D&G K Alt

D&G K Alternative
1NC
Our solvency as the schizoanalyst is what will solve our problem. Endorse nomadism, endorse anti-oedipus, and free yourself from fascism. The time is now; our advocacy is not an engagement of the state, just merely a liberation of the Oedipus complex. The body without organs is with the concept of becoming. Rather than maintaining rigid structure we have to traverse every border culturally, socially, racially, and even geographically. This takes us on the journey of becoming-minoritarian through the theater of violence and ends on the plane of immanence: every point connecting to the other and the politics of schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 85-86
The first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods. The fact has often been overlooked that the schizo indeed participates in history; he hallucinates and raves universal history, and proliferates the races. All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racist. It is not a matter of the regions of the body without organs "representing" races and cultures. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate regions on this body-that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individualization and sexualization are produced within these fields. We pass from one field to another by crossing thresholds: we never stop migrating, we become other individuals as well as other sexes, and departing becomes as easy as being born or dying. Along the way we struggle against other races, we destroy civilizations, in the manner of the great migrants in whose wake nothing is left standing once they have passed through although these destructions can be brought about, as we shall see, in two very different ways. The crossing of a threshold entails ravages elsewhere-how could it be otherwise? The body without organs closes round the deserted places. The theater of cruelty cannot be separated from the struggle against our culture, from the confrontation of the "races," and from Artaud's great migration toward Mexico, its forces, and its religions:
What is the nature of this order? individuations are produced only within fields of forces expressly defined by intensive vibrations, and that animate cruel personages only in so far
And can Zarathustra be separated from the "grand politics," and from the bringing to life of the races that leads Nietzsche to say, I'm not a German, I'm Polish. Here again individuations are brought about solely within complexes of forces that determine persons as so many intensive states embodied in a "criminal," ceaselessly passing beyond a threshold while destroying the factitious unity of a family and an ego: "I am Prado, I am also Prado's father. I venture to say that I am also Lesseps .... I wanted to
as they are induced organs, parts of desiring-machines (mannequins) give my Parisians, whom I love, a new idea-that of a decent criminal. I am also Chambige-also a decent criminal. ... The unpleasant thing, and one that nags at my modesty, is that at root every name in history is 1."34 Yet it was never a question of identifying oneself with personages, as
It is a question of something quite different: identifying races, cultures, and gods with fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying personages with states that fill these fields, and with effects that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. Whence the role of names, with a magic all their own: there is no ego that identifies with races, peoples, and persons in a theater of representation, but proper names that identify races, peoples, and persons with regions, thresholds, or effects in a production of intensive quantities. The theory of proper names should not be conceived of in terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of "effects": effects that are not a mere dependence on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs. This can be clearly seen in physics, where proper names designate such effects within fields of potentials: the Joule effect, the Seebeck effect, the Kelvin effect. History
when it is erroneously maintained that a madman "takes himself for so-and-so...."
is like physics: a Joan of Arc effect, a Heliogabaius effect-all the names of history, and not the name of the father.
2NC
Overview
Extend D&G 72 it says that the plan cant solve because desire produces the social, which means conditions for a mindset shift wont occur without a micropolitical movement. Were the only risk of solving the links, embracing revolutionary goals without questioning the role of the force within the coding of the preconscious by the State means their alternative produces Oedipal desire, retrenching oppression. The D&G 72 is a DA to the plan 2 reasons: 1) Oedipus ignoring investments of desire leaves behind a desire to be dominated. The revolution, even if it succeeds materially, perpetuates fascism by never looking outside the channels of power. The impact is endless war and oppression. 2) Value to Life their cannibalistic fear politics creates life as a project of fear. This is a trick by liberalism designed to keep the masses in line: it strangles the danger out of life and prevents the pursuit of joyous lines of flight in the name of security. And, we solve 100% of the case, thats D&G 72, schizoanalysis is a pre-requisite to the success of other movements. Material or other gains are only possible outside of a striated channel of desire. A liberated libidinal investment is necessarily revolutionary. No offense for the aff, only a risk the plan causes fascist retrenchment.
Double bind
Theyre in a double bind: either a) The alt solves the K and the disads because their plan isnt too radical to be incorporated into our micropolitics. Or, b) Their plan is too radical, and we have a disad that the alt solves. Extend Deleuze and Guattari 72 that points out the desire claims for the disad to the case. Their plan ignores immanence: instead, you should vote neg to do the alt as a turning point to the plan. The alt is ideologically aligned with the pragmatic effects of the plan, and even if its a little striated, its better because their plan blows apart the strata, creating fascist crackdowns. Were the only team that solves the risk. Deleuze and Guattari 80 [Gilles and Felix, professors at the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes, ATP, p160-1] 159
You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you
have to keep small supplies of significance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when
things, persons, even situations force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You don't reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of organs we call the organism. There are, in fact, several ways of botching the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked. This is because the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it
with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums
of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate,
continue: a whole "diagram," as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines.
A2: Perm do both

1. The perm adds the alt to the existing plan
This is bad for 5 reasons
1) Kills Education shifts the debate away from the plan and to extra topical portions 2) Makes the aff extra topical which kills all disad links. 3) Ground a) Makes the aff a moving target because the perm can always just add things to their perms. b) Not predictable they can just add anything to the plan they wont and it removes the debate away from the resolution c) Kills all disads they could just add an intrinisic perm to any disad to solve the impacts. d) Justifies infinitely conditional advantage counterplans for the neg. 4) Err neg on theory aff gets first and last speech plus unlimited prep. 5) Voter for fairness, ground, and education.
The alt is a prerequisite to political action We cant do the plan and the alt at the same time. Their politics induces the exact apathy we criticize. Weissberg 2004 (Robert Weissberg is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Urbana., Society Abandoning Politics,
May/June, http://transactionpub.metapress.com/app/home/content.asp)
The conventional wisdom tells us that Americans are generally politically apathetic and, judging by recent voting trends this situation may be deteriorating. Self-appointed civic guardians predictably express profound unease
about this disengagement and offer up a plethora of remedies, everything from user-friendly ballots to electronic versions of democracy to reenergize political life. Academics seem especially alarmed that
apathy will impede impoverished minorities from climbing up the socio-economic ladder while allowing special interest to ride roughshod over the common good. Alas, these discussions are quite superficial and misdirected. At most, those damning apathy glibly offers unproven clichs about rising alienation and similar banalities as if Americans were suddenly paralyzed to shape the world around them. Laments about lethargy fail to grasp that this disengagement only reflects a shift in choice of weapons, not laziness. Those grumbling about idle parents reluctant to pressure government for better schools incorrectly assume that rejecting politics will necessarily guarantee shoddy education. Ditto for those who seem indifferent about crime, the environment, high taxes and just about all other maladiesmisery awaits those who sit on the sidelines. Reality is more nuanced and, critically, this reflexive bewailing of apathy reflects a state centered view of progress so, ipso facto, political disengagement preordains failure. Fortunately, the United States is not a totalitarian system in which the government is the only game in town. This myopic
focus on state-centered solutions also obscures an important emerging fact. To the extent that abandoning politically directed remedies is not ideologically uniform, the civic landscape will soon be profoundly altered. In a nut- shell, the Left with its deep commitment to political solutions will continue to dominate policy-making while the nation as a whole quietly moves rightward.
Alt is mutually exclusive with the plan. We need a change in the way that desire is invested and collectives are formed before any change can occur. Even if the 1AC may seem revolutionary from the perspective of class and community, it is not revolutionary from the lens of desire. The 1AC mindset doesnt change and the failure to focus on the individual and repression makes the 1AC impossible and renders their roadmap for change apolitical and counterproductive
Deleuze and Guattari 1972, (Anti-Oedipus, 347-8) Not only can the libidinal investment of the social field interfere with the investment of interest, and constrain the most disadvantaged, the most exploited, to seek their ends in an oppressive machine, but what is reactionary or revolutionary in the preconscious investment of interest does not necessarily coincide with what is reactionary or revolutionary in the unconscious libidinal investment. A revolutionary preconscious investment bears upon new aims, new social syntheses, a new power. But it could be that a part at least of the unconscious libido continues to invest the former body, the old form of power, its codes, and its flows. It is all the easier, and the contradiction is all the better masked, as a state of forces does not prevail over the former state without preserving or reviving the old full body as a residual and subordinated territoriality (witness how the capitalist machine revives the despotic Urstaat, or how the socialist machine preserves a State and market monopoly capitalism). But there is something more serious: even when the libido embraces the new bodythe new force that corresponds to the effectively revolutionary goals and syntheses from the viewpoint of the preconscious-it is not certain that the unconscious libidinal investment is itself revolutionary. For the same breaks do not pass at the level of the unconscious desires and the preconscious interests. The preconscious
revolutionary break is sufficiently well defined by the promotion of a socius as a full body carrying new aims, as a form of power or a formation of sovereignty that subordinates desiring-production under new conditions. But even though the unconscious libido is charged with investing this socius, its investment is not necessarily revolutionary in the same sense as the preconscious investment. In fact, the unconscious revolutionary break implies for its part the body without organs as the limit of the socius that desiring-production subordinates in its turn, under the condition of
The preconscious revolution refers to a new regime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests. But the unconscious revolution does not merely refer to the socius that conditions this change as a form of power: it refers within this socius to the regime of desiring-production as an overthrown power on the body without organs, It is not the same state of flows and schizzes: in one case the break is
an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of
desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology: desire is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiringproduction. But these forms can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it
schizoanalysis is that constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals in this instance than in the other). If the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a
group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and its preconscious investments, but not be so-and even remain fascist and police-like-from the standpoint of its libidinal investments, Truly revolutionary preconscious interests do not necessarily imply unconscious investments of the same nature;
an apparatus of interest never takes the place of a machine of desire.
A2: Perm do the alt

1. The perm severs out of the entire plan
This is bad for 5 reasons -
1. Education We no longer learn about the specifics of the aff plan because they can just kick out of it with the perm. 2. Destroys fairness- they can just spike out of any net benefit by kicking out of strategic areas of case. 3. Ground Severance perms allow the aff to fiat a win by avoiding our offense. 4. Err neg on theory aff gets first and last speech plus unlimited prep. 5. Voter for ground, fairness and education. 2. The perm is nonsensical - The aff is the OPPOSITE of the alt - The aff requires the government to read a specific book, the alt requires to forget specificity and adopt rhizomatic politics and nomadism. This makes the aff the opposite of their original plan text, which is the worst form of severance and is a strong voter. 3. The alt competes through net benefits, which means that the perm isnt competitive. Perm: do the alt is illegitimate when the plan and the alt compete.
A2: Perm do the plan + all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt
1. The perm adds the non-existing parts to the plan
This is bad for 5 reasons
1) Kills Education shifts the debate away from the plan and to extra topical portions 2) Makes the aff extra topical which kills all disad links. 3) Ground a) Makes the aff a moving target because the perm can always just add things to their perms. b) Not predictable they can just add anything to the plan they wont and it removes the debate away from the resolution c) Kills all disads they could just add an intrinisic perm to any disad to solve the impacts. d) Justifies infinitely conditional advantage counterplans for the neg. 4) Err neg on theory aff gets first and last speech plus unlimited prep. 5) Voter for fairness, ground, and education.
The alt is a prerequisite to political action Their politics induces the exact apathy we criticize, meaning only the alt solves. Weissberg 2004 (Robert Weissberg is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Urbana., Society Abandoning Politics,
The alt is mutually exclusive with the plan. We need a change in the way that desire is invested and collectives are formed before any change can occur. Even if the 1AC may seem revolutionary from the perspective of class and community, it is not revolutionary from the lens of desire. The 1AC mindset doesnt change and the failure to focus on the individual and repression makes the 1AC impossible and renders their roadmap for change apolitical and counterproductive
an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that ideology: desire
desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-
production. But these forms can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it
constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals in this instance than in the other). If the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a
A2: Multiple Perms

1. Time skew they can just read 11 perms in 20 seconds and force us to answer all of them which is hugely unfair. 2. Strat skew if we want the alt to stay in the round we have to spend all our time answering the perms and we cant adequately cover the net benefits. 3. Multiple conditional advocacies bad its a no risk answer to every alt because they can just kick out of all the perms we answered and extend the ones that we barely covered. 4. Interpretation the aff is allowed one perm per counterplan/k that must include the entire aff and all or part of the k/alt to check competition and anything else is an illegitimate advocacy. 5. Double bind: must be either severance or intrinsic a) Anything other than our interp means the either the aff is no longer advocating the entity of the plan which is bad because it kills predictability OR b) Its intrinsic because they are arguing something completely new which makes them a moving target and untopical. 6. Err aff on theory- neg gets the block and can control the outcome of the debate by strategically picking certain arguments. 7. Voter for fairness, education, and ground
Alt before Plan

The alt is a prerequisite to political action Their politics induces the exact apathy we criticize. Weissberg 2004 (Robert Weissberg is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois-Urbana., Society Abandoning Politics,
Plan fails & alt solves better

Alt impact is a disad to the plan. We need a change in the way that desire is invested and collectives are formed before any change can occur. Even if the 1AC may seem revolutionary from the perspective of class and community, it is not revolutionary from the lens of desire. The 1AC mindset doesnt change and the failure to focus on the individual and repression makes the 1AC impossible and renders their roadmap for change apolitical and counterproductive
an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that ideology: desire
desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-
production. But these forms can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it
constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals in this instance than in the other). If the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a
We need to singularly focus on fascism at the individual level Deleuze and Guattari 80 (Gilles and Felix, philosophers and rhizomes, A Thousand Plateaus pg 214-215, dml)
It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic
perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not localizable), the
barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segments.I0 We would even say that fascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropolitical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1' There is
fascism when a war machine is installed in each hole, in every niche. Even after the National Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." Daniel Guerin is correct to say that if
Hitler took power, rather then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the segmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film has often depicted these molecular focal points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.
Squo politics fails Desire manifests itself at the local level the unconscious and resonates into a group order, powering politics. Failure to investigate motivations at the level of desire abandons any possibility of understanding how political formations come to be and ensures serial policy failure Ballantyne 7 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 27-28)
So these
habits of thought, once they are planted in us, take over and refract our view of the world and all our dealings with it. It is probably becoming clear by now how the capitalism and schizophrenia project, across the two volumes Anti-Oedipus
and A Thousand Plateaus, was caught up in every aspect of life. It is set up not as a set of dogmas or even of questions, but as a set of values. It is a work of ethics, and the link with Spinozas Ethics is strong. It too is a project based around immanence rather than transcendence. The
desiringmachines that figure so prominently at the opening of Anti-Oedipus, are the machines that operate without our noticing them to produce the desires that we do notice, and that we would like to act upon. But as mechanisms that operate to produce consciousness, the machines can be pulling in different directions and producing incompatible desires, which might be resolved at a preconscious level, or might surface as conflicted conscious desires. There are thousands upon thousands of these mechanisms, of which we become aware only as they produce effects that approach the level of consciousness, and what goes on amongst them is a micropolitics thousands upon thousands of rhizomatic connections, without any clear limit on where the connections would stop, and without any necessity to pass through a centralized arborescent hub. The scale of operations builds up from a preconscious sub-individual, who is already a swarm of desiringmachines, to a social group, or a crowd, where certain aspects of the people involved connect together to produce a crowd-identity that is unlike that of any of the individuals in the crowd. Crowds will do things that individual people would not (Canetti, 1973). The individuals are to the crowd what desiring-machines are to the individual. Except that one could alternatively say that it is certain of the mass of individuals desiring-machines that, upon being brought together in the crowd, they are found to be able to act together to produce the group identity. The crowd is a body. Some of the mechanisms that would come into play in the individual acting alone are somehow switched out of the circuit, and become irrelevant to the crowd, and having been switched off cannot inhibit the crowds actions. So the
sense of the individual is even further problematized, and we see it to be highly divisible. But nevertheless the idea of t he individual is deeply ingrained in our language, and if were trying to explain ourselves, we might find that its the most direct word to be using. If were trying to connect with others then we need to be able to allow ourselves, from time to time, to speak like everyone else. As we follow Deleuze and Guattari further into their world, it becomes increasingly difficult to do that, as each straightforward utterance seems, from an alternate view, to have an inaccurate a spect.
Our solution begins with the way political formations occur in the status quo -- Even the most revolutionary aims can be tainted by underlying desires in the unconscious. The alt takes place at the level of the preconscious. Absent our investigation, change is doomed to failure as desire is tainted by the flaws of past politics. Desire is strangled by the formations of the status quo, turning life against itself Deleuze and Guattari 72 (Anti-Oedipus 345-349) Libidinal investment does not bear upon the regime of the social syntheses, but upon the degree of development of the forces or the energies on which
these syntheses depend. It does not bear upon the selections, detachments, and remainders effected by these syntheses, but upon the nature of the codes and the flows that condition
the social means and ends, but upon the full body as socius, the formation of sovereignty, or the form of power for itself, devoid of meaning and purpose, since the meanings and the purposes derive from it, and not the contrary. It is doubtless true that interests predispose us to a given libidinal investment, but they are not identical with this investment. Moreover, the unconscious libidinal investment is what causes us to look for our interest in one place rather than another, to fix our aims on a given path, convinced that this is where our chances lie-since love drives us on. The manifest syntheses are merely the preconscious indicators of a degree of development; the apparent interests and aims are merely the
them. It does not bear upon
a form of power is identical with the violence it exerts by its very absurdity, but it can exert this violence only by assigning itself aims and meanings in which even the most enslaved elements participate: "The sovereign formations will have no other purpose than that of masking the absence of a purpose or a meaning of their sovereignty by means of the organic purpose of their creation," and the purpose of thereby converting the absurdity into spirituality. That is why it is so futile to attempt to distinguish what is rational and what is irrational in a society. To be sure, the role, the place, and the part one has in a society, and from which one inherits in terms of the laws of social reproduction, impel the libido to invest a given socius as a full body-a given absurd power in which we participate, or have the chance to participate, under the cover of aims and interests. The
preconscious exponents of a social full body. As Klossowski says in his profound commentary on Nietzsche, fact remains that there exists a disinterested love of the social machine, of the form of power, and of the degree of development in and for themselves. Even in the person who has an interest-and loves them besides with a form of love other than that of his interest. This is also the case for the person who has no interest, and who substitutes the force of a strange love for this counterinvestment. Flows that run on the porous full body of a socius-these are the object of desire, higher than all the aims. It will never flow too much, it will never break or code enough-and in that very way! Oh how beautiful the machine is! The officer of "In the Penal Colony" demonstrates what an intense libidinal investment of a
We have seen how the capitalist machine constituted a system of immanence bordered by a great mutant flow, nonpossessive and nonpossessed, flowing over the full body of capital and forming an absurd power. Everyone in his class and his person receives something from this power, or is excluded from it, insofar as the great flow is converted into incomes, incomes of wages or of enterprises that define aims or spheres of interest, selections, detachments, and portions. But the investment of the flow itself and its axiomatic, which to be sure requires no precise knowledge of political economy, is the business of the unconscious libido, inasmuch as it is presupposed by the aims. We see the most disadvantaged, the most excluded members of society invest with passion the system that oppresses them, and where they always find
machine can be, a machine that is not only technical but social, and through which desire desires its own repression. an interest, since it is here that they search for and measure it. Interest always comes after. Antiproduction effuses in the system: antiproduction is loved for itself, as is the way in
Repressing desire, not only for others but in oneself, being the cop for others and for oneself-that is what arouses, and it is not ideology, it is economy. Capitalism garners and possesses
which desire represses itself in the great capitalist aggregate. the force of the aim and the interest (power), but it feels a disinterested love for the absurd and nonpossessed force of the machine. Oh, to be sure, it is not for himself or his
A violence without purpose, a joy, a pure joy in feeling oneself a wheel in the machine, traversed by flows, broken by schizzes. Placing oneself in a position where one is thus traversed, broken, fucked by the socius, looking for the right place where, according to the aims and the interests assigned to us, one feels something moving that has neither an interest nor a purpose. A sort of art for art's sake in the libido, a taste for a job well done, each one in his own place, the banker, the cop, the soldier, the technocrat, the bureaucrat, and why not the worker, the trade-unionist. Desire is agape. Not only can the libidinal investment of the social field interfere with the investment of interest, and constrain the most disadvantaged, the most exploited, to seek their ends in an oppressive machine, but what is reactionary or revolutionary in the preconscious investment of interest does not necessarily coincide with what is reactionary or revolutionary in the unconscious libidinal investment. A revolutionary preconscious investment bears upon new aims, new social syntheses, a new power. But it could be that a part at least of the unconscious libido continues to invest the former body, the old form of power, its codes, and its flows. It is all the easier, and the contradiction is all the better masked, as a state of forces does not prevail over the former state without preserving or reviving the old full body as a residual and subordinated territoriality (witness how the capitalist machine revives the despotic Urstaat, or how the socialist machine preserves a State and market monopoly capitalism). But there is something more serious: even when the libido embraces the new body-the new force that corresponds to the effectively revolutionary goals and syntheses from the viewpoint of the preconsciousit is not certain that the unconscious libidinal investment is itself revolutionary. For the same breaks do not pass at the level of the unconscious desires and the preconscious interests . The preconscious revolutionary break is sufficiently well defined by the promotion of a socius as a full body carrying new aims, as a form of power or a formation of sovereignty that subordinates desiring-production under new conditions. But even though the unconscious libido is charged with investing this socius, its investment is not necessarily revolutionary in the same sense as the preconscious investment. In fact, the unconscious revolutionary break implies for its part the body without organs as the limit of the socius that desiring-production subordinates in its turn, under the condition of an overthrown power, an overthrown subordination. The preconscious revolution refers to a
children that the capitalist works, but for the immortality of the system.
new regime of social production that creates, distributes, and satisfies new aims and interests. But the unconscious revolution does not merely refer to the socius that conditions this change as a form of power: it refers within this socius to the regime of desiring-production as an overthrown power on the body without organs, It is not the same state of flows and schizzes: in one case the break is between two forms of socius, the second of which is measured according to its capacity to introduce the flows of desire into a new code or a new axiomatic of interest; in the other case the break is within the socius itself, in that it has the capacity for causing the flows of desire to circulate following their positive lines of escape, and for breaking them again following breaks of productive breaks, The most general principle of schizoanalysis is that desire is always constitutive of a social field. In any case desire belongs to the infrastructure, not to ideology: desire is in production as social production, just as production is in desire as desiring-production.
But these forms can be understood in two ways, depending on whether desire is enslaved to a structured molar aggregate that it constitutes under a given form of power and gregariousness, or whether it subjugates the large aggregate to the functional multiplicities that it itself forms on the molecular scale (it is no more a case of persons or individuals
). If the preconscious revolutionary break appears at the first level, and is defined by the characteristics of a new aggregate, the unconscious or libidinal break belongs to the second level and is defined by the driving role of desiring-production and the position of its multiplicities. It is understandable, therefore, that a group can be revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and its preconscious investments, but not be so-and even remain fascist and police-like-from the standpoint of its libidinal investments, Truly revolutionary preconscious interests do not necessarily imply unconscious investments of the same nature; an apparatus of interest never takes the place of a machine of desire. A revolutionary group at the preconscious level remains a subjugated group, even in seizing power, as long as this power itself refers to a form of force that continues to enslave and crush desiringproduction. The moment it is preconsciously revolutionary, such a group already presents all the unconscious characteristics of a subjugated group: the subordination to a
in this instance than in the other socius as a fixed support that attributes to itself the productive forces, extracting and absorbing the surplus value therefrom; the effusion of antiproduction and death-carrying elements within the system, which feels and pretends to be all the more immortal; the phenomena of group "superegoization ," narcissism, and hierarchy-the mechanisms for the
A subject-group, on the contrary, is a group whose libidinal investments are themselves revolutionary; it causes desire to penetrate into the social field, and subordinates the socius or the form of power to desiring-production; productive of desire and a desire that produces, the subject-group invents always mortal formations that exorcise the effusion in it of a death instinct; it opposes real coefficients of transversality to the symbolic determinations of subjugation, coefficients without a hierarchy or a group superego. What complicates everything, it is true, is that the same individuals can participate in both kinds of groups in diverse ways (Saint-Juste, Lenin). Or the same group can present both characteristics at the same time, in diverse situations that are nevertheless coexistent. A revolutionary group can already have reassumed the form of a subjugated group, yet be determined under certain conditions to continue to play the role of a subject-group. One is continually passing from one type of group to the other. Subject-groups are continually deriving from subjugated groups through a rupture of the latter: they mobilize desire, and always cut its flows again further on, overcoming the limit, bringing the social machines back to the elementary forces of desire that form them.
repression of desire,
Role of the ballot

Affirming the free space created with the 1NC is not a neutral act we should learn from disconnected figures. The political strategy of the 1NC understands that we should never reach a point of full separation, rather we should understand the possibility of complete freedom, and use those lessons to inform individual empowerment Ballantyne 7 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 34-37)
In its most elemental state it is the body without organs a term which Deleuze and Guattari adapt into an abstract concept, reterritorializing it in many contexts but its origin is in a concrete example. It emerged in the last work by the dramaturge of the Theatre of Cruelty, Antonin Artaud (18951948). To Have Done With the Judgement of God was a rant against America and God, that carries the scars of Artauds tormented years in lunatic asylums. It was intended for radio broadcast on November 28, 1947, but was suppressed.6 . . . there
is nothing more useless than an organ. When you will have made him a body without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions and restored him to his true freedom (Artaud, 1947, 571). So the body without organs is presented here as an idealized state, in which anything becomes possible. (Under a more common-sense description such a body is comatose and has severe psychiatric disorders.) It is the condition of the lost sheep, away from the flock, deterritorialized and desocialized, without politics or a self. At this moment of confusion, it has lost the habits that have been there as part of its ancestral inheritance and its upbringing. But in Artauds case it
goes further. He remembered having found himself during a mental breakdown, with no shape or form, right there where he was at that moment (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, 8). He was away from the flock of other socialized people, who structured his sense of who he was in the world, and away from the flock
This sense of the body without organs, a catatonic body that is not structured by interactions, responses or concepts, is taken up by Deleuze and Guattari and is itself deterritorialized, so that it becomes a mobile concept, signalling in general the removal of all acquired habits and identity. We make ourselves bodies without organs by flirting with catatonia, by suspending our identity. We step out of the world of the actual, the world of common-sense stability, where we function well by repeating the habits of the day before, into the world of the virtual, where anything can happen. It was what Hume described himself as doing when he was thinking philosophically about himself, and consequently losing
of desiring machines that normally structured his sense of who he was in himself. His identity had gone. his sense of his self. Judge Schreber also had problems conceptualizing his body and what was happening to it. He lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with a torn esophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs, he used sometimes to swallow parts of his larynx with his food, etc. but divine miracles (rays) always restored what had been destroyed (Freud, 1911, 147; quoted by Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 150).
The body without organs is virtually all the things we could be, but when were in that state were actually none of them. In order to actualize a virtuality, we need to conceptualize some step towards it as a possibility, and as a body without organs we have no concepts, so we are trapped in a catatonic state for as long as it lasts. The virtual is the realm of the pre-possible, where there is no conception of what the alternative possibilities could be, so if
anything happens, it happens without having those possibilities to guide or inform it. It is the soup from which the emergent properties will in due course emerge, but with no sense as yet of what those emerging properties are going to be. Schrebers non-standard actualization was an oddity that tells us something about the range of possibilities, and different cultures at different times have conceptualized the body in multifarious ways (see e.g. Feher, 1989).
The body without organs lies before and beyond all the actual alternatives: The body without organs is what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy, and significances and subjectifications
as a whole. Psychoanalysis does the opposite: it translates everything into phantasies, it converts everything into phantasy, it retains the phantasy. It royally botches the real, because it botches the body without organs. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 151) The body
without organs is pure immanence (the plane of immanence) having in it no conceptual apparatus that has been imposed from outside nothing transcendental about it. After all, isnt Spinozas Ethics the great book of the body without organs? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 153). All bodies without organs pay homage to Spinoza (154). The body without organs is a state of creativity, where preconceptions are set aside. It is the state before a design takes shape, where all possibilities are immanent, and one holds at bay the common-sense expectations of what the design should be. When a stimulus or an internal pain prompts a line of flight, then formations assemble, giving the beginnings of a form a structure, a detail, a leitmotif. The aim could be that the design would be entirely immanent in its initial conditions, and would emerge as a product of the various forces in play in the milieu. It would not be imposed from outside as a specified form, but would work with the grain of its matter, from within, but also seamlessly with the milieu and
networks extending to its horizons. It can crystallize in various ways, at a molecular level, to aggregate and produce different surface effects
when it becomes apparent to the senses in a wider world. It is clearest in the sort of house that is a continuation of the person who lives in it, as a mollusc lives in its shell.
Solvency: Schizophrenia Makes Changes in Reality

The act of the 1AC is a political gesture towards the schizophrenic never becoming a schizo, but learning from the potential provided by the freedom of insanity. Considering the possibility of being completely unfettered to reality, always reimagining concepts, is enough to make a change in reality Deleuze and Guattari 72 (Anti-Oedipus, 366-8) The fourth and final thesis of schizoanalysis is therefore the distinction between two poles of social libidinal investment: the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole. Once again, we see
no objection to the use of terms inherited from psychiatry for characterizing social investments of the unconscious, insofar as these terms cease to have a familial connotation that would make them into simple projections, and from the moment delirium is recognized as having a primary social content that is immediately adequate. The
two poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiringmachines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these
molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics: the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them again according to the limits interior to the system, in such a way as to produce the images that come to fiIl the field of immanence peculiar to this system or this aggregate. the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production. And to summarize all the preceding determinations: the one is defined by subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups. It is true that we still run up against all kinds of problems concerning these distinctions. In what sense does the schizoid investment constitute, to the same extent as the other one, a real investment of the socio-historical field, and not a simple utopia? In what sense are the lines of escape collective, positive, and creative? What is the relationship between the two unconscious poles, and what is their relationship with the preconscious investments of interest? We have seen that the unconscious paranoiac investment was grounded in the socius itself as a full body without organs, beyond the preconscious aims and interests that it assigns and distributes. The fact remains that such an investment does not endure the light of day: it must always hide under assignable aims or interests presented as the general aims and interests, even though in reality the latter represent only the members of the dominant class or a fraction of this class. How
could a formation of sovereignty, a fixed and determinate gregarious aggregate, endure being invested for their brute force, their violence, and their absurdity? They would not survive such an investment. Even the most overt fascism speaks the language of goals, of law, order, and reason. Even the most insane capitalism speaks in the name of economic rationality. And this is necessarily the case, since it is in the irrationality of the full body that the order of reasons is inextricably fixed, under a code, under an axiomatic that determines it . What is more, the bringing to light of the unconscious reactionary investment as if devoid of an aim, would be enough to transform it completely, to make it pass to the other pole of the libido, i.e., to the schizorevolutionary pole, since this action could not be accomplished without overthrowing power, without reversing subordination, without returning production itself to desire: for it is only desire that lives from having no aim. Molecular desiring-production would
regain its liberty to master in its turn the molar aggregate under an overturned form of power or sovereignty. That is why Klossowski, who has taken the theory of the two poles of investment the furthest, but still within the category of an active utopia, is able to write: "Every sovereign formation would thus have to foresee the destined moment of its disintegration.... No formation of sovereignty, in order to crystalize, will ever endure this prise de conscience: for
By way of the circuitous route of science and art, human beings have many times revolted against this fixity; this capacity notwithstanding, the gregarious impulse in and by science caused this rupture to fail.
as soon as this formation becomes conscious of its immanent disintegration in the individuals who compose it, these same individuals decompose it. ... The day humans are able to behave as intentionless phenomena-for every intention at the level of the human being always obeys the laws of its conservation, its continued existence-on that day a new creature will declare the integrity of existence.... Science demonstrates by its very method that the means that it constantly elaborates do no more than reproduce, on the outside, an interplay of forces by themselves without aim or end whose combinations obtain such
In order to prevent science from calling social groups back in question, these groups take science back in hand ... [integrate it] into the diverse industrial schemes; its autonomy appears strictly inconceivable. A conspiracy joining together art and science presupposes a rupture of all our
and such a result. ... However, no science can develop outside a constituted social grouping . institutions and a total upheaval of the means of production.... If some conspiracy, according to Nietzsche's wish, were to use science and art in a plot whose ends were no less suspect, industrial society would seem to foil this conspiracy in advance by the kind of mise en scene it offers for it, under
pain of effectively suffering what this conspiracy reserves for this society: i.e., the breakup of the institutional structures that mask the society into a plurality of experimental spheres finally revealing the true face of modernity-an ultimate phase that Nietzsche saw as the end result of the evolution of societies. In this perspective, art and science would then emerge as
sovereign formations that Nietzsche said constituted the object of his countersociology-art and science establishing themselves as dominant powers, on the ruins of institutions
Solvency: Nomadic War Machine

Our politics is of the nomadic war machine everywhere we go we create smooth spaces; places of invention and experimentation and immanence. Protest movements are trapped in an apparatus of capture: the war machine has been appropriated by the State and used to ossify fascism in the heads of the masses. Vote neg to uproot yourself from institutions and become mobile.
Conley in 6 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95 -100) Deleuze and Guattari propose an adventitious network, a mobile structure that can be likened to underground filaments of grass or the mycelia of fungi. A rhizome moves horizontally and produces offshoots from multiple bifurcations at its meristems. It changes its form by connecting and reconnecting. It does not have a finite or ultimate shape. Space does not pre-exist the rhizome; rather, it is created through and between the proliferating lines. Rhizomes connect and open spaces in-between which, in the rooted world of the tree, an inside (the earth) is separated from an outside (the atmosphere). Unlike the tree, the rhizome can never be fixed or reduced to a single point or radical core. Its movement is contrasted with the stasis of the arborescent model. In Rhizome the vertical, arborescent model contributes to the creation of striated spaces. In the ebullient imagination of the two authors it appears that the latter slow down and even prevent movement of the kind they associate with emancipation and creativity. Instead of imitating a tree, Deleuze
and Guattari exhort their readers to make connections by following multiple itineraries of investigation, much as a rhizome moves about the surface it creates as it goes. Rhizomes
form a territory that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders. In addition to Smooth spaces allow optimal circulation and favour connections. Over time, however, smooth spaces tend to become striated. They lose their flexibility. Nodes and barriers appear that slow down circulation and reduce the number of possible connections. Writing Anti-Oedipus in a post-1968 climate, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic connections that continually rearticulate smooth space in order not only to criticise bourgeois capitalism with its institutions the family, school, church, the medical establishment (especially psychiatry) but also to avoid what they see as a deadened or zombified state of things. They criticise the state for erecting mental and social barriers and for creating oppositions instead of furthering connections. Institutions and the state are seen as the villains that control and immobilize people from the top down. They argue that when the family, the church or the psy instill guilt in a child, mental barriers and borders are erected. The childs creativity, indeed its mental and physical mobility are diminished in the process. Such a condition cripples many adults who have trees growing in their heads. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Little
this novel way of thinking, rhizomatically, the philosophers make further distinctions between smooth and striated spaces. Hans, a child analysed by Freud and whose creativity, they declare, was blocked by adults who wrongly interpreted his attempts to trace lines of flight within
The state, too, functions by ordering, organizing and arresting movement, by creating relations of inclusion and exclusion. The state facilitates the creation of rigid and often ossified institutions. It enacts laws of inclusion and exclusion that order the family and the social in general. It tries to immobilize and dominate the social world. Yet the social cannot be entirely dominated. The organising rgime of the order-word is never stable. It is constantly being transformed. Lines detach themselves from fuzzy borders and introduce variations in the constant of the dominant order. These variations can lead to a break and produce lines of flight that bring about entirely new configurations. Of importance in the late 1960s and 1970s is the doing away with institutions and the state that represses subjects. In AntiOedipus, the philosophers show how institutions like the family and psychiatry repress sexuality and desire in order to maximize their revenue. They argue for the creation of smooth spaces where desire can circulate freely. In A Thousand Plateaus, the bourgeois
and through the structure of the family into which he had been born (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). state ordered by the rules of capitalism is criticised. Deleuze and Guattari rarely contexualise the state in any specific historical or political terms. Constructing a universal history of sorts, the philosophers note that the
state apparatus appears at different times and in different places. This apparatus is always one of capture. It appropriates what they call a nomadic war machine that never
entirely disappears. The nomadic war machine eludes capture and traces its own lines of flight. It makes its own smooth spaces. Our politics resists codification by the State through a becoming-revolutionary that embraces a minoriatrian identity. Our project destabilizes order-words and withers away the borders of identity, blurring all of ontology into one immanent plane. Vote neg to engage a becomingminoritarian as a strategy against State fascism. Conley in 6 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95 -100) Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in subjects who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate from the dominant order that uses order-words to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a becomingrevolutionary of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of becomingminoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35-year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails. A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, Afro-American, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in Rhizome that the connections they advocate are different from those of
computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies
).Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities and of writing in they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given nation-state. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its order-words, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475 a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless,
Impact
When the nomadic war machine becomes appropriated by the State, total war becomes the object of the State. Beyond total war is a terrifying peace the same desires of the masses to go to war in Vietnam have been replicated in space, transforming the State into a militarist war machine. The impact is total war, fascism, and eventually nuclear catastrophe.
Buchanan 5 (Ian holds the foundation Chair of Communication and Cultural Studies at Charles Darwin University, War in the age of intelligent
machines and unintelligent government, Australian Humanities Review Issue 36, July 2005) This, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is the point at which Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed. When total war - i.e., war which not only places the annihilation of the enemy's army at its centre but its entire population and economy too - becomes the object of the State-appropriated war machine, then at this level in the set of all possible conditions, the object and the aim enter into new relations that can reach the point of contradiction. In the first instance, the
war machine unleashed by the State in pursuit of its object, total war, remains subordinate to the State and merely realises the maximal conditions 22 of its aims. Paradoxically, though, the more successful it is in realising the State's aims, the less controllable by the State it becomes. As the State's aims grow on the back of the success of its war machine, so the restrictions on the war machine's object shrink until - scorpion like - it effectively subsumes the State, making it just one of its many moving parts. In Vietnam, the State was blamed for the failure of the war machine precisely because it attempted to set limits on its object. Its inability to adequately impose these
limits not only cost it the war, but in effect its sovereignty too. Since then the State has been a puppet of a war machine global in scope and ambition. This is the status of militarism today and no-one has described its characteristics more chillingly than Deleuze and Guattari: This
worldwide war machine, which in a way 'reissues' from the States, displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism, which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, postfascist, figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its object directly, as the peace of Terror or Survival. The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. Total war is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still.23 It is undoubtedly Chalmers Johnson who 24 has done the most to bring to our attention the specific make-up of what Deleuze and Guattari call here the worldwide war machine. His description of a global 'empire of bases' is consistent with Deleuze and Guattari's uptake of Paul Virilio's concept of the 'fleet in being'. This is the paradoxical transformation of the striated space of organisation into a new kind of 'reimparted' smooth space which outflanks all gridding and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the States.25 Bases do not by themselves secure territory, but as is the case with a battle fleet their mobility and their firepower mean they can exert an uncontestable claim over territory that amounts to control. This smooth space surrounding the earth is, to put it back into Baudrillard's terms, the space of simulation. The empire of bases is a virtual construct with real capability. Fittingly enough, it was Jean Baudrillard who first detected that a structural change in post-WWII militarism had taken place. In Simulacra and Simulation he argues that the Vietnam War was a demonstration of a new kind of will to war, one that no longer thought in terms of winning or losing, but defined itself instead in terms of perseverance.26 It demonstrated to the US's enemies, clients and allies alike its willingness to continue the fight even when defeat was certain, or had in a sense already been acknowledged (the US strategy of 'Vietnamising' the war which
commenced shortly after the Tet offensive in 1968, and become official policy under Nixon, was patently an admission that the war couldn't be won - in the short term it was Johnson's way of putting off admitting defeat until after the election so as to give Hubert Humphrey some chance of victory; in the longer 27 term it was a way of buying time for a diplomatic solution). It was a demonstration of the US's reach, of its ability to inflict
destruction even when its troops were withdrawing and peace talks (however futile) were under way. It also demonstrated to the American people that the fight could be continued as the troops were withdrawn, a factor that as I've
already pointed out would become decisive in re-shaping militarism as an incorporeal system. It was also a demonstration to the American domestic population that the country's leaders were willing to continue to sacrifice lives to prove this point. 28 The contrary view, that Nixon wanted to end the war sooner but was unable to do so because domestic politics didn't allow it, in no way contradicts this thesis. If anything it confirms it because if true it would mean, as Deleuze and Guattari have said of fascism, at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, the
American
people wanted Vietnam, and, as they add, it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.29 While there can be no doubt Vietnam was an unpopular war that was eventually brought to a halt by popular pressure, it is a sobering thought to remind oneself that it was a war that lasted some 10 years. If one takes 1967 as the decisive turning point in popular opinion, the moment when protest against the war became the prevailing view and support for it dwindled into a minority murmur, then one still has to take stock of the fact that it took a further 6 years for US troops to be fully withdrawn.30 The kind of sustained popular pressure that brought the Vietnam War to a close has not yet even begun to build in the US in spite of the fact
that the death toll has passed 1500 (as of March 2005). Wars are spectacles in the traditional sense of being events staged to convey a specific message, but also in the more radical or postmodern sense that spectacle is the final form of war, the form war takes when it takes peace as its object. Hence the military's facilitation of the media (this backfired to a large degree in Vietnam, but the lessons learned then are put to good use today). Ultimately, though, as Baudrillard rightly argues , the media and official news services are only there to maintain the illusion of an actuality, of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts. 31 Chomsky's analyses of current trends in US imperialism confirm this thesis. As he argues, 'preventive' wars are only fought against the basically defenceless.32 Chomsky adds two further conditions that chime with what we have already adduced: there must be something in it for the aggressor, i.e., a fungible return not an intangible moral reward, and the opponent must be susceptible to a portrayal of them as 'evil', allowing the victory to be claimed in the name of a higher moral purpose and the actual venal purpose to be obscured.33 At first glance, waging war to prevent war appears to be as farcical as fucking for virginity, but that is only if we
Or, rather, given that it is alleged that the putative Qaeda and its supposed supporters, took first blood (the Rambo reference is of course deliberate), we are asked to believe the current war is being fought to prevent a second, more damaging strike. The obsessive and suitably grave references to Weapons of Mass Destruction by the various mouthpieces of the Bush regime (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Rice, but also Blair and Howard) is plainly calculated to compel us to accept that any such second strike will be of biblical, or worse, Hollywood proportions.
assume that the aim of the war is to prevent one potential aggressor from striking first. enemy, Al As one joke put it, the Americans could be certain that Iraq had at least some Weapons of Mass Destruction because they had the receipts to prove it. The grain of truth in this joke reveals the true purpose of the war - it was a demonstration to all of America's clients that it wouldn't tolerate 'price-gouging'. Obviously I am speaking metaphorically here, but the fact is that Iraq is a client of the US, it purchases arms and consumer goods and sells oil at a carefully controlled price. Why this arrangement suddenly became so unsatisfactory is subject to a great deal of speculation which centre on two basic theories: (1) when Iraq switched from the dollar to the euro it posed an intolerable threat to the stability of the US currency; (2) the US is positioning itself to monopolise oil ahead of growing Chinese demand. Either way, if one wants a metaphor to describe US imperialism it wouldn't it wouldn't be MacDonald's, a 34 comparatively benign operator, but the predatory retail giant Wal-Mart. In other words, today's wars are fought to demonstrate will. The age of gunboat 35 diplomacy has given way to the age of gunboat commerce. When war changed its object it was able to change its aim too and it is this more than anything that has saved 'real' war from itself. Baudrillard's later work on the spectacle of war misses this point: through becoming spectacles the fact that real wars (i.e., territorial wars) are no longer possible has not diminished their utility - the
US isn't strong enough to take and hold Iraq, but it can use its force to demonstrate to other small nations that it can inflict massive damage and lasting pain on anyone who would dare defy it.
Baudrillard's lament that the real Gulf War never took place can only be understood from this viewpoint - although he doesn't put it in these words, his insight is essentially that war in its Idealised form is much more terrifying than peace. Again, although Baudrillard himself doesn't put it this way, the conclusion one might draw from the paradigm shift in war's rationalisation enumerated above - from pragmatic object (defeating North Vietnam) to 36 symbolic object (defending the credibility of the fight forces) -is that war has become 'postmodern'. This shift is what enables the US
to ideologically justify war in the absence of a proper object and indeed in the absence of a known enemy. The Bush regime's 'War on Terror' is the apotheosis of this change: the symbolic (terror) has been made to appear instrumental (terrorism), or more precisely the symbolic is now able to generate the instrumental according to its own needs. This is the moment when the war machine becomes militarism, the moment when doxa becomes doctrine. What is a war machine? The answer to this question must always be, it is a concept. But because of the way Deleuze and Guattari create their concepts, by
abstracting from the historical, there is always a temptation to treat the war machine as primarily descriptive. More importantly, the war machine is only one element in a complex treatise which is ultimately a mordant critique of the present. Deleuze and Guattari's analysis proceeds via a threefold hypothesis: (1)
the war machine is a nomad invention that does not have war as its primary object, war is rather a second-order objective; (2) the war machine is exterior to the State apparatus, but when the State appropriates the war machine its nature and function changes, its polarity is effectively reversed so that it is directed at the nomads themselves; (3) it is only when the war machine has been appropriated by the State that war becomes its primary object.37 Deleuze and Guattari are careful to clarify that their main purpose in assigning the invention of the war machine to the nomads is to assert its
historical or 'invented' character. Their implication is that the nomadic people of the steppes and deserts do not hold the secret to understanding the war 38 machine. We need to look past the concrete historical and geographical character of the war machine to see its eidetic core. Clearly, it is not the nomad who defines this constellation of characteristics; on the contrary, it is this constellation that defines the nomad, and at the same time the essence of the war machine.39
In its nomad origins, the war machine does not have war as its primary objective. Deleuze and Guattari arrive at this conclusion by way of three questions. First of all they ask, is battle the object of war? Then they ask if war is the object of the war machine. And finally they ask if the war machine is the object of the State. The first question requires further and immediate clarification, they say, between when a battle is sought and when it is avoided. The difference between these two states of affairs is not the difference between an offensive and defensive posture. And while it is true that at first glance war does seem to have battle as its object whereas the guerrilla has nonbattle his object, this view is deceiving. Dropping
bombs from 10 000 metres above the earth, firing missiles from a distance of hundreds of kilometres, using unpiloted drones to scout for targets, using satellite controlled and guided weapons, are the actions of a war-machine that has no interest at all in engaging in battle. The truism that the Viet Cong frustrated the US Army in Vietnam by failing to engage them
in battle should not be taken to mean the US Army sought battle and the enemy did not. The Viet Cong frustrated the US Army by failing to succumb to its nonbattle strategies and forced them into seeking battles with an elusive army with a better understanding of the terrain. If operation Rolling Thunder, or 40 any of the many other battle-avoiding stratagems the US attempted had worked, they would not have sought battle at all. Ironically, too, as Gabriel Kolko points out, the more strategic the US tried to make its offensive operations, i.e., the more it tried to disengage from face-to-face encounters on the battlefield, 41 the more passive its posture became because of its escalating logistical support requirements and increasing reliance on high maintenance technology. By the same token, it is clear that the
guerilla armies of the Viet Cong did in fact seek battle, but did so on their own terms. As Mao said, the guerrilla strikes where the other is weak and retreats whenever the stronger power attacks, the point being that the guerrilla is constantly on the look out for an opportunity to engage the enemy. 42Battle and nonbattle are the double
43 object of war, according to a criterion that does not coincide with the offensive and the defensive, or even with war proper and guerrilla warfare. For this reason the question has to be pushed further back to ask if war is even the object of the war machine? Too often the answer to this question is automatically 'yes', but this reflects a precise set of historical circumstances and not an essential condition. It is true, throughout history, the nomads are regularly to be found in conflict situations, but this is because history is studded with collisions between war machines and the states and cities which would grind them into the dust. War is thrust upon the war machine, but its actual occupation is quite different. It could even be said to be peaceful were we not suspicious of that term. And as I have already argued, it
is when the war machine takes peace itself as its object that it enters its most
terrifying phase.
War Machine & the State

The war machine is not inherently negative it is a neutral force outside of the state and created by the desires of individuals. Only through State co-option and redirection towards peace can annihilation and nuclear holocaust occur through the demands of the masses. Deleuze and Guattari 80 (Gilles and Felix, philosophers and rhizomes, A Thousand Plateaus pg 230-231, dml)
There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it substitutes destruction for mutation, that it frees the most catastrophic charge. Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change. War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition. (Later, we will propose a theory of the complex
relation between the war machine and war.)31 This brings us back to the paradox of fascism, and the way in which fascism differs from totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assemblage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates. Even in the case of a
military dictatorship, it is a State army, not a war machine, that takes power and elevates the State to the totalitarian stage. Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State . A bizarre
remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its
utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curious that from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and the death of the Germans. They thought they would perish but that their undertaking would be resumed, all across Europe, all over the world, throughout the solar system. And the people cheered, not because they did not understand, but because they wanted that death through the death of others . Like a will to wager everything you have every
hand, to stake your own death against the death of others, and measure everything by "deleometers." Klaus Mann's novel, Mephisto, gives samplings of entirely ordinary Nazi speeches and conversations: "Heroism was something that was being ruled out of our lives. . . . In reality, we are not marching forward, we are reeling, staggering. Our beloved Fiihrer is dragging us toward the shades of darkness and everlasting nothingness. How can we poets, we who have a special affinity for darkness and lower depths, not admire him? . . . Fires blazing on the horizon; rivers of blood in all the streets; and the frenzied dancing of the survivors, of those who are still spared, around the bodies of the dead!"32 Suicide is presented not as a punishment but as the crowning glory of the death of others. One can always say that it is just a matter of foggy talk and ideology, nothing but ideology. But that is not true. The insufficiency of economic and political definitions of fascism does not simply imply a need to tack on vague, so-called ideological determinations. We prefer to follow Faye's inquiry into the precise formation of Nazi statements, which are just as much in evidence in politics and economics as in the most absurd of conversations. They always contain the "stupid and repugnant" cry, Long live death!, even at the economic level, where the arms expansion replaces growth in consumption and where investment veers from the means of production toward
Virilio's analysis strikes us as entirely correct in defining fascism not by the notion of the totalitarian State but by the notion of the suicidal State: so-called total war seems less a State undertaking than an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels into it a flow of absolute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself. "The triggering of a hitherto unknown material process, one that is limitless and aimless. . . . Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace, for the indirect strategy effectively places the dominant powers outside the usual categories of space and time . . . . It was in the horror of daily
the means of pure destruction. Paul
life and its environment that Hitler finally found his surest means of governing, the legitimation of his policies and military strategy; and it lasted right up to the end, for the ruins and horrors and crimes and chaos of total war, far from discharging the repulsive nature of its power, normally only increase its scope. Telegram 71 is the normal outcome: If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Here, Hitler decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own
It was this reversion of the line of flight into a line of destruction that already animated the molecular focuses of fascism, and made them interact in a war machine instead of resonating in a State apparatus. A war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.
people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)."33
Subordination of desire to fear in the face of police lines and threats from the outside world has transformed the State into a war machine. Liberalism asks us to surrender and be safe war is permeating throughout all of society. In this way, war is an imminent thing. The war machine has placed us in a constant state of emergency by its own doing: fear has turned us all into cannibals, desiring our own domination and servitude. You should challenge the politics of fear and endless war-mongering with a contraption of your own.
This is Daniel Bell in 2007(Daniel M., Associate Professor of Theological Ethics, Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary, Journal for Cultural and Religious
Theory, JCRT 8.2 SPRING 2007 55,d http://www.jcrt.org/archives/08.2/)
Deleuze holds that life is constituted by motion; specifically by the active power that is desire. Moreover, this desire in a state of nature if you will, is not reactive; it is not fearful. Rather, it is anarchic, creative, harmonic. This active, playful power that is desire only becomes reactive, fearful, or in Deleuzes terms, paranoid, as it is acted upon, as it is captured or seduced by reactive and fearful forces, which is precisely what the state-form attempts to do. The state-form assembles desire, forms and shapes it so that it is paranoid and fearful, and in so doing, the state promotes the promise of its own existence: Surrender and be safe. Deleuzes focus, however, broadens beyond the state-form to consider the contemporary political horizon as it is constituted by global capitalism. He positions his account of desire and the state-form within a universal history of capitalism. According to this genealogy, the history of capitalisms advent is the story of the state-forms slow subsumption by or becoming immanent to economy. Hobbes absolutist state of sovereignty was able to channel all desire through the bottle-neck of the state and its mercantile economy. Yet, as Foucault noted, eventually desire exceeded the ability of the sovereign to control and contain it, and as a result the state-form mutated into liberal
Like Hobbes and Foucault, state. What is novel about the liberal state is that its art of government neither requires all desire be funneled through the state (civil society is fine, as per Foucaults governmentality) nor demands that desire be subordinated to the ends of sovereignty. In this sense, liberal government is distinctly economic government; it is government that strives to further not its own ends, what an earlier political tradition called reason of state, but the ends of capitalist economy. The liberal state is immanent to the larger economic field, and its task is primarily that of minimizing intervention and interference in the workings of that field. Yet, we might ask, have we not crossed a new threshold in recent decades as capitalism has increasingly undermined the governing authority of even the liberal, economic, state? Does not global capitalism mark a crisis of the liberal state? After all, it would appear that capitals ability to eclipse national sovereignty is approach ing the point of rendering the liberal state unnecessary, a point where passports can be replaced
we have entered a new era, but the state-form has not been rendered obsolete. Rather, it is undergoing another mutation, a shift toward a much more active or aggressive advocacy of capital. No longer is the state satisfied with merely minimizing intervention in economy; now it actively pursues the extension of economy into every fiber and cell of human life. The state has become a model of realization for capital. More specifically, and more immediately relevant to the matter of the culture and politics of fear, the state has become a war machine. Whereas it was once the case that states appropriated war machines; today states constitute a war machine.
by credit cards and citizenship replaced by membership in trade alliances and associations. According to Deleuze, Specifically, they are capitalisms war machine. The capitalist state is the small state, strong state that we see evolvin g all around us in response to the dictates of the global
the object of this machine is no longer, as it once was, war in the traditional sense of the term. Here we might recall the ways the war of terrorism was described at its initiation. It is a ghost war, occurring not at the frontiers of society but, like a fog and in a manner synonymous with governmentality, permeating or blanketing society. And it is waged against a
capitalist order states long on disciplinary power and short on welfare capacity. Furthermore, spectral enemy be it terrorists with dirty bombs, microbes, or superpredator youths16 by means equally spectral stealth forces, renditions, disappearances, electronic eavesdropping, invisible break-ins, snooping librarians, truck driver informants and so forth. This war machine, moreover, does not simply fight in society, but rather it has society, peace, politics, the world order as its object. As Deleuze observes, with this latest permutation of the state-form, Clausewitzs famous for mula has been inverted: War is
We are already living in the midst of the Third World War, Deleuze wrote almost thirty years ago. Politics, culture, peace, civil society are the object of this war. Thus we are submerged in a state of permanent war; permanent emergency, a permanent state of exception where the laws and civic political associations that once offered some degree of liberty are suspended indefinitely and foreclosed. 18 Moreover, in waging this war against peace and politics, the state-form, in a move reminiscent of Orwells 1984, promotes and installs a very special kind of peace: a terrifying peace, the peace of absolute terror, a culture and politics of fear. Security is now conceived as war, as organized insecurity, as distributed and programmed universal catastrophe. War is peace and freedom is preserved only by sacrificing it and we all have a stake in this as we desire the goods that this fear makes possible. And what goods are those? According to Deleuze, this state of permanent war, this culture of fear has as its goal the deterritorialization of desire, the separation of the productive force of desire from anything that would stand between it and the capitalist market and the concomitant rendering available of this desire to this market. Thus, the culture of fear is not in service to the state per se, but the market. The threat of terror paves the way for capital and the goods it promises to provide. So, after 9/11 the president instructs us, not to seek out our neighbors and embrace them, but to shop, to seek out commodities and purchase them. Shortly thereafter, the US trade representative to Latin America wielded the threat of terrorism to cajole reluctant nations to fall in line with trade pacts. Likewise, homeland security and terrorism have been invoked to crush domestic labor actions,
no longer the continuation of politics; politics is now the continuation of war. 17 as well as popular movements against the expansion of the capitalist market. The invasion of Iraq, while falling far short of its lofty rhetoric with regard to the welfare of the Iraqi people, has gone a long way toward privatizing oil resources, abolishing unions, lowering wages, etc in short, furthering capitals extension in the region. Likewise, Katrina was used to repeal a host of labor and environmental laws that stood in way of the market and talk persists of rebuilding the New Orleans in a manner that is decidedly market
With Deleuze, we reach the end of our survey of liberalism and fear. The politics and culture of fear that envelop us is not the intrusion of an extra-political force kept a bay by the liberal political order. To the contrary, liberalism needs fear and so it produces it, and it does so not simply by the imposition of the heavy, disciplinary hand of the state and its apparatuses, but by the velvet touch (one that we even desire!) of the vast array of technologies of the self that constitute the complex space of civil society. Moreover, by means of this liberal governmentality, we come to desire our own domination and participate in a kind of political cannibalism whereby we want the very things that undercut the liberties liberalism purports to secure. Thus, as we examine the culture of fear, we are looking as if into a mirror and glimpsing the truth of our liberal
friendly. The list of examples of how fear and terror are used to promote the capitalist order could go on and on. soul. Liberalism is founded on fear. As Judith Shklar has said so well, liberalism does not offer a summum bonum toward which all should strive; nor does it rest upon a theory of
Liberalism is erected on the sheer negative, the fear of a summum malum. As she says, to be alive is to be afraid.19 But in this way the contradiction at the empty heart of liberalism is exposed: The promise of liberalism recall Montesquieu et. al. was freedom from terror and fear; yet this it cannot and it dare not deliver. For without fear, liberalisms raison detre, even the very barren surface into which it sinks its sickly roots, erodes as if into nothing. Therefore, under liberalism, there can be no end to fear. Even death is not its terminus, but only its culmination and even its return, for death does not relieve our fears. Rather, as Hobbess insightfully discerned, face to face with death we are reminded that whatever meager goods we seek out in the midst of this vale of tears career, family, friends, etc. are contingent upon actually surviving to pursue them. For an end to fear, for a politics that finally is not cannibalistic of either liberty or life and so holds forth the hope of nurturing human communion/community (the root meaning of politics), for a more generous politics beyond the (anti)politics of color-coded insecurity and perpetual war with our neighbors, both foreign and domestic, we will have to look elsewhere. To this alternative we now turn.
moral pluralism as many are wont to proclaim. Rather, its foundation is much more barren.
Squo sucks
Violence is systemic and its effects are transparent now. The ethics of the paranoiac assassin, the calculative thought we indict is the mentality that legitimizes nuclear annihilation and atomic space weapons.
Deleuze and Guattari 80 (Gilles Deleuze; Felix Guattari, A thousand Plateaus, p. 345-346)
Material thus has three principal characteristics: it is Molecularized matter; it has a relation to forces to be harnessed; and it is defined by the operations of
it is clear that the relation to the earth and the people has changed and is no longer of the romance type. The earth is not at its most deterritorialized: not only a point in a galaxy, but one galaxy among others. The people is not at its most Molecularized: a molecular population, a people of oscillators as so many forces of interaction. The artist discards romantic figures, relinquishes both the forces of the earth and those of the people. The combat, if combat there is, has moved. The established powers have occupied the earth; they have built peoples organizations. The mass media, the great peoples organizations of the party or union type, are machines for reproduction, fuzzification machines that effectively scramble all the terrestrial forces of the people. The established powers have placed us in the situation long ago, even before it had been installed (Nietzsche, for example). They became away of it because the same vector was traveling their own domain: a molecularization, an atomization of the material, coupled with a cosmicization of the forces taken up by that material. The question then became whether the molecular or atomic populations of all natures (mass media, monitoring procedures, computers, space weapons) would continued to bombard the existing people in order to train it or control it or annihilate it or if other molecular populations were possible, could slip into the first and give rise to a people yet to come. As Virilio say in his very rigorous analysis of the depopulation of the people and the deterritorialization of the earth, the question has become: to dwell as a poet of as an assassin? The assassin is one who bombards the existing people with molecular populations that are forever closing all of the assemblages, hurling them into an even wider and deeper black hole. The poet on the other hand is one who lets loose molecular populations in hopes that this will sow the seeds of, or even engender, the people to come, that these populations will pass into a people to come, open a cosmos. Once again, we must not make it seem as though the poet gorged on metaphors: it may be that the sound of molecules to pop music are at this very moment implanting here and there a people of a new type, singularly indifferent to the orders of the radio, to computer safeguards, to the threat of the atomic bomb.
consistency applied to it. Finally,
The state striates the entire space over which it tries to reign or utilize turning space into a deterritorialized appropriation
Hardt 93 (Michael Hardt, American literary theorist and political philosopher perhaps best known for Empire, written with Antonio Negri and
published in 2000.It has been called the Communist Manifesto of the 21st Century, 4/X/93, http://www.duke.edu/~ha rdt/mp5.htm, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy)
What we generally have in these plateaux is the appropriation of the war machine by the State and thus the striation of smooth space (or rather the use of smooth space between striae). This
3. Axiomatics of the Global War Machine-relationship seems to change, however, when D&G consider the present situation when the world is not organizated by sovereign nation-States, but rather States are in some ways subordinated to a global order. They reject right away the possibility that there is emerging some sort of global State that stands
The various States are thus superceded by what I would call a smooth global Empire. "The war machine reforms a smooth space that now claims to control, to surround the entire earth. Total war itself is surpassed, toward a form of peace more terrifying still. The war machine has taken charge of the aim, worldwide order, and the States are now no more than objects or means of that war machine. (...) [The enemy is] no longer another State, or even
above the various nation-States. "It is an absurdity to postulate a world supergovernment that makes the final decisions" (461).
another regime, but the 'whichever enemy' [l'ennemi quelconque]" (421-22). Whichever enemy -- Quaddafi, Noriega, Saddam, whichever. I think this is a very interesting description of the contemporary global order, but how in the logic of the text do D&G move from the State continually getting the upper hand over the war machine to this situation where the war machine has subordinated States to its order? And how is it that now the war machine and its free space that used to be associated with creation and free activity now has taken only global order for its object? Or the question is posed most clearly for me in terms of soveriegnty. If I understand
sovereignty as an instance of power transcendent to the social field and specifically as residing in the striae of the State space, then how can we say that this global war machine (which is by definition
on smooth space) is sovereign? How can a war machine rule? I think the answer has to lie back in the question of the axiomatic, which we first saw in AO and which reappears here in these plateaux. As you remember, the axiomatic was introduced as a way to understand the immanence of capitalism and its controlled schizophrenia. In the present situation, D&G say, the relationship between axiomatics and politics becomes more and more close. "[A]n axiomatic is not at all a transcendent, autonomous, and decision-making power opposed to experimentation and intuition" (461). Axiomatics involve combinations of indeterminate variables that sometimes come up against undecidable propositions. The system of "whichever enemy", for example, refers to an axiomatic. (And this is an axiomatic that better describes the post Cold War world ever better than it did the workd of D&G's time.) Whichever enemy is a variable that can be filled in the equation by a variety of different terms, yeilding different solutions. The global war machine doesn't need fixed relations and striated spaced ruled by a transcendent power. It can deal with a variety of configurations through its immanent laws. If the global war machine is not capital, then at least we can say that it is constituted by an axiomatic just as capital is.A new sovereignty. Capitalist sovereignty.
AT: Utopianism
Our neg is not about in-round solvency or some arbitrary pre/post-fiat distinction. We do not believe reading the 1NC will change the world. Rather, we present a political strategy and defend that an agent, when given the choice, should affirm our methodology. No link this isnt anti-realist theory; its a philosophical connection to the world at large that allows our movement to have real implications. Colebrook 2 (Claire, Understanding Deleuze, p.69) This is not an anti-realist theory. Deleuze is not arguing that reality is just an image or is constructed by mind. On the contrary, reality in all its difference and complexity cannot be reduced to the extended images we have formed of it. Nor can the mind be seen as the author or origin of all images. Reality itself is an infinite and inhuman plane of imaging: when one cell responds to another, or when a plant grows toward the sun, or when a virus mutates, we can refer to each of these as imaging. One event of life has apprehended a different event, creating two points, and each point of imaging has its own world. There are not subjects who then perceive; there is an impersonal plane of perceptions from which subjects are folded. It is from the specific manner of perception, its style or inflection, that the point of view of the soul or subject is effected: the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the
soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if
from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act (Deleuze 1993, p. 23). Human life or thought is just one type of imaging or perception among others; the error has been to think that the world is simply there, or transcendent, only to be viewed by the human knower. If we begin from immanence then there is no privileged point such as mind, thinking or representationthat can adopt such an external point of view.
AT: Realism
We have a discourse critique that operates independent of the plan A. The aff constitutes a reality of inevitable conflict which effaces human agency.
Burke 7 (anthony, prof @ jhu ontologies of war: violence existence and reason theory and event 10:2 proj muse) This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from
critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to
We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and
military violence. it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary,
39 Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been
there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury... influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians.
B. The violent quest to overcome uncertainty in the international arena is double dangerous: It has both created the implements that make human extinction possible and the political context that renders it necessary and inevitable. Bell is a Disad to the plan
Dillon and Campbell 93 (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, and David, Professor of
Cultural and Political Geography at Durham University, The Political Subject of Violence, pg 163-165)
This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by
The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of
the formation of (political) identity.
reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostated conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned. It might have once been the case that
the
prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful - indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point . But, having reached what Foucault has called society's 'threshold of modernity', 'we' now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because 'the life of the
species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political
How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically, and politically, is not. The double bind of this prospect is that modernity's alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason's success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (la politique, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violence practices of politics (la politique). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust. For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis' genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the 'civilising process'. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal order, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust 'was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residence of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house. The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergency of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can
existence: modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question.' be no better indication in contradistinction to those 'modernists' who would like to brand so-called 'postmodernists' with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts - that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the 'civilising process' of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes: 'We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of ethical norms and moral inhibitions.'
AT: Identity Good

Our argument moves beyond identity: its not a question of European or rich or female: its about organizing struggles around desire and recognizing that all identity is immanent.
Gilbert Et Al 8 (Jeremy Gilbert, ric Alliez, Claire Colebrook, Peter Hallward, Nicholas Thoburn - all have PhDs and whatever; "Deleuzian
Politics? A Roundtable Discussion"; New Formations) Claire: If you think about contemporary politics: all
we have to do is move from talking about national liberation movements and workers movements to looking at some of the most tortured and vexed political situations, such as the relationship between indigenous Australian communities and European settled communities, and we can see that as long as we have a notion of collectivity thats founded on the traditional notion of labour and its organisation, then we will always be necessarily disenfranchising and robbing those people of a potential form of individuation. This is what this is all about. The key question is how you can take part in some form of collective action without necessarily being identified as or appealing to classes in the old sense. So the molecularisation of politics which Deleuze and Guattari propose is about how to get beyond a situation in which, within a given context of communication, there are things that cant be heard. The question is: how can you have some maximum degree of inclusion with a minimal degree of identification? This is a crucial question if you want a global politics which can allow for notions of contamination, and which can get beyond the limitations of models of politics modelled on opposed pairs of identities: workers vs. capitalists, national liberation struggles vs globalist struggles. You cant have that anymore: you can only have these extremely molecular, local, individuating political gestures. Peter: Well it depends on the situation. There are contexts where something like an indigenous mobilisation verging on identity politics, grounded in an indigenous tradition - as in parts of Bolivia and parts of Guatemala, and other places - has been politically significant and is today politically significant. The same applies to contemporary forms of class struggle. Of course things are
changing all the time, but the basic logic of class struggle hasnt changed that much over time: the dynamics of exploitation and domination at issue today are all too familiar, and remain a major factor in most if not all contemporary political situations. Claire: Thats why the
model of political engagement needs to be re-thought, why in a Deleuzian register one always refers to a becoming-x. Because yes, there is a strategic need for molar or identifiable movements. But if they start to think OK this is our movement, this is what we are identified as, and this is the only way its going to work, then apart from the philosophical problems of identity that run there, such a movement is also going to destroy itself precisely by being identified and stable. The only way a transformatory political project is going to work is if it has a notion of redefinition that is inbuilt.
AT: D&G Bad/Crazy/Stupid

1. No link the person is not the argument we arent advocating Deleuze and Guattari make them prove a link to the Foucauldian-Deleuzoguattarian synthesis that our other authors uphold otherwise treat their argument to the same threshold as you would any other generic mudslinging argument 2. No link they assume ideas of abstract kritikal analysis that we provide, not schizoanalysis 3. They authors have failed to understand Deleuze - while their author may be correct in their criticism of specific lines, texts, or metaphors displayed in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, they ignore the revolutionary potential of our philosophical concepts as formed beyond the limitations of text
Lambert 2006 (Greg, "Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari?")
The above points of impasse are obvious to anyone who is familiar with the debates that have surrounded the early reception of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes. It will not come as any great surprise to learn that part of my answer to the question will be because these
works were misunderstood or so badly represented. Even though this sounds like the occasion for offering a fresh commentary as a corrective to
previous interpretations of these works, interpretations that were badly botched or misplaced in their major conclusions, in fact, I feel just the opposite: that most interpretations so far have been right on the money and their conclusions have been sound. Perhaps,
where they have led us astray and this is partly the responsibility of a certain marketing rationale that dominates academic publishing these days with a preference for commentaries on major figures and classroom textbooks is that they remain at the level of interpretation, if not explication de texte. They dont seem to take into their account that Deleuze and Guattari didnt write books together, but rather attempted to trace intensities in the process of becoming revolutionary. The former is a fairly static process, and already poses that the end of the process occurs when the object of interpretation is explained and fairly well understood; however, understanding has never been a goal of Deleuze and Guattaris writings, but rather something that they have called by different names, all of which amounts to an active process of becoming-x and is involved with the fundamental issue of desire. But what is desire? Here we begin the process of real learning that their writings aim to address. After all, Deleuze and Guattari say that a book isnt produced in order to be understood, but is rather a machine for producing desires. (I will argue that Jameson was alone in understanding this, even better than most Deleuzians, and, therefore, also knew what kind of threat this book might pose for his own programme of political interpretation.) We can find all kinds of desires expressed around and in response to their works revolutionary and reactionary alike but the real question doesnt concern the interpretation of these books but what kind of desires they are associated with and what they can be plugged into. As Deleuze himself once remarked concerning the status of Anti-Oedipus as a book: Its not as a book that it could respond to desire, but only in relation to what surrounds it. A book is not worth much on its own. Its always a question of flow: there are many people doing work in similar fields. I doubt they will buy the current type of discourse, at once epistemological, psychoanalytic, ideological, which is beginning to wear thin with everyone . . . In any case, a book responds to a desire only because there are many people fed up with the current type of discourse. So, its only because a book participates in a larger re-shuffling, a resonance between research and desire. A book can respond to desire only in a political way, outside the book. (Deleuze and Guattari [hereafter DG] 2004: 220)
4. And, even if they win the ad hom, just delete the undesirable part from your flow all we have to defend is the core of our advocacy, the details and specific parts are ever-shifting.
Massumi 83 (Brian, Professor of something at a place of respectable respectedness; A Thousand Plateaus, Introduction) "State philosophy" is another word for the representational thinking that has characterized Western metaphysics since Plato, but has suffered an at least momentary setback during the last quarter century at the hands of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and poststructuralist theory generally. As described by Deleuze,16 it reposes on a double identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy. The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity. Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains. The faculty of judgment is the policeman of analogy, assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that the proper correspondences obtain. In thought its end is truth, in action justice. The weapons it wields in their pursuit are limitative distribution (the determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in contradistinction to the others: logos, law) and hierarchical ranking (the measurement of the degree of perfection of a term's self-resemblance in relation to a supreme standard, man, god, or gold: value, morality). The modus operandi is negation: x = x = not y. Identity, resemblance, truth, justice, and negation. The rational foundation for order. The established order, of course: philosophers have traditionally been employees of the State. The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the
first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and in the United States. The
goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the "spiritual and moral training of the nation," to be achieved by "deriving everything from an original principle" (truth), by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (the State). The end product would be "a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society"17each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.18 More insidious than the well-known practical cooperation between university and government (the burgeoning military funding of research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that "properly spiritual absolute State" endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric.
Deconstruction-influenced feminists such as Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray have attacked it under the name "phallogocentrism" (what the most privileged model of rocklike identity is goes without saying). In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe it as the "arborescent model" of thought (the proudly erect tree under whose spreading boughs latter-day Platos conduct their class). "Nomad
thought" does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on
identity; it rides difference. It does not respect the artificial division between the three domains of representation, subject, concept, and being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a conductivity that knows no bounds. The
concepts it creates do not merely reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to the extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. They do not reflect upon the world but are immersed in a changing state of things. A concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window. What is the subject of the brick? The arm that throws it? The body connected to the arm? The brain encased in the body? The situation that brought brain and body to such a juncture? All and none of the above. What is its object? The window? The edifice? The laws the edifice shelters? The class and other power relations encrusted in the laws? All and none of the above. "What interests us are the circumstances."19 Because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a set of circumstances, at a volatile juncture. It is a vector: the point of application of a force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction. The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act. Nomad thought replaces the closed equation of representation, x = x = noty (I = I = not you) with an open equation:.. . + y + z + a + ...(...+ arm + brick + window + . . .). Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary). The modus operandi of nomad
thought is affirmation, even when its apparent object is negative. Force is not to be confused with power. Force arrives from outside to break
constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls. The space of nomad thought is qualitatively different from State space. Air against earth. State space is "striated," or gridded. Movement in it is confined as by gravity to a horizontal plane, and limited by the order of that plane to preset paths between fixed and identifiable points. Nomad
space is "smooth," or open-ended. One can rise up at any point and move to
any other. Its mode of distribution is the nomos: arraying oneself in an open space (hold the street), as opposed to the logos of entrenching oneself in a
closed space (hold the fort). A Thousand Plateaus is an effort to construct a smooth space of thought. It is not the first such attempt. Like State philosophy, nomad thought goes by many names. Spinoza called it "ethics." Nietzsche called it the "gay science." Artaud called it "crowned anarchy." To Maurice Blanchot, it is the "space of literature." To Foucault, "outside thought."20 In this book, Deleuze
and Guattari employ the terms "pragmatics" and "schizoanalysis," and in the introduction describe a rhizome network strangling the roots of the infamous tree. One of the points of the book is that nomad thought is not confined to philosophy. Or that the kind of philosophy it is comes in many forms. Filmmakers and painters are philosophical thinkers to the extent that they explore the potentials of their respective mediums and break away from the beaten paths.21 On a strictly formal level, it is mathematics and music that create the smoothest of the smooth spaces.22 In fact, Deleuze and Guattari would probably be more inclined to call philosophy music with content than music a rarefied form of philosophy. Which returns to our opening question. How should A Thousand Plateaus be played? When you buy a record there are always cuts that leave you cold. You skip them. You don't approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You find yourself humming them under your breath as you go about your daily business.
AT: You Use The State / Revert The War Machine

1. We recreate power relations the State controls power in the status quo, we break it down, we dont cede the political or become undermined by the state. The War Machine isnt rooted in fascist discourse; its only bad when it becomes appropriated by the state Extend the Deleuze and Guattari 80 card that says the war machine is not inherently negativeits a neutral force and created by the desires of individuals. Also extend our 1NC evidence on the politics of nomadism. Turn power relations can only be negative when the State maintains hegemonic control over identity our nomadic stance directly destroys this concept
Conley in 6 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95 -100)
Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in subjects
who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate from the dominant order that uses order-words to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a becoming-revolutionary of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of becoming-minoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails. A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, Afro-American, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in Rhizome that the connections they advocate are different from those of
computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475).Deleuze
and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities and of writing in a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless, they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given nation-state. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its order-words, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.

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