Rico Rommel Atienza vs.

Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson

Rico Rommel Atienza vs. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson G.R. No. 177407 February 9. 2011 Facts: Private respondent went to Rizal Medical Center to submit for a check up due to her lumbar pains. Her diagnostic laboratory test results revealed that her right kidney was normal while her left kidney was non-functioning and non-visualizing. Hence, she underwent kidney operation under the care of the four physicians namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio and petitioner Dr. Rico Rommel Atienza. The said physicians removed her fully functioning right kidney instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Due to their gross negligence and incompetence, private respondent filed a complaint against the four doctors before the Board of Medicine. Private respondent therein offered four certified photocopies as her documentary evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time that she was operated. The Board of Medicine admitted the formal offer despite the objection of herein petitioner. Petitioner contends that the documentary evidence offered were inadmissible as it were incompetent. Further, he alleged that the same documents were not properly identified and authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his substantive rights, and are completely hearsay. Issues: Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it violates the best evidence rule. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that they have not been properly identified and authenticated. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is completely hearsay. Whether the admission of the documents violated the substantive rights of the petitioner. Ruling:

1. 2. 3. 4.

1.

No. The subject of the inquiry in this case is whether the doctors are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left nonfunctioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. The proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence. In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule 130 provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the offeror. Since the original documents cannot be produced based on the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence, and thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

2.

No, the documentary evidence were properly identified and authenticated. The records show that the exhibits offered by private respondent were the same evidence attached in Doctor Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in answer to the criminal complaint of the respondent. To lay the predicate for her case, private respondent offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation. No, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical positions whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area. No, petitioners substantive rights were not violated when the documentary evidence were admitted. The fact sought to be proved by the exhibits that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on is presumed under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The fact sought to be established by the admission of the respondents exhibit need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical science, specifically biology include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings in which the court may take judicial notice.
__________________________________________

3.

4.

TORRES vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011)

FACTS:

Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino FilipinoHyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner. On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders. On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him. On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service. On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration. Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has already prescribed. After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his petition on the same ground. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of reconsideration? DECISION: A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of

personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom. Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act. We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

TORRES vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011)

FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino FilipinoHyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount

of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner. On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders. On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him. On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service. On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration. Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has already prescribed. After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his petition on the same ground. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of reconsideration? DECISION: A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom. Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery. In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act. We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ROMY FALLONES y LABANA, Appeellant. G.R. No. 190341 | 2011-03-16

Remedial Law Evidence Res Gestae

In the morning of June 29, 2004 Amalia was told by her mother to look for her sister Alice. Alice was an 18 years old girl with the mind of a 5 year old. Amalia looked for Alice all over the neighborhood until she neared the house of Romy Fallones. As she approached the house of Fallones, she heard a familiar cry:

Tama na! Tama na!

It was Alices voice. Immediately, she ran up to Fallones door and knocked repeatedly until Fallones opened the door. Behind Fallones she saw Alice. Alice said:

Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.

Alice grabbed her sister who had a bloodied shorts. They went to the barangay office where Alice was able to positively identify Fallones as the person who sexually abused her.

A rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she heard during the incident. Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape. On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay for she only heard the cry of Alice but did not see the act of rape. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Amalia is admissible despite being hearsay. HELD: Yes. It is exempted from the hearsay rule under the principle of Res Gestae. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. In this case, the utterances of Alice Tama na! Tama na! were made during a startling event (when Fallones was penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalias incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o. The admissibility of Alices spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness. _____________________________________________________________________________________

People of the Philippines vs. Gilberto Villarico, Sr., et al. G.R. No. 158362 | 2011-04-04

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING", GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, andRICKY VILLARICO, Accused-Appellants. Facts: Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his familys residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio,Misamis Occidental. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child whowas answering the call of nature near the toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused asthey stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door Ricky Villarico was at the left side,and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him.When Gilberto,

Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to theground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law. At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots.Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet.Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting). Atthat, she and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortlythereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood.However, some of the facts were proved corroborated by the Defense with the help of Peter Ponggos,who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habal-habal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter,he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he didnot recognize. Issue: Whether or not an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually sawthe assailants? Held: The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accusedstanding near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside thekitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical inference than that the four accusedwere the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco needed to haveactually seen who of the accused had fired at Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuouslyaimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as they were leaving the crime scene.The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting uttered in theimmediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res gestae. Thestatement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42,Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is takingplace or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be givenin evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to theissue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. (36 a) Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being aneyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime

. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as aneyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seenwith the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the secondtype of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonableconclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actualeyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to theexclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basicand elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such aproposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime isnot the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort tocircumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of directevidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not alwaysrequire direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes wherethere are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm theidentification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.The petition was affirmed. The accused shall pay the costs of suit. ____________________________________________________________________________COASTAL SAFEWAY MARINE SERVICES VS. ESGUERRA[ G.R. NO. 185352; AUGUST 10, 2011 ] Doctrine: Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Facts: After 46 days of shipboard employment, Esguerra requested medical attention for back and chest pains.Esguerra was declared not fit for work until complete cardiac evaluation is

done and advised to rest untilthen. Despite the normal results of the serology, hematology, biochemistry and x-ray tests administered uponhim, however, Esguerra insisted on going home on the ground that he had been rendered unfit for work.Esguerra further underwent diagnostic tests and was prescribed various medications at the PGH for chronicstable angina. Esguerra filed against CSMSI, its president, and CMEGT, the comp laint for medicalreimbursement, sickness allowance, permanent disability benefits, damages and attorneys fees before thearbital level of the NLRC. Esguerra alleged that he was repatriated for medical reasons on account of his workrelated/aggravated ailment; that despite being apprised of his intention to submit himself fo r medicalexamination, CSMSI failed to refer him to a company-designated physician, and insisted that he was fit for work; and, that left with no choice but to seek medical attention on his own at the PGH, PHC and POH, he wasconstrained to file his complaint for disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorneys fees.Finding in favor CSMSI, Morcilla and CMEGT, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground thatEsguerra failed to prove his disability and to submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by acompany-designated physician, pursuant to Section 20-B of the POEA SEC. The Court of Appeals reversedthe decision. Issue: Whether the ruling of the Court of the Court of Appeals is contrary to the evidence on record and runs afoulwith prevailing jurisprudence. Held: Yes. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicialbodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described asmore than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might acceptas adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds mi ght conceivably opineotherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to complywith the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare assertion that CSMSI(employer) never gave him referrals to continue his medications as recommended by the foreign doctordespite his call on 8 July 2003 to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit his medicalevaluation abroad, Esguerra did not present any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submithimself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was notawarded disability benefits and sickness allowance.

Antonio Perla, petitioner v. Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla, respondentsC.R. No. I 72471 Nov. 12, 2012 FACTS:1.

MIrasol (and Randy) filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.2.

According to Mirasol, she and Antonio had a common law relationship for 2 years, andthat Randy was the result of their affair.3.

Randy was made to testify in Court, he said that he has been in the house of his AuntLelita (sister of Antonio),, and that the Perla family treated him as a member of their family.4.

A ntonio denied Mirasols allegations, saying that Randy isnt his (he came in Manila only after his graduation in 1981 and He claimed that he had sexual intercourse withMirasol only once which happened in the month of September or October of 1981).5.

Antonio also said that Randys birth cert. has a lot of inaccuracies. RTC Antonio was ordered to support Randy (as illegitimate child).CA upheld RTC decision.ISSUE: WON Randy is entitled to receive support from Antonio.HELD: NO. Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.RATIO:

The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows: Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parentconcerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.x x x x Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence aslegitimate children.

x x x xRespondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate hasno probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not si gned the same.60 It is settled that [a] certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is noshowing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.61 We also cannot lend credence toMirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain info rmation through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did notpresent Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed suppl ied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the severalunexplai ned discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios non -participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which sheconfirmed on the witness stand Evidence: Best Evidence Rule

Title:
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc;

G. R. No. 171701; February 8, 2012

SERENO, J.

Facts:
The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiffs exhibit Q, may be a public document, but what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN andwas not signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down theproceedings. Such document may link the Marcos siblings and Gregorio AranetaIII to the ill-gotten wealth case of the former President Marcos.

Issue:
Is Exh Q admissible?

Ruling:
No

Analysis:
Under Sec. 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide that when the originaldocument is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, itscontents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit Q was not a certified copy and it wa s not even signedby the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, petitioner fails to itfollows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and GregorioAraneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couples alleged accumulation of ill

-gotten wealth EREZ, J.: G.R. No. 184603 August 2, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROMEO LABAGALA y ABIGONIA, ALVIN LABAGALA y JUAT, and RICHARD ALLAN ALEJO y SIGASIG, Accused, ROMEO LABAGALA y ABIGONIA, ALVIN LABAGALA y JUAT, Accused-Appellants. FACTS: on October 10, 2002 at Brgy. Balanoy, Municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac the accused rob and carry away with them P300,000.00 in cash belongingto Estrelita Fonte and also wound and stab Estrelita Fonte which caused her death. The 3 accused were arrested on 10 October 2002. During arraignment on 4March 2003, they pleaded not guilty.Raul Torres Arceo testified that on 10 October 2002, while he was on the way home with his brother after paying their electric bill, they met a tricycle. Inside thetricycle was his mother, Estrelita Fonte, who was bleeding. Immediately, they took her, boarded her inside their van and brought her to the Medicare Hospital of LaPaz, Tarlac. His brother drove the van while he carried his mother on his lap. At the Medicare Hospital, they were advised to bring their mother to the Talon GeneralHospital. On the way to the Talon General Hospital, he could see the wound of his mother on her chest. He asked her who stabbed her. His mother told him that twomalefactors entered their store and she was able to hit one of them with a bottle on the head. She also mentioned they took the money meant for payment of the lotbeside their store. Upon arrival at Talon Hospital, Estrelita was declared dead on arrival.In a Decision dated 4 November 2003, the RTC found all three accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide The CA, in a Decision dated 2 February 2007, affirmed with modification the RTCs verdict by acquitting Richard Allan Alejo. The CA acquitted Richard Allan Alejo on the ground that the only act attributable to himwas that he was with the appellants when they were apprehended. The CA reasoned:It is worth to note here that according to the dying declaration of the victim, two men entered her store and stole the money that would be used aspayment for the lot they bought. When appellants were apprehended by the Zaragoza police it was confirmed that appellant Romeo Labagala sustained awound on his head. Notably, the only act attributable to appellant Richard Allan Alejo was he was with the other appellants when they were apprehended.To

our mind, however, his act of being with the brothers Labagala taken as a whole, does not suffice to prove conspiracy in the case at bar. Neither does it renderhim liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Jurisprudence dictates that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission isnot, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy at the time of its commission. Without evidence clear and convincing at that as to how an accused participated inthe perpetration of the crime, conspiracy cannot be appreciated against him. More so in this case where the evidence particularly the dying declaration of the victimspecified that only two men entered the store.In the instant appeal, accused-appellants Romeo Labagala and Alvin Labagala seek a reversal of the CA and RTC rulings. In their Brief, accused-appellants allegethat the evidence presented was merely circumstantial since no eyewitnesses testified in court. They argue that the circumstantial evidence presented was too weakto warrant the conviction of the accused ISSUE:

whether or not the guilt of accused-appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD: After review, we resolve to deny the petition. We have consistently ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt is indispensable to overcome the constitutionalpresumption of innocence and that in every criminal prosecution, what is needed is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.It must be noted, however, that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding ofguilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonableconclusion proving that the appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others.In this case, the accused-appellants were found guilty based on circumstantial evidence leading to the conclusion that they in fact committed the crime. To justifyconviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must be attendant: (a) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (b) the facts onwhich the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The following circumstances as established by the prosecution were, in combination, point towards the conviction of the accused, to wit: (1) they were present at thevicinity of the crime; (2) they were running away from the scene of the crime; (3) they were caught and apprehended

shortly after the commission of the crime; and(4) the wound on the head of one of the accused coincides with the dying declaration of the victim that she was able to hit one of the malefactors on the head with abottle.Contrary to accusedappellants contention, the tapestry of circumstances presented by the prosecution created an undeniable impression of their guilt sufficient toremove the mantle of presumptive innocence. Like direct evidence, these can, as correctly ruled below, convict the accused of the crime of which they are charged. As we have often said, insistence on direct testimony would, as in this case, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.Credence should be given to the dying declaration of the victim, Estrelita Fonte. As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites mustconcur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, thedeclarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case forhomicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. 32 All the above requisites are present in this case. At the time she narrated how the malefactors robbed and stabbed her, Estrelita was conscious and lying on the lapof her son, with gaping wounds on her chest. The victim's statements also form part of the res gestae . For the admission of evidence as part of the res gestae , it isrequired that (a) the principal act, the res gestae , be a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had theopportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances.Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as adying declaration and at the same time as part of the res gestae

. Having given credence to the dying declaration of the victim and the testimonies of the witnessesfor the prosecution, we find there is no doubt that accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. WHEREFORE , the Decision dated 2 February 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00215 affirming with modification the Decision dated 4 November2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 64 in Criminal Case No. 12536 is AFFIRMED .Arsalle

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
Facts: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads: On or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. On August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (C A), the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Electronic Evidence applies on criminal cases and thus, the picture sent through a cell phone message wherein Saguds face was attached on the body of a nude woman may be used as evidence for violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. Held: The rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RUSTAN ANG vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

OCT

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 FACTS: This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, respondent sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former

girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became on-and-off sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter. As a defense Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-701-SC). ISSUES: 1. Whether accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. 2. Whether or not Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC) is applicable in criminal action. HELD:

Answer to the first Issue: Yes. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, (a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: 5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony th at she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon

him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Answer to the second Issue : NO. The rule cited do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. Besides, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

-_____________________________________ Digest 4: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010 RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents. Facts: The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a face of Irish superimposed on it. Rustan even added in the text message that it is easy for him to spread those pictures in the internet. Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local police was made. Entrapment operation was conducted and arrested Rustan. Issue: Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should not be made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly authenticated as provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents? Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence

(A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. Indeed the assertion of Rustan will not be given merit for the basic reason that such contention was only raised before this court to which the latter had a presumption that Rustan has waived his right to question the authenticity of the pictures. Moreover, the court avers that such assertion of Rustan cannot be made possible in criminal case; such can only be made before, civil and administrative actions. The high court denied the petition. ___________________________________________________________________________-RUSTAN ANG v. CA G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010 FACTS: Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish decided to break up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a livein partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with him. Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. He used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave heralone. On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) apicture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender's cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the internet. Irish sought the help of the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police supervision, she contacted Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort. When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!" Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster,

which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. According to him, this explained why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to him. The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustans MR. Rustan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262; and 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picturein this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

HELD: 1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e) defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. An "awaybati" or a fightandkiss thing between two lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

______________________________________________________________ These Links po are for those additional cases given by Justice
618 s 298 lasale vs agustin http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/152364.htm res gestae exception 610 s 316 awigan http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jan2010/gr_177727_2010.html people vs romio lab gala et al, dying declaration res 626 s 267: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/184603.htm 613 s 291 people vs puna , case on DNA http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/185709.htm people v. Cabigquez 631 s 652 - stolen item http://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/sep2010/gr_185708_2010.html

ang vs CA 618 s 592 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/182835.htm