

. .
.

aspernatum

sensusque ju-

had propounded

his sceptical

views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to have placed his career too early
(^Biog. 4.5), in

making

his dxiAi
B.C.

between 300 and 296

On

the death of Crates, the conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (JOiog. 32), through whom it attained no small note {Strabo, i. 2, 2, p. 15 Diag. 37 Numen. in Em. xiv. 6, 14). From public matters he held aloof, and lived in
; ;

dicium, primumque instituisse nou quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandilicentia with which Augustin., herein doubtless following Cicero, c. Acad. iii. 17, 39, charges him, contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis
causa.
^

Conf.

Numen.

in Eus. Pr.

B V. xiv. 6, 12, and above, p. 86, 4.

ARCESILAUS.
Plato and Aristotle he ignored altogether.

631

Indeed,

Ohap.
V"V"TTT
1_

no peculiar arguments against knowledge are referred

to him.

The

old sceptical arguments of Plato and

Socrates, of Anaxagoras,

Empedocles, Democritus,

and Parmenides, are repeated,' all of which apply only to the knowledge of the senses, and
Heraclitus,

not to rational knowledge.

Nevertheless, Arcesilaus
latter along

aimed at overthrowing the

mer.^

with the for-

For the opinion that he only used doubt as a preparation to or means for concealing genuine Plato-

nism/

is

opposed to

all credible authorities.

It ap-

pears, however, all the

more

clearly, that to

him

it

seemed unnecessary to refute the theory of a knowledge existing independently of the senses.

The Stoic arguments in favour of irresistible impressions Arcesilaus met by asserting that an intermediate something between knowledge and opinion, a kind of conviction common to the wise and the
unwise, such as the Stoic KaTaXrj'f'is,
is

inconceivable

the wise man's conviction being always knowledge,

and that of the

fool

always opinion.^

Going then

farther into the idea of (pavTacria KaraXTjirTiicij, he en-

deavoured to show that

tradiction
'

it

contained an internal conis

for to conceive {KaraKtj^is)

;

to approve
iii,

PlMt. Adv. Col. 26, 2 Cio. Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter's view of the latter passage that Arcesilans dwelt on the diversities of philosophic teaching in the view of refuting it (iii. 478) appears to be so entirely without foundation, that he rather appealed to its unanimity to confront doubt.

die.

De

Orat.

18.

Sea
Dio-

p. 530, 1.
'

SeM. Pyxrh.

cles

of Cnidus, Eus. Pr. Bv. xiv. 6, 5

i.

234
;

Numen, in
Aui/ustin.

Acad. iii. 17, 38. GefEers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy, * Sesd. Math. vii. 163.
c.

M M

632

THE
tion,
if

SCEPTICS.

Chap. XXIII.

{avyKaraBea-is), and approval never applies to sensa-

but only to thoughts and general ideas.'

Lastly,

the Stoics regarded force of conviction as the dis-

tinctive

mark

of a true or irresistible conception, and

as belonging to it in distinction

from every other, the

of such a nature, but
If no
is

Sceptic rejoined that such conceptions do not exist,

and that no true conception

that a false one

is

may be
since

equally irresistible.^
is

certainty of perception
possible.'

possible,

no knowledge
for

And

the wise

man

point Arcesilaus agrees with the

on Stoics must

this

only
re-

consider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing

mains

for

him but

to abstain from all

and every

statement, and to despair of any certain conviction.''

'

SoBt. Math.
Cic.
:

1.

c.

154.

'kpKiulKaos.
'KtfT'n\^OiT{}VT]

oBtb
TIJS

yiip

Kol ave-

Acad.

asserted An conoeptional perception is such an impression of a real object as cannot possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus en-

24, 27. Zeno irresistible or

ii.

itrtlTT'fllxTJS

atTia

buted to Arcelaus

All that is here attriis the assertion that eTTurrTjrhv is the cause of ^irio-Ti^^r), and that it is so
ipai/eiTcu.

deavoured to prove nullum tale visiim esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset

produces a (pavraala The connection in which these statements were

it

vrhen

KoTo^TjTrTiK^.

made by

Arcesilaus
:

was

pro-

The same vievir in Sesnt. 1. c. To these may be added discussions on deceptions of the senses and contradictions in
esse.

the statements of the senses in Sext. vii. 408, and otherwise attributed to the Academicians. Conf Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70 Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum
.

bably this If there is such a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produce it. These objects, however, do not exist, there being no object which does not admit a false opinion equally well with a true
one.
' Sext. 155 ^u)) ofo-ijj 8e KaroKvrTiKTJs (jmvraatas ovSi Karixiit)j ytvtiireTaf tiv y&p (taToATj:

ipse falsa

omnia

diceret, quae

sensibus viderentur, Zenon auvisa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno Plut. De An. (Kr. vii.) 8ti ov rh 1, probably refers

tem nonnulla

TTTiKp (pavTatri^ (TiryKOTcffletris. oSarts 5 KaTa\ii^eQis

^i]

vdvTa

effra*

&KaTd\7iirTa.
*

Sext.
;

1.

u.

Cic.
,-

Acad.

i.

4iri(rrriThv alrioy ttjs iiriariinii! iis

12,

45

ii.

20,

66

Pint. Adv.

ARCESILAUS.
It is therefore impossible to

533

we even know
thing.'

for certain that

know anything, nor can we do not know anydefinite

Chap.
XXIII.

It was quite in accordance with this theory

for Arcesilaus to lay

down no

view in his
others.^

lectures,

but only to refute the views of

Even

his

disparaging remarks on dialectic,^ sup-

posing them to be genuine,'' are not at variance with

this conduct.

He might

consider the arguments of

the

Stoics

useless, whilst, at

and the sophisms of the Megarians as the same time, he was convinced

that no real knowledge could be attained by any

other means.

He might

even have inferred from

is

their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as

little as

the senses.

There

no real difference be-

tween the result at which he arrived and that of

Pyrrho.'
Col. 24, 2
;
,

Mus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, By Sext. Pyrrh. i. 16; 6, 4. 233, it is thus expressed Arcesilaus regards itroxh as being a good in every case, o-iy/coTo:

fleo-is
'

as

an

evil.
i.

Cic.

Acad.
iii.
.

12, 45.

Cic. Fin.

ii. 1,

De
28
;

Orat.

18, 67

2; v. 4,11; Diog. iv. ;

7.
:

Conf

Pliit. C.

Not. 37,

long more fittingly to the Chian Aristo (see p. 59) than to ArStill, if Chrysippus cesilaus. condemned the dialectic of the Sceptics (according to p. 66, 1), Arcesilaus may very well have condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Does not even Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, probably following Cameades (see p.
541,
4),

Stoi. Floril. 82, 4 'Apirea-iKaos 6 tpiKiaotpos e^rj robs SiaXc/cTiKous ioucc'yol Tois tpnipOTralKTais (jugglers), o'hives xapUvras wapa\oylQovTai and, Tbid. 10 (under the heading 'ApK<rt\dov ix rav
; :

cause

it

object to dialectic, befurnishes no know-

S^piivou avonviiiiaveufiiraii') XeicTi/cV Se (pedye, avyxvic^

Kfirw.

6ia-

r&va

* This fact is not only recognised by Numen. in Mis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 4, but by Seint. Nor does the Pyrrh. i. 232. difference apply to Arcesilaus which the later (see p. 533, 1)

' The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and they would seem to be-

Sceptics made between themselves and the Academicians, viz. that they asserted the principle of doubt tentatively,

534

THE

SCEPTICS.

Chap.

xxm.
(2) Praiahility.

If opponents asserted that

by denying knowledge
Arcesilaus declined

all possibility of action is denied,'

to accede to this statement. as

No

firm conviction

is,

he maintained, necessary for a decision of the will; for an action to come about a perception influences
the will immediately, leaving the question as to truth entirely out of sight.^
its

In order to act sensibly

is

we need no knowledge. For this purpose probability quite enough anyone can follow probability, even
;

though he
ledge.
practical

is

conscious of the uncertainty of all knowis

Thus probability
life.*

the highest standard for

We

are but scantily informed

and influences the
avyKwriBctris.

how

whereas the Academicians had

asserted
absolutely. Even Sextus asserts it with some dif\iyoi ris '6ti iidence (irh^iv et ^)i K.T.K.). On account of this
it

will without

connection

with Pyrrho, the Stoic Aristo called Arcesilaus (following H. vi. 181) TTp6ir8e
:

Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus (_Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 12. See above 87, 1), there can be no doubt that it was pro-

pounded by
'

Arcesilaus.
vii.

Heart.

Math.

158

aW

iirel fierce

raiha

eSei Kal irepl ttjs

AtiSapos.
iv. 33.

Sexft.

1.

c.

Numen.
;

in Bus. Pr. Ev. xiv.

'

5;

11

Diog.

TOV $iov Sie^ayayTis ^t)TUv $J ris ov xwpls KpiTTjplou TretpuKev diroSiSoffOai,

d<f>'

oS Kal

7j

si'SaifjLoyia,

has been already seen that this was the key to the position which the Stoics and Epicureans took up against the
It

TOvrdffTi rh tov ^lov t4\os, ^prijfievr]v

ex^i T-^v
Srt

iriffTiv,

<pTi(rly

&

'ApKe(ri\aos,

trepl

irdvTtev

Sceptics. " Pint. Adv. Col. 26, 3, protecting Arcesilaus against the attacks of Kolotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot show that ^irox^i leads to inactivity, for irivTO. ireipCiffi /col (rrpftpovatv avTois oi/x (nri]Kovffiv t] dpfji^ yev4(r$ai ffvyKardBecris ouSe TTJs ^oirris dpxhv JSe^aro t^i' aJftrflrjinj', d\\' ^i lauTijs aywyhs iirX tas irpi^eis ^<pdvTj fi^ SiOfi4v7i tov TTpoaTiBeadai. Perception arises

ei:4x<av Kavovikl t^s alpso'eis koL ipvycts Kal Kotvus Tcky Trpd^eis t^
ev\6y(j},

Kara tovt6 re itpoepx^Kpiriipiov

fievos

rh
fxkii

Karopd^fret'
irepi^

T^v

yap

eifBaifioviav
tppovfjffews,

yivetrdat

5tct rris

r^v

5e

(t>p6v7i(nv KLveiaOoA

ivro7s learopQ^.

fuaai, rh Be KaT6p9a.'p,a elvai (ac-

cording to the Stoic definition)

^irep

dTToKoyiay.

TrpaxBiv eilKoyov exel r^v 6 irpoff^x^^ oiv r^ if-

\^ytp KaropBdiffii koX euSaijuov^irci.

It is

Numen.

a mistake to suppose, with in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6,

'

CARNEADES.
Areesilaus applied this principle to the sphere of
rals,

635

moall

Chap.
XXIII.

but a few of his utterances are on record,'

bearing witness to the beautiful spirit of moderation

in the

moral theory of the Academy, which was

otherwise exemplified in his

own

life.^

Comparing with the theory of Areesilaus, that which was propounded by Carneades a century later, the same leading features are found to be underlying but all points have been more carefully worked out, and placed on a wider footing. Of the imme;

B. Carneades.

diate followers of Areesilaus

4,

it

can only be stated

Si' 'i\ov,

that Arcesilaias denied pro-

theory of a Kpaais

that

babilities.
' In Pint. Tran. An. 9, g, B, 470, he gives the advice rather to devote attention to oneself and one's own life than to works of art and other external things. In Stoi. Floril. Poverty is bur95, 17, he says densome, but educates for virtue. Ibid. 43, 91 Where there are most laws, there are most Plut. transgressions of law. Cons, ad Apoll. 15, p. 110, has a saying of his as to the folly Id. De of the fear of death. Sanit. 7, p. 126, Qu. Conv. vii.

p.

his criticism of dogmatism extended to natural science. 2 Conf. p. 529, 3 g, B. ^ Geffers, De Aroesilse Successoribus (including Carneades) Gott. 1845. Areesilaus
:

was succeeded by Laoydes- of

Gyrene, who died 240,B:C.,'after presiding over the School for 26 years, having entrusted it in his lifetime (probably only shortly before his death) to the care of the PhocEeans Telecles and Buandros {Biog. iv. 59-61). The statements made in Diog. 1. c, Numen. in JSns. Pr. Bv. xiv. 7, Phtt. De Adul. 22, p. 63, JSttan, V. H. ii. 41, Atlien, x. 438, a, xiii. 606, c, PUii. H. N. X. 22, 51, referring particularly peculiarities individual to which he appears to have had, must be received with caution, and particularly the smack which Diog, 59 passingly mentions and Numeuius depicts

a somewhat 3, 7, records severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is the statement in Tertull. Ad Areesilaus held Nation, ii. 2 that there were three kinds of Gods (in other words he divided the popular Gods into three
5,
:

the Olympian, the the Titans. It implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods. It also appears by
classes):
stars, and

with intolerable garrulity. Diog.

calls
oiiK

him
oKiyovs

av^ip

i7niv6ra.Tos

Kal

the language used in Pint. C. Not. 37, 7, respecting the Stoic

iff)(7iKiiis

^T}\ur<i.s
TTeVTJi

<pl\6irOJ'6s

T iK ViOV KOi

636

THE
sumed

SCEPTICS.
It

Chap.

that they clung to their teacher. that they did little in the

may be

pre-

xxin.

way

of expansion,

since the ancients are silent as to their labours, only

Carneades
To

'

being mentioned as the continuer of the

Respecting these inneades. dividuals nothing is known beyond the names. ' Carneades, the son of Epior Philocomus, was born at Cyrene {Biog. iv. 62; Strabo, xvii. 8, 22, p. 838 ; Cic. Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (^Biog. 65), 129 B.C., in his 8oth year. Imoian, Macrob. 20 assigns to him the same age. With less probabi-

his admirers belongs Attavisit to ins I. of Pergamum. his court was however declined in skilful language (^Diog. 60, which Geffers, p. 5 clearly misunderstands). In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having been the first to commit to writing the teaching of the New Academy (^Sidd. AoK typa^e ^iKdco^a Koi "Jrepl the latter is somewhat <l>v<rfus extraordinary for a Sceptic) was by some mistake called its

comus

'

lity

Cic.

Acad.

ii. 6,

16,

Valer.

Max.
to 90,

viii. 7, 5,

extend his age

According 50). to Biog. vii. 183, see p. 46, 1, he

founder
(^JDiog.

appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus' lifetime. Panaretus {A then. xii. 552, d j^l. V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (Pluta/i-cli. Philopon. 1 Arab. 5, 7) are also called pupils of
;

The most distinArcesilaus. guished pupil of Lacydes, aqcording to Eus. xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by Biog. ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is also mentioned by Timotheus, in Clemens, Strom. His successors were 496, D. Teleoles and Euandros, who jointly presided over the School. Buander, however, according to Cie. Acad. ii. 6, 16, Biog. 60, Ens. 1. u., having survived his colleague, was followed by Hegesinus (^Biog. 60 do. 1. c.) or Hegesilaus (as he is called by Clemens, Strom, p. 301, c), the immediate predecessor of Car;

making his birth year 213 B.C. Later admirers find a remarkable fact in his birthday happening, like Plato's, on the Carnean festival (^Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 2, 1). Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time received instruction in dialectic {do. Acad. ii. 30, 98) from the Stoic Diog'enes, and studied with indefatigable zeal {Biog. 62) philcsophic literature, and in particular the writings of Chrysippus {Biog. 62 Plvt. Sto. Kep. 10, 44 Mas. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13). In 1 56 B.C. he took part in the well-known associa;

tion of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the

boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death, pro-

bably also at an earlier period, he became blind {Biog. 66),-

CARNEADES.
Academic Scepticism.
Carneades
is

The importance attaching

is

to

Chap
XXII]

therefore all the greater, and he

in

consequence called the founder of the third or

New

Academy.'

Nor

is

this

done without reason, witness

the admiration which his talents called forth

among

cotemporaries and posterity,' and the flourishing con-

He

left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (Biog. 66, 67; de. Acad. ii. 31, 98; Respecting his cha32, 102).

gather from a that, whilst vigorous in disputation (_Diog. 63 Gell. N. A, vi. 14, 10), he was not wanting in a repose of mind harmonising with his
racter,

we may

few expressions
;

his name), to be a special favourite of Apollo, but that tradition said an eclipse of the moon (Suid. Kapv. adds an eclipse of the sun) commemorated his death ; a-v/jardS^iay, ttjs ttv ettroi ris, aiviTTOixevov tov jiAffl' ^\iov KaWltTTOv TUi/ liffrpwv (,Diog. 64). Straio, xvii. 3, 22, p. 838, says of him: oZtos 8J

Twv
<\)a>v

i^ 'AKoS-rifiias Apiirjos <j)lKo{t6'

;

That he principles (Diog. 66). was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justice, we can well believe (^Qnintil.
xii. 1, 35).

The quotation in Ding. 64

(t]

ffvtniiffaffa ipixris nai Siahiaei)

does not indicate fear of death, but simple resignation to the Still less so course of nature. does his language on Antipater's
suicide (and also what is quoted in Stob. i'loril. 119, 19) indicate a faint-hearted attempt at imitation afterwards abandoned, but only a not very witty ridi-

dfi.o\oyehai and there was only one opinion among the ancients regarding the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence, aided as these were by un-" usually powerful organs (see the anecdotes in I'lut. Garrul. Conf. 21, p. 613; JHffg. 63). Diog. 62 CUc. Fin. iii. 12, 41 De Orat. ii. 38, 161 iii. 18, 68; Gell N. A. vi. 14, 10 Nnmen. in Emeiius, Pr. Bv. xiv. 8, 2 and 5 Laetant. Inst. v. 14 Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success atKome,
;
;

says fi&Kiara, S' tj KapvedSov x<^pts,

:

culing of an action which appeared to Carneades eminently

^s Siyafils T6 irXeiffTTi KoL S6^aTris SvvdfJietos ovK airoSeoutra , &s

. .

mad.
'

Se^. Pyrrh.
;

Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12 croi. 20.

2

220; Mis. Lucian. Mai.

T^v irdMi/ tjxV^ ei/eVXTjo-g. Kal K6yos Kareix^^^ ^^ av^p^E^Arju

Tivivjia

\vv

Kol

;^eipotl/Aei/o$,

epura

Seivhif

His School held him in such esteem, that it not only considered him, together with Plato, because of his birthday (TOless the idea grew out of

&\Kav

TjSoyciv Kai

dtarpL^Siv iKpiKQOQ-'

KeffdiiTes ivQovfft&ffi Trepl

538

THE

SCEPTICS.
Himself a pupil
in tone of mind,^

Chap,

dition in which he left his School.'

of Chrysippus, and resembling

him

Carneades expanded not only the negative side of

the Sceptical theory in
ness entitling
all

directions with an acute-

him to the first

place

among the ancient

Sceptics, but he was also the first to investigate the

positive
bility,

side of Scepticism, the doctrine of proba-

and to determine the degrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he carried

the philosophy of Scepticism to

its

greatest

scientific perfection.
(1) Nega-

As regards the negative

^^JQ^g^ qj-

side of these investiga-

tweddeof
iitg.

the refutation of dogmatism, the attacks of

Carneades were directed partly against the formal

possibility of knowledge,

and partly against the chief

actual results of the knowledge of his day, and in

both respects he had mainly to do with the Stoics,'

little as
{a) Denial

he confined himself to them.

impossibility of knowledge in ge-

To prove the
jjeral,

ofposd-

fm-mal

There is no kind of conviction which does not sometimes de^

^gj^g ^g
tees
its
.

he appeals sometimes to experience.

consequently there

mw

ge.

own

truth.*

is none which guaranGoing then further into the

'

*
'

de. Acad. ii. 6, 16. See p. 536, note. i%a*. Math. vii. 159 toBto
:

KOI & 'ApKealKaos. i Sk KapvedS-qs ou fxivov Tots ^Ta'iKois aAAct koL

KaxTtTOiS'Kph avrovavTi^i^TOLffffeTO
TTfpl

system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of his attack. Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162 I'lut. Garrul. Augustin. c. Acad. 23, p. 514
; ;

iii.

17, 39.
.

In Math. ix. 1, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diifuseness in discussing the f uudamental principles of every
ToS
KpiTiipiov.

* Sext. 1. o. koX S^ TrpSnos n^v abrif koX Koivhs nphs Tr(ii'Tas cVt! \6yos KaB' %v iraplaraTai 8ti

obSh
pioi',

ia-nv airhus i,\i]6(ias Kpiri)ov \6yos o&k

a1ir9ii<rts

o4 (pav-

CASNJEADES.
nature of our notions, he argues, that since notions
consist in the

,639

Chap.
XXIII.

change produced on the soul by im-

pressions from without, they must, to be true, not

only furnish information as to themselves, but also

as to the objects

producing them.
case,

Now,

this is

by

no means always the

many

notions avowedly

giving a false impression of things.

Hence the note

of truth cannot reside in an impression as such, but

only in a true impression.'

It

is,

however, impossible

to distinguish with certainty a true impression from

one that
visions,

is

false.

For independently of dreams,

and the fancies of madmen, in short, of all the unfounded chimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth,^ it is still undeniable that

many

false notions

resemble true ones

most unmistakably.
two
tibly
is

The

transition, too,

from truth

to falsehood is so gradual, the interval between the

occupied by intermediate links so innumeso slight, that they impercep-

rable,

and gradations

go over one into the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line between the two
opposite spheres.^
Tiuria
Trdi/To

Not content with proving

tioohus,
'

this

otiK SXSa ti tuv ovrav yip toDto avWii^Si]!/ Sia-

whose immediate adCic.

versary was Carneades.

rfieiiStTat Tjiius.
'

According to

Acad.

Sext.
.

1. c.

160-163.
; ;

2 Conf Sext. vii. 403 Cio. Acad. ii. 15, 47 28, 89 Carneades being undoubtedly meant, although not mentioned by name. For the further sceptical arguments in Cicero tally with those which Sextus attributes to Carneades, and those here quoted are refuted by An-

40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions (1) that there are false notions (2) that these cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true ; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one and not the other (4) that there is no true notiou by
ii.

13,

540
Chap. XXIII.

THE

SCEPTICS.

assertion in regard to the impression of the senses,

Carneades went on to prove

it

with regard to general

impossible for us to

notions based on experience and intellectual conceptions.^

He showed

that

it

is

distinguish objects so

much

alike as one

egg

is

from
that

another; that at a certain distance the painted surface

seems raised, and a square tower seems round

an oar in the water seems broken, and the neckplumage of a pigeon assumes dififerent colours in
the sun
as
;

that objects on the shore seem to be

moving

we

sail by,

and

so forth

in all of

which cases
this

the same strength of conviction belongs to the false as

to the true impressions.^

He showed further that

cannot be solved
;

applies

equally to purely intellectual ideas; that

*

many

logical difficulties

that no

the side of which cannot be placed guishable from it. and third of these
first

false one not distinThe second

percipi possit. Haec autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.

^

propositions not being denied at all, and the

Sext. vii. 409

;

Cie.

Acad,
:

ii.

26, 84

one only being denied byEpicurus in regard to impressions on the senses, all imporproposition, to which Sextns, vii. 16-t and 402, and Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 4, look as the pith of the proof.
'

men. Therewith

Nu25, 79 in Euis. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5.

7,

19

is probably connected the statement in Galen,

tance attaches to the fourth

De

Cie.

Acad.

ii.

13,

42

Divi-

enim In partes et eas quidem magnas primum in

dunt
:

sensus, deinde in ea, quse ducuntur a sensibjas et ab omni

oonsuetudlne, volunt (the

obscurari against which Chrysippus already directed severe attacks. See p.

ffvviiQita

quam

Opt. Doct. c. 2, vol.i. 45, K, to the effect that Carneades persistently denied the axiom that things that are equal to a third are equal to one another. His assertion probably comes to this that it may be possible to distinguish two things as unequal, which cannot be distinguished from a third, that therefore two things may appear equal to a third without being or appearing equal to

46, 2

91, 2) turn

perveniunt

one another. Sext. 402 and 408.

* The fallacy called ^eMItems ia carefully investigated

ad earn partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectuia ulla res

CARNEABBS.
absolute distinction can be
little,

541

drawn between much and

;

Chap.

in short, between all differences in quantity

it is

and that

the most natural course in

all

such

cases to follow Chrysippus,

ous inferences which

and to avoid the dangermay be drawn by withholding

facts,

judgment.'
concluded at
senses, that

Arguing from these

first

Carneades

in regard
is

to impressions of the as ^avraa-ia

there

no such thing

KardXrj-jniKi} in the Stoic sense of the term, in other

words, that
racteristics,

no perception contains in

itself

cha^

by virtue of which
is

its

truth

may

be

inferred with certainty.^

This fact being granted,

the possibility

in his opinion precluded of there

residing in the
distincition

understanding a standard for the

of truth from falsehood.

this belief
its

The undersenses.*

standing
nents

and

was shared by his oppo-

must
tests

derive

material from the

Logic

the formal accuracy of combinations of

thought, but gives no insight into their import.''

Direct proofs of the uncertainty of intellectual convictions are not therefore needed.

may

also be attained

in

The same result more personal way, by a

individuals obtain their
Cie. Acad. ii. 28,. 91, who here appears to be following Philo, and, subsequently, Garneades as well. Carneades also gives utterance to a similar

raising

the question,

how

in Cic. Acad. ii. 30,95 (by Carneades as he saj'S, 98), as an instance in point. Sext. 416 Cic. 1. c. 29, 92. Since Chrysippus tried to meet
'

the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against

view of dialectic in
93,
4),

Stoh. Floril.

13 (conf.

Phd.

C. Not. 2,

the Stoics.
2

Sext. vii. 164;

ii. 5,

Augmtin.

c.

Acad.
'

11.

comparing it to a polypus consuming its own tentacles. It is able, he conceives, to expose fallacies, but not to discover truth.

Sext. 165.

'

542

THE
'_

SCEPTICS.

Chap,

XXIII
.

knowledge. He can only be said to know a thine who has formed an opinion respecting it. In the mean time, until he has decided in favour of some definite opinion, he has still no knowledge. And what dependence can be placed on the judgment of one who has no knowledge ?
. .

(J) Attack
"^ftaifio

In these formal enquiries into the possibility of

knowledge, Carneades had chiefly to deal with the
Stoics,

hnmvledge
tinte.

with

whom he

holds a

common ground

in his

appeal to the senses.

The

Stoics were also his chief

(o)

The

opponents in his polemic against the material results

^^ ^'^ dogmatic philosophy.

'^v^ms'of tJui Stoics

Natural science having

throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian philosophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise

engaged more attention at the hands of Carneades than science.^ In as far as he studied Natural science,
he appears to have been entirely opposed to the Stoic
treatment of the subject, and to this circumstance

we owe

it,

that better information

is

forthcoming

regarding his

scientific, or rather his theological in-

vestigations, than regarding his moral views.

The
and

Stoic theories of

God and

of final causes

'

afforded

ample scope
difficult for

for the exercise of his ingenuity,

it

from the ground he occupied

cannot have been

him

to expose the

weak points of that

' ac. Acad, ii.36, 117. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician, a,nd it is probable that it was the work
'

Oic. N, D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical views of Gods Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cu:

of Carneades.
"

piditatem.

JMoff. iv. 62.

CARNEABES.
theory.
belief in at

543

The God

Stoics

had appealed in support of the

to the consensus gentium.

How

Chap. ^^'

close

hand was the answer,' that the

universality of

was neither proved to exist, nor as a matter of fact did it, but that in no case could the opinion of an ignorant multitude decide anything.
this belief

The
cies

Stoics thought to find a proof of divine provi-

dence in the manner in which portents and prophe-

To expose the delusion, no very expanded criticism of divination was necessary.^ Going beyond this, Cameades preceded to call in question
true.

come

the cardinal point of the Stoic system

in God, the doctrine of the soul

the
its

belief

and reason of the

arrange-

universe,

and of the presence of design in

How, he asks, is the presence of design manifested ? Whence all the things which cause
ments.
destruction and clanger to

men

if

it

be true that

God

has
is

made

the world for the sake of

man ? ^
is it

If

reason

praised as the highest gift of God,

not
to

manifest that the majority of

men

only use

it

make themselves worse than brutes ? In bestowing such a gift God must have been taking but little
' do. N. D. i. 23, 62 iii. 4,11. Here, too, Cameades is not mentioned by name, but the reference to him is clear by Cicero's remarking that he is quoting the Academic view. ^ Conf. Cic. N. D. iii. 5, 11. ' The Academician in Cic. Acad. ii. 38, 120. That these ar;

guments were used by Cameades is clear from Plut. in Porpkyr. ce Abst. iii. 20, where the
latter vindicates

against the

Stoics the existence of vermin, of poisonous plants, of beasts of prey. In answer to Ciirysippus' assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the object for which it was destined it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be killed and eaten.
;

644

THE
care of this maioritv.'

SCEPTICS.

Chap,

Even

if

we

attribute to
still,

XXIII

mar
has

direct

blame
?^

for the

misuse of reason,

why

G-od bestowed on

him a

reason which can be so

muci

abused
a wise

Moreover, the Stoics themselves say thai

can nowhere be found?

man

too, that folly is the greatest misfortune.

They admit, How, then,

can they speak of the care bestowed by

when on
is

God on men, whole their own confession, the of mankind

sunk in the deepest misery ? ^ But allowing that the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon
all,

they could, at

least,

have taken care that

it

should go well with the good.

Instead of this, the

that crime succeeds

experience of a hundred cases shows that the upright

man comes

to a miserable

end

and that the criminal can enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds undisturbed. Where, then, is the agency of Providence ? ^ The facts being entirely different to

what the Stoics suppose, what becomes of

ferences?
world, and granting that the world
is

their in-

Allowing the presence of design in the

as beautiful as possible,

and good

why

is

it

inconceivable that

nature should have formed the world according to

natural laws without the intervention of

God

Ad-

mitting, too, the connection of parts in the universe,

why

should not this connection be the result simply

of natural forces, without a soul of the universe or a

deity?*
'

Who

can pretend to be so intimately ae'

'
'

N. D. iii. 25, 65-70. presumed that the leading thoughts in Cicero's description belong to the School
Cic.

It is here

lUd. Hid.
Cio.

31, 76.

32, 79.

N. D. iii. 32, 80. Cio. Acad. ii. 38, 1 20 N. D.

;

pf Carneades.

iii.

11, 28.

CARNEADES,
quainted with the powers of nature, as to be able to
prove the impossibility of this assumption
?

545

Zeno

Chap. XXIII '_

argued that rational things are better than things

irrational, that

the world

is

the best possible, and

must therefore be rational.

world must have a soul.
demician,'
is

Man,

says Socrates, can

;

only derive his soul from the world

therefore the

But what,
?

replies the
is

Aca-

there to show that reason

it

best for

the world, if

be the best for us

or that there

must

be a soul even in nature for nature to produce a

soul ?

What man

is

not able to produce, that, argues

Chrysippus,

being

must have been produced by a higher by deity. But to this inference the same objec-

tion was raised by the Academicians as to the former

one, viz., that it confounds

view.

man.
self ?
^

two different points of There may, indeed, be a Being higher than But why must there needs, be a rational

man-like Being ?

Why a God ? Why

not nature her-

Nor did the argument seem to an Academician more conclusive, that as every house is destined to be inhabited, so, too, the world must be intended for the habitation of Grod. To this there was the obvious reply :^ If the world were a house, it might be so;
but the very point at issue
is

whether

it is

a house
it is

constructed for a definite purpose, or whether

simply an undesigned result of natural forces. Not content with attacking the conclusiveness
of the
belief

(/3) T/iec-

arguments upon which the Stoics built their

in a

^^If^g
Stoics at-

God, the scepticism of the Academy

8,

tacked,

ac. N. D. iu. 26; 11, 27.

21

10,

" '

Ibid. 10, 25. L. 0.

N N

646
Chap.

THE
was an untenable one.

SCEPTICS.

souffht to demonstrate that the idea of

God

itself

The

line of

argument which
is

Carneades struck out for this purpose

essentially

the same as that used in modern times to deny the

personality of Grod.

gards

Him

as

an

infinite, but, at

The ordinary view of Grod rethe same time, as

a separate Being, possessing the qualities arid living To this view Carneades the life of an individual.
objected, on

the ground
;

that

the

first

assertion

contradicts the second

sible to

and argues that

it is

impos-

apply the characteristics of personal exist-

God without limiting His infinite nature. Whatever view we may take of God, we must regard
ence to

Him

as a living

Being

and every living being

is

is

composite, having parts and passions, and

destructible.'

hence

Moreover, every living being has a

Far, therefore, from refusing such a

sense-nature.

nature to God, Carneades attributed to

interest of omniscience, far

than the

five

we

possess.

Him, in the more organs of sense Now, everything capable

is

of impressions through the senses

also liable to

change
soul

sensation,

according to the definition of

Chrysippus, being nothing more than a change of

and every such being must be capable of pleasure and pain, without which sensation is inconceivable. Whatever is capable of change is liable to
;

destruction
liable

whatever

is

susceptible to pain

is

also

to deterioration, pain being caused

by dete-

rioration,

and

is

also liable to destruction.^

As the

o. N. D.
34.

iii.

12,29;

14,

' C!ic. N. D. iii. 13,32. More fully Sext. Math. ix. 139-147.

CAJRNEADES.
capacity for sensation, so too the desire for what
in
is
is

647

Chap.
-'^^^""

harmony with nature, and the

dislike of

what

opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever has the power of destroying any being is
lives

opposed to the nature of that being, everything that being exposed to annihilation.' Advancing

from the conception of a living being to that of a rational being, all virtues would have to be attributed to

God

as well as bliss.

neades, can any virtue be ascribed to

But how, asks CarGod ? Every

virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which

it

consists.

He

only

is

continent who might pos-

sibly

be incontinent, and persevering who might be

indulgent.

To be

danger

to be

brave, a man must be exposed magnanimous, he must be exposed

to to

misfortunes.

being not feeling attraction for

pleasure, nor aversion for pain

and

difficulties,

dan-

gers

and misfortunes, would not be capable of

little

virtue.

Just as

could we predicate prudence of a being

;

not susceptible of pleasure and pain

sisting in

prudence con-

knowing what is good, bad, and morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where there is no susceptibility to pleasure or pain ? Or how can a being be conceived of capable of
feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling pain, since

pleasure can only be

known by

contrast with pain,

and the possibility of increasing life always supposes Nor is it otherwise the possibility of lessening it.
Here too Garneades is expressly mentioned. But without being mentioned the agreement with Cicero would show that we
were dealing with his views, Oie. IMd. Further proofs
'
;

of the transient nature of all earthly beings are there given.

2

N N

548

THE
\.

SCEPTICS.

Chap,
-y^Y'TTT

with intellieence (evBovKla). C3

He
it, it

only

is

intelligent

1_

who
If,

always discovers what will subserve his purpose.

however, he must discover

cannot have been

intelligence can

previously

known

to him.

Hence
is

only belong to a being

who

ignorant about much.

Such a being can never feel sure that sooner or later something will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to fear.

A being

susceptible of plea-

sure and exposed to pain, a being

with dangers and

fear,

difficulties,

who has to contend and who feels pain and

we cannot conceive we cannot conceive of

must

inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite

If,

and destructible.
of

therefore,

God except
at
all,

in this form,

Him

our conception being self-destructive.'

yet another reason, according to Carvirtue
;

There
neades,
virtue
is

is

why God cannot have any

above
its possessor,

because

above God.^

and there can be nothing Moreover, what is the position of God

?

in regard to speech

It

was easy to show the ab-

surdity of attributing speech to

Him,' but to

call

Him

speechless {a(f)a>vos) seemed also to be opposed

belief.''

to the general

Quite independently, howment has a look

about
it.

' Sext, Math. ix. 152-175, quotes the same argument for ffoxpitoffipri, and so does Oio. N. D. ill. 15, 38, both without mentioning Carneades by name, but since both writers introduce these proofs in the same position of a longer argument, in which Carneades is expressly mentioned both before and after, there can be no doubt that to him they refer. 2 Sext. Ix. 176. The argu-

of sophistry It alludes to the im-

portant question which engaged so much attention in the middle ages, viz. How in Deity the universal side is related to the individual, whether goodness and reason are for God a law

independent of His will or not. ' As Epicurus did. See p.

468,
*

3.

Sext. 178.

CARNEADE8.
ever, of details, the inconceivableness of
so soon as the question is raised,
is

549

God

appears.

Chap.
^^^^^'

whether the deity

limited or unlimited, material or immaterial.

;

God

cannot be unlimited
sarily

for

what
its

is

unlimited

is

neces-

immoveable

soulless

since by virtue of

because

it

has no place
boundlessness
;

and
can-

it

not form a whole permeated by a soul

ordinarily think of both as

but God we
as

with a soul.
is

moving and Nor can God be limited

;

endowed
be

for all that

limited

is

incomplete.

Moreover,

God cannot

immaterial, for Carneades, like the Stoics, held

tliat

what

is

immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling,

nor activity.

Neither can he be material,

all

com-

posite bodies being liable to

change and destruction,

If,

and simple bodies,

ing neither
life

fire,

water, and the like, possess-

nor reason.'

then,

all

the forms

under which we think of

God

are impossible. His

existence cannot be asserted.

Easier work lay before the Sceptics in criticising

(7) Polyjv-s ai-

and their defence by the Stoics. Among the arguments employed by Carneades to overthrow them, certain chain-arguments are prominently mentioned, by means of which he
polytheistic views of religion

tacked.

endeavoured to show that the popular belief has no

distinctive
'

marks

for the spheres of

God and man.

Sext. 1. c. 148-151 ; 180. That SexCus here refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with Oio. N. D. 12, 29-31
14, 34.

Sextus himself seems to refer not only individual arguments, but the whole series of them, to Carneades, when he oontinues, 182: ^ptSTriyraiSJ Kal

Cicero introduces his

:

w6

remarks with the words Ilia autem, qu^ Carneades afferetat,

toC Kafv^iSov Ka\ aupniKus

k.t.A.

rttifs,

quemadmodum

dissolvitis?

550

THE
If Zeus
is

SCEPTICS.

Chap.

a Grod, he argues, his brother Poseidon

xxili

must likewise be one, and if he is one, the rivers and streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a Grod, the appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must be a Grod and, consequently, month, year, morning,
;

midday, evening, must

all

be Gods.^

Polytheism

is

here refuted by establishing an essential similarity

between what
this

is

accepted as
It

God and what

is

avow-

edly not a God.

may

readily be supposed that

was not the only proof of the acuteness of CarDivination, to which the Stoics attached especial

neades' reasoning.^

importance,^ was stoutly assailed.

Carneades proved

that no peculiar range of subjects belonged thereto,

but that in

all cases

admitting professional judgment

experts pass a better

judgment than

diviners.^
is

To

know
it
is

accidental
useless to

events beforehand

impossible;

know

those that are necessary and

it

unavoidable, nay, more,

would even be harmful.'

If the

No
a

casual connection can be conceived of between

prophecy and the ensuing realisation.^

Stoics

met him by pointing

182-190.

to fulfilled prophecies,
at

he replied that the coincidence was accidental,'

'

/SfeiT*.

More fully
:

Sexin do. N. D. ill. 17, 43. tus also observes, 190 xaX SaXous S^ toioiStous fftjopiiras ^pterSxriv 01 iTfpl tiv KapvedSriv eis ri (i); ehai eiois. 2 To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned arr gument in Cfio. N. D. iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, proving the want of unity in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the

same name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from some Greek
treatise.
'

See

Cfic.

Divin.

i.

4,

7,

12.
*
'>

Ibid. ii. 3, 9. Ibid. v. 13 ;

is

ades
*
'

but Carnenot here mentioned by

i.

name.
Ibid.
13,

23

6?o. I.e. and Divin.

49, 109. ii. 21,48.

CABNEABES.
the same time declaring

551
stories

many such

to be

Chap.
xxiii.

without doubt

false.'

Connected probably with these attacks on divina- (S) Moral tion was the defence by Carneades of the freedom of "* "(
'

the atoics

the will.

The

Stoic fatalism he refuted by an appeal attacUA.

is

to the fact that our decision

free

and since the

In so
but

Stoics appealed in support of their view to the law

of causality, he likewise attacked this law.^

doing his intention was not to assert anything positive respecting the nature of the

human

will,

only to attack the Stoic proposition, and if for his

own part he adhered

probable.

to the old

Academic doctrine

of a free will, he still regarded that doctrine as only

Less information exists as to the arguments by

which Carneades sought to

ciples of morality.
.

assail the current prinis

Nevertheless, enough

known

to indicate the course taken

this sphere.

by his Scepticism within

in the year 156 B.c.,^ he

In the second of the celebrated speeches

which he delivered at
denied that there
all
is

Eome

such a thing as natural right

laws are only positive civil institutions devised by

for the sake of safety
;

men

and advantage, and

is

for

the protection of the

as foolish

weak and hence he

regarded

who

prefers justice to interest,

11, 27.
'

which after

'

Cic.

1. c. ii.

Fato, 11, 23 ; 14, The freedom of the will, 31. he there says, may be asserted even granting that every motion is referred to a cause, for it is not necessary that this law should hold good of the will.
2

Cie.

De

He will therefore confine it to bodily motion, and not allow it unconditional validity,
"

Laet. Instit.

v. 14,

follow;

ing Cic. De Bep. iii. 4 Plut. Cato Maj. c. 22 QvAntil. In;

stit. xii. 1, 35.

652

TEE
all
is

SCEPTICS.
In support of

Chap,

the only unconditional end.

xxin.

these statements he appealed to the fact that laws

ferent countries.

change with circumstances, and are different in difHe pointed to the example of all
nations,

great

such as the Eomans,

the

all

of

attained to greatness by unrighteous means.

whom He
the

impressed
questions

into
raised

his

service

many

casuistical

hy the

Stoics,

expressing

opinion that in

all

these cases it is better to commit

the injury which brings advantage

for instance, to

murder another to save

that intelligence
tion to justice.*
is

one's

own

life

rather than

to postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred

a state of irreconcileable opposi-

This free criticism of dogmatic views could not

fail

to bring Carneades to the

same

result as his

predecessors.

Knowledge

is

absolutely impossible.

A man
sides

of sense will look at everything from all and invariably withhold judgment, thus guard-

ing himself against error.*

'

And
oiKtias

to this conviction
yip ^aaiviiims
or
iwpo-

Laetatit.
iii.
;

\.

Eep.

18, 59.

8-12 On the above oasuisti; ;

Cie. De \& 14 17 Fin. ii.

c.
;

Kiiov,Tipbs Tolniiv

Ix""

'rpdrrip, fin-Te ;ui)5eK

irpoirirTaieiv.
irTai<r/a is,

oirToxria

cal cases see 23,

89,

De

Off. p.

iii.

13;
2.

according to the Stoic

and above,

299,

Probably Carneades was the canse of the study of casuistry

t^/iij

definition {Diog. vii. 46) = ^iriirtoD Tnire Sei o-wTKoravMftrBai koI

among
^

the later Stoics. do. Acad. ii. 34, 108 conf

;

In Id. Att. xiii. 21, he compares this itroxh to the

31, 98.

drawing up of a charioteer, or to the guard of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to Ivoxh that AUx. Aphr. De An. 154 a, says The Academicians
:

consider airTaaia the irpwrov

oi-

|U^j. It consists, therein not giving a hasty assent to any proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever, aTrpoirjrTMirIa becomes then identioal with ivoxt] or fi7vom, which Max. Tyr. Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimace end of Car>

fore,

CARNEADES.
be clings so persistently that he altogether refuses to
listen
a,t

553

Chap.
'_

to the objection that the wise

man must
from
actions

be

least

convinced of the impossibility of any firm

conviction.'

The

earlier Sceptics,
all

far

attri-

(2)

Pod-

buting an equal value to

notions on this account,

for

tlwteaah,-

had not
thoughts.
neades,

dispensed with

reasons

and

^pi "^
.

This point was now taken up by Car-

who

in attempting to establish the conditions ofprola***'

and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain a clue

as to the

kind of convinction which was

still

per-

mitted in his system.

despair of

However much we may knowledge, some stimulus and groundis

work

for

action

needed.

Certain

suppositions

must therefore be assumed, from which the pursuit To these so much weight of happiness must start.^ must be attached that they are allowed to decide our conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be true, or to be something really known and conceived. Nor must we forget that
neades. Hence Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against every subject, without expressing a decided opinion, die. N.D. I. Acad. ii. 18, 60 Divin. 5, 11 ii. 72, 150 Kep. iii. 5, 8 ; Tuso. V. 4, 11 5 Jihis. Pr, By. xiv. 7,
; ; ;

esset,
set,
. . .

si

probabile

nihil

es-

12.
'

<Mc.
Seiet.

Acad.

ii.

9, 28,

Math,

vii.

166

aira-

To^jne>/os5eaiauTi)s[i KapxeiJSijj]
Ti Kpiriiptov irpis re rijp

tov $iov
ttjj fu-

Sie|a7u7-))v Koi vphs

tV

Nam 104 qui de omnibus rebus contineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actlonem excitemur, etc. Hence the assurance {Hid. 103 Stol. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 231) that the Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They accept it as a
: ;

et sequitur omnis vitie Ibid. 101 eversio. 32, cum placeat, eum
;

Satfiovlas irepi/CTrjiriJ' Sufifuy aitmayKiCerai xal Kaff avrhp repl

Ti/iTov SioTaTTto-flai, k.t.\.

do.

Acad. cbus)

ii.
:

99 (of ClitomaHtenim contra naturam

31,

phenomenon of consciousness, and a basis of action, but they deny that it strictly furnishes The senses are knowledge.
iyifts,

but not

ciKpifieTs,

554
Chap, XXIII.

THE
false ones

SCEPTICS.
is

even the nature of our true ideas

such as that of

may

be,

and that the truth of ideas can

certainty.

never be

known with
all assent,

Hence we

shall

withhold

not allowing any ideas to be true,

{d\r)6r]

but only to have the appearance of truth

(jiaivsadai)

or

probability

{efju^acns,

iriOavoTrjs).^

In every notion two things need to be considered,

the relation to the object represented which makes
either true or false,
it

and the relation to the subject

seeT/i

who has the notion, which makes it The former relation is, or false.
judgment; the
latter,

either true

for

the reasons

already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our

the relation of a notion to

ourselves, falls within the sphere of consciousness.''

So long as a notion seemingly true

distinct, like
it

cloudy and inan object contemplated from a distance,

is

makes no great impression on

us.
is

When, on

the

contrary, the appearance of truth

strong, it pro-

duces in us a belief^ strong enough to determine us

to action, although it does not

come up

to the im-

pregnable certainty of knowledge.''

Sext. and Cic. 1. o. Sext. 1. 0. 167-170. Ibid. 171-173 or, as It is expressed by Cicero, Acad. ii. It is possible nihil per24, 78 oipere et tamen opinari. It is importance that Philo of no
'

^
^

sen^ujrum (aliquando, as the latter passage adds) non percepto,

tern.
ii.

i.e.

opinaturum sapien-

and Metrodorus saidCameades had proved this statement, whereasClitomachus had stated,
hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum. Acad. ii. 48,
148; 21, 67, attributes the state-

c. Acad, 26 (undoubtedly in point of matter and probably in terms following Cicero) Idprobabile

Conf. Augugtin.

11,

verisimile Academioi vocant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut

vel

id

ment to Carneades, without any

qualification,

adding only

Ad-

quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To

CAENEADES.
Belief,

655
is

however, like probability,

of several

Chap.

degrees. The lowest degree of probability arises when a notion produces by itself an impression of
truth, without being taken in connection with other

xxni.

notions.

The next higher degree

is
it.

is

when

that im-

pression

confirmed by the agreement of

all

notions

which are related to

degree
is

The

third

and highest
all.
;

when an

investigation of all these notions

results in

producing the same corroboration for

case a notion
is

In the

first

called probable {iriOav^)

in the second probable and undisputed {iriOavr)

dtrspLcnraa-Tos)
;

km

in the third probable, undisputed, and

tested (jridavrj kuI diripienraa'Tos koI TTspLaSsvfisvr]).^

Within each one of these three

distinguishing marks, which

classes

difierent

gradations of probability are again possible.^

of probability, appear

The must be considered in

to

the

investigation

have

been investigated by Carneades in the spirit of the In proportion to the greater or Aristotelian logic.^
less

practical importance of a question, or to the

accuracy of investigation which the circumstances allow, we must adhere to one or the other degree of
probability.''

Although no one of them

is

of such a

nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this circumstance need not deprive us of certainty in
the same effect, Miseh. Pr. Ev. Carneades declared xiv. 7, 12 it impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted
:

fhai aKardhwra, oil Conf. Cic. Acad ii 17, 54, where the objection is raised to the New
irivra
iiev

irdvra

ii

&Sr,Ka.

cernvmt, omnia se reddere inea dioo iucerta, quod nolunt certa, qu^ &Sn\a Gr^oi. ' Sext. 1. o. 173; 175-182; Pyrrh. i. 227 conf Cio. Acad. U. 11, 33; 31, 99; 32, 104. ^ Sext. 1. c. 173 ; 181. Hid. 176 183.
; ;
.

Academicians

Ne hoc quidem

Ibid. 184.

556

THE

SCEPTICS.

Chap.
XXIII.

respect to actions, provided

we have once convinced

ourselves that the absolute certainty of our practical

premisses
hesitate ditional

is

not possible.'
affirm or
is

to

way which
its

Just as little shall we deny anything in that conalone possible after what has

been stated.
the sense of

Assent will be given to no notion in

being absolutely true, but to many

notions in the sense that

probable.''
(i)

we consider them highly

Moral

Among questions about which the greatest possible

certainty
is

and

religious

felt to

be desirable, Carneades, true to

view of
lije.

his whole position, ciples of morals

;

gave a prominent place to prinlife

'

and action being the principal

thoroughly
of
dis-

things with which the theory of probability has to

do.''

We

hear, therefore, that he

cussed

the fundamental questions

Ethics, the

question as to the highest Grood.^

>

On

this subject he
i.

Seart. 1. o.

174

dc. Aoad.
ydp
;

'

Sext. Pyrrh.

226

ayaShv

ii.31,99.
I. u. 32, 103 48, 148. explanation does away with the charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in do. Acad. ii. 18, 59 24, 78 (see p. 554, 3), on 21, 67 the ground that he allowed, in

ri fpcwiv elvat ol ^AKaSrifiaiKol

Cio.

Kol KaKbi/,
juerct

ovx

&ffirep TifiHS,
'6ti

aWA
aya;

This

rov

TretreiffOat

inBavov
Kal

iffrt

fuiWov h Keyovffip
fl

flvuu

6bv

viriipxeii'

rh evavriov

* "

See p. 553, 2

Here the question

554, 4. arises

contradistinction to Arcesilaus. that the wise man will sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain statements. Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7, even asserts that he expressed hjs own convictions to his friends in private but this assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus (see p. 531, 3), as may be seen from
;

the Sceptic derive his conviction as to probabilities in morals 1 and as perception is not available for the purpose, GefEers concludes (De Arc. Successor. 20) that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For

Whence does

the passage on

p. 557, 2.

such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot be gathered from the hypothetical language respeot-

CARNEABES.
distinguished
six,

657

or relatively four, different views.

Chap.
'_

If the primary object of desire can in general only

consist

of those things which correspond with our

nature, and which

into

consequently call our emotions

of desire or

exercise, the object

must be

either

pleasure,

or absence

of pain,

conformity with

nature.
results

In each of these three cases two opposite

are possible
:

either the highest

Good may
latter is

consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the

activity

which aims at
of the

its

attainment.

The

the view

Stoics only,

and

arises

from

re-

garding natural activity or virtue as the highest

Grood.

Hence the

six possible views are practically

reduced to four, which taken by themselves alone, or

else

in combination, include all existing views re-

specting the

highest Good.'

But

so

ambiguously

did Carneades express himself as to his particular

preference of any one view, that even Clitomachns declared he was ignorant as to his real opinions.''
It

was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting

the Stoics, that he propounded the statement that

the highest

Good

consists in the

enjoyment of such

things as afford satisfaction to the primary impulses

ing the freedom of the will in See p. Cie. De Fato, ii. 23. 551, 2. Nor is it, indeed, neoessary that Carneades, who never pretended to hold any psychological theory, should

have had any opinion on the subject, Supposing he did have it, he might have appealed to exquite
as readily or

fact that certain things are far more agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote or disturb happiness. ' Cic. Pin. v. 6, 16, to 8, 23 ; Conf Tuso. v. 29, 84 ; Bitter,
.

iii.

686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades' division, which he would otherwise

perience

more so than the Stoics, and have been content with the

hardly have accused of being inaccurate and superficial, ^ Cie. Acad. ii. 45, 139.

658

THE
of nature.'

SCEPTICS.

Chap,

Nevertheless, the matter has often been

xxin.

placed in such a light as though Carneades had

propounded this statement on his own account and the statement itself has been quoted to prove that
;

he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses apart from virtue as an end in itself.^ It is also asserted that he approximated to the view of Callipho, which does not appear to have been essentially difThe same ferent from that of the older Academy.*
leaning to the older

Academy and

its

doctrine of

moderation appears in other recorded parts of the

Ethics of
Carneades.
fortune he wished to
of
its

The pain caused by mislessen by thinking beforehand

the destruction of

possibility

and after

Carthage he deliberately asserted before Clitomachus

that the wise

man would

never allow himself to be

disturbed, not even by the downfall of his country.'

> InCic. Acad. ii. 42, 131 troducebatetiamCarneades,non quo probaret, sed ut oppoaeret
:

' CSe. Acad. ii. 45, 139 Ut Calliphontem sequar, cnjusquidem sententiam Carneades ita
:

frui

sumnmrn bonum ease rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset (yutuow'). Similarly Fin. v. 7, 20 Tusc.
Stoicis,
ids
;

studiose defensitabat, ut earn probare etiam videretur. Cal-

This view differs 30, 84. from that of the Stoics, because it makes the highest Good conV.
sist not in natural activity as such, but in the enjoyment of natural goods. 2 Olc. Fin. ii. 11, 35 Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from pain), Cameadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). Cont. Ibid. \.
:

lipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum aliqua accessione or, as it is said, Fin. t. 8, 21 ; 2.5, 73 Tuso. v. 30, 85, voluptas cum honestate the highest Good, * Pint. Tranq. An. 16, p.

475.
" ac. Tusc. iii. 22, 54. Let be observed that this view of Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, videri fore in Eegritudine sapientem

it

7,

20

8, 22.

patria capta.

The other

state-

CARNEADES.
Putting
quite in
all

559

these statements together,

we obtain

Chap.
xxiir.

a view not unworthy of Carneades, and certainly

harmony with

his position.

That philosceptical

sopher

could not, consistently with his

principles, allow scientific certainty to

any of the

various opinions respecting the nature and

aim of

moral action;

and in

this point

he attacked the

Stoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency

in calling the choice of

what

is

natural the highest

to

business of morality,

and yet not allowing

what

is

simply according to nature a place

to have been brought to

among

goods,'
is

was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater

said

admit that not the

objects to

which choice
is

is

directed, but the actual

choice itself,

a good.^

He
;

even asserted that the

Stoic theory of Groods only differed in words from

that of the Peripatetics

to which assertion he was

probably led by the fact that the Stoic morality

appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory

therewith

connected of things to be desired and

If there were any difference

things to be eschewed.^

between the two. Stoicism, he

the real wants of nature.
ments of Caraeades on
ethics,

thought, ignored

The

Stoics, for instance,

.

Carneades.
Stoics.

Carneades
it

even
to the
:

such as that in Phct. De Adulat. 16, p. 51, hare nothing charaoteristic about them. gee p. 279. Stob. ' Plut. C. Not. 27, 14
1 ;

practically attributes
Cic.

Fin.
.

iii.
. .

12,

41

Car-

Plutarch, howEel, ii. 134. ever, only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It ap-

neades tuus rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod puguare non destitit, in omni hac qusestioue, quae de
bonis et mails appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis coutroversiam, sed no-

pears more probable that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which

Antipater

defended

against

minum.

560

THE SCEPTICS.
called a
'_

Chap,

good name a thing indifferent

Carneades,

however, drove them so

of this

much

into a corner because

statement that they ever after (so Cicero

least a secondary value

assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a

good name at
lieved to find

among

things

to be desired {'n-po'ny/j.svay

Chrysippus, again, befor the ills of life

some consolation
no

in the thought that

man

is free

from them.

Car-

neades was, however, of opinion that this thought

could only afford consolation to a lover of
ill
;

it

being rather a matter

exposed to so hard a

for

sorrow that

all

should be
too,

fate,'

Believing,

that

man's happiness does not depend on any theory of

ethics,'

he could avow without hesitation that

all

other views of morality do not go beyond probability

;

and thus the statement of Clitomachus,

without doubt correct.
exclude
conviction

as

far as it refers to a definite decision as to the highest

good,

is

But
in

just

as the

denial of knowledge does not, according to the view

of Carneades,

general
it

on

grounds of probability, no more does

vince of ethics.

in the pro-

Here, then,

is

the intermediate

position which was attributed to

him

a position not

only suggested, by the traditions of the Academic

School, but remaining
as a
last

residuum to the
inconsistency of at
sit

sceptical destroyer of systems so opposite as Stoicism

and the theory of pleasure.

'

The
biis,

Fin.

iii. 1 7,

57.

sophoTiun sententia

de

fini-

do. Tuso. iii. 26, 59. ' Hid. V. 29, 83: Et quoEiam videris hoc velle, ut, quae'

tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam prEesidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare
solitum accepimus,
etc.

cumque dissentientium

philo-

CARNEABES.
one time identifying the satisfaction of natural instincts with virtue, and at another time making them
distinct
is

56]

Chap.
~^^^^'^-

from virtue, which

for

is

attributed to Carneades,
is

an inconsistency

which probably Cicero

alone responsible.

The real meaning of Carneades can

is

only be that

virtue consists in an activity directed

towards the possession of what

according to nature,
'

and hence that

cannot be separated from this as the highest Grood. For the same reason, virtue, in
it

his opinion, supplies all that is requisite for

piness.^

hap-

Hence, when

it is

stated that notwithstanding

on moral subjects, Carneades was a thoroughly upright man,' we have not only no reason
his scepticism

to doubt this statement as to his personal character,

but we can even discern that

it

was a practical and

It

legitimate consequence of his philosophy.

may

appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation of

absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct
nevertheless, it is
all

the scepticism of post-Aristotelian times.

an inconsistency deeply rooted in That

even
its scientific

scepticism Carneades brought to completeness, and

in logically developing his theory,

defects

came to light. For the same reason we may

He

also give credit to

explicitly says, Fin. v. that as each one defines the highest good, so he determines the honestum (the Kahhn, virtue). The view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum
'

cording to nature, the prima

7, 18,

naturam are also prima in animis quasi rirtutum

secundum

igniculi et semina. ^ See p. 560, 3, and Plut. Tranq. An. 19, p. 477, where,

and bonum in an activity aimIng at what is according to nature adding that, according to the view which places it in the possession of what is ao;

however, the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch,

^

Quintil. Instit. xii.

1,

1,

35.

See above 636,

end.

662

THE
'

SCEPTICS.

Chap,

the statement that Carneades, like the later Sceptics,

notwithstanding his sharp criticisms on the popular

and philosophic theology of his age, never intended On this to deny the existence of divine agencies.'
point he acted like a true Sceptic.

He

expressed

doubts as to whether anything could be known about

(xod,

but for practical purposes he accepted the be-

lief in

God

as

an opinion more or

less

probable and

useful.

Taking

all

things into account, the philosophic

importance of Carneades and the School of which he

was the head cannot be estimated at so low a value as would be the case were the New Academy merely
credited with entertaining shallow doubts, and Carneades' theory of probabilities deduced from rhetorical rather

than from philosophical considerations.*

For the

last assertion there is

no ground whatever

Carneades distinctly avowed that a conviction resting

on probabilities seemed indispensable for practical

needs and actions.

On

this point, too,

he

is

wholly

in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only

with the

the later Sceptics.

New Academy, He

but also with Pyrrho and

differs

from them only

but

in

the degree of accuracy with which he investigates

the varieties and conditions of probability

44 Hso Cameades aiebat, non ut Deos toUeret. Quid enim philosopho minus conveniens? sedutStoi'

,a
ar-

Cic.

N. D.

iii.

17,

God, but that he finds the

guments imsatisfaotory.
wise Sextus, Pyrrh.
nlv
$liji

Like2: t^

iii.

KaTaKoAoueoGfTes iSoJi-

cos nihil de Diis explicare convinoeret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i. 22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in

aras
/xiv.
'

^a/iii/ elvai Seobs koI trepo-

fiey fleous koI rpovosii/ airoiis (pa-

Mtter,

iii.

730, 694.

SCHOOL OF CARNEADES.
question of degree can least of all be urged against
a philosopher.
,

563

Chap.

Nor should doubts be

called shallow

_1^__L

which the ancients even in subsequent times could only very inadequately dissipate, and which throw light on several of the deepest problems of life by
the critical investigations they occasioned.

No doubt,
all,

in the despair of attaining to knowledge at

in the

and

attempt to reduce everything to opinion more

or less certain, indications

may be

seen of the ex-

haustion of the intellectual spirit, and of the extinction of philosophic originality.

Nevertheless

it

must

never be forgotten that the Scepticism of the

New

Academy was not only

naturally

harmony with the course taken by Greek philosophy as a whole, but

in

that

it

vigour leaving no doubt that

was pursued with an acuteness and a scientific it was a really im-

portant link in the chain of philosophic develop-

ment.

In Carneades this Scepticism attained

growth.

its

highest

c. School

The

successor of Carneades, Clitomachus,' ^/j"j"

he became esteemed as a philosopher and productive as a
virriter {JDiog. iv. 67).

' Clitomachus was a native of Carthage, hence called by Max. Tyr. Diss. 10, 3, & Aifivs, and originally bore the name At home he of Hasdrubal. devoted himself to study, and wrote several treatises in his mother tongue (rp iSdj (pavf iv

Treatises
Cie.

of his are

mentioned by
;

Acad.
ii.

ii.

31,

He 92. Stob. Floril. vii. 55) not before 110 B.C.

98 32, 102; J?io^. died (according to

by
(as

suicide,

Zwmpt

Tp TrarplSi 4^i\o(r6'<j>ei).' When 40 years of age (according to Steph. Byz. Be urbe Kapxi**": 28), he came to Athens, was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, -and devoted himself to it with such zeal and success {Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; Athen. ix. 402, c) that 31, 98
;

remarks, Ueber d. philosoph. Sohulen in Ath. Abh. d. Berl. Akad., Jahrg.1842. Hist.Philol. Kl. p. 67), since, according to

do. De Orat. i. 11, 45, L. Crasduring his qusstorship, met him at Athens, which falls
sus,

at the earliest in this year.

He
old.

must then have been very

o 2

564

THE
is

SCEPTICS.
exponent of the views taught
of his

Chap. XXIII.

known

as the literary

by Carneades.'

At the same time we hear

;

being accurately acquainted with the teaching of the

Peripatetics and Stoics

doubt

his first
it

aim

to refute the

and although it was no dogmatism of these

Schools,

would appear that Clitomachus entered

into the connection of their doctrines

than

is

usually the case with opponents.'

more fully As to his

fellow-pupil,

unimportant utterance

Charmidas (or Charmadas),' one wholly is our only guide for deter-

mining

his views.''

For ascertaining the philosophy

of the other pupils of Carneades,^ nothing but the

'

Mog.

iv.

67

die.

Acad,

ii.

32, 102.

* As the peculiar observation in IHog. iv. proves av^p

:

iv rais rpifflv dlpeffefri SiairpE^as, sv re

'

ry

'AAaST^/iai'K^ Kal ireptira-

TTJTlKy Koi (TTaiK-p.

According to
;

6,

17

De

tor, 16,

Acad. ii. 45 Ora61, Charinadas was a

Cio.

dicendi, nisi qui philosophodidicissent. Sext. Math. ii. 20, also mentions the hostile attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians, at whom both he and the School to which he belongs tilt. His fellow-disciple Agnon

rum inventa

Orat.

i.

11,

drew up a
to
'

treatise, according
ii.

Quintil.

17, 15, entitled

pupil of Oameades, whom he followed not only in teaching

Charges against the rhetoriBitter's

cians.'

inferences,

but in method. He must have survived Clitomachus, since he taught at the same time with Philo. See p. 566, 1. Philo, however, according to Clitomachus, undertook the presidency of the School {JBus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9). According to
Cio.
i.

that Charmadas recommended philosophy as the only way to eloquence, and thus openly avowed the end of the philosophical doctrine of probability, iii. 695, make far too much of

chance expression, which really says nothing but what

the Stoics, and before
Plato,

De

Oraf.

ii.

88, 360, Tusc.

them

he was remarkable for a good memory. * ac. De Orat. i. 18, 84: Gharmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores nominabantur et qui
24, 59,

had

said.

' In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, CHc. Acad, ii.

dicendi prsecepta traderent niplane tenere, neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi
hil

6, 16, mentions Hagnon and Melauthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also mentioned

by
xiii.

Quintilian. (See AtJien. Cicero adds that 602, d.)

SCHOOL OF CARNEADES.
scantiest fragments have been preserved.

565

The

state-

Chap.

ment

Academic School degenerated into empty subtleties, and thereby became an object of contempt,' may deserve no great amount of belief but it does seem probable that the School made no important advance on the path marked out
;

of Polybius that the

xxin.

Metrodorus of Stratonioe passed for a friend of Carneades ; he

&ITT dtaTTOpiLV, clS^ivut^v

[1. fi

Sv-

had joined

him from among the

(JDiog. x. 9).

yardv] ia-ri,Tabs iv'PM\vai^ Suras 6(rippaiytr6ai rStv e^ofievuy uuy 4y

"E<p4<Ta, Kol Stari^eiv,
fiii

Epicureans Metrodorus

This

na

xaB'

must neither be

h Kaiphv iv

^AKoSTjfiiq.

SiaKfyovraL

confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the pupil of Charmadas (see p. 566, 1), nor with the Metrodorus distinguished
as a

vepl Tointov oiix inrkp &\\uv &p' iv oiKip KaraKeifievoi ro^rovs 5iaT(BevTat Tohs \6yovs' i^&v Si' uTrcp-

^o\^v T^s

'irapado^o\oylas

eh

Sia-

painter, 168

B.C.,

whom

.Smilius

Eome
135).

Paulus brought to {Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11,

0o\ijv iJxatTtriiv '6\tjv a'lpetrtv, Sxrre Ka} ra Ka\u/s aTropoifj.eva vapSt ToTs
ivOpciiTois eis

ibmarlav

fjx^'^'t

f"'

The former must haTe

Xwpls
c&ffre

TTJs iSias atrroxias Kal 7o7s

been younger, the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius (Diog. ii. 64), and also of Carneades in his later years {Phct. An.
Sen. S. Ger. Resp. 13, l,p. 791), of Naples, according to Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45, a distinguished teacher in the Academic School, likewise towards the close of the second century. Another pupil, Men-

veois TotovTov

ivreroKaiTi ^\ov, Tuv fiev ijdtHuv Kal irpayfia' TiKuv \6yuv ^ijSk rijv rvxovirav
iirivoiav
Troie7(T6aty
8i'

Siv

Hujitris

Tols tpt\o<Totpova't^ Trepi Seros avu<pf\eis Kal napaSo^ovs evpeai?ij)ylas Kevodo^ovvres KaiaTpi^ovffi rois

was .Xschines

tor,

was by Carneades forbidden School, because he was caught with his concubine
the
{Diog. iv. 63
;

In the time of Carneades, whose cotemporary Polybius was, and to whom the remark of the enthusiasm of youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory Ianplovs.

guage could not have been used of the Academy. The historitherefore, of the is suspicious. It bears, besides, so entirely the maxk of exaggeration, that it is no more useful as giving a view of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying any idea of mocal value,

Numen.
:

in Mas.

Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7). ' Exc. Vatic, xii. 26 koI yap iKfiyay [ray iv 'AKaSrifiiif] Tivis PouKiiitmi TTffi re tuv Trpocpavws
KaraXijirruv
fJvai

whole passage

ZoKoivrav koX

ircpl riiv iicaToA^irToiv eis hiroplav

iyeiv Tohs Trpoaiiaxofifvovs Toia^rais XP^vrai irapaSo^oXoyiais Koi TomtJras evvopovffi Tri6av6T7jTas,

dern German philosophy.

56G

THE

SCEPTICS.
It did not even continue

Chap.
XXIII.

by himself and Arcesilaus,

after the death of its

true to that path for very long.

Not a generation most celebrated teacher, and

even among his own pupils,' that eclecticism be-

gan to appear, the general and simultaneous spread of which ushered in a new period in the history of
the post-Aristotelian philosophy.
'

Among

these pupils the

tendency to lay stress on the

doctrine of probabilities in relation to Scepticism was already strong. Proof may be found not only in the accounts already given us of Clitomachns and .^sohines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers made the fourth Academy date from Philo and

Charmidas, the
tlochus
Ihcs. Pr.
(^Sext.

fifth

from Ani.

Pyrrh.
4,

220;

Ev. xiv.

16).

At a

tonice (see p. 564, 5), mentioned by do. Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might also be suggested (Straio, xiii. 155, p. 609 ; xvi. 4, 16, p. 775 Flut. Lucull. 22; Diog. v. 84; Go. De Orat. ii. 88, 360 ; 90, 365 iii. 20, 75 ; Tuso. i. 24, 59 Pliu. Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89 ; Quintil. X. 6, 1 ; xi. 2, 22 ; Miiller, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at Chalcedon, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put to
; ;

still earlier date, Metrodorusis said to have departed from the platform of Carneades. Avgiistin. c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus and his renunciation of Scepticism, says Quamquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse conf essus, non deoreto placuisse Aoademiois, nihil posse comprehendi, sed necessario contra Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this passage from a lost treatise of Cicero, and hence it may be relied upon. The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stra:

death by his orders,

an advanced age.
;

B.C. 70, at Cic. De

Orat. iii. 20, 75, calls him an Academician and he is mentioned, IMd. i. 11, 45, as a pupil of Charmadas. The language quoted by Augustin may have come from the treatise irepl
is

awnBeias {Straho, p. 775). He otherwise only known as a

and politician. The same remark applies to the

rhetorician

language in

Cic.
3).

Acad.

ii.

24,

do not know who is the Metrodorus referred to. It may, however, be inferred that it is the same Metrodorus who is mentioned
78 (see p. 654,

We

by Augustin.

INDEX.
ACA

APH
Allegorical
interpretations
of

ACADEMIC,
565.

Scepticism, 537; School, 560, 565 ; decline of,

;

myths, 354.
Allegorising, the spirit of,

among

Academician, 377 view of reason, 545 systems of morality,

;

the Stoics, 354. Amafinius, a promulgator of Epi-

399.

Academicians attacked by Stoics,

233
545.
;

objections to Chrysippus,
;

cureanism at Kome, 411. view of, 265. Anaxagoras, sceptical arguments

'AftipTTina, Stoic
of, 531.

Academy, 301

influence of, on Stoics, 402 ; older, 399, 400, 558 ; Middle, 46, 528, 535 New, 26, 409, 517, 521, 523, 528 scepticism of, 529, 545, 562, 563 connection witb Stoicism, 529 Third, 537.
; ; ;

Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, 518.

Achaean League, 13,

Aohseans, 13, 14. Achaia, province of, 14. Achilles, shield of, explained, 360 staying the plague, 363. 'ASi((/)opa, 232, 283. .fflnesidemus, a later Sceptic, 523. jEtolians, 13. Affections permitted, 299.
Air,

Animals, Stoic views on, 208 Epicurean views on, 451. Antonies, the, 417. Antodinus'view of demons, 351. Antigonus Gonatus, 39. Antipater of Tarsus, 336, 371 a later Stoic and president of that School, 50 inference from
;
;

a single premiss, 121

follows Zeno's example, 336 ; interpretation of myths, 362 ; views on divination, views on 371 ;
;

moral choice, 559.

Antisthenes quoted as an examfollowed by ple, 274, 292, 306 Stoics, 357, 387, 388 by Zeno, 509 reflected by Aristo, 388
;

God

as, 148.

Air-currents, Stoic theory of, 127, 129, 148, 152. AKOTa\7)i('ia of Sceptics, 525. Alexander of Macedon, 518. Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 117. Alexandria, 351 ; influence of, on philosophy, 28; birthplace of

sophistical assertions of, 390. Anthropomorphic view of nature,

8.

Apathy, Stoio, modified, 292.

'Airaffa, 281.
'A</)0(r(o
'Aipopiiii,

Platonic School, 28.

Alexandrian period,

17.

of Sceptics, 525. 242.

; ; ;

; ; ; ;

668

INDEX.
APH
AEI
of,

Aphrodite, Stoic interpretation

361, 365, 366. Apollo as the sun, 361 explained, 363.
'ATToirporiyufvov, 283.
;

Aristotle, merits

and defects

of,

arrows

of,

1 ; connection with Greek character, 6; idealism of, 2, 512 j criticism of Plato, 2, 133 in;

ApoUodorus, an Epicurean, 411.

Applied moral science, 279. Aratus, a Stoic, and pupil of Zeno,
43.

133 generic conceptions of, 19, 85 commentators on, 63 commendation of speculation, 57, 256, 513 teaching of, 96 followed
of,
3,

consistencies

84,

Arcesilaus, a Sceptic, belonging to Middle

29,

528

by

Academy,
;

account 46 nected with

;
;

of,

528 not conZeno, 529 op;

Stoics, 97, 100, 194, 196, 202, 396, 397 categories of, 97, 98, 107 ; perfections of Greek philo;

ponent of Stoic theory, 531, agreement with Stoics, 632 532 views on probability, 534
I

sophy in, 1, 11 ; mistakes in natural science, 3; prominence

given to dialectic method, 4 did not go far enough, 5 system of, connected with Greek cha;

compared 535 with Carneades, 535, 565. Archedemus of Tarsus, a Stoic, 50 view of the seat of the centre of
followers
of,
;

racter, 7

two sides of
his age, 10

failing to distinguish ideas, 8 the child of ; speculations of, 18

;

force, 147.

Archipelago, Stoics

In, 36.

Ares, story of, 361, 365. Aristarohus of Samos, 348. Aristippus considers bodily gratification the highest pleasure, 475 relation to Epicureanism,
;

bridges over chasm between thought and its obj ect, 1 8 makes reason the essence of man, 19; metaphysics of ,22 de velopes the doctrine of the syllogism, 65 views on conceptions, 96 on the modality of judgments, 115;
; ;
;

508 followed by Epicurus, 509 but not wholly, 510. Aristo, the Stoic, 40 pupil of Zeno, 41 wins over the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes, 49 views
;

on logic and natural science,

;
;

59,

62 a native of Chios, 59, 255, opposed to encyclical 281

knowledge, 60 ethics of, 61 peculiar views of, 62 differs from Zeno, 63 objects to study of mind, 92, 298 divisions of emotions, 249 an enemy of speculation, 255 on the oneness of virtue, 261 not followed by the Stoics, 281 follows Cynics, 297 followed by Cleanthes, 298 view of the common source of virtue, 257, 261 denied s-msationto Deity, 347 relation
; ; ;
; ; ;

of, to Stoics, 388.

the study of, 126 metaphysical notions of, 133; distinguishes matter and form, 104, 105 view of two kinds of fire, 201 view of the world, 203 of the stars, 205; of the seat of life, 214 of the soul, 215 places knowledge above action, 256 followed by Zeno, 257 investigations into individual virtue, 301 prejudice against foreigners, 326; relation of Epicureans to, 509, 511; logic of, 123 followed by Chrysippus, 393 philosophy of, 126 theory on time and space, 196 doctrine of the four elements, 197, 199 on the regulation of emotions, 252 under the influence of Greek ideas, 301 view of Gods, 513 moral theory of, 398 many-sidednes^
; ; ; ;
;

; ;

INDEX.
ARI
developed Socratio ignored by Arcesilaus, 531 formal and final causes, lil; commentators on,
402 thought,
of,
j

569

CAT
Basilides, an Epicurean and president of the School, 410. Being, the Stoic category of, 98, 99, 126 primary, 161 divine, 217, 341, 349. Bithynia, birthplace of Asclepiades, 415. Boethus, a Stoic, 49 inclining to the Peripatetics, 49 attacked by Chrysippus, 76 ; dissents from Stoic pantheism, 159 ; views on divination, 371. Bosporus, birthplace of Sphaems
; ; ; ;

fill

53.

Aristotelian, logic, 124, 555 original teaching, 3; categories, 105; ethics, 804; spirit of, 555; manner, 285 ; view of heaviness,
;

speculations, 516 ; philosophy, 396, 397. Aristoxenus, 128, 133. Artemis, explained as the moon, 361. Asclepiades, an Epicurean of Bithynia, 465. Asia, emigrants to, from Greece, 14 ; the birthplace of Stoics, 36 ; Epicureans in, 406. Assent, Stoic view of, 83. Assos, birthplace of Cleanthes, 40. 'Krapatjia, in the Epicurean system, 475 ; of Sceptics, 525. Atheism, 465. Athene, Stoic interpretation of, 358, 359, 361, 363. Athenian, 404. Athens, 528 ; brilliant career of, seat of all Schools, 29 9 foreign teachers at, 35 ; visited by Zeno, 36, 528 appreciates him, 39; visited by Epicurus, 405, 406 ; Epicureanism at, 412, 413, 417 ; visited by ApoUodorus, 412 ; rivalry with Sparta, 11 ; the playball of rulers, 13. Atomists, system of, 501 ; view of nature, 517. Atoms and empty space. Epicurean view of, 439 ; deviation of, 444. Angeas, 368. Authorities for Stoic philosophy,
;
; ;

445

the Stoic, 44.

Bryso, not instructor of Pyrrho, 518. Byzantine imperialism, 33.

CALLIPHO'S
249.

view, 558. Canonic, the Epicurean, 425. Care, Stoic view of the causes of,
;

Cameades, a Sceptic, 535 his debt

to Chrysippus the Stoic, 56, 538 a thoroughly upright man, 561
;
-,

on formal knowledge,
;

539, 540
;

scepticism of, 563, 538 ethics of, 558 negative views of, 538 positive views of, 553 a century
;

than Arcesilaus, 536 founder of the Third Academy, tpainairla kotoXtjdenied 537 tttikJ), 541 common ground with strictures on StoiStoics, 542 cism, 543 views of God, 546defends free will, 551 550 denies knowledge, 55"<;, 560
later
; ; ;
; ;

theory of probabilities, 553, 555;

views on morals, 556-559 importance of, 562 pupils of, 564

;

53.

'Mia, 227. 'A{(<^a, 110.

School of, 563. Carthage, birthplace of Herillus, 42, 256 ; destruction of, 558. Carus, T. Lucretius. See Lucretius.

BAEGYLIUM, birthplace of
tarchus, 411.

Pro-

Categories, the Stoic, 97, 99 lation of, 109.

re-

; ;

; ;

570

INDEX.
CAT
CLE
;

Cato quoted as an example, 274 death of the younger, 335, 337. Cause, God the highest, according
to Stoics, 148. Centaur, 458. Cerberus, 364. Chffironea, results of battle of, Chain-inference, 119, 122. Charmidas, 564. Charybdis, Stoic explanation 869. Chemical combination, 106, n. Chios, birthplace of Aristo, 41, 255. Chiron, 363.
;

13.

of,

2.

59,

Christian ethics, 240 view of demons, 354 modes of thought,

;

221. Christianity, success of, 34 ; influence of, 9. Christians, early, 220 ; follow Zeno, 357 ethics of, 240 ; example of, 357.
;

Chrysippus, 54, 55, 57, 64, 65, 69 ; first founder of later Stoicism, 45 attended lectures of Aroesilaus, 46 ; diilered from Cleanthes, 47 ; a voluminous writer, 47; 86; formal logic of the StoicsfuUy developed by,92, 370 contest between, and Diodorua, 115; distinguishes five original forms of hypothetical sentences, 119; exposes current fallacies, 122 ; narrows the field of logic, of, 124; materialism 131; teaches Kpams Si' iXeni, 138 his view of the world, 146 ; view of the resolution of the world, 153 appeals to general conviction, 174 ; the theory of necessity, 178, 180; definition of time, 197 view of separate existence, 21 9 places the essence of emotions in the imagination, 249 theory of virtue, 299 definitions of virtue, 260 ; on pleasure, 286 on virtue being lost,
; ; ; ; ; ;

division of ethics, 298 295 shocks the feelings of cotemporaries, 307 moral character of, 309 his polity of the wise, 322 view of demons, 352, 354 view of divination, 370, 375; explains omens, 375 vagaries follows Aristotle's of, 380; completes Zeno's logic, 393 developed Stoic system, 401 knowledge, theory of 525, 401 on superhuman powers, 48, 55 definitions of sensations, 545 on destiny, on adip546 180 tation of means to ends, 184; on punishment, 193 on faulty imagination, 246 on emotions and virtue, 260 on the wise man, 284, 286, 322, 323 view of the Gods, 346, 364, 545; explanation of myths, 365 regards knowledge as a means, 381 influence of, 400; contemporary unadorned style of, 63 of, 48 scholars of, 49, 375, 538, 541; time of, 64, 69, 70, 86, 257 subtlety of, 191 view of e^Sai/iovia,
;
:

352. Cicero, 53 239, 346

speaking as a Stoic, follows Pansetius, 298, 315 ; account of Sceptics, 560 treatise on duties, 298, 299, 302 on divination, 379 ; account of Epicureans, 414 ; responsible for Sceptic inconsistencies, 561 time of, 419. Cilioia, birthplace of Chrysippus the Stoic, 45.
;

Circe,

house

of, 369.

Citium, birthplace of
Stoic, 36.

Zeno the

Citizenship of the world, Stoic,

326. Civil Society, Epicurean view of, 490. Cla,ss-conceptions of Stoics, 99.

Cleanthes the Stoic, 40 a representative 237

;

stem,
Stoic,

; ;

INDEX.
CLE
instructor of Sphserus the Stoic, 44; views of, 62; holds later theory to some extent, 76 view of perceptions, 78 ; view of life according to nature, 228 sad view of life, 272 ; view of the seat of efficient force, 147 ; view of the destruction of the world, 165 view of separate existence, 218; holds that all pleasure is contrary to nature, determines the relations 237 of the virtues, 262 ; HeriUus a fellow-student of, 281 teaches indefectible virtue, 295 ; agrees with Aristo, 298 ; moral character of, 309 ; submission to destiny, 333 ; death of, 336 view of Stoicism, 342 ; seeks for moral ideas, 355 explanation of myths, 361 ; distinguishes two kinds of fire, 397 ; a counteipart of Xenocrates, 400 ; allegorical interpretation of mythology, 361, 362, 364, 368 preparation for later teaching,
;
; ; ; ; ; ;

571

CYE
Consensus gentium, appealed to

400

by

Stoics, 543.

Constantine, 32. Conversion, Stoic theory of, 275. Conviction or assent, 88. Cornutus, a Stoic, 53, 368.

Cosmopolitanism of Stoics, Course of the world, 332.

35, 326.

Crates the Cynic, 37 ; teacher of Zeno, 40. Criticism of popular faith by

Stoics, 344.

Cronos, 367. Cyclopes, 369. Cynic, appeal to nature, 91 Kpicurean view of life, 488 j life, 306 ; Zeno at one time, 322 ; strength of will, 389 ; contempt for theory, 390, 510; view of wise man, 488 ideas, 40 teaching, 515 a precursor of Scepticism, 515 ; nominalism, 84 ; School, precursor of Stoicism, 17 onesidedness of, 306 philosophy, 28; followed by Aristo, 281, 297; virtue, 282; ethics,
; ; ; ; ; ;

370 62
;

teaching
logical of the
;

view
272
;

of, 44, 45, 46, 54, treatises of, 63 common source of

386.

257 moral view of life, the successors of, 273 specially honours the sun, 146, views on the soul, 165, 362 217 view of divination, 370. Cleomenes, Spartan reformer, 44.
virtue,
; ;

Cynicism, 43, 91, 92, 238 of the instances of, 307 Stoics, 305 a, consequence of Stoic principles, 308, 385, 387, 389, 390; attraction of, for Zeno, 401
;
;

Cynics, 223, 239, 273, 277,

;
;

288,

CUtomachus, 557, 558, 560, 563.

Colotes,

an Epicurean,

409.

Composite judgment of Stoics, 113 inference, 119. Conceptions formed from perceptions, 79 truth of, 135 relation to perceptions, 83 primary, a standard of truth, 90 highest, of
;
;

meagre teaching of, 37, 308 255 appeal to nature, 92 connections of Stoics with, 291, 317, 323, 389, 390 followed by Aristo, 297 precursors of Stoics,
; ; ;

327.

Cyprus, Citium in, 36. Cyrenaio, 48; School, 44,511; a precursor of Epicurean, 17, 511 view of pleasure as the object
of life, 475, 510.

Socratio theory of, 9. Condensation, a cause of being,

Stoics, 98
;

140.

Connection, inner, of Stoic system,

381.

Cyrenaios, theory of pleasure followed by Epicurus, 509; content with feelings, 510 ; view of language, 624.

; ;

;;

5?2
DEI

INDEX.
BNC
Dionysus, Stoic view of, 359, 364. Divination, Stoic view of, 370 attacked by Sceptics, 550 a proof of Providence, 175 causes
; ;

DEITY, the

Stoic conception of, 148; as original matter, 155. Demeter, Stoic view of, 358, 364.

Demetrius, an Epicurean, and pupil of Protarohus, 411. Democritus, 518, 531 view of the world, 203 linown to Epicurus, 405, 433, 438 his pupil Anaxarchus, 518 on being and not being, 440 view of atoms, 433, 445, 447, 441, 443, 444 system of, 405, 502 doctrine of atompictures, 457, 465 physics borrowed by Epicureans, 510 suggests doubt to Pyrrho, 515 sceptical argument of, 531 relations of Epicureans to, 502, 510. Demons, Stoic views on, 351. Depravity of nature, 271. Desirable things, 278. Desire, 249 a standard, 76. Destiny, God as, 150 nature of, 170, as Providence, 170 as generative reason, 172 as fate, 170. Dialectic, a branch of Stoic logic,
;
; ;

of,

377.

Divine Being, 216, 217, 341, 348. Dogmatic, Schools of post-Aristotelian philosophy, 25 Scepti;

cism, 26.

Dogmatists, struggle with Sceptics,

A(iia,

524.

the Epicurean, 430. Duties, perfect and intermediate,

287.

Dynamical theory of nature, held by the Stoics, 126, 139.

"PAST,

the, 17, 28;

nations

of.

Eclecticism, 28 practical, 29 involves doubt, 30. Eclectics, 22 ; later, 399. Efficient cause with Stoics, 143
;

nature
455.

of, 143.

70.
^iavoitiiTM6v, 214.

'HyeimviK6y,

158,

214,

216,

244,

Dicaearchus, 133. Diocletian, 32. Diodorus, the logician, teacher of

'Hyoiiifvav, 113,

Egypt, Greek emigrants Egyptian customs, 28.

to, 14.

a Megarian, 115 38 captious, 38 School of, 385. Diogenes, Laertius, 63, 261, 337. Diogenes of Seleucia, a Stoic and
Zeno,
;
;

pupil of Chrysippus, 49 succeeded by Antipater, 50 definition of virtue, 261 an example of wisdom, 274, 306 on forbidden gains, 285 division of ethics, 298 on suicide, 337
;
;

views on divination, 371. Diogenes the Cynic, 294, 306; shamelessness of, 308. Diomedes, 366. Dionysius, a Stoic, and pupil of
Zeno, 43 joined Epicureans, 44 president of the Epicurean School, 410.
;

ElSos of Aristotle, 104. El;Sa>\o, 457. I.tiiapfi4vn of Stoics, 170. Elean criticism, 518. Elements, the four, 197. Elis, birthplace of Pyrrho, 517, 528. Emotions, 290 ; varieties of, 249 ; and virtue, 243 nature of, 243. Empedocles, his view of Ares, 366 ; on the origin of animals,
;

451
581.

sceptical

arguments

of,

Empire, attempt to revive the, 31; a loose congeries of nations, 32.

Empty,

'Ei'<4p7eio,

the, 196, 439. 428.

Encyclical knowledge, 60,

;; ;

; ;; ; ;

INDEX.
EPI
Bnd-in-chief, of Stoics, 187. 'ZvidKTtKbv ffTiiielov, 115. 'EvSLdeeros K6yos, 72, n. 2. 'Ekkoiw Koica! of Stoics, 81.

673

Epaminondas,
393.

11.

Ephesus, birthplace of Heraclitus,

Epictetus, 299 ; a, freedman, 325 native of Phrygia, 36 ; a Stoic, 53, 92 ; of later times, 316 ; dis-

suades from matrimony, 324 religions language of, 328 ; view

;

of demons, 351.

Epicurean, 415, 419, 431, 437, 463, view of Stoicism, 311 489 philosophy, 499 divisions of, 424 antecedents of, 16 system, of, character 418, 425, 432, 472, 474, 480, 481, 504, 516 outUved others, 417 developed, 500 historical relations of, 503 selfcontentment, 17 imperturbability, 21; School, 29, 44, 415, 420 tone of, 498 appreciates friendship, 502 doctrines, 411 inner connection theory, 517 of, 499 ethics, 439, 456 friendship, 493, 495, 506 Gods, nature of, 467 canonic, 415 views on nature, 434, 457 view of virtue, 481, 482 moral science, 485 theory of pleasure, 505, 481. Epicureanism, 26, 400, 403 scienintellectual tific Value of, 418 value, 420 grows out of Cyrepower of naic teaching,, 17 estabself-preservation, 418 lished in Rome, 411 historical relation to position of, 503
;
; 1 ; ;

Stoicism, 400, 403, 503, 508, 514, 515 ; relation to Aristippus, 608; relation to Democritus, 610; to Aristotle and Plato, 511 ; to older philosophy, 508; aims at a practical science of life, 509 ; vindicated, 500, 513 Epicureans, 412, 414, 420, 458; of the Koman period, 411

regard individual side in man, 25 distinguished from Stoics, 183, 372; points of agreement with, 507, 508, 515, 516 charged with impropriety by opponents, 407 view of divination, 372 aim of philosophy, 420 divide philosophy into three parts, 424 indiflferent to explaining phenomena, 434 refer them to natural causes, 437 consider the earth the centre of the universe, 450 on the relations of body and soul, 454, 479, 505 negative attitude of, towards popular faith, averse to public affairs, 471 491 build a rational system on a base of the senses, 500 hold theory of atoms, 505 irreligious freethinkers, 505 practical philosophy of, 41 6 onesidedness of, 424 explain man's origin naturally, 451 materialism of, 456 sincerity of, 465 view of the Gods, 468 on bodily pleasures, 478, 506 moral science of, 485; friends of monarchy, 492 view of friendship, 494. Epicurus, school of, subordinate theory to practice, 19 view of the world as unlimited, 203, 409 ; of empty space, 445, 44 life of, 404 writings unread in Cicero's time, 419; despised learning, 421, 501 ; theory of knowledge, 423; on certainty of the senses, 427 on st andard of truth, 431 a voluminous views on colour, writer, 47 undervalues logic, 434, 433 425 undervalues natural science, 436, 438, 511; and mind, 440, 513 relations to Democritus, 439, 444, 502, 510 does not investigate psychologically, 459 does not give up belief in Gods, 465, 466 position of, contrasted with the Stoica, 481, 456, 484,
; ; ; ; ;
;

; ;

; ;

574

INDEX.
EPO
;

view on friendship, system of, bears a definite stamp, 503 dogmatism of, 418 explains phenomena, 435 and the origin of things, 444 view of history, 453 of the soul, 454 moral science of, on the wise man, 483, 472, 485 connection with others, 506 490; deprecated family life, 492 his apotheosis of nature, view of pleasure as the 453 highest good, 235, 420, 473, 474,
504, 512 495, 496
;

Family, Stoic view of, 320; Epicurean view of, 490. Fate or destiny, 170 fates, 365.
;

Fear, 249.
Fire,

God

as, 148, 154.

Fluvius explained by the Stoics,

361. Folly, 268.

Force and matter, 139

141.

nature

of,

Foreknowledge, an argument for

Providence, 175.
of, 102, 104; antithesis of, and matter, 6, 173. Formal logic of Stoics, 92. Freedom, Stoic views of, 219 ; of will defended by Carneades, 551. Friendship, Stoic view of, 317

Form, Stoic category

475,

477,

478,

480,
of,

488,

606,

609; difficulties

499; view

of philosophy, 500; objection to predecessors, 508; personal' vanity of, 509 labours of, 407 writings of, 419 ; death of, 409
;

garden

of,

410

School

of,

21,

Epicurean view

of, 493.

406, 501 ; scholars of, 408. 'ETToxh of Sceptics, 526.

Eratosthenes, a Cyrenaic, 48 gained for Stoicism, 49. Esohewable things, 278. Esprit de corps, of Greeks, 15.
'ETepofuins, 78.

GALENUS,

246.
Sa-

Galilfeo, Aristarchus of mos, the, of antiquity, 348.

Generative reason, 172.

Germanic character,

9.

Ethics, 67; Stoic views on, 213,

382
Ether,

Epicurean views on, 423.

God

as the, 148, 154, 201.

Eu/3ou\fa, 648.
EuSai/uorfa, 352.
of, 350. 291. EiTux^r, 270. Evil, existence of physical, 188 of moral, 189 ; compared with good, 230. 'Efis, 208. Expansion, cause of, 140. Expression of Stoics, 132 [see
Eiirrifleio,
;

Euemerus, rationalism

G^d, conception of, 84, 343, 344, 347, 349; Stoic view of, 147; as original matter, 156 identical with the world, 156; Epicurean view of, 465, 466 criticism of, 462 nature of, 466 as Providence, 463; Sceptic
; ;
;

view

of,

548.

Good, Stoic conception of, 84, 128; Stoic view of highest, 225 and evil, 230 and pleasure, 235 as law, 240 secondary, 250 Epicurean view of highest, 472 discussed by Carneades, 657,
;

Utterance]
perfect, 94

; ;

incomplete,
110.

94

558, 561.

Graces, Chrysippus' view of, 365. Grammar of words, 94. Greece, state of, 13, 407; help-

FAITH,

popular,

and Stoicism,

343. Fallacies, Stoic refutation of, 122.

lessness of, 16; a Roman province, 27; loss of nationality, 34 intellect of, 10, 27, 29, 513
;

; ; ;

INDEX.
GBE
Stoics in, 36
of, 8
;

675
IND

change in views
of,

mental tone
;

bril-

Heraelitus, a Stoic philosopher, 53 ; explains the Odyssey, 369.

liant career of, 9

political de-

gradation
spirit of, on, 27 ;

philosophic 23 ; influence of Eome common opinions of,

of,

10;

Herbart, 262. Hercules, 292

367.

Stoic view of, 359,

286.

Greek, 327, 370, 402 ; culture, 34, propriety of 842, 344 ; mind, 2 conduct, 8 all brances of, family, religion, 34 ; mythology, 10 357, 370; philosophy, 568, 9, the offspring of freedom, 15 lent itself to Eclecticism, 28, setting of, 34. Greeks, 15, 127 national exclusiTeness of, 8 and foreigners, 14 the Bible of, 356.
; ; ; ; ; ;

HADES,
;

Stoic interpretation of,

358, 368, 369.

Happiness, connected with virtue, 191 negative character of, 239 intellectual, according to Epicureans, 476. Hecato, 285. Helios, claim of, to be a God, 550. Hellas, seat of learning, 14 ; religion of, 8 the playball of changing rulers, 12 denuded of her population, 14.
; ;

of, explained, 358, 361, 368. Herillus the Stoic, 41 ; of Carthage, 42, 256 approximates to Peripatetic School, 43; declared knowledge to be the chief good, and the end of life, 256 ; 58 fellow-student of Cleanthes, 281. Hermarchus, an Epicurean, succeeded Epicurus as president, 409. Hermes, Stoic view of, 359, 361, 863. Hesiod, appealed to by the Stoics, 356. Hestia, Stoic view of, 358. Hippoclides, an Epicurean, 410.
; ;

Here, legend

Homer, appealed
;

to

by the

Stoics,

356 interpretation of, 357. Homeric, Theomachy, 361 story

;

of Apollo's reconciliation, 363.

Hypothetical judgment. 111, 113 inference, 119 sentences, five original forms of, 119.
;

Hellenism, age
Hephsestus,

of, 35.

Stoic view of, 358, 359, 361, 366. Heraclea, birthplace of Dionysius the Stoic, 43. Heraelitus, of Ephesus, 393, 531 relation of Stoics to, 133, 161, 197, 358, 392, 393, 402, 439, 602,

IADETOS,
Ida,

367.

Mount, 360. Idealism of Plato, 130

totle, 2, 9.

and

Aris-

Ideas, 75.
'ISi'tos iroidv,

104.

510; views on cosmogony, 197,

204, 393, 394 ; not the cause of scepStoic materialism, 1 34
;

tical

arguments of, 531 pantheism of, 51 7 flux of things, physics of, borrowed by 394 Stoics, 510 view of Zeno, 358
; ;
;

Immortality, Stoic view of, 219. Imperfect expression of Stoics, 94. Imperialism, Byzantine, 33. Imperturbability, mental, of Sceptics, 18, 525 Impressions the basis of perceptions, 77.

Incorporeal, the, 132.

Indefinite, the, the highest

of Proteus, 360 ; of Apollo, 363 of Cerberus, 364. j

con-

ception, 98, 99.

; ;

; ; ;

576 IND
India, 518.

INDEX.
MAT

LACONIAN,
Lacydes,

411.

Indicative sign of Stoics, 115. Indifferent things, 281. Individual, the, Epicurean views of, 485 ; relation of, to Providence, 177 ; importance of, 301. Inference, Stoic, 116 hypothetical, 117 ; composite forms of, 117 from a single premiss, 121.
;
,

a philosopher of Middle Academy, 46. AdSe 0iiiiraf, Epicurean watchword,

491. Latin, 411. Law, Universal,

God

as, 150,

170

Jnnate ideas,

80.

Highest Good as, 241. Leading clause, 113. Leibnitz on the marvellous, 374.
AfKT6i>,

Intelligence, 359 ; Epicurean, 476. Intermediate duties, 287. Intermingling, universal, Stoic theory of, 136. Irrational parts of nature, 204. Irresistible perceptions, standard of truth with Stoics, 87 ; this theory attacked by Sceptics, 530. Italian allies of Greece, 13.

the Stoic, 92, 132, 135.

A^yoi', 113.

Leto, Stoic view of, 361. Logic of Stoics, 70; formal, 75, estimate of, 123 92, 119, 123 an outpost of their system, 124.
;

Ao7i(rju(fs,

214.

AoyKrTm6v, 214. Adyos ivdid0eTOSfX3;ffTrepfjLartK6Sfl72, 360, 397; <(>uffi(col \6yoi of the

Stoics, 365. Lotoides, birth of, explained, 362. Lotophagi explained, 369. Lucretius, an Epicurean, 415 view of atoms, 447 ; view on the origin of animals, 451 ; view of religion, 462 ; view of the Gods, 467.

JEWISH notion of
Jews, ethics Zeno, 357.
of,

demons, 354.
240
;

follow

Judgment,
111
of,
;

Stoic, 110; simple, composite, 113 ; modality 116; Sceptic, withholding

of, 523.

Jupiter, 202. Justice, 315.

MACEDONIAN
KATAAHT12,
90, 531. KaTO\i)n'TiK(iy, 91. KoT<ip9Mfio, 265, 287. Knowledge, Stoic theory of, 75 general character of, 75 particular points in, 77 artificially
; ;

13,

332;

conqueror,

supremacy, 12, 327;

empire, 401.

Macedonians, 13. Man,' Stoic views on, 210, 332; and the course of the world, 332 Epicurean views on, 451 origin
;

a standard, 77 impossible with Sceptics, 521 denied by Aicesilaus, 528 denied by Carneades, 638, 541 Epicurean theory of, 426.
formed, 82
;

of, 457.

Marcus Aurelius, a
;

Stoic, 53, 184,

KoiKol

hvouu
iroidi/f

Koivus
Kpo<rij,

of Stoics, 81, 90. 104.

;

KoToj, 367.

299 the last of the Stoics, 314 a later Stoic, 816. Mars, 202. Material, 100, 172 reality belonging to, 126 causes of action, 130 wide extension of, 131.
;

106, n. 2 defined, 137, u. See also C.

5i'

i\av,

137

1.

Materialism, Stoic, 126, 210, 384, 385, 426 nature of, 126 ; causes of, 132 ; consequences of, 135 ;
;

; ;;

INDEX.
MAT
not an expansion of Peripatetic
views, 133.

57,7

PAT

\TATUEAL SCIENCE,
IN
stoics, 125.
;

67;
;

of

nature of the soul, 210. Matter, antithesis of, and form, 6, 101, 155 ; and force, 139 identfaterialistic
;

tical

with, God, 155; resolved

2.

Nature, Stoic study of, 125 God as, 150 Epicurean views of, 434 object of study, 434 mechanical explanation of, 437 general ideas on, 194 the same
;
; ;

into primary being, 164.

Mechanical combination, 106, n. Megarian criticism, 518.

;

Megarians, fallacies fostered by, 122 ; teaching of, 255 sophisms of, 533 logical accuracy of, 38 subtleties of, 62, 533 relation of Stoics to, 392 criticism,
; ; ; ;

primary being, ] 71 ; irrational parts of, 204 ; submission to the course of, 332. Necessity, a proof of Providence,
as
difof, 188 theory of, 117. Negative character of happiness,
;

174

meaning

ficulties of

239.

515.

Mercury, 202. Mercy, 315. Meteoiology, Stoic, 206. Metrodorus, an Epicurean, and pupil of Epicurus, 408 writings unread in Cicero's time, 419 favourite pupil of Epicurus, 478 asserts that everything good has reference to the belly, 479 on the wise man, 483. Might, 332. Mind, God as, 148, 154. Mijis, 106, n. 2 Stoic theory of, 136 definition of, 137, n. 1. Mnaseas, the father of Zeno the
; ;

Neooles, father of Epicurus, 404 Neoplatonic School, 135 ; doctrine of revelation, 380.

Neoplalonism produced by a real on interest in knowledge, 23

;

the same platform as other postAristotelian philosophy, 24 ; of Alexandria, 28 ; transition to, 31 united previous elements, 32 theintellectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism, 33. Neopythagorean doctrine of reve;

lation, 380.

Neopythagoreans, 22, 23. Nominalism, Cynic, 84. Non-material, the, of the Stoics,
132.

Stoic, 36.

Modality,
115.

Stoic,

of

judgments,

Notions, Epicurean, 428.

Moon, 202.
Moral, responsibility, indicated, 179 theory of the world, 186 ; science applied, 297 ; evil, 188
; ;

ODYSSEY,
369.

explained by Stoic?,

Olympians pull down Zeno, 359.

Opinion, Epicurean, 429. Oriental modes of thought, 14, 28, 36; emperors of Rome, 31; despotism, 33 mysticism, 33. Original or primary being, 158.
:

connection

of,

and scientific
; ;

ele-

ments in Stoicism, 385

view

of of Stoics attacked, 551 Sceptics, 556. Muses, 365. Musonius, a later Stoic, 92, 316.

"Opflbs K6yos, 76.

'Offiii,

Myths, interpretation Stoic interpretation

359, 362, 367.

of,

354
356,

242.

of,

PAIN,
P P

freedom from, 474.

Pan, 366.

; ;

; ; ;

ers

INDEX.
PAN
PLA
(pavTafflai,

Pansetius, a later Stoic and scholar of Antipater, 51 ; not a severe Stoic, 286; teacher of Posidonius, 298 treatise of, 302 followed by Cicero, 315 j treatise on divination, 371 ; denies omens, 374. Pantheism of Stoics, 126, 166,
; ;

77

KaToAnirTUCof,

89,

531, 541.

Phaedrus, an Epicurean, 413, 414, 417. Philo, a pupil of Diodorus, 38.

Philodemus, an Epicurean, 413, 468 view of the Gods, 468.

;

Philosophy, Stoic divisions

of,

66

517 dissented from by BQethus,

;

159. napadeats, 106, n. 2

n. 1.

Epicurean divisions of, 424. Phlius, birthplace of Timon, 519.

Phrygian, Epictetus, 36.
iiffts,
UiBaiffi,

defined, 137,

Parmenides, sceptical arguments

of, 531. Patro, an Epicurean, 414.

228, 350, 209. 555.

TIi9av6rTjs, 555.

Planets,

Stoic

view

of,

208

Peloponnesian war, 10. Peloponnesus, 13. Penelope, suitors of, 60. Verceptions derived by Stoics from impressions, 77; the basis of conceptions, 79, 83 a standard, 76 irresistible, the standard of truth, 87 sole source of truth, 135 Epicurean view of, 425.
; ; ;

Epicurean view
;

of, 451.

Plato, 55, 126, 305, 323, 509, 611, 513, 531 perfection of Greek

Perfect duties, 287. Pericles, age of, 9.

Peripatetic
;

School, 29, 301 approached by Herillus the Stoic, 43 on the human soul, 397 materialism, 133 view of emotions, 253 goes back to earlier View, 301 philosophy, 133 debt of Stoics to, 402 notion, 244 doctrine, 397 views, 398, 281 view of goods, 559. Peripatetics, opposed to the Stoics, the Sorites of the, 120 62, 66 logic of, 124 ground occupied by, 133 view of emotions, 253 teaching of, 49, 398, 564 theory attacked by of goods, 559 Stoics, 233 not the cause of
; ;
; ; ;

philosophy in, 1 the study of, 126 example, 1 87 many-sidedness of, 402 merits and defects of, 1 idealism of, 2, 9, 130 flaws in teaching of, 3 dialectical exclusiveness of, 4 antagonistic currents in, 45; general conceptions of, 18; denies virtue in great men, 274 view of demons, theory of final causes, 351 396 system of, connected with
;
; ;

Greek character, 7

doctrine of
;

Persseus,

Zeno's materialism, 134. a Stoic and pupil of Zeno, 43 fellow pupil of Aristo,
; ;

298.

Persian war, 9 Greek dependence on empire, 12.

the four elements, 197 view of the stars, 205; of the seat of life, 214 view of the soul, 215 on the regulation of emotions, 262 permits a lie, 305 prejudice against foreigners, 326 view of pleasure, 474 places knowledge above action, 256 advocates community of wives, 310 distinguishes supreme and popular gods, 348 known to Epicnrus, 405 sceptical arguments ot, 531 pure speculation of, 57; metaphysical notions of, 133 example of, 187, 268 time of, 178 teaching of, 252, formal and final 399, 406; causes of, 141 relation of
;

; ;

INDEX.
PLA
Stoics to, 399 relation of Epicureans to, 511 ; Tiew of the stars, 205 view of the soul, 213 School of, 528. Platonic, 55, 133, 221, 304, 516 theory of conceptions, 5 system, 31 speculations, 516 School at Alexandria, 328. Platonism, 3i2, 399, 531 Seneca's resemblance to, 222 a religious
;

679

PBO
392, 484, 542, 566 ; causes producing, 17, 35 character of, ] 9 ; subordinates theory to practice, peculiar mode of dealing 19 with practical questions, 21 its development, 25 unlike that of Socrates, 18 ; times, 392, 561 systems, 402, 512 ; Scepticism,
; ; ; ;

514, 561;
of,

common characteristics

system, 342. Platonists, 22, 30, 61

;

apologetical writings of, 25 School of, converted to Scepticism, 29 opposed to Stoics, 62. Pleasure^ 249 and the good, 235 Epicureans, 472 freedom from
;

subordinates science to ethics, 542 ; refers man back to himself, 19 ; includes Stoicism andNeoplatonism, 24 variously modified, 24 ; personal character of, 33 ; reverses relations, 301 ; practical tendency of, 392
19
;
; ' ;

pain, 474. Plotinus, 23. Plutarch, 53, 261 ; treats virtues as many, 261 ; treatise against Colotes, 409. nvei/iaTa, the Stoic, 129, 148. noirfv, 100, 104. noioTTjs, 367. Polemo, a teacher of Stoic Zeno, 32, 399 ; School of, 385. Political life, 318 ; Stoic aversion to, 324. Polygenus, an Epicurean, pupil of Epicurus, 408. Polybius, as an authority, 565. Polystratus, third president of the Epicurean School, 410.

aims at independence of man, 484 common characteristics of,

;

511 materialism, 512. Predestination of the Stoics, 376. Preferential things, 278, 289. Pre-Socratic philosophy, influence
;

of, on Stoicism, 133. npeVox, 303.

Primary conceptions a standard

of truth, 90 ; being, 161, 170 172, 198. Probability, Arcesilaus' theory of, 534 ; Carneades' theory of, 553. Upimyiiivov, 283, 289, 290, 560. Progress, state of, 293. TlpoKo-ni], 294. EpiXlfioX^eis, Stoic, 80, 90; curean, 428, 461. Property, Stoic category of, 102.
fire,

Polytheism, truth in, 348; attacked by Sceptics, 549. Pontus, birthplace of Dionysius the Stoic, 43.

Prophecy, Stoic explanation

374, 403.

of,

Prophetic powers. Stoic view

369. TlpoipopMhs \(!70s, 73. Proposition, 110k np<is Ti vas ^X""; 100> 107. Proserpine, rape of, 365.

of,

nSs

^xo", 100, 107. Poseidon, Stoic interpretation of, 358 claim of, to be a god dis;

cussed, 550. Posidonius, the Stoic, 206, 208, 293, 298; popular notion of demons, 357 views on divina;

tion, 371, 373. Possible, 178.

Post-Aristotelian philosophy, 301,

Protagoras, language on truth, 431. Protarchus, of Bargyllium, an Epicurean, 411. Proteus, story of, explained, 360.

p p 2

; ; ;

;; ;

580 PRO

INDEX.
SCH
Rhodes, a centre of philosophy,
35.

Providence, 156, 171, 359, 403 God as, 150 in the Stoic system. 341 Zeus as, 359 Stoic argU' ments in favour of, 173, 372 argument from general conviction, 174 from God's perfection, 174 from necessity, 174 from God'sforeknowledge, 175 from divination, 175 the idea of, 175 as necessity, 175 relation to individuals, 176 difficulties of, 177; rule of. Stoic theory of, 388, 331 Epicurean denial of, 396, 403 435, 462, 463 denied by Carneades, 544 criticism of, 542.
;

period, 17, 326; world, province, 27 ; jurisprudence, 240 ; character, 32 ; dominion, 332 ; Empire, 401. Romans, 521 ; uphold traditional

Roman,
31
;

faith, 344.

Rome,
;

325,

413,

414,

415,

492,

551 relations between Greece and, 27 a centre of philosophy, statesmanship in, 326 35 Stoicism in, 492 influence of, on philosophy, 27 arms of, 13 Gods of, 32 decline of, 31 Epicureans in, 411, 413.
; ;

Ptolemy

Soter, 28.

Ptolemsean dynasty, 28.

Pyrrho, the Sceptic, 517, 562 teaching of, 518, 519, 520-525 agrees -with Arcesilaus, 533 and his followers, 517 receives from Democritus an impulse to doubt, 515 example of, 528 School of, teaching of, 521
; ; ;

SAMIAN picture,
Samos,
348
;

360. birthplace

of

Epicurus, 404. Saturn, 202.

Sceptic, 525, 536, 562; imperturbability, 17 ; suspension of

534, 526. Pytliagoras, 55.

judgment, 525 Schools deny every dogmatic position, 514. Sceptical theory, 516 Schools,
; ;

Pythagorean, 55, 399 School at Alexandria, 28 system, 31 friendship, 496 influence on the older Academy, 399. Pytho, defeat of, explained, 362.
; ; ;

27.

EEASON,
<

133,

359,
;

ternal to man, 6

368; exa standard,

76.

generative, Reason, right, 76 172; of the world, 170; identical with God, 147. Reasoners, School of, 66. Relation, category of, 108. Religion of Stoics, 341 of Epicureans, 462 of Sceptics, 556. Republic, last days of, 32. Rhea, Stoic view of, 358.
;
; ;

Scepticism, 26, 29, 514, 515, 528, 651 ; influences producing, 27 ; involves eclecticism, 30 ; intellectual objections to, 86 pure, 523 ; object of, 526 dogmatic, position of, historical 26 ; relations to dogmatism, 514 514 ; of New Academy, 529, School of, 517 ; posi537, 563 tive side of, 538 ; starts from earlier philosophy, 515 causes of, 515 ; relations to Epicureanism and Stoicism, 515, 516. Sceptics, 512, 517, 549 ; School of the, 19 opposed by Stoics, 21 New School of, 22 ; happiness, the starting-point with, 521
; ; ; ; ; ;

Rhetoric, a branch of Stoic logic,

70.

ethics of, 556 ; later, 562 ancient, 538, 553. Schleiermaoher, 219.

more

; ; ; ;

;;

INDEX.
SCI
Sciro,

581
STO

an Epicurean, 413. Soylla, Stoic explanation of, 369. Secondary goods, 280. Seleucia, birthplace of Diogenes, 49.
Seneca, 219, 239, 285, 299, 306,
316, 319, 325, 326, 335, 337, 339, 351 a Stoic, 53 ; in harmony with the Stoics, 154 opinion
; ;

mitted a arguments

sceptical 305 531 on the derivation of the soul, 645; relalie,

;

of,

tions of Stoics 'to, 387, 391, 396. Socratic, old, teaching, 401 dictum, 245, 247; introspection, 511 ; views, 388 ; theory of conceptions, 9 teaching, 255
; ;

defends external possessions, 285 views on customs, 306 age of, 274 a later Stoic, 316 his views on friendship, 318, 319; on the wise man's independence, 335 on suicide, 337, 339 denies the use of prayer, 344 view of demons, 351. Sensation, Epicurean view of, 425,
; ;
;

on wickedness, 273

philosophy, 392 ; School, 509. birthplace of Chrysippns, 45 of Aratus, 43. Something, the highest conception,
Soli,
;

98.

457. Senses, Epicurean superiority to, 478. Septimus Severos, Emperors after,
32.

Sophists, practical philosophy of, 18 ; fallacies fostered by, 122. Sorites, the, of the Peripatetics developed by the Stoics, 120. Soul, of the parts, 213 nature of, 210; the individual, 216; God as, 148 Stoic views of, 210
; ;

Epiouream views of, 453 rialistic view of, 210.

mate-

Space, 196. Sparta, rivalry of, with Athens,

11, 13.

Sextus Empiricus, a Stoic authority, 53.

Spartan reformer, Cleomenes, 44.

of

Sidon,

birthplace Epicurean, 412.

Zeno the

Spartans, 14.
"Zirep^aTiKoi \6yoi.

Simple judgment, 110, 111.

Sirens explained, 369. Social relations, Stoic view of, 311. Society, origin and use of, 311 Epicurean views on, 490. Socrates, 274, 292, 305, 306, 501, 509, 511 definition of the good, 229 ; of virtue, 59, 255 ; scep;

Sphferus,

See \6yoi. a Stoic and pupil of Zeno, 44 from the Bosporus, 44 logical researches of, 64
; ;

treatise

on divination, 371.

Spinoza, 219.

Standard of truth. See Knowledge. Stoic, 86 need of, 86 irresistible impressions, 87 primary conceptions, 90 Epi; ;

531 view of natural science, 60 line of thought presupposed by Epiphilosophic cureanism, 511 practical philoideas of, 2 sophy of, 17 differs from past philosophy, 18 Aristotelian view of means and ends, 185 time of, 225 defines the good as the useful, 229 an example of wisdom, 274, 292, 306 pertical'

arguments

of,

curean, 431. See Canonic. Stars, Stoic view of, 204.

Stilpo,

combined Cynic and Me;

garian teaching, 37 School of, 385 connected with Zeno, 392.

;

trait. voiKiK'ti,

38, 327. Stobseus has preserved extracts from writings of Teles, 48 ; and definitions of virtues, 261. Stoic, 49, 132, 251, 313, 324, 346, 374, 517, 531 ; apathy, 121 ; doc*

682
STO

INDEX.
STO
65 principles, logical result of, 311 principles, 153, 219, 225, 256, 293; propositions, 310, 551 views on nature 194 ScJuiol. 29, 62, 64, 69, 168, 274, 286, 297 299, 300, 307, 336, 351, 388 founded by Zeno, 36 Chrysippus presidentof, 45 a School of reasoners, 66 (pairaa-la, 541 severity, 286 skill, 363 specu lation, 173 System, inner con nection of, 381 teaching, 55,
; ;

trine fully expanded by Chrysippus, 47, 48 appeal to the senses, 530 , assertion, 185 bias, 304 citizenship of the world, 327 ; notions of Proviconception, dence, 177, 388 397 theory of the good, 290, 559 wise man, 335 ; enquiries, 170 Ethies, 249, 278, 383 two currents of thought in, 382 main features of, 383 ; explanation of myths, 367, 368 ; fatalism, 175, 551 influence of, 529 insensibility to pain, 477 KwraMi/is, 531 ; virtue, 398, 334,
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;

59, 67, 69, 4, 133, 221, 257, 316,

456

theology, 545
69,

treatment
339,
357,

of science, 542.

apathy, 316^ panmorality, 229, 333, necessity, 176 ; philo390, 342 sophers, 298, 322 ; citizenship of the world, 328, 506 materialism, 384, 385 system, 91, 394
58,

505

Stoicism, 26,

326,

theism, 176
;

380

growing out of Cynicism,

; ;

91, 125, 138, 152, 173, 223, 249, 277, 301, 351, 354, 381, 394, 68,

relation of, to 17, 91, 392, 402 previous system, 387 related to Cynics, 387 ; to Socrates, 387 to Aristotle, 396 to Megarians, 392; to Heraolitus, 392; to
; ;

504, 516,543; PMlosojihy, 33i authorities for, 53 divisions of, 66 practical character of, 134 scope of, 381 as a whole, 400 political antecedents of, 16
; ; ;

doctrine expanded, 47 problem proposed to, 56 enquiries into duties, 302 practical character, 56-; necessity for knowledge, 58 ; position towards logic and relative natural science, 59 importance of parts, 68 ; onesidedness of, 402 place in history, 400 theory of intermingling, 137 of irresistible impressions, 530; Zogic of, 70, 121; field of, 70 words and thoughts, 73; formality of, 75, 92, 119; estimate of, 123 ; categories, 97
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;

later, founded by 399 Chrysippus, 45 historical ingredients of, 400 form fixed, 48 Eratosthenes won for, 48 as traditionally known, 56 features of, 239 a religious system, 342 essentially practical, 380, 385 insists onself-sufiicienoy of virtue, 389 preserved original character of Socratic philosophy, 391 stern tone of, 498 and the theory of pleasure, 560 entered the Roman world under Panaetius, 51 declared

Plato,

theory of illation, 121 Knowledge, theory of, 75, 525 prominent points in, 77 prophecy, 379 platform, 335, 353 point of view, 43, 90 polytheism, 549 preference for argument.
;

independent of his fellows, 311; makes a dogma of fatalism, 332 connection with religion, with popular faith, 343 341 ethical side of, 382 scientific side of, 383 elements combined in, 386 relation of Epicurean system to, 503, 508, 509, 514,
; ;
: ;

man

517. Stoics [gee Table of Contents'], 276, 814, 393, 398, 512 ; of the Roman period, 36, 326, 492 School of
;

;; ; ; ;

; ;;

INDEX.
STO
the, 19 feel the need of philosophic speculation, 20 history of, 35 sq. take their name from Htoa TtoMiKiij 38 highest conception of, 99 look at accuracy of expression, 118 seek a standard of truth, 20 demand a knowledge of conceptions, 479 logic of, 96, 97, 123, 223 sorites, did little for natural 120 science, 20; opposed to Sceptics, 21 teach original unity of human family, 21, 490 apologetical writings of, 25 regard universal element, 25 belief from idea, 36 develope the doctrine of the syllogism, 65 problem proposed to, 56 view
;

683
STO

divide mankind into two 269 the wise man of, 270, 271, 291, 295, 304, 317, 383 influenced by Academy, 399 agrees with Arcesilaus, 532 opponent of Cameades, 542, driven into admissions, 564 287 ; compelled to recognise differences of degree, 293 ; connection with Cynics, 305, 307,

261

classes,

308, 327, 388, 402, 510 insist justice and mercy, 315 ;. pay great attention to domestic life, 321 view of suicide, 336, 338 ; of lying, 305 ; ethical principles
;

on

59, 128, 272, 300; unity of virtue, 266 ; differ generally from Aristo, 62 ; their

of

virtue,

views expanded by Chrysippus, make three divisions of 64 philosophy, 66 development of teaching, 69 their view of thoughts and words, 74 had no dis inct theory of knowledge before Chrysippus, 76 attach importance to the senses, 77 make perceptions the source of XcktIiv of, 92 notions, 82, 91 "consider material objects alone real, 84, 94 admit the existence of immaterial attributes, 106 enumerate sentences, 110; discuss modality of judgments, attached great value to 115 the theory of illation, 116 strive to find firm ground, 123 their view of knowledge, 129 ground occupied by, 134, 135 deny the freedom of the will, distinguished from 179, 217 Epicureans, 183, 470; agree;

385 aim at independence, inexorable sternness of, subordinate logic and natural science to moral science, 507 adhere to fatalism, 505 appeal to consensus gentium, theological views of, at543 tacked by Sceptics, 545 view of the soul, 211, 214, 215, 222 supposed connection with Heraclitus, 135, 394 materalism of, 139, 210, 385, 425 hold one primary force, 143, 146 view of Deity, 148, 152, 154 view of popular Gods, 358, 362, 366, 368, identify God and the 369, 549 world, 156, 348, 349 theology pantheism of, 159 ;. of, 341
of,
;

488 497

view of nature, 194, 223, 361, 373 view of the resolution of the world, 165, 203 view of the seat of generative power, 173 view of divination, 175, 370,
; ;

377, 550; prophecy, 373, 374, view of relation of 375, 378 man to destiny, 182, 301 view
; ;

with, 454, 481, 484, 500, 507, 508, 516 ; follow Aristotle, 194; do not explain irregular impulses, 248; classify errors,

ment

of the unity of the world, 183, 231 ; of the perfections of the world, 187; of physical evil, 188 ; view of moral evil, 189, inconsistencies of, 193 ; 191 view of time and space, 197 hold two active elements, 179,
;

;;

584
STR

INDEX.
UTT
ivyriniifvov, 113.
;

consider the stars living, meteorological investiga; tions of, 207 ; view of plants and animals, 208 ; view of man,

201 206

[Sympathy of nature, 183.

Syria, Stoics in, 36. Syro, an Epicurean, 413.

225,

490

evil, 230, 233, 269,

;

view of good and 293 view of

;

pleasure, 237 of emotions, 24i, 245, 248, 253, 473; theory of necessity, 246 classification of
;

TARSUS,

highest good, 557 collisions with current views, 278, 292, 296, 347, 352 on secondary goods, 280; on things indifEerent, 281, 338; things preferential, 283 views of acerrors,

261

a philosophic centre, 35 ; birthplace of Zeno the pupil of Chrysippus, 49 birthplace of Antipater, 60.
;

Teles, a Stoic.,

and cotemporary

of

Chrysippus, 48. Test-science of truth, 426. Thebes, 11. Theophrastus, followed by Chrysippus, 119.

casuistry of, 299, 290 552 moral science of, 302 on unchastity, 309 view of social
tions,
; ;
; ;

Theory, modification of Stoic, 284. Thoughts, Stoic view of, 73.

relations, 311 ; relation of individual to society, 312 friend;

Time, 196.

Timon

ship of the wise, 320 ; on the rights of man, 329 ; citizenship of the world, 326, 506 view of
;

of Phlius, 519 ; a follower of Pyrrho, 519 jealous of New

;

Academy, 521
621
;

Scepticism of, ; places true happiness in

pieces,

demons, 353
,

allegorical inter-

aTapa|fa, 526.

pretation of 354 ; on predestination, 376 ; tion, 379

Titans tear Dionysus to

364, 367. Tdiros, 196.

encouraged supersti;

neglect
;

scientific

philosophical pedigree of, 387 ; expand Socratic philosophy, 392 ; knowledge of conceptions, 479 ; speculatively orthodox, 505 ; mental repose of, 615 ; law of causality, 551.
Strato, 133.

knowledge, 381, 391

Trendelenburg on Aristotle, 104.

TpiToyevcm, 363. Troad, the birthplace of Cleanthes,
40.
Tp<(7roi,

the, of the Sceptics, 523. Truth, Stoic standard of, 86.

Tiiraxris, 78.

Subject-matter, Stoic category of,

98.

"rtTAH

Substance, Stoic category

universal, 156.

of,

98

Suggestive symbol, 116.

2u7KOT(4eeffis, 88, 532.

Siyxyffis, 106, n. 2

137, n. 1.

Siroios, 100, n. 4 140, n. 1. Ulysses, 292, 363, 368; a pattern of all virtues, 369. Universal depravity, 272. Universe, course of, 163 nature of, 202 ; Epiotirean arrangement of, 449.

Suicide, Stoic view of, 335, 489. Su^3ci3T)KiiTa, of Epicureans, 439. 2u/t7rT(^^aTa, of Epicureans, 439.
Sufafria, 142, n. 2.

'riroKel/ieiiov,
'tTr6\ri\\iis,

100.

Epicurean, 430.

TvonvniTTLKos, 115.

SweKTiKol
'iiyepya

olfjiai,

alfrio,

142, n. 2. 142, n. 2.

Uranos, 367. Utterance, the Stoic theory 92 complete, 108.

;

of, 73,

; ;

; ; ; : ;

INDEX.
VAR
ZEU

585

VARIETY,
;

Stoic category of, 107 of relation, 107. Venus, 202. Virtue, connection of happiness and, 191 emotions and, 243 Stoic idea of, 254 positive and negative aspects of, 254; virtues severally, 257 mutual relations of, 261 unity of, 266 Epicurean, 478.
; ; ; ;

40, 41 ; time of, 134 ; uncertainty as to motives of, 55 influenced by Peripatetics, 133 ; polity of the wise, 322 ; views on divination, 370; vindicates the supremacy of virtue, 385 connected with Stilpo, 392 strictures on Aristotle, 511 not connected with Arcesilaus, 529 ; estimate of rational things, 545
; ;

deification of seasons, 349

lead-

WILL,
483.

Epicurean views on, 459.

folly, 268.
;

Wisdom and
Stoic,

Wise man,

268

Epicurean, 73
;

Words, Stoic view

of,

gram;

mar

of, 94.

World, identical with God, 156

origin of, 161 ; end of, 163 cycles in, 165 ; government of, 170 nature of, 182 unity and perfection of, 183 moral theory Epiof, 187 ; course of, 331 curean view of, 444 origin of, 447 ; arrangement of, 448.
; ; ; ; ;

ing thought of, 385 debt to Megarians, 392 debt to Polemo, views 399 on causation, 86 view of the world, 146 view of Ether, 201 of life according to nature, 228 distinguishes emotions, 249; Herillus, his pupil, 256 view of virtue, 257, 261 offends against propriety, 308 on unnatural vice, 309 advocates community of wives, 310
; ; ; ;
;

contempt for religion, 344, 347 seeks moral ideas, 355 draws on former systems, 386 distinguishes two kinds of fire, 397 aim of, 400 attracted by Cyni; ;

XEN0CEATES,41
Zeno,
; ; ;

influence on Cleanthes, his 399 counterpart, 400 known to Epitime of, 528 a curus, 405 teacher of the Stoic Zeno, 38.
; ;

regards virtue as highest good, 401, 505. Zeno, of Sidon, an Epicurean, 412,
cism, 401
;

416.

ZENO

the Stoic, 36, 54, 58, 62, 246, 370, 400 of Cytium, 36 founder of Stoicism, 36 son of Mnaseas, 36 ; only half a Greek, 327 death of, 336, 337 living at Athens, 36 a pupil of Grates, 37 views on logic and natural science, 62; relation to Hera; ; ; : ; ; ;

Zeno, of Tarsus, a Stoic and scholar of Chrysippus, 49. Zenonians, original name of Stoics,
38.

Zeus, 171, 271, 348, 364, 487, 550 distinguished from nature, 153 the will of, 171 ; happiness of, enjoyed by the wise man, 271 distinguished from other Gods,
357, 358; legends of, interpreted, 358, 359 ; not envied by an Epicurean, 477, 487 criticised by Sceptics, 550.
;

clitus,

134

materalism
;

of,

134

definition of time, 197 ; places force in heaven, 146 pupils of.

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Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy. Square crown Svo. 12s. Proctor's Larger Star Atlas. Folio, 15*. or Maps only, 12*. Gd. New Btw: Atlas. Crown Svo. 5a. Light Sctience for Leisure Hours. 3 Series. Crown Sro. The Moon. Crown Svo. Gs. Other Worlds than Ours. Crown Svo. 5s. The Sun. Crown Svo. 14*. Svo. 5*. Studiffl of Venus-Transits. Orbs Around Us. Crown Svo. 5*. Universe of Stars. Svo. 10*. Gd. "Webb's Celestial Objects for Common Telescopes. Crown Svo. 9*.

5*.

each.

THE 'KNOWLEDGE'

LIBRARY.

Edited by Biohard A. Proctor. Pleasant Ways in Science. Or. Svo. 6*. How to Play Whist, Crown Svo. SiStar Primer. Crown 4to. 2*. Gd. Home Whist. 16mo. Is. Gs. The Seasons Pictured. Demy 4to. 5s, Cr, Svo. Science. of The Borderland Strength and Happiness. Cr. Svo. 6s, Nature Studies. Crown Svo. Gs. Gs. BoughWays made Smooth. Cr.870.6. Svo. Crown Headings. Leisure

The Stars in their Seasons. Imp. Svo. 6*. The Expanse of Heaven. Cr, Svo. 6*. Myths and Marvels of Astronomy. Our Place among Infinities, Cr, Svo. 6*. Crown Svo. 6a.
[

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General Lists of Works.

CLASSICAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE.

.Sschylus, The Eumenides of. Text, with Metrical English Translation, by J. E. DaTies. 8yo. 7s. Aristophanes' The Aohamians, translated by E. T. Tyrrell. Crown 8vo. 2j. M. Aristotle's The Ethics, Text and Notes, by Sir Alex. Grant, Bart. 2 vols. 8vo. 32.

The Nicomacbean Ethics, translated by Williams, crown 8to. 7*. 6d. The Politics, Books I. III. IV. (VII.) with Translation, &C. by Bolland and Lang. Grown 8vo. Is. Bd. Becker's Charicles and Oallus, by Metcalfe. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d. eaoh. Cicero's Correspondence, Text and Notes, by B. Y. Tyrrell. Vols. 1 & 2, 8vo.
12s. each.

Iliad, Homometrically translated by Cayley. 8to. 12j. 6d. Greek Text, with Verse Translation, by W. d. Green. Vol. 1, Books I.-XII. Crown Svo. 6j. Mahaffy's Classical Greek Literature. Crown Svo. Vol. 1, The Poets, 7s. 6d,

Homer's

Vol.
Virgil's

2,

The Prose

Writers,

7s.

M.

Plato's Pannenides,

_ _ _ byW.J.ThoruhiU. Cr.8vo.rj.6ii. Poems, Prose, by Conington. Crown Svo. Witt's Myths of Hellas, translated by P. M. Tounghusband. Crown Svo; Sd, The Trojan War, Pep. Svo. The Wanderings of Ulysses, Crown Svo.
9.

with Notes, &c. by J. Magnire. Svo. 7s. ed. Works, Latin Text, with Commentary, by Kennedy. Crown Svo. 10. Sd. 2Ejneid, translated into English Verse, by Conington. Crown Svo. 9s,

8>.

S,

3<, 6il

NATURAL HISTORY, BOTANY, & GARDENING.

Allen's Flowers

and

their Pedigrees.

Crown

Svo. Woodcuts, 6i.

Deoaisne and Le Maout'e General System of Botany. Imperial Svo. 31s. id. Bixon's Bural Bird Life. Crown Svo. Illustrations, 5s. Hartwig's Aerial World, Svo. 10. ed. Polar World, Svo. 10s. 6d. Sea and its Living Wonders. Svo. 10s, 6d, Subterranean World, Svo. 10s. Gd. Tropical World, Svo. 10. 6d. Lindley's Treasury of Botany. 2 vols. fop. Svo. 12. Loudon's Encyclopsedia of Gardening. Svo. 21s,

Plants.

Svo. Us.
5s.

Rivers's Orchard House.

Miniature Fruit Garden. Pep. Svo. is. Stanley's Familiar History of British Birds. Crown Svo. 6*. Wood's Bible Animals. With 112 Vignettes. Svo. 10. 6iJ.

Crown

Svo.

Common

British Insects.

Crown

Svo.

3s.

6d,

Homes Without Hands,

Horse and Man.
Insects at

Svo. 10s. 6d.

Insects Abroad, Svo. IDs. 6d.

Svo. 14s.

Home. With 700 Illustrations. Svo. 10* Bd. Out of Doors. Crown Svo. 5 J. Petland Bevisited. Crown Svo. 7. Sd. Strange Dwellings. Crown Svo. 6s. Popular Edition, 4to.

ed.

London:

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General Lists of Works.

THE

FINE ARTS

AND ILLUSTRATED
Sic.

EDITIONS.
144.

Eastlake's Household Taste in Furniture,

Jameson's Sacred and Legendary Art. 6 toIb. Legends of the Madonna. 1 vol. 21a. Monastic Orders 1 toI. 21s. Saints and Martyrs. 2 vols, Zls. Bd. Saviour. Completed by Lady Bastlake. 2 vols. 42s. Macaul^'s Lays of Ancient Rome, illustrated by Scharf. Fop. 4to. 10a. 6<2. The same, with Ivrp and the Armada, illustrated by Weguelin. Crown 8vo. 3j. Sd. New Testament (The) iUustrated with Woodcata after Paintings by the Early

Square crown 8vo. square 8vo.

Masters.

4to. 21s.

CHEMISTRY ENGINEERING, & GENERAL SCIENCE.

Amott's Elements
Barrett's
of Physics or Natural Philosophy. Crown 8vo. 12*. 6d. their Historical Development. English Glees and Part-Songs
:

Crown

8vo. 7s. Qd.

Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine, Crown 8vo. 7a. 6d. Examples of Steam, Air, and Gas Engines. 4to. 70s. Handbook of the Steam Engine, Pop. 8vo. 9s. Recent Improvements in the Steam Engme, Fop. 8vo. Treatise on the Steam Engine. 4to. 42j. Buckton's Our Dwellings, Healthy and Unhealthy. Crown 8vo.

6*.

3*. Qd.

Clerk's

The Gas Engine.

"With Illustrations,

Crown

8vo.

7s.

6d.

Crookes's Select Methods in Chemical Analysis. 8vo. 24j. Culley's Handbook of Practical Telegraphy. 8vo. 16s. Fairbaim's Useful Information for Engineers. 3 vols. croWn 8vo. 31j. Sd. Mills and MiUwork. 1 vol. 8vo. 25s.

Ganot's Elementary Treatise on Physics, by Atkinson. Large crown 8vo. Natural Philosophy, by Atkinson. Crown Svo. 7s, 6d. Grove's Correlation of Physical Forces. Svo. 16a Haughton's Six Lectures on Physical Geography. Svo. Us. Helmholtz on the Sensations of Tone. Royal Svo, 28j.

15*.

Helmholtz's Lectures on Scientific Subjects.

2 vols,

crown Svo.

7s. 6d.

each.

Hudson and

or ' Wheel Animalcules.' With 30 Coloured Plates. 6 parts. 4to. 10s. 6d. each. Complete, 2 vols. 4to. 3. 10s. Hullah's Lectures on the History of Modem Music. Svo. 8. Qd. Transition Period of Musical History. Svo. lOs. Bd.

Gosse's

The Botifera

Jackson's Aid to Engineering Solution. Royal Svo. 21s, Jago's Inorganic Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical. Fcp. Svo. 2s. Jeans' Railway Problems. Svo. 12*. 6d. Kolbe's Short Text-Book of Inorganic Chemistry. Crown Svo. 7s. Sd,
Lloyd's Treatise on Magnetism.
Macalister'B Zoology and
Svo. 10s. Gd.
of Vertebrate Animals.

Morphology

Svo. 10*. 6d.

Macfar^en's Lectures on Harmony.

Svo. 12s.

Practical. 3 vols. Svo. Miller's Elements of Chemistry, Theoretical and Chemical Physics, 16*. Part II. Inorganic Chemistry, 34j. Part III. 6d 31*. Chemistry, price

Part I. Organic

Mitchell's

Manual

of Practical Assaying.

Svo. 31*. 6d.

London:

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00.

Noble's Hours with, a Three-inch Telescope. Northoott's Lathes and Turning. 870. 18^. 3 vols. 8to. 73f. Gd.

Crown

8vo. 4,

fid.

Owen's Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the Vertebrate Animals. Art of Perfumery. Square crown 8vo. 21s. Reynold's Experimental Chemistry. Pep. Sto. Part
Piesse's

I.

U.

Gd.

Part

II, Si.

6(2.

Part in.
Schellen's

Bs. Gd,

Spectrum Analysis. 8vo. 3l5. 6d. Sennett's Treatise on the Marine Steam Engine. 870. 21s. Smith's Air and Hain. 870. 245. Stoney's The Theory of the Stresses on Girders, &c. Royal 870.
Tilden's Practical Chemistry.

36*.

Fcp. Svo.

Is, Gd.

Tyndall's Paraday as a Disco7erer. Crown 8to. Ss. Gd. Pleating Matter of the Air. Crown 870. 78. Gd.

Notra of Lectures on Light. Crown 870. Is. sewed, Is. Gd. cloth. Sound, with Frontispiece and 203 Woodcuts. Crown 870. IOj. 6d. Watts's Dictionary of Chemistry. 9 70ls. medium 870. 15. 2s. Gd. Wilson's Manual of Health-Science. Crown 8vo. 2*. Gd.

Fragments of Science. 2 7ols. post 870. 16. Heat a Mode of Motion. Crown 870. 125. Lectures on Light deli7ered in America. Crown Svo. Lessons on Electricity. Crown 870. 2*. Gd.

55.

NotM on Electrical Phenomena. Crown

870. Is. sewed, 1*. Gd. cloth.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS WORKS.

Arnold's (Rev. Dr. Thomas) Sermons. 6 vols, crown 870. 5*. each. Boultbee's Commentary on the 39 Article. Crown 8vo. 65. Browne's (Bishop) Exposition of the 39 Articles. 870. 16s.

BuUinger's Critical Lexicon and Concordance to the English and Greek Testament. Royal 870. 15. Colenso on the Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. Crown 870, Gs. Conder's Handbook of the Bible. Post 870. 7s. Gd.

New

Conybeare

8i Howson's Life and Letters of St. Paul : Library Edition, with Maps, Plates, and Woodcuts.

2 7ol8. square orown

870. 21s.

Student's Edition, revised and condensed, with 46 Illustrations and Maps. 1 7ol. crown 870. 78. Gd.

Cox's (Homersham) The First Century of Christianity. 870.' 123. Da7idson's Introduction to the Study of the New Testament. 2 7ols. Svo. 30i, Ederahetm's Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah. 2 vols. Svo. 24f. Prophecy and History in relation to the Messiah. Svo. 12*. Ellicott's ^Bishop) Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. 870. Galatians, 8. Gd. Sphesians, Bs. Gd. Pastors^ Epistles, lOs. Gd. Philipplaus, Colossians and Philemon, 10s. 6d. Thessalonians, 7s. Gd.

Lectures on the Life of our Lord. 870, 12. Bwald's Antiquities of Israel, translated by SoHy. 870. 12*. Gd. History of Israel, translated by Carpenter & Smith, 8 vols. Svo.

&

2, 24*.

Vols. 3

&

VoU

4, 21s.

Vol.

5,

I8s.

Vol.

6, 16*.

Vol. 8, ISi. Hobart's Medical Language of St. Luke, 870. IGs, Hopkins's Christ the Consoler. Fcp. 870. 2^. Gd.

Vol. 7. ' 2ls,

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(General Lists of
Jukea's

Works.

Eternal Life, Crown 8ro. Ss. Second Death and the Bestitutiou ol all Thinga, Crown 8to. 3s. 6<2. Types ot Genesis. Crown 8vo. 7i. 6<J. The Mystery of the Kingdom. Crown 8to. 3*. 6d. Lenormant's New Translation ot the Book of Genesis. Translated into English.

New Uan and the

8yo. lOi. Bd.

Fcp. 8vo. 5s, : Hymns translated by Miss Winkworth. Macdonald'a (G.) Unspoken Sermons. Two Series, Crown 8vo. 3f. Sd, each, The Miracles of our Lord. Crown 8vo. 3a. ed. Manning's Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost. Crown Sto. St. Si. Martinean's Endeavours after the Christian Life. Crown 8to. 7s. 6d. Hymns of Praise and Frayer. Crown 8to. is. 6(2. 32mo. Is. 6(2. Sermons, Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. 2 vols. 7s, 6(2, each, Monsell's Spiritual Songs for Sundays and Holidays. Fcp. 8vo. 5s. 18mo. 2f,

Lyra Germanica

MUller'a (Max) Origin and Growth of Religion. Science of Religion. Crown 8vo.

Newman's Apologia pro Yitft Su&. Crown 8vo. 6s. The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated.
Historical Sketches.
3 vols,

Essays on Biblical and- on Ecclesiastical Miracles. Crown 8vo. 6s. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. 7s. 6i2. Overton's Life in the English Church (1660-1714). 8vo. 14s. Supernatural Religion. Complete Edition. 3 vols. 8vo. 36s. Younghusband's The Story of Our Lord told in Simple Language for Children.
Illustrated.

Crown
7s. 6(2.

8vo.

7s. 6(2.

Crown

Bvo, 7s,

crown 8vo. 6s. each. Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects. Crown 8vo. 6s. An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Crown 8vo. 6s, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching ConVol. 2, crown 8vo. 5s. 6(2. sidered. Vol. 1, crown 8vo. 7s. 6(2. The Via Media of the Anglican Church, Illuatrated in Lectures, &c,
Essays, Critical

2 vols, ccovnx Bvo. 6s. each and HistoricaL

2 vols, crown 8vo. 12s.

Crown

8vo. 2s. Sd. cloth plain

3s. 6(2.

cloth extra, gilt edges.

TRAVELS, ADVENTURES,
Alpine Club (The) Map of Switzerland. In Fonr Sheets. Baker's Eight Tears in Ceylon. Crown 8vo. 5s.

See.
42s.

Rifle

and Hound in Ceylon.

Crown

8vo. Ss.
:

Ball's

Alpine Guide.

3 vols, post 8vo.

with Maps and Illustrations

I.

Western

Alps, 6s. 6(2. n. Central Alps, 7s. 6(2. HI. Eastern Alps, 10s. Ball on Alpine Travelling, and on the Geology of the Alps, Is.

6(2.

Braaaey's Sunshine and Storm in the East. Library Edition, 8vo. 21s, Edition, crown 8vo. 7s. 6(2. Popular Edition, 4to. 6(2. Voyage in the Yacht ' Sunbeam.' Library Edition, 8vo. 21s. Edition, crown 8vo. 7s. 6(2. School Edition, fcp. 8vo. 2s. Edition, 4to. 6d. In the Trades, the Tropics, and the ' Roaring Forties.' Library 8V0.21S. Cabinet Edition, crown 8vo. 17s. 6(2. Popular

Cabinet
Cabinet Popular
Edition, Edition,
2s. 6(2.

4to. 6(2.

Fronde's Oceana
cloth,

or,

England and her Colonies.

Crown 8vo.

2i.

boards

Howitt'a Visits to Remarkable Places. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6(2. Three in Norway, By 1\"0 of Them, Crown 8vo, Illustrations,

6s,

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General Lists of Works.

WORKS OF

FICTION.

Beaconsfield'8 (The Earl of) Novels and Tales. Hi^henden Edition, with 2 Portraits on Steel and 11 Vignettes on ^Vood. 11 vols, crown 8vo. 2. 2s Cheap Edition, 11 vols, crown 8to. Is. each, boards ; Is. 6d. each, doth.
liOthair. Sybil.

ConingBby. Tancied.
Venetia. Henrietta Temple.

Contarini Fleming. Alroy, ladon, &c. The Tonng Dnke, &c. Vivian &rey.

Endymion.

Black Poodle (The) and other Tales. By the Author of * Vice Versfi.' Or. 8vo. 6*. Braboume's (Lord) PriendH and Foes JErom Fairyland. Grown 8vo. Ss. Caddy's (Mrs.) Through the Fields with linnseus : a Chapter in Swedish History. 2 vols, crown 8vo. 16a.
Haggard's (H. Bider) She: a History of Adventure. Crown 8vo. Gs. Harte (Bret) On the Frontier. Three Stories. 16mo. Is. By Shore and Sedge, Three Stories. 16mo. 1*. In the Carquinez Woods. Crown 8vo. 2s, boards ; 2s. 6d. cloth. Melville's (Whyte) Novels. 8 vols. fcp. 8vo. 1*. each, boards ; Is. 6d. each, cloth. Gk>od for Nothing. Digby Grand. Holmby House. General Bounce. The Interpreter. Kate Coventry.

The

Gladiators.

The Queen's Maries.

Moiesworth's (Mrs.) Marrying and (xiving in Marriage. Crown 8vo. 7s. Gd. Novels by the Author of * The Atelier du Lys ' The Atelier du Lya ; or, An Art Student in the Reign of Terror. Crown
8vo. 2s. Gd.

Mademoiselle Mori : a Tale of Modem Kome, Crown 8vo. 2s. Gd, In the Olden Time a Tale of the Peasant War in Germany. Crown 8vo. 2s. Gd. Hester's Venture. Crown 8to. 6*.
:

Oliphant's (Mrs.)

Madam.
In Trust
2s.
:

Crown

8vo. Ss.

6(2.

the Story of a Lady and her Lover. boards ; 2s. Gd. cloth.

Crown

8vo.

The Luck of the Barrells. Crown 8vo. 3*. Gd. Thicker than Water. Crown 8vo. 2s. boards ; 2s. Gd. cloth. Fairy Prince FoUow-my-Lead. Crown 8vo. 5*. Reader's The Ghost of Brankinshaw ; and other Tales. Fcp. 8to. 2s. Gd. Ross's (Percy) A Comedy without Laughter. Crown 8vo. 6*. Sewell'B (Miss) Stori^ and Tales. Crown 8vo. Is. each, boards ; Is. Gd. cloth
Payn's (James)

2s.

Gd. cloth extra, gilt edges.

Amy

Herbert. Cleve Hall. The Earl's Daughter. Experience of Life* Gertrude. Ivora.
Stevenson's (R. L.)

A Glimpse of the World.

Katharine Ashton. Laneton Parsonage. Margaret Percival.
Ursula.

The Dynamiter.
sewed
;

Fcp. 8vo. 1*. sewed ; 1*. Gd. cloth, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Fcp. 8vo.
Is.

1*.

Gd. cloth.
Is.

Trollope's (Anthony) Novels.

Fcp. 8vo.
I

each, boards

Is. Gd.

cloth.

The Warden

Barchester Towers.

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General Lists of Works.

11

POETRY AND THE DRAMA,

Anrwtrong's (Bd.

Poetical Works. Fcp. 8vo.5*. (G. F.) Poetical Works ; Poems, Lyrical and Dramatic. Ecp. King Saul. Fop. 8to. 5s. 8vo. Bs. King David. Fcp. 8to. 6s, XTgone : a Tragedy. Pep. 8to. 6*. King Solomon Fcp. 8to. 6. AQ-arland from Greece. Fcp. 8vo.9. Stories of Wicklow. Fcp. 8vo.
'
.

JO

9*.

Bowen's Harrow Songs and other Verses. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. ; or printed on hand-made paper, 5a. Bowdler*s Family Shakespeare. Medium 8to. 14s. 6 vols, fop^ Bro. 21. Dante's Divine Ctmiedy, translated by James Innes Mjnohin. Crown Svo. 16s. Goethe's Faust, translated by Birds. Large crown 8to. 12a, 6d. translated by Webb. 8vo. 12j. Qd, edited by Selss. Crown 8vo. 5s. Ingelow'B Poems. Vols. 1 and 2, fcp. 8va. 12s. VoL 3 fcp, 8to. 6*. Lyrical and other Poems. Fcp. 8to. 2i. 6d. doth, plain ; 3a, cloth,

gilt edges.

Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Borne, with Ivry and the Armada. DluBtrated by Weguelin. Crown 8to. 3s. 6d. gilt edges. The same, Popular Edition. Uluatrated by Scharf. Fcp. 4to. Gd, swd., Is, cloth. Nesbit's Lays and Legends. Crown 8vo. 5*. Header's Toices from Flowerland, a Birthday Book, 2s. 6tZ, cloth, 3s. Gd. roan.
Southey's Poetical Works.

Medium

8vo. 14a.

Stevenson's

A Child's Garden of

Verses.

Fcp. 8vo.

5s.

Virgil's .Slneid, translated

by Conington.

Poems, translated into English Prose.

Crown 8vo. 9s. Crown 8vo.

9a.

AGRICULTURE, HORSES, DOGS, AND CATTLE.

How to Make the Land Pay. Crown 8vo. Fitzwygram's Horses and Stables. 8vo. 5s.
Dunster's
Lloyd's
5s.

The Science

of Agriculture.

8vo. 13*.
21*.
6(2.

Loudon's EncyclopsBdia of Agriculture.

Miles's Horse's Foot, and How to Keep it Sound. Imperial 8vo. 12s. Plain Treatise on Horse-Shoeing. Post 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Remarks on Horses' Teeth. Post 8vo. Stables and Stable-Fittings. Imperial 8vo. Nevile's Farms and Farming. Crown 8to. Horses and Biding. Crown 8vo.
Qa.

Is. 6(2.

15s.

Gs.

Steel's Diseases of

Stonehenge'B

a Manual of Bovine Pathology. 8vo. Disease. Square crown 8vo. 7a. Greyhound. Square crown 8vo. 15*. Book. Pep. 8vo. 2s. 6d. Note Agricultural Taylor's Ville on Artificial Manures, by Crookes. 8vo. 21*. Touatt's Work on the Dog. 8vo. 6s.
the
Ox.,

15s,
6(2.

Dog in Health and

_ _ Horse.
London
:

8vo. 7s. Gd.

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General Lists of Works.

SPORTS AND PASTIMES.

The Badminton Library of Sports and Pastimes. Edited by tbe Duke of Beanfort and A. E. T. Watson. With nnmerous Illnstrationa. Crown 8to. lOi. Sd.
each.

Hunting, by the Dnke of Beaufort, &c, fishing, by H. Cholmondeley-Fennell, &c. 2 Tols. Bacing, by the Earl of SufTelk, &c. Shooting, by Lord Walsingham, &c. 2 vols. Cycling. By Viscount Bury. %* Other Volumes in preparation. Campbell-Walker's Correct Card, or How to Play at Whist. Fop. 870. Dead Shot (The) by Marksman. Crown 8vo. 10. Sd. I^ancii'a Treatise on Fishing in all its Branches, Post 870, ISj.

2i.

id.

Longman's Chess Openings,

Pease's
Pole's

Fcp. 8vo.

2. &d.

The Cleveland Hounds as a Trencher-Fed Pack. Boyal 8to. 18j. Theory of the Modern Scientlflc Game of Whist, Fcp. Sto. 2>. id. Proctor's How to Play Whist. Crown 8vo. 5s. Bonalds's Fly-Fisher's Entomology. 8to. lis.
Eccentricities.

Vemey's Chess

Crown

8vo. 10. id.

WUcocks's Sea-Fisherman.

PostSvo.

6.

ENCYCLOP/EDIAS, DICTIONARIES, AND BOOKS OF REFERENCE.

Acton's Modem Cookery for Private Families. Fcp. 870. is. id. Ayze'B Treasury of Bible Knowledge. Fop. 8vo. 6s. Brando's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. 3 vols, medium 8vo. 63s. Cabinet Lawyer (The), a Popular Digest of the Laws of England. Fcp. 8vo. 9s. Cates's Dictionary of G-eneral Biography. Medium 8vo. 28s,
Doyle's

The Official Baronage of England. Vols. L-in. 3 vols. ito. 5. 5s. Gwilt's Encyclopaedia of Architecture. 8vo. 62s. Gd. Keith Johnston's Dictionary of Geography, or General Gazetteer. 8vo. 42s. M'Culloch's Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navigation. 8vo. 63s.
Maunder's Biographical Treasury,
Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Scientific and Literary Treasury. Fcp. 8vo. 6s. Treasury of Bible Knowledge, edited by Ayre. Fop. 8vo. 6s. Treasury of Botany, edited by liudley & Moore. Two Parts, ISs. Treasury of Geography. Fop. 8vo. 6s. Treasury of Knowledge and Library of Beference. Fcp. Svo. 6s. Treasury of Natural History. Fcp. Svo. 6s. Quoin's Dictionary of Medicine. Medium Svo. 31s. id., or in 2 vols. 34s.

Historical Treasury.

Keeve's Cookery and Housekeeping. Crown Svo. 7s. id. Bich's Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities. Crown Svo. Boget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases. lire's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, and Mines.

7s.

id,
Svo. AT, It,

Crown

Svo. 10s. id.

4 vols,

medium

WlUich's Popular Tables, by Marriott.

Crown

Svo. 10s. id.

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A SELECTION
OF

EDUCATIONAL WOEKS.
TEXT-BOOKS OF SCIENCE
FULLY ILLUSTRATED.
Abney'B Treatise on Photography. Fcp. Svo. Anderson's Strength of Materials. Ss. 6d. Armstrong's Organic Ohemistry. 2s. Gd. Ball's Elements of Astronomy. 6t, Barry's Bailway Appliances. 3. Gd. Bauerman'B Systematic Mineralogy. Gf Descriptive Mineralogy. 6i. Blozam and Huntington's Metals. 5t,
3f. 6(2.

G^lazebrook'g Physical Optics.

&s. 6j.

Glazebrook and Shaw's Practical Physics.

Gore's Art of Electro-Metallurgy.
Griffin's
6.

Algebra and Trigonometry, ds. 6d. Kotes and Solutions, 3t. 6d. Holmes's The Steam Engine. Gs. Jenkin's Electricity and Magnetism. 3s, Sd. Maxwell's Theory of Heat. 3j. Gd. Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic and Mensuration. 3^. 6d. Eey, 3^. Gd, Miller's Inorganic Chemistry. 3s. 6d, Preece and Sivewright's Telegraphy. 5*. Butley's Study of Bocks, a Text-Book of Petrology. 4*. 6d.
Shelley's Workshop Appliances. 4s. Gd. Thome's Structural and Physiological Botany. 6. Thorpe's Quantitative Chemical Analysis. 4^. 6d, Thorpe and Muir's Qualitative Analysis. 3s. Gd, Tilden's Chemical Philosophy. 3j. 6d. With Answers to Problems. XJnwin's Elements of Machine Design, Gs. Watson's Plane and Solid Geometry. 3s. Gd.
'

4j. Gd.

THE GREEK LANGUAGE.

Bloomfield's College and School Greek Testament. Lang's Politics of Aristotle. Post Svo. Bolland

Fcp. Svo.
7s.

5s.

&

Gd.

Greek Irregular Verbs. Svo. 1*. Pontes Gneci, Stepping-Stone to Greek Grammar. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Praxis Gneca, Etymology. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Greek Yerse-Book, Praxis lambica. 12mo. 4. 6d. Fexrar's Brief Greek Syntax and Accidence. l2mo. is. Gd, Greek Grammar Bules for Harrow School. 12mo. Is. Gd. Geare's Notes on Thucydides. Book I. Fcp. Svo. 2*. Gd. Hewitt's Greek Examination-papers. 12mo. 1*. Gd. Isbister's Xenophon's Anabasis, Books I, to III. with Notes. 12mo. Ss. Gd. Jerram's Graeo6 Beddenda, .Crown Svo. 1*. 6d.
CoUis'a Chief Tenses ot the

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14

Selection of Educational Works.

Liddell

Kennedy's Greek Grammar. 12mo. 4*. 6d. & Scott's English-Greek Lexicon. 4to.
Malmfly's Classical Greek Literature.

365,

Crown

8to.

Poets, 7.ed.

Square 12mo. 7. 6d. Prose "Writers,

7s. Bd, Morris's Greek Lessons.

Part I. 3s. 6d. ; Part II. Is. 12mo. Ss. Gd. Plato's Republic, Book I. Greek Text, English Notes by Hardy. Crown 8vo. Ss. Sheppard and Evans's Notes on Thucydides. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. Thucydides, Book IV. with Notes by Barton and Chavasse. Crown 8to. 5s. Valpy's Greek Delectus, improved by White. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Key, 2s. 6d, White's Xenophon's Expedition of Cyrus, with English Notes. 12mo. 7s. Gd. WilMns's Manual of Greek Prose Composition. Crown 8to. 5s. Key, 5s. Exercises in Greek Prose Composition. Crown 8vo. 4j. Bd, Key, 2s. Gd. New Greek Delectus. Crown 8vo. 3s. Gd. Key, 2s. Gd. Progressive Greek Delectus. 12mo. 4. Key, 2s. Gd. Progressive Greek Anthology. 12mo. 5s. Scriptorea Attici, Excerpts with English Notes. Crown 8vo. 7s. Gd. Speeches from Thucydides translated. Post 8vo. 6s. Tonge'a English-Greek Lexicon, 4to. 21*. Square 12mo. 8*. Gd.

Square 18mo.

Parry's Elementary Greek

Grammar.

THE LATIN LANGUAGE.

Bradl^'s Latin Prose Exercises. 12mo. 3j. Gd. Key, 5s. Continuous Lessons in Latin Prose. 12mo. 5*. Key, 5*. Gd. Cornelius Nepos, improved by White. 12mo. 3*. Gd. Eutropius, improved by White. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Ovid's Metamorphoses, improved by White. 12mo. 4jt. Gd. Select Fables of Phsedrue, improved by White. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Colla's Chief Tenses of Latin Irregular Verbs. 8vo. la. Pontes Latini, Stepping-Stone to Latin Grammar. 12mo. 3s. Gd. Hewitt's Latin Examination-Papers. 12mo. 1*. Gd. Isbister's Caesar, Books I.- VII, 12mo. 45. ; or with Reading Lessons, 4. 6dl. Caesar's Commentaries, Books I.-V. 12mo. 3s. Gd. First Book of Cseaar's GaUic War. 12mo. Is. Gd. Jerram'a Latini Reddenda. Crown 8vo. \s. Gd. Kennedy's Child's Latin Primer, or Pirst Latin Lessons. l2mo. 2s. Child's Latin Accidence. 12mo. Is. Elementary Latin Grammar. 12mo. 3s. Gd. Elementary Latin Reading Book, or Tirocinium Latinum. ISmo. Latin Prose, Paleestra Stili Latini. 12mo. Gs. Latin Vocabulary. 12mo. 2s. Gd.

2s.

Subsidia Primaria, Exercise Books to the Public School Latin Primer, I. Accidence and Simple Construction, 2s. Gd. II. Syntax, 3*. Gd. Key to the Exercises in Subsidia Primaria, Parts I. and II. price 5*. Subsidia Primaria, III. the Latin Compound Sentence. 12mo. 1*.

Oorrioulum

Stili Latini.

12mo.

4*. Gd.

Key,

7j.

Gd.

Falaeatra Latina, or Secood Latin

Reading Book.

12mo.

5s.

London:

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Selection of Educational Works.

15

Millington's Latin Prose Composition. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. Selections from Latin Prose. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6(f.

Moody's Eton Latin Grammar. 12mo. 2*. 6d. The Accidence separately, 1*. Morris's Elementa Latina. Fcp. 8vo. Is. 6d. Key, 2s. 6d. Parry's Origines Eomanae, from Livy, witli English Notes. Crown 8vo. 43. The Public School Latin Primer. 12mo. 2s. 6d. Grammar, by Bev. Dr. Kennedy. Post 8vo. 7s. 6(i. Prendexgast's Mastery Series, Manual of Latin. l2mo. 2s. 6(2. Bapier's Introduction to Composition of Latin Verse. 12mo. Ss. Gd. Key, 2s. Gd, Sheppard and Turner's Aids to Classical Study. 12mo, &s. Key, Gs. Valpys Latin Delectus, improved by White. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Key, 3*. Gd. Virgil's .^neid, translated into English Verse by Conington. Crown 8vo. 9s. Works, edited by Kennedy. Crown 8vo. IOj. Gd. translated into English Prose by Conington. Crown 8vo. 9s. Walford's Progressive Exercises in Latin Elegiac Verse. 12mo. 2s. Gd. Key, 5*. Wbite and Riddle's Large Latin-English Dictionary. 1 vol. 4to. 21^. White's Concise Latin-Eng. Dictionary for University Students. Royal 8vo. 12j. Junior Students* 'Eng.-'La.t. & Lat.-Eng. Dictionary. Square 12mo. 5s.

qotkh-o+^Itt i iseparareiy

"^^ Latin-English

Dictionary, price

3s.
Zs.

^ ,j,^^

Tonge's Latin Gradus,

English-Latin Dictionary, price Post 8vo. 9*. ; or with Appendix, 12*.

WHITE'S GRAMMAR-SCHOOL GREEK TEXTS.

^sop
(Fables)
Is.

& Palsephatus
2s.
Is.
I. Is.

(Myths).

Xenophon, Book
lary.
St.
25.

I.

without VocabuLuke's Gospels,

John's

32mo.

3d.
St.

Euilpldes, Hecuba.

Matthew's and
Gd. each.

Homer, Iliad, Book I. Odyssey, Book

St.

Lucian, Select Dialogues. 1*. Xenophon, Anabasis, Books I. III. IV. V. & VI. 1*. Gd. each ; Book II. Is. ; Book VII. 2s.

Gospels, Gd. each. of the Apostles. 2s. Gd. St. Paul's Epistle to the Bomans. Is.Gd
Is,

Mark's and

St.

The Acts

The Four

Gospels in Greek, with Greek-English Lexicon. Edited by White, D.D. Oxon. Square 32mo. price 6*.

John

T,

WHITE'S GRAMMAR-SCHOOL LATIN TEXTS.

Cffisar.

&

Gallic War, Books I. & II. V. VI. 1*. each. Book I. without

Nepos, Miltiades, Simon, Pauaanias,

Aristides. 9d. Selections from Epistles and Fasti. Is, Ovid, Select Myths from Metamorphoses. 9d. Phaedrus, Select Easy Fables, PhsBdms, Fables, Books I. U. U. Sallust, Bellum Catilinarium. lA Gd. Virgil, Georgics, Book IV. Is. Virgil, ^neid, Books I. to VI. is. each. Book I. without Vocabulary, Sd. Virgil, ^neid, Books VTL VIII. X. 6d. each.

Vocabulary, 3d.
Ctesax, Gallic

Ovid.

War, Books

III,

&

IV.

Cffisar, Gallic War, Book VII. Cicero, Cato Major (Old Age). Cicero, Laslins (Friendship).

1*. Gd. 1*. Gd.

Is.

Gd.

&

Histoiy, Books I. & IV. Is. & n. 1. Books HDrace,Odes, Books I. II. & IV. 1*. each. Horace, Odes, Book III. Is. Gd. Eutropins,

Roman

m.

Horace, Epodes and Carmen Seculare.

XLXn.

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16

Selection of Educational Works.

THE FRENCH LANGUAGE.

Albita*B

Fop. Sto. 5s. 6d. Instantaneous Frencli Exercises. Fcp. 2s.

How to Speak French.

Key,

2s.

Gassal's

French Genders.

Grown

Sto.

3s.

Sd.

Fart I. Zs. Gd. Earcher's G-raduated French Translation Book. Key to Part I. by Professor Oassal, price 5s. Gontanseau*s Practical French and English Dictionary. Post Sto. 3. Bd. Pocket French and English Dictionary. Square ISmo. If. 6(2. , Premi&res Lectures. 12mo. 2s. 6d. First Step in French. 12ino. 2a. Qd. Key, St. French Accidence. 12mo. 2t. Gd.
Oassal

&

Part

II. 5j,

Grammar.

12mo.

4*.

Key,

3s,

Gontanseau's Middle-Olass French Course. Fcp. 8to. : Accidence, 8d. French Translation-Book, 8(2. Syntax, 8d. Easy French Delectus, 8d. French GonTersation-Book, Bd. First French Header, 8(2, Second French Beader, 8d. First French Exercise-Book, Bd. French and English Dialogues, 8 Second French Exercise-Book, Bd. Contanseau's Guide to French Translation. 12mo. 3^. 6d. Key 3^. Gd, Prosateurs et Fortes Fran^ais. 12mo. 5s. Precis de la litt^rature Fran^aise. 12mo. 3s. 6(2.

Abr6g6 de rHlstoire de France. 12mo. 2s. Gd. F^rars Chouans et Bleus, with Notes by C. Sankey, M.A, Fcp. 8to. 2s. Bd. Jerxam's Sentences for Translation into French. Gr. Sto. Is. Key, 2s. Bd. Prendergast's Mastei*y Series, French, 12mo. 2s. Bd. Souvestre's Philosophe sous les Toita, by Sti&Tenard. Square ISmo. 1*. Bd. Stepping-Stone to French Pronunciation. ISmo. Is. Sti&Tenard's Lectures Franpaises from Modem Authors. 12mo. 4s. Bd Rules and Exercises on the French Language. 12mo. 3s. Bd, TarTer's Eton French Grammar. 12mo. Bs. Bd.

THE GERMAN LANGUAGE.

Dictionary. Post Sto. St. Bd. Bnchheim's German Poetry, for Repetition. ISmo. li. Bd. Collis's Card of German Irregular Verbs. Sto, 2t. Fischer-Flschart's Elementary German Grammar. Fcp. Sto. 2*. Bd, Just's German Grammar. 12mo. Is. Bd. German Beading Book. 12mo. 3;. Bd. Longman's Pocket G^e^man and English Dictionary. Square ISmo. 2*. Bd. Naftel's Elementary German Course for Public Schools. Fcp. 8to. German Prose Composition Book. 9d. German Accidence. 9d.
Blackley's Practical

German and English

German Syntax.

-Sd.

First

German Reader.

9d.
9<2.

Second German Reader. First German Exercise-Book. 9d. Second German Exercise-Book. 9d. Prendergast's Mastery Series, German. 12mo. 2s. Bd.
Quick's Essentials of German. Crown Sto. 3s, Bd. Crown 8to. 5*. Selss's School Edition of Goethe's Faust. Outline of German Literature. Crown Sto. 4*. Bd.

Wirth's

German

Ohit-Chat.

Grown

8to.

2t. Bd.

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J^ottUwoode
Js

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