G.R. No. L-31083 September 30, 1975 URSULA FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

JULIAN RODRIGUEZ, defendant-appellee, MONINA RODRIGUEZ, defendant-intervenor-appellee. Castillo Law Offices for plaintiff-appellant. Arsenio Suazo for appellee Heirs of Julian Rodriguez. Maximo N. Llanto, Jr. for oppositors-claimants. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Octavio R. Ramirez for intervenor Director of Lands. MARTIN, J.: In a span of more than two decades now, this case has been appealed to Us for the third time, with the plaintiff-appellant inquiring into the extent and coverage of the reversion order of the Court in its anterior decision. Sometime in 1932, the plaintiff-appellant, Ursula Francisco, applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of L-102 of Davao Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185 hectares, situated in barrio Bunawan, Davao City, through Sales Application No. 15774. Unfortunately, the Director of Lands rejected the sales application, for the reason that the plaintiff-appellant had permitted herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the land. Nonetheless, the plaintiff-appellant continued in possession and in June, 1940 she conveyed 29.3298 hectares of the land to her former lawyer, defendant Julian Rodriguez. Later, upon discovering that the document she signed was a deed of absolute sale and not the antichresis she thought of, she filed civil case 9-R in the Court of First Instance of Davao and sought for the annulment of the deed. The deed was declared null and void, but the land was considered Government property and not plaintiff-appellant's. Subsequently, the Bureau of Lands reinstated plaintiff-appellant's sales application, but stayed the execution thereof. Plaintiff-appellant then sued defendant Julian Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Davao, docketed as Civil Case 268, for recovery of possession, sum of money, and damages. Defendant Monina Rodriguez, Julian's daughter, was allowed to intervene.

After trial, the lower court adjudged plaintiff Ursula Francisco and defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez not entitled to the possession of the disputed land and left the disposition thereof to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Both parties appealed to this Court. On May 21, 1956, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the Court holding that the land dispute between the parties may well be left to the 1 action of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The parties separately moved for reconsideration, believing that the decision of the Court had restored to them their status ante litem motan, to obtain possession of the property and the fruits thereof pendente lite, but the motions were denied. When the records of the case were returned to the lower court, the parties reiterated their motions, which the trial court also denied on the ground that it is either the Secretary of Agriculture or the Director of Lands who should ask for the possession of the property. On October 22, 1956, after the Bureau of Lands had completed its investigation of the land controversy ordered by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary denied the claims of Julian Rodriguez and his daughter Monina to the 29.3298 hectares and it improvements. Further, it declared the land in question vacant, the steps leading to its sale, including the improvements, in a public bidding to be forthwith taken. The Office of the President affirmed the Secretary's ruling in toto. On December 8 1958, the Director of Lands moved to intervene in Civil Case 268 before the lower court and prayed that the receivership be dissolved after the receiver shall have rendered an accounting. The motion was granted and the final accounts of the receiver were approved. Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez filed a motion asking for the possession of the property and discharge of the receiver and later, together with the plaintiff-appellant, moved that the proceeds of the property be delivered to and divided between them equally. The motions were denied and so, defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez appealed to this 2 Court imputing that the trial court erred in declaring the litigated land already reverted to the State; the State's ownership of the land as carrying with it the right to possession; in not declaring defendants entitled to the material and physical possession of the land; and in not terminating the receivership. On October 31, 1962, the Court affirmed the judgment appealed from, ruling that the reversion is self-operative and separate action need not be instituted

by the Government for that purpose. The provision of Section 101 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) that "all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereof shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," applies only when title has already vested in the individual, which is not the case in the appealed judgment. Neither could the parties claim for the proceeds of the property pendente lite because "all rights in and interest to, and the improvements and crops upon, land for which an application has been denied or cancelled or a patent or grant refused, or a contract or concession rescinded or annulled, shall also be forfeited to the Government." (Section 98, Commonwealth Act No. 141). Instead, the property as well as the fruits thereof pendente lite should be delivered to the 3 Director of Lands, who had intervened in Civil Case 268. On March 17, 1966, the Director of Lands sought the execution of the decision of the Court before the lower court. Plaintiff Ursula Francisco opposed the petition, contending that only twenty-nine (29) hectares of the 33-hectare Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao Cadastre, was reverted to the State, excluding the four (4) hectares which she claims to have been in her possession even during the pendency of Civil Case 268. Defendants Julian Rodriguez and Monina Rodriguez followed, claiming that an independent suit is necessary for the execution of the judgment since more than five (5) years have already elapsed from its finality. Opposition also came from claimants-oppositors Alejo Dugasa, et al., pressing on the impropriety of execution by mere motion and asserting their possessory right 4 over the land in question. The lower court denied the oppositions in its Order of September 18, 1967 and directed the issuance of a writ of execution placing the Government thru the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer in Davao in complete possession of the land in question. In a subsequent order of November 10, 1967, the lower court also enjoined the receiver in the proceedings to submit its final accounting, after which the Motion for Dissolution of Receivership filed by the Director of Lands would be heard. Hence, on November 20, 1967, plaintiff-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal 5 against the September 18, 1967 Order of the lower court.

Only one issue is raised by plaintiff-appellant and that is, whether the reversion ordered in G.R. No. L-15605, October 31, 1962, refers to the whole Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao, consisting of 33.1185 hectares, or only to the 29.3298 hectares, the conveyance of which by the plaintiffappellant to defendant Julian Rodriguez had been annulled. The fundamental principle is that the State possesses plenary power "as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public domain, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what 6 otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership." And the law has laid in the Director of Lands "the power of executive control, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands" that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the 7 lands of the public domain subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary 8 of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its decisions as to questions of fact are conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources. 9 It is indisputable that the only basis of the plaintiff-appellant's claim to the property in question is her Sales Application No. 15774, wherein she applied for the purchase of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102, Davao Cadastre, consisting of 33.1185 hectares. However, the application was rejected by the Director of Lands on August 10, 1935, because she "permitted herself to be a dummy." She continued to possess the property though and then sold 29 hectares thereof to her previous lawyer, defendant Julian Rodriguez. Later, the sale was declared null and void by this Court in G.R. No. L-8263, May 26, 1952, not only because plaintiff-appellant's rights under her sales applications had been cancelled by the Bureau of Lands but especially because the convenyance was made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture as required by law (Section 29, Commonwealth Act No. 141), The nullity of such sale produced as a consequence "the reversion 10 of the property with all the rights thereto to the State." The subsequent reinstatement of plaintiff-appellant's sales application by the Director of Lands did not redeem her claim to Lot 595, Cadastral No. 102 from its incipient nullity because the application was finally denied by the Secretary of Agriculture on October 22, 1956 after formal investigation by the Bureau of Lands, a ruling now beyond judicial interference. 11 As a result, whatever rights or interests plaintiff-appellant may have in Lot No. 595 had thus frittered away and the entire lot reverted to the mass of public lands,

such reversion being even imprescriptible. By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in the acquisition of the land and selling the same without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself has eliminated the very source (Sales Application) of her claim to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which, 13 she cannot later on assert any right or interest thereon. This is the imperative import of the pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No. L-15605 that the invalidity of the conveyance plaintiff-appellant "produced as a consequence the reversion of the property with all rights thereto to the State." As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains that any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary Agriculture and Natural Resources "shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited." Thus, in Republic v. 14 Garcia, quoted in Republic v. Ruiz, supra, it was held that "even if only 19 out of the 23.21 hectares of the homestead land had been sold or alienated within the prohibitive period of five years living date of issuance of the patent to the grantee, such alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the State 15 of the whole grant." Much more, when even the mere application is denied by the Bureau of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred any right over the land covered by the application. It is the award made by the Director to the applicant (if he is the highest bidder) that confers upon him a certain right over the land, namely, "to take possession of the land so that he could 16 comply with the requirements prescribed by law." It is at this stage, when the award is made, that the land can be considered "disposed of by the Government", since the aforestated right of the applicant has the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing People v. Lapasaran, 100 Phil. 40 and Diaz v. Macalinao, 55 O.G. 1021). However, the disposition is merely provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements prescribed by law before any patent is issued. After the requisites of the law are complied with by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, the patent is issued. It is then that the land covered by

12

the application may be considered "permanently disposed of by the 17 Government." In case the applicant is found not to possess the qualifications necessary for the award of the land, the application is 18 revoked. Furthermore, the finding of the Court in its previous decisions that the Director of Lands and finally the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had rejected plaintiff-appellant's sales application for Lot No. 595 may well be considered as the law of the case between the parties herein, to the effect that the resulting absence of plaintiff-appellant's rights or interests 20 to the entire Lot No. 595 constitutes controlling legal rule between them. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of the court a quo, dated September 18, 1967, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of the Government, thru the Director of Lands, of Lot No. 595, Cadastral No. 102 of Davao Cadastre (for the whole area of 33.1185 hectares) is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Actg., Chairman, Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Esguerra, J., is on leave.
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G.R. No. L-27455 June 28, 1973 ANA GONZAGA, SERVILLANO IGNACIO and ANASTACIA SAN JUAN, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BONIFACIO EVANGELISTA, JOSE EVANGELISTA CHUA, PAULINO EVANGELISTA, PEDRO TRINIDAD, FORTUNATA TRINIDAD, RUPERTA DE ROSAS, ANASTACIA DE ROSAS, PATRICIA EVANGELISTA, and JUANA EVANGELISTA, respondents-appellees. FERNANDO, J.: It must have been well-founded doubts about the strength on the original position taken by petitioners both in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and subsequently in respondent Court Appeals, that in this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the latter tribunal, a novel aspect is sought to be introduced them. It represents a last-ditch effort in their thus far hopeless quest for excluding private respondents, nephews and nieces of the late Juan Evangelista, from any share in that portion of his estate sold by his widow, petitioner Ana Gonzaga, to the other petitioners. The point raised by them, not previously passed upon by this Court, is that the requirement in 1 Section 20 of the Public Land Act, couched in absolute terms, of the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the proposed sale of the rights of one seeking a free patent, does not apply 2 unless the application deals with a homestead. It is their contention that if such interpretation be adopted, then the decision adverse to them, both in the lower court as well as in respondent Court of Appeals, should be reversed. We do not feel called upon to rule squarely on such an issue, as the factual basis thereof is completely lacking, not only as shown in the decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed, but also as reflected in the answer of petitioners in the lower court as well as in their brief with the respondent Court. Such an commission has consequences fatal to their belated claim. What is more, the approach followed by petitioners is not in conformity with our past pronouncements, with had indicated the fullness of the power of the state as to how public lands may be acquired and under what conditions, as well as the restrictions imposed on original applicants, who could thus legally be prevented from being victimized as a result of improvidence or even poor judgment, by requiring such approval. As thus viewed, it would clearly appear that this appeal by way of certiorari lacks merit. We affirm.

There was a stipulation of facts before the lower court which was quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Thus: "1. That on October 13, 1958, Juan Evangelista died intestate leaving among others, a parcel of land situated in Barrio Darangan, [Municipality] of Binangonan, [Province] of Rizal covered by [Original Certificate] of Title No. 183 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and Tax [Declaration] No. 12131 of the [Provincial] Assessor of Rizal, which parcel is now the subject of this litigation; 2. That said Juan Evangelista was survived by the defendant, Ana Gonzaga and plaintiffs, the latter being the sons and daughters of the brothers an sisters of the deceased; 3. That during the lifetime of Juan Evangelista, he and said Ana Gonzaga on April 21, 1956 sold for valuable consideration several parcels of land to the spouses, Anastacia San Juan and Servillano Ignacio (defendants herein) including that parcel of land describe in the foregoing paragraph (1) and as a consequence which sale, the corresponding tax declaration was transferred (to) said vendees; that at the time of said sale, there was a pending application of Juan Evangelista an Ana Gonzaga over the land in question with the Bureau Lands, but the title thereto was not issued until November 28, 1958, i.e., after the death of Juan Evangelista; 4. That on April 21, 1962, defendant Ana Gonzaga alleging to (be) the surviving spouse of the deceased Juan Evangelista, executed an Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of the sum parcel of land in question in favor of the same vendees, herein defendants, Servillano Ignacio and Anastasia San Juan; 5. That in a series of subsequent transfers and conveyances, the same parcel of land was sold on March 6, 1963 by the spouses Servillano Ignacio and Anastacia San Juan to the defendant R & R Realty Co., Inc. and the latter, together with other properties owned by it, mortgaged the same to the Continental Bank; that it was by reason of these subsequent conveyances that defendants Filipinas Agricultural & Realty Co., Inc. and the Continental Bank were 3 impleaded as party defendants." On the above facts, the lower court relying on the aforesaid Section 20, declared he 1956 sale void and consequently ruled in favor of the successional rights of private respondents as heirs of the deceased, Juan Evangelista. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed. As set forth at the outset, there is no legal basis for reversing the decision of respondent Court. 1. Petitioners are well aware and therefore cannot deny that unless the sale made by the deceased Juan Evangelista in his lifetime of the disputed lot was valid, then the rights of private respondents as his heirs should be respected. Both the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals were agreed that considering the express and categorical language of Section 20

of the Public Land Act, such sale "shall be null and void" there being no "previous approval" of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It could not have been otherwise, for there is nothing in the stipulation of facts that would, in any way, take this transaction out of the operation of that legal provision. It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be 4 obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. Now petitioners before this Court apparently would try to extricate themselves from what for them is an untenable situation by alleging that it was not a homestead that was applied for by the deceased. Such a contention does not carry persuasion. There was no such allegation in their answer filed before the 5 lower court. There was nothing to that effect in the stipulation of facts. After losing in the lower court, there was not even a motion for reconsideration filed. The matter was immediately taken respondent Court of Appeals. In their brief before respondent Court of Appeals, again, such a defense now interposed is conspicuous by its absence, the two paragraphs devoted to the point merely confining itself to the assertion that the Public Land Act does not prohibit an applicant from selling his right and interests during his application for a free patent. Apparently realizing the weakness that characterized their vain effort to prevent private respondents from enjoying their successional rights, an attempt is made by petitioners in the appeal by way of certiorari as well as in their brief, to mitigate its shortcoming by raising what in effect is a new matter, namely, that the application was not for a homestead. Outside of such an assertion lacking support in the facts as found by respondent Court, to which we must accord deference, there is another obstacle to its being considered. Such an issue was not raised before the lower court. It was not even brought to the attention of respondent Court of Appeals. What was said, 7 therefore, in the recent case of Arangco v. Baloso has relevance. Thus: "As far back as 1904, in Tan Machan v. Trinidad, for the appellate tribunal to consider a legal question, it must be raised in the court below. Such a principle has been consistently adhered to. As was categorically announced in City of Manila v. Roxas by Justice Hull, 'the rule is almost universal, and it 8 has been repeatedly followed by this court ....'" It cannot be said then that respondent Court erred in affirming the decision of the lower court, declaring the nullity of the sale dated April 21, 1956 executed without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus is the first assigned error disposed of.

2. The principal argument, thus exposed as devoid of any persuasive force, was sought to be strengthened in the second assignment of error by an attempted distinction between the limitation placed on the grantee after the free patent is issued and the absence thereof prior thereto, except if the application is for a homestead. That, in effect, is the error imputed to respondent Court under this category. Petitioners again labor under a 9 misapprehension. Section 118 of the Public Land Act reads: "Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops of the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations." Is it not a clear expression then of the state policy to assure that the original grantee, even if he were minded otherwise, is deprived for a period of five years of his freedom of disposition? Thus is he protected from his own weaknesses or temptation to sell, or lack of business acumen, the purpose being, in the 10 language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Artates v. Urbi, to keep and preserve for him "or his family the land given to him gratuitously by the State, so that being a property owner, he may become and remain a contented and useful 11 member of our society." Considering that such is policy, does it not logically follow that he is precluded disposing of his rights prior even to his obtaining the patent? Both policy and reason, therefore, unite in conclusion that no such distinction should be made. Then, it is not to be forgotten that the state is possessed of plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding placing of obstacles in the way of their exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership? 3. The third assigned error impugning the judgment respondent Court of Appeals in favor of appellees before now private respondents, being a logical consequence of the foregoing, need not be discussed at all. WHEREFORE, the decision of February 24, 1967 affirmed. With costs against petitioners. Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 71285 November 5, 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ESTEBAN MENDOZA and LEON PASAHOL, Respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J. This petition for review by way of certiorari questions the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan granting the private respondents' petition to reopen the cadastral registration proceeding of the lot in dispute and ordering its registration in the names of the respondents. The facts are undisputed. As found by the appellate court, they are as follows: On December 18, 1968, a petition was filed by Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol with the then Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, alleging ownership of the land in question (Lot 444) by purchase from its original owners (Annex "A") and thereafter, actual, continuous, public and adverse possession by them tacked on to their predecessors-in-interest for a period exceeding 30 years. Petitioners' predecessors-in-interest failed to answer in the cadastral court for lack of knowledge of the existence of an ongoing cadastral proceeding because of which Lot No. 444 was declared public land. Notwithstanding, admittedly it has not been alienated, reserved, leased or otherwise disposed of by the government. Basic petition reopens cadastral proceedings insofar as this lot is concerned and prays for issuance of a decree/title in petitioners' name. Traversing the foregoing, Solicitor General opposed denying adequate basis for grant of prayer; that neither documentary evidence nor nature of possession would warrant; that lot 444 is of public domain. Evidence of ownership and possession show petitioner Esteban Mendoza and his co-petitioner, his brother-in-law Leon Pasahol, bought Lot 444 from the heirs of Maria Nunez and Feliciano Ignacio on December 1, 1957 as shown by a deed of sale (Exhibit "A"); that after acquiring the land, they planted it to various fruit-bearing trees; that from December 1, 1957, petitioners had possessed the land peacefully, openly and continuously

under claim of ownership, as had their predecessors-in-interest before them; that before the purchase of the land, it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maria Nunez since 1932 (Exhibit "E"); that in 1962, he and Leon Pasahol had agreed that the property was to be declared for taxation in Pasahol's name only (Exhibit "F"); that petitioners were informed before the sale by their vendors that the latter did not claim the land in the cadastral proceedings Rec. No. 1097, Cad. Case No. 19 because they were "totally ignorant" of said proceedings, not having been notified of the same; and that the land subject of the petition was not covered by any government or forest reservation .Mendoza's testimony was corroborated by witnesses Arsenio Amante, Eliseo Reyes (one of the vendors), and Cresencio Abuzman. Petitioners likewise presented other documentary evidence namely: Exhibit "B" - Certification of the Land Registration Commission dated December 23, 1968 that the lot in question had been declared public land. Exhibit "C" - Plan of Lot 444 of the Mariveles Cadastre prepared by Geodetic Engineer Victor Clamor, Jr. and certified by Carlos G. Reyes, Chief of the Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands. Exhibit "D" - Technical description of Lot 444 certified as correct by the Surveys Division Chief acting for the Director of Lands. Exhibit "G" - Certification dated December 10, 1968 by the Municipal Treasurer of Mariveles, Bataan that payment of land taxes for Lot 444 was up to date. Exhibit "H" - Certification by the Acting District Land Officer dated April 15, 1969 that the land had been cadastrally surveyed for the heirs of Feliciano Iglesia, predecessors- in-interest of the petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Exhibit "J" - Report of the District Forester, Bureau of Forestry, Balanga, Bataan recommending approval of the petition considering that the land being applied for was not needed for forestry purposes. On the part of the State, the Solicitor General did not present evidence of any kind but relied only on the petitioners' own evidence. Initially, the court a quo denied registration observing, that Exhibit "C", the plan of the property sought to be registered, "does not appear to have been

approved by the Director of Lands." Furthermore, although Esteban Mendoza and Leon Pasahol were the petitioners in the case, the latter had not appeared "to corroborate the oral testimony of Mendoza that Pasahol has agreed with him to have the land declared for taxation purposes only in the latter's name." On motion for reconsideration, the court a quo reconsidered and ordered a new hearing on the petition. In the new trial, the previous deficiencies were rectified by the petitioners. Leon Pasahol took the witness stand to corroborate Esteban Mendoza's testimony; Exhibit "C" was presented anew in evidence, this time with the required approval of the Director of Lands. As a consequence, the court a quo granted the petition for registration of Lot 444. (pp. 1-3, DecisionIntermediate Appellate Court) On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision and held: In this appeal, the Solicitor General contests, alleging Exhibit "A" shows that petitioners' possession began only in 1957, they could not tack their possession to their predecessors-in-interest because of the failure of the latter to lay claim to the property in question either during the cadastral survey of the area in 1927 or in the original cadastral proceedings held thereafter. We do not agree. Record shows Feliciano Iglesia, original owner of the property, died before herein cadastral proceedings were instituted. His heirs who succeeded to his rights over the land lived in a remote part thereof and only infrequently visited the provincial capital where the courts were located. Under these circumstances, it is quite credible petitioners'predecessors-in-interest did not receive any notice of the cadastral proceedings, Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that either the petitioners' possession or that of their predecessors was ever disrupted or interrupted by third-parties, much less by the government. Petitioners after the sale had zealously cultivated the property and religiously paid the taxes thereon for a good number of years. We find possession of the land by both parties was in good faith and that petitioners herein should not, as a consequence, be held strictly accountable for the lapse of their predecessors to file a cadastral yo to the property.

Petitioners may tack their period of possession with that of their vendors totalling to more than thirty years. The Solicitor General points out, however, that under Section 1 of Republic Act 391, as amended by Republic Act 2061, reopening cadastral proceedings is allowable "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." Applying said provision to the lot in question, it is claimed that registration is not possible as said land is actually already forest land and/or part of a military reservation. In support of this contention, the Solicitor General cites the Report of Forest Guard Crescensio Abuzman to the District Forester (Exhibit "J") which states that "the area involved is a portion of former Military Reservation (US) turned over to Philippine government." Hence, not disposable under any circumstances. We disagree. The land may have been a military reservation in the past, but no longer. The same report Exhibit "J" relied upon by the Solicitor General goes on to state that this "former Military Reservation" had already been "delimited and classified by our bureau (Forestry) as alienable and disposable block under the Proposed Land Classification Project No. 4-C of Mariveles, Bataan." Additionally, the Report in fact recommended the titling of the property in the petitioners' name as the same was no longer needed for forestry purposes and the government would not be adversely affected. Contributing to the view as to the disposable character of the land is the approval by the Director of Lands himself of Exhibit "C", the plan of the land to be registered. Such approval would hardly be forthcoming were the property really non-disposable as claimed by the State. Finally, We note from the record as well that all the other adjoining lots (Nos. 443, 447, 446, 438, etc.) were already registered and titled in the names of private individuals, a circumstance hard to reconcile with the position of the Solicitor General that registration of the area was simply not possible. (pp. 46, Decision-Intermediate Appellate Court). In this instant petition, the petitioner challenges the decision of the appellate court as being contrary to law on the ground that it held that the subject land is agricultural and alienable land of the public domain and that the same can be subject to acquisitive prescription of thirty (30) years of open, continuous

and uninterrupted possession under abona fide claim of ownership by the private respondents as to entitle them to registration and title over the land. The petitioner maintains that Exhibit "J" which is the report of the District Forester recommending approval of the private respondents' petition is a mere proposal contained in the Proposed Land Classification Project No. 4 of Mariveles, Bataan, which has not yet been approved by the President of the Philippines; and that unless the President upon the recommendation of the Minister (Secretary) of Natural Resources, reclassifies and declares a particular land as agricultural or disposable, its status as military reservation or forest land remains unaltered and no amount of physical occupation and cultivation thereof can change it to agricultural land and bring it within the provisions of the Public Land Act. Therefore, it was error on the part of the appellate court to rule that the land in dispute has been in the open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the private respondents for more than thirty years as to entitle them to register the same and procure a title thereto because possession of an inalienable land, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. On the other hand, the private respondents argue that even though Exhibit "J" was a mere proposal, such proposal had been honored and implemented when the land in dispute had been recommended for titling in their favor. Furthermore, the recommendation for such titling was made by the same office or branch of the government authorized and empowered to classify and dispose of the property. Moreover, the subject property has no more use for any government purpose and for which reason, the Bureau did not object but instead recommended that it be titled in favor of the private respondents. In fact, the Director of Lands himself approved the plan Exhibit "C" covering the land sought to be registered We find merit in the instant petition. While it may be true that as ruled by the appellate court, the private respondents could tack their possession of the land to that of their predecessors-in-interest as a result of which they now have more than thirty (30) years' possession of the same, the fact remains that the subject land has not yet been released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and still has to be reclassified as alienable public land with the approval of the President of the Philippines as required by the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and Republic Act No. 1275. As we have ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (148 SCRA 480, 489):

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec- 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio San Jose, barrio Cabraban Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan PMD No. 267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents, had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act (Record on Appeal, p. 19). Consequently, under the above mentioned jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land. (Emphasis supplied). We, therefore, cannot sustain the appellate court's ruling that the land in dispute is no longer part of the military reservation on the basis of a mere proposal to classify the same as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. A proposal cannot take the place of a formal act declaring forest land released for disposition as public agricultural land. To sustain the appellate ruling would be to pre-empt the executive branch of the government from exercising its prerogative in classifying lands of the public domain. We ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (129 SCRA 689, 692-693) that: In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended: Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [1983]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]) The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the

fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the well-settled rule that the State Cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]) if omission there was, in fact. While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System. Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicant may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. We are not unmindful, however of the plight of the private respondents who have in good faith possessed and occupied the disputed land for more than (30) years. If what is needed is only the formal release of the property from its classification as a military reservation and its reclassification to disposable agricultural land, the petitioner should, for equitable reasons, take the necessary steps towards the declassification of the same. As we have held in the same case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (supra): The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the

property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitionersofficials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy be encouraged. (Director of Lands v. Funtillar 142 SCRA 57, 69). Apart from strongly opposing an obviously improper method of securing title to public land, the Solicitor General should also take positive steps to help the private respondents remedy the situation in which they find themselves. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent appellate court is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The application for cadastral registration of title of the private respondents is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to their recourse to the proper administrative remedy. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983 SERAFIN B. YNGSON , plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, defendantsappellees. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretar y of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure question of law was involved in the appeal. There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the statement of facts in the Solicitor-General's brief. W e do the same: The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Burea u of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on Januar y 14, 1946, followed

by Custodio Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes. On March 19, 1952, petitioner -appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. W hen the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the

division of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant filed a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20, 1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on Appeal). Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, the Secretar y of A griculture and Natural Resources, Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez. The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be re instated. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on the ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and t he Office of the President of the Philippines

as to constitute grave abuse of discretion justif ying review by the courts in a special civil action. The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors: I THE LOW ER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND W HIMSICAL EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT. II THE LOW ER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ

AND GONZALES ON EQUAL FOOTING ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS AW ARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS. III THE LOW ER COURT ERRED DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. IN

APPLICANT therefore, if LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications filed for the same area shall be rejected. The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications on the following dates: 1. Teofila L. de Ligasan - January 14, 1946. 2. Custodio Doromal - October 28, 1947 3. Serafin B. Yngson - March 19, 1952

Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case. The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read: SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application -In determining the priority of application or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed: (a) W hen two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of preference thereto. xxx xxx xxx (d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by the Director of Fisheries by reason o f the fact that the area covered thereby has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR

4. Anita V. Gonzales - March 19, 1953 5. Jose M. Lopez - April 24, 1953 The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear , therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and c nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications. After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason

given was Yngzon's priority of application. W e see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative authori ties committed no grave abuse of discretion. It is elementar y in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisher ies has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestr y v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1184). The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes. All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. W hether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue

such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His appl ication was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the one- year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications must be considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto. The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a premature application a better right over another of the same category. W e find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we

held that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that the above rulings should also apply to the present case. During the pendenc y of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid stakes on the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property on different dates and destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In their comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares alloted for the petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed markers and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that these markers and signs were subsequently

destroyed and later on Mr. Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for, which he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further prohibited Yngson fro m constructing any improvements in any area outside his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of their permits. The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more proper for a trial court. W e have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23; Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142) The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct action before the proper low er court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner-appellant. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., is on leave.