Traditional and Personal Elements in Aristotle's Religion Author(s): W. J. Verdenius Reviewed work(s): Source: Phronesis, Vol. 5, No.

1 (1960), pp. 56-70 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181667 . Accessed: 02/04/2012 05:57
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Religion* in Aristotle's Elements andPersonal Traditional

W. J. VERDENIUS

is a special reasonwhy Aristotle deservesa place on the programme of this congress. Our general theme, "Tradition and Personal Achievement," may be interpreted in two different ways. We may try to determine the proportion of these two factors in the works of the ancients. This proportion shows a large scale of variations, from the predominance of the traditional element to the predominance of the personal element. But there is also another scale of variations, which extends from unconscious adoption of traditional views to conscious criticism. It is from this point of view that I will discuss some ideas of Aristotle. Criticism of traditional views is to be found in the works of most of the Greek thinkers, including the work of Aristotle. But what distinguishes his attitude towards tradition from that of his predecessors is the fact that he seems to be the first to take up a definite position with regard to tradition as a whole.' Other thinkers had confined their attention to special elements of tradition, such as some theory or some popular belief which conflicted with their own view, but they did not reflect on the value of tradition as such. It was Aristotle who discovered tradition, i.e. who realized that tradition as such, irrespective of its special contents, confronts us with a problem. This problem is, whether tradition has a value simply because it is tradition. Aristotle attached a value to tradition as such, because in his opinion tradition embodies a real experience.2 He argues that we must consider a problem not only from a scientific point of view but also in the light of current opinions: "for with a true view all the data harmonize. "3 Withby rakirmpout any comment he replaces the expression 'ra'. ey0'Levm current that xov'r, and he could do so, because he seriously believed opinion always expresses some real fact. "It is impossible," he writes, "that the views held by many nmenand men of old should be entirely mistaken."' Aristotle does not put the question why the current view is likely to be right. An indirect answer to this question may be deduced from the combination of three other passages: "Men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth," "Every man has some contribution to make to the truth," "There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good
THERE * A paper read before the Third InternationalCongressof ClassicalStudies in London in September z9gs. Notes will be found at pp. 64-70 infra.
56

quality; but when they all come together it is possible that they may surpass - collectively and as a body, although not individually- the quality of the few best... This is the reason why the Many are also better judges of music and the writings of poets: some appreciateone part, some another, and all together appreciateall."5 We may add the conclusion that a common opinion, wherein a greatnumberof such individual approachesto the truth is seen to concur, is likely to be right, because in such a case man's naturalaptitude for attainingthe truth has found a mutual confirmation. The reliability of such a current view becomes still greater, if it is also a tradition, i.e. if it reaches back to ancient times. In the passage just quoted the expressions "manymen" and "men of old" are used in one breath. Aristotle sometimes stresses the antiquity of a traditional view to such a degree that he makes the impressionof regardingthis antiquity as a value in itself.6 The question why the antiquity of a view should be a guaranteeof its truth, is not answered by him, but in this case, too, we may deduce the answer from another passage. "What is long establishedseems akin to what exists by nature".7Accordingly,the antiquity of a tradition is a justification of its existence and thus a guaranteeof its truth. In addition to its antiquityand the large number of its adherentsthere is a third factor which establishesthe value of tradition. "We are bound to pay some regard to the long past," writes Aristotle, "for almost everything has been discovered already."8 This means that the value of tradition lies in the fact that it cannot be surpassed.There is no real progress in the history of thought, but, as Aristotle puts it, "the same ideas recur in men's minds not once or twice but againandagain." The question why there is such an eternal return in human thought is not answered by Aristotle except in an indirect way. Speakingabout political institutionshe writes: "Thesame institutionshavebeen invented in the course of the years on a number of different occasions - indeed an indefinite number. Necessity itself, we may reasonablysuppose, will steadily be the mother of indispensable inventions."10 If there is an analogy between the recurrence of these indispensableinventions and the recurrence of fundamentalideas, there must be a kind of necessity behind the latter, too. This force which causes the same ideas to appear againand againwould probablyhave been called "Nature" by Aristotle.'"
If this assumption is correct, the value of tradition is based on Nature in three respects: tradition starts from a natural instinct for what is true, its antiquity shows that it exists by nature, and its recurrent character is determined by nature.
S7

This natural authority of tradition does not imply that Aristotle feels committed to it in every respect. After saying that "almost everything has been discovered already," he continues, "though some of the things discovered have not been co-ordinated, and some, though known, are not put into practice. "12 Accordingly, the only thing Aristotle holds himself entitled to add to the views handed down by tradition is some co-ordination. This co-ordination should not be regarded as something entirely new but rather as the clarification of a meaning already inherent in tradition itself. The procedure of co-ordination and clarification is described by Aristotle as follows: "From statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the customary confused statements.13 This exchange does not imply an essential transformation of the traditional views but only a supplement, as appears from another passage: "We ought to take over and use what has already been adequately expressed before us, and confine ourselves to attempting to discover what has hitherto been omitted."'4 Aristotle even deems it his duty to establish the traditional views by solving their apparent contradictions, so that their claims to the truth may become manifest: "We must, as in all other cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the common opinions .., or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both remove the difficulties and leave the common opinions standing, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. "15 The difficulties are removed by Aristotle by pointing out the relative limits of the conflicting views: "If what is said is true in one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views stand good. "16 It is well-known that this method of co-ordination, clarification, and reconciliation has led Aristotle both to admirable and to deplorable results. On the one hand, he is never tired of penetrating into the real meaning of even the most obscure and strange ideas, always viewing them as serious attempts to arrive at the truth,7 on the other hand, he does not shrink from the boldest distortions and the grossest misrepresentations 18 This deformation of history often seems to contradict his intellectual honesty'9 but it should rather be explained as the inevitable consequence of a tragic conflict, a conflict between Aristotle's belief in Nature and his belief in himself. If, as we have seen, tradition is a special manifestation of Nature and if Nature is always looking for the best,20 tradition has to be proved right anyway. If, on the other hand, any belief, tinme-

honoured though it may be, has to vindicate itself before the tribunal of reason, Aristotle had to maintain his own position. The result was a constant wavering between his respect for Nature and his respect for his own reason. When it came to the point, however, Reason triumphed over Nature, and the traditional views were either rejected or adapted or simply ignored. But in none of these cases does Aristotle plead guilty of being disloyal to Nature. So he does not seem te be conscious of the conflict at all. It is therefore that I spoke of "a tragic conflict." The three possibilities which I have mentioned, rejection, adaptation, and ignoring, not only determine Aristotle's attitude towards traditional views in the field of philosophy but also in the field of religion. An example of outright rejection is the following criticism: "The school of Hesiod and all the theologians thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the gods taste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their existence, how can gods who need food be eternal? But into the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously. "21 In other cases, however, Aristotle took the trouble to bring mythology into harmony with his own doctrine. He even interprets Zeus as a symbol of the unmoved mover: quoting the passage from the Iliad in which Zeus defies the other gods to fasten a golden rope to the heavens and to pull him down, he remarks: "Homer's words would seem appropriate... for that which is entirely unmovable cannot be moved by anything."22 The fact that Zeus sometimes moves from Olympus to Mount Ida is simply ignored by Aristotle. But he does not ignore every religious tradition that is inconsistent with his own doctrine. It was easier to suppress Nature in philosophy than in religion. Greek religion seems to have had such an impact on Aristotle's mind that even into his ideal state he admits such elements as did not conform to his own moral standards. He writes: "We must also prevent the exhibition of indecent pictures and the performance of indecent plays. It should therefore be the duty of the governmenit to prohibit all statuary and painting which portrays any sort of indecent action. An exception may, however, be made for the festivals of deities where even the use of scurrility is licensed by the law. "23This quotation shows that

Aristotle adopts a much more liberal attitude towards Greek religious tradition than Plato.24 Strictly speaking,however, it was not a question of liberality, but, as I have alreadysuggested, of an unconsciousconflict. Aristotle takes it to albe self-evident that the traditional gods should be worshipped,28 of these gods flatlycontradictedhis though the common representations most fundamentalconvictions. The Aristotelian god has no need of AII ordinaryactionsare unworthy of action, since he is his own end.28 But him, so that the only activity allowed to him is self-contemplation.27 than direct their activities to other things traditional constantly the gods themselves. Nevertheless Aristotle does not call into question these activities. He accepts, for instance, divine providence without any discussion: "Hewho exercises his reasonand cultivatesit seems to be both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for humanaffairs,as they are thought to have, it will be reasonableboth that they should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributesbelong most of all to the philosopheris manifest. He, therefore, is the dearestto the
gods. "28

It has been supposed that Aristotle here simply reports a traditional belief, viz. the belief that the gods reward the man who honours them, without committing himself to it.29 But the fact that he connects this tradition with his own conception of human reason as the element of manwhich is most akin to God, shows that he attacheda realvalueto it.30 On the other hand, there is some uncertainty in his words, for the providenceof the gods is posited in a hypotheticaland impersonalform: "Ifthe gods have any care for humanaffairsas they are thought to have 8oxeZ)."The same uncertaintyappearsin another passage: "If (Wcmep there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonablethat happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuchas it is the best. But this question would perhapsbe more appropriate to another inquiry; happinessseems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things."31 This is perhapsthe most significantpassagein Aristotle's theology. For the other inquiry to which he refers does not exist, and I doubt whether he ever seriously intended to devote himself to such an inquiry. On the one hand, his conviction of the natural character of tradition prevented him from 6o

dismissingthe common belief in divine providence; on the other hand, he intuitively felt that it was incompatiblewith his own idea of god in its strictest form. I have added the words "in its strictest form", because Aristotle did not always stick to his most rigorous definitions. In such moments he may have vaguely thought of a kind of reconciliation between his god and the traditionalgods. In his strictest form the Aristoteliangod is the finalcauseof the world, resting in his own sphereandactingon the world as a model of perfection. But the final cause sometimes develops an efficient aspect, e.g. in the following passage: "We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe possessesthe good and the highest good, whether as something separateand by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probablyin both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for "132 The image of he does not depend on the order but it dependson him. the leader shows that the principle of order not only transcends the world as a model of perfection, but also pervadesthe world as a force exercised by the supreme power.33 Consequently,the Aristoteliangod, who is the ultimate source of the good, brings about the order of the world, primarily as the object of the world's desire, but secondarily
as a regulative force.34 If this assumption is correct, we can also explain the fact that Aristotle sometimes equates "Nature" and "God", e.g. in the utterance "God and Nature create nothing that has not its use."35 Nature as the immanent force which underlies the order of the world is divine,36 and may be called God in so far as it is the efficient aspect of God. This efficient aspect, however, is not the essential nature of God, but a secondary aspect which connects him with the world. From this point of view Nature has a mediating function, transmitting the perfection of God to the world.37 Now the Greeks called a divine being which has an intermediate character a 84Lpwv.38Aristotle adopted this term when he wrote: "Dreams are not sent by God... but they are 8mqL6vLa, for Nature is A0L,uoVLx, but not ltoc. "13 He uses the same term when
ascribing inspiration to "something 8aL,u6vtov. "40 It is true that Aristotle

tries to explain dreams and inspiration from natural causes,41 but this does not imply that he did not take their divine character seriously.42 For natural causes are at the same time divine causes,43 even if they pertain to normal phenomena. Speaking about the question whether we can become good "by nature" Aristotle remarks: "That which belongs to Nature evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some
6I

divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate."4"From a modem point of view inspiration may be called a supernatural phenomenon. But in Aristotle's view it is natural as well as divine. Accordingly, when he says that "poetry is inspired by God" (9v&eoq) or that some utterances of the ancients are "divinely said" (4sL&c),4" we have no reason to doubt that he is speaking from his own conviction. In all these cases God makes his influence felt in the natural world. We may now venture to ask whether Aristotle may not have interpreted the traditional gods as operating through Nature in a way analogous to that of his own god. There is an interesting passage in which he praises the ancients for regarding the primary substances which act as the unmoved movers of the planets, as gods, and only criticizes the fact that they imagined these gods in the form of men.4"This seems to show that Aristotle took the traditional gods to be imperfect representations movers of the planets. These unmoved movers are of the urunmoved divine beings of the highest order, they lie beyond the outermost motion of the heavens and live the best and most self-sufficient of lives.47 So they belong to the same sphere of being as the supreme unnmovedmover. Aristotle does not define their mutual relations, but he probably imagined sonmekind of subordination of the unmoved movers as the minor gods to the one unmoved mover as the highest god.48 The planets themnselves are also divine beings, partaking of life and action.49 The last fact, their action, distinguishes them from their unmoved movers and connects them with the sphere of Nature. Now the unmoved movers are primarily final causes, but just as the supreme god, they may have an efficient aspect. In that case the planets are the visible manifestations of the gods and it is through the mnovementsof the planets that the gods are operating in this world.50 We are now treading on dangerous ground. It has been rightly remarked that "Aristotle does not even say, as he might easily have done, that these visible beings serve as mediators between the highest God and There is no trace of astrological speculation in his work. On man."'51 the other hand, Aristotle lived in a time when astral religion was getting a stronger hold in Greece. Plato took the movements of the heavenly bodies to be the most obvious proof of the existence of the gods.52 The author of the Epinomis argued that the heavenly bodies are either gods or images of gods fashioned by these gods themselves, that they should be worshipped with higher honours than all others, and that these other gods may be put anywhere provided they conform to the system of astronomy.53 Aristotle himself explained the origin of religion from two
62

sources, the prophetic power of the soul in dreams and the contemplation of the movements of the heavenly bodies.54 He even derives the word to6 from &6w , "to run, " "to move. "55 It maybe concluded that in Aristotle's eyes the heavenly bodies are the most divine beings of which man has some experience. The question remains why he attached, as we have seen, such a special importance to the planets. An indirect answer to this question may be found in a passage in which the complex movements of the planets are illustrated by the complex movements of the living beings on earth.56 Aristotle may have attached a deeper meaning to this analogy and have regarded the movements of the planets as the most impressive manifestation of a divine life pervading our world and somehow connected with our life. It should once more be emphasized that if Aristotle had any idea of possible connections between traditional religion and his own theology, it must have been a very vague idea. Why did he not make any stronger attempts at reconciliation, or if he realized that this would be impossible, why did he not reject the traditional gods altogether? 7 I have explained his respect for tradition from his respect for Nature. But from what source came this respect for Nature? It has often been suggested that the contradictions in Aristotle's system ultimately derive from the conflict between two forces in his mind, Platonism and empiricism.58 But his respect for Nature is something more than empiricism: it is not only a belief in the observation of nature, but also, and in the first place, a belief in Nature itself. This belief in Nature was an inheritance from Plato, and the main conflict was not between Platonism and something else, but between the different aspects of Platonism as they were developed by Aristotle.59 Plato firmly believed in the unity of Nature,60but this did not compel him to accept anything that presented itself as natural. What saved him from becoming a mere naturalist was his idea of a hierarchical structure of reality, everything striving after some model of perfection of which it is an image, an approximative imitation.61 Accordingly, Plato could do justice to tradition and current opinion by giving them their proper place on the scale of being, and this usually was such a low position that they were practically rejected. Aristotle adopted the idea of the unity of Nature, but he interpreted this unity in such a radical way that he could not accept the idea of hierarchical imitation.62Tradition and current opinion now had to be admitted to the full status of naturalness and as such could not easily be rejected. On the other hand, Aristotle stood by the Platonic principle that only the reasonable can be fully true and real. The result was, as we have seen, a constant struggle between the claims of Nature and the claims of Reason.
63

A further result of Aristotle's rejection of imitation as a principle of differentiation was the complete separation of God and the world. The Platonic god is a self-sufficient and transcendent being, but the idea of imitation enabled Plato to translate the perfection of the highest god into the providence of the lower gods.63 In Aristotle's system, as we have seen, there is no -eal synthesis of divine transcendence and divine providence. We should not blame Aristotle for this failure, for it may be doubted whether such a synthesis is possible at all. At any rate, Plato's solution, especially his introduction of the Demiurge, makes a somewhat artificial impression. In this respect Aristotle's inconsistency is more realistic and more human. Universityof Utrecht
I Cf. K. von Fritz, in Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquiti (Vandoeuvres-Gen6ve, 1958), p. 92: "Aristoteles ist der erste, der sich selbst historisch als Glied in einer Entwicklung gesehen hat". "Ces appels A ' Cf. J. M. Le Blond, Logiqueet methodechez Aristote (Paris, 1939), p. 252: l'opinion des sages et de la multitude ne constituent pas seulement, ni meme principalement, un procede eristique ou persuasif, ad hominem, mais ils sont reellement pour lui, indirecte, qui prolonge et amplifie l'experience une sorte d'experience, une expe'rience personnelle dans le temps aussi bien que dans l'espace". &x o cu ppa0XTocroq xoal 1X cv 6 a E. N. 1098 bg axen-r6ov gt 7rtept ouT ovq Fo x6vov 7r&vrot &x cuv4&eL -r& oc,'Tj Cj, yap Xr7v Xeyo,vov &aX& xal 7?pl ?,6yoq, [LAv DXOet WratpXo0vT. I have adopted, with some modifications, the Oxford translation, except for the Politics, where I have used Barker's translation, and the EudemianEthics, where I have quoted the Loeb translation by H. Rackham. 4 E.N. IO98 b27 To&roiov gA T&r fLV ToXXol xoal 7rMkLol ?IAyouaLv, T& B& oAMyoLxxl bV8ootl 'r &-8peqou8-rTpouq oV
'rl

8A 'ro&rcov e?Xoyov

aLotp-rdVvLv
nacL

1roq UXotl,

&).X' gv yA -rl % xoc

&vaLpCV

7thLdacr

XcXropPoi0V. Cf. 1 73 a i& yp 7rivunI-r&repm

Lt(L)8?C

t-rrTv

'v 7rlarv
iXeLV

6 8' eivoat go r >iv y&p v&v'xq &pEL, De div. 462 b14 To6
'rsx'

8 oxc,

0o

Wr0\XlAP&VMLV

-r&X&V)7rtoL

nopkXeAL 7oGrLV

0)4 1.

1jL7reLp(ocq

Xey6FLevov.

See also Le Blond, op. cit., p. 26o. ' ' 6 Rhet. 1 355 ai S ot dv,&pco7rL 7tp6q 'r D)0iqb 7IYX(XC;LV [XhOV4 xal 7TX E>?) TwyXVOUVaL '-v & 2 1 I 6 b3 I gXeLyap Exar-ro OtXeL6V )&motCv, Pol. 1 2 81 a42 SL np64 a'), &Xoctc,, E.E. Touq y&p 7oXXok, i5v 9xasTr6q ?St;V Ou a7toU8vto04 &'p, 68LGaq IvXETOcxaUve?6v-ro a?XX'ov,aq xv'r s... aLx xOC Xp(VtoLV &0LELVOV ?tVOCL PEXTEOUq &XEKCOV,o0X c0 gxa-rov 'rCoV .pLov, nr&v'cx oL 7toX)tol xal 'r&x 'q ,ouatxrq lpyo xxl -r&t tA 7rOLT)V-&v)&oL y&p 6?Jo
8& 7rVTEs.

'Nrv &pxotcavxal 7a7wocIC0v. E.g. Met. 1074 a38 nop8cMo-rat 8& 7rapap This sentence is also quoted rt paxLvcra tOV CPt'aCL. by B. A. van Groningen, In the Grip of the Past (Leyden, 1953), p. 8 n. S, who rightly remarks that the special context of that passage does not forbid us to assume that the words for Aristotle had a more general significance. His conclusion from antiquity to naturalness seems to be a special application of the belief that "Nature does nothing in vain". What exists for a long time, does not exist in vain, so it exists by nature.
6

7 Rhet. I387 a16 rb &pxatLov IyyU

64

8 Pol. 1 264 a2 Xp?i 7pottv &vrmyap aXc&v dSp7ML. -rT 7?o)Xi, Xp6v ... 9 Cael. 270 b g9ov yr&p &nroc, X &p7rCLP&XK8SCLVO[L(tCLV'r&imc&r& &(LKVteCLOxL ou8 8 &?W 339 bi8. I cannot agree with Le Blond, op. cit., p. 262, that c6Zx;P_E;a&c. Cf. Meteor.

"ce sont I& des farons de parler courantes".

10 POl.1329 b2s aXE8?V vOFtL(tV e6p7aa=tLNO)XixLq &v r& 7 I.Lv o5v xxl -r& Wm WCL x6 'riv. 'r&. 8' La&ov irnLp&xty&p cxbc6 &v'cyxz 'rxqv XpeiEv 8t8axV tv ,p6vcp, Cf. cpuatx? nt,&u[ac, p. &pe , .cp.LXMa (Bonitz, Ind. 834 ai4-28), and especially 8i yewcV mtL Poet. i448 a4 oExmatl Xub UX65'riv noLvrtXKV mItrmL 86O tLV&4xzl a5-ro O rolr. &v&pc7V0otq x-r. &x 7rmL8wV&karl pt)OLOxm-r6 -re y&p LLILCeLakau a1[Lyu'ov 12 Pol. 124 4 'r& i LV ou alnAX-MLL 6 a+&) axov're;. To!q 8' 01'XXpA yrLVy 18E.E. 1216 b3 2 kx yip rv &)7i k ?,ey0Lv,dCv ou accq; ,LFv 7rpoto5 71VaTOL xXl 'r -rv V& &cl e6&6MrTov ?COX Ut)Lu&VX5CO. ?4yea&OL CaFCtp, upLW',rcpm LPM'VOU)5LV 14 POl. 1329 b34 CL TOI;1v ELp?MLVOL txmv&q Xp'la,& d8& pXe)XeLtLvvanetLpas0a

b3 8Ec 8&, &antp k7d 'r&v &)Uav, 'rtOiwq a& xct snprov 8Lmcpmvx6evcx V Lk.L&)tcmttLv r&v-rm o d w& , el 8&t -r& 7cop1Jaov't ouCrc 8eLxv6vaxt 'r&d Iv8oE 7repL =ra -r &ri 'r&nwkea'rxxaxl xuptLcIY r'&bv8ota, p xxlc xrl7rroct 8 arm * T'v ya'pX1$)rtI TE
8W8eLYIAVOV &V Et-7 Ex)OvCO;.

~-qrclv. 15 E.N. i I45

'I E.E. 12 3g bhI 'r& 8M yoi 6o=sq*utv &uac -re&oxo5vr 7replnro6cv tLdX'r-m 3 )nso dopEOXMaC xXl 'rk vv-rsdOXaFEL *roiro 8' 'aTr. &c&v &7rO&cOaCTCL xal 'r&ras eiA6ycwq ?pav-nrm& rcI&vov-r(maoxouYTa. l&decrTmy&tp 6V.oXoyoLTt'LoV 6 'roLoxroq or)aXL ?,6yo 'rol; qXWvo& &a ,utVELv h b X)ey6tevov *.-L W llv,b &XYu N t -r&; 1VMv'L64aLq tX&votw CU[LP 8C o0. Cf. R. Eucken, Die Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872), p. IO, c&g who refers to Gen. corr. 323 bi7 axt-Mv8i 'T-, 1vav'rL0X)oyEcz68rt8ov 6Xov 'r &EcipaGcx Jpo4 'rL nUyX&vouLXiyovres kX&-TpOL, Phys. 206 aI 3 7r(w)q I TL 7t 6 8' 0o, Met. vrL X yeLv 6ptMq, 6Uca 8' o'ux 6pM;, io86 ai 3 7r&v'rocq Pol. 1 280 ag aCuJpJ(veL xa
7r&v-rc &oVXlx aL(x(tou

'rLv6(,

[ xal ?1&you(0L o7' r&v r F.XPL TLV6; 7ppOk0XOV'racL,

It will be clear that I cannot agree with J. B. McDiarmid, Harr. Stud. xUP(op 8&xCrLoV.
6i (19S3), p. 86, who maintains that 'Aristotle is not interested in historical facts as such at all. He is constructing his own system of philosophy, and his predecessors are of interest to him only insofaras they furnish materialto this end". Cherniss' conclusion which this quotation claims to summarize,is much more qualified(cf. Aristotle's Criticismof PresocraticPhilosophy, Baltimore, 193S, p. 348). 17 Cf. e.g. Met. 985 a4 Ey&p rtq &K0xoXouOoL E xxl )al0p4&vot 7rpo, ijv 8t&&voLtMv xxl I' 7rp6 & Trtv& 8cxov-res t )kycov'Epre&ox)B xTX., Gen. corr. 3I8 b26 'rp67sov cXXECvrmt 0,68i
18

)xkyov'req o&Ux &Xrj'&kq.

This has been made abundantlyclear by H. Chernissin his books Aristotle's Criticismof PresocraticPhilosophy (Baltimore, 193g) and Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, I944). For some qualificationssee W. K. C. Guthrie, J.H.S. 77 (1957), pp. 3S-41. 19 Cf. L. Robin, Aristote (Paris, 1944), p. 299: "un defaut de franchise, une indecision souvent troublante... cet art du compromis... a toujours quelque chose d'e4quivoque et de factice".
20

Bonitz, Ind. 836 b29-39. Met. I 000 ag ot I?&v o5v 7rept 6aoL &eoX6yoL 'HatoSov xal 7r&v-re4 -ro5 I6vov &pp6v-naOCv - a0u5 7rL&aIvoi ro5 aOI1'Yro6, iLaV -r&TX 8' dLy6p-amv yM'p 7tOLOUVrq nTp6; awpx xctl ix te&v yeyovivaC,r&.,uLyeucasroLevCI To VkXrocpoq XmC yev&aG}ct Tq &tL(po0taq& -rT'X 6v6[tLX l pza(v, 8~Xov Cq 5i-3a C6UOLZXXcTrOL xat nx atu'EI (X&yovTeC Vp6pL[L
21

T7q

W7 Popa. TOV X't(ov

'rO&Th)V 6i

EXtp XWtSV

El

0Lkv

yap X&PL1V h8ovA

'a 6 v&xracp xxl h &.LPpOE(C, CE 8' T0o ClVact, acx6rv &&ykvOou )Ov,o&OvOcfrL -ro5 CIvct &X& 7repl1.dv 'row FLuKxra) coy ok,v oux &eLov ,c &v clv &t8ot 86WCVOL'rpoponq;

aiou8iq axo7relv.Aristotle had a keen eye for the psychological backgroundof ILe-r& a 'roi3ro7rdv'rc qpoal Pa3&XeCeCaO&mL, religion. Cf. e.g. Pol. 1252 b24 Toiq eoDu 8 && &rt xcxl airol ot I6v It xxclv5v ot 8i 'r6 &pX-tov &camLm),ov'ro. Another example of 7apccvo5v'rci the rejection of a traditionalview is E.N. I 177 b3l o' Xp 8 xci'r&'roCk
gv'rac oU8g O-r& 'r6v Ovr6v, &?X &tp'6aorv &vXc'rct qpovcLv &vOpco7rov &v&p67ntva Cf. W. Vollgraff, L'oraisonfunibre de Gorgias (Leyden, 195 2), pp. I 56-7. mvcvivcreLv. 2s Mot.an. 699 b3S &6 W6cLEv V TOI; O65'r(Oq (those who hold that the UO)XxLVOUaLV ce cEpisa~c universe) the outside 'O1.dBptp origin of motion must be at rest &X' oVx &v Ip6craor' 1t ouppacv*evTre&ov8 x&,uoV' o8' CEVacM7roXX& 7r&v'rOV, ZiV' 5S7rCTov 7C&V'rc 8' L&dtca4-ct &col 176aci( 'r aOCiLVOEL. &8MkeToxw710ivact.Cf. his allegorical interpretation 'rb yap 6)cor &x(vTnrov Unc'oU'8cv6q of Atlas as the axis of the heavens, Mot. an. 699 a27, and E. Zeller, Die Philosophieder Griechen II 24 (Leipzig, 1921), p. 795 n. 3. 3 Pol. 1336 bl 13 cpcvepbv&rt xml 'r6 kcapctv I ypciq&'
brLtLc); iIv o0V Ia'rc 7rp&cEwv tLlaLv,
^

(IEopt{o.av). X6youq&a J*?ovmq

ypXc v ?tlvcL'FOLOU'T(CV TOs &PXoUaL VnL7V .J'TC &cMXc 0L &lroM8(&a 6 et p.* 7rcp& rart kkots 'ro&ovrom olq xcxl 'r6v raca6v

24 Cf. Zeller, op.cit., p. 796: 'von jener platonischenForderungeiner Reform der Religion durch die Philosophie findet sich bei ihm keine Spur". 25 Top. ioS ag oE[Liv yap &iropo5v'rcq 8tl -robb eoq 'rLL5V XOci Toyq yovctq &yiOMFv 7r6'rcpov
iepiM xOCrcTa'triov, oS'rc p&viuaov 8iovraL, Pol. 1329 a29 OS'rt yrp ycc?py6v V 7Vp6q 7rpincl 'r4LlaxtcL To'ro tO6o, E.N. 1162 a4 Ia'L 8' ' -n)v 7ro)Lwr(ov also Cf. xoxl &yco-Mv 7rp6o i7rcpkXov. cB, xaCI pLX(ci 7rp64 yovet7 fco4 &V,p67r0Lq -1*xvoL; .. &vci Zvaci. the end of his will (D.L. V s6): '?v Arq ~rp6q 'ri c,'ripmi Ir A*,uqrp&

0 o5 xo?&reo

u7r6 yip

fV DX aCoO&NVTOC, &vcIctvci 8i xcii NLX&vOPCi ckxv

~4jm ip ciS'ro5 ',1)Ec[L,-v,

OLVM'rcEr-

POMcX7' ALL Mo'rpL XMI 'ANv4 acrctp4e. 'r6 o5 lvcxc. co* -arrL yip mu'-r6 26 Cael. 292 b5 'rip 8' ug &pta'ra Xov'rL o&Hv 8e 7rpdE ctvMi 27 E.N. 178 t 8 Tok &CO6 Y&p pi&Ma=i ucpcBi?PCv [ cXptou4 xaIl cS8ciL?ovMq

cpOvoUvrocL 'ri 8LxXct(c; h ye),olot 7rp&eL4 8i 7roEocc&NovctL[LmL Xpewv ci&rolt; 7repac &vOpCtou4, C; &X,& r'K OsvoarX&'roVerc; xMil 7rMpMxciOxXaca &7ro8L86vrc; xai 6acr roLOCGTa tVL 8t 8&aouoLv; xmi6v; %-rig &cu4cp(ouq; U7T0LkvovTmq 'ri 9opep3c xacl xLv8ovetUov'rxq 6&rL rti &v lcv; ^ op'TLX64 'rL-roLoi3rov. act 8i aXgpovcq T fci &'ronov 8' Et xMI Ia'CL avciirq ov6[LLa &v 'ri 7tEpl Ta'r 8i 7rX'rci eCpiVOL'r' 8&CtLoiaL 6 brciVo; 6T&L 06X IXOUat(Xcis bITCuft[EM; XcUTrou xci &vEpyetv Tt EL?)IpOCOLV ft4V. &W& [L0V 4Vkvv4cU7TV'C1 7rp&E,CL ,tLXP xal &VdELOC &9CiLpou'r4 8? 4Cavrt 'ro5 7rpxr'tcLv 6aurep 'r6v 'Ev8u[4ovac. 8? XCt6i8ELV yap * oi) &pa [L&Ou, &L 8E 1?&)XOV rO 7OLtCLV, rE )xdLlrec n),\v
Oep(a;

6a're

'

ro5

ftco

&vipycLoi,

8Lciq poUOc, tcop7yrmx ) iv ct'i. Met. 1074 b3o Wo rL iv ct) 'r6 'rL)LLrpOV OxCpL6'rq'rL mc&r6v &pa voct, CtTc?p &crTl r6 xprrtLarov. 'r6 voo6evov... 6 vo5q, 25 E. N. I 179 a2 &pLta-r xcil 8L&cxd(icvoq 3 6 8t xciai voVv &vcpyc7v xal 'ro5rov tcpace6tcov 'r v v&Dpc0tdvow LTC6&c1V ytEVc'rci, xcii bcoqLXVabraroq foLXeV elvact. ei yip rtrL&7rLI&XCLc xcI 't(r o1.yyevca'raCi( C) &pta'r v cUoyov xalottict 8oxet, &aip X%ctpctv Tr acu&rO r 8' iv ctl1 6 voi5q) xac &Tyoi7tTrv'rci 'roq tL&XLtarcx'rou'ro xcl 'rL.LoCVTOt &VTEUrUDIOLCLV 8rL 8g 7r&cv'a -rc xmi xaciV 7rp&'"ov'raq. qp)cov cxU'ro4 &7rL).Lc)ouELivOu xcxl 6pC; &pac. oux &8fXov. AfOtoLXsa'rcv'o 7rdepXeL, Xa M.Lc&' & 'rcixJ'rc p croy) 4op
('ro5tro

cg 'rV

66

29 Zeller, op. cit., pp. 388-9: "eine beilaufigeBeriihrungdes gewohnlichen Vorsehungs-

glaubens (E.N. II79 a22) gibt uns kein Recht, diesen GlaubenAristoteles selbst zuzuschreiben". F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles NikomachischeEthik (Darmstadt, 1956), p. 597: "kein Lehrstuckin streng philosophischemSinn, daher auch kein Gegensatzzu friiheren Aussagen uber die Gotter, sondern die iibliche Einbeziehungvon Traditionellem".
,eo - 8TXov yap dwqo68e &tnL Dirlmeier, p. 52 1, refers to E.E. I244 b8 -ro53ro cpovep6v (Rou c'rC rt ou8 8e/a"r/cxt, o08' la6rauX ye [L7nOvSOlkr6 'rou. But "to have 7tpoa8e6jxevoq

a ct)Xoq" presupposesa permanentneed; this is absent from the act of qcthtv, which has a more incidentalcharacter.Similarly,man and God cannot "becpLoL", because their disparity is too great (E.N. ii8 b32). But this does not imply that incidental (PLIE should be impossible. Aristotle expressly admits the possibility of y)da between God
and man (E.E.
1238

r LptXe!t-tc. Dirlmeier, p. &VT-Lq0Xz ouX61xoEwo

2 6'rL bi8), and only adds (b27): 4E Ycotov y&p et T'L kyxoo (-I 'r& 521, comments on this as follows:

"Der Gebrauchvon 'lacherlich' zeigt eben, dass die anthropomorpheVorstellungeiner wechselseitigen Freundschaftmit Gott abstrus ist." But Aristotle does not exclude (cf. E.N. 1i63 b 1 -S). The only remarkablething &VLtcpLXelv but only 6 ?oEwo&.vrTLpetv is that Aristotle mentions the fact that God is too perfect to think of anythingelse beside himself as showing that the self-sufficient man cannot be completely like God (E.E. 124S bi6), but not as proving that God cannot 97eplv. so This seems to be recognizedby Dirlmeier himself, pp. s98-9: "Sohathier die populare Formulierungdes 'do ut des' eine einzigartigeSublimierungerfahren. Aristoteles durfte diesen Abschnitt in der Tat als die Erreichungseines Zieles betrachten.
31 E.N. IO99 el it.i o5v xxl W)o -t(&atL fC0)v 8Mp*)1uxc &V&pC')7toLq, eXoyov bl xocl rhv eu'8=lOovlmv ft6agorov T'rV &V4Po(EVC0V 6a(p eIVXL, xxl lL&XLcMOX )LTrOV. &XX01 T'oio >?v tlao &W-1; &v es axk4icoq oExcLO6repov, mEVvrauL 8i x&v cEt 00 ft67re[?7rt6q *a7Lv &W

8'
32

&.pe'hv

XOE -LXv IL&0-jatV ntLaC7rx?r0v

&axYnaLV 7opOy(vTroct,

'rGV kCLo-r&t0v

e1vot.

s yaMv xal Tr6 7o?p0 XL ? 'o5 6Xou ?l5an 'r6 &pLa'roV,7r6-repov XCXOpLatiAVOv TL xocl o xmzO ' oc&ar6, % Av 'r&wv. &p.qot*pwo, tcritp xot yap &vr -r&4EL crp&',euFLax; -so ed xxcl 6 a-rpcrly6, xact tLXXov o6vtor,- oi yolp o5toq 86C T)V r&fLV &X?X' &xcLv8&& 'rO56v &-t9v. 33 Ross, ad loc., maintains: 'God is the source of the good in the world, which is prog? xo

Met. 1075 all

duced by the desire for him, as the order in an armyis producedby its strivingto do the will of its leader." But this can hardlybe the meaning of 8Lta oi3-rov, which shows that order is effected by the leader. D. J. Allan, The Philosophyof Aristotle (Oxford, I952), p. i 19, remarks: 'it is not God but the good which thus pervadesall being." But Aristotle speaksof "thegood and the highest good"; the latter cannotbe immanentin the universe, so that the term IXCL (all) should not be taken in the strict sense of "contains'. Cf.
a8-9 (6 &v0pc7rLvoq vo5q) IX..... Tr6 &pLOtov, 6v &o
'ri, which clearly shows that God

is the source of the good. al The assumptionof an efficient aspect of a secondarycharacterin the Aristotelian god has also been made by the later Peripateticschool. Theophrastus(Met. 6 ai) speaksof the v& unmoved mover as 7rckvrc &pLac otaPouMtvov.In an Arabic excerpt of the pseudoAristoteliantreatise On the Virtuesof the Soul publishedby S. Pines, Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyenage 23 (I956), pp. 5-43, it is arguedthat God's care of the world is subordinate to his care of his own perfection, and Alexanderof Aphrodisias(Apor. II 21, p. 66, 17 Br.) seems to have interpreted the providence of God in the same way (cf. Pines,
pp. 25-27).

'Theseviews are probablycoloured by Platonic and Stoic ideas, but they may have been
*

partly suggestedby some indications in the works of Aristotle himself. That he did not conceive of the unmoved mover as a purely finalcause also appearsfrom the fact that he assumesthe unmoved mover to be in contact with the world (Phys. 267 b8, Gen.corr. the whole world, which 322 b2 I). Met. 1074 b3 the divine is said to enclose (rcpt&Xetv) being. Cf. Gen.corr.3 36 b3 1 uveUV)dP(acs seems to be impossiblefor a strictly transcendent
'r6 8ov 6 ft6q. Met. 983 ag Aristotle assigns aop?mto God, i.e. knowledge of the causes of existing things (whereas I o74 b iS ff. it is argued that God's thought cannot have any object but himself). It seems to me that this idea must have meant something more to Aristotle than a popular phrase (as is assumed by Ross, ad loc.). See also Le Blond, op.cit.,
pp. 386-7. as Cael. 271 a33 6 Bi *fct
0 87Z,uLoupyecrmax Cpusts. 8U'vXL) 9auvXCL

xxl

* (p1otq tr

O'8&v .L&'rTVroLo0aLv.Cf. 7rFxv, E.N.

I
I53

Part. an.

645 a 9
?t

36
37

Pol. 1326

a32 (etoc

b32

7r&v'rc

yap

yUrtL

rL &el0v.

This would also explain the anthropomorphic traits in Aristotle's description of the activity of Nature, a feature which has caused some difficulties to modern interpreters. Cf. A Mansion, Introductiond la physique aristotelicienne (Louvain, 1946), pp. 261-269. Plato Symp. 202e-3a, Rep. 392a, Leg. 38 E.g. Eur. Hel. 1137, Troad. SS-g6, Med. 1391,
7i7b.

De div. 46 3 b 1 3. Beare, ad loc., wrongly assumes that "the &4cuov is the offspring of the &e6q;. H. J. A. Nolte, Het godsbegrip bij Aristoteles(Nijmegen, 1940), p. 92, is equally wronig in translating "de natuur staat onder daemonen". 0 E.E. 1 214 a24.
39

41 De div. 464 a6 ff.

42

(Liege, 1932), p. 31: "nous As is suggested by J. Croissant, Aristote et les mysteres trouvons donc les faits religieux difinis comme des r6alitis d'ordre psychologique... Des lors, il n'importe guere que l'explication proposee s'integre dans un systeme plus ou moins spiritualiste". Similarly Nolte, op. cit., p. 37. 43 Cf. P. Boyance, Le culte des Musesches les philosophesgrecs (Paris, I 937 ), pp. 186-194. ft4 c 44 E. N. I 1 7 9 b 2 1 'r6 ILuv oiZv rqc4 paeo 8m)Bov d Oux &I V[Lv, &&. 8L 'r LV(X pp. 193-4, who rightly 7ratipyL. Cf. Boyance, op.cit., n otroc'r 4olq &Xq 7, ?l,ruykV argues that there is no essential difference between this passage and E.E. I248 a26-31. De somno453 b2 3 the things caused by 'r68XL&6vlov are divided into the things which occur The equation of by nature (p6aeL) and those which are spontaneous (&76r mUroua&rou). rLVL "nature" and divine determination is also to be found in Plato, e.g. Ap. 22b ?Uii1EL Leg. 642c xO&PUeC4 i 9uaL4, ,uo[pq, Lp.tt&cav=b2 xOa 6V&OUML&MOvreq, Phdr. 240 ag -rts xat xexr& pi6atv. Cf. E. des Places, Pindare et Platon (Paris, 1949), P. 149 if. 68 2a xoTr ?ev 45 Rhet. 1408 big, Cael. 279 a23, Met. 1074 bg.
"6

Met.

1074 a38 wapm8kOorxL g& sxp&

0tL4 LVZUCvTcr-repov&rL
(I)t6@

'rV itp6~

&pXtX(V

X1XI 7UOC[L

V IV uL64OUCILX

XaTCl-.oXe

?toLV coL

L r6 7vepLxX7 O6OL xCCl ?epov

tqV 7?tCLG TGV 7r0?uhA

''ov 6'v6v qv5atv.

r sx?86BOLna
v6i?ouq

2f

7TpOGYXTL

xalrcp6; Qrv kc'rou

&XXkv (4oCv
OLq 'WV elp

xal Tr

cauO0pov

XpnawCV

&pW7r1OEL86L4

-re yap ro&Touq xcxl 'rv

TLOYXkyOUaL, xac ?o&rotL 4owtou; ou'r6 X&POL FOVov et -Lq Xcpta5

gepop
TO

&x6Xou&o

xal 7partpo aLxtrot4

7tpCorov, 6tL 45eo6q tOVTO 'r4q xYpOrOoUaLlCc ?Ivot, That o-roL (b3) refers to the unmoved movers, seems &v ctpnaoxtt aCl4 voi.tcrvL?. to appear from rrpcCrot; o6aloq (bg) and raic o6aCaoc xalc r q pXos xr&q&xtviXVoXu (a 6).

argues that "medieval and modern Cf. also Tricot ad loc. Allan, op. cit., pp. 120-1, commentators have unjustifiably complicated the scheme by supposing that there are

68

are not distinct personal 'unmoved movers'", and that "the various planetary spheres beings, but psychical powers within a complex soul." Allan refers to Cael. II 12, but there (292 b28i Aristotle connects the movements of the planets with a plurality of which he distinguishes from the 7pw'rrq &pXod &pX'. See further J. Owens, "The Reality of the AristotelianSeparate Movers,n Rev.Met. 3 ( I90), pp. 319- 337, TheDoctrineof Beingin theAristotelian H. A. Wolfson, Metaphysics (Toronto, 19i), pp. 278-287, "The Pluralityof Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroe~s, " Harv.Stud. 63 (I 958),
pp. 233-253. '7 Cael. 279 a2 0 Tr5v 1'7rip

Av &c'r&dvr Te-CyUlkv61 vpop(iv...

rv &ptac lXovra Clcjtv

xacl AVj au'-ropxecsr-drnv. 48 Cf. 292 b2g9 VorJaot yp

ge-L rr7s~Ca; xol ?qj &pXrqWxa'rn; 7oMXXv 67repoXyV Trp k &X?M, Met. 1073 bi 6rt [Lkvo5v ctcslv oiaEoL, xal 'rot'1r) 'Lg 7rP6; xal 8TE&pa xa&'rx V Or?s V 'rats qzopot5 Ur&v&aSrpcov, q(pmvp6v. See further 7xpdrrn Tr&EW Wolfson, Op.Cit., pp. 235- 239. " Cael. 292 IX6v'cv, aig9 iCUtCt c' 7repl acqukrcov o6rCov{56vov xnl Vovc8&o -rIELvSLkv t'oXexmCivcv 7rp&deo. xal dcjXcov 8i 7rd1?7v, 8t4xVOoLtC5o * El 8' (k tex6vrov ~(-* Cf. De philos. fr. 21 W. 50 Aristotle takes the annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle to be the cause of coming-to-be and passing-away (Gen. corr. 336 a32, Meteor. 346 b22, Met. 107I aI6). 61 Allan, op. cit., p. 122. Cf. p. 29. 52 Leg. 88Se, 886e, 887e, 967d. 13 Epin. 983e-4a, 984d, 987d-8a. " De philos. fr. I 2-13 W-. 66 Meteor. 339 b26 or6 yap dc&e a&xn F&ov&[ix xal &ct6v -r Av cp6atv IolxcxaLv UCo0rXPv. 66 Cael. 292 bi ff. 57 Nolte, op. cit., tries to show that there is an evolution in Aristotle's thought, moving from the belief in the providence of a plurality of gods to the doctrine of a single selfcentred god. But on the one hand, the idea of God as a self-centred being acting on the world as its final cause already appears in an early work such as the E.E., cf. 1245 b 18 (#c6;) PkXtTLOV e ?kre &XXo 'rL voetv 7ocp' OtCr6< ocsrr6v, 1249 bi4 ou yap &7rxtxxrtLXr

Cael.

'r E?VlL

rpr P

&pXwv 6 ?r5

&dcX' o5 hexo

^ 9pp6vraLt;

On the other 7w rrcLkdTt.

hand, the providence

of the gods is mentioned in a passage of the N.E. (quoted supra, n. 28) which is commonly taken to be much later than the E.E. See further the review of Nolte's book by A. Mansion, Tijdschr.v. Philos. 7 (1945), pp. 127-140. This does not imply that we should exclude the possibility of any development in Aristotle's religious thought. But our data are too scanty to trace such a development. W. Lameere, Ant.Cl. I8 (1949), 279-324, tries to show that Aristotle orginally accepted, but later abandoned, the idea of a genius accompanying man during his life. But the evidence he adduces is not sufficient to draw such a conclusion: fr. 193 is suspect, Gen.an. 76I b8-23 refers to animals, and An. 41 I a7-I does not exclude the existence of demons, who would rather consist of 7rvci3i? or ether than of fire or air. 68 Cf. e.g. I. During, Arctos I (I9S4), p. 76: "In Aristotle's writings, we can always expect to meet side by side the two dominant trends: Platonic abstraction and biological empiricism." W. K. C. Guthrie, C]. Quart. 2 8 (I 934) ,p.98, rightly suggests "that Aristotle's system, b instead of showing a development altogether away from Platonism, might rather be described as in some respects the furnishing of logical grounds for preserving what he regarded as the essential parts of Platonism intact," and points out how the theory of the 69

unmoved mover and that of the plurality of unmoved movers may be explained as developments of different aspects of Plato's cosmology: 'The attainment of the one unmoved mover as the culmination of his theories of motion had restored to Aristotle one fundamental dogmaof Platonism,that the first principlemust at least be incorporeal. But in the Laws, his last work, Plato supposedfor his theory not only a soul for the first heaven, but also a separate one for each of the planets, the sun and the moon... in Aristotle not only the first heaven but also the planets are to have external movers... Does it not look as if the discussionswith Callippusthe astronomerhadhad an ulterior purpose in view, that Aristotle had seen in astronomy the possibility of restoring another little bit of Platonic belief to the realm of true, because demonstrable, philosophy?"Cf. 1. During, Eran. j4 (1956), p. I 12: "Aristotle was strugglingto become a Platonist and to reconcile his empirical and common sense approachto nature with Plato's idealism." 60Cf. e.g. Meno 8 Icg '6i cpaecos &7rac', auyyevois o5S". Even the Formsare kv rn 9Caet (Phd. 103 bs, Rep. 598 ai, Parm. 132 d2). See further G. R. Morrow, 'Plato in PoliticalTheory to G. H. Sabine Presented (Ithaca,N.Y., and the Law of Nature," Essays 1948), pp. I 7-44, esp. 31 ff. 61 A. Dies, AutourdePlaton (Paris, 1927), p. 594,rightlyremarks: "L'id6ed'imitation est (Leyden, au centre meme de la philosophieplatonicienne". See furthermy essayMimesis
i949),
'9 It

pp. I6-17.

is true that Aristotle writes (Met.iosob28) [LLtLext'QL xod -r& 8& a'& &98apTCc (v ,U'rcxf3oXj6v'nz,but he did not accept the Platonic idea that the degree of reality of anything is dependent upon its degree of approximationto eternal Being. Homire in La notiondudivindepuis see my essay"PlatonsGottesbegriff" 6s For particulars jusqu'a Platon(Vandoeuvres-Geneve,I954), pp. 241-293.
Additional note. On the problem of tradition in Aristotle's thought, see also 0. Gigon in sur la tradition platonicienne (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1g97), pp. 27 ff. On the Recherches attitude of the Greek philosophers towards tradition, cf. H. Cherniss, "The History of Ideas and Ancient Greek Philosophy," in Estudios de historia de la filosofia en homenaje al Professor RodolfoMondolfoI (Tucuman, 1957), pp. 93-114.

70